U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

45–112 CC WASHINGTON : 1998

S. HRG. 105–304

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

REVIEWING THE EFFECTS OF GREENHOUSE GASES ON GLOBAL

WEATHER CONDITIONS AND ASSESSING INTERNATIONAL POLICY

OPTIONS TO REDUCE THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

JULY 10 AND 17, 1997

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works

(

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington DC 20402
(II)

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island, Chairman

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia

ROBERT SMITH, New Hampshire

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Idaho

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri

TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama

MAX BAUCUS, Montana

DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

HARRY REID, Nevada

BOB GRAHAM, Florida

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

BARBARA BOXER, California

RON WYDEN, Oregon

JIMMIE POWELL, Staff Director

J. THOMAS SLITER, Minority Staff Director

(II)
(iii)

CONTENTS

Page

JULY 10, 1997

REVIEW OF THE SCIENCE

OPENING STATEMENTS

Allard, Hon. Wayne, U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado ............................ 9

Baucus, Hon. Max, U.S. Senator from the State of Montana .............................. 3

Bond, Hon. Christopher S., U.S. Senator from the State of Missouri ................. 5

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California ........................ 16

Chafee, Hon. John H., U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island ................. 1

Hutchinson, Hon. Tim, U.S. Senator from the State of Arkansas ....................... 6

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 9

Lautenberg, Hon. Frank R., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey ........... 13

Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of Connecticut ........... 14

Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada .................................. 11

Thomas, Hon. Craig, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming .......................... 4

Wyden, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator from the State of Oregon .................................. 8

WITNESSES

Barron, Eric, professor, Department of Geosciences, and director, Earth System Sciences Center, Pennsylvania State University ....................................... 17

Articles:

Consequences: Nature and Implications of Environmental Change ..... 69

Evaluating Policy Decisions Based on Climate Model Predictions ....... 81

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63

Responses to additional questions from:

Senator Baucus .......................................................................................... 90

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 93

Senator Reid .............................................................................................. 92

Christy, John R., associate professor, Department of Atmospheric Science,

University of Alabama at Huntsville .................................................................. 19

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 94

Responses to addition questions from:

Senator Baucus .......................................................................................... 104

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 108

Jorgenson, Dale, professor, Economics Department, Harvard University .......... 28

Article, Economic Effects of a Carbon Tax ..................................................... 172

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 158

Lindzen, Richard S., Alfred P. Sloane Professor of Meteorology, Massachusetts

Institute of Technology ........................................................................................ 22

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 110

Responses to additional questions from:

Senator Baucus .......................................................................................... 118

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 119

Schneider, Stephen H., professor, Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford

University ............................................................................................................. 25

Article, Achieving Carbon Dioxide Targets Cost-Effectively: What Needs

To Be Done Now? 141

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 120

Responses to additional questions from:

Senator Baucus .......................................................................................... 150
Page

iv

Schneider, Stephen H., professor, Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford

University—Continued

Responses to additional questions from—Continued

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 155

JULY 17, 1997

INTERNATIONAL POLICY REVIEW

OPENING STATEMENTS

Baucus, Hon. Max, U.S. Senator from the State of Montana .............................. 199

Chafee, Hon. John H., U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island ................. 197

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 199

Kempthorne, Hon. Dirk, U.S. Senator from the State of Idaho ........................... 201

Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada .................................. 205

WITNESSES

Fay, Kevin J., executive director, International Climate Change Partnership .. 227

Letters to:

President William Clinton ........................................................................ 249

Under Secretary of State Wirth ............................................................... 247

Membership list, International Climate Change Partnership ...................... 261

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 246

Proposal, Issues in the Climate Change Protocol Negotiations .................... 250

O’Keefe, William F., chairman, Global Climate Coalition .................................... 229

Letter, response to comments by Under Secretary of State Wirth .............. 265

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 255

Responses to additional questions from Senator Chafee ............................... 267

Wirth, Hon. Timothy E., Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Department of State ........................................................................................................ 206

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 243

Yellen, Janet, chair, Council of Economic Advisers, National Economic Council, Executive Office of the President .................................................................. 202

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 236

Responses to additional questions from:

Senator Chafee .......................................................................................... 239

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 241

Senator Lieberman .................................................................................... 242

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL

Article, Greenhouse Forecasting Still Cloudy, Science magazine ........................ 262

Letter, Association of American Railroad .............................................................. 273
(1)

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

THURSDAY, JULY 10, 1997

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, Washington, DC.

REVIEW OF THE SCIENCE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room 406,

Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. John H. Chafee (chairman of the

committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Chafee, Warner, Inhofe, Thomas, Bond, Hutchinson, Allard, Sessions, Baucus, Lautenberg, Reid, Graham, and

Wyden.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. CHAFEE,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

Senator CHAFEE. We want to welcome everyone this morning.

We’ve got quite a turnout here, so if there are any seats, please

take them. If people leave, please do so quietly and the others fill

into the seats quietly.

This morning, we will receive testimony on one of the most important and challenging environmental, economic and political matters of our time. That is global climate change. It is a serious issue

that requires immediate attention.

To help us better understand some of the fundamental scientific

and economic issues which underpin the current policy debate,

we’ve assembled some of the world’s leading experts. The full committee will conduct a follow-up hearing 1 week from today on July

17 to receive testimony from the Administration on the upcoming

international negotiations over amendments to the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The issue of global climate change is certainly politically contentious, both here and abroad. For years now, we’ve had one side

forecasting a scenario of rising seas, recurrent drought, and a blistering heat, all of which they say will result in a ravaged economy.

On the other side are those who claim that meaningful policies

to control emissions of greenhouse gases are premature, unwarranted and unfounded and would result in a ravaged economy.

What’s going on here? What are the scientists saying? Consider

this quotation. ‘‘Would it not be possible that the Earth’s temperature had decreased during periods of low carbon dioxide and increased when the protective carbon dioxide had been present to a

higher degree.’’
2

As our distinguished witnesses are aware, this hypothesis was

not culled from the text of some suspect environmental organization’s manifesto; it was delivered in an 1896 lecture, 101 years ago

before the Stockholm Physics Society by the Nobel Prize winning

Swedish chemist, Sevante Arenious.

Professor Arenious was the first to predict that large increases

in carbon dioxide from humans could result in warming of the

globe. What have the world’s scientists told us at different intervals

over the last 101 years since Professor Arenious first identified the

warming effects of carbon dioxide? Here is a sample.

In 1924, U.S. physicists speculated that industrial activity would

double atmospheric carbon dioxide within 500 years, roughly 2424.

Current projections are for a doubling sometime before 2050, 400

years earlier than predicted 70 years ago.

In 1957, scientists from Scripps reported for the first time that

much of the carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere is not absorbed by the oceans as some had argued, leaving significant

amounts in the atmosphere.

In 1967, the first reliable computer simulation calculated that

global average temperatures may increase by more than 4 degrees

Fahrenheit when atmospheric carbon dioxide levels are double that

of preindustrial times.

In 1985, a conference sponsored by the United Nations, the

WMO and the International Council of Scientific Unions forged a

consensus of the international community on the issue of climate

change.

In 1987, an ice core from the Antarctic analyzed by French and

Russian scientists revealed an extremely close correlation between

carbon dioxide and temperature going back more than 100,000

years.

In 1990, in an appeal signed by 49 Nobel Prize winners and 700

members of the National Academy of Sciences said, ‘‘There’s broad

agreement within the scientific community that amplification of the

Earth’s natural greenhouse effect by the buildup of various gases

introduced by human activity has the potential to produce dramatic

changes in the climate. Only by taking action now can we ensure

that future generations will not be put at risk.’’

In the same year, 747 participants from 116 countries took part

in the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva. They reported,

‘‘If the increase of greenhouse gas concentrations is not limited, the

predicted climate change would place stresses on natural and social

systems unprecedented in the past 10,000 years.’’

In 1992, we had the framework of 153 nations, including the

United States, sign the Framework Convention on Climate Change.

In that year, they committed the signatory governments to voluntary reduction of greenhouse gases.

The Senate consented to ratification of this landmark environmental treaty on October 7 with a two-thirds majority vote. That

was in 1992.

In 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, representing thousands of climate scientists, concluded ‘‘The balance of

evidence suggests there’s discernible human influence on global climate.’’
3

It must be stated that recent IPCC conclusion is based on numerous variables and we’re all eager to learn more about these variables and about the certainties from our witnesses. So today we

will hear about this evolution of scientific understanding.

I’m convinced the science in this matter has and will continue to

evolve. The question is, do we know enough to support legally binding reductions in greenhouse gas emissions as proposed by the

United States and numerous other countries? Are we prepared to

accept the risks associated with the decision to postpone further action to address potential climate change?

What is being called for? What might be the impacts to our economy? Some say we must stabilize carbon dioxide emissions at 1990

levels by the year 2010. At least one economic model forecast this

sort of action would result in economic losses of about 2.4 percent

of the GDP. This, of course, is significant.

Others, using more optimistic models, believe that the U.S. economy could withstand significant emissions reductions while prospering as never before. Some 2,500 economists declared in February of this year that cost-effective means are available for the

United States to address the threat of climate change.

Let me conclude by identifying what I see as the fundamental

questions before us today. First, how much warming might occur

as a result of human actions and how soon might such warming

occur? What is the range of impacts and when might they be conclusively identified? What do economic modeling and empirical data

tell us about the various policy responses?

We look forward with great interest to the witnesses.

Senator Baucus, do you have a statement?

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAX BAUCUS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MONTANA

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am looking forward to the hearing. We have today scientists and economists who

are very imminent in their field.

I was at Rio de Janeiro, as you were, Mr. Chairman, in 1992 and

was filled with the expectation and the promise that we’re going to

finally do something about world environmental problems, including climate change.

Since then, I think the results have been poor, that is actions

taken by countries and probably for some good reason. That is, this

is not an exact science. That is, we’re making lots of guesses here,

there’s lots of modeling and it’s very difficult to know exactly

what’s happening.

Nevertheless, since 1992, we have a lot more data, we have a lot

more studies and we’re now in a better position than we were then

to know what we should or should not do.

I’m also very pleased that today’s hearing is somewhat focused

on the science of climate change and also a bit on what some of

the actions could be to take to the degree that global climate

change is causing quite significant adverse conditions on this planet. That is, we’re not yet getting to the policy discussions until next

week, but rather, focusing much more on the science today.
4

I think that’s very good and I hope all of us and the panel today

do focus on the science because it’s important to get the facts before

we then proceed to making policy determinations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Thomas.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CRAIG THOMAS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING

Senator THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a statement I wish to put in the record if I may and just

let me say that I think it’s very important that we do talk about

this as we prepare for the negotiations that will take place both in

the next month and then in December.

I happen to be a member of the Energy Committee as well as

Foreign Relations, as well as this committee, and we’ve had hearings of this nature in all three committees. So far, we’ve focused

on the science, we’ve focused on the policy, but I guess it’s important to continue to do that again.

What are the issues? Of course, what should be done; what’s the

United States’ role vis-a ́-vis other countries; do we put controls on

our country and not on others; and what impact does that have?

I think those are very important issues.

I am an original cosponsor of Senate Resolution 98 with Senator

Byrd calling basically that if we have these binding commitments

that they also apply to others. I also hope that those testifying

today might give some thought and some consideration to what the

EPA regulations that have recently been announced might, in combination, mean as we move on to this.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll submit my statement.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thomas follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CRAIG THOMAS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF WYOMING

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for taking the time to schedule this hearing to discuss

the Clinton Administration’s policy on global climate change. As world negotiators

prepare for meetings in Bonn later this month, with an eye toward Kyoto, Japan,

in December, it is critical that we do all we can to make sure the scientific facts

are available and credible. Using good science, rather than emotional rhetoric, ensures we will be spending our limited resources on actual problems.

As some of my colleagues may know, both the Energy and Natural Resources and

the Foreign Relations Committees have had hearings on this topic. I am a member

of both and, if there is one thing I can report, it’s that the science at this point is

not ‘‘clear and compelling.’’ Furthermore, there is currently no consensus that would

compel us to rush into an agreement that will hurt America’s economic competitiveness for questionable benefits. Nevertheless, the Administration already seems to

have its mind made up by stating that ‘‘the science is over.’’

Before the United States enters into any formal binding agreement, we must first

be sure that the effects of global warming are real and the economic consequences

are better understood. Unfortunately, the Administration is withholding the fine

print details of its proposal from the American people. To the extent that there is

a global warming problem, all countries must participate and play by the same

rules. If this does not happen, the result is a diminished American economy and a

worse worldwide environment. Everyone ought to contribute to the cause. Asking all

nations to contribute will help the environment, help U.S. industries stay competitive, and help build new exports as we send our environmental technology and expertise around the globe.

I have repeatedly stated my opposition to legally binding targets and timetables

on the U.S. and other developed countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while
5

at the same time exempting heavy polluters like China, India, Mexico, South Korea

and Brazil from those identical requirements. It doesn’t take a genius to figure out

that they will not have to meet the uncompromising restrictions that will be placed

on our industries. Mr. Chairman, by the product of government regulation, we could

potentially drive the relatively cleaner U.S. industries out of business, thus increasing emissions of dirtier plants in undeveloped nations. That just doesn’t make sense.

I am an original cosponsor of Senate Resolution 98, introduced by Senators Byrd

and Hagel, calling on the Clinton Administration not to agree to any measure which

would commit the U.S. to a binding international treaty for developed countries, but

exclude those standards on China, India, Mexico and others. Although we should

constantly work to reduce air pollution around the world, this must be done in a

manner that does not threaten jobs or our international competitiveness. I am

pleased to report that 62 of my Senate colleagues share this same view and have

cosponsored this important initiative.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, we have some expert witnesses and I look forward to

their testimony. I would hope that they expand their comments and touch on the

Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) particulate matter and ozone rule which

President Clinton recently endorsed. Although 250 Members of Congress, 27 Governors, the U.S. Conference of Mayors and many State and local officials and business leaders alike have expressed disapproval and opposition to the new standards,

the president turned a deaf ear. I, for one, believe the impacts of a binding global

climate treaty, coupled with the EPA’s new air regulations could prove devastating

to America’s energy-intensive businesses, our Gross Domestic Product (GDP), American jobs and our global environment. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHAFEE. Fine.

Senator Bond.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I really appreciate your scheduling this hearing today on the

science and economics surrounding global climate change. Unfortunately, I have to be on the floor to participate in a debate on a very

important amendment that is up, so I’m going to have to read the

testimony of these witnesses, but I am very much interested in

knowing what it is we know on global climate change. It is my assumption that after this hearing, we may have more questions

than answers.

The chairman read some statements from a century ago, and 5

years ago, we saw headlines ‘‘As Earth summit nears, consensus

still lacking on global warming cause.’’ Six years ago, the Washington Post had articles that we’re still trying to find answers.

Yesterday, I read a very interesting piece by Mr. Samuelson in

the Washington Post ‘‘Dancing Around the Dilemma.’’ He made

some interesting points. He said, ‘‘The problem with global warming is that we don’t yet know whether it represents a genuine national threat, and if so, how large.’’

‘‘Economic growth requires more energy and fossil fuels provide

85 percent of all energy. Without a breakthrough in alternative energy—nuclear, solar, something—no one knows how to lower emissions adequately without ultimately crushing the world economy.’’

He ended, ‘‘Hardly anyone wants to admit candidly the uncertainties of global warming. It’s politically incorrect to question

whether this is a serious problem that serious people ought to take

seriously.’’ I’m glad we are taking it seriously.

Mr. Chairman, in my position as chairman of the Small Business

Committee, I’ve been hearing for months from small businesses

who already have a tough time and have to weave through a mo-
6

rass of regulations that they are concerned they will face

unsustainable costs.

An opinion piece by Karen Kerrigan, President of the Small Business Survival Foundation, addressing the proposed global warming

treaty stated, ‘‘For America’s small businesses, the treaty could be

especially harsh. Energy intensive operations, such as bakeries,

drycleaners, auto repair shops, small manufacturers and ironically,

recycling businesses, would be immediately hit.’’

Finally, I picked up a book that I have found to be very informative, a book called ‘‘Facts, Not Fear, A Parents Guide to Teaching

Children about the Environment,’’ which contains information on

subjects from endangered species to global warming.

The book points out that back in 1989, ‘‘Some scientists were predicting an increase in global temperatures between 3.5—5 degrees

Celsius perhaps as early as the middle of the 21st Century.

‘‘In 1990, an intergovernmental panel of scientists projected an

increase of 3 degrees Celsius by the year 2100, but the latest estimate is that temperatures may increase by between 1 and 3 degrees Celsius by the year 2100.’’

Mr. Chairman, some consensus has been reached in the scientific

community on some very basic points. First, we do burn large

quantities of fossil fuels that add carbon dioxide to the atmosphere

which may affect greenhouse gases. Two, the Earth’s temperature

has increased slightly over the last 100 years.

In my opinion, that’s about all the consensus we have. I will be

very interested in hearing the chairman’s opinion and nobody

asked for my opinion, but I’m going to give it to you anyhow. If and

when we can develop consensus that global warming really is a

problem, then we’re going to have to make some tough choices.

Mr. Samuelson said one of the alternatives is to go to something

or nuclear power. In this country, we’ve had hysteria about nuclear

power that shut down our nuclear power generating industry. Nuclear fission is something that has engendered a great deal of hostility and fear, but it is not a generator of carbon dioxide, it is not

burning fossil fuel and if we want to get serious about global warming, then we have to deal with the realities of nuclear power, nuclear fission in the next 10, 20, or 30 years until we develop the

capability of using nuclear fusion energy and that’s going to have

to be our challenge.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can develop a sound scientific

basis for determining whether we are going to get serious about

global warming, whether it is a serious trend, and I look forward

to reading, though I will not be here to participate in questioning

and hearing firsthand the testimony of these distinguished witnesses.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Hutchinson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM HUTCHINSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ARKANSAS

Senator HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would ask that my full statement be entered into the record.

It’s interesting when I first came to the Senate, the first hearing

that I participated in, the first hearing of this committee was a
7

hearing on the science dealing with the proposed clean air standards. It’s like de ́ja ́ vu and I really applaud the chairman for looking

at the science.

If there’s one thing I learned from the clean air hearings, it is

that oftentimes scientists are not in agreement as to what the status of true science is regarding any particular subject and I suspect

that’s what we will be hearing today as well.

I, like Senator Bond, am a cosponsor with over 60 other Senators, of the Byrd Resolution opposing the United States agreeing

to any terms in Japan in December that unfairly harms the United

States.

If the developed countries alone are responsible for reducing the

world’s emissions, these nations could face serious economic disadvantages. In Arkansas, where agriculture is the leading industry

and is so very important to the economic status of our State and

to the livelihood of tens of thousands of Arkansans, we cannot afford to give such a competitive advantage to these developing countries such as China.

We, in Arkansas, are the leading producer of rice—40 percent of

the State’s rice is exported out of the country. The State’s economy

relies heavily on rice productions and yet, China produces 24 times

the rice of the United States. So if we limit rice production or

hinder it in any way, it will not deal effectively with global warming but will put States like Arkansas, and particularly the Mississippi Delta area, which is already an impoverished area, at a

tremendous disadvantage and would truly be devastating.

I want to thank the chairman for calling this hearing and for the

witnesses who will testify today. I look forward to hearing that testimony and hopefully establishing some factual basis for the decisions that will be made.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchinson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TIM HUTCHINSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF ARKANSAS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to hear testimony regarding the scientific basis behind the Global Climate. This is kind of a de ́ja ́ vu experience, because

one of my first hearings in the Senate and the first hearing in this committee was

a science hearing on the EPA’s clean air proposal.

Today we have a similar hearing, this time focusing on the science of the greenhouse effect on the United States. If there is anything I have learned from the Clean

Air hearings is that many times scientists do not agree on the science. Despite the

fact that it seems to be the common assertion that humans are causing the greenhouse effect, in reality there is some disagreement regarding our actual effect.

There is agreement that humans are adding some greenhouse gases, the disagreement, however is whether these additions are causing significant changes in the

Earth’s temperature. I have an Associated Press article, that if we have time I

might ask the panel to comment on, which states that it is possible that North

America’s ecological systems have always been in flux.

According to the article, not long ago ice sheets two miles thick covered the entire

northern half of the continent. The article goes on to say that as recently as 1850,

temperatures were few degrees cooler than they are today and that any warming

we may be experiencing now this is merely the continuation of a natural warming

trend that began 150 years ago.

These scientific uncertainties are disturbing, especially when considering we are

faced with the administration’s support for legally binding reductions of greenhouse

emissions. Even more frightening, perhaps, than the U.S. being legally bound to re-
8

ducing emissions, is the prospect that ‘‘developing’’ nations, such as China and Mexico will not be required to implement similar reductions.

I question whether this will do any good at all for the reduction of greenhouse

emissions. If humans are causing a great warming of the earth, then all humans

must be concerned with this trend, not just the countries that are developed.

This December in Kyoto, Japan, the world will decide what needs to be done to

reduce the threat of global warming. I, along with 58 other Senators, cosponsored

the Byrd resolution opposing the United State’s agreeing to any terms in Kyoto that

unfairly harms the United States.

If the developed countries alone are responsible for reducing the world’s emissions, these nations could face serious economic disadvantages. In Arkansas, where

agriculture is the leading industry, we cannot afford to give such a competitive advantage to these developing countries, such as China.

Arkansas is the leading producer of rice in the United States. Forty percent of

the State’s rice is exported out of the country. The State’s economy relies heavily

on rice productions, yet China produces 24 times the rice of the U.S. If we limit rice

production, or hinder it in any way, the Mississippi Delta, an already impoverished

area would be devastated.

Again, I want to thank the chairman for calling this hearing and for the witnesses

who will testify today. I hope we can establish some facts today.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

Senator Wyden.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, have a number of meetings this morning but I wanted to

come especially today because my State is the first State in the

country to legislate mandatory standards for controlling carbon dioxide emissions.

I think the challenge for this committee as we get into this issue

is to show that it is possible to lead in this effort to control greenhouse gas emissions without producing an economic meltdown. For

real concrete evidence of that, you can just come to our State because what we have shown is that we can make this work, both

for the economy and for the environment.

Mr. Chairman, just very briefly, there were really three things

that we sought to do in terms of trying to make this system work.

The first is we phased in CO2 emission standards as part of the

siting process for new power plants. What happened then was the

standards became part of the design criteria for new plants so the

developers were actually encouraged to design plants that are more

efficient and we reduced the plants’ operating costs.

The second thing we focused on was a market-based approach to

achieve these standards. We created a bidding process where new

energy plant developers compete for plant permits with CO2 emissions as one of the criteria for awarding the permit.

Finally, we gave credit to developers for creative approaches

when they were in a position to mitigate environmental impacts.

For example, developers got credits for tree plantings and offset for

CO2 emissions because trees absorb CO2 from the air, retain the

carbon and release oxygen.

Mr. Chairman, I think we all know this is an extraordinarily difficult issue. I’ve heard several of my colleagues—Senator Hutchinson—make points that I consider extremely important. Certainly

we’re concerned about the question of what happens when the

United States takes a leadership role on these issues.
9

I would hope that as we tackle this issue in the days ahead, we

could look to my home State because I think we have shown a concrete case of how it is possible to control greenhouse gas emissions

in a fashion that makes sense for long-term economic growth that

our citizens want.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for your leadership.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Allard.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WAYNE ALLARD,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO

Senator ALLARD. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I’d like to thank you

for holding this important hearing and I hope that we can continue

to hold these on an annual basis to continue to review the scientific

data because I think in order for us to make good policy decisions,

it has to be based on good science.

I’m absolutely delighted with the panel that you’ve brought forward which is going to do the best they know how to present their

scientific view of what is happening as far as global warming is

concerned. I’m very much interested in hearing what they have to

say.

I don’t think enough has been said about the buffer system within the whole context of ecosystems in the whole world. I happen to

feel that we do have a total buffer system that is very effective.

For example, people talk about the problem of too much CO2 in

the air, but they don’t recognize as alluded to by my colleague that

trees use CO2 to kick out oxygen and there is a balance between

animal life and plant life. Obviously because of that, there is a

large buffer system. Maybe that buffer system is greater in Oregon

than it is in Colorado where we don’t have so many trees.

I think these are things that have to be thought through. I’ve

been searching the scientific literature for good, solid facts. I’m

aware that we are having some information coming down from our

satellite systems that indicate there really isn’t any real change as

far as temperature. In fact, I’ve seen one report where maybe it’s

cooled a little bit.

I also realize that there is some modeling out there, and I think

we have to be careful with our modeling, about what we put into

those models, what we hold as stable fact and what we hold as

variable fact.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I’m looking forward to this panel’s discussion and the committee’s discussion.

Thank you very much.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Inhofe.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Like the rest, I have a statement to be entered into the record.

I’ll spare you that.

As those who are testifying this morning, I recall that many

years ago—in fact, 48 years ago, I was in junior high school and

I remember a professor who was absolutely convinced that because
10

of the global changes that the southwestern two tiers of States in

the United States would slide into the ocean and he gave a very

persuasive case. By Senator Reid’s presence here, we can see that

hasn’t happened 48 years later.

I’m disappointed in the lack of cooperation that we’ve had from

the Administration. The Administration has not given us information we’ve requested.

I was with Congressman Tom Bliley from Virginia yesterday and

he tells me it’s been months now that he’s requested information

that he has not been able to get.

I’ve seen some analogous things with what we’re going through

as has been mentioned by some of my colleagues over here with the

ambient air quality standard changes that were proposed by the

Administration.

I, as chairman of the committee, had the scientific hearing first

and I applaud you for doing the same thing, Mr. Chairman, because I think when we listen to the hysterical things out there such

as we went through on ambient air, they first said it was going to

result in some 60,000 premature deaths a year, then that was

dropped down to 40,000 and after about six hearings, it’s down to

below 1,000 now.

The Administrator had said initially it was going to cost $6 billion and now, according to the Reason Foundation in California, it’s

up to somewhere between $90 and $150 billion. So we need to get

beyond the hysteria and start looking at the facts.

I, too, am a cosponsor of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. I feel if

we’re going to enjoy this, we want everyone else to get in there

with us.

I’ll be looking forward to this hearing probably more than any

others we’re having because the science is unclear to me and

maybe it will be clearer after this hearing.

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing today. The debate on global climate change is an important one that deserves considerable attention.

As a cosponsor of the Byrd/Hagel Sense of the Senate Resolution, my position has

been clear. I do not support a binding committee for emissions reductions that does

not also bind developing nations. In addition, I have serious concerns and questions

regarding the underlying science and the economic considerations.

I appreciate Senator Chafee bringing in this panel of experts today to help educate the committee. I am concerned that the Administration has been unwilling and

uncooperative in providing the necessary data to Congress regarding the underlying

models they are using in their international negotiations. I know Congressman Bliley has been requesting this information for months and his requests have gone unanswered. Therefore we will have to rely upon ourselves to obtain the necessary information.

I know the President has announced that he will convene a White House Conference on Climate Change later this year, but because of the Administration’s past

record of withholding information and silencing critics, I will be looking at the composition of this panel carefully. I hope the President will ensure that all sides of

the debate are treated equally, if the purpose of the panel is to truly uncover the

facts.

As the President also pointed out in his remarks, this debate is very similar to

the debate on the proposed new standards for ozone and particulate matter. He believes that the new standards are the first step toward addressing the climate

change issue. I am concerned that some in the Administration and the EPA are

using the ends to justify the means for both climate change and the NAAQS debate.
11

If the climate change science is as incomplete and uncertain as the particulate matter science, then the Administration is in trouble on this issue.

Because of this, it is my intention to hold Oversight hearings in my Clean Air

Subcommittee on the use of the Clean Air Act under this Treaty prior to any Senate

vote on Treaty ratification. Again I would like to thank Senator Chafee for calling

this hearing today, and I look forward to working with him on this issue in the

months to come.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Reid.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY REID,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, I say to my friend, Senator Inhofe,

we, in Nevada, have always been envious of States that have

beachfront property.

[Laughter.]

Senator REID. I would also say that I’m sorry that Senator Bond

is gone, my friend from the State of Missouri, but I will say to

him, and I’m sure the message will be carried by others, that

maybe some of those old lead mines in Missouri could be used for

nuclear waste disposal if he thinks it’s such a good idea.

[Laughter.]

Senator REID. I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that my full statement be made a part of the record.

I’d also say that I’m one of those that appears today to be in a

minority on this committee that think we do have problems with

global warming. I think it is a problem, I think that the scientific

evidence is clear that there are changes in weather patterns that

are significant in nature, not the least of which is on our own continent where we’ve had these storms, these floods that are happening in recent years which just aren’t by happenstance. It appears

that the same amount of water is coming from the sky; it’s just

coming in a much shorter period of time.

I think the hurricanes we’ve had off the coast of Florida are also

not just by chance. I think the fact is we know the surface temperature of the ocean only has to raise a very small amount, less

than a degree, to cause problems.

I think it’s very important, Mr. Chairman, that these hearings

take place. I commend and applaud you for approaching this. The

hearings are balanced. You have people who have different points

of view and our job is to weigh the evidence.

I would say to those who say that the things we do legislatively

may not be of significance, we look back 25 years ago when the

Clean Water Act was passed and we did that because the Cuyahoga River kept catching fire and the third time, it was decided

that we should do something about it.

As a result of that legislation, we’ve done a remarkable job of

making our rivers and streams much better than they used to be.

In fact, about 80 percent of the rivers and streams were polluted

at the time this Act passed and now, only 20 to 30 percent of them

are polluted. So the things we do here have a long-range impact.

I’m confident that this fact-gathering that we’re going to be doing

here in this committee on global climate change will be significant.

I’m only going to be able to stay through the rest of these brilliant opening statements and miss the meat of the hearing because
12

we have overlapping jurisdiction hearings that are taking place,

but I’m very interested in what is taking place here and I’m going

to give it as much attention as I can.

[The prepared statement of Senator Reid follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY REID, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF NEVADA

Good Morning. I want to share a few thoughts on the science and economics of

the global climate change debate. Although the committee has wisely chosen to hold

one hearing on science and economics, and another on the on-going international

treaty negotiations, my comments cannot be so easily separated.

There is a discernible human influence on global climate. Since the dawn of the

industrial age, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen by

30 percent. Most experts now agree that the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere due to the combustion of fossil fuels and other human activities is happening. To many this is a troubling phenomenon. Although we are not sure what

the exact adverse consequences of this buildup will be, mere common sense dictates

that we, at a minimum, begin preparing to deal with it.

The Senate approved the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change in 1993, which called for all signatory nations to adopt policies and programs to limit their greenhouse gas emissions on a voluntary basis. The United

States had hoped to stabilize emissions in the year 2000 at 1990 levels. Unfortunately, we have fallen well short of that mark.

The United States is, at the moment, the world’s biggest consumer of fossil fuels

and producer of greenhouse gas emissions. As such, it is important that we must

show international leadership in terms of analysis, research, and, if necessary, in

reducing these emissions.

As part of the on-going international treaty negotiations, the Administration has

moved toward supporting mandatory, legally binding limitations on greenhouse

gases for the nations of the World. Within limits, I am supportive of these efforts.

Unfortunately, I share the concern of many of my colleagues that the current negotiations do not seem to require a firm time table for reductions from the nations

of the developing world.

The U.S. currently emits more greenhouse gases than developing nations, such as

China and India. However, this will not be the case for much longer, especially if

the U.S. begins to curb our emissions. While I am not eager to perpetuate the poverty in these nations by mandating that they participate equally and immediately

in making reductions, I have economic and competitive concerns about requiring

nothing from them.

I cannot, in good faith, ask the citizens of Nevada, who have worked very hard

to develop and accommodate environmentally friendly transportation policies and

clean industries, to now make more sacrifices without some guarantee that the developing nations will not make similar efforts soon.

In a global economy, we are often forced to compete with other nations that have

different labor laws and practices than our own, different rules of resource protection, and yes, often weaker environmental laws. Unfortunately, cheap labor, wasteful resource use, and weak environmental laws often add up to a mighty competitive

retail price.

On an issue of such wide-ranging economic impact and consequence, it is unfair

to our citizens to let other nations do nothing while we make the necessary sacrifices.

Again, I absolutely acknowledge that the United States must do its part to try

to avert any adverse climate change. We are a part of the problem and we will be

an important part of the solution.

I would prefer that Senator Byrd’s resolution recognize that the nations of the developing world will need some extra time, perhaps as much as 10 years, to put their

binding reductions in place.

However, given a choice between sending U.S. negotiators to Kyoto offering unilateral economic disarmament on this subject, and sending them into final negotiations with a stance that demands worldwide equality of treatment now, I must

choose to protect the best interests of the United States.

Thank you.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Lautenberg.
13

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Senator LAUTENBERG. I’ll be brief, Mr. Chairman.

I want to commend you for holding this hearing because with all

of the doubt and with all of the debate, I think that we kind of

miss the point. I sense that, as my colleague, Harry Reid said, and

nobody caught your joke about the brilliant opening statements

and I don’t think mine is going to change your mind, but the fact

of the matter is we see changes around us that we don’t understand. We see changes that are making a huge difference. I’ve

heard reports of rain at the poles. These things aren’t just the coincidence of the moment.

We talk about peer reviews and everybody enjoys kicking EPA

and some of the agencies around because we disagree with them,

but given a task and saying, look, we want peer-reviewed material,

and there was a concern that EPA was using less than adequate

backup before acting.

However, the critics who demanded peer-reviewed research before we take action seem to have no trouble discounting peer-review research when it suits their purpose.

The tobacco industry comes to mind when we saw evidence,

400,000 people dying each and every year and all kinds of respiratory diseases, suddenly learning that 50,000 fatal heart attacks

take place as a result each year of secondary smoke, we had hundreds of thousands of pages of reports galore, the best medical research in the world couldn’t convince the industry that cigarettes

cause cancer or are addictive.

The plea was, listen, we don’t want to put these people out of

jobs. No, I don’t want to put them out of jobs either, I don’t want

to prevent the farmers from making a living, but frankly, I must

tell you I hear some of the same things being discussed here today.

We really don’t know—well, thank goodness, we’re going to have

a hearing, we’re going to have a chance to find out.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my full statement

be inserted in the record and I would like to make one observation

because I listened to the Senator from Missouri’s references to the

Samuelson article.

Through it, he does say that some of this is a gushing source of

national hypocrisy at the top. That doesn’t mean that he’s right

and everybody else is wrong. Throughout the article he describes

what has to be done politically to make things right even though

he doesn’t buy into the fact that this thing is really the kind of

threat that many of us feel it is.

In his last sentence, he says, ‘‘But it would be political suicide

to do anything serious about it, so shrewd politicians are learning

to dance around the dilemma.’’

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LAUTENBERG, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

The EPA, along with other health, environment and safety agencies are under

congressional pressure to use good science: peer reviewed research before taking actions to protect the Nation’s workers and children. The concern is that EPA was

using less-than-adequate backup before acting. However, the critics who demand
14

peered research before we take action to protect the environment, seem to have no

trouble discounting peer reviewed research when it suits their purpose. The tobacco

industry comes to mind. Hundreds of thousands of pages of the best medical research in the world can’t convince the industry that cigarettes cause cancer or are

addictive. At today’s hearing, we are talking about global warming. An unprecedented number of scientists around the world, thousands of peer reviewed research

and projects all point to the fact that global warming is happening—it is a threat

to our environment and we have a moral imperative to act.

A few fringe scientists, generally paid for by industrial polluters, disagree. Essentially, their work is not peer reviewed. However, they are heard because millions

of dollars are spent to give these scientists a megaphone that drowns out the undisputed consensus of an overwhelming number of the world’s scientists. The threat

of humankind changing the climate is real. In New Jersey, we are concerned that

global warming will lead to rise in sea level that will devastate our coastal beach

resources. As all Americans, we are watchful of extreme weather events and wary

of changes in precipitation patterns that could led to floods, droughts and inadequate water for crops.

I look forward to these hearings on what many believe is the most critical environmental issue facing our globe.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.

I want to remind all the Senators that a week from today,

namely July 17, we will have an additional hearing and there, the

Administration will be present, so I hope everybody will be present

for that hearing likewise.

I want to explain to the panel that you may see some of these

Senators come and go. As has been mentioned earlier, we have a

series of conflicts today with the Thompson hearings and the conference with the House on the tax bill and so forth and the defense

bill on the floor.

There are statements from Senators Lieberman and Boxer that

I’d like to have put in the record.

[The prepared statements of Senators Lieberman and Boxer follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding these hearings on climate change. I regret

that I will be unable to stay for the testimony and questions because this is a very

important issue.

Climate change is one of the most serious global issues we face today and in the

future. After spending more than 3 years analyzing hundreds of peer-reviewed scientific studies, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change—a group of 2,500

expert scientists representing more than 50 countries—concluded that as a result

of human emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly by combustion of fossil fuels,

‘‘there is a discernible human influence on the global climate.’’ The IPCC included

a diversity of members from individual disciplines who, based on sheer odds alone,

are likely to hold widely ranging views within the scientific community. I’ve been

told that getting scientists to agree to anything is as challenging as herding cats.

So the fact that consensus has been reached within the IPCC on an emerging scientific issue of such complexity and variety is remarkable, and makes its conclusions very impressive.

The IPCC has tied the increase of atmospheric greenhouse gases to long-term

changes in prevailing patterns of temperature and precipitation. Without action to

reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, we are likely to see temperature changes in

the next 100 years many times those experienced in the last several centuries. The

IPCC predicts the number of extreme weather events—floods, heat waves, and

droughts—will increase. We know our weather already is becoming increasingly peculiar. In the last few years the frequency and magnitude of floods have been altered dramatically in many regions of the US, along with heat waves, record heat

days, severe rains, and dry spells. IPCC experts also predict sea level will rise substantially. The number of citizens in the U.S. living in coastal areas at risk of serious ocean flooding likely will double due to sea level rise. The amount of urbanized
15

land likely to be vulnerable to extreme weather events is large, raising economic

issues of disaster relief, damage repairs, and relocation in many regions.

Changes in climate have major implications for human health, water resources,

food supplies, infectious diseases, forests, fisheries, wildlife populations, urban infrastructure, and flood plain and coastal developments in the United States. Although

uncertainties remain about where, when, and how much climate might change as

a result of human activities, the changes—when they happen—may have severe impacts on many sectors of the U.S. economy and on the environment. These are serious risks that we must start considering.

The fundamental question as we consider a climate agreement is whether the

U.S. can develop policies that will achieve significant reductions in greenhouse gas

emissions without harming the economy. The news here is promising and suggests

that we can afford to meet realistic emissions reductions. First, the National Academy of Sciences concluded in 1991 that ‘‘the efficiency of practically every end use

of energy can be improved relatively inexpensively . . . and that the United States

could reduce or offset its greenhouse gas emissions by between 10 and 40 percent

of 1990 levels at low cost or at some net savings.’’ More recently, over 2,500 American economists, including eight Nobel laureates, stated that there are many potential policy options to reduce greenhouse gas emissions for which the total benefits

outweigh the total costs. These policies would slow climate change without harming

American living standards, and may in fact improve U.S. productivity in the longer

run.

We won’t find a silver bullet to solve the problem. Luckily, climate change lends

itself to flexible solutions. Because it’s all one atmosphere, it doesn’t matter where

or how the reductions are made. It only matters that fewer greenhouse gases are

emitted. The 2,500 economists found that the most efficient approach to slowing climate change is through market-based policies such as an international emissions

trading agreement. We know from our experience with programs like the acid rain

title of the Clean Air Act that emissions trading is very cost-effective because it provides businesses with the maximum flexibility to make choices about how to achieve

the necessary reductions.

Given the potential impacts of climate change, it is not surprising that nations

of the world agreed to find more effective ways to understand and deal with the

problem. If we don’t agree to long-term greenhouse gas limits soon, and instead wait

to see how our climate changes, it may be too late. Greenhouse gases remain in the

atmosphere for decades to centuries, and there is a long lag time between when

gases are emitted and when the climate consequences of those emissions appear. So

we need to begin reductions soon to have any long-term effect. And, a new generation of energy-efficient technologies requires a long lead time for development and

implementation. This won’t happen without clear signals to the market.

Recent discussions in the Senate regarding the international agreement have emphasized the role of the developing countries. I concur that this is an important

issue, and developing countries ought to make commitments consistent with their

historic responsibility for the problem, as well as their current capabilities.

At the same time, I am concerned that elevating one issue to a level of importance

that will overshadow other key matters may harm the United States’ efforts to ensure that the climate agreement is realistic and achievable. For example, the need

for flexibility in implementing a treaty is critical. Some countries, such as members

of the European Union, would prefer highly prescriptive policies and measures to

meet reduction targets. The United States’ negotiating team has made flexibility an

absolute prerequisite for any agreement, and I want to commend them for this approach. I believe that to be acceptable, our businesses must have the most flexibility

possible to find the least-cost ways to reduce emissions. This means the agreement

must contain provisions that are so important to our business community: emissions

trading, joint implementation between nations, and appropriate credits for those

companies that have already made certain emissions reductions.

As we grapple with the human judgments and values that inevitably will determine how we handle climate change, we must base our actions on the facts—the

scientific evidence of climate change, the physical effects that are likely to result

from it, and the costs of our ‘‘insurance policy’’ to prevent these changes. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and the members of the committee as we

face these challenges.
16

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman, today will be the first of two hearings dealing with global climate

change, a topic of critical importance to the citizens of our country, and indeed critical importance to all living things on our planet. Global climate change does not recognize State or national boundaries. We are ALL affected by global climate change.

Scientists tell us that human activities since the Industrial Revolution have contributed billions of tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. These activities include the burning of fossil fuels to power our automobiles and industries, as well

as certain industrial activities and deforestation. As a result of these emissions, the

heat-trapping capability of the Earth’s atmosphere has increased significantly, and

a majority of scientists agree that there are clear signs of global warming.

The potential changes we will hear about today are alarming. I am very concerned

about the potential effects of global climate change because the economy and quality

of life of Californians is so closely linked to climate.

EFFECTS ON AGRICULTURE

California is the No. 1 agricultural State in the Union, contributing more than

$22 billion per year to our nation’s economy while employing more than 1.4 million

people. Farmers in my State are concerned that global climate changes will cause

highly unpredictable weather and changes in water availability resulting in reduced

crop yields.

EFFECTS ON WATER SUPPLIES

Californians depend upon reliable sources of water for their livelihood and quality

of life. Warmer temperatures due to increased greenhouse gases could cause more

precipitation to fall in the form of rain instead of snow. A reduced snowpack, especially in the Sierra Nevada, could lead to a change in the timing of runoff and potentially greater flooding during the winter and dryer conditions in the summer.

EFFECTS ON HEALTH

Warmer temperatures will likely lead to increased incidents of heat-related mortality and illness, and will have its most disastrous effect on infants and the elderly.

Air quality improvements we have realized over the years in California could be severely affected.

Other ramifications include adverse impacts upon forestry, tourism, animal and

plant diversity, and ocean shorelines. These impacts are of equal concern for other

States.

Finding a solution to this truly global problem will not be easy, nor will it occur

overnight. But we must start.

The United States can have a significant impact on reversing global warming.

First, we must listen to the scientific community. The vast majority of scientists

agree that global climate change is a reality, and that it is attributable to emissions

of greenhouse gases associated with human activities.

Second, we must move swiftly to stabilize and if possible reduce greenhouse gas

emissions. The United States has only 4 percent of the world’s population, yet we

produce more than 20 percent of the greenhouse gases. Measures we take within

our country will have dramatic effects on reducing the amount of greenhouse gases

worldwide. For example, if we were to raise Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards from 27.5 miles per gallon to 45 miles per gallon we would reduce carbon dioxide emissions by almost 560 million tons per year. Other measures we can take

could have similar effects.

Finally, we must develop policies and technologies that will help us meet our

global responsibilities and protect our living standards.

I am convinced that there is widespread agreement within the scientific community that global climate change is a reality and a major cause of that change is the

emission of greenhouse gases. We need to bring this portion of the debate to a close

and for the sake of future generations, focus on solutions. We owe those future generations nothing less than our full attention to this critical issue.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHAFEE. I know that Senator Sessions wanted to be

here. He is chairing a Judiciary Committee hearing today and particularly, Dr. Christy, he wanted to welcome you here. He spoke to
17

me about your presence and we’re very glad you’re here. I know

that Senator Sessions regrets that he can’t be present.

We will start with Dr. Barron.

Gentlemen, if you will note, here is the green light, then the yellow will come on after 6 minutes and then the red light. So you’ll

get about 7 minutes apiece.

Go to it and there will be questions for all of you. What we’re

going to do is have each of you give your statements and then we

will have questions from here.

Senator INHOFE. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Senator CHAFEE. Sure.

Senator INHOFE. I notice we have five witnesses and I think we

only received information from four. Was one added at the last moment?

Senator CHAFEE. Dr. Barron’s testimony apparently came in late.

We’ll get it for you.

Dr. Barron, go to it.

STATEMENT OF ERIC BARRON, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF

GEOSCIENCES, AND DIRECTOR, EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCES

CENTER, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

Dr. BARRON. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators, members of

the Senate staff and public participants, I believe that the prospect

of future human-induced climate change is one of the most complex

and serious science and societal issues that we have to face in this

century and going into the next century.

We know that humans are altering the environment; we know

that they are altering the land surface; we know the composition

of our atmosphere has changed. If we look at the very best scientific assessment of these changes, it appears as if the climate response will be something that is large and something that is significant.

At the very same time we say that, we also have to recognize

that the air of ours or the uncertainties about those predictions are

very large. So really, the major question comes down to the fact of

what do you do when the scientific community, and the best scientific assessments we have, suggest that the change is going to be

large and that in a sense, we need to look out because the future

climate is going to be dramatically different than the present climate.

At the same time, the scientific community is hotly debating the

size of the warning label that should be applied to this particular

problem.

We have two lines of evidence on which we have to focus. One

of them is observations and one of them is the development of predictive models. If we look at the observational record, what we see

is that instrumental record is extremely short and at the same

time, it was never designed to take the temperature of the planet

or the pulse of this earth.

Instead, it was designed to provide weather safety information

and weather forecasting information. This means its use in some

ways, in terms of climate, has become limited.

At the same time, when we do look at this record, we’re beginning to see the signs that the latter half of the century is distinctly
18

different in terms of precipitation and temperature from the earlier

half of the century.

If we go back in the geologic record and look further back over

thousands of years, we even see that in some places on the Earth,

the record of climate of the 20th Century appears to be unique, but

at the same time, if we go even further back in our history on the

order of say 10,000 years and 15,000 years, we have to conclude

that modern humans have yet to experience the extent of natural

variations in climate that we see recorded in that record.

What that means is that we have a ways to go before we can understand the character of this variability and what the distribution

of that variability is. We can turn to climate models and look at

predictive models and look at what is the best and most comprehensive assessment of what the climate system is like and we

also see that there are distinctive limitations.

If we’re referring to numbers that are global, what the warming

might be within 100 years and we provide that answer within a

range, then we tend to see agreement among the scientific community that the warming is likely to occur in that range.

As soon as we move to saying what will happen in a particular

decade to a particular region of the Earth for a particular phenomenon, like whether or not we’ll experience more intense storms,

then we begin to have substantial disagreement and controversy.

Unfortunately, at that scale is the very place the climate intersects

and interacts with human systems.

We made tremendous progress in the last decade in addressing

all of those different issues, but it would be a mistake for any of

us to promise you that the solutions to a lot of those issues are

going to be addressed rapidly and are just around the corner.

As a matter of fact, I’m willing to bet that in the newspaper articles that we will read 10 years from now, the newspapers will continue to seek out the poles of opinion to put in those papers in

order to appear to be giving a balanced view on this particular

issue, no matter what the mass of scientific sentiment is on this

particular field.

So in the middle of a great deal of public confusion that ends up

as a product of this combining the poles of opinion every time you

want to discuss this particular topic, we’re still stuck with the

problem that the models, the records, suggest the Earth is changing and the models suggest some of those changes may be severe.

What should we do? What kind of strategy can we come up with?

I think that strategy has to have two elements. One element of

that strategy is that we have to maintain a very strong research,

observation and modeling program in this country.

It’s almost tragic that we have an observational system that we

pay for but we don’t spend the additional small investment to make

sure that observational system can be used to assess climate. It’s

almost tragic that we have a whole series of satellite observations

providing us all sorts of information, but we don’t have the continuity of those measurements to ensure that our conclusions from

them are going to be robust.

We need to make sure that we work hard to advance on the limitations and high resolution in climate model predictions. We see a

number of other countries—Japan and Germany with less robust
19

economies than we have—right now actively pursuing major observational and modeling efforts. They do this because they realize

this advanced information and predictive capability has economic

significance.

The second thing is we need some litmus test to be able to decide

at what point we should worry about these particular issues. My

particular feeling is this litmus test has to be based on the degree

to which we’re vulnerable or at risk.

If we look around this Nation and take, for example, water resources as an example, if your region, your State is already vulnerable to natural variability, there are droughts and floods, and in

addition to that, you see that in these predictions and assessments

that there is a continuation of this risk or that risk is even enhanced, then it strikes me since we’re already having problems

with that water availability, that should be a call for action.

If you look at other areas in which there is potential for significant risk, say for human health issues, so that you see a heat wave

brings substantial mortality in major cities like St. Louis, Chicago,

Philadelphia or Washington; if you look at the fact that the distribution of mosquitoes that are vectors for disease like dengue

fever or malaria, have the potential because of natural variability

or climate change to move into more northern States and present

the possibility of health risks; if you already have evidence that

something like the deadly hanta virus occurred because of natural

climate variability in wet-dry cycles or that lyme disease is actually

closely tied to how warm winter temperatures are; if you begin to

assess these things and realize you have risk for both natural variability and climate change, then I think that becomes a call for action.

The bottom line, basically, of my testimony is that I think we’re

going to have to live with a certain level of uncertainty. The only

way that we can tackle that uncertainty is No. 1, to make sure we

have very healthy programs that are addressing these issues; and

No. 2, that we begin to make careful assessments of what the

vulnerabilities and risks are.

Thank you very much.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Dr. Barron.

Dr. Christy.

STATEMENT OF JOHN R. CHRISTY, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,

DEPARTMENT OF ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF

ALABAMA AT HUNTSVILLE

Dr. CHRISTY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I’m

honored to be here to provide you with a little bit of information

about the climate system.

In the late 1980’s, the potential catastrophe of human-induced

global warming began receiving a lot of attention, thanks in part

to a couple of warm but not recordbreaking summers here in the

eastern United States.

The predictions were horrifying—we were going to have rapid

temperature rises, coastal flooding, massive hurricanes and so on.

As a student of climate, I and others, were concerned with the

lack of proper data to describe the Earth’s system and the lack of

perspective in which to judge these events as being extreme or not.
20

In 1989, Dr. Roy Spencer, a NASA scientist with similar concerns, and I set out with an agenda to provide an accurate dataset

of truly global observations of atmospheric temperature. These data

would not be plagued, as the traditional surface data are, by changing locations or dependence on transient shipping or lack of coverage in very large areas.

We did not know what that dataset would show. Our goal was

precision and accuracy, to provide the scientific community with excellent, truly global temperature data.

An added incentive for us, in creating the Microwave Sounding

Unit dataset, was that two of the atmospheric layers we were closely examining happened to be two layers which climate models indicated the largest and most rapid responses would occur, if climate

change were occurring.

A warming of the troposphere, faster even than the surface, and

the cooling of the stratosphere—the troposphere is about the surface to 20,000 feet and the stratosphere is up above 50,000 feet.

Two ways have been used to measure the temperature of the

lower atmosphere since 1979, our work, the satellites, and by instruments carried aloft by balloons. I’m a working stiff atmospheric

scientist, so I still have transparencies.

This is just a little picture to show you that satellites measure

the direct emissions from the atmosphere and balloons carry instruments aloft and they can measure the same layers. Balloons,

however, are only released in scattered locations around the Earth

where people live and the polar-orbiting satellites see the entire

planet every day.

I compared our satellite measurements with those from balloons

from 97 stations in the western-northern hemisphere. That was the

result, almost essentially perfect agreement.

Senator CHAFEE. I think that will need a little explanation.

Dr. CHRISTY. OK. You see a dotted line and a solid line. One is

the balloons and one is the temperature of the satellite system that

we have generated for 97 places on the Earth where balloons are

located. So it’s a satellite looking at the same places where the balloons are, a correlation of .97 trends are almost exactly the same.

Senator BAUCUS. The dotted and the solid lines are the same?

Dr. CHRISTY. Yes, that’s what the correlation .97 means.

Senator CHAFEE. The balloons must be at a far lower altitude.

What altitude?

Dr. CHRISTY. They go up to the upper stratosphere. They measure exactly the same layer of the atmosphere. The agreement is astounding. These are completely independent ways to measure the

troposphere.

So the satellites were providing the precision we had hoped for.

Again, I did not, nor did Roy, have any agenda in terms of what

the data would show. We were providing a precise record of the atmospheric temperature. This is what we found when we looked for

the entire globe. By the way, these are in your verbal remarks,

these transparencies.

This is what we found, the troposphere since 1979 has gone up

and down but virtually no trend in either direction. The stratosphere has had a significant downward decline in temperature. You

can see it is truly affected by volcanic eruptions. Those two red
21

spikes in the temperature record in the stratosphere are due to volcanic eruptions.

The year-to-year fluctuations due to volcanoes and ocean temperatures affect the top line, the tropospheric temperature. All the

ups and downs are not caused by anything with long-term effects;

it’s mostly the volcano and ocean situation.

So you cannot look at that and really judge if a warming or cooling is taking place because of the length of record. Dr. Richard

McNider, a UAH colleague, and I published a paper that calculated

and removed the impacts of varying oceanic and volcanic influences

to see if a longer-term trend was present.

We looked at that temperature record, calculated the effects from

the ocean, which is the second line, calculated the effects from volcanoes which is the two blue impacts there, the fourth line, and the

fine result is the fifth line which is the temperature once these oceanic and volcanic effects are removed.

It does show a slight warming trend of .06 degree per decade. It’s

small enough to be easily placed within the bounds of natural variability, but I can’t be certain about that. Humans may be having

a slight impact on the global tropospheric temperature. The trend

is small.

Senator BAUCUS. You go back how many years?

Dr. CHRISTY. 1979 it begins.

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you.

Dr. CHRISTY. This is a measurement of temperatures from 1979

to 1996, 18 years for the troposphere at the top. These are with

balloons and satellites, completely independent comparisons of the

tropospheric temperature.

The bottom is the surface record from three different surface

datasets. We see the temperatures look like they’re going in different directions. The troposphere is pretty steady or slightly downward, we all agree with that. The surface records are upward,

roughly around a tenth of a degree per decade.

No climate model I have seen indicates the troposphere should

cool while the surface warms for human-induced climate change.

With these observations which cover the period of the greatest

human impacts on climate, if they are to be evident, that is what

we see.

If we had regular weather measurements for the past 5,000

years, we would see centuries in which the temperature rose and

when it fell. There would be observations of far more observations

of devastating floods, droughts and blizzards more than we have

seen in the past 100 years. I’m confident of that.

Focusing on just the 20 years of the satellite record or just 100

years of thermometers doesn’t give one a good idea of what has

happened in the last 5,000 years or so. If we look at the somewhat

murky world of proxy data—tree rings, et cetera—most records do

not show this century as remarkably different from the others.

Our present weather woes have always been part of the planet’s

history, whether it’s a drought in the 1930’s or the Red River flood

in 1997.

I agree with Eric Barron that without a continuing program of

observation and research that places climate variations in proper

perspective and reports with improving confidence on their causes,
22

we will be vulnerable to calls for remedies to combat ‘‘climate

change’’ because climate change now seems to be blamed for every

weather woe that comes along. Such remedies are likely to be unproductive.

The satellite and balloon data, the top line, show that catastrophic warming is not now occurring. The detection of human effects on climate has not been convincingly proven because the variations we have observed are not outside the natural variations of

the system.

The stratospheric temperatures which I showed earlier suggest

something is going on, but separating the massive effects of the

volcanoes is not easily done. If the global atmosphere is our patient, I would say that we’ve taken its temperature at a few points

and there seems to be a slight fever, but we’re not sure.

Sensible precautions can be taken. However, my view is that the

planet needs a thorough physical to more clearly determine what

might be wrong, along with a complete assessment of how effective

any medicine would be before it’s administered.

Thank you.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

Dr. Lindzen from MIT.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD S. LINDZEN, ALFRED P. SLOANE

PROFESSOR OF METEOROLOGY, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Dr. LINDZEN. Thank you, Senator Chafee, members of the committee and staff.

You’ve heard I think already a certain amount of conflicting information, although what is interesting is the conflict has been

larger among the Senators on the committee than the scientists

thus far.

I think the reason for that is that 10 years ago when this issue

became publicized, it was put forward as simple. The idea was we

have gases that absorb heat or infrared, they’re increasing, and

that will cause the Earth to warm. The gases were known as

greenhouse gases.

You perhaps don’t understand why such a simple picture has become so complicated and why it’s called into question. There are

problems with that picture. The Earth’s surface does not cool primarily by radiation. It cools by evaporation and convection. The

main greenhouse gas is not carbon dioxide; it’s water vapor. Water

vapor has phenomenal temporal and spacial variability.

We don’t even have records that are worth mentioning for water

vapor, so we don’t even know what’s happened to total greenhouse

gas. It isn’t even a matter of total amount of greenhouse gas. One

molecule of water vapor at 10 kilometers has the same effect as

1,000 molecules at the surface.

None of this would be a problem if the models were trustworthy,

but satellite measurements of upper tropospheric humidity, some of

which have come from Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville,

are in complete disagreement with models at a level which is profoundly important for climate change.

I’ll give you an example later but I might as well mention it now.

John Bates at NOAA has analyzed the satellite data and he finds
23

latitude by latitude models overestimate humidity by about 20 percent. Just for purposes of comparison, 20 percent represents five

times the radiative forcing that a doubling of carbon dioxide gives.

In any event, that’s a place where we are and you would think

that under the circumstances, the situation would be more chaotic

than it is. I think, however, there are some areas of agreement and

one of them is that I think virtually everyone I know working on

climate dynamics agrees that increasing CO2, carbon dioxide,

should have some impact.

The argument is about whether this impact is significant and, in

this case, significant has a fairly precise meaning. It’s been repeated several times. We’re dealing with the climate; it’s a naturally variable system. I should point out that means even if you

change nothing, it varies.

We’ve adapted to the natural variability. Significant has to mean

that it’s bigger than the natural variability. Otherwise, we pretty

much know how to adapt to it.

The IPCC, which has been mentioned, came out with a statement that was quoted by Senator Chafee. I think that statement

has led to a great many claims by other people than scientists.

The statement is an extraordinarily weak statement. I should

tell you of over 20 IPCC reports approximately—I think it’s 17 and

one is three volumes—since 1990, this is the weakest report. I don’t

mean weak scientifically but the weakest in its claims.

There hasn’t been a progression upward, the numbers go down

and down, but let me read the full text of the statement that Senator Chafee quoted.

Our ability to quantify the human influence on global climate is currently limited

because the expected signal is still emerging from the noise of natural variability

and because there are uncertainties in key factors. These include the magnitude and

patterns of long-term, natural variability and the time-evolving patterns of forcing

volume responses to changes in concentration of greenhouse gases, aerosols and

land surface changes. Nevertheless, the balance of evidence suggests there is a discernible human influence on global climate.

What it says, they explain, is that it is unlikely that all of the

change in the last century is due to natural variability is simply

not true. They make no statement, and they are very explicit on

this matter, about the amount of expected change. We said that’s

what the argument is about. Indeed, except for the peculiar fact

that the studies from which the statement is drawn probably are

wrong, the statement is nothing to disagree with. Some impact is

likely. They’re saying it’s some. It may be very small, it may not.

As such, it is virtually a trivial statement except that it depends

on models replicating natural variability which we know they don’t.

They don’t get major sources of natural variability correct like Enso

and El Nin ̃ o, the quasi-biennial oscillation, etc.

Indeed, a recent study by Polyak and North showed the remarkable fact that models are structurally different from the atmosphere.

The study on which the IPCC study is based is from Santer. It

fails the most elementary test of statistical significance, namely the

relation doesn’t remain when you extend the data record a little.

That is the kind of mess we’re in: that we have weaker and weaker

statements after 10 years of saying it’s a self-evident issue and billions of dollars on research expense.
24

What is perhaps more remarkable from the point of view of policy rather than science are the uses made of this very weak statement. It’s a statement which is borderline trivial, says nothing.

Senator CHAFEE. You’re referring to the IPCC?

Dr. LINDZEN. Yes, that sentence of discernible influence.

For instance, environmental groups—I just got a mailing from

the Union of Concerned Scientists—they do the obvious thing, they

start out with that sentence, they change and leave out the front

end, as was done here. They say instead, predictions of global climate change are becoming more confident and then they associate

it, as I’m afraid Senator Lautenberg did, with everything from heat

waves and droughts and forest depletion, forest security and so on,

and then conclude we should sign a treaty at Kyoto.

Senator LAUTENBERG. Are you attributing that whole statement

you just made to me?

Dr. LINDZEN. No, to the UCS. You only made the one about

weather variability. I think Dr. Christy correctly pointed out there

has been no discernible change in that. The IPCC certainly hasn’t

identified any that were predicted.

There are all sorts of statements that lend themselves to misuse.

One of my favorites is ‘‘many recordbreaking years,’’ Andy Solow

and Broadus at Woods Hole showed many years ago, as did someone called Bassett, that it is an inevitable statistical consequence

of reaching one record, that you’ll have many recordbreaking years

following; there is independent information associated with the

claim.

Let me finish up, since I’m near the end, with what can we say

about increasing carbon dioxide? What can we say it does?

If you just increase carbon dioxide alone, leave out the feedbacks,

you’ll get something between 1⁄3 of a degree and one degree for a

doubling of CO2 in equilibrium. This depends crucially on what you

mean by holding all other variables constant. That is generally

reckoned not to be severe. Everything else depends on feedbacks,

of which the largest is the water vapor feedback, which doubles the

response and increases the responsiveness to other feedbacks.

The data does not support the ability of models to actually handle that feedback. I think Senator Allard brought up the philosophical issue—I’m not sure if it was he—that in an odd way, it’s

a philosophical issue. Do we believe that the Earth, when we perturb it, acts to make everything worse or do we believe—I think

it was Senator Hutchison who said that—or do we believe that it

has some resilience; apparently we’re committed to the first view,

that the Earth is vindictive.

The last thing I want to say is on policy, namely what would

happen if we stabilize emissions at 1990 levels or reduce them a

bit because the talk here is climate could be a serious problem and

we should do something. Is that doing something?

At MIT at the Center for Global Change Science, what Figure 4

in my testimony tells you is what will happen is determined by the

sensitivity of the climate system. We don’t know that, but if we assume it’s a sensitive system, you’ll get a lot of warming with emissions reductions and you’ll get almost the same warming, maybe a

bit more if you do nothing. If the system is not sensitive, naturally

policy won’t matter.
25

So we’re not talking about policy to prevent global warming if it’s

going to occur. We’re talking about policy that will have very little

impact.

Thank you.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

Dr. Schneider from Stanford.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Dr. SCHNEIDER. It’s an honor and a pleasure to appear again before this committee on the issue of climate change and its potential

impacts, particularly since my initial appearance was exactly 20

years ago.

I decided to skim through that testimony because it’s often interesting to decide whether you’re going to be happy or embarrassed

at what you said before.

Several things struck me. First, it was a very cordial exchange

among ourselves and the panel and Senators then—Domenici, Wallop, McClure, Gravel and Vincent. If I can indulge in a personal

note for a second, it was a pleasure for me to read a transcript

where the issues were the primary question, and where the level

of contention and personal acrimony was low, as I’ve been personally distressed in the last 10 years that such a high level of exchange has not always been there.

I’m delighted that the chairman and this committee are beginning to reverse that acrimonious trend by focusing on issues and

the questions of science, so I commend you all for that and hope

we can continue that style. With that personal indulgence aside, let

me continue the debate and contrast what we were talking about

then, 20 years ago, to now.

I was struck by how much of the current debate was already anticipated in those days. I think Senator Hutchinson mentioned that

this was de ́ja ́ vu. I was thinking of the Yogi Berra cliche about de ́ja ́

vu—one ‘‘over again’’ isn’t enough. There are many ‘‘over agains’’

but, on the other hand, that is important when issues have lots of

uncertainty and lots of contention. I think it’s necessary that each

generation go over the issues and see what we’ve learned in the intervening generations.

I want to briefly address that rather than all the details which

are in my written testimony and the other witnesses’ as well.

One of the things I had said then, and I’ll just quote it briefly

and see how it stands up over the test of time:

There are scientists who believe that the particles, the aerosols, could lead to cooling and to CO2 to warming.

I personally don’t think the issue is resolved, although I think the present majority of climatologists would come out on the long-term warming side.

That was 1977. I don’t think it’s all that different in a sense that

it reflects some of the debate that we would hear now.

Since 1977, we’ve still learned a lot. One of the things we

learned, for example, is that aerosols are implicated not just in climate, but in health risks. They’re involved in lung diseases and

other things of concern, and as a result of that, we’ve had a Clean

Air Act in an attempt to try to remove the aerosol particles.
26

What we’ve discovered is that the control technologies which

were originally predicted to be highly expensive turned out to be

not nearly as expensive as we thought when we applied marketbased systems, such as tradable permits and other such things to

them. I think there is an instructive metaphor there.

There is also a climate-related component, which is, if aerosols

can be removed quickly when people put health as a high priority.

I think that has occurred in more wealthy societies; some of the

projections of the amount of aerosols we’ll see in the next century

may not be nearly as severe as some people have said.

Indeed, as we’ve been talking about the past 20 years, the prime

problem of the next century may very well be if we continue business as usual, then carbon dioxide emissions which start to swamp

all the other factors.

So I think there is more confidence today than there was 20

years ago, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has

stated, that the combination of global warming from greenhouse

gases, including not just CO2 but methane and other greenhouse

gases, and a lesser but still significant regional cooling from

aerosols, has indeed left its ‘‘discernible’’ mark in that famous sentence that everybody quotes.

Remember, that discernible remark was in the sense of preponderance of evidence, not proof beyond doubt. As one of the lead authors of that report, I know we debated that sentence quite literally

for hours. Many of us wanted to use the word ‘‘preponderance’’ to

convey that sense of civil rather than criminal trial levels of evidence.

The reason that ‘‘preponderance’’ was not included was that it

simply didn’t translate well into all the languages of the various

countries participating and that’s why the ‘‘balance of evidence’’

came out instead.

So it was in that sense that ‘‘discernible’’ appeared. We were not

using a statistical standard of 99 percent significance. In fact, that

wouldn’t be very meaningful because it’s hard to define every aspect in those kinds of terms. Climate variation isn’t a dice game

or a coin flip. There’s lots more complexity here.

Let me continue and dwell on this issue of uncertainty because

I would argue that it would be a mistake for us to interpret these

bland statements about things which are uncertain as if somehow

all aspects were equally uncertain.

We have a very ordered set of knowledge here and that is the

repeated assessment over every 5 or 7 years that keep coming out

from the National Research Council and now several from the

IPCC. What they tell us is, there’s lots of aspects about the problem that are well understood aspects over which there is a strong

consensus. There are aspects for which we have fairly good information and a decent guess and then there are aspects that are

highly speculative.

It’s always a personal frustration for me when these aspects all

get lumped together, particularly in the media debate, as Eric Barron said earlier, and then people become understandably confused

and think that nobody knows anything. That’s simply not an accurate reflection of the state-of-the-art of the science.
27

What we try to do is make sure that through the process of assessment where a community of scientists gets together, we can

point out those aspects where there is strong consensus and separate these out from the speculations so that we don’t misunderstand the nature of the science. That’s a tough thing to avoid.

Let me further elaborate on this issue of uncertainty. Of course

despite the considerable progress mentioned earlier, there are still

many remaining uncertainties. It’s the cliche of our era, but as I

said, that bland statement by itself throws away much useful

knowledge that already exists in the scientific and policy communities.

We know, for example, how to separate those aspects with strong

consensus and those parts which are plausible and thus well established and those which are highly speculative, but we can go beyond that because we’ve actually applied scientific techniques to

tap the subjective judgments of a variety of expertise in climatology, atmospheric chemistry, agriculture, ecology or economics.

What such formal studies show is the gradations of uncertainty.

What they do is quantify the subjective probability assigned by surveyed experts on such issues as how much the Earth might warm

up if CO2 were to double. I have a figure in my written testimony,

Figure 1, which shows examples of 16 different scientists, two on

this panel, who have made various estimates of that.

How much the economy might be damaged by different degrees

of global warming had also been assessed, as has how much of that

damage would accrue to market sectors, areas like agriculture,

which is clearly an important market sector, forestry or energy demand as opposed to so-called non-market damages to amenities

like visibility, human health or protection of endangered species or

habitats.

So anyone who is a ‘‘rationalist’’, meaning we believe in looking

at balances between costs and benefits, clearly wants to quantify

both the costs and the benefits. Here is where the uncertainty gets

in the way because depending upon which end of the spectrum of

the range of uncertainties you can pick on both the cost and the

benefit side, you can come out with mild or catastrophic conclusions.

So this is no different, in essence, than most risk management

problems that corporate executives face all the time or that you

face all the time in trying to determine how to use a limited budget

in dealing with a wide range of problems, picking which are priorities. Therefore, you want as much quantitative information as you

can have, not just about what can happen but also what are the

odds that it can happen. By selective information grabbed out of

the context of the range of the odds it might happen, it’s very difficult for us to be able to do that risk management job rationally.

My written testimony gives several examples of these formal

studies and they all possess a common attribute. Most, but not all,

experts assign a broad distribution of scientifically-based, subjective probabilities to a range of climatic effects or impacts. In most

cases, the vast majority of experts assign a small—5 or 10 percent

probability—to outcomes like very little change or catastrophic

change.
28

Of course in the value system of a risk prone person, a 5 percent

change of a nasty outcome is small whereas to a risk averse person,

that possibility might lead to hedging strategies like investing in

insurance or redundant backup systems. Therefore, we need to understand that value aspect all the way through.

Let me conclude with a quote, which I think one of you will recognize, and that succinctly summarizes my views—‘‘If there is one

point I could make, Mr. Chairman, it is this. There are a great

many questions about the greenhouse effect that can’t be answered

today, but I don’t think we ought to let scientific uncertainty paralyze us from doing anything. It is always convenient to find an excuse not to do something and there is always an excuse out there

not to do something. I think the issue before is what steps should

we be taking today to help solve the problem in addition to doing

more scientific research.’’

I trust you remember when you said that, Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. One of the dangers of this job is resurrect

things you said in the past, but I’ll stick by that.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Good. That was the gamble I was taking.

Senator CHAFEE. You thought it was a pretty good statement.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. I thought so too and I think it’s still true. You

said that in June 1988 in front of the Senate Committee on Energy

and Natural Resources when, in fact, those heat waves, which were

unusual but not extraordinary generated all that public interest to

the issue.

I think, as I said, it’s as valid today as 9 years ago except today

I think we have a stronger consensus for dealing with this issue

than we did a decade ago. As the recent statement calling for modest climate policy actions from more than 2,000 economists attests—I will make a bold prediction and that my colleague, Dale

Jorgenson’s testimony will likewise conclude—that modest actions

which try to balance costs and benefits are not premature.

I thank you for your persistent interest in global environmental

issues, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify, and of course, I

stand ready to respond to any of the questions or comments each

of the committee members may have.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much.

Now, Dr. Jorgenson from Harvard, former chairman of the Economics Department and Professor of Economics. We welcome you

here.

STATEMENT OF DALE JORGENSON, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, FORMER CHAIR OF ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Dr. JORGENSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Distinguished members of the committee, it’s a great pleasure for

me to be here and to see the breadth of interest in the subject that

we’re here to discuss.

I think it’s very important for me to focus right away on the fact

that I’m going to deal with the economics of climate change and not

with the scientific issues that the other four witnesses have just

placed before you.

I was the author of the Economists’ Statement on climate change

that attracted, as the chairman said, more than 2,500 signatures,
29

including eight Nobel Prize winners. I’d like to use that as a point

of departure. That’s in the material I distributed. It’s about halfway through the packet. I’m going to start by summarizing the

statement because it’s an attempt to elicit what turned out to be

close to a consensus about an economic approach to the problem.

First of all, let me say a few things about the economics of the

situation somewhat in the vein of Senator Chafee’s opening remarks about the science.

The science of global change is at least a century old. It was

originated, as the Senator pointed out, by Svante Arrenhius and

the qualitative features of the science of the problem haven’t

changed even though the quantitative precision, thanks to the excellent observations that you’ve heard about from Dr. Christy and

the modeling which Steve Schneider, among others, has been involved in, we know a great deal more about the quantitative features, but the qualitative features of climate change go back at

least a century.

The economics is much more recent and in fact, for the benefit

of the panel and also for the benefit of the staff and maybe some

of the members of the audience, I’ve included a few recent references which are research reports that I think have moved the economics forward by a good bit.

It turns out that these are very recent references. One of them

is to a World Bank report from June 1992. It was intended to be

available at the same time as the Rio Summit, but in fact, arrived

just as the Summit was beginning and therefore, had no influence

on the outcome.

The other references are to a book by William Nordhaus of Yale

University. I know, Senator, you are an alumnus of that very distinguished university. William Nordhaus is a co-author of the

Economists’ Statement as well as one of the leading economists

working in this area. Finally, there is a paper by myself and Peter

Wilcoxen, a former student of mine now at the University of Texas,

which is dated 1995.

Notice that all of these references are subsequent to the Rio conference. In other words, what we know about the economics of climate change is something that has arrived on the scene very recently. I think it’s very appropriate to underline that by referring

to the article that appeared yesterday in the Washington Post—if

your copy of the Washington Post has already disappeared, you can

find this also in Newsweek Magazine, by Robert Samuelson, surely

one of the most distinguished economic journalists working in the

area of economic policy.

The phrase that he used is precisely the opposite of the economic

consensus. The phrase, which you quoted, I believe, Senator

Chafee, was that ‘‘Effective action on climate change would amount

to crushing the world economy.’’ That turns out to be exactly the

opposite of what I believe the economic consensus appears to be.

It reflects a view of the economics of this problem which I think

goes back to the reactions to the Rio Summit and to the definition

of the problem that was adopted there which, unfortunately, as I’ve

already suggested, did not benefit from the recent economic research that I want to discuss.
30

Let’s proceed with the Economists’ Statement. That is about midway through your packet if you’d like to refer to it but I’m going

to summarize it very briefly.

The first paragraph says that climate change involves significant

environmental risks and the preventive steps are justified. The second paragraph summarizes economic studies showing that there

are policies available for educing greenhouse gas emissions for

which the benefits outweigh the costs. The third paragraph describes policies in more detail and emphasizes the importance of

the approach you’ve heard from a number of the other panelists

and also from some of the opening statements, many of which I

found to be brilliant—I hope Senator Lautenberg agrees.

These opening statements, a number of them, refer to marketbased approaches and that is, in fact, something that is gaining a

good bit of momentum in this area of environmental policy and in

others. That is the basic thrust of the Economists’ Statement.

Now, I’d like to lay out the approaches to practical implementation. Again, this is on page 5 of your handout if you’d like to look

at that.

The first thing we have to focus on is how to choose an appropriate objective. It’s very clear from the testimony that you’ve

heard that there is certainly the possibility that emissions of greenhouse gases will affect the climate.

Senator CHAFEE. Doctor, could you slow up here? I’m just trying

to get located. You said page 5 in the handout material?

Dr. JORGENSON. Right.

Senator CHAFEE. Is that the big print?

Dr. JORGENSON. Yes. This is the big print and talks about practical implementation.

Senator CHAFEE. Yes, all right.

Dr. JORGENSON. That’s exactly the page, Senator.

The first point is that we have to agree on an appropriate target.

That is something that was discussed at the Rio Summit but in

fact, the target that was suggested there, which is stabilizing emissions, is not something that can be justified on economic grounds.

That is the first and most important point.

When we think about setting the target, the Rio agreement is the

wrong starting point and we’ll come back to the setting of the target later.

The second point is we have to think of a means of international

implementation. This is where we come to the issue of marketbased approaches. I’m happy to say that the Administration, which

you will hear from at the next meeting of this committee, has proposed a market-based approach based on internationally tradable

permits.

That has important limitations, some of which are the subject of

the Senate resolution by Senator Byrd and others, including members of this panel, but that is something we can discuss in more

detail.

Now we come to the issue of domestic implementation. Here, the

issue is how to achieve reductions in emissions that balance the

costs against the benefits. The answer to that, and this is discussed

in great detail in my paper with Wilcoxen, is that we need to think

about a carbon tax, we need to think about a tax on energy use
31

that would have the effect of reducing the growth of carbon dioxide

emissions, not the most important greenhouse gas to be sure, but

the one for which atmospheric concentrations are changing.

Now we come to Mr. Samuelson. Mr. Samuelson says, thinking

we’re going to crush the world economy, that to have an appropriate effect, the appropriate carbon tax would be $100 per ton of

carbon. The appropriate tax discussed in my testimony is, in fact,

$10 a ton. In fact, that $10 figure is for the year 2025. If we

wanted to think about an appropriate tax at present, what would

be the tax that we should implement immediately, the answer is

about $5.29 a ton, in other words, a totally different order of magnitude than what has been suggested.

The conclusion is then that we have to think of this as a threestep process. The first is determining an appropriate target for an

international agreement. Unfortunately, the Rio Summit of 1992

got off on the wrong foot. What is required is slowing the growth

of emissions, not capping emissions at something like 1990 levels.

The second point is that once we’ve agreed, hopefully in Kyoto,

but if not, then at some subsequent meeting, on an appropriate target that is justified in terms of the costs and the benefits that are

associated with slowing climate change, we then have to arrive at

a means of international implementation.

For that purpose, I think the Administration’s position involving

a system of internationally tradable permits is certainly an appropriate point of departure, but it’s important to combine that with

the key feature that has been the subject of the Byrd resolution

which is bringing in all the parties, in other words having an international agreement that is truly comprehensive.

Now we come to the nub of the matter. We have a climate

change policy. It is, in fact, embodied in the U.S. Climate Change

Action Plan. If you look at the final exhibit in my handout, you’ll

see the effect of the Climate Change Action Plan.

There was an objective of trying to achieve by voluntary methods

a reduction in emissions by the year 2000 to 1990 levels. That was

what was called for in the Rio Summit. That has been, unfortunately, a total failure.

What we have found is that the emissions have grown very, very

substantially. Even by 1996, the last year for which the most recent data are available, these have grown far beyond what the Administration at that time—Senator Chafee alluded to the Senate

ratification of the Administration agreement by President Bush at

Rio—that there would be a growth of emissions without this Global

Climate Action plan that would go far beyond stabilizing emissions.

In fact, the growth of emissions has been far beyond what was anticipated at the time.

Nonetheless, we come back to the basic point that the goal of climate change has to be reconsidered and that economics is really

the key to understanding that issue.

Thank you very much.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Doctor.

What we will do is each of us will have 8 minutes to ask some

questions. I understand there is going to be a vote at 11:05 a.m.,

so I’d like to start off. Sometimes votes are scheduled and don’t

occur.
32

Dr. Barron, if I understood your testimony correctly, you stated

as a fact that there has been a global temperature increase. Am I

correct in that?

Dr. BARRON. If you look at the surface observations over the entire century, what you see is the differences that are on the order

of .4 to .6 of a degree Celsius. I don’t think anybody argues that

over that span of time, that there isn’t some temperature difference.

Senator CHAFEE. You indicated that there must be a strong research and observational system and apparently we don’t match

the Germans and the Japanese in that. What are they doing that

we’re not doing? We had the testimony from Dr. Christy about the

balloons and the satellites.

Dr. BARRON. I think what you’re seeing is just somewhat of a

change in attitude where if you look at our satellite observation

programs, they are under continual challenge, year to year in

terms of budget, in terms of scope, to the point where we once

again are moving into a mode where it will be difficult to make

sure we have continuity of our observations.

This was something where basically the United States just ruled

supreme in terms of these observations. Now we’re seeing that the

Europeans and the Japanese are putting forth very strong efforts

along those lines.

If you look at the IPCC assessment, you see the unusual circumstance that it is models from other countries providing the

long-term simulations that were the basis of a significant portion

of that report and I think much less participation on the U.S. side.

There’s a lot of different U.S. activities and a lot of very healthy

U.S. activities, but I just think it’s important to make sure that we

continue to maintain those.

Senator CHAFEE. How do the Japanese make these observations?

They don’t have satellites up there to the extent we do.

Dr. BARRON. Yes, they do. Unfortunately, they just lost one,

Addios, which just went dead because of some sort of power failure

and they have plans for the next launches of Addios and we did

have a U.S. instrument on board that satellite, a windscatterometer.

Senator CHAFEE. Do you believe the global temperature has increased due to an abundance of CO2 from the Earth?

Dr. BARRON. I think there is a distinct probability that a component of that warming is due to CO2, but I also believe we have a

very strong natural variability segment in there that we have to

address.

If you’ll let me go back a little farther in Earth history, I would

tell you that every single time there was a warm time period, there

is evidence of higher CO2 and of almost all the cold periods we

have, there’s evidence of reduced CO2.

It’s not that it is the primary cause in every single case, but if

we look through the entire spectrum of Earth history, warm time

periods have higher CO2, cool periods have lower CO2, and it’s very

hard to escape that point.

Senator CHAFEE. How would we get the variations in CO2 emissions say going back before the Industrial Revolution? Would it be

from volcanic eruptions or something?
33

Dr. BARRON. We have several sources of information. One is an

ice course.

Senator CHAFEE. I appreciate that. That would be a way of measuring it, but what would the variations come from? What would

cause pre-Industrial Revolution variations in CO2?

Dr. BARRON. It’s probably a whole broad range of factors. On a

very long time scale, it has to be the volcanic emissions and the

rate of uptake of that CO2 by actually weathering of rocks, but you

have all sorts of variations from variations in the biology, variations in the climate for which it becomes a feedback. It’s a broad

range of factors.

Senator CHAFEE. Dr. Christy, you indicated in your conclusion

that something is going on but you’re not sure what. What is the

something? You reported since 1979, there’s been a very small increase in the temperature in the troposphere. Is that the something?

Dr. CHRISTY. No, it was the stratosphere that had the largest signal, the remarkable decrease. The cause could be due to ozone depletion, that seems to be a good culprit for that, or the effects of

volcanoes which is quite a natural phenomena.

Senator CHAFEE. If you were sitting up here, what would you do?

Would you worry and do anything or say, well, let’s wait a little

while longer?

Dr. CHRISTY. I’ve never been a Senator before.

Senator CHAFEE. You can pretend you’re one, a lot of people do.

[Laughter.]

Dr. CHRISTY. I suppose whatever could be done, that which is politically feasible, from your point of view.

Senator CHAFEE. No, don’t put it on that basis. Let’s say we’re

trying to do the right thing up here. Long before it was popular,

we got into the chlorofluorocarbons, the CFCs, and as you just

mentioned, I think we did some good work there. It wasn’t immediately popular, but it was the right thing to do. Just tell us what

your recommendation would be to us.

Dr. CHRISTY. To find out as much as possible, first of all, about

what the climate is doing and what effects a particular control

might have. The modest controls talked about here and probably to

be recommended will probably not have much effect on the global

climate, if it is being affected by the greenhouse gases.

I’m not an expert on the economic issues and things like that. I

only know about pretty much one thing and that’s the satellite

temperatures, so it’s hard for me to answer that kind of question.

Senator CHAFEE. Except that your satellite temperatures, as I

understood them, indicate some small increases in temperature.

Am I correct in that?

Dr. CHRISTY. When adjusted for the natural variations of the

ocean temperature volcanoes, that’s right, less than what model

projections show.

Senator CHAFEE. Dr. Schneider, you indicated that it’s unfair to

label all uncertainties as being equally uncertain. How certain are

you that there’s been an increase in the global temperature?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. I’m highly certain that there’s been an increase

in the global surface temperature. I’m less certain about what the

middle of the atmosphere is doing and I’m more concerned about
34

what happens to the surface because that’s where we and the bulk

of living things are.

Senator CHAFEE. Could you put a figure on that?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Remember, these probabilities are subjective because there are many factors involved but so are the opinions often

of generals, doctors and others, so my subjective opinion on this

would be 95 percent likely that there is a global warming trend,

probably even higher than that because it isn’t just thermometers

of the world which average out to show this 1 degree Fahrenheit

warming in a century, but mountain glaciers have been largely receding around the world and sea levels have risen. There is a consistent pattern.

The issue isn’t so much whether the Earth is warming, it’s why.

Senator CHAFEE. It’s also important how much, isn’t it?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Yes.

Senator CHAFEE. Could you set a figure on that, how much?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. How much is a little tougher even at the surface

because you can’t just stick a thermometer in somewhere and get

out the number. That’s why many of us are pleased that the satellite measurements have come along to provide a supplement, yet

there is a lot more adjusting that needs to take place in coordinating the instruments.

Unfortunately, satellites were only flying in 1979, so we have to

try to guess about where there were inaccuracies and so forth.

I think what the IPCC said and the National Research Council

said before, is that the standard best guess is something like a half

degree warming over the past century, plus or minus a couple

tenths of a degree, and there are four groups around the world that

continuously reanalyze this data to try to take out biases and correct errors.

Senator CHAFEE. Senator Baucus.

Senator BAUCUS. I’d like to see if there is any agreement among

the panel first as to whether or not there’s been an increase in CO2

caused by man over the last 100 years? Does everybody agree there

has been a significant increase in CO2 caused not by natural

causes, but by man?

The figure I have is that 250 ppm to about 360 ppm over the last

100 years.

Dr. LINDZEN. It’s closer to 280 ppm.

Senator BAUCUS. The range is from 280 ppm to——

Dr. LINDZEN. To 360 ppm.

Senator BAUCUS. OK. The primary causes of that are what, fossil

fuels?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Fossil fuels and deforestation. The initial deforestation was in the now-developed countries. If we had a balloon

and we could have flown from the East to the West Coast of the

United States before the settlers were here, we largely would have

seen trees more so than farms and that carbon that those trees

then represented is now in the air. The same thing is true in Europe.

Now we’ve been regrowing our forests and the bulk of the net deforestation is taking place elsewhere.

Senator BAUCUS. So there is agreement that CO2 caused by man

is increasing?
35

Dr. SCHNEIDER. More than half is probably from CO2 due to industrial emission.

Senator BAUCUS. More than half due to industrial.

Is there also agreement that the surface is warming, has over the

last 150 years? I’m not getting into the cause but whether the surface has been warming?

Dr. LINDZEN. I think the IPCC limit is 1⁄3 to 2⁄3 of a degree. There

is uncertainty in that. While there is widespread agreement, for instance, it’s been mentioned that there’s urbanization, I had to work

with these records a few months ago and I suddenly realized the

IPCC listed Capetown, Johannesburg, and Buenos Aires as rural

stations.

Senator BAUCUS. But there is general agreement?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. There’s general agreement, it’s got a large error

bar and nobody knows why.

Dr. JORGENSON. Let me chime in at this point. if you look at Figure 5.4 of my testimony, you can see what appears to be the consensus about global mean temperature changing from 1865. It’s increased by a little over a degree (Farenheit).

Senator BAUCUS. The next question I want to ask you scientists

is to rate the probability of individual causes. The cause of today’s

hearing basically is CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Dr. Lindzen,

you say water vapors is much more.

Before we get into that, I just want to ask each of the panelists

to give his view of what’s caused this warming, two or three candidates and the best you can give a probability to each of the two

or three candidates.

I’ll start with you, Dr. Barron, and answer very quickly because

I don’t have a lot of time left.

Dr. BARRON. I think there’s a significant probability that a good

portion of that has to do with human activity.

Senator BAUCUS. With what?

Dr. BARRON. With human activity.

Senator BAUCUS. Which human activity?

Dr. BARRON. Emissions of CO2.

Senator BAUCUS. Emissions of CO2. You think there is a significant probability?

Dr. BARRON. I think there’s a significant probability.

Senator BAUCUS. OK. Dr. Lindzen.

Dr. LINDZEN. I would say at this point, the most likely candidate

is natural variability. As I point out, this is the system that vacillates with no forcing, even according to models and theory.

Senator BAUCUS. Dr. Schneider.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. If you consider the surface warming together

with the cooling of the stratosphere, which actually I think is due

not just to depletion of ozone but increased greenhouse gases, they

actually cause the stratosphere to cool and the lower atmosphere

to warm, I would say that it is maybe only a 10 or 20 percent

change, in my opinion, that the warming trend is a natural event.

There is an equal probability it could have been a cooling event

in nature. I don’t know which it is, so I would rate it more like 80

or 90 percent likely that we’re part of the story and that the bulk

of that is probably emission of carbon dioxide.

Senator BAUCUS. Dr. Jorgenson.
36

Dr. JORGENSON. I’ll defer to Dr. Christy.

Dr. CHRISTY. I look at those records very closely and the 19th

Century was one of the coldest of the last 1,000 years. We are coming out of a very cold century right now. Most of the temperature

rise—and I sat on the IPCC panel that dealt with this—the number was .42 was given to us by the latest results of a degree Celsius

warming.

Most of that is caused by natural variability, the rebound from

the 19th Century cold period. What part of that might be caused

by our activities of the .42, I would say at most, .1.

Senator BAUCUS. Caused by man?

Dr. CHRISTY. Human activity.

Senator BAUCUS. Point 1. Did you say there’s a 10 percent

change?

Dr. CHRISTY. No. I would say at most that warming of .42 that

we see, at most, .1 would be due to human cause, at most.

Senator BAUCUS. What lessons are there from the CFC matter?

Years ago, it was a big debate, were CFCs causing a hole in the

ozone layer in the stratosphere? Lots of industries said, no, but we

went ahead and worldwide enacted controls.

I’m just wondering if the state of knowledge here is in any way

parallel or similar to the state of knowledge back when we first

started to debate this issue? Does anybody want to take a crack at

that? Dr. Schneider?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Sure. In fact, one of the prime confusions in the

lay world is that the ozone depletion issue and the greenhouse effect question are the same. In fact, they are not. They are very different but there is a component of them where I think we can draw

a lesson as you asked in your question.

When you use the atmosphere as a free sewer, if you will, eventually something nasty might happen. It was determined that those

chemicals that were injected could be breaking down and while nobody could precisely calculate the chemistry 15 years ago, there

was a possibility it could be significant. It became a risk management question about whether to take the chance.

Now, the ozone hole that you mentioned, the irony in this and

the chief lesson, is the ozone hole was not anticipated by most people. In fact, what we were expecting was a smooth, slow loss of

ozone. The ozone hole came as a surprise, which was interpreted

by some people who didn’t see this as a problem. They were saying,

‘‘You see, we never really understood the atmosphere because we

didn’t predict the hole.’’ On the other hand, it was interpreted by

environmentalists and others as, ‘‘See, when you mess around with

Mother Nature at the global scale, you’re going to get nasty surprises.’’

I think that it’s almost certain that the rates at which we modify

the environment, both through land clearing and atmospheric effects, will give us surprises. Some will be pleasant, some will be

nasty. The absolute prime message is that when you start interfering with the natural rates of things, you have to expect changes,

as Eric Barron said.

What we are not capable of doing is honestly telling you the precise range and details of those changes. If we did, we’d be beyond

our capacity. But we can forecast that the more rapidly we force
37

the system to change, the more likely it is that there will be surprises like the ozone hole. I think that’s a relatively safe forecast.

Senator BAUCUS. I’d like to follow up very briefly on the question

the chairman asked, namely how do we go about getting more data,

either baseline data, more research, more facts so that we can be

a little more certain that our decisions are better founded than

they otherwise might be? Where is the deficiency in either research

or data gathering? What do we do?

Obviously this is a big problem—global warming, climate

change—and I think intuitively most people think something bad

is going on here, but we also want to make sure, as much as possible, that we handle it the right way and make the right decisions.

It seems to me that the best way to address that is, as you all

suggested one way or another, to get more data, do more research

and so forth. I don’t know what it is. What do we do to make sure

we’re getting better information, more facts? Any of you?

Dr. BARRON. I’d just add that I think there are some things like,

for instance, making sure when you’re collecting weather data that

it’s suitable for climate. A few simple rules and policies and a little

bit of investment would go a long way.

I think it’s clear just by the debate where deficiencies are in

models.

Senator BAUCUS. If we could spend more money, where should

we spend?

Dr. JORGENSON. Could I check in on that? I think the thing to

focus on, Senator Baucus, is that we are spending $2 billion a year

on this problem. It’s not as if our efforts are insignificant in economic terms. We’re putting a lot of money into research and we’re

getting the benefits of that research as you see before this panel.

I don’t think it’s a question of spending more money. It’s a question of absorbing the information that we have and maintaining, as

Dr. Barron suggested earlier, the observational system that we’ve

put up, making sure it continues.

Senator BAUCUS. But I understand that Japan, Germany, and

other countries are doing more.

Dr. JORGENSON. That’s simply not true. If you look at our effort

by comparison with these other countries, it’s very large by comparison with our R&D effort and by comparison with the size and

scope of our economic activities. We are the leaders in this field by

a substantial margin.

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

We’re in the last part of the vote. This is what I’d like to do.

We’ll take a little recess now and we’ll go over and I think a lot

of us want to hear these answers and we’ll come right back.

This is interesting to all of us. Why don’t we all go and vote and

I personally am going to come back very quickly and then we’ll

start again. I hope everybody will be here because we’re all interested in what you have to say.

Thank you.

[Recess.]

Senator CHAFEE. In our order of appearance, we had Senator

Thomas who is not here, Senator Bond is not here.

Senator Hutchinson.
38

Senator HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the panel for their testimony and as I listened,

it seemed to me one word kept popping up and that’s the word ‘‘uncertainty,’’ that there was at least some uncertainty regarding the

scientific data that we have.

I think, Dr. Christy, the one thing that almost got lost when you

were playing Senator, was when you said that we need to gather

more data. There did seem to be a lot of uncertainty to me.

I read an AP article not long ago that quoted a U.S. Geological

Survey ecologist who said he was uneasy about attributing ecological changes to human-caused global warming because North America’s ecological systems have always been in flux.

A mere 18,000 years ago, not long in geological time, ice sheets

two miles thick covered the entire northern half of the continent

and as they melted away, plants and animals claimed the land the

glaciers once covered.

He says there have been smaller climate fluctuations since then

as recently as 1850 at the end of a period known as the Little Ice

Age when temperatures were a few degrees cooler than they are

today and that leaves ecologists wondering whether the changes

they are now documenting are merely the continuation of a natural

warming trend that began 150 years ago.

I think it was Dr. Lindzen who questioned the models, the accuracy of the models that are available, so I think of the scientific uncertainty.

As I listened to the testimony, it also struck me that there is uncertainty as to the impact of policy changes that have suggested as

to how dramatic a change we can really affect by making the policy

changes that have been proposed, particularly the ones that have

been proposed by the Administration.

So we have, at best, a marginal impact. In fact, I think I’m

quoting Dr. Lindzen correctly when he said they would have very

little impact.

When you consider that the proposals that we have before us, the

Administration’s proposals would limit the regulations to developed

countries, excluding and exempting the developing nations like

China and Mexico. It would seem to me that they would even further marginalize the impact of any policy changes.

So in the midst of all that uncertainty, it seems to me there is

one thing that is certain and that is there is going to be enormous

costs that’s going to be imposed. While we are uncertain about the

scientific basis and that we need more data, we’re uncertain about

the impact of policy changes, that it may or may not be beneficial,

but there is one thing that is quite certain and that is, it is going

to be expensive.

Dr. Lindzen, I’m going to direct this to you and I know you’re

anxious to speak but I want to particularly look at the area of agriculture. Agricultural production accounts for 20 percent of all

human-caused greenhouse emissions according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

In their study, they further singled out rice as the No. 1 agricultural source of human-caused methane emissions, 20 percent of all

human-causes from agriculture and rice being the No. 1 contributor
39

of that. Arkansas is the No. 1 rice producer and the Mississippi

Delta is the place that’s grown.

Current negotiations only focusing upon developed nations will

put Arkansas and other areas at a great disadvantage. In fact, in

1996, the United States produced 7,771 metric tons of rice while

China produced 188,000 metric tons of rice, 24 times the amount

the United States produces.

It seems to me if we’re going to regulate, we’re going to limit

American agriculture, which would be about 4 percent of world production of rice, any impact is going to have to be very, very minimal.

Here is the question. Is the proposal the Administration has advocated the proper response in light of the uncertainty that surrounds the issue?

Dr. Lindzen.

Dr. LINDZEN. I think the issue of uncertainty has to be dealt with

with care. There are some things we’re uncertain about to be sure,

but on the issue you asked about, surprisingly there is rather less

uncertainty than on many matters.

We know, for example, that projected increases in methane will

contribute very little of any putative warming, no matter what you

think will happen; CO2 will dominate.

We know that stabilization of emissions involving India and

China at 1990 levels will, if you expect 4 degrees warming, doing

nothing much, knock you down to maybe 3 degrees.

We know that the No. 4 is very uncertain but we know if that

were the number, the proposed actions will not reduce it to a number that would be small climate change.

Senator HUTCHINSON. You’re saying the certainty is that the policy changes would have minimal impact?

Dr. LINDZEN. That’s the part we’re far more confident of than the

specific number we expect to be achieved in 2100, if we do nothing.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Dr. Jorgenson.

Dr. JORGENSON. I’d like to expand on that. I think that what you

said, Senator, whatever we do is going to be very costly is precisely

the point of view that was expressed by Robert Samuelson in his

Washington Post piece.

That is predicated on the idea that we’re going to continue our

failed policy of 1992. That’s the policy that involves stabilizing

emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. That is not economically

justified.

If you look at the figure in my testimony, Figure 5.2, what you’ll

find is that the economic—this is at the end of the handout and it’s

Figure 5.2 and describes greenhouse gas emissions under the optimal economic policy.

Senator CHAFEE. This is a chart?

Dr. JORGENSON. That’s a chart. What this shows is that the optimum policy is one that does not stabilize emissions. That scenario

would indeed, Senator Hutchinson, be extremely costly, and that’s

what Dr. Lindzen was alluding to.

Senator HUTCHINSON. That would be ineffective also.

Dr. JORGENSON. Not that it would be something that would be

effective in stopping climate change; but the point is it is not economically justified.
40

Weigh the costs against the benefits—as you have with your example based on rice culture in Arkansas—but I think is appropriate. Farming is the industry that is going to be most affected by

this policy. Whatever we do, we need to think about very moderate

measures.

Instead of Samuelson’s $100 tax, what we need to think of by the

year 2025 is something like a $10 tax per ton of carbon. That’s a

difference of order of magnitude. That is where the economics of

this boils down to. We need to take very moderate measures, but

we need to start now.

As far as the developing countries are concerned, the important

thing to focus on there is that at the present time, developing countries are not going to be very substantial emitters. However, we

can anticipate the growth of emissions from countries like China is

going to be substantial. Therefore, we need to bring them into the

discussion.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Dr. Jorgenson, if China produces 24 times

the rice that the United States produces and if it is only a modest

tax as you’re advocating that would be imposed, even a small differential between a developed nation like the United States and

China which is producing 24 times, it’s hard for me to imagine

that’s not going to have a dramatic impact in markets and costs on

American agriculture.

It also seems to me to argue that China is not a significant emitter if it’s producing 24 times the rice. That doesn’t equate with me.

Dr. JORGENSON. No, at the present time, China certainly is a significant emitter. My point is that if you take developing countries

as a whole, they are far less significant than the developed countries.

Focusing on the role of China, China, like the United States, will

have opportunities to participate in an international agreement.

They will benefit from looking at the costs on the one side and the

benefits on the other and what we should try to achieve is an international consensus based on the idea that we minimize the cost of

whatever we do. We want to minimize the cost of climate policy,

whatever that policy turns out to be.

For that purpose, I think the Administration’s proposal of internationally tradable permits, when expanded in due course, to the

developing countries, would be an appropriate market-based instrument.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired but Dr. Schneider was wanting to respond and I would like

to ask permission.

Senator CHAFEE. Go ahead.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. I just wanted to clarify something. In the charts

that Dale Jorgenson showed with economic justification for certain

actions, including figures with three and four decimal places of precision, although I agree in principle with what he’s trying to say,

I have to remind us that these are based upon economic models

which assume what cost profiles will be because they assume what

the cost of technology will be. They also assume what the damages

to the economic system will be from various levels of climate

change.
41

There is a wide range of uncertainty on both of those factors.

One of the things we learned after the OPEC price rises, which

were induced by political action, was that the economy responded

to those price rises through inventing much more efficient technologies. We now have the indelible benefits of the improved technology because of the inventive genius we had once we had an incentive.

One of the hopes of those people who call for modest solutions

like a low carbon tax, for example, is not that it will, under present

assumptions, eliminate the climate problem, but will help to induce

the kind of learning by doing and technological changes that can

make it much, much cheaper to abate carbon in the future and that

those steps need to begin now in order to get that process going.

I would commend the idea of what he said, not the three decimal

place precision. It’s not conceivable that we could have that kind

of precision, given that we don’t know yet what our technology

would be.

Just in your State, think about rice as you mentioned. You’re already in a warm summer state and therefore, the question isn’t

just what the cost is of the rice emissions, it’s also what is the damage to the rice farmers if you increase the numbers of a certain

kind of heat waves. That’s what we call climate damage.

What we’re trying to do in these optimizations is balance a guess

of how the world would be damaged by climate change against a

guess of what the costs would be to the economy of say, increasing

the price of energy.

That leaves out the whole range of surprises like the ozone hole

and other factors, so it could very well be cost effective to have

much more control than is on this chart if we were unlucky and

it turned out the damages were higher than the best guess.

Senator HUTCHINSON. I’d like to agree completely with everything Mr. Schneider just said.

Senator CHAFEE. Excellent.

Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I’d like to direct a couple or three questions to Dr. Barron.

Dr. Barron, according to the 1995 IPCC report, there has been

some pretty substantial strides differentiating greenhouse gases released naturally and greenhouse gases caused by humans. Do you

agree with that?

Dr. BARRON. Do I agree with the precise numbers?

Senator ALLARD. No. Do you agree there has been substantial advancement scientifically in being able to measure greenhouse gases

caused by natural causes as opposed to human origin?

Dr. BARRON. I think that makes sense.

Senator ALLARD. Could you detail for me the amount of greenhouse gases you would attribute to human sources as opposed to

natural sources?

Dr. BARRON. I don’t think in some precise number, it’s a number

that I know what it is. Sorry. I work more on the climate modeling

side of things and less on the biologic-chemical flux side of this.

Senator ALLARD. Do you know whether or not there’s been an attempt by the committee or anybody to break down these emissions
42

by country so that we would know the impact of the Annex I countries, for example, versus developing countries?

Dr. BARRON. There are all kinds of assessments that go country

by country.

Senator ALLARD. Did the IPCC try and break those down and

you do have some conclusions on that. OK. I’ll want to run down

those conclusions and review those.

The 1995 report seemed to modify greatly certain predictions

that were made earlier, particularly if we look at the 1990 report.

The 1995 report estimates for an increase in global mean surface

air temperature one-third lower than those estimated in the 1990

report.

The 1995 report indicated that sea level changes are 25 percent

lower than estimated in 1990. Many of you had indicated that

there was considerable modification. If that’s the case, why

shouldn’t we maintain a good case of skepticism on the 1995 report? What’s changed?

Dr. BARRON. I think you should maintain a level of skepticism

and I think several people have mentioned this uncertainty issue.

Of course you’ve got to realize we’re trained basically almost at

birth as prenatal scientists to question everything and to focus on

all the uncertainties of every particular issue. It doesn’t really release us from responsibility on some of the decisionmaking.

Part of the progress that you will make over a period of time between those assessments is that in some cases, you’re going to see

that a focal point like aerosols and aerosol effect on clouds wasn’t

as clearly recognized and for which over 5 years, people began to

look at that particular factor may cause the estimates to be smaller

or extend the time scale of the warming.

You also see that there are time periods that the advanced

knowledge adds a level of uncertainty. We’re just beginning to realize that vegetation, if it changes with the climate that’s projected,

is going to contribute to the climate change in itself. It isn’t just

something that’s passive.

So these things become initially areas of uncertainty and as

progress goes on, then we begin to add higher levels of uncertainty.

To tell you the truth, if I look back over the broad history of this

problem, the things we’ve had questions about, we’ve had questions

about for about 20–25 years because it takes a long time to solve

some of these things.

The broad picture of the warming is not dramatically different.

Senator ALLARD. You bring up the balance of the plants and the

interaction. I’m trying to think in my own mind. If we assumed on

the plant side we had adequate nutrients and we increase water

or water vapor, we increase humidity and we increase temperature,

I would expect plants to grow more, bigger, faster and I would expect the by-product from that would be more oxygen.

I’m not sure there is enough discussion. In my comments, I

talked about the buffer part of the system. I don’t think there’s

enough discussion about that.

Dr. BARRON. That is an issue that is really just beginning to

come on line in terms of how high latitude plants will respond because we’ve gone from the point of looking at the atmosphere with
43

trying to couple all these different components of the system. I

know that’s going to introduce uncertainty.

There are some areas that also build a little bit of confidence

that you know the climate system is sensitive and you know these

models can’t be too far wrong in some ways. I’ll just give you one

example.

We’re now at the point where there have been literally hundreds

of experiments in trying to predict past planets because we can

predict the present day but that’s how we built the model. You predict the future, you don’t know whether you’re right or wrong.

You can go back in the past and try to predict the last Ice Age

or the last warming episode. In the hundreds that have been done

with models all over the world, there is not a single case of a model

overpredicting the climate of the past, cold or warm.

Senator BAUCUS. What do you mean by overpredicting?

Dr. BARRON. That means that the geologic record says it was cold

and you used one of these climate models and it said it was colder

than what it actually was or you use one of these climate models

to predict a time period that was warm and it actually made it

warmer than it actually was in the past.

Senator BAUCUS. So they didn’t overpredict?

Dr. BARRON. In every single case, it underpredicts. There’s a lot

we don’t know.

Senator BAUCUS. Underpredict cold and warm?

Dr. BARRON. Underpredict cold and warm. There’s a lot we don’t

know about the climate system, there’s a lot we don’t know about

that data, but it begins to be suspicious when you look at every single time period and you discover you underpredict.

One other example, you can take that same range, severe storms

leave a remarkable record in sediment, ripping up sediment stones.

You can take different continental positions, different CO2 levels

that geologists think occurred and almost every storm deposit that

we have that’s been recorded in the geologic record comes up under

the model predicted storm tracks.

I would say there’s something about the characteristics of those

simulations that must be fairly robust. There’s a lot of things in

there I wouldn’t trust at all. I think you can come up with this ordered list, but I think there’s evidence that we have a sensitive system on our hands.

Senator ALLARD. If I have time, I do have a question for you, Dr.

Schneider, but go ahead and respond.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Briefly, I was going to clarify that the comment

you made before about how early reports suggested warmings on

the order of five degrees as the top number, then that went down

to three and the sea levels come down. There is an important clarification and distinction I wanted to make.

There was no difference from the first report to the second report

of the IPCC or, in fact, over the last several reports of the National

Research Council, on the basic sensitivity of the climate to a given

change in carbon dioxide. That’s not what changed.

What changed was the assumption of what human behavior

would be, how much sulfate aerosols would be generated, for example, and the assumption that was made in the 1995 report was that

China would have uncontrolled coal burning that would produce
44

lots of sulfate aerosols that would offset some of the global warming.

Now the current assumptions are that they will not allow that

on health grounds and therefore, those combined global warming

numbers will probably, in the next assessment, creep right back

up. It was the difference in the assumptions as to what people will

do, not a difference in the sensitivity of the models that caused the

change in projections.

Senator ALLARD. I’ve been called to order by the chairman, but

hopefully we can come back and maybe continue some of this discussion later.

Senator CHAFEE. Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m going to cut

mine down to only 4 minutes because I’m running out of time. If

you can keep your answers short, I’d appreciate it.

Dr. Barron, I didn’t see your testimony before the meeting, but

you said we maintain a sophisticated observation system. We have

the satellite but not the continuity. I don’t know what you mean

by ‘‘not the continuity.’’

Dr. BARRON. You can take, for instance, the MSU records.

There’s a paper that just appeared in Nature which basically looks

at other techniques and thought there was an issue about the

trends because it’s not a single satellite.

I have a great deal of faith that John Christy knows that data

inside and out, but here it becomes a matter of some debate because it’s multiple satellites. Now we’ve set about in this Nation to

create an earth-observing system with which we can address issues

like that and make sure that we can begin to have this long-term

record.

That system has gone through a tremendous amount of debate

and we don’t want to launch the same thing over again. We’ve finally come down to the point where we’re going to launch a couple

of these satellites. We’ve got about 9 months to decide on what the

next set of satellites are like and we’re not ready.

Senator INHOFE. Dr. Christy, do you have any response to that?

Dr. CHRISTY. Just that, yes, we used nine satellites to piece the

record together but as I showed by the independent validation, it

was done correctly.

Senator INHOFE. Dr. Barron, you are predicating a lot of these

predictions on the computer models and I think last April there

was an article in the Washington Post, if you can help me through

this, where the National Weather Service was trying to predict the

cresting of the river in North Dakota. In a 2-week period, they

went from 49 feet to 50 feet to 52.5 and 54 and so forth.

I guess the question I would ask is aren’t there more variables

in predicting, as in your discussion, than there would be in something like this? When you talk about a timeframe of 2 weeks,

wouldn’t the incidence of accuracy be damaged a little by looking

at 100 years versus 2 weeks?

Dr. BARRON. It’s true, except you also have to realize that

weather prediction is quite different than climate prediction. In

weather prediction, you’re basically starting at an initial stage

which is observed and you’re carrying that forward based on laws
45

of physics into the future and you’re updating it with the new observations as you go along.

What that means is the error grows the farther you go into the

future and so that’s basically weather prediction. To predict something 2 weeks in advance is a very challenging issue.

In climate prediction, you’re basically looking at a set of factors

that forced the system to change and you’re attempting to see what

is in equilibrium or balance with those particular forcing factors.

It has a completely different set of problems and errors. We don’t

want to just accept what it says, it has a completely different set

but the two issues are quite distinct.

Senator INHOFE. Dr. Jorgenson, I have a quote from your book.

You submitted kind of an outline as opposed to the test of your remarks, so one of my staff read your book, ‘‘The Economic Effect of

Carbon Tax.’’ It says, ‘‘Stabilizing the atmosphere and concentration of carbon dioxide which would lead to an eventual stabilization

of temperature would require reducing emissions by 50 percent relative to 1990, a very costly policy.’’

My question would be, a minute ago you said we’re not talking

about capping, we’re talking about reducing the growth. When I

read this, my interpretation was capping. Was my interpretation

wrong?

Dr. JORGENSON. What I did in that paper was to look at the consequences of various policies. I considered stabilizing the climate,

which is what you’re referring to; I considered stabilizing emissions, which is the objective of the Rio Summit Agreement; and

what I put in my written testimony and in the outline you referred

to is the economist’s best policy defined by the one that produces

the most benefits relative to the cost.

That doesn’t involve capping the climate or capping emissions.

What it involves is reducing the growth of emissions very, very

modestly. That means that the climate is going to continue to

change and that we’re going to have to learn to adapt to that.

Senator INHOFE. But the treaty that we’re going to be looking at

is talking about capping, isn’t it?

Dr. JORGENSON. I think that it’s to be determined because at the

moment, there are a number of proposals on the table. The small

island states needless to say, a relatively insignificant group from

the political point of view, is talking about reducing emissions by

20 percent. The Europeans—they don’t agree on this, in particular

the British don’t agree with this—have talked about reducing emissions by 15 percent.

The goal that is to be advocated by our Administration in the

Kyoto meetings and the meetings that lead up to it is to be determined. They don’t actually say what the goal is. What I’m saying

is it is up to you to determine that. That is what I suggest you do.

I’ve laid out what I believe that should be, namely a very, very

modest reduction.

Senator INHOFE. I am out of time. I have one last question I’d

like to ask. I know scientists cannot answer questions yes or no,

but I’m going to ask you to do that or not answer it at all, starting

with Dr. Barron.

It’s a yes or no question. You mentioned, Dr. Barron, in your testimony that the models have limitations causing uncertainties. The
46

Administration is moving forward with a treaty which will be finalized in December. Will we have these uncertainties answered by

December, starting with you?

Dr. BARRON. Absolutely not.

Dr. LINDZEN. No.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. No.

Dr. JORGENSON. No.

Senator INHOFE. I do have other questions I’ll submit in writing.

Senator CHAFEE. Dr. Jorgenson, as I understand what you’re advocating is that we don’t try and stabilize our emissions at some

year, but that we seek, I believe you used the term modest reductions. Those I think you were seeking to achieve by what, 2023, or

something like that?

Dr. JORGENSON. No. This would be a continuous process. I’d like

to begin as soon as possible and continue indefinitely. This is not

a problem that’s going to go away.

Senator CHAFEE. The trouble is we have to have incentives to

make us take that tact, that approach, limitations of some type. In

other words, some witness said when the oil embargo came, the

country responded and came up with alternatives and lowered fuel

consumption. Yes, that’s absolutely true but there was a driving

force; the driving force was the oil embargo.

We had the reduction in CFCs because we mandated them pursuant to the Montreal protocol and so forth.

Therefore, it seems to me that in order to get these, we’ve got

to have some mandate to force us in that direction. This is not

easy. Let me just give you a tiny illustration.

Because of the Social Security Fund problems in 1983, we enacted some social security reforms and indeed, increased the retirement age from 65 to 67, being gradually phased in starting at the

turn of the century and extending up to 2023.

Also, many of us voted to make the Medicare age correspond

with that. You think that’s pretty gentle, 2023. Nobody can get too

excited about that, but it doesn’t turn out that way. There is a lot

of resistance to that. The House of Representatives, I think will see

that as this conference goes along.

Just because something is in the out years doesn’t necessarily

make it much easier to achieve. It should work out that way, but

we’ve got to have a driving force. What are you suggesting be that

driving force?

Dr. JORGENSON. Senator, the driving force I think in environmental policy is always the same, namely it’s the damages. These

damages sometimes take the form of health effects, as in the case

of the Clean Air Act, we’ve talked about sanitation associated with

clean water standards, cleaning up the Cuyahoga River and things

like that.

In this case, we now have a substantial amount of economic evidence and it’s based on the following idea. That is that changing

the climate with all the uncertainties that have been described by

this panel is something that is going to have a negative, not gigantic, but a negative effect on agriculture. It’s going to have a negative effect on forestry, it’s going to have a negative effect on our requirements for energy, for heating and cooling. It’s going to have

a negative effect on the coastal areas.
47

It’s easy to exaggerate that but nonetheless, we will be confronted by coastal damage which will require efforts at mitigation

that involve building dikes and the sort of thing that has been done

in the Netherlands for centuries. All of those things add up to

about the equivalent of a whole year of economic growth over the

next century. That is not the most dramatic problem you’re ever

going to confront in the environmental arena, but it is nonetheless

a very substantial amount of damage.

That is the motivating force for the concern of scientists, economists and others. How do we mitigate that damage? The answer

is that we do it very gradually. It’s not something that is dramatic

and overwhelming. It’s something that requires modest but nonetheless substantial measures. That’s what I’ve tried to place before

you.

I’d like to make one qualification. That is the emphasis in this

panel, both in terms of the questions that the panelists have asked

and the responses that you’ve heard from the scientists is uncertainty. That is an argument in favor of action, not an argument in

favor of inaction.

That leads to the recommendation that now is the time when we

need to think about these things as you and your fellow panelists

have decided to do. I think that’s the driving force. It’s the damages

to our economy, the damages to our ecology, the damages to our environment that will result from global warming with the uncertainties that we’ve heard about.

Senator CHAFEE. Let me ask the panelists. You heard Dr. Jorgenson recite the potential problems as he sees them. Do you agree

those problems exist—shall exist.

Dr. BARRON. I think that if you start to make a list and you go

sector by sector. If you start to do that, then I think there is a lot

of reason to be concerned.

Senator CHAFEE. What do you say?

Dr. LINDZEN. Yes, I’m very perplexed by Dale’s remarks. If the

emission caps and emission reductions will lead to very little mitigation of climate, then your more relaxed approaches would have

an unmeasurable effect on climate. So if they have a benefit, it

must be something unrelated to climate. What is the benefit?

Dr. JORGENSON. I’m sorry. Maybe I didn’t make myself clear. The

policies that I’ve advocated are precisely those that reduce the

damages and do it at minimum cost. That’s the economist’s approach.

Dr. LINDZEN. What damages with respect to climate do they minimize?

Dr. JORGENSON. The measures that I proposed are measures that

involve reducing emissions and thereby gradually reducing the

change in the climate. That’s something that will have benefits for

farming, benefits for forestry.

Dr. LINDZEN. Excuse me, Dale. You keep saying that but what

you’re proposing by emissions reductions, rate of increase will have

almost no impact on climate.

Dr. JORGENSON. It will have a very modest impact on climate. I

emphasized in my presentation, I hope, that the climate will continue to change. We not only need to mitigate the change in the

way I’ve suggested, we need to adapt to the change that’s going to
48

take place, which is your point. Therefore, I think we’re in agreement unless I misunderstood you.

Dr. LINDZEN. No, no. I just didn’t understand what the point was

at all in reducing the emissions vis-a ́-vis climate.

Dr. JORGENSON. Not to eliminate climate change. I certainly

didn’t mean to suggest that there’s any way that is economically

attractive of putting climate change at an end. That is not the objective of the policy that I’m advocating.

What we need to do is to mitigate that change, to slow the

change, but the climate, as you’ve emphasized, will go on changing.

Senator CHAFEE. I think you left him perplexed. You’ve got me

semi-perplexed. Now that I understand what you’re saying, I’m not

sure I agree with you.

What you’re saying is the climate is going to change because of

man’s actions.

Dr. LINDZEN. No. He’s saying if it changes, any policy will not

impact that. If it isn’t changing——

Dr. JORGENSON. That’s not right. Why don’t you try, Senator.

Senator CHAFEE. Doctor, you can mark my blue book.

Dr. JORGENSON. I’ve never marked the blue book of a Yale man.

[Laughter.]

Senator CHAFEE. What you’re saying is that man’s actions are

causing climate change. It will have, as we go into the next century, significant effects on agriculture, forestry, the oceans and so

forth.

By starting now with modest mitigation efforts, namely reducing

some of the CO2 that we’re releasing into the atmosphere, we will

reduce the effects. We’re not going to eliminate them, but we will

reduce the effects and presumably by reducing these effects, we

will be able to adjust to these effects as we go along.

Dr. JORGENSON. If you don’t mind my marking that blue book as

A-plus. You got it exactly right.

Senator CHAFEE. I’ll take it and move on.

Senator Baucus.

Senator BAUCUS. I’d just like to follow up. Frankly, I think we’re

in a real dilemma here because if the efforts are modest—$10 a ton

by 2025, whatever—I don’t know if that’s going to have a significant reduction on emissions.

At least now the economy is doing OK. As I see the utility vehicles that people buy and the gas guzzlers, they buy big cars and

so on, I just don’t know if that level is going to have a significant

effect at all which gets a little bit into the other side of the coin.

Sometimes we just need a shock to force changes in peoples’ actions, to develop new technologies and so forth. The oil shock did

it. Sputnik sure did. We woke up and saw Sputnik flying around

and that galvanized us into action.

Generally it’s my judgment politically nothing really happens unless either there is a crisis or there is extraordinary leadership. I

don’t see a lot of the latter.

Dr. JORGENSON. I think although it’s invisible, we’ve had serious

efforts inside the Administration to formulate a climate policy that

would meet the objectives that I think all of you are concerned

about. I think you’re going to hear more of that. There is a lot of

concern politically out there in the population about climate issues.
49

I think the focus needs to be the following. If we look at the impact of the oil crisis—I think it’s important to come back to that—

we had the benefit there of experience, namely that increases in

prices, just increases in prices by themselves had the effect of stabilizing emissions.

Senator BAUCUS. Dramatic increases in prices.

Dr. JORGENSON. Dramatic increases in prices, stabilizing emissions from 1973, the beginning of the oil crisis until 1987. That’s

the longest period in recent history for which we’ve been able to

stabilize emissions. So we know how to achieve the goals of climate

policy.

Now we come to the question Senator Chafee addressed which is,

what should those goals be. There, I think we don’t need to be dramatic. We need to say there is a need which I think you’ve heard

testimony on this morning and you’re going to hear more testimony

on.

Senator INHOFE. I understand that but I think there’s a dilemma

here. I don’t think it’s going to shock people into change frankly

and change behavior. I just don’t know that.

Another question I have is with respect to other countries. You

mentioned developing countries don’t produce much. An exception

is China.

Dr. JORGENSON. Right.

Senator INHOFE. I heard someone mention not too long ago that

if there is about 3 billion more tons of carbon produced in the world

in the next 20 years and one-third of it will be produced in China

because of their power plants primarily. That’s significant.

Dr. JORGENSON. That is significant, Senator, but let’s just focus

on China. China is a country which has undergone a lot of economic reform and it’s been very successful in producing economic

growth.

The one thing they have left untouched is their market for energy. They have continued to maintain energy prices well below

world levels. Think, by contrast, with the countries of the former

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which are also very energy intensive. Those economies have reduced their emissions dramatically as a result of moving their energy prices to world levels. That

is essentially the policy that we need to think about for China, not

something that involves endorsing an international agreement. We

need to get them to focus on reforming part of their economy which

is the energy sector. We need them to move their energy prices, especially the price for electricity to which you alluded, to world market levels.

What does that mean in practice? That means that they will

need fewer power plants than they otherwise would need. It means

they’re going to make efforts to reduce their reliance on coal. You

can already see them moving in other directions just by what they

know about the forces that will be at work in the future.

They have not taken the critical step and that’s where we can

play a role. Namely, they have not decontrolled energy prices in the

Chinese economy, so they have not had the kind of dramatic reductions in energy use that we’ve seen in the former Soviet Union, another ex-communist country or in the countries of Eastern Europe.
50

I think there is an opportunity to do something about China entirely outside the framework of the kind of international agreement

that will be debated at Kyoto. That should be the goal of our diplomats specifically Under Secretary Wirth, the Under Secretary of

State in charge of global affairs. I hope he’s going to focus on that

in Kyoto.

Senator INHOFE. Is El Nin ̃ o at all relevant to anything we’re talking about here today?

Dr. LINDZEN. Can I answer that a little bit?

Senator INHOFE. Yes.

Dr. LINDZEN. There have been a number of studies while Wallace, Zhang and others at the University of Washington and elsewhere. These are leading scholars on El Nin ̃ o, looking at the

changes in El Nin ̃ o and trying to decide whether they have produced the changes of temperature in the 1970’s or whether it goes

the reverse.

By and large, changing patterns associated with Enso seem to

have played a major role according to Wallace’s papers in the temperature change observed in the 1970’s. This is part of the autonomous variability of the system.

Dr. BARRON. But that begs the question of why El Nin ̃ o changed.

Dr. LINDZEN. That’s all right but you take the view that all

changes occur because something forced them.

Dr. BARRON. No, I wasn’t. I was just saying there wasn’t an answer to a question there.

Senator BAUCUS. Dr. Schneider.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. First of all, El Nin ̃ o is a natural phenomena and

has been for a long time, although there have been some very unusual El Nin ̃ os in terms of prolonged ones and some very intense

ones, which has naturally raised the question, ‘‘Gee, it happened at

the same time the climate was changing. Maybe these are not independent events.’’

The answer is we haven’t got a clue what the answer is. This

could be another one of those imaginable surprises. It’s simply one

of the risks we take when we modify the system. We do not know

if they are connected or disconnected—yet.

However, one thing we do know from El Nin ̃ o is that social and

economic systems still remain vulnerable to extremes of climate

and weather. We can quantify how those rapid changes can lead

to significant impacts in terms of droughts, floods and so forth.

That lesson tells us that we’re vulnerable to natural variability.

But are we vulnerable to unnatural variability? The answer is

probably yes, but if we had some advanced warning—that’s where

the research comes in—and if we knew exactly what would be happening, we’d be more able to adapt than otherwise.

The question is how can you reduce the most rapid rates of

change which, I would argue, would be more likely to cause unpredictable extreme variability than slower rates of change.

Senator BAUCUS. What’s your reaction to Dr. Jorgenson’s comments?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. I’m glad you asked but the red light kept coming

on so I kept not having them.

I was going to call your attention to a figure I had in my written

testimony, Figure 3, which Bill Nordhaus prepared. He was frus-
51

trated when he was trying to do exactly the same thing many years

ago as a pioneer of this kind of work—to try to balance in an optimizing framework, the mitigation costs and damages due to climate.

What you want to reduce first is the cost of abatement, trying

to mitigate CO2 by increasing the price of energy, which might hurt

the economy. He was attacked from all sides because he picked 1

percent loss of GDP for his climate damage function.

He was attacked by environmentalists because this value underestimated, in their opinions, damage to nature and it neglected

health effects. He was attacked by others for the point about resilience, that his 1 percent GDP damage estimate neglected CO2 fertilization effects—which could be benefits.

So he asked a number of people, about 18 or 19 people—I was

one of them—and he conducted a survey and said what do you believe climate change damages would be? We recognize you can’t calculate it precisely, but you study the fields, so give your best guesses.

In my testimony Figure 3 shows the two different scenarios of

change, 3 and 6 degrees, and what he found is that the economists

as a group tended to have lower climate damage estimates but they

were not negligible. They would assign a 10 percent chance of a

benefit. Their 50th percentile estimate was about half of a percent

loss of GDP and then their 10th percentile radical number on the

high side was several percent loss of GDP. So again, it’s a risk

question. They viewed climate damage across a wide range.

When Nordhaus asked the natural scientists, they gave a factor

of 20 higher in their estimates of climate damages, to which Bill

quipped that, ‘‘those who know the most about the economy aren’t

so worried.’’ I counter-quipped, ‘‘those who know the most about

nature are.’’

Part of the difference is that the natural scientists were less optimistic about the resilience of nature than the economists. But you

can’t know for certain. We’re not going to have the uncertainties

resolved in time either. The sword of uncertainty has two edges

and one edge is we might be lucky and things will come down. The

other edge is we might not be so lucky and it’s back to risk management again.

To me, the best way to manage risk is to have flexible management, because in a state of large uncertainty, you don’t want to

make irreversible decisions. You don’t want to make irreversible

decisions that damage the economy, nor do you want to make irreversible decisions that damage the ecology.

My support for Dale Jorgenson’s call for a modest tax is not because I think that over the long term, I want to see only a small

percentage of climate change be mitigated, but I’d like to get the

experiment started of finding out how that tax would induce technological change, how the prices of alternatives would come down

so there isn’t an economic catastrophe from a big change being

needed later on.

If we don’t start that process now, we’ll be building power plants

which have 40-year life times that will emit a lot.

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you.

Senator CHAFEE. Senator Sessions.
52

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It’s a fascinating subject and I’m not going to ask a lot of questions. I’m sorry I was unable to be here. I consider this a most important hearing but I did have markup on a juvenile justice bill on

a committee I chair and it was important for me.

Dr. Christy, first, I want to welcome you here. I’m delighted that

the chairman could invite you. I’ve read about some of your work

and have not had the chance to meet you.

I know you are funded by NASA and have done extensive work.

In some respects, it shows that parts of the atmosphere have actually cooled in the last number of years, is that correct?

Dr. CHRISTY. Yes. We’re looking at the troposphere, a region that

should have warmed if climate models are correct in their projections and that has not been the case to the extent that the climate

models have indicated.

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I know Dr. Jorgenson indicated that the cause is uncertain and there may be even more need

to act, but there are certain things that we can know with certainty. That is, if we spent more money on emergency rooms and

certain medical treatment programs, we could save large numbers

of lives. So we have to decide what we’re going to expend our resources on as a Nation.

We’re talking about a major environmental commitment when

we may have little, if any, benefit from it when we know there are

alternatives that we could expend our resources on that would preserve benefits.

You see the situation about the Third World. How many lives

would be saved if throughout the Third World there were electric

generating plants as good as the ones in the United States, polluting somewhat, but how many lives would be saved if they had

cheap electricity as we do in the United States.

That’s really all I have to say. I’m interested in this subject. I

consider it important for the Nation and the world and hope to

learn more about it as we go.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you know, I’ve associated myself with the efforts of Senator

Byrd and others on this issue. The main reason I’ve done so is

couched in the question I’ll put to all members of the panel.

Given that the current negotiations are focused on stabilizing

and reducing greenhouse gas emissions from developed nations

only, has the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change determined if there will be any discernible—that’s the word I use,

maybe there is a better one—discernible environmental benefit in

terms of the amount of projected temperature increase or sea level

rise as a consequence from implementing these proposals only on

the developed nations?

Dr. Christy or Dr. Schneider, why don’t you start off?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. I want to make sure I understand the question.

The discernible benefit of?

Senator WARNER. If you just apply it to the developed nations

and not the undeveloped, is there any likelihood there is going to

be any benefit?
53

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. I think there would be several benefits but

it would not be an optimal benefit.

Senator WARNER. Not a what?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Not an optimal one. It would be much better to

have everybody play. In that sense, I agree with you, but let me

clarify that. I’ll try to do it briefly.

If nobody takes a first step, there will never be a step. Who

should take the first step, one would assume that those people in

a more economically favorable position to do so, and that’s been

considered in the world forum to be at least the richer nations.

The second reason is that since the richer nations have contributed the largest amount of cumulative emissions, that is, if you

look back between now and what’s been emitted over the last century, the bulk of what’s out there is due to our activities.

In the future, that will change, there is no question of that, but

we got the problem started. We had the victorian industrial revolution which even if powered by dirty power sources led nonetheless

to an improved standard of living and there are other countries

that would like to copy us in doing that.

They see our attempts to impose higher prices on them as trying

to prevent them from doing what we were freely able to do and we

polluted and now we’re asking them not to. I think in that sense,

there is a fairness argument.

However, you’re all correct in saying that if we continue the policy of just having small segments of the world reducing emissions,

that would not have nearly the impact as otherwise, so what we’re

trading off is essentially an efficiency versus equity argument.

If you’ll indulge me in a cliche, I agree in this sense with the

Byrd resolution, that everybody has to play for us to be effective

but not necessarily everybody has to pay. We can argue that within

the next couple of decades China will have larger emissions than

the United States, but that will be in absolute terms, not per capita

terms. Therefore, we could, in the sense of the planetary bargain

in the international forum, argue about what is fair for the distribution of cost. Certainly you cannot have the developing world

as nonplayers for a long time and then make a difference.

Senator WARNER. I think we’ve got your perspective. Anyone

else?

Dr. JORGENSON. Yes. I’d like to chime in on this. I think the important thing is to think about the time dimension for policy. You

and your colleagues every year have to consider taxes, you have to

consider the budget, every year.

Senator WARNER. We try to do it every other year. You’re speaking to very senior members of the tax panel when you look at the

chairman and ranking member of this committee.

Dr. JORGENSON. Right, but this is something that was considered

in 1992 and ended up with the treaty that was ratified by the Senate in 1994. We are now 3 years later if there is a treaty proposed

in Kyoto, it will take a while to ratify. I would say it’s something

that will extend over a period of about 5 years.

There will undoubtedly be further climate negotiations. That’s

the point. Bringing in the developing countries is going to have a

time dimension to it that will provide opportunities to take advan-
54

tage of the benefits of having those countries play. Who pays remains to be determined by the negotiations.

It’s not something that is a matter of great urgency and it’s not

a reason that we ought not to take action now. We will sacrifice

some efficiency but that is going to be very, very modest. What we

ought to focus on is setting in course a process that will bring those

countries into the negotiating arena and get them to be players at

the appropriate time.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Lindzen.

Dr. LINDZEN. Yes. Could I answer it briefly? If you do not bring

in China, no matter what you believe about climate——

Senator WARNER. You say if we do not bring China in?

Dr. LINDZEN. If you do not bring in China and India, no matter

what you believe about climate, the impact on climate will be very

little.

I guess I hear underneath what you’re saying is, the reason you

want to do something is to see how people would respond to such

regulations to get a better idea. That may be an advantage, but the

advantage will not be for climate due to these actions.

Senator WARNER. I thank the chair.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

Senator Sessions, do you have any other questions?

Senator SESSIONS. Again, I’m troubled by the thought you’re willing to sacrifice some efficiency but I’ve learned in the 6 months or

so that I’ve been here that group after group after group comes before the U.S. Government and ask, it only cost a little bit to do this

program or this regulation only increases costs a minimal amount,

so incrementally pretty soon you have hampered this Nation’s ability to be competitive in the world.

We already are losing large numbers of jobs around the world.

I think, I for one, want to know that there is identifiable sound

science that indicates to a significant degree we can improve this

global climate before we take action.

Would anybody like to comment on that and correct me if I’m

wrong in my thoughts?

Dr. Schneider.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. I certainly agree with you that we need to base

all judgments on sound science, but we have a definition problem.

Sound science does not necessarily mean certain science. To me

what sound science means is the best judgment of the state-of-theart of the community of the range of possible outcomes.

That is what these reports (e.g., IDCC) try to do and in that communication, there is always a fair degree of uncertainty. As I said

earlier, that uncertainty includes mild and catastrophic outcomes

as relatively low probability possibilities and almost everything

else in between more likely.

As we continue to do more research, hopefully we’ll be narrowing

those ranges of uncertainties but everybody agrees they won’t narrow that rapidly. Therefore, the question is whether we fear more

investing present resources as you said, which have many good

competitive uses, as a hedge against some potential risk in the future or whether we fear more the investment or whether we fear

more having those risks unfold.
55

What Dale Jorgenson was suggesting is a modest policy to get

started is probably a good way to go. I personally share that view.

It is an experiment on how well we can do things and it is absolutely essential to reevaluate after every assessment which pops up

every 5 years—in my testimony I refer to them as ‘‘rolling reassessments.’’

We must continue to reassess, knowledge may change of both the

climate system and its impacts and the economic costs as new technologies are developed and we need a policy instrument flexible

enough to crank up or down our concern as new information occurs.

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Lindzen.

Dr. LINDZEN. I think Steve likes to emphasize the consensus on

certainty and he always likes to point to a survey where I suggested there was less uncertainty, at least if I had to make a best

guess.

The authors of the study, which Steve never quotes, point out

that the behavior they see for the consensus is a herd instinct, not

a scientific instinct. I think one issue we’ll have to deal with in

time, and I think John has been contributing to that, is we’ve had

for over 20 years the estimates being based on models and the assumption that one of them must be right. It hasn’t changed in 20

years.

As Steve said, what has changed is they put in different forcing

by assuming that. That is a horrendous state that we haven’t focused in 20 years on pinning down this answer better. I think some

efforts are beginning to go toward that.

I think if you listen carefully to what you’ve heard here, you’ll

find that John finds it’s not warming. The models say it should be

warming throughout the atmosphere. Steve says let’s look at the

surface.

If you wanted to focus, you’d say if there is a discrepancy between the air and the surface, the surface then is not greenhouse.

You’d begin to focus on the problem, pin down the science and get

a firmer answer. I think we have to be worried about a science that

isn’t doing that for 20 years.

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Barron.

Dr. BARRON. I was just going to say if you believe you should

control emissions, I think the developed countries have to go first

or else you’re not going to get any of the other countries to follow.

I also agree if you don’t get China and India involved in there

eventually, the impact is going to be minimal.

Senator CHAFEE. When you say the impact will be minimal?

Dr. BARRON. The impact on mitigating the projected climate

change.

Senator CHAFEE. The impact to the other nations.

Dr. BARRON. Yes. I asked a class of 200 students every semester

to take all the numbers from emissions from different countries

and the United States and come up with a strategy that would reduce them. It’s practically impossible.

Tell you the truth, I personally, even though I also agree this

might get us some efficiencies and learn how to do things, I personally don’t think we’re going to be successful until there are emergencies.
56

I suspect that the strategies we should involve ourselves in are

ones that are adaptation oriented. I think the focus we have to take

is to balance the economic issues that people are talking about

against the vulnerabilities to all these changes and include natural

variability. If you’re vulnerable to natural variability, then I think

it suggests you have to make an investment in these directions.

Dr. JORGENSON. Could I underline my agreement with what Dr.

Barron just said? The real issue in this area, Senator, is adaptation. That’s the most important, single issue we need to focus on.

What we’ve been focusing on here to a good extent is the need

for mitigation. I’ve stated I think there is a need for mitigation, but

if you ask where the dollars are, where can we do the most good,

there’s no doubt adaptation is far more important and mitigation

is something that has to take second role.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. May I briefly add to that. There’s an area where

mitigation and adaptation become almost the same thing.

For example, suppose it turned out that the damages were at the

more serious end—I would give that a coin flip, I don’t know in advance whether it’s going to come out on the less or more serious

end—suppose we get a dramatic event or several events in the

weather that mobilized public opinion rightly or wrongly, demanding urgent action and like the OPEC embargo, and the damages to

the economy were done because of the sharpness of the price rise,

not because of the price rise itself. Long-term benefits came from

the price rise but there was significant damage from the sharpness.

To return to my point, if sudden events came along and the politics

changed and there was action with dramatic reversal of the nature

of the energy system (e.g., from coal to solar or nuclear), I think

that would be vastly more costly than if it were to take place slowly.

So one potential form of adaptation is an R&D policy. Whether

that’s direct subsidies or taxes or cap and trade or other factors as

I discuss in the appendix to my written testimony and others can

address, but if we could invest now in making those future alternatives both possible and cheaper, then you avoid the potential risk

to the economy should that 50 percent eventuality come out that

people want to really control the climate problem more so in the

future and you wouldn’t be hurt as badly.

In a sense, it is also adaptation to do that development of the alternatives that allow you to mitigate at a lower cost in the future.

Senator SESSIONS. I would just say it seems to me from what I’ve

heard, and I’ll be studying this with my staff and reading the transcript, but it seems to me what you’re saying is it’s uncertain that

we have global warming. No. 2, it’s pretty certain that if we act

unilaterally, it’s not going to have any impact on the environment.

I’m worried about working Americans who would bear the cost

of a policy that wouldn’t be effective if it were implemented. I guess

that’s my troublesome position.

Senator CHAFEE. Dr. Lindzen, if I understand what you’re saying, it seems to me that your point is it doesn’t make any difference

what we do.

Dr. LINDZEN. It depends on what you mean not making a difference. I’m saying if you believe models that say we’re going to get

four degrees warming by 2100, which is well in excess of what the
57

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is saying, then if you

were to reduce emissions to 20 percent below 1990 levels, which as

everyone seems to agree, we can’t do, you would end up maybe

with three degrees instead of four degrees.

I’m saying if you expect two degrees in 2100, we’re not sure, then

the proposed policy which is again, this exceedingly difficult policy,

might bring it down to 1.6. At that point, you’re already at the

level of natural variability.

However you view natural variability, we’ve shown we can adapt

to it, so I’m saying yes, no policy discussed and no argument made

so far would, if you believed in global warming, stop it.

Obviously, if you think that global warming is not occurring, it

also has impact, but I make the point in my testimony if our successors 50 years from now find there has been very little warming,

and we do introduce stabilization, the one thing we can be sure of

50 years from now is if there wasn’t warming, it was not due to

the stabilization. It was due to our overestimate of the sensitivity.

Dr. JORGENSON. But there is a very important point I think

needs to be added and that is, among the different alternatives

that Professor Lindzen just rehearsed, the economic costs differ

enormously. The economic costs of reducing emissions to something

like 20 percent below 1990 levels are astronomical by comparison

with the benefits.

Therefore, what we need to do is focus on something that is far

more modest. That, I think, is what you should take away from

this, that if we take the uncertainties that are involved and balance the cost against the benefits, we need to take a modest step,

not a dramatic step.

Senator CHAFEE. It seems to me that we don’t know. There is a

lot we don’t know about all this. However, there does seem to be

some global warming taking place. If that is so—I think it is so—

then we ought to do what we can about it.

Your point is there are some modest steps we can take that

aren’t going to wrench around the economy and devastate it but

that would have some effects. I take it, Dr. Lindzen would say

those steps you’re suggesting don’t amount to much. Is that unfair?

Dr. LINDZEN. No, that’s unfair. I’m saying more than that. I’m

saying what Dale is proposing, take the scenario you expect four

degrees, that would knock it down to 3.95. We couldn’t measure

that impact, we couldn’t even tell that it had an impact. So you’re

engaging in a policy where no one can assess whether you did anything.

Dr. JORGENSON. I beg to differ. If you look at Figure 5.4 in my

testimony, the effect on global mean temperature in the year 2105,

which is the end of this graph, it’s a good bit more than that under

the policy I would propose. It eliminates about 10 percent of the

warming that would otherwise take place.

Ten percent is not a dramatic number. It’s not 100 percent. That

is Professor Lindzen’s point and I agree with him, but I think you

shouldn’t underestimate the changes that would be required and

that can be justified on economic grounds.

I would say we need to focus on adaptation but there are steps

to mitigate the effects of climate change that could have the effect

of reducing some of the global warming. They are not, as Professor
58

Lindzen wants to emphasize, steps that will end global warming.

We are going to have some global warming if these figures are correct.

Dr. LINDZEN. Could I ask for one change in vocabulary? We’re

using warming in two senses. We’re using it in the passive sense

of change of temperature and we’re also using it in the active sense

of man having done something to warm the atmosphere.

So far there’s data that suggests there’s been very modest, passive warming of the climate system over the last century. As the

IPCC made very clear, we’re having almost no luck in being able

to attribute anything of this to man’s activities.

I think if we could be careful in the use of the word warming to

distinguish the two rather than mixing them.

Senator CHAFEE. Wait a minute. That’s quite a statement you’re

making. If I understand what you’re saying, it’s yes, indeed, the

globe has warmed up, temperatures are higher but it’s due to passive activities.

Dr. LINDZEN. No, no. I’m saying it’s a matter of the English language. We used the word ‘‘warm’’ to mean change of temperature

and we also use it as an active verb meaning we have caused something.

I’m saying the passive part is the temperature has changed a little bit. It really has been a little bit. Half a degree centigrade is

what the temperature change is while you wait for the street light

to change.

On the other hand, the IPCC has been very clear that they have

been unable to tell what fraction of that very small temperature

change has been due to man’s activities. So we’ve been unable to

pin down what we’re doing to it.

Dr. CHRISTY. I’d like to add something there. I was on that panel

that looked carefully at the temperature record of the past and we

included a statement in the IPCC that this century was the warmest of the past six. That’s not a very remarkable statement when

you think about it, but you looked at the data that we did have

available to us but we’re not quite as sure about, centuries in the

past were warmer than the present century.

You go from one century to the next and there are large changes.

The 21st Century will be different than this current one. It’s definitely the case that the 19th Century was unusually cool. Bouncing

back from that, as Dr. Lindzen said, is part of the natural variability which is why in my comment earlier, I made the statement

that most of what we’ve seen is due to natural variability.

Dr. BARRON. You just don’t know whether we’re bouncing back

from anything.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. How do you know we’re bouncing back? How do

you know it wasn’t stopped by the increase of emissions from initial

deforestation and industrialization? You’re presupposing you know

the climate is random. We don’t know that. That’s what we’re interested in figuring out.

Dr. CHRISTY. We’re looking at temperatures that were warmer in

past centuries than today.

Dr. BARRON. But how do you know that it wouldn’t have continued?
59

Senator CHAFEE. What does he know what wouldn’t have continued?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. That the recovery is in fact a recovery. Maybe

it’s induced. We don’t know that. That’s one of the difficult issues

where it might be partly related to some changes in the energy output of the sun. There are a number of aspects we can debate.

That’s what we’re trying to figure out, the relative amounts, but

you can’t presuppose that the recent variations in the system are

all natural.

Once we know that humans started changing the land surface

and started changing the atmosphere, which we began to do significantly in the 18th Century, so we cannot actually rule that potential influence out yet. That’s part of the debate.

Dr. BARRON. The objection occurs when he says the world is

bouncing back from an unusually cold period. It’s just as possible,

because of the way natural variability works, that it was in the

midst of bouncing to an even colder century and therefore we have

an even bigger problem than we’re thinking.

By saying that, he’s presupposing he knows the mechanisms and

the way natural variability works.

Dr. CHRISTY. I would say most of that occurred before these

events you’re talking about affected the climate.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. I’m not saying humans created a little Ice Age.

What I’m arguing is that it’s often said this is just the recovery

from that. Well, it’s the recovery but that doesn’t mean that there

wasn’t a human component of that recovery and that’s what we’re

trying to figure out.

Dr. CHRISTY. There’s a variance about that and that’s what we

said here earlier.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. The word modest has been the word of the day

and it’s a very good word and it’s one to which I subscribe. I’d like

us to have some modesty also as I said earlier, and let me reinforce

it, about let’s not underestimate what the technological capacity

and the inventive genius our society is.

If engineers and the companies of the world, with I think some

government involvement as well—and that balance is for you to decide—made it a determined plan to find alternative technologies

that could produce the service—we’re not interested in whether it’s

carbon dioxide, we’re interested in energy, the service that counts—

we can abate carbon cost effectively.

If we could produce the service by alternative means at lower

prices, then some combination of economic and ecological environmental wisdom would move us in that direction, but those technologies don’t invent themselves.

Therefore, what we’re talking about is what are the modest policies that can help us as an insurance policy to develop those technologies so we have that standby capacity should the future lead

us to, by bad luck, more serious outcomes.

Let me recall Dale’s presentation—with Dick and Dale arguing

about how many tenths of a degree would be saved by various optimized policies. Tim Roughgarden, an undergraduate student who is

in our senior honors program at Stanford, took a look at the

Nordhaus climate energy-economy model and instead of using the

damage function that Bill did—the 1 percent loss of GDP—we used
60

five published damage functions from other economists, ecologists

and others and he found there is about a factor of 10 difference in

their estimate of climate damages.

The amount of carbon tax varies by a factor of five in the optimum calculations just depending upon which one of those damage

functions you used. We don’t know the answer to which is correct

yet and there may even be others.

Therefore, the amount of climate change policy response needed

substantially varies depending upon what you assume about climate damage. I hope our modesty extends to also understanding

that optimal tax calculations have a very wide range of uncertainty

and there are many estimates that are much larger than those

used in Bill Nordhaus’ study for which there is a substantial scientific justification, although you can also justify the more modest

kind. Therefore, flexible instruments seem to be the most important message of the day.

Senator CHAFEE. In that quote you had from that certain Senator

Chafee, I think it was 10 years ago?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Nine.

Senator CHAFEE. As I recall, it was about doing something. We

don’t know what’s happening, but we’d better plan. Don’t take the

rosiest view, take a different view because it might occur. Could

you read that quote?

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Sure. I’d be delighted to.

If there is one point I could make, Mr. Chairman, it is this. There are a great

many questions about the greenhouse effect that can’t be answered today, but I

don’t think we ought to let scientific uncertainty paralyze us from doing anything.

It is always convenient to find an excuse not to do something and there is always

an excuse out there not to do something. I think the issue before is what steps

should we be taking today to help solve the problem in addition to doing more scientific research.

That was your quote from the Senate Energy Committee testimony in 1988.

Senator CHAFEE. I approve of that quote.

Do you have anything else, Senator?

Senator SESSIONS. I would like to ask one question. Are you satisfied as a Nation and the world, have we properly focused on establishing the best science that we can to answer where we are and

do we need to do anything to improve our scientific gathering of

evidence?

Dr. JORGENSON. Senator, you came in, as you said, after some of

the presentations, but a number of people quoted a Washington

Post piece by Robert Samuelson that appeared yesterday and that

is also in the current issue of Newsweek in which he presented his

view of the economics of the problem.

I think great advances in the economic understanding are called

for. He was talking about measures that would involve a $100 tax

on carbon as opposed to the kind of measures that I’ve been talking

about which are $10, a totally different order of magnitude.

Although I think a great deal of progress has been made in the

science, I think there is a great deal of need for better economic

understanding.

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Christy, is anyone asking you from the

Environmental Protection Agency?

Dr. CHRISTY. Give me more satellites and data.
61

Senator SESSIONS. And you think you could determine whether

or not this is happening?

Dr. CHRISTY. The upper atmosphere or the tropics, that’s an area

where we have little understanding. Climate models are clearly in

error in that region. Balloon networks are falling apart around the

world. This is an international problem when you’re talking about

surface observations.

Data is becoming very hard to get from other countries and that

hurts us in trying to understand how the system varies. So if those

barriers can be reduced and a systematic measuring system carried

forward, that would be my goal.

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Lindzen.

Dr. LINDZEN. Yes. I have a slightly oddball suggestion, but I

think if you want to solve problems with science, you need a stable

funding base for science so that scientists do not feel that if a problem gets solved, there goes their funding.

Senator SESSIONS. Time and again, we do have groups come in

from various independent agencies and you wonder if they all got

together under good leadership and hammered out these differences, could we reach a consensus.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing. I congratulate

you on your leadership on this issue over the years.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

Let me ask one final question if I might. The question is, do you

believe we know enough about the prospect of climate change to

embark upon a program to address it, some program? I’m not saying x billion but some program in order to address it?

Dr. BARRON. I personally think a combination of what we know

about the potential for human-induced changed and what we know

about natural variability suggests to me there is a lot of practical,

maybe what you’d call win-win things that you can and should do,

so I do think you need to embark on something.

Basically, I look at this as say the issue is health and you see

the health is tied to both natural variability and potential for climate change, it suggests that surveillance efforts on some of these

viruses, on the distribution of vectors, the mosquitoes, an ability to

have advanced warning systems, and public awareness are all

things that become logical for which you can substantially reduce

what the risk is and it helps you adapt.

The same thing occurs in water resources. If you’re sitting there

and you’re in a state and you’re living on the edge of your resources, and in the case of natural variability, you go through tremendous hiccups, problems or issues in terms of the availability of

the resource just by natural climate variability, I think it makes

sense to have some call to action there.

In a lot of cases, it’s win-win in the sense of the benefits you’d

get in not having the natural variability affect you to such great

degree, but we also discover that, for instance, industry collocates

with water availability.

Right now, in every single State in this Nation, they use, withdraw from streams about 25 percent of the available resource and

there’s a big difference in the availability of resources across this

Nation. That means the industry is sitting there locating next to

rivers and the same thing occurs for recreation.
62

So if you’re at risk, just a natural variability and you see this

risk extends also to climate change. I think there is a good reason

to something now, but these are protection against adaptation and

the expectation that in doing something now, you’ve saved yourself

money.

Senator CHAFEE. Dr. Lindzen.

Dr. LINDZEN. I think what Eric has said is hard to disagree with.

Fundamentally, one is saying no, we don’t know—we know enough

right now to know there is no action we will take that will change

what will happen vis-a ́-vis climate, but there are actions we can

take to make our society more robust.

As has been said in the past, if you can think of things that are

worth doing anyway, my argument has been to justify them on

what they will do anyway. I think the difficulty here is there may

be things that can make the society more robust to climate change.

There is very little we can do to affect whether there will be climate change or not.

Senator CHAFEE. Dr. Schneider.

Dr. SCHNEIDER. You called on us to make a conclusion, which as

you know, is a value judgment, namely do we fear more investing

present resources against something which might happen or do we

fear more letting it happen without trying to slow it down.

Then you said how much information does it take for us to make

such a judgment. That’s exactly the same question of how much information does it take to decide how much insurance to buy or how

much national security to buy through military investment. This is

exactly that same kind of problem.

I’m a risk averse person. I have earthquake insurance. A lot of

my colleagues don’t, living in California and the question is, how

much of it do we want to purchase.

Frankly we’ve been talking about what we’ve been saying over

the last 20 years. I thought we had enough scientific information

20 years ago to do the kinds of policies Eric Barron talked about,

namely make ourselves less vulnerable to the natural kind of variability. Dick Lindzen says, ‘‘Well, do that but don’t say it’s climate.’’

I would disagree with Dick in this sense. I would say, ‘‘Do a little

bit more as the insurance premium to deal with climate change.’’

I’m willing to make that investment personally and try to convince

people out in society they should make that small investment in

that insurance premium at the scale of our planet to reduce the

likelihood of the negative outcomes. If we can make those investments in something that makes sense anyway such as developing

alternative energy systems that have less air pollution, that can be

cheaper in the future and be more reliable, so much the better.

Dr. JORGENSON. Senator Chafee, I’d just like to sum up my remarks. As you suggested, I’ve already laid out my proposals but let

me be explicit about it.

One thing we could do right away that would have a major impact and is a ‘‘win-win’’ situation is to eliminate $14 billion in energy subsidies through the Tax Code and through our expenditure

programs that distort energy markets in the direction of using too

much energy.

Second, in terms of the Kyoto Summit, here is where we come

to Senator Sessions’ very well taken point. We have an opportunity
63

to act in a way that is not unilateral. That’s the point. It doesn’t

make any sense to think about what I’m about to say on a unilateral basis, but at Kyoto we have the opportunity to bring about

some kind of international agreement. That would involve the kind of ideal agreement about a $5 tax

beginning immediately on carbon. That’s a very modest step but it’s

one I would add to the $14 billion in subsidy removal.

Senator SESSIONS. How would that translate on a gallon of gas?

Dr. JORGENSON. That translates to about 5 cents on the gallon.

Let’s focus on what we should recommend to China by our diplomatic efforts and by efforts at the Kyoto Summit. We should urge

China to do what, in the last 10 years, almost every developing and

formerly socialist country has done, which is to move energy prices

to world levels.

That would have a tremendous benefit to China, it’s a win-win

for them; and to the world economy. It’s a win-win for the rest of

us as well.

I think there are concrete steps we can take and that would be

my list of three.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. Do you list in here where that $14 billion comes from? Is that

in your testimony?

Dr. JORGENSON. That is not in my testimony, I’m sorry to say.

That is a study that was done by the Department of Energy and

I’d be happy to provide a reference and I’ll send it to you.

Senator CHAFEE. Could you? That would be helpful. Thank you.

Dr. Christy.

Dr. CHRISTY. To answer your question, it’s a fairly vague question so I think I could vaguely say yes, if you include the conservation efficiencies and improved technologies and so on, that kind of

program would be worthwhile.

I agree pretty much with the generalities that have been stated

thus far.

I would say I use less energy today than I did before because I

have a daughter in college and that requires me to not be able to

spend as much on doing things and buying stuff. So that’s my level

of conservation at the moment. I think it will improve.

Senator CHAFEE. We thank you all very much for coming.

[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the chair.]

[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIC J. BARRON, EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCE CENTER, THE

PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY PARK, PA

The prospect of future human-induced climate change represents perhaps one of

the most challenging science and society questions of the century. There is no doubt

that humans are altering the environment—both in terms of the land surface and

the composition of the atmosphere. In particular, greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide,

methane, nitrous oxides) in the atmosphere have increased substantially in concentration over the last several decades.

The best scientific assessments available suggests that the impacts of these

changes will be significant, yet the error bars, or uncertainties, are also very large.

The real question is how should society respond when the best available science suggests that human activity may substantially alter climate, but at the same time the

scientists are seriously debating the magnitude, timing and distribution of the climate changes. Answers to this question depend on two basic sources of information,

climate observations and model predictions.
64
65

Figure 1b. Temperature trends for the United States. Solid circles represent increases

in temperature and open circles, decreases. The size of the circle indicates the magnitude of the increase or decrease.

Karl’s analysis also indicates (figure 2) that there has been an increase in the

amount of precipitation from extreme precipitation events (daily events at or above

2 inches of rainfall).

Figure 2. Percent area of the USA with a much above normal proportion of total annual precipitation from extreme precipitation events [daily events at or above 2 inches

(50.8mm)]

Combined land and ocean surface temperatures (figure 3) provide the basis for examining global trends in temperature, and are the basis for speculation on the importance of anthropogenic greenhouse gas increases as an explanation of the warming. These analyses indicate that global-mean surface temperatures have increased

by .4 to .60°C during the 20 Century.
66

Figure 3.

However, our observations of climate change from instrumented records are very

short, and they rely on systems designed for weather prediction—not one designed

for taking the temperature or pulse of the earth. We lack continuity of satellite observations, surface instruments are subject to change and the level of accuracy is

based on weather safety and forecasting needs and not global temperature analysis.

Geologic records from ice cores, tree rings, corals and other sources of data suggest

that the Earth’s climate is naturally highly variable. The record of snowfalls on

Greenland (figure 4) illustrate this variation during the last 18,000 years. Changes

in snow accumulation rate are often abrupt, suggesting remarkably large climate

changes over periods of decades.
67

Figure 4. Greenland snow accumulation rates

Tree ring data are equally intriguing. For example, Jacoby et al. (1996; Science)

report on Mongolian tree rings which indicate much wider tree ring widths for the

recent century—a phenomena associated with warmer annual temperatures. The

20th century warming appears to be unique over the last 450 years (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Ring widths for the last 450 years from Mongolia illustrating a unique

20th century record indicative of warming.
68

The recent record appears to be unique, but the simple fact is that modern humans haven’t experienced the range of variations which occur naturally, nor do we

have a real sense of their character or spatial distribution. The record describes

change, but without clear attribution as to the causes. Significant natural variability

should be expected during the coming decades.

RESULTS FROM MODEL PREDICTIONS

The results from model predictions also have limitations. In large measure, scientists agree when the topic is global and the predicted changes are given as a

range (e.g., a doubling of CO2 will yield 1 to 4.5°C globally averaged temperature

warming), but we have greater and greater uncertainty when we look at specific regions, specific decades or specific phenomena, such as changes in hurricane intensity

or numbers. Yet it is at these scales that human systems intersect and interact with

climate.

The reprint that follows is a summary of predictions from climate models with a

‘‘ranking’’ of the uncertainty associated with the predictions. The rankings are based

not on some specific criteria, but rather the considered opinions of a large group of

climate experts who have sought to place model predictions in an ordered context

which would readily be understood by the educated United States citizen. Within

the text are two figures which illustrate results from comprehensive climate models.

Figure 1 in the reprint illustrates the range in predicted changes in global-mean

surface temperature, in degrees Celsius, for the next 80 years based on results from

seven different General Circulation Models (the most comprehensive climate models

to date) with carbon dioxide increases included at the rate of 1 percent per year

(IPCC 1995 assessment). All seven models suggest an additional 1 degree globalmean increase in temperature by the year 2050. Figure 2 in the attached reprint

gives the predicted geographic distribution of an increase in mean-annual surface

temperature that would result from a doubling of carbon dioxide based on the GCM

simulation of Manabe and Stouffer (1994; Journal of Climate). Increases for the

United States range from 3 to more than 5°C. The predicted changes are substantial

given that the 1988 heat wave and drought in the Ohio River Basin was on average

less than 1°C above normal.

Climate model experiments designed to predict past climates, which are very different from today also yield valuable insights. During the last decade, hundreds of

GCM simulations have been completed by a wide variety of models in an attempt

to predict climates both substantially warmer and substantially cooler than at

present. In no case did a GCM overpredict the warming or the cooling in the geologic record. This suggests that the GCMs may have a sensitivity to factors such

as carbon dioxide which is less than that required to explain past climates. Other

factors may also be important (e.g., identification of all the factors which may have

influenced past climates and difficulty in extracting correct climate information from

fossils), but the fact that the models always have underpredicted the changes in the

past may be telling. It is also interesting to note that the major warm episodes during the past are also associated with geochemical evidence for higher atmospheric

carbon dioxide levels.

The reprint which follows details the strengths and weaknesses of current modeling programs nationally and internationally. It also notes that progress on both observational and modeling fronts over the last decade have been clear, but it is a mistake to promise quick answers. Solution of many of the remaining issues will

undoubtably take decades. I suspect that for many years to come, newspapers will

continue to explain topics like global warming by quoting scientists who are poles

apart on specific points. Yet in the midst of the public confusion that this approach

promotes, we can’t ignore the fact that even within the range of climate model predictions, the consequences have significance for our economic vitality and national

security.
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

EVALUATING POLICY DECISIONS BASED ON CLIMATE MODEL PREDICTIONS

Policy decisions about climate change are particularly challenging given that (1)

the results from comprehensive climate models suggest significant changes over the

coming decades, but the uncertainties are also large—particularly when examining

the aspects of climate model predictions which are most significant for human activities and (2) the increased surface temperatures and changes in precipitation patterns recorded from surface instruments may be a result of human-induced climate

change, but may also be a product of natural climate variations. Two types of actions address this conundrum.

(1) We must ensure that we have a healthy observing system and modeling effort

in this nation. Obtaining useful climate records is a secondary priority of our current observing systems which has been designed for weather safety and prediction.

Relatively modest increases in funding could address this issue. Programs designed

to provide continuity of satellite observations (e.g., NASA Earth Observing System)

are subject to annual review and budget reductions, increasing the risk that continuity of critical measurements will be lost. Interestingly, European countries and

Japan are promoting strong space-based observation programs as they recognize the

value of these data sets for decision-making and scientific advancement.

The U.S. climate modeling community has expressed strong concerns about the

effectiveness of our efforts in climate modeling, with particular emphasis on the fact

that IPCC assessments are increasingly being based on long-term simulations completed by other nations. Interestingly, countries like Japan, the United Kingdom

and Germany are promoting strong observation and modeling programs with less

robust economies than the U.S. The simple fact is that advanced knowledge has economic and societal value.

There is also considerable prospect for advances in knowledge, and at scales

which allow us to examine more closely the potential impact of climate change on

societies. For example, recent techniques have been applied to produce high resolution climate simulations by embedding or nesting high resolution, limited area climate models within global models. Global models provide the coarse spatial resolution predictions of the large-scale atmospheric circulation, while the high resolution

model allows the incorporation of more realistic elevations and model physics. Figure 3 in the reprint illustrates the improvement in the prediction of precipitation

for the United States comparing (a) observations for spring 1980, (b) a GCM prediction for spring 1980 showing a relatively poor simulation of this important variable, and (c) the results for the same period from a high resolution model embedded

within the same GCM shown in figure 3b. The improvement is dramatic, giving confidence that higher resolution models may provide more useful predictions. Figure

6 illustrates the results from this technique for a doubled concentration of carbon

dioxide. The results suggest substantial differences in precipitation (figure 7). Winter precipitation is predicted to increase in the Northwest and Northeast with modest increases across the northern states. California and Arizona show significant decreases in winter precipitation. In summer, the model simulation suggests the largest increases in precipitation occur from Louisiana-Mississippi-Alabama across the

across the central U.S. to South Dakota. Again, California has significant decreases.

Such results must be viewed with caution—they are a preliminary analysis using

a new, and not thoroughly tested technique to achieve high resolution predictions

for specific regions.
82
83
84
85

(2) We need to develop and apply a litmus test to action which is practical and

most likely to achieve positive results. Risk and vulnerability to natural variability

and climate change must be a key aspect of this test. For example, if a region is already historically and economically vulnerable to droughts or floods, and predictions

of fixture climate change also exhibit such tendencies, or even enhanced tendencies,

then this should be a call to action. Water and water resources provide a key example of potential vulnerabilities. Two figures follow which describe vulnerability associated with water availability and water quality. Figure 8 illustrates regions with

water demand problems in 1980. Each dot or shaded area indicates a problem where

water demand approached or exceeded supply during the period of analysis. This

suggests a vulnerability to natural variability and to climate change (see figure 1

and 7, for comparisons). Figure 9 illustrates water withdrawals by industry. Note

that the industrial withdrawal of water is basically a percentage of the available

resource (near 25 percent). This suggests that water is a critical resource to industry

and that industry is co-located with water, using far more in regions where water

is abundant. Many regions are susceptible to water quality problems as a result of

climate variability or change. Interestingly, decreased river flow, or increased extreme events with decreased median rainfall events, has the potential to dramatically change the dilution power of rivers for pollutants. Water quality may be an

unheralded global change issue.

Economic and societal risk should also be a key aspect of decision-making. For example, the emergence or re-emergence of infectious diseases, which are closely related to climate, have become an issue of growing concern in the health community.

Human health issues have potential for tremendous costs associated with human

life. Human health risks are governed by a large number of factors, ranging from

socio-economic status, to the availability of clean water and nutrition, to the quality

of the health care infrastructure—factors which generally serve to limit U.S. risks.

However, over the last decade, climate and climate change have become recognized

as one of the significant factors influencing health risk within the U.S. Climate

change and variability can effect health directly, through extreme thermal events

like heat waves and cold episodes, and through severe weather such as hurricanes

and tornadoes. Climate change can also influence human health indirectly. The majority of the indirect influences involve (1) changes in the range and activity of vectors and infective agents, (2) changes in water and food-borne infective agents, and

(3) altered food (especially crop) productivity. A number of examples of human

health vulnerability in the United States serves to illustrate the nature of this problem.

The increases in average temperatures associated with global warming or with extremes in natural climate variability will probably be accompanied by an increase

in the number of heat waves. The deaths of 726 people in Chicago during the summer of 1995 heat wave is an example of the potential direct impact of thermal extremes. Mid-latitude cities, already characterized by large urban heat island effects,

appear to be the most susceptible to heat waves. The heat-related mortality that has

occurred in cities such as Chicago, St. Louis, Washington D.C., and New York City

disproportionally affect the young, elderly, the economically disadvantaged, and the

ill.

Phenomena, such as El Nin ̃ o, are associated with changes in rainfall, producing

flooding and droughts in different regions. Based on climate model predictions, climatologists have speculated about whether anthropogenic warming will produce increased intensity or an increased number of severe hurricanes along the east coast

of the U.S. Severe weather has well-known potential to increase the number of

deaths and injuries.
86
87
88

Vector-borne diseases are a major cause of illness and death across the world.

These disease vectors (e.g., mosquitoes and rodents) are strongly influenced by climate. For example, Dengue fever is transmitted by the bite of a mosquito (Aedes

aegypti and Aedes albopictus). Both mosquitoes are currently present in Florida and

Texas (an outbreak of Dengue occurred in south Texas in 1986) but U.S. cases are

uncommon, most probably because of high standards of housing, adequate water,

sewer and waste management systems. However, the mosquitoes that transmit Dengue are strongly controlled by winter temperatures. Warming, particularly in terms

of minimum winter temperatures could substantially increase the range of this Dengue vector, including regions north of the mid-Atlantic states. Figures 10 and 11

show regions of potential outbreak, and the association of the Dengue vector with

warm winter temperatures. Malaria, caused by the protozoan parasites of the genus

Plasmodium and transmitted by Anopheles mosquitoes, would also substantially extend its range and activity under conditions of global warming.

Wet-Dry cycles also influence human health risks because of its influence on predator-prey relationships. Historically, moving into a wet period following a few years

of severe drought, provides advantages to rodent populations which can reproduce

faster that their predators (e.g., owls, etc). Population explosions of rodents eventually leads to invasions into human habitats and human food stocks, increasing the

risk of disease. This is the primary explanation for the outbreak of the deadly Hanta

virus in the Four-Corners region of the U.S. (figure 12).

Lyme disease, which is caused by a bacterium, has a strong climatic association

as well. Lyme disease is transmitted by the bite of a tick (Ixodes scapularis) which

feeds on the white-footed mouse, the white-tailed deer and other mammals. The

number of Lyme disease cases is strongly correlated with the size of the deer population, and in turn, the size of the deer population is correlated with the severity

of winter conditions in the northeastern U.S. (figure 13).

The U.S. is less susceptible to problems of malnutrition and crop productivity

compared to much of the world because of the breadth of food production and our

capability for technological adaptations. None-the-less, climate change and variability may result in the need to change crops and planting practices, and may also

influence the activity or emergence of crop diseases.

Health risks associated with climate change and variability have implications for

policy. Such policy should involve (1) surveillance efforts, (2) increased research on

changes in range and activity of vectors associated with climate change, (3) disease

prevention programs, (4) education for medical and public health communities, and

(5) public outreach.
89
90

SUMMARY

Two examples are given where action makes sense because of the level of risk and

the level of our vulnerability to natural variability as well as the potential for future

climate change. In the face of uncertainties associated with the observed record and

model predictions, we must adopt practical strategies for dealing with the potential

impact of climate variability and change. These strategies should be based on two

elements: (1) a strong observation and modeling research program within the U.S.

designed to enhance economic vitality and national security, and (2) a litmus test

for decision makers based on the level of risk and vulnerability to natural variability

as well as future climate change. These two elements provide the most logical basis

for policy decisions.

RESPONSES BY DR. ERIC BARRON TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BAUCUS

Question 1. During the hearing, you stated that our strategies to address increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases should be adaptive in nature. In your opinion, what would be the most important adaptation strategies to pursue.

Response. Decisions concerning adaptation strategies should be based on assessments of risk and vulnerability that involve natural variability in climate as well

as the prospect of future climate change. If society already exhibits vulnerability to

natural variability, and the prospect of climate change due to increases in greenhouse gases may exacerbate that vulnerability, then the argument for adaptive

strategies becomes stronger. In my opinion, the strongest arguments to pursue

adaptive strategies because of climate and climate change are for water resource

availability and water quality, severe weather hazards, and human health. The

types of strategies to pursue for these three areas are illustrated by examples. First,

we already have considerable problems with water resource availability associated

with climate variability. Water quality also frequently depends on the dilution

power of rivers and streams, and thus is dependent on water availability. The

adaptive strategies for this problem are varied and range from protection of groundwater resources (e.g., controls on growth and development in local recharge regions),

assessment of water use and priorities under different climate and climate variability scenarios, planned changes in storage facilities where demand already frequently exceeds supply, and efforts to promote greater water use efficiencies. Second, increases in severe weather, as a product of natural variability or human induced changes, would have a major impact on property and human life, and has the

potential to dramatically change the insurance and re-insurance industry with an

impact on economic growth (based on the number of billion dollar natural disasters

during the last decade). This implies that we limit rebuilding, for example in disaster-prone coastal regions, or individuals should assume the risk. Third, the emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases and the heat-elated mortality of the

last decade are also suggestive of considerable vulnerability to climate and climate

vulnerability. In this case, the adaptive strategies should involve such actions as

disease surveillance, public education, and maintenance of health care and research

facilities. Each of the above strategies has the potential to have positive impact on

society regardless of whether human-induced global change becomes a major factor

in the future.

Question 2. Dr. Schneider stated in his testimony that it was difficult for plants

and animals to adapt to a temperature increase of 5°C over the 10,000 year period

following the last Ice Age and that many species would likely go extinct with a kind

of rap id temperature increase projected for the next century. Assuming, for the purpose of this question, that the Earth experiences a temperature increase of greater

that 1.5°C over the coming 100 years, what is the likelihood that species will successfully adapt? If in your opinion, this represents a threat to preserving biological

diversity, to your knowledge has there ever been a period in the paleoclimate record

where climate change has resulted in significant loss of species?

Response. Largely because of changes in the land surface due to human activities

we have already experienced, and will continue to experience, major changes in biological diversity. I suspect that this factor will continue to play the largest role in

modifying biological diversity, while a climate change of 1.5°C would be a secondary

factor. However, there are two issues to consider. First, a 1.5°C temperature change

is in the global average. Some areas, notably higher latitudes and the continental

interior regions of the mid-latitude continents, are likely to experience substantially

greater temperature and water balance changes. Therefore, the vulnerabilities of

species may be very different from region to region. Second, human land use may

present a major issue in the migration and adaptation of different species to climate
91

change—in other words farms, cities and other human habitations may present considerable barriers to migration. Adaptation may then also depend on human actions

and assistance. Given the importance of human land use in biological diversity, I

suspect it would be very difficult to estimate how well species will adapt to climate

change. There have been numerous abrupt changes in biological diversity during

earth history, with multi-million year times for recovery of biological diversity and

the development of numerous new species. The causes of such extinctions are a matter of considerable debate, but often climate change is included as one of theories

offered to explain these events.

Question 3. Dr. Lindzen referred in his testimony to a natural mechanism that

would be employed by the Earth to counteract the predicted climatic changes due

to the effect of increased water vapor in the atmosphere. Are you aware of any historic reference or specific research that would support a theory of the existence of

such a mechanism?

Response. Dr. Lindzen’s argument has been seriously debated by the scientific

community, with several research projects (particularly associated with research in

the Pacific tropics) directed to test these ideas. To my knowledge, no conclusive

proof that this mechanism exists has yet been offered and some evidence has been

supplied which is negative. In my view, Dr. Lindzen’s mechanism is far from acceptance, however, he has provided an important service in focusing attention on how

poorly we currently measure water vapor in the upper troposphere and in the dry

regions of our atmosphere. I believe that he is correct in recognizing that uncertainties in our observations in these regions produces uncertainties in climate model

predictions.

Question 4. Dr. Lindzen stated in his testimony that one specific feature that led

to the IPCC conclusion of a discernible human influence on global climate, ‘‘. . . disappears when additional data is considered.’’ Are you aware of specific ‘‘additional

data’’ that was not considered or erroneously applied that would cause the IPCC to

reach a different conclusion? Are you aware of a specific research result or model

that supports Dr. Lindzen’s claim? If so, did you know whether the IPCC considered

it? Are you aware of other factors that the IPCC relied upon to conclude that human

activities were impacting global climate?

Response. I am unaware of any specific ‘‘additional data’’ that was not considered

or erroneously applied that would cause the IPCC to reach a different conclusion.

On the contrary, I do believe that the evidence is growing stronger. In my opinion,

the IPCC assessment process is well-reasoned and broadly reflective of the weight

of scientific opinion and evidence.

Question 5. Do you believe there is sufficient evidence of a problem with humaninduced climate change for us to keep pursuing some kind of policy to limit CO2

emissions? If not, should we stop funding research that would tend to prove or disprove the theories that human activities are impacting global climate? If there is

sufficient evidence, what more, if anything, should we be doing?

Response. My answer to this question is based on several views. First, 1 think

the best scientific evidence available supports the view that a 1.5 to 4°C increase

in globally averaged temperature will occur with a CO2 concentration doubling. In

my view, a climate change of this magnitude will have severe consequences. Second,

I believe that continued increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations are inevitable

for many years to come because of the increase in world population, the abundance

of fossil fuels like coal, and the push for higher standards of living in many developing countries. Regardless of U.S. actions, the global experiment in atmospheric

chemistry will continue. Therefore, I personally believe that much of the climate

change due to greater concentrations of greenhouse gases is inevitable unless the

whole world takes action. Third, as the greatest per capita user of fossil fuels, I believe that concerted international efforts will not happen without the U.S. taking

action first. The problem is that any action by the U.S. which might be publicly acceptable in our country is likely to be too small to impact climate change because

of world fossil fuel use. The argument for emissions controls then becomes one of

taking action for the purpose of promoting efficiency (a valuable effort in its own

right) and providing the leadership necessary to begin a process of reduced global

emissions. My feeling is that such steps have the potential to bring unexpected positive surprises, delays in the time of CO2 doubling, and greater efficiencies with positive benefits, but that adaptive strategies are likely to be the major way we address

greenhouse warming over the next 50 years.

Research remains critical for several reasons. First, I believe that observations

and predictions, as they improve, will become increasingly valuable. They may minimize risk and vulnerability and they are likely to have positive economic value
92

given the importance of most ‘‘advance knowledge’’ in our society. Second, I believe

that the ozone depletion problem and the greenhouse gas problem are just examples

of what lies in store for the world population. Given the growth in population and

the breakneck speed of technologic change, humans are ever more capable of impacting the nature of our environment. Greater knowledge of how the earth system

works will become increasingly important for each generation, because our response

time for providing solutions to problems may well get shorter as world population

grows.

Question 6. In your professional opinion, what is the probability that there will

be a doubling of CO2 concentrations since pre-industrial times by the year 2100? A

tripling? what are the impacts of a doubling? what are the impacts of a tripling?

Response. In my opinion, the probability that there will be a doubling of CO2 con- centrations by the year 2100 is very high, while the probability that there will be

a tripling is much lower. The article submitted as part of my written testimony on

the reliability of climate model predictions gives a precise account of my views of

the most likely impact of a doubling of carbon dioxide. The impacts of a tripling of

carbon dioxide are much less studied, but are likely to be similar to the impacts of

a doubling, but of greater magnitude.

RESPONSES BY DR. ERIC BARRON TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR REID

Question 1. Much has been made of the newfound general consensus that there

is a ‘‘discernible human influence on global climate.’’ What exactly does this mean?

Response. Climate varies on many different time scales in response to many different factors (as a product of volcanic eruptions, or simply the way that the atmosphere and ocean interact). Changes in climate on the time scales of decades to centuries is therefore not at all unusual. At the same time we know that human activities, specifically the burning of fossil fuels, is increasing the level of greenhouse

gases in our atmosphere and that this increase will cause a greater absorption of

the energy being radiated to space from the earth’s surface, thus promoting warming. Therefore, we have more than one factor operating which has the potential to

influence our weather and climate—the so-called natural variability and the humaninduced changes. We also know that the earth has experienced a global warming

of .4 to .6°C over the last century. The question is one of attribution, is this warming a product of human activity or of natural variability. The consensus cited in the

question means that the way climate has changed over the last century is suggestive of a warming due at least in part to the increases in greenhouse gases. Such

a conclusion depends on evidence that the nature of the change is unlike the natural

variations recorded in the past and that the changes have a ‘‘fingerprint’’ which

matches the expected changes due to increased greenhouse gases.

Question 2. During the 1980’s, we heard a lot about global warming. Now we are

hearing a lot about global climate change. Are they the same thing? How are they

different?

Response. The topic hasn’t really changed, only the perspective. The nature of the

climate changes associated with higher greenhouse gas concentrations involves

much more than temperature changes (e.g., changes in precipitation, sea ice distribution, snow cover, etc.). Climate change incorporates a spectrum of factors that

is greater than just temperature. Second, greenhouse gases are not the only humaninduced changes. We are also changing the land surface dramatically and the

amount of aerosols (fine particles) in the atmosphere. Each of these factors can influence climate. The term climate change is more comprehensive than the term global warming.

Question 3. Assuming for the moment that greenhouse gases are accumulating in

the atmosphere, how long will it take to get them out? If we are not likely to face

real problems for 20 to 40 years or more from now, is it really necessary to begin

making reductions now? Would the Nation be better served by waiting for the technology and other efficiency improvements to develop further?

Response. Numerous studies have recently been undertaken to determine how

long the greenhouse gases that are accumulating in the atmosphere will remain. Basically, the mechanisms for removal include the productivity of plants, the uptake

by the ocean, and the weathering of rocks and minerals. Major increases in plant

productivity would remove carbon dioxide, but such changes are not rapid. Uptake

by the ocean, largely dependent on the sinking of water masses to depth is very

slow—centuries to thousands of years, and rock weathering processes are even slower. Most studies suggest that if emissions were to stop today, many centuries would

be required for the atmosphere to return to pre-industrial levels.
93

Scientific certainty over having some level of impact grows after the concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere approaches levels of a doubling, but this does not

mean that we are necessarily unlikely to face real problems for 20 to 40 years. In

terms of human health issues, water resource availability, water quality and weather-related natural hazards, we are already experiencing problems due to some combination of natural variability and human-induced climate change. However, as stated in my testimony, I believe that some climate change is inevitable even with reasonable plans for emission reductions because of the growth of world population and

because the desire by many nations to increase their standard of living will cause

CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere to continue to rise. In my view, the efforts

to control emissions are unlikely to make a marked impact of the climate of the next

50 years because, in themselves, they won’t dent the level of global emissions. Rather, such emissions controls would serve to promote the technology and efficiency improvements that may lead to unexpected positive surprises, as well as provide needed U.S. leadership in the world.

Question 4. Germany and the United Kingdom seem to be the only nations that

have made real progress toward achieving their voluntary emissions reductions

goals. How did they do it and are there lessons in this for the United States?

Response. Although I am not a social scientist and have not studied the spectrum

of factors in other countries which promote emission reductions, personal experience

suggests that the higher prices for fuels in the U.K. and Germany, combined with

their records of economic growth, are likely to be a reasonable explanation. Higher

fuel prices certainly promote greater efficiency or conservation.

RESPONSES BY DR. ERIC BARRON TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. Are the effects of increased greenhouse gases reversible?

Response. The earth system has many different feedbacks, and if greenhouse gas

emissions by humans were to be reduced substantially and concentrations in the atmosphere were to return to pre-industrial levels, the climate system would likely

return to a state more similar to the pre-industrial level after many centuries. However, climate change is caused by many factors, including human-activities, and

therefore it is unlikely that any future climate will be identical to the pre-industrial

era.

Question 2. If we halt the increase in production of greenhouse gases, would temperatures continue to rise or would they remain steady?

Response. If the increase in greenhouse gas emissions were halted, then the concentration of greenhouse gases produced by humans would tend to stabilize, and

then the climate ‘‘forcing’’ of these gases would tend to stabilize. Therefore the

added tendency to promote warming would be removed. However, the response time

of the atmosphere and ocean is not immediate, and the modem climate is unlikely

to be in balance with the current level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. For this

reason, I believe that it would still be a matter of decades before the majority of

the climate change due to current CO2 levels would be realized.

Question 3. In your opinion, should the lack of complete certainty regarding the

science of climate change result in a wait-and-see approach?

Response. For many decades to come, there will remain substantial uncertainty

about global change. The question facing society is a tough one. Climate models provide the best currently available assessment of future climate change, and these

models suggest substantial change due to human greenhouse gas emissions, yet the

models are associated with substantial uncertainty. In my view the solution to this

conundrum must be to assess how vulnerable we are to climate change. Further,

I believe that we are already vulnerable to natural climate variability, and climate

change may exacerbate this vulnerability, and this is sufficient reason to take action. In many cases this action should involve adaptive strategies.

Question 4. We hear about natural climatic cycles. For example, we know from

geologic evidence that the earth has naturally gone through cooling and warming

cycles, usually on a scale of 10’s of thousands of years. Is it possible to identify cycles of a shorter scale?

Response. Geologic evidence suggests that the earth experiences climate change

on many different time scales from decades to millions of years.

Question 5. Would we be able to detect variations attributable to human activities

in this natural cycle?

Response. It is not a simple task to attribute any climate change to human activities precisely because of the natural variations that occur. The key is to detect
94

changes which are unlike the spectrum of natural variations over the last several

thousand years and to detect changes that ‘‘fingerprint’’ changes caused by a particular human-induced forcing factor, like increased concentrations of carbon dioxide

in the atmosphere. Through model and laboratory studies we expect specific types

of changes (e.g., cooling of the stratosphere at the same time the lower atmosphere

warms). These lines of evidence are the reason why the IPCC report now states that

some level of human-induced change is now detectable.

Question 6. We know that CO2 has the potential for affecting the climatic balance

of our atmosphere. Would it not make sense to limit the amount of CO2 we put into

the atmosphere until we more fully understand the effects CO2 has on our atmosphere?

Response. Ideally, it makes perfect sense to limit the amount of CO2 we put into

the atmosphere until we have more knowledge. Unfortunately, carbon-based fuels

are a critical underpinning of the world economy. To control emissions to the point

of having a real impact on future climate change is likely to have major economic

impact. However, actions that begin control emissions may well produce unexpected

positive impacts on technology and efficiency that may help limit the long-term potential for large climate changes. In my opinion, over the next half century higher

greenhouse concentrations are probably inevitable and some level of climate change

is likely to occur despite efforts to control emissions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN R. CHRISTY, DEPARTMENT OF ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCE

AND EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCE LABORATORY, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA IN HUNTSVILLE

1. CONCERN FOR CLIMATE CHANGE

In the 1980’s, Global Warming due to the enhanced greenhouse effect came to be

perceived as a serious threat to the planet’s ecological and societal sustainability.

This concern was based primarily on estimates of global warming and other climate

changes from numerical models of the Earth’s climate system. (This perception was

reinforced by a few hot, dry summers in the eastern U.S. which constituted for some

people the ‘‘smoking gun’’ of climate change.) While the development of models is

critical to our future ability to examine what we may be doing to alter the climate

of the Earth, many scientists acknowledge that models are still rather simple representations of the complex processes that control the Earth’s climate.

The observational evidence for enhanced greenhouse global warming is also less

than clearly defined. While all surface-based global temperature data sets indicated

warming of 0.3 to 0.6°C since the last century, the complete source of this warming

is still unknown. First, the Earth was evidently coming out of a relatively cold period in the 1800’s so that warming in the past century may be part of this natural

recovery. Data sparseness and reliability are somewhat suspect in the early years

of the thermometer climate record and remain a concern even today when the

shrinking network of stations is attempting to capture relatively small variations.

Local land use changes may also have added additional warming not connected with

greenhouse gases.

With this background, scientists recognized that we did not have an observing

system in place with adequate means to truly monitor the health of the planet or

to provide the data needed to validate and improve the models of the Earth System.

One obvious limitation of information about the atmosphere was the lack of true

global coverage.

2. THE MICROWAVE SOUNDING UNIT DATA SET

I am here to report a success story—a story that involves U.S. Government scientists and managers who collaborated closely and productively with university scientists. In 1989, to test the ability of satellites to monitor the Earth, Dr. Roy Spencer, a NASA scientist, and I began investigating temperatures measured by the existing TIROS–N family of weather satellites (average life span was only 4 years

each). These satellites were designed to provide information for daily weather forecasts, not for answering questions about global climate change.

The instrument of interest to us was the Microwave Sounding Unit (MSU), identical copies of which were flown on all of NOAA’s operational polar orbiters since

1979. The MSU measures the intensity of weak microwave radiation emitted to

space by oxygen in the air. The magnitude of this intensity is proportional to air

temperature, so with global coverage by the satellites we could compute the true

globally averaged air temperature. Two specific layers have lent themselves to accurate measurements: (1) the lower troposphere, or the lowest 7 km of air next to the

surface, and (2) the layer at 17–21 km, or lower stratosphere.
95

Putting together a climate record from multiple satellites involved collecting a

huge volume of data and was a remarkable achievement in and of itself. It is a tribute to the current government system and the vision of scientists at the National

Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) that those data (with little perceived market value at the time) were saved and archived. The MSU data products are now

almost priceless in the global warming debate in having established a precise historical record of the Earth’s temperature over the last 18+ years.

It was our good fortune that my call to NCAR asking about the possibility of obtaining the MSU data came 1 week before a previously scheduled, major NCAR

project was to begin to copy all satellite data from an old, outdated storage system

to a newer one. Thus, forewarned that Spencer and I believed the MSU data were

of some unique value, NCAR kindly extracted the necessary data (only 2 percent

of the total) for us at only the marginal cost of the extraction process. This relatively

‘‘free and open’’ attitude concerning data availability was the key to our success in

creating the MSU data set, since obtaining the data from a cost-recovering data center would have been prohibitive (the quote was over $1 million) for the speculative

value of the MSU data for climate monitoring.

The computing facilities for our own massive processing task were provided by

NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center, and we had the enthusiastic support of the

Earth Science and Applications Division. After several months of tedious data analysis, we were able to construct various data sets with exceptional precision and continuity. The particular technique we eventually developed allowed the MSU data to

be independently validated. In Fig. 1, I show the comparison between MSU temperatures and those measured by radiosondes (balloons) in which a weather instrument package is carried aloft. These two systems (satellite and radiosonde) are completely independent in every way. In Fig. 1 it is clear that both systems are measuring the same variations in temperature to high precision.

For long term variations, I include in the table below comparisons between large

numbers of radiosondes and MSU measurements. It is again clear that both systems

are telling us the same story on temperature variations since 1979. Note that none

of the long-term trends differ by more than ±0.03°C/decade.

Comparisons of trends since 1979 for MSU lower troposphere vs. various radiosonde-based tropospheric datasets which, except for the 850–300 hPa layer temperature, are weighted to

match the MSU weighting function.

No. stations used Balloon Tr end

°C/dec.

MSU Trend for

same region

Difference (Balloon

minus MSU) Years

Global (850–300 hPa)1 .. 63 ¥0.06 ¥0.04 ¥0.02 79–96

No. Hemisphere2 ............. 250+ +0.01 +0.02 ¥0.01 79–96

So. Hemisphere2 ............. 50+ ¥0.11 ¥0.08 ¥0.03 79–96

Global2 ............................ 300+ ¥0.04 ¥0.04 0.00 79–96

W. No. Hemisphere3 ........ 97 +0.16 +0.14 +0.02 79–94

1 Angell 1988 and updates.

2 Parker et al. 1997.

3 Stations in an area roughly bounded by Truk, South Pacific to Pt. Barrow, AK to Keflavik, Iceland to Trinidad. This is a comparison of sondes with colocated MSU.

Our datasets begin with January 1979 and continue to this day. We have been

fortunate that two of the four MSU channels have performed exceptionally well on

each of the nine satellites that were launched at intervals of about 2 years. It was

critical that at least one satellite in functioning condition was orbiting when a new

satellite was launched, because we required a period of overlap for precise intercalibration. (Only two satellites are operational at a given time).

3. THE TEMPERATURE OF THE LOWER ATMOSPHERE

The temperature of the global atmosphere is shown for the lower troposphere and

lower stratosphere in Figure 2 (courtesy R. Spencer). Since we live in the lower troposphere, that time series has received the most attention. You will notice that

there are large variations, both month-to-month and year-to-year. Because these

variations are independently observed by two satellites, we know they are real. The

trend in the time series is slightly downward (¥0.05°C/decade or ¥0.09°F/decade).

It is this relatively flat trend when compared to surface data (which show warming

trends since 1979 of +0.09°C to +0.14°C/decade, depending on which dataset is cited)

that has attracted attention to the Spencer/Christy MSU dataset.
96

Though the MSU temperature record has demonstrated high precision, there is

also an element of ambiguity in the measurement. The layers measured by the MSU

are several kilometers deep. Any intra-layer variability, therefore, would be masked

by the vertical average. For example, a warming trend at upper levels and a cooling

trend at low levels of one layer would be seen as no trend in the MSU vertical average.

One of the reasons the surface thermometer data have shown greater warming

in the past 18 years is due to the fact that in continental regions the surface temperature responds with greater variation than the deep layer of air above. Over

oceans (and in the global average), the opposite occurs. In the past 18 years there

has been a tendency for the atmosphere over land areas to show warming (which

is greater in the surface air response) while the atmosphere over oceans has exhibited cooling (greater effect in the MSU record). This pattern is thought to be due

to natural variations. The net effect in the global average is a relative difference

in the trends between surface air and the deep atmosphere. Thus, the uneven

warming/cooling distribution of the past 18 years accounts for part of the difference.

Other differences are due to areas poorly sampled or not sampled at all by the

surface network, as well as to some urban warming or land-use changes around

many of the thermometers. It is a monumental achievement to construct a record

of surface air temperatures, and most of these data sets have been subjected to

many careful corrections to account for these non-natural temperature impacts.

Because of its precision and true global coverage, we believe that the MSU

dataset is the most robust measurement we have of the Earth’s bulk atmospheric

temperature. At the same time, it is still a relatively short data set for climate studies. As indicated in Figure 2, the data contain both long and short period fluctuations. To be useful in the global warming debate one must understand and carefully

account for fluctuations in the data that may be masking or dominating the anticipated enhanced greenhouse signal.

Recently, two colleagues have questioned the precision of the MSU data. They believe the data have spurious jumps in 1981 and 1991 which caused the overall trend

to be downward rather than upward as they believe it should be. Their basis for

this allegation utilized no observed data from the atmosphere. Since the time their

allegations were made public I have shown that the MSU data are indeed precise

with independent and direct observations of the troposphere (i.e. I used real data).

For example, in the most serious allegation, my two colleagues speculated that the

merging of one satellite, NOAA–7, into the time series caused a spurious 0.25°C

jump in late 1981 in the tropical time series. I show in Fig. 3 the temperature

anomalies of two satellites NOAA–6 and—7 for the tropics during that time. It is

important to note that these are completely independently calculated. One can readily see that whether NOAA–7 was included or not, the time series is still the same.

Therefore, the addition of NOAA–7 into the dataset did not cause a problem and

the claim of my colleagues is clearly in error.

4. THE CAUSES OF THE TEMPERATURE VARIATIONS

In a recent study, Dr. Richard McNider, also of the University of Alabama in

Huntsville, and I looked for the causes of the natural fluctuations. We found that

by accounting for the influence of tropical ocean temperatures (El Nin ̃ o) and the

cooling effect of volcanoes, we could explain over 60 percent of the monthly variations (Fig. 4). These natural, shorter-term fluctuations indicate to us how much the

global temperature responds to specific causes. Once calculated and removed, we see

that without El Nin ̃ os and volcanoes, the temperature trend of the past 18+ years

is upward (+0.06°C/decade or +0.11°F/decade, Fig. 4, bottom. The value varies from

+0.05 to +0.10°C/decade depending on certain parameters specified.). What is causing this upward trend? We do not know for sure. It may be the enhanced greenhouse effect. At the same time there could still be a longer term trend in the data

due to variations in aerosols, water vapor, or other unknown factors that are masking the true magnitude of the greenhouse effect.

The latest results from global climate models, which include improvements and

the cooling effects of air pollution, indicate warming rates for the Earth of +0.08°C

to +0.30°C/decade for the latter part of the 20th century. These are about half of

the warming rates predicted a few years ago, when only increases in greenhouse

gases were modeled. Note too, that according to the latest models there should be

more warming in the troposphere than at the surface. Therefore, the MSU is ideally

suited to provide information on the layers that should show the greatest change.

The present warming rate of +0.06°C/decade observed in the ‘‘adjusted’’ MSU data

is just outside this model range, and is not inconsistent with fully natural variations
97

on decadal time scales. Therefore, uncertainty remains as to the cause(s) of the

trend the MSU has measured.

Why is there a discrepancy between the models’ estimate of global warming and

what the MSU data have shown? One must remember that temperature is essentially a response parameter. The MSU data in Figure 2 show us what has been happening to the climate but not why. A key goal of efforts to study the planet from

space is to provide heretofore unmeasured data that can provide an understanding

of why the Earth system behaves as it does. I believe that new observables such

as aerosols, rain structures, water vapor distributions and surface characteristics,

when used in conjunction with the MSU data set will provide answers to these questions. Our work demonstrates that satellites can be used to monitor the Earth on

decadal time scales and that the vantage point of space offers the only truly global

view of the Earth system that can give robust measures of key variables.

The Spencer-Christy MSU data set has been used by some as evidence that global

warming is not important, which then undercuts the need and urgency of programs

to continue to study the Earth System. I strongly disagree with this interpretation.

By showing that the Earth’s rate of warming is slower than predicted by earlier

models or surface data sets (Fig. 5), it does, perhaps, remove the sense of urgency

for those who wish to enact greenhouse gas controls or to shut off scientific debate.

But most importantly, the slower warming rate in the last two decades in effect

gives us the security of time so that data from future observations and research may

be used within the debate.

I believe that honest and open scientific debate with precise data is the key to

making sound societal decisions. The cultivation of diversity of scientific thought is

critical to vigorous debate. The MSU data set would not have been developed without the competitiveness and entrepreneurial spirit fostered by having separate

NASA science centers and a broad university research program. Industry should

recognize that good science and good data are their allies, whether in debates on

acid rain or global warming. It is now more critical than ever that we study the

planet’s health with new diagnostic devices. Any delays in doing so may mean that

the length of data records available to scientists will be reduced and cannot be used

in the societal debates.

The disagreement between models and the MSU simply illustrates how little we

understand about the complexities and factors that control the Earth’s climate.

Every month Roy Spencer and I process the newly arrived data and eagerly look

at the month’s temperature to see what is happening to the Earth. If we knew everything we needed to know about the Earth’s system, we would not be as anxious

about the results. I look forward to the time when new data from planned satellite

sensors, coupled with an understanding of the Earth’s climate system developed

under research programs emphasizing global change, make surprises in the MSU

global temperature as rare as being surprised by land-falling hurricanes in this era

of weather satellites.

5. THE TEMPERATURE OF THE LOWER STRATOSPHERE

The record of the lower stratosphere is fascinating in its own right. Clearly, here

is an example of global change on the scale of years to decades (Figure 2). The two

conspicuous warming events were due to explosive volcanic eruptions—El Chichon

(1982) and Mt. Pinatubo (1991). The aerosols injected by these explosions high into

the stratosphere caused the warming through radiative interactions. Notice, however, that once the aerosols settled out, the global stratospheric temperature fell to

levels below those observed at pre-eruption. It is widely thought that the loss of

stratospheric ozone, both naturally from volcanic events and from human-generated

chemicals, has caused this overall cooling. The increase in greenhouse gases, which

will cause stratospheric cooling, is probably a factor as well, though smaller.

The 1996 annual stratospheric temperature was the lowest annual value ever

measured by satellite, and March 1997, was the coldest single month on record for

the North Polar region. (Globally, the temperatures have rebounded a bit for the

first half of 1997.) Something is changing in the lower stratosphere—the temperature tells us that much, but cannot specifically indicate the cause. (Others have

much more experience here.) The extent of the stratospheric cooling trend points to

the need to fully understand its cause.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Continued monitoring of global temperature through the Spencer-Christy method

is expected as long as our good fortune holds and the two orbiting instruments do

not fail (which almost happened recently). Thus, we should continue to provide the

scientific community with precise temperatures for deep atmospheric layers.
98

In any weather variable, e.g., temperature, rainfall, etc., it is the shorter-term

fluctuations (week-to-week) that cause the greatest impact on human productivity.

One valuable benefit of a program of escalating Earth observations is the resulting

improvement in weather forecasts—particularly out to 2 to 3 weeks and even to seasonal averages. The potential economic impact of improved long-range forecasts

would be enormous. Virtually every sector of our economy is sensitive to weather,

especially those related to energy production and consumption, agriculture, transportation, insurance and recreation. Improved knowledge of coming weather situations would be used to add value to the products and services generated by these

industries.

A strong and continuing program in atmospheric observation and research has

this more subtle benefit as well. There will be extreme climate events in the near

future because that is the nature of weather and climate. Without a continuing program of research that places climate variations in proper perspective and reports

with improving confidence on their causes, we will be vulnerable to calls for kneejerk remedies to combat ‘‘climate change,’’ which likely will be unproductive and economically damaging. We can protect ourselves from such pitfalls by improving our

ability to measure what the climate is doing and determine the causes for its variations.

In simple terms, the ‘‘Global Climate’’ is our patient. We have taken its temperature in a few places and have seen just enough change to cause concern. Before prescribing any powerful medicine though, the patient should be given a complete physical as soon as possible, so we may then make the proper diagnosis and chart a correct course of action for the benefit of all.

REFERENCES

Angell, J.K., 1988: Variations and trends in tropospheric and stratospheric global

temperatures 1958–87. J. Climate, 1, 1296–1313.

Christy, J.R., 1995: Temperature above the surface layer. Climatic Change, 31, 455–

474.

Christy, J.R. and J.D. Goodridge, 1995: Precision global temperatures from satellites

and urban warming effects of non-satellite data. Atmospheric Environment, 29,

1957–1995.

Christy, J.R. and R.T. McNider, 1994: Satellite greenhouse signal, Nature, 367, 325

(27 January 1994). (Fig. 4 of testimony, updated, taken from this article.)

Parker, D.E., M. Gordon, D.P.N. Cullum, D.M.H. Sexton, C.K. Folland and N.

Rayner, 1997. A new global gridded radiosonde temperature data base and recent

temperature trends. Geophys. Res. Lett., in press.

Spencer, R.W. and J.R. Christy, 1990: Precise monitoring of global temperature

trends from satellites. Science, 247, 1558–1562 (30 March 1990).

Spencer, R.W. and J.R. Christy, 1992: Precision and radiosonde validation of satellite gridpoint temperature anomalies. Part I: MSU channel 2. Journal of Climate, 5, 847–857.
99
100
101
102
103
104

RESPONSES BY JOHN R. CHRISTY TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BAUCUS

Question 1. During the hearing, Dr. Barron stated that our strategies to address

increasing concentrations of greenhouse gasses should be adaptive in nature. In

your opinion, what would be the most important adaptation strategies to pursue?

Response. In my opinion, preparing an economy to cope with the full range of natural weather variations (that will always occur) would position society to accommodate any future climate change better than simply adapting to a change after it occurs. For example, building a typical structure on beach front property along the

Gulf and Atlantic coasts is not preparing for the full range of natural weather extremes because eventually a powerful hurricane will come along and devastate the

region. However, development of cereal crops that can withstand greater extremes

while enjoying higher CO2 concentrations is an obvious avenue to pursue. (I use the

term extremes not to imply that the future climate will have greater extremes, but

that the crop could withstand whatever might come along.) We are a most adaptive

and clever species, for example, being able to grow a single food (corn) in climates

ranging from North Dakota to Alabama.

In an odd sort of way, conservation of carbon is actually one adaptive strategy

because it is possible that the climate may cool in the next century or so. A colder

climate is probably far more devastating than a warmer climate. Thus having carbon available for energy production in such a climate would be wise. An adaptive

strategy is one that decreases our vulnerability to extreme events of all types.

As the IPCC has shown we still cannot identify regional weather changes due to

CO2 increases after over 100 years. And, in my view, it will be many more decades

before the regional signal may (if ever) be extracted from the noise of natural variability. If present infrastructures could be designed to cope with 99.9 percent of the

extremes on both sides (hottest, coldest, wettest, driest, etc.) rather than the 90–

95 percent as is done now, we will be in much better position to handle what may

happen in terms of climate change.

Question 2. Dr. Schneider stated in his testimony that it was difficult for plants

and animals to adapt to a temperature increase of 50°C over the 10,000 year period

following the last Ice Age and that many species would likely go extinct with a kind

of rapid temperature increase projected for the next century. Assuming, for this

question, that the Earth experiences a temperature increase of greater than 1.50°C

over the coming 100 years, what is the likelihood that species will successfully

adapt? If, in your opinion, this represents a threat to preserving biological diversity,

to your knowledge has there every been a period in the paleoclimate record where

climate change has resulted in significant loss of species.

Response. The significant loss of species has always been a feature of the history

of the planet. I understand that approximately 99 percent of all species which have

inhabited the Earth are extinct. Nature has been unmercifully severe for the vast

majority of life forms. It is difficult to separate out the role of climate as a cause

for extinction in comparison with other factors such as the evolution of competing

and opportunistic species or something as exotic but as realistic as an asteroid collision.

Changes in global average temperature do not cause the loss of species, rather

it is the local change of climate. The greatest rise in temperature due to the enhanced greenhouse effect (whatever its magnitude) is predicted to occur for those

regions which already experience significant year to year and decade to decade variations (midlatitude and polar regions). I think we shall find that nature is rather

resilient, though no one would expect the exact geographic distribution of populations of various species to remain identical to the present day. Perfect stability has

never happened before. For example, the Southeastern quad rant of the U.S. has

experienced cooling temperatures over the past 100 years with an associated southward displacement of plant species. am told that citrus crops were harvested as far

north as southern Georgia around the turn of the century, yet today they are found

commercially only from central Florida southward. This is due to the significant cold

weather that the region has experienced in the last few decades.

Rapid, natural changes have occurred in the past. Let me quote from an issue of

PAGES (Past Global Changes Programme, IGBP, 4, #3 Nov. 1996).

Climate variability at both a regional and a global scale has, even within the

boundary conditions prevailing during the Late-Holocene [last 5,000 years],

been significantly greater than has been recorded during the short, recent period for which instrumental records of climate variation exist. This is conclusively demonstrated by recent research, is of crucial significance for predicting

future climate change and is not recognized in the recent IPCC Report.
105

Since rapid changes have occurred in the past, we may assume that not every species survived the change. However, the species we see today must have survived

some combination of past rapid changes. One wonders how many of today’s species

are actually here because a particular rapid change altered the balance between

competing species in the favor of the present-day survivor. The system of life is exceedingly complex, and attributing climate changes to particular species survival is

beyond my expertise.

I believe Dr. Schneider would agree that the number of species which might experience extinction due to possible global warming is much smaller than those we are

losing today due to land-use changes, poaching, human encroachment, etc. Just as

the evolution and redistribution of opportunistic species forced vulnerable species

into extinction in the past, we are seeing human-induced extinction happening quite

apart from climate change. We as a species are now one of those very opportunistic

species that is dangerous to many others. If extinction is a concern, (and I believe

it is) one should assess the major causes and then address those with action that

has the best chance for producing results. However, I understand, having lived in

a Third World country, that it is a difficult problem to advise other countries on

this topic because (1) our own past haunts us and (2) the idea of loss of sovereignty

is keenly felt in any nation.

I lived in Kenya, East Africa for 2 years and lived among people who were making

decisions to destroy forests so they could raise food to feed their families. I could

understand their motivation for survival as I witnessed people dying simply because

they had no food. The population growth in that region, believe, is the cause of tremendous suffering and is the primary issue that must be dealt with ahead of the

issue of climate change (if there is a choice on where to concentrate efforts). Of

course, controlling population will probably have an eventual benefit of lower fossil

fuel consumption.

I suspect I agree with Dr. Schneider in this limited sense: a significant fraction

of the biosystem, relying only on evolution and redistribution, would find it difficult

to adapt to a changing environment if the change occurred over time scales of centuries when research indicates biosystem changes normally take millennia to adapt.

Question 3. Dr. Lindzen referred in his testimony to a natural mechanism that

would be employed by the Earth to counteract the predicted climatic changes due

to the effect of increased water vapor in the atmosphere. Are you aware of any historic reference or specific research that would support a theory of the existence of

such a mechanism?

Response. Global climate models produce most of their warming because they

cause the troposphere (surface to 10 km altitude) to become more moist than is presently observed. In other words, global warming in the models is due more to additional water vapor than additional CO2 in the atmosphere. This additional water

vapor enhances the natural greenhouse gas, trapping more radiant energy in the

lower atmosphere thus causing the surface temperature to rise even further. Models

are quite primitive in the ‘‘rules’’ or equations they require the atmosphere to obey.

In the case of greenhouse warming, the models require that as soon as the temperature rises a little due to CO2 radiative forcing, more water vapor is forced into the

troposphere, thus causing a ‘‘positive feedback’’ process: higher temperatures lead to

more evaporation which leads to more water vapor in the atmosphere which leads

to higher temperatures which leads to more evaporation, etc.

The real atmosphere does not appear to be so inflexible. Current research carried

out by my colleague Dr. Roy Spencer of NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center (Huntsville, AL), points to the possibility that as the tropical system warms, the amount

of vapor might actually decrease (or at least not increase much) in the troposphere.

There are certainly periods (months or so, see Sun and Held, J. Climate 1996, pp.

665–675) in which warming is not accompanied by the presence of more water vapor

as inflexible models require. The current warm El Nin ̃ o event in the Pacific will be

an excellent test case to check whether the tropical troposphere actually moistens

or dries as the temperature rises. Currently, models give one result: the atmosphere

always moistens when it is warmed.

The key mechanism to understand on this issue is that the heat that is naturally

lost to space is highly proportional to the amount of vapor in the troposphere. Thus,

the amount of water vapor in the troposphere regulates the amount of heat that escapes and which therefore would be unavailable to warm the surface. In fact, the

vapor in the troposphere is more important for this energy balance than the vapor

at the surface. A slight reduction of the vapor in the troposphere (i.e. a drying) leads

to a significant increase in the outgoing energy. So, if there is a slight drying of the

troposphere as the world warms a little, the drier troposphere would act as an open

window to let more energy escape, thus reducing any feedback-warming of the sur-
106

face. Only slight changes in the tropical tropospheric humidity are necessary to reduce the warming due to the enhanced greenhouse effect. (The drying results from

the fact warmer rain-clouds tend to lose more moisture to rainfall than cooler cloud

systems, thus expelling less vapor to the troposphere.)

Considerable work is ahead of us on this area of research as theory is only now

being given observations that may help solve this issue of tropospheric water vapor

feedback. What we lack at this point is high vertical resolution observations of temperature, winds, precipitation and humidity of the extensive tropical atmosphere

where so many questions remain.

Question 4. Dr. Lindzen stated in his testimony that the one specific feature that

led to the IPCC conclusion of a discernible human influence on global climate,

‘‘. . . disappears when additional data is considered.’’ Are you aware of specific ‘‘additional data’’ that was not considered or erroneously applied that would cause the

IPCC to read a different conclusion? Are you aware of a specific research result or

model that supports Dr. Lindzen’s claim? If so, did you know whether the IPCC considered it? Are you aware of other factors that the IPCC relied upon to conclude

that human activities were impacting global climate?

Response. A paper had been submitted just before the final IPCC science authors’

meeting in Asheville, NC (Aug. 1995) which compared upper air balloon data for

1964 to 1987 and climate model results for the same period. The point of the paper

was to show that the warming in the observations of the troposphere was matched

by model results, thus the model was in some sense verified. I read the pre-publication paper at this meeting.

I discussed a bit of this paper with one of the authors at the meeting, pointing

out that the early years were relatively cool in this 24-year period and the hottest

year observed happened to be the last year, 1987. Thus, the period selected for the

model comparison did not represent the actual climate variations for the longer period using pre-1964 and post-1987 data, and for which the model results had less

agreement. The post-1987 data, showing cooling, were available to some researchers

as I had submitted a paper 2 years before (1993) using data from this dataset which

at that time were available through 1989. However, it could be the case that these

post-1987 data may not have been in a form usable to the authors.

In Asheville, the author told me that he did not have available to him the post1987 data and that a follow-up study would be completed in which such data would

be utilized. I did not feel the author had deliberately stopped at 1987 to produce

a ‘‘politically correct’’ result and in my other dealings with the author found him

to be highly objective and credible. Utilizing the more recent data, however, the

model in question apparently does not reproduce the observations nearly so well, especially the tropospheric non-warming that has occurred in the past 18 years (see

Michaels, P.J. and P.C. Knappenberger, 1996: Sensitivity to the greenhouse fingerprint to data selection. Nature, 383, 12 December). Thus, the ‘‘discernible human

influence’’ phrase may be viewed as only slightly less strong.

The main lines of evidence used to substantiate the ‘‘discernible human influence’’

statement as outlined in the policymakers summary were:

1. The 20th century appears to be the warmest of the past 600 years.

2. Several models, using only natural factors, could not explain all of the 20th century warming, thus implying that some fraction of the warming was probably due

to human factors.

3. The vertical patterns of change produced by models which include human-factors match observed patterns of change for 1964–87.

The first statement is not as convincing as it seems because the data we examined

(I was a key contributor to the IPCC)—and which were then used by the authors

of the Policymakers Summary—were quite sparse before 1400. We all knew, and

stated such in the scientific text, that the warming of the 20th century could largely

be related to the natural ‘‘recovery’’ from the Little Ice Age, a cold period which existed, more or less, in the 15th–19th centuries. Had we used the sparse data prior

to 1400, we would have reported that in many places on the planet, the decades

around 1000 A.D. were warmer than even today. In the next IPCC report, this issue

will probably be addressed in greater detail. What caused the earth to cool in the

last six centuries is a topic of intense scientific research and it highlights the lack

of understanding we now posses in explaining natural variations in the global climate.

The second statement comes from several model simulations of the last 100 years.

These particular models could not reproduce all of the 0.40°C temperature rise of

the last century unless they included the human factor of CO2 forcing. We know,

however, that the models are primitive and are essentially unable to reproduce

other natural variations (e.g., Barnett et al., 1996; Estimates of low frequency natu-
107

ral variability in near-surface air temperature. Holocene, 6, 255–263). Barnett et al.

concluded:

. . . our results should serve as a warning to those anxious rigorously to pursue the detection of anthropogenic effects in observed climate data: the spectrum of natural variability against which detection claims, positive or negative,

are made is not well known and apparently not well represented in early CGCM

[coupled global climate model] control runs.

As I testified before the committee I agree with this second statement that some

fraction of the observed 0.40°C warming is probably due to human factors.

The third statement relates to the paper I discussed earlier. I should add that a

source of the relatively high correlation between the model and the observations was

due to the strong cooling of the stratosphere found in the model results and in the

observations. The main cause of this cooling is most likely ozone depletion, not CO2. Thus, the CO2 effects were less involved in the ‘‘match’’ with observations than was

generally perceived by the public.

Question 5. Do you believe there is sufficient evidence of a problem with humaninduced climate change for us to keep pursuing some kind of policy to limit CO2

emissions? If not, should we stop funding research that would tend to prove or disprove the theories that human activities are impacting global climate. If there is

sufficient evidence, what more, if anything, should we be doing.

Response. There are many severe human-induced environmental issues that I believe strongly overshadow the potential effects of global warming. Dealing with

these serious issues would, I believe, lead to an associated reduction in CO2 emissions. Population increases, habitat destruction, uncontrolled pollution of air and

water by toxic emissions and effluent (not CO2) are problematic now.

I believe we should continue supporting observations and research of the global

system. Some observations are now being scaled back, and this reduces the base

from which detection of any changes may be substantiated. Better observations combined with more research has the added advantage that forecasts, particularly extended-range forecasts, would likely be more accurate. This would allow the public

to plan for weather impacts thus increasing their economic viability.

I can only comment as a non-expert in the realm of economic and social consequences of legislative actions intended to deal with climate change. What should

we do? An idea I would put forth is to let the U.S. Government take the lead in

generating reductions of CO2. The government owns thousands of vehicles, electricity-intensive appliances, heavy equipment, inefficient buildings etc. By setting

for itself more stringent standards, and purchasing new equipment and services

within the free market, the government in effect sponsors the R&D for these new

products, allowing future costs for these more efficient technologies to be lower to

the public and therefore more acceptable in the long run.

Such a large government program must begin with accurate data on current emissions against which future reductions could be precisely assessed. I would think

every aspect of government use of CO2 would be measured (i.e. field tested) and documented. Then, a program to upgrade current vehicles, appliances, building environments, and even military maneuvers, to reduce carbon emissions could be instigated. The monitoring program would then be in place to prove to the interested

parties (i.e. international monitoring agencies and the American public) that reduction in emissions is occurring. The government then would become the laboratory

out of which proven technologies could be made available for the public, though

some form of incentives would likely be required to replace cheap but inefficient

equipment.

How would this program be paid for? My personal opinion is that a nickel tax per

gallon of gasoline (i.e. ‘‘A Nickel for Nature’’?) would not cause great hardship for

the vast majority of Americans and would raise quite a bit of revenue for the government to proceed. Such a tax might even be politically acceptable if promoted as

a way for everyone to help the environment and which is used entirely for its intended purpose.

It is important to remember that modest reductions in CO2 will have an indiscernible effect on climate no matter what scenario of warming one may believe. Yet,

I suspect modest controls are all that the public will accept.

Question 6. In your professional opinion, what is the probability that there will

be a doubling of CO2 concentrations since pre-industrial times by the year 2100? A

tripling? What are the impacts of a doubling? What are the impacts of a tripling?

Response. Thank you for asking this question as an ‘‘opinion’’ as I do not perform

research specifically related to the magnitude of CO2 concentrations. I can only read

the information available, and the IPCC reports are my main source of information.
108

The rise in CO2 since 1958 has been slightly more than 1 ppmv per year, and most

recently growth has been at a rate of 0.4 percent per year. The preindustrial concentration was about 280 ppmv, with today’s value about 360 ppmv. By 2100, at

this rate, the concentration would be between two and three times the preindustrial

level. I believe there are factors yet unmodeled that will produce only a doubling

by 2100. This is strictly an opinion based on my view that uncertainties are considerable in the present models and the economic and industrial future is rarely predicted with accuracy.

My opinion (and that is all it is) on the climate effects of doubling or tripling is

that the effects will be fairly benign overall. If warming occurs, it will occur slowly

and modestly. I will mention again that the effects of natural variability will continue to cause the havoc we have always known.

I would be remiss if I did not address a major aspect of this entire debate that

has been basically ignored. It is popular today to think that burning carbon is an

evil and destructive activity. I’ve lived in a Third World country, teaching physics

and chemistry and sometimes distributing food and medicine to people in great

need. These Africans were not nameless images on a TV screen to me, I knew them

as fellow human beings with names, families, friends and hope. We provided for

them that which they could not provide for themselves. What we gave came from

an American nation whose economic engine has fueled the discoveries that have

given our country a standard of living envied throughout the world and whose benefits have lifted many millions of non-Americans to a better life. I had a small part

in that enterprise because American people, who burn carbon, were generous in financing experiences such as mine in Africa.

Today, the world’s one and only superpower is dedicated to, among other noble

pursuits, free and open scientific inquiry, freedom of faith and freedom of association. Such noble ideas are not expressed in the economic models out of which various scenarios of future policy are determined. What is their value? say they are invaluable. To be sure, we have ‘‘spent’’ considerable amounts of carbon to achieve

what we have, but I believe it has largely been well-spent when one looks at the

entire picture.

I realize that reductions of CO2 are eventually going to affect us, yet I wonder

if those who advocate draconian measures truly understand how the world as a

whole would be affected. I’ve lived in a part of the world for which a loss of American economic strength and world leadership would probably cause greater suffering. As poorly as we model the global climate, even these physical results are more

realistic than predictions of economic and social impacts which buildupon the imperfect climate model output. In short, the impacts to human existence of a doubling

or tripling of CO2 are almost impossible to predict when one considers our present

level of ignorance in these matters.

Question 7. Dr. Christy, if you add balloon temperature measurement records to

the 18 years of satellite temperature records, is there an observable warming trend?

How does that compare with the surface temperature records.

Response. As I reported in the Hearing, the global balloon and satellite record

both show that the lower tropospheric temperature has declined by—0.040°C/decade

since 1979. Two years ago I wrote a paper which specifically addressed the comparison of various records of upper air temperatures for the period since 1958 when balloon datasets began: Temperature above the surface layer, Climatic Change, 31,

455–474, (1995). I found that ‘‘Beginning in earlier years, (relying only on radiosonde data before 1979) the estimated warming trend since the late 1950’s is +0.07

to +0.110°C per decade.’’ One surface dataset (GISS) shows a trend for the same period of +0.090°C/decade, which indicates that over this particular time period (1958–

96), the surface and troposphere experienced the same trend. It is important to note

that climate models project greater warming in the troposphere on all time scales,

a feature which has apparently not appeared in the actual observations, and certainly is not verified in the observations since 1979.

RESPONSES BY JOHN R. CHRISTY TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. We hear about natural climatic cycles. For example, we know from

geologic evidence that the earth has naturally gone through cooling and warming

cycles, usually on a scale of 10’s of thousands of years.

Is it possible to identify cycles of a shorter scale?

Response. Variability of global and regional temperature occurs on all time scales

from minutes to millennia. Some of this variability occurs in a true cyclic fashion,

for example, seasonal changes of temperature in which summer is warmer than

winter or daily cycles in which afternoons are warmer than mornings. These two
109

examples represent the only regular cycles that can be identified. understand the

comment ‘‘We hear about natural climatic cycles’’ because I hear it quite often too.

However, as one who has poured over many records in detail, these alleged cycles

are not as apparent as one would be led to believe.

Natural temperature variations due to El Nin ̃ os, volcanoes, or fluctuations in

solar radiation, atmospheric aerosol loading, oceanic circulations etc., are sometimes

referred to as cycles, but they are much less predictable than forecasting that the

temperature will be warmer in July than January. These other variations would not

be categorized as strictly cyclic because they do not repeat with regularity.

Part of the problem here is that we are limited by the length and quality of our

data records. If we accept the ‘‘global’’ surface temperatures for the past 100 years

as having reasonable accuracy, even they cannot tell us whether variations on 200,

500 or 1,000 year time scales are occurring. Until we understand the magnitude and

cause for these longer variations, we will be unable to state with any confidence

that a human-induced global warming signal has been detected (unless the world

suddenly begins to warm at a very rapid rate). The present rate of temperature

change is not outside of natural rates observed in the past. The IPCC was careful

to remind the readers in the Policymakers Summary that natural variability was

a key uncertainty in this scientific endeavor and was a major reason for the cautious words ‘‘. . . balance of evidence suggests . . .’’.

Further studies of the paleoclimate records will lead to a more knowledgeable assessment of the scale of natural variations, and therefore provide the context in

which detection of human-induced changes may be identified.

Question 2. Would we be able to detect variations attributable to human activities

in this natural cycle?

Response. We know that climate models, which try to detect natural vs. unnatural

changes, are primitive and are essentially unable to reproduce natural variations on

the longer time scales (e.g., Barnett et al., 1996; Estimates of low frequency natural

variability in near-surface air temperature. Holocene, 6, 255–263). Barnett et al.

concluded

. . . our results should serve as a warning to those anxious rigorously to pursue the detection of anthropogenic effects in observed climate data: the spectrum of natural variability against which detection claims, positive or negative,

are made is not well known and apparently not well represented in early CGCM

[coupled global climate model] control runs.

Thus, separating a slow, modest human-induced warming trend which is apparently smaller than changes observed in paleoclimate records, is a tenuous exercise

at present. The problem here is that even more rapid, natural changes have occurred in the past. Let me quote from an issue of PAGES (Past Global Changes Programme, IGBP, 4, #3 Nov. 1996).

Climate variability at both a regional and a global scale has, even within the

boundary conditions prevailing during the Late-Holocene [last 5000 years], been

significantly greater than has been recorded during the short, recent period for

which instrumental records of climate variation exist [last 100 years]. This is

conclusively demonstrated by recent research, is of crucial significance for predicting future climate change and is not recognized in the recent IPCC Report.

I prefer the terminology ‘‘natural variations’’ vs. ‘‘natural cycles’’ since the longer

term variations are not strictly cyclic. I believe future research will continue to show

that some of the past, natural changes were quite rapid and severe and that

changes naturally occur from any century to the next. This confounds ones attempts

to attribute any variation to human-effects. So, the short answer to this question

is that unless the warming is dramatic (which to date it has not been), we will be

hard pressed to prove that the present level of climate variation is due to humaninduced causes.

Question 3. We know that CO2 has the potential for affecting the climatic balance

of our atmosphere. Would it not make sense to limit the amount of CO2 we put into

the atmosphere until we more fully understand the effects CO2 have on our climate.

If the consequences of choosing ‘‘limitations on CO2’’ vs. ‘‘unlimited CO2’’ were similar, I would readily agree that ‘‘limitations on CO2’’ should be chosen. In the real

world, however, forcing a limit on CO2 production has tremendous economic (and

thus, political) consequences. As we noted in the hearing, small or even moderate

reductions in CO2 production in the U.S. will do essentially nothing to change any

possible global warming.

Response. An idea I would put forth is to let the U.S. Government take the lead

in generating reductions of CO2. The government owns thousands of vehicles, elec-
110

tricity-intensive appliances, heavy equipment, inefficient buildings etc. By setting

for itself more stringent standards, and purchasing new equipment and services

within the free market, the government in effect sponsors the R&D for these new

products, allowing future costs for these more efficient technologies to be lower to

the public and therefore more acceptable in the long run.

Such a large government program must begin with accurate data of the current

emissions so that future reductions could be precisely assessed. I would think every

aspect of government use of CO2 would be measured (i.e. field tested) and documented. Then, a program to upgrade current vehicles, appliances, building environments, and even military maneuvers, to reduce carbon emissions could be initiated.

The monitoring program would then be in place to prove to the interested parties

(i.e. international monitoring agencies and the American public) that reduction in

emissions is occurring.

In this scheme, the government would become the laboratory out of which proven

technologies could be made available for public consumption, though some form of

incentives would likely be required to replace cheap but inefficient equipment. How

would this program be paid for? My personal opinion is that a nickel tax per gallon

of gasoline (i.e. ‘‘A Nickel for Nature’’?) would not cause great hardship for the vast

majority of Americans and would raise quite a bit of revenue for the government

to proceed. Such a tax might even be politically acceptable if promoted as a way

for everyone to help the environment and the revenues were explicitly used for that

program.

I suppose my point here is this: there are some rather modest programs that may

be initiated to deal with what appears at this time to be at most a modest problem.

These programs would have a minuscule effect of CO2 concentrations, but would

perhaps nudge a new set of technologies out into the market place due to the fact

the U.S. Government is a very, very big customer.

I would be remiss if I did not address a major aspect of this entire debate that

has been basically ignored. It is popular today to think that burning carbon is an

evil and destructive activity. I lived in Kenya, East Africa for 2 years, teaching

physics and chemistry and sometimes distributing food and medicine to people in

great need. To me, these Africans were not nameless images on a TV screen. I knew

them as fellow human beings with names, families, friends and hopes. We provided

for them that which they could not provide for themselves. What we gave them

came from an American nation whose economic engine has fueled the discoveries

that have given our country a standard of living envied throughout the world and

whose shared-benefits have lifted many millions of non-Americans to a better life.

I had a small part in that enterprise because American people, who admittedly burn

a lot of carbon, were generous in financing experiences such as mine in Africa.

Today, the world’s one and only superpower is dedicated to, among other noble

pursuits, free and open scientific inquiry, freedom of faith and freedom of association. Such noble ideas are not expressed in the economic models out of which various scenarios of future policy are determined. What is their value? say they are invaluable. To be sure, we have ‘‘spent’’ considerable amounts of carbon to achieve

what we have, but I believe it has largely been well-spent when one looks at the

entire picture.

I realize that reductions of CO2 are eventually going to affect us, yet I wonder

if those who advocate draconian measures truly understand how the world as a

whole would be affected. I’ve lived in a part of the world for which a loss of American economic strength and world leadership would probably cause greater suffering. As poorly as we model the global climate, even these physical results are more

realistic than predictions of economic and social impacts which build upon the imperfect climate model output. In short, the impacts to human existence of a doubling

or tripling of CO2 are almost impossible to predict when one considers our present

level of ignorance in these matters.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD S. LINDZEN, ALFRED P. SLOAN PROFESSOR OF

METEOROLOGY, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

I wish to thank Senators Chafee and Baucus, as well as the members of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, for the opportunity to put forward my views on the issue of putative global warming.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of global warming is one of the more contentious issues in science today.

Superficially, it is frequently portrayed as a ‘simple’ issue. Gases which absorb infrared radiation (known as greenhouse gases) inhibit radiative cooling of the earths
111

surface and hence increasing greenhouse gases must lead to warming. The issue is

rendered more complex by the fact that the surface of the earth does not cool primarily by means of radiation, but rather cools by evaporation and convection. Moreover, the main greenhouse gas is water vapor which is both natural in origin and

highly variable in its distribution. In the absence of good records of water vapor we

aren’t even in a position to say how much total greenhouse gases have increased.

If this weren’t bad enough, it isn’t even the total amount of greenhouse gas which

matters; for example, a molecule of water vapor at 12 km altitude is more effective

than a thousand molecules near the surface. All of this might not be relevant if

models were trustworthy, but satellite measurements of upper level water vapor

show profound discrepancies in model results. Under the circumstances, it is surprising that there is any agreement among scientists, but, in fact, most scientists

working on climate dynamics would agree that increasing levels of carbon dioxide

should have some impact on climate. The real argument is over whether the impact

will be significant. The word ‘significant,’ in this context, has a rather specific meaning. The climate is a naturally variable system. That is to say, it varies without any

external forcing. Human society already has to deal with this degree of variability

over which it has no control. For anthropogenic climate change to be ‘significant,’

it must be as large or larger than natural variability. For smaller changes, the historical record demonstrates our capacity to adapt. It is in this context that the statement frequently drawn from the 1995 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change) report assumes some relevance. It is important, therefore, to know precisely what this statement does and doesn’t say. Although it is likely that the statement is also incorrect, that turns out to be less important.

DISCERNABLE INFLUENCE

Let us begin by quoting this statement (which, in contrast to earlier IPCC reports,

gives considerable more attention to important caveats):

‘‘Our ability to quantify the human influence on global climate is currently

limited because the expected signal is still emerging from the noise of natural

variability, and because there are uncertainties in key factors. These include

the magnitude and patterns of long-term natural variability and the time-evolving pattern of forcing by, and response to, changes in concentrations of greenhouse and aerosols, and land-surface changes. Nevertheless, the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate.’’

What it says is that the climate’s behavior over the past century appears ‘‘unlikely

to be due entirely to natural variability (IPCC 1995, p. 412).’’ As Chapter 8 of IPCC

95 points out, even this trivial assertion, which, as I have noted, seems totally compatible with our theoretical understanding and makes no claims concerning the

magnitude of global warming, is dependent on the assumption that natural variability is replicated in models (IPCC 95 p. 430) an assumption which is clearly untrue since major observed components of natural variability like the quasi-biennial

oscillation and El-Nin ̃ o are either not replicated at all or replicated very poorly. Indeed the very structure of the circulation in models is different from what is observed in the data (Polyak and North, 1997). The specific feature which led Santer

(the lead author of Chapter 8 of IPCC 95) to claim discovery of the discernible impact of anthropogenic forcing fails the most elementary test of statistical robustness:

namely, it disappears when additional data is considered. Chapter 8 concludes that

our ability to quantify the magnitude of global warming ‘‘is currently limited by uncertainties in key factors, including the magnitude and patterns of longer-term natural variability and the time-evolving patterns of forcing by (and response to) greenhouse gases and aerosols.’’ In brief, a decade of focus on global warming and billions

of dollars of research funds have still failed to establish that global warming is a

significant problem. Normally, this would lead one to conclude that the problem is

less serious than originally suggested. While the IPCC 1995 report does not go so

far as to state this explicitly, it is certainly the most subdued and reserved of the

numerous IPCC reports issued since 1990.

It has been a remarkable example of semantic distortion that this weak and

unsupportable statement has encouraged environmental advocates to claim that this

report endorses various catastrophic scenarios. An appeal issued a few days ago by

one such organization, The Union of Concerned Scientists, illustrates the general

procedure. The statement begins with a clear misrepresentation of the IPCC statement: ‘‘Predictions of global climatic change are becoming more confident. A broad

consensus among the world’s climatologists is that there is now ‘a discernible

human influence on global climate.’ ’’ The UCS immediately continues: ‘‘Climate

change is projected to raise sea levels, threatening populations and ecosystems in
112

coastal regions. Warmer temperatures will lead to a more vigorous hydrological

cycle, increasing the prospects for more intense rainfall, floods, and droughts in

some regions. Human health may be damaged by greater exposure to heat waves

and droughts, and by encroachment of tropical diseases to higher latitudes.’’ The

UCS proceeds to then associate climate change with forest depletion, water scarcity,

food security, and species destruction. It concludes that scientists must endorse a

strong climate treaty at Kyoto. The implication is that the so-called IPCC consensus

extends to these claims as well. This is clearly a misrepresentation of the IPCC..

I use the phrase ‘so-called’ advisedly. The IPCC went to great lengths to include as

many names as possible among its contributors. Against my expressed wishes, even

my name was included. I can assure the committee that I (and the vast majority

of contributors and reviewers) were never asked whether we even agreed with the

small sections we commented on. Nevertheless, the usual comment is that 2,500 scientists all agree with whatever it is that the environmental advocates are claiming.

To the credit of the IPCC, it extensively documented the shortcomings of various

projections, and made few claims for any confidence. The document was deeply biased insofar as it took as its task the finding of global warming rather than the

more objective approach of determining whether it is indeed a significant problem.

Such an approach could be rationalized on the basis of sincere concern. However,

even this document puts forward comments which are misleading. For example, on

page 45 which deals with potential surprises, the possibility of an instability of the

West Antarctic ice sheet is mentioned without any reference to the fact that such

an unlikely instability is largely unrelated to climate (Bentley, 1997).

Genuinely Misleading Statement

One of the common claims in support of the reality and seriousness of global

warming is that we have had a large portion of record breaking warm years during

the last decade or so. This is not a claim used by the IPCC, and its presence in

any discussion is a rather clear piece of evidence of the intent to deceive (especially

when the claim is made by a scientist). As noted by Solow and Broadus (1989) and

Bassett (1992), this is an inevitable occurrence when one has a single record breaker

in a time series characterized by interannual variability, interdecadal variability

and an underlying trend or longer period variability. Solow and Broadus show the

clustered nature of record breakers. For those who can follow some mathematics,

the situation is easily synthesized as follows.
113

Let us represent the time series for temperature by the following expression:

where the first term corresponds to interannual variability, the second term to

interdecadal variability, and third to longer term trends or variability. This series

is shown in Figure 1.

Not surprisingly, record breakers cluster in exactly the manner found by Solow

and Broadus (1989) in the observed temperature record. The occurrence of such

record breakers contributes no additional information. Our prime concern remains

with the determination of trend and the identification of such trends with emissions

of carbon dioxide, and this remains a difficult and contested issue as the IPCC freely acknowledges.

Scientific Waffling

S. Fred Singer has recently reported that the former head of the IPCC, Bert

Bolin, has denied claims by Vice President Gore and environmental activists that

‘‘any floods, droughts, hurricanes, or other extreme weather patterns are the result

of rising global temperatures.’’ Bolin is quoted as saying ‘‘There has been no effect

on countries from any current change,’’ adding that efforts by activists to establish

such a link ‘‘is why I do not trust the Greens.’’ Although I was not present at the

debate where Bolin is alleged to have made this remark, my personal experience

suggests that it may be true. In 1993 at a mock trial of global warming held by

the BBC in which both Bolin and I participated, Bolin made similar admissions.

Nevertheless, in response to Singer’s claims, Bolin has issued a formal denial. It

may be of interest to look at this denial in some detail.

‘‘Observations show that some extreme events are becoming more intense (heavy

rainfall events in some regions), some are becoming less intense (cold spells), while

others show no statistically significant changes (hurricanes). These changes are consistent with the kind of changes that would be associated with a warmer climate.

While it cannot yet be concluded that these changes are caused by human-induced

changes of climate, neither can this association be excluded. To state that these

sorts of changes that ‘are consistent’ with the predicted effects of climate change,

as Vice-President Gore is quoted to have stated, is a scientifically accurate statement and no cause for criticism.’’

In saying this, Bolin parts company with normative science which recognizes the

virtual impossibility of disproving unverifiable assertions and sticks to statements

that are capable of ‘falsification.’ ‘Consistency,’ in this context merely means that

the situation is so unclear that virtually anything is will ‘be consistent.’ In the long

run, the replacement of the precise and disciplined language of science by the misleading language of litigation and advocacy may be one of the more important

sources of damage to society incurred in the current debate over global warming.
114

What can be said of the influence of increasing carbon dioxide?

Since the Charney Report of the NRC in 1979, the range of expected equilibrium

global warming due to doubling carbon dioxide has been stated to be from about

11⁄2C to 51⁄2C. This is simply a statement of the range of results obtained by existing

models, and assumes, somewhat illogically, that the correct answer must be in the

output of at least one model. However, as frequently noted by the IPCC, the correct

answer depends on correctly simulating feedbacks which, at present, are only poorly

known and modeled. Despite this uncertainty,there are some aspects of the problem

that are somewhat better known. In general, the response to doubled carbon dioxide

(or equivalent carbon dioxide where the effect of other anthropogenic greenhouse

gases is expressed in terms of ‘equivalent’ carbon dioxide) in the absence of

feedbacks is taken to be the response when all other atmospheric parameters are

held constant. The changes due to concomitant changes in other parameters are

called feedbacks. There is some disagreement over whether one should consider the

distribution of temperature change as a feedback. If one does, then the no-feedback

equilibrium response to doubled carbon dioxide is about 0.31⁄2C (Lindzen, 1995a); if

one does not, then the no-feedback response is about 1.21⁄2C. The latter is much

larger than the former because it includes the warming effect at the surface of cooling in the stratosphere. If one takes the latter approach, then the most important

feedback is due to upper level (above about 2 km) water vapor. In all existing models (in the original models by explicit assumption), water vapor, the most important

greenhouse gas, increases at all levels as surface temperature increases, doubling

the no-feedback response to doubled carbon dioxide. The presence of the positive

water vapor feedback in current models also increases the sensitivity of these models to other smaller feedbacks such as those due to clouds and snow reflectivity. The

trouble with current models is that they generally lack the physics to deal with the

upper level water vapor budget, and they are generally unable, for computational

reasons, to properly calculate a quantity like water vapor which varies sharply both

vertically and horizontally (Sun and Lindzen, 1993, Lindzen, 1995). Indicative of

these problems is the recent work of J.J. Bates and D.L. Jackson at NOAA who

found, using satellite data from infrared sounders, that, on the average, current

models underestimate zonally averaged (averaged around a latitude circle) water

vapor by about 20 percent. This is illustrated in Figure 2. It should be noted that

this represents an error in radiative forcing of about 20 Watts per square meter,

as compared with the forcing of 4 Watts per square meter due to a doubling of carbon dioxide (Thompson and Warren, 1982, Lindzen, 1995). More recent observational analyses by Spencer and Braswell (1997), using satellite microwave data, suggest that even Bates and Jackson have overestimated water vapor, and that the discrepancy with models is still greater. Under the circumstances, there seems to be

little actual basis for the most important positive feedback in models. Given our in-
115

ability to detect expected warming in the temperature data, one might reasonably

conclude that models have overestimated the problem.

In some ways, we are driven to a philosophical consideration: namely, do we think

that a long-lived natural system, like the earth, acts to amplify any perturbations,

or is it more likely that it will act to counteract such perturbations? It appears that

we are currently committed to the former rather vindictive view of nature.

What can be said of the implications of proposed policies for climate?

The above remarks dealt with the issue of global warming as a phenomenon.

However, the current political concern deals with the proposed setting of firm emission limitations at the forthcoming Kyoto meeting in December. The underlying assumption is that stabilization of emissions at 1990 levels (or modest reductions of

these levels) would spare the world from global warming, should the more extreme

model forecasts prove correct (despite the patent shortcomings of these models, and

the absence of convincing confirmation in existing data). It is important, therefore,

to note that such emissions reductions would have no such effect regardless of what

one believes about global warming. The effects of either lesser reductions or of restricting emission reductions to the developed world would be even more negligible

in terms of climate impact. This is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 taken from a recent report of Prinn et al (1997) based on the model developed for MIT’s Program

on the Science and Policy of Global Change. Figure 3 shows carbon dioxide levels

for a variety of scenarios. The levels by 2100 vary from about 590 ppmv to 950

ppmv. Figure 4 shows global mean temperature change for various conditions indicated by three letters. The first letter refers to emissions, with H associated with

the high values in Figure 3 and L with the low values; R refers to a reference case.

The second letter refers to the ocean delay with H referring to short delay and L

referring to long delay. The third letter refers to climate sensitivity with H referring

to an equilibrium sensitivity to doubled carbon dioxide of about 4.5°C, and L to a

sensitivity of about 1.5°C. We see that for high climate sensitivity we will get pronounced warming regardless of emission scenario, while for low sensitivity, emission

scenarios will not matter. It is important to note that emission caps proposed for

Kyoto, as difficult and expensive as they may prove, will not prevent global warming

if the climate should prove sensitive. The impact of any proposed policy, currently

reckoned as even marginally feasible, will likely be impossible to ascertain regardless of what the climate sensitivity is. However, what Figure 4 does tell us is that

should there be little warming over the next 50 years, it won’t be because of any

policy we implement at Kyoto.
116

REFERENCES

Bassett, G.W. (1992) Breaking recent global temperature records. Climate Change,

21, 303–315.

Bentley, C.R. (1997) Rapid sea-level rise soon from West Antarctic Sheet collapse?

Science, 275, 1077–1078

Bates, J.J. and D.L. Jackson (1997) A comparison of water vapor observations with

AMIP–1 simulations. In preparation.

IPCC 95 (1996) Climate change 1995: The science of climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 572pp.

Lindzen, R.S. (1995) The importance and nature of the water vapor budget in nature and models. In Climate Sensitivity to Radiative Perturbations: Physical Mechanisms and their Validation, H. Le Treut (editor), pp. 51–66, NATO ASI Series

1: Global Environmental Change, Vol. 34, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, 331p.

Lindzen, R.S. (1995a) How cold would we get under CO2-less sky? Phys. Today, 48,

78–80.

Polyak, I. and G. North (1997) Evaluation of the GFDL GCM climate variability,

2, Stochastic modeling and latitude-temporal fields. J. Geophys. Res., 102, 6799–

6812.

Prinn, R., H. Jacoby, A. Sokolov et al (1997) Integrated global system model for climate policy assessment: feedbacks and sensitivity studies. In preparation.

Solow, A.R. and J.M. Broadus (1989) On the detection of greenhouse warming. Climate Change, 15, 449–453.

Spencer, R.W. and W.D. Braswell (1997) How dry is the tropical free troposphere?

Implications for global warming theory. Bull. Amer. Met. Soc., 78, 1097–1106.

Sun, D-Z. and R.S. Lindzen (1993) Distribution of tropical tropospheric water vapor.

J. Atmos. Sci., 50, 1643–1660.

Thompson, S.L. and S.G. Warren (1982) Parameterization of outgoing infrared radiation derived from detailed radiative calculations. J. Atmos. Sci., 39, 2667–2680.
117
118

RESPONSES BY RICHARD LINDZEN TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BAUCUS

Response 1. Dr. Barron’s suggestion was intentionally generic rather than specific.

Moreover, adaptive policies require something to adapt to, and in the words of Bert

Bolin, the former head of the IPCC, ‘‘There has been no effect on countries from any

current change. The increases in temperature have been so small as to be barely

detectible.’’ Thus, at the moment, there is nothing special to adapt to. In the longer

term, we can plausibly expect many things to change over the next century including the climate (even without any influence from man) in almost totally unanticipated ways. It thus behooves us to continue to develop a society that can successfully deal with and exploit change. The obvious tools for this are wealth and capital,

information and education, as well as flexibility, freedom and intelligence.

Response 2. Frankly, I do not know the basis for Dr. Schneider’s remark. However, it is obvious that species respond to local rather than global conditions, and

locally, changes on the order of 1.5°C and more have occurred over the past century

or even less. This has led to some modest species migration and changes in agriculture, but not, to the best of my knowledge, to extinctions. What I suspect Dr.

Schneider may be referring to is the fact that climate change in the past, forced by

changing patterns of heating, among other things, rather than gross global heating,

has been characterized by large changes in the temperature difference between the

tropics and the poles rather than changes in global mean temperature. Thus, by

some reckonings during the last major glaciation global mean temperature may only

have been about 8°C colder than at present. Indeed, both glaciation and deglaciation

led to species extinctions for creatures that had specifically adapted to the earlier

climate and terrain. Even so, these were not among the major periods of species

loss.

Response 3. First, let me state that predictions of large climate change already

require that these mechanisms act to amplify the changes due to increasing anthropogenic greenhouse gases. There is no credible evidence for this. The warming expected from a doubling of CO2 even in the absence of any natural thermostatic control would only be about 1°C (and about 1.5°C for a tripling; the effect is not linear).

This low level of warming calls for no mechanism whatever to counteract the effect

of increased anthropogenic greenhouse gases. Predictions of greater warming actually require that water vapor act in such a way as to increase the warming by a

factor of two and more. I intentionally refer to the action of water vapor rather than

to the amount of water vapor. Water vapor in the atmosphere is extremely heterogeneous. There are regions that are very dry and regions that are very moist. Most

water vapor resides in the lowest 2–3 km of the atmosphere, but it is water vapor

above this level that is most important to the greenhouse effect (E. Schneider et al,

1997, Shine and Sinha, 1991). Moreover, most radiative cooling occurs in dry regions, and cooling would increase if the dry regions increased in area even if the

net water vapor increased. Understanding the water vapor feedback in dry regions

is central to determining the feedback. Here, the budget of water vapor consists in

drying due to subsiding air and moisturizing from the evaporation of ice thrown off

by clouds rather than directly falling as rain (Sun and Lindzen, 1993, describe the

water vapor budget in detail). If claims of an intensified hydrological cycle in a

warmer climate prove correct, then the drying term will increase. Moreover, the

amount of ice thrown off depends on the precipitation efficiency of clouds. The more

efficient the clouds, the less ice there is to throw off According to every text on cloud

physics written over the past half century, precipitation efficiency increases with increasing temperature (Fletcher, 1962, Mason, 1971, Rogers and Yau, 1989 for example). Thus we expect the moisturizing to decrease. Both effects should lead to an

expansion of the dry regions which would counteract the effect of increasing CO2.

This is the opposite of what current models display, which is not surprising since

current models completely fail to produce dry regions of the sort observed in satellite data (Spencer and Braswell, 1997).

Response 4. The IPCC conclusion was based on the then unpublished work of

Santer et al (1996). This work used radiosonde (balloon) data from sometime in the

70’s until 1987. As shown by Michaels and Knappenberger (1996) when the available radiosonde data until 1995 was used, the effect that Santer et al claimed to

have found (a correlation between observations and model predictions) disappeared.

Another study by some of the same authors who participated in Santer et al also

reached the conclusion that the earlier study was not statistically robust (Tett et

al, 1996). In fact, studies examining the results in Santer et al were not possible

until after the publication of IPCC 95, since the Santer et al paper had not yet appeared when IPCC 95 was published. This, of course, is counter to the claimed policy of the IPCC. That said, the Santer et al paper never claimed to quantify the
119

impact of human activities. The paper, moreover, acknowledged that even the meager result claimed was absolutely dependent on the assumption that natural variability was well replicated by model variability—a dubious assumption at best. Finally, the paper failed to consider whether the observed behavior could be due to

other factors. The Santer et al paper and IPCC use of it are excellent examples of

how virtually meaningless statements by scientists can be found by non-scientists

to have dire import. In many cases, the scientists are by no means innocent of exploiting this difference in perception.

Response 5. No, I do not believe there is sufficient evidence to continue pursuing

‘‘some kind of policy to limit CO2 emissions’’. If the only reason you can imagine

for supporting climate research is the likelihood of catastrophe, then by all means

stop funding research. However, in the light of my answer to your first question,

this would seem short sighted indeed. Regardless of the current evidence or lack

thereof, it seems to me that it would be unwise to make support of any science contingent on the projection of catastrophe.

Response 6. Predicting industrial trajectories is as difficult as any other kind of

long term prediction. However, I personally think that it is entirely possible, in the

light of our present imperfect knowledge, that atmospheric CO2 levels in 2100 will

be double present values. About the only effect of this that we are presently reasonably sure of is that plant growth will increase, and plant susceptibility to water

stress will decrease. As concerns climate, we have already had a 50 percent increase

in ‘effective’ CO2 since the last century, and hardly anyone has noticed. There is no

compelling evidence that matters will change dramatically with further increases.

REFERENCES

N.H. Fletcher (1962) The Physics of Rain Clouds, Cambridge University Press.

B.J. Mason (1971) The Physics of Clouds, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Michaels, P. J. and Knappenberger, P.C. (1996) Human effect on global climate?,

Nature, 384, 522.

Rogers and Yau (1989) A Short Course in Cloud Physics, Pergamon Press.

Santer, B.D., K.E. Taylor, T.M.L. Wigley, T.C. Johns, P.D. Jones, D.J. Karoly, J.F.B.

Mitchell, A.H. Oort, J.E. Penner, V. Ramaswamy, M.D. Schwarzkop?, R.J.

Stouffer, and S. Tett (1996). A search for human influences on the thermal structure of the atmosphere, Nature, 382, 39.

Schneider, E.K., B.P. Kirtman and R.S. Lindzen (1997) Upper tropospheric water

vapor and climate sensitivity. submitted to J. Atmos. Sci.

Shine, K.P. and A. Sinha (1991) Sensitivity of the Earth’s climate to height dependent changes in the water vapor mixing ratio, Nature, 354: 382.

Spencer, R.W. and W.D. Braswell (1997) How dry is the tropical tree troposphere?

Implications for global warming theory, Bull Amer. Met. Soc., 78, 1097–1106.

Sun, D-Z. and R.S. Lindzen (1993) Distribution of tropical tropospheric water vapor,

J. Atmos. Sci., 50, 1643–1660.

Tett, S.F.B., J.F.B. Mitchell, D.E. Parker, and M.R. Allen (1996). Human Influence

on the Atmospheric Vertical Temperature Structure: Detection and Observations,

Science, 274, 1170.

RESPONSE BY RICHARD LINDZEN TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM SENATOR BOXER

Response. The most famous cycle of climate change we know of is the 100,000

year cycle of glaciation usually identified with orbital variations. Numerous climate

changes on shorter time scales have been observed, though it is hardly clear that

these are cyclic. Among the more famous climate events of the holocene (the period

since the last ice age) are the mid-holocene optimum, the medieval optimum and

the little ice age. Traditionally, warm periods were referred to as optima. Regionally, many regions have undergone climate change that may be peculiar to those regions. In fact, regional variability is generally much larger than global variability.

Even within this century, there appears, for example, to have been a significant

winter cooling trend in north Florida. On relatively short time scales, climatic variations associated with El Nin ̃ os are beginning to be understood. However, although

strong interdecadal variability is evident in the data, its cause is not understood.

What is increasingly clear is that the atmospheric system is capable of variability

without external forcing, and that variability is the norm rather than the exception.

The detection of change due to human activity amidst all this natural variability

is, indeed, a difficult task. However, it would not be difficult if warming were to be

progressing at the rate suggested in the 1990 IPCC report (0.3°C per decade).
120

Your last question clearly transcends science. I would normally be sympathetic to

your suggestion if it were cost-free. However, as I noted in my testimony, presently

suggested policies like limiting emissions to 1990 levels would have little impact on

either CO2 buildup or projected warming (regardless of model or belief). Moreover,

without the participation of all nations, the impact would be essentially nil. Thus,

we are suggesting potentially large costs (both in terms of money and regulatory

burden) for certifiably small benefits. This really does not seem to make much sense

on the face of it.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

CLIMATE CHANGE: CAUSES, IMPACTS AND UNCERTAINTIES

I. Does Natural Variability Explain All Climate Change?

Twenty thousand years ago, a mere blink in geologic time, a visitor to the nowproductive Corn Belt of Illinois would not be sitting in the heart of the world’s foremost granary, but rather open spruce parkland forest, where many of the tree species seen are the same kinds that are found today 500 to 1,000 miles north in the

Boreal Forests of Canada. Similarly, if we could somehow have been flying over the

Great Basin we would have seen the massive fossil lakes, some stretching hundreds

of miles like former Lake Bonneville in Utah, and the now-fossil beaches (currently

visible flying into Salt Lake City Airport or over Mono Lake) from those high water

stands that date back 10 to 15 thousand years ago. The Ice Age, which at its maximum some 20,000 years ago was about 5° to 7°C (around 100°F) colder than our

current global climate, disappeared in, what is to nature, a relatively rapid period

of about 5,000 to 10,000 years. The average rate of temperature change from the

Ice Age to the current 10,000 year period of relative climate stability, our so-called

Holocene Interglacial, is about 1°C change for every thousand years. Of course there

were more rapid periods embedded within this timeframe, but I’m only giving the

sustained average rates.

Not only did such change correspond with radical alterations to the ecosystems

of the earth, but have been implicated in the extinction of what is known as the

charismatic megafauna (woolly mammoth, saber tooth tigers, etc.). Fossil pollen evidence tells us that the vegetation habitats during the more ‘‘rapid’’ parts of the transition from ice age to interglacial around 10 to 12 thousand years ago saw what

paleoclimatologists call ‘‘no analog habitats,’’ that is, combinations of pollen abundances which do not exist on earth today. All of this change was natural, of course,

and there are two reasons for mentioning it in our context. First, to remind us that

the climate and ecosystems change by themselves, without need of humans (the latter is what we call anthropogenic causation), and second, that climate change of

about several degrees on a global average basis is a very significant change from

the point of view of natural systems.

Explanations of the Ice Age vary, the most popular one being a change in the

amount of sunlight coming in between (a) winter and summer and (b) the poles and

the equator. These changes in the distribution of seasonal or latitudinal sunshine

are due to slow variations in the tilt of the earth’s axis and other orbital elements,

but these astronomical variations alone cannot totally explain the climatic cycles.

If these orbital variations and other factors (such as the increased reflectivity of the

earth associated with more ice) are combined, our best climate theories (embodied

through mathematical models that are comprised of the physical laws of conservation of mass, energy and momentum) suggest that the Ice Age should have been several degrees warmer than it actually was—especially in the Southern hemisphere.

What could account for this extra cold? Perhaps the models are not sensitive

enough, that is they do not respond sufficiently to a change in so called ‘‘radiative

climate forcing,’’ that is the change in the amount of radiant energy coming to the

earth from external factors like orbital variations or extra ice. Another (more likely,

I think) possibility is that something else also changed at the same time.

These theories can be better reconciled with what happened between ice ages and

interglacials if one assumes that several watts of energy over every square meter

of the earth were taken away in the ice age by some other mechanism at a global

scale. But what could be such a mechanism? The obvious candidate would be a

change in the composition of the earth’s atmosphere which affects both its reflectivity and its heat trapping capacity (e.g., decreases in the well-known greenhouse effect or increases in atmospheric dust). But what evidence is there that greenhouse

gases, for example carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, or water vapor, had lower

concentrations 20,000 years ago than in the interglacial? About 15 years ago that
121

evidence came through loud and clear from the ice caps of the world. Air trapped

in these glaciers provides a library of the history of the earth’s atmosphere back

some 200,000 years. It shows that during the past two ice ages carbon dioxide concentration was about 40 percent less and methane half of the average value during

the current and penultimate interglacials. It also shows that since the Industrial

Revolution carbon dioxide has increased beyond any levels experienced in the past

150,000 years (at least) by nearly 30 percent and methane by 150 percent—two figures that virtually no knowledgeable scientist disputes are a result of so-called anthropogenic emissions which are driven by increasing numbers of people pursuing

higher standards of living and using technology to achieve those growth-oriented

goals.

If the carbon dioxide and methane decreases in the last ice age helped to explain

the ice age coldness, can they tell us something about how the anthropogenic increase of these gases due to human activities might cause climate change in the future? The answer is ‘‘not directly,’’ for it is possible that there are other factors we

have not accounted for in the ice age story that could well have been involved, and

there are still many unanswered questions associated with the Ice Age cycles. It is

simply a circumstantial bit of evidence which suggests that it is more consistent to

explain the ice ages with the heat trapping power of the greenhouse effect existing

at the magnitudes currently envisioned by most scientists—i.e. a doubling of CO2

would raise surface temperatures by about 3°C plus or minus 1.5°C. This is known

as the ‘‘climate sensitivity range.’’ The magnitude of climate sensitivity that helps

to explain the ice age coldness best is 2–3°C. If the best estimate were ten degrees

warming, which is twice the value at the high end of the climate sensitivity range

thought by the mainstream of scientist today (e.g., IPCC 1996a), then the ice ages

should have been even colder than they were. On the other hand, if the earth would

only warm up by half a degree or less if CO2 doubled, then it would be tougher to

explain the magnitude of the ice ages without finding some other mechanism not

yet understood. Of course, the latter is possible, but what other lines of circumstantial evidence or direct evidence do we have for estimating climate sensitivity?

We know from quite literally thousands of laboratory experiments and direct

measurements, millions of balloon observations and trillions of satellites data bits,

that the basic structure of the energy flows in and out of the earth’s atmosphere

are relatively well understood. We know that water vapor, carbon dioxide, or methane trap enough energy on the earth to warm the surface up about 33°C (60°F) relative to that which would occur in their absence.

This well known natural greenhouse effect is not under dispute, and has been

known for a century and a half. Nor is the 0.5°C (plus or minus 0.2°C) globally averaged warming trend at the earth’s surface over the past century in dispute. In dispute is whether a small increment since the Industrial Revolution in this envelope

of greenhouse gases, which our calculations tell us should have trapped about two

extra watts of energy over every square meter of Earth, would produce a noticeable

response (i.e. a ‘‘climate signal’’). The debate over whether that signal has been detected has been intense lately and this intensity has been based upon significant

new pieces of evidence—albeit each piece is circumstantial—and a few loud, wellpublicized denials that the totality of evidence has any meaning. In the absence of

clear, direct empirical evidence, one often has to use either circumstantial evidence,

or incomplete bits of direct evidence with uncertainties attached. When the preponderance of such evidence gets strong enough, then most scientists begin to accept,

tentatively of course, the likelihood of causal connections. Some people shed their

skepticism at different levels than others, so naturally there will be a cacophonous

debate over whether a climate signal has been detected, let alone whether it could

be attributed to human activities. One can always find some scientist who will want

999 out of a 1,000 probability of certainty, and others who will accept the proposition at eight or nine chances out of ten. This is not science, but a value judgment

about the acceptability of a significant, but not conclusive, body of evidence. The scientific job is to assess (A) what can happen, and (B) what the odds are of it happening (see, for example, this discussion in Chapter 6 of Schneider 1997a). Let me discuss this process further.

I have mentioned the ice ages since this is a ‘‘natural experiment’’ that we use,

not to forecast the future, but to build understanding of climate processes and to

validate the tools that we do use to forecast the future—that is, our climate theories

embodied in mathematical models. Are there any other such natural experiments?

The answer is ‘‘yes there are many,’’ the two most prominent being (1) episodic volcanic eruptions which throw dust in the stratosphere that reflects for a few years

a few watts per square meter of solar energy that otherwise would have reached

the lower atmosphere and (2) the seasonal cycle. Let’s consider volcanic eruptions

first. Volcanic dust veils should cool the planet. In fact, the last major eruption, Mt.
122

Pinatubo in 1991, was forecast to cool the earth’s lower atmosphere on the order

of several tenths of a degree by a number of climate modeling groups—in advance

of the actual data to confirm—and indeed, that is roughly what happened. However,

it could be argued that a few tenths of a degree cooling, or warming for that matter,

might be a natural fluctuation in the earth’s climate system, and indeed, fluctuations of that magnitude are a part of the natural background ‘‘climatic noise.’’ How

then could we distinguish the climatic signal of the volcanic eruption from the noise

of the natural variability? In any one eruption it is difficult to do so since the signal

to noise ratio is about one, i.e. the magnitude of the cooling expected is about equal

to the magnitude of the natural fluctuations in non-volcanic years, and therefore for

any one event we cannot have very much confidence that a signal has been observed. So the fact that the Pinatubo results showed up about as predicted doesn’t,

by itself, give a lot of confidence, although as a circumstantial bit of evidence is

quite useful. However, another volcanic eruption in 1983, El Chicho ́n, was also followed by several tenths of a degree cooling, as was the effect after Mt. Agung in

1963 or Mt. Krakatoa in the Victorian period.

In other words, by looking at the results of several volcanic eruptions and

compositing, a number of scientists (including Mass and Schneider, 1977) used this

technique and discovered that indeed there was a clear and obvious correlation

which suggests that when a few watts of energy over every square meter of the

earth is removed by volcanic dust veils in the stratosphere, the lower atmosphere

will indeed cool by a few tenths of degrees—the very magnitude predicted by the

same computer models that we use to forecast the effects of a few watts per square

meter of sustained heating from global warming.

What other natural experiments might we have to test climate sensitivity? My favorite is one that happens every year—the seasons. Winter predictably follows summer, being some 15 degrees colder in the Northern Hemisphere and five degrees

colder than summer in the Southern Hemisphere. The reason the Southern Hemisphere has a smaller seasonal cycle is because it has much more ocean than land,

and water has a higher heat retaining capacity than land or air. Since a season is

not long enough for the planet to reach an equilibrium temperature change, therefore, the more land dominated Northern Hemisphere has lower heat capacity and

thus a larger seasonal cycle of surface temperature. How well do the climate models

do in reproducing this change? The answer is ‘‘extraordinarily well.’’ Although what

the absolute temperatures models may simulate can be off by as much as five or

six degrees in some regions of the world for some seasons, the models’ capacity to

reproduce the amplitude of the seasonal cycle of surface air temperatures, by and

large, is quite good. (It is less good for other variables, however, particularly

hydrological systems.) Now, if we were making a factor of ten error by either overestimating or underestimating the sensitivity of the climate to radiative forcing, it

would be difficult for the models to reproduce the different seasonal cycle surface

temperature amplitudes over land and oceans as well as they do. This is another

piece of circumstantial evidence suggesting that current estimate of climate sensitivity is not off by a factor of ten, as some ‘‘contrarians’’ assert. Indeed, indirect evidence like ice ages, volcanic eruptions and the seasonal cycle simulation skills of

models are prime reasons why many of us in the scientific community have for the

past 20 years expected that ‘‘demonstrable’’ (e.g., see p.11 of Schneider and Mesirow,

1976—in which I projected just such a change) anthropogenic climate change was

not unlikely by the 21st century.

In summary, then, in my opinion it is unlikely that natural variability is the explanation of all climate change, especially that which has been documented in the

20th century. However, since much of the debate over detection and attribution of

human-caused climate change hinges on the projections of climatic models, it is necessary to have at least a cursory understanding of how they work. Although it is

impossible to treat more than the highlights of the nature and use of climatic models in a dozen pages, I nonetheless offer the following section in the hopes of reducing somewhat the confusion that may exist in many peoples’ minds after listening

to the often acrimonious and technically complex debate over climatic models and

their credibility.

II. Overview Of Climate Modeling Fundamentals

Engineers and scientists build models—either mathematical or physical ones—primarily to perform tests that are either too dangerous, too expensive, or perhaps impossible to perform with the real thing. To simulate the climate, a modeler needs

to decide which components of the climatic system to include and which variables

to involve. For example, if we choose to simulate the long-term sequence of glacials

and interglacials (the period between successive ice ages), our model needs to include explicitly the effects of all the important interacting components of the climate
123

system operating over the past million years or so. These include the atmosphere,

oceans, sea ice/glaciers (cryosphere), land surface (including biota), land sub-surface

and chemical processes (including terrestrial and marine biogeochemical cycles), as

well as the external or ‘‘boundary forcing’’ conditions such as input of solar radiant

energy (e.g., see IPCC, 1996a).

The problem for earth systems scientists is separating out quantitatively cause

and effect linkages from among the many factors that interact within the earth system. It is a controversial effort because there are so many sub-systems, so many

forcings and so many interacting complex sets of processes operating at the same

time that debates about the adequacy of models often erupt.

Modeling the Climate System. So how are climate models constructed? First, scientists look at observations of changes in temperatures, ozone levels and so forth.

This allows us to identify correlations among variables. Correlation is not necessarily cause and effect—just because one event tracks another doesn’t mean it was

caused by it. One has to actually prove the relationship is causal and explain how

it happened. Especially for cases where unprecedented events are being considered,

a first principles, rather than a purely empirical-statistical approach is desirable.

However, observations can lead to a hypothesis of cause and effect—‘‘laws’’—that

can be tested (for example, see Root and Schneider, 1995). The testing is often based

on simulations with mathematical models run on a computer. The models, in turn,

need to be tested against a variety of observations—present and paleoclimatic. That

is how the scientific method is typically applied. When a model, or set of linked

models, appear plausible, they can be fed ‘‘unprecedented’’ changes such as projected

human global change forcings—changes that have not happened before—and then

be asked to make projections of future climate, ozone levels, forests, species extinction rates, etc.

The most comprehensive weather simulation models produce three dimensional

details of temperature, winds, humidity, and rainfall all over the globe. A weather

map generated by such a computer model—known as a general circulation model

or GCM—often looks quite realistic, but it is never faithful in every detail. To make

a weather map generated by computer we need to solve six partial differential equations that describe the fluid motions in the atmosphere. It sounds in principle like

there’s no problem: we know that those equations work in the laboratory, we know

that they describe fluid motions and energy and mass relationships. So why then

aren’t the models perfect simulations of the atmospheric behavior?

One answer is that the evolution of weather from some starting weather map

(known as the initial condition) is not deterministic beyond about 10 days—even in

principle. A weather event on 1 day cannot be said to determine an event 20 days

in the future, all those commercial ‘‘long-range’’ weather forecasts notwithstanding.

But the inherent unpredictability of weather details much beyond 10 days (owing

to the chaotic internal dynamics of the atmosphere) doesn’t preclude accurate forecasts of long-term averages (climate rather than weather). The seasonal cycle is absolute proof of such deterministic predictability, as winter reliably follows summer

and the cause and effect is known with certainty.

Grids and Parameterization. The other answer to the imperfection of general circulation model simulations, even for long-term averages, is that nobody knows how

to solve those six complex mathematical equations exactly. It’s not like an algebraic

equation where one can get the exact solution by a series of simple operations.

There isn’t any known mathematical technique to solve such coupled, nonlinear partial differential equations exactly. We approximate the solutions by taking the equations, which are continuous, and breaking them down into discrete chunks which

we call grid boxes. A typical GCM grid size for a ‘‘low resolution’’ model is about

the size of Colorado horizontally and that of a ‘‘high resolution’’ GCM is about the

size of Connecticut. In the vertical dimension there are two (low resolution) up to

about 20 (high resolution) vertical layers that are typically spanning the lowest 10

to 40 kilometers of the atmosphere.

Now, we’ve already noted that clouds are very important to the energy balance

of the earth-atmosphere system since they reflect sunlight away and trap infrared

heat. But because none of us have ever seen a single cloud the size of Connecticut,

let alone Colorado, we have a problem of scale—how can we treat processes that

occur in nature at a smaller scale than we can resolve by our approximation technique of using large grid boxes. For example, we cannot calculate clouds explicitly

because individual clouds are typically the size of a dot in this grid box. But we can

put forward a few reasonable propositions on cloud physics: if it’s a humid day, for

example, it’s more likely to be cloudy. If the air is rising, it’s also more likely to

be cloudy.

These climate models can predict the average humidity in the gridbox, and whether the air is rising or sinking on average. So then we can write what we call a para-
124

metric representation or ‘‘parameterization’’ to connect large scale variables that are

resolved by the grid box (such as humidity) to unresolved small scale processes (individual clouds). Then we get a prediction of grid box-averaged cloudiness through

this parameterization. So-called ‘‘cumulus parameterization’’ is one of the important—and controversial—elements of GCMs that occupy a great deal of effort in the

climate modeling community. Therefore, the models are not ignoring cloudiness, but

neither are they explicitly resolving individual clouds. Instead, modelers try to get

the average effect of processes that can’t be resolved explicitly at smaller scales than

the smallest resolved scale (the grid box) in the GCM. Developing, testing and validating many such parameterizations is the most important task of the modelers

since these parameterizations determine critically important issues like ‘‘climate

sensitivity.’’ The climate sensitivity is the degree of response of the climate system

to a unit change in some forcing factor: typically, in our context, the change in globally averaged surface air temperature to a fixed doubling of the concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide above pre-industrial levels. This brings us to one of the

most profound controversies in earth systems science, and one of the best examples

of the usefulness, and fragility, of computer modeling.

The Greenhouse Effect. If the earth only absorbed radiation from the sun without

giving an equal amount of heat back to space by some means, the planet would continue to warm up until the oceans boiled. We know the oceans are not boiling, and

surface thermometers plus satellites have shown that the earth’s temperature remains roughly constant from year to year (the interannual globally averaged variability of about 0.2°C or the 0.5°C warming trend in the 20th century, notwithstanding). This near constancy requires that about as much radiant energy leaves the

planet each year in some form as is coming in. In other words, a near-equilibrium

or energy balance has been established. The components of this energy balance are

crucial to the climate.

All bodies with temperature give off radiant energy. The earth gives off a total

amount of radiant energy equivalent to that of a black body—a fictional structure

that represents an ideal radiator—with a temperature of roughly—18°C (255°K).

The mean global surface air temperature is about 14°C (287°K), some 32°C warmer

than the earth’s black body temperature. The difference is due to the well-established greenhouse effect.

The term greenhouse effect arises from the classic analogy to a greenhouse, in

which the glass allows the solar radiation in and traps much of the heat inside.

However, the mechanisms are different, for in a greenhouse the glass primarily prevents convection currents of air from taking heat away from the interior. Greenhouse glass is not primarily keeping the enclosure warm by its blocking or re-radiating infrared radiation; rather, it is constraining the physical transport of heat by

air motion.

Although most of the earth’s surface and thick clouds are reasonably close approximations to a black body, the atmospheric gases are not. When the nearly black

body radiation emitted by the earth’s surface travels upward into the atmosphere,

it encounters air molecules and aerosol particles. Water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, ozone, and many other trace gases in the earth’s gaseous envelope tend to be highly selective—but often highly effective—absorbers of terrestrial

infrared radiation. Furthermore, clouds (except for thin cirrus) absorb nearly all the

infrared radiation that hits them, and then they reradiate energy almost like a

black body at the temperature of the cloud surface—colder than the earth’s surface

most of the time.

The atmosphere is more opaque to terrestrial infrared radiation than it is to incoming solar radiation, simply because the physical properties of atmospheric molecules, cloud and dust particles tend on average to be more transparent to solar radiation wavelengths than to terrestrial radiation. These properties create the large

surface heating that characterizes the greenhouse effect, by means of which the atmosphere allows a considerable fraction of solar radiation to penetrate to the earth’s

surface and then traps (more precisely, intercepts and re-radiates) much of the upward terrestrial infrared radiation from the surface and lower atmosphere. The

downward re-radiation further enhances surface warming and is the prime process

causing the greenhouse effect.

This is not a speculative theory, but a well understood and validated phenomenon

of nature. The most important greenhouse gas is water vapor, since it absorbs terrestrial radiation over most of the infrared spectrum. Even though humans are not

altering the average amount of water vapor in the atmosphere very much by direct

injections of this gas, increases in other greenhouse gases which warm the surface

cause an increase in evaporation which increases atmospheric water vapor concentrations, leading to an amplifying or ‘‘positive’’ feedback process known as the

‘‘water vapor-surface temperature-greenhouse feedback.’’ The latter is believed re-
125

sponsible for the bulk of the climate sensitivity (IPCC, 1996a). Carbon dioxide is another major greenhouse gas. Although it absorbs and re-emits considerably less infrared radiation than water vapor, CO2 is of intense interest because its concentration is increasing due to human activities. Ozone, nitrogen oxides, some hydrocarbons, and even some artificial compounds like chlorofluorocarbons are also greenhouse gases. The extent to which they are important to climate depends upon their

atmospheric concentrations, the rates of change of those concentrations and their effects on depletion of stratospheric ozone—which in turn, can indirectly modify the

radiative forcing of the lower atmosphere thus changing climate—currently offsetting a considerable fraction of the otherwise expected greenhouse warming signal.

The earth’s temperature, then, is primarily determined by the planetary radiation

balance, through which the absorbed portion of the incoming solar radiation is nearly exactly balanced over a year’s time by the outgoing terrestrial infrared radiation

emitted by the climatic system to earth. As both of these quantities are determined

by the properties of the atmosphere and the earth’s surface, major climate theories

that address changes in those properties have been constructed. Many of these remain plausible hypotheses of climatic change. Certainly the natural greenhouse effect is established beyond a reasonable scientific doubt, accounting for natural

warming that has allowed the coevolution of climate and life to proceed to this point

( e.g., see Schneider and Londer, 1984). The extent to which human augmentation

of the natural greenhouse effect (i.e., global warming) will prove serious is, of

course, the current debate.

Model Validation. There are many types of parameterizations of processes that

occur at a smaller scale than our models can resolve, and scientists debate which

type is best. In effect, are they an accurate representation of the large-scale consequences of processes that occur on smaller scales than we can explicitly treat?

These include cloudiness, radiative energy transport, turbulent convection,

evapotranspiration, oceanic mixing processes, chemical processes, ecosystem processes, sea ice dynamics, precipitation, mountain effects and surface winds.

In forecasting climatic change, then, validation of the model becomes important.

In fact, we cannot easily know in principle whether these parameterizations are

‘‘good enough.’’ We have to test them in a laboratory. That’s where the study of

paleoclimates has proved so valuable (e.g., Hoffert and Covey, 1992). We also can

test parameterizations by undertaking detailed small-scale field or modeling studies

aimed at understanding the high resolution details of some parameterized process

the large-scale model has told us is important. The Second Assessment Report of

IPCC (IPCC, 1996a) Working Group I devoted more than one chapter to the issue

of validation of climatic models, concluding that ‘‘the most powerful tools available

with which to assess future climate are coupled climate models, which include threedimensional representations of the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and land surface.

Coupled climate modeling has developed rapidly since 1990, and current models are

now able to simulate many aspects of the observed climate with a useful level of

skill. [For example, as noted earlier, good skill is found in simulating the very large

annual cycle of surface temperatures in Northern and Southern Hemispheres or the

cooling of the lower atmosphere following the injection of massive amounts of dust

into the stratosphere after explosive volcanic eruptions such as Mt. Pinatubo in the

Philippines in 1991.] Coupled model simulations are most accurate at large spatial

scales (e.g., hemispheric or continental); at regional scales skill is lower’’. [sentence

in square brackets added]

One difficulty with coupled models is known as ‘‘flux adjustment’’—a technique for

accounting for local oceanic heat transport processes that are not well simulated in

some models. Adding this element of empirical-statistical ‘‘tuning’’ to models that

strive to be based as much as possible on first principles has been controversial.

However, not all models use flux adjustments, yet nearly all models, with or with

out this technique, produce climate sensitivities within or near to the standard

IPCC range of 1.5 to 4.5°C. Flux adjustments do, however, have a large influence

on regional climatic projections, even if they prove not to be a major impact on globally averaged climate sensitivity. Improving coupled models is thus a high priority

for climate researchers since it is precisely such regional projections that are so critical to the assessment of climatic impacts on environment and society (e.g., IPCC,

1996b; IPCC, 1997).

Transient versus Equilibrium Simulations. One final issue needs to be addressed

in the context of coupled climate simulations. Until recently, climate modeling

groups did not have access to sufficient computing power to routinely calculate time

evolving runs of climatic change given several alternative future histories of greenhouse gases and aerosol concentrations. That is, they did not perform so-called transient climate change scenarios. (Of course, the real Earth is undergoing a transient

experiment.) Rather, the models typically were asked to estimate how the Earth’s
126

climate would eventually be altered (i.e., in equilibrium) after CO2 was artificially

doubled and held fixed indefinitely rather than increased incrementally over time

as it has in reality or in more realistic transient model scenarios. The equilibrium

climate sensitivity has remained fairly constant for over 20 years of assessments by

various national and international groups, with the assessment teams repeatedly

suggesting that, were CO2 to double, climate would eventually warm at the surface

somewhere between 1.5 and 4.5° C. (Later on we will address the issue of the probability that warming above or below this range might occur, and how probabilities

can even be assigned to this sensitivity.)

Transient model simulations exhibit less immediate warming than equilibrium

simulations because of the high heat holding capacity of the thermally massive

oceans. However, that unrealized warming eventually expresses itself decades to

centuries later. This thermal delay, which can lull us into underestimating the longterm amount of climate change, is now being accounted for by coupling models of

the atmosphere to models of the oceans, ice, soils, and biosphere (so-called earth system models—ESMs). Early generations of such transient calculations with ESMs

give much better agreement with observed climate changes on Earth than previous

calculations in which equilibrium responses to CO2 doubling were the prime simulations available. When the transient models at the Hadley Center in the United

Kingdom and the Max Planck Institute in Hamburg, Germany were also driven by

both greenhouse gases (which heat) and sulfate aerosols (which cool), these time

evolving simulations yielded much more realistic ‘‘fingerprints’’ of human effects on

climate( e.g., Chapter 8 of IPCC, 1996a). More such computer simulations are needed to provide high confidence levels in the models, but scientists using coupled, transient simulations are now beginning to express growing confidence that current projections are plausible.

Transients and Surprises. However, such a very complicated coupled system like

an ESM is likely to have unanticipated results when forced to change very rapidly

by external disturbances like CO2 and aerosols. Indeed, some of the transient models run out for hundreds of years exhibit dramatic change to the basic climate state

(e.g., radical change in global ocean currents). Thompson and Schneider (1982) used

very simplified transient models to investigate the question of whether the time

evolving patterns of climate change might depend on the rate at which CO2 con- centrations increased. For slowly increasing CO2 buildup scenarios, the model predicted the standard model outcome: the temperature at the poles warmed more than

the tropics.

Any changes in equator-to-pole temperature difference help to create altered regional climates, since temperature differences over space influence large-scale atmospheric wind patterns. However, for very rapid increases in CO2 concentrations

a reversal of the equator-to-pole difference occurred. If sustained over time, this

would imply difficult to forecast, transient climatic conditions during the century or

so the climate adjusts toward its new equilibrium state. In other words, the harder

and faster the enormously complex earth system is forced to change, the higher the

likelihood for unanticipated responses. Or, in a phrase, the faster and harder we

push on nature, the greater the chances for surprises—some of which are likely to

be nasty.

Noting this possibility, the Summary for Policy makers of IPCC Working Group

I concluded with the following paragraph:

Future unexpected, large and rapid climate system changes (as have occurred

in the past) are, by their nature, difficult to predict. This implies that future

climate changes may also involve ‘‘surprises.’’ In particular these arise from the

non-linear nature of the climate system. When rapidly forced, non-linear systems are especially subject to unexpected behavior. Progress can be made by investigating non-linear processes and sub-components of the climatic system. Examples of such non-linear behavior include rapid circulation changes in the

North Atlantic and feedbacks associated with terrestrial ecosystem changes.

Of course, if the Earth system were somehow less ‘‘rapidly forced’’ by virtue of

policies designed to slow down the rate at which human activities modify the land

surfaces and atmospheric composition, this would lower the likelihood of non-linear

surprises. Whether the risks of such surprises justify investments in abatement activities is the question that Integrated Assessment (IA) activities are designed to inform (IPCC, 1996c). The likelihood of various climatic changes, along with estimates

of the probabilities of such potential changes, are the kinds of information IA modelers need from earth systems scientists in order to perform IA simulations. We turn

next, therefore, to a discussion of methods to evaluate the subjective probability distributions of scientists on one important climate change issue, the climate sensitivity.
127

Subjective Probability Estimation. Finally, what does define a scientific consensus? Morgan and Keith (1995) and Nordhaus (1994) are two attempts by non-climate scientists, who are interested in the policy implications of climate science, to

tap the knowledgeable opinions of what they believe to be representative groups of

scientists from physical, biological and social sciences on two separate questions:

first the climate science itself and second impact assessment and policy. Their sample surveys show that although there is a wide divergence of opinion, nearly all scientists assign some probability of negligible outcomes and some probability of very

highly serious outcomes, with one or two exceptions, like Richard Lindzen at MIT

(who is scientist number 5 on Fig. 1 of Morgan and Keith).

In the Morgan and Keith study, each of the 16 scientists listed in Table 1 were

put through a several hour, formal decision-analytic elicitation of their subjective

probability estimates for a number of factors. Figure 1 shows the elicitation results

for the important climate sensitivity factor. Note that 15 out of 16 scientists surveyed (including several IPCC Working Group I Lead Authors—I am scientist 9) assigned something like a 10 percent subjective likelihood of negligible (less than 1°C)

climatic change from doubling of CO2. These scientists also typically assigned a 10

percent probability for extremely large climatic changes—greater than 5°C, roughly

equivalent to the temperature difference experienced between a glacial and interglacial age, but occurring some hundred times more rapidly. In addition to the lower

probabilities assigned to the mild and catastrophic outcomes, the bulk of the scientists interviewed (with the one exception) assigned the bulk of their subjective cumulative probability distributions in the center of the IPCC range for climate sensitivity. What is most striking about the exception, scientist 5, is the lack of variance in his estimates—suggesting a very high confidence level in this scientist’s

mind that he understands how all the complex interactions within the earth-system

described above will work. None of the other scientists displayed that confidence,

nor did the Lead Authors of IPCC. However, several scientists interviewed by Morgan and Keith expressed concern for ‘‘surprise’’ scenarios—for example, scientists 2

and 4 explicitly display this possibility on Figure 1, whereas several other scientists

implicitly allow for both positive and negative surprises since they assigned a considerable amount of their cumulative subjective probabilities for climate sensitivity

outside of the standard 1.5 to 4.5 range. This concern for surprises is consistent

with the concluding paragraph of the IPCC Working Group I Summary for Policymakers quoted above.

IPCC Lead Authors, who wrote the Working Group I Second Assessment Report,

were fully aware of both the wide range of possible outcomes and the broad distributions of attendant subjective probabilities. After a number of sentences highlighting

such uncertainties, the Report concluded: ‘‘nevertheless, the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on the climate.’’ The reasons for

this now-famous subjective judgment were many, such as the kinds of factors listed

above. These include a well validated theoretical case for the greenhouse effect, validation tests of both model parameterizations and performance against present and

paleoclimatic data, and the growing ‘‘fingerprint’’ evidence that suggests horizontal

and vertical patterns of climate change predicted to occur in coupled atmosphereocean models has been increasingly evident in observations over that past several

decades. Clearly, more research is needed, but enough is already known to warrant

assessments of the possible impacts of such projected climatic changes and the relative merits of alternative actions to both mitigate emissions and/or make adaptations less costly. That is the ongoing task of integrated assessment analysts, a task

that will become increasingly critical in the next century. To accomplish this task,

it is important to recognize what is well established in climate theory and modeling

and to separate this from aspect that are more speculative. That is precisely what

IPCC (1996a) has attempted to accomplish.

III. Assessing The Impacts Of Climatic Change Projections

One of the most dramatic of the standard ‘‘impacts’’ of climatic warming projections is the increase in sea level typically associated with warmer climatic conditions. An EPA study used an unusual approach: combining climatic models with the

subjective opinions of many scientists on the values of uncertain elements in the

models to help bracket the uncertainties inherent in this issue. Titus and

Narayanan (1996)—including teams of experts of all persuasions on the issue—calculated the final product of their impact assessment as a statistical distribution of

future sea level rise, ranging from slightly negative values (i.e., a sea level drop)

as a low probability outcome, to a meter or more rise, also with a low probability

(see Fig 2). The midpoint of the probability distribution is something like half meter

sea level rise by the end of the next century.
128

Since the EPA analysis stopped there, this is by no means a complete assessment.

In order to take integrated assessment to its logical conclusion, we need to ask what

the economic costs of various control strategies might be and how the costs of abatement compare to the economic or environmental losses (i.e. impacts or damages as

they are called) from sea level rises. That means putting a value—a dollar value

of course—on climate change, coastal wetlands, fisheries, environmental refugees,

etc. Hadi Dowlatabadi at Carnegie Mellon University leads a team of integrated assessors who, like Titus, combined a wide range of scenarios of climatic changes and

impacts but, unlike the EPA studies, added a wide range of abatement cost estimates into the mix. Their integrated assessment was presented in statistical form

as a probability that investments in CO2 emissions controls would either cost more

than the losses from averted climate change or the reverse (e.g., Morgan and

Dowlatabadi, 1996). Since their results do not include estimates for all conceivable

costs (e.g., the political consequences of persons displaced from coastal flooding), the

Carnegie Mellon group offered its results only as illustrative of the capability of integrated assessment techniques. Its numerical results have meaning only after the

range of physical, biological and social outcomes and their costs and benefits have

been quantified—a Herculean task. Similar studies have been made in Holland by

a Dutch government effort to produce integrated assessments for policymakers. Jan

Rotmans, who heads one of their efforts, likes to point out that such modeling of

complex physical, biological and social factors cannot produce credible ‘‘answers’’ to

current policy dilemmas, but can provide ‘‘insights’’ to policymakers that will put decisionmaking on a firmer factual basis (Rotmans and van Asselt, 1996). Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of any complex analytic tool is essential to rational policymaking, even if quantifying the costs and benefits of specific activities is

controversial.

William Nordhaus, an economist from Yale University, has made heroic steps to

put the climatic change policy debate into an optimizing framework. He is an economist who has long acknowledged that an efficient economy must internalize

externalities (in other words, find the full social costs of our activities, not just the

direct cost reflected in conventional ‘‘free market’’ prices). He tried to quantify this

external damage from climate change and then tried to balance it against the costs

to the global economy of policies designed to reduce CO2 emissions. His optimized

solution was a carbon tax, designed to internalize the externality of damage to the

climate by increasing the price of fuels in proportion to how much carbon they emit,

thereby providing an incentive for society to use less of these fuels.

Nordhaus (1992) imposed carbon tax scenarios ranging from a few dollars per ton

to hundreds of dollars per ton—the latter which would effectively eliminate coal

from the world economy. He showed that, in the context of his model and its assumptions, that these carbon emission fees would cost the world economy anywhere

from less than 1 percent annual loss in Gross National Product to a several percent

loss by the year 2100. The efficient, optimized solution from classical economic costbenefit analysis is that carbon taxes should be levied sufficient to reduce the GNP

as much as it is worth to avert climate change (e.g., the damage to GNP from climate change). He assumed that the impacts of climate change were equivalent to

a loss of about 1 percent of GNP. This led to an ‘‘optimized’’ initial carbon tax of

about five dollars or so per ton of carbon dioxide emitted. In the context of his modeling exercise, this would avert only a few tenths of a degree of global warming to

the year 2100, a very small fraction of the 4°C warming his model projected.

How did Nordhaus arrive at climate damage being about 1 percent of GNP? He

assumed that agriculture was the most vulnerable economic market sector to climate change. For decades agronomists had calculated potential changes to crop

yields from various climate change scenarios, suggesting some regions now too hot

would sustain heavy losses from warming whereas others, now too cold, could gain.

Noting that the U.S. lost about one third of it’s agricultural economy in the heat

waves of 1988, and that agriculture then represented about 3 percent of the U.S.

GNP, Nordhaus felt the typically projected climatic changes might thus cost the

U.S. economy something like 1 percent annually in the 21st century. This figure was

severely criticized because it neglected damages from health impacts (e.g., expanded

areas of tropical diseases, heat-stress deaths, etc.), losses from coastal flooding or

severe storms, security risks from boat people created from coastal disruptions in

South Asia or any damages to wildlife, fisheries or ecosystems that would almost

surely accompany temperature rises at rates of degrees per century as are typically

projected. It also was criticized because his estimate neglected potential increases

in crop or forestry yields from the direct effects of increased CO2 in the air on the

photosynthetic response of these marketable plants. Nordhaus responded to his critics by conducting a survey, similar to that undertaken by Morgan and Keith, but

this time focused on the impacts of several scenarios of climatic change on world
129

economic product—including both standard market sector categories (e.g., forestry,

agriculture, heating and cooling demands) and so-called non-market amenities like

biological conservation and national security.

When Nordhaus surveyed the opinions of mainstream economists, environmental

economists and natural scientists (I am respondent #10, in Nordhaus, 1994), he

found that the former expressed a factor of 20 less anxiety about the economic or

environmental consequences of climate change than the latter (see Fig.3—Scenario

A is for 3°C warming by 2100 A.D. and Scenario C for 6°C by 2100 A.D.). However,

the bulk of even the conservative group of economists Nordhaus surveyed considered

there to be at least a 10 percent probability that typically projected climate changes

could still cause economic damages worth several percent of gross world product

(the current U.S. GNP is around five trillion dollars—about 20 percent of the global

figure). And, some of these economists didn’t include estimates for possible costs of

‘‘non-market’’ damages (e.g., harm to nature). One ecologist who did explicitly factor

in non-market values for natural systems went so far as to assign a 10 percent

chance of a hundred percent loss of GNP—the virtual end of civilization! While

Nordhaus quipped that those who know most about the economy are less concerned,

I countered with the obvious observation that those who know the most about nature are very concerned.

We will not easily resolve the paradigm gulf between the optimistic and pessimistic views of these specialists with different training, traditions and world views, but

the one thing that is clear from both the Morgan and Keith and Nordhaus studies

is that the vast bulk of knowledgeable experts from a variety of fields admits to a

wide range of plausible outcomes in the area of global environmental change—including both mild and catastrophic eventualities—under their broad umbrella of

possibilities. This is a condition ripe for misinterpretation by those who are unfamiliar with the wide range of probabilities most scientists attach to global change

issues. The wide range of probabilities follows from recognition of the many uncertainties in data and assumptions still inherent in earth systems models, climatic impact models, economic models or their synthesis via integrated assessment models

(see Schneider, 1997a,b). It is necessary in a highly interdisciplinary enterprise like

the integrated assessment of global change problems that a wide range of possible

outcomes be included, along with a representative sample of the subjective probabilities that knowledgeable assessment groups like the IPCC believe accompany

each of those possible outcomes. In essence, the ‘‘bottom line’’ of estimating climatic

impacts is that both ‘‘the end of the world’’ and ‘‘it is good for business’’ are the two

lowest probability outcomes, and that the vast bulk of knowledgeable scientists and

economists consider there to be a significant chance of climatic damage to both natural and social systems. Under these conditions—and the unlikelihood that research

will soon eliminate the large uncertainties that still persist—it is not surprising that

most formal climatic impact assessments have called for cautious, but positive steps

both to slow down the rate at which humans modify the climatic system and to

make natural and social systems more resilient to whatever changes do eventually

materialize.

IV. Policy Implications

What Are Some Actions to Consider? Decisionmaking, of course, is a value judgment about how to take risks—gambling, if you will—in the environment-development arena. Despite the often bewildering complexity, making value choices does

not require a Ph.D. in statistics, political science or geography to comprehend. Rather, citizens need simple explanations using common metaphors and everyday language that ordinary people can understand about the terms of the debate. Once the

citizens of this planet become aware of the various tradeoffs involved in trying to

choose between business-as-usual activities and sustainable environmental stewardship, the better will be the chances that the risk-averse common sense of the ‘‘average’’ person may be thrust into the decisionmaking process by a public that cares

about its future and that of its planet, and knows enough not to be fooled by simple

solutions packaged in slick commercials or editorials by any special interest.

What are the kinds of actions that can be considered to deal with global change

problems like climate change. The following list is a consensus from a multi-disciplinary, business, university and government assessment conducted by the National

Research Council in 1991. It is encouraging that this multi-discipline, ideologically

diverse group (including economist Nordhaus, industrialist Frosch and climatologist

Schneider) could agree that the United States, for example, could reduce or offset

its greenhouse gas emissions by between 10 and 40 percent of 1990 levels at low

cost, or at some net savings, if proper policies are implemented. Here is the Council’s entire suggested list:
130

(1) Continue the aggressive phaseout of CFC and other halocarbon emissions and

the development of substitutes that minimize or eliminate greenhouse gas emissions.

(2) Study in detail the ‘‘full social cost pricing’’ of energy, with a goal of gradually

introducing such a system. On the basis of the principle that the polluter should

pay, pricing of energy production and use should reflect the full costs of the associated environmental problems.

(3) Reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases during energy use and consumption

by enhancing conservation and efficiency.

(4) Make greenhouse warming a key factor in planning for our future energy supply mix. The United States should adopt a systems approach that considers the

interactions among supply, conversion, end use, and external effects in improving

the economics and performance of the overall energy system.

(5) Reduce global deforestation.

(6) Explore a moderate domestic reforestation program and support international

reforestation efforts.

(7) Maintain basic, applied, and experimental agricultural research to help farmers and commerce adapt to climate change and thus ensure ample food.

(8) Make water supply more robust by coping with present variability by increasing efficiency of use through water markets and by better management of present

systems of supply.

(9) Plan margins of safety for long-lived structures to take into consideration possible climate change.

(10) Move to slow present losses in biodiversity.

(11) Undertake research and development projects to improve our understanding

of both the potential of geoengineering options to offset global warming and their

possible side-effects. This is not a recommendation that geoengineering options be

undertaken at this time, but rather that we learn more about their likely advantages and disadvantages.

(12) Control of population growth has the potential to make a major contribution

to raising living standards and to easing environmental problems like greenhouse

warming. The United States should resume full participation in international programs to slow population growth and should contribute its share to their financial

and other support.

(13) The United States should participate fully with officials at an appropriate

level in international agreements and in programs to address greenhouse warming,

including diplomatic conventions and research and development efforts.

This NRC (1991) assessment produced a remarkable list, considering the diversity

of the participants’ backgrounds and their varying ideological perspectives. But in

the crucible of open debate that permeated that assessment activity, self-interest polemics and media grandstanding are incinerated. This group didn’t assert that catastrophe was inevitable, nor that it was improbable. We simply believed that prudence dictates that ‘‘despite the great uncertainties, greenhouse warming is a potential threat sufficient to justify action now.’’

Integrated assessments of the policy options offered by the National Research

Council Report are actively being pursued with a variety of models.

It is interesting that this comprehensive list of 13 recommendations from the National Research Council report still ignored two fundamental aspects: the desperate

need for (1) an intelligent, non-polemical public debate about global change and (2)

interdisciplinary public education that also teaches students about whole systems

and long-term risk management, not only traditional areas of isolated specialization.

Environment and (or versus) Development? While the NRC report did acknowledge

the importance of international dimensions of global change policymaking, it was

still largely a developed country perspective. Developing countries often have very

different perspectives. First of all, LDCs are struggling to raise literacy rates, lower

death rates, increase life expectancy, provide employment for burgeoning populations and reduce local air and water pollution that pose imminent health hazards

to their citizens and environments.

Protecting species or slowing climate change are simply low on their priority lists

as compared to more mature economic powers like the OECD nations. It is ironic,

even if understandable, that LDCs put abatement of global change disturbances so

low on their priority lists despite the fact that nearly all impact assessments suggest that it is these very countries that are most vulnerable to climatic change, for

example.

There is a phrase in economics known as ‘‘the marginal dollar.’’ In our context

it means that given all the complexity of interconnected physical, biological and social systems, climate abatement may not be perceived as the best place to invest

the next available dollar so as to bring the maximum social benefit to poor coun-
131

tries. I have heard many representatives of LDCs exclaim that until poverty is corrected, preventable disease stamped out, injustice redressed and economic equity

achieved, they will invest their precious resources on these priorities. My response

has been that climatic changes can exacerbate all of those problems they rightly

wish to address, and thus we should seek to make investments that both reduce the

risks of climate change and help with economic development (transfer of efficient

technologies being a prime example). It is a great mistake, I believe, to get trapped

in the false logic of the mythical ‘‘marginal dollar,’’ for it is not necessary that every

penny of the next available dollar go exclusively to the highest priority problem

whereas all the rest (particularly problems with surprise potential and the possibility of irreversible damages) must wait until priority one is fully achieved. To me,

the first step is to get that marginal dollar cashed into small change, so that many

interlinked priority problems can all be at least partially addressed. Given the large

state of uncertainty surrounding both the costs and benefits of many human and

natural events, it seems most prudent to address many issues simultaneously and

to constantly reassess which investments are working and which problems—including global change—are growing more or less serious.

It takes resources to invest, of course, and since the bulk of available capital is

in developed countries, it will require international negotiations—‘‘planetary bargaining’’ it has been called—to balance issues of economic parity and social justice

with environmental protection. Such negotiations are underway under U.N. auspices, and will likely take many years to work out protocols that weigh the diverse

interests and perceptions of the world’s nations.

There is a lively debate among economists, technologists and environmentalists

about what are the most cost-effective strategies for abating carbon emissions which

also can reduce potential impacts of climatic changes to below the undefined ‘‘dangerous’’ levels referred to in the Framework Convention on Climate Change language. Most economists argue that some policy to ‘‘internalize the externality’’ of potential climate damage is already appropriate, reflecting the recommendations already published by the National Research Council in 1991. Environmentalists usually argue that major efforts to spur immediate abatement of carbon emissions are

necessary if climatic changes less than one more degree Celsius are to likely be

avoided (which they typically define as ‘‘dangerous’’). Most economists, on the other

hand, often argue that new technologies will be able to accomplish carbon abatement more cheaply in the future as such technologies are discovered and deployed

(Wigley et al, 1996). Thus, their logic suggests that a cost-effective time profile of

abatement would be to postpone most carbon reductions until later in the 21st century. This seemingly implacable debate will echo in Kyoto chambers, I am sure, in

December 1997.

My colleague, the Stanford University economist Lawrence Goulder, and I have

used state-of-the-art economic modeling tools to study this debate, and conclude that

both the stereotypical environmentalist (who argue to abate now) and economist positions (abate later) are actually not incompatible, but complimentary! We show

(please see the Appendix in which our submitted Commentary to Nature magazine

is reproduced) that although the economist view that future abatement is likely to

be cheaper is probably correct, so too is the environmentalist argument that current

actions are urgently needed, since such technologies referred to in economic cost-effectiveness studies won’t simply invent themselves. In other words, policy actions

to help induce technological changes are needed now in order to bring about a profile of cost-effective abatement in the decades ahead. We also address the relative

economic efficiency of alternative policy instruments: contrasting carbon taxes versus research and development subsides. Although we recognize the political reluctance of many to embrace any new taxes, in truth, most economic analyses show

that a fee for the use of the atmosphere (currently a ‘‘free sewer’’) will reduce incentives to pollute, increase incentives to develop and deploy less polluting technologies,

and can be more economically efficient than other policies—particularly if some of

the revenues generated by a carbon tax were recycled back into the economy. R&D

subsidies can be economically efficient, our conventional economic analyses suggest,

to the extent that current R&D markets are already subsidized or otherwise not optimally efficient—a likelihood.

Therefore, it is my personal view that all parties should recognize that potential

damages to a global commons like the Earth’s climate are not mere ideological rhetoric, nor are solutions necessarily unaffordable. Moreover, ‘‘win-win’’ solutions in

which economic efficiency, cost-effectiveness and environmental protection can happily co-exist are possible—if only we put aside hardened ideological positions.
132

V. Personal Observations On The Global Warming Media Debate

A very intense, too-often personal and ad hominem, media debate has attended

the global warming problem in the past 5 years. As a participant in this process,

I can attest to the frustration one experiences in seeing a complex scientific problem

with many policy implications often trivialized into an ideological boxing match in

which polar extremes are pitted against each other and the work of the vast bulk

of the knowledgeable community is marginalized. A baffling array of claims and

counter claims appears, particularly in op-ed pieces, and a general state of public

confusion is fostered. It is my belief that this confusion does not reflect the ordered

state of knowledge, in which many aspects of the climate change issue enjoy strong

consensual views, other aspects are considered plausible, whereas yet others are

clearly (to insiders at least) highly speculative. Public dialog would be much richer

if we all strove to separate out what is well known from what is speculative, an

effort not attempted often enough in most public accounts of the issue. How is this

best accomplished?

For 20 years the scientific community, or at least the broad cross section scientific

community represented by the deliberations of the National Research Council, IPCC

and other international assessment groups, have suggested that if CO2 were to double and be held fixed, then at equilibrium (i.e. the change in steady state after a

few hundred years) the earth’s temperature would warm up some one and a half

to four and a half degrees centigrade—the uncertainty, as noted earlier, in this climate sensitivity range largely being associated with the well recognized processes

that we treat crudely in our climate models, mostly clouds and water vapor. The

reason that very few scientist set the climate sensitivity range above four and a half

degrees or below one and a half degrees is primarily because of natural experiments

such as ice ages, volcanoes and seasonal cycles, as well as other technical questions

dealing with theory and modeling (see IPCC 1996a for details). Nevertheless, a few

have asserted, some with very high confidence, that global warming from CO2 doubling would only cause a few tenths of a°C equilibrium temperature rise, and even

have argued that certain processes that they can name, but cannot demonstrate to

have global scale effects, would be responsible for this diminishing effect (e.g.,

Lindzen, 1990). Such debates (e.g., see Schneider, 1990) are very difficult for the lay

public to penetrate, and even for relatively skilled but still non-professional observers, they are hard to follow. It is for such reasons that groups like the National Research Council or The World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations

Environment Program have called a community of scientists holding a spectrum of

views, but all knowledgeable in the basic art, to meet together to debate the relative

merits of various lines of evidence and to provide assessments which give the best

guess as well as a judgment for the ranges of uncertainty of a variety of climate

changes, as well as their potential impacts on environment and society and the costs

of mitigation from alternative policies. Indeed, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 1996a, b, and c) is now the premier such assessment activity

and represents the effort of hundreds of directly involved scientists and thousands

of indirectly involved scientists, industrialists, NGO’s or policymakers who serve as

reviewers and commentators.

The IPCC Peer Review Processes. Let me contrast the IPCC process with that of

some of its critics. In July 1996 an extraordinary meeting of about six dozen climate

scientists from dozens of countries took place. It was the third installment of a process to write a Second Assessment Report for the IPCC. This meeting, in Asheville,

North Carolina, was designed to make explicit the points of agreement and difference among the scientists over exceedingly controversial and difficult issues, including the signal detection and attribution chapter—the most controversial. Chapter 8 was controversial since new lines of evidence had been brought to bear by

three modeling groups around the world, each suggesting a much stronger possibility that a climate change signal has been observed and that its pattern (or fingerprint) is much closer matched to anthropogenic caused changes than heretofore believed. Scientists are by nature a skeptical lot, and typically submit their work for

peer review before publishing. When scientists have new ideas or new tests, as the

dozen or so representing these modeling groups in fact had, they typically write a

journal article and submit it for publication. The journals, peer reviewed of course,

typically send the article out to two or three peers, who write anonymous reviews,

(unless the reviewers have the courage to confess as I, the editor of the journal Climatic Change, encourage my reviewers to do). The authors then rewrite their article

in response to the reviewers and the editor serves as referee. The process usually

goes back and forth several times with several revised drafts of the article until a

suitable compromise is achieved among reviewers, authors and the editor.

Contrast this normal journal peer review process in which a few people are involved, with what happened in Asheville in 1995 at the IPCC’s third workshop. Ben
133

Santer from Lawrence Livermore National Lab, who had assembled the results of

a number of modeling groups and was the first author of the submitted manuscript

(Santer et al, 1996) on climate signal detection and the Convening Lead Author of

Chapter 8 of the IPCC report (the controversial IPCC chapter on signal detection

and attribution), presented the results of his group’s effort not to just the half dozen

Lead Authors of Chapter 8, as is typical in IPCC meetings, but to the entire assembled scientific group at Asheville. Not only did Santer have to explain the work of

him and his colleagues (many of whom were there) to his most knowledgeable peers,

but also to scores of others from communities as diverse as stratospheric ozone experts like Susan Solomon and Dan Albritton, to satellite meteorologists like John

Christy or biospheric dynamics experts such as Jerry Melillo. Climatologists such

as Tom Karl or myself were also present, along with heads of weather services and

other officials from several countries who served on the IPCC’s assessment team as

a member of the scientific delegations of the various nations. Not everybody was

equally knowledgeable in the technical details of the debate, of course, but even

these less familiar participants served an essential role: of witnesses to the process

of honest, open debate. Perhaps only twenty-five percent of those assembled had

truly in-depth knowledge of the full range of details being discussed. However, all

understood the basic scientific issues and most know how to recognize slipshod

work—to say nothing of a fraud or a ‘‘scientific cleansing’’—when they see it. This

remarkable session lasted for hours, was occasionally intense, always was cordial,

and never turned polemical. As a result, words for Chapter 8 were changed, ideas

and concepts altered somewhat, but by and large basic conclusions were unchanged

because the vast bulk of those assembled (and no one proclaimed to the contrary)

were convinced that the carefully hedged statements the lead authors proposed

were, in fact, an accurate reflection of the state of the science based upon all available knowledge—including the new results. This was not only peer review, but this

was peer review ten times normal! As the editor of a peer review journal it would

be inconceivable for me to duplicate this process, as I have to hope that a few referees and myself can serve the peer reviewing role half as well as this remarkable,

open process at Asheville. Moreover, after the Asheville meeting there were two

more IPCC drafts written and reviewed by hundreds of additional scientists industrialists, policymakers, and NGO’s from all over the globe.

Contrast this open IPCC process then, to the harsh critics of the IPCC, alleging

‘‘scientific cleansing’’, ‘‘herd mentality’’, and first presenting their detailed technical

counter arguments in such ‘‘refereed scientific literature’’ as the editorial pages of

the Wall Street Journal (Singer 1996, Seitz 1996,). Some had the temerity, although

I do not understand how they could do it with a straight face, to allege that Chapter

8 conclusions were all based upon non peer reviewed work, despite the fact that the

Asheville process was ten times normal peer review, to say nothing of the hundreds

of scientific reviewers of the next draft of the IPCC report that followed. In the wake

of all these reviews, textual alterations needed to be made, and these were minor,

but were done over the course of time. The last round of changes were made by the

Convening Lead, Ben Santer. Some interests subsequently alleged that these minor

changes dramatically altered the report and, with no evidence, asserted they were

politically motivated (‘‘scientific cleansing’’ one charged—and launched a vicious personal attack on one of the least political, most cautious scientists, Ben Santer). Any

honest evaluation will reveal that this irresponsible charge—published in the

unrefereed opinion pages of a business daily—is utterly absurd. In fact, the most

famous line in the IPCC report (that there is a ‘‘discernible’’ human effect on climate) appeared as one sentence in a short paragraph that was 80 percent caveats!

The IPCC report essentially ‘‘drips’’ with caveats.

Moreover, the ‘‘discernible’’ line is not a radical statement, as it reflects a lowest

common denominator consensus view of the vast bulk of people exposed to the evidence. It does not assert climate signal detection to be proven beyond any doubt,

nor do I or any other responsible scientists I know of make such assertions. Nor

can such evidence of human effects be dismissed as wholly random at a very high

probability by responsible scientists—except perhaps in the opinions section of some

newspapers. To ignore such contrarian critics would be inappropriate, I agree. However, to give them in news stories comparable weight to a hundred-scientists, thousand-reviewer document, as if somehow a small minority of scientists who are skeptical deserve equal weight, without informing the readership or viewership that the

contrarians represent a tiny minority, is to mislead a public who cannot be expected

to look up for themselves the relative weights of conflicting opinions. And to publish

character-assassinating charges of ‘‘scientific cleansing’’ without checking the facts

is simply unethical—at least in any system of ethics I respect.
134

VI. Concluding Remarks

A condensed summary of the principal conclusions I would like to draw is as follows, beginning with the more narrowly technical issues and proceeding to broader

generalizations about impacts, uncertainties and policy choices:

Hierarchy of models. A hierarchy of models, ranging from simple zero or one-dimensional, highly parameterized models up to coupled three-dimensional models

that simulate the dynamics and thermodynamics of connected physical and biological sub-systems of the earth-system are needed for climatic effects assessment. The

simpler models are more transparent—allowing cause-and-effect processes to be

more easily traced—and are much more tractable to construct, run and diagnose,

whereas multi-dimensional, dynamical models can provide geographic and temporal

resolution needed for regional impact assessments and—hopefully—provide more realistic and detailed simulations, even if at much higher costs for construction, computation, diagnosis and interpretability. Since the real climate system is undergoing

a transient response to regionally heterogeneous (patchy) forcings (e.g., aerosols and

greenhouse gasses combined, which both vary over time and space), eventually it

will be necessary to run fully coupled three-dimensional earth systems models in

order to ‘‘hand off’’ their results to a variety of regional impact assessment models.

In the interim, lower resolution ‘‘simple’’ climate models can be hybridized into more

comprehensive models to produce hybrid estimates of time-evolving regional patterns of climatic changes from a variety of emissions and land use change scenarios.

Such estimates may be instructive to policymakers interested in the differential climatic impacts of various climate forcing scenarios and/or various assumptions about

the internal dynamics of both climate and impact models.

Sensitivity studies are essential. It is unlikely that all important uncertainties in

either climatic or impact models will be resolved to the satisfaction of the bulk of

the scientific community in the near future. However, this does not imply that

model results are uninformative. On the contrary, sensitivity analyses in which various policy-driven alternative radiative forcing assumptions are made can offer insights into the potential effectiveness of such policies in terms of their differential

climatic effects and impacts. Even though absolute accuracy is not likely to be assured for the foreseeable future, considerable precision concerning the sensitivity of

the physical and biological sub-systems of the earth can be studied via carefully

planned and executed sensitivity studies across a hierarchy of models.

Validation and testing are required. Although it may be impractical, if not theoretically impossible, to validate the precise future course of climate given the uncertainties that remain in forcings, internal dynamics and unpredictable surprise

events, many of the basic features of the coupled physical and biological sub-systems

of the earth can already be simulated to a considerable degree. Testing models

against each other when driven by the same sets of forcing scenarios, testing the

overall simulation skill of models against empirical observations, testing model

parameterizations against high resolution process models or data sets, testing models against proxy data of paleoclimatic changes and testing the sensitivity of models

to radiative forcings of anthropogenic origin by computing their sensitivity to natural radiative forcings (e.g., season radiative forcing, volcanic dust forcing, orbital element variation forcings etc.) comprise a necessary set of validation-oriented exercises that all modelers should agree to perform. Similarly, impacts models should

also be subjected to an analogous set of validation protocols if their insights are to

gain a high degree of credibility.

Subjective probability assessment. In addition to standard simulation modeling exercises in which various parameters are specified or varied over an uncertainty

range, formal decision-analytic techniques can be used to provide a more consistent

set of values for uncertain model parameters or functional relationships. The embedding of subjective probability distributions into climatic models is just beginning

(e.g., Titus and Narayanan, 1996), but may become an important element of integrated assessment modeling in future generations of model building (e.g., see the

discussion of the hierarchy of integrated assessment models in Schneider, 1997b).

‘‘Rolling reassessment.’’ It is obvious that the projection of climatic effects and related impacts will continue to change as the state-of-the-art in both kinds of models

improves over the next few decades. Therefore, the most flexible management possible of a global commons like the Earth’s climate seems a virtual necessity, since

the potential seriousness of the problem—or even the perception of that seriousness—is virtually certain to change with new discoveries and actual climatic and

other environmental or social events. Therefore, a series of assessments of climatic

effects, related impacts, and policy options to prevent potentially dangerous impacts

will be needed periodically—perhaps every 5 years as IPCC has chosen for the repeat period of its major Assessment Reports that treat climatic effects, impacts and

policy issues as separable assessments. It seems important that whatever policy in-
135

struments are employed (to either mitigate anthropogenic forcings or help reduce

damage from projected climatic effects) be flexible enough to respond quickly and

cost-effectively to the evolving science that will emerge from this rolling reassessment process.

Consider surprises and irreversibility. Given the many uncertainties that still attend most aspects of the climatic change and impacts debate, priority should be considered for those aspects which could exhibit irreversible damages (e.g., extinction

of species whose already-shrinking habitat is further stressed by rapid climatic

changes) or for which imaginable ‘‘surprises’’ have been identified (e.g., alterations

to oceanic currents from rapid increases in greenhouse gasses). For these reasons,

management of climatic risks needs to be considered well in advance of more certain

knowledge of climatic effects and impacts.

‘‘Win-win’’ strategies. Economically efficient, cost-effective and environmentally

sustainable policies have been identified and others can be found to help induce the

kinds of technological innovations needed to reduce atmospheric emissions in the

decades ahead. Some mix of emissions ‘‘cap and trade’’, carbon taxes with revenue

recycling, or technology development incentives can provide ‘‘win-win’’ solutions if

all parties to the environment-development debate would lower the intensity of their

ideological preconceptions and work together for cost-effective and equitable measures to protect the global commons.

REFERENCES

Hoffert, M.I. and Covey, C. (1992) ‘‘Deriving global climate sensitivity from

paleoclimate reconstructions,’’ Nature 360: 573–76.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change (IPCC), (1996a). Climate Change

1995. The Science of Climate Change: Contribution of Working Group I to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Houghton, J.T., Meira Filho, L.G., Callander, B.A., Harris, N., Kattenberg, A., and

Maskell, K., eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 572 pp.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change (IPCC), (1996b). Climate Change

1995. Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change: Scientific-Technical

Analyses. Contribution of Working Group II to the Second Assessment Report of

the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Watson, R.T., Zinyowera, M.C.,

and Moss, R.H., eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 878 pp.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change (IPCC), (1996c). Climate Change 1995.

Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Contribution of Working

Group III to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Bruce, J.P., Lee, H., and Haites, E.F., eds. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change (IPCC), 1997. Workshop on Regional

Climate Change Projections for Impact Assessment, Imperial College, London, 24–

26 September 1996.

Lindzen, R.S. 1990. ‘‘Some Coolness Concerning Global Warming’’. Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc. 71: 288–299

Mass, C. and S. H. Schneider, 1977. ‘‘Influence of sunspots and volcanic dust on

long-term temperature records inferred by statistical investigations’’. J. Atmos.

Sci. 34 (12): 1995–2004.

Morgan, M.G. and H. Dowlatabadi. 1996. ‘‘Learning from Integrated Assessment of

Climate Change’’. Climatic Change 34 (3–4): 337–368.

Morgan, M.G. and D.W. Keith 1995. ‘‘Subjective judgments by climate experts’’, Environmental Science and Technology 29: 468A–476A

National Research Council. 1991. Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming. National Academy of Sciences; Washington, DC.

Nordhaus, W.D. 1992. ‘‘An Optimal Transition Path for Controlling Greenhouse

Gases’’, Science 258: 1315–1319.

Nordhaus, W.D. Jan-Feb 1994. ‘‘Expert opinion on climate change’’, American Scientist 45–51.

Root, T. L. and S. H. Schneider. 1995. ‘‘Ecology and climate: research strategies and

implications’’, Science 269: 331–341.

Rotmans J. and van Asselt, M. 1996. ‘‘Integrated assessment: a growing child on its

way to maturity—an editorial’’. Climatic Change 34 (3–4): 327–336.

Santer, B.D., K.E. Taylor, T.M.L. Wigley, T.C. Johns, P.D. Jones, D.J. Karoly, J.F.B.

Mitchell, A.H. Oort, J.E. Penner, V. Ramaswamy, M.D. Schwarzkopf, R.J.

Stouffer, and S. Tett. 1996. ‘‘A search for human influences on the thermal structure of the atmosphere.’’ Nature 382: 39–46.

Schneider, S.H. 1990. Global Warming: Are We Entering the Greenhouse Century?

Vintage Books, New York, NY. 343 pages.
136

Schneider, S.H. 1997a. Laboratory Earth: The Planetary Gamble We Can’t Afford to

Lose. Basic Books: New York.

Schneider, S.H. 1997b. ‘‘Integrated assessment modelling of global climate change:

Transparent rational tool for policymaking or opaque screen hiding value-laden

assumptions?’’ Environmental Modelling and Assessment (submitted).

Schneider, S.H. and R. Londer. 1984. The Coevolution of Climate and Life. Sierra

Club Books, San Francisco, CA.

Schneider, S.H. and L.E. Mesirow. 1976. The Genesis Strategy: Climate and Global

Survival. Pleanum, New York, NY. 419 pages.

Seitz, F. 1996. ‘‘A Major Deception on Global Warming’’. Wall Street Journal. New

York. June 12.

Singer, S.F. 1996. ‘‘Letter to the Editor’’. Wall Street Journal. New York. July 11.

Thompson, S. L. and S. H. Schneider, 1982. ‘‘CO2 and Climate: The importance of

realistic geography in estimating the transient response’’, Science 217: 1031–1033.

Titus, J. and V. Narayanan, 1996. ‘‘The Risk of Sea Level Rise: A Delphic Monte

Carlo Analysis in which Twenty Researchers Specify Subjective Probability Distributions for Model Coefficients within their Respective Areas of Expertise’’. Climatic Change 33 (2):151–212.

Wigley, T.M.L., R. Richels, and J.A. Edmonds. 1996. ‘‘Economic and environmental

choices in the stabilizations of atmospheric CO2 concentrations,’’ Nature 379: 240–

243.
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

RESPONSES BY DR. STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR BAUCUS

Question 1. During the hearing, Dr. Barron stated that our strategies to address

increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases should be adaptive in nature. In your

opinion, what would be the most important adaptation strategies to pursue?

Response. I agree with Dr. Barron that adaptive strategies are the most sensible.

The reason I feel that they are sensible, as I also pointed out in written and oral

testimoneys, is that it is very likely that further information on both climatic effects

and impacts is likely to change our perceptions of the damages that climate could

cause to environment and society, as well as the costs of mitigating those damages

as new technologies are invented and implemented. Therefore, whatever policy instruments we adopt should have the maximum flexibility to be able to take advantage of, what I called in my written testimony, ‘‘rolling re-assessment.’’ That is,

every five or so years some groups (like the IPCC) will produce the assessments,

and the state of knowledge so assessed might indicate more serious (or less serious)

concern over climate change than previous assessments. Therefore, policy instruments that are most flexible will allow the highest degree of adaptive management.

In my personal view, although I recognize that political realities (currently in the

United States at least) stand in its way, a carbon tax is probably the most flexible

instrument (see the Appendix to my written testimony, which contains the commentary, now accepted, for Nature magazine by Professor Larry Goulder and myself

defending the flexibility and economic efficiency aspects of a carbon tax as opposed

to other carbon policy instruments). But regardless of whether a carbon tax, cap and

trade arrangements, R&D subsidies or other instruments are the ultimate policies

of choice, minimizing ‘‘hardwiring’’ would seem to me the best strategy.

There are other areas where I think adaptive measures should also be considered.

I have long advocated ‘‘anticipatory adaptation’’ as one of the responses to the possibility of negative effects of climatic changes. For example, a new water project could

well increase the height of a dam, the width of a channel, or the amount of free

coastline before expensive infrastructure would be allowed to be built, all in anticipation of the not unlikely possibility of increased extremes of drought and flood or

sea levels. Building extra margins of safety into currently planned or future infrastructure is usually very inexpensive relative to the cost of retrofit. Thus, such anticipatory adaptation can substantially reduce the overall lifetime cost of the project,

particularly if currently foreseeable but not certain impacts like sea level rise or extreme floods were to occur. Likewise, it is well-known that building more efficient

houses and cars at the outset is much less costly than trying to retrofit them once

they have been built.

Another way in which anticipatory adaptation can take place is to make investments in agricultural research. For example, we know that if there is an increase

in the probability of droughts and floods, as it is appearing to be increasingly likely,

then agronomic research in which crop varieties or farming techniques that are

more resilient to large climatic variations would provide a measure of security

against those variations as they unfold. And even if they did not unfold, such resilience would help us deal with the ordinary climate variability, which already causes

substantial year-to-year variations in agricultural productivity, even in technologically advanced countries like the United States.

Finally, a form of adaptive strategy is simply the development of alternative energy technologies. That is, should the world decide in the next decade or so that it

really does wish to avert the potential for ‘‘dangerous interference’’ in the climate

system as the FCCC words it, it would be much more expensive to replace these

conventional energy systems if there were no previous enhanced research and development efforts to experiment with nonconventional alternatives in advance of their

urgent need. Therefore, investment in alternative energy systems to conventional

fossil energy provides a measure of anticipatory adaptation that would make future

adjustments much less expensive than if we simply pretend that business is usual

is the safest and best path, and luck turns against us as new studies prove climate

change to be in the mid-to-upper range of currently projected damages.

Question 2. You stated in your testimony that it was difficult for plants and animals to adapt to a temperature increase of 5°C over the 10,000 year period following

the last Ice Age and that many species would likely go extinct with a kind of rapid

temperature increase projected for the next century. Assuming, for the purpose of

this question, that the Earth experiences a temperature increase of greater than

1.5°C over the coming 100 years, what is the likelihood that species will successfully

adapt? If, in your opinion, this represents a threat to preserving biological diversity,

to your knowledge has there ever been a period in the paleoclimate record where

climate change has resulted in significant loss of species?
151

Response. Let me answer the last part of Senator Baucus’s question first. There

are a number of periods in paleoclimatic records where rapid climate change resulted in dramatic loss of species. The obvious example is the famous ‘‘Cretaceous/

Tertiary boundary’’, in which temperature changes on the order of 10 degrees per

year likely accompanied an asteroid collision with the earth. Half the existing species in the world disappeared, including dinosaurs. Fortunately, no one envisions

such a catastrophic rate of change! However, climate change is not the only factor

by which humans disturb nature. It has long been argued by ecologists that the

fragmentation of habitats, forcing wild species into smaller and smaller refuges with

fewer resources and higher competition than they would normally experience, is a

threat to preserving biodiversity. Indeed this ‘‘conventional ecological wisdom’’ has

led such luminaries as E.O. Wilson at Harvard to predict a mini-extinction crisis,

which, viewed from the perspective of hundreds of years, might look in some future

geological record almost as if an asteroid had hit the earth today.

But, if we combine the fragmentation of habitats, the introduction of thousands

of chemicals for which most creatures have no evolutionary experience and which

are often toxic, the transport across natural biogeographic barriers of so-called ‘‘exotic species,’’ and combine these stresses on natural systems with climate change

at rates of degrees per century (as opposed to degrees per thousand years that are

more typical in the past 10,000 years), then I am confident that it would be very

difficult for many species to survive such a combination of human pressures without

an unnaturally large number of extinctions. Whether such extinctions would be

counted ‘‘only’’ in the several percent range or the tens of percent range, as many

ecologists predict, is of course impossible to know now. But, it would seem to me

almost certain that a dramatic increase of unnatural extinction rates would occur

from this combination of fragmented habitats and rapidly changing climate. Even

if we were to substantially expand our network of reserves and to interconnect them

to allow migration corridors, actions that would certainly reduce somewhat our damages to nature, I still doubt we could prevent substantial loss of biodiversity. However, careful conservation practice, maintaining conservation areas, ecosystem restoration, maintenance of adequate wetlands, and cost-effective priorities for conservation investments, probably could go a long ways toward offsetting a significant

fraction of the damages that we would likely otherwise inflict on nature.

Finally, without requiring an asteroid collision and its unbelievably rapid, large

climate change, we do know that extinctions occurred at the end of the last ice-age,

in which the ‘‘charismatic metafauna’’ such as mammoths and saber-toothed tigers

disappeared. This is a time in which there were many ‘‘no analog’’ habitats, brought

about by nature’s typical sustained rates of climate change: on the order of degrees

per millennium. I am virtually certain that degrees per century of climate change

sustained over a century or more and combined with fragmented habitats would, as

stated earlier, substantially increase the extinction rates of species all around the

world.

Question 3. Dr. Lindzen referred in his testimony to a natural mechanism that

would be employed by the Earth to counteract the predicted climatic changes due

to the effect of increased water vapor in the atmosphere. Are you aware of any historic reference or specific research that would support a theory of the existence of

such a mechanism?

Response. Dr. Lindzen referred in his testimony to natural mechanisms that could

counteract the rate of climate change, as he has done many times in the past and

in different contexts. A number of years ago, he asserted, without proof, that increasing surface temperatures would decrease the amount of moisture in the upper

troposphere (between about 5 and 10 miles up). However, a number of observational

studies show that when the North Pacific region warmed, the moisture content of

the upper troposphere actually increased, as the computer models suggest, not as

Dr. Lindzen speculated. He later ‘‘recanted’’ his position (at least temporarily) when

pressed by then Senator Gore at a Senate hearing.

Dr. Lindzen frequently points to physical processes that are known to occur on

small-scales, and asserts that since they are not explicitly treated in computer models, that the models necessarily are inaccurate, and, furthermore, he implies this inaccuracy is only in one direction—an overestimate of climate sensitivity. He has

never demonstrated that the neglect of such small-scale processes makes any difference at the scale at which these models operate (hundreds of kilometers across).

A scientist must demonstrate how small-scale processes matter to events at large

scales, and then demonstrate that the poor treatment of such processes will change

the climate sensitivity in a given direction. Neither Dr. Lindzen nor anyone else has

demonstrated that poor treatment of each of these small scale processes necessarily

matters at large scales, let alone in what direction a better representation of them
152

would alter our predictions. Quite simply, these are theoretical speculations and Dr.

Lindzen has asked the world to wait until these complex, technical issues are thoroughly resolved before paying attention to the current state-of-the-art—imperfect as

it is—in modeling.

To me, what is essential is the validation of existing tools, not their theoretical

completeness (see my written testimony on this). Validation studies produce mixed

results, of course, but, generally support the basic predictions of the magnitude of

change in the climate models, not a tenth of that magnitude that Dr. Lindzen repeatedly asserts is the most likely outcome.

Furthermore, in his written testimony, Dr. Lindzen said that satellites suggested

that the computer models underestimated the amount of water vapor in the upper

troposphere sufficiently to cause an error of about 20 watts per square meter in the

models’ natural greenhouse effect calculations. He compared this 20 to the 4 watts

per square meter that a doubling of CO2 would add in terms of trapped infrared

heat and implied we somehow can’t detect a consequence from about 4 watts per

square meter heat trapping when the absolute error in the models is 20 watts? Dr.

Lindzen knows, as we have personally debated this issue before, that this is a misleading comparison. Since any error a model may make in the absolute amount of

energy that it calculates the natural atmosphere traps is also an error that would

take place both in the model’s control experiment, and in the experiment in which

carbon dioxide were increased. In other words, the error would subtract out from

these two experiments, leaving no difference at all unless the processes involved are

what we call ‘‘nonlinear.’’ Indeed, processes are nonlinear in the climate system, but

Dr. Lindzen has never shown that any such nonlinearity would reduce the sensitivity of the climate, as it could increase in sensitivity. The scientific community is well

aware of these issues, tries to test them as best as possible, and would never confuse relative and absolute accuracy. By way of analogy, if I normally weighed 180

pounds, got on my scale and it said 190 pounds, I would be angry at the absolute

error in my scale, but would get used to it over time. If a month later, after overindulging in too many desserts, I step on the scale and it read 193, I would be remiss to say that because the 3-pound relative increase is less than the absolute

error of 10 pounds in the scale, that therefore the 3-pound increase can’t be taken

seriously. Obviously, had the scale been properly calibrated to 180, it still would

have come out at 183, or perhaps 182 or 184 if the scale were slightly ‘‘nonlinear.’’

But by and large, the absolute error would make very little difference in the sensitivity of the scale to measuring change. That is the fallacy in Dr. Lindzen’s comparison of the 4 watts per square meter CO2 doubling heating effect with the 20

watt per square meter absolute error in the baseline calibration of the models he

claims exists. I apologize for the technical complexity of this answer, but I feel that

it is important to focus on that statement so as to emphasize the very little credibility that it deserves.

Question 4. Dr. Lindzen stated in his testimony that the one specific feature that

led to the IPCC conclusion of a discernible human influence on global climate,

. . . ‘‘disappears when additional data is considered.’’ Are you aware of specific ‘‘additional data’’ that was not considered or erroneously applied that would cause the

IPCC to reach a different conclusion? Are you aware of a specific research result

or model that supports Dr. Lindzen’s claim? If so, did you know whether the IPCC

considered it? Are you aware of other factors that the IPCC relied upon to conclude

that human activities were impacting global climate.

Response. This is a very complicated issue, which I will try to answer as briefly

as possible, but still will take several paragraphs. In short, IPCC in 1995 had not

considered the additional data that Dr. Lindzen refers to, because it was not available to the analysis team at the time the analysis was performed. However, the very

same authors who performed the analysis have not only considered such data recently, but they have incorporated it into subsequent analyses and their conclusions

remain the same, in fact, they are strengthened. I strongly urge that you contact

Dr. Ben Santer from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, who will be able

to explain this further. There is a debate in Nature magazine (12 December 1996

issue) in which you can find further technical details. In short, the argument is simply this. The first analysis that the IPCC debated was based on a calculation at

Lawrence Livermore National Lab, in which carbon dioxide increases and aerosol

increases from pre-industrial values to present were used and compared to carbon

dioxide increases alone. The agreement between the models and observations was

much better when the aerosols were included, which is what one might expect since

aerosols also are part of the human impact on climate in the real world. However,

the real world did not experience a fixed increase in either carbon dioxide or
153

aerosols, but rather these ‘‘radiative forcings’’ changed with time—what we call

transient experiments (see my written testimony).

The first studies which Dr. Santer and his colleagues performed involved equilibrium experiments. It turns out, and government officials should be proud of this,

that environmental controls on air pollution that generates sulphate particles (because of their potential hazards to human health) caused a reduction in the emissions of such sulphates from the mid-seventies through the 1990’s in North America

and Europe. Therefore, a better way to perform the climate experiment would not

be to put in a fixed amount of sulphate, as was done in the initial Santer et al.

experiments, but to allow Northern Hemispheric sulphate to increase rapidly from

post-World War II to the mid–1970’s, then allow it to reduce due to air pollution

controls, and then start to increase again in the 1990’s because of Chinese emissions. Since the IPCC 1995 report, additional transient experiments with such timevarying sulphate forcing patterns have been performed, and that Dr. Santer and colleagues (as reported briefly in the previously cited Nature debate) have shown that

when this more correct sulphate forcing is applied to climate models, it gives a particular shape of response, which is similar to the shape that is observed when the

‘‘additional data,’’ to which Dr. Lindzen refers, is included. So the reason Dr.

Lindzen asserts that the additional data invalidates the original conclusion is because Dr. Lindzen is applying the additional data to the equilibrium experiment—

and the agreement becomes worse. But when this new data is applied to the transient experiment, the agreement between model and observations becomes even better. Since the transient experiment is the better representation of reality, the ‘‘additional data,’’ in my opinion, would improve one’s confidence that a ‘‘discernible

human influence’’ on climate has occurred.

Finally, let me say that it is absolutely incorrect to assert (as Dr. Lindzen does

in his written testimony) that the IPCC lead authors, and I was one of them, used

the ‘‘discernible’’ phrase because of this one additional ‘‘specific feature’’ that Dr.

Santer and 11 other colleagues presented. Indeed, there were many lines of evidence, of which this ‘‘specific feature’’ was one, and if any one of them collapsed,

it would not eliminate the preponderance associated with the others. These other

factors include (1) a well validated theory of heat trapping, (2) a well established

century-long 1/2°C warming trend of the earth, (3) geographic patterns of climate

change with CO2 and aerosols which begin to match observed patterns, (4) mountain

glacier retreats, (5) rising sea level, (6) ability of the models to reproduce the different seasonal cycles of surface temperature in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, and (7) the capacities of models to reproduce cooling of the lower atmosphere following volcanic eruptions in roughly the same amount as was observed.

The ‘‘discernible’’ statement was clearly not based on one line of evidence.

Question 5. Do you believe there is sufficient evidence of a problem with humaninduced climate change for us to keep pursuing some kind of policy to limit CO2

emissions? If not, should we stop funding research that would tend to prove or disprove the theories that human activities are impacting global climate? If there is

sufficient evidence, what more, if anything, should we be doing?

Response. With due respect to Senator Baucus, asking the question about ‘‘sufficient evidence’’ to ‘‘keep pursuing some kind of policy to limit CO2 emissions’’ is

clearly asking me for a value judgment. However, since I have been asked for my

values many times, and they are well documented on the record through many congressional testimoneys and four published popular books (most recent being Laboratory Earth: A Planetary Gamble We Can’t Afford to Lose, Basic Books, 1997), I will

not hesitate to restate that opinion here.

Indeed, as I said in my oral testimony on July 10, I have believed that there has

been ‘‘sufficient evidence’’ for the past 20 years to limit CO2 emissions, not because

I was certain of the precise nature, timing, and distribution of consequent damages,

but simply because I am a risk-averse person who doesn’t believe in taking irreversible chances—especially with the life-support systems of the planet, particularly

when alternative energy systems already exist, and modest research development

programs, along with incentive programs that could be spurred through more realistic energy pricing, could very well reduce substantially our impacts on the atmosphere. This, to me, is fundamental planetary insurance against the first decimal

place odds chance of substantial damages, particularly in areas such as biodiversity

loss.

With regard to whether we should stop funding research that would ‘‘prove or disprove the theories,’’ I have two reasons to disagree. The first is plain self-interest:

as a scientific researcher interested in understanding how nature works, it would

be hard for me not to advocate pursuing further knowledge for its own sake. With

that self-interest aside, the second reason may prove more compelling to some in
154

the Congress. That is, we need to understand how the system works, and how it

changes, and how we might or might not be damaging it not only to help us decide

how much carbon emissions to mitigate—the adaptive management issue referred

to in question 1—but simply to help us learn how to adapt more effectively to whatever change might occur. Suppose we chose as a matter of policy to take the risk

that climate change will not be serious and allow the earth to ‘‘perform the experiment’’ for us. Let us also suppose, that some damages unfold (both not unlikely assumptions, I’m afraid). In that case, the amount of damages that would eventually

occur would depend upon on our capacity to forecast accurately what further

changes would take place. For example, it is much easier for farmers to adapt to

changes that are known in advance, for water supply planners or health officials

to make contingency planning to deal with known changes than random or

unforecasted changes. Likewise, wildlife managers could deal with artificial wetlands or migration corridors or other more cost-effective planning activities if they

knew precisely what changes would unfold than if changes simply occurred unanticipated. Therefore, even if we choose to do nothing now to abate carbon—believing

that any amount of uncertainty is sufficient grounds to do nothing (which I think

is inconsistent with most personal and business investment practices)—we still

would need the kinds of scientific information that the research community can provide in order to make adaptations more efficient and ultimate damages to incur

lower costs.

Since I argue that more research is important, you ask ‘‘what more’’ should we

be doing. First, I think we need to integrate work in physical, biological, and social

areas. I think that most areas of physical climate research are already in relatively

good shape, and the most important thing in this area to watch is some continuity

in funding, so that research groups aren’t always spending so much time fighting

for new grants. The amount of effort scientists put into grant writing these days

because of unreliable funding often starts to equal the amount of effort they put into

their own research. So, continuity and stability would strike me as more important

than any particular increase in overall effort in physical science or climatology. With

regard to biological research, I think there needs to be more coordination so that

interdisciplinary activities across biological and physical research groups could continue to expand. The rewards systems in science don’t often provide incentives to

interdisciplinary researchers, and I think that universities and government labs

could use some encouragement from Congress and funding agencies to support such

applied, but fundamentally interesting, interdisciplinary work. Finally, I think we

have put too little relative effort into asking the question, ‘‘So what if the climate

changes?’’ I think more coordinated efforts to perform ‘‘integrated assessment’’ of the

human activities which threaten to create climate change, which affect how we

could adapt should such changes occur, and which evaluates the distribution of

damages need a boost. Even more than for physical scientists, funding is spotty and

unreliable, and impact assessment researchers spend a large fraction of their time

in defensive posture pursuing grants rather than basic work. Furthermore, academic institutions are less likely to employ such people as they are not always valued as highly as ‘‘basic researchers.’’

Finally, I think the economics community has taken major strides toward studying the potential costs of carbon abatement as well as the benefits of such abatement. Although all that work has accelerated, it is still at a relatively early stage

of development, and not only does more of such work need to be done, but it needs

to be better coordinated with those who study climate damages and the community

that produces climate systems research. In a nutshell, it would be nice if we had,

as the now defunct National Climate Program Office was supposed to do when it

was first mandated by Congress in 1978, some central tracking office to make sure

that wasted overlaps do not occur, and that serious research gaps do not also occur.

Some office needs to help provide some continuity of funding for observations and

modeling so that the research community can spend most of its time working, rather

than frantically pursuing the next grant dollar for survival.

Question 6. In your professional opinion, what is the probability that there will

be a doubling of CO2 concentrations since pre-industrial times by the year 2100? A

tripling? What are the impacts of a doubling? What are the impacts of a tripling?

Response. The probability that there will be a doubling of CO2 concentrations

since pre-industrial times by the year 2100 is very high. If we include the combined

effects of carbon dioxide, methane, and fluorocarbons, I think the probability is very

close to one. It will be exceedingly difficult to turn off the population growth, economic growth and fossil fuel growth engines of this planet before the equivalent carbon dioxide concentration (i.e., CO2 plus methane, fluorocarbons, etc.) reaches the

heat trapping equivalent of 550 parts per million CO2—probably before the middle
155

of the next century. However, if we begin to invest in alternative technologies, and

turn lose the impressive capacity of our industries to invent and deploy more efficient systems, I think there is no justification to go beyond that equivalent doubling

of CO2. Indeed, we could hold heat trapping from CO2 well below a doubling if we

were to aggressively pursue all ‘‘no-regrets’’ energy-efficiency options now, as well

as perform the needed research to enhance efficiency and lower the costs of less carbon-intense alternative energy systems. I also believe we would have to engage in

‘‘planetary bargains’’ with countries like China and India, especially if the differential cost of their building more efficient, less polluting power plants were borne by

richer countries. In this way, the Chinese would not lock in inefficient, high CO2- producing coal burning power plants now whose operating lifetime could be near

five decades. Since I do not believe it is likely that such an international effort will

get very far in the near future, I give a fairly high probability to the equivalent doubling of CO2. I believe also that the equivalent tripling of CO2 by 2100 is quite likely

if the world pays no attention to the alternative pathways for energy development,

and the continuation of international non-cooperation on energy and protection of

global commons is maintained. I am hopeful that will not be the case, although I

am fearful this may only happen if environmental disasters motivate attention—

something I recall Senator Baucus said in his oral remarks during the hearing and

that I unhappily, but professionally, agree with.

With regard to the impacts of doubling of CO2, I think that there is a 5 or 10

percent chance that that doubling could be relatively modest in its effect on climate

(on the order of 1°C or less temperature rise), and I think that there is probably

a 10 percent chance that it could be potentially catastrophic (something like 4–6°C

or more). I think it is most likely that 2–3°C will occur as a result of that doubling,

but that alone occurring over a century, would, as I said in answer to question 2,

likely cause serious damages to nature in the form of biodiversity loss and dramatically altered habitats, as well as increases in the frequency of hydrological extremes,

such as droughts, floods, and sea level rises, and other disruptions to our normal

activities that depend on climate. I feel the impacts of a tripling would be substantially worse than those of the doubling, for a tripling could well cause climate

changes of 5°C or more, and in such instances major surprises, such as a flip-flop

in North Atlantic ocean currents, large releases of stored carbon compounds in soils

and bogs, and other currently ‘‘imaginable surprises’’ would be much more likely to

occur. I think that virtually any currently imaginable definition of ‘‘dangerous climate change’’ would insist on holding the future amount of carbon dioxide for doubling or less, and indeed a cogent case could be made for holding the increase to

no more than 450 parts per million, although I recognize that to do that would require significant policy actions right away.

RESPONSES BY DR. STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. We hear about natural climatic cycles. For example, we know from

geologic evidence that the earth has naturally gone through cooling and warming

cycles, usually on a scale of 10’s of thousands of years.

Question 1a. Is it possible to identify cycles of a shorter scale?

Response. Yes, there are shorter scale cycles, but the very large ones occur on tens

of thousands of years (like ice ages and interglacial cycles, whose peak-to-peak temperature differences are in the order of 5°C—9°F). Smaller scale cycles usually involve changes that are 1°C or less. Remember, we are talking about the ‘‘best guess’’

for human-induced climate changes in the next century of several degrees, larger

than the short scale effects. For example, during the early part of the current millennium, exploration of Greenland in a so-called ‘‘medieval climatic optimum’’ took

place, in which temperatures in the North Atlantic region were perhaps one to two

degrees warmer than now. However, on a globally averaged basis, it is unlikely surface temperatures were even 1°C warmer. A few centuries ago, Europe and parts

of North America were particularly affected by a so-called ‘‘little Ice-Age,’’ between

about 1500 and 1800. Again, temperature decreases in northern latitudes were on

the order of 1°C colder relative to today, and globally probably 1/2°C or less. Thus,

the magnitude of unnatural change that is typically projected as likely in the next

century swamps these short-term cycles, which is why scientists frequently discuss

the tens of thousands of years scale cycles for points of comparison, noting how

rapid the typically projected human-induced climate change is likely to be relative

to the large changes between ice ages interglacials.

Question 1b. Would we be able to detect variations attributable to human activities in this natural cycle?
156

Response. This is an excellent and very difficult question, and one of the most

controversial ones in climate science. One thing that needs to be stated first is that

the words ‘‘detect’’ and ‘‘attribute’’ are quite separate in the minds of scientists. For

example, to detect a climate change all we need to show is that it is relatively unusual given the natural cycles that occur. A 1/2°C warming trend of the twentieth

century is relatively unusual. I have estimated from looking at paleoclimatic indicators that it is perhaps a 10 percent chance that the twentieth century trend was

entirely due to natural causes. Furthermore, recent evidence from Dr. Tom Karl at

NOAA in Asheville, shows that since 1910 the U.S. has experienced a 10 percent

increase in precipitation, and that more than half of that increase in precipitation

occurred in the upper decile of precipitation intensity—i.e. most of the increase occurred in ‘‘gully washers’’ rather than gentle rains. The statistical significance of

this finding is very high—that is, there is little doubt that this is the detection of

a real climate change. The attribution problem is whether this is just ‘‘double snake

eyes’’ from a perverse nature, or have we begun to ‘‘load the climate dice’’? The latter is much more difficult to establish, and requires statistical testing, mathematical

models, multiple kinds of evidence and is precisely the kinds of activities that the

scientific community has been vigorously pursuing over the past 10 years. The most

recent IPCC report, in which roughly 100 lead authors spent days debating this one

point, led to the cautious, but nonetheless strong assertion, that ‘‘the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human impact on climate.’’ I think this

cautious statement goes about as far as the bulk of the community would allow,

namely, a strong confidence that we are at least partly in the act, but that given

the large degree of natural variability, until another decade or two elapses, in which

case predicted effects should become even larger and therefore the probability of

perverse nature even smaller, there still would be debate over this topic.

Question 2. We know that CO2 has the potential for affecting the climatic balance

of our atmosphere. Would it not make sense to limit the amount of CO2 we put into

the atmosphere until we more fully understand the effects CO2 has on our climate?

Response. This question, of course, calls for a value judgment about whether one

fears more performing unplanned experiments on what I like to call ‘‘Laboratory

Earth’’ or whether one fears more what the economic or social consequences would

be from those actions which tend to reduce the pollutants. This is a balance of values question, and in my value system, which is risk averse, I don’t like to take potentially irreversible chances with the life support systems of the earth. Nor do I

like to risk committing future generations to have to adapt to potentially large

changes that they had no participation in creating. In my value system, when we

pursue activities that benefit us with the potential for irreversibility and the potential for causing harm to persons other than ourselves, these conditions lead me to

limiting the amount of CO2, simply as planetary insurance that ethical people would

undertake until they were more sure of the relative harm or benefits that our unplanned experiment could create.

Question 3. In your testimony, you mentioned the incentive that a carbon tax

would have upon emerging ‘‘clean’’ industries. What kind of industries do you think

would emerge?

Response. I feel that a carbon tax would have several positive benefits, as explained in the Appendix to my written testimony (the Commentary now accepted

by Nature magazine by Professor Larry Goulder and myself). First of all, a fee for

dumping carbon in the atmosphere sends the right signal to a market-based economy, that the atmosphere is not a valueless commodity, and cannot be used as a

‘‘free sewer.’’ In other words, how can a market system be efficient, if not all costs

are part of the price. The price of energy is not simply extraction, transport, storage

and profit, but also damages that each system differentially inflicts on people’s

lungs, sea level, nature, and so forth. Those systems which damage more should be

charged more, otherwise a market system cannot work—these unpriced side effects

are what economists call externalities. Internalizing these externalities, in my opinion, is most simply accomplished by a carbon tax, which, as I said in answer to Senator Baucus’s question, also is a highly flexible policy instrument that can be

cranked up or down as new knowledge tells us that the perceived problem is more

or less serious than currently believed. Furthermore, a carbon tax not only causes

billions of individuals to be more conscious of the energy components of the activity—that is, the energy component that produces carbon dioxide—but serves as a

major stimulus to alternative energy systems and to energy efficiency. It is already

a fact that when the OPEC countries dramatically and precipitously increased the

price of energy in the early seventies, this caused significant economic harm because

of the precipitousness of the price shock. However, it is also a fact that after a temporary adjustment, structured changes to the economy and the inventive genius of
157

our technologists caused a significant drop in the amount of energy it took to

produce a unit of GDP in the developed countries of the world. In other words, we

invented more efficient technologies and alternative ways to run our economy (e.g.,

information in computers rather than logs on tracks) on less energy. These effects

have indelibly improved our economy and part of the economic boom we now enjoy

is because of the structured changes and extra efficiency that was induced by that

temporary oil price rise. Only after the prices decreased in the 1980’s did we lose

the great rate of progress that we were making in improving energy intensity. In

other words, despite the political resistance to higher prices of energy, such price

incentives have been demonstrated to stimulate improved technology which actually

helps the economy over the long term. The key lesson is not to have any price rises

which are both unexpected and precipitous.

In addition to improving energy efficiency, alternative energy systems would be

encouraged by raising prices of conventional energy. Investors in solar, wind, fuel

cells, more efficient natural gas, and perhaps even safer and cheaper nuclear energy

would all feel more investment opportunity if they knew that there were to be a

sustained increase in conventional energy prices that would give them a larger potential market share. The more investors are willing to pump into research and development activities in these alternative energy systems, the more rapid progress

would be made which will bring down the ultimate price of those alternative energy

systems. This is not simply a way of reducing carbon more cheaply, but may very

well in the long term help our economy materially in the following way. We know

that oil is becoming increasingly scarce, and that after the next decade or so world

oil production will no longer increase each year, despite further exploration activities, but will begin to decline, as has been long predicted. Oil prices will then increase. The question is, What will replace them? Isn’t it better to replace them with

cleaner alternative energy systems than coal or oil shales, and how can these cleaner systems compete with the dirty systems, unless the clean ones have had adequate

research and development opportunities. Therefore, carbon taxes, or R&D subsidies,

or other mechanisms that provide incentives for research seem to me essential regardless of the climate problem, as anticipation for dealing with the inevitable increase in fossil energy prices over the long run, which will require the development

and deployment of substitutes, which, if we have foresight and pursue more vigorously now, will not only reduce greenhouse gases slightly today, but also will give

us the opportunity for dramatic greenhouse gas reductions (relative to ‘‘business as

usual’’) should new science prove that to be necessary. Development of alternative

economic and energy systems provides a measure of protection against the inevitable increase in energy prices that will accompany the scarcity in fossil fuels as

the oil era winds itself down in the first few decades of the 21st century.

Question 4. What are the three most important things that need to be done to

address global climate change?

Response. As I have said in my oral and written testimoneys, I believe the first

most important thing to do is to send a message that the atmosphere is not a ‘‘free

sewer.’’ That is, some charge for the use of the global commons needs to be part

of the price of doing business, so that the true costs to both the economy and ecology

can be better incorporated into the price of commodities. The second thing is to improve the resilience of our systems to whatever changes take place—natural or

human induced. In other words, developing more resilient agriculture, water supplies, biological reserves, and so forth, is an insurance policy not only against potential human-induced climate changes, but also against natural variability that nature

often thrusts on us with or without climate change. Finally, I think one of the important things to do to deal with climate change is one of the important things to

do for living in a secure 21st century-world: putting the question of sustainable development at the top of the world’s agenda, not near the bottom. One poignant metaphor reminds us that all in the ship are at risk when one end is sinking. Clearly,

developing countries have a right to be concerned that worries about global commons like the atmosphere might just be another excuse of the developed countries

to restrain the competition that these developing countries will provide as they industrialize. My view is that we should be partners in that development, helping to

transfer efficient and less polluting technologies, even via concessionary terms, for

which we get back in exchange better relations, future customers, and less of a legacy of pollution and degradation for us and our posterity. I personally believe there

is much too much emphasis around the world on international competition and national competitiveness, and insufficient attention to cooperative win/win solutions in

which countries like China can use high technology to jump over the Victorian industrial revolution in which the now rich countries used inefficient, polluting technologies to build their wealth. I recognize how large these questions are and that
158

planetary foresight is called for, and hope that the public education needed to

achieve political acceptability of such planetary bargaining strategies becomes a reality, before large climate change and loss of biodiversity, coastal flooding, and other

kinds of tragedies finally catalyze public consciousness after much preventable damage has occurred.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DALE W. JORGENSON, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS,

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee on Environment and

Public Works: I am very grateful for the opportunity to participate in these Hearings on the scientific understanding of global climate change. My testimony will

focus on the economics of climate change. As a point of departure I will use the

‘‘Economists’ Statement on Climate Change’’ included in my written testimony. I

was one of five co-authors of this statement, which was circulated in January of this

year and has now been endorsed by 2,600 economists, including eight Nobel prize

winners.

The first paragraph concludes that global change involves significant environmental risks and preventive steps are justified. The second paragraph summarizes

economic studies showing that there are policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions with benefits that outweigh the costs. The third paragraph describes these

policies in more detail and emphasizes the importance of relying on market-based

mechanisms.

The economics of climate change can usefully be divided into three parts. The first

is determination of the overall objective of climate policy. The economists’ approach

to this problem is to choose a policy that produces the greatest margin of benefits

over costs. Using economic jargon, I will refer to this as the ‘‘optimal’’ policy. Such

a policy would stipulate a time path for future emissions of greenhouse gases that

could be embodied in an international agreement.

After an overall objective is chosen, the second step is to devise a means of implementing this goal. Emissions of greenhouse gases would have to be allocated among

the signatories of an agreement. In addition, emissions by countries that are not signatories would have to be taken into account, since the global climate is affected

by total emissions. Third, given an allocation of greenhouse gas emissions among

countries, each country would have to implement its emissions goal by devising policies that would hold emissions within the prescribed quota. Furthermore, the international community would have to monitor emissions for all countries.

Let me begin with an evaluation of our existing climate policy, the Climate

Change Action Plan (CCAP) of 1993. This Plan consisted of voluntary actions projected to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. The goal was stipulated

in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ratified by the

United States in October 1993.

The impact of CCAP is summarized in the final chart, which compares a projection of U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases under the original CCAP ‘‘baseline,’’ projecting emissions without the Plan. The CCAP actions were projected to reduce

emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. The third line on the chart gives actual

U.S. emissions through 1996. These are above the CCAP baseline and far above

emissions levels required for stabilization. Clearly, we need to consider alternatives

to our existing climate policy.

The starting point for a discussion of climate policy is the damages associated

with a change in the climate. This is based on combining a physical description of

the climate with an economic description of the world economy. This type of analysis

is called ‘‘integrated assessment’’ and an assessment of this type has been carried

out by William Nordhaus of Yale University in his 1994 book. The loss associated

with climate change is 1.34 percent of world product in 2050.

How large are the damages associated with climate change? They are equivalent

to the loss of about 1 year of world economic growth. Obviously, this is sizable, but

not overwhelming. In the view of the signatories of the Economists’ Statement on

Climate change, this is sufficient to justify preventive steps to reduce greenhouse

gas emissions.

Next, suppose we choose reductions in emissions that will produce the maximum

difference between costs and benefits. How large are the benefits of this policy?

Nordhaus has calculated the benefits for the world as a whole to be equivalent to

$271 billion dollars. This is only 0.04 percent of future consumption! While damages

associated with climate change are substantial, steps to mitigate these damages will

produce only very modest effects.
159

Let me emphasize at this point that the policy I have described conforms to the

Economists’ Statement on Climate Change. Preventive steps are justified. Policies

like the one I have described would reduce greenhouse gas emissions and could employ market-based mechanisms to do so. A policy appropriate for international implementation would be the system of internationally tradeable permits described in

the U.S. Climate Change Proposal of January 17.

For domestic implementation of the optimal climate change policy an appropriate

market mechanism would be to impose taxes on greenhouse gas emissions. These

taxes would be relatively modest, amounting to an initial tax of $5.29 per ton of

carbon and rising to $10.03 per ton by the year 2025. My paper with Peter

Wilcoxen, ‘‘The Economic Effects of a Carbon Tax,’’ analyzes the effects of a tax on

emissions of carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas, in greater detail.

Wilcoxen and I calculate the cost of achieving various goals, including the stabilization goal of the United Nations Convention. We also consider different methods for

‘‘recycling’’ the revenues from a carbon tax and find that the economic cost is highly

dependent on the use of the revenue. Finally, we consider the use of alternative tax

instruments, such as a ‘‘Btu’’ tax on energy and an ad valorem tax on energy.

Our overall conclusions are, first, that a carbon tax is superior to other tax instruments. Second, by using the revenues to reduce the most burdensome taxes, namely

taxes on income from capital, economic growth can be stimulated rather than retarded. Of course, reducing the tax burden on capital by substituting other forms

of taxation would produce similar effects with no effect on emissions of greenhouse

gases.

To sum up: The economics of climate change is well understood. The optimal policy, described in more detail in my written testimony, involves a modest reduction

in the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. This should provide the basis for any

international agreement that would supersede the United Nations Framework Convention of 1994. However, this involves smaller reductions than our existing climate

policy, the U.S. Climate Change Action Plan.

The U.S. Climate Change Proposal from last January contains a useful contribution to international implementation by proposing a system of internationally

tradeable permits for emissions. Domestic implementation requires a process for setting country-specific quotas for emissions. This might impose lower or higher reductions in emissions for the U.S., relative to other countries. After the U.S. quota has

been determined, the final step would be to impose a tax on emissions like the carbon tax discussed in my paper with Wilcoxen.
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
(197)

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

THURSDAY, JULY 17, 1997

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, Washington, DC.

INTERNATIONAL POLICY REVIEW

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:38 a.m. in room 406,

Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. John H. Chafee (chairman of the

committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Chafee, Inhofe, Baucus, Kempthorne, Reid,

and Wyden.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. CHAFEE,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

Senator CHAFEE. This morning we have, as is not infrequent,

some challenges as far as time goes. What I’d like to do this morning is have our opening statements, which I hope will be rather

brief, and then we’ll vote. The first vote is on now. I believe the

leader has scheduled three votes.

I noticed Secretary Wirth isn’t here yet, but I certainly presume

he’ll be here when we finish our statements.

A week ago today, the committee received testimony from a distinguished panel of witnesses on the science and economics of global climate change. This morning we hope to learn more about how

the Administration has interpreted the current scientific and economic understanding of the climate change issue to form its domestic and international policies, how is this all influencing us.

We will also receive views from two very knowledgeable representatives of the business community.

What we did learn last week from our witnesses? I must say it

didn’t all come out like the blinding light that hit Paul on the road

to Damascus, but information was there if we looked hard enough.

Many left the hearing even more sure that there are too many uncertainties to commit the United States to additional or legally

binding greenhouse gas emission reductions.

Others may now be further convinced that serious climate

change risks have been demonstrated sufficiently and that the time

for meaningful, preventive action is now.

Individuals possessing sound reason and good intent, of which

this committee has 18, could plausibly arrive at either conclusion.

That’s a judgment call. Those of us in government and here on this

committee have to advance with the best possible information.
198

What are the facts? First, energy from the sun warms the Earth.

Second, greenhouse gases in the atmosphere trap heat from the

Earth that would otherwise radiate out into space. Third, greenhouse gases make the Earth warmer than it otherwise would be.

Fourth, water vapor is the most abundant, natural greenhouse

gas. Fifth, greenhouse gases emitted by human activities are altering the pre-industrial composition of the atmosphere. Indeed, the

concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased

from about 280 parts per million 200 years ago to about 360 ppm

today.

Importantly, the concentrations will not absolutely halt at 360

ppm. We will observe a doubling of pre-industrial concentrations

sometime in the early part of the next century unless we take action.

Sixth, all nations are contributing to this buildup of greenhouse

gases. No one Nation acting alone can effectively address this matter. Seventh, the United States is the largest greenhouse gas emitter in absolute and in per capita terms. China is the second largest

greenhouse gas emitter in absolute, but on a per capita basis, emits

one-tenth of U.S. emissions. Eighth, we have measured one degree

of Fahrenheit temperature increase globally over the past 100 year.

Finally, on the economic side, it is a fact that limiting carbon dioxide emissions will mean significant changes in energy use and

energy sources.

The question is, has science provided enough information on the

relationship between these facts and actual changes in the climate

to warrant further action? Obviously, the Administration has made

its conclusion.

The United States and 160 other nations are negotiating changes

to the existing 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. These changes, if agreed to, could require specific, legally binding, greenhouse gas emission reductions commitments for

the post-2000 period. These international negotiations are to culminate at the third conference of the parties in Kyoto in December

of this year.

Should we be signatories to a Kyoto agreement? What role

should the developing countries play? What kind of emission reduction requirements are appropriate? What are the likely economic

trade, competitiveness and job impacts? What are the likely environmental impacts of acting or not acting? How will such an international agreement be implemented domestically?

Finally, is it possible to embark upon a ‘‘low regrets,’’ or ‘‘no regrets’’ strategy which would minimize economic damage or even

improve our economic performance while responsibly reducing the

threat of climate change? Can we do some things that are cost-effective, regardless of whether we believe in reducing the treat of

climate change, but indeed, will reduce the threat of climate

change? For instance, we talked the other day about a certain type

of bulb in our lights.

These are other topics will be our focus today.

Senator Baucus.
199

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAX BAUCUS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MONTANA

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have just a few brief remarks and observations from last week.

No. 1, the scientists last week presented what I thought was

quite solid evidence and a thoughtful argument that future changes

in our climate caused by human activity is a potentially serious, if

not absolutely certain, outcome.

To me, that means the potential consequences are too serious to

ignore and if we begin to make modest steps now to curtail greenhouse gas emissions, we may start making progress toward that

goal without encountering serious economic disruptions.

As with many issues around here, our task is to find the right

balance between maximizing the benefits of a policy and minimizing any adverse consequences from it. As we were told last week,

the sooner we start, the better this country will be able to achieve

that result.

My second point is that if we are to succeed in limiting worldwide emissions and CO2 and other greenhouse gases, we must have

greater participation by at least the major developing countries.

After all, this is called global climate change. If the major global

players are not part of the solution, the prospects for success will

be slim.

Perhaps this is an area in which we need to broaden our thinking. I’ve spent a good deal of time looking at China’s role in the

world, particularly from the trade standpoint. The United States

has a lot of issues to deal with China on, some issues on which we

have fundamental disagreements, but there are many others with

China on which we share mutual interest. Climate surely is one of

them.

China has more people potentially at risk from rising sea levels

and violent weather than any other nation. It also has a desperate

need to increase its domestic energy supplies. If there is no change,

China will be contributing a full one-third of the additional greenhouse gas emissions in the world over the next 20 years, one-third.

Looking at the broad array of issues on the United States-China

table, we should be able to find ways to gain their support on this

issue. As I’ve said many times, our disagreements with China

should not stop us from engaging with them on issues where we

can both make some progress.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, whatever our ultimate policy on climate

change will be, it needs the support of the American people. I believe there is a compelling case to be made and it’s why I welcome

the President’s decision to become more personally involved.

The toughest issues for democracies to handle are those in which

the threat to society builds gradually but inexorably over time. We

deal well with immediate crises and I hope it will not take such

an event to spur action on this one.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Inhofe.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
200

I do have a more lengthy statement that I will submit for the

record, but I want to mention a couple of things that do concern

me.

The Clean Air Subcommittee has already held one hearing on climate change. One of the things that concerns me is I think the disingenuous way we’ve gotten information and treatment from the

Administration. I have a list of contradictory statements that have

been made. I’ll only mention one of them and then submit the rest

of them in my opening statement.

In June 1996, Mr. Palmeritz, who is an Assistant Secretary over

at the State Department, made the statement in response to the

question ‘‘Are we going to agree to a legally binding instrument in

Geneva?,’’ ‘‘Are we going to agree to a legally binding instrument

in Geneva? No way.’’ One month later, Secretary Wirth, you announced that the United States supported a legally binding emissions target.

This concerns me, the discrepancies that we are getting in statements from the various departments.

I would like to just, in one sentence, outline five conclusions that

I felt we came to in our first subcommittee hearing, Mr. Chairman,

on this subject.

No. 1, while there is a large body of scientific research, there is

much controversy and disagreement and the scientific facts are

being misrepresented by the Administration and the press.

No. 2, we don’t know how much human activity has influenced

the climate. One scientist said less than 6 percent.

No. 3, if you look at satellite data, we are not sure if there has

been any global warming.

No. 4, even if we eliminate all manmade emissions, it may not

have a noticeable impact on the environment and the treaty may

only eliminate emissions here in the United States and not the entire world.

No. 5, when asked, all five witnesses—these are the scientific

witnesses—they stated that we would not have the uncertainties

understood by this December when the Administration plans on

making a decision regarding the treaty.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll be looking forward to asking some

questions.

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I am glad you called today’s hearing, it is important

to hear from the Administration on this issue. Under Secretary Wirth has testified

in many Congressional hearings over the last few years, and unfortunately he raises

more questions than he answers, but I hope today will be different.

Last week at our science hearing on this issue, a number of points were made

and I personally learned a great deal. I would like to summarize a few key observations from the hearing:

(1) While there is a large body of scientific research there is much controversy and

disagreement and the scientific facts are being misrepresented by the Administration and the press.

(2) We don’t know how much human activity has influenced the climate. One scientist said 6 percent.

(3) If you look at satellite data, we are not sure if there has been any global

warming.
201

(4) Even if we eliminate all manmade emissions, it may not have a noticeable impact on the environment, and the Treaty may only eliminate emissions here in the

United States, not the entire world.

(5) When asked, all five witnesses stated that we would not have the uncertainties

understood by this December, when the Administration plans on making a decision

regarding the Treaty.

I have read over the hearing records in the various congressional committees over

the last few years and I am very disturbed by the way the Administration makes

promises to Congress and then immediately ignores them in international meetings.

I would like to offer a few examples.

In March 1995, in a House Commerce Hearing Congressmen Dingell and Schaefer

raised concerns that new targets may not apply to all countries, on behalf of the

Administration, Mr. Rafe Pomerance a Deputy Assistant Secretary at the State Department said ‘‘Our goal, Mr. Chairman, is that all parties participate in this next

round of negotiations. We want to see that all governments participate and help define the post-2000 regime.’’

One month later the Administration signed onto the ‘‘Berlin Mandate’’ to review

the commitments made to reduce the greenhouse gases and adopt targets for further

reductions. The conference differentiated between developed and developing nations.

This was clearly at odds with Congressmen Dingell and Schaefer’s concerns and the

Administration’s assurances.

In June 1996, before a hearing, Mr. Pomerance stated, ‘‘Are we going to agree to

a legally binding instrument in Geneva? No way.’’ One month later in Geneva,

Under Secretary Wirth announced that the United States supported a legally binding emissions target.

In September 1996 before the Commerce Committee, Assistant Secretary of State

Eileen Claussen told Congressman Dingell that the United States would not be

bound before we have completed the economic analysis and assessments. We

learned this week that the Administrations efforts to analyze the economic effects

has failed. The models they used did not work, and we will not understand the effect on our nation’s economy before December.

I have to conclude based on the Hearing records that the performance of this Administration is somewhere between ‘‘misleading’’ and downright ‘‘untruthfulness’’. I

hope today’s witnesses can change this record, but I will have to reserve judgment

to see if today’s promises will be fulfilled.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHAFEE. We have about 4 minutes left on this vote and

my suggestion is rather than racing through your statement, that

we go over and vote and then come back and we’ll hear your statement, Senator Kempthorne, and then proceed with the witnesses.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. If you don’t mind, may I race?

Senator CHAFEE. We’re certainly delighted to hear what you’ve

got to say if you’re conscious of 31⁄2 minutes. The option is yours.

I’m perfectly delighted to stay here. I was going to let you proceed

in a more leisurely manner when the pearls you have to offer us

will be easier observed in a calmer atmosphere.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, I’d like to go ahead and do

this, but if the others would like to go, I understand that, so I’ll

understand.

Senator CHAFEE. I’ll wait with you.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIRK KEMPTHORNE,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IDAHO

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, I’ve always believed that

fundamentally, we’re all environmentalists. We all want a cleaner,

healthier environment for our children and their children.

I’ve always believed that the best way to achieve that cleaner

and healthier environment is not necessarily through more Federal

regulation and mandates. I believe there will be better results

achieved faster using incentives, flexible programs and voluntary

incentives.
202

As I understand it, the push for more aggressive, global climate

change policy is being driven by evidence that suggests that the

global temperature has increased by one degree, although it’s unclear whether or not human-caused activities are solely responsive

for that increase. Nor do we know whether it’s significant.

The assumption is that we should do something about it anyway,

reduce or freeze greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels. While I

won’t dispute that conclusion here today, in light of the uncertainty, I think it’s important that we not jump to impose more regulations on U.S. businesses risking jobs in our economy when we

really don’t know if we are truly addressing the problem.

We should also be concerned about what costs of any new policy

will, in fact, be and who will bear them. Providing flexibility and

greater opportunities for voluntary programs will go a long way to

controlling unnecessary costs and increasing acceptance of any new

policy.

Just as importantly, we should not put our U.S. industries at a

competitive disadvantage with their competitors in international

markets. Climate change is truly a global issue and the solution

must be a global one as well.

If the United States is going to agree to mandatory reductions,

our treaty partners, including developing countries, must also.

That’s only fair. Ultimately, the workability and cost of any new

policy will be determined largely by the specific target levels and

compliance schedules that the Administration negotiators decide to

accept.

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses as we discuss this

critically important issue.

Senator CHAFEE. We have to hasten over. Mr. Secretary, we will

be back shortly. There are three votes, but they are 10-minute

votes, so we will be back shortly.

There will be a brief recess.

[Recess.]

Senator CHAFEE. If we could have everyone’s attention, we will

start the hearing again.

We apologize for the interruptions. I guess nobody understands

the interruptions better than the distinguished Assistant Secretary

of State, a former colleague who served in this body with distinction.

We’ve completed all the statements and Mr. Secretary, go to it.

We’d be interested to hear what you’ve got to say.

Secretary WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, if you have any desired order, we might ask Dr.

Yellen to lead off, if that would be all right.

Senator CHAFEE. That’s fine. Go ahead, Dr. Yellen.

STATEMENT OF JANET YELLEN, CHAIR, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Ms. YELLEN. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the

committee.

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the economics of global climate change. In a speech to the United Nations

in June, President Clinton emphasized that the risks posed by
203

global climate change are real and that sensible, preventive steps

are justified.

This assessment accords with the views of more than 2,300

economists, including 8 Noble laureates, who signed the statement

supporting measures to reduce the threat of climate change.

At this time, the Administration has not settled on a particular

set of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, the

President indicated in his U.N. speech that he intends to engage

in a discussion with all interested parties, Members of Congress

and other elected officials, scientists, economists, business and

labor leaders, about the problems posed by greenhouse gas accumulations and the costs and benefits of corrective action.

This discussion is intended to inform the Administration’s decisionmaking process which will culminate in a U.S. policy position

in the international negotiations in Kyoto in December of this year.

An important step in this, in any policy process, is determining

the impact a policy will have on the American economy. President

Clinton’s top priority since his first days in office has been revitalizing the U.S. economy, creating jobs and investing in people and

technology to enhance long-term growth, and we have made tremendous progress.

Any policy the President ultimately endorses on climate change

will be informed by his commitment to sustaining a healthy and robust economy. In my testimony today, I’d like to describe some of

the principle lessons that emerged from the voluminous literature,

much of it relatively recent, on the economic impacts of policies to

address global climate change.

Before I begin my discussion of the economic literature, however,

I’d like first to emphasize the uncertainties that are associated

with estimating both the costs and the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Just to provide some perspective, as you all know, it is quite difficult to gauge exactly what impact, for example, the balanced

budget agreement will have on the U.S. economy’s growth rate, levels of employment, interest rates and consumption over a period as

long as the next 5 years.

With global climate change, it’s orders of magnitude more difficult to gauge the effects of policies on the economy. We’re concerned with not just the next 5 years and not just the American

economy, but rather, with economic and physical processes that operate globally and over decades, if not centuries.

Both the costs and the benefits of climate protection are very difficult to quantify or predict with any certainty. So, in short, if anybody tells you that he or she has the definitive answer as to the

costs and benefits of particular climate change policies, I would

suggest that you raise your collective eyebrows.

Let me now turn to the economic literature and try to summarize

what I think we know so far about this difficult topic.

The economic literature includes estimates using many different

models to evaluate numerous alternative emission reduction strategies. In fact, because there are so many different models, economists initially faced difficulties in comparing results.

To solve this problem, thereby enabling meaningful comparisons,

many economists have calibrated the various models by performing
204

a standardized simulation. Specifically, they’ve assessed the consequences of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by

2010 or 2020.

Within the Administration, a staff level working group, the Interagency Analytical Team, has attempted to estimate some of the

economic implications of climate change policies.

They took the emissions scenario that’s most often used in the

academic literature, that is stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by

2010 as the starting point for their own analysis. I emphasize that

this scenario is not Administration policy. Instead, it was picked to

make comparison with other models easier.

This modeling effort produced some useful lessons, but as we

found from peer reviewers’ comments, it also suffered from some

serious shortcomings. I think both the lessons and the shortcomings point to one clear conclusion which is that the effort to develop a model or small set of models that can give us a definitive

answer concerning the economic impacts of a given climate change

policy is futile, but we are left with a set of parameters and relationships that influence estimates of the impacts.

I understand that a draft of the staff analysis was given to this

committee earlier this week, along with reviewers’ comments. I

would be happy to answer any questions you may have about this

modeling effort. Let me say just a bit about the lessons.

The modeling efforts, both inside the Administration and outside,

clearly indicate that economic analysis can do no more than estimate a range of potential impacts from particular policies and

highlight how outcomes depend on underlying assumptions about

how the economy works and the ways in which policy is implemented. I’d like to briefly summarize a few of the key lessons we’ve

learned.

First, the magnitude of the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the various models depends crucially on a number of key

assumptions about how the economy works. Essentially, the lesson

is that the greater the substitution possibilities and the faster the

economy can adapt, the lower the costs.

Second, costs depend critically on how emission reduction policies

are implemented. It just boils down to this, if we do it dumb, it

could cost a lot, but if we do it smart, it will cost much less and

indeed, it could produce net benefits in the long run.

The over 2,300 signatories of the economist statement argued

that any global climate change policy should rely on market-based

mechanisms. These mechanisms allow for flexibility in both the

timing and the location of emissions reductions, thereby minimizing the cost to the U.S. economy.

The economists concluded, ‘‘There are policy options that would

slow climate change without harming American living standards

and these measures may, in fact, improve U.S. productivity in the

longer run.’’

The third lesson that emerges from a study of the economics of

climate protection is that developing, as well as developed, countries must be part of the process. While developed countries are responsible for most of the greenhouse gas currently in the atmosphere, developing countries are starting to catch up.
205

The timetable for inclusion of developing countries is also important. The sooner the developing countries face incentives to move

away from carbon-intensive energy sources, the less likely it is they

will become dependent on those types of fuels to spur their own

economic growth. In short, global problems require global solutions.

Let me wrap up by saying that policies to promote economic

growth create jobs and improve the living standards and opportunities of all Americans have been and always will be the top priority

of the President and the Administration.

In his remarks to the Business Roundtable on Global Climate

Change, the President said, ‘‘Let’s find a way to preserve the environment to meet our international responsibilities, to meet our responsibilities to our children, and grow the economy at the same

time.’’

I believe that some of the lessons we’ve learned from the economics literature will help us achieve the President’s goal.

Thank you. I’d be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much.

Now what I’d like to do is proceed with Secretary Wirth.

Ms. YELLEN. I do have a longer statement I’d like to submit for

the record.

Senator CHAFEE. That’s fine. Do you have any urgency to leave?

Ms. YELLEN. No.

Senator CHAFEE. Why don’t you go ahead?

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHAFEE. Yes.

Senator REID. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of my statement be made a part of the record as if read.

Senator CHAFEE. Fine.

[The prepared statement of Senator Reid follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY REID, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF NEVADA

Good Morning. I want to share a few thoughts on the science and economics of

the global climate change debate. Although the committee has wisely chosen to hold

two separate hearings on this subject this summer, one on science and economics,

which was held last week and today’s on the on-going international treaty negotiations, my comments cannot be so easily separated.

There is a discernible human influence on global climate. Since the dawn of the

industrial age, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen by

30 percent. Most experts now agree that the build-up of greenhouse gases in the

atmosphere due to the combustion of fossil fuels and other human activities is happening. To many this is a troubling phenomenon. Although we are not sure what

the exact adverse consequences of this build-up will be, mere common sense dictates

that we, at a minimum, begin preparing to deal with it.

The Senate approved the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change in 1993, which called for all signatory nations to adopt policies and programs to limit their greenhouse gas emissions on a voluntary basis. The United

States had hoped to stabilize emissions in the year 2000 at 1990 levels. Unfortunately, we have fallen well short of that mark.

The United States is, at the moment, the world’s biggest consumer of fossil fuels

and producer of greenhouse gas emissions. As such, it is important that we must

show international leadership in terms of analysis, research, and, if necessary, in

reducing these emissions.

As part of the on-going international treaty negotiations, the Administration has

moved towards supporting mandatory, legally binding limitations on greenhouse

gases for the nations of the World. Within limits, I am supportive of these efforts.

Unfortunately, I share the concern of many of my colleagues that the current negotiations do not seem to require a firm time table for reductions from the nations

of the developing world.
206

The United States currently emits more greenhouse gases than developing nations, such as China and India. However, this will not be the case for much longer,

especially if the United States begins to curb our emissions. While I am not eager

to perpetuate the poverty in these nations by mandating that they participate

equally and immediately in making reductions, I have economic and competitive

concerns about requiring nothing from them.

I cannot, in good faith, ask the citizens of Nevada and the rest of the Nation, who

have worked very hard to develop and accommodate environmentally friendly transportation policies and clean industries, to now make more sacrifices without some

guarantee that the developing nations will not make similar efforts soon.

In a global economy, we are often forced to compete with other nations that have

different labor laws and practices than our own, different rules of resource protection, and yes, often weaker environmental laws. Unfortunately, cheap labor, wasteful resource use, and weak environmental laws often add up to a mighty competitive

retail price.

On an issue of such wide-ranging economic impact and consequence, it is unfair

to our citizens to let other nations do nothing while we make the necessary sacrifices.

Again, I absolutely acknowledge that the United States must do its part to try

to avert any adverse climate change. We are a part of the problem and we will be

an important part of the solution.

I would prefer that Senator Byrd’s resolution recognize that the nations of the developing world will need some extra time, perhaps as much as 10 years, to put their

binding reductions in place. I am hopeful that a compromise can be worked out to

everyone’s satisfaction.

However, given a choice between sending U.S. negotiators to Kyoto offering unilateral economic disarmament on this subject, and sending them into final negotiations with a stance that demands world-wide equality of treatment now, must

choose to protect the best interests of the United States.

Thank you.

Senator REID. I’d also like to tell the chairman and especially my

friend, Secretary Wirth, that I scheduled my time to be here from

10 a.m. to 11:15 a.m. and that time has gone and I will be unable

to listen to his testimony. I apologize.

Senator CHAFEE. I know you made the effort and unfortunately

we had the intervention with those votes and that’s just life in the

Senate. We’re glad you were able to come even though briefly.

Mr. Secretary, why don’t you proceed?

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, UNDER SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Baucus, Senator Reid, Senator Kempthorne, Senator

Inhofe, we appreciate your being here. We also appreciate the great

interest of this committee. I read with interest the transcript of the

science panel and discussion that you had. Questions were raised

earlier and we may have a chance to touch upon them today.

My part of the discussion this morning is to focus on the ongoing

negotiations toward the next steps under the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change. These negotiations

began in August 1995 and are scheduled to end in December at the

third conference of the parties in Kyoto when we hope to adopt a

new protocol or other legal instrument.

In his address last month to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session, President Clinton noted that, ‘‘The science is

clear and compelling’’ and the President committed the United

States to strong leadership on climate change.

The President, as well, committed himself to engage the American people and the Congress in a dialog to explain the real and

imminent threats from climate change, the economic costs and ben-
207

efits involved, and the opportunities that American technology an

innovation can provide.

The President also committed to ‘‘bring to the Kyoto conference

a strong American commitment to realistic and binding limits that

will significantly reduce our emissions of greenhouse gases.’’

In recent weeks, interest in the negotiations has intensified, particularly in the Congress. The Administration welcomes this interest, Mr. Chairman, and wants to encourage the broadest possible

dialog as we work toward a new agreement in Kyoto and urges the

Senate and House leadership to establish observer groups with

whom we can work even more closely in the weeks and months

ahead.

I would like today to focus on two concerns, first, how the actions

negotiated under the Climate Convention correspond to a significant environmental objective and second, the need for developing

nations to acknowledge more fully their role in meeting that objective.

I won’t repeat the science here this morning. That is familiar to

all of you, particularly after your last hearing, but let me just

briefly make one comment on effects. Virtually all the studies on

the effects of climate disruption have focused on a predicted doubling of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases; but as

Senator Baucus pointed out in his opening statement, unless significant actions are taken early in the next century, it is very likely

that atmospheric concentrations will, by the year 2100, nearly triple the pre-industrial level and rise higher than at any point in the

last 50 million years.

Changes to our climate system would also continue beyond the

effects the current studies predict. The risks would increase dramatically as concentrations continue to rise. Moreover, there is no

reason to believe that these additional effects would be linear. They

would most likely take unpredictable and highly undesirable paths.

Let me now move on to the division of responsibilities between

the developed and the developing countries.

As I noted earlier, we know that man-made emissions have increased the concentration by about 30 percent, from 280 ppm in

pre-industrial times to around 366 ppm today. We know that the

industrialized countries have put most of the carbon into the atmosphere and that CO2 lingers there for 100 to 150 years. We

know that the United States is the largest emitter of greenhouse

gases; we have 4 percent of the world’s population and contribute

22 percent of the carbon. We also know that given current trends,

the developing world will pass the developed world as an emitter

in about 30 years. At that point, the developing world will have

about 70 percent of the world’s population. China, with it’s 1.2 billion people, will probably pass the United States toward the end of

the first quarter of that century.

So action by the industrialized nations alone will not put us on

the road to safe concentrations of greenhouse gases. We need action

by the developing countries as well.

It’s very clear from all our discussions and negotiations to date

that if the developed countries, with our current economic capacity,

technical capability and energy-intensive lifestyle, don’t go first,

setting the example and reducing emissions, then developing coun-
208

tries will not act either. We must lead the way and we must move

soon.

If not, a doubling of concentrations becomes certain and we put

ourselves on the road to a tripling or even higher levels of concentrations, the consequences of which are uncertain but likely to

be catastrophic.

The United States has put forward a number of proposals which

are outlined in my testimony and the attachments. Perhaps most

controversial is Article 16, our proposal which calls for developing

country parties to adopt by the year 2005, binding provisions so

that all parties have quantitative greenhouse gas emission obligations and so that there is a mechanism or trigger for automatic application of those obligations based on agreed criteria.

In urging this policy of what we call evolution, the United States

is far out in front of almost all other countries and we’re being

criticized accordingly. For example, several developed countries believe that our proposal imposes unfair burdens on developing countries. Most countries in the developing world believe that evolution

goes beyond the scope of the Climate Convention and the Berlin

Mandate. We think we have the concept about right. No one should

be exempt. We emit the most, so we have to act first, but others

have to phase in over time.

The overall negotiation on climate change is extremely complex,

the most complex I’ve seen in 25 years of public life. The evolution

aspect is perhaps the most important of all. We have put forward

some proposals, some in Congress have as well. Now we have to

hammer out a final proposal and negotiating position. We welcome

your input, support and creativity as we work to solve this problem

and I look forward to hearing your ideas, questions and comments

today.

The issue is not whether developing countries, especially the big

and rapidly developing ones, take on quantified commitments to

limit or reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. Clearly, it will

be impossible to abate the threat of climate change unless they do.

The issue is when such commitment should begin and what criteria

should be used to establish them and to whom they would apply.

The Framework Convention, which President Bush signed and to

which the Senate overwhelmingly gave its approval, established

the principle that with respect to climate change, the world’s nations have common but differentiated responsibilities and varying

capabilities. Insisting the developing nations immediately accept

binding emissions targets that industrialized nations are seeking to

negotiate is neither realistic, nor consistent with the Convention

approved by the Senate, but insisting that those developing nations

now responsible for a growing share of global greenhouse gas emissions should have no further obligations to act until they cross

some threshold of national income or emissions per capita, is equally unrealistic and inconsistent with the Convention’s ultimate objective.

The agreement reached in Kyoto will not solve the problem of

global climate change. No matter how ambitious, it will represent

only a second step along the much longer path toward achieving

the Climate Convention’s ultimate objective. As we prepare for

Kyoto, we must also prepare for further steps beyond it. In particu-
209

lar, we must ensure that all nations responsible for a significant

share of current global greenhouse gas emissions accept the need

to limit or reduce their emissions and that they begin to move in

that direction.

What a Kyoto agreement can do is provide nations with the tools

they will need to achieve a significant, binding greenhouse gas limitation and reduction commitment. These tools include greenhouse

gas emission budgets over multiyear periods that will help smooth

out annual fluctuations. They include full national flexibility in the

choice of policies and measures to meet such binding emission

budgets. They include emissions trading among nations with binding emission budgets, with the participation of the private sector

in the trading regime which we believe will help significantly lower

the cost of compliance. They include joint implementation for credit

between nations with binding emissions budgets and those that do

not yet have such budgets both to lower the cost of compliance and

to promote economic development and environmental protection.

Mr. Chairman, we have charted an ambitious course for the

months ahead. The tremendous risk to our plant demand nothing

less. With your continued support and the support of other Members of Congress, I am confident that we will obtain an outcome in

Kyoto that will represent a significant step forward on the much

longer path toward safeguarding the Earth’s climate system for

present and future generations.

If I might, I’d like to have my statement included in full in the

record and we look forward to answering any questions that the

committee might have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much.

What we will do is have a round of questions. I would say each

member will have 6 minutes and we will go around and come back

so that everybody gets a chance.

You say in your opening statement, President Clinton noted ‘‘The

science is clear and compelling.’’ I didn’t get that feeling. Could you

summarize the science that is clear and compelling?

Secretary WIRTH. As you know, this is probably the most peerreviewed, carefully studied international issue that mankind has

looked at. The international community established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in the 1980’s. That made its

first report when you and I were at the Rio Conference just before

the 1992 Rio Summit. It’s second report was completed in the fall

of 1995 and was published in the spring of 1996.

The consensus of that study—of almost every climate scientist in

the world—was that man’s impact on the climate can now be seen.

That was Volume 1.

Volume 2 pointed out what some of the impacts of this are going

to be. As Senator Kempthorne pointed out, there’s a lot of uncertainty as to exactly where, how much, how fast, and a great deal

of work to be done, but Volume 2 began to tease out what some

of the implications of this were.

Volume 3 contained work by a great number of economists as

well as people in the climate world as to what steps ought to be

taken. It’s a very impressive piece of work.
210

It was our judgment, in summary, looking at the science as it

comes to us it was important and prudent for us to establish steps

now to begin to take what many have called an insurance policy.

There are still uncertainties, Senator Kempthorne, as to exactly

where, how much, how fast, and that is well recognized, but the

overall trend, in our opinion, is so compelling that we believe we

have to begin now to take steps. As Senator Baucus pointed out,

the earlier we take steps, the easier it’s going to be to make these

kinds of changes, the less disruption we’ll have, the fewer costs we

will incur. We have to begin to make those steps now, in the form

of the insurance policy described in our proposals for Kyoto.

Senator CHAFEE. The big stumbling block probably will be the

developing countries and in your testimony, you indicated it’s very,

very important to get them aboard. I think it is important for us

to recognize.

I believe from your testimony, you say we’ve got 4 percent of the

population and emit 22 percent of the CO2 and those are startling

statistics and statistics that the developing countries know as well

as we do.

When you seek the participation of the developing countries,

which means I would gather that they are going to accept some legally binding emission reduction targets, how are you going to do

that in a timely manner?

Secretary WIRTH. As I pointed out in my testimony, we have a

five-part approach for bringing the developing countries on board.

In summary, let me say that Senator Byrd had a very appropriate

metaphor for this, which I think is very helpful. That is, we’re all

in the same boat together. This is a problem that we all have to

face and it’s a very significant one. In that boat, we begin with a

bigger oar than the developing countries but over a period of time,

the size of their oar phases in so that when we get to say 2030,

2040, we’re all pulling together oars the same size. That’s not a bad

metaphor to understand the process of phasing in.

We have proposed a phase-in approach far beyond what almost

anybody else in the world has done. The developing countries are

required to advance their existing commitments on issues like energy efficiency, elimination of subsidies, privatization of energy,

and the investment in renewable energy resources. There are a

whole series of things that we want them to be pinned down to in

advance.

Second, we would like to create what is called an Annex B. As

you know, Mr. Chairman, the Framework Convention has Annex I

countries and non-Annex I countries. The Annex I countries are the

developed countries and then there is everybody else. There are a

number of countries who, over a relatively short period of time, are

now graduating toward developed country status. We think as they

graduate, for example, as they assume membership in the OECD,

they also have to assume certain obligations, so we are proposing

a second sort of interim category.

Third, we’re calling on developing country parties to adopt by

2005, binding provisions so that all parties have quantitative emission obligations.
211

Fourth, we have very important joint implementation processes

which we think add real incentives to bring the developing countries on board. It’s in their advantage to do so.

Finally, we’re carrying out other bilateral initiatives as part of

our treaty obligations to promote energy efficiency, forest protection

and various technical country assessments.

This is the trickiest and most difficult issue in the whole negotiation as you pointed out in your resolution, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate your help and work on that and look forward to working

with you and other members of the Senate.

Senator CHAFEE. Many of us look back on the Montreal Protocol

and the CFCs and what we did there, but when you look at that,

it seems easy compared to this problem.

As you recall, we had binding limitations in that by the year

2005, whatever it was, I can’t remember the exact dates, the production of a certain type of CFC had to be completely banned. So

we were able to achieve that, plus we had wonderful cooperation

from American industry on it.

I see my time is up. I’m going to give everybody else 8 minutes

and I’ll take two more myself and then everybody will have eight.

Dr. Yellen, in the beginning of your testimony, you said, ‘‘The

Administration has not settled on a particular set of new policies

to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.’’ Kyoto is 20 weeks away. That

is not very far, so if you haven’t settled on it, you’d better hurry.

[Laughter.]

Senator CHAFEE. What is your answer?

Ms. YELLEN. I should perhaps clarify and say there are some elements as the Under Secretary has mentioned of the United States

approach that certainly are settled on. These have to do with the

joint implementation, international emissions and other flexibility

provisions that I think are very important.

With respect to targets and timetables, that isn’t settled and

what that would entail in terms of domestic implementation.

The President has indicated that he really thinks it is important

before we settle on a policy to have a period in which he and the

rest of the Administration become personally heavily engaged in

hearing from broadly, Members of Congress, elected officials, business and labor leaders, and others that are interested, about their

views on this topic. We would like to get that kind of input before

trying to settle on the a policy.

Senator CHAFEE. On page 10 of the testimony you submitted to

us, you said, ‘‘What a Kyoto agreement can do is provide nations

with the tools they will need to achieve significant binding greenhouse gas limitation and reduction commitments.’’

Are you saying there will be binding greenhouse gas limitations?

Is that what your thought is?

Secretary WIRTH. Yes. It’s our belief that we have to go to a binding approach on this sort of thing.

Just as a quick aside, I might say that Geneva was not a negotiation where we were making commitments; we were rather proposing what ought to be done and that might be the explanation.

We believe that the non-binding aim that was built into the initial Framework Convention coming out of Rio has not been adequate to the task. We’re going to miss it, everybody else is going
212

to miss it except the United Kingdom which made a transition to

natural gas, which was very painful and difficult for them to do

and very laudable. They did that for a lot of other reasons, for the

most part. Germany will make it because they adopted utilities in

East Germany and shut them down which was difficult for them

to do.

Nobody else in the world is going to make the non-binding aim

of Rio. We believe that we need a binding agreement that all nations really step up to, and really understand what they’re committing themselves to, to make very significant progress.

A binding agreement gets us beyond rhetorical flourishes into a

kind of serious reality.

Senator CHAFEE. I agree you’ve got to have a binding agreement

if you’re ever going to get the thing done.

My times is up. Senator Baucus.

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, as you know, any treaty adopted by the Senate requires two-thirds of the members of the Senate to vote for a treaty.

As you also know, Senator Byrd is sponsoring a resolution which

basically states that no treaty should be adopted unless the developing countries are equally committed. He has two-thirds of the

members of the Senate as co-sponsors of that resolution, and he’s

intending to push that resolution quite quickly I would expect before Kyoto.

What is the Administration doing to turn that vote around? It

seems to me that the Administration has quite a difficult job ahead

of it because there is quite a feeling in the Senate that yes, the

United States must do something about greenhouse gases. I think

most of the Senators think that, although there are some who do

not think that, but certainly those who feel the United States

should not act, feel if we act that certainly all countries should, in

an appropriate way, be a part of this solution. After all, we’re all

on this globe together.

India and China together should I think be close to 40 percent

of greenhouse gas emissions.

We all know the facts and the figures and we’re all trying to find

a solution here, but my question really is, what is the Administration’s plan or what is the Administration going to do to persuade

the Senators, by a two- thirds majority, that we ought to adopt a

treaty?

My advice to you is that we have to go farther than the United

States does in persuading not only developing countries, but also

the other developed countries that the developing countries have to

step up a little more than they have thus far?

Secretary WIRTH. We recognize the size of the challenge that you

lay out in your question. Let me just take pieces of it if I might.

First of all, the engagement and leadership of Senator Byrd, we

applaud. I have met with Senator Byrd. I don’t know how many of

you have had the opportunity to sit down and talk with him, I suppose all 70 who signed on.

Senator BAUCUS. And some who have not signed have spoke with

him.

Secretary WIRTH. And some who have not signed on.
213

Senator Byrd’s resolution, in our opinion, is largely on the button

and comes very close to the Chafee Resolution which we also very

much applaud and support.

The Byrd Resolution related to sharing of economics and engagement of that one element of it. We thoroughly agree with that. Second, we thoroughly agree with the engagement of a Senate observer group in the process. Third, we very much agree with the

thrust of what he’s saying related to developing country commitments.

Exactly how those get defined is the thrust of our proposals for

Kyoto which I outlined, the five-point position that we’re taking.

China and India together are enormous producers of greenhouse

gases and are going to be at the same time a huge market over the

next 30 years. It is estimated that China and India together will

be building 1,500 megawatt plants in the next 30 years. That is the

equivalent of 50 percent of the installed energy capacity in North

America. That’s a remarkable opportunity for us.

Senator BAUCUS. That’s why many have signed onto the Byrd

Resolution.

Secretary WIRTH. We have to engage them both to get them to

recognize the imperative of them dealing with the problem. China,

as was pointed out in some of the earlier comments—I believe

yours, Senator Inhofe—has got major problems of their own. They

are starting to recognize those, they are starting to move in this

right direction.

We are negotiating as well with the Indians. We have to get

them to understand that it’s in their interest. Joint implementation, emission trading and other market mechanisms can be helpful

to them as they move along the course of economic development.

Senator BAUCUS. As I understand it, the 2005 commitment for

developing countries—I don’t want to put words in your mouth—

is essentially a proposed commitment by that date, talk. That is,

it is not a commitment to by that date, commit to certain specific

targets?

Secretary WIRTH. Under the 1992 Climate Treaty, there are certain existing commitments which the developing world is required

to undertake. We believe those ought to be more broadly articulated, that those ought to be more carefully defined. These existing

commitments can be very significant if they meet them. They are

already required to do that.

We think that specificity in their requirements ought to be part

of the agreement that we reach. That’s part of the phase-in policy.

It won’t be the same targets and timetables that we have now, but

it’s moving them into that over a period of time.

Senator BAUCUS. Can you describe the Annex B you talked

about? What is that about?

Secretary WIRTH. The idea of an Annex B is that there are certain countries that are developing very rapidly which have assumed, for example, OECD status. They get that status, that privilege of membership, but coming with that are obligations. We believe there ought to be a sort of new interim category into which

countries move with different responsibilities in the Climate Treaty.
214

Senator BAUCUS. Why not follow that step a little further and

have not only Annex 1 but Annex B, C, D and E and all countries

commit but at different rates?

Secretary WIRTH. That’s generally the idea, that there will be different rates.

Senator BAUCUS. But the point is they all commit to certain targets?

Secretary WIRTH. We would like to see that kind of commitment

from all countries. We’re dealing with 150-some signatories of the

Climate Treaty, but we’re really talking about maybe 35 countries

that make major contributions. If we could get those 35 under the

tent, as suggested by Senator Kempthorne’s questions, we would

have made an enormous difference.

Senator BAUCUS. Am I correct in assuming that some other developed countries are not as interested as the United States?

Secretary WIRTH. That’s true. We’re far out front.

Senator BAUCUS. Why is that? Why would the European Unions

not be as interested, including developing countries as quickly as

the United States?

Secretary WIRTH. I don’t want to get into the politics of what

may go on in Germany or wherever. I think they are a little skeptical of our engagement in that because we haven’t put up numbers

yet. I think some of that is their way of saying to us, ‘‘why haven’t

you put up your targets and timetables yet, we’re not going to

agree with what you’re saying until you come forward with your

targets and timetables.’’

We’ll do so later this fall and then I think it will be easier for

us to bring them on board.

There are also some suggestions that they don’t want to get far

out front in placing demands on the developing world, that maybe

they can gain some economic advantage by having us out front as

being the guy really pushing on the developing countries and they

come back and say, we’re the good guys.

Senator BAUCUS. If you had to guess, what’s the main reason?

Secretary WIRTH. The main reason is that we haven’t yet put out

our targets and timetables, so they’re not going to pick up our proposals until we put out clear indications of what we believe we’re

going to do.

Senator BAUCUS. So you think if we do put out our targets and

timetables, then they too will then come in and suggest that developing countries step up more quickly?

Secretary WIRTH. Yes, I believe that’s the case. We take the lead,

we’re the key area in all of this. We do a reasonable targets and

timetables approach in Kyoto. We have that on the table mid to

late October, that’s part of that negotiation; then I think it’s much,

much more likely that we’re going to get our proposals on economic

flexibility that Dr. Yellen was outlining and it’s much more likely

then that they go along with us in pushing for developing country

participation.

We have then the opportunity and the Annex 1 countries or the

developed countries to begin then to make a much clearer and coherent case to the developing countries to get on board. As the

chairman pointed out, getting the developing countries on board is

going to be the toughest part of this whole negotiation.
215

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you.

Senator CHAFEE. Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Wirth, these reductions on fossil fuels that would be

required by an agreement, where would they come from? Let me

put it this way, would the armed services be coming under this requirement, would they be exempt?

Secretary WIRTH. Our armed services are already making very

significant steps toward their own economic efficiencies in the use

of fuel, the recycling of materials and so on. We’re way out in front

of any other armed service in the world on that.

Senator INHOFE. But I’m talking about are they going to be required, as I’ve seen some of the requirements that are going to be

proposed, they would not be exempt in any way, would they?

Secretary WIRTH. I don’t think Secretary Cohen would want

them to be exempt.

Senator INHOFE. I’m sure he wouldn’t, but would you?

Secretary WIRTH. No.

Senator INHOFE. So they would be included also. What about political subdivisions, State and local governments?

Secretary WIRTH. I think part of this process would be that State

and local governments, like my city of Denver, the State of Colorado, would make very significant efforts to move toward natural

gas vehicles and so on.

I think there is a sense of shared responsibility. Of course they’d

be involved.

Senator INHOFE. I’m a former mayor, so I’m a little sensitive to

this type of thing. Do you think this would be, in your mind, interpreted as an unfunded mandate?

Secretary WIRTH. An unfunded mandate?

Ms. YELLEN. A requirement to do something.

Senator INHOFE. An unfunded mandate, yes.

Secretary WIRTH. I think most of the things we’re proposing are

going to be, as the economic studies suggest, steps that are going

to end up like an insurance policy but most importantly the guts

items are going to pay for themselves, at least for a long period of

time.

Senator INHOFE. So you don’t see there could be any costs incurred by political subdivisions to comply?

Secretary WIRTH. Over a period of time, I would think the investments made in terms of energy conservation and efficiency during

a first phase like this would absolutely pay for themselves.

We then get into a situation as we’re looking at steps 20, 30

years down the line in which we’re involved in very significant

technological investments where we’re really changing the nature

of the way in which we fuel much of our economy.

Senator INHOFE. But there will be costs incurred by State and

local governments, you agree with that, don’t you?

Secretary WIRTH. Sure.

Ms. YELLEN. I’d just add that I think what’s being proposed here

is a national cap on emissions and I think what you’re talking

about would be particular emissions limits placed on the armed

services, on individual cities.
216

Senator INHOFE. Exactly. They’re going to have to be a part of

this. They’re not exempt.

Ms. YELLEN. We really have not reached a conclusion as to how

to go about implementing any overall national emissions target domestically. Certainly one kind of system that one could imagine,

that one could think of——

Senator INHOFE. You do not anticipate that the costs incurred by

State and local governments would somehow be borne by the Federal Government, or do you?

Ms. YELLEN. I think that until we have discussed what kind of

scheme would be used in order to try to meet targets and timetables, it’s really impossible to discuss what the costs would be.

Senator INHOFE. We’ve established there will be some costs—

they might be high, they might be low—but there will be costs. My

question would be, do you anticipate that the Federal Government

will step in or should step in?

Secretary WIRTH. That would then be up to the implementing

legislation and what the Congress, in its wisdom, decided to do

based upon our consultations with the Congress. As Dr. Yellen has

pointed out, we haven’t gotten there yet, but it is fair to say that

nobody is exempt, a developing country or whoever it may be.

Senator INHOFE. Let me suggest that after you left this body, we

did pass legislation on unfunded mandates in terms of political

subdivisions. You may want to look into that.

I want to move on here. In my opening statement, Mr. Palmeritz

made a statement that ‘‘Our goal, Mr. Chairman, is that all parties

participate in the next round of negotiations.’’ Let me find it here.

‘‘Are we going to agree to the legally binding instrument in Geneva,

to a legally binding instrument?’’ and he said, ‘‘No way.’’ You were

quoted a few days after that as contradicting that. Who is right?

Secretary WIRTH. Again, as I pointed out earlier, I’d have to look

at the context of that, but Geneva was not a negotiating session in

which we agreed to some thing and it’s part of a negotiation. That

is not what Geneva was.

Geneva was a preparatory meeting and at Geneva, we laid out

the U.S. proposal and included in the U.S. proposal were legally

binding targets.

Senator INHOFE. That answers the question. I want to get to the

one I don’t understand and I need to have it explained because in

your opening statement, which I did not read but I was here during

your opening statement.

You made several comments. I think you said it’s not realistic to

assume that any product that comes out of here is going to impose

the same thing on developing nations as developed nations. Is that

correct?

Secretary WIRTH. That’s true, yes.

Senator INHOFE. And you said it several different ways. This also

you said is maybe the most contentious part of this.

Secretary WIRTH. Most difficult, that’s right.

Senator INHOFE. Just about 5 minutes ago, this Senate Joint

Resolution passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and I

understand there are only two votes against it. To my understanding, they have somewhere between 66 and 70 co-sponsors. You’ve

addressed this.
217

As I read it, my interpretation is that if you don’t treat them the

same, we’re not going to ratify them. Is that a different interpretation than you had?

Secretary WIRTH. That is a different interpretation than we have

of that. Again, you would have to talk to Senator Byrd and Senator

Hagel about their intent on this. As I pointed out, I thought the

most useful metaphor in describing this was the boat and the oars.

Senator Byrd said we’re all in the same boat. We start with a bigger oar, over a period of time the size of their oar phases in.

This is not dissimilar to what we’ve done in other environmental

treaties. I might say Senator Chafee raised the Montreal Protocol.

Under the Montreal Protocol, the developing countries were given

a longer period of time in which to phase-in and as the Senator

pointed out, that has been an extraordinarily successful environmental treaty.

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary, but I read this

and I don’t see that this is subject to interpretation or legislative

intent. I have talked to both Senator Byrd and Senator Hagel. I’m

going to read it. It states very clearly that we’re not going to ratify

a treaty, an agreement or a protocol which would—I’m directly

reading from paragraph A—‘‘mandate new commitments to limit or

reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex 1 parties unless the

protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled

commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for developing country parties within the same compliance period.’’ What is

ambiguous about that?

Secretary WIRTH. We agree with that, unless the protocol or

other agreement also mandates specific scheduled commitments.

We’re agreeing with that. That is in our proposal. It does not say

the same commitments.

If one followed your interpretation, Senator, as I understand

what you’re suggesting, any new commitments under line 1, mandate new commitments, that would then go to the end of that sentence that those would be the same new commitments. Nowhere in

the Byrd Resolution does it say the same new commitments for developing parties. That is not Senator Byrd’s intent.

Senator Byrd’s intent is to start with a commitment which is

lower for the developing countries and phase that in to what the

developed countries do.

Senator INHOFE. Respectfully, Mr. Secretary—and my time is

up—I have to tell you I read this, it’s in the record and it says the

same. It doesn’t use the word ‘‘same;’’ it says, you shall not expect

anything from developed countries that you don’t also get from developing countries.

The reason I’m concerned about this is that you’re going into negotiations knowing in advance that if you don’t treat them both the

same, you’re not going to get ratification. You don’t agree with

that?

Secretary WIRTH. Senator, the word ‘‘same’’ in here applies to the

compliance period, not to the requirements. The word ‘‘same’’ is

used as a way of defining compliance periods, not requirements.

That’s what the Byrd Resolution says, will be in the same compliance period but not the same requirements within that compliance

period.
218

They will start with lower requirements in that same compliance

period. Over a period of time, those lower requirements become

greater and we all have the same size oar over a period of time.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I don’t know how to

word it any other way.

Senator CHAFEE. Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Secretary, in your statement, you said

industrial nations like the United States have to go first in reducing greenhouse gas emissions because the developing countries

won’t act on their own.

You also stated that developing countries will emit more greenhouse gases than industrial nations within the next 30 years.

Under the Administration’s approach, wouldn’t industrial nations

be required to reduce their emissions and limit economic activity

while developing countries would be allowed to continue to increase

their emissions?

Secretary WIRTH. Yes, that will be one of the results in this first

period of time. We will be limiting our emissions. We hope that we

will get to a point of stabilization at a particular time and that all

developed countries will.

And soon thereafter, when the developing countries begin to

phase in their own requirements and steps, then we all end up

with the same kinds of requirements.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Are we, to follow your metaphor, going to

be retarding or holding constant the size of our oar, while the other

countries will be able to continue to grow their oar?

Secretary WIRTH. The oar metaphor relates to the actions that

each of us takes. This gets a little stretched, Senator Kempthorne.

The oar relates to the power that we put behind ultimately reaching the goal of stabilizing the concentrations of greenhouse gases.

The goal in all of this is that all of us together, sometime in the

21st century, will stabilize the concentrations of greenhouse gases

in the atmosphere. The developed countries have been the ones responsible for increasing the level of concentrations, for the most

part, from the historic level of around 260 to above 360 today.

We have to say we were responsible, we’ll take the first step. We

have the technology but you guys are coming along fast and you’ve

got to phase in, not dissimilar from the very successful kind of

phase-in approach that we did in the Montreal Protocol.

Would these be legally binding on developing countries?

Secretary WIRTH. Yes. We believe they should be and that’s the

list of specific items that we have put out there in terms of the enhancement or articulation of their existing commitments.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. How would we enforce that?

Secretary WIRTH. In most international treaties, we have a whole

section, and I’ll be happy to put that in the record if I might, as

to how one goes about reporting and meeting requirements and

compliance. That’s not in my testimony but I’ll submit that to the

record.

We have proposed a whole package of approaches ranging from

reporting to public disclosure of this to expert understanding and

expert analysis of what goes on. For the most part, Senator Kempthorne, when you get to a legally binding treaty like this, if a country goes through the process of examining what it has to do
219

and makes these commitments, then they’re going to meet those

commitments. Nations, for the most part, do what they say they’re

going to do.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I wish we had more time because I’d

really like to pursue that. At another date, we will.

Secretary WIRTH. Let’s do that. I’d be happy to get together with

you, Senator, at any time.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Dr. Yellen, you stated the effort to model

economic impacts based on alternative emission reduction strategies was abandoned, correct?

Ms. YELLEN. The search for a single model or a small set of models. In the case of the IAT report, three were used. The IAT analysis would produce forecasts that we could rely on or regard as definitive. That search was abandoned, but I don’t mean to say that

we don’t expect to use a broad set of tools including those models,

and other models that are better at understanding some other

issues and many sorts of economic analysis in defending any proposal we would put forward.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. You also State in your testimony, in short,

‘‘If anybody tells you that he or she has the definitive answer as

to the costs and benefits of particular climate change policies, I

would suggest your raise your collective eyebrows.’’

How are you going to agree to different reduction strategies if

you can’t estimate the impact of those strategies on the U.S. economy?

Ms. YELLEN. I believe I used the word definitive and to have a

single forecast of, for example, the amount of jobs to be gained or

lost in a particular industry in the year 2030. That is a search I

think we’ve abandoned and shouldn’t try to give you.

Certainly we need to produce economic analysis of any proposal

with respect to targets and timetables that the Administration

would put forward and try to estimate even if it’s only a range of

potential impacts, what we think the impact would be on the

American economy.

We will, when there is a policy, certainly be prepared to do that.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. As we listen to this testimony, we take it

in light of what was discussed at last week’s hearing, the raised

eyebrows, the abandonment of certain strategies, the data that

doesn’t quite give us any conclusion.

You also stated, ‘‘If we do it dumb, it could cost a lot. If we do

it smart, it could result in net benefits.’’ You seem to be telling us

to trust the Administration to implement any new requirements

reasonably. How can we depend on the Administration to do that

when it seems that it cannot estimate the relative costs of alternative strategies to reduce greenhouse gases?

Ms. YELLEN. The Administration has been engaged, for some

time now, in attempting to study and understand the potential impact on the economy of an emissions reduction strategy.

While I used the term abandoned with respect to an attempt to

produce definitive forecasts of impacts, I certainly do not mean to

suggest that we have not learned a great deal from that exercise

about what makes a policy sensible as opposed to costly and certainly reading a broader range of economic analysis by economists
220

outside the Administration, putting it together with what we have

done internally, points to some clear conclusions.

One of the things I think the report that we’ve submitted to you

does very well is to provide a general sense of what the gains are

when one uses what I’ve described as flexible or smart strategies.

One of the strengths of the U.S. proposal, I believe, is that it has

emphasis on flexible, market-based, smart strategies that provide

flexibility with respect to emission reductions when it comes to

where they will take place and when they will take place.

Within our own economy, coming back to Senator Inhofe’s earlier

question, I think the framework that you had in mind earlier was

that you would imagine individual firms or State and local governments potentially having clear mandates as to how much emission

reduction might be done.

We’ve not settled on policies but flexible could mean, for example, tradeable permits where if one entity found it very difficult or

costly to reduce emissions, they wouldn’t have to do it, they could

buy a permit to allow greater emissions.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I appreciate that. I want to slide in one

more question before that red light comes on.

Mr. Secretary, the developing countries have a much greater population and are sure to pass, as you pointed out, the industrial nations in greenhouse gas emissions in the next quarter century.

Given those facts, why is the Administration arguing in support of

a per capita limit on greenhouse gas emissions rather than a proportionate share based on economic productivity? Aren’t we really

arguing against our own best interests?

Secretary WIRTH. We’ve not argued anywhere there should be a

per capita limit. That would be a very, very unwise policy. If we

say we’re going to have a per capita limit, that would mean the

United States would have the same per capita limitations as India

whose population is growing perhaps even faster than their production of greenhouse forcing gases. That would certainly not be a prudent thing for us to do.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I appreciate that.

Secretary WIRTH. If I might comment on one piece about this

model. I’m not an economist. I view with some skepticism all of the

modeling based upon a lot of experience on these kinds of issues.

I remember when Senator Baucus and I were freshmen Members

of Congress. The Arab oil boycott had first occurred and the economic modelers came in front of the Congress and told us that the

cost of oil was going to be $110 a barrel and there would be huge

stacks of what were called petrodollars in the Middle East and this

was going to be a disaster for our economy. Well, none of those

things proved to be the case. The modelers were wrong.

When we did the Clean Air Act, you remember, Senator Chafee,

the original model suggested that the reduction of a ton of sulfur

would cost about $2,000. We figured out the right kind of a

tradeable permit system in the United States and most recently,

the cost of that has dropped to $100. The modelers were off by a

factor of 20.

They are useful tools to help you begin to think about this but,

in summary, what I think we’re saying is there is no single model
221

that is going to give you every dot as to what is going to happen

10 years, 20 years or 30 years out.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I raise my eyebrow.

[Laughter.]

Senator CHAFEE. We’ve been challenged by your statement to

raise our collective eyebrows, Doctor. I’m not sure we do anything

collectively around here.

We will do 5 minutes in this round because we have another

panel and I want to make a sure they get a chance.

In the other areas we’ve worked on that are similar to this,

namely you mentioned the Clean Air Act. At that time, you remember the whole acid rain problem was there and many of us took

trips abroad and saw what the acid rain had done to the trees in

the Black Forest of Germany or Switzerland.

When we came to the CFCs, there was a real concern because

there is a direct relationship between the destruction of the ozone

layer and the increase in skin cancer. So we could sound the alarm,

as it were. I find what is lacking here is the sounding of an alarm.

In your statement, you state, ‘‘Based on these warming trends,

sea level is projected to raise an additional 1.5 feet by the year

2100,’’ and 2100 is only 100 years from now. ‘‘This would, without

adoptive measures, flood 9,000 square miles of coastal areas in the

United States, notably in Florida and Louisiana and put about 100

million people worldwide at risk each year from storm surges.’’

That is an alarming statistic.

I think the Administration, as I see it, is very, very cautious

about going public with statements like that. I think your case is

helped by pointing out the dangers that lie ahead if we do nothing.

One of our scientists, Dr. Benjamin Santa, gave a very compelling statement, ‘‘Although we will never have complete certainty

about the exact size of the past, present or future human effect on

climate, we do know beyond any reasonable doubt, that the burning of fossil fuels has modified the chemical composition of the atmosphere.

‘‘The question is not whether but to what extent such changes in

atmospheric composition have already influenced the climate of the

past century and will continue to influence the climate of the 21st

century.’’

I believe in that and my question to you is, isn’t it possible for

the President or those who have a bully pulpit to get out there and

State what you have stated in your statement to us here?

Secretary WIRTH. I share your frustration about getting the story

out and telling the story. The President has really picked up this

cudgel. He began very aggressively with a terrific speech at the

United Nations 2 weeks ago. I would ask that speech be placed in

full in the record.

He has two strong paragraphs in there for making the case. He

has made it very clear that he’s going to devote a great deal of attention this summer, identifying why this is as problem, pointing

out to the American people that we have to move on this, culminating in a White House conference in late September-early October

to bring together as much of this evidence as we can.

The President was much taken, for example, by the World Wildlife Fund, which pointed out that in Glacier National Park, 70 per-
222

cent of the glaciers have melted. The evidence on glaciers around

the world, the man that was found in the Alps, why was that man

15,000 years old or whatever, suddenly discovered? The big glaciers

had melted.

The young woman who was sacrificed and put into an ice cave

in the Andes a long time ago, suddenly found. Why was that? The

glaciers are retreating.

Look at south Florida and look at what insurance companies are

starting to do there in terms of saying maybe we don’t want to ensure here because the incidence of hurricanes may well be going up

because there is greater warmth in the water, greater energy there,

greater violence in these storms.

These are the kinds of stories and anecdotes that have got to be

put together so that people really understand what it’s going to

mean to them day in and day out. The President has dedicated

himself to doing that.

Senator CHAFEE. I know it’s easy for us to sit here and say go

to it, but I do have the feeling that the concerns haven’t gotten out

there. That was what made us move successfully in these past efforts I just mentioned, in which you were deeply involved at the

time.

I would encourage you and others who have a standing in these

areas and we have responsibilities likewise. It isn’t just all the Administration but I would urge the President to speak out on these

subjects.

I was not aware of this White House conference. That sounds

like a good idea.

Senator Baucus.

Senator BAUCUS. Thank you very much. I’ve been around once.

Senator WYDEN. It’s a pleasure to have Secretary Wirth and Dr.

Yellen here. I just have a couple of questions for the two of you.

I’m from I think the only State in the United States that has put

in place carbon dioxide controls. We are convinced that it is possible to do this in a fashion that is good for the environment and

also doesn’t cause economic meltdown.

I’d like to ask each of you a couple of questions. One, Mr. Wirth,

if you could outline what you think are the most cost effective

strategies for controlling emissions? My sense is this would give us

a chance to compare some of the alternatives that are relevant here

as Congress goes forward on this issue.

Secretary WIRTH. First of all, thank you, Mr. Wyden, for your

kind opening comments and we appreciate not only your progressive State, but it’s progressive representation.

We do not have, as Dr. Yellen pointed out, a specific proposal at

this point, so any comments that I might make are not in the context of a specific Administration proposal.

Having said that, it’s very clear there are very significant efficiencies over a relatively short period of time that can be had in

our economy. We all worked on those together on the Commerce

Committee in the House of Representatives. What was true then

is true today.

The Japanese, for example, are about twice as fuel efficient as

we are, with an economy that is about close to being two-thirds of
223

our size. Those are rough numbers. There are great significant efficiencies.

Second, there are real opportunities for us to create very, very

productive partnerships with large parts of American industry. You

might have seen the piece this morning in the Washington Post by

the chairman or president of Chrysler talking about the partnership for a new generation of vehicles. That’s the kind of thing we

think we can embark upon.

There are real opportunities. We look at deregulation in the utility world. Think about the factor in the climate issue which can be

very helpful in coming to the right kinds of economic decisions

there. Getting the prices right is, of course, a very important one,

to remove subsidies from key areas.

These are some of the items that we can do over a relatively

short period of time that can have a significant impact. The automobile example is a longer term one but again, the kind of promising steps that we might make.

A final note, and I would ask Dr. Yellen to comment, this problem is not going to be solved, as you know, by these kinds of shortterm measures. This is a long-term pull over 40, 50, or 60 years.

The long-term solution is going to come from major technological

improvements, changes and innovations. That is where the payoff

is going to be.

The sooner we start to get the framework right for developing

those long-term technological solutions, the better chance we have

of meeting our obligations to our children, grandchildren and great

grandchildren.

Senator WYDEN. Is it your sense that energy efficiency, we’ve

seen appraisals that would be in the vicinity of $2 a ton plus tree

planting and forest management strategies where modest costs per

ton would be sensible kinds of approaches that we ought to look to

first.

Secretary WIRTH. We’ve already embarked upon a number of

joint implementation projects with some 17 or 20 of those around

the world today. We’d be happy to send you a list of those. Many

of those do relate to forestry practices and very progressive forestry

practices.

The sequestration of carbon is a very, very important part of anything that we might want to do. Again, here is a good example of

where the opportunities for us to develop partnerships with the agricultural community, with the forest product community, are very

significant. There’s a lot of carbon stored out there in sound agricultural practices.

Senator WYDEN. I appreciate your saying that because there is

no question in our minds that looking at sensible forest management strategies is the winner all around. You’re going to get more

and higher value. Wood products are going to get better habit for

species, water quality and as you said, it’s a cost-effective way to

sequester carbon.

Given that, can the Administration make a special push to ensure that forest management and reforestation programs are a significant component of a global climate treaty?

Secretary WIRTH. We have made that point over and over again

and I would commit that to you here, that the commitment and en-
224

gagement of the forest product industry, agriculture overall, is very

important.

I’ve met with our former colleague, Hinson Moore, who understands this and is a very, very effective spokesperson for his industry. We’ve met and will continue to do so on this very important

issue.

Senator WYDEN. Let me turn to your colleague for a moment.

Dr. Yellen, I’m interested in your thoughts about how a region’s

economy absorbs the impact of some of these kinds of changes as

it relates to carbon dioxide emissions and in particular, what we

found in Oregon is that if one does nothing else, nothing else other

than look at a market-based kind of system for dealing with these

issues, and making a number of the key ones prospective, such as

the changes in the power plant area, that alone constitutes a significant effort to deal with this issue in a way that can be absorbed

from an economic standpoint. Do you agree?

Ms. YELLEN. I would agree with your assessment. I think that

there are a variety of market-based approaches that we could potentially use. Again, I want to emphasize that we haven’t developed policies in this area but we’ve had experience in the United

States. It’s been very positive with emissions trading of permits in

the case of sulfur dioxide and water trading.

We’ve had some experience in California and other places and I

think market-based systems really have the power to work to

greatly reduce the costs. They provide flexibility over time with

banking and borrowing of permits and across places. You give incentives to firms or individuals who see an opportunity there to

make money when they can really reduce emissions very effectively, very cheaply. They have now an incentive to do more than

they would otherwise be required to do because they can profit

from it and reduce the cost to others that would find it costly.

Senator WYDEN. I came in late.

Senator CHAFEE. You did come in late and the red light is on.

What we’d like to do is go to Senator Baucus.

We have another panel, I want to remind members of that and

we want to give them a fair shot, plus we want to have an opportunity to ask questions. So I would like to move along here.

Senator Baucus. We’ll get back to you, Senator Wyden, if you

wish some more on this.

Senator BAUCUS. Secretary Wirth, one of the questions here obviously is how we implement controls. You talked about marketbased mechanisms.

The first question I have, the degree with which we think the

emissions trading system which has worked under the Clean Air

Act, in sulfur in particular, was transferable to greenhouse gases

on a global level.

Ms. YELLEN. My sense is, although we’ve not concluded a study

of that, an emissions trading system could be developed that would

work for carbon dioxide emissions if we wanted to go in that direction.

That is why there are proposals here for international trading.

Senator BAUCUS. Why is it that the Europeans are resistant to

that idea? I asked Secretary Wirth that question. I understand the
225

Europeans are resistant to the kinds of emissions trading proposals

for carbon dioxide that we have adopted for sulfur dioxide.

Secretary WIRTH. The Europeans have their own emissions trading system in their proposal. I think disingenuous is too tough a

word but they are saying to us we don’t want to have emissions

trading but the whole proposal made by the EU is premised upon

a bubble that would include all European countries.

It would allow Portugal, for example, to increase their numbers

by 40 percent, while Germany decreases by 15 percent. If that’s not

emissions trading, I don’t know what is. So they’re saying you guys

can’t do it internationally, but we can do it within the EU. We’re

saying, wait a minute.

Senator BAUCUS. Practically, they do because they practice emissions trading but they will probably agree in a more comprehensive

way.

Secretary WIRTH. I think they will when we get there.

Senator BAUCUS. My next question is, you mentioned Mr. Easton’s piece in the Washington Post. His main point is to wait until

there is better technology on how to deal with all of this.

Are we expending enough effort in this country, not only in cars

but in coal-fired technologies, to be more fuel efficient? Could we

do a better job there?

Secretary WIRTH. Fuel efficiencies of our energy technologies are

greater than any place in the world. Our new technologies, you talk

to someone like the Enron people about what we can do and what

we’re promoting around the world and the dramatic efficiencies

from where we are with our best technologies and elsewhere.

You’re familiar with all of these Senator Baucus.

The automotive industry has told us that they would expect to

get very, very significant efficiencies, like 88 miles per gallon.

Senator BAUCUS. This is a ‘‘chicken before the egg’’ question because I think we find efficiencies when we have to very often. For

example, the oil shock enabled us to find new efficiencies.

This committee years ago asked the automotive industry to develop the catalytic converter. First of all, they said they couldn’t do

it. Then they did it and they found out in doing so, they were much

more efficient. They developed a much more efficient engine and

fuel exhaust system.

Again, sometimes this world is run by deadlines and when you

have deadlines sometimes you’re more likely to do something than

when you’re not.

I wish you well. This is a daunting task, but it’s a necessary one.

Thank you.

Secretary WIRTH. I might say we believe that the framework that

we’ve laid out over a period of time provides exactly the kinds of

incentives and direction that is needed to do just the sort of pressure and push for the next steps that have to be taken.

Senator BAUCUS. Your key problem right now is getting developing countries to commit to specific numbers by certain dates.

Senator CHAFEE. Senator Wyden.

Senator WYDEN. Just one question. To continue this point on the

economic impact for a second, Dr. Yellen. I think we’ve seen in the

State of Oregon, for example, how you can go about making some

emissions limits in a cost-effective kind of way.
226

My sense is that to do nothing is going to have extraordinarily

bad economic consequences. I gather Secretary Wirth talked about

this as something of an insurance policy.

We recently had a conference in the Pacific Northwest where a

group of independent scientists predicted climate change could

bring a whole host of problems to the region’s water resources, forests, agriculture, energy, water shortages, diseases forests, flooding, a variety of these.

Has there been any ballpark estimate given to calculate the economic consequences of doing nothing? I know we have spent a

great deal of time thrashing around with these estimates on what

happens if you do this and this, particularly from some who are not

advocating action at all.

It would seem to me we also ought to try to get a ballpark set

of costs for what happens if you do nothing.

Ms. YELLEN. Quantifying the cost of doing nothing with respect

to environmental damage, public health and other issues is extremely difficult, very uncertain. Most modelers don’t even include

the benefits side of addressing climate change in their model. Indeed, in the report we sent to you, you’ll see no modeling of the

benefit side.

There is some work in the economics literature and I could try

to get back to you and give you some of the results from that literature, that have tried in a very rough way to estimate the benefits from exactly what you’re talking about and they are significant.

I’d be happy to send you some further details.

Senator WYDEN. The kind of example that would concern me is

if you mess up your water supply, for example, what we know in

the Pacific Northwest is that’s going to make it hard to attract high

tech companies because one of the things they have said again and

again is that they need access to clean, pure water.

It would seem to me that economic models that would address

doing nothing and what happens if your water gets fouled and

what happens when it has economic consequences for high technology companies is important.

Your calculus now is that this would have major economic consequences but modeling is difficult?

Ms. YELLEN. It’s hard to put a price tag on the consequences, but

certainly this is why we’re talking about it because obviously there

are benefits from acting and there would be costs from failing to

act.

Senator CHAFEE. All right. Mr. Secretary, looking at the greenhouse gas emission curves, how long do you estimate we can afford

environmentally to wait around before getting this participation by

not only the developing countries but the developed countries as

well?

Secretary WIRTH. It depends on what assumptions you make

about what a harmful concentration of greenhouse gases may be.

Most of the environmental modeling has been done on a doubling

of parts per million of carbon in the atmosphere. We’re 30 percent

of our way there; we’re probably going to get there sometime in the

second quarter and before 2040–2050, we’re going to get to doubling. That’s where the sea level rise and most of those predictions

come.
227

If we don’t start to act now to break into that curve, there is no

way in the world that we can stop it doubling. We have to start,

as Senator Baucus pointed out, now. There are some very sophisticated modeling curves about greenhouse gas emissions and I would

like to submit those for the record because they do show where the

curve and the breakpoints are.

If we start now, how likely is it that we can stop it doubling. If

we wait for 20 years, it’s almost impossible that we can stop it doubling and we’ll move rapidly to tripling. When you start to get between doubling and tripling, most scientists would agree that the

impacts become even more severe and we’re probably, as I pointed

out, no longer into linear impacts but we’re going to see some

major surprises along the way.

Senator CHAFEE. That is a good presentation and I hope you are

able to sound that alarm publicly to a great extent.

Secretary WIRTH. We appreciate your help in doing so, Senator,

and look forward to working with you.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much.

Secretary WIRTH. Thank you.

Senator CHAFEE. We appreciate both you and Dr. Yellen.

Now, Mr. Kevin Kay, executive director, International Climate

Change Partnership and Mr. William O’Keefe. Will they both

quickly come to the table and we’ll get started because we want the

opportunity to hear what you have to say.

What we’ll do with each of you is if each of you could give your

statements in say 7 minutes, then we will have a chance to ask

some questions. Your statements obviously will go into the record.

Go to it, Mr. Fay.

STATEMENT OF KEVIN FAY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PARTNERSHIP

Mr. FAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

My name is Kevin Fay. I’m the executive director of the International Climate Change Partnership, a coalition of U.S. industry

representatives and associations as well as international associations interested in the policy development process with respect to

global climate change. We appreciate the opportunity to be here

today.

ICCP was organized in 1991 to provide a forum to address the

issue of global climate change and to be a constructive participant

in the policy debate. We continue to recognize the climate change

issue as an important matter with which government should be

concerned. However, it is a very long-term issue and extraordinarily complex in both its underlying science and its entanglement with the very foundations of the global economic structure.

We have recently communicated our views on the key issues in

the Kyoto negotiations to the Administration. I’m attaching this

correspondence to my testimony and ask that it be included in the

record.

Senator CHAFEE. Yes, it will be.

Mr. FAY. We have also communicated to the President on the

issue of the Administration’s now incomplete economic analysis, expressing our frustration at their lack of communication on the matters of greatest concern to the private sector, namely the potential
228

economic impacts of a climate change agreement and the current

thinking of future implementation scenarios.

In light of the Administration’s demurral on the economic analysis, our frustration only grows. In our view, the Administration

made progress in its own deliberations and offered a thoughtful

policy framework at the second meeting of the parties in 1996 and

we have heard about that here today.

This policy outline includes a comprehensive approach, identification of a long-term objective, identification of developing country

roles under the treaty, implementation of flexibility through emissions trading, banking and joint implementation, and avoidance of

a laundry list of so-called policies and measures.

The U.S. framework also included a call for a binding commitment which the Administration has subsequently defined as an

emissions budget period of undetermined length to achieve reductions of an undetermined size.

While most of the attention has been focused on this part of the

discussion, we continue to believe that it is not the only key to a

successful treaty agreement in Kyoto or after Kyoto.

You will note in both of the letters we attached, we urged the

President and the State Department to reiterate to our negotiating

partners that the U.S. policy framework enunciated last July is the

only framework that can provide a climate change agreement that

is both environmentally beneficial and economically feasible.

Our primary concern has been that the result of the negotiations

would focus on only one or two of the key issues, some of which

we have outlined in our letter, and that the rest would be left until

later.

To date, frankly, we have been disappointed in the progress on

most of these fronts and we are pessimistic on the ability to

achieve them between now and Kyoto. ICCP is not and never has

been interested in an agreement at the Kyoto meeting just for the

sake of reaching an agreement. This view will not change.

With respect to the economic issues, which I referred to earlier

and the impacts of a climate change agreement on the U.S. economy, jobs and the environment, we remain very concerned. It is difficult to address this issue in any effective way given the lack of

dialog on these topics and the lack of information being provided

by the Administration.

We know that the economic analysis that has been performed by

the Administration and others tells us several important things—

that there are costs involved in reducing greenhouse gas emissions;

that the costs are likely to be reduced if flexibility provisions are

incorporated; that you cannot achieve any reasonable goals either

environmentally or economically without developing country participation; and the costs are less if you avoid premature capital retirement or turnover and provide industry the opportunity to manage their way into the technological innovation that will be necessary to accomplish whatever long-term goal is established by the

parties to the Convention.

We need to know now, however, what analytical process might

be pursued in light of the Administration’s current view of the difficulty of completing what it has promised for more than a year.

In order for there to be an effective treaty, we believe that the par-
229

ties must first get the treaty structure right. We have a long way

to go before that will happen.

In closing, I believe it is useful to look at previous examples for

guidance that may provide a better perspective than the intense

pre-Kyoto focus.

More than 12 years ago, negotiators were struggling to complete

the Vienna Convention for protection of the ozone layer after more

than 5 years of negotiation. These negotiations had taken on a bitter tone as parties, including the United States and the European

Union tried to——

Senator CHAFEE. When you say these negotiations, you mean the

ozone layer, the Vienna ones?

Mr. FAY. Yes. The United States and European Union tried to

push for adoption of their own preferred policy approach to dealing

with those depleting compounds. Instead, the parties agreed to that

convention without the regulatory protocol and also agreed to establish a series of workshops and information-gathering devices to

better understand each others’ views.

When negotiations resumed, approximately 2 years later, the

parties were much better informed and a treaty structure was

adopted that has since proven very durable. The Montreal Protocol

which was signed in 1987 has proven much more effective than

most of us thought possible at the time.

We raise this as an example not because we believe the issues

are identical. They are not and climate change is certainly far more

complex. We raise it because as we reach this fevered pitch prior

to Kyoto, we want to stress that an effective framework is what

counts, not an expedient framework.

The climate treaty needs to be durable for the next 100 years.

Our companies have determined that the current State of scientific

understanding requires a prudent, long-term approach to address

this issue. This view is equally applicable to the climate negotiations themselves.

We appreciate the opportunity to be here today.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Fay.

Now, Mr. O’Keefe, chairman, Global Climate Coalition here in

Washington.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM O’KEEFE, CHAIRMAN, GLOBAL

CLIMATE COALITION

Mr. O’KEEFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am William O’Keefe,

chairman of the Global Climate Coalition. Our members form the

backbone of the U.S. economy and encompass companies from manufacturing, agriculture, transportation, energy utilities and mining.

The GCC commends this committee for holding these hearings to

discuss the scientific and economic realities of climate change and

the implications of the Administration’s negotiating strategy in a

rational, logical, and open forum.

Recent Senate hearings have put a much needed spotlight on the

compelling scientific uncertainties that should permeate every climate change policy discussion. A May 16 article in the respected

journal, Science, demonstrated convincingly that based on our current State of knowledge, we do not face an imminent crisis and so
230

do not need to undertake precipitous actions that could badly damage our economy.

As scientific knowledge about climate change has improved, estimates of future temperature and sea level increases have moderated. In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

estimated that the average global temperature would rise 4 degrees

Celsius by 2100. In 1995, the IPCC reduced that estimate by 50

percent. More recent British and United States estimates reported

in Science place it lower than that.

It is ironic that as estimates of the impacts have moderated, the

Administration’s policy has shifted from support of voluntary programs to legally binding commitments. Although the Administration has not specified for the Senate the critical details of what it

might propose, Administration officials have alluded to cutting carbon dioxide emissions back to 1990 levels around 2010 and holding

them there.

Such a goal would require more than a 25 percent reduction in

projected fossil fuel use. They have not told you, but I will, there

is simply no economically viable technology that can replace that

amount of energy that quickly. By implication, the Administration

may be planning to commit the United States to a severe form of

energy rationing. Nor will we escape through allusions to an

unproven and unworkable international trading scheme to counterbalance the damage of self-imposed energy rationing.

Other nations have already rejected such schemes. My written

statement cites the estimated loss in income, jobs, and U.S. competitiveness that are likely to result from what the Administration

has in mind.

MIT economics professor, Richard Schmallensee has stated the

matter graphically, ‘‘The economic impacts would feel like the energy price hikes of the 1970’s with a massive hangover.’’ All of the

sacrifice could be tolerated if significant benefits would be secured,

but the plain fact is that the Berlin mandate, which is guiding the

current round of negotiations, exempts developing countries such

as China, India, Mexico, and Brazil, even though they will account

for most of the future growth in carbon dioxide emissions in the

next century.

Any defensible emissions goal requires participation of all nations. The 2,600 economists who signed a petition on climate

change and the 65 Senators who have co-sponsored Senate Resolution 98, and virtually all others who have analyzed this issue emphasize that all countries must participate in any program that is

to be beneficial. That program should be guided by the limits of

knowledge, anticipate that surprises will occur and recognize the

need to adapt as new knowledge is created.

Climate policy is simply not a dichotomy of action versus no action. We agree that action is justified but reject the course being

pursued in international negotiations. It is an unjustified rush to

judgment.

The major difference between the GCC and our understanding of

the Clinton administration is over approach, not need. We believe

that a wise policy on climate change is akin to driving in a thick

fog. The prudent course of action is to proceed at a speed consistent

with how well the car’s headlights illuminate the road ahead.
231

The Administration approach appears akin to driving full speed

on the Autobahn on a clear day with no reason for caution. That

approach is flawed and risks a fatal crash.

By setting a pace that is consistent with the State of knowledge

and economic realities, actions can be taken to achieve any justifiable, long-term goal at one-fifth the cost of the approach being embraced by international negotiators.

We should also invest in information to reduce the uncertainties

and to better understand the implications of alternative courses of

action.

Finally, we should take steps that will produce benefits under

any set of circumstances. The GCC has developed several of these

no or low regret actions and have shared them with the Administration. They are based on these points: No. 1, encourage the economic turnover of the capital stock; No. 2, focus investment and research to narrow the range of scientific uncertainties; No. 3, invest

in the development of new technologies; No. 4, expedite diffusion

of new technologies in developing countries; No. 5, facilitate the investment of U.S. private capital in countries with high emission

levels; and finally, No. 6, continue promoting voluntary programs

for reducing U.S. emissions.

As we make progress in reducing climate change uncertainties,

we can anticipate that additional prudent steps will be revealed.

By proceeding at a pace that scientific understanding allows, we

can greatly reduce the cost of dealing with potential climate

change.

It is a fact of life that precipitous actions driven by current technology and today’s knowledge will be vastly more expensive and

therefore, less effective than a balanced approach that does not undermine our remarkable record of economic growth and job creation.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. O’Keefe.

I’m not sure what you meant in the second of your points there

at the end, let me start at the beginning. ‘‘The business community

has shared these steps with the Administration which are based on

these points: encourage an economic turnover of the capital stock.’’

I’m just not sure what that means.

Mr. O’KEEFE. The existing inventory of plant and equipment represents long-lived investments. You should look for impediments to

turning those over at the end of their economic life. Depreciation

schedules, some provisions in Superfund law, some provisions of

the Clean Air Act, new source performance standards and prevention of significant deterioration, all encourage keeping plants in operation longer than would otherwise be justified.

As they are replaced, those that replace them will be more energy efficient. And, anything that will advance, on an economic

basis, greater energy efficiency will lead to lower emissions.

Senator CHAFEE. Mr. Fay, it seems to me what you’re saying is

that the position of your membership is that it accepts the science

of climate change. You see a problem there and I guess it was Mr.

O’Keefe that talked about the approach that you’re concerned with.

Was that in your testimony?

Mr. FAY. That’s correct, yes, sir.
232

Senator CHAFEE. But Mr. Fay, as I understand it, you accept

that the best scientific information suggests that the human component of climate change isn’t small and that human activities already are producing climate change signals that we ought to pay

attention to. Am I correct in that?

Mr. FAY. We would agree that the science requires us to pay attention to it, yes.

Senator CHAFEE. What would you do about that? You heard the

Secretary’s testimony a while ago about what will happen in the

middle of the next century, the first part or the middle of the next

century, and what do you say to that?

Mr. FAY. We’ve heard a lot of discussion. You need to cut up the

science probably into three different regions of certainty. One is

that our greenhouse gases are building up as a result of human activity, yes. There is the scientific consensus concerning temperature.

Senator CHAFEE. What’s your answer to the first? Did you say

yes, are they building up as a result of human activities?

Mr. FAY. Right, but in terms of the temperature range, we still

think the temperature range and the sea level rise projections,

there’s a wide band there. We agree that the scientific consensus

appears to have arrived at that range.

Much beyond that in terms of those other effects you get,

whether it’s disease spread or agricultural impacts, we think there

is an awful lot of uncertainty associated with those, but recognizing

that the buildup of the gases themselves, if you realize those effects, would take a long time to retreat from them, it requires you

to take a longer term view toward working on that issue.

So we’ve acknowledged that it’s appropriate to begin developing

a means to work on this issue.

Senator CHAFEE. Mr. Fay, you mentioned the Montreal Protocol

and as you recall, all the signatories had to agree to a phaseout of

the use of the ozone-depleting substances. You cited that as something that worked well. What do you think about following that

procedure here?

Mr. FAY. Well, I think that in those negotiations, the developing

countries accepted the need for them to be participants. I’m afraid

I haven’t seen that kind of recognition from the developing countries in the current negotiations. There is a continuing insistence

on their part with regard to climate change that they have no commitments, despite the fact that the Administration continues to

argue they do have existing commitments which we welcome to be

elaborated under the existing treaty.

We’re very concerned. I think Mr. O’Keefe mentioned the fact

that there is virtually unanimous agreement that you can’t achieve

any reasonable climate change goals if you don’t have developing

countries participating. You have to find a way to get them on

board. I haven’t seen where we’ve achieved the recognition by those

countries, however, that they are willing to do that.

Senator CHAFEE. To get them on board, Secretary Wirth stressed

we have to go first.

Mr. FAY. I think we already are going first, Senator. We’re already implementing the programs voluntarily. It is our technology

that is likely to lead us toward solutions on this issue.
233

What we have asked for is because of the fact a great majority

of the investment made by developed countries and developed country industries is going into developing countries, that you have to

reach some decision as to what their role is going to be in the

treaty process, what their commitments are going to be before we

get into any kind of binding period for our own countries and our

own companies. That’s a minimum of what would be acceptable.

As I said, we’re still a long ways away from that recognition by

the developing countries that while 80 percent of the emissions

may have been associated with our economies over the last 100

years, 80 percent of the emissions over the next 100 years are

going to come from their economies.

Senator CHAFEE. Yes, but we’ve got a situation as we pointed out

before where we have I believe the statistic is 4 percent of the

world’s population and we emit 22 percent of the carbon dioxide.

If I were in China or India and somebody from the west came

to me and said, you’ve got to reduce your CO2 emissions, I’d say,

look, you ought to go first, you keep wrecking the place, not us.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, could I comment on that?

Senator CHAFEE. Yes.

Mr. O’KEEFE. It is true that we account for 22 percent of the

world’s CO2 emissions, but we also account for at least that much

and probably more in terms of the generation of global wealth. CO2

and other greenhouse gases are not typical pollutant. They are natural elements in nature and increases of CO2 are the result of economic activity. So when we produce a good and export it to another

country, the emission is attributed to us, while a benefit accrues to

the importing country.

I think it’s much more complex than suggested by a simple statistic.

It may sound good to say that we spoiled the nest or we account

for the bulk of the emissions, but we also account for much of the

wealth, the food production, the goods and services those countries

are using and that ought to be taken into account as well.

Senator CHAFEE. That’s a tough one to explain to somebody in

India, isn’t it?

Mr. O’KEEFE. I don’t think anyone is saying that they have to

have our technology tomorrow. We ought to do everything we can

to aid the growth in their economies because it’s the wealthier

countries that have the technology that adapt and protect against

unforeseen events. So the faster they can grow up the economic

curve, the more efficient they will be in using energy. But, they

have to participate or else we’re not going to make any progress.

Mr. FAY. We have suggested, Senator, as a way of dealing with

this through the entry into force requirements for the treaty that

while perhaps our efforts may be more aggressive up front, may

take place prior to theirs, that you certainly have to have a significant percentage of world greenhouse gas emissions, and that would

include India and China, and that you have to have as parties to

the treaty, a majority of developed countries, a majority of developing countries, that you try to negotiate a treaty that perhaps as

there was in the Protocol, there was a delay in the implementation

of the requirements for those countries, but we had them as parties.
234

What we’re not seeing is an indication that they are willing to

become parties in that sense. So it’s a question of how we assist

them in growing smart, not how we stop them from growing, how

we get them to adopt the most efficient technologies just as we

need to be adopting the most efficient technologies here.

Senator CHAFEE. As I understood the first part of your testimony, Mr. Fay, you were lamenting the fact that there didn’t seem

to be a dialog with the Administration with your organization and

perhaps Mr. O’Keefe’s organization. Am I correct in concluding

that?

Mr. FAY. We have lots of talks, but it has been pretty barren in

terms of specifics, aside from the general framework that they put

out where they continue to emphasize the need to do this in a rational, economic way.

We’ve asked them to define their specific objectives; we’ve asked

them to embrace the framework they put out there a year ago; and

we’ve asked them to come to us and say what is their expectation

of our industry sectors over the next two decades, what is it you

want us to do better? We have not had those kinds of conversations. They’ve not defined a specific objective. They’ve defined a

general framework which we’re supportive of.

Now we want them to say that’s the framework they have to

have in the negotiations. We want them to tell them what their expectations are of our industries. Until we can get that, it’s going

to be difficult for us to sign onto some blank check Kyoto agreement where we don’t know what they are expecting of us or what

their implementation regime may be when they bring that agreement back to the United States.

These are reasonable questions for us to ask. We also think it’s

reasonable information for them to have. It was information we

had as we were working through the Montreal Protocol negotiations. We had a better description of implementation schemes and

those impacts.

Senator CHAFEE. It certainly seems to me that we should expect

in any agreement we entered into that the developing nations are

going to be a part of it. I can understand that perfectly well and

I think that’s a reasonable point you’re making.

Mr. O’Keefe, in your testimony you talked about actions being

considered by negotiators that would require us to suppress energy

use by at least 25 percent in a little over a decade. Where do you

get that figure from? Where is that? Is that being seriously considered by our negotiators, requiring a response like that?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Dr. Yellen used as the period 2010 to return to the

1990 levels. In the State Department’s report on the voluntary programs, they talk about a 25 or 26 percent reduction. All the independent economic analyses that have been done on the subject assume that the most benign thing that’s being considered, that

might be agreed to, is returning to the 1990 levels by 2010.

The best estimate is that we would have to suppress, reduce energy consumption of fossil fuels by at least 25 percent below the

level being estimated today by the Energy Information Administration.

Senator CHAFEE. From where we’d otherwise be?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes.
235

Senator CHAFEE. Even though that might be more than the 1990

level?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Oh, it will be. We don’t have the technology to

make that kind of reduction in that short a time period—13 years.

I think that Mr. Fay has made the same point.

We need a process that is predictable, that is realistic. The Administration analysis is based on a trading program and some new

technology. The technology hasn’t been identified and other countries have rejected the trading scheme and many economists believe that it’s not feasible. Quite simply, other nations will not

agree to it.

Certainly, if it was going to be in place, it’s going to take a long

time to get an agreement. So it might be better in Kyoto to try and

agree on a framework that all nations would embrace and then, at

a future conference, decide what the target is and the time period

for achieving it.

Senator CHAFEE. As I understand what both of you are saying,

both of you recognize that there is a problem there and it’s what

to do about it where the contention comes. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. O’KEEFE. I think that there is a risk. I think there is legitimate scientific dispute over the problem and the hearing you had

last week demonstrated that. The last page in Chapter 8 of the

IPCC report, around page 439, makes it clear that there is not a

scientific consensus that we have a problem. But that’s not an excuse for inaction.

There is a potential risk and there is uncertainty and the uncertainty goes both ways. Given the uncertainty and the potential risk

if we guess wrong, there is certainly a need for prudent action, but

the people who have also studied this say we do have time to do

it right. We do not face an imminent catastrophe that justifies the

kind of crash program to reduce energy use that’s being considered

by the negotiators.

Senator CHAFEE. The problem we have with that is, and we encounter this all the time. I’m on the Finance Committee and we’re

dealing there with Medicare and we have come up with a proposal

that eligibility age for Medicare be increased to 67 to correspond

with the eligibility age for social security.

There is great objection to that from many saying no, no, no and

we’re doing it because there is a real problem out there with the

future of Medicare. So those like myself who are proponents for

doing something say there’s always an excuse to wait and delay

things and it’s always attractive to postpone it. It seems to me

there is a similar situation here.

I hardly think we’ve rushed into this, but your feeling is, I think

you just said, let’s wait and do it right. Who knows what right is?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Let me be clear. I’m not saying we should do nothing. There are hundreds of companies that are participating in the

voluntary programs. The petroleum industry, which I also represent, is spending over $10 billion a year on achieving environmental objectives. There is a lot of progress being made. It’s not

whether we act; it’s the rate at which we force actions to be taken

and the consequences of those.

By taking the time to do it right, and by that I mean the time

to turn over the capital stock, get new plants and equipment in op-
236

eration; and incentives to accelerate our improvement of energy efficiency. We’ve reduced the energy component per dollar of GDP

over the past two decades by 30 percent. Incentives to continue

that. And to take our technology and get it in the hands of other

nations all take time.

Senator CHAFEE. What are the incentives now? You must be

doing it. Your companies aren’t doing it because they’re worrying

about global warming; they must be doing it because being more

fuel efficient saves them money. Hopefully that is an incentive.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, they learn with new knowledge. We find

there are better ways to do it and people take into account potential changes in law and regulation and knowledge. I can’t tell you

what component of the decision may take into account climate

change, but certainly the possibility is taken into decisions when

you’re making capital investments that will last 20 or 30 years.

Mr. FAY. I think that our companies do also take into account the

environmental issues as well, Senator. Our problem is not so much

that we’ve rushed into this that all of a sudden we have these negotiations; our biggest problem I think is that we’re 5 months from

the supposed deadline and we have some fairly basic issues that

this Administration either hasn’t talked to us about or hasn’t made

their own decisions on.

They’ve come in now after promising for a year this economic

analysis and they’ve come back and said, it’s hard. Well, we know

it’s hard. We have to make hard decisions every day in the private

sector.

We need to know what basis are they going to use then to make

their decisions. We think it’s still possible to achieve a treaty in December, but it’s getting harder and harder as the time grows shorter. We don’t think a 2-day White House conference is going to help

all of a sudden produce the magic answers of what we’re going to

do on climate change.

Mr. O’KEEFE. It also doesn’t help the Senate that has to participate in the advice and consent process.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you both very much for coming. Your

testimony was very helpful and we appreciate you being here.

That concludes the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the chair.]

[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]

STATEMENT OF JANET YELLEN, CHAIR, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the economics of global climate change.

INTRODUCTION

In his speech to the United Nations Special Session on Environment and Development in June, President Clinton emphasized that the risks posed by global climate

change are real and that sensible preventive steps are justified. This assessment accords with the views of the more than 2,300 economists, including 8 Nobel laureates, who signed a statement supporting measures to reduce the threat of climate

change. The economists endorsed the conclusions from last year’s report by the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which said that governments

should take steps to reduce the threat of damage from global warming, and went

on to argue that market-based policies can slow climate change without harming the

American economy.
237

At this time the Administration has not settled on a particular set of new policies

to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, the President indicated in his U.N.

speech that he intends to engage in a discussion with all interested parties about

the problems posed by greenhouse gas accumulations and the costs and benefits of

corrective action. To this end, the President will hold a White House conference on

climate change later this year, and members of his Cabinet and other senior Administration officials will meet with Members of Congress, scientific and economic experts, environmentalists, local government officials, and business and labor leaders

on a regular basis over the next several months to discuss issues related to climate

change. This process is intended to inform the Administration’s decisionmaking

process, which will culminate in a U.S. policy position in the international negotiations in Kyoto in December of this year.

An important step in this—and any—policy process is determining the impact it

will have on the American economy. President Clinton’s top priority, since his first

days in office, has been revitalizing the U.S. economy, creating jobs and investing

in people and technology to enhance long-term growth. And, we have made tremendous progress. The President is not going to jeopardize that progress. Any policy he

ultimately endorses on climate change will be informed by his commitment to sustaining a healthy and robust economy.

In my testimony today, I would like to describe some of the principal lessons that

emerge from the voluminous literature, much of it relatively recent, on the economic

impacts of policies to address global climate change.

UNDERLYING UNCERTAINTIES

Before I begin my discussion of the economic literature, I would like first to acknowledge the uncertainties associated with estimating both the costs and benefits

of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. To provide some perspective: as you all know,

it is difficult to gauge exactly what impact the balanced budget agreement will have

on the U.S. economy’s growth rate, levels of employment, interest rates and consumption over the next 5 years. But with global climate change, it is orders of magnitude more difficult to gauge the effects on the economy: we are concerned with

not just the next 5 years and not just the American economy, but, rather, we are

dealing with economic and physical processes that operate globally and over decades, if not centuries.

Although a great many scientists believe that global climate change is already underway, the more serious potential damages associated with increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases are not predicted to occur for decades. This means that

the benefits of climate protection are very difficult to quantify. And, while the potential costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions may be more immediate, they too,

as I will discuss below, are difficult to predict with any certainty. Many unanswered

questions exist about the biophysical systems, potential thresholds, and economic

impacts. In short, if anybody tells you that he or she has the definitive answer as

to the costs and benefits of particular climate change policies, I would suggest that

you raise your collective eyebrows.

LESSONS FROM THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE

Let me now turn to the economic literature and try to summarize what I think

we know so far about this difficult topic. Most economists have not addressed the

benefits of climate protection, but rather have focused on the costs associated with

alternative paths for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The economic literature includes estimates using many different models to evaluate numerous alternative

emission reduction strategies. In fact, because there are so many different models,

economists initially faced difficulties in comparing results: they could not sort out

the extent to which differences in results stemmed from differences in models and

assumptions versus differences in baseline emission paths and policies. To solve this

problem, thereby enabling meaningful comparisons, many economists have calibrated the various models by performing a standardized simulation. Specifically,

they have assessed the consequences of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at 1990

levels by 2010 or 2020.

Within the Administration, a staff level working group—the Interagency Analysis

Team (IAT)—has attempted to estimate some of the economic implications of climate change policies. They took the emissions scenario most often used in academic

literature—that is, stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by 2010—as the starting

point for their own analysis. I would emphasize that this scenario is not Administration policy; instead, it was picked to make comparisons with other models easier.

The staff group employed 3 different models—the DRI model, the Second Generation

Model (SGM) and Markal-Macro model, all commonly available in the public sphere.
238

In running these models, the staff adopted a common baseline and, to the—maximum extent possible, similar economic assumptions. This modeling effort produced

some useful lessons, but as we found from the peer reviewers’ comments, it also suffered from some serious shortcomings. Both the lessons and the shortcomings point

to one clear conclusion: the effort to develop a model or set of models that can give

us a definitive answer as to the economic impacts of a given climate change policy

is futile. Rather, we are left with a set of parameters and relationships that influence estimates of the impacts. In my view, it is more productive to employ a broad

set of economic tools to analyze policy options than to seek to develop a single definitive model.

I understand that a draft of the staff analysis was given to the committee earlier

this week, along with the reviewers’ comments. I would be happy to answer any

questions you may have about this modeling effort.

The Lessons

Modeling efforts both inside and outside the Administration clearly indicate that

economic analysis can do no more than estimate a range of potential impacts from

particular policies and highlight how outcomes depend on underlying assumptions

about how the economy works and the ways in which policy is implemented. However, the economics literature on climate change does point to several important lessons:

How the economy works

First, the magnitude of the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the various models depends crucially on a number of key assumptions about how the economy works. For instance: • If firms in the economy can shift from high-carbon to low-carbon energy sources

quickly, the costs of climate protection will be lower. • If the economy has significant opportunities, even now, to employ energy-saving

technology at low costs, the costs of climate protection will be lower. • If technological change occurs at a rapid rate, or is highly responsive to increases in the price of carbon emissions, the costs of climate protection will be reduced. • If the Federal Reserve pursues a monetary policy oriented toward keeping the

economy at full employment, transitional output costs will be lower.

In short, the greater the substitution possibilities and the faster the economy can

adapt, the lower the costs.

How the plan is implemented

Second, costs depend critically on how emission reduction policies are implemented. It boils down to this: if we do it dumb, it could cost a lot, but if we do it

smart, it will cost much less and indeed could produce net benefits in the long run.

The over 2,300 signatories of the economists’ statement argued that any global climate change policy should be rely on market-based mechanisms. Such mechanisms

allow for flexibility in both the timing and location of emission reductions, thereby

minimizing the costs to the U.S. economy. The economists concluded that ‘‘there are

policy options that would slow climate change without harming American living

standards, and these measures may in fact improve U.S. productivity in the longer

run.’’ • The speed at which emissions reductions are required can have large effects on

the estimated costs. It is important to allow sufficient lead-time for orderly investment in new equipment and technology. Alternatively, if emission reduction requirements are too far off in the future, the incentives to adopt energy efficient technologies are weakened because people may not view the policy as credible. • A ‘‘cap and trade’’ system in which emission permits are issued and then traded

among firms can substantially reduce the cost of meeting an emissions target by

creating incentives for emissions to be reduced by those firms and in those activities

where costs are lowest. • International emission permit trading substantially lowers costs by applying the

same cost-minimizing principle globally. • So-called ‘‘banking’’ and ‘‘borrowing’’ of permits increases flexibility and lowers

costs by allowing firms to change the timing of their emission reductions. • Joint implementation, whereby U.S. firms would receive credit for undertaking

emission reductions in countries with low abatement costs, would also lower the domestic burden.

An additional aspect of implementation that profoundly affects the costs of reducing emissions concerns ‘‘revenue recycling.’’ In many model simulations, emissions

are reduced by using various market mechanisms. For many of these scenarios, the

Federal Government realizes an increase in revenues. Economic growth can receive
239

a long-term boost if these revenues are used to reduce distortionary taxes that diminish the incentives to invest, save or work, or if the revenues are channeled into

deficit reduction, thereby lowering interest rates and boosting investment. In fact,

in some models and scenarios, emissions reduction generates a net economic benefit

when the revenues are recycled in a growth-promoting fashion.

Which countries participate

The third lesson that emerges from a study of the economics of climate protection

is that developing, as well as developed, countries must be part of the process. While

developed countries are responsible for most of the greenhouse gas currently in the

atmosphere, developing countries are starting to catch up. By 2040, the largest fraction of emissions is estimated to come from developing countries. Thus, any comprehensive plan to deal with this global problem must include a mechanism to bring

developing countries into the process.

The timetable for the inclusion of developing countries is also important. The

sooner that developing countries face incentives to move away from carbon intensive

energy sources, the less likely it is that they will become dependent on those types

of fuels to spur their economic growth. In short, global problems require global solutions. We must find the technologies and solutions to lead the way.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude. Policies to promote economic growth, create jobs, and improve

the living standards and opportunities of all Americans have been and always will

remain the top priority of the President and his Administration. In his remarks to

the Business Roundtable on global climate change, the President said ‘‘[l]et’s find

a way to preserve the environment, to meet our international responsibilities, to

meet our responsibilities to our children, and grow the economy at the same time.’’

Some of the key economic lessons we have learned that will help us achieve the

President’s goal include: • Inherent uncertainty dictates that models should be expected to generate only

a range of economic impacts, not definitive answers. • Key assumptions about how the economy works directly influence the estimated

costs of climate protection. • Implementation of any policy needs to be market-based and flexible over time

and space to achieve the lowest cost reductions. • All nations, both developed and developing, need to participate.

Thank you I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

RESPONSES BY JANET YELLEN TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CHAFEE

Question 1. Dr. Yellen, you indicate at the beginning of your testimony that the

Administration, ‘‘has not settled on a particular set of new policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.’’ We are now 20 weeks away from Kyoto. When will it? Is there

still time for informed public review and debate on the options?

Answer. The President, Members of the Cabinet and Senior White House officials

have been meeting with a wide range of parties interested in the issue of global climate change. We have been consulting with representatives from business and

labor, environmental groups, scientists, economists and others about the best, most

cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. On October 6, the White

House will hold a conference to discuss the scientific evidence, the economic impact

and the international implications of global climate change. These discussions are

intended to inform the Administration’s decisionmaking process, which will culminate in a U.S. policy position for the international negotiations in Kyoto in December of this year.

With the lessons we have learned so far, the Administration has established a

broad framework within which this policy position will be developed. For example,

we support the use of flexible approaches, such as international emissions trading.

We support the requirement that non-Annex I countries, as they become wealthier,

abide by binding emissions goals that are formulated in international treaty negotiations. And, for domestic implementation, we support the use of flexible, market

based approaches.

Question 2. You also say in your prepared remarks that, ‘‘the effort to develop a

model or set of models that can give us a definite answer to the economic impacts

of a given climate change policy is futile.’’ How are we to respond? What reliable

tools do we have to determine what, if any, agreement is best for the United States?

Answer. No one model, or even a small set of models, can give a definite estimate

of the effects of a policy on the economy 20 or 30 years into the future. The existence
240

of modeling difficulties does not mean, however, that we can abandon rigorous economic analysis. Rather, we must employ a broad set of economic tools, and incorporate insights from the existing body of research on climate change policies, as we

analyze the policy options. Some of these may have strengths on issues where the

models used in the Interagency Analytical Team (IAT) analysis were weak.

Drawing on this broad array of analytic tools allows an intelligent evaluation of

policy alternatives. I am confident that the analytic tools and perspectives available

to the Administration can provide us with sufficient information to generate ranges

of estimated economic effects so that the Administration can make informed policy

decisions.

Question 3. Is the Administration considering some form of new energy tax to administer a new treaty, domestically?

Answer. At this time, the Administration has not settled on a particular set of

policies. The Administration is considering an array of market-based approaches to

implement climate policy.

Question 4. What advantages or disadvantages (economically or environmentally)

might a trading system have over energy taxes?

Answer. Tradeable emissions permits would provide greater certainty than energy

taxes of attaining a specified emissions cap. By specifying a number of permits and

allowing firms to trade these permits, the country can ensure that it is meeting an

agreed upon carbon emissions goal. A tax, on the other hand, would provide greater

certainty than a cap-and-trade approach of limiting costs, since the increase in unit

costs would be determined by the tax. Taxes and permits may also differ in their

administrative and transactions costs and ease of enforcement, particularly depending on how a permit trading system is implemented.

Question 5. In order to use flexibility instruments like the proposed joint implementation and emissions trading, do we need to have a cap on nations’ emissions?

To what extent can these instruments reduce the cost of implementation of greenhouse gas emissions reductions for the United States and others? Is there reliable

data available?

Answer. For international emissions trading, all countries participating in the

trading scheme will need to have their emissions capped. For joint implementation,

all countries can participate, regardless of whether their emissions are capped. However, it will be necessary to set standards for approving joint implementation

projects sufficient to ensure that the credit received by U.S. companies actually results in incremental abatement activities abroad.

International permit trading allows emission reductions to occur in areas where

the costs of those reductions are lowest. If some of the emissions reductions necessary to achieve the U.S. goal can be undertaken in other countries at lower costs,

then U.S. emissions control costs will fall, by some estimates as much as two-thirds.

While every country is better off when it can voluntarily buy or sell permits according to its respective emissions reduction costs, the ultimate permit price and traded

quantities depend heavily on the degree of participation by developing countries and

economic growth in Russia and Eastern Europe.

Question 6. Some have argued that innovation toward less greenhouse-intensive

technologies will occur in the absence of any market signal. Do you agree? Why or

why not? If a market signal is needed, how should it be provided?

Answer. Some shift toward a less energy-intensive economy occurs in the absence

of deliberate government influences on price, some believe because of the changing

composition of the U.S. economy toward less energy-intensive sectors. Many studies

suggest that energy use relative to GDP falls each year, regardless of the price signal, by 0.5 to 1.25 percent. To the extent that energy use is associated with climate

change effects, and in turn causes damages not reflected in market prices, the business-as-usual decline in energy use relative to GDP is unlikely to be sufficient. Additional incentives to innovation, such as price signals or support for R&D may be

needed.

Question 7. Many are concerned that caps on industrialized nations’ emissions,

without similar caps on developing nations’ emissions, will simply promote the flight

of jobs, capital, and polluting activity to developing nations. Is this a valid concern?

How should it be addressed? Would joint implementation help?

Answer. Certainly the participation of developing countries is key to the long term

success and cost-effectiveness of a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. In

the next century, developing countries will likely reach and surpass currently developed countries in their share of global emissions. Any emissions reductions that

Annex I countries achieve can be undone by others who do not so carefully address
241

the problem. In addition, the important opportunities for low cost reductions created

by developing countries’ participation could reduce the overall cost of achieving a

given environmental goal by more than a half by some estimates.

Some observers of the climate change issue have suggested that capping only developed countries’ emission will result in ‘‘leakage’’: the escape of jobs, capital, and

polluting activity to developing countries. Even if caps are not initially placed on

developing countries’ emissions, the economic evidence does not support the argument that sensible climate policies will adversely affect overall U.S. economic competitiveness.

First, non-tradeable sectors account for a substantial share of carbon emissions.

Transportation and residential and commercial buildings account for approximately

two-thirds of U.S. carbon emissions. For these sectors, the ‘‘competitiveness’’ argument does not appear applicable. Second, energy costs comprise only a small percentage of total manufacturing costs. According to the 1995 Annual Census of Manufactures, energy costs for manufacturing industries averaged just 2.2 percent of

total costs. Given the small share of energy in total costs, differential shifts in existing energy prices are unlikely to have substantial effects on location decisions and

trade flows. Third, our experience in this country with environmental regulation has

been that it does not cause significant leakage. Firms that decide to relocate to

other countries do so because of international differences in input costs and exchange rate changes that all swamp the costs of complying with environmental regulations.

RESPONSES BY JANET YELLEN TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. In the Administration’s economic analysis, it is stated that, ‘‘There is

no evidence of a wholesale ‘capital flight’ from the United States resulting from an

emissions reduction policy.’’ Can you please expand on this?

Answer. Certainly the participation of developing countries is key to the long term

success and cost-effectiveness of a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. In

the next century, developing countries will likely reach and surpass currently developed countries in their share of global emissions. Any emissions reductions that

Annex I countries achieve can be undone by others who do not so carefully address

the problem. In addition, the important opportunities for low cost reductions created

by developing countries’ participation could reduce the overall cost of achieving a

given environmental goal by more than a half by some estimates.

Some observers of the climate change issue have suggested that capping only developed countries’ emission will result in ‘‘leakage’’: the escape of jobs, capital, and

polluting activity to developing countries. Even if caps are not initially placed on

developing countries’ emissions, the economic evidence does not support the argument that climate policy will adversely affect overall U.S. economic competitiveness.

First, non-tradeable sectors account for a substantial share of carbon emissions.

Transportation and residential and commercial buildings account for approximately

two- thirds of U.S. carbon emissions. For these sectors, the ‘‘competitiveness’’ argument does not appear applicable. Second, energy costs comprise only a small percentage of total manufacturing costs. According to the 1995 Annual Census of Manufactures, energy costs for manufacturing industries averaged just 2.2 percent of

total costs. Given the small share of energy in total costs, differential shifts in existing energy prices are unlikely to have substantial effects on location decisions and

trade flows. Third, our experience in this country with environmental regulation has

been that it does not cause significant leakage. Firms that decide to relocate to

other countries do so because of international differences in input costs and exchange rate changes that all swamp the costs of complying with environmental regulations.

Question 2. The United States has far lower energy costs than Europe and Japan.

How would our costs of emission reductions compare with theirs? How would this

affect our ability to compete?

Answer. The costs of reducing emissions in the United States, and in Europe and

Japan, depend on how all of these countries implement their policies. If the United

States employs a market-based approach, the costs will not be that high relative to

Europe and Japan. Regardless of the implementation approaches used in these

countries, the costs of emissions reductions are not likely to affect U.S. competitiveness. As noted above, energy costs comprise a small share of total manufacturing

costs (2.2 percent). Further, two-thirds of carbon emissions occur in non-tradeable

sectors. The evidence on energy price differentials across countries suggests that

they are not sufficient to spur firm relocation to other countries.
242

Several analyses indicate that Western Europe will bear higher costs for reducing

carbon emissions than will the United States. Western Europe already has high energy taxes relative to the United States, and has already ‘‘backed out’’ of fossil fuel

use to varying degrees. This implies that a lot of the less expensive measures for

reducing carbon reductions have already occurred in Europe, so that the United

States has relatively more opportunities to inexpensively cut carbon emissions. For

example, 20 percent of all energy in France, and a majority of its electricity production, is from nuclear power, while only 7 percent is from coal. Since nuclear is not

carbon-based, France cannot further reduce carbon emissions from that energy

source, and can achieve relatively limited emissions reductions from its low use of

coal. In contrast, in the United States nuclear power comprises only 9 percent of

total energy production, while coal comprises 23 percent.

Question 3. Dr. Yellen, we have heard horror stories of all the catastrophic economic effects that embarking on a policy of reducing greenhouse gas emissions

would cause. Did the administration’s analysis consider the positive effects on

health, environment, AND the economy that reducing greenhouse gases would

produce?

Answer. The IAT report did not assess the human health and environmental benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, the IAT did not study the

risks of effects of climate change on economic activity. However, the report did assess the impacts of climate policy on the economy. The IAT analysis confirms other

economic research (for example, the recent report by the World Resources Institute)

that smart climate policy could produce some benefits for the economy. For example,

the IAT analysis found that auctioning off tradeable permits and using the proceeds

of the auction to reduce other taxes that distort work and savings decisions could

produce economic benefits that offset the costs of meeting a climate change goal.

Question 4. We heard last week that the longer we wait to implement our reductions, the more costly it will be in practically all sectors—health, environment, and

jobs. This reminds me of the commercial where the grizzled mechanic says, ‘‘You

can pay me now, or you can pay me later.’’ What did your analysis find in terms

of the costs of delaying action?

Answer. We believe it is important to take early, credible action toward a long

term strategy to control greenhouse gas emissions. More gradual efforts to reduce

our carbon emissions can significantly lower the economic costs relative to very aggressive reductions efforts while still achieving the same carbon dioxide concentration goal. For example, some international proposals to reduce carbon emissions

would have Annex I countries cutting emissions to 20 percent below 1990 levels by

2005. Such a target and timetable would have very substantial economic costs because it does not provide enough time for the capital stock to turn over. It is very

expensive to prematurely scrap the existing capital stock while much of it is in the

prime of its life. Further, such a goal would require the economy to employ existing

low-carbon and carbon-free technologies while longer-term reductions would provide

more lead time to develop and implement superior technologies. Given that it is the

stock of carbon dioxide, not the annual emissions of carbon dioxide, that drive global

warming, flexibility in the timing of emissions reductions can lower costs while not

undermining our commitment to achieving a given ultimate concentration.

Question 5. California has been a leader in development of new energy technologies. Based upon your analysis, what industries are likely to grow over the next

20–30 years?

Answer. It is very difficult to forecast the nature of the economy, especially specific industries, 20 or 30 years into the future. If the country embarked on a policy

of reducing carbon emissions, obviously the firms and industries that can creatively

and cost-effectively reduce their emissions will benefit relative to their competitors.

It is reasonable to envision that the products and services of industries that develop

energy efficient technologies and industries that develop low-carbon based energy

(such as renewable energy sources including wind, solar, and biomass) would be in

greater demand during a period of reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.

RESPONSES BY JANET YELLEN TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Question 1. Congressman Dingell suggested on 6/19/97 that the Administration’s

analysis is ‘‘too late to inform the process, and likely will be used to justify what

the Administration has already decided to do.’’ Please comment on his concerns.

Answer. The Administration’s analysis on the issue of climate policy has not occurred in a vacuum. In fact, climate change has been one of the more active areas

of research in economics this decade. The economic literature on climate change,
243

complemented by the IAT report, has already done quite a lot to inform the policy

development process. Based on the economic research, we have identified some of

the important characteristics of the climate policy we will develop: international

emissions trading, developing country participation, emissions budgets, and marketbased, flexible domestic implementation. My interpretation of the role of economics

differs—I believe economics has informed the process, and I am confident that it will

continue to play an important role in our country’s deliberations over a climate policy position.

Question 2. If the economic impacts of climate policies cannot be determined precisely, how will the economic analysis be used to develop the Administration’s specific positions on a target and a timetable? Can the relative costs of different policies

be evaluated with confidence by the Interagency Team?

Answer. No one model, or even a small set of models, can give a definite estimate

of the effects of a policy on the economy 20 or 30 years into the future. The existence

of modeling difficulties does not mean that we can abandon rigorous economic analysis. Rather, we must employ a broad set of economic tools and incorporate insights

from the existing body of research on climate change policies, as we analyze the policy options. Some of these may have strengths on issues where the models used in

the Interagency Analytical Team (IAT) analysis were weak.

Drawing on this broad array of analytic tools allows an intelligent evaluation of

policy alternatives. I am confident that the analytic tools and perspectives available

to the Administration can provide us with sufficient information to generate ranges

of estimated economic effects so that the Administration can make informed policy

decisions.

STATEMENT OF THE TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR

GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Chairman Chafee and members of the committee, I am pleased to be with you

today to discuss the ongoing negotiations toward next steps under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. These negotiations began in August 1995 and are scheduled to end in December, at the Third Conference of the

Parties in Kyoto, Japan, with the adoption of a new protocol or other legal instrument.

In his address last month to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session, President Clinton noted that ‘‘[t]he science is clear and compelling’’ and committed the United States to strong leadership on climate change. The President

committed himself to engage the American people and the Congress in a dialog to

explain the real and imminent threats from climate change, the economic costs and

benefits involved, and the opportunities that American technology and innovation

can provide. The President also committed to ‘‘bring to the Kyoto conference a

strong American commitment to realistic and binding limits that will significantly

reduce our emissions of greenhouse gases.’’

In recent weeks, interest in the negotiations has intensified, particularly in the

Congress. The Administration welcomes this interest, wants to encourage the broadest possible dialog as we work toward a new agreement in Kyoto, and urges the

Senate and House leadership to establish observer groups with whom we can work

even more closely in the weeks and months ahead.

I would like today to focus on two concerns—first, how the actions we are negotiating under the Climate Convention correspond to a specific environmental objective; and second, the need for developing nations to acknowledge more fully their

role in meeting that objective.

I would like to begin with the science, because scientists were the ones who drew

our attention to climate change in the first place, and because we continue to base

our policies on the best evidence and the most rigorous scientific analysis available.

While I know many of you are aware of the basic facts, I think it may be useful

to reiterate a few of the most crucial points that the scientific community has established.

The ‘‘greenhouse effect’’ is caused by gases such as carbon dioxide, methane and

nitrous oxide, which accumulate in the atmosphere and trap solar radiation, thus

making the planet warmer than it otherwise would be. The natural levels or concentrations of these greenhouse gases in the atmosphere keep temperatures within

a range that can support life. Without the background level of greenhouse gases in

our atmosphere, the earth’s temperature would be about 33 degrees Celsius cooler.

Human beings increase the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere

primarily by the burning of fossil fuels—coal, oil and natural gas—and through a

number of other industrial processes. Changing land use patterns, particularly de-
244

forestation and soil erosion, also play a role, by reducing the capacity of the natural

environment to absorb carbon from the atmosphere. Since the industrial revolution

in the 18th century, the concentration in the atmosphere of carbon dioxide has risen

30 percent; during the same period, methane concentrations have doubled, and nitrous oxide concentrations have risen by about 15 percent.

Since pre-industrial times, the Earth has warmed about one degree Fahrenheit.

Scientists believe that the observed increase is unlikely to be entirely natural in origin. In its most recent scientific assessment, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that the balance of evidence suggests ‘‘a discernible

human influence on the climate system.’’

Projections of future climate change, based on complex climate models and on our

best understanding of the physics of the climate system, suggest a rise of another

2 to 6.5 degrees Fahrenheit by 2100, with an average increase greater than any

seen in the last 10,000 years. This warming will not be uniform—it is likely to be

greater at higher latitudes and at the poles.

Based on these warming trends, sea level is projected to rise an additional 1.5

feet by 2100 due to thermal expansion of the oceans and to the melting of glaciers

and ice sheets. This would, without adoptive measures, flood 9,000 square miles of

coastal areas here in the United States, notably in Florida and Louisiana, and put

about 100 million people worldwide at risk each year from storm surges.

In other words, the path we are on is cause for significant concern. Climate

change is likely to have wide-ranging and mostly adverse effects on human health.

Both natural and managed ecosystems are at risk. The viability and location of forest and agricultural zones will change significantly.

Moreover, virtually all the studies on the effects of climate disruption have focused on predicted doubling of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. But

unless significant actions are taken early in the next century, it is very likely that

atmospheric concentrations will, by the year 2100, nearly triple the pre-industrial

level and rise higher than any point in the last 50 million years. Changes to our

climate system would also continue beyond the effects that the current studies predict; the risks would increase dramatically as concentrations continue to rise. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that these additional effects would be linear; they

would most likely take unpredictable and highly undesirable paths.

Let me now move on to the division of responsibilities between developed and developing countries.

As I noted earlier, we know that man-made emissions have increased the concentration by about 30 percent, from 280 parts per million in pre-industrial times

to around 366 ppm today. We know that the industrialized countries have put most

of the carbon into the atmosphere, and that CO2 lingers there for 100 to 150 years.

We know that the United States is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases; we have

4 percent of the world’s population and contribute 22 percent of the carbon. We also

know that, given current trends, the developing world will pass the developed world

as an emitter in about 30 years. (At that point, the developing world will have about

70 percent of the world’s population.) China, with its 1.2 billion people, will probably

pass the United States toward the end of the first quarter of that century.

So action by industrialized nations alone will not put us on the road to safe concentrations of greenhouse gases; we need action by the developing countries as well.

But it is very clear from all our discussions and negotiations to date that if the developed countries, with our current economic capacity, technical capability, and energy intensive life-style, don’t go first—setting the example and reducing emissions—then developing countries will not act either. We must lead the way. And we

must move soon. If not, a doubling of concentrations becomes certain, and we put

ourselves on the road to a tripling or even higher levels of concentrations—the consequences of which are uncertain but likely to be catastrophic.

In 1992, the world community adopted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in an effort to begin coming to grips with this environmental threat. Under the Convention, developing nations agreed to take a variety

of actions to mitigate climate and to facilitate adaptation to it’s consequences. Industrialized nations agreed to take the same actions, but in addition, they agreed to

take steps aimed at returning their emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by

the year 2000.

In 1995, the Parties to the Climate Convention decided the existing treaty commitments were not adequate to address the threat. Accordingly, they agreed to

begin a process to negotiate next steps. Since the ‘‘aim’’ set for industrialized nations

expires in the year 2000, they began to consider the goals that should guide their

efforts in the decade or two after the year 2000. Industrialized nations agreed to

establish quantified targets to limit and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions over

yet-to-be-determined time periods—such as 2005, 2010 or 2020. At that time, devel-
245

oping nations, many of whom had only begun to implement their existing commitments under the Convention, argued strenuously that the negotiating process

should not result in new commitments for them. They agreed, however, to continue

to advance the implementation of their existing commitments.

The U.S. proposals in the current negotiations attempt to move the process. The

U.S. proposal acknowledges that the list of ‘‘developed country Parties’’ established

by the Convention’s Annex I in 1992 no longer reflects current realities. A number

of developing countries have joined the ranks of the developed world, through membership in the OECD and in other ways, and more are poised to do so. Our proposal

to establish an ‘‘Annex B’’ would enable such countries, on a voluntary basis, to

move beyond their current non-Annex I status, and take on binding greenhouse gas

emissions obligations, reflecting their rapidly changing economic status, and enabling them to engage in emissions trading with industrialized nations.

Similarly, Article 16 of the U.S. proposal calls on developing country Parties to

adopt, by 2005, binding provisions so that all Parties have quantitative greenhouse

gas emissions obligations and so that there is a mechanism or ‘‘trigger’’ for automatic application of those obligations, based on agreed criteria.

In urging this policy of ‘‘evolution,’’ the United States is far out in front of almost

all other countries, and we are being criticized accordingly. For example, several developed countries believe that our proposal imposes unfair burdens on developing

countries. Most countries in the developing world believe that ‘‘evolution’’ goes beyond the scope of the Climate Convention and the Berlin Mandate. We think we

have the concept about right: no one should be exempt; we emit the most, so we

have to act first; but others have to phase in over time.

The overall negotiation on climate change is extremely complex—the most complex I have seen in 25 years of public life (including 12 years on this challenging

committee!)—and the ‘‘evolution’’ aspect is perhaps the most important of all. We

have put forward some proposals; some in Congress have as well. Now we have to

hammer out a final proposal and negotiating position. We welcome your input, support and creativity as we work to solve this problem, and I look forward to hearing

your ideas, questions and comments today.

The issue is not whether developing countries, especially the big and rapidly developing ones, take on quantified commitments to limit or reduce their emissions

of greenhouse gases clearly, it will be impossible to abate the threat of climate

change unless they do. The issue is when such commitments should begin, and what

criteria should be used to establish them, and to whom they would apply.

There are significant disparities in national income between those in industrialized nations and those in developing nations. There are enormous differences in

per capita levels of greenhouse gas emissions. Some developing countries argue that

these gaps must narrow before they will accept quantified emissions limitation or

reduction commitments.

While this argument is understandable, it misses two key points. First, the environmental threat posed by global climate change cannot be averted if nations wait

to act until levels of national income or per capita emissions converge at some theoretical point in the future. Second, industrialized nations simply will not make significant efforts to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions if their efforts will be undermined by an unlimited increase in emissions from the developing world.

The Framework Convention, which President Bush signed and to which the Senate overwhelmingly gave its advice and consent, established the principle that, with

respect to climate change, the world’s nations have common but differentiated responsibilities and varying capabilities. Insisting that developing nations immediately accept binding emissions targets that industrialized nations are seeking to

negotiate for themselves is neither realistic nor consistent with the Convention approved by the Senate. But insisting that those developing nations now responsible

for a growing share of global greenhouse gas emissions should have no further obligations to act until they have crossed some threshold of national income or emissions on a per capita basis is equally unrealistic and inconsistent with the Convention’s ultimate objective.

The agreement reached in Kyoto will not solve the problem of global climate

change. No matter how ambitious, it will represent only a second step along the

much longer path toward achieving the Climate Convention’s ultimate objective. As

we prepare for Kyoto, we must also prepare for further steps beyond it. In particular, we must ensure that all nations responsible for a significant share of current

global greenhouse gas emissions accept the need to limit or reduce their emissions,

and that they begin to move in that direction.

What a Kyoto agreement can do is provide nations with the tools they will need

to achieve to achieve significant, binding greenhouse gas limitation and reduction

commitments. These tools include greenhouse gas emissions budgets over multiyear
246

budget periods that will help smooth out annual fluctuations. They include full national flexibility in the choice of policies and measures to meet such binding emissions budgets. They include emissions trading among nations with binding emissions budgets, with the participation of the private sector in the trading regime, to

help lower the costs of compliance. And they include joint implementation for credit

between nations with binding emissions budgets and those that do not yet have

such budgets both to lower the costs of compliance and to promote economic development and environmental protection.

Mr. Chairman, we have indeed charted an ambitious course for the months ahead.

The tremendous risks to our planet demand nothing less. With your continued support and the support of other Members of Congress, I am confident that we will obtain an outcome in Kyoto that will represent a significant step forward on the much

longer path toward safeguarding the Earth’s climate system for present and future

generations. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF KEVIN J. FAY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE

CHANGE PARTNERSHIP

Good Morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. My name is Kevin

Fay; and I serve as the Executive Director of the International Climate Change

Partnership (ICCP), a coalition of U.S. industry representatives and associations, as

well as international associations, interested in the policy development process with

respect to global climate change. We appreciate the opportunity to appear before the

committee today on the subject of a global climate change convention.

ICCP was organized in 1991 to provide a forum to address the issue of global climate change and to be a constructive participant in the policy debate. Five months

before the Third Conference of Parties meeting in Kyoto, the issue has certainly

raised the interest of many of us in the private sector and the Congress.

ICCP continues to recognize the climate change issue as an important matter

with which governments should be concerned. However, it is a very long-term issue

and extraordinarily complex in both its underlying science and its entanglement

with the very foundations of the global economic structure.

We have recently communicated our views on the key issues in the Kyoto negotiations to the Administration. I am attaching this correspondence to my testimony

and ask that it be included in the record. We have also communicated to the President on the issue of the Administration’s as yet unreleased economic analysis, expressing our frustration at their lack of communication on the matters of greatest

concern to the private sector—namely the potential economic impacts of a climate

change agreement and the current thinking of future implementation scenarios.

This letter is also attached.

Our views have been based on the premise that the only agreement that is acceptable is one that is comprehensive and can work with flexibility, maintain national

sovereignty, ensure participation by all countries, maintain a competitive level playing field, and is guided by effective science and includes a long-term objective that

will guide future policymakers and future negotiators.

You will note that in both letters, we urge the President and the State Department to reiterate to our negotiating partners that the U.S. policy framework enunciated last July is the only framework that can provide a climate change agreement

that is both environmentally beneficial and economically feasible.

Since prior to the first meeting of the parties in Berlin, we have consistently argued that the time is not yet right for a climate change agreement. Unfortunately,

the parties established an artificial deadline under the Berlin mandate to reach an

agreement by the third meeting of the parties, now scheduled to be held in December of this year.

In our view the Administration made progress in its own deliberations and offered

a thoughtful policy framework at the second meeting of the parties in 1996 which

we have heard about here today. This policy outline includes a comprehensive approach; identification of a long-term objective; identification of a developing country

role under the treaty; implementation flexibility through emissions trading, banking, and joint implementation; and avoidance of a laundry list of so-called ‘‘policies

& measures.’’

The U.S. framework also included a call for a binding commitment, which the Administration has subsequently defined as an emissions budget period of undetermined length to achieve reductions of an undetermined size. While most of the attention has been focused on this part of the discussions, we continue to believe that

it is not the only key to a successful treaty agreement in Kyoto or beyond Kyoto.
247

We should point out at this time, however, that we have been provided with no

analysis to justify any particular target or timetable that might be advocated.

Our primary concern has been that the result of the negotiations would focus on

only one or two of the key issues, some of which we have outlined in our letter, and

that the rest would be left until later. This would be unacceptable to us. This worst

result would be for the Administration to agree to some target and not achieve the

entire policy framework it has advocated.

An agreement on a target and timetable in Kyoto, and nothing else, would be unacceptable to the ICCP. An agreement in Kyoto on a target and timetable, including

a developing country schedule, but with none of the flexibility or other provisions

as articulated last year by the Administration, would be just as unacceptable.

To date, we have been disappointed in the progress on most of these fronts and

we are pessimistic on the ability to achieve them between now and Kyoto absent

strong signals by the White House to reinvigorate the negotiations. ICCP is not and

never has been interested in an agreement at the Kyoto meeting just for the sake

of reaching an agreement. This view will not change.

With respect to the economic issues and the impacts of a climate change agreement on the U.S. economy, jobs, and the environment we remain very concerned.

It is difficult to address this issue in any effective way given the lack of dialog on

these topics and the lack of information being provided by the Administration. We

know that the economic analysis that has been performed tells us several important

things:

• that there are costs involved in reducing greenhouse gas emissions;

• the costs are likely to be reduced if flexibility provisions are incorporated;

• that you cannot achieve any reasonable goals either environmentally or economically without developing country participation; and

• the costs are less if you avoid premature capital retirement or turnover, and

provide industry the opportunity to manage their way into the technological innovation that will be necessary to accomplish whatever long-term goal is established by

the parties to the convention.

It is difficult to know how the costs compare to the benefits because we have yet

to see any analysis that includes the benefits of mitigating climate change or facilitating adaptation strategies.

In order for there to be an effective treaty, we believe that the parties must first

get the treaty structure correct. We have a long way to go before that will happen.

In closing, I believe it is useful to look at previous examples for guidance that may

provide a better perspective than the intense pre-Kyoto focus. More than 12 years

ago, negotiators were struggling to complete the Vienna Convention for Protection

of the Ozone layer after more than 5 years of negotiation.

These negotiations had taken on a bitter tone as parties, including the United

States and European Union, tried to push for adoption of their own preferred policy

approach to dealing with ozone depleting compounds. Instead the parties agreed to

the convention and to establish a series of workshops and information gathering devises to better understand each other’s views.

When negotiations resumed, the parties were much better informed, and a treaty

structure was adopted that has since been proven very durable. The Montreal Protocol, signed in 1987, has proved much more effective than most of us thought possible

at the time.

We raise this example not because we believe the issues are identical. They are

not and climate change is far more complex. We raise it because as we reach a fevered pitch prior to Kyoto, we want to stress that an effective framework is what

counts, not an expedient framework.

A climate treaty needs to be durable for the next 100 years. Our companies have

determined that the current State of scientific understanding requires a prudent

long-term approach to address this issue. This view is equally applicable to the negotiations themselves.

We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and we look forward

to answering your questions.

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PARTNERSHIP,

June 6, 1997.

Hon. TIMOTHY WIRTH,

Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs,

Department of State, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. WIRTH: You have requested our views on specific issues under consideration as part of the negotiations on implementation of the Berlin Mandate for a pos-
248

sible protocol or other legal instrument to the Framework Convention on Climate

Change. We are pleased to provide these comments on specific issues of concern to

the members of the International Climate Change Partnership (ICCP) with respect

to the treaty negotiations. We are also writing, however, to express our concern with

the current lack of focus to the negotiations or linkage of these issues with the important relationship between the international treaty and domestic implementation

schemes.

ICCP continues to recognize the climate change issue as an important matter

with which governments should be concerned. However, it is a very long-term issue

and extraordinarily complex in both its underlying science and its inextricable entanglement with the very foundations of the global economic structure. We are concerned that this complexity is exposing an overly ambitious timeframe for current

negotiations and that the cohesive activity necessary to ensure a viable foundation

for future action under this important treaty simply has not come to be. It is equally

disturbing that there has been little public discussion of the economic impacts of the

range of climate change mitigation by any of the parties, including the United

States.

ICCP commended the U.S. position enunciated in its statement in July of last

year as a reasonable framework, and was particularly supportive of its efforts to

force into the negotiations greater focus on the long-term character of the issue and

its economic implications. However, we have made clear that our support is for the

entire framework, and not for individual components. Some have misconstrued this

position as support for early targets and timetables. It would be incorrect to read

our position as such. While ICCP members have recognized the possibility that negotiators would agree on a mid-term emissions target, we could not specifically support such a target given the current lack of understanding of the implications of

such a target or how it would be implemented.

In our view, the issue of a binding target is not the most critical element of the

negotiation. We view it more important to provide definition to the treaty structure

through a long-term objective and a mechanism to ensure that all parties, developed

and developing, have clearly defined roles before we enter into a binding commitment period. It is also important that the parties are able to achieve these goals

with flexibility through emissions trading, banking, and true joint implementation.

We appreciate that the United States has recognized this need for flexibility.

It is of great concern to us that little progress appears to have been made on

many of these issues concerning flexibility and the role of developing countries.

While the United States has elaborated its views on these positions in subsequent

statements and its protocol draft, we have detected little movement by the other

parties on these issues. Since we are not privy to your bi-lateral discussions or the

behind the scenes meetings, it is difficult for us to determine the current status of

these topics.

It is not acceptable to us for the negotiations to conclude in December with an

agreement on a binding commitment toward a mid-term target with all details on

other key provisions to be negotiated later.

As you recall, we have consistently expressed our view that 1997 is too soon for

a credible technical assessment process which would support an agreement by the

parties on these issues. The apparent lack of progress to date, the dearth of information available to us regarding how these issues may be resolved, and the failure to

thoroughly discuss the economic implications for an agreement, have only served to

confirm this view.

We have pledged to work responsibly with the United States and other parties

on the development of an effective framework to address the climate change issue

consistent with the need for all nations to sustain economic growth. We remain committed to this principle. It is not clear, however, that these issues can be resolved

satisfactorily by the Kyoto meeting. ICCP will, of course, reserve any judgment on

the results of Kyoto for the implementation process.

We urge the United States to remain focused on and committed to delivering concrete results on all the points outlined in the statement delivered last July and

elaborated on in its subsequent submittals. Further, we believe that the United

States should indicate its commitment to its proposed climate change policy structure at the upcoming meetings of the G–7 and the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the Environment.

Concurrently, we believe the economic impacts of a possible agreement should be

communicated with industry and other policymakers so we can have an effective dialog. Failure to discuss some of these issues in advance will make it extremely difficult to build support for ratification and implementation of the international agreement.
249

We look forward to working with you and appreciate the opportunity to discuss

the specific views on the attached position paper in the very near future.

Sincerely,

KEVIN J. FAY,

Executive Director.

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PARTNERSHIP,

June 6, 1997.

President WILLIAM CLINTON,

The White House, Washington, DC.

Dear MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the International Climate Change Partnership,

I am writing to express our concern for the status of the economic analysis for purposes of the international negotiations on climate change and the apparent lack of

progress in making the economic issues an integral part of these negotiations. The

ICCP is a coalition of companies and industries around the world committed to responsible participation in the climate change policy process.

ICCP continues to recognize the climate change issue as an important issue with

which governments should be concerned. However, it is a very long-term issue and

extraordinarily complex in both its underlying science and in its entanglement with

the very foundations of the global economic structure. ICCP commended the U.S.

position enunciated in its statement in July of last year as a reasonable framework,

and was particularly supportive of its efforts to give the negotiations greater focus

on the long-term character of the issue and its economic implications.

It is disturbing to us that, for nearly 1 year, there has been little public discussion

of the economic impacts of the range of proposed climate change mitigation strategies by any of the parties, including the United States.

The Administration had promised the results of its economic analysis to the Congress, its negotiating partners, the private sector and the non-governmental organizations. While we applaud the recognition of the need to peer review this work, the

slow pace at which this activity is occurring raises concerns that it is either not

being seriously pursued, or that the results are not being shared. Neither of these

reasons, if true, bodes well for constructive private sector support of the Administration’s efforts or for any result produced from the Third Conference of Parties meeting to be held later this year in Kyoto.

This matter is further complicated by the recent resignation of Under Secretary

of Commerce Ehrlich, who was coordinating the analytical effort. His departure suggests a possible further loss of momentum on this important effort at a critical time.

Those who may be able to provide constructive input into the analysis and assessment being pursued by the Administration wonder what must be done to understand how specific industry sectors are being examined and what steps are being

contemplated in order to pursue your climate protection goals. At a minimum, the

Administration should be able to immediately publish the policy assumptions being

used for individual sectors.

In addition, aside from frequent references to implementation of flexible, marketbased approaches, there has been little discussion of what may be suggested as implementation steps for a Kyoto agreement. Failure to discuss some of these issues

in advance will likely make it difficult to build support for ratification of the international agreement and for development of implementing legislation.

We respectfully urge you the Administration to provide an outline of the economic

information and policy considerations, as well as a meaningful timeframe for the release of this information.

Finally, we understand that you are preparing to attend the meetings of the

G–7 and the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the Environment.

We urge you to reiterate the United States’ support for these key economic issues

as critical elements of any future agreement on climate change. It is only with these

key policy provisions that we will have a climate change agreement that is both environmentally beneficial and economically feasible.

Sincerely,

KEVIN J. FAY,

Executive.
250

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PARTNERSHIP VIEWS ON KEY ISSUES IN THE

CLIMATE CHANGE PROTOCOL NEGOTIATIONS (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

DEVELOPING COUNTRY ROLE

The United States has outlined a specific proposal for dealing with the developing

country role as part of the Kyoto agreement, including definition of obligations

under Article 4.1 of the Framework Convention, establishment of an Annex B of

countries which would voluntarily adopt emissions budgets, and a date certain by

which all parties would have emissions budgets.

As stated by Bert Bolin, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC) at the March 1997 meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Science and

Technological Advice (SBSTA) in Bonn, ‘‘[I]t is obvious from this graph that no reasonable future reductions by Annex I countries would stabilize global emissions.’’

Therefore, it is imperative that developing countries be part of this agreement. Furthermore, as stated in the Administration’s recent economic work, a significant percentage of infrastructure and industry investment by developed countries is occurring in developing countries. Finally, because of the strong linkages’ between population growth and greenhouse gas emissions, it is important that we recognize that

seven of the current non-Annex I countries represent two-thirds of the world’s population.

The Administration has been forthright in its insistence that the developing country role be defined. ICCP recognizes the potential limits of the current Berlin Mandate with respect to new commitments for non-Annex I Parties. It is clear, however,

that the Berlin Mandate contemplates definition and elaboration of Article 4.1 commitments for all Parties, including the developing countries.

Additionally, it is imperative that additional developing country participation, including emission budgets, must be defined prior to the start of the first binding

budget period for the current Annex I parties. It is only through such definition that

governments and the private sector can ensure that investment flows are not distorted.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

ICCP has noted that six countries, including India and China, currently account

for 55 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. In order for the treaty to enter into

force, it is imperative that a significant percentage of greenhouse gas emissions be

represented by ratifying countries. In addition, a significant percentage of Annex I

countries and developing countries should ratify the treaty before it enters into

force.

We also believe that it is inappropriate for a regional economic organization to

be allowed to represent both itself and the voting rights of its individual members.

The EU has argued that it should be allowed to bubble its emissions and is proposing to allocate emissions internally. It is unfair that the EU be granted this concession to bubble its emissions when it declines to support similar flexibility for other

Parties. Therefore, the EU should have to decide to either bubble and count as one

vote, or to not bubble and to be counted individually.

GREENHOUSE GAS COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The protocol negotiations should continue to focus on a comprehensive approach

at the international level. Recent proposals from the European Union suggested a

protocol on only three gases—carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide—with the

notation that fluorocarbon compounds should be covered by policies and measures

and added to the basket in the year 2000. ICCP strongly opposes the EU approach.

The gases that can be measured should be covered simultaneously in a comprehensive manner. The key to a comprehensive approach is for Parties to focus on achieving the most efficient emission reductions possible; and therefore, it is unproductive

to segregate gases from coverage until a later date or to treat gases differently in

an international agreement.

LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE

ICCP has urged the negotiators to provide for a long-term focus or objective. We

believe such an objective provides clarity to negotiators, as well as to those charged

with implementation of commitments. It is our understanding that the United

States has performed some analysis of this issue, and that such analysis could be

useful to the negotiators currently. Furthermore, we applaud the article in the U.S.

protocol proposals which contemplates a long-term objective.
251

This objective will be an important guide to future decisionmaking, including private sector investment planning. We note that several participants, including the

EU, and certain environmental organizations have suggested certain objectives

characterized as atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, and that the IPCC

documents present their analysis according to atmospheric loading of greenhouse

gases measured in parts per million (ppm) of CO2 equivalent.

ICCP has not advocated a greenhouse gas concentration as the appropriate measure for the long term objective. A long-term objective could be defined as a combination of adaptation, impacts, and concentration measures.

Recent analysis of the economics of climate change controls have indicated that

the long-term objective is not as relevant as the path charted for the emission reduction. In our view, it is impossible to develop a meaningful path without knowing

the point of departure and the intended goal.

We recognize that the current State of science does not provide a precise ‘‘correct’’

answer. Science does provide a basis for making an informed political judgment on

the objective, and scientific assessment through the IPCC and elsewhere is critical

to future reassessment of any potential long-term objective.

POLICIES AND MEASURES

It is imperative that each Nation maintains maximum national flexibility with respect to implementation of its climate commitments. It is neither appropriate nor

productive for the negotiators to determine the manner in which each country

should achieve its commitments. ICCP is opposed to any listing of specific annexes

of policies and measures in any manner, i.e., mandatory, regional coordination, voluntary, or exemplary.

TARGET/BUDGET/ACCOUNTABILITY PERIOD

There have been several proposals for specific point targets and/or budget periods

as part of the protocol proposals that are currently before the Parties. ICCP has not

endorsed the notion of a binding ‘‘target.’’ We do, however, recognize that all of the

government proposals to be considered in Kyoto do contemplate such a step as a

starting point.

The lesson from the non-binding commitment of the 1992 FCCC agreement is

that, despite the best of intentions, a specific point target is very difficult to administer due to fluctuations in economic conditions, weather conditions, etc. Therefore,

we believe it is imperative that the long-term objectives be utilized to examine a

reasonable path that minimizes short-term economic disruption and stimulates the

longer-term technological innovation necessary to significantly reduce worldwide

greenhouse gas emissions.

The United States has indicated a preference for an emissions budget period and

a binding commitment to achieve that budget. In our view, the practical timetable

for ratification and implementation of a Kyoto climate agreement, including subsequent definition of a developing country role, suggests that meaningful program implementation steps could not be up and running with confidence any time soon after

a Kyoto agreement. There has been a great deal of focus on the beginning of such

a so-called budget period.

In our view, the beginning of the budget period is not as important as the end

of the budget period, i.e., the point at which the principle of ‘‘binding commitment’’

actually has the potential to impose penalty or sanction. In light of the uncertainties

stated above, ratification, implementation, developing country role, and some level

of experience with the implementation process, we believe that it would be inappropriate to end the first binding budget period before the year 2020. This timeframe

will allow industry to develop its programs, and gain confidence in their performance.

ICCP also believes this timeframe is consistent with its previous position that

policies at the outset of this effort must take into account a reasonable period for

capital stock turnover. This will provide a period for industry to ‘‘ramp up’’ its climate change responses.

If the budget period is to be adopted, we believe that it should be long enough

to encompass weather and economic cycles, but not so long as to present an impossible horizon to provide both industry and policymakers with some certainty. Therefore, it appears that a 10-year budget period is better than a 3- or 5-year period.

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

Although not specifically included as part of the current protocol proposals, ICCP

continues to believe that the FCCC must be grounded in sound scientific and tech-
252

nological assessment processes. This function, as currently served primarily through

the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), is inadequate.

The IPCC is currently considering restructuring proposals including the adoption

of working group outlines that incorporate an effective role for private sector expert

participation. We encourage support for these proposals.

Finally, it is also important that we de-politicize the IPCC process to the maximum extent possible. Its credibility can be sustained only if it is truly seen to be

the work of scientific and technical experts, and not subject to the whims of the diplomatic and political process or other special interests.

TRADING, BANKING AND JOINT IMPLEMENTATION (JI)

Most available economic analysis continues to indicate that flexibility through

emissions trading, banking of emission credits, and joint implementation policies

can help to maximize greenhouse gas emission reductions most cost-effectively.

ICCP is fully supportive of such mechanisms as part of any agreement in Kyoto and

beyond.

We believe it to be imperative that such principles be included in the first agreement and not be left to some future negotiations. We also believe it is important

that these provision not be relegated to some pilot project with final decisions to be

made at some future date.

Finally, it appears that flexibility is a positive inducement to ensure maximum

compliance. It also would allow us to avoid the use of trade restrictions or trade

sanctions as an enforcement mechanism in the treaty.
253
254
255

1For a more complete listing of scares, see: Adam J. Lieberman, Facts Versus Fears: A Review

of the 20 Greatest Unfounded Health Scares of Recent Times, prepared for the American Council

on Science and Health, May 1997. 2For instance, the president of the World Resources Institute wrote: ‘‘Climate change isn’t just

any environmental issue. It’s bigger . . . it’s tied to almost every facet of contemporary economic

life. How we travel, manufacture and ship goods, build buildings, farm, and spend our leisure

time all influences the tempo of climate change.’’ [emphasis in original] See: Gus Speth, forward

to The Greenhouse Trap (World Resources Institute, 1990).

3 Aaron Wildavsky, ‘‘Global Warming as a Means Of Achieving an Egalitarian Society: An Introduction,’’ introduction to Robert C. Balling, Jr., The Heated Debate (1992), xv. 4 Richard S. Lindzen, ‘‘Global Warming: The Origin and Nature of the Alleged Scientific Consensus,’’ Regulation, Vol. 15, No 2, (Spring 1992). 5Worldwatch Institute, Beyond the Petroleum Age: Designing a Solar Economy (December

1990), 48.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. O’KEEFE, CHAIRMAN, GLOBAL CLIMATE COALITION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as chairman of the Global Climate

Coalition (GCC), I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you on global climate

negotiations. The GCC is the leading representative of business and industry on this

issue with members that encompass manufacturing; agriculture; small and large

businesses; air, rail and barge transportation companies; domestic and international

vehicle manufacturers; oil, coal, natural gas and other natural resource companies;

municipal, co-op, investor-owned and independent electric utilities; cement; iron and

steel; forest and paper; and numerous producers of chemicals, plastics and other industrial and consumer products.

On behalf of this broad membership—the backbone of the U.S. economy—I would

like to take this opportunity to set the record straight on five points that are key

to the current public debate on climate change. First, the science is not ‘‘clear and

compelling’’ as President Clinton claimed July 3 in his speech to the United Nations

General Assembly, Special Session on Environment and Development. Instead, scientific uncertainties abound; enhanced global warming is still a hypothesis. Second,

statements on scientific uncertainties by members of the GCC are consistent with

those expressed in the May 16 issue of the respected journal Science [attached]. Advocates of precipitous curbs on greenhouse gas emissions are the ones who are

unjustifiably representing climate science in promoting a rush to judgment. Third,

curbs on greenhouse gas emissions—which mean suppressing energy use—will not

be cheap and relatively painless as some advocates encourage Americans to believe.

Instead, curbs would be brutally expensive in terms of lost income, lost jobs and lost

U.S. competitiveness on world markets. Fourth, business does not oppose action as

evidenced by its widespread participation in the Administration’s voluntary Climate

Action programs. We support action that recognizes the state of knowledge, the extent of uncertainty, and balances the need for preserving robust economic growth

with the requirement for a cleaner environment. Fifth, the climate issue does not

represent a crisis requiring precipitous and dramatic actions to prevent an imminent ecological catastrophe.

PRECIPITOUS ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE SERVES AN ANTI-INDUSTRY AGENDA

Claims of imminent catastrophe are designed to create a crisis atmosphere helpful

in promoting other agendas. This strategy is routinely used to advance ill-advised

policies—the saccharin scare in 1977, predictions in the 1970’s of famine and the

exhaustion of natural resources, the predicted cancer epidemic in the 1980’s, and

the Alar, EDB and electromagnetic scares to name only a few.1

When these scares proved to be unfounded, the quest continued to find the ultimate environmental problem that will require wholesale, radical change in American lifestyles.2 The late Professor Aaron Wildavsky wrote that ‘‘warming (and

warming alone) . . . is capable of realizing the environmentalist’s dream of an egalitarian society based on rejection of economic growth in favor of a smaller population’s eating lower on the food chain, consuming a lot less, and sharing a much

lower level of resources more equally.’’3 MIT Professor Richard Lindzen has added

that ‘‘the great threat of warming fits in with a great variety of preexisting agendas—some legitimate, some less so: energy efficiency, reduced dependence on Middle

Eastern oil, dissatisfaction with industrial society (neopastoralism), international

competition, governmental desires for enhanced revenues (carbon taxes), and bureaucratic desires for enhanced power.’’4

And so it is that climate change underpins the claims:

• That the automobile is a greater threat than any enemy we will ever face.

• That suburbia should be phased out.5
256

6 Bill McKibben, The End of Nature (1989), 191–192.

• That human numbers must be drastically reduced.6

Obviously, evidence that climate change may not be an imminent catastrophe undermines such visions of America in the 21st Century. Indeed, unwavering allegiance to such agendas may explain why advocates of precipitous action deny with

vehemence the logical implications of obvious scientific uncertainties.

True concern for the economic and environmental well-being of people in this and

other countries would surely lead negotiators to balance their policy prescriptions

with the state of scientific evidence. After all, carbon dioxide (CO2) is not a pollutant

but a natural element necessary for survival, with man-made emissions directly related to prosperity and economic progress. Curbing those emissions unnecessarily

would mean fewer jobs and less income—and therefore less money for other health

and environmental protection measures. A less prosperous United States means a

nation less able to promote technological development which is essential to environmental progress and to our continued ability to adapt in a changing world.

THE SCIENCE IS NOT SETTLED

The hearings of this committee a week ago—and those of the Senate Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion chaired by Senator Hagel in June—have put a much-needed public spotlight on the compelling scientific uncertainties that should permeate every climate change discussion and negotiation. Climate scientists and modelers simply do not know enough about possible human impacts on the global climate system to justify taking near-term actions being considered by international negotiators that would require us to suppress energy use by at least 25 percent in little over a decade.

That opinion is shared by scientists who participated in the Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and wrote the 1995 Second Assessment Report, along with many other members of the scientific community. That report does state

that ‘‘the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate’’ and the Administration repeatedly quotes that sentiment—out of context—in

its statements that the ‘‘science is settled.’’ The May 16 issue of the journal Science

pointed out that Dr. Benjamin Santer, a lead IPCC author, warned against such

over-simplification when he stated that, ‘‘It’s unfortunate that many people read the

media hype before they read the [IPCC] chapter [on greenhouse warming] . . . We

say quite clearly that few scientists would say that the attribution issue was a done

deal.’’ That same Science article also notes that ‘‘[s]ome scientists assert that developments since the IPCC completed its report have, if anything, magnified the uncertainties,’’ and quotes a noted scientist as saying, ‘‘There really isn’t a persuasive

case being made’’ for detection of greenhouse warming. At the article’s end, the author refers to a climatologist and IPCC contributor who concluded that ‘‘while researchers are firming up the science, policy-makers could inaugurate ‘some cautious

things’ to moderate any warming.’’

Unquestionably, the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has increased. It has

gone from about 280 parts per million two centuries ago to about 360 parts per million today. It is generally agreed that this increase is due to human activity, especially combustion of fossil fuels. CO2 like several other gases in the atmosphere, especially water vapor, traps heat. Without this greenhouse effect, the average global

temperature would be about zero degrees and life as we know it would not be possible. In theory, if CO2 is increasing, more heat might get trapped and the temperature might rise.

But theory is not fact until subjected to the acid test of scientific rigor to confirm

or reject it. To date, no confirming evidence has withstood tough scrutiny—as the

May 16 Science article explains. While it is a fact that there has been some warming

over the past century, it is within the range of normal variability. Furthermore,

most of it occurred before 1940, which was before any significant increase in CO2

emissions. In particular, over the past 20 years, when high-quality satellite measurements of temperature began, no warming has been observed; and, in fact, there

has been a slight downward trend.

Moreover, Dr. Bert Bolin, the chairman of the IPCC, has repeatedly said science

has not established a link between human greenhouse gas emissions and particular

severe weather events. Yet, Vice President Gore and other Administration officials

made such an overstatement when they associated the flooding in North Dakota

earlier this year with global warming. President Clinton made a similar overstatement when he said on June 30 in New York City that greenhouse gases have ‘‘led

to the most disruptive weather patterns anybody can remember over the last 4 or

5 years.’’ Members of the GCC and of the business community are only being accu-
257

7These authors wrote: ‘‘Despite significant differences in views, there is agreement that energy efficiency gains of perhaps 10 to 30% over baseline trends over the next two or three decades can be realized at negative or zero net cost (negative net cost means an economic benefit).’’

See: International Panel on ‘‘Climate Change, Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change.’’ Contribution of Working Group III to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1996), 16.

rate when they point out that such claims go beyond what can be supported by climate science.

EXEMPTING THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES GUARANTEES FAILURE

Dr. Bolin has also cautioned against expecting global temperature benefits from

emission reductions by developed countries alone. Yet, the Berlin Mandate agreed

to by international negotiators in 1995 exempts developing countries from any new

commitments to curb emissions. Dr. Bolin, during his February 25, 1997 presentation in Bonn to international negotiators, said that the proposals applicable only

to the industrialized nations ‘‘would not be detectable on projected temperature increases.’’

The 2,000 economists who signed a petition on climate change—and the 65 U.S.

Senators who have signed Senate Resolution 98—emphasize that all countries must

participate in any program to address ‘‘global’’ emissions. China, India and other developing countries will account for most of the future growth in carbon dioxide (CO2)

emissions in the next century but will be exempt from any meaningful treaty obligations. This will create powerful incentives to attract manufacturing investments and

the jobs they create from the industrialized countries—and also create powerful economic and political constituencies for never curbing emissions. As Representative

John Dingell asked rhetorically in his testimony of June 19 before the Senate Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion: ‘‘Does

anyone seriously believe China, or any other country for that matter, will act on altruistic motives?’’ Without the active involvement of developing countries, the

growth in global CO2 emissions will not be reduced in any meaningful way.

THE ECONOMIC COSTS WOULD BE HIGH

The Administration suggests that curbing energy use will impose little economic

sacrifice. Everett M. Ehrlich, former undersecretary of commerce for economic affairs, wrote in The Washington Post of June 15, 1997 that ‘‘the economic literature

suggests that we could roll back our CO2 emissions to their 1990 levels by 2010 for

the equivalent of a 25 cent gas tax. It’s not free, but it’s not the end of the world.’’

Few consumers would share this benign view of such a hike in their energy bills.

Some authors of the IPCC report even suggest that curbing greenhouse gas emissions could be free—the environmental equivalent of a free lunch—or even be economically beneficial!7

In fact, however, every credible, independent economic analysis confirms what

common sense suggests: a substantial curb on the use of a key economic resource

will impose substantial costs. From an Administration draft analysis circulated last

May, one could reasonably conclude that U.S. negotiators want to cut CO2 emissions

back to 1990 levels by sometime around 2010, and hold them there. This would require more than a 25 percent reduction in projected fossil fuel use. The Administration is placing its blind faith in unidentified technological breakthroughs and an

unproven—and probably unworkable—trading scheme to counterbalance the economic damage of self-imposed energy rationing.

However, economic studies more realistic about the probable contributions of existing and new technologies paint a more sobering picture. Studies by Charles River

Associates, DRI, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration indicate that energy taxes of $125 to $200 per metric ton of carbon would be needed to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 ($200 per ton is equivalent to an increase in the excise

tax on gasoline of about 60 cents a gallon). The annual impact of a tax this size

includes the following losses:

• $100 billion to $275 billion in gross domestic product (GDP).

• $200,000 to $500,000 U.S. jobs.

• $65 billion to $100 billion in fixed business investment.

• $50 billion to $110 billion in consumer purchases.

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN SLOW TO RELEASE ITS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

DOE released on July 11, 1997 a study contracted with Argonne National Laboratory early in 1996 to investigate ‘‘the potential effects (which may be either beneficial or adverse) on energy-intensive industries in the United States of alternative
258

8 The six industries studied were: aluminum; chemicals and allied products; petroleum refining; cement; paper and allied products; and steel.

scenarios for changes in world patterns of industrial energy prices that might result

from new climate commitments.’’ Six industries were selected and the study results

show that the impact on each industry would range from ‘‘significantly adverse’’ to

‘‘devastating’’ and produce little, if any, environmental benefit.8

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has attempted to put these results in a

favorable light by claiming that the study examines energy price scenarios based on

other countries’ proposals ‘‘of large hypothetical energy price increases’’ rather than

the ‘‘Administration’s basic approach.’’ However, the Administration has not explained how its own goals for curbing emissions could possibly avoid either high energy prices or highly restrictive regulatory curbs on energy use. At the very least,

the DOE’s claim that the Argonne study results apply only to the climate change

proposals of other countries is an open admission that this study lacks a direct analysis of the Administration’s own proposals. Hence, DOE’s claim that the study ‘‘confirms the wisdom of the Administration’s basic approach to climate change’’ is without foundation.

The delay in releasing this study and the release two days ago by the Administration of its long-promised analysis and assessment of its own post-2000 climate

change proposals raises questions about its negotiating objectives.

In March 1995, as the Berlin Mandate began to take shape, President Clinton

characterized U.S. objectives this way in a letter to Representative John Dingell:

‘‘We have said this process must include thoughtful analysis and reflect the

fact that global problems require global solutions. Furthermore, I assure you

the U.S. delegation will not accept any outcome or agree to any process that

adversely affects the United States and its industrial competitiveness.’’

DOE and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) jointly held a workshop in

Springfield, Virginia to unveil the Administration’s initial analysis. At a June 19,

1996 hearing before the House Commerce Committee, the DOE’s Acting Assistant

Secretary for Policy—Marc Chupka—testified that the ‘‘U.S. strongly believes that

analysis and assessment is central to the development of further commitments by

Annex I Parties and to the furtherance of existing commitments of other parties to

the Framework Convention on Climate Change.’’ When it was announced last summer that Dr. Everett Ehrlich would assume the role of directing and coordinating

this analytic effort, he assured everyone that the results would be available this

past January. Over the next several months, Under Secretary of State Tim Wirth

repeatedly stated that the Administration’s analysis would be released soon. This

did not occur and yet negotiations proceeded.

This state of affairs led Representative Dingell in his Senate testimony of June

19, 1997 to ask:

‘‘Why are we [proceeding with negotiations] before we have the most basic information about how climate change policies will affect our economy? In short,

has the Administration bothered to do its homework? We were supposed to have

the vaunted analysis and assessment of the impact of climate change policies

on the U.S. economy by the end of last year. It has not been completed yet, despite repeated promises to Congress and industry that it would be available before important policy decisions are made. But the State Department formally

proposed a cap-and-trade negotiating position in January. In short, the analysis

is self-evidently too late to inform the process, and likely will be used to justify

what the Administration has already decided to do. Just as clearly, public participation and comment on the analysis and assessment is irrelevant.’’

Representative Dingell’s remarks were insightful. Only two days ago did the Administration release a draft copy of its baseline economic analysis. While the GCC

has not had time to examine this document thoroughly—and we would ask the committee for the opportunity to submit comments later—it is clear that the Administration still has not provided its assessment of specific policies now under consideration. It also has not explained how those policies would be implemented domestically and internationally nor has it quantified the impact of these policies on the

U.S. economy, labor, industry and trade.

This slow and partial release of the Administration’s analysis and assessment has

meant that the United States Senate has so far been unable to fulfill its Constitutional responsibility of ‘‘Advice and Consent.’’ Senate Resolution 98, introduced by

Senators Byrd and Hagel—and now co-sponsored by 65 Senators reflects growing

frustration with the Administration’s failure to consult and alarm over the con-
259

9 EPRI Journal, Nov./Dec. 1995.

sequences for the U.S. economy that will result from the current negotiating strategy.

THE GCC SUPPORTS APPROPRIATE ACTION

In spite of major scientific uncertainties, inadequacies in climate models and the

doubt that any enhanced warming will soon occur, it would be imprudent to presume ‘‘no problem.’’ Global warming could have serious consequences should nations

make wrong choices in either direction.

Therefore, a proper framing of the problem recognizes uncertainty—as pointed out

by the petition signed by 2,600 economists. The Administration frames climate

change as devoid of significant uncertainty—an approach that is clearly flawed.

The basic structure for decision-making under conditions of significant uncertainty is relatively simple even though the global climate issue itself is complex. The

first decision rule is to be slow rather than quick to commit to a single course of

action. This is especially important when the costs of immediate action are known

to be high—perhaps equal to our Nation’s current total annual environmental expenditures—but the many scientific uncertainties prevent any reliable estimate of

the environmental benefits (if any) from that action. In the case of global warming,

we have time to address these uncertainties. Nothing we do in the next 20 years

will have any appreciable impact on the world’s average temperature in 2050 or

2100.

This fact is absolutely crucial, because costs are exceedingly sensitive to timing.

Many capital investments, including those in the energy and automobile industries,

are long term. If change can be deferred until current equipment reaches the end

of its useful life, and until more efficient devices are on-line, costs can be substantially less. Over the past 22 years, new technologies have enabled us to reduce energy intensity per dollar of gross domestic product by about 32 percent. This

progress should continue. Analysis by the Electric Power Research Institute and the

Stanford Energy Modeling Forum concludes that an orderly, long-term strategy for

achieving a scientifically justified CO2 objective would cost only one-fifth as much

as a program that requires near-term cuts.9

This leads to the second decision-making rule: invest in information to reduce the

uncertainties and to better understand the implications of alternative courses of action. Indeed, the money already spent on improving climate models has increased

our understanding of the climate system enormously with no indications yet that

we have reached the point of diminishing returns in improving scientific knowledge

and climate models.

Furthermore, as climate models have improved they have—so far—suggested that

much of the 1°F increase in average global temperature over the past 130 years is

due to natural variability and that any future warming is likely to be much less

than earlier models have predicted. For instance, when the British Meteorological

Office recently improved its modeling of the effects of clouds and precipitation, the

model’s response to a doubling of CO2 emissions was a decline in warming from 5.2

Celsius degrees to 1.9 degrees. The first results from the new climate model at the

National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder, Colorado suggest—

according to the May 16 article in Science—that ‘‘future greenhouse warming may

be milder than some other models have suggested—and could take decades to reveal

itself.’’

With improved information indicating that the problem may be less—rather than

more—severe than originally thought, it seems only sensible to continue improving

scientific knowledge before committing to expensive policies predicated on earlier estimates, as the Administration appears determined to do. Although assessments of

potential future impacts have moderated over the past few years, the Administration’s policy has shifted from support of voluntary programs to legally-binding commitments.

The third rule for decision-making under uncertainty is called ‘‘no or low regrets.’’

Look for actions that will produce benefits under any set of circumstances. The GCC

has developed a list of emission-reducing actions that would be worthwhile even if

the threat of global warming turns out to be another wildly exaggerated environmental scare.

The business community has shared these steps with the Administration which

are based on these points:

• Encourage an economic turnover of the capital stock.

• Focus investment in research to narrow the range of scientific uncertainties.

• Invest in the development of new technologies.
260

• Expedite diffusion of new technologies in developing countries.

• Facilitate the investment of U.S. private capital in countries with high emissions levels.

• Continue promoting voluntary programs for reducing U.S. emissions.

These points establish that GCC members support an action-oriented policy on climate change.

The fourth decision rule is to consider alternatives. Only two decades ago, global

cooling was the dominant concern. It is also possible that some warming will occur

but not be harmful—or that developing adaptations to warming will greatly mitigate

any harm. Sound policies must allow for these possibilities, and not be based on a

single point estimate.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Many uncertainties about the climate system, and the current and future impact

of human activities on it, have been well documented. Business has played a constructive role by drawing attention to these uncertainties and the serious ramifications they pose for the Administration’s negotiating strategy.

Business agrees that action should be taken but rejects an unjustified rush to

judgment. The major difference between the business community and the Clinton

Administration is over approach, not the need for action. We support what can be

called ‘‘Lewis and Clark’’ planning, after the famous explorers who successfully

managed enormous uncertainty by gathering new information, taking a limited

number of steps, reassessing and then repeating the process. In 1803, Lewis and

Clark could not plan a detailed water route to the Pacific—President Jefferson’s

main goal. No one knew that the Rocky Mountains were in the way. Lewis and

Clark were successful because they respected the limits of knowledge, anticipated

surprises and recognized the need to adapt.

The Clinton Administration supports an approach that discounts uncertainty.

Minimal uncertainty allows detailed planning comparable to an extended itinerary

what can be called ‘‘Cooke’s Tour planning’’ after the famous travel agency. The conditions for this type of policy planning do not exist, and a Kyoto agreement that presumes they do will be playing ‘‘Russian Roulette’’ with our economy.
261
262
263
264
265
266
267

RESPONSES BY WILLIAM F. O’KEEFE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR

CHAFEE

Question 1. Mr. O’Keefe, you say in your testimony that you support ‘‘appropriate

action.’’ You want to encourage economic turnover of capital stock, spur the development of new technologies, and expedite their diffusion in developing countries. You

also want to ‘‘facilitate the investment of U.S. private capital in countries with high

emissions levels.’’

I assume by that last point you mean that you are interested in spurring investment that reduces these high emissions, is that right? (If yes,) now why would you

be interested in reducing these emissions?

Answer. As I responded at the hearing when asked if there is a climate change

‘‘problem’’, the GCC recognizes that there is a risk that deserves to be addressed.

Until the uncertainty surrounding this issue is reduced by expanding our State of

knowledge, we simply do not know whether there is a genuine and serious ‘‘problem.’’ We do know that there is a very real risk that precipitous action will cause

society’s scarce resources to be wasted and our economic well being damaged. The

risk of human-induced climate change warrants current efforts to ensure that we

undertake emissions policies which are generally termed ‘‘no’’ or ‘‘low’’ regrets. Such

a policy, which calibrates our national response to the still uncertain and evolving

understanding of human impacts on the climate system, is what I meant when I

urged ‘‘appropriate action’’ to reduce emissions. Such actions include promoting research leading to more energy-efficient technologies and their subsequent export to

developing countries. The expanded use of current and future energy-efficient technologies in developing countries will contribute to their productivity improvements

and economic strength and is therefore a desirable goal in itself. It also would limit

GHG emissions growth in those countries and therefore diminish the risk associated

with higher CO2 concentration levels.

I would like to stress, however, that today there is an entirely legitimate scientific

debate regarding the extent, if any, of human-induced climate change and of what

the impacts of change might be—past, present, and future. Most regrettably, as the

scientific community publicly acknowledges the uncertainty, and as warming predictions for the next century moderate substantially, the Administration has declared the debate to be over and attacked the patriotism and integrity of those who

raise legitimate questions about their apocalyptic visions.

As your first hearing on July 11 amply demonstrated the utter lack of scientific

consensus regarding human-induced climate change, I will not address that fact further. However, I would like to draw the committee’s attention to the efforts by the

Clinton Administration to stifle the important and legitimate debate about inferences that can be drawn from the current State of scientific knowledge and about

policies that are consistent with those inferences. On June 25, Vice-President Gore

spoke at Vanderbilt University on the topic of ‘‘global warming’’ and stated:

‘‘There is a small group that likes to spread dissension and skepticism, just

like the big tobacco companies spent huge amounts of money telling tobacco

smokers smoking is not bad for you. . . . That’s ridiculous and unethical.’’ The

Tennesseean (June 26, 1997).

On July 21, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt appeared on the Diane Rehm Show,

and stated:

‘‘[I]t’s an unhappy fact that the oil companies and the coal companies in the

United States have joined in a conspiracy to hire pseudo scientists to deny the

facts, and then begin raising political arguments that are essentially fraudulent,

that we can’t do this without damaging the economy . . . [T]he energy companies need to be called to account because what they’re doing is un-American in

the most basic sense.’’

This type of extreme statement makes it more difficult for the American people

to gain a better understanding of the issue and for the Senate to gain the type of

information necessary for it to discharge its constitutional responsibility. Very plainly, efforts to suppress the free exchange of information, evidence, and opinion undermine efforts to formulate a responsible national policy on climate change. The passage of Senate Resolution 98 by a vote of 95–0 will hopefully dissuade the Administration from continuing to pursue its ‘‘rush to judgment, cutoff debate’’ strategy. It

is now clear that an open policy dialog—which necessarily includes an honest evaluation of the science of climate change—will occur and the Senate will independently distinguish the science from the pseudo-science.
268

1Testimony of Dr. Janet Yellen before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, July

17, 1997, p. 6: ‘‘[C]osts depend critically on how emission reduction policies are implemented.

It boils down to this: if we do it dumb it could cost a lot, but if we do it smart it will cost much

less . . .’’ (emphasis added). The GCC is still curious as to what the ‘‘it’’ is, as well as the justification for ‘‘it.’’ [Step One Above].

Question 2. Since you support ‘‘appropriate action,’’ I assume that you would prefer smart action to dumb action. By ‘‘smart action’’ I mean action that reduces emissions at lower cost than action that is costly.

Well, the acid rain trading program under the 1990 Clean Air Act has proven

itself to be a smart kind of action, since it is reducing emissions fast and cheaply,

spurring innovation, and dramatically lowering the costs of technologies.

I am told that a recent M.I.T. study has demonstrated this. It sounds to me like

you are making an argument in favor of the ‘‘cap-and-trade’’ approach, with joint

implementation or trading with developing countries as a key component. That

would address, in a smart way, all of the concerns for ‘‘appropriate action’’ that you

have raised. Your thoughts?

Answer. Your assumption that my use of the term ‘‘appropriate action’’ implies

‘‘smart action [as opposed] to dumb action’’ is correct. Let me clarify, however, that

determining ‘‘appropriate action’’ is a two-step, sequential process:

(1) identify and substantiate the problem you are trying to solve and what result

or target is necessary to solve it; and

(2) how to achieve that result or target most cost-effectively.

The Administration has emphasized being ‘‘smart’’ solely with respect to the second step above, without being ‘‘smart’’ on the essential first step.1 Unfortunately,

being ‘‘dumb’’ with respect to the essential first step renders the entire two-step

process ‘‘dumb’’. Thus, joint implementation and emissions trading are options to be

considered in the second step above. The GCC has long supported the concept of

joint implementation, but questions the practicability and enforceability of an international ‘‘cap and trade’’ system for curtailing global greenhouse gas emissions.

While ‘‘cap and trade’’ may seem like an attractive concept, a ‘‘cap’’ means rationing,

which is a failed concept. However, the use of ‘‘smart’’, market-based tools to achieve

a result that is not, in fact, yet warranted by the evidence, is not ‘‘smart’’. It is instead merely a ‘‘smart’’ way to address a dumb conclusion.

Your reference to the acid rain trading program of the Clean Air Act of 1990 is

a useful one because it highlights the advantages of market mechanisms, the importance of serendipity, and the significant differences between the SO2 trading program and an international tradable permits program for greenhouse gas emissions.

First, the acid rain trading program did allow companies flexibility in meeting a

performance goal, and that allowed cost savings compared to what would have occurred with a one-size-fits-all command and control program. Second, while the current market value of an SO2 emission permit is below levels projected while the program was being devised, to a large extent this is the result of serendipity. For example, energy prices are lower than projected and deregulation in the transportation

sector has allowed much greater use of low-sulfur coal. Third, there are immense

differences between the United States SO2 trading program and a program required

for international tradable permits in greenhouse gases. The SO2 program involved

one gas, in one industry, in one country and the application of readily available

technology. An international tradable permit program for greenhouse gases would

involve multiple gases, multiple nations, plus every industry and every citizen in

every country. Furthermore, short of suppressing energy use there is no practical

technology for significantly reducing or sequestering CO2 emissions. Obviously, an

international tradable permits system would require a tremendous, unprecedented

global monitoring and transactional infrastructure to ensure its integrity and enforceability. Whether political systems based upon national sovereignty could accommodate such an infrastructure is a serious question. Many, such as Dr. Richard Cooper (Harvard University) and Dr. Thomas Schelling (University of Maryland) have

carefully considered these issues and concluded that ‘‘cap and trade’’ as well as joint

implementation programs are simply not practical in any real sense. Cap and trade

programs require allocation of the cap, and there is no generally accepted basis for

such allocation. And to be cost-effective, both programs require major commitments

by developing nations—commitments that are clearly not forthcoming. For these

reasons, it is facile to suggest an easy parallel between the SO2 trading permits program in the United States and a global emissions trading scheme for GHGs.

Question 3. You state in your testimony that, curbs on greenhouse gas emissions,

‘‘would be brutally expensive in terms of lost income, lost jobs and lost U.S. competitiveness on world markets.’’ Curbs of any kind?
269

2 Between 1973 and 1986, energy consumption per dollar of GDP declined 2.6 percent per

year. Between 1986 and 1996, energy consumption per dollar of GDP declined 0.4 percent per

year. 3Dr. Everett M. Ehrlich, who recently resigned his position as Undersecretary of Commerce

for Economic Affairs, wrote in the Washington Post on June 15:

‘‘. . . the economic literature suggests that we could roll back our CO2 emissions to their

1990 levels by 2010 for the equivalent of a 25 cent gas tax. It’s not free, but it’s not the

end of the world.’’

In addition, on July 15 the Administration released its May 30 draft interagency study on

the economic impacts of stabilizing CO2 emissions by 2010 at 1990 levels.

Answer. The GCC’s consistent promotion of ‘‘no’’ or ‘‘low’’ regrets measures to constrain the growth in greenhouse gas emissions obviously implies that there are opportunities to reduce emissions that would be benign economically and perhaps even

beneficial. Many such opportunities have been embraced by industry to support voluntary efforts to achieve the ‘‘aim’’ of returning 2000 greenhouse gas emissions to

1990 levels. The U.S. Climate Action Report, released in May, reveals that over

5,000 private sector organizations participate in voluntary Federal climate mitigation programs, which are projected to reduce emissions by an estimated 75 million

metric tons by the year 2000; consumer and business savings are projected at $10

billion by 2000 and $50 billion by 2010. Importantly, the Report documents that 94

percent of the U.S. primary aluminum production capacity has joined the Voluntary

Aluminum Industrial Partnership; electric utilities representing 69 percent of 1990

electric generation and utility carbon emissions have signed the Climate Wise agreements; 2,300 companies now participate in the Green Lights program; and the Gas

Research Institute has pledged $4 million of its annual budget to projects that reduce methane emissions. Widespread voluntary efforts such as these are an efficient, cost-effective way of speeding the adoption of economically viable energy efficient technologies. Such programs should help strengthen the already strong trend

of increased U.S. energy efficiency.2 In fact, the Energy Information Administration’s 1997 reference case projection indicates annual decreases of 1 percent in energy consumption per dollar of GDP through 2015.

However, your quotation from my full Statement regarding ‘‘brutally expensive’’

curbs on greenhouse gas emissions appears as point 3 in the introductory summary.

My detailed discussion of such costs relates to the Administration’s intimation of

agreeing to a legally binding U.S. commitment to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels

in the next 12 years, by 2010.3 In that regard all credible, independent economic

analyses of the costs of dramatically curbing near term emissions—to 1990 levels

by 2010—indicate the same result: brutal expense to our economy and people. Studies by Charles River Associates, DRI/McGraw Hill, the U.S. Energy Information Administration and economists at our most prestigious universities indicate that energy taxes of $125 to $200 per metric ton of carbon would be needed to suppress

demand sufficiently to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 ($200 per ton is

equivalent to an increase in the excise tax on gasoline of about 60 cents per gallon).

A conservative estimate of the annual impact of a tax this size includes the following losses:

• $100 billion to $275 billion in GDP.

• 200,000 to 500,000 U.S. jobs.

• $65 billion to $100 billion in fixed business investment.

• $50 billion to $110 billion in consumer purchases.

On July 11, the Administration finally released a study by the Department of Energy (contracted through the Argonne National Laboratory). The study focused on

‘‘the potential effects on energy-intensive industries in the United States of alternative scenarios for changes in world patterns of industrial energy prices that might

result from new climate commitments.’’ The study results described the impacts on

six industries (steel, cement, aluminum, paper, chemicals, and petroleum refining)

as ‘‘significantly adverse’’ to ‘‘devastating,’’ producing little, if any, environmental

benefit.

In her testimony before the committee, Dr. Janet Yellen, Chair, Council of Economic Advisers, reported that the Administration’s economic modeling efforts to predict the impacts of climate change policy were ‘‘futile.’’ She stated that the Administration was left only with ‘‘a set of parameters and relationships that influence estimates of the impacts.’’ It is, however, noteworthy that the May 30 Draft Report of

the Interagency Analytical Team revealed that ‘‘[t]he starting point scenario [assuming stabilized emissions at 1990 levels by 2010] would raise the implicit price of carbon in the economy by about $100 per ton of carbon.’’ The Report then described

that ‘‘[a] permit price of $100 per ton is the equivalent of a price increase of 26 cents

per gallon of refined petroleum product, $1.49 per thousand cubic feet of natural
270

gas, $52.52 per ton of coal, and 2 cents per kilowatt hour of electricity produced.’’

Draft Report, Page 8.

This important effort, before it was abandoned by the Administration, was tending to confirm the severely negative economic costs of a policy to drastically curtail

emissions in the near term. In fact, Dr. Yellen emphasized in her testimony that

‘‘[t]he speed at which emissions reductions are required can have large effects on

the estimated costs. It is important to allow sufficient lead-time for orderly investment in new equipment and technology.’’ This conclusion supports arguments made

by the GCC in its July 1995 paper by David Montgomery, Charles River Associates,

‘‘Toward an Economically Rational Response to the Berlin Mandate.’’ Others, such

as Wigley, Richels and Edmonds in their January 18, 1996 article in Nature come

to similar conclusions, namely that ‘‘[u]nanticipated changes will be costly. Time is

therefore needed to reoptimize the capital stock.’’ The GCC agrees and re-emphasizes that a 12-year period to return emissions to 1990 levels—requiring an approximate 25 percent reduction in projected fossil fuel use—would be brutally expensive.

Even using Dr. Yellen’s ‘‘remaining tools,’’ we are unaware of any ‘‘parameters’’ or

‘‘relationships’’—or existing technology for that matter—which avoids that result.

Question 4. Do you base your impacts assertions on the recent economic modeling

done by the Charles River and Associates group? (If yes,) please talk some about

the underlying assumptions in the Charles River Associate model, because a model

as you know only suggests potential impacts. Does that particular model, for example, assume that the economy suffers persistent transitional inefficiencies (from actions to reduce emissions)?

Does it assume that there will be any energy source substitution? Does it assume

inclusion of joint implementation or emissions trading, or any other flexibility instruments? Does it assume any benefits from averting climate change or other pollution damages? Is it reasonable to assume any of these at some level?

Answer. My statements regarding the economic impacts of policies to drastically

limit greenhouse gas emissions and U.S. energy use are based on a broad spectrum

of economic modeling efforts. In addition to work done by Charles River Associates,

work by other groups such as MIT, the Energy Modeling Forum, DRI, and ABARE

(Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics) are also relevant and

provide useful insights into the large impacts that should be expected from the targets and timetables proposed in the Berlin Mandate negotiations.

The question states that, ‘‘a model as you know only suggests potential impacts.’’

This applies to models that project climate and the impacts of a change in climate,

as well as to economic models that focus more on the impacts of climate policy.

There is an apparent inconsistency in the Administration’s confidence in modeling:

why are economic models deemed ‘‘futile’’ in terms of projecting impacts in the next

20 years, while climate models predicting changes in the next 100 years are unquestioned? Thus, results of climate and climate impact models that are used to promote

climate policies of the type being negotiated concern suggested potential impacts

that might occur 100 or more years into the future. While some economic models

cover a similar time horizon, most of the policy impact analysis done by the groups

mentioned above focus on the next 20 or so years and evaluate the relatively nearterm economic impact of proposed climate policies. It is very hard to deny that climate and impact models 100 years out are, by orders of magnitude, more unreliable

than the economic models 10 or 20 years out. This is particularly true when you

realize that the climate and impact models, for 100 years out, require inputs from

economic models to even start their analysis. Assumptions regarding population,

economic activity, technology, and lifestyles are all required before estimates of

greenhouse gas emissions are generated for the next 100 years. Without that information, the climate models either have no emissions baseline to work with or are

randomly picking scenarios that may have no relevance to the real world.

Regarding the CRA model, it assumes that market mechanisms would be used to

create incentives for reducing energy use, thereby reducing carbon emissions, below

baseline projected levels. These market mechanisms can be viewed either as carbon

taxes or auctioned tradable permits, which are viewed by economists as being the

least-cost way of reducing carbon emissions. Therefore, the model does not assume

that the economy suffers persistent transitional inefficiencies specifically from actions to reduce emissions.

Transitional inefficiencies are more likely to be induced by the use of various command and control policies. In fact, since the model is of the type referred to as general equilibrium models, it arguably omits some transitional costs to the economy

of moving to a lower-carbon trajectory, and therefore its impact estimates may be

on the low side.
271

4See footnote 3 regarding statements by Dr. Ehrlich and the May 30 Draft Interagency Study.

The CRA model does allow for substitution among different fossil fuels, as well

as to non-carbon fuels. This substitution occurs depending on the relative prices of

the fuels, including carbon taxes or tradable permit market values that raise the

cost of carbon generating fuels. The CRA model, following the general structure of

the Framework Convention on Climate Change as well as the Berlin Mandate language, assumes that each OECD country individually meets a proposed emission

target.

The model is designed to help identify the economic costs of alternative emission

reduction targets and timetables and does not attempt to address any possible benefits of lower carbon emission trajectories. While all policies should at least be evaluated with respect to likely costs and benefits, one difficulty with the climate change

issue is that there are large near-term economic costs to reducing emissions substantially over the next two decades while it is unlikely that there would be any

measurable benefits from reduced carbon emissions during that same timeframe, especially if developing countries are excluded from emission reduction requirements.

Returning to ‘‘transitional inefficiencies,’’ there is a recent tendency to mischaracterize how economic models address the issue—are consumers efficient in their

energy use and how efficient are they in changing their energy use. The recent

World Resources Institute study, The Costs of Climate Protection: A Guide for the

Perplexed is a prime example. For example, one of the six criteria the WRI study

used to characterize model results was ‘‘inefficient economic responses.’’ More specifically, it asked: ‘‘Is the model of the CGE type, which assumes that the economy

adjusts efficiently in the long-run, or it is a macro model that assumes that the

economy suffers persistent transitional inefficiencies?’’ This is a clear mischaracterization of the difference between model types, especially when the CGE results

are labeled ‘‘optimistic’’ and the macromodel results are labeled ‘‘pessimistic.’’ In reality the two types of models address different questions: the former asks what are

the economic consequences of different equilibrium conditions (one with large carbon

taxes and one without), and the latter asks what sort of costs arise during a policyinduced transition from one equilibrium to another. The difference between the

models is sort of like moving from Washington, DC. to either Seattle or San Diego.

The CGE model asks what life is like after you moved, while the macromodel focuses more on how you get to either location. It’s like a vacation—getting there is

at least half the fun, but if you cannot afford the travel portion, you do not take

the trip.

Question 5. You talk about actions being considered by negotiators that would require us to ‘‘suppress energy use by at least 25 percent in little over a decade.’’ What

actions or proposals, now being seriously considered by international negotiators,

would ‘‘require’’ this sort of response?

Answer. With less than 4 months before the Kyoto Conference of the Parties,

United States negotiators still have not revealed to Congress or the American people

the specific targets and timetables they intend to endorse. Apparently, the U.S. position will not be settled until late in the Fall. However, U.S. Government officials

have consistently discussed and analyzed a commitment to return to 1990 emissions

levels by 2010.4 This past Spring, the European Union (EU) proposed a 15 percent

reduction in 1990 emissions by 2010.

Comparing such goals with official U.S. Government projections of emissions

clearly indicates that very large emissions reductions by the United States would

be required. For example, Table A9 of the Energy Information Administration’s

International Energy Outlook 1997 reports that U.S. carbon emissions for 1990 were

1.34 billion metric tons. The reference case projection for 2010 is 1.72 billion metric

tons. Thus, to limit emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 would require a 22 percent

reduction in emissions from the baseline. To limit emissions to 15 percent below the

1990 level by 2010 would require a 34 percent reduction in emissions from the baseline. As a practical matter, it is difficult to comprehend how emissions could be reduced by 1⁄3 off the baseline in little over a decade. Only very large carbon taxes,

very high tradable permit prices, and/or an exceptionally long list of highly onerous

command and control programs could suppress energy use sufficiently to achieve

such emission reductions within that timeframe.

Question 6. If a treaty were signed that called for . . . let’s say, a return to 1990

emissions levels by the year 2015: is the only way to get to that goal (that your

group would support) a requirement that all countries, regardless of poverty level

or current emissions contribution, take identical action at the same time? That is,

should Togo, for example, be required to take the same actions as the United States

and other OECD nations, and China, at the same time?
272

Answer. Any impact GHGs have on climate is independent of whether they come

from developed or developing countries, and developing countries’ emissions are projected to grow rapidly in the next century, outstripping those of the developed world

by 2015, according to the Energy Information Administration. The purposes of the

ongoing negotiations to amend the Framework Convention on Climate Change

(‘‘FCCC’’) are ostensibly to limit emissions, thereby limiting the potential of climate

change. The Berlin Mandate of 1995, which exempts the developing world from assuming any treaty obligations, guarantees that total global GHG emissions will increase in the next century. As of now, therefore, the Berlin Mandate guarantees failure in addressing the objective of the FCCC. In addition, the flight of capital, jobs,

and economic strength from participating developed countries to the exempted developing world would be an inevitable consequence of the Berlin Mandate.

In light of those realities, the relative burden of nations in addressing a global

environmental risk is a daunting challenge that was recognized in the Berlin Mandate. Economic equity must be an essential part of any treaty negotiation, in spite

of the difficulty in pursuing it. Many Senators supporting the unanimous passage

of Senate Resolution 98 expressed the view that the Berlin Mandate, to which the

Administration agreed in 1995, was a ‘‘fundamental error.’’ President Clinton himself stated on August 4: ‘‘I believe the [Kyoto] agreement has to be a global one.

I think all nations, developed and developing, should be a part of this.’’ On this

point, the GCC agrees with the President and the 95 U.S. Senators who supported

Senate Resolution 98.

Question 7. You State that unnecessarily curbing carbon emissions will mean

fewer jobs and less income. Does this prediction include all the new jobs that will

be created by the shift to new technologies and industries?

Answer. Absent any identification of the ‘‘new technologies’’ that will enable, at

the least, a 22 percent reduction in our use of fossil fuels within 12 years, it would

be highly speculative to assume related ‘‘new industries’’ and ‘‘jobs.’’ If technology

does not emerge to accommodate an international commitment to reduce our use of

fossil fuels by at least 22 percent, then painful policies to ration that use would be

necessary. Prudent policymaking should prompt the question: What is the risk that

a technology will not emerge which will enable a 22 percent reduction in our fossil

fuel use in 12 years? Economist Robert Samuelson wrote in the July 9 Washington

Post:

‘‘Without a breakthrough in alternative energy—nuclear, solar, something—

no one knows how to lower emissions adequately without ultimately crushing

the world economy.’’
273
274
275
276

Æ