SIGAR

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

2530 Crystal Drive

Arlington, VA 22202

www.sigar.mil

FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE MAY BE REPORTED TO SIGAR’S HOTLINE

By phone: Afghanistan

Cell: 0700107300

DSN: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303

All voicemail is in Dari, Pashto, and English.

By phone: United States

Toll-free: 866-329-8893

DSN: 312-664-0378

All voicemail is in English and answered during business hours.

By fax: 703-601-4065

By email: sigar.hotline@mail.mil

By web submission: www.sigar.mil/investigations/hotline/report-fraud.aspx

SIGAR-17-62-LL

FINAL_Security Report Cover.indd 1 
Cover photo credit: DOD Photo by Ryan DeBooy 

PAKTIKA

KHOWST

TAKHAR

BADAKHSHAN

BAGHLAN

BAMYAN

FARYAB

WARDAK

KUNAR

KUNDUZ

NURISTAN

NANGARHAR

FARAH

NIMROZ

HELMAND

KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL

GHOR

GHAZNI

BALKH

BADGHIS

KABUL

KAPISA

PAKTIYA

LOGAR

LAGHMAN

JOWZJAN

PARWAN

SAR-E PUL

HERAT

DAYKUNDI

SAMANGAN

PANJSHIR

FINAL_Security Report Cover.indd 2 
2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

Special Inspector General

for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons 

From the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan is the second in a series of lessons 

learned reports to be issued by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction. The report examines how the U.S. government—primarily the 

Departments of Defense, State, and Justice—developed and executed security 

sector assistance (SSA) programs to build, train, advise, and equip the Afghan 

National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), both unilaterally and as part of 

a coalition, from 2002 through 2016. The report identifies lessons to inform U.S. 

policies and actions at the onset of and throughout a contingency operation and 

provides recommendations for improved performance. In Afghanistan today, the 

U.S. effort to train, advise, and assist the ANDSF does not appear to be over. In 

light of the administration’s current focus on strategy in Afghanistan, this report 

provides timely and actionable recommendations for our current and future 

efforts there. 

Our analysis revealed that the U.S. government was not properly prepared 

from the outset to help build an Afghan army and police force that was 

capable of protecting Afghanistan from internal and external threats and 

preventing the country from becoming a terrorist safe haven. We found the 

U.S. government lacked a comprehensive approach to SSA and a coordinating 

body to successfully implement the whole-of-government programs necessary 

to develop a capable and self-sustaining ANDSF. Ultimately, the United States 

designed a force that was not able to provide nationwide security, especially as 

that force faced a larger threat than anticipated after the drawdown of coalition 

military forces. 

SIGAR began its lessons learned program in late 2014 at the urging of 

General John Allen, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and others who had served in 

Afghanistan. This report and those that follow comply with SIGAR’s legislative 

mandate to provide independent and objective leadership and recommendations 

to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; prevent and detect fraud, 

waste, and abuse; and inform Congress and the Secretaries of State and Defense 

about reconstruction-related problems and the need for corrective action. 
2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

Unlike other inspectors general, SIGAR was created by Congress as an 

independent agency, not housed inside any single department. While other 

inspectors general have jurisdiction over the programs and operations 

of their respective departments or agencies, SIGAR has jurisdiction over 

all programs and operations supported with U.S. reconstruction dollars, 

regardless of the agency involved. SIGAR is the only inspector general focused 

solely on the Afghanistan mission, and the only one devoted exclusively to 

reconstruction issues. Because SIGAR has the authority to look across the entire 

reconstruction effort, it is uniquely positioned to identify and address whole-ofgovernment lessons. 

As Reconstructing the ANDSF has done, future lessons learned reports will 

synthesize not only the body of work and expertise of SIGAR, but also that of 

other oversight agencies, government entities, current and former officials with 

on-the-ground experience, academic institutions, and independent scholars. 

The reports will document what the United States sought to accomplish, 

assess what it achieved, and evaluate the degree to which these efforts 

helped the United States reach its strategic goals in Afghanistan. They will 

also provide recommendations to address the challenges stakeholders face in 

ensuring efficient, effective, and sustainable reconstruction efforts, not just 

in Afghanistan, but in future contingency operations. Other lessons learned 

reports, currently in progress, will cover a range of topics, including, but not 

limited to, counternarcotics, stabilization, and private sector development. 

SIGAR’s lessons learned program comprises subject matter experts with 

considerable experience working and living in Afghanistan, aided by a team of 

experienced research analysts. In producing its reports, the program also uses 

the significant skills and experience found in SIGAR’s Audits, Investigations, and 

Research and Analysis directorates, and the Office of Special Projects. I want to 

express my deepest appreciation to the research team members who produced 

this report, and thank them for their dedication and commitment to the project. 

I also want to thank all of the individuals—especially the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford; Resolute Support mission commander, 

General John Nicholson; former Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan (CSTC-A) commander, Major General Richard Kaiser; deployed 

personnel at Resolute Support, the regional train, advise and assist commands, 

and the U.S. Embassy; senior agency officials at the Departments of Defense, 

State, and Justice; and academicians, subject matter experts, and others—

who provided their time and effort to contribute to this report. It is truly a 

collaborative effort meant to not only identify problems, but also to learn from 

them and apply reasonable solutions to improve future reconstruction efforts. 
2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

I believe the lessons learned reports will be a key legacy of SIGAR. Through 

these reports, we hope to reach a diverse audience in the military services 

and the legislative and executive branches, at the strategic and programmatic 

levels, both in Washington and in the field. By leveraging our unique interagency 

mandate, we intend to do everything we can to make sure the lessons from 

the United States’ largest reconstruction effort are identified, acknowledged, 

and, most importantly, remembered and applied to reconstruction efforts in 

Afghanistan, as well as to future conflicts and reconstruction efforts elsewhere 

in the world. 

John F. Sopko 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Arlington, Virginia

September 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS | RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VIII

CHAPTER 1 1

INTRODUCTION 

Why Policy Makers Should Care 

about Security Sector Assistance 3

The Complexities of the U.S. Security 

Sector Assistance Framework 5

CHAPTER 2 11

2001–2003:

BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN 

NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Early U.S. Efforts Did Not Include 

Security Force Development 11

The Afghan Scrimmage for Power 12

Lead Nation Silos: International Commitment 

to Security Sector Reform 14

Afghan National Army 15

Afghan National Police 26

Transitional Forces and Eroding Security 33

CHAPTER 3 35

2004–2008:

RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE TO ADDRESS 

GROWING INSECURITY

Reconstitution of the Taliban 35

Erosion of Local Support 36

United States Takes Ownership of 

Army and Police Development 37

Afghan National Army 38

Afghan National Police 55

CHAPTER 4 69

2009–2014:

U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

U.S. Strategic Review 69

Transition Security to Afghan Lead 71

Afghan National Army 76

Afghan National Police 93
TABLE OF CONTENTS | RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

CHAPTER 5 107

2015–2016:

TRAIN, ADVISE, AND ASSIST

Conditions Not Set, Afghans Face Resilient Insurgency 107

U.S. Leadership Struggles to Stabilize Mission Scope 108

Resolute Support and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel 109

Afghan National Army 111

Afghan National Police 120

CHAPTER 6 131

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES AFFECTING 

ANDSF DEVELOPMENT

Corruption and Conditionality 131

Literacy Training: Building a Sustainable, 

Independent ANDSF 142

Women in the ANDSF 148

ANDSF Equipment and Weapons 153

Attrition in the ANDSF 156

Rotational Training 160

CHAPTER 7 165

KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 8 175

LESSONS

CHAPTER 9 181

RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES 199

Appendix A: Methodology 199

Appendix B: Summary of Relevant 

Audits and Inspections 202

Appendix C: Abbreviations 215

Endnotes 217

Selected Bibliography 247

Acknowledgments 259
ILLUSTRATIONS | RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

FIGURES

Figure 1: Northern Alliance Dominates Security Ministries 13

Figure 2: Lead Nations of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan 14

Figure 3: Initial ANA Plans: Kabul-Centric 18

Figure 4: LOTFA Funding Compared to ANP Growth 29

Figure 5: Afghanistan Security Incidents (2004–2008) 36

Figure 6: ANA Expansion: In Time for 2004 Elections 39

Figure 7: NATO ANA Trust Fund Spikes at Start of Resolute Support 43

Figure 8: Total U.S. Funding for the ANA Compared to the ANP 67

Figure 9: Average U.S. Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, FY 2002–FY 2016 70

Figure 10: NATO Tranches 72

Figure 11: NTM-A Trainer Shortfalls (as of May 17, 2011) 74

Figure 12: U.S. Contribution to NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (Nov 2010) 75

Figure 13: ANA and AAF Force Posture (2014) 77

Figure 14: ASFF Sustainment Funding Increases 80

Figure 15: NATO TAAC Framework Countries 110

Figure 16: ANP Zones vs. ANA Corps Area Boundaries 121
ILLUSTRATIONS | RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

TABLES

Table 1: Department of Defense Security Sector Assistance Programs 6

Table 2: Department of State Security Sector Assistance Programs 7

Table 3: Ministers of the Interior, 2001–2005 31

Table 4: Comparing Key Elements of the Afghan National Army 42

Table 5: Inconsistent Monitoring and Evaluation Systems 51

Table 6: Evolution of CUAT Ratings 53

Table 7: Evolution of ANP Training 99

Table 8: Essential Functions (EF) 111

Table 9: Comparing Key Elements of the Afghan National Police 124
viii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The development of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 

(ANDSF) is a cornerstone of the overall U.S. policy in Afghanistan and a 

key requirement of the U.S. strategy to transition security responsibilities to the 

Afghan government. Since 2002, the ANDSF has been raised, trained, equipped, 

and deployed to secure Afghanistan from internal and external threats, as 

well as to prevent the reestablishment of terrorist safe havens. To achieve 

this, the United States devoted over $70 billion (60 percent) of its Afghanistan 

reconstruction funds to building the ANDSF through 2016, and continues to 

commit over $4 billion per year to that effort. 

This lessons learned report draws important lessons from the U.S. experience 

building the ANDSF since 2002. These lessons are relevant to ongoing 

efforts in Afghanistan, where the United States will likely remain engaged 

in security sector assistance (SSA) efforts to support the ANDSF through at 

least 2020. In addition, the United States currently participates in efforts to 

build other developing-world security forces as a key tenet of its national 

security strategy, an effort which we anticipate will continue and benefit from 

the lessons learned in Afghanistan. Finally, the report provides timely and 

actionable recommendations intended to improve our actions in Afghanistan 

and elsewhere. 

This report examines the U.S. efforts to design, train, advise, assist, and equip 

the ANDSF and describes how these efforts waxed and waned within the policy 

priorities of the United States and other key donors. It charts the evolution of 

the mission from the initial U.S. agreement to serve as the lead nation for the 

development of the Afghan National Army (ANA), to later assuming a level of 

ownership for the success of the Afghan military and police forces, to ultimately 

making their development a critical precondition for reducing U.S. and coalition 

support over time. The report also describes how the U.S. government was 

ill-prepared to develop a national security force in a post-conflict nation; 

the changing resource requirements for ANDSF personnel, equipment, and 

funding; and the inherent tensions within and between the U.S. government and 

international coalition. 

In addition, the report provides a detailed analysis of cross-cutting issues 

affecting ANDSF development. These issues include corruption, illiteracy, the 

role of women, the provision of weapons and equipment, high levels of ANDSF 

attrition, and the annual rotation of U.S. advisors and trainers. 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | ix

Our report identifies 12 key findings regarding the U.S. experience developing 

the ANDSF: 

1. The U.S. government was ill-prepared to conduct SSA programs of the 

size and scope required in Afghanistan. The lack of commonly understood 

interagency terms, concepts, and models for SSA undermined communication 

and coordination, damaged trust, intensified frictions, and contributed to 

initial gross under-resourcing of the U.S. effort to develop the ANDSF. 

2. Initial U.S. plans for Afghanistan focused solely on U.S. military operations 

and did not include the development of an Afghan army, police, or supporting 

ministerial-level institutions. 

3. Early U.S. partnerships with independent militias—intended to advance U.S. 

counterterrorism objectives—ultimately undermined the creation and role of 

the ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP). 

4. Critical ANDSF capabilities, including aviation, intelligence, force 

management, and special forces, were not included in early U.S., Afghan, and 

NATO force-design plans. 

5. The United States failed to optimize coalition nations’ capabilities to support 

SSA missions in the context of international political realities. The wide use 

of national caveats, rationale for joining the coalition, resource constraints 

and military capabilities, and NATO’s force generation processes led to an 

increasingly complex implementation of SSA programs. This resulted in a 

lack of an agreed-upon framework for conducting SSA activities. 

6. Providing advanced Western weapons and management systems to a largely 

illiterate and uneducated force without appropriate training and institutional 

infrastructure created long-term dependencies, required increased U.S. fiscal 

support, and extended sustainability timelines. 

7. The lag in Afghan ministerial and security sector governing capacity hindered 

planning, oversight, and the long-term sustainability of the ANDSF. 

8. Police development was treated as a secondary mission for the U.S. 

government, despite the critical role the ANP played in implementing rule of 

law and providing local-level security nationwide. 

9. The constant turnover of U.S. and NATO trainers impaired the training 

mission’s institutional memory and hindered the relationship building 

required in SSA missions. 
x | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

10. ANDSF monitoring and evaluation tools relied heavily on tangible outputs, 

such as staffing, equipping, and training levels, as well as subjective 

evaluations of leadership. This focus masked intangible factors, such as 

corruption and will to fight, which deeply affected security outcomes and 

failed to adequately factor in classified U.S. intelligence assessments.

11. Because U.S. military plans for ANDSF readiness were created in an 

environment of politically constrained timelines—and because these plans 

consistently underestimated the resilience of the Afghan insurgency and 

overestimated ANDSF capabilities—the ANDSF was ill-prepared to deal with 

deteriorating security after the drawdown of U.S. combat forces. 

12. As security deteriorated, efforts to sustain and professionalize the ANDSF 

became secondary to meeting immediate combat needs. 

In 2002, the United States and its coalition partners concluded that the

development of an internationally trained and professional Afghan national 

security force could serve as a viable alternative to an expansion of international 

forces in Afghanistan. Despite being ill-prepared and lacking proper doctrine, 

policies, and resources, the United States took the lead for building the ANA. 

Coalition partners accepted responsibility for other efforts: police reform 

(Germany), counternarcotics (United Kingdom), judicial reform (Italy), 

and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (Japan). General Karl 

Eikenberry, the first Security Sector Coordinator in Afghanistan, remarked that 

“overall, it might be termed exploratory learning because the many uncertainties 

of the Afghanistan mission added to the steepness of the learning curve.”1

By May 2002, U.S. training of the new ANA began with the deployment of U.S. 

Special Forces to lead the effort. Recognizing that training a national army was 

beyond the core competency of the Special Forces, the United States deployed 

the 10th Mountain Division of the U.S. Army to expand the training program 

from small infantry units to larger military formations and develop defense 

institutions, such as logistics networks. In order to ensure sufficient U.S. 

combat support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Army National Guard assumed 

responsibility for the ANA training mission. 

In 2004, the United Nations described Afghanistan as “volatile, having seriously 

deteriorated in certain parts of the country.”2

 The director of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency reported that enemy attacks had reached “their highest 

levels since the collapse of the Taliban government.”3

 The United States 

recognized that dividing security sector responsibilities among the coalition was 

not producing the desired results, requiring the Bush Administration to increase 

U.S. commitments. In 2005, the United States assumed the lead for developing 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | xi

both the ANA and the ANP, and in 2006, created the Combined Security 

Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) as the proponent responsible for 

training, advising, assisting, and equipping the Afghan security forces. 

When assuming the lead for the ANP mission, the United States failed to 

sufficiently coordinate police training programs and mission requirements 

with Germany, which had previously had the lead, and the European Union. 

The United States preferred a plan to militarize the police as a localized defense 

force, while the Europeans wanted a traditional community policing model. This 

led to conflicting training, advising, and assisting efforts and resulted in 

the current ANP identity crisis. 

As U.S. and coalition military forces tried to get ahead of growing insecurity, 

the United States turned to rapidly expanding the ANDSF on a condensed 

training and development timeline. For the ANA, training capacity at the 

Kabul Military Training Center increased from two to five kandaks (U.S. Army 

battalion equivalents), and basic training was reduced from 14 weeks in 2005 to 

10 weeks in 2007. In 2005, the U.S. military reported that of the 34,000 “trained” 

Afghan police officers, only 3,900 had been through the basic eight-week course, 

while the remainder had attended a two-week transition course. In contrast, 

police recruits in the United States—who are pulled from a highly literate pool 

of high school graduates—attend an average of 21 weeks of basic training, 

followed by weeks of field training. 

The lack of appropriate equipment for the Afghan security forces threatened 

their combat readiness. According to a 2005 U.S. military report, some ANP 

units had less than 15 percent of the required weapons and communications 

systems on hand.4

 In 2006, retired General Barry McCaffrey concluded that the 

ANA was “miserably under-resourced” and such circumstances were becoming a 

“major morale factor for the force.”5

 

Despite known issues with equipping the force, the United States pushed for 

the expansion of ANDSF force strength. By the end of 2006, senior U.S. officials 

told the Afghan government that the United States would withhold funding 

if the Afghans did not agree to expand the ANP from 60,000 to 82,000 police. 

And in 2008, the U.S. and Afghan governments agreed to expand the ANA from 

75,000 to 134,000 (to include a new Afghan Air Force), without considering the 

associated fiscal and resource requirements. 

As part of the expansion of the Afghan military, the United States initiated 

training of specialized units, transitioning the ANA from a light-infantry army 

to a combined arms service with army, air force, and special forces elements. 

The train, advise, and assist programs for these specialized forces were the 
xii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

most successful of the training efforts, and were based on the comprehensive 

and persistent approach taken by U.S. Special Operations Command and some 

elements of the U.S. Air Force. U.S. Special Forces implemented a rigorous 

16-week training program—modeled on the U.S. Army Ranger program—that 

included close and enduring post-training mentorship in the field. This resulted 

in Afghan Special Forces becoming the “best-of-the-best” in the Afghan military. 

And, while still a fledgling institution (largely because the program was not 

initiated until 2006), the Afghan Air Force shows great promise; it recently 

increased its ability to provide close air support and lift to ground forces. 

The U.S. government initiated three specialized police programs after 2005: the 

Afghan National Auxiliary Police, the Afghan Public Protection Program, and 

the Afghan Local Police. With limited oversight from and accountability to the 

Afghan government and the United States, these police forces were reported 

to have engaged in human rights abuses, drug trafficking, and other corrupt 

activities, ultimately serving as a net detractor from security. While the United 

States stopped supporting two of the programs due to these issues, the Afghan 

Local Police continue to operate today.

In 2009, with the Taliban threat increasing and the ANDSF struggling to secure 

the country, President Barack Obama authorized a surge of U.S. combat forces 

and agreed to increase ANDSF end-strength to 352,000. President Obama also 

announced a withdrawal date for combat forces and the transfer of security to 

the ANDSF beginning in mid-2011. With guidance from the president, the U.S. 

military pursued a strategy of rapidly improving security, while also supporting 

the development of a struggling ANDSF. This dual-track strategy resulted in an 

environment ripe for capacity substitution, where U.S. trainers and advisors 

augmented critical gaps in Afghan capability, providing enablers such as close 

air support, airlift, medical evacuation, logistics, and leadership to ensure 

success on the battlefield. At the same time, the mandate to conduct partnered 

operations with the ANDSF taught the Afghans to model their fighting on that of 

the United States, resulting in Afghan ground forces’ increasing dependence on 

U.S.-provided advanced military capabilities. 

Assessment tools used throughout the reconstruction effort evaluated 

tangible information, such as recruitment, training, and equipment, and failed 

to assess subjective factors, such as corruption, leadership, and battlefield 

performance. These assessment systems created disincentives for Afghan units 

to improve because the coalition prioritized supporting units with lower ratings. 

Furthermore, from 2005 to 2016, the United States used four different ANDSF 

assessment methodologies that resulted in inconsistent and often contradictory 

conclusions about the quality and readiness of the forces. 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | xiii

The ANDSF train, advise, and assist effort was chronically understaffed. In 

2009, NATO established the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A) as 

a partner organization to CSTC-A. In February 2010, when NTM-A/CSTC-A 

became fully operational, only 1,810 of the required 4,083 trainers were in place. 

Similar shortages remained as time went on. Even in those areas deemed critical 

priorities, NTM-A struggled to meet its personnel requirements. In November 

2010, for example, about 36 percent of instructor positions seen as critical 

priorities were unfilled. At a time when the ANA was rapidly expanding toward 

a force strength goal of 171,600, these staffing shortfalls at training facilities 

and in the field negatively affected planned ANDSF development. General John 

Craddock, Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 2006 to 2009, stated that 

“NATO nations have never completely filled the agreed requirements for forces 

needed in Afghanistan” since mission inception.6

With a poor monitoring and evaluation system, and the United States and 

NATO substituting for the capacity and capability of the ANDSF, it was not a 

surprise that, as U.S. and NATO forces drew down and transitioned to training 

and advising at the regional and institutional level, the ANDSF struggled 

to succeed. General Joseph Dunford warned the Senate Armed Services 

Committee in March 2014 that upon coalition troop withdrawal, the “Afghan 

security forces will begin to deteriorate.... I think the only debate is the pace of 

that deterioration.”7

It was not until 2015 that the United States and NATO prioritized security 

sector governance and defense institution building over improving the fighting 

capabilities of the force. Prior to 2015, developing Afghan ministerial capability 

in the security sector was primarily focused on governing initiatives that would 

improve the combat effectiveness of the force, often postponing the governing 

functions that are critical to improving accountability, oversight, professional 

development, and command of subordinate units. 

Starting in January 2015, U.S. and NATO forces have provided train, advise, 

and assist support to the ANDSF at the ANA corps level, the ANP zone level, 

and within the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Four regional train, advise, 

and assist commands (TAAC) provide routine support to ANDSF units in close 

proximity and will “fly-to-advise” to more remote locations, as needed. This 

posture has significantly decreased U.S. “touch-points” with ANDSF units, 

causing the United States to rely on ANDSF information to understand the 

forces’ needs and struggles. Leaving some units uncovered, without regular U.S. 

advisors, proved disastrous in the summer of 2015, as the ANA 215th Corps in 

Helmand completely collapsed and had to be reconstituted. 
xiv | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Even with improved U.S. SSA efforts, corruption within the security forces 

and associated ministries continues to corrode the ANDSF’s force readiness 

and battlefield performance. By 2013, corruption was officially recognized as a 

critical threat to U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. Despite consistent reports of 

rampant corruption, U.S. security-related aid was provided with little oversight 

or accountability. According to Lieutenant General Todd Semonite, former 

commanding general of CSTC-A, the United States had “no conditions” on funds 

flowing through CSTC-A to the Afghan defense and interior ministries prior 

to 2014.8

 SIGAR noted in a 2015 report to Congress that, even with conditions 

on U.S. aid, Afghan leaders “may construct compliance charades like enacting 

high-sounding but unenforced laws and conceal day-to-day practices.” Today, 

the Ministry of Interior (MOI) is widely accepted as one of the most corrupt 

institutions in Afghanistan. In May 2017, at the Third Annual European Union 

Anti-Corruption Conference, President Ashraf Ghani publicly admitted that 

“the Ministry of Interior is the heart of corruption in the security sector.”9

As security in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate, force protection 

requirements have increased, ultimately restricting U.S. advisors’ ability to 

operate. Civilian advisors, once able to drive themselves to the Ministry of 

Defense (MOD) and MOI, are now forced to move with armed guards, in 

convoys, or even by helicopter. Expeditionary Advisory Packages—the U.S. 

military’s way of reaching remote units—typically travel in large armored 

convoys supported by U.S. air power. In these packages, advisor to security 

personnel ratios can be as high as 1 to 3. President Ghani is attempting to 

restructure the ANDSF to optimize offensive capabilities and to reverse the 

eroding stalemate, but with the U.S. military confined to large bases and the 

civilian advisory mission largely stuck behind U.S. Embassy Kabul’s walls, there 

are limits on what can be achieved. 

LESSONS

This report identifies 11 lessons to inform U.S. policies and actions at the onset 

of and throughout a contingency operation.

1. The U.S. government is not well organized to conduct SSA missions in postconflict nations or in the developing world because our doctrine, policies, 

personnel, and programs are insufficient to meet mission requirements 

and expectations.

2. SSA cannot employ a one-size-fits-all approach; it must be tailored to a host 

nation’s context and needs. Security force structures and capabilities will not 

outlast U.S. assistance efforts if the host nation does not fully buy into such 

efforts and take ownership of SSA programs.
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | xv

3. Senior government and nongovernment leaders in post-conflict or 

developing-world countries are likely to scrimmage for control of security 

forces; SSA missions should avoid empowering factions.

4. Western equipment and systems provided to developing-world militaries are 

likely to create chronic, high-cost dependencies. 

5. Security force assessment methodologies are often unable to evaluate the 

impact of intangible factors such as leadership, corruption, malign influence, 

and dependency, which can lead to an underappreciation of how such factors 

can undermine readiness and battlefield performance. 

6. Developing and training a national police force is best accomplished by law 

enforcement professionals in order to achieve a police capability focused on 

community policing and criminal justice.

7. To improve the effectiveness of SSA missions in coalition operations, the U.S. 

government must acknowledge and compensate for any coalition staffing 

shortfalls and national caveats that relate to trainers, advisors, and embedded 

training teams. 

8. Developing foreign military and police capabilities is a whole-ofgovernment mission. 

9. In Afghanistan and other parts of the developing world, the creation of 

specialized security force units often siphons off the conventional force’s 

most capable leaders and most educated recruits. 

10. SSA missions must assess the needs of the entire spectrum of the security 

sector, including rule of law and corrections programs, in addition to 

developing the nation’s police and armed forces. Synchronizing SSA efforts 

across all pillars of the security sector is critical. 

11. SSA training and advising positions are not currently career enhancing 

for uniformed military personnel, regardless of the importance U.S. 

military leadership places on the mission. Therefore, experienced and 

capable military professionals with SSA experience often choose non-SSA 

assignments later in their careers, resulting in the continual deployment of 

new and inexperienced forces for SSA missions. 
xvi | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

RECOMMENDATIONS

SIGAR recommends the following actions that can be undertaken by Congress 

or executive branch agencies to inform U.S. security sector assistance efforts 

at the onset of and throughout reconstruction efforts, and to institutionalize 

the lessons learned from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan. The first set of 

recommendations is applicable to any current or future contingency operation 

and the second set of recommendations is specific to Afghanistan.

Legislative Recommendations

1. The U.S. Congress should consider (1) establishing a commission to review 

the institutional authorities, roles, and resource mechanisms of each major 

U.S. government stakeholder in SSA missions, and (2) evaluating the 

capabilities of each department and military service to determine where SSA 

expertise should best be institutionalized. 

2. The U.S. Congress should consider mandating a full review of all U.S. foreign 

police development programs, identify a lead agency for all future police 

development activities, and provide the identified agency with the necessary 

staff, authorities, and budget to accomplish its task. 

Executive Agency Recommendations

1. Department of Defense (DOD) and State SSA planning must include holistic 

initial assessments of mission requirements that should cover the entire 

range of the host nation’s security sector. 

2. DOD and State should coordinate all U.S. security sector plans and designs 

with host-nation officials prior to implementation to deconflict cultural 

differences, align sustainability requirements, and agree to the desired size 

and capabilities of the force. DOD and State should also engage with any 

coalition partners to ensure unity of effort and purpose. 

3. DOD, in partnership with State, should reinforce with host-nation leaders 

that the United States will only support the development of a national 

security force that is inclusive of the social, political, and ethnic diversity of 

the nation. 

4. To prevent the empowerment of one political faction or ethnic group, DOD, 

in coordination with State and the intelligence community, should monitor, 

evaluate, and assess all formal and informal security forces operating within 

a host nation. DOD should also identify and monitor both formal and informal 

chains of command and map social networks of the host nation’s security 

forces. DOD’s intelligence agencies should track and analyze political 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | xvii

associations, biographical data, and patronage networks of senior security 

officials and political leadership. 

5. DOD, State, and other key SSA stakeholders should enhance civilian and 

military career fields in security sector assistance, and create personnel 

systems capable of tracking employee SSA experience and skills to expedite 

the deployment of these experts. 

6. DOD and State should mandate professional development and training for 

all civilian and military members involved in SSA activities, as well as review 

curricula from the current training programs to align training with mission 

requirements and fully prepare deploying SSA personnel. 

7. To overcome staffing shortages within a coalition, DOD and State should 

bolster political and diplomatic efforts to ensure better compliance with 

agreed-upon resource contributions from partner nations and, if unsuccessful 

and unable to fill the gaps, reassess timeframes and anticipated outcomes to 

accommodate new realities. 

DOD-Specific Recommendations

1. Prior to the initiation of an SSA mission—and periodically throughout the 

mission—DOD should report to the U.S. Congress on its assessments of U.S. 

and host-nation shared SSA objectives, alongside an evaluation of the host 

nation’s political, social, economic, diplomatic, and historical context, to 

shape security sector requirements. 

2. DOD should lead the creation of new interagency doctrine for security 

sector assistance that includes best practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, 

Kosovo, and Vietnam. 

3. DOD should review the evolution of command structures and assessment 

methodologies used in Afghanistan and Iraq to determine best practices 

and a recommended framework to be applied to future SSA missions. DOD 

should design new monitoring and evaluation tools capable of analyzing both 

tangible and intangible factors affecting force readiness. 

4. DOD should conduct a human capital, threat, and material needs assessment 

and design a force accordingly, with the appropriate systems and equipment. 

5. When creating specialized units such as special forces, DOD should 

submit human capital assessments and sustainability analyses for both the 

specialized and conventional forces to the House and Senate Appropriations 

and Armed Services Committees. Force capability assessments must 
xviii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

determine the best course of action, including redesigning requirements for 

each unit. 

6. DOD should diversify the leadership assigned to develop foreign military 

forces, to include civilian defense officials with expertise in the governing 

and accountability systems required in a military institution. 

7. DOD and the military services should institutionalize security sector 

assistance and create specialized SSA units that are fully trained and ready to 

deploy rapidly for immediate SSA missions. DOD should create an institution 

responsible for coordinating and deconflicting SSA activities between the 

services and greater DOD, provide pre-deployment training, and serve as 

the lead proponent for security sector governance requirements, including 

defense institution building. 

Afghanistan-Specific Recommendations

While the United States continues to support the development and professionalization of the ANDSF, there are several actions that can be taken now to 

improve our SSA efforts. 

Executive Agency Recommendations

1. Realign the U.S. advisor mission to meet the operational and organizational 

roles and responsibilities of the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI. 

2. Recreate proponent leads for the ANA and ANP. 

3. Create a rear element to provide persistent and comprehensive support to 

CSTC-A and the TAACs. 

4. Synchronize troop decisions with NATO force generation conference 

schedules and begin discussions for post-2020 NATO support to Afghanistan. 

5. Mandate SSA pre-deployment training at service-level training centers. 

6. Create incentives for military and civilian personnel with expertise in SSA. 

7. Improve ANDSF governing, oversight, and accountability systems. 

8. Impose stringent conditionality mechanisms to eliminate the ANDSF’s culture 

of impunity. 

9. Develop a civilian cadre of security sector governance personnel at MOD 

and MOI. 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | xix

10. Institutionalize rotational schedules that allow for continuity in mission 

and personnel. 

11. Increase civilian advisors to the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI. 

DOD-Specific Recommendations

1. Implement best practices and develop mitigation strategies for the Afghan Air 

Force recapitalization.

2. Conduct a human capital assessment of the ANDSF conventional and 

special forces. 

3. Review combat and logistics enabler support to the ANA.

4. Increase advisory capacity in ANA military academies and ANA and ANP 

training centers. 

5. Expand the train, advise, and assist mission below the corps level. 

6. Consider security requirements, such as guardian angels for trainers and 

advisors, when making decisions on contributing additional troops. 

7. Ensure that the necessary technical oversight is available when maintenance 

or training tasks are delegated to support contracts.

8. Consider deploying law enforcement professionals to advise the ANP. 

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION 

The development of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 

(ANDSF) is a cornerstone of the overall U.S. policy in Afghanistan and a key 

requirement of the U.S. strategy to transition security to the Afghan government. 

Since 2002, the ANDSF has been raised, trained, equipped, and deployed to 

secure Afghanistan from internal and external threats, as well as to prevent the 

reestablishment of terrorist safe havens. To achieve this outcome, the United 

States devoted over $70 billion (60 percent) of its Afghanistan reconstruction 

funds to building the ANDSF through 2016, and continues to commit over 

$4 billion per year to that effort. 

This lessons learned report draws important lessons from the U.S. experience 

building the ANDSF since 2002. These lessons are relevant to ongoing efforts 

in Afghanistan, where the United States will likely remain engaged in security 

sector assistance (SSA) efforts to support the ANDSF through at least 2020. 

In addition, the United States currently participates in efforts to build other 

developing-world security forces as a key tenet of its national security strategy, 

an effort we anticipate will continue. The report further provides timely and 

actionable recommendations intended to improve U.S. operations and outcomes 

in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 

U.S. Army photo
2 | CHAPTER 1 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

This report is divided into nine chapters. After the introductory section, 

chapters two through five characterize the different eras of U.S. efforts to 

design, train, advise, assist, and equip the ANDSF and describe how these efforts 

waxed and waned within the policy priorities of the United States and other 

key donors. The chapters chart the evolution of the mission from the United 

States’ initial agreement to serve as the lead nation for developing the Afghan 

National Army (ANA), to later assuming a level of ownership for the success of 

the Afghan military and police forces, to ultimately making their development 

a critical precondition for reducing U.S. and coalition support over time. These 

sections note how the U.S. government was ill-prepared to develop a national 

security force in a post-conflict nation; the changing resource requirements for 

ANDSF personnel, equipment, and funding; and the inherent tensions within and 

between the U.S. government and the international coalition. 

Chapter six provides a detailed analysis of cross-cutting issues affecting ANDSF 

development. These issues impacted both military and police development 

and were a persistent challenge from the beginning of the U.S. effort. They 

include corruption, illiteracy, the role of women, the provision of weapons 

and equipment, high levels of ANDSF attrition, and the annual rotation of U.S. 

advisors and trainers. 

Chapters seven through nine constitute the report’s conclusion. Chapter seven 

outlines in depth the key findings from our analysis of the U.S. efforts to develop 

the ANDSF. Chapter eight provides the lessons derived from this analysis. 

Chapter nine offers recommendations for improving security sector assistance 

efforts in Afghanistan and future contingency operations.

The report identifies 12 key findings regarding the U.S. experience developing 

the ANDSF: 

1. The U.S. government was ill-prepared to conduct SSA programs of the 

size and scope required in Afghanistan. The lack of commonly understood 

interagency terms, concepts, and models for SSA undermined communication 

and coordination, damaged trust, intensified frictions, and contributed to 

initial gross under-resourcing of the U.S. effort to develop the ANDSF. 

2. Initial U.S. plans for Afghanistan focused solely on U.S. military operations 

and did not include the construction of an Afghan army, police, or supporting 

ministerial-level institutions. 

3. Early U.S. partnerships with independent militias—intended to advance U.S. 

counterterrorism objectives—ultimately undermined the creation and role of 

the ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP). 

4. Critical ANDSF capabilities, including aviation, intelligence, force 

management, and special forces, were not included in early U.S., Afghan, 

and NATO force-design plans. 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 3

5. The United States failed to optimize coalition nations’ capabilities to

support SSA missions in the context of international political realities. 

The wide use of national caveats, rationale for joining the coalition, 

resource constraints and military capabilities, and NATO’s force generation 

processes led to an increasingly complex implementation of SSA programs. 

This resulted in a lack of an agreed-upon framework for conducting 

SSA activities. 

6. Providing advanced Western weapons and management systems to a largely 

illiterate and uneducated force without appropriate training and institutional 

infrastructure created long-term dependencies, required increased U.S. fiscal 

support, and extended sustainability timelines. 

7. The lag in Afghan ministerial and security sector governing capacity hindered 

planning, oversight, and the long-term sustainability of the ANDSF. 

8. Police development was treated as a secondary mission for the U.S. 

government, despite the critical role the ANP played in implementing rule of 

law and providing local-level security nationwide. 

9. The constant turnover of U.S. and NATO trainers impaired the training 

mission’s institutional memory and hindered the relationship building 

required in SSA missions. 

10. ANDSF monitoring and evaluation tools relied heavily on tangible outputs, 

such as staffing, equipping, and training levels, as well as subjective 

evaluations of leadership. This focus masked intangible factors, such as 

corruption and will to fight, which deeply affected security outcomes and 

failed to adequately factor in classified U.S. intelligence assessments.

11. Because U.S. military plans for ANDSF readiness were created in an 

environment of politically constrained timelines—and because these plans 

consistently underestimated the resilience of the Afghan insurgency and 

overestimated ANDSF capabilities—the ANDSF was ill-prepared to deal with 

deteriorating security after the drawdown of U.S. combat forces. 

12. As security deteriorated, efforts to sustain and professionalize the ANDSF 

became secondary to meeting immediate combat needs. 

WHY POLICY MAKERS SHOULD CARE 

ABOUT SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE

A fully capable ANDSF that is able to secure Afghanistan from internal and 

external threats and prevent the re-establishment of terrorist safe havens is a 

U.S. national security objective. Despite U.S. government expenditures of more 

than $70 billion in security sector assistance to design, train, advise, assist, and 

equip the ANDSF, the Afghan security forces are not yet capable of securing 

their own nation. Learning what has worked well—or not—over the past 16 

years is important to improving ongoing efforts to create a capable ANDSF, as 

well as ensuring that future SSA efforts achieve their objectives. 
4 | CHAPTER 1 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

In general, security sector assistance to foreign governments is used to meet 

U.S. national security objectives and increase U.S. influence globally. The United 

States aims to empower partner nations to address regional and national threats 

without a large deployment of U.S. combat forces. The 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance noted that “building partner capacity” is a key component of defense 

planning and will be used as a means of decreasing Department of Defense 

(DOD) budgets over time.10 According to media reporting, a 2009 private White 

House briefing estimated the cost of deploying one U.S. soldier to Afghanistan 

to be about $1 million per year.11 While $70 billion for SSA efforts over a 

14-year period is a significant amount of money, that same amount equals the 

deployment of 70,000 U.S. soldiers to Afghanistan for only a single year, making 

SSA a truly cost-effective option. 

While the U.S. government has a number of individual department and agency 

initiatives to improve SSA programs, it currently lacks a comprehensive, wholeof-government approach and coordinating body to manage implementation 

and provide oversight of these programs. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates described “America’s interagency toolkit” for building the security 

capacity of partner nations as a “hodgepodge of jerry-rigged arrangements 

constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent 

shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.”12 For example, in 2016 the 

RAND Corporation identified 106 “core” DOD security cooperation statutes 

within Title 10 of the U.S. Code. That same year, the United States Institute of 

Peace (USIP) identified 24 programs in seven different U.S. agencies responsible 

just for police development.13

“America’s interagency toolkit” for building the security capacity 

of partner nations was a “hodgepodge of jerry-rigged arrangements 

constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, 

persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.”

—U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

In the 2016 Brussels Agreement, the United States committed to supporting the 

ANDSF through 2020. The U.S. administration is currently deliberating a new 

Afghanistan strategy, to include potentially long-term support to training, advising, 

and assisting the ANDSF. It is therefore necessary to identify, understand, and 

apply U.S., NATO, and Afghan lessons learned over the last 15 years of SSA 

efforts to position the United States to meet its national security objectives 

in Afghanistan, and to eventually support the exit of U.S. combat forces from 

that nation. 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 5

THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE U.S. SECURITY 

SECTOR ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK

The legal and institutional framework of SSA originated in congressional 

documents, legislation, and executive orders beginning in the late 1940s. The 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 cemented the Secretary of State’s policy and 

oversight role in SSA, with DOD serving as the primary executor. Starting in 

the 1980s, Congress provided DOD with its own SSA authorities under Title 10 

and the annual National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA). These authorities 

increased through the 1990s, ultimately giving DOD the ability to independently 

fund security assistance programs for counternarcotics, humanitarian assistance, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism, each with State’s concurrence.14

Following the mass casualty terror attacks in the U.S. homeland on September 

11, 2001, and the eventual U.S. commitment to reconstruct both the Afghan 

and Iraqi security forces, Congress substantially increased State and DOD 

authorities to train, advise, assist, and equip foreign security forces. Due to 

State’s limited number of personnel and ability to oversee security programs, 

DOD’s role ultimately increased beyond State’s oversight capacity. To meet 

the growing demand for SSA activities, DOD’s authorities and responsibilities 

were increased.15

Security Sector Assistance

Security sector assistance is defined in the 2013 Presidential Policy Directive 23 

(PPD 23) as “policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to: (1) engage 

with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector; 

(2) help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate 

institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and (3) enable foreign 

partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.”16 

Within DOD alone, there are programs for building partner capacity, security assistance, security sector assistance, security force assistance, global train and equip 

missions, and defense institution building (table 1 on the next page). Currently, 

DOD views each of these separate programs as fitting under the umbrella of 

“security cooperation,” a term used when the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA) administers defense equipment, military training, and other 

defense-related services. The purpose of security cooperation, as defined by DOD, 

is to “build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, 

develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational 

operations, and provide the U.S. with peacetime and contingency access to a host 

nation.”17 With the exception of defense institution building, each of these programs largely focuses on improving the effectiveness of fighting forces, without 

addressing the governance and civilian authorities that oversee them. 
6 | CHAPTER 1 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

It was not until 2008 that DOD began two small programs aimed specifically 

at improving security sector governance: the Defense Institutional Reform 

Initiative (DIRI) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Security 

Cooperation, and the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program, aligned 

under DSCA. To date, DOD lacks a coordinating and oversight institution 

Security sector 

governance is the 

transparent, accountable, and legitimate 

management and oversight of security policy 

and practice.

TABLE 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Program Description

Security Cooperation

According to DSCA, security cooperation “comprises all activities undertaken by [DOD] to encourage and 

enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.” Additionally, 

security cooperation promotes specific U.S. security interests, develops allied and friendly military capabilities, 

and provides U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

Security Sector 

Assistance (SSA)

DOD uses the 2013 definition of SSA established in PPD 23. SSA refers to the policies, programs, and 

activities the United States uses to engage with foreign partners to assist them with their security sector development; this includes building and sustaining partner nations’ security capacities and enabling foreign partners 

to contribute to common security challenge efforts. SSA is intended to complement U.S. national security and 

foreign assistance objectives.

Security Force Assistance 

(SFA)

SFA entails all DOD activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security 

forces and their supporting institutions. SFA focuses on helping foreign security forces independently make 

decisions and conduct operations. Also, SFA seeks to support the professionalization and sustainability of 

foreign security forces. 

Building Partner 

Capacity (BPC)

DSCA is responsible for managing the execution of a wide array of Title 10 and Title 22 programs designed 

to advance partner nation capacity and capabilities through the provision of training and equipment. Also, 

through Title 10 humanitarian-related programs, DOD seeks to achieve national security objectives by building 

military-civilian relations. DSCA houses BPC programs within the Directorate of BPC, which is organized into 

separate divisions: equipping division; humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and mine action division; and 

training division. A mixture of DOD Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales-funded personnel 

comprise the staffing for these programs.

Train and Equip

Train and equip programs are established in accordance with Section 1206 of the NDAA to build the capacity 

of foreign military forces. The Secretary of Defense, with concurrence from the Secretary of State, supports and 

conducts various programs to build the capacity of a foreign military force so the country can sustain its forces 

and defend itself without assistance.

Defense Institution 

Building (DIB)

DOD Directive 5205.82, issued in January 2016, describes DIB as “security cooperation activities that 

empower partner nation defense institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to make 

their defense sector more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and responsive to civilian control.” 

DIB increases the sustainability of other DOD security cooperation programs and is typically conducted at the 

ministerial, general, joint staff, and military headquarters levels. Defense institutions include the people, organizations, rules, norms, values, and behaviors that enable a defense enterprise to function with proper oversight, 

governance, and management.

Ministry of Defense 

Advisors (MODA)

Piloted in July 2010, this effort partnered DOD civilian experts with foreign defense and security officials to 

build core competencies in areas such as strategy and policy, human resources management, acquisition and 

logistics, and financial management. Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence from 

the Secretary of State, to assign DOD civilian employees as advisors to the ministries of defense of foreign 

countries in the fiscal year (FY) 2012 NDAA. In Afghanistan, where the program was first implemented, MODA 

sought to address past concerns regarding advisors’ lack of expertise.

Defense Institutional 

Reform Initiative (DIRI)

DIRI is a “global institutional capacity-building program that supports partner nation ministries of defense 

(MOD) and related institutions to address capacity gaps.” To address partner nation weaknesses and shortfalls, 

DIRI provides subject matter experts to work with partner nation leaders. 

Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Directorate of Building Partnership Capacity,” http://www.dsca.mil/about-us/programs-pgm (accessed 

February 7, 2017); DSCA, “Security Cooperation Overview and Relationships,” http://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-1 (accessed February 7, 2017); 

GAO, Security Force Assistance: The Army and Marine Corps Have Ongoing Efforts to Identify and Track Advisors, but the Army Needs a Plan to Capture Advising 

Experience, GAO-14-482, July 11, 2014, p. 1; DSCA, “Security Force Assistance (SFA),” http://samm.dsca.mil/glossary/security-force-assistance-sfa 

(accessed February 7, 2017); DOD, “Instruction 5000.68 – Security Force Assistance,” October 27, 2010, p. 2; DOD, “Directive 5205.82 – Defense 

Institution Building (DIB),” January 27, 2016, p. 13; GAO, Building Partner Capacity: DOD Should Improve Its Reporting to Congress on Challenges to Expanding 

Ministry of Defense Advisors Program, GAO-15-279, February 2015, pp. 1–2; DODIG, Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program Elements Need to Be 

Defined, DODIG-2013-019, November 9, 2012, p. 2; DSCA, “Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI),” http://www.dsca.mil/programs/defense-institutional-reform-initiative (accessed February 8, 2017); DOD, “Directive 5132.03 – DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” December 

29, 2016, p. 17; White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy,” April 5, 2013; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 

Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1206; DOD, “Instruction 5111.19 - Section 1206 Global Train-and-Equip Authority,” July 26, 2011.
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 7

responsible for all defense and military security assistance activities conducted 

independently by the military services, Joint Staff, DSCA, and OSD. 

State’s SSA authorities are largely derived from Title 22 of the U.S. Code. 

For State, the security assistance portfolio has no formal definition, but 

rather consists of six budget accounts under the header “International 

Security Assistance.”18 State’s DOD-implemented programs, such as Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International 

Military Education and Training (IMET), are conducted under State’s Title 22 

authorities. State also administers its own programs authorized by Title 22, 

including International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); 

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR); and 

Peacekeeping Operations (table 2). While DOD categorizes its efforts under the 

TABLE 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Program Description

Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS)

FMS is a form of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) intended to strengthen 

U.S. security and promote world peace. The Secretary of State determines which countries are eligible to 

participate in FMS and the Secretary of Defense executes the programs. FMS is conducted through formal contracts or agreements between the U.S. government and an authorized foreign purchaser through a seven-step 

process.

Foreign Military 

Financing (FMF)

FMF is also authorized through the AECA and provides the authority to finance procurement of defense items 

for foreign countries and international organizations. FMF gives eligible partner nations the ability to purchase 

U.S. defense articles, training, and services through FMS or foreign military financing of direct commercial 

contracts. Similar to the FMS program, the Secretary of State determines which countries are eligible and the 

Secretary of Defense executes the programs. FMF funds are appropriated by Congress through the Department 

of State Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriation Act.

International Military 

Education and Training 

(IMET)

According to a 2014 joint report to Congress on FMF, State and DOD agreed that IMET was a “low-cost, highly 

effective component of U.S. security assistance.” To address security issues and improve defense cooperation 

between the United States and other countries, IMET seeks to establish regional stability through cohesive 

military-to-military relations. Additionally, IMET provides training to foreign military forces and civilian personnel 

to reinforce their adherence to democratic values within their government and military.

International Narcotics 

Control and Law 

Enforcement (INCLE)

In partnership with DOD, INCLE seeks to combat international drug trafficking, terrorist organizations, and 

other transnational crime groups through the training of foreign law enforcement and security institutions. 

INCLE provides training and other essential support for foreign governments to identify, confront, and disrupt 

the operations of illicit groups before they become a U.S. national security threat. INCLE funds are focused on 

areas where security situations are most dire and where U.S. resources are used in tandem with host country 

government strategies.

Nonproliferation, AntiTerrorism, Demining, 

and Related Programs 

(NADR)

NADR seeks to counter foreign terrorist fighters, destroy small arms, clear unexploded ordnance, and address 

other critical, security-related issues. The programs within NADR primarily entail working with other countries to 

reduce transnational threats.

Peacekeeping Operations 

(PKO)

PKO funds “support multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations that are not funded through 

the [United Nations].” PKO seeks to address gaps in capabilities to allow countries and regional organizations 

to participate in a variety of peacekeeping operations, as well as to reform security forces in a post-conflict 

environment.

Source: Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, “Chapter 5: Foreign Military Sales Process,” Green Book, January 2017, pp. 5-1, 5-2; 

DSCA, “Foreign Military Financing,” http://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-financing-fmf (accessed February 8, 2017); House Committee on 

Appropriations, State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, H.R. Rep. 114-154 (June 15, 2015), pp. 42-49; DOS and DOD, Foreign 

Military Training Joint Report to Congress, October 30, 2014, pp. II-1, II-2, II-3; DOS, “Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

Program and Budget Guide: Fiscal Year 2012 Budget,” https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rpt/pbg/fy2012/185676.htm (accessed April 20, 2017); DOS, 

“Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Program and Budget Guide: Fiscal Year 2012 Budget,” https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/

rpt/pbg/fy2012/185676.htm (accessed April 20, 2017); DOS, “Peacekeeping Operations Account Summary,” https://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/

c14563.htm (accessed February 8, 2017).
8 | CHAPTER 1 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

umbrella of security cooperation, State defines all support to foreign military 

and security forces as security sector assistance. 

In an effort to address the complexity of U.S. SSA programs, the administration 

of President Barack Obama ordered a top-down review of all security 

assistance programs and authorities in 2009. As a result of this review, the 

White House issued PPD 23 in April 2013, mandating an overhaul of SSA policy. 

PPD 23 required establishing a new interagency framework for planning, 

implementing, assessing, and overseeing SSA to foreign governments and 

international organizations.19 The White House Fact Sheet for PPD 23 stated 

that SSA programs were aimed at “strengthening the ability of the United 

States to help allies and partner nations to build their own security capacity 

consistent with the principles of good governance and rule of law.” A further 

goal of PPD 23 was to promote “universal values, such as good governance, 

transparent and accountable oversight of security forces, rule of law, 

transparency, accountability, delivery of fair and effective justice, and respect 

for human rights.”20

Congress took several actions in the FY 2017 NDAA to enhance and improve 

DOD’s authorities to conduct SSA. In Section 1204, Congress mandated an 

evaluation of DOD’s framework for security cooperation activities by an 

independent entity, which must submit its recommendations to Congress by 

November 1, 2018. Congress further recommended in Section 1205 that the 

Secretary of Defense “develop and maintain an assessment, monitoring, and 

evaluation framework for security cooperation with foreign countries to ensure 

accountability and foster implementation of best practices.”21 Recognizing that 

DOD has historically prioritized improving the kinetic capabilities of combat 

forces and placed less attention on the governing institutions overseeing them, 

Section 1233 stated that “the Secretary shall certify ... a program of institutional 

capacity building ... to enhance the capacity of such foreign country to exercise 

responsible civilian control of the national security forces of such foreign 

country” as a part of future security assistance programs.22 State, Department of 

Justice (DOJ), and other non-DOD SSA stakeholders have not been subject to 

the same scrutiny and review of SSA-related authorities and capabilities. 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 9

Complexities Enhanced: Security Sector Assistance within NATO

SSA in Afghanistan was a “whole-of-governments” effort, as programs and initiatives were 

divided among the United States, NATO, and non-NATO coalition partners, fundamentally 

increasing the complexity of the mission. After 9/11, NATO invoked Article 5 of the 

alliance’s charter for the first time, leading to the creation of the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) as the first NATO expeditionary mission.23 While some U.S. 

military and civilian personnel had prior experience operating under a NATO charter, for 

example, in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti, the United States had never partnered with NATO 

on a mission of the size and scale required in Afghanistan. 

Understanding NATO processes, capabilities, and authorities was a challenge for U.S. 

officials, in particular because these activities often did not align with U.S. doctrine, 

policies, and authorities, as was the case with SSA missions.24 Furthermore, the 

deployment of NATO advisors and trainers was often held up by NATO’s force-generation 

processes, and the advisory missions were therefore chronically understaffed and underresourced. Due to the lack of standardization in NATO deployments, assigned trainers 

and advisors were beholden to their individual country’s rules, laws, and caveats; as a 

result, NATO forces lacked a uniform mission and purpose.25 In addition, chronic issues 

of interoperability and information sharing unnecessarily complicated the mission. 

All of these differences led to the creation of an unsynchronized force and limited the 

development of the ANDSF.26 To this day, the United States and its NATO partners lack a 

commonly shared doctrine or policy for conducting security sector assistance missions. 

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 11

CHAPTER 2

2001–2003: 

BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES 

EARLY U.S. EFFORTS DID NOT INCLUDE 

SECURITY FORCE DEVELOPMENT

On 9/11, the U.S. military had no plans prepared and readily available for 

operations in Afghanistan. As a result, the U.S. response was initially led by 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operators, leveraging intelligence assets and 

personal relationships with anti-Taliban militias, mainly the Northern Alliance 

faction. Small teams of U.S. Special Forces quickly deployed to Afghanistan and 

partnered with CIA and Northern Alliance teams to target Taliban positions and 

track and attack al-Qaeda leaders.27 A little over two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, 

the White House published its “Declaratory Policy on Afghanistan,” describing the 

United States’ focused goal in Afghanistan as “simple: eradicate the terrorism that 

led to the strikes that killed citizens of 78 countries on September 11.”28

On October 7, 2001, with military plans finalized, President George Bush 

authorized Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and its strikes on al-Qaeda 

training camps and Taliban military installations. In his address to the nation 

that evening, the president stated, “Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the 

battle is broader.”29 Based on the need for a rapid response to the 9/11 attacks, 

DOD planners focused on kinetic operations and had little time to plan for postJason Howk photo
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

12 | CHAPTER 2 | 2001–2003: BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

conflict reconstruction, including building a national army and police force. The 

Bush administration, staunchly opposed to nation building, drafted a document 

for discussion among senior officials that stated the United States “should not 

commit to any post-Taliban military involvement, since the U.S. will be heavily 

engaged in anti-terrorism efforts worldwide.”30 The U.S.-partnered operations 

with the Northern Alliance and U.S. air superiority quickly overwhelmed the 

Taliban battle lines, forcing large units to surrender or withdraw to Talibancontrolled pockets in the south and east of Afghanistan. Senior U.S. officials 

rebuffed Taliban surrender and reconciliation overtures to Afghan factional 

leaders, preferring a military defeat of the Taliban.31 On December 7, 2001, 

Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan Mullah Salam Zaeef announced the Taliban’s 

strategic withdrawal from Afghanistan.32

Operation Enduring Freedom vs. the International Security Assistance Force

From 2001 to 2015, two separate and independent operations were being conducted 

simultaneously in Afghanistan: the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the NATOled and UN-approved International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). OEF was principally 

designed to target al-Qaeda and Taliban elements as part of the U.S. Global War on Terrorism, 

with a secondary mission of developing the ANA and eventually the police. With the primary 

U.S. focus on counterterrorism operations, senior U.S. officials believed that reconstruction of 

Afghanistan should be the responsibility of the international community. 

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 established ISAF in 2001.33 ISAF was a 

NATO-led military mission responsible for stability and peacekeeping operations. According 

to the 2001 Bonn Agreement, ISAF was initially given the responsibility to assist and consult 

with the Afghan Interim Authority to maintain security in and around Kabul so that Afghan 

and UN personnel could work safely.34 ISAF’s other primary objectives were to build capacity 

in governance, reconstruct and develop the country, and conduct counternarcotics efforts.35

To this day, the United States continues to operate an independent counterterrorism mission 

(Operation Freedom’s Sentinel) in parallel with the NATO train, advise, and assist mission of 

Resolute Support. 

THE AFGHAN SCRIMMAGE FOR POWER

After the Taliban’s removal from power, anti-Taliban factions—predominantly 

the Shura-e Nazar (SEN) faction of the Northern Alliance—exploited this 

moment and quickly moved to control key security leadership positions 

(figure 1). With U.S. government support or, at best, indifference, the Northern 

Alliance stepped deftly into positions of authority across Kabul, forming a new 

government composed mostly of heavily armed, former Northern Alliance power 

brokers.36 In Bonn, Germany, Afghan factions selected Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun 

tribesman from southern Afghanistan, as the leader of the Afghan Interim 

Authority (AIA). Hamid Karzai lacked a robust personal security force and relied 

heavily on U.S. Special Forces to move throughout Afghanistan. In exchange 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 13

for political support at Bonn, Karzai appointed Northern Alliance leaders as 

the interim Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, resulting in their 

monopoly of power over the national security apparatus.

“Insecurity and the lack of law and order continue to impact 

negatively on the lives of Afghans every day, whittling away at 

the support for the transitional process.” 

—UN Security Council

From 2002 to 2003, the scrimmage for power among Afghan elites and competing 

local and regional militias posed the greatest threat to Afghan stability. In the 

north, Jumbesh-e Milli leader Abdul Rashid Dostum and Northern Alliance 

commander Atta Mohammad Noor engaged in regular armed clashes over control 

of Mazar-e Sharif and other key territories. In the west, Ismail Khan’s fighters 

clashed with Amannullah Khan’s militia for control over Herat City.37 In an act 

of particularly brazen defiance, militia commander Pacha Khan Zadran shelled 

FIGURE 1

Source: Hamid Karzai (DOD photo by Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo); Fahim Khan (photo by Maj. William S. Wynn); Yunis Qanooni (photo 

by Michał Koziczyński); Abdullah Abdullah (photo by Jessica Lea/DFID).

NORTHERN ALLIANCE DOMINATES SECURITY MINISTRIES

Interim President

Hamid Karzai 

Northern Alliance

Minister of Defense

Fahim Khan 

Minister of Interior

Yunis Qanooni 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

Abdullah Abdullah 

Pashtun

Tajik
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

14 | CHAPTER 2 | 2001–2003: BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Gardez City in Paktia Province, killing dozens of civilians after a local shura 

refused Karzai’s appointment of Zadran as the provincial governor.38 Karzai, 

lacking his own national security forces, was unable to intervene and quell 

conflicts that affected the daily lives of the population, resulting in a loss of local 

support and momentum gained after the collapse of the Taliban government.39 In 

early 2003, a UN Security Council report stated that “insecurity and the lack of 

law and order continue to impact negatively on the lives of Afghans every day, 

whittling away at the support for the transitional process.”40

LEAD NATION SILOS: INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT 

TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 

In early 2002, the United States and its coalition partners concluded that 

the development of an internationally trained and professional Afghan 

national security force could serve as a viable alternative to the expansion of 

international forces in Afghanistan.41 An indigenous force would also serve 

to expedite the reduction of international forces already in country. In April 

2002, the Group of Eight (G8) nations met in Geneva, Switzerland, to map 

out divided responsibilities for security sector reform (SSR) in Afghanistan. 

Five independent silos with an appointed lead nation were created: military 

reform (United States), police reform (Germany), judicial reform (Italy), 

counternarcotics (United Kingdom), and disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration (Japan) (figure 2).42 At a 2003 SSR conference in Kabul, Karzai 

announced that “security sector reform, in short, is the basic prerequisite to 

recreating the nation that today’s parents hope to leave to future generations.”43

Despite the U.S. government’s commitment to help build the ANA, the U.S. 

national security team held divergent views on the required level of U.S. 

financial support. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld—an opponent of 

FIGURE 2

Source: GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, GAO-05-575, 

June 2005, p. 5.

LEAD NATIONS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN AFGHANISTAN

United Kingdom Italy Japan United States Germany

Counternarcotics Judicial

Reform

Disarmament,

Demobilization,

& Reintegration

Military

Reform

Police

Reform
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 15

nation building—argued that the United States was spending billions of dollars 

“freeing Afghanistan” and that the U.S. position on financial support to the 

Afghan army “should be zero.”44 Secretary of State Colin Powell disagreed, 

arguing that “there can be no reconstruction in Afghanistan without security.”45

Powell even went so far as to say the United States should plan to be “heavily 

involved” in both the army and police reconstruction.46

Security Sector Coordinator 

In October 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 

selected General Karl Eikenberry to serve as the head 

of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan 

(OMC-A) and as Security Sector Coordinator (SSC). His 

job was to integrate Ministry of Defense (MOD) and 

ANA development and to synchronize the five-pillar 

international SSR process. Eikenberry would report 

through both DOD and State channels. His primary 

task was to “accelerate the development of a Security 

Sector Reform working group that would include the five 

lead nations, the Afghan government, and the [United 

Nations].”47 Describing his initial planning for and 

execution of the SSC role, Eikenberry stated, “Overall, it 

might be termed exploratory learning because the many 

uncertainties of the Afghanistan mission added to the 

steepness of the learning curve. They included: (1) lack 

of doctrine for nation building on this level of destruction; 

(2) lack of cooperative agreements among the lead 

nations as to the scope of their efforts and willingness to 

cooperate; and (3) the unprecedented nature of building 

security sector in a nation that is so damaged after 

30 years of civil war and humanitarian disaster.”48

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY 

Deciding on the Initial Design 

With the Taliban removed from power, senior Afghan security officials—

principally interim Minister of Defense Marshall Fahim Khan—advocated for 

a 200,000- to 250,000-member national transitional army staffed by “those who 

have participated in the liberation wars and have played a significant role in 

the defeat of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.”49 According to Khan’s initial design in 

January 2002, the transitional Afghan Militia Force (AMF) would eventually 

be supplanted by a smaller, professionally trained force of 60,000 soldiers.50

However, as security deteriorated, senior Afghan officials abandoned the 

smaller force design and sought a larger force to counter threats originating 

from Pakistan. 

Security Sector Reform Senior Working Group at the British 

Embassy, summer 2003. (Photo by Jason Howk)
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

16 | CHAPTER 2 | 2001–2003: BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

The U.S. design of the new national army did not match Khan’s or that of 

other Afghan leaders. The U.S. goal was to minimize time, energy, resources, 

and commitment in Afghanistan by developing a smaller, Afghan-sustainable 

national security force. The United States believed that the greatest threat to 

Afghanistan’s stability was factional fighting, not Pakistan, a country the United 

States viewed as a key ally in the Global War on Terrorism. The United States, 

therefore, believed Afghanistan needed a small, light infantry force that could 

be rapidly deployed by the national government to intervene in internal affairs.51

According to an ANA design team chief, the initial U.S. plan was to develop one 

army corps, secure the upcoming presidential elections, and withdraw from 

Afghanistan by the end of 2004.52

The Afghan Militia Force 

After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, armed groups began to increase throughout 

Afghanistan. Each of these groups claimed a stake in the new Afghan Interim 

Government.53 In 2002, private militias served as a transitional army called the Afghan 

Militia Force, under minimal control of the MOD.54 The AMF was intended to provide 

security until a formal army could be created and supported. 

The AMF faced numerous difficulties after its creation. Its military capability was poor 

due to lack of equipment, low discipline, and inefficiency.55 AMF soldiers remained loyal 

to local warlords, commanders, and political parties.56 Additionally, the AMF was under 

strength and most of the resources provided by the MOD were pocketed by the appointed 

commanders or redistributed among the troops.57 There was also inflation of military 

ranks. According to Afghan army scholar Antonio Giustozzi, “The transitional army has one 

of the highest officer to soldier ratios in the world, estimated at 1 to 2.... Most armies 

are in the 1 to 12 or 13 range.”58 Because international donors did not want to keep the 

transitional army and refused to fund it, there was an attempt to move soldiers out of the 

AMF and into the ANA. 

Given its position as the lead nation for military reconstruction, the United 

States was in a position to ensure that its preferred design for the new national 

army would take root. In December 2002, an agreement was finalized for a 

Ministry of Defense and an all-volunteer national army, with an eventual endstrength capped at 70,000 soldiers.59 Furthermore, stakeholders agreed to a 

mandatory ethnic balance within the ANA that would be representative of the 

country as a whole.60

Despite agreeing to lead the development of the new Afghan army, the United 

States lacked an active and readily available military force, interagency doctrine, 

or model for reconstructing a foreign military at the scope and scale that 

Afghanistan required. Therefore, sticking with what they knew, senior U.S. 

military officers initially modeled the ANA on the U.S. Army’s light infantry 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 17

forces, despite the fact that Afghanistan lacked the infrastructure and logistical 

capabilities required for such a model.61 The United States pushed for a standardsbased, volunteer, ethnically diverse national army composed of civilian leaders, an 

officer corps, enlisted soldiers, and noncommissioned officers (NCO). 

Civilian control of the military and a Western-style NCO corps were not a part 

of the history of the Afghan military forces, however, and were initially difficult 

for Afghan leaders to accept. The historical Soviet and Turkish influences had 

emphasized the development of officers, while neglecting the development of 

NCOs due to a draft or levy system that only required two-year assignments. 

Given this influence, many Afghan officials believed that only senior Afghan 

uniformed officers had the necessary background for leadership roles. U.S. 

General Eikenberry noted that Afghan leaders believed, “I have to be wearing 

a uniform. I don’t like this idea of wearing civilian clothes and being in the 

Ministry of Defense.”62 Despite this tradition, the Afghans—capitulating to U.S. 

pressure for civilian military leadership—ultimately found a workable solution 

with the appointment of the former Northern Alliance commanding general 

Marshall Fahim Khan as the civilian Minister of Defense. 

Training Commences: Focus On Light Infantry Brigades (May 2002–May 2003)

In May 2002, U.S. Special Forces officially commenced training the ANA. The 

first phase of training emphasized developing operational forces, specifically one 

light infantry corps in Kabul—the Central Corps—with expanded development 

to be determined at a later time (figure 3 on the next page).63 The U.S. Special 

Forces trainers were fully prepared to execute their core competency, foreign 

internal defense (FID), to train small and inexpensive units of indigenous forces 

on light infantry tactics.64 Thus, the Central Corps was designed to have limited 

combat power while relying on U.S. and international air power for missions 

requiring more lethal capabilities.65 According to General Eikenberry, the 

Central Corps was intended to have “enough combat power that it would be able 

to act [at] the behest of the central government and move forward into an area 

of Afghanistan and impose its will upon any contending factional force.”66

From the start of the training mission, international partners agreed to support 

U.S. efforts to build the ANA, beginning in early 2002 with the French, who 

teamed with U.S. Special Forces to train the first infantry battalions of the new 

Afghan army.67 In the fall of 2002, the British agreed to establish an NCO training 

program and an officer candidate school. At this point, the French committed to 

assuming responsibility for training Afghan officers and establishing a Command 

and General Staff College. The United States focused on basic training for 

enlisted soldiers and constructing a National Military Academy, in partnership 

with Turkey.68 By the end of 2002, the development of the ANA was officially a 

multinational coalition mission with the United States as the lead nation. This 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

18 | CHAPTER 2 | 2001–2003: BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

division of labor created challenges for the new ANA as the French, U.S., and 

British visions of the roles and responsibilities of soldiers and officers differed.

In late 2002, senior U.S. officials acknowledged the limitations of Special Forces’ 

FID doctrine and determined that the reconstruction of an entire army and 

its defense institutions was beyond the Special Forces’ capabilities and core 

mission. Aside from the doctrinal limitations of FID, Special Forces were 

stretched thin balancing global counterterrorism operations and building the 

ANA. According to Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley, a trained Special 

Forces officer, Special Forces “have limited capability to train beyond small unit 

tactics.... [Special Forces] guys are great at smaller unit tactics at the squad and 

platoon level and even up to the company level, but once you start getting up 

into that level, it really gets beyond their mission profile or mission set.”69 Thus, 

the U.S. approach began to shift away from Special Forces’ FID toward the use 

of conventional forces as trainers. 

FIGURE 3

Source: Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, interview by Dr. Lisa Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, Combat Studies Institute, Volume III, ed. Michael G. Brooks, 

November 27, 2006, p. 17; U.S. Army Center of Military History, Operation Enduring Freedom, March 2002–April 2005, p. 29. 

PAKISTAN

IRAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN CHINA

INDIA

INITIAL ANA PLANS: KABUL-CENTRIC

Kabul

Central Corps

The Central Corps was designed 

to be a small, light infantry force 

that could be rapidly deployed by

the national government to 

intervene in internal affairs. 

The formal activation of the 

Central Corps occurred on 

August 30, 2003. 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 19

Conventional Forces Take Over (May 2003–October 2003)

In early 2003, DOD decided that U.S. Army conventional forces would 

take over responsibility for ANA training. While conventional forces were 

capable of training larger military units, they lacked doctrine and training on 

reconstructing foreign militaries of the size and scope required in Afghanistan, 

much like Special Forces. In May 2003, a brigade from 10th Mountain Division—

commanded by then-Colonel Milley—deployed to Afghanistan and assumed the 

lead role of training the ANA under the newly created Task Force (TF) Phoenix. 

TF Phoenix’s mission was to take army training and development to the next 

level by expanding the program from small-units of infantry to company and 

battalion operations. It was also tasked with establishing institutions, such as 

school systems and logistics networks, and improving combat tactics.70 TF 

Phoenix trained the ANA from individual soldier to corps levels, while 

ministerial-level development was deferred to Military Professional Resources, 

Incorporated (MPRI), a DOD contractor.71 For expediency in ANA development, 

a train-the-trainer framework was adopted; eventually, 10th Mountain handed 

over the four-week basic course to the Afghans, who were supported by U.S. 

advisors.72 This new framework met training target numbers and on August 30, 

2003, the Central Corps was formally activated. The corps consisted of 

thousands of internationally trained soldiers assigned to three brigades.73

In a display of proficiency and capability, in January 2004 the Central Corps 

successfully provided security for the high-level jirga in Kabul in which the 

new Afghan constitution was ratified. In addition, the Central Corps secured the 

A jirga is a traditional 

assembly of leaders 

who make decisions 

by consensus.

The first Afghan National Army battalion is honored as it readies to depart the Kabul Military Training 

Center. (Photo by Jason Howk)
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

20 | CHAPTER 2 | 2001–2003: BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

opening ceremony for the Bagram-to-Kandahar section of the Ring Road that 

same year.74

Invasion of Iraq Impacts Training Mission: National Guard Assumes Responsibility 

In 2003, OMC-A Chief and Security Sector Coordinator General Eikenberry 

requested another active duty combat brigade to backfill the 10th Mountain 

Division as it redeployed, but his request was denied. Eikenberry was instead 

informed that the U.S. Army National Guard would now assume responsibilities 

for ANA development in order to free up active duty combat forces for Iraq. 

Eikenberry noted, “In the fall of 2003, before my departure [from Afghanistan], 

I think the war was already starting to reflect the stress on the force.”75 In 

September 2003, a White House progress report on the Global War on Terrorism 

said, “With the help of our friends and allies, we have eliminated Afghanistan as 

a safe haven for al-Qaida and disrupted terrorist cells around the world. Iraq is 

now the central front for the war on terror.”76

In December 2003, a unit from the 45th Enhanced Separate Brigade of the 

Oklahoma National Guard, commanded by Brigadier General Thomas Mancino, 

assumed duties for TF Phoenix II.77 From this point forward, rotational National 

Guard units of several hundred soldiers—augmented with coalition support—

assumed the responsibilities of training and developing the ANA.78

Pre-deployment training for the first National Guard unit consisted of 30 days at 

Fort Carson, Colorado, where altitude and weather conditions closely resembled 

those in Afghanistan. The unit was trained in basic weapons tactics, convoy 

procedures, and local culture. Some of the training was beneficial and related to 

the mission, but one advisor noted, “Culture training would have been good if it 

... covered Afghanistan instead of Iraq.”79 Such anecdotes underscored the poor 

quality of mission preparation some National Guard soldiers received before 

deploying to Afghanistan. 

Initial Focus: Infrastructure, Equipment, and Recruiting 

Despite these early training efforts, ANA development was severely limited 

due to the lack of infrastructure, equipment, and human capital. According to 

multiple senior U.S. officers involved in ANA development from 2002 to 2003, 

questions dominating discussions at OMC-A and within the ANA design team 

included where to deploy units, whether current infrastructure and sustainability 

pipelines could serve those locations, and what equipment units would receive.80

Furthermore, the U.S. military largely underestimated the critical role the U.S. 

Army Corp of Engineers would play in the early ANA reconstruction efforts. The 

ANA lacked the required local and regional bases and the critical infrastructure 

necessary for military logistics and transportation requirements. Yet, in October 

2002, there were only three or four U.S. Army engineers responsible for 
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SEPTEMBER 2017 | 21

planning and implementing reconstruction programs worth hundreds of millions 

of dollars.81

Infrastructure Challenges 

U.S. and international trainers, as well as Afghan army recruits, faced extremely 

poor infrastructure conditions. General Eikenberry referred to the situation 

as the “Valley Forge of the Afghan National Army.” Telecommunications 

coverage was unpredictable, forcing U.S. officers and trainers to travel on 

under-developed roads to talk to senior ANA officials in person.82 Afghan, U.S., 

and international leaders would travel nationwide every week to “recruitment 

shuras” to convince local village leaders to volunteer fighting-age males to join 

the new national army.83 Traveling by road from Kabul to Kandahar—a four-hour 

trip in 2016—could take 12 hours or more in 2002.84

The international coalition effort to develop the ANA paralleled and relied upon 

a complete reconstruction of the country’s major infrastructure. Despite the 

United States’ preferred minimalist approach to ANA development, it dramatically 

increased the budget for ANA development during this era, from $79.2 million in 

FY 2002 to $347.6 million in FY 2003.85 Part of the focus of this funding was on 

reconstruction of supporting infrastructure, such as training facilities, barracks, 

and roads.86 Critically, the primary ANA training site at the Kabul Military Training 

Center (KMTC) was in abysmal condition. By the winter of 2002, the center 

still had no heat for new recruits on the Afghan side of the compound. In a sign 

of solidarity, U.S. Special Forces refused to place heaters on their side of the 

compound until their Afghan counterparts received heat. The road from KMTC to 

Damaged infrastructure at KMTC in Kabul that needed to be repaired before basic infantry training for new 

Afghan recruits could start. (Photo by Jason Howk)
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

22 | CHAPTER 2 | 2001–2003: BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

downtown Kabul was also in such terrible condition that travelers could only drive 

5–10 mph.87 During a 2007 interview, General Milley highlighted how TF Phoenix 

had to start from the ground up in Kabul, stating, “When we got there, Task Force 

Phoenix didn’t exist.... We went into a parking lot behind a warehouse, we looked 

around, and we said ‘This looks like a pretty good place to establish a base camp,’ 

and there was nothing but trash, but that was what we did.”88

In addition to the physical infrastructure challenges, Afghanistan’s banking infrastructure was almost nonexistent. Most new Afghan recruits did not have bank 

accounts—and receiving their monthly pay and providing it to their families took 

days or even weeks, resulting in increased levels of absenteeism from the force.89

Equipment 

In 2002, the United States decided to arm the ANA with equipment and weapons 

seized during military operations or donated by former Soviet-bloc nations.90

Given Afghanistan’s history, older soldiers and members of the Northern Alliance 

were familiar with Soviet-style weapons systems, whose ruggedness allowed them 

to function well in the rough Afghan terrain. In addition, Soviet-style weapons 

required less maintenance than more modern NATO-standard weapons and were 

less expensive. According to ANA scholar Antonio Giustozzi, “The technology 

level of the new army [was] deliberately kept low, mainly in order to make it 

sustainable in the long-term for the Afghan state.”91

U.S. trainers had relatively little experience with Soviet-style military equipment 

and therefore had to rely on former Soviet-bloc nations to provide trainers to 

support ANA development. For example, Mongolians, who had used Soviet 

A weapons cache discovered by ANA soldiers in Bamyan. (Photo by Jason Howk)
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 23

artillery such as D-30 122 mm howitzers, deployed to Afghanistan as members 

of embedded training teams. Romanians offered support to work on the T-55 

and T-62 tanks, and Bulgarians provided assistance on the use of Soviet armored 

personnel carriers.92

According to General Eikenberry, “There was a hodgepodge of all kinds of 

vehicles that were being donated, but the donation of these various kinds of 

equipment caused great difficulties in terms of standardization for the ANA.”93

Donated equipment also prevented planners from forecasting when equipment 

would arrive and determining how that would affect the training schedule for 

the force.94 Additionally, when countries made these donations, they generally 

did not provide a sustainment package, including in-theater training and a pipeline for spare parts. Thus, the decision to rely on donations would eventually be 

revisited in 2005, when U.S. trainers recognized that the unreliability of donor 

supply and lack of uniformity of weapons was undermining ANA development. 

“The technology level of the new army was deliberately kept 

low, mainly in order to make it sustainable in the long-term for 

the Afghan state.” 

—Antonio Giustozzi, King’s College London

Even when the United States provided weapons, vehicles, and other equipment to 

Afghan forces, in the rush to get the equipment to Afghanistan, operator manuals, 

parts manuals, and technical training were often not provided. Equipping became 

the focus, rather than developing the capability needed to train operators 

and sustain the equipment. As a gap filler, contracts were established for the 

maintenance of the equipment, highlighting the importance of having a system 

in place to adequately oversee the performance of contractors, particularly 

those performing technical tasks. Unfortunately, the system for monitoring and 

evaluating contractor performance was often deficient.95

Recruiting

New ANA recruits were obtained through three primary means: (1) the 

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program transitioned former 

militia fighters into the officially sanctioned national army, (2) recruitment 

shuras convinced local tribal leaders to volunteer fighting-age males to join the 

ANA, and (3) the MOD delivered quotas of new recruits to KMTC. U.S. trainers 

vetted the new recruits to ensure an ethnic balance and occasionally delayed or 

refused to train the new unit until diversity standards were met. 

At first, interim Minister of Defense Fahim Khan exploited his position by 

placing loyalists in senior positions in the MOD and ANA. Any notion that he and 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

24 | CHAPTER 2 | 2001–2003: BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

his followers would proactively balance the national army was deeply mistaken: 

Khan appointed 100 generals in 2002, 90 of whom belonged to his Shura-e Nazar 

faction of the Northern Alliance.96 With his strongmen in leadership positions, 

Khan manipulated the early development of the ANA by controlling recruitment. 

Initially, most recruits were affiliated with Khan’s political party and allies, 

and were primarily northern Tajiks, resulting in an ethnically and politically 

unbalanced ANA.97 Furthermore, because the United States and its allies were 

not familiar with the Afghan countryside, they were not in a position to influence 

recruitment from the districts; U.S. trainers could only affect recruitment 

at KMTC. 

In 2002, a high percentage of initial recruits were men experienced in fighting 

the Taliban and, in some cases, the Soviets. Although this contributed to a 

seasoned fighting force, it also created unique challenges. One such challenge 

was managing the charismatic leaders of former mujahedeen factions who 

commanded the loyalty of many, yet lacked the required skills to serve as a 

commander in a conventional military force.98 Integrating these armed factions 

into the ANA further swung the composition of the ANA toward political and 

ethnic members of the Northern Alliance factions and away from Pashtun 

groups in the east and south, reinforcing the imbalance.99

Starting in 2003, it was widely recognized that the recruiting profile needed to 

be changed. The ANA was dominated by legacy mujahedeen leaders, whose 

Soviet-style or irregular warfighting techniques and leadership styles did not suit 

the new Western model of the ANA. Because of the existing ethnic and political 

ANA soldiers practice using rocket-propelled grenades. (Photo by Jason Howk)
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 25

imbalance, the United States decided to reconstitute the ANA and imposed a 

recruitment board at the MOD.100 In March 2003, donor countries planned to 

disband the transitional AMF in an effort to reduce patronage in the MOD. By 

September 2003, the United States overhauled ANA recruitment to overcome 

the structures that undermined the ethnic and political balance of the ANA and 

promoted corruption and internal struggle.101 The United States cut funding for 

the AMF and mandated that only 15 percent of recruits could come from the 

AMF.102 Though this strategy sidelined members of the AMF, it did not prevent 

Tajik over-representation and the sustained under-representation of southern 

Pashtuns in the ANA in the long-term.103

From this point on, U.S. ANA training programs had to deal with an increasing 

number of recruits lacking prior military experience. According to General 

Eikenberry, in the summer of 2003, 30-40 percent of recruits had no prior 

fighting experience.104

 This was a tradeoff intended to result in ethnic balance 

within the ANA. Sometimes, training would not begin on time because the 

recruiting pool was too unbalanced. Often, training had to begin at a more basic 

level to accommodate inexperience. Training also had to address non-kinetic 

aspects of modern military culture, such as personal hygiene standards and daily 

duties like cleaning dining facilities.105 At one point in 2002, U.S. Special Forces 

trainers recognized that one of the reasons Afghans were not shooting straight 

was because they could not see their targets. The United States deployed an 

optometrist to help outfit ANA soldiers with glasses, if needed.106 Finally, early 

training focused on overriding ethnic and political divisions by emphasizing 

the new Afghan nation. As General Milley noted, U.S. efforts were designed to 

Afghan leader welcomes new recruits to the Kabul Military Training Center. (Photo by Jason Howk)
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

26 | CHAPTER 2 | 2001–2003: BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

change a soldier’s outlook from that of a tribal member to, “I am beyond my 

tribe and I am part of a nation state.”107

As the 2004 Afghan elections neared, the new ANA was successfully taking 

shape. Despite attrition, recruiting and force strength numbers were largely 

met, and initial assessments of the ANA’s capabilities were positive. By end of 

this early era, force strength reached 6,000 “on-duty soldiers” whose primary 

role was to patrol in and around Kabul.108 Security in the capital was good, 

and the coalition forces looked forward to the establishment of the new 

Afghan constitution and government, as well as the anticipated end of military 

operations in Afghanistan.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE 

The German Approach 

Building on a strong historical relationship, including previous German 

assistance to the Afghan police before World War II, Germany was officially 

designated as the lead nation for ANP reconstruction at the Geneva Conference 

in April 2002.109 Anticipating its official involvement, Germany conducted a 

fact-finding mission in Afghanistan in January 2002, followed by an international 

planning conference for ANP support the following month.110 The conference 

was attended by representatives from 11 international organizations and 18 

countries, including the United States.111 During the conference, Germany 

pledged €10 million ($8.6 million) toward police reform efforts for 2002 alone.112

In March, the German government introduced its comprehensive plan for 

developing the ANP titled the “German Project for Support of the Police in 

Afghanistan.” The plan outlined five focus areas: advise on the structure of the 

organization of the force, rehabilitate the Kabul Police Academy, reconstruct 

police buildings and institutions (focused mainly on the rehabilitation of the 

officer academy in Kabul), provide equipment such as police vehicles, and 

coordinate all other donor activities related to policing.113 According to a former 

German Special Representative for Police Sector Reform, the German program 

intended to “start with the backbone.”114

Based on fiscal sustainability considerations and European force model 

calculations of police-to-population ratios, Germany, Afghanistan, and the 

international community agreed to a final ANP force size of 62,000 police 

(44,300 uniformed police, 12,000 border police, 3,400 highway patrol, and 2,300 

counternarcotics police).115 During a July 2002 meeting between the Minister 

of Interior, Taj Mohammad Wardak, and both U.S. and German representatives, 

Wardak declared his intention to have a “fully professional, well-trained, modern 

police force within six months,” however, no specific deadlines were officially 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 27

set.116 At the time, Afghanistan had an interim police force of 50,000–70,000 men 

who were largely untrained and severely lacking in equipment.117 Moreover, 

“between 70 and 90 percent” of the force was illiterate, and the force included 

many “former fighters who were loyal to warlords and local leaders rather than 

to the new central government.”118

According to Amnesty International, only 120 of 3,000 police officers in 

Kandahar Province had received formal police training and lacked basic 

education; Amnesty International also noted an extensive record of human 

rights abuses among these officers.119 Minister Wardak acknowledged these 

impediments to reaching his goal, including the lack of educated recruits, and 

further noted that low police salaries were disincentives for recruiting the right 

people.120 Further, the dearth of literate police recruits compromised the very 

basis of the German police plan, which required senior officers and NCOs to 

receive university-level training.121

In 2002, Germany launched its official police reform program by deploying 40 

civilian police advisors to Kabul. This was widely criticized as being insufficient 

and only enough to train several hundred police officers in the capital itself.122

For Germany, police training and reform were seen as a civilian mission, not 

a military one. Their efforts were further constrained by national caveats

restricting movement and activities of German personnel. For example, German 

advisors were required to train Afghan police on civilian policing methods 

within the confines of German bases, and thus were not exposed to the realities 

of actual Afghan urban and rural policing environments.123 Furthermore, as 

A national caveat is a 

restriction countries 

place on the use of 

their military forces 

and civilian personnel. 

German Police Project Team member overseeing Afghan National Police training. (Photo by Sandra Arnold)
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

28 | CHAPTER 2 | 2001–2003: BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

the German effort focused only on officers and NCOs in Kabul, field training 

for the forces already in place across the country was neither conducted, nor 

planned.124 At the ministerial level, efforts to develop and reform the Ministry 

of the Interior (MOI) were nearly nonexistent. Only one German advisor was 

assigned to the ministry, despite the ministry being described as deficient in 

even the most basic systems and inadequate to oversee and govern the ANP.125

German officials would later report they believed their role as the lead nation 

was to be the lead advisor and coordinator for police development activities; 

they did not believe this entailed full responsibility for developing or retraining 

the entire ANP.126 The German view ran counter to the U.S. assumption that 

Germany would be responsible for police reform in its entirety, to include 

local patrol officers, and would serve as the majority contributor of training 

personnel, resources, and funding. 

While the Germans made progress in the five focus areas of their police support 

project, most of Germany’s funding focused on building infrastructure, primarily 

the Kabul Police Academy.127 The academy officially opened in August 2002 with 

1,500 police recruits enrolled.128 Although it is possible a few hundred NCOs 

may have graduated near the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004, based on 

the Germans’ three-year officer curriculum, the first trained police at the officer 

level would not have graduated until 2005. Taking into consideration the stated 

62,000 force size goal, one expert noted that “the German approach would have 

taken decades.”129 This restricted effort left local security outside of Kabul 

largely under the control of untrained police officers affiliated with militias and 

predatory warlords.130
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 29

Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan Struggles to Support Afghan Police

The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)—which became the UN Development 

Programme’s (UNDP) largest project—was created in 2002 to provide international financial 

assistance to Afghanistan’s police force (figure 4).131 At its core, LOTFA is a payroll system 

that provides direct funds to the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MOF) and MOI for regular 

payment of ANP salaries.132

Since its creation, LOTFA has faced many challenges. Despite long-term international political 

support for the ANP, LOTFA has been unable to “attain a multi-year planning framework due 

to the short-term funding horizon of donors.”133 According to an independent evaluation by 

Atos Consulting, the UN has been unable to provide a consistent source of financing to the 

Afghan police force through LOTFA.134 For example, from 2003 to 2004, as the ANP was 

increasing in size, LOTFA funding decreased from $21 million to $2 million.135 Variable rates 

of funding also occurred during the U.S. and coalition surge and the transition to Afghan-led 

security. From 2011 to 2013, for example, LOTFA funding decreased from $668 million to 

$348 million.136 The instability of funding has likely been a contributing factor to the Afghan 

government’s inability to provide consistent salaries to police officers operating on the front 

lines against a growing insurgent threat, which, in turn, has affected retention and quality of 

life for these officers and their families. 

FIGURE 4

Note: ANP 2008 numbers are from October 2008. ANP 2012 numbers are from October 2012. ANP 2013 numbers are from September 2013. ANP 

2014 numbers are from March 2014. ANP 2015 numbers are from July 2015.

Source: UN Development Programme, Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan: Management Review, December 15, 2012, p. 39; UN Development 

Programme, Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) 2017; Brookings Institute, Afghanistan Index, May 25, 2017. 

LOTFA FUNDING COMPARED TO ANP GROWTH

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

$7.03 $21.18 $2.23 $45.77 $100.38 $153.65 $200.50 $360.25 $592.07 $668.49 $498.05 $348.75 $580.13 $545.55

0 0 33 40 49.7 75 79.91 94.96 116.86 143.80 148.54 152.34 152.68 148.30

($ MILLIONS)

ANP FORCE LEVEL (THOUSANDS)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

$800

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)

Afghan National Police (ANP)
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

30 | CHAPTER 2 | 2001–2003: BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

To properly manage and allocate LOTFA funds, UNDP requires the Afghan government to have 

human resource management, record keeping, and accounting practices in place throughout 

the country, including areas that are not easily accessible.137 However, the Afghan government 

failed to meet these requirements, resulting in an environment where corruption became 

ingrained in LOTFA. For example, there were reports of embezzlement and skimming of 

salaries within the MOI and ANP since LOTFA’s creation; the lack of conditionality placed on 

the funds allowed corrupt officials to operate with impunity.138 A 2013 UN report confirmed 

mismanagement of the fund and stated that UNDP’s failure to provide the necessary 

oversight had resulted in procurement fraud.139

 While UNDP denied the allegations, it 

launched an internal investigation and attempted to address these concerns.140

A January 2015 SIGAR audit concluded that the ANP lacked the necessary capability—and 

oversight—to accurately report attendance and payroll, which led to inconsistent data and 

misuse of LOTFA funds.141 According to the audit, ANP provincial headquarters without 

internet connectivity sent attendance data via radio through the chain of command. This 

verbal transfer of information “increase[d] the risk that present-for-duty numbers could be 

erroneously reported or recorded, or successfully manipulated by unsupervised or colluding 

individuals at lower levels within the ANP.”142 In addition, the audit noted that the two main 

electronic systems the ANP used to collect personnel and payroll data—the Afghan Human 

Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) and the Electronic Payroll System 

(EPS)—were not fully functional as of January 2015, further impeding verification of data.143

The audit highlighted that, as the drawdown of U.S. forces continued, the U.S. government 

would have less oversight of ANP data collection.144 MOI verification of the accuracy of the 

personnel and payroll data would increasingly be relied upon, and, as a result, more LOTFA 

funds were at risk of being wasted or abused if systems and processes were not improved. 

The audit found that more than $300 million in U.S. government funding for ANP salaries 

was at risk of being wasted or abused.145 UNDP disagreed with this finding after the audit 

was published; however, UNDP did acknowledge that more could be done to improve LOTFA’s 

oversight, accountability, and transparency.146
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 31

U.S. Impartiality Turns to Impatience 

As the lead nation for developing the ANA, the United States played a limited role 

in police development through 2002, mostly confined to some funding channeled 

through State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

(INL) for counternarcotics efforts in the country.147 By the end of 2002, however, 

U.S. senior officials were becoming increasingly concerned by the lack of trained 

Afghan police officers, with many believing the resulting security void would 

threaten the planned 2004 Afghan presidential election.148

In 2003, General Eikenberry met with the newly installed Minister of Interior Ali 

Jalali (table 3) to discuss ways for the United States to help accelerate police 

training and make the program more comprehensive, using the U.S. training of 

the ANA as an example.149 By May 2003, State had initiated a training program 

focused on non-officer patrolmen that was independent of, but parallel to, the 

German effort.150 State contracted with DynCorp International, a company that, 

while having trained police in Bosnia and Haiti, faced scrutiny over past police 

development program employee misconduct.151 The contract for Afghan police 

development included the construction of a Central Training Center (CTC) in 

Kabul and seven Regional Training Centers (RTC). Construction of the CTC was 

completed in May 2003, and the RTCs were finished in 2004.152 The initial State 

police training program was designed as a “train-the-trainer” model where 

“experienced” Afghan police officers would attend a three-week refresher 

course taught by DynCorp contractors; the police officers would then train new 

Afghan recruits at basic training. Like the Germans, DynCorp advisors did not 

provide for any post-training field mentoring.153

Imbalance: Ethnic and Political Challenges

With the United States focused primarily on the ANA, and Germany focused 

at the ANP officer level in Kabul, militia leaders, power brokers, and warlords 

easily controlled and manipulated local police forces. Malign power brokers 

and warlords were allowed to reestablish themselves as the controlling force, 

and their militias were quickly reflagged as police at sub-national levels.154 By 

TABLE 3

MINISTERS OF THE INTERIOR, 2001–2005

Years in Service Ministers Ethnicity Reason for Removal/Leaving

2001–2002 Yunis Qanooni Tajik Coalition pressure on Karzai to diversify the Afghan security ministries and lessen 

the Northern Alliance’s monopoly of control

2002–2003 Taj Mohammad 

Wardak

Pashtun Unsuccessful in reforming the MOI and improving security

2003–2005 Ali Jalali Pashtun Desire to return to academic career

Source: CRS, Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, May 2, 2003, p. 10; Amin Tarzi, “Afghanistan: Top Security Official Resigns Amid Controversy,” 

RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty, September 28, 2005; Khaama Press, “Mohammad Yunis Qanooni,” September 24, 2010; Khaama Press, “Ali Jalali,” 

September 25, 2010.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

32 | CHAPTER 2 | 2001–2003: BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

the end of 2003, these political and factional control problems threatened the 

coalition’s and Afghan government’s goals of establishing a strong, central 

government and a sustainable, professional police force capable of supporting 

and protecting the populace.155 Additionally, the German and U.S. efforts were 

insufficient to succeed against the power brokers and their militias already 

in place.156

As with the MOD, former Northern Alliance leaders assumed control of 

the MOI after the fall of the Taliban.157 Yunis Qanooni, a close ally of fellow 

Shura-e-Nazar member and interim Minister of Defense Fahim Khan, used his 

involvement in the Bonn Conference to obtain the powerful position of Minister 

of Interior, though not without controversy. At the Loya Jirga in 2002, under 

pressure to diversify the Afghan security ministries and lessen the Northern 

Alliance’s monopoly of control, Karzai removed Qanooni as Minister of Interior 

and replaced him with Taj Mohammad Wardak, an ethnic Pashtun. Although 

Qanooni was initially described as conceding gracefully, rumors of a coup by 

Qanooni and his Tajik-dominated MOI spread in the days following the official 

announcement. U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad observed “soldiers armed 

with grenade launchers and police in full riot gear” standing by the ministry 

“preventing Wardak, the new minister, from assuming office.”158 Karzai would 

later give Qanooni the position of a new “special advisor on national security” 

as a way to appease “powerful ethnic Tajik leaders” unhappy with Qanooni’s 

removal.159 Wardak’s tenure was short and described as unsuccessful in 

reforming the ministry and improving security. By early 2003, he was replaced by 

a former ANA colonel, Ali Jalali, who would hold this position through 2005.160

There were “daily reports of abuses committed by gunmen 

against the population—armed gangs who establish illegal 

checkpoints, tax farmers, intimidate, rob, rape, and do so—all too 

often—while wielding the formal title of military commander,

 police, or security chief.” 

—Senior UN Official Lakhdar Brahimi 

Ethnic disparities and tensions were not limited to senior positions; for 

example, 12 of the 15 police stations in Kabul were led by Panjshiri Tajiks.161

Ethnic and tribal imbalances began fostering “intense tension and animosity” 

across the country, undermining the authority of the central government 

and police force.162 In July 2003, senior UN official Lakhdar Brahimi said that 

“skirmishes between local commanders ... continue to cause civilian casualties 

in many parts of the country where terrorism is no longer an issue” and there 

were “daily reports of abuses committed by gunmen against the population—
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 33

armed gangs who establish illegal checkpoints, tax farmers, intimidate, rob, 

rape, and do so—all too often—while wielding the formal title of military 

commander, police, or security chief.”163 In 2003, Amnesty International reported 

on human rights abuses by Afghan police across the country.164

TRANSITIONAL FORCES AND ERODING SECURITY 

Despite a number of reports from the UN, nongovernmental organizations 

(NGO), think tanks, and the media warning of eroding security caused by 

transitional security forces, the United States failed to respond appropriately.165

The United States remained focused on rapidly training and creating new, lightly 

armed professional security forces to deal with Afghanistan’s internal security 

needs, despite initial forecasts that a force capable of securing the country was 

not imminent. In 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz commented, 

“There is on one hand the sort of left-over army that’s quite large and is a bit 

of a security problem, and there’s the new army which we’re training which is 

very different.”166

While the United States and other lead nations focused on the nascent national 

security forces, factional leaders inside and outside the national government 

took advantage of the security void by appointing loyalists and empowering 

local militia leaders to serve as interim security providers. As a result, security 

suffered. By the end of 2003, the UN reported that “in too many areas of the 

country, the arbitrary control exercised by local commanders and factional 

armies has resulted in heavy casualties.”167

 The UN also noted in 2003 that over 

one-third of the country was off-limits to its personnel and that many NGOs had 

left these high-risk areas.168

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 35

CHAPTER 3

2004–2008: 

RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE TO 

ADDRESS GROWING INSECURITY

RECONSTITUTION OF THE TALIBAN 

I

n early 2004, a Taliban-led insurgency reconstituted in Pakistan and 

strengthened in Pashtun-dominated areas of south and east Afghanistan 

where government officials and security forces were largely absent. In February 

2004, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, 

reported that enemy attacks had reached “their highest levels since the collapse 

of the Taliban government.”169 In August 2004, the UN characterized security as 

“volatile, having seriously deteriorated in certain parts of the country.”170 Due 

to the confinement of senior U.S. and international officials mostly to military 

bases in northern Afghanistan and Kabul, the slow re-emergence of Taliban 

forces was largely out of sight of most senior officials. With the exception of 

U.S. Special Forces, U.S. personnel primarily operated above the conflict at the 

regional and headquarters levels. 

As ISAF expanded its footprint in 2005, the entrenchment of the insurgency 

became obvious. Portions of the local population became increasingly 

discontented with declining levels of security and insufficient development, 

which created an environment ripe for insurgent forces to exert influence. For 

example, enemy-initiated attacks increased by over 500 percent from 2004 

U.S. Army photo
36 | CHAPTER 3 | 2004–2008: RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE TO ADDRESS GROWING INSECURITY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

to 2008 (figure 5).171 As violence rose, it posed a significant concern for U.S. 

and coalition officials as security requirements for the October 2004 Afghan 

presidential election and September 2005 Afghan parliamentary election were 

rapidly increasing. 

EROSION OF LOCAL SUPPORT 

At the same time, the UN noted that “factional feuds, rivalries, and increasingly, 

drug-related incidents continued to affect the lives of the population,” 

compounding the security threat.172 Until mid-2005, U.S. Special Forces 

maintained partnerships with local and regional warlords to target Taliban and 

al-Qaeda leaders. Such partnerships ultimately empowered the same corrupt 

and oppressive strongmen from the early 1990s that led to the initial rise of the 

Taliban movement in 1994. The establishment of a capable national military was 

FIGURE 5

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

0

3,000

6,000

9,000

12,000

15,000

556% increase

in security incidents 

from 2004 to 2008

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY INCIDENTS (2004–2008)

Note: Numbers on graph indicate the total number of security incidents recorded that year. Incidents include suicide bombings, indirect attacks, 

IED/mine incidents, IED/mine direct attacks, and direct attacks.

Source: Defense Intelligence Agency, “Afghanistan Security Incidents Database: 15 April 2016.”

12,333

1,880
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 37

necessary to get locally independent factions under the control of the national 

government. This effort, however, was slow to progress.173

Corruption within the Karzai administration added to the erosion of local 

support for the newly elected government. Regional warlords—now serving 

as members of Karzai’s cabinet—and local security commanders instituted 

parallel and informal chains of command that further damaged the integrity 

of the national government. According to a 2006 field report from senior DOD 

official Marin Strmecki, most Afghan and international interviewees shared the 

following view that, “It is not that the enemy is so strong, but that the Afghan 

government is so weak.”174

“It is not that the enemy is so strong, but that 

the Afghan government is so weak.” 

—Senior DOD Official Marin Strmecki

UNITED STATES TAKES OWNERSHIP OF 

ARMY AND POLICE DEVELOPMENT 

The United States recognized that dividing the responsibility of security sector 

reform among the United States and its coalition partners was not producing 

the desired results, requiring the Bush administration to increase the U.S. commitment.175 To better streamline and expedite ANDSF development, in July 2005 

DOD expanded its role in police development efforts and assumed responsibility 

for the coordination, training, and advising of both the army and police.176

In April 2006, the United States renamed OSC-A the Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), emulating General David Petraeus’ 

model for training the Iraqi security forces. CSTC-A assumed full command 

of the training program and follow-on embedded field training teams under 

TF Phoenix. In February 2007, CSTC-A’s command unit, Combined Forces 

Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), was deactivated and CSTC-A began to report 

directly to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) leadership. CSTC-A’s authority 

expanded as the organization assumed responsibility for political-military 

interaction with U.S. Embassy Kabul and the Afghan government, in addition to 

training and developing the ANDSF.177

The 2006 CSTC-A Campaign Plan identified three lines of operation: build and 

develop ministerial institutional capability, generate fielded forces, and develop 

the fielded forces.178 These lines of operation were conditions-based, sequential 

phases that overlapped, as needed.179 Phase I sought to generate and field 

effective national military and police forces, to include ministries, institutions, 
38 | CHAPTER 3 | 2004–2008: RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE TO ADDRESS GROWING INSECURITY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

and intermediate commands. CSTC-A noted that substantial U.S. assistance 

would be required during this phase. Phase II was intended to develop the Afghan 

national security capability through joint planning, coordination, and operations. 

The end state of Phase II would be achieved when most ANDSF organizations 

reached Capability Milestone 1 (CM1), which meant they could plan and operate 

with limited international assistance. Phase III was to be the “Transition to 

Strategic Partnership” and “Afghan Security and Police Reorientation.” This 

phase would occur when the Afghan government assumed full responsibility for 

its security needs. At this phase, the United States would transform CSTC-A to 

a traditional Office of Security Cooperation in the U.S. Embassy and “continue 

to provide financial and training assistance.”180 While the overall campaign plan 

was conditions-based, initial forecasts had Phase II completed by mid-2011 and 

the start of Phase III scheduled to begin in mid-2009.181 According to a State and 

CFC-A directive drafted by Ambassador Ronald Neumann and then-Lieutenant 

General Eikenberry, U.S. plans to begin troop withdrawals could begin as early 

as FY 2006, with a completion date between FY 2011 and FY 2012, assuming an 

ANA force capable of independent operations in FY 2011 and an ANP capable of 

independent operations in FY 2012.182 These timelines were not met.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

Change of Command

Under pressure from the ISAF coalition, President Karzai removed First Vice 

President and Minister of Defense Fahim Khan from both the presidential ticket 

and the MOD in 2004. President Karzai announced Ahmad Zia Massoud—the 

younger brother of the former Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud—

as his candidate for first vice president. In response to his removal, Fahim Khan 

supported the candidacy of fellow Tajik political contender and former Minister 

of Interior Yunis Qanooni. After Karzai’s October 2004 victory, he appointed Abdul 

Rahim Wardak, a professional military officer with international training and 

credentials as a Pashtun mujahedeen commander, to succeed Khan as the new 

Minister of Defense. The international community, including the United States, 

welcomed this move and viewed Wardak as a credible and respected partner. 

In the United States, President Bush replaced Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld with Robert Gates in late 2006. Secretary of Defense Gates supported 

U.S. efforts to build the ANA and proved to be a key supporter of the U.S. 

military surge and requests to expand the ANA under the Obama administration. 

Expansion in Size and Capabilities 

In 2004, with the training of the Central Corps under way, the United States 

and its coalition partners transitioned into a new phase: the rapid expansion 

of the ANA and the creation of four regional corps across Afghanistan.183
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 39

Initially, the coalition’s plan to expand the ANA outside the Central Corps 

and Kabul region included a staggered, two-year rollout of four regional ANA 

commands.184 This plan was modified and made more ambitious in May 2004 

when senior U.S. military officials decided that the four commands would 

form and deploy simultaneously in order to have them established by the 2004 

election (figure 6).185 Having four regional corps operational by that time was not 

possible because the ANA development effort was severely understaffed in U.S. 

training personnel and Afghan soldiers. For example, some of the commands 

were only able to recruit and train 150 troops by election day, when thousands 

more were required to fully staff the regional commands.186

In line with the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, the United States and its coalition 

partners moved forward to expand the ANA to the desired end-strength of 

70,000.187 To accommodate the accelerated growth, the United States constructed and opened regional training centers and specialist schoolhouses that aided 

in dramatically recruiting and training up to 35,000 troops by the end of 2006. 

FIGURE 6

Source: GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to be Better Dened, January 2005, p. 13; RAND, 

Security Force Assistance: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts, 2011, pp. 32–33; GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May be Needed to Ensure 

Completion of a Detailed Plant to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661, June 2008, p. 22.

PAKISTAN

IRAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN CHINA

INDIA

ANA EXPANSION: IN TIME FOR 2004 ELECTIONS

Mazar-e Sharif

209th Corps 

Kabul

201st Corps

Gardez

203rd Corps

Kandahar

205th Corps 

Herat

207th Corps 

Initial plans called for a gradual, 

two-year rollout of four regional 

commands. In order to have the 

commands in place by the 

October election, plans were 

modied to entail the 

simultaneous formation and 

deployment of all four commands 

by the end of September 2004. 

Due to insufcient personnel and 

resources, these commands were 

not fully operational by that date. 
40 | CHAPTER 3 | 2004–2008: RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE TO ADDRESS GROWING INSECURITY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

In 2007, senior Afghan, U.S., and international leaders agreed that a more rapid expansion of the Afghan military was required in terms of both size and capabilities, 

transitioning from small, light infantry brigades to a combined arms force with 

Afghan combat enablers.188 In July 2008, Minister of Defense Wardak proposed expanding the ANA from a force size of 80,000 to 122,000, with an additional training 

pool. This proposal was approved by the Afghans and international community 

without financial arrangements for how the larger force would be funded. Minister 

Wardak reasoned that the ANA had to be expanded because the Taliban was 

“stronger, better trained, and better equipped than expected.”189 All participants 

agreed that expansion was necessary to ensure security and development. In the 

end, the United States ended up covering most of the new expenses.

Air Capability 

In 2005, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld directed the U.S. Army to formally 

rebuild an Afghan presidential airlift capability as part of the Afghan National 

Army Air Corps (ANAAC).190 In 2006, the Afghan government subordinated the 

ANAAC as a unit under the larger ANA, rather than creating a separate air force. 

By the end of 2006, the Afghanistan Compact officially called for an Afghan Air 

Corps (AAC) of 7,000 members to be carved out of the ANA. With this mandate, 

the United States and its coalition partners developed a plan for the ANAAC, to 

include three wings: presidential airlift, rotary wing, and fixed wing.191

In 2007, responsibility for the development of the ANAAC shifted from the 

U.S. Army to the U.S. Air Force (USAF).192

 In the spring of 2007, five years 

after the start of the initial military training mission, the Combined Air Power 

Transition Force-Afghanistan (CAPTF-A) was activated with a mission to 

“set the conditions for a fully independent and operationally capable” air 

corps to meet Afghanistan’s security needs.193 Much like the plans for building 

the ANA, Afghans and U.S. officials took different view of the details of an 

independent Afghan air corps. In 2007, media reporting cited Afghan Colonel 

Khei Mohammad as stating, “We are grateful for what America and the West 

are doing, but we need to rebuild our air corps faster.... We should have jets, 

helicopters, and cargo planes, so that we can defend our borders ourselves.”194

At the same time, U.S. Brigadier General Jay Lindell was cited as calling for 

meeting “the immediate critical need ... [for] air mobility capability,” focusing 

less on providing fighter jets and attack helicopters to the Afghans.195

With differences unresolved, CAPTF-A began work on training the fledgling 

air corps with around two dozen aircraft.196 The coalition agreed to provide 

more aircraft by 2008: the UAE and Czech Republic agreed to provide 13 Mi-17 

helicopters, while Ukraine donated three An-32 fixed-wing transports.197 The 

U.S. government committed to spend $20 million to purchase spare parts and 

other supplies to keep existing Afghan aircraft flying.198 The Afghan government 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 41

wanted more: Afghan officers felt they could not defend their country without 

fighter jets and attack helicopters, so Minister of Defense Rahim Wardak 

requested A-10 ground-attack planes and Apache helicopters from the Bush 

administration, which was denied.199

By 2008, the plan for developing the Afghan air corps was underway and becoming 

more organized. CENTCOM designated the 435th Air Expeditionary Wing as the 

USAF organization responsible for providing air advisors in support of the Afghan 

Air Force.200 The 438th also became the NATO Air Training Command–Afghanistan 

(NATC-A), which was established to “solidify NATO’s commitment to the mission 

of building a sustainable air force.”201 NATC-A fulfilled the training, equipping, and 

capacity-building function for Afghan air power developed by CSTC-A. 

Special Forces 

Creating a special operations force within the ANA was first explored in 2002; 

however, the first Afghan commando battalion was not fully trained until 

2007. U.S. Special Forces, French Special Forces, and MPRI contractors were 

responsible for training the ANA commandos at the Camp Morehead Training 

Center south of Kabul. Initial recruiting efforts focused on culling promising 

and literate soldiers from the struggling conventional forces and putting them 

through a rigorous screening and training process. 

The initial 12-week training, based on the U.S. Army Ranger model, was divided 

into three elements: the fighting force, headquarters support, and battalion staff. 

After graduation, ANA commando battalions were assigned to one of the four 

regional ANA command headquarters where the battalion was partnered with a 

U.S. soldier unloads a refurbished Mi-17 helicopter from the Czech Republic. (Photo by David Votroubek) 
42 | CHAPTER 3 | 2004–2008: RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE TO ADDRESS GROWING INSECURITY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

U.S. Special Forces team to begin 18 weeks of field training, including six weeks 

of training, six weeks of mission, and six weeks of rest and recovery.202

The Afghan Special Forces maintained a close, long-term relationship with their 

U.S. Special Forces trainers.203 Unlike the relationship with the conventional 

forces, the training relationship with the Afghan Special Forces was not restricted 

by withdrawal deadlines or other aspects of the war. Moreover, Afghan Special 

Forces were better paid than their conventional force counterparts. They received 

higher pay ($50 more per month) and more food rations (50 percent more than the 

conventional ration).204 Better training and living conditions improved retention 

and morale; the commandos were reported to have the lowest absent-withoutleave (AWOL) rate and the highest retention rate in the ANA.205

In September 2007, the initial commando unit conducted its first operation, 

resulting in the capture of two large weapons caches, 80 kilograms of heroin, 

and the detention of a known Taliban improvised explosive device (IED) maker. 

By the end of 2008, four commando battalions, with a total of 3,500 soldiers, 

had completed initial training at Camp Morehead.206 For a comparison of key 

elements of the ANA and ANA Special Forces, see table 4.

TABLE 4

COMPARING KEY ELEMENTS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY 

Afghan National Army (ANA) Afghan National Army Special Forces (ANASF)

Recruiting • Initially recruited from established militias 

• Attempted to ethnically balance recruitment 

• Established ANA Recruiting Command

• Recruits remain mostly illiterate

• Targeted recruiting and a competitive selection process

• Recruited from the most promising soldiers in the ANA 

Training* • Basic Warrior Training: 10-14 weeks 

• Advanced Warrior Training: 6-8 weeks for select individuals, after 

completion of Basic Warrior Training

• Basic: 12 weeks 

• Additional 6-week rotations of training, then missions with 

U.S. Special Forces advisers, plus 6 weeks of recovery

• Additional training opportunities provided, such as driving skills 

and leadership

Training 

Description

• Focused on infantry tactics

• Embedded Training Teams mentor and advise in the field 

• Comparison of marksmanship training: Average ANA solder fires 

60 rounds in training each year 

• Focused on training forces to resemble U.S. Army Rangers

• Live and train shoulder-to-shoulder with U.S. Special Forces

• Comparison of marksmanship training: Average ANASF soldier fires 

6,000 rounds of ammunition in initial training

Salary** • Comparatively low pay

• Starting as low as $165/month

• $50-100 more per month than conventional forces 

• Receive better equipment and double the food rations compared to 

conventional forces

Equipment • Initially, provided former Soviet-bloc rifles, both light and heavy machine 

guns, and rocket propelled grenade launchers

• Eventually began transitioning to U.S. and NATO weapons systems

• From the start, equipped with U.S. and NATO weapons systems. 

Not subject to the donations-based, Soviet-era supplies like 

conventional ANA

 • Equipped with M4 and 81mm mortars

Attrition*** • 2% per month (roughly 24% per year) • 1% per month (roughly 12% per year)

Reenlistment • Ranging from 35%-52% reenlistment • Recently as high as 88.5% reenlistment

Note:

* Training - Ranges show various lengths of the main, U.S.-initiated training programs over time. Does not include enabling or auxiliary training, such as literacy. 

** Salary - Refers to base pay only. Amounts listed do not account for losses over time from corrupt leaders skimming salaries, which has improved with the implementation of more advanced 

systems to account for and transfer pay electronically to personnel.

*** Attrition - Percentage is an approximation of attrition rates by month and year, over time. 

Source: RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 21, 25, 33, 40–41, 52, 56, 76; RAND, The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army, 2009, p. 18; DOD, Enhancing Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, pp. 51, 63–64; U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, “Q&A with Brigadier General Edward M. Reeder Jr.” in Afghanistan: The Road 

Ahead, Special Warfare, vol. 24, issue 4, October-December 2011, p. 20; Ann Scott Tyson, “Afghan Commandos Emerge,” Washington Post, April 19, 2008; DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining 

the Afghanistan National security Forces, June 2008, pp. 16–17; NTM-A, “ANA Base Pays and Incentive Pays,” April 20, 2011; DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,

January 2009, pp. 39, 41. 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 43

NATO’s ANA Trust Fund: The First of Its Kind

In 2007, NATO created the ANA Trust Fund to provide financial assistance for the transport 

and installation of military equipment donated to the ANA by ISAF members. As the size of 

and requirements for the ANA increased, NATO agreed to expand the fund to include recurring 

sustainment costs, as well as additional items such as literacy training and professional 

military education (figure 7).207

Since NATO’s creation in 1949, “consensus” has been a fundamental principle of the organization 

and historically included an agreement to use “common funding.”208 Common funding requires 

all NATO members to initially agree on the purpose and mission of a fund and then requires each 

member nation to equally share the fiscal burden associated with that fund.209

As a first of its kind, the ANA Trust Fund deviated from this principle and currently allows 

member nations to contribute voluntarily.210 The ANA Trust Fund did not adopt Article 5 to 

compel member countries to contribute and allows nations to refuse to participate altogether. 

For example, Albania and Poland have not donated to this fund, to date.211 In addition, the 

fund allows contributions from non-NATO donors, which was unprecedented within NATO. This 

policy was implemented to take the financial burden off NATO nations and spread it broadly 

across the entire international donor community. Ten non-NATO nations have contributed to 

the fund since its inception: Australia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, South 

Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Arab Emirates.212 During the 2016 Warsaw Summit, 

NATO agreed to continue working with the international community to secure necessary 

pledges through the end of 2020.213

FIGURE 7

Note: For the NATO ANA Trust Fund, the source used gives years 2007–2010 as a collective total. This chart omits bank interest numbers, which are 

listed in the source material as ‘other.’ 

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Resource Policy and Planning Board, “Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund Status of Contributions (as 

of 31/12/2015);” SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2015. 

NATO ANA TRUST FUND SPIKES AT START OF RESOLUTE SUPPORT ($ MILLIONS)

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

 $169,395,485 

 $144,958,924 

 $111,173,808 

2007–2010

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

$400

 $288,048,057

 $243,528,100 

 $378,683,045 
44 | CHAPTER 3 | 2004–2008: RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE TO ADDRESS GROWING INSECURITY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Inadequate Pre-Deployment Preparation for Rotational U.S. Trainers

National Guard units and individual military augmentees frequently received 

little notification of their deployment to Afghanistan, precluding effective 

pre-deployment training and preparation for the mission.215 For some, 

pre-deployment training consisted of only a week of preparation at one of 

the military’s CONUS Replacement Centers.216 Interviews with members of 

TF Phoenix and embedded training teams (ETT) highlighted the poor predeployment training for trainers and advisors, as well as the perception that 

the United States was focused on the war in Iraq.217 According to a senior U.S. 

Army officer, “Afghanistan is one of the best kept secrets. Everything is Iraq, 

Iraq, Iraq.” He further remarked that he was unable to familiarize himself with 

the specific mission before deployment because he and his unit did not know 

to which location within Afghanistan they were headed. Ultimately, when 

the team arrived in Afghanistan, despite pre-deployment training as a unit, 

individual members were split among five different locations.218

Given the complexity and nuances of Afghan society, particularly its localized 

nature, abbreviated or generic training on Afghanistan would likely have little 

impact on deployed trainers’ knowledge of local dynamics. Furthermore, the ad 

hoc nature of assigning trainers to units and locations throughout Afghanistan 

undermined any attempts pre-deployed trainers could make to understand 

specific regions or locations in Afghanistan. Thus, the pre-deployment training 

model for ANA trainers from the United States did not serve to properly prepare 

trainers for their mission. Much was instead learned “on the job” during the 

6–12 month deployment, and also while working beside new ANA recruits 

in theater. Most of this learning was lost as personnel rotated out and were 

replaced by fresh personnel. Often, new coalition trainers and new ANA recruits 

were equally unprepared for their mission in Afghanistan’s war.

U.S. Inputs Increase, But Not Enough to Meet New Requirements

Funding

Though the United States took on much of the responsibility for funding the 

expanded army, challenges in estimating and allocating the necessary funds 

hampered ANA development. For example, funding more than quadrupled 

from $362.7 million in 2003 to $1.7 billion in 2005 to meet the growing 

requirements of fielding the force.219 Yet, with the rapid expansion and continued 

focus on countering the insurgency, the significant increase in funding was 

U.S. embedded training 

teams were teams of 

U.S. military forces 

assigned to train 

ANA and ANP units in 

the field. 

The United States does not directly contribute to the ANA Trust Fund. However, despite NATO 

overseeing the daily management of the fund, the United States collects NATO contributions, 

merges NATO funds into the U.S. Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), and manages the 

distribution of funds to meet ANA requirements.214
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 45

disproportionately allocated toward combat capabilities within the force, and 

consistently underfunded enablers (such as air capabilities) and MOD governing 

institutions. Partly as a result of this focus, by April 2005 the commands 

responsible for communications, logistics, recruiting, education, training, and 

acquisition were staffed at only 10 percent of authorized levels.220

Later, the budget would expand again: CSTC-A’s ASFF budget request for FY 2008 

was $2.7 billion, including $1.7 billion for the ANA alone. Yet, increased funding 

did not seem to help with the challenges of estimating costs. In a June 2008 

assessment report, DOD admitted that, based on constantly changing operational 

and security realities, it was not possible to reliably estimate long-term costs for 

developing the ANDSF.221

Training and Force Strength 

To counter rising violence and instability, the United States rapidly expanded 

training capacity for the ANA as a way to quickly increase the size of the 

force to secure the country for the 2004 and 2005 elections, as well as for the 

eventual expansion of the force outside the Kabul region. From January 2004 to 

January 2005, training capacity at the KMTC increased from two to five kandaks

trained simultaneously.222

In 2005, all new ANA recruits received 14 weeks of training. In 2007, this training 

was replaced with a 10-week Basic Warrior Training program, and the option for 

qualified candidates to attend an additional six- to eight-week Advanced Warrior 

Training course. This expanded training required a dramatic increase in training 

A kandak is the 

ANA equivalent of a 

U.S. Army battalion.

A USAF airman mentors an ANA military policeman during training at Kabul Military Training Center. 

(U.S. Air Force photo by Cecilio M. Ricardo, Jr.)
46 | CHAPTER 3 | 2004–2008: RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE TO ADDRESS GROWING INSECURITY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

capacity at KMTC, which eventually reached 24,000 new recruits a year. Due 

to limited resources and trainers, the advanced training was capped at 8,000 

soldiers per year, which meant that two-thirds of the new recruits would receive 

only the 10 weeks of basic training, compared to the 14 weeks recruits were 

receiving in 2005.223

Recruiting and attrition issues impeded the U.S. ability to achieve force endstrength numbers, which, in turn, increased pressure to process more recruits 

through the U.S.-led training. Recruiting proved volatile. In 2004, for example, 

15,790 recruits joined the ANA, while a year later, only 11,845 recruits joined.224

Recruiting increased to 21,287 in 2006.225 Persistently high attrition rates eroded 

end strength, as well. In 2005, the United States forecast that 50 percent of 

the first class of ANA recruits eligible for reenlistment would do so; however, 

only 35 percent reenlisted.226 Soldiers who went AWOL posed another attrition 

challenge; MOD replaced deserters, but not AWOL soldiers, in the hopes the 

soldiers would eventually return. This had the effect of leaving units understaffed. 

Other issues affecting the force included the declining quality of recruits over 

time. For example, the proportion of illiterate recruits jumped from 71 percent 

in early 2005 to 80 percent by December 2005.227

 In addition, the Afghan 

government was unable to balance the force ethnically. Southern Pashtuns, the 

Taliban’s traditional recruiting pool, remained underrepresented, while factions 

of the Northern Alliance were overrepresented.228

Shortages of Training Teams 

The United States’ push to rapidly expand 

the force resulted in dramatic shortfalls in 

U.S. and international ANA trainers, forcing 

the United States to decrease the size and 

capabilities of the training units. The increase 

in training capacity from two to five kandaks at 

KMTC created requirements for the embedded 

training mission to increase from 410 to almost 

700 personnel. Until additional trainers were 

deployed in February 2005, ETTs were reduced 

in size from 16 to 12 personnel.229 To offset the 

decreased size of the ETTs and build rapport 

earlier in the military partnership, training 

teams were paired with Afghan units on the 

first day of training, rather than at graduation.230

U.S. ETTs completed training with the ANA 

units and deployed downrange to provide field 

training, as well.231

An ANA soldier and U.S. military 

advisors on patrol in Nuristan Province. 

(DVIDS photo by Isaac Graham)
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 47

In 2006, ISAF established its equivalent to U.S. ETTs called Operational Mentoring 

and Liaison Teams (OMLT). The first OMLT was deployed by the UK to Helmand 

in May 2006. OMLTs followed the NATO deployment cycle, as advisors were 

deployed to train an Afghan unit for as little as six months, while U.S. ETTs were 

initially assigned to a unit for one year.232 National caveats attached to some 

OMLTs prevented embedded units from engaging in combat alongside their 

Afghan partner units, limiting the level of field training and mentoring provided.233

With the establishment of ETTs and OMLTs, the United States and its coalition 

partners were unable to meet the associated personnel requirements. From August 

to December 2007, CSTC-A determined that around 2,400 ETT personnel were 

required; however, only about 1,000 were assigned, a shortfall of over 50 percent.234

During that same period, the required number of personnel for OMLTs was 70; 

however, fewer than 20 were assigned, a shortfall over 70 percent.235 Thus, in 

addition to coalition differences in national caveats and approach to training the 

ANA, a simple inability or unwillingness to fully staff ETTs and OMLTs contributed 

to ANA training gaps. Even with these known gaps in trainers and advisors, the 

issue did not elicit a reassessment of ANDSF capability milestones or a U.S. 

reevaluation of political timelines set for ANDSF development. 

Equipment

Despite increases in financial resources, there were persistent shortages in 

equipment, including weapons, ammunition, vehicles, uniforms, boots, and 

communications equipment.236 Following a visit to Afghanistan in June 2006, 

Members of the ANA learn how to maintain and operate Humvees in a five-month course at Kabul Military 

Training Center. (Photo by Douglas Mappin)
48 | CHAPTER 3 | 2004–2008: RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE TO ADDRESS GROWING INSECURITY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

retired General Barry McCaffrey concluded that the ANA was “miserably 

under-resourced” and that such circumstances were becoming a “major morale 

factor for their soldiers.”237 Furthermore, the donation-based equipment supply 

system was beginning to take its toll: Minister of Defense Wardak asserted that 

the condition of the equipment received was far worse than the equipment 

received during the mujahedeen fighting days of the 1970s and 1980s.238 Afghan 

field commanders reported that Afghan units tried to seize Taliban caches 

because the Taliban’s equipment was better.239 When the growth of the ANA 

began to accelerate substantially, U.S. and coalition leaders began to rethink the 

merits of donated equipment and shift toward new, more modern equipment.240

Even with changes to the equipment procurement process, the ANA still suffered 

from chronic under-resourcing in 2008. According to some measures, the 

developing army had only 60 percent of mission-critical items, at a time when 

the United States required Afghan units to have 85 percent of critical items 

to be deemed ready for independent operations.241 In October 2006, CSTC-A 

commander Major General Robert Durbin submitted a request for an increase 

in ANDSF funding to address some of these shortfalls, which was met with an 

FY 2007 increase to $4.88 billion.242 These funds were largely used to procure 

U.S.-standard weapons and equipment, which reduced equipment variation and 

improved capability in the ANA.243 CSTC-A continued to accept internationally 

donated equipment, but in 2007 received permission from the Afghan government 

to vet all donated items to ensure they matched ANA mission requirements.244

A U.S. Army soldier mentors an ANA recruit as he learns to use his new M16. (Photo by Guy Volb) 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 49

Shifting the ANA equipment procurement system to NATO standards provided 

minimal, short-term relief to the problem of under-resourcing the ANA. This 

process would, in fact, become a part of a larger movement to transition 

the ANA into a Western-style force. Starting in 2007, ANA kandaks were 

restructured to mirror Western forces, transitioning from light infantry units 

to motorized infantry units equipped with small arms, support weapons, Light 

Tactical Vehicles, and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (Humvee). 

In 2008, the United States began to equip ANA units with U.S.-standard weapons, 

including M16 assault rifles from excess U.S. Marine Corps stock. Mortar units 

and machine gun teams were also re-outfitted with new U.S.-grade equipment, 

while older, Soviet-era equipment was phased out.245

 This transformation, while 

seemingly benefiting the ANA through the standardization and modernization 

of its weapons and equipment, would ultimately foster increased long-term 

dependency on international donors for both funding and maintenance.246 These 

NATO-standard weapons and equipment marked the beginning of the ANA’s 

history of increasing complexity of systems and its unsustainability. 

Complexity and Sustainability 

Throughout 2004 to 2008, ANA development saw the continued expansion of the 

force outside Kabul, attempts to standardize the ANA’s weaponry and equipment, 

and modifications to the training framework.247 All of these changes, while 

seemingly benefiting the ANA, also served to make the institution increasingly 

complex and expensive, thereby delaying sustainability and Afghan ownership. 

Additionally, while one of the coalition’s original goals was to stand up an army 

capable of preventing Afghanistan from falling to the Taliban and becoming a 

safe haven for terrorists—so coalition troops could transition security quickly to 

the Afghans—the systems chosen inherently delayed the drawdown of coalition 

forces. Furthermore, these systems and modifications appeared a mismatch to 

Afghan culture and society: Western-style management systems, an all-volunteer 

light infantry force (including artillery, armor, commando, combat support, 

combat service support, and the requisite intermediate commands and sustaining 

institutions), and a budding air corps capability were imposed upon a largely 

illiterate population with a history of tribal conflict. 

“The logistics system in the ANA was broken when we got there. 

It’s getting better, but it’s still broken. That’s the Achilles heel 

of the ANA right now.” 

—Lieutenant Colonel John Schroeder

Complicated logistics systems were an example of this mismatch. These 

systems often required higher levels of literacy than available in the army or the 

Afghan population at large. At the same time, however, logistics management 
50 | CHAPTER 3 | 2004–2008: RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE TO ADDRESS GROWING INSECURITY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

was a capability the ANA desperately needed. When asked in 2007 what the 

Afghan kandak staff needed most from him, Lieutenant Colonel John Schroeder 

responded, “The biggest thing [the Afghans] wanted from the United States was 

resource management. The logistics system in the ANA was broken when we got 

there. It’s getting better, but it’s still broken. That’s the Achilles heel of the ANA 

right now.”248

Force Readiness Assessment Challenges

Despite monumental adversity, the ANA had begun to take form in 2004, 

increasingly projecting national power as a multi-ethnic, albeit ethnically 

unbalanced, fighting force. According to CFC-A commander Lieutenant 

General David Barno, no ANA formations were defeated or broke from combat 

engagements from 2003 to 2005, and the army showed notable improvements in 

discipline during civil disturbance operations.249

The ANA also flexed its ability to function as an extension of Kabul’s central 

authority. In 2004, the ANA was deployed outside of Kabul on behalf of the 

national government to provide security for the Afghan presidential election and 

subdue factional fighting.250 Following heavy fighting between governor of Herat 

Ismail Khan and General Zahir that resulted in significant civilian casualties, 

Karzai deployed the ANA to restore peace. In Faryab Province, factional 

tensions escalated between the governor and Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Jumbesh 

faction that again required ANA intervention. In Ghor Province, the ANA was 

deployed to intervene following factional fighting between the head of the main 

transitional military unit and supporters of the government.251

Despite these early successes, by 2008 the reliability of the Capability Milestone 

(CM) system to gauge the quality of the ANA was beginning to come into question 

(see essay on pages 51–54). These doubts stemmed, in large part, from the CM 

rating’s focus on training level rather than battlefield performance. In 2008, for 

example, 16 units had a CM1 rating, the top rating level, despite declining security 

conditions.252 One expert questioned the quality of the ANA, asserting that the 

ANA lacked important capabilities and that the CM ratings were not a realistic or 

adequate system for demonstrating ANA proficiency on the battlefield.253

Assessment methodologies further created a misleading picture of ANA 

readiness. Assessments did not account for the impact of intangible inputs, such 

as corruption and poor leadership, on ANA development.254 These intangibles 

were often underappreciated by the United States, despite experts’ insistence 

that corruption was undermining the readiness of the ANA.255 The focus on 

measurable inputs, such as amounts of money and numbers of personnel, 

distracted from assessing equally important, but often unmeasurable, factors.
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 51

Assessing the ANDSF 

In July 2005, the United States implemented capability assessment mechanisms to evaluate 

the ANDSF. Since then, the ANDSF assessment methodology has changed at least three 

times. The first mechanism used was the four-point Capability Milestone (CM) rating system, 

which was replaced in April 2010 by the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT).256

 The 

CUAT was replaced by the Regional ANDSF Assessment Report (RASR) in July of 2013.257 The 

RASR changed to the Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report (MAAR) in January 2015.258 Each of 

these assessment mechanisms is described below (see table 5).

Capability Milestone

In June 2008, a DOD report to Congress outlined the CM ratings, as applied in Afghanistan.259

The highest rating, CM1, described a “unit, agency, staff function, or installation” that was 

capable of conducting its primary operational missions. Depending on the mission, CM1 units 

could still require specified assistance from international partners. The CM2 rating described 

units that were mission capable with routine assistance from international partners. The CM3 

rating described units that were “capable of partially conducting primary operational missions,” 

but were still reliant on coalition support. The lowest rating, CM4, described a unit or agency 

that was capable of portions of operational missions, but needed significant assistance from 

the international community.260

While CM ratings were widely reported in DOD’s reports to Congress, there were many 

inconsistencies. According to the June 2009 DOD report, for example, 83 ANA units were 

evaluated in May 2009 using the CM methodology. This number differed from the April 2010 

DOD report, which stated that only 50 units were evaluated in May 2009 using the CM 

system.261 Outside of DOD reporting, there was limited publicly available rating information. 

The CM rating system produced inconsistent results and created disincentives for the ANDSF 

to improve because the coalition prioritized supporting units with lower ratings.262 Units that 

achieved top ratings lost their mentors and partner support, along with valuable protection, 

expertise, supplies, funding, and prestige. CM ratings were also noted to be inconsistent 

TABLE 5

INCONSISTENT MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS

Capability Milestone (CM) 

Jul 2005–Apr 2010

Commander’s Unit 

Assessment Tool (CUAT)

Apr 2010–Jul 2013

Regional Afghan 

National Security Forces 

Status Report (RASR) 

Sep 2013–Jan 2015

Monthly ANDSF Assessment 

Reports (MAAR)

Jan 2015–Present

Highest

Rating(s)CM1: Mission capable, may require 

specified assistance 

(1) Independent with 

 advisors (1) Fully capable (1) Sustainable 

CM2: Mission capable only with 

routine assistance 

CM3: Capable of partially conducting 

missions, reliant on assistance 

(2) Effective with advisors 

(3) Effective with partners 

(4) Developing with 

 partners

(2) Capable 

(3) Partially capable 

(4) Developing 

(2) Fully capable 

(3) Capable 

(4) Partially capable 

Lowest 

Rating(s) CM4: May be capable of conducting portions of missions, reliant on 

support

(5) Established 

(6) Not assessed 

(5) Established 

(6) Not assessed 

(7) Awaiting fielding 

(5) In development

Note: Capability Milestone (CM) ratings are abbreviated versions of longer definitions found in DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan 

National Security Forces, June 2008, pp. 6–7. 

Source: DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 2008, pp. 6–7; SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces: 

Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 14-33-AR, February 2014, p. 6; DOD, Report on Progress Toward 

Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 75; DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, pp. 21–22. 
52 | CHAPTER 3 | 2004–2008: RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE TO ADDRESS GROWING INSECURITY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

in that they did not measure the ANDSF’s ability to sustain its capabilities. For example, 

according to a 2010 SIGAR audit, 38 percent of ANA units and 66 percent of ANP units 

were shown to have regressed at least one level in capability over a 12-month period.263

Additionally, the reliability of data reported by the ANA was often called into question. RAND 

reporting from 2011 cites a lack of U.S. personnel to verify data and the fact that Afghan 

units were not under U.S. command as hindrances to the U.S. attempt to verify reported 

data.264 The accuracy of ANP assessments was also noted to be problematic, as reports from 

some districts indicated that even CM1-rated units required constant reinforcement.265

Discrepancies were also observed among different units with the same CM rating. For 

example, some CM1-rated units were more capable than others, indicating the relativity 

of the assessment. As a result of these differences, “one could not assume that units with 

similar ratings would have similar capabilities.”266 Inconsistencies were also noted between 

army units that were partnered with the coalition and those that were only mentored by the 

coalition, despite having the same CM rating.267

Finally, CM rating measurement tools emphasized quantitative inputs, which masked 

qualitative measures of readiness. For example, the capability checklists for the ANP 

consisted of 70 percent of quantitative input measures, such as levels of staffing and 

equipment.268 This methodology masked performance-degrading factors, such as poor 

leadership and corruption, and emphasized readiness, mostly in terms of a unit being fully 

staffed or supplied. Given these weaknesses, and complaints from commanders in the field, 

the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) decided to replace the CM rating system, and in late March 

2010, told SIGAR that plans were underway to do so.269

Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool

Since IJC’s creation in late 2009, it had been responsible for U.S. and coalition forces 

working with fielded ANDSF forces. IJC was therefore also responsible for the assessment of 

these ANDSF forces. Aware of the flaws with the CM system, IJC introduced a new process by 

which Regional Commands reported on governance, development, and security for priority 

areas of Afghanistan. 

In April 2010, IJC rolled out its new ANDSF assessment framework: the Commander’s 

Unit Assessment Tool.270 The CUAT framework included both quantitative and qualitative 

components: Quantitative data included force strength numbers and equipping levels, 

and qualitative data included overall descriptions of leadership quality, competency, and 

unit morale. This new assessment framework, together with battlefield reporting, informal 

commander’s assessments, and ISAF’s separate assessments of the MOD and MOI, created 

the assessment methodology for the security apparatus.271

Despite the CUAT being considered a more detailed, stronger assessment tool for measuring 

ANDSF readiness, flaws in the model continued to mask the true nature of the ANDSF’s 

ability to secure the country. Though the new assessment tool showed that the ANDSF was 

improving, there remained significant inconsistencies in the quality of data used to assign 

rating levels. Again, establishing longitudinal trends remained a problem. A 2012 Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) report noted that the CUAT suffered from changing definitions, 

which DOD attributed to a reported increase in the number of ANDSF units rated at the 

highest level, and problems applying the CUAT to ANP capability.272 For example, between 
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the CUAT’s inception in 2010 and its end in 2013, IJC changed the assessment rating 

definitions four times (table 6). 

According to IJC officials, these changes were made in response to inflated ratings and the 

fact that officials conducting the assessments had limited understanding of the differences 

between rating levels. Although assessment levels remained mostly consistent, the 

definitional changes made it difficult to assess improvements in the ANDSF over time.273

Finally, the CUAT system was more complex than the CM rating system. In response to 

projected ISAF force reductions, the CUAT ratings were amended to be assessed and 

reported in bi-monthly cycles; however, ISAF force reductions occurred on varying timelines, 

resulting in ISAF’s inability to assess the required units every cycle. At times, CUAT data was 

recorded in cycles without proper dates, which further clouded the accuracy of the data.274

Moreover, the CUAT required additional training and guidance on rating definitions. Many 

ANDSF advisors did not receive this training, rendering the ratings largely inconsistent and 

often inaccurate.275

Regional ANDSF Status Report

In July 2013, IJC replaced the CUAT framework with the Regional ANDSF Status Report. Three 

different DOD reports to Congress captured detailed RASR evaluations before the system 

was deemed classified by IJC.276 In the previous CM and CUAT assessments, the ANA and 

ANP were recorded separately and, specifically in the CUAT, down to the kandak level (ANA). 

In the October 2014 DOD report to Congress, IJC changed the names of the sub-levels it 

was evaluating from the previous April 2014 and November 2013 DOD reports to Congress, 

creating difficulty in determining improvement. Moreover, as noted in SIGAR’s October 

2014 Quarterly Report, IJC determined that future ANDSF capability assessments would be 

classified, removing public transparency.277

The RASR framework was designed to improve upon the CUAT by enabling IJC to better track 

the degree to which ANDSF units were able to use their staffing, equipping, and training 

TABLE 6

EVOLUTION OF CUAT RATINGS 

April 2010 July 2010 September 2010 October 2010 August 2011 

Effective with advisors Independent Independent Independent Independent with 

advisors

Effective with assistance Effective with advisors Effective with advisors Effective with advisors Effective with advisors 

Dependent on coalition 

forces for success Effective with assistance Effective with assistance Effective with assistance

Effective with 

assistance

Barely effective Dependent on coalition 

forces for success

Dependent on coalition 

forces for success Developing Developing with partners 

Ineffective Ineffective Ineffective Established Established 

Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed

Note: IJC color-coded the CUAT rating levels. This table shows the changes in IJC’s coding over time. 

Source: SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 14-33-AR, February 

2014, p. 6. 
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numbers (similar to the CUAT) to successfully engage the enemy in combat, change advisor 

teams to match resource constraints, and better measure the capabilities of the various 

branches of the ANDSF.278 The RASR rating levels were fully capable, capable, partially 

capable, developing, established, not assessed, and awaiting fielding.279

The RASR framework marked another change in the levels and definitions used to assess the 

ANDSF, which again made any longitudinal analysis of the ANDSF’s improvement challenging. 

Furthermore, the new framework measured the ANDSF’s capabilities on a monthly, rather than 

quarterly, basis.280 IJC also designed RASR to assess, in a more targeted fashion, fewer units 

with greater consistency every month. This design, in theory, allowed IJC to focus on specific 

units of critical importance or interest. To improve upon the guidance previously provided for 

the CUAT system, IJC issued a fragmentary order (FRAGO) with more specific instructions on 

the data that advisor units should include in the comments supporting their ratings in each 

category, for each unit assessed.281 Additionally, quality control checks were put in place to 

ensure a higher quality of data.282

Essential Functions and the Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report

After the 2014 security transfer and subsequent ISAF drawdown, in early 2015 U.S. Forces–

Afghanistan (USFOR-A) adopted a broad assessment framework with eight essential 

functions (EF) for the entire Resolute Support mission. The EFs were measured according to 

a 5-point scale with the highest score, 5, signaling that the “Afghan systems are in place, 

functioning, and being used effectively, and that the associated processes will be carried 

forward by Afghans without any advising or other coalition involvement.”283

In addition to this broad assessment framework, commanders accounted for train and advise 

efforts at the ANA corps and ANP headquarters level via the Monthly ANDSF Assessment 

Report. As of May 2016, the MAAR also included a 5-point scale in which the top rating, 

5 (“sustainable”), signaled that a unit had sustained a rating of “fully capable” for three 

continuous months, had demonstrated “effective mission planning, successful utilization of 

unit processes, and coordination across essential functions,” and required coalition support 

“only for integration of new systems or for advanced operations.”284

The current MAAR reporting system remains limited and problematic. The MAAR assesses 

the ANA and ANP only at the headquarters level and, as noted by the U.S. military itself, 

it is not intended “to be used as an assessment or evaluation of the entire ANDSF.”285

 Such 

a methodology and lack of coverage of the ANA and ANP below the headquarters level 

suggests that any evaluation is capturing only superficial and potentially misleading details 

of current readiness. 
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AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

Europeans Continue Civil Policing Effort 

From 2004 to 2007, the German Police Project Team (GPPT) continued to 

focus time, attention, and personnel on university-level training for NCOs and 

officer cadets, a program that took nine months to three years, respectively.286

Senior Afghan MOI officials recognized the dual-track police development 

initiatives by the United States and Europe and wanted to ensure a balanced 

approach was implemented. In meetings and correspondence between U.S. and 

Afghan officials at the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004, U.S. leaders drafted 

and pushed forward plans to further accelerate ANP training. MOI leaders 

were resistant, stressing the need for a balanced police development program. 

Minister Jalali and Deputy Minister Helal agreed to move forward with a plan to 

train 12,000 patrolmen and 8,000 officers to meet the June 2004 goal of 20,000 

trained police.287 By January 2005, only 41 officers and 2,583 NCOs—less than 

5 percent of the 62,000 final force strength required at that time—had been 

trained through the German program, which focused on civil policing, rule of 

law missions, and building a defensive and reactive force.288

In June 2007, the EU assumed lead responsibility for the European efforts to 

support police reform, and established the EU Police Mission for Afghanistan 

(EUPOL). The EUPOL team was composed of several member states, including 

Germany. Although the agency changed, police training efforts continued along 

the same track as the German effort, toward a civil policing model focused on 

professional development of police officers and NCOs.289 During a meeting with 

U.S. Ambassador William Wood in Kabul, EUPOL leaders outlined their plans 

German Police Project Team mentors host a graduation ceremony for 63 newly commissioned Afghan 

National Police officers. (IJC Photo by Sandra Arnold)
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and mission to support the ANP. EUPOL mentors would work at the “strategic 

level” mentoring ministry officials, police chiefs at the national, regional, and 

provincial level, and the attorney general’s office. EUPOL would not provide 

field training or basic training for lower-level police officers. EUPOL leaders 

promised 160 to 190 police mentors by November 2007.290

State Struggles, DOD Takes Over 

By 2004, U.S. interest in police development increased significantly. State was ultimately responsible for the U.S. police development program. Because it lacked an 

institutional capability with the necessary resources and trained law enforcement 

professionals to conduct the mission, State was forced to rely almost exclusively 

on its contract with DynCorp International to meet the mission requirements. 

Until 2005, DynCorp was unable to conduct essential follow-on field training, 

mentoring, and evaluation required outside of Kabul, largely due to force 

protection concerns inherent in civilian-led missions.291 State considered 

expanding the program’s field training but decided the expansion would be too 

costly and could possibly increase security threats to the police trainers.292 GAO 

cites State INL officials as noting high costs, security threats to personnel, and 

the inability to recruit a significant number of international police as reasons for 

not implementing a “countrywide field-based program.”293

Although State’s training program was meeting numeric output goals, for example, 

reaching 20,000 police trained by mid-2004, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was 

increasingly worried about the minimal capabilities of the Afghan police and 

was interested in DOD assuming control of police development.294 Rumsfeld felt 

that despite State’s efforts, security was worsening and that DOD was better 

suited to provide field partnering and tactical support.295 In April 2005, the United 

States officially transitioned police development responsibility to DOD under the 

Office of Security Cooperation (the predecessor organization to CSTC-A). State, 

however, maintained contracting management authority over police training, 

mentoring, and MOI reform, which created oversight and contractual hurdles.296

Placing police development under DOD brought unique challenges. DOD largely 

failed to assess its congressional authorities and restrictions related to foreign 

police development prior to assuming the role of the lead U.S. organization. 

When confronted with the U.S. recommendation for the U.S. military to assume 

the lead for police development, Afghan Minister of Interior Ali Jalali agreed, but 

warned that he did not want his police militarized, or trained by soldiers. At this 

time, OMC-A leaders assured Jalali that trainers would only be drawn from law 

enforcement personnel.297 Jalali also noted that he did not want to sacrifice quality 

for quantity.298 Despite Afghan reservations, U.S. soldiers became an integral part 

of the new DOD police training mission, leading to a militarization of the force.299
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According to U.S. Ambassador Ronald Neumann, in 2005 early DOD efforts 

to equip the ANP were halted when DOD was informed it could not use 

its Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds for police 

development. And, despite the ANP often having to serve as the frontline 

defense against the rising Taliban threat, the U.S. government prohibited 

providing heavy weapons to foreign police officers, including the ANP.300

Prioritizing Quantity Over Quality 

Similar to the U.S. position on developing the ANA, senior U.S. officials believed 

that a rapid deployment of trained police officers was a necessary alternative to 

expanding international forces, allowing the international community to maintain 

a light footprint and withdraw on shorter timelines. The insufficient number of 

trained and equipped police operating in the provinces was a major obstacle to 

the expansion of government authority and international development. Based 

on these factors, the United States dramatically expedited the police training 

program for patrol officers as a means to significantly increase the quantity of 

active police, ultimately jeopardizing the quality of the force. 

Under DOD’s lead, the DynCorp ANP training program evolved and expanded 

slightly from its original version. Training focused on the individual patrol 

officer and continued the pattern of deploying newly trained recruits into an 

environment ripe with incentives to engage in corruption. Training was still 

largely restricted to the capital and according to a 2005 GAO report, only 12 

trainers were sent to areas outside of Kabul.301

U.S. Army military police demonstrate riot control techniques to members of the ANP. (105th Mobile Public 

Affairs Detachment photo by Darren D. Heusel)
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A 2006 fact-finding mission by General McCaffrey assessed the ANP was in 

“disastrous condition: badly equipped, corrupt, incompetent, poorly led and 

trained, riddled by drug use, and lacking any semblance of a national police 

infrastructure. There is very little oversight at province or district level.”302

Embassy cables and other U.S. government reports at this time further 

confirmed and detailed the “disastrous condition” of the police forces.303

According to a 2005 CFC-A report, of the 34,000 “trained” police officers, only 

3,900 had been through the eight-week course; those who did not go through the 

eight-week course went through a two-week transition course.304

The ANP was in “disastrous condition: badly equipped, 

corrupt, incompetent, poorly led and trained, riddled by drug use, 

and lacking any semblance of a national police infrastructure. 

There is very little oversight at province or district level.” 

—General Barry McCaffrey

By 2006, training requirements increased; literate ANP recruits were to attend 

a nine-week training program, while illiterate recruits were to complete a fiveweek literacy program, followed by the nine-week basic training.305 In reality, 

however, this did not occur.306 For example, RAND reported that “many of the 

60,000 ANP personnel who were designated as having officially completed their 

training by June 2006 had only attended the three-week course developed for 

ANP recruits recite oath of honor at a graduation ceremony in Kabul. (U.S. Air Force photo by Beth 

Del Vecchio)
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SEPTEMBER 2017 | 59

officers already in service, despite the fact that their backgrounds, experiences, 

and suitability for police work varied considerably.”307 In comparison, previous 

U.S. foreign police training efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which drew from a 

pool of cadets who were “much more literate” and were conducted in a “less 

violent society,” provided 25 weeks of initial training.308 And, in the United 

States, police recruits—who are generally pulled from a highly literate pool of 

high school graduates into a fully developed and established national and subnational police bureaucracy—attend an average of 21 weeks of basic training, 

followed by weeks of field training.309

The U.S. inability to track and monitor training and development of ANP units 

or individual police officers prevented the United States from performing 

the necessary follow-up professional training or remedial retraining required 

under the enhanced program.310 Furthermore, according to one expert, the 

effectiveness of the Afghan basic police training was questionable, as police 

officers who attended a basic training course were subsequently deployed into 

the field to work alongside untrained and often corrupt officers and patrol 

officers, resulting in training that was viewed as “largely wasted.”311

With DOD now leading the charge for police development, militarization of the 

force began to occur in various forms. One manner in which this occurred was 

via the significant lack of focus on civilian policing essentials, such as crime 

prevention. Ambassador Neumann affirmed this, noting, “We never focused on 

crime prevention. For us, this was in one box and insurgent activity in another. 

We never collected crime statistics on any regular basis. Yet, for an Afghan, 

violence [was] all part of insecurity. If the government cannot protect against 

both, then it does not provide security; [this was] a major problem for winning 

loyalty and trust of the people.”312

By the end of the 2006 fighting season, the United States independently decided 

that the ANP needed to rapidly expand to 82,000 police and threatened to 

withhold funding if the Afghans did not approve.313 In May 2007, the ANP’s 

official end strength was formally increased to 82,000, which was to be reached 

by 2010.314

Increased Attention and Resources Still Missed the Mark for an Expanding Force

Funding

In May 2004, international donors attended a conference on Afghan police 

reconstruction co-hosted in Doha, Qatar, by Germany, Qatar, the UN, and the 

Afghan government. Donors pledged $350 million for police reform over the 

next several years. Despite these pledges, in 2004, LOTFA—a funding source 

responsible for paying police salaries and equipment—suffered a shortfall of 

over $72 million.315
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U.S. financial support for police development drastically increased to a 

cumulative total of roughly $6 billion from 2004 to 2008, a number far below the 

ANA development budget of roughly $10 billion during that same time period 

(figure 8 on page 67).316 In October 2006, there was a significant increase in 

requested funding for FY 2007; the approved ANP budget of $2.7 billion was 

larger than all U.S. funds provided for police development to date.317 In addition 

to U.S. funding, Germany invested roughly $12 million a year through its tenure 

as lead nation from 2002 to 2007.318

Problems related to funding and salaries plagued the ANP, including the issue of 

“ghost police,” or nonexistent police. Afghan police leadership was accused of 

exploiting internationally funded police salaries by inflating rosters with ghost 

personnel in order to receive more funds. Inflated numbers corroded combat 

readiness of police units, as actual staffing levels were unknown. During a 2006 

U.S. military site visit to Kama District, Nangarhar Province, only 28 of the 60 personnel on the roster actually worked at that location. Some of the absent police 

officers assigned to Kama District were actually working in the provincial capital 

of Jalalabad.319 From August to September 2007, TF Phoenix conducted a survey 

of 81 percent of Afghan districts to confirm uniform, border, and civil order police 

against MOI payroll lists. The survey was conducted in response to ongoing concerns regarding the actual number of police on the ground. According to CSTC-A, 

“MOI personnel and payroll offices have reported varying figures for the same district, often seriously at odds with claims by local chiefs of police, the 2007 tashkil

(list of personnel and equipment), and observations of PRT officers.”320 Survey 

findings verified only 76 percent of the 45,731 police listed on the payroll.321

Equipment

Equipment limitations undermined ANP mission readiness.322 In 2002, 

German assessments had indicated that less than 10 percent of the ANP was 

adequately equipped.323 Although there was an increase in financial support 

for the ANP to purchase weapons, GAO cited DynCorp officials in early 2005 

as estimating that the ANP was still short “48,500 side arms, 10,000 automatic 

rifles, and 6,250 machine guns” for a force size of less than 40,000.324 Due to 

this shortfall, GAO noted that through March 2005, trainees were no longer 

receiving firearms training.325 The GAO report further described the effects of 

the equipment shortfall by noting, “Most police do not perform routine patrols 

because they lack adequate numbers of vehicles and the fuel to operate them. 

State/INL officials reported that police often rely on civilian complainants 

for transportation during law enforcement investigations.”326 In 2005, CFC-A 

reported that during a recent operation, ANP units deployed without food, 

water, sufficient ammunition, cold weather clothing, or blankets. Three years 

after the 2002 German assessment, CFC-A reported the ANP still had less than 

15 percent of the required weapons and communication systems.327
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While significant progress was made in resourcing the ANP, by June 2006 most 

ANP units had less than half of their authorized equipment. To make matters 

worse, 95 percent of the equipment on hand was donated from coalition 

partners and labeled both “nonstandard” and “low quality.”328 By mid-2008, GAO 

reports indicated “the ANP has not received about one-third of the equipment 

items [DOD] considers critical and continues to face shortages in several types 

of equipment, including vehicles, radios, and body armor.”329

Personnel

While the United States and coalition partners increased advisors, mentors, 

and trainers during this period, police development programs were consistently noted as being understaffed and the quality of those assigned was routinely 

questioned.330 Secretary Gates said, “Our main challenge is increasing the competence and reliability of the force, and that requires large numbers of mentors 

and trainers. So far we have been unable to fill most of what is required.”331 DOD 

replicated its ANA development model by assigning field training teams called 

Police Mentoring Teams (PMT) to provide follow-up instruction and mentorship. 

Having military personnel serve on the PMTs contributed to what was widely 

criticized as an increasingly over-militarization of the U.S. police mission. 

With the police mission secondary to ANA development, PMTs suffered from significant personnel shortages, leading to coverage of less than 25 percent of ANP 

units and organizations.332 Similar to the army training mission, NATO mirrored 

the U.S. ANA model and developed police operational mentoring and liaison 

teams (POMLT) to further assist with the advising and mentoring mission. 

Afghan police trainees learn “cover down” tactics at the Jalalabad Regional Training Center. (U.S. Army 

photo by Reeba Critser)
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Similar issues of under-resourcing plagued the POMLTs; coalition partners’ input 

continued to be limited, with consistent shortfalls. For example, in 2008 the 

EU provided only 80 of its pledged 215 mentors (less than 40 percent) toward 

ANP mentorship at the ministerial, regional, and provincial levels.333 In addition 

to numerical deficiencies, the quality and experience of the military personnel 

assigned to the police training mission was inadequate. Many of the trainers 

were described as people with a wide variety of military backgrounds, but not 

necessarily any police experience or expertise.334

Creation of New Units to Supplement ANP Deficiencies 

As projected end dates for ANP force readiness targets drew nearer and security 

continued to deteriorate, the United States began to explore options to rapidly 

enhance policing capabilities.335 From 2004 to 2008, the United States supported 

multiple supplemental police force initiatives, including the Afghan National 

Auxiliary Police (ANAP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). 

Afghan National Auxiliary Police

The ANAP program was created by the United States in September 2006 as 

a way to temporarily expedite the expansion of local security in areas under 

threat from the Taliban.336 ANAP started on a small scale with a pilot program 

in Zabul Province. In theory, police officers were vetted and chosen locally—by 

governors, shuras, and community elder leadership—and were responsible for 

staffing checkpoints and providing local police patrols.337

In reality, however, incoming police officers were rarely vetted. According to an 

Afghanistan Analysts Network report, “Recruits were not selected locally and 

were ill-suited to do community-based policing.”338 Additionally, the report noted 

Members of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police train with wooden rifles during their two-week training 

program. (NTM-A photo by Scott Cohen)
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that police were not representative of the communities they were policing, 

noting, “Out of 200 recruits in the second class of ANAP trainees in Zabul, 

80 were from Kandahar, 26 were from Kunduz, 23 from Uruzgan and 17 from 

Ghazni. Only 16 were from Zabul.”339 The allegiance of the ANAP recruits was 

also questionable.340 One analyst added, for example, that a “significant number 

of ANAP recruits openly stated they were ‘Gul’s men,’” referring to a known 

local strongman.341 Furthermore, ANAP recruits received less training but were 

paid salaries comparable to uniformed police and were employed closer to 

home, negatively affecting recruiting for the regular ANP.342

The ANAP had limited, if any, Afghan or international oversight or accountability 

mechanisms.343

 Corruption, human rights abuses, and parallel chains of 

command negatively influenced both the public perception of the police force 

and the larger force organization.344 These factors contributed to the ANAP 

quickly becoming a predatory force, more strongly aligned to local power 

brokers than to the government, and a net detractor from security in most areas.

Ultimately, the ANAP initiative failed. Although it was true that the ANAP had 

been able to expand rapidly, it was only effective in a limited number of areas. 

In May 2008, the United States and Afghan governments decided the ANAP 

would be dissolved entirely by the end of the year. Some ANAP members 

became part of the ANP, but only if they had “served for at least one year, had 

been trained for at least five weeks, and were recommended by their district 

chief.” The rest were terminated by September 30, 2008.345 The ANAP was 

widely criticized as an incompetent and ineffective force that undermined 

disarmament and demobilization programs such as the 2005 Disbandment of 

Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) initiative.346 An inadvertent, secondary effect 

described by U.S. Embassy Kabul was that the ANAP also began providing an 

avenue for Taliban insider attacks, as poor recruit vetting allowed for easier 

insurgent infiltration.347

Afghan National Civil Order Police and the Focused District Development Program 

In May 2006, the Afghan National Civil Order Police were established in 

response to riots in Kabul after a traffic accident—involving a U.S. Embassy 

vehicle—killed four Afghan civilians. ANCOP was initially designed to be a 

regionally stationed, small, rapid reaction force available to help quell civil 

unrest, operating as a quasi-gendarme unit for Afghan policing. ANCOP units 

would be able to rapidly respond to emergencies that other units were neither 

trained nor equipped to handle. 

ANCOP members were trained by U.S. Special Forces units and received better 

training, advanced equipment, and more in-depth leadership development than 

regular ANP units. ANCOP training was 16 weeks, as opposed to the standard 
64 | CHAPTER 3 | 2004–2008: RAPID EXPANSION OF THE FORCE TO ADDRESS GROWING INSECURITY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

five to eight weeks for ANP recruits. In comparison, U.S. Army military police 

training lasts 20 weeks. 

According to a 2007 U.S. Embassy Kabul report, ANCOP was composed of 

both urban units and patrol units. ANCOP members received armored vehicles, 

unlike the unarmored Ford Ranger pickup trucks provided to ANP, as well as 

better pay and quicker rank increases based on good performance.348 In May 

2007, the first ANCOP class graduated from training in Mazar-e Sharif. According 

to a police mentor, the first class of recruits was ethnically balanced, worked 

well together after training as a unit, and was 95 percent literate.349

Regardless of initial plans for ANCOP’s function, its main application shifted 

from rapid reaction to that of support for a new U.S. initiative known as 

Focused District Development (FDD). The FDD program was designed to deploy 

ANCOP units to replace local ANP units, which would then receive additional 

training and professionalization. After this training, the ANP units would return 

to their local area and the ANCOP unit would move on to the next district. The 

United States hoped this would mitigate earlier problems of training individual 

police who were then sent into larger units across the country, many of which 

suffered from corruption and employed police who had not yet received any 

training at all.350

Through FDD, police spent eight weeks at a Regional Training Center, while 

ANCOP personnel backfilled their posts.351 Initial reports from early 2009 were 

positive as a number of police units’ capability ratings increased, according 

Afghan National Civil Order Policeman fires an AK-47 assault rifle during a marksmanship competition at

Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City. (U.S. Army photo by Carol A. Lehman)
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to DOD assessments.352 Public perceptions of ANCOP’s professionalism and 

expertise contributed to an optimistic outlook for the program’s efficacy. 

Problems began to arise in later months, however, as shortages of personnel and 

unrealistic timelines significantly restricted the program’s outcomes.353

Some Reforms Made Progress

During this period, the MOI lacked the basic fundamentals of planning, 

programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) essential to governing and 

sustaining a Western-style security force with a demand-driven logistics 

system.354 One of the biggest challenges for the ministry during this period was 

pay and rank reform, as the ratio of high-ranking officer positions to lower 

officers and NCOs created structural imbalances that limited recruitment and 

retention for the MOI and ANP.355 In 2006, the MOI implemented pay reform 

through a distribution system which made it possible for police officers to 

receive their pay directly from a local bank. Prior to the reform, pay was 

delivered by middlemen, and according to the embassy, most of the funds were 

siphoned off by corrupt officials.356 In 2007, CSTC-A began issuing police salaries 

electronically to further reduce the opportunities for corruption.357

In 2006, with U.S. assistance, the Minister of Interior, Ahmad Moqbel Zarar, 

undertook rank reform. This reform reduced the number of generals to an 

appropriate level based on a 62,000-person police force. For example, 120 

two- and three-star generals and 235 brigadier generals were reduced to 

31 and 86, respectively.358 The MOI partnered with CSTC-A to complete the 

design and vetting process for the rank reform program. The vetting process 

included reviews by the international community, including a review by 

the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) for any human rights 

violations. The rank reform process was critical for the success of pay reform, 

which established new salaries based on the new rank structure. Following 

rank and pay reform efforts, the international community worked with the MOI 

to create parity in salaries between the ANP and ANA. International donors to 

LOTFA agreed to raise salaries for patrol officers from $70 to $100 a month.359
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Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

Created in 2005, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) has been the primary means 

of U.S. financial support for manning, training, and equipping the ANDSF (figure 8).360

While the ASFF has provided the Afghan government with a sustained source of funding, it 

is a congressionally authorized fund that requires routine reauthorization based on ANDSF 

requirements.361 ASFF’s budget is often a two-year appropriation cycle, which limits flexibility 

to account for on-the-ground changes to ANDSF development. Due to that lack of flexibility, 

supplemental funding has often been required to address these changes. 

In 2011, OSD authorized the expansion of ASFF resources to allow CSTC-A to use ASFF 

to sustain the ANDSF and provide funds directly to the Afghan ministries.362 Through 

this action, the “goal was to develop ministerial capability and capacity in the areas 

of budget development and execution, payment of salaries, acquisition planning, and 

procurement.”363 However, on-budget assistance to the Afghan government removed U.S. 

oversight and accountability mechanisms. 

The Afghan MOF, MOD, and MOI are responsible for developing, validating, and justifying 

requirements, as well as accounting for ASFF direct contributions from DOD.364 This means 

the success of the ASFF relies on the government of Afghanistan’s ability to acquire accurate 

payroll and personnel data to ensure accountability of U.S. funds.365 As noted in an April 

2014 report by the DOD Inspector General, the MOD and MOI used ASFF direct contributions 

for $82.7 million of unauthorized expenditures in FY 2013, including for miscellaneous 

items such as land purchases or allowances for uniformed employees.366 As a consequence 

of oversight failures, both the MOD and MOI spent approximately $60.2 million more than 

they were authorized for designated budget codes.367 CSTC-A failed to ensure the Afghan 

government had the proper internal controls over its operations and reporting functions that 

could have provided transparency and accountability of ASFF direct contributions.368 As a 

result, CSTC-A could not verify that ASFF direct contributions were properly spent or used for 

predetermined purposes, and the Afghan government could not be held accountable. 

An April 2015 SIGAR audit revealed ANA attendance data lacked proper oversight, resulting 

in inconsistent numbers.369 In consultations with CSTC-A and ANA officials, SIGAR was 

unable to identify direct oversight during attendance data collection and reporting.370

 This 

was due, in part, to a lack of personnel, which left CSTC-A reliant on reporting from ANA 

officials. Additionally, poor data collection practices may have contributed to some ANA 

personnel receiving incorrect salaries.371 The challenges associated with CSTC-A and ANA 

personnel collecting data, verifying its accuracy, and informing the proper channels resulted 

in weaknesses in the ASFF.

To mitigate the threat of ghost soldiers, in January 2017 the United States withheld financial 

support for 30,000 ANDSF salaries and stipulated it would pay salaries only to soldiers who 

were biometrically enrolled in the Afghan personnel system.372 Additionally, the United States 

required the Afghan government to remove several top Afghan Air Force leaders who were 

weak and corrupt, in exchange for more than 100 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters procured 

through ASFF. Initial reflections from USAF advisors indicated the change in Afghan Air Force 

leadership was a positive development.373
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 67

FIGURE 8

Note: ANA funding above is composed of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) budget; DOD Train and Equip; DO International Military Education and Training (IMET); DOS Foreign Military 

Financing (FMF); and DOS Voluntary Peacekeeping (PKO). ANP funding above is composed of ASFF budget account two and DOS International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 

(INCLE). ASFF funding for the ANP was calculated from disbursements. State’s IMET funding was calculated from expenditures. State’s PKO funding was calculated from expenditures. 

State’s INCLE funding was not available for FY 2003, as confirmed by SIGAR data calls. 

Source: GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, GAO-05-575, June 2005, p. 9–10; SIGAR, Quarterly 

Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2009, p. 40; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2010, pp. 140–141; DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 

April 14, 2011; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 30, 2014, pp. 212–213; DOD, response to SIGAR data call, December 31, 2016; State, response to SIGAR data 

call, December 31, 2016; State, response to SIGAR data call, January 6, 2017; DOD, response to SIGAR data call, January 17, 2017; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2017, pp. 212–213.

TOTAL U.S. FUNDING FOR THE ANA COMPARED TO THE ANP ($ BILLIONS)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

$7

FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016

$.08 $.20 $.58 $1.47 $.71 $4.80 $1.78 $4.20 $5.20 $6.76 $6.10 $3.14 $2.71 $2.35 $2.05

$.03 - $.15 $$.26 $1.13 $2.34 $.95 $1.34 $3.60 $3.15 $2.36 $1.50 $1.14 $1.35 $.78

ANA

ANP

1st ANDSF Unit Rated CM 1

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 69

CHAPTER 4

2009–2014: 

U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

U.S. STRATEGIC REVIEW 

After President Obama’s January 2009 inauguration, the White House 

undertook a strategic review of the effort in Afghanistan. In March 2009, 

President Obama outlined the first phase of his new Afghanistan strategy in five 

“realistic and achievable objectives.” The objectives were to disrupt terrorist 

networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan; promote a more capable, accountable, 

and effective Afghan government; develop an increasingly self-reliant Afghan 

security force; assist efforts to enhance civilian control of a stable government 

in Pakistan; and involve the international community to actively assist in 

addressing the Afghanistan-Pakistan objectives.374

In August 2009, the newly appointed commander of U.S. and ISAF forces, 

General Stanley McChrystal, published his multidisciplinary assessment 

of the situation in Afghanistan. For the first time, a U.S. commander in 

Afghanistan publicly described the situation as “serious” and “deteriorating” 

and recommended a complete overhaul in strategy to a comprehensive and 

fully resourced counterinsurgency (COIN) mission focused on protecting 

the population. The assessment outlined the first stage of the new mission 

U.S. Air Force photo
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

70 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

as requiring the United States and Afghanistan to regain the initiative and 

“definitively check the insurgency.”375

McChrystal warned that a failure to reverse the Taliban’s momentum would 

not only prevent success, but would also result in a loss of international 

support. He recommended an increase of international forces and a dramatic 

increase in the ANDSF to 400,000 members.376 The White House ultimately 

supported an international surge of military and civilian forces, as well as an 

increase in the size of the ANDSF to 352,000, an increase from the previous 

force strength target of 220,000.377

President Obama’s December 2009 West Point speech concluded that year’s 

strategic review of Afghanistan. The president announced a surge authorization 

of 30,000 U.S. troops—increasing U.S. force strength from 67,000 to over 

100,000—and set a mid-2011 date for transferring security to Afghan forces 

(figure 9).378 The goal of the military surge was to reverse the Taliban’s 

momentum and set security conditions to a level the ANDSF could handle, 

within the known limitations of the force. President Obama said, “Commanders 

in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with the reemergence of the 

Taliban, but these reinforcements did not arrive.”379 This time, the White House 

would deliver the requested troop increase. 

FIGURE 9

0

30,000

60,000

90,000

120,000

150,000

180,000

Note: For FY 2002–2007, the annual total is derived from average monthly troop levels. For FY 2008–2016, the annual total is derived from average 

quarterly troop levels. While the 2007 total (from monthly averages) in Iraq was 148,300 troops, troop levels surged to 165,607 in the fourth quarter. 

U.S. troop numbers in Iraq for FY 2012 (11,445) represent the number of troops in the rst quarter; there were no U.S. troops in Iraq by the end of the 

second quarter beyond a residual force that remained to provide embassy security and other security cooperation assistance. Starting in June 2014, 

additional U.S. military personnel were sent to Iraq in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) to advise and train Iraqi forces and support U.S. military 

operations against the Islamic State. 

Source: CRS, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001–FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, July 2, 2009, p. 9; CRS, Department of 

Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007–2017, April 28, 2017, pp.4–11; CRS, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: 

Background and Status, February 7, 2017, p. 19

AVERAGE U.S. FORCES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, FY 2002–FY 2016

Afghanistan

Iraq

FY 02 FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 FY 12 FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 FY 16

Surge 

Announced

Surge 

Announced

Surge Peak

100,000 Troops

OIF

Ends

OND

Ends OIR

Starts

Surge Peak

165,607 Troops

ISAF Ends;

RS Starts
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 71

New U.S. Strategy Creates Tension within the Coalition

While agreeing to the need for a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, some members of the coalition—Australia, Canada, and France—refused to extend timelines for combat troops, while others were reluctant to accept General McChrystal’s request to reduce 

force protection measures. In the Netherlands, support for the new U.S. strategy resulted in 

a no-confidence vote and eventual collapse of the Dutch government in 2010.380

TRANSITION SECURITY TO AFGHAN LEAD

Inteqal—the Dari and Pashtu word for transition—was the process by which the 

Afghan security forces gradually assumed lead responsibility from international 

forces. In July 2010, the Kabul Conference created the Joint Afghan-NATO 

Inteqal Board (JANIB), designed as a “mechanism to assess districts and 

provinces ready for transition” based on security, political, and economic 

progress.381 In November 2010, the NATO Lisbon Conference formally agreed 

to the inteqal process and a transition that would be “conditions-based, not 

calendar driven,” and that would “not equate to a withdrawal of ISAF troops.”382

Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, noted in 2012 

that while the international community provided comprehensive assessments of 

potential transition areas, “ultimately, the transfer decision [lay] with President 

Hamid Karzai and his principal advisor for transition, Ashraf Ghani. Complex 

political considerations, including ethnic balancing, at times influence[d] the 

transfer decisions, despite ISAF’s advice.”383

In March 2011, President Karzai announced the first tranche of Afghan provinces 

and districts to start the transition process. These areas were in relatively 

secure areas of ethnic-minority regions of the north and west. From November 

2011 to December 2012, President Karzai announced three more tranches 

for transition that included more than 75 percent of the population.384 During 

Karzai’s January 2013 meeting with President Obama, both presidents reaffirmed 

their commitment to a previously agreed-upon acceleration of the military 

transition timeline from December 2013 to June 2013. Obama noted that ANDSF 

growth was “on track” and had reached a force size of 352,000, as planned.385

On June 18, 2013, President Karzai hosted a ceremonial event announcing the 

launch of the fifth and final tranche, marking the completion of “Milestone 2013,” 

and the official transfer of nationwide security to the ANDSF (figure 10 on the 

next page).386 According to a November 2013 DOD report, “areas that reach[ed] 

the final stage of transition [would] remain at that stage until December 2014, 

when all provinces and districts in Afghanistan [would] graduate from 

transition, regardless of what stage they [had] achieved.”387 On December 28, 

2014, a formal ceremony was held in Kabul to mark the end of ISAF’s mission 

and the transition to a train, advise, and assist role under NATO Resolute 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

72 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

Support.388 This occurred despite the fact that elements of the army, police, and 

associated ministries had not achieved the highest capability milestone ratings 

and continued to require coalition assistance to accomplish their mission.389

FIGURE 10

PAKISTAN

IRAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN

CHINA

INDIA

PAKTIKA

KHOWST

TAKHAR

BADAKHSHAN

BAGHLAN

BAMYAN

FARYAB

WARDAK

KUNAR

KUNDUZ

NURISTAN

NANGARHAR

FARAH

NIMROZ HELMAND KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL

GHOR

GHAZNI

BALKH

BADGHIS

KABUL

KAPISA

PAKTIYA

LOGAR

LAGHMAN

JOWZJAN

PARWAN

SAR-E PUL

HERAT

DAYKUNDI

SAMANGAN

PANJSHIR

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2013; NATO, Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead, January 7, 2015. 

NATO TRANCHES

Transition Tranche 1

On March 22, 2011, President 

Karzai announced the rst set 

of Afghan provinces, districts, 

and cities to begin transition. 

This decision was based upon 

operational, political, and 

economic considerations, 

drawing on the assessments 

and recommendations of the 

Afghan government and 

NATO/ISAF through the Joint 

Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board.

Transition Tranche 2

On November 27, 2011, using 

the same decision-making 

process, President Karzai 

announced the second set of 

Afghan provinces, districts, 

and cities for transition 

implementation.

Transition Tranche 3

On May 13, 2012, President 

Karzai announced the third set 

of areas to enter the transition 

process, covering over 75% of 

the Afghan population. This 

decision marked the 

beginning of transition in 

every one of the 34 provinces 

of Afghanistan, including every 

provincial capital, covering 

almost two-thirds of the 

country's districts.

Transition Tranche 4

On December 31, 2012, 

President Karzai announced 

the fourth group of Afghan 

provinces, cities, and districts 

to begin the transition 

process. With this decision, 23 

of 34 provinces had fully 

entered transition and 87% of 

the population lived in areas 

where the ANDSF had the lead 

for security.

Transition Tranche 5

On June 18, 2013, President 

Karzai announced the launch 

of the fth and nal tranche 

for transition. Once this was 

fully implemented, the 11 

remaining provinces fully 

entered into transition and 

Afghan forces were in the lead 

for security across the country.
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 73

The NATO Training Mission for Afghanistan

NATO efforts in Afghanistan consistently suffered from shortages of personnel to train, advise, 

and assist the ANDSF. From 2009 to 2014, nations contributing troops to the NATO Training 

Mission for Afghanistan (NTM-A) struggled to fill the personnel requirements set forth in the 

NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), NATO’s capabilities-based document 

that identifies requirements for NATO operations. These shortfalls hindered ANDSF development, 

undermined NATO credibility, and curtailed ISAF-led train, advise, and assist operations. 

NTM-A was created at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009 to oversee NATO training of 

the ANDSF, parallel to the U.S. train, advise, and assist effort led by CSTC-A. Headquartered 

at Camp Eggers in Kabul, NTM-A became fully operational in February of 2010 under 

the command of U.S. Lieutenant General William Caldwell, who was dual-hatted as the 

commander of both organizations.390 With NTM-A and CSTC-A focused on training recruits 

and developing institutional training capacity, IJC assumed responsibility for training Afghan 

forces in the field and conducting combat operations.391

Trainer Shortfalls: The Inability to Meet Requirements or Fulfill Pledges

According to U.S. officials interviewed by the GAO, NTM-A was created, in part, to encourage 

increased NATO contributions to developing the ANDSF.392 Similar to previous years, however, 

the new NATO mission struggled to meet personnel requirements and contributing countries 

routinely failed to fulfill their personnel pledges. In February 2010, for example, when NTM-A/

CSTC-A became fully operational, only 1,810 of the required 4,083 trainers were in place.393

Similar shortages remained as time went on. In September 2012, only 1,752 of the required 

2,612 trainers had been provided, and in July 2013, 1,941 of the required 2,135 trainers were 

in place.394

 Even in those areas deemed critical priorities, NTM-A struggled to meet personnel 

requirements. In November 2010, for example, about 36 percent (101 of 281) of instructor 

positions seen as critical priorities were unfilled or lacked pledges.395 At a time when the ANA 

was rapidly expanding toward a force strength goal of 171,600, these staffing shortfalls at both 

training facilities and in the field negatively affected planned ANDSF development.396

Trainer shortfalls were made worse by the inability, or unwillingness, of contributing member 

countries to fulfill personnel pledges made during NATO force generation conferences, the 

mechanism used by NATO to staff operations. According to a May 2011 NTM-A update 

(figure 11 on the next page), NATO’s inability to fulfill personnel pledges contributed to 

staffing levels that were almost always below 50 percent. In May 2011, for example, only 

1,370 of the required 2,800 NTM-A trainers were in place, a staffing level of 49 percent and 

a shortage of 1,430 trainers.397 If all 960 personnel pledged for that month had shown up, 

the staffing level would have exceeded 80 percent. 

Furthermore, reported shortfalls often did not accurately reflect the actual number of 

personnel in country. For example, NTM-A reported a shortfall of only 788 trainers for 

December 2010 because it counted pledged personnel. However, the pledged personnel were 

not in Afghanistan in December 2010. The true number of trainers actively involved in training 

the ANDSF that month was only 1,147, a shortfall of 1,653 people. The reality was, of the 

2,800 personnel required, NTM-A was staffed at only 41 percent. 

Shortfalls in NATO training personnel for Afghanistan were not new. According to General John 

Craddock, Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 2006 to 2009, “NATO nations have never 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

74 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

completely filled the agreed requirements for forces needed in Afghanistan” since mission 

inception.398 Staffing shortages have been attributed to low levels of political support for the 

Afghan mission among some NATO countries and the difficulty of financing a troop presence 

abroad during a global economic recession.399 Without a mechanism in place to compel 

NATO partners to meet their staffing pledges, the train and advise effort suffered. 

The U.S. Role

While the U.S. military maintained a strong presence in the field and provided mentoring 

during combat operations, the U.S. contribution to NATO for the NTM-A mission remained low. 

According to a November 2010 ANDSF progress report, total U.S. contributions of personnel 

to NTM-A amounted to only 288 of the total 2,135 personnel pledged by all nations, or 

13 percent of the effort (figure 12).400 While the United States achieved the highest fill-rate 

of troops, with 266 of 288 troops in country, U.S. deployed personnel assigned to NATO 

accounted for only 21 percent of military and police trainers in country. 

The United States was ultimately unable, or unwilling, to compensate for NATO staffing 

shortfalls caused by other nations, or find ways to ensure compliance with agreed-upon 

personnel contributions.

FIGURE 11

2010 2011

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May

Note: CJSOR stands for NATO’s Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. In-place personnel are those currently in Afghanistan assigned to NTM-A. Pledged personnel are NATO trainers 

assigned to the mission but not yet in Afghanistan. 

Source: NTM-A, DCOM-ISC Update, May 17, 2011. 

NTM-A TRAINER SHORTFALLS (AS OF MAY 17, 2011)

630

455

658

659

656

694

646

713

975

702

980

949

545

1,071

865

1,147

827

1,189

799

1,215

694

1,344

480

1,450 960

2,800

1,370

NTM-A Stated 

Shortfall:

788

Actual Shortfall in 

Afghanistan:

1,653

In Place Pledged CJSOR Requirement
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 75

National Caveats: A Further Limiting Factor

The overall NTM-A effort was further hindered by the national caveats placed on deployed 

personnel by contributing nations. National caveats, described by one NATO commander as 

having “the same practical effect as having fewer forces deployed,” restricted the types of 

activities advisors could perform while training and advising the ANA and ANP.401 Caveats 

that were particularly inhibiting included those that “ban night-time operations, restrict the 

geographical mobility of national forces, require consultations with national capitals when 

making tactical decisions, and exclude specific categories of activity.”402 Considered one of 

the greatest threats to operational success and alliance unity, national caveats negatively 

affected the scope and impact of training activities. By mid-2009, for example, nearly half 

of all troops under ISAF command had caveats in place that restricted their operational and 

maneuverability capabilities, as well as their use of force.403

Germany, at times the third-largest troop contributor behind the United States and UK, was 

known to have some of the most rigid restrictions in Afghanistan. German troops, and thus 

trainers, were confined to the relatively stable northern areas and were required to go to great 

lengths to avoid initiating combat operations or engaging with insurgents. As such, German 

troops were only authorized to fire weapons in self-defense and could not travel on security 

patrols with Afghan partner units in high-threat environments.404

FIGURE 12

Note: Pledged trainers are additional trainers assigned to NATO requirements but not yet in country. Total is the combination of in-country and pledged personnel.

Source: NTM-A, ANSF Monthly Progress Report, November 15, 2010

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO NATO TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN (NOV 2010) 

Number of Trainers

Total: 1,266

0

300

600

900

1,200

1,500

266

While the U.S. achieved the highest 

ll-rate with 92%, U.S. boots on the 

ground as part of NTM-A accounted 

for only 21% of total military and 

police trainer contributions. 

United States

Other Countries

BREAKDOWN BY COUNTRY (NOV 2010)

Nation In-country Pledged

Total

Contribution

United States 266 22 288

Italy 126 107 233

France 102 125 227

United Kingdom 146 81 227

Romania 27 108 135

Germany 78 33 111

Greece 7 88 95

Jordan 67 17 84

Other 447 288 735

Total 1,266 869 2,135
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

76 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

U.S. Support Increased, but Not in Size and Scale for New Force Strength 

President Obama’s and General McChrystal’s assessments of the war in 

Afghanistan dramatically accelerated the ANA development effort. Force 

strength numbers increased significantly, at a higher rate, with tighter deadlines. 

Instead of increasing the force strength to 134,000 by the end of 2011 as 

scheduled, General McChrystal argued those numbers needed to be reached 

by October 2010.405 Though the dramatic increase in ANA force strength was 

designed to counter a resurgent Taliban, it would also help make the ANA selfsufficient and, in theory, enable the coalition to move closer to its goal of turning 

over security responsibility to the ANDSF. 

This new strategy suggested there would be a short period of intense activity 

to weaken the Taliban and improve the ANDSF before the level of effort by the 

United States and ISAF would begin to decrease, until the transition start date 

of July 2011.406 Similar to the Bush administration, the Obama administration 

viewed the development of the ANA as a key enabler to dramatically reduce 

U.S. combat forces.407

In order to achieve these goals, the U.S. government surged both military and 

civilian resources to Afghanistan. This surge became commonly known as 

the new U.S. COIN strategy, which shifted focus toward stabilizing the local 

population through significant civilian and military programming. In his March 

2009 speech on the new strategy, President Obama voiced high hopes that U.S. 

trainers would dramatically increase their role, stating, “Every American unit in 

Afghanistan will be partnered with an Afghan unit, and we will seek additional 

trainers from our NATO allies to ensure that every Afghan unit has a coalition 

partner.”408 Unfortunately, with the expanded training and advising mission, the 

United States and its NATO partners were never able to fulfill this. 

The influx of U.S. and international advisors and increase in resources for ANA 

development made ANA structures increasingly complex and, some would argue, 

increasingly reliant on international donors for financing and international troops 

for enabling support (figure 13). The new approach to ANA development created 

bureaucratic systems that required the U.S. military and civilian surge personnel 

to operate them, rather than Afghans who still largely lacked the training and literacy to execute these systems. Despite the surge, the new strategy created a paradox: Although there were dramatic increases in coalition resources for the train, 

advise, and assist effort, including equipment, trainers, advisors, and funding, 

there was still significant understaffing for the expanded mission. The ANA was 

increasing in size at a rate faster than the United States and its coalition partners 

could keep pace, especially in training and providing the institutional backbone to 

sustain the force, for example, in logistics, human resources, and oversight. 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 77

Trainers and Advisors

Increasing the size of the ANA required more U.S. and international trainers. 

Compared to previous years, the training mission was better staffed and included 

new programs, such as the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA), an initiative 

led by DOD to professionalize ministerial-level governing and managerial 

capabilities.409 Before MODA, efforts to build capacity in the Afghan security 

forces had focused almost entirely on tactical proficiency.410 MODA placed DOD 

civilians in the Afghan MOD in order to provide expertise in ministerial functions, 

such as finance, logistics, personnel, communications, and intelligence.411

An independent evaluation by USIP in February 2012 highlighted the program’s 

strengths and weaknesses.412 Among the noted weaknesses was the tension MODA 

created between DOD civilian and military personnel which resulted from MODA 

advisors focusing on increasing governing capacity while military personnel 

were largely focused on current military operations and fighting capabilities.413 In 

addition, advisors found a discrepancy between their pre-deployment training and 

FIGURE 13

PAKISTAN

IRAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN CHINA

INDIA

Note: Located in Kabul, AAF headquarters commands and controls three wings: the Kabul Air Wing, the Kandahar Air Wing, and the 

Shindand Air Wing. Additionally, AAF headquarters commands and controls eleven detachments, ve of which have aircraft assigned. 

Detachments with assigned aircraft include Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, Shorab, Gardez, and Herat. 

Source: DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, pp. 52–53; The Long War Journal, “Afghan National 

Security Forces Order of Battle,” http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/ANSF%20OOBpage3-ANSF.pdf.

ANA AND AAF FORCE POSTURE (2014)

Mazar-e Sharif

209th Corps 

Mazar-e Sharif 

Air Detachment 

Kabul

111th Capital Division

ANA Headquarters

ANASOC Headquarters

AAF Headquarters

Kabul Air Wing

Gardez

203rd Corps 

Gardez Air Detachment

Kandahar

205th Corps 

Kandahar Air Wing 

Herat

207th Corps 

Herat Detachment

Shindand Air Wing 

Jalalabad

Air Detachment 

Lashkar Gah

215th Corps

Shorab Air Detachment 

ANA Areas

 111 Division

 201 Corps

 203 Corps

 205 Corps

 215 Corps

 207 Corps

 209 Corps

201st Corps
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

78 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

the actual nature of their jobs in Afghanistan.414 Despite this, USIP noted that the 

vetting of potential MOD advisors and the nature of their training curriculum were 

considerably more rigorous than the pre-deployment training for other advisors.415

Other observers noted that, despite the advisors’ expertise, they were not always 

slotted into MOD jobs that suited their skill sets.416 Nevertheless, the MODA 

program was a significant step toward institutionalizing U.S. efforts focused on 

improving ministerial capabilities. 

During this time, the United States also turned to the newly created Security 

Force Assistance Teams (SFAT), composed of carefully selected U.S. military 

officers who were assigned to ETTs that emphasized COIN training and 

operations with their partnered ANA units.417

Insider Attacks Led to Guardian Angel Program and Reduced Advisor Numbers

U.S. and NATO advisor numbers were, in part, affected 

by an increase in the number of insider attacks after 

2011.418 Forty-four insider attacks were reported to 

have occurred in 2012, a dramatic increase from the 

five attacks in 2010 and 16 attacks in 2011.419 DOD 

cited a number of reasons why insider attacks occurred, 

including insurgent infiltration and influence, cultural 

conflicts, personal grievances, social pressure, and 

psychological distress.420 Further, a series of actions by 

U.S. and international service members in 2012 likely 

contributed to the spike in insider attacks that year.421

These events included the burning of Korans outside 

of Bagram Air Base, the killing of Afghan civilians in 

Kandahar by a U.S. Army sergeant, and the circulation 

of photographs of U.S. military personnel defiling 

bodies of deceased Taliban fighters.422

In response to this surge of insider attacks, the United 

States and NATO temporarily reduced the number of 

advisors on the ground and suspended some partnered 

operations in Afghanistan.423 Following this temporary 

suspension, ISAF and the Afghan government began 

implementing a series of countermeasures to mitigate 

the risk of insider attacks, with specific attention falling 

on the ANDSF recruit vetting process.424 In written 

testimony provided to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee in November 2012, General Joseph Dunford 

described enhanced recruitment and supervisory 

requirements, including the revalidation of 17,000 

ALP members. Additional countermeasures included 

“strengthening vetting and screening processes for new 

recruits and those returning from leave; increasing the 

number and training for [ANDSF] counterintelligence 

agents; and enhancing force protection for ISAF 

troops operating in small units or in remote areas.”425

A “guardian angel” program was also implemented to 

ensure the protection of ISAF soldiers while in certain 

locations and during specific tasks and activities.426 The 

guardian angel program reduced the number of military 

advisors directly supporting ANDSF development by 

transitioning them to a security over-watch role.

A guardian angel provides support during a security shura in 

Uruzgan Province. (U.S. Army photo by Luke Talbot)
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 79

Despite the influx of additional resources and new programs, staffing shortfalls 

persisted for SFATs. Though NATO determined that 446 SFATs were required 

to fulfill the SFA training model, by December 2012, 13 percent of SFATs, or 

60 teams, remained unfilled, with no plans to fill them.427 Shortages of SFATs 

forced the coalition to prioritize some ANA units over others for training. In 

general, SFATs went to ANA units that needed more operational or enabling 

support. Thus, ANA units in the north and west, where the security situation was 

relatively stable, often lacked a coalition partner.428

Funding

In 2009, U.S. funding to ANA development doubled, increasing from $2.75 billion 

in FY 2008 to $5.8 billion in FY 2009. Inputs reached a high of $11 billion in 

FY 2011.429 From FY 2011 to the end of 2014, financial support to the ANA 

gradually declined as U.S. surge forces began to draw down. 

In February 2009, NATO agreed to expand its ANA Trust Fund to include funds 

for sustainment costs. Prior to this, the ANA Trust Fund could only be used for 

ANA development efforts.430 In May 2011, NTM-A conducted a program update 

to project ASFF costs from FY 2013 to FY 2017. The resulting brief outlined 

key assumptions, including that by December 2014, the insurgency would be 

sufficiently contained so that ANDSF operational requirements could begin to 

slow, which in turn would reduce costs and allow for a rebalancing of the policeto-army ratio. These assumptions were based on improved security and the 

increasing need for civil policing at the expense of a large counterinsurgency 

army. These assumptions failed to factor in the increasing violence and the 

resiliency of the Taliban-led insurgency. 

Though financial support increased dramatically, the larger plan was to shift 

finances away from ANA development and toward ANA sustainment, which in 

theory would be less costly. Under the assumption that the ANA was close to full 

combat readiness, the coalition effort could switch to bolstering sustainment 

functions, for example, human resources and logistics. Consequently, DOD’s 

FY 2013 appropriated ASFF funding decreased by almost half from the FY 2012 

appropriation.431 In 2014, requested sustainment funds for ASFF increased 

by 8 percent compared to 2013, while requested training funds decreased by 

17 percent.432 These requests signaled the shift in emphasis as the building and 

equipping phase drew to a close and as the focus turned toward sustaining the 

ANDSF (figure 14 on the next page). 

Additionally, the coalition hoped to increasingly draw the funds for the ANA 

budget from the Afghan government, not the international community. For the 

first time, new language in the April 2009 DOD report to Congress suggested that 

the long-term ANA strategy would be “increasingly funded from Government of 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

80 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan revenue” and would “set the conditions for 

the eventual withdrawal of international forces.”433

Equipment

One of the major weaknesses of the donations-based equipment procurement 

system was the extensive coordination process required to obtain proper 

equipment, which often created a lag in acquisition. CSTC-A considered 

several possible programs and procurement options for upgrading the ANA’s 

mechanized and armor capabilities, from the donated Soviet-bloc equipment 

to more modern Western equipment aimed at bolstering the ANA’s COIN 

capabilities.434 Yet, the new effort to standardize equipment lagged due to the 

dramatic increase in ANA force strength and challenges with U.S. acquisition 

and contracting. The acceleration of ANA numbers created delays in the 

standardization of weapons as U.S. foreign military sales lagged compared 

to ANA fielding schedules.435

 While the transition to U.S.-model equipment 

ensured Afghan security forces were reliant on the United States for military 

support and partnership in the long-term, the underdeveloped Afghan 

economy ensured that weapons modernization efforts also resulted in longterm financial dependence on the United States. 

Source: DOD, FY 2005 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Unified Assistance, 

February 2005, p. 79; DOD, FY 2006 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), February 2006, 

pp. 62-63; DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget Military Personnel Programs (M-1) and 

Operation and Maintenance Programs (O-1) Fiscal Year 2009, February 2008, p. 26; DOD, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund: FY 2009 Overseas 

Contingency Operations Supplemental Budget Request, March 2009, p. 1; DOD, Budget Amendment to FY 2010 Supplemental Request Operation 

Unified Response, March 2010, p. 23; DOD, (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget: Military Personnel Programs (M-1), Operation and 

Maintenance Programs (O-1), Revolving and Management Funds (RF-1) Fiscal Year 2011, February 2010, p. 13; DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget: Operation and Maintenance Programs (O-1), Revolving and Management Funds (RF-1) Fiscal Year 

2013, February 2012, p. 10; DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2014: Justification for FY 2014 

Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2013, p. 2; DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget, Budget Amendment to the Fiscal Year 2014 President’s Budget Request for Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO): Operation and Maintenance Programs (O-1), Revolving and Management Funds (RF-1), May 2013, p. 10; DOD, Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget, Budget Amendment to the Fiscal Year 2017 President’s Budget Request for 

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO): Operation and Maintenance Programs (O-1), November 2016, p. 10. 

ASFF SUSTAINMENT FUNDING INCREASES ($ BILLIONS)

FY 2005–FY 2013 FY 2014–FY 2016

Infrastructure Training and Operations Equipment and Transportation Sustainment

$13.5

38%

$10.9

31%

$7.3

20% $3.9

11%

$2.8

25%

$7.2

65%

$.63

6%

$.48

4%

FIGURE 14
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 81

The process of equipping a growing national army also underscored the challenges of 

complex supply and logistics requirements in a reconstruction effort. For example, 

as ANA troop numbers increased, equipment funding decreased. CSTC-A noted 

that the decrease was due to corrections in accounting and equipment costs after 

internal auditing.436 Furthermore, DOD equipment reporting during this era simply 

noted inputs and outputs, without any assessment of the new equipment’s effects 

on the readiness or battlefield performance of the ANA.437

Retention and Attrition 

The years 2008 to 2014 marked the most dramatic increase in ANA force

strength since the ANA’s inception in 2002. In 2008, according to DOD reporting, 

force strength hovered just under 80,000. By mid-2013, ANA numbers had more 

than doubled, topping 185,000, with an end goal of 195,000.438 ISAF assessed that 

recruitment efforts would suffice to meet this new, higher target.439

Though force strength numbers increased, persistently high attrition and 

the difficulty of recruiting educated Afghans for more sophisticated enabler 

unit positions (such as aviation and intelligence) undermined the growth and 

sustainability of the ANA. From 2004 to 2014, monthly attrition rates hovered 

between 2–3 percent, despite a goal of only 1.4 percent.440 With this rate, onequarter to one-third of the army was depleted every year. Attrition most severely 

impacted the NCO corps and more junior enlisted soldiers, undermining efforts 

to develop a trained and experienced cadre of NCOs.441 At times, the focus 

shifted toward backfilling soldiers from fielded units rather than developing 

more advanced warrior skills.442 Furthermore, to keep up the pace of combat 

An ANA armored security vehicle from 2nd Company, 4th Mobile Strike Force, participates in an exercise at 

the ANA Armor Branch School in Kabul. (Photo by Alexandre Cadieux)
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

82 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

operations, specialist soldiers and educated recruits were frequently assigned to 

units that could not use their expertise.443

Various programs and methods were employed to try to stem attrition. For 

example, soldiers were sometimes allowed to take leave to support the harvest 

season, and in 2012, a leave policy was formalized to include 20 days of annual 

leave for all new recruits.444

 Still, attrition remained high. Experts noted that 

policy changes, while welcomed, did not address the main causes of attrition. 

Despite commonly held beliefs that attrition was due to high operational 

requirements, an increasingly kinetic environment, or poor living standards, 

high attrition was most strongly correlated to poor or corrupt leadership, an 

element of the ANA in which the United States and its coalition partners were 

reluctant to become involved.445

Retention efforts were not only undermined by high attrition, they were 

hampered by other factors, as well. There were increasing concerns over the 

vetting of new recruits after a spike in insider attacks, which served as a damper 

on the working relationship between Afghans and members of the international 

community.446 In addition, efforts to ethnically balance the ANA continued to 

suffer; the number of Pashtuns in officer and soldier ranks stagnated overall.447

Because of these and other factors, force strength numbers would not reach 

their goals for the rest of this time period and, in fact, began decreasing between 

2012 and 2014.448

Growing Reliance on Combat Enablers Created Capacity Substitution Dilemma 

To streamline command and control of the battlefield, ISAF activated its Joint 

Command in October of 2009.449 After achieving full operational capability in 

November 2009, the IJC commander oversaw all military operations, including 

exercising command authority over Regional Commands and the ETTs of TF 

Phoenix.450 From this point forward, regional commanders were responsible 

for both coalition military operations and the ANA field training missions. 

Pressure to improve local security through mandated Afghan-led missions with 

developing ANA forces created an environment ripe for capacity substitution by 

coalition military leaders and advisors.451

Several factors contributed to the ANA’s increased dependence on coalition 

forces during this transition period. ISAF tactical directives mandating AfghanISAF partnered operations resulted in the Afghan army units’ reliance on combat 

enablers—such as close air support, casualty evacuation and intelligence—to 

conduct offensive operations. The implementation of operational capabilities 

and organizational doctrine, preferred by the U.S.-led coalition, was ill-suited to 

the competencies of the ANA and largely stemmed from the tendency to develop 

the ANDSF in the likeness of U.S. force structure and doctrine. 

Capacity substitution 

occurs when U.S. and 

coalition advisors fill 

critical gaps in Afghan 

capability to achieve 

mission objectives.
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 83

In 2010, for example, U.S. Army Major David Park wrote, “Like it or not, [ANA] doctrine is a carbon copy of U.S. doctrine.... The ANA is a highly centralized, top-down, 

leader-centric, consensus-seeking organization, mirroring the culture from which 

it originates.”452

 While U.S. mentors have often spoken of the need to create an 

independent and self-sufficient ANDSF, the long-term trend of structuring and organizing the ANDSF as a mirror image of the U.S. military contributed to Afghans’ 

increased dependence on U.S. and NATO enabling capabilities over time.453

A U.S. advisor to the Afghan Air Force confirmed this trend, noting that 

U.S. military planners designed the AAF to resemble the USAF. The advisor 

explained that force development planning was often conducted with little 

regard for what the Afghans desired or were capable of.454 Training Afghan 

forces on and conducting offensive operations with close air support—despite 

an under-developed AAF and a dearth of trained pilots—was an example of this. 

Unsurprisingly, the integration of close air support largely contributed to an 

environment where many Afghan officers became “addicted to close air support” 

over time, viewing it as essential to success on the ground and calling for it 

when operations were not running as planned.455 Moreover, because many 

Afghan army units were “trained and mentored to rely on close air support when 

fighting,” the delayed development of the AAF furthered Afghan dependence on 

and increased calls for U.S. air support past 2013.456 According to Afghan army 

expert Antonio Giustozzi, “The delayed development of the Afghan Air Force ... 

has had a particularly strong impact on Afghan army combat units trained and 

mentored to rely on coalition close air support when fighting.”457 Yet, due to a lack 

U.S. Army soldiers and Afghan National Army troops exit to a waiting UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter 

from 101st Combat Aviation Brigade following a partnered force protection patrol in Laghman Province. 

(U.S. Army photo by Jarrod Morris)
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

84 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

of ammunition and trained crews, the Afghan Mi-35 combat helicopters were not 

operational until the summer of 2013, when the first combat mission was flown.458

The tendency to train and assist the ANDSF with capabilities largely provided 

by the U.S. led-coalition extended beyond the provision of close air support. 

The ANA became accustomed to other combat enablers, such as medical 

evacuations, intelligence gathering, and reconnaissance capabilities, that were 

largely underdeveloped or nonexistent within the ANA at the time.459 In April 

2010, for example, Defense Minister Wardak told NATO assembly members that 

the ANA faced shortcomings in air transport, mobility, reconnaissance, and 

firepower.460 This view was largely shared by other ANA officers, who viewed 

the ANA as dependent on foreign support because of its own lack of heavy 

equipment, close air support, and intelligence.461

Capability Ratings Skewed Based on Partnered Operations 

The most important security development in Afghanistan during this time period 

was the transition of combat operations to an Afghan lead. By the end of 2014, 

all combat operations were intended to be Afghan-led, with U.S. and ISAF 

support provided via trainers and with minimal enabling units. However, this 

partnering was supported by a battlefield assessment methodology that masked 

weaknesses in the ANA. 

In practice, “Afghan-led” did not manifest as hoped. To increase security in 

preparation for ISAF withdrawal, U.S. and international trainers were encouraged to stabilize security conditions, even if that meant assuming a larger 

combat role to ensure Afghan partner units succeeded. U.S. military leadership 

remained risk averse and saw potential tactical battlefield losses by the Afghans 

as a failure and not as a means to grow and learn lessons. To demonstrate the 

ANA was increasingly capable of taking over security, trainers were encouraged 

to bolster ANA assessments to produce higher numbers of capable units.462

To accomplish this, in part, the United States and coalition partners changed 

the methodology for assessing the force readiness of the ANA several times. 

The new assessment methodologies were arguably more effective for measuring 

ANA readiness based on peacetime standards, but the changes interrupted 

longitudinal measurement, heightened the risk of confirmation bias, and still 

failed to assess or forecast battlefield performance.463

DOD assessment methodologies were vulnerable to confirmation bias. Unlike 

past training validation methods, which required an outside unit to validate, the 

new system required “self-assessment,” in which trainers validated their own 

training of ANA units.464 Such a validation technique suggested that the ratings 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 85

were measurements of training quality and quantity, not battlefield readiness 

or performance. 

To highlight ANA battlefield performance, DOD reporting emphasized an 

increase in the number of operations undertaken by the ANA. For example, 

by early 2013, the ANA led 87 and 86 percent of all conventional and special 

operations, respectively, while ISAF unilaterally led only six and five percent 

of conventional and special operations, respectively.465 This reporting did 

not go into detail regarding the types of operations or levels of difficulty or 

success, rendering such aggregate numbers highly problematic as forecasting or 

assessment tools.

The focus on measurable outputs, such as recruiting, force strength, and 

the number of operations conducted, continued to overshadow efforts to 

acknowledge the impact of corruption and other predatory behaviors in the 

MOD and ANA. By 2013, DOD reporting described corruption in the Afghan 

government as a “major threat” to the Afghan political establishment.466 Yet, 

increases in resources, particularly financial resources from the United States 

and ISAF, without effective oversight mechanisms both locally and nationally 

created opportunities for corruption to increase within the MOD and ANA. 

Corrupt behavior was shown to affect force strength numbers via high attrition 

rates, and to further perpetuate criminal behaviors, such as pay-for-play 

schemes; the theft of fuel, supplies, and commodities; and narcotics collusion.467

In the end, the new assessment system not only incorrectly measured ANA 

capabilities, it masked fundamental weaknesses in the ANA institutional 

framework that the United States and coalition ignored or minimized.

Special Forces Becoming a Formidable Force

By 2011, the size and scope of the Afghan Special Forces necessitated the 

establishment of the ANA Special Operations Command Headquarters (ANASOC), 

which occurred on April 7, 2011.468 ANASOC was designed to include two brigades 

of commandos and one brigade of ANA Special Forces (ANASF). The ANASF 

partnered with U.S. Special Forces and specialized in foreign internal defense 

operations and COIN.469 ANASOC established its School of Excellence for training 

new commando and ANASF recruits at Camp Morehead, outside Kabul. 

The new ANASOC was better supported by the coalition and benefited 

from improved organization and structure. Though the ANASOC relied 

on the coalition significantly for sustainment, maneuver, and higher-level 

communications, it was able to conduct operational direction and control of 

fielded forces by the end of 2011, with assistance in intelligence support from 

IJC.470 The School of Excellence trained 1,186 new commandos and 243 new 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

86 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

special forces between April and September of 2011, with the goal of completing 

the staffing and development of the ANASOC by the end of 2014.471

DOD reported major gains in both ANASOC training and force strength in April 

2012.472 The ANASOC dramatically increased recruiting and training, reaching well over 8,000 commandos and special forces combined.473 The speed at 

which the ANASOC filled its staffing requirements suggested that the both the 

commandos and the special forces would reach their staffing goals before the 

2014 deadline. Additionally, the ANASOC established an additional general 

support kandak and forward support companies, including intelligence detachments, for each special operations kandak. Such a structure enabled tactical 

and operational-level logistical support to the ANASOC forces. Furthermore, 

adding support companies to each of the nine ANASOC battalions better 

sustained operational units across multiple provinces.474 Thus, in contrast to 

the conventional forces, the development and deployment of enabling units 

became an immediate priority upon the establishment of the ANASOC. Intelligence, logistics, and eventually air capabilities would become the focus of 

ANASOC development until the anticipated development deadline in 2014.

At the end of 2012, over 12,525 commandos and 955 special forces had 

graduated from the School of Excellence.475 The commandos had already 

reached their force strength goals, and special forces’ recruiting and retention 

numbers remained high enough to achieve their force strength goal early, by 

the end of 2013. By that time, the School of Excellence had become primarily 

Afghan-led.476 The forces within ANASOC increasingly operated independently. 

An Afghan commando provides security during a patrol training exercise in Kabul Province. (U.S. Army photo 

by Ryan DeBooy)
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SEPTEMBER 2017 | 87

With a new focus on Village Stability Operations (VSO), the Afghan special 

forces’ community conducted a total of 2,384 operations in the second half of 

2012, a notable increase from the 1,884 Afghan-led operations conducted during 

the previous six months.477 Of these, 74 percent were Afghan-led.478

By the end of 2013, the ANASOC structure and staffing were complete. With 

a division headquarters and two brigade headquarters, the ANASOC had nine 

special operations kandaks, including both special forces and commandos. 

These forces were supported by a military intelligence kandak, a garrison 

support unit, a general support kandak, the School of Excellence, and the 

Special Mission Wing.479 While the special forces focused on collecting 

intelligence and acting as quick reaction forces, the commandos largely 

conducted independent missions. Of note, both forces were frequently paired 

with other ANDSF elements and conducted joint operations.480

The fledgling ANASOC shared some of the challenges of the conventional 

forces, especially in establishing enabler capabilities such as logistics, 

command and control, and intelligence. Additionally, the high operational 

tempo of the ANASOC forces required a high level of ISAF air transport and 

helicopter lift. Despite these challenges, the ANASOC forces were highly 

regarded by the U.S. Army as the most capable within the ANDSF. Though 

the ANASOC forces required ISAF support for some time, by the end of 2013, 

99 percent of their operations were self-led.481

One of the most notable reasons for the ANASOC’s relative success compared 

to other elements of the ANDSF was its low attrition. In 2014, monthly attrition 

stood at 1.2 percent, just below the 1.4 percent goal.482 Though shortages 

in equipment remained (84 percent of the equipment tashkil, or standard 

equipment list, was filled by the end of 2014), the ANASOC was able to increase 

in size and reach without significant impacts from attrition or shortages of 

recruits.483 As ANASOC forces continued to increase their capabilities and 

presence throughout Afghanistan, their importance to the overall mission in 

Afghanistan grew. ANASOC continued to integrate its capabilities with other 

ANDSF units. The special forces and commandos often paired with the special 

units in the police, such as the General Command of Police Special Units, with 

whom they conducted over 900 independent operations in 2014.484

Afghan Air Force Combat Capabilities Slow to Get Off the Ground 

By 2009, documentation on the development of the Afghan Air Corps was a 

fixture of DOD’s reports to Congress.485 Training expanded outside Afghanistan 

as the first group of Afghan pilot candidates traveled to the United States for 

English language training and undergraduate pilot training.486 Amid calls to 

expand the size of the AAC, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board 

Village Stability 

Operations (VSO)

was a DOD program 

implemented by U.S. 

Special Operations 

Forces from 2010 

through 2014 

that attempted to 

secure and connect 

strategically located 

villages to the Afghan 

government, while also 

complementing the 

stabilization efforts of 

conventional forces.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

88 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

(JCMB) approved an increase to the air corps’ capabilities.487 By June 2009, the 

United States had established a June 2016 deadline as the initial operational 

capability date for the AAC, with a goal of 12 Mi-17s and four C-27 cargo planes 

by the end of 2009.488 The AAC would reach the Mi-17 goal, but not the C-27 

one.489 By the end of 2009, the number of passengers and kilograms of cargo the 

AAC could transport had increased substantially.490

Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board

The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board was a strategic coordination platform 

through which the Afghan government and the international community worked to 

implement the Afghanistan Compact, which was established at the London Conference 

and supported by UN Security Council Resolution 1659. The board had 28 members, 

including seven from the Afghan government (nominated by the Afghan president) and 

21 from the international community. The board provided high-level oversight of the 

progress of the Afghanistan Compact, including addressing issues of coordination, 

implementation, financing benchmarks, and timelines.491 Within its broad mandate, the 

JCMB also provided input to and approval of ANA force-strength numbers.492

In early 2010, U.S. Air Forces Central Command finalized an ANDSF Airpower 

Requirements Review. The review established the “recommended roles, missions, and force structure for the ANAAC,” emphasizing sufficient sustainability, and long-term affordability.493 Additionally, the Afghan Minister of Defense 

issued Decree 467, which renamed the AAC as the Afghan Air Force (AAF).494

According to this decree, the AAF would realign from a corps in the ANA to a 

“complementary organization” much like the ANASOC under the Chief of the 

General Staff.495 The AAF was organized into a headquarters, three air wings, 

four detachments, and eight air units, with a training support infrastructure.496

With this change in the air force’s structure, DOD was optimistic about continued 

growth and improvement.497 In October 2009, the AAF finally acquired two of the 

four previously ordered C-27s, a year after originally scheduled.498 Growth of the 

AAF fostered demand for further increases: the AAF set a goal of 20 C-27s by 

2012.499 These C-27s, along with the Mi-17s, began to diversify the AAF fleet as 

both Russian and American technologies became staples of the AAF’s capabilities.

In 2010, the United States articulated its goal for the AAF, stating, “The longterm strategy for the development of the AAF is the creation of a COIN-capable 

air force by 2016.”500 To help reach this goal, the AAF training center in Kabul 

doubled in capacity. DOD described the AAF as having “several operational 

success stories,” such as conducting humanitarian and disaster relief operations, 

assisting with elections, providing aerial support against Taliban attacks on 

Kabul, and providing enabling support for commandos.501
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SEPTEMBER 2017 | 89

Recruitment was a primary concern for the AAF, and it remained difficult because 

aviation required literacy and English-language proficiency.502 An Aviator Incentive 

Pay Program was established to attract educated recruits and reduce attrition. 

Further, NATC-A established “Thunder Lab” at Kabul Air Base, where pilot 

candidates were immersed in English before going on to flight school.

By 2011, more than 30 coalition partners were participating in the AAF train 

and advise mission.503 To accommodate the range of technologies in use, the 

trainers were drawn largely from Western and former Soviet-bloc countries. 

For example, USAF Colonel Michael Outlaw, a special operations C-130 

pilot, commanded the USAF’s air advisory group, a part of NATC-A. He was 

tasked with training Afghan airmen in Mi-17 operations, as well as in ground 

support specialties ranging from airfield firefighting and medical support to 

communications and managing dining facilities.504

For older Afghan pilots, the common language was Russian, which few U.S. 

trainers knew. This underscored the importance of former Soviet-bloc nations’ 

contributions to the training effort. In addition, the impact of the former Soviet 

system and technologies extended beyond training and communication: Afghans 

hesitated to adopt the Western-based training system and would default to 

using the more familiar Soviet style.505 A Lithuanian commander involved in 

the training saw firsthand, however, “why a Western/U.S.-style training and 

command-and-control system that emphasized institutionalized procedures and 

also allowed for individual pilot and aircrew initiative and decision-making was 

better than the Soviet system.”506

ANAAC troops stand before a C-27 cargo transport plane on March 24, 2010, at the celebration of the first 

operational flight of the C-27 training program. (Photo by David Quillen)
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

90 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

At this time, the United States sought to focus on building the instructor 

corps to bolster the AAF’s sustainability. As with the recruitment of pilots, 

education levels, English language proficiency, and levels of training impeded 

the expansion of the instructor corps.507 The importance of the English language 

became increasingly relevant in the instructor corps: English is the “language of 

flying” and literacy is required. Since the AAF originated as a part of the larger 

ANA, literate candidates had often been diverted away from the AAF into the 

special forces, whose mission appeared more critical to the COIN strategy. A 

further issue emerged as young, literate pilots with English language skills were 

“remarkably” more competent than older pilots, causing significant generational 

friction in the air corps.508 Afghan air corps leadership, respecting Afghan 

cultural norms, passed over younger pilots for air time, preferring to give older 

pilots flying assignments. 

The year 2011 was known as a “promising period” for the AAF. In the first half 

of the year, the first Afghan student pilots flew Mi-17s in Shindand; the first two 

Afghan Mi-17 aircraft commanders graduated; the first Afghan Mi-17 instructor 

pilot flew with a student pilot; the first all-Afghan Mi-17 helicopter movement of 

the president of Afghanistan took place; U.S.-trained Afghan helicopter pilots 

completed initial Mi-17 copilot certificates in Kabul; and the first Afghan Mi-17 

instructor pilot in the Kandahar Air Wing passed flight check.509 In the fall of 

2011, five Afghan fixed-wing pilots completed the entire training course from 

pre-flight to earning their pilot wings and eleven accomplished the same feat 

as newly minted rotary wing pilots.510

Despite these milestones, DOD noted the still-fledgling nature of the AAF, 

whose entire force was rated at CM4, or established but not operational.511

Only 59 of 145 planned aircraft had been delivered, and the training mission 

lacked 65 promised trainers.512 Further, on April 27, 2011, an insider attack 

killed eight USAF members, which led to increased force protection measures 

and delayed U.S. training efforts. At higher levels, U.S. and Afghan leaders 

differed on what constituted a mission in legitimate need of air support. 

Some Afghans preferred to use aircraft for personal, political, tribal, and 

other missions, while the United States preferred the AAF’s focus remain on 

COIN operations.513

Equipment acquisition remained a challenge for the AAF. The original air 

campaign plan called for 20 C-27s. The first two aircraft arrived in late 2009; by 

early 2011, only 10 of the C-27s were in place. By the end of 2012, the program 

was discontinued, with only 16 C-27s provided.514 Cancellation of the remaining 

C-27s was largely due to emphasis on operational support missions over training 

and an “unacceptably low” mission capable rate for the C-27.515 Only two Afghan 

pilots ever became certified to fly the C-27 under USAF supervision.516
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 91

By June 2012, the AAF was composed of more than 5,800 personnel and 97 

aircraft. This included the G-222 (C-27A variant) fixed-wing aircraft, the Mi17, Mi-35, MD-530F helicopters, and 18 training aircraft (Cessna 182 and 

208), as well as an initial set of A-29 Super Tucano turboprops that were in 

development.517 The goal remained to have 8,000 personnel and 145 aircraft 

by 2016.518 In terms of training, the short-term goal of the United States was to 

reach a point where U.S. mentors were no longer needed. As Colonel Needham, 

the commander of the 738th Air Expeditionary Advisory Squadron, said, “We 

would like to work ourselves out of the job.”519

G-222 Program Terminated

During a November 2013 visit to Afghanistan, Special 

Inspector General John Sopko noticed G-222 aircraft—

twin-propeller military transport aircraft built in Italy—

abandoned at Kabul International Airport by DOD. 

Shortly thereafter, SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects 

initiated a review of the $486 million program—

intended to provide 20 G-222s to the Afghan Air 

Force—which had been terminated in March 2013 after 

sustained and serious problems with performance, 

maintenance, and spare parts. 

In January 2013, a DOD IG report indicated that the 

G-222 program office did not properly manage the 

effort to obtain the spare parts needed to keep the 

aircraft flight-worthy. The DOD IG also pointed out that 

an additional $200 million of ASFF might have to be 

spent on spare parts for the aircraft to be operational, 

and that the G-222s had only flown 234 of the 4,500 

required hours from January through September 2012. 

In March 2013, the G-222 program was effectively 

ended with an announcement that the AAF would use 

a different aircraft to meet its long-term, medium airlift 

requirement. Sixteen of the planes were grounded at 

the Kabul airport, while another four were transported 

to Ramstein Air Base in Germany. SIGAR alerted DOD 

that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) had scrapped 

the 16 aircraft sitting idle at the Kabul airport. 

An Afghan construction company paid approximately 

six cents per pound for the scrapped planes, for a total 

of $32,000. This was a minuscule fraction of the funds 

expended on the program, and in an inquiry letter sent 

to the USAF, SIGAR expressed concern that the officials 

responsible for planning and executing the scrapping of 

the planes may not have considered other alternatives 

to save taxpayer dollars. DLA has yet to make a final 

decision regarding the fate of the remaining four 

G-222s in Germany. In another inquiry letter, SIGAR 

requested that DOD provide sufficient advance notice of 

any change in the status of the four remaining G-222s 

to supplement SIGAR’s ongoing review of the fleet. This 

matter continues to be the focus of criminal and civil 

investigations by SIGAR.

Special Inspector General John Sopko inspects the abandoned 

G-222 Fleet at Kabul International Airport in November 2013. 

(SIGAR photo)
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In 2012, the DOD IG published a report highlighting systemic, training, 

equipping, fielding, and other issues within the AAF, as follows:

1. Systemic issues: NATC-A had difficulty achieving a vision for the roles, 

missions, and capabilities of the AAF. There remained a need for an enhanced 

ability to exercise command and control of air resources, NATC-A personnel 

deficits, and institutional incorporation of NATC-A into NTM-A/CSTC-A.520

2. Training issues: Training, guidance, and oversight of air advisors assigned to 

the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing was inadequate for the effectiveness of air 

advisor flying duties; AAF air wings lacked qualified maintenance personnel to 

sustain aircrafts; proficiency of English-language instructors was inadequate to 

effectually teach AAF personnel: 85 percent were still illiterate.521

3. Equipping issues: G-222 dual-engine aircraft were not proper cargo aircraft 

to support the development of an independent AAF; units within the AAF were 

not issued sufficient equipment, as authorized by MOD; aircraft manuals were 

not available in Dari or Pashtu.522

4. Fielding issues: recruiting personnel accepted individuals with deficient 

literacy, and education; AAF personnel compensation was too low to guarantee 

retention of those who finished technical and language training.523

5. Other issues: USAF pilots assigned to the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing 

were concerned about the continued safe operation of the G-222. In March 

2012, this claim was investigated.524 The investigation found that the G-222 

was not safe to fly under existing circumstances, but there also existed the 

potential to reduce the risk to a satisfactory level.525 Perhaps due in part to 

procurement challenges, DOD reporting pushed the AAF initial operational 

capability deadline to 2017 (previously 2016), with the caution that capabilities 

such as airlift, close air support, and medical evacuation might remain 

“limited capacity.”526 

Additional DOD reporting to Congress recognized corruption as a significant 

issues in the AAF and claimed that criminal patronage networks had infiltrated 

the AAF. Reports further highlighted areas in need of continued development, 

mirroring areas the ANA also needed to develop, such as planning, budgeting, 

supply, quality assurance, contracting, distribution, material accountability, and 

performance measures.527 DOD reporting attributed the lag in AAF development 

to the lack of technical expertise among Afghans, as well as deficits in numbers 

of training personnel.528

The United States and NATO began playing catch-up with supplying training 

personnel, resulting in improvements in the “aircraft build” line of operation.529

At this time, AAF infrastructure was only 51 percent complete and all AAF units 

were still rated at CM4.530 The DOD IG report described the development of the 

AAF as being in a “nascent stage,” despite initial development having started 

seven years prior. The report indicated that “U.S. and Coalition forces have 
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only recently shifted their focus from generating the force to developing quality 

and professionalism.”531 In addition, the emphasis of AAF development shifted 

toward training, equipping, and fielding enabling organizations, including AAF 

logistics and maintenance units.532 Finally, the report placed the blame for AAF 

sustainability issues squarely on the Afghan government, stating, 

The coalition designed and was building the AAF to have capabilities that 

accommodate the human capital and infrastructure of Afghanistan. However, 

GIROA senior officials seemed to expect that their Air Force should have 

the same capabilities as the coalition air forces conducting missions in their 

country. Moreover, senior civilian and military officials were not always 

following AAF command and control policies and procedures. This impacted 

AAF sustainability.533

As of July 31, 2013, less than one year after rating all AAF units at CM4, DOD 

rated the AAF at CM2B, stating the AAF was now capable with various aircraft, 

but could not yet maintain them.534 On a further positive note, attrition in the 

AAF was one of the lowest of all the ANDSF components (although recruitment 

remained low and failed to meet goals). Operation Semergh was highlighted 

as an AAF success story in 2013, being the first operation the AAF planned 

and led. During Semergh, the AAF inserted Afghan special forces and cargo 

into a designated location, on time, and simultaneously evacuated hundreds of 

civilians from a flooded region.535

By 2014, the AAF still faced challenges.536 Recruiting remained a major problem 

as high standards disqualified many from eligibility. The AAF demonstrated 

capabilities in personnel and cargo lift and evacuation, but not in close air 

support or medical evacuation. Training improvements resulted in the pilot and 

instructor corps reaching 50 percent of their force strength goal.537 Maintenance 

and logistics remained slow to develop in the AAF; as of June 2014, only onethird of the required 1,370 personnel were considered qualified maintainers.538 In 

response, NATC-A released its 2013–2017 Afghan Air Force Master Plan to guide 

the construction of “the most capable air force in the history of Afghanistan.”539

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

COIN Strategy Increased Role of the ANP, Yet Led to Militarization of the Force

Under the U.S. COIN strategy, the role of the ANP in security operations 

became more prominent.540

 To support this shift in mission, the United States 

armed the ANP similar to a paramilitary force with the core mission of holding 

territory gained from U.S.-Afghan military operations. In this role, the ANP 

served on the front line against heavily armed insurgents. Acknowledging 

this de facto role, the United States supported the increased militarization of 

the ANP, arming local police with AK-47s, light machine guns, and militarystandard light combat vehicles.541
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The U.S. vision that the ANP would serve as the “hold” function in COIN’s “clearhold-build” strategy often led to a lack of focus and underdevelopment of the 

civil policing functions of the force. Civil policing professionalization was further 

undermined when, in 2009, just before the election cycle began, CSTC-A reduced 

ANP training to three weeks in an attempt to field more police, more quickly.542 In 

contrast to these actions, in 2010 the MOI stated that it envisioned a traditional 

policing function role for the ANP, with a goal for full professionalization within 

five years.543 According to Afghan security expert Vanda Felbab-Brown, however, 

the force continued to serve more as “light counterinsurgency forces” throughout 

2012. She further noted, “The ANP continues to lack an anti-crime capacity.... 

Yet crime, such as murders, robberies, and extortion, are the bane of many 

Afghans’ daily existence.”544 She also said the government and police inability 

to effectively respond to criminal actions was creating an environment ripe for 

Taliban exploitation. A 2014 USIP report on the status and progress of the ANP 

concurred with Felbab-Brown, stating that “almost all police development efforts 

... were modeled on military rather than civilian police institutions.”545 The report 

added, “As recently as 2011, there was no vision for what the ANP would look like 

once the ISAF mission was complete.”546 The report continued, noting that the 

“challenge persists,” and that “the ISAF approach remains focused on growing the 

number of trained ANP to 157,000” at the expense of professionalization, which 

was seen as simply a distraction compared to immediate security needs.547

U.S. Marine officer and Garmsir District Governor Fahim walk to Combat Outpost Rankel in Helmand 

Province after examining the district’s new community center. (DOD photo by Reece Lodder)
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Attempts to Correct Training Deficiencies: 

The Focused District Development Program

Many police were still under-trained or even untrained at the beginning of this 

era. Police development consisted of, at best, initial recruit training at national 

or regional training centers and likely no follow-on field training. As previously 

noted, the ANP were not fielded as units, but rather recruited and trained as 

individual patrol officers who were subsequently posted with active units 

throughout the country. This resulted in newly trained police officers being placed 

into existing units that were often corrupt and largely unaware of the procedural 

and behavioral standards of the new Afghan government and police system.548

Slightly over a year from initiation of the Focused District Development program, 

problems began to develop. The total number of units that had been trained 

via FDD and ultimately achieved DOD’s highest force capability rating declined 

from 18 percent of the ANP in February 2009 to 12 percent in September 2009.549

Shortages of personnel and overly optimistic timelines significantly restricted the 

program’s outcomes.550 Deficiencies in trainers and mentors, and unanticipated 

delays in units achieving their goals, stunted the expected pace of training. 

A 2011 RAND study concluded that “only 65 of Afghanistan’s 365 police districts 

completed the FDD program in its first two years, and CSTC-A estimated that 

it would take until 2014 for every district in the country to go through the 

program.”551 The RAND report noted that some of these issues may have also 

arisen based on the varied implementation of the program across Afghanistan, 

such as when only portions of units were sent through the program, and 

U.S. Army officer and Afghan National Police practice tactical movement as part of the Focused District 

Development training program at the Kandahar Regional Training Center. (NTM-A photo by David Votroubek)
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96 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

failures to assess the program over time.552 Other factors negatively affecting 

the program were a failure to accurately assess how much time and how many 

personnel in police mentoring teams would be needed for units to achieve and 

maintain the highest capability rating.553

Additionally, attrition posed a significant challenge to the long-term goals of 

FDD, as the average 25 percent annual attrition rate at that time meant that 

“by the end of 2009, the first units that went through FDD would have lost nearly 

half of the personnel who completed the program.”554 A Congressional Research 

Service report from 2010 noted that observers also criticized the program for 

not being “comprehensive enough to be effective” and that “taking thugs away 

for a few weeks ... just gives you better-trained thugs.”555

The unexpected need to extend FDD timelines to train ANP units to the 

level required had adverse effects on the Afghan National Civil Order Police 

and resulted in high demands on ANCOP units to backfill ANP units. Delays 

kept ANCOP police deployed away from home for months at a time, with no 

knowledge of when they might be able to return home. With ANCOP’s small 

force size and the large requirements levied under the FDD program, this high 

OPTEMPO put immense stress on the force, resulting in an almost immediate, 

unsustainable monthly attrition rate as high as 70 percent (in 2009).556 High 

ANCOP attrition also limited the FDD program’s backfill capacity, resulting in 

some police units not being trained as a whole, contrary to the program’s aim.557

In March 2011, there was an attempt to address the overuse of ANCOP through 

the “Three P Program.” The program “called for the partnering of ANCOP 

units with U.S. military counterparts; increased pay and improved procedures 

to ensure police received their salaries; and, predictability, or scheduling unit 

rotations so personnel knew what to expect.”558 Subsequently, ANCOP monthly 

attrition rates dropped, but only to 36.4 percent, still leaving ANCOP with the 

highest attrition rate of all the branches of the ANP.559

The Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) reported that although feedback on 

the FDD program draft was provided to CSTC-A by a number of agencies prior 

to the program’s implementation, “there was no response,” and it “became 

clear that the programme had been decided upon and there was little scope for 

any changes.”560 Additionally, the AAN noted that CSTC-A rejected third-party 

assessments of the FDD program and ignored feedback provided on FDD course 

curricula in lieu of internal meetings focused on more technical aspects of 

the program.561

The FDD program was phased out beginning in 2011, though this was not 

conveyed in DOD reports to Congress. FDD is mentioned as progressing mostly 
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positively through 2009 and early 2010, however later 2010 reports make no 

mention of FDD at all. Based on the aforementioned issues relating to training 

backsliding, deficiencies in trainers, stresses on ANCOP, inappropriate timelines, 

and attrition affecting long-term effectiveness, it is unclear what the overall 

achievements of the program were.562

Training Remained Inadequate 

Overall training for the ANP remained deficient through most of 2011, although 

it would later improve slightly as the United States implemented a new standard 

Basic Patrolman Course at all training centers.563 These improvements slightly 

extended the number of training hours, as well as expanded and improved 

components of the course curriculum, but ultimately proved insufficient in 

rectifying training deficiencies in the ANP forces overall, to include illiteracy. 

In 2009, literate police recruits were sent through an eight-week (203-hour) 

basic training program. The same year, a USIP report assessing the police in 

Afghanistan described the impact of such short training periods by noting 

that “trainees did not remain at the training centers long enough to absorb 

much detail or the ethos of democratic policing through contact with the 

instructors.”564 Additionally, NTM-A noted that the training curriculum was 

neither standardized nor used in all training centers.565

U.S. Army military policeman teaches ANP in Logar Province about improvised explosive devices. 

(DOD photo by De’Yonte Mosley)
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NTM-A described the 2009 police training program as being “PowerPoint-based,” 

“theoretical,” and “intended for literate students.”566 This curriculum was not 

suitable for the majority of ANP recruits; the training was based on a program 

used in the Balkans for literate recruits, whereas the vast majority of Afghan 

police recruits were illiterate.567

Further, USIP assessed in 2009 that ANP “trainees had little or no previous 

classroom experience” (table 7).568 USIP described the ANP classroom experience 

as challenging, highlighting how the extreme desert temperatures severely 

affected classroom temperatures, and that there were translation difficulties as 

well as a lack of trainers experienced in adult-training techniques.569

In 2010, under pressure to rapidly increase the ANP’s force size, training was 

compressed to six weeks, but still consisted of 203 hours as training days 

were simply extended. Implementation of this program remained inconsistent 

between training centers.570

Also in 2010, into 2011, mandatory literacy instruction was finally added to ANP 

training, initially lasting only 64 hours (less than two weeks).571 Prior to this 

time, it is unclear how many police were receiving literacy training; however, 

a DOD report to Congress in mid-2008 noted that an MOI-level literacy program 

was about to be initiated.572 A January 2009 DOD report indicated funding was 

being provided for ANA literacy programs, with no mention of it also occurring 

U.S. Army soldier and Afghan policeman during training at Afghan police headquarters in Charreh Dera. 

(DOD photo by Walter M. Wayman)
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for the ANP.573 Literacy training for “all policemen” is mentioned in the April 

2009 DOD report to Congress, although it was categorized as “additional 

specialty skills” training and as “voluntary” (table 7).574

Two weeks of literacy training could hardly make an impact on the skills of 

an illiterate recruit, as a joint State and DOD report from 2006 had previously 

assessed the impacts of literacy programing. The report concluded that “for 

an illiterate student, a five-week literacy course is a start toward literacy. 

However, such a short course does not fully prepare the illiterate recruit for 

the basic police course designed for literate students.”575 Further discussion 

of the impacts of illiteracy on force readiness can be found in chapter six of 

this report. 

A former senior U.S. official with knowledge of police development projects 

described U.S. efforts on literacy training for the ANP as “absolutely one of 

the greatest missed opportunities in the history of our involvement there.... 

In a country where you have 80–85 percent illiteracy, had we started literacy 

programs when we arrived there in 2002, and kept at it, we would have changed 

the whole nature of the country.”576

In 2011, the Basic Patrolman Course was further modified. Training continued 

to last six weeks, but was reduced to 200 hours. Although a reduction in 

training time was a loss for force professionalization efforts, a positive shift 

toward adapting the programming to Afghanistan’s specific needs was also 

seen. Courses were, for the first time, noted to be “tailored to Afghanistan and 

designed for low-literacy students.” Training was also described as “focused on 

practical exercises,” instead of solely classroom lectures.577

TABLE 7

EVOLUTION OF ANP TRAINING

2009 2010 Early 2011 Late 2012

Length of Training 8 weeks 6 weeks 6 weeks 8 weeks

Total Training Hours 203 hours

203 hours + 48 

hours of drill and 

physical training

200 hours

266 hours + 72 

hours of drill and 

physical training

Description of 

Training

Theoretical, 

PowerPoint-based, 

same program as 

used in the Balkans

Compressed, but no 

change from 2009 

description, no 

consistency between 

training centers 

• Practical and tailored 

to Afghanistan

• Designed for low-literacy students

• First standard patrolman course

Standardized to all 

pillars of the ANP

Literacy Levels

Intended for literate 

students, no mandatory literacy training

Literacy instruction 

introduced, 64 hours 

of literacy required

64 hours of literacy Literacy increased to 

96 hours

Source: NTM-A, “ANP Professionalization: The Basic Patrolman Course,” May 7, 2011.
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100 | CHAPTER 4 | 2009–2014: U.S. SURGE AND TRANSITION 

Later in 2011, the curriculum was again restructured, expanded, and extended 

to eight weeks of instruction. This was an additional 116 hours of training, as 

compared to the previous six-week training program, and 183 more hours than 

the original eight-week program. Additionally, 24 additional hours of drill and 

physical training outside of classroom hours were added, and literacy training 

was increased to 96 hours. This extended training program aimed to ensure 

all students reached or exceeded a 1st grade reading level and included the 

first 25 percent of a 2nd grade reading curriculum.578 Despite these changes, a 

January 2014 SIGAR audit found that between July 2012 and February 2013, 

“45 percent of police personnel ... were sent directly to field checkpoints 

without receiving any literacy training.”579

Additionally, the United States and MOI still lacked significant managerial 

infrastructure to support the police training effort. ANP training was conducted 

by the Afghan Police Training Teams, which were still in short supply.580 A January 

2010 SIGAR Quarterly Report noted a “shortfall of 119 training teams.”581 An 

ineffective MOI human resource mechanism, inadequate staffing levels on training 

teams, and deficiencies in U.S. oversight and assessment to track personnel 

training led to only the newest recruits receiving the updated curriculum in their 

training. Forces already stationed in the field throughout the country continued to 

be significantly under-trained, as well as illiterate. According to a 2010 SIGAR data 

call, OSD reported that 70 percent of ANP personnel still had not been “through 

any formal police training.”582 Although improvements to the curriculum were 

made and training hours extended, in 2011 it was clear that these improvements 

were not only hampered by issues pertaining to logistics and infrastructure, 

but were also still insufficient to achieve the desired results of a competent, 

professional ANP within stated withdrawal timelines.

Narrowly Focused on Outputs: Auxiliary Police Programs 

By early 2009, the United States increased its focus on end-strength numbers 

with an eye toward inundating Afghanistan with Afghan security personnel, 

which was seen as the cure for Afghanistan’s security problems. In a July 2009 

briefing, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Richard 

Holbrooke noted that, “The current force levels of police and army are clearly 

going to have to be increased.”583 By July 2010, the target end strength for 

October 2011 had ballooned to 134,000.584 The narrow focus on the numbers of 

police trained and fielded, however, continued to negatively affect the quality 

of the force. The new auxiliary programs decreased the vetting performed and 

training received, and undermined central command and control structures.

Afghan Public Protection Program 

In March 2009, in order to meet the ever-expanding force size goals within 

the narrow timelines established, the Afghan Public Protection Program 
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(AP3) was initiated in Wardak Province.585 AP3 was based on a model similar 

to the failed ANAP and was designed to take advantage of more traditional 

community-policing models, as well as to work in tandem with populationcentric COIN efforts.586 Wardak Governor Fedai was a strong advocate during a 

three-day conference with local Afghan elders in Wardak, but “participants were 

vocal in their misgivings about the program and refused to sign a memorandum 

of understanding with the government ... because Wardak had painful 

experiences with government-sponsored militias.” The Wardak elders were 

reputed to be worried about “infighting among rival militias.”587

Misgivings about the AP3 program were ignored, to the program’s detriment. 

The Afghanistan Analysts Network reported, “Many of the problems that had 

plagued the ANAP came back to haunt AP3.”588 The AP3 police received several 

weeks less training than ANP or ANA members, but were paid roughly the same 

salaries, creating competing incentives for prospective ANP and ANA recruits.589

Command and control of the force became a major hurdle, as “the AP3 operated 

as an entirely separate force” from the ANP. For example, a former militia commander and local strongman Ghulam Mohammed was controversially appointed 

as an AP3 provincial commander at the end of 2009. It was noted that his AP3 

force “was nearly double the size of the ANP in the province,” and he “made it 

very clear that he answered only to the U.S. military and the MOI in Kabul.”590

Ultimately, even Wardak Governor Fedai recognized AP3 did not live up to 

its intended composition and function, later in 2010 described it as having 

Local officials attend the Afghan Public Protection Program graduation in Wardak Province. (DOD photo)
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been merely an attempt at a “temporary fix.”591 Analysis and reporting of AP3 

revealed a mixed success, with third parties highlighting flaws, although DOD 

considered it to be mostly successful.592 The program was ultimately not 

expanded to other provinces; DOD said this was due to “the large amount of 

resources” needed to implement the program, which were eventually rolled 

into future auxiliary programs.593

Afghan Local Police

By 2009, police auxiliary programs rooted in traditional community policing 

concepts were an intrinsic part of the new U.S. ANP development strategy 

for Afghanistan. The next iteration of the model was the Afghan Local Police 

(ALP), which was formally established in August 2010 when President Karzai 

announced its creation.594 An International Crisis Group (ICG) report on the 

program states that “General David Petraeus endorsed the idea when he took 

over NATO forces mid-2010 and persuaded a reluctant Karzai, despite palace 

misgivings about semi-regular security forces.”595 The ALP was designed, similar 

to its predecessors, to provide security within villages and rural areas “to 

protect the population from insurgent attacks, protect facilities, and conduct 

local counterinsurgency missions.”596

Many, if not all, of the various auxiliary programs to date “leaned heavily on 

interpretations of the Pashtun arbakai concept that traditionally only existed 

in the southeast,” as well as “from the concepts underlying the Sons of Iraq 

Program.”597 Arbakai were traditional security structures roughly equivalent to 

local police, recruited from the community and monitored by elders. The Sons 

of Iraq were effectively nongovernmental militias, formerly against the state, 

which decided to align with the new government and take up arms with the 

U.S. and international forces against al-Qaeda. With the ALP, the United States 

again tried to combine traditional tribal security structures and pro-government 

militias to help counteract the rising insurgency.598

As with past auxiliary police programs, command and control of the ALP was 

under MOI, with local command officially falling under the purview of provincial 

and district police chiefs. The United States helped establish local councils, 

in concert with the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program, which were to 

select ALP recruits.599 Vetting was to be conducted through MOI.600 Recruits 

were trained for three weeks and issued assault rifles and machine guns. Their 

training was significantly shorter than that of the regular ANP.601 Even so, by 

June 2016, a DOD Report to Congress indicated that over 6,000 untrained ALP 

guardians were still present within the force.602

The ALP, like its predecessors, had mixed outcomes. It provided security in 

a limited number of areas, primarily where members were recruited properly 
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through shuras and village councils, and where ethnic representation matched 

community demographics.603 However, in many other areas, the ALP were 

corrupt and abusive, undermining security and government legitimacy.604

Reports indicate that, similar to past auxiliary police programs, intended 

command and control structures through the central government were 

manipulated, circumvented, and negatively influenced by local warlords, powers 

brokers, and their militias.605 ALP guardians were ordered to patrol only within 

their “home villages,” though this was “widely ignored.”606 Circumvention of the 

central government’s authority over these armed groups was also reinforced by 

the U.S. military’s need to “deal directly with the villages” when conducting rural 

operations, diluting the central government’s authority.607

The ALP was criticized for conflating security force efforts with reintegration and 

subsequent Taliban infiltration, thereby increasing insider attacks in the ANDSF 

and “officially encouraging the legitimization [of] armed groups.”608 In September 

2012, “ISAF suspended Special Forces training for the ALP after a spike in the 

number of attacks on coalition forces by Afghan counterparts, including ALP 

members.”609 U.S. government assessments showed powerbroker control of ALP 

units and ghost personnel, and further noted the ALP had a “lack of criteria for 

selection” and exhibited “abusive behavior against local citizens.”610

Although congressionally mandated DOD reports mentioned some problems 

facing the force, solutions to these problems were rarely discussed. 

Afghan Local Police candidates graduate from the ALP Academy in Kajran, Daykundi Province. (DOD photo 

by Jonathan Hudson)
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The October 2011 DOD report to Congress disassociated the problem of 

legitimization of armed groups from its purview of responsibility, describing 

the problem as the growth of other “independent, non-sanctioned militias” 

posing as ALP, noting that these groups might undermine the program.611 The 

report further described the ALP as largely successful in helping to counter 

the insurgency, and said the only major issue was ALP overreliance on U.S. 

SOF for training, advising, and mentoring.612

According to a 2014 DOD report to Congress, ALP training was extended 

from three to four weeks to address “some of the ethical concerns about the 

ALP cited by international organizations, and [enhance] the credibility of the 

ALP.”613 The extended program was now 140 hours total, and covered topics 

such as human rights, ethics, logistics, and administrative processes. The 

report, however, further described a number of challenges, including command 

and control, as well as questionable effectiveness of the program.614 A 2015 

International Crisis Group report continued to detail the lack of oversight of 

the ALP program and described some ALP members’ continuing human rights 

abuses.615 In conjunction with the release of the report, the ICG Asia Program 

Director described the ALP as “not a solution to rural insecurity: too many units 

have become predators on the people they are supposed to protect.”616

 A DOD 

report to Congress in 2015, however, did not mention these concerns.617
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The Afghan Public Protection Force

The Afghan Public Protection Force was initiated in 2009. APPF was intended to be a small 

force that would replace private security firms as the provider of facility and convoy security 

across the country.618 However, similar to the ALP, the APPF was noted to be “recruited 

directly” and did not participate in NTM-A’s police training program.619 The creation of the 

APPF was, in part, intended to decrease concerns about private security contractors (PSC) 

in Afghanistan. However, third-party reports, such as those of Human Rights Watch (HRW), 

described concerns about the continued influence of former warlords within the force. This 

was due to many PSCs and their command structures simply being rolled into and rebranded 

as APPF.620

The HRW report and a 2013 USIP report further described APPF human rights abuses and 

a lack of oversight of the force, similar to the ALP.621 At the end of 2013, DOD described the 

APPF as having conducted a number of successful convoy escort operations, but also as an 

“immature organization” overall, with a lack of “systematic processes” and concerning levels 

of corruption.622

Graduation of Afghan Public Protection Force from three-week training program in Kabul. (ISAF photo by 

Kristopher Levasseur)

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 107

CHAPTER 5

2015–2016: 

TRAIN, ADVISE, AND ASSIST 

CONDITIONS NOT SET, AFGHANS FACE RESILIENT INSURGENCY

While the U.S. military surge helped blunt the Taliban’s momentum and 

increased security gains, the Taliban remained resilient and the insurgency 

became emboldened by the drawdown of U.S. and coalition military forces. 

In 2016, General John Nicholson reiterated a statement made throughout the 

conflict by senior U.S. military leaders when he noted, “Remember, this is an 

insurgency that still enjoys sanctuary and support from outside the country, 

that’s very difficult for the Afghans to defeat.”623

In 2013, General Joseph Dunford stated, “The gains that we have made to date 

are not going to be sustainable without continued international commitment....

We are not where we need to be yet.”624 Less than a year later, in March 2014, 

General Dunford warned the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) that, 

upon coalition troops’ withdrawal, “the Afghan security forces will begin to 

deteriorate.” He added that “the only debate is the pace of that deterioration.”625

In February 2016, General John Campbell, the Resolute Support (RS) and 

USFOR-A commander, informed the SASC that Afghanistan had not achieved the 

enduring level of security and stability sufficient to justify a reduction in U.S. supU.S. Air Force photo
108 | CHAPTER 5 | 2015–2016: TRAIN, ADVISE, AND ASSIST

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

port to the ANDSF. Also that month, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper 

alerted the SASC that the intelligence community believed “fighting in 2016 will be 

more intense than 2015, continuing a decade-long trend of deteriorating security.”626

In the years since these warnings began, the ANA’s ability to hold territory has 

gradually decreased. According to USFOR-A, as of August 2016, only 63 percent 

of the country’s 34 provinces were under Afghan government control or influence, down from 72 percent at the end of 2015.627

U.S. LEADERSHIP STRUGGLES TO STABILIZE MISSION SCOPE 

Following the official transition of security responsibilities to the ANDSF in 

June 2013, President Obama aimed to make good on his pledge to withdraw 

U.S. combat forces and reduce the U.S. footprint to a small, embassy-centric 

presence by the end of 2016.628 Contrary to DOD estimates, however, the ANDSF 

was unable to secure the country and prevent the re-emergence of terrorist 

sanctuaries with the planned levels of U.S. and international military assistance. 

To address a security situation that was deteriorating more rapidly than forecast, President Obama extended timelines and resource commitments while 

loosening targeting restrictions.

At the end of 2014, President Obama had introduced new restrictions on targeting Taliban forces. These restrictions were a part of the administration’s 

effort to end the U.S. combat role in Afghanistan and support the larger peace 

and reconciliation process, but had damaging effects on the relationship 

Generals Nicholson (l) and Dunford (r) meet with President Ghani in July 2016 to discuss the Resolute 

Support mission. (DOD photo by Dominique A. Pineiro)
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 109

between the advisory mission and the ANDSF.629 In 2015, with security conditions deteriorating, President Obama was forced to change timelines two more 

times following deliberations with the Afghan government and his national 

security staff. In March 2015, during a joint press conference with President 

Ghani, President Obama announced that the United States would maintain 

its 9,800 troop strength through the end of 2015 and would transition to a 

Kabul-based embassy presence by the end of 2016.630 President Obama noted, 

“Afghan forces are still not as strong as they need to be. They’re developing 

critical capabilities–intelligence, logistics, aviation, command and control. 

And meanwhile, the Taliban has made gains, particularly in rural areas, and 

can still launch deadly attacks in cities, including Kabul.”631

On the advice of General Nicholson, in June 2016 President Obama loosened 

targeting restrictions, allowing targeting under certain circumstances, while also 

permitting U.S. forces to closely partner with the ANDSF at the sub-national 

level.632 With the loosening of targeting restrictions, in May 2016 the U.S. government launched a successful airstrike in Pakistan that killed Taliban senior 

shura leader, Akhtar Mohammad Mansour.633 Recognizing that security was not 

dramatically improving and the Afghan security forces still lacked the indigenous capability to win decisively against the Taliban, in 2016 President Obama 

reversed promises to withdraw all U.S. forces and deferred withdrawal timeline decisions to the next administration. On July 6, 2016, President Obama 

announced 8,400 troops would remain in Afghanistan through 2016; the previously authorized level was 5,500 troops. President Obama noted in his decision 

that “the security situation in Afghanistan remains precarious. Even as they 

improve, Afghan security forces are still not as strong as they need to be.”634

RESOLUTE SUPPORT AND OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL 

On January 1, 2015, U.S. and NATO forces officially changed missions to 

Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) and Resolute Support, respectively. However, 

U.S. strategy essentially remained centered on working with NATO allies to 

support the development and professionalization of the ANDSF. To accomplish 

this, according to DOD, the “U.S. and coalition forces conduct [train, advise, and 

assist] efforts at the ANA corps level, the ANP zone level, and with MOD and the 

MOI to improve their ability to support and sustain the fighting force.”635

The RS mission currently includes regional train, advise, and assist commands 

(TAAC) in the north, south, east, west, and capital, with a functional TAAC for 

air capabilities (figure 15 on the next page). Each TAAC is led by a “framework 

nation” responsible for coordinating support and capabilities. The four “framework nations” are the United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey.636 International 

advisors partner with the Afghans on three levels. Level 1 advising is continuous, 
110 | CHAPTER 5 | 2015–2016: TRAIN, ADVISE, AND ASSIST

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

usually daily, and normally conducted by embedded advisors. Level 2 is less 

frequent, based on the proximity of the advisors and capability of the Afghans, 

and is intended to ensure continued development. Level 3 advising means that 

advisors are no longer co-located; expeditionary teams of advisors visit their 

Afghan counterparts to plan and coordinate operations and sustainment.637

According to DOD, “unlike the previous [ISAF] mission focused primarily 

on combat operations with a secondary focus on generating, training, and 

equipping the ANDSF and building ministerial capacity, the main effort for RS 

is ministry and ANDSF capacity-building at the national and regional levels.”638

To accomplish this, eight essential functions (EF) were identified, with a U.S. 

or coalition general officer or senior civilian defense executive as the lead 

(table 8). Despite a limited mission scope and smaller resource requirements, 

some advisor and leader slots remain unfilled.639

FIGURE 15

PAKTIKA

KHOWST

TAKHAR BADAKHSHAN

BAGHLAN

BAMYAN

FARYAB

WARDAK

KUNAR

KUNDUZ

NURISTAN

NANGARHAR

FARAH

NIMROZ HELMAND KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL

GHOR

GHAZNI

BALKH

BADGHIS

KABUL

KAPISA

PAKTIYA

LOGAR

LAGHMAN

JOWZJAN

PARWAN

SAR-E PUL

HERAT

DAYKUNDI

SAMANGAN

PANJSHIR

Note: TAAC-Air encompasses all of Afghanistan. TF Forge and TF Anvil replaced Advise and Assist Cell (AAC) Southwest and Southeast in late 2016. 

Source: DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, pp. 15–17; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2017, pp. 

14–16; NATO, Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, October 13, 2016.

NATO TAAC FRAMEWORK COUNTRIES

Herat

TAAC-West

Kandahar

TAAC-South

Laghman

TAAC-East Kabul

RSM HQ

TAAC-Capital

Mazar-e Sharif

TAAC-North

Legend:

TAAC-Capital - Turkey : Kabul / RSM Headquarters

TAAC-East - United States 

TAAC-South - United States

TAAC-West - Italy

TAAC-North - Germany

TF Southeast - United States

TF Southwest - United States

Helmand

TF Southwest

Ghazni

TF Southeast
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SEPTEMBER 2017 | 111

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

Loss of Territory, Mixed Assessments of Battlefield Performance 

Despite the alarming decline in the amount of territory under the control of the 

Afghan government, one expert observer noted that such a decline was to be 

expected after the withdrawal of the U.S. military and did not necessarily signal 

the demise of the ANA.640 USFOR-A suggested that such a loss of territory was 

deliberate, because efforts to restructure the ANA’s force posture by closing 

numerous checkpoints and consolidating forces intentionally left some territory 

less heavily guarded.641 USFOR-A’s plan for restructuring the ANA included 

identifying critical areas the ANA must defend and disregarding less important 

areas that had little impact on the overall mission of the ANDSF.642

During this time, the ANA’s battlefield performance varied by region, with some 

successes, but, more notably, major failures in Helmand and Kunduz Provinces 

that grabbed international headlines. In a blow to the ANA, Musa Qala District 

in Helmand fell to the Taliban in the summer of 2015.643

 And, in September 2015, 

Kunduz City rapidly fell to the Taliban, with members of the ANA seen fleeing 

to the airport for escape. The Taliban had been closing in on Kunduz City for 

at least a year, with no significant attempt by the ANA to push them out of the 

province. After two weeks, the ANDSF eventually regained control of the city, 

albeit with significant coalition support.644

Leadership remained a key issue preventing improved readiness within the 

ANA, and varied by region. The 215th Corps in Helmand, for example, nearly 

disintegrated.645 Additionally, poor and corrupt leadership resulted in problems 

with resource management.646 In Helmand and Kandahar, 40 percent of the 

corps’ leaders were deemed ineffective, and were removed and replaced.647 The 

large number of ineffective senior leaders suggests a system that had rewarded 

inept or corrupt leadership.

USFOR-A believed the ANA performed better in 2016 than in 2015.648 In a 

December 2016 press briefing, General Nicholson reported the Afghan security 

TABLE 8

ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS (EF)

EF 1 Plan, program, budget, and execute

EF 2 Transparency, accountability, and oversight

EF 3 Civilian governance of the Afghan security institutions and adherence to rule of law

EF 4 Force generation

EF 5 Sustain the force

EF 6 Plan, resource, and execute effective security campaigns

EF 7 Develop sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes

EF 8 Maintain internal and external strategic communications capability

Source: DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, pp. 12–15.
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forces, though still reliant on the United States for enabling support, thwarted 

eight attempts by the Taliban to seize cities during 2016, including attacks on 

Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, Kunduz, Tarin Kowt, and Farah. General Nicholson said 

the ANDSF’s ability to deal with simultaneous crises reflected their growing 

capability and maturity.649

However, U.S. advisors had little direct contact with ANA units below the corps 

level; advisors were forced to rely heavily on assessments provided by the 

MOD to evaluate the effectiveness of the ANA. Given the distance between the 

advisors and the data, the consistency, comprehensiveness, and credibility of 

these assessments varied and could not always be confirmed by U.S. officials.650

The ANA Special Forces continued to be more proficient than the conventional 

ANA forces. As the security situation continued to deteriorate, the Afghan 

government increasingly relied upon the ANA Special Forces to help secure key 

population centers, largely due to perceived and real deficiencies in the ANA 

conventional forces. The commander of the ANASOC protested that the purpose 

of the special forces was to conduct short-term missions rather than defend 

territory.651 This sentiment was echoed by RS advisors who felt that the overuse 

of special forces would result in burnout among Afghanistan’s most elite 

forces.652 To prevent further misuse of the forces, RS attempted to restructure 

the force posture of the ANA. 

Assessments Still Fail to Assess Battlefield Performance

Over the course of the ANA reconstruction effort, the ANA assessments 

methodology changed at least three times: from Capability Milestone (CM) to 

Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT); from CUAT to Regional ANDSF 

Assessment Report (RASR); and from RASR to Monthly ANDSF Assessment 

Report (MAAR).653 The most recent methodology, MAAR, assesses the ANA only 

at the headquarters level and, as noted by the U.S. military, is not intended “to be 

used as an assessment or evaluation of the entire ANDSF.”654

Such a methodology and lack of coverage of the ANA below the corps level 

suggest that any evaluation is capturing only superficial details of the ANA’s 

current battlefield readiness. The illusion that such an assessment framework 

could accurately depict realities on the ground was dispelled at the end of 2015 

when the 215th Corps collapsed and had to be reconstituted. Following the U.S. 

and coalition military drawdown and leading up to the 215th Corps’ collapse, 

only five of the six ANA corps were supported by coalition advisors. The 215th 

Corps in Helmand was not supported because the UK declined the advisory 

mission and the United States was unwilling to increase its presence. The lack 

of coverage and advisory units below the corps level hindered the U.S. ability to 

forecast ANA operational capabilities before it was too late to rectify. 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 113

Changes to ANA Development 

During this time, USFOR-A made “modest progress” in moving the ANA toward 

offensive, rather than defensive, operations.655 In practice, this meant that the U.S. 

military advocated for the closure of multiple checkpoints and consolidation of 

forces on fewer bases. To improve force protection and logistics, coalition advisors advocated for consolidating ANA forces in priority areas of the country.656

Consolidated forces allowed for more flexibility during clearing operations, but 

contributed to security vacuums in areas without checkpoints. Furthermore, 

local Afghan power brokers, who largely saw the presence of the ANA in their 

territories as military might at their disposal, resisted this restructuring, resulting 

in some static posts remaining unconsolidated, leaving many spread far and wide. 

This situation made some ANA soldiers easy targets for the Taliban and increased 

ANA casualties.657 Checkpoints and small military outposts were also seen by the 

local population as a comforting presence of security forces, no matter how small 

or incapable those units were. Withdrawing those checkpoints resulted in negative 

reactions by villagers and local officials, forcing the Afghan national government 

to allow checkpoints to remain for political, not military, reasons. 

Changes to the ANA’s design were made to stem attrition and casualties. The 

force restructuring established a National Mission Brigade, scheduled to be fully 

operational by 2018. The National Mission Brigade was designed to alleviate 

the improper use of the ANA Special Forces in clearing and holding missions, 

A U.S. Marine observes an ANA soldier at the Helmand Regional Military Training Center at Camp Shorabak. 

The U.S. Marine Corps was forced to redeploy to Helmand following the collapse of the ANA 215th Corps in 

2015. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lucas Hopkins)
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enabling those forces to focus on their short-term, operations-driven mission.658

The brigade is planned to consist of approximately 200 personnel to provide 

ANA SOF contingency operations command and control capabilities.659

The MOD and ANA have begun creating reserve forces of former ANA soldiers 

to serve locally in support functions, such as base security and checkpoints.660

In September 2016, reserve kandaks for the 201st and 209th Corps, consisting of 

600 reserve soldiers each, and for the 111th Capital Division were established. A 

reserve kandak for the 207th Corps is in the planning stages.661

 The combined size 

of the ANA and reserve forces must remain within the 195,000 final force ceiling 

for the ANA.662 Though officials hope that reserve forces will help mitigate some 

of the factors driving attrition, it is too early to observe such an effect.

In addition to the restructuring of the ANA, U.S. and Afghan officials are seeking 

to reform and professionalize the MOD. In 2014, the U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Civilianization Agreement made progress toward increasing civilian personnel in the 

MOD.663 President Ghani spearheaded efforts to professionalize the MOD, including increasing legal education at the corps level and improving and formalizing 

investigative procedures.664 Under such reforms, a major fuel theft case in the 

205th Corps successfully made its way through the Afghan court system.665

In September 2016, the Common Policy Agreement established guidelines 

to help the MOD improve internal behaviors, professionalize the force, and 

generate combat power.666 This policy allows coalition advisors to provide 

An Afghan Air Force MD-530 helicopter participates in an air-to-ground integration exercise in Kabul 

Province. (NATO photo by Kay M. Nissen)
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 115

rewards and penalties based on MOD compliance, and aims to stem problems of 

poor leadership and corruption in the MOD. 

Demands for U.S. Combat Enablers Persist, Afghan Air Force Improving

Years of operating in the shadows of U.S. and international advisors and mentors 

resulted in a physical and “psychological” dependency that has proven difficult to 

break for most ANA conventional units.667 According to the Washington Post, one 

U.S. advisor noted that air strikes were used as a way to keep Afghan forces on 

“life support” and resulted in the “Afghans ask[ing] for air strikes every day.”668 The 

June 2016 measure to increase airstrikes granted General Nicholson “the authority 

to order ‘pro-active’ close air support strikes for Afghan forces in the field.”669

In February 2017, Afghanistan’s national security advisor, Mohammed Hanif 

Atmar, told reporters he was asking the United States to provide close air support 

for ground operations as a “kind of filling-the-gap measure” until Afghan security 

forces could do the job alone. Atmar stated that “it will take [Afghanistan] time” 

to develop such capabilities.670 Atmar’s request, however, came five months after 

General Nicholson cited Afghanistan’s Air Force—in addition to Afghanistan’s 

special forces and police special units—as one example of “the way in which [the 

Afghans] are conducting most of their operations in an independent manner.”671

A-29 Super Tucano Procurement and Delay

The acquisition of the A-29 Super Tucano 

counterinsurgency aircraft demonstrated the challenges 

of the bureaucratic process espoused by the United 

States and coalition. At the end of 2011, DOD awarded 

a $355 million contract to Embraer, the Brazilian 

company that made the A-29 Super Tucano, and its 

American business partner, Sierra Nevada Corps.672

Embraer’s competitor, Kansas-based Hawker Beechcraft 

Defense Company, protested Embraer’s contract win, 

resulting in a pause in the contract and launching the 

dispute into the hands of the courts.673 A year later, 

in 2013, DOD handed Embraer another win, rejecting 

Beechcraft’s dispute.674 Beechcraft again protested 

through the GAO, but within three days of the temporary 

stay on the contract, DOD decided to continue with 

Embraer. Beechcraft protested yet again, this time with 

a lawsuit. Beechcraft alleged that the USAF would pay 

more than $100 million more for the A-29, compared 

to the Beechcraft AT-6, and that most of the A-29 parts 

would be made in Brazil, compared to Beechcraft’s 

American-made planes. Embraer denied that most 

of their planes’ parts would be made in Brazil.675 In 

June 2013, the GAO issued Embraer another win, and 

Beechcraft another loss, stating that there were no 

irregularities in the procurement process.676 In February 

2016, the first A-29 Super Tucanos arrived in Kabul, 

Afghanistan, almost two years behind schedule.677

Afghan Air Force A-29 Super Tucanos fly over Kabul. (U.S. Air 

Force photo by Larry E. Reid, Jr.)
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The development of the AAF is part of improving the offensive capabilities 

of the conventional military units, in addition to on-the-ground firepower 

capabilities. A capable AAF could increase combat airstrikes to alter the 

current stalemate with the Taliban, and decrease Afghan dependence on U.S. air 

support. USAF A-29 advisors noted they observed conventional ANA soldiers 

take a more offensive posture when supported by Afghan A-29 assets, indicating 

that air support is highly desired for most Afghan ground forces.678

DOD reported in 2015 that the AAF flew “most operations independently.”679 Yet, a 

hallmark of the AAF persisted: force strength remained under goals and even began to decrease.680 DOD further reported that the logistical sustainment of the AAF 

would “make or break” the force in the long term, and was a serious challenge.681

Pilot availability and development remained a critical challenge within the 

AAF through 2016.682 The literacy skills required for pilot training made finding 

qualified recruits challenging. The addition of new technologies and equipment 

further complicated AAF training, requiring even experienced pilots to be away 

from the battlefield to train in new technologies. Finally, pilots were frequently 

redirected to other purposes, particularly the Special Mission Wing.683

Some improvements in the AAF were noted by 2016. The AAF was increasing 

its capabilities in airlift, casualty evacuation, and airpower.684 The AAF independently planned for and provided air assets for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief efforts, human remains return, casualty evacuation, nontraditional 

ISR, air interdiction, armed over-watch, and aerial escort missions. The physical structure of the AAF included the headquarters in Kabul and three wings 

in Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand. The training mission, TAAC-Air, provided 

persistent training in Kabul and Kandahar and routinely sent Expeditionary 

Advisory Packages (EAPs) to Herat.685

As of November 2016, the AAF had 116 of 136 originally planned aircraft, 

consisting of C-130, C-208, A-29, Mi-17, MD-530, and Mi-35, or a mix of U.S., 

Russian, Brazilian, and French fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Use of these 

aircraft was somewhat limited by the lack of fully-trained flight crews, 

including flight engineers, loadmasters, and maintenance personnel.686

 The 

complexities of the A-29 Super Tucano required the AAF to extend the timeline 

for development and initial operational capability past 2017, as originally 

expected.687 Although the Super Tucanos were credited with successfully 

supporting the 209th Corps in Badakhshan in April 2016, the first class of 

trained Afghan maintenance personnel for the A-29s graduated in December 

2015 and the platform remained dependent on contractor logistics support 

(CLS).688 Additionally, full staffing of the Mi-17 was extended to 2018 due to its 

continuing reliance on CLS for heavy lift operations.689
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SEPTEMBER 2017 | 117

At the end of 2016, the AAF lacked the trained operations and maintenance 

personnel required for its current size. Only 223 students were enrolled in U.S.-

funded training programs, 172 of whom were training to be pilots.690 The largest 

challenge for the AAF remained recruiting qualified candidates, despite Englishlanguage training in Kabul, Kandahar, and at the Defense Language Institute in 

the United States. At the same time, Afghan Tactical Air Coordinator training—

an airpower familiarization course for ANA personnel—increased throughout 

2016. At the beginning of 2016, only 14 recruits had graduated from the course, 

but by the end of the year, there were 130 graduates.691

Sustainment remained an obstacle. The AAF could not sustain itself at any of 

its locations, and given the increased operational tempo, had become increasingly reliant on contractor logistics support, which was expected to be required 

through 2023.692 In Kabul, the rationing of electrical power to support AAF sustainment operations further undermined consistency.693

In terms of operations, DOD noted there was “a tension between the need for 

training and the combat demand placed on the AAF fleet.”694 DOD largely used 

increases in the number of operations conducted to demonstrate the AAF 

was improving. For example, although AAF’s capacity to conduct casualty 

evacuations had increased, the number of requests still far exceeded the AAF’s 

ability to respond due to increased overall operational tempo of the ANDSF. 

SIGAR project team lead James Cunningham speaks with the deputy commander for TAAC-Air about the MD530 light helicopters being supplied to the Afghan Air Force for air support of ground troops. (SIGAR photo)
118 | CHAPTER 5 | 2015–2016: TRAIN, ADVISE, AND ASSIST

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ANA Attrition, Casualties, and Ghost Soldiers Undermined Force Strength 

ANA force strength decreased from 185,817 in September 2013 to 168,327 in 

November 2016, with numbers steadily declining for three quarters in a row in 

2016.695 The decline in ANA numbers was largely attributed to high attrition and 

casualty rates. Furthermore, the true number of soldiers was increasingly called 

into question due to the persistent issue of ghost soldiers.

ANA attrition remained high during this time, with about one-third of the force 

lost annually, or just below 3 percent per month.696 In 2016, USFOR-A reported 

overall ANA attrition at 2.9 percent in August, 2.3 percent in September, and 

3.1 percent in October.697 Though recruiting efforts persisted, such high attrition 

increasingly created a military with little to no training. Thus, training efforts 

had to continue to focus on basic training, with fewer opportunities to train 

soldiers at advanced warrior levels.698

The unprecedented number of casualties sustained by the ANA was even more 

alarming.699 ANA casualties from January to November 2015 increased 27 percent over the same time period in 2014.700 In the ANDSF overall, 5,523 service 

members were killed in the first half of 2016 alone.701 In addition to battlefield 

casualties, the ANDSF experienced a spate of insider attacks in which its personnel turned on fellow soldiers, claiming 257 lives by 2015.702

Ghost soldiers remained an elusive challenge to ANA development. Such a phenomenon not only resulted in fraudulent budget forecasting, but also overstated 

ANA force strength, undermined recruiting 

and planning forecasts, and undercut battlefield performance.703

 To address the issue of 

ghost soldiers, CSTC-A is implementing four 

automated systems to address personnel and 

pay accountability.704 When fully functional, 

the Afghan Human Resources Information 

Management System (AHRIMS), the Afghan 

Personnel Pay System (APPS), the Afghan 

Automated Biometric Identification System 

(AABIS), and the ANDSF Identification Card 

System (ID) will be integrated to pay properly 

enrolled soldiers electronically.705 Such complex systems will, however, still require oversight to determine that personnel are properly 

accounted for and active in the ANDSF. 

Furthermore, modern infrastructure is required to operate these systems, including 

reliable electricity and internet access with 

The 209th Corps’ biometric enrollment 

process under way in Mazar-e Sharif.

(SIGAR photo)
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 119

proper bandwidth.706 CSTC-A, though hopeful, has acknowledged that the systems will not completely eliminate the problem of ghost soldiers.707

Afghan Special Forces Became “the Best of the Best,” But Were Often Misused

By 2015, increases in violence and political instability appeared to have taken 

their toll on the ANASOC. Once a large force of over 12,000 highly-trained 

members, the ANASOC shrank to 10,700 personnel by mid-2015.708 The force 

structure grew, however, to ten kandaks across the country.709 Despite the dip in 

force numbers, the ANASOC made significant progress in its ability to execute 

complex operations, notably in Helmand Province. Though the RS mission still 

provided advising, medical evacuations, and ISR enablers, its support goal transitioned to encouraging Afghan forces to have confidence in their own systems, 

processes, and capabilities.710 By mid-2015, the Afghans had completely taken 

the lead in the Special Forces training effort.711

The ANASOC continues to be the most proficient Afghan force on the battlefield.712 Attrition remains low and reenlistment high.713 ANASOC forces perform 

well at both the tactical and operational levels. Some experts believe the ANASOC 

remains the last bet against the Taliban and other insurgent and terrorist forces 

in Afghanistan.714 Yet, challenges persist. ANASOC still has difficulty in acquiring 

and maintaining the proper equipment.715 Additionally, ANASOC, a light force by 

design, requires appropriate enabling capabilities, relying on the conventional 

ANA for resupply and logistics, for example.716 Aviation, ground mobility, fires, and 

intelligence capabilities are all still in need of training and increased proficiency. 

ANA commandos participated in counterinsurgency operations in Kapisa Province. (U.S. Army photo by 

James K. McCann)
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A notable and recent challenge to ANASOC is the improper use of its capabilities 

in conventional-type clear-and-hold operations.717 As the conventional forces 

have been plagued by high attrition and serious deficits in training, equipment, 

and overall readiness, ANASOC forces have increasingly filled this void. 

This mismatch degrades combat effectiveness, capability, readiness, and 

morale.718 The over-reliance on ANASOC forces for battlefield successes in 

Afghanistan has recently been noted to be affecting the morale of special forces 

and commandos.719 These threats to ANASOC cohesion and readiness are a 

double-edged sword: (1) Without properly attending to the needs and mission 

of ANASOC, the RS mission and coalition members risk the degradation of 

Afghanistan’s most capable forces, and (2) without proper attention to the ANA 

conventional forces, Afghanistan will continue to rely on ANASOC forces for 

capabilities that lie outside their primary mission.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE 

Current ANP Train, Advise, and Assist Mission

Under Resolute Support, U.S. and NATO police advisors are restricted to the 

ANP zone level and within the MOI (figure 16).720

 Since many ANP units are 

manning checkpoints or policing district centers, U.S. oversight and visibility of 

ANP performance and development is scarce. At U.S.-led missions at TAAC-East 

and TAAC-South, the police advisory missions are led by U.S. conventional 

army units that may or may not have the required training or expertise in police 

advising or rule of law. Ministerial-level advising teams also remain under the 

command of U.S. Army units. To augment deficiencies in policing expertise, 

contractor specialists are deployed to augment U.S. military units. 

ANP patrolman and U.S. Marine near Patrol Base Amir Agha. (DOD photo by Reece Lodder)
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 121

A primary focus of the U.S. DOD effort is to work with MOI in developing an 

operational readiness cycle for the ministry.721 An operational readiness cycle—

train, fight, rest—is designed to improve professional development of the force 

and allow units to rest and refit. The operational readiness cycle will also 

increase the U.S. and coalition advisors’ ability to provide hands-on training for 

units throughout the country on a routine basis as units rotate back to the zone 

level for remedial training. 

ANP Still Suffering From Missteps of the Early Years

Although some progress has been made since 2002 in improving MOI systems 

and processes, the ANP continues to suffer from an identity crisis largely due 

to the competing efforts of U.S. and European stakeholders. ANP train, advise, 

and assist efforts suffered from a failure to meet international advisor staffing 

level targets and to properly equip police units.722 Additionally, the U.S. and 

coalition’s lack of coverage and attention to police units and offices outside of 

Kabul has had lasting, negative effects on the development of the ANP and MOI. 

FIGURE 16

ANP ZONES VS. ANA CORPS AREA BOUNDARIES

Source: DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, pp. 63, 95.

111th Capital Division

201st Corps

203rd Corps

205th Corps

207th Corps

209th Corps

215th Corps

ANP Zones

ANA Corps and Capital 

Division Area Boundaries

ANP ZONE

606

ANP ZONE

707

ANP ZONE

808

ANP ZONE

505

ANP ZONE

404

ANP ZONE

303

ANP ZONE

202

ANP ZONE

101
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Without regular oversight and accountability, inappropriate ANP activities have 

contributed to the persistent low confidence Afghan civilians have in criminal 

justice and rule of law.

Friction among Key Stakeholders Results in Identity Crisis 

Tension over the purpose of the ANP and the role of the advisory mission 

remain today. The U.S. military continues to see the ANP as a counterinsurgency 

force focused on protecting the population from Taliban attacks and influence. 

Due to the high-threat environment, State’s civilian advisors have been restricted 

to advising in Kabul and lack a continued presence at the regional TAACs where 

the day-to-day advising of the ANP occurs. For the Europeans, after nearly a 

decade in Afghanistan, the EU ended its police mission on December 31, 2016, 

but noted its intentions to send some follow-on advising teams in late 2017. The 

decision to end the EUPOL mission was in response to “growing instability” 

which was noted as limiting EUPOL’s ability to work effectively on civilian 

policing, as most police were “increasingly focus[ed] on fighting insurgents 

rather than traditional police work.”723

Under Afghanistan’s four-year plan for the ANDSF, the ANP’s mission is to 

conduct community policing with a focus on rule of law. However, based on 

years of training and development as a counterinsurgency force, as of 2016 

the ANP lacks the ability to protect the general populace as a civilian policing 

institution and struggles to address criminality and crime prevention that is 

not insurgent-related.724 A June 2017 DOD report to Congress indicated that 

Members of the ANP in Bamyan Province next to their Humvee during a raid demonstration. 

(U.S. Army photo by Christopher Bonebreak)
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“the focus and employment in counterinsurgency military functions have 

hindered the ANP’s development of sufficient anti-crime and other community 

policing capabilities.”725

The ANP remains focused on the front lines, combating the Taliban-led 

insurgency, with professionalization as a secondary objective.726

 Particularly 

at sub-national levels, where civilian policing is most critical and the battle for 

control of territory is ongoing, the ANP have remained largely paramilitary in 

nature.727 This focus has been continually reinforced by U.S. COIN-oriented 

strategy and objectives for police development efforts in Afghanistan.728 The 

paramilitary focus is likely further influenced by MOI leadership with ties to the 

military, for example, with former ANA commanders currently and previously 

leading the ANP.729 In many cases, the police still suffer from poor leadership, 

are under-equipped, under-trained, and subsequently incapable of effectively 

executing their mission, leading to the reported abandonment of 112 police 

checkpoints in late 2016.730

Due to its continued front-lines role, the ANP has suffered heavy casualties, 

negatively impacting morale and attrition rates, which have been consistently 

around 2 percent of the force per month.731 This attrition rate means that, on 

average, roughly a quarter of the ANP is lost annually.732 Such heavy losses 

negatively impact the institutional knowledge of the force, as well as creating 

additional funding, logistical, and professionalization challenges. 

At the same time, the COIN focus of the ANP is at odds with MOI’s 10-

year vision, published in 2013. The MOI vision document states that the 

responsibilities of the police should include “enforcing the rule of law, 

maintaining law and order on the streets and protecting human safety.” It further 

details that “over the last ten years the police have been used to fight insurgency, 

which has confused their role and functions. Now the vision of the Ministry 

of Interior is to return police to the traditional duties they perform under the 

Afghan Police Law and to cease their participation in combat operations.”733

Focus on (Unsustainable) Numbers, not Professionalization

Since 2002, the force size for the police has increased dramatically, from 62,000 

in 2002 to 157,000 in 2016. This figure does not include the semi-autonomous 

ALP, which itself is roughly 30,000 police.734 Together, the current ANP force size 

is three times what it was after the original German assessments in 2002. 

The financial obligations for the current ANP force size are unsustainable for 

the Afghan government. The United States contributed $93 million in FY 2016 

alone.735

 SIGAR previously noted that the Afghan government has been facing 

severe shortfalls in domestic revenue targets, such as for the 2015–2016 fiscal 
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year, when Afghanistan was 35 percent below targets.736 The April 2017 SIGAR 

Quarterly Report also noted that, “as of March 31, 2017, the United States had 

obligated $20.3 billion and disbursed $19.9 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, 

equip, and sustain the ANP.”737

Improvements have been made in ensuring all Afghan police have completed 

required training prior to beginning work at their assigned posts. According to 

DOD, as of May 31, 2016, more than 95 percent of ANP personnel had received 

basic training, with plans in place to ensure this is mandatory in the future. 

However, a June 2017 DOD report to Congress indicated there were still 

“significant deficiencies” in ANP training, concluding that “efforts to increase 

TABLE 9

COMPARING KEY ELEMENTS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) Afghan Local Police (ALP) Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

Recruiting

• Historically low literacy rates

• Challenging recruitment due to high attrition and negative 

incentives created by lower pay and training for AUP, compared to ANA or ANCOP

• Historically low literacy rates

• Strong powerbroker influence as 

a result of limited oversight during 

recruitment process 

• Described as legitimizing militias 

• Recruited more literate personnel

• Recruited from the best officers serving in 

the AUP

• High attrition, at one point as high as 70 

percent, due to over-usage of the force

Training*

Basic: 4-9 weeks

In the early years, a 2-week refresher course was offered in 

lieu of basic training to police with previous experience

Basic: 3-4 weeks Basic: 16+ weeks

Training 

Description

• Basic policing skills

• Basic firearms training added in 2005

• Initially PowerPoint-based, theoretical, intended for 

literate students 

• Updated to accommodate low literacy, focusing on practical 

exercises in 2011

• ANP training and application described as increasingly 

over-militarized and focused on COIN 

• Trained by a mix of contractors, U.S. military, and Afghans

• Basic policing techniques 

• Brief module on human rights 

• Trained by U.S. SOF, coalition forces, 

and other ANDSF

• More police-focused training than AUP or ALP, 

including: 

 • Crowd control

 • Urban tactical operations

 • Tribal relations

 • Ethics

 • Special weapons tactics

• Closer field training, mentoring, and partnering with U.S. and coalition SOF, as compared 

to other ANP divisions

Salary** Pre-2009: $25-80 per month

Post-2009: $100-165 per month

Pre-2009: N/A 

Post-2009: $100-150 per month 

Pre-2009: $140 per month 

Post-2009: $260 per month

Equipment

• Provided AK-47s, side arms, some light machine guns, 

uniforms, vehicles

• Historically ill- and under-equipped; improvements made in 

recent years

• Provided AK-47s and ANP police 

uniforms

• Issues regarding logistical support 

from MOI

• Provided better weapons, equipment, and 

vehicles than other ANP divisions, such as 

AUP and ALP

Note:

*Training - Ranges show the length of U.S.-initiated training programs over time. Training includes only the basic/initial training course provided (not including literacy, which was later added as 

a mandatory component of ANP training). Training length shown is also only for those police who attended a basic training course. A number of ANP and ALP personnel did not go through basic 

training, particularly in the earlier years of U.S. involvement in police training, as well as during the push to rapidly expand the ANDSF in 2009 and beyond. DOD reports as recent as 2017 indicate 

that some ALP still have not gone through training. 

**Salary - Salary figures refer to base pay only and do not account for bonuses. Salaries also do not include losses which occurred when corrupt leaders skimmed salaries; this has improved over 

time with the implementation of more advanced HR systems and electronic funds transfers.

Source: U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghan National Civil Order Police: First Battalions Graduated and Ready For Duty,” Kabul 001727 cable, May 24, 2007; Donald Rumsfeld, “Afghan National Police,” 

Memorandum to Dr. Condoleeza Rice, Rumsfeld Files Archive, February 23, 2005; DOD and State Inspectors General, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, 

November 2006, pp. 17, 19, 27, 41–64; DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Local Police, DODIG-2012-109, July 9, 2012, p. 47; DOD, Report 

on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, pp. 69, 71; DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces, June 2008, pp. 21–24; GAO, 

Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, p. 23; GAO, Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police 

Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation, GAO-09-280, March 2009, pp. 3, 37; SIGAR, Afghan Local Police: A Critical Rural Security Initiative Lacks Adequate Logistics Support, 

Oversight, and Direction, SIGAR 16-3-AR, October 2015, p. 4–5; NTM-A, “ANP Professionalization: The Basic Patrolman Course,” May 7, 2011; NTM-A, “ANP Base Pay and Incentive Pays,” April 20, 

2011; Robert Perito, Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police: Victim of Its Own Success, USIP, Special Report No. 307, May 2012, pp. 2, 9–12; Robert Perito, Police Transition in Afghanistan, USIP, Special 

Report No. 322, February 2013, pp. 2, 4–5; David Bayley and Robert Perito, The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime (London, United Kingdom: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 

Inc., 2010), pp. 23, 28; Richard Hooker Jr. and Joseph Collins, Lessons Encountered, pp. 292–293, 299; Ali Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges, and 

Sustainability, Peaceworks No. 115, USIP, 2016, p. 18; RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 50–52, 61–64; Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), 

From Arbaki to Local Police: Today’s Challenges and Tomorrow’s Concerns, Spring 2012, p. 5; Andrew Wilder, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, July 2007, pp. ix, 2, 

12–14, 35–37; C.J. Chivers, “Afghan Police Earn Poor Grade for Marja Mission,” New York Times, June 1, 2010. 
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the capabilities of ANP units” were “severely hampered.”738 The drawdown of 

coalition forces since 2014 has resulted in significantly decreased oversight 

and assistance to police training across the country. And, as U.S. funding and 

assistance to training decreases, keeping pace with annual attrition may prove a 

significant obstacle for the Afghan government to overcome.739

Even with significant international financial support, the United States and MOI 

continue to struggle with equipping the forces currently in place, including 

the ALP and the elite forces like ANCOP (table 9).740 A December 2016 DOD 

report to Congress described “limited accountability for equipment and supplies 

at the ANP provincial headquarters.”741 The report further described MOI as 

having “limited capacity to draft and manage complex procurement contracting 

actions.” However, DOD described recently initiated efforts to improve MOI 

capacities through procurement training programs, which DOD stated have 

resulted in improvements in the ministry’s contracting capabilities.742

Afghan Local Police

Reports still indicate ALP program results are mixed.743 Assessments of the 

ALP indicate that third parties raised concerns with the program and its 

efficacy early on, as reports of human rights abuses, drug trafficking, and 

corruption were noted from the first year.744 The ALP continues to be accused 

of corruption and a variety of human rights abuses across the country.745

Although DOD reports in previous years have indicated the ALP contributed to 

counterinsurgency efforts and improved security, recent DOD reports do not 

confirm this, but rather detail the ALP’s significant challenges.746

The International Crisis Group described the ALP’s assistance with security 

as marginal, noting that between 2010 and 2014, overall levels of violence 

across Afghanistan rose by 14 percent, but in the five provinces without an ALP 

presence, these levels fell by 27 percent.747 The record does, however, also suggest “that the ALP contribute to security where local factors allow recruitment 

of members from the villages they patrol and where they respect their own communities. But such conditions do not exist in many districts.”748 The ICG report 

also noted that some of the provinces that experienced improved security, but 

did not have an ALP presence, were already more peaceful than other regions. 

The ALP and past auxiliary programs have, however, proven themselves to be 

more fiscally sustainable than the regular ANP; one ALP guardian costs roughly 

one quarter of the average ANP policeman.749 The 2013 estimates from DOD noted 

that the ALP program would cost roughly $121 million annually to sustain.750 This 

reduced price-tag was appealing, especially considering the cost of the ANA and 

ANP reconstruction overall. Burden-sharing, while desirable, is not likely for these 

auxiliary programs; the Afghan government is incapable, at least in the near-term. 
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Other international donors, such as Japan and some European countries, have 

noted they are not only legally unable to support the auxiliary police, citing their 

resemblance to militias, but also unwilling, as they have strong reservations about 

such militia-based programming.751 At this point, the ALP is still funded entirely by 

the United States from the Afghan Security Forces Fund.752

Size goals and timelines for the ALP remain of concern. As of the end of 2016, 

the ALP force strength was roughly 28,000, with an authorized end strength 

of 30,000.753 Although the ALP program was established with the stated intent 

to be phased out within two to five years, training was still occurring in 2016, 

with no end dates or transition timelines officially indicated in DOD reports to 

Congress.754 An August 2016 SOF News report notes that the force “has been 

fully transferred to the Afghan [MOI],” but also notes that “a small advisory 

team” is still in place.755 MOI’s 2013 10-year vision for the ANP states its intent to 

eventually integrate the ALP into the ANP “as security conditions improve” and 

“after receiving the required education and training.” 756

The ALP continues to receive mixed reviews.757 The ALP has been assessed, 

mostly by U.S. government officials, as having helped in achieving some counterinsurgency goals, nationally.758 However, DOD reporting to Congress in 2016 also 

indicates a number of persistent problems with the ALP, such as powerbroker 

control of ALP units and the continued existence of ghost personnel, albeit with 

improvements.759 Specifically, the report detailed how 2,000 ghost police were 

removed with the help of new payroll systems and how two “districts identified 

as working for local powerbrokers were disestablished.”760

ALP recruits in basic training at Nangarhar Police Regional Training Center. (U.S. Army photo by Jarrod Morris)
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Although some improvements are noted to have recently been made, a SIGAR 

audit conducted in 2015 indicated that CSTC-A had still not conducted a 

thorough audit of the ALP program and that a number of recommended 

improvements to the program had not been implemented.761

 A 2016 DOD report 

to Congress did indicate that attempts were made to improve ALP command 

and control structures, but also noted those actions were not successful. The 

report detailed that “despite the alignment of the ALP more directly underneath 

the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) in June 2015, in practice, provincial chiefs 

of police have maintained operational control or influence over many ALP 

units.”762 Former Afghan Minister of Interior Jalali also noted in a 2016 report 

that, although safeguards have been established, they are “rarely implemented,” 

resulting in his ultimate conclusion that the force was still a net contributor to 

instability, not security.763 Jalali further described the mixed results and reviews 

of the ALP, stating,

The ALP has contributed to security in areas where its members could be 

recruited from local villages and tribes, where they serve and are accountable 

to their local communities. In other places where the ALP is organized and 

led by local militia leaders and patronage networks, the armed men become 

engaged in predatory acts—abusing the population—and in many locations, 

they worsen security.764

Evidence suggests that in its current capacity, the ALP is a dangerous, doubleedged sword. Although the ALP has helped to counter the insurgency in roughly 

a third of the areas where they are present, the ALP still largely continues to 

reinforce the legitimization of corrupt, criminal, warlord-loyal militias, often 

undermining the authority of the central government and the overall security 

situation.765 As Minister Jalali succinctly stated in 2016, “Unless the current ALP 

program is reformed ... any expansion will be a waste of resources.”766

Corruption and Lack of Public Confidence Still Helping to Drive the Insurgency

There are mixed indicators for public perceptions of and confidence in the 

ANP. Some prominent Afghans have noted that the government, including the 

police, still enjoys a respectable amount of public support, at least compared to 

other options (for example, the Taliban or other violent extremists).767 However, 

patronage networks continue to negatively influence local capacities to maintain 

security, as do continued corruption and human rights abuses by the police.768

In many cases, based on the history of limited government oversight and corrupt 

practices, police are often viewed as a net detractor from security. This was 

especially true with the ALP, who were described as “cheap but dangerous” in a 

2015 International Crisis Group report.769

 Institutional governance and integrity 

have been significantly damaged by years of informal chains of command, the 

re-sanctioning of untrained or under-trained militias across the country, and 

subsequent pervasive corruption and human rights abuses by these groups.770
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The Afghan government and ANP legitimacy are also still negatively impacted 

by the continued lag in justice sector development, including rule of law, which 

undermines security efforts by causing Afghans to turn to the Taliban for 

“quick justice,” effectively legitimizing the insurgency.771 Police corruption has 

added to the slow development of these complementary sectors, as police face 

little recourse for offenses, such as sexual harassment or accepting bribes for 

releasing offenders from detention. In the last quarter of 2016, for example, the 

number of Gross Violation of Human Rights (GVHR) cases identified for MOI 

increased from 24 to 30, as compared to the previous quarter. Of the 24 reported 

in the previous quarter, only 10 of those cases were actually investigated.772

Corruption and abuse are significant challenges for the MOI writ large. DOD 

reported that, at the end of 2016, MOI “possesses the basic systems and 

organizations to investigate and adjudicate allegations of GVHR and corruption.” 

However, DOD also described significant challenges for the ministry, such as 

not demonstrating a capacity “to train personnel on rule of law issues” and an 

inability to manage “the volume of corruption and GVHR allegations identified,” 

noting that MOI “leadership’s political will to hold violators accountable remains 

inconsistent at best.”773

A human rights report issued by the State Department in 2015 described the 

ANP as a major predatory actor.774 The report stated, “According to observers, 

ALP and ANP personnel were largely unaware of their responsibilities and 

defendants’ rights under the law. Accountability of NDS and ANP officials for 

A large audience, including Major General Richard Kaiser and Inspector General John Sopko, third and 

fourth from left, respectively, attended a May 2017 conference in Kabul on “Countering the Culture of 

Corruption in Afghanistan.” (Afghan government photo)
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torture and abuse was weak, not transparent, and rarely enforced. Independent 

judicial or external oversight of the NDS and ANP in the investigation and 

prosecution of crimes or misconduct, including torture and abuse, was 

limited.”775 President Ghani, speaking at the 2017 Annual European Union AntiCorruption Conference, described the MOI as the most corrupt institution in 

Afghanistan, further emphasizing the significant challenges facing MOI in its 

efforts to curb corruption.776

Police corruption continues to negatively affect both the civilian population 

of Afghanistan and the police themselves. In a January 2015 audit, SIGAR 

found that ANP personnel were sometimes being paid for days not worked, or 

not receiving pay either in-full or partially, as “trusted agent” payroll systems 

allowed senior officials to skim police wages, as well as benefit from ghost 

police salaries.777 For example, a provincial police chief in Helmand Province 

claimed that half of the Helmand police consisted of ghost personnel.778

To mitigate this, the United States began integrating AHRIMS into the MOI 

and MOD at the end of 2016.779 According to CSTC-A, this system may 

help dramatically reduce, though not completely eliminate, the problem of 

ghost police.780

Public confidence in the police force has, however, been noted to be improving 

by some experts.781 Albeit rising slowly from markedly low levels, rising public 

confidence could indicate that issues of corruption, lack of transparency and 

accountability, and human rights abuses will continue to diminish if further 

efforts are placed on countering corruption, improving command and control, 

and general professionalization.782

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Several cross-cutting issues have affected the development of the ANDSF 

since 2002, including corruption, low literacy rates, the role of women in the 

security forces, equipment shortages, high levels of attrition, and the consistent 

rotations of U.S. trainers and advisors. 

CORRUPTION AND CONDITIONALITY 

In Afghanistan, currently ranked one of the most corrupt nations in the world, 

corruption has contributed to the significant waste of U.S. funds and resources, 

particularly in relation to the U.S. ANDSF development efforts.783 Since 2001, 

corruption has ballooned to a level referred to as “pervasive,” “entrenched,” and 

even “deadly” to Afghan society.784 In this environment, “resource windfalls or 

aid flows may instead reinforce patronage networks, encourage economic rentseeking, and foster corruption and waste.”785 Corruption by ANDSF officials, 

at all institutional levels, has degraded security, force readiness, and overall 

capabilities. High-level corruption, such as that exhibited by some ANDSF leaders, 

is likely to promote lower-level corruption, as a culture of impunity starts at the 

top and then normalizes corrupt behavior within the entire system. It gives the 

rank and file an “excuse” to engage in extortion, embezzlement, fraud, and other 

abusive behaviors themselves, which then directly affects the population.786

CHAPTER 6

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES AFFECTING 

ANDSF DEVELOPMENT 

U.S. Army photo
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132 | CHAPTER 6 | CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES AFFECTING ANDSF DEVELOPMENT

Reports indicate that corruption has been steadily increasing in Afghanistan 

since 2001.787 Little was done to address this issue, especially during the early 

years of reconstruction, due in part to the competing priorities of coalition 

nations. For example, the United States prioritized immediate security concerns 

and countering the rising insurgency above long-term sustainability and 

development objectives, including a focus on anticorruption.788

According to a 2016 Asia Foundation (TAF) report, Afghan perceptions of 

corruption reveal significant and steady signs of disillusionment. TAF polling 

indicated a rise in the percentage of survey respondents describing corruption 

as a “major problem” in local authorities, rising from 48 percent in 2006 to 58 

percent in 2016. Similarly, Afghan perceptions that corruption was affecting 

their daily lives increased from 42 percent in 2006 to 61 percent in 2016.789

By 2009, donor nations began to recognize the full extent of the negative impacts 

of corruption on security and development throughout the country. Corruption 

and its “direct influence on insecurity” could no longer be ignored.790 Although 

some measures to counteract corruption were implemented in earlier years, more 

significant steps—including additional pay and rank reform initiatives, as well as 

aid conditionality—were taken to counteract corruption within the ANDSF from 

2009 onward, albeit with limited results. While there have been renewed efforts to 

counter corruption within the ANDSF in 2017, including mass firings and parliamentary hearings, it is unclear if these are signs of a normative shift, or simply a 

show of force that will be followed by a continuation of business as usual.791

Corruption in the ANDSF

Within the ANDSF, reports of corruption have been widespread and varied, 

including, but not limited to, participation in the drug trade, extortion, payfor-position schemes, bribery, land grabbing, and selling U.S. and NATO-supplied 

equipment, sometimes even to insurgents. The impacts of corruption within the 

ANDSF have been felt far and wide within the country and have been described 

as tarnishing the reputation and diminishing the legitimacy of the forces, and the 

Afghan government.792

Corruption within the ANA was regularly reported as being lower than in 

the ANP. Possible reasons for this difference include the ANA having less 

interaction with the public and more consistent contact with the coalition. At 

the same time, ANA corruption typically remained at a level that was cause 

for concern. This concern was enhanced in recent years, as perceptions of 

corruption within the ANA have steadily increased since 2006.793 TAF noted that 

48 percent of its 2016 survey respondents were exposed to corruption through 

interactions with the ANP, while exposure to corruption through interactions 

with the ANA was lower at 38 percent.794
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Effects of the Drug Trade

Corruption has been in part fueled by the drug trade and opium production, 

“affecting all levels of the Afghan government,” to include the ministries of 

defense and interior, as well as parliament.795 A report from USIP noted that 

“Afghans believed almost universally that Interior Ministry officials, provincial 

police chiefs, and members of the ANP were involved with the drug trade.”796

These beliefs were based on widely reported incidents of officials accepting 

“large bribes for protecting drug traffickers and for ‘selling’ senior provincial 

and district police positions to persons engaged in drug trafficking.”797

Extortion

Public extortion has long been a problem within the ANP. Afghans reported 

being frequently held at legal and illegal police checkpoints and required to pay 

bribes in order to pass through in a timely manner, if at all.798 At checkpoints 

along the road from Herat to Kandahar, Afghans reported having to pay multiple 

bribes, or “risk having the windows of their vehicles broken” or having other 

damage done to their vehicle, property, or person.799 An assessment conducted 

in 2013 found that of 377 checkpoints surveyed, nearly “two-thirds of police 

checkpoints [were] charging illegal tolls.”800 Truck drivers also reported being 

taken hostage by police, who then demanded that truck owners pay ransoms 

to secure their drivers’ release.801 Shopkeepers in Herat also described other 

incidents of extortion, where members of the ANDSF entered their stores 

and “they pay whatever they want for things.... If you [the shopkeepers] say 

anything, they threaten you.”802

Afghan Uniformed Policeman stands guard at a checkpoint in Kandahar. (U.S. Army photo by Kaily Brown)
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134 | CHAPTER 6 | CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES AFFECTING ANDSF DEVELOPMENT

Extortion deeply affects individual Afghans, but also has repercussions at a 

broader level. For example, extortion has been described as having a “major 

depressive impact” on the economy, helping to keep foreign investors at bay.803

Using Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) data, an IWPR reporter 

estimated that “illegal road tolls amount[ed] to US $50,000 each month.”804

Foreign investors were reluctant to invest time, personnel, and capital in a 

country where not only the individual safety of employees was in question—

because of concerns about the Afghan security forces responsible for protecting 

them—but also where their supplies and products could be commandeered, or 

when significant amounts of money might be wasted paying bribes or ransoms.

Stealing Salaries

The theft of soldiers’ and police officers’ salaries was another aspect of 

corruption within the ANDSF. SIGAR previously reported on this phenomenon 

in 2015, stating that more than $300 million in annual U.S.-funded salaries for 

the ANP were based on only partially verified or reconciled personnel data.805

According to these reports, CSTC-A indicated that corrupt practices, including 

a “trusted agent method of salary payments,” could lead to a loss of 50 percent 

of a policeman’s salary.806 The “trusted agent method” meant personnel were 

paid in cash via an intermediary agent, who accepted the money from a central 

institution. The agent was supposed to then deliver the cash to the policeman 

or soldier in person.807

This phenomenon was also observed frequently within the ANA, where there was 

minimal oversight of personnel and payrolls. CSTC-A estimated that in February 

2015, 5 percent of ANA personnel were paid through a similar trusted agent 

method.808 This method increased the opportunity for corruption, as there was little, if any, oversight once the cash was turned over to the agent. The trusted agent 

model effectively enabled corruption and salary skimming at a national level. Such 

practices underscore the importance of electronic payment systems that can be 

more easily viewed and assessed by third parties, such as donor nations.

Theft and Sale of Supplies

Supplies and equipment have also frequently been affected by corruption within 

the ANDSF. Police and soldiers have reportedly sold fuel, weapons, ammunition, 

and other supplies for profit, sometimes even to the Taliban.809 Lower-level personnel found guilty of these activities often pay a heavier price than more senior 

officers, who have the resources or political power to evade prosecution.810

The mismanagement of ANDSF supplies is perhaps best illustrated by the 

misuse of weapons and ammunition. Media outlets have investigated Afghan 

soldiers who fired their weapons purely for the sake of being compensated for 

their ammunition.811 Reuters estimated that eight of ten soldiers in the ANA had, 
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at some point, sold their ammunition for personal profit, adding, “Some soldiers 

and police even sell weapons and ammunition to the Taliban.”812

The theft and sale of weapons and equipment was not unique to the ANA. A 

Congressional Research Service (CRS) report indicated that an equivalent 

phenomenon occurred within the ANP. The ANP increasingly received heavy 

weapons and vehicles from U.S. and coalition forces and, in some cases, ANP 

commanders sold and pocketed funds from ammunition and vehicle sales.813

In a 2014 SIGAR audit, the agency highlighted how ANDSF records did not 

adequately provide accountability of all weapons transferred by the U.S. and 

coalition forces to the Afghan security forces. Although the audit did not 

address where the unaccounted-for weapons ended up, it was inferred that 

many were sold illegally by ANDSF personnel.814

Fuel presented a separate and unique resource for exploitation. SIGAR’s 

investigations into the use and misuse of fuel noted CSTC-A had no record of 

spilled or lost fuel. This lack of accountability created opportunities for theft.815

CSTC-A admitted to having poor or incomplete data, suggesting there was no 

way the agency could properly predict the demands and amount of money 

that would be needed to supply fuel to the ANDSF in the future. To further 

underscore this issue, in Kapisa Province, the provincial police chief, Brigadier 

General Abdul Karim Fayeq, allegedly orchestrated the theft of about 60,000 

gallons of government fuel meant for Afghan troops.816

Inspector General Sopko discusses fuel authentication procedures with Brigadier General Paul Calvert, 

deputy commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, during a visit to the headquarters of the 201st 

Corps. (U.S. Army photo by Egdanis Torres Sierra)
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136 | CHAPTER 6 | CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES AFFECTING ANDSF DEVELOPMENT

Weapons, equipment, and fuel theft are perhaps the most common examples 

of U.S. concerns about the mismanagement of resources and corrupt practices 

within the ANDSF. Yet, the provision of food and health care were additional 

indicators of the severity and saturation of corruption within the ANDSF. 

Recently, the New York Times reported that Major General M. Moein Faqir 

of the ANDSF was arrested and charged with the misuse of money intended 

to supply his soldiers with food.817 Furthermore, the U.S. government has 

investigated significant corruption at the Dawood National Military Hospital, 

where injured ANDSF members were treated.818 The misuse of money intended 

for food and healthcare underscores the fact that the provision of anything, 

regardless of its value, must be subject to strict oversight and accountability to 

prevent corruption. 

Anticorruption Activities

Extortion and bribery within the ANDSF were thought to be, in part, a product 

of low pay and the skimming of salaries by senior officials. Pay reforms were 

attempted, but produced limited results. An Integrity Watch Afghanistan 

(IWA) report on senior MOI appointments and corruption noted that, in the 

case of the police, officers who “engage more in corrupt practices seem more 

likely to secure better positions since they can afford buying [them].”819 IWA 

also described cases of reported corruption which were largely ignored due 

to “influential figures” derailing many investigations and prosecutions.820

Some junior-level police were fired and prosecuted for stealing “thousands” 

of afghanis, but senior officials, described as stealing “millions” of afghanis, 

were not prosecuted.821 As recently as 2015, Afghan MOI Inspector General 

Members of the ALP wait patiently to receive their monthly pay in Kandahar Province. (DOD photo by Arnell Ord)
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officials were accused of not investigating corruption and even participating in 

it themselves.822

Pay and rank reforms were first instituted by the coalition in 2006 in part to 

correct issues related to corruption. These reforms were described as having 

only moderate success.823 Rank was noted to have become more balanced, 

wages rose, and some ghost soldier positions were eliminated through a new 

direct payment system. However, implementation was limited, in part due to a 

lack of banks throughout the country, which allowed some officials to skim off 

salaries in rural areas. The reform program was also noted to ultimately be “far 

less successful in creating a merit-based system for recruitment, promotions, 

and assignments and reducing the influence of corruption, factionalism, and 

tribalism in these areas.”824

As part of the pay reform effort, at the end of 2008, “CSTC-A, major donors, 

and Interior Ministry officials agreed on a plan for restructuring the ministry 

to improve efficiency and reduce corruption.”825 However, the implementation 

of the plan was delayed due to political resistance, as well as “a lack of 

coordination between international donors and advisors.”826 Ministry officials 

also noted confusion throughout the process, as they were receiving “conflicting 

advice from mentors from different countries.”827

More recently, CSTC-A implemented four automated systems to address 

personnel management and accountability problems: The Afghan Human 

Resource Information Management System, the Afghan Personnel Pay System, 

the Afghan Automated Biometric Identification System, and the ANDSF 

Identification Card System.828

 These systems are not yet fully operational 

due, in part, to their complexity.829 The systems have been criticized because 

they require continued assistance from U.S. personnel to maintain, calling 

into question their sustainability and prolonging issues of dependence and 

capacity substitution.

Conditionality

By 2013, corruption was recognized as a critical threat to U.S. objectives 

in Afghanistan. DOD called “government ineffectiveness and endemic 

corruption” the most significant threats to the successful transition of security 

responsibilities in Afghanistan.830 Despite consistent reports of rampant 

corruption, U.S. security-related aid to Afghan ministries was provided with 

little oversight or accountability. According to Lieutenant General Todd 

Semonite, former commanding general of CSTC-A, the United States “had no 

conditions” on funds flowing through CSTC-A to the Afghan defense and interior 

ministries prior to 2014.831 Generally, any mechanisms that were in place to 
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prevent funds or resources from being misappropriated or otherwise misused 

were secondary to the demands of war fighting and increasing security. 

At the ministerial level, efforts to counter corruption were not prioritized. In 

2013, for example, DOD reported that at the same time an already potentially 

destabilizing political transition was occurring, the MOI made several cuts to its 

inspector general staff. The MOI inspector general’s office was noted to be “the 

main focus of ISAF counter-corruption” efforts.832 That same year, DOD reported 

that because of the political transition in MOI, there was no common direction 

on anticorruption efforts.833 Due to these cuts and lack of direction, DOD noted 

that, “The positive progress made six months ago at MOI has slowed or in some 

cases stalled.”834

It was not until 2014 that the U.S. military started using conditionality as a way 

to influence leadership and institutional behavior. Implementing a conditionsbased provision of funds and resources was seen as a “risk-mitigating and 

damage-controlling” measure appropriate for a “challenging environment for 

aid implementation.”835 More importantly, however, conditionality was seen as 

a mechanism for fostering a sense of discipline, capacity, and self-sufficiency—

qualities that had not yet been required of the ANDSF given such strong 

international support.836

Since 2014, the U.S. military has come to increasingly use conditionality as 

a way to mitigate corruption. The conditions-based provision of funds and 

resources is decided annually by CSTC-A and the ANDSF via the mutual drafting 

and signing of bilateral financial agreements, or commitment letters. The 

commitment letters stipulate the conditions the Afghan government must meet 

in order to receive aid or resources and provide CSTC-A the leverage to hold or 

debit funds. 

More broadly, conditionality is viewed as a means to ensure the proper 

implementation and integration of items such as payroll, human resources, and 

real property systems. In the context of security assistance, conditions can be 

large in scope, such as demonstrating progress toward ministry-level goals, 

or can be more targeted, such as integrating the use of electronic personnel 

information systems or submitting corps-level spending plans. CSTC-A’s 2014 

commitment letter to MOD, for example, implemented a condition of an annual 

100 percent inventory of weapons, with loss reports due within 30 days; CSTC-A 

could freeze deliveries or withhold repair support if discrepancies were not 

reconciled or resolved.837 In 2015, leaders from MOD, MOI, and MOF signed a 

commitment letter obligating each of their respective organizations to meet 93 

mutually agreed-upon goals: 45 for MOD and 48 for MOI. According to Major 

General Semonite, these goals “drive Afghan government processes, save 
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millions of dollars in donor contributions by reducing fuel and ammunition 

excess (by 40 and 60 percent, respectively), addressing corruption at multiple 

levels, and setting procedures that reduce fraud and abuse opportunities.”838

Factors that Impede Conditionality Effectiveness 

Several factors undermined the effectiveness of conditionality. First, 

conditionality required extensive understanding and buy-in from the Afghan 

government. A 2015 SIGAR Quarterly Report to Congress noted that, without 

genuine understanding and support of aid programs and their conditions, 

recipient nation leaders “may construct compliance charades like enacting 

high-sounding but unenforced laws and conceal day-to-day practices ... may 

be willing to tolerate penalties for failing to enact reforms they do not actually 

want ... or they may simply lack the political or administrative clout to deliver 

compliance in the first place.”839 To illustrate, a USIP briefing paper on aid 

for Afghanistan noted that “withholding funding for gender programs on the 

basis of limited progress on gender issues may prove counterproductive given 

that some [local] actors may actually welcome cessation of such funds.”840

Moreover, in its report on the failure of international aid programs, the 

National Academy of Public Administration noted that “governments will 

agree to almost anything [to obtain aid] ... [but] whether they support it is 

another matter.”841 The report also noted that political pressures and fears of 

wrecking or undoing progress may serve as an impetus to keep aid flowing, 

despite failing to comply with or meet agreed-upon conditions.842

In Afghanistan, U.S. and other donor nations’ security concerns resulted in 

a lack of rigor in enforcing conditionality. In 2015, for example, the DOD 

Inspector General reported concerns regarding CSTC-A’s efforts to develop 

capacity and responsibility at the Afghan ministerial level. The DOD IG became 

aware of “internal pressure to not allow the Afghans to fail” and that “pressure 

to maintain hard-fought gains” led to “overlooking ministerial shortcomings.” 

The same report noted that CSTC-A was unable to develop the capacity of the 

ministries to operate “effectively, independently, and transparently” because 

CSTC-A officials “often performed ministerial functions” and “did not enforce 

the requirements within commitment letters.”843 This tendency was reflected 

in a 2015 SIGAR interview with Lieutenant General Semonite, who said he 

believed strongly that fiscal discipline and capacity building imperatives 

forbade rescuing Afghan ministries every time they had problems, but 

added he would not stand by if Afghan ministry failures to satisfy conditions 

threatened loss of life or battlefield defeat.844

Corruption in Afghanistan Today

The train, advise, and assist mission remains focused on “improving the ability 

of the MOD and the MOI to provide appropriate oversight and accountability 
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of international funding for the ANDSF and developing Afghan capability in 

financial management.”845 According to a December 2016 report, USFOR-A 

has incorporated the recommendations of the DOD Inspector General and 

SIGAR. In addition to the continued reliance on financial commitment letters, 

USFOR-A has been working toward developing a financial intelligence and 

forensic accounting capability to gain greater oversight of U.S. funds.846 In 

addition, as of March 2016, the coalition began conducting quarterly reviews 

at the two-star level to assess MOD and MOI progress on meeting conditions 

outlined in commitment letters and to better determine responses when and 

if the Afghans did not meet established conditions. According to a December 

2016 DOD report, “The first two quarters of [FY 2016 saw] mixed success in 

meeting the conditions outlined in the commitment letters” and the “second 

quarter saw a slight improvement, with 66 percent of conditions demonstrating 

satisfactory progress compared to 60 percent demonstrating satisfactory 

progress in the first quarter.”847 Penalties for noncompliance included reduced 

fuel allocations and equipment withholding. 

In January 2017, Resolute Support and CSTC-A Major General Richard 

Kaiser stated that the U.S. military would only pay ANA soldiers who were 

biometrically enrolled and had matching identity cards. The U.S. military 

subsequently removed more than 30,000 names of suspected ghost soldiers 

they could not prove existed; the ANA has until summer 2017 to refute this.848

These recent efforts followed SIGAR allegations that Afghan soldiers were 

still selling weapons and vehicles to the enemy.849 To tackle these corruption 

issues, Major General Kaiser and the U.S. military placed increased focus on 

Dr. Rohullah Abed, at far left, executive director of Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Justice Center, with 

visitors (left to right) Josie Stewart, UK Department for International Development; Carl Walker, CSTC-A; 

Hamidullah Hamidi, CSTC-A; Capt. Matthew Karchaske, CSTC-A; Col. John Siemietkowski, CSTC-A; and 

Charles Hyacinthe, SIGAR. (SIGAR photo)
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“big-ticket” items such as fuel contracts and personnel. Kaiser noted that, 

while losing supplies to the enemy remained a serious concern, monitoring 

losses caused by sales or desertions of some Afghan forces was impeded 

by limited U.S. oversight in Afghanistan’s provinces. Acknowledging the 

limitations of what could be done to address the issue of corruption due to 

time and resources available, the Wall Street Journal quoted Major General 

Kaiser as saying, “We can do anything, but we can’t do everything.”850

In 2017, Afghan security ministers came under renewed scrutiny and review 

by the Afghan parliament because of recent SIGAR and other Afghan 

commentators’ reporting on endemic corruption and leadership challenges 

within the security services. An Afghan news agency reported that, at the end of 

2016 through the beginning of 2017, the Afghan government had “fired at least 

1,394 army personnel,” including some army generals and commanders, “on 

charges of corruption amid persistent efforts to bring reforms in the government 

institutions.”851 However, Deputy Defense Minister Helaluddin Helal also noted 

that only 140 of those fired had been charged with “involvement in corruption 

and graft.”852 General Nicholson testified to Congress in February 2017 that the 

Anti-Corruption Justice Center, “stood up by President Ghani ... with support 

of the international community,” had its “first trial of a two-star general in the 

Ministry of Interior.”853

 The MOI general was convicted of charges relating to 

bribery for a fuel contract and was sentenced to 14 years in jail. Nicholson noted 

that because of this and other problems relating to corruption, the control of 

fuel contracts had been pulled back under CSTC-A, instead of the ministries. He 

also said they would be “going after the reduction of ghost soldiers,” mentioning 

the personnel management systems CSTC-A was implementing.854

Although reform programs are noted by both U.S. and Afghan officials to be in 

place in the security ministries, the actual impact of these programs is unclear, 

as several senior leaders have recently been implicated in corrupt activities. A 

senior Afghan general, Major General Mohammad Moeen Faqeer, was arrested 

on charges of corruption in March 2017, “a year after he was deployed to crack 

down on fraud and other shady dealings in restive Helmand Province.”855 Faqeer 

had been sent to the 215th Corps in early 2016 to replace another commander 

who had become embroiled in controversies related to corruption and poor 

unit performance. In March 2017, charged with incompetence and corruption, 

Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Abdullah Khan Habibi; Minister of 

Interior, Taj Mohammad Jahid; and National Directorate of Security head, 

Masoom Stanikzai, narrowly survived a parliamentary vote of no-confidence for 

corruption-related concerns.856

Corruption has plagued the development of the ANDSF since 2002 and President 

Ghani faces continued criticism as “high levels of fraud continue.”857 It is still 
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possible for Afghanistan to effectively combat corruption through new or 

current initiatives being implemented, including the prosecution of high-level 

officials. The United States and its partners can promote those efforts through 

the use of effective conditionality. 

LITERACY TRAINING: BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE, 

INDEPENDENT ANDSF 

Afghanistan’s population has long suffered from extremely low levels of literacy. 

Recent reports estimate that nearly 70 percent of the adult population is 

illiterate, making Afghanistan one of the most illiterate countries in the world.858

In Afghanistan’s rural areas, the situation is even more acute: an estimated 

90 percent of women and 63 percent of men cannot read, write, or compute.859

Literacy challenges have significantly hindered U.S. security sector assistance 

efforts within the country. The ANDSF has been affected by this problem, albeit at 

an even more alarming rate than the national average. In 2009, SIGAR estimated 

that only 13 percent of ANDSF recruits could read and write.860 Admiral Michael 

Mullen, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as other sources, cited 

an even lower percentage: 9 to 10 percent.861 Similar estimates were affirmed by 

CSTC-A commander Lieutenant General William Caldwell IV, who said in 2011 

that “nine out of ten [recruits] were illiterate.”862 In July 2010, DOD News reported 

that Army Colonel John Ferrari, deputy commander for CSTC-A programs, cited 

literacy as the “biggest hurdle” the ANDSF faced. The article quoted Ferrari as 

saying, “Afghanistan is a country that has been at war for 30 years. Education 

was not prized; as a matter of fact, the Taliban shut down the schools.”863

Consequently, recruits between the ages of 18 and 30, who the United States and 

its coalition partners were trying to bring into the security forces, lacked basic 

literacy skills and experience with formal education systems. 

The disparity between the literacy levels of incoming ANDSF recruits and 

those of the average Afghan adult population were attributed to the number 

of recruits coming from lower-class, less-educated families.864 Even within 

the ANDSF, differences existed between the literacy rates of the ANA and the 

ANP. This largely stemmed from the disincentives associated with joining the 

ANP.865 Prior to 2005, the recruitment and retention of police suffered under a 

system that failed to meet pay expectations and was not aligned with the ANA’s 

rank and pay scale.866 It was not until 2005 that the MOI began implementing 

pay reform to establish parity between ANA and ANP salaries.867 Surprisingly, 

the implementation of literacy programs also contributed to the high turnover 

rates that plagued the ANDSF. According to one Afghan soldier, a number of his 

colleagues who excelled in the literacy training program left the ANA because 

“once they could read and write, they could easily find a better job.”868
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While improving literacy has recently been considered a critical factor in 

developing professional and capable security forces, literacy training was not a 

component of early ANA and ANP training efforts by the coalition, as well as by 

Afghan leadership itself. In pursuit of quick, tangible results, U.S. and coalition 

training efforts for the ANDSF centered largely on combat preparation in order 

to rapidly field operational forces. Because of this, force and weapons training 

took precedence over any literacy or educational efforts. As the focus shifted 

toward developing sustainable and independent security forces, however, 

addressing the problem of illiteracy took on new and increased importance.

Impacts of an Illiterate Force 

The importance of having a literate Afghan security force is best understood 

when the specific, tangible impacts of illiteracy are exposed. Unable to read 

maps, signs, directions, or instructions, many Afghan army and police forces 

were largely dependent and unable to operate alone.869 An Afghan army recruit 

once stated, “If someone calls me and tells me to go somewhere, I can’t read the 

street signs.”870 Lieutenant General Caldwell elaborated on this in an article for 

Military Review, noting, “How do we professionalize a soldier who cannot read 

a manual ... fill out a form for the issue of equipment ... or write an intelligence 

report for a higher command? How do we professionalize a police officer who 

cannot read the laws he is enforcing, write an incident report, record a license 

plate, or even sign his name to a citation?”871 Caldwell also described challenges 

of accountability of both superiors and subordinates when personnel could 

not read what was expected of them, particularly in terms of equipment, pay 

received, and other professional actions.872

An ANA recruit receiving literacy training during Basic Warrior Training at the Regional Military Training 

Center in Kandahar. (Photo by Adrienne Brammer)
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The Military Review article further noted that illiteracy regularly affected the 

pace and depth of training, in that “all training has to be hands-on; each skill 

has to be demonstrated. Without the ability to provide written material to prime 

the pump, every new block of instruction starts from scratch.”873 In the field, 

the low literacy levels of ANA forces inhibited “their ability to use computers, 

effectively manage staff functions, and exercise command and control.”874

Similarly, illiteracy impeded vital military functions, including understanding 

written orders, documenting operations, and using technical manuals. A 2008 

DOD report noted that “only officers and NCOs have arrest authority, largely due 

[to] low rates of literacy among patrolmen.”875

Illiteracy also inhibited the ability of the ANDSF to effectively use advanced, 

Western weapons systems, vehicles, aircraft, and equipment. While the provision 

of NATO-standard weapons and equipment improved standardization and 

modernization, many of the highly advanced goods and systems were unsuitable 

for an illiterate force.876

 The inability of the Afghans to effectively operate such 

systems, as well as the tendency for Western advisors to lead such efforts to 

avoid failure, led to problems of capacity substitution, rather than capacity 

building. This had the effect of increasing the Afghans’ long-term dependence 

on international donors for both operational and maintenance capacities and 

capabilities. Further, a later emphasis on achieving a literacy rate aligned to 

first-grade proficiency levels was unlikely to sufficiently enhance the security 

forces’ ability to use these systems.877

Those tasked with training and advising the ANDSF on logistics, communications, and maintenance support were particularly attuned to the impact illiteracy 

had on overall training efforts. Illiterate soldiers struggled to account for equipment and weapons due to their inability to complete paperwork and read serial 

numbers. Unable to correctly log supply data, the Afghan army and police were 

unable to create the organizational capacities, management controls, and oversight required of an independent security force.878 This concern was highlighted by Colonel Ferrari of CSTC-A when he said, “It’s hard to teach somebody 

logistics and to do inventory control if they don’t know how to read.”879 Moreover, the dearth of literate soldiers and police contributed to the shortage of personnel in more specialized positions, including, but not limited to, intelligence 

officers, mechanics, engineers, artillery specialists, and medics. 

ANDSF Literacy Training

Early efforts to train the ANA centered on combat and infantry training in 

preparation for battle and security operations, with new recruits receiving 

standardized initial entry training at the Basic Warrior Training course.880 Initial 

literacy-based training programs centered on improving the educational level of 

ANA officers, who were required to have “basic reading and writing abilities.”881
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These efforts aimed to increase the professionalism of the officer corps by 

improving their understanding of operational and strategic concepts; at the time, 

no literacy-based training program was in place for Afghan enlisted soldiers.882

Training of the ANP was largely similar to that of the ANA in both structure 

and scope. In 2008, most Afghan police officers, with the exception of auxiliary 

forces, received training on “basic policing skills” and firearms.883 Advanced and 

specialized training was “offered” in topics such as investigative skills, forensics, 

and ethics, though it is unclear how many police completed these courses.884 A 

2011 RAND report noted that, by 2006, although 

illiterate recruits were supposed to attend 

a five-week literacy program prior to their 

enrollment in the basic patrolman’s course, “the 

reality was that few police actually received 

this training. Many ... had only attended the 

three-week course developed for officers 

already in service, despite the fact that their 

backgrounds, experiences, and suitability for 

police work varied considerably.”885 A 2008 

DOD report stated that, in addition to providing 

schooling for NCOs, the United States was 

“implementing literacy programs in the MOI to 

increase the literacy level of all policemen.”886

No details regarding the literacy program were 

provided, however. 

While initial force-building efforts were 

focused on increasing the quantity of the ANA 

and ANP, the focus shifted slightly in late 2009 

and early 2010 toward improving the quality of these forces. Included in this 

shift was a new focus on literacy and educational training. A literate ANDSF 

was recognized as essential if Afghan security forces were to one day conduct 

operations independent of U.S. and NATO support. 

Following its formation in 2009, NTM-A/CSTC-A affirmed the U.S. and NATO 

commitment to establishing a literate Afghan security force by implementing 

mandatory literacy programs. It established the goal of having “100 percent of 

[ANDSF] personnel achieve Level 1 literacy (basic literacy equivalent to first 

grade proficiency) and at least 50 percent personnel attain Level 3 (functional 

literacy equivalent to third-grade proficiency) by December 31, 2014.”887

In October 2009, the MOD implemented 64 hours of mandatory literacy training 

in its Basic Warrior Training program. This was the first time literacy training 

A literacy class for Afghan National Police 

at the Lashkar Gah Training Center in 

Helmand Province. (U.S. Marine Corps 

photo by Tammy K. Hineline)
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was both mandatory and included in basic ANA training.888 That same year, 

the MOI also added 64 hours of literacy training to its basic police training 

program.889 The goal of mandatory literacy training was to provide each graduate 

with the ability to read at a first-grade level, which required a rudimentary grasp 

of numbers, letters, and simple words. However, while NTM-A/CSTC-A may have 

considered literacy training “mandatory,” actual Afghan buy-in may have limited 

the program’s potential. Afghan commanders “prioritize[d] even noncritical 

missions ahead of literacy training” and an MOI decree specified MOI “should” 

institute literacy training, “leaving the enforcement and prioritization up to the 

local commander on the ground.”890

Literacy experts interviewed by SIGAR were skeptical of the timelines set under 

NTM-A/CSTC-A’s literacy program, noting that while plausible, they were likely 

overly optimistic given the recruits’ low literacy rates and limited exposure 

to formal educational settings.891 A joint report issued in 2006 by the DOD and 

State Inspectors General concurred with these reservations about short-duration 

literacy training, stating that “a five-week literacy course is a start towards 

literacy. However, such a short course does not fully prepare the illiterate 

recruit for the basic police course designed for literate students.”892 A 2011 

Military Review report noted, “For many [recruits], the availability of literacy 

training is the first educational opportunity in their lives.”893

Skepticism concerning the timelines set by the program was substantiated by 

remarks from Afghan soldiers who completed the program. In 2014, a soldier in 

the ANA stated that the courses “were too short,” “focused on delivery rather 

than results,” and that there “was too much to take in;” despite 64 one-hour 

lessons, he was still unable to do more than write the first three letters of his 

name.894 He stated, “For someone my age [34 years old], you need much more 

time to practice.”895 Moreover, it is unclear if achieving first-grade proficiency 

would produce recruits with merely rote memorization skills or with actual 

phonological awareness. In addition, experts believe that comprehension of 

technical manuals—such as those accompanying more advanced weaponry sent 

to Afghanistan—requires reading proficiency above a ninth-grade level.896

NTM-A/CSTC-A efforts were further expanded to build upon the foundation laid 

by literacy training conducted in ANA and ANP basic training programs. Literacy 

program accomplishments, however, appear to have been limited, at best. An 

April 2011 DOD report stated that goals were met, with an average success 

rate of 90 percent within a year of the literacy programs’ establishment.897 IJC 

reported in October 2013 that 224,826 ANDSF personnel had achieved basic 

Level 1 literacy and that 73,700 had achieved Level 3 proficiency since the 

program’s inception in November 2009. However, a 2014 SIGAR audit found 

these numbers did not tell the full story. The audit determined that literacy goals 
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were based on the ANDSF’s 2009 authorized end-strength of 148,000 personnel, 

rather than the updated goal of 352,000 (which was roughly a 138 percent 

increase in force size between those years). Consequently, the reported 

percentage of literate personnel lacked context and was overstated: It did not 

account for the increase in current force strength goals. NTM-A/CSTC-A officials 

interviewed affirmed this shortfall, describing the program’s goal of 100 percent 

literacy as “unrealistic” and “unattainable.”898

Additionally, the audit report highlighted the inability of NTM-A/CSTC-A to 

measure the effectiveness of the literacy program and determine the extent 

to which overall literacy in the ANDSF had improved. The report found that 

“none of the three literacy training contracts requires independent verification 

of testing for proficiency or identifies recruits in way that permits accurate 

tracking as the recruits move on to army and police units.”899 The audit also 

determined that the contracted programs were able to operate without defined 

requirements for classes and length of instruction—and without measurable 

performance standards—due to the inability of NTM-A/CSTC-A to effectively 

provide oversight. Literacy efforts were also impacted by significant shortfalls in 

instructors who specialized in literacy training.900

The SIGAR audit noted that external factors impeded both actual progress and 

the ability to measure progress. Due to increased security pressures and the 

need to send personnel into the field quickly to combat the rising insurgency, 

some recruits were unable to complete the full 64 hours of instruction needed 

to achieve Level 1 literacy. Moreover, the report stated that the MOD actually 

removed literacy training from basic ANA training from February to July 2013, 

and that “45 percent of the police personnel recruited between July 2012 and 

February 2013 were sent directly to field checkpoints without receiving any 

literacy training.”901 Following the release of the audit report, SIGAR reported 

that NTM-A implemented changes to increase program oversight and efficiency. 

Additionally, SIGAR reported that NTM-A issued an improved program plan that 

would “[incorporate] five years of lessons learned.”902

Impacts of any new literacy training are difficult to assess, however, as the 

MOD and MOI assumed full responsibility for the ANDSF literacy programs, to 

include monitoring and evaluation, on January 1, 2015, with the transition to the 

Resolute Support mission.903 One year later, in January 2016, USFOR-A reported 

that the MOD and MOI literacy contract packages submitted in 2015 were still 

awaiting final approval by the National Procurement Agency.904 In the interim, 

according to USFOR-A, the ANA and ANP were conducting literacy training with 

internal assets, relying primarily on “train-the-trainer” graduate instructors at 

regional training centers.905 At that time, ANA and ANP officers and NCOs were 

still expected to be literate to hold their positions. 
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WOMEN IN THE ANDSF

Historically, women were part of the Afghan security forces; however, after the 

Soviet occupation of the late 1970s to the late 1980s, conservative Islam spread 

throughout large parts of Afghanistan, resulting in a prohibition on women joining the force, especially during the Taliban regime.906 On October 31, 2000, the 

UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325, which stressed the importance of 

involving women in all aspects of peacebuilding in post-conflict countries.907 This 

document remains the foundation for inclusion of women in the modern ANDSF. 

Additionally, Article 6 of the Afghan constitution upholds the importance of equality across the nation. Article 55 states that “defending the country shall be the 

duty of all citizens of Afghanistan.”908 However, quotas for women’s participation 

are largely limited to political roles in the national government and parliament.909

Incorporating women into the Afghan security forces was not a priority in 

early, post-2001 design decisions for the force. Initial decisions were primarily 

based on establishing an ethnic, political, and regional balance among the male 

recruits; there was no quota established for women. In the 2005 Afghanistan 

Millennium Development Goals Vision 2020 report, the government made no 

mention of the inclusion of women in the security forces in its list of goals.910

Afghan National Army

As reported by DOD, the inaugural female Officer Cadet School class of 37 

female cadets began in May 2010.911 Although attrition was relatively high, 29 

cadets graduated on September 23, 2010. Also in 2010, the MOD and MOI set a 

goal of 10 percent women in all ANA and ANP uniformed positions by 2020.912

DOD noted in April 2011 that Afghan culture continued to impede the inclusion 

of women in the force.913 In 2012, CSTC-A reported to SIGAR that there was a 

low prioritization of recruitment and retention of women in the ANA.914 CSTC-A 

interpreted this as stemming from the ANA’s lack of centralized and structured 

systems to onboard female applicants, in addition to the absence of female 

career paths.915 As DOD reported in October 2011, NTM-A began working with 

the ANA to increase female recruiting and training.916 DOD understood the 

important role women played in creating credible and respectable security 

forces, but acknowledged there were difficulties in reaching target numbers in 

recruiting, and problems with equipment, uniforms, and facilities.917

Even with coalition assistance, as of April 2012 there were only 350 female ANA 

members out of a goal of 19,500.918 Although MOD had a gender integration 

Ministerial Development Plan that was the foundation for increasing women’s 

representation within the ANA, DOD noted that MOD lacked the capability to 

execute this plan and ensure respectful and fair treatment of women in the 

force, which, in turn, further diminished female representation.919
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Although there were setbacks for ANA female recruitment, ISAF continued to 

focus on increasing the representation of women in the force. Before the release 

of the April 2012 DOD report to Congress, ISAF hosted a Gender Integration 

Conference to discuss how women could be better represented in the security 

forces and how stakeholders, like the Afghan government and civil society, could 

assist this effort.920 The MODA program assigned two senior gender integration 

mentors to NTM-A; their responsibilities included advising the MOD and MOI on 

how to improve gender integration and equality in the ANDSF.921 Nevertheless, 

shortfalls continued. Between April and December 2012, there was an increase 

of only 29 women in the ANA overall.922 In May 2014, the Minister of Defense 

ordered a comprehensive effort to double women in the ANA by May 2015 

through an annual recruiting and training plan.923 As in many militaries, however, 

women were not allowed to serve in combat roles. This limited the positions they 

were able to enter and therefore continued to impact their ability to integrate. 

According to DOD, although female recruitment and retention continued to be 

low in 2017, training was still available for female recruits.924

Afghan National Police 

DOD began to report about women in the ANP in April 2010.925 This was the 

result of a February 2010 MOI two-day conference intended to increase recruitment and training of women in the ANP to 5,000 by 2014, with assistance from 

DOD and State.926 This goal was referred to as MOI Decree 55 and, although 

supported verbally, there is little evidence there was any follow-through on its 

initiatives.927 As of April 2010, DOD reported that fewer than 1,000 female police 

were serving in the ANP.928 The report noted that women were being paid the 

Female ANA soldiers at the grand opening of their new permanent facilities in Camp Shaheen. (U.S. Navy 

photo by Egdanis Torres Sierra)
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same as men, but suffered from “low public opinion, lack of support from male 

co-workers, and the dangerous nature of the job.”929

According to DOD reports to Congress, the ANP continued to focus on 

initiatives to increase the presence of women in the force. In November 2010, 

1,191 women were serving across the MOI, with a majority serving in the 

Family Response Units in 34 provinces.930 In 2010, the ANP began to actively 

recruit women. The ANP established a female recruiting branch “to focus on 

the recruitment, retention and career advancement of women in the ANP.”931

Additionally, the ANP made training adjustments that extended the six-week 

course to eight weeks, with a shorter training day that allowed women to go 

home in the evening.932

By October 2011, the United States and MOI conceded that the goal of 5,000 

women in the ANP by 2014 would not be achieved.933 The ANP failed to meet 

the 2010 and 2011 recruiting goals for women, leading to their continued 

underrepresentation.934 MOI, as well as MOD, faced significant challenges, 

particularly in the provincial and district levels.935 In October 2014, DOD 

reported the goal of 5,000 women in the force would be met by the end of 

February 2015, not far off the target of 2014.936 By April 2015, ANP reported 

having only 2,100 female police, a shortfall of 2,900.937 Again in June 2015, MOI 

was directed to increase the number of women in the force. The goal was “to 

employ 6,000 women by the end of fiscal year 2015, employ 10,000 women by the 

end of 2016, and have women make up 10 percent of the workforce by the end 

of 2017.”938 The December 2015 DOD report stated that “as of October 20, 2015, 

Afghan policewomen during riot training conducted by U.S. forces. (105th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment 

photo by Darren D. Heusel)
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there were approximately 2,200 women within the ANP forces with the goal of 

reaching more than 3,000 by the end of 2015.”939

Challenges

For women to serve successfully in the ANDSF, they must overcome a variety 

of challenges, including cultural stigmas, discrimination, and family concerns.940

Many times, family members or male ANDSF members have pushed back on 

the inclusion of women out of fear for their safety.941 One ANA female recruit 

was cited as saying, “There were so many problems with my family over 

my choice.... But I insisted, and they came to support me in the end.”942 In 

April 2012, DOD reported that “many Provincial Headquarters Commanders 

do not accept policewomen, as they prefer male candidates and lack adequate 

facilities to support females.”943 Specifically, in the ANA, there were concerns 

about women working away from their families with large groups of men.944 In 

the ANP, other challenges included an inability to work night shifts and lack of 

daycare facilities.945 Overall, in 2013, coalition advisors were unsure if the lack 

of progress in adding women was a result of families’ reluctance to support 

women who entered into the force, or of ANDSF leadership, specifically in the 

ANA, which was not ready to recruit more women.946

Additionally, when women entered the force, they were discriminated against by 

their male counterparts. On October 29, 2013, Michelle Barsa, former Director of 

Security Policy and Programming at the Institute for Inclusive Security, testified 

before the House Armed Services Committee about securing Afghan women’s 

gains post-2014. She alluded to numerous issues that women in the ANDSF 

faced, ranging from being turned away from the force, not being trained to use 

weapons, sexual harassment, and public perceptions.947

In October 2014, DOD identified four challenges with integrating women into the 

ANA, which could further be applied to the ANDSF as a whole: (1) achieving the 

goal of recruited and trained women in accordance with the Annual Accession 

Plan approved by MOD in April 2014, (2) identifying permanent positions for 

women within the force, (3) ensuring that all military establishments have 

adequate female facilities, and (4) creating a safe environment for all women 

across the ANA.948

 In 2014, ISAF believed that as more women began to serve in 

the ANDSF, men would learn to accept and respect their presence.949

Progress

Although DOD reported that recruiting and retaining women in the ANDSF 

would be a difficult task, incremental progress did occur, often through reassessments of the feasibility of goals. In 2010, rather than having a set number 

of women in the force by a certain date, goals were changed to have 10 percent 

representation of women across the ANDSF by 2020.950 However, a revision to 
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this goal was reported in December 2015. The Resolute Support Gender Office 

aimed “to have 5,000 uniformed women in the ANA and 10,000 uniformed 

women in the ANP by 2025.”951 Although this change extends the timeline for 

increasing women in the force, it is also reflective of the inherent challenges. 

DOD, MOD, MOI, and the Afghan government recognized that cultural 

perceptions created difficulties in integrating women into the ANDSF. In July 

2013, DOD stated that gender training was in place across most of the ANDSF 

and gender integration policies existed in both the MOD and MOI.952 However, 

more improvements were needed to make these policies effective. In 2013, the 

ANP turned to well-known Afghans “to promote the image of the ANP as being 

an employer of choice for Afghan women and their families.”953 To further 

address this issue, in 2013 MOD stood up the Directorate of Human Rights 

and Gender Integration.954 Also in 2013, MOD and MOI worked to establish 

programs focusing on women’s rights and promoting women in the ANDSF.955

The ANA created educational training that focused on women by using Afghan 

historical values, Koran passages, and cultural context.956 The ANP worked 

with the MOI Human Rights, Gender, and Child Rights office to provide 

training on UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which focused on women, 

peace, and security.957

In the FY 2014 NDAA, Congress directed no less than $25 million in funds for 

the recruitment and retention of women in the ANDSF.958 This money went 

to ANDSF priorities, including female recruiting and advertising campaigns, 

performance awards, and construction and renovation of facilities, with the 

hopes of overcoming the various barriers to entry for women.959 The ANA 

developed a comprehensive plan to increase capability in the MOD to recruit 

and retain women. By 2015, the ANP had made the force an attractive option 

for women because of the nature of the work and flexibility for women to work 

close to home.960 In 2016, MOI finalized a transportation stipend for women, 

and MOD was finalizing a similar policy, which are both intended to give female 

personnel ease of access to their positions.961

One area in which women were essential to the ANDSF was in filling roles that 

men could not fill due to cultural sensitivities. Female ANDSF personnel were 

called to conduct searches, report human rights violations, and log domestic 

disputes.962 Women were also used in the Ktah Khas, a light infantry special 

operations kandak with a female tactical platoon.963 In this role, they were used 

to interrogate other women and assist in grouping women and children together 

after an operation.964

Importantly, there has also been an increase in the diversity of women’s roles 

in the ANDSF. As of June 2015, the Afghan Air Force reported its personnel 
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included 51 women, which later increased to 55 in October 2015.965 To continue 

this diversity, in 2016 MOD and MOI created more than 5,000 dedicated womenonly or gender-neutral positions to open up advancement for women.966 Finally, 

the Afghan government worked with MOD and MOI in 2016 to create the 

Afghan Office of Human Rights Ombudsman, which supports gender efforts in 

Afghanistan, including within the ANDSF.967

ANDSF EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS 

One of the many challenges of building the ANDSF after the fall of the Taliban 

in 2001 was providing weapons and equipment, as well as developing the supply 

systems through which the fledgling security institutions could sustain their 

forces. Notably, the effort to arm and equip the Afghan security forces was not a 

new challenge: Decades earlier, the Soviet effort to supply forces with weapons 

and equipment was also riddled with challenges and complexity.968

In 2001, the effort to arm the new ANDSF depended primarily on the donations of 

Soviet-era weaponry and equipment from former Soviet-bloc countries. These efforts were poorly planned and generally unpredictable. The nascent Afghan security 

ministries lacked the ability to plan and execute the acquisition of weapons and 

equipment, so the responsibility for this lay largely with the international community.969 However, the coalition did not turn its focus toward mastering the logistics 

and supply chains necessary for proper weaponry and equipment until 2009.970 Even 

then, the United States and its partners in the development of the ANDSF failed to 

keep proper records of the weapons and armaments supplied to Afghanistan.971 The 

mismanagement of resources was underscored by the example of the Mobile Strike 

ANA soldiers learning how to repair heavy equipment at Camp Shorabak in Helmand Province. (U.S. Marine 

Corps photo by Tammy K. Hineline)
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Force, a component of the ANA that received most of its ordered vehicles, but 

lacked spare parts and proper training in operating the vehicles.972

Logistics and supply systems that are critical for the provision and sustainment 

of equipment and weapons require months, if not years, to develop and 

master.973 Yet, ISAF did not adequately address these needed capabilities until 

2011.974

 Eventually, the ANDSF’s logistics system transitioned from a push 

model—centrally driven by the United States and coalition—to a pull model that 

was demand-driven at the unit level.975 Although the new logistics and supply 

systems were complex, the coalition did not precisely increase training in the 

required pull-model skillsets, such as planning and budgeting. Further, the 

systems required multiple levels of authorization, which resulted in increased 

opportunities for corruption throughout the ANDSF ranks.976 For example, some 

Afghan officials would delay equipment delivery or supply requests until they 

had been properly paid off.977 Personnel within the MOD, MOI, and General Staff 

often remained undertrained, inexperienced, and ripe for corrupt behavior.978

Without the proper training, the new logistics and supply models became 

burdensome, increasing Afghan reliance on the United States and coalition. 

Logistics planning remained deficient, and supply chain management failed to 

ensure consistent supplies to support combat and garrison operations. 

In addition, the complexity of systems and equipment resulted in a situation 

where Afghan forces and security institutions were not equipped to use and 

sustain command and control technologies.979 For example, the United States 

and its coalition partners lacked a plan for providing computer automation 

and information technology to the ANDSF that took into account the relatively 

low levels of education and literacy among security force personnel. Further, 

despite improvements in infrastructure, many locations in Afghanistan still 

lacked the appropriate electrical grid to support the technologies required to 

manage ANDSF supply and logistics systems—and the electrical infrastructure 

that did exist in remote areas frequently became the target of Taliban attacks.980

These limitations further solidified the ANDSF’s reliance on the planning and 

operational capabilities of the United States and its coalition partners.981

In July 2014, a SIGAR audit concluded that DOD did not pay adequate attention 

to the disposition of weapons sent to Afghanistan. Rampant discrepancies in 

the records of guns’ serial numbers, among other problems, underscored the 

unprofessional manner in which weapons were accounted for in Afghanistan.982

A SIGAR auditor highlighted the role corruption played in undermining the 

ANDSF’s ability to sustain equipment and weapons. The auditor referenced 

poor record keeping and attempts by Afghan officials to obstruct entrance 

into warehouses as indicators that corruption was suspect in these cases.983

Special Inspector General John Sopko stated, “There is also evidence that the 
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Taliban have instructed their field commanders to simply purchase U.S. supplied 

weapons, fuel, and ammunition from Afghan soldiers because to do so is both 

easier and less expensive for the insurgents.”984

In 2015, as the U.S. and coalition forces drew down and the ANDSF assumed 

the lead for security, the ANDSF still did not have the necessary planning, 

programming, budgeting, and execution capability necessary to provide 

timely resource support to their respective security forces to sustain combat 

operations.985 The Afghan MOD and General Staff PPBE processes were 

“immature and unable to identify requirements and acquire equipment and 

materiel necessary to sustain the [ANDSF] logistics systems.”986 In part, this 

immaturity was the result of insufficient numbers and experience of U.S. and 

coalition advisors in the security ministries.987

In addition to shortages of equipment, there were questions about the kinds 

of weapons to provide the ANDSF. A 2012 DOD IG report underscored the 

sensitive nature of this question; not only were the ALP perceived to be 

outgunned by insurgents, the insurgents also had heavier weapons that were 

more effective at longer ranges.988 In 2016, RAND reported that between 

January 2012 and January 2013, 21 districts whose ALP programs had been 

under Afghan control for at least three months, on average, “had almost all 

of their authorized complement of light weapons (AK-47s), but the median 

level of machine guns, ammunition, and trucks was less than 50 percent.”989

This disparity between the ALP and the enemy made it difficult for the ALP to 

provide the local population with proper security. The DOD IG report stated 

that the “inability of police forces to counter current and potential threats 

degrades their operational effectiveness and morale, increases their desertion 

rates, and reinforces a defensive mindset to avoid major casualties rather than 

engaging in proactive patrolling of their communities.”990

The ANA provides another example of equipment mismatch. Initially, Army 

recruits were trained with “impractical” M16 rifles and issued “poorly 

designed” uniforms and military hardware.991 The coalition also provided 

Humvees, a far more complex and difficult to maintain vehicle compared to 

other options, such as former Soviet models.992 Humvees serve as a prime 

example of equipment that surpassed the ANDSF’s resources and capacity 

to maintain: According to one investigation, Afghan soldiers were unable 

to repair these vehicles, which resulted in unsafe driving and increased 

accidents.993

 The inability to maintain and sustain their equipment directly and 

negatively impacted ANDSF combat readiness and effectiveness.994 The failure 

to properly equip even local forces proved to be a driver of several chronic 

challenges in developing the ANDSF.
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As the coalition began to draw down, support for the ANDSF, including contractor support, followed suit. The timing and rate of drawdown impacted the 

Afghans’ abilities to sustain the supply and logistics frameworks, resulting in 

pervasive unpreparedness.995 Further, the nature of coalition and contractor 

logistics support largely focused on equipment readiness, without adequate 

resources dedicated to training Afghan forces on maintenance.996 The Afghans’ 

ability to assume responsibility for the maintenance of weapons and equipment 

through contracting or training will be critical to meet force readiness requirements and the long-term sustainability of the ANDSF. 

ATTRITION IN THE ANDSF

Attrition has severely limited the ANDSF’s ability to meet force-size goals and 

operate independently without help from the international community.997 On 

average, the ANA loses one-third of its members to attrition every year, and the 

ANP loses one-fifth, rates which have garnered attention and concern from U.S. 

and international military and civilian leadership.998 A 2008 GAO report stated that 

although an estimated 32,700 ANA combat personnel received training and were 

assigned to one of five corps, “the number of combat troops on hand [was] less 

than those trained and assigned due to attrition, absenteeism, scheduled leave, 

and battlefield casualties.”999 In June 2016, DOD reported that consistently high attrition had a direct impact on the combat effectiveness and growth of the ANDSF 

due to the ongoing loss of institutional knowledge and trained personnel.1000

The government of Afghanistan has taken a variety of steps to address this issue. 

In September 2010, Minister of Defense Wardak issued an AWOL mitigation plan 

in an attempt to recognize the issue and attempt to reduce attrition in the ANA.1001

The plan called for an increased effort to find and recall AWOL soldiers and 

Afghan drivers with the ANA’s 6th Kandak repair a vehicle during preventive maintenance training. (Photo by 

Mike MacLeod) 
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created a commission to address AWOL, attrition, and leadership effectiveness in 

units with high attrition rates.1002 Despite these and other efforts, attrition rates 

remained high.

ANDSF attrition is primarily a result of personnel simply dropping from the 

rolls, followed by voluntary separation.1003 Reasons for attrition include poor 

unit leadership, insufficient vetting of recruits, lack of equipment and support, 

substandard literacy rates, poor quality of life, and corruption.1004

Defining Attrition 

Until the end of 2010, the ANA and ANP had different definitions of attrition. In 

December 2010, the Convergence Decree provided a common definition to be used 

by both the MOI and MOD in their reporting.1005 The decree created five categories 

of attrition: (1) killed in action, (2) non-hostile death, (3) disappeared or captured, 

(4) disabled, and (5) dropped from rolls.1006 In addition, ANDSF personnel were to be 

reported as AWOL after 24 hours of absence, and dropped from rolls after 20 days of 

AWOL for officers and NCOs and 30 days for patrol officers.1007

According to the April 2011 DOD report to Congress, this new model assisted “in 

increasing the level of accuracy and reporting” of personnel.1008 However, the definition of 

attrition was still not universally applied within the ANDSF. For example, SIGAR Quarterly 

Reports from the same year indicated that attrition for the ANA was defined as “the loss 

of soldiers from the force before they complete[d] their contracts,” while ANP attrition 

was defined as “personnel who had been killed in action or injured, were absent or 

AWOL, had disappeared, or had been separated from service, retired, or captured.”1009

In 2015, DOD reported that ANDSF attrition included losses to the force for these 

reasons: killed in action, non-hostile deaths, separations, retirements, and dropped from 

the rolls.1010 DOD further noted that ANDSF personnel were dropped from the rolls after 

being absent for more than 30 days without authorization. In 2015, dropped from rolls 

was the largest source of ANDSF attrition and killed in action was the smallest.1011 From 

2010 to 2015, the definition of attrition became more specific. Yet, despite efforts to 

apply a standard definition within the ministries and the ANDSF, inconsistent and inaccurate reporting resulted in DOD being unable to accurately track ANDSF attrition over time. 

Poor Leadership and Corruption

Ineffective leadership and corrupt behavior among both high-level military and 

police officers negatively affected attrition rates and ANDSF effectiveness.1012

In March 2015, General John Campbell testified to the U.S. House of 

Representatives Armed Services Committee that high attrition due to poor 

leadership had a negative impact on combat readiness.1013 General Campbell 

continued in 2015 to highlight why attrition was so high. In August, he stated at 

a Brookings Institution discussion that poor leadership, among other factors, 

drove the high attrition rates within the Afghan security forces.1014
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In an April 2011 report to Congress, DOD documented poor leadership in 

the ANDSF as a persistent concern that increased attrition.1015 A number of 

police chiefs and ANA kandak commanders were guilty of pay and rank abuse, 

including the creation of ghost soldiers and the purchase of promotions.1016

Reports of the theft and illegal sale of ANDSF supplies were commonplace.1017

These issues, combined with a lack of U.S. and ministry oversight of units, 

undermined leadership and efforts to establish professional norms for ANDSF 

personnel. In turn, poor leadership affected morale and increased the likelihood 

for security force personnel to leave their posts.1018

The MOD, with help from the United States, initiated efforts to reduce the 

negative impact of corruption and poor leadership through improved leadership 

development practices, to include increasing the literacy of ANA recruits.1019

Additionally, goals were set to produce professional officers and NCOs who 

could lead the ANA. GAO underscored this notion and stated that leadership 

skills among the NCO corps could “provide a vital link between senior officers 

and soldiers and can provide leadership to ANA units in the field.”1020 These 

initiatives, however, failed to reverse high attrition rates, and the ANA continued 

to suffer from the loss of soldiers with leadership skills. A November 2013 DOD 

report to Congress noted that, although recruiting rates were sufficient to offset 

high attrition rates in the ANA, the loss of officers and NCOs was impeding the 

professionalization of the force.1021

Lack of Equipment and Support

Another factor driving ANDSF attrition was the lack of quality equipment and maintenance support from MOD, MOI, and the United States.1022 In 2005, DOD planned 

to provide the ANA with donated and salvaged weapons and armored vehicles; 

however, this proved detrimental to the ANDSF because the equipment was “worn 

out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment.”1023 Subsequently, the United 

States began to provide the ANA with U.S. equipment, which had a more reliable 

supply chain. Yet, the ANDSF still suffered from insufficient support and equipment 

due to competing global priorities, production delays, and delayed execution of the 

budget.1024 For a 2008 report, GAO interviewed DOD officials from CSTC-A, the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command concerning shortfalls, specifically with the ANA. The officials 

attributed these deficiencies to competing global priorities for equipment, including 

those stemming from the simultaneous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.1025

In 2013, DOD reported that the ANDSF lacked sufficient air resources for 

casualty evacuations. This negatively affected morale among ANA troops and 

resulted in increased attrition due soldiers’ fears of what would happen if they 

were injured in action.1026 This concern became a reality when a wounded 

Afghan soldier had to wait 19 days for medical evacuation from the field.1027
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DOD’s November 2013 report to Congress asserted that the “single most 

important challenge facing the ANDSF ... is in developing an effective logistics 

and sustainment system.”1028 In 2015, DOD reported that the train, advise, and 

assist mission was attempting to develop better logistical and sustainment 

capabilities for the ministries and the ANDSF.1029

Poor Quality of Life

Hardship and sacrifice defined the life of an ANDSF recruit. Corruption, poor 

leadership, and lack of equipment and support structures served to undermine the 

recruit’s well-being and overall quality of life. According to DOD, this was further 

exacerbated by poor compensation, insufficient casualty and martyr care, absence 

or misunderstanding of leave policies and procedures, and generally inadequate 

living and working conditions.1030 Problems with low wages were highlighted in 

December 2009, when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that “the Taliban, 

for the most part, are better paid than the [ANDSF].”1031 And, as DOD reported in 

2013, low wages were a top concern contributing to attrition.1032

High attrition led to several, related personnel concerns. Afghan forces were 

unable to take leave to look after their families, thereby creating low morale 

and negatively affecting their quality of life.1033 Furthermore, there was a lack of 

personnel rotation within the ANDSF.1034 As Secretary Gates noted in December 

2009, ANDSF personnel would frequently “fight until they die or they go AWOL” 

because no one was able to rotate out for a much-needed rest.1035 This severely 

undermined morale and caused fatigue.1036

In addition to low wages and the inability to take leave or rotate into different 

positions, heavy combat itself had negative effects on personnel well-being 

and morale. Secretary Gates noted that “attrition is higher in the areas where 

the combat is heavier.”1037 ANCOP, in particular, suffered increased levels of 

attrition because of high levels of combat related to election preparations and 

the Focused District Development program.1038 Yet, despite the impact of heavy 

combat over the years, in November 2013, DOD reported that increased casualties accounted for only a small portion of overall attrition in the ANDSF.1039

Conclusion

Although defining and measuring attrition has been a challenge, official 

reporting and expert analysis confirms attrition is a serious threat to the 

development of the ANDSF. Several issues have been identified as affecting 

the ANDSF’s ability to retain and maintain its force strength, including poor 

leadership and corruption, lack of equipment and support, insufficient vetting 

of recruits, and an overall poor quality of life. Despite coalition and Afghan 

government efforts to stem attrition, it remains one of the most pressing issues 

affecting ANDSF development and sustainability. 
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ROTATIONAL TRAINING 

The U.S. and coalition effort in Afghanistan was dominated by the rotational deployment of civilian and military units on short tours of duty. Implemented in part 

to help mitigate the physical and psychological stress of operating in a war zone, 

short tours of duty–where entire units rotated in and out of country every four to 

twelve months–were also cited as a way to ensure “both tactical proficiency and 

unit cohesion at the soldier level.”1040 Despite the legitimacy of these reasons, the 

regular turnover of civilian and military personnel, as well as the frequent shifts in 

command, hindered U.S. and coalition training efforts in Afghanistan. 

Rotational Training and the U.S. Advisory Effort 

Short tour lengths were a consistent, critical challenge to the U.S. advisory 

effort in Afghanistan. While tour lengths varied in duration, the majority 

of units rotated out of country after less than one year. Some U.S. marines 

and airmen, as well as many NATO personnel, served only six-month tours, 

for example.1041 These short deployments, while important for the health 

and welfare of military and civilian personnel, limited the U.S. effort in 

Afghanistan, negatively affecting institutional knowledge and continuity. As 

one report succinctly affirmed and described, brief rotational deployments 

and frequent shifts in command contributed to a “lack of proper continuity 

of effort, a breakdown or gaps in critical U.S.-host country relationships, and 

a mutual lack of trust.”1042 A 2016 Foreign Policy assessment of the situation 

highlighted the U.S. tendency to rotate “leaders through the country like 

tourists,” a policy that “explicitly short-changed the [war] effort.”1043 At a 

joint SIGAR and USIP conference in April 2016, one participant described the 

regular turnover of personnel as an “annual lobotomy.”1044

The frequent turnover of advisors and senior leaders was also described as 

“ill-suited” for a counterinsurgency campaign, where understanding the local 

context and building relationships are essential.1045 Given that it often takes 

more than a year to achieve useful knowledge of a local context, the brevity of 

in-country assignments and the frequent rotation of personnel into and out of 

Afghanistan led to a “constant loss of knowledge and experience.”1046 A former 

special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and advisor to the 

Afghan Border Police wrote in 2015, “By changing out entire units so frequently, 

our policy has guaranteed that military leaders rotating through Afghanistan 

have never had more than a superficial understanding of the political 

environment they are trying to shape.”1047 Retired Command Sergeant Major 

Robert Bush emphasized a similar point, describing the “acclimatization” and 

“training wheels” phase required by newly arrived units as ill-suited for any type 

of campaign where cultural knowledge is critical. He wrote, “One tenet of COIN, 

and for any type operations, is to know the populace, and one-year tours ... did 

not give organizations or the community they were supporting the time to get to 
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know one another. [One unit] leaves and another unit would come in and begin 

the learning phase all over again.”1048

Impeding Continuity 

Due to the short deployment lengths of military and civilian units, Afghans 

regularly had to adjust to a new unit’s expectations and training program. 

For example, from 2003 to 2009, eight different Army National Guard units 

assumed responsibility for TF Phoenix and the training of the ANA.1049 With 

few standard operating procedures or consistent staffing policies in place, 

incoming units were unable to build upon previously established relationships 

or take advantage of pre-existing norms or procedures. Moreover, these units 

were at risk of missing out on previous lessons learned. According to a U.S. 

military officer who served in Afghanistan, new units arriving in theater often 

made “quick adjustments in operations” and new leaders implemented changes 

“before they fully [understood] all the implications of their actions.”1050 This 

was affirmed by a senior defense contractor at TAAC-South, who noted that 

while some attempts were made at educating incoming personnel on previous 

procedures, many incoming units desired to “do it their own way.”1051 In 

response to similar experiences with the special operations advisory effort in 

Afghanistan, a 2015 RAND report argued, “Effective continuity means that new 

staff build on previous advisor practices and relationships, avoid ‘reinventing 

the wheel,’ and understand past successes and failures.”1052

Without periods of overlap between incoming and outgoing personnel, 

information was not always effectively transferred. As reported by RAND, 

the lack of proper communication and coordination between units was 

described by Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) advisors as causing 

“advisor fratricide,” where, without the ability to “mentor the mentors,” 

incoming advisors provided conflicting advice or guidance to their Afghan 

counterparts.1053 Moreover, gaps in assignments further inhibited the effective 

transfer of information and ease of transition. According to the same RAND 

report, numerous relief-in-place gaps were reported at the Special Mission Wing, 

including a two-month gap between outgoing and incoming commanders and 

a three-month gap for the position of executive officer.1054 In such instances, 

the effective transfer of authority or information rarely occurred. Additionally, 

U.S. military commanders expressed concern over opposition forces exploiting 

security gaps created by the months-long rotations.1055

Rapport

Numerous reports emphasize the importance of rapport to security force 

assistance.1056 Strong rapport proved particularly critical to the U.S. advisory 

effort in Afghanistan, where advisor and counterpart trust was often described 

as central to the partnership’s success.1057 The 2015 RAND study on the 
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special operations advisory effort in Afghanistan stressed that strong rapport 

between host-nation and partner units can reap a number of benefits, including 

“increasing the possibility that an advisor’s advice will be acted upon and 

reducing the risk to coalition forces.”1058 Rapport has also been noted to enhance 

information sharing between host-nation and partner units.1059

Not surprisingly, therefore, frequent and short rotations regularly impeded trust 

and rapport-building efforts between the U.S. and Afghan partner units. Advisors 

in Afghanistan, for example, frequently observed “‘mentor fatigue’, whereby 

Afghans tire[d] of the revolving door of advisors.”1060 RAND cites one SOAG 

advisor as stating, “There is reluctance on [the] part of Afghans to really open 

up to you because they get tired [of the constant influx of new advisors]. A sixmonth [tour] becomes, if you are lucky, five months of a working relationship. 

Four months is effectively what we get.”1061

Going Forward 

There have been many suggestions for mitigating the setbacks caused by 

the frequent rotations of military and civilian units and personnel. One 

recommendation, for example, calls for increasing the deployment length of 

military units. A 2015 RAND report recommended “nontraditional” or “atypical” 

assignment rotations and durations for military personnel, noting that “models 

other than the standard short deployment may be more effective” given 

the importance of personnel continuity to building partnership capacity.1062

Additionally, multiple reports call for increased tour lengths for key advisory 

positions or senior leaders.1063 One assessment noted, “Leaders attempting to 

establish the kind of relationship and understanding necessary to be effective in 

counterinsurgency must be kept in place much longer.”1064

Others have cited the nature of a counterinsurgency campaign as the reason 

behind recommending repeated deployments to the same location. According to 

a U.S. military officer who served in Afghanistan, counterinsurgency missions 

require “interaction with the local populace and relationship-building” which 

inherently “require longer tour lengths or repeated deployments to the same 

location to help facilitate the necessary interpersonal relations between soldiers 

and key leaders.”1065 Individuals returning to the same location are able to build 

on past relationships, do not have to spend time familiarizing themselves with 

a new culture, and are able to maintain continuity of efforts within their areas 

of operation.1066 The benefits of repeated deployments to the same area were 

also corroborated by a 2015 RAND study, which noted that “units that returned 

time and time again to work with the same partner unit reported unusually 

positive rapport.”1067
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The State Partnership Program 

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) provides a potentially useful 

model for improving continuity in security assistance. Implemented in 1993, the SPP 

links a state’s National Guard with a partner nation’s security forces in a “cooperative, 

mutually beneficial relationship.”1068 The program is managed by the National Guard 

Bureau, guided by State’s foreign policy objectives, and executed by the individual 

state adjutants general, in support of combatant command security objectives and 

ambassadors’ country strategies. In 2017, the SPP accounts for 73 unique security 

partnerships involving 79 nations around the globe.1069 Through the program, the 

National Guard supports not only security goals through military-to-military engagements, 

but a number of governmental, economic, and social initiatives as well. Examples of 

these broader efforts include disaster preparedness, counternarcotics, deployment 

planning and family support, critical infrastructure and resource protection, and law 

enforcement reform and development.1070 In Afghanistan, aligning National Guard units 

with specific expertise within the train, advise, and assist effort—for example, police, 

aviation, and maintenance—has the potential to provide enduring support to the ANDSF. 

As observed recently in TAAC-South, the deployment of National Guard law enforcement 

professionals has contributed to improved training of the ANP in Kandahar.

Other recommendations aimed at mitigating the effects of frequent unit 

rotations include providing advance notification for deployments in order to 

allow incoming staff time to prepare and make connections in the field, requiring 

departing personnel to create “continuity books,” and leveraging experienced 

staff who can ensure continuity within the advisory units.1071 Similarly, some 

reports emphasize the need for overlap between incoming and outgoing 

personnel to ensure an effective transfer of authority and information.1072

An April 2017 SIGAR visit to Afghanistan confirmed that several commanders 

are taking the initiative to mitigate the adverse effects of the “brain drain” that 

has plagued Afghanistan since 2002. These initiatives include overlapping ninemonth deployments of the commander’s unit and deputy commander’s unit 

to maintain continuity through the mission. The United States has also begun 

sending small teams of deployed advisors back to the United States to sync up 

with the replacement unit to improve information sharing through the transition 

process. While each of these initiatives has reportedly shown progress, the U.S. 

military has no institutionalized mechanism to address the issue of rotational 

trainers. Implementing the lessons we’ve learned—and institutionalizing 

rotations that reinforce the advisory mission and the importance of continuity 

and rapport with our Afghan counterparts—remains critical to advancing 

ANDSF development efforts. 

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CHAPTER 7

KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Our study of the U.S. experience developing the ANDSF since 2002 finds: 

1. The U.S. government was ill-prepared to conduct security sector

assistance programs of the size and scope required in Afghanistan. The 

lack of commonly understood interagency terms, concepts, and models 

for SSA undermined communication and coordination, damaged trust, 

intensified frictions, and contributed to initial gross under-resourcing 

of the U.S. effort to develop the ANDSF.

The United States lacked an interagency framework and decision-making 

processes for SSA sufficient to address the scope and magnitude of issues 

that arose in Afghanistan. Security sector reconstruction models that 

included raising, training, and fiscally supporting an entire military and police 

force and their sustainment institutions were very different from the typical 

SSA models where the United States provided advanced military support 

to a standing force, for example, in Pakistan, Jordan, Japan, and Israel. The 

lack of appropriate models undermined the U.S. government’s ability to 

undertake a sound approach to ANDSF development and appropriately link 

training combat forces to the necessary critical infrastructure and equipment 

requirements. The absence of common language and authoritative concepts 

impeded communication and coordination within the U.S. government and 

DOD photo
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

with Afghan and international partners, and often pulled efforts in different 

directions. These problems wasted time and resources, created opportunities 

for manipulation by Afghan elites, and contributed until late 2009 to 

grossly inadequate resourcing of the SSA effort by the United States and its 

international partners. 

2. Initial U.S. plans for Afghanistan focused solely on U.S. military

operations and did not include the development of an Afghan army, 

police, or supporting ministerial-level institutions.

Starting in 2001, the United States’ primary focus was targeting al-Qaeda 

leadership and removing the Taliban government from power. As security 

deteriorated, the international community viewed the creation of an Afghan 

security force as a preferred alternative to expanding the international military presence nationwide. In March 2002, the Group of Eight nations met 

in Geneva, Switzerland, to divide responsibility for security sector reform 

in Afghanistan, with five countries assuming a lead nation role: the United 

States (military reform), Germany (police reform), UK (counternarcotics), 

Italy (judicial reform), and Japan (disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration). It was not until 2006 that the United States created CSTC-A 

and assumed the primary responsibility for training both the ANA and ANP, 

as well as fielding training teams under TF Phoenix.

3. Early U.S. partnerships with independent militias—intended to

advance U.S. counterterrorism objectives—ultimately undermined the 

creation and role of the ANA and ANP.

In the early years of OEF, the United States partnered with independent 

militia leaders to conduct counterterrorism operations with U.S. Special 

Forces and the CIA. In June 2002, as the United States began training the 

new ANA, the average Afghan militia fighter was reportedly being paid 

significantly more by the United States than what was being offered by the 

Afghan government to join the national army and police force. Additionally, 

local militia fighters were allowed to serve near their homes, while new 

Afghan army and police recruits were stationed in Kabul. This created 

incentives for local Afghan fighters to continue their partnership with CIA 

and U.S. Special Forces and not join the emerging national army, causing 

initial recruitment for conventional forces to be quite low. To increase 

recruiting, in 2003 the United States cut the number of U.S.-funded militia 

fighters by half. Although both the CIA and U.S. Special Forces objected to 

this action, it resulted in an increase in the number of ANA recruits to 4,000 

by the end of 2003. 

In 2006, to address growing insecurity, the United States again turned to 

local militias to provide security in areas with limited national security 
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forces. These militias became part of auxiliary police forces that were 

partnered with U.S. Special Forces in high-risk areas of Afghanistan and 

were largely independent of the national government. With limited oversight 

from and accountability to the Afghan government, some police forces were 

reported to have engaged in human rights abuses, drug trafficking, and 

other corrupt activities.

4. Critical ANDSF capabilities, including aviation, intelligence, force

management, and special forces, were not included in early U.S., 

Afghan, and NATO force-design plans. 

The development of combat enablers and their supporting institutions 

takes significantly more time than building a light-infantry force, and often 

requires years to come to full maturity. Furthermore, these capabilities 

require a highly educated, literate, and professional workforce, are 

expensive to build, and create increased fiscal dependencies. Decisions 

to build an Afghan Air Force, special forces, intelligence capabilities, and 

necessary force management systems only began in earnest as security 

deteriorated in 2005. Since these elements were not part of the initial force 

design and investment, milestones for their development were chronically 

postponed. On a positive note, the successful Afghan special forces have 

become critical components of the Afghan government’s ability to counter 

the rising Taliban threat. 

5. The United States failed to optimize coalition nations’ capabilities to

support SSA missions in the context of international political realities. 

The wide use of national caveats, rationale for joining the coalition, 

resource constraints and military capabilities, and NATO’s force 

generation processes led to an increasingly complex implementation of 

SSA programs. This resulted in a lack of an agreed-upon framework for 

conducting SSA activities. 

The NATO alliance’s financial and military support to Afghanistan for over 

a decade and a half was crucial to success. However, the SSA mission, 

conducted as part of a coalition, was as much a political exercise as a military 

operation. Coalition members’ rationale for partnering with the United 

States to help develop the ANDSF ranged from a country’s commitment to 

adhere to Article 5 of the NATO alliance to engagements to bolster bilateral 

relationships with the United States. Removing the Taliban from power, 

advancing democracy in Afghanistan, and eradicating terrorism from South 

Asia were not the primary drivers for some nations to commit forces to 

Afghanistan. Based on this, some partner nations deployed forces with very 

restrictive national caveats, which hindered the deployed forces’ ability 

to travel and engage in combat. For example, Germany, the third-largest 

NATO troop contributor and initially the lead nation for police reform, had 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

national caveats and laws that prevented its deployed soldiers from engaging 

in expeditionary combat. This had the effect of precluding German police 

advisors from deploying with ANP units in the field to mitigate the Taliban 

threat in contested or non-permissive environments. 

Additionally, many European countries generally viewed police reform as a 

civilian mission focused on civil policing, reactionary operations, and rule 

of law. In contrast, the U.S. military often viewed the ANP as the first line of 

defense in the counterinsurgency mission, which required offensive operations against Taliban forces. Within the MOI, U.S. MODA advisors provided 

guidance that supported the U.S.-preferred design of the force, while EU advisors provided the same senior Afghan officials alternative views on the role of 

the police. This dichotomy contributed to the ANP’s current identity crisis.

6. Providing advanced Western weapons and management systems 

to a largely illiterate and uneducated force without appropriate 

training and institutional infrastructure created long-term 

dependencies, required increased U.S. fiscal support, and extended 

sustainability timelines.

From 2002 to 2008, the United States outfitted the ANDSF with equipment 

donated by former Soviet-bloc nations and from seized Taliban caches. 

This led to a lack of uniformity in weapons systems and equipment within ANDSF units. In 2008, the United States began to equip the force with 

NATO-standard weapons and equipment. This transformation, while seemingly benefiting the ANA through the standardization and modernization of 

its weapons and equipment, ultimately fostered increased long-term dependency on international donors for both funding and maintenance capacity. 

Western-style management systems, an all-volunteer force, and a budding 

air corps capability were imposed upon a largely illiterate population. 

Educated, literate, and professional members of the ANDSF were often 

offered positions in specialized units, removing talented junior officers 

from the ranks of the conventional force. These specialized units were 

more successful in adapting to the transition to Western-style weapons and 

management systems, while the conventional units suffered. Conventional 

forces’ reliance on combat enablers and U.S. trainers and advisors resulted 

in long-term dependency and missed force readiness milestones. 

Furthermore, the requirement to invest in Afghan professional schools to 

ensure the ANDSF could train its military in the operations and maintenance of equipment was not appreciated, and there were inadequate efforts 

to leverage U.S. or other coalition formal training institutions to develop 

Afghan experts.
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7. The lag in Afghan ministerial and security sector governing capacity

hindered planning, oversight, and the long-term sustainability of 

the ANDSF. 

The importance of governing institutions for the security sector was 

chronically under-appreciated by U.S. officials. Prior to 2008, the U.S. 

military lacked comprehensive and institutionalized programs specifically 

tailored to developing and advising on security sector ministerial-level 

governing capabilities. In 2008, the MODA program was created within 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. MODA deployed trained 

U.S. government civilians to partner with MOD and MOI personnel to 

train, advise, and assist in the governing and oversight functions of the 

ministries. The results of the MODA program were mixed. Proper alignment 

of civilian experts with their Afghan counterparts led to positive results; at 

the same time, civilian advisors were often either a misfit for the mission 

or were improperly assigned to missions that were outside the scope of 

their expertise. Starting in 2015, the U.S. and NATO train, advise, and assist 

mission focused on ministerial-level capacity and advising at the ANA corps 

or ANP zone levels. 

8. Police development was treated as a secondary mission for the U.S.

government, despite the critical role the ANP played in implementing 

rule of law and providing static, local-level security nationwide. 

The U.S. military aligned its military-to-military engagements with the 

ANA; however, there wasn’t a similar symmetry of engagement between 

U.S. civilian law enforcement entities and the ANP. This led to gross 

underfunding, under-resourcing, and less mentoring of police units, as 

compared to army units. Based on increased insecurity and non-permissive 

environments, and under the guise of support to the overarching ANDSF, 

DOD was forced to adapt SSA programs for military units to fit police 

units. For example, in 2008 DOD created the MODA program to embed 

DOD civilians at the MOD to help govern the national army. There was 

no program to mirror this in the MOI and ANP. MODA advisors were 

“converted” to MODA billets to support the MOI, despite the differences in 

overall mission between the ministries of defense and interior. The same 

phenomenon occurred in the field, where deployed U.S. soldiers assigned 

to provide field training to the Afghan army were converted to a field 

mentoring team advising police units, with no additional training in civil 

policing or rule of law. Furthermore, crime statistics were never collected 

or analyzed by the MOI, despite the adverse effects that criminality, such as 

petty theft and non-insurgent related violence, had on the population daily. 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

9. The constant turnover of U.S. and NATO trainers impaired the training 

mission’s institutional memory and hindered the relationship building 

and effective monitoring and evaluation required in SSA missions. 

U.S. military units frequently transitioned into and out of Afghanistan, 

forcing ANDSF units to adapt to new U.S. trainers and advisors and 

establish new relationships. Often times, as relationships and trust 

between the ANDSF and U.S. units deepened, a new U.S. unit arrived and 

the cycle started again. Unlike other military units, U.S. Special Forces 

and USAF trainers and advisors created enduring relationships with their 

Afghan partners through frequent deployment cycles partnering with 

the same Afghan units. This enduring partnership resulted in the quicker 

development of specialized units, as compared to other forces. Recognizing 

the importance of building and maintaining personal relationships, the 

MODA program mandated its civilian advisors serve two-year tours, with 

the potential to remain in country for a third year. 

Furthermore, high turnover of SSA personal had a destructive impact on 

the U.S. military’s ability to properly provide long-term forecasting for 

ANDSF development and correctly assess ANDSF capabilities against 

readiness milestones.

10. ANDSF monitoring and evaluation tools relied heavily on tangible

outputs, such as staffing, equipping, and training levels, as well as 

subjective evaluations of leadership. This focus masked intangible 

factors, such as corruption and will to fight, which deeply affected 

security outcomes and failed to adequately factor in classified U.S. 

intelligence assessments.

The U.S. military relied on tangible measures of success of the ANDSF, such 

as gross recruiting requirements and force strength targets; however, a focus 

on aggregate numbers masked important rank and social imbalances that 

damaged ANDSF performance and perceptions of the force’s legitimacy. 

Furthermore, ANDSF readiness measures assumed the U.S. military’s 

capability milestones system would be able to predict battlefield 

performance and security outcomes in Afghanistan. These forecasts, 

however, underappreciated key strategic-level threats, including the will 

and ability of the Taliban to continue the fight, sustained popular support 

for the Taliban in Afghanistan, insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan, eroding 

Afghan government legitimacy, and corruption in the ANDSF.
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11. Because U.S. military plans for ANDSF readiness were created in

an environment of politically constrained timelines—and because 

these plans consistently underestimated the resilience of the Afghan 

insurgency and overestimated ANDSF capabilities—the ANDSF was illprepared to deal with deteriorating security after the drawdown of U.S. 

combat forces. 

U.S. military and civilian personnel surges were designed to reduce the insurgent threat and set conditions for an ANDSF with known limitations to be 

able to successfully provide national security post-transition. However, the 

United States, ISAF, and the Afghans did not reduce the Taliban threat to a 

level that could be contained and eventually defeated by the ANDSF. By 2014, 

as the ANDSF assumed lead responsibility for security nationwide, Afghan 

security forces faced far larger threats than they were designed to handle. 

Initial plans for the ANDSF envisioned light-infantry brigades capable of 

being deployed by the national government to quell local unrest, mostly 

between factional militias. By 2004, Taliban attacks spiked and the United 

States and international community reacted by expediting training of the 

ANDSF’s light-infantry brigades and expanding the size of the military and 

police forces. By 2006, the ANDSF design was changed and plans were 

created to develop Afghan Special Forces, an Afghan Air Force, and other 

advanced combat units. Timelines to leave Afghanistan quickly changed. 

ANDSF force-size planning conferences relied upon DOD assumptions of a 

reduction in the Taliban threat and improved security; however, as violence 

and high levels of insecurity continued throughout the 2009 U.S. military 

and civilian surge and into 2010, senior U.S. officials recognized previous 

assumptions were incorrect and that a longer-term sustained presence of 

U.S. combat forces and advisors would be required. Initial force sizing of 

60,000 for the ANA and 62,000 for the ANP ballooned to a collective endstrength goal of 352,000. 

12. As security deteriorated, efforts to sustain and professionalize the 

ANDSF became secondary to meeting immediate combat needs.

Early decisions concerning the design and development of the ANDSF 

were largely made in the context of establishing a highly professional 

force that would be sustainable by the nascent Afghan government. 

Starting in 2006, as Taliban-initiated violence skyrocketed, decisions 

concerning the size and capabilities of the ANDSF were made almost 

exclusively in relation to countering violence and insecurity, with limited 

concern for the Afghan government’s ability to sustain the force in the 

short- or long-term. The U.S. military was unable to maintain a “gold 

standard” training program at the speed of politically driven milestones 

and, therefore, expediency overtook professionalization. This situation 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

continues today, as senior U.S. officials highlight the significant stress 

placed on the ANDSF due to the increased and sustained operational 

tempo of the fight, and describe sustainment and operational readiness of 

soldiers and police in the field as a significant weakness.1073

These findings underscore the significant shortfalls in the U.S. approach to 

security sector assistance in Afghanistan that contributed to the current 

inability of the ANDSF to secure the country from internal and external 

threats and prevent the re-establishment of terrorist safe havens. The 

United States failed to understand the complexities and scale of the mission 

to construct the Afghan security forces in a country suffering from 30 years 

of war, government misrule, and significant poverty and underdevelopment. 

Since 2002, senior U.S. and international officials have noted that the 

Afghanistan government’s inability to quell local unrest, protect the 

population from insurgent-related violence or crimes from predatory 

Afghan security officials, and respond to factional fighting has “continue[d] 

to impact negatively on the lives of Afghans every day, whittling away at the 

support for the transitional process.”1074 As described by former senior DOD 

official Marin Strmecki, “It’s not that the enemy is so strong, but that the 

Afghan government is so weak.”1075

Senior U.S. and Afghan officials remain committed to rectifying past 

errors. In response to the deadly attacks against the 209th Corps in 

northern Afghanistan in April 2017, President Ghani took long overdue 

steps to remove weak military leaders, replacing several corps’ leaders 

and putting more capable and professional military leaders into senior 

positions.1076 This was a step that was welcomed by deployed senior U.S. 

military leaders.1077 In May 2017, at the Third Annual European Union 

Anti-Corruption Conference, President Ghani publicly admitted that “the 

ministry of interior is the heart of corruption in the security sector and it 

is unacceptable and it will be reformed.”1078

The U.S. government also imposed rigid conditionality on the Afghan 

government to pressure it to undertake necessary reforms in exchange 

for continued U.S. financial and material commitment. To mitigate the 

threat of ghost soldiers, starting January 2017 the United States withheld 

financial support for 30,000 ANDSF salaries and stipulated it would only 

pay salaries to soldiers who were biometrically enrolled in the Afghan 

personnel system.1079 Additionally, the United States required the Afghan 

government to remove several top Afghan Air Force leaders who were weak 

and corrupt, in exchange for more than 100 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. 

Initial reflections from USAF advisors indicated the change in Afghan Air 

Force leadership was a positive development.1080
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While these are promising steps, General Nicholson recently noted that 

the conflict in Afghanistan is at a stalemate, and the Taliban continues to 

control a significant amount of territory in Afghanistan.1081 U.S. military 

leaders asked the U.S. administration to increase the deployment of ANDSF 

trainers and advisors to expand training to the brigade level and support 

the expansion of the Afghan special forces and Afghan Air Force. A strong 

ANDSF could advance the U.S. national security objective of preventing 

parts of Afghanistan from returning to terrorist safe havens and serve as the 

security transition strategy for the nation. 

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CHAPTER 8

LESSONS 

This section distills lessons from the U.S. experience designing, training, 

advising, assisting, and equipping the ANDSF.

Lesson 1. The U.S. government is not well organized to conduct 

SSA missions in post-conflict nations or in the developing world. 

Furthermore, our doctrine, policies, personnel, and programs are 

insufficient to meet SSA mission requirements and expectations.

The United States does not lack the capability to conduct effective SSA 

programs, but rather lacks a comprehensive interagency approach to 

implement these programs. Most U.S. SSA programs focus on improving 

fighting capabilities of the partner nation’s security forces, with limited efforts 

to improve the necessary security governance and sustainability institutions. 

After more than 15 years of SSA efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the United 

States has made limited progress in institutionalizing innovative programs, such 

as CSTC-A and TF Phoenix, that were designed to build partner security sectors. 

U.S. Marine Corps photo
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176 | CHAPTER 8 | LESSONS

Lesson 2. SSA cannot employ a one-size-fits-all approach; it must be 

tailored to a host nation’s context and needs. Security force structures 

and capabilities will not outlast U.S. assistance efforts if the host nation 

does not fully buy into such efforts and take ownership of SSA programs.

From 2002 to 2015, senior U.S. and NATO officials took ownership of ANDSF 

development, with little to no input from senior Afghan officials. Afghan buyin largely occurred through the process of U.S. and NATO officials briefing 

Afghan leaders on military plans and training programs for the ANDSF. At 

one point, the United States threatened to withhold funding for the ANP if 

the Afghans did not increase the end-strength of the force to the numbers the 

United States demanded. In Afghanistan, PowerPoint-based police training 

curricula previously used in the Balkans were a mismatch given the high levels 

of illiteracy within the police force. This mismatch is only one example of the 

“cut-and-paste” programs applied from one country to the next that negatively 

impacted the overall effort. Additionally, the lack of Afghan ownership of force 

development, operational planning, and security sector governance prevented 

the Afghans from effectively overseeing and managing the ANDSF following 

security transition at the end of 2014. 

Lesson 3. Senior government and nongovernment leaders in post-conflict 

or developing-world countries are likely to scrimmage for control of 

security forces; SSA missions should avoid empowering factions.

U.S. officials should expect host-nation leaders to compete for control of the 

military and police, including attempts to manipulate U.S. efforts to advance 

their own personal and political agendas. In many developing-world countries, 

the control of military and police forces is a show of political power. Even in 

situations where the United States does not directly support one faction or 

ethnic group, the provision of U.S.-made equipment is often seen as a sign of 

that support. In Afghanistan, the United States largely ignored the transitional 

security forces operating throughout Afghanistan, as well as the political 

imbalances throughout the rank-and-file that were eroding security, both of 

which were often supported by host-nation elites. As a result, major social and 

political imbalances remain within the ANDSF today. 

Lesson 4. Western equipment and systems provided to developing-world 

militaries are likely to create chronic, high-cost dependencies. 

Many developing-world security forces have military and police personnel with 

far lower rates of literacy than their Western counterparts. Advanced weapons 

systems and vehicles, demand-based supply systems, and high-tech personnel 

and command and control systems that work for Western militaries could be 
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SEPTEMBER 2017 | 177

inappropriate for many developing-world forces. Even if some personnel at 

higher echelons can master the systems, such capabilities might not be realistic 

in tactical units. Those with such skills are also more likely to seek higherpaying (and safer) employment in the private sector or senior civil service. 

Western advisors, therefore, are likely to step in to perform the jobs themselves 

rather than see the tasks done poorly or not at all. In Afghanistan, this reliance 

on U.S. support created a chronic dependency within the ANDSF. 

Lesson 5. Security force assessment methodologies are often unable 

to evaluate the impact of intangible factors such as leadership, 

corruption, malign influence, and dependency, which can lead to an 

underappreciation of how such factors can undermine readiness and 

battlefield performance. 

Assessment methodologies used to evaluate the ANDSF measured tangible 

outputs, such as staffing, equipping, and training status, but were less capable 

of evaluating the impact of intangible factors, such as battlefield performance, 

leadership, corruption, malign influence, and changes in systems and equipment. 

DOD forecasts and targets for force readiness were largely based on the U.S. 

military’s capacity for recruitment and training, and not based on battlefield 

performance and other factors corroding the force. Issues such as ghost 

soldiers, corruption, and high levels of attrition were more critical than training 

capacity to measure true ANDSF capabilities. 

Lesson 6. Developing and training a national police force is best 

accomplished by law enforcement professionals in order to achieve a 

police capability focused on community policing and criminal justice.

In Afghanistan, two different U.S. government agencies led police development 

activities. Each of these efforts alone was insufficient. State, mandated 

by legislation and supported by funding, is responsible for foreign police 

development. However, State INL is staffed by civilian program managers 

and not law enforcement professionals. Therefore, State largely relied on 

contracting with DynCorp International to conduct police training and 

development programs in Afghanistan. U.S. civilian police trainers were largely 

restricted from operating in high-threat environments and therefore could 

not provide follow-on field training to new ANP recruits. The mission was 

eventually transferred to DOD, which was largely inexperienced and improperly 

prepared to provide rule of law training to foreign police forces. As a result, 

training and development of the ANP was militarized and resulted in a police 

capability focused more on force protection and offensive operations and less 

on community policing and criminal justice. 
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178 | CHAPTER 8 | LESSONS

Lesson 7. To improve the effectiveness of SSA missions in coalition 

operations, the U.S. government must acknowledge and compensate 

for any coalition staffing shortfalls and national caveats that relate to 

trainers, advisors, and embedded training teams. 

The ANDSF training mission suffered from chronic understaffing. Even 

during the surge from 2010 to 2011, required trainer billets at NTM-A were 

staffed at less than 50 percent. Due to the national caveats of some NATO 

countries, deployed trainers were unable to be appropriately assigned 

throughout Afghanistan. In late 2011, ANP trainers in Kabul were overstaffed by 

215 percent, while police trainers in hostile and non-permissive areas of eastern 

Afghanistan were at a shortfall of 64 percent, leaving the advisory mission 

severely understaffed. Chronic understaffing remains today, as Resolute Support 

still has gaps in its advisory program. 

Lesson 8: Developing foreign military and police capabilities is a 

whole-of-government mission. 

Successful SSA missions require whole-of-government support from the civilian 

and defense agencies with expertise in training and advising foreign countries 

in both security operations and the necessary institutional development of 

the security forces’ governing institutions. Within DOD, SSA is a defense 

enterprise mission and not strictly a mission to be executed by the military 

chain of command. Deploying military combat commanders to oversee 

military operations and the development of foreign forces results in an overprioritization of the fighting force at the expense of governing and sustainability 

missions. For police-related missions, the United States lacks a deployable, 

rule of law training force that can operate in high-threat environments; in 

Afghanistan, this limited the U.S. ability to develop the ANP. 

Lesson 9: In Afghanistan and other parts of the developing world, 

the creation of specialized security force units often siphons off the 

conventional force’s most capable leaders and most educated recruits. 

In post-conflict nations and the developing world, where human capital for 

a professional military and police force is limited, the creation of smaller, 

specialized forces may be necessary. However, if the decision to create these 

specialized forces is executed, the U.S. military must analyze the impact 

the removal of the potential cadre of promising leaders will have on the 

conventional forces. In Afghanistan, to address growing instability and support 

the fledgling conventional forces, the U.S. military relied on specialized security 

forces. Within the ANA, the creation of the ANA commandos and special forces 

removed literate and proficient soldiers from the ranks of the conventional 
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forces and moved them into the new ranks of the ANA elite forces. Within the 

ANP, the creation of the Afghan National Civil Order Police and special police 

units also removed the most literate and capable police recruits from the force. 

While the performance of these elite units has been admirable, the conventional 

units struggled. 

Lesson 10: SSA missions must assess the needs of the entire spectrum 

of the security sector, including rule of law and corrections programs, 

in addition to developing the nation’s police and armed forces. 

Synchronizing SSA efforts across all pillars of the security sector 

is critical. 

Successful security sector development is often achieved when all aspects 

of the security sector are developed in concert with one another. Successful 

development of a national police force without development programs and 

reforms of the nation’s judicial and corrections systems will create perverse 

incentives for the police to capture and release criminals for bribes or be 

involved in extra-judicial activities. In Afghanistan, the 2002 division of security 

sector reform into the five independent silos of military reform (United 

States), police reform (Germany), judicial reform (Italy), counternarcotics 

(UK), and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (Japan) undermined 

each individual program’s success as the SSR process lacked the required 

coordination and synchronization of effort. 

Lesson 11: SSA training and advising positions are not currently 

career enhancing for uniformed military personnel, regardless of the 

importance U.S. military leadership places on the mission. Therefore, 

experienced and capable military professionals with SSA experience 

often choose non-SSA assignments later in their careers, resulting in the 

continual deployment of new and inexperienced forces for SSA missions. 

The career path of a U.S. Army officer, for example, relies on commanding 

U.S. soldiers. Outside of joint military exercises, experiences partnering with 

a foreign military have little positive impact on promotion board review. U.S. 

military commanders publicly emphasized the importance of the train, advise, 

and assist missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, this emphasis did not 

equate to any change in how the military rewarded those members who 

volunteered for or were deployed in support of SSA missions.

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CHAPTER 9

RECOMMENDATIONS 

These recommendations suggest actions that can be undertaken by 

Congress or executive branch agencies to inform U.S. security sector 

assistance efforts at the onset of and throughout reconstruction efforts, and to 

institutionalize the lessons learned from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan. The 

first set of recommendations is applicable to any current or future contingency 

operation and the second set of recommendations is specific to Afghanistan.

When assessed in hindsight, we recognize that the numerous pressures facing 

policymakers may have led to short-sighted choices and hard-won lessons. 

The recommendations below aim to provide better policies, organizations, 

information, and staffs to future policymakers faced with the difficult decisions 

inherent in reconstruction efforts in contingency operations. 

The specific lessons these recommendations relate to are listed after each 

recommendation. 

U.S. Army photo
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LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The U.S. Congress should consider (1) establishing a commission to

review the institutional authorities, roles, and resource mechanisms 

of each major U.S. government stakeholder in SSA missions, and 

(2) evaluating the capabilities of each department and military service 

to determine where SSA expertise should best be institutionalized. 

[Lesson 1]

In the FY 2017 NDAA, the U.S. Congress mandated the Secretary of Defense 

undertake a study of DOD security cooperation activities, to be led by an 

independent organization of experts. This is a step in the right direction; 

however, we recommend that the mandate be expanded to include State, 

Justice, and other key SSA stakeholders. Our recommended study should 

include an analysis and evaluation of the authorities-based relationships 

and coordination mechanisms of U.S. government departments and 

agencies, and suggest ways to improve their effectiveness. Additionally, 

because the reliance on contractors to meet the needs of the U.S. SSA 

program in Afghanistan was not effective, the U.S. government should 

formalize and institutionalize SSA expertise within its military and civilian 

elements. 

2. The U.S. Congress should consider mandating a full review of all U.S.

foreign police development programs, identify a lead agency for all 

future police development activities, and provide the identified agency 

with the necessary staff, authorities, and budget to accomplish its task. 

[Lesson 6]

The Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training 

Assistance Program (ICITAP) is staffed with law enforcement professionals 

experienced in the design, delivery, and management of foreign police 

development programs and security sector construction. While ICITAP uses 

federal and non-federal police advisors and trainers, it does not contract 

out the responsibility for program management and accountability. ICITAP 

has no independent budget and is fully dependent on State or DOD for 

funding and guidance. State does not have a staff of law enforcement 

professionals, but does have the required authorities and funding. In highthreat environments, DOD will by default assume a significant role in 

police development programs and, therefore, elements within DOD must 

be considered in the congressional review. During this review, the U.S. 

government should identify the lead agency for training both foreign police 

units involved in civil policing and also paramilitary police forces similar to 

the European gendarmerie. The U.S. government would benefit from having 

deployable experts capable of conducting training in both facets of policing. 
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EXECUTIVE AGENCY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. DOD and State SSA planning must include holistic initial assessments

of mission requirements that should cover the entire range of the host 

nation’s security sector. [Lesson 10]

Future missions that require reconstruction of a host nation’s security 

sector should include the development of the host nation’s judiciary and 

corrections systems, in addition to the police and military forces. U.S. 

military officials must pace the overarching development of the security 

sector to ensure each line of effort is being developed in tandem. A rapidly 

developed security force without the necessary corrections infrastructure 

and judicial systems will ultimately undermine security sector efforts 

overall. The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation 

has already taken positive steps with the introduction of DOD Instruction 

5132.14, Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy of the Security 

Cooperation Enterprise, which mandates an assessment of the host 

country’s security sector needs prior to the initiation of the SSA program. 

2. DOD and State should coordinate all U.S. security sector plans and

designs with host-nation officials prior to implementation to deconflict 

cultural differences, align sustainability requirements, and agree to 

the desired size and capabilities of the force. DOD and State should 

also engage with any coalition partners to ensure unity of effort and 

purpose. [Lesson 2]

In post-conflict nations and fragile states, coordination and synchronization 

with an underdeveloped host-nation government will be a challenge. 

However, as the government matures, host-nation ownership of SSA 

activities is critical. While extremely lengthy and slow to develop, the 

U.S. Security Governance Initiative (SGI) currently implemented in six 

African countries has been praised for its unique focus on host-nation 

ownership, joint planning, and long-term forecasting. According to White 

House documents, SGI’s distinctive approach “focuses on the systems, 

processes, and institutions that reinforce democratic security sector 

governance; uses vigorous analysis, shared data and agreed upon goals, 

and is supported by regular measurement and evaluation; and relies on 

commitment and accountability for results on the part of the United States 

and our partners.”1082 The 2004 Securing Afghanistan’s Future report, 

published by the UN, World Bank, and government of Afghanistan, noted 

that “the only actor that can effectively coordinate the security sector 

reform process and fill the leadership void over the medium to longer term 

is the Afghan Government. Sustainable reform cannot be achieved if it is 

donor driven.”1083
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3. DOD, in partnership with State, should reinforce with host-nation

leaders that the United States will only support the development of 

a national security force that is inclusive of the social, political, and 

ethnic diversity of the nation. [Lesson 3]

The U.S. military attempted to strictly enforce ethnic diversity quotas in 

the early ANA; however, these quotas failed to address political and social 

diversity. While Pashtun quotas were met, Pashtun representation from 

southern Afghanistan–the Taliban’s homeland–was minimal. Capping 

Tajik representation to minimize Northern Alliance domination failed to 

recognize the ethnic diversity of the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance. 

Pashtun commanders affiliated with the Northern Alliance were appointed 

to meet quotas, but this also ensured their political dominance of the force. 

4. To prevent the empowerment of one political faction or ethnic group, 

DOD, in coordination with State and the intelligence community, 

should monitor, evaluate, and assess all formal and informal security 

forces operating within a host nation. DOD should also identify and 

monitor both formal and informal chains of command and map social 

networks of the host nation’s security forces. DOD’s intelligence 

agencies should track and analyze political associations, biographical 

data, and patronage networks of senior security force and political 

leadership. [Lesson 3]

While access may be limited before the start of the SSA program, key 

identifiers can be obtained during initial training and advising missions. 

From 2001 to 2006, the U.S. military largely ignored transitional or informal 

security forces operating throughout Afghanistan, allowing security to 

deteriorate to a point that could no longer be mitigated by the newly trained 

ANDSF. Transitional forces, left unmonitored, eroded the legitimacy of 

the national government and security sector institutions. Multiple SIGAR 

interviews with former Afghan military officials and U.S. advisors noted that 

Afghanistan has a history of informal chains of command, often based on 

personal relationships and familial ties. These informal chains of command 

were often empowered over the formal chains of command, which the 

United States was attempting to develop. 

5. DOD, State, and other key SSA stakeholders should enhance civilian

and military career fields in security sector assistance, and create 

personnel systems capable of tracking employee SSA experience and 

skills to expedite the deployment of these experts. [Lesson 1]

Despite more than 15 years of SSA in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. 

government has very limited institutional expertise for SSA missions 

beyond unit-level training. Compared to other offices in DOD, State, 

or Justice, SSA offices and training centers are small and inadequately 
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resourced. No department has the required cadre of trained experts to 

draw upon for SSA missions beyond normal foreign military sales (FMS), 

small unit train, advise, and assist missions, and multinational joint military 

exercises. Commands created to facilitate SSA missions, such as CSTC-A, 

were “pick-up” teams of brave and well-meaning personnel who lacked the 

necessary experience, relationships, continuity, organizational coherence, 

and pre-deployment training. They were forced to learn on-the-job within 

their 6–12 month rotations, which led to many lessons being lost as 

individuals rotated out of country. This problem was magnified as the SSA 

missions in Afghanistan competed for attention, talent, and resources with 

the high-priority mission in Iraq. 

Developing such professional expertise in DOD and State will enable U.S. 

officials to better forecast timelines and resource requirements needed for 

successful SSA missions. More professional expertise will also increase the 

probability that U.S. officials will recognize and address problems such as 

corruption and malign influence. In Afghanistan, U.S. officials chronically 

underestimated these and other issues, including their impact on realistic 

readiness and reform timelines, which deeply impacted the overall SSA effort. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should 

leverage internal DOD databases to track military and civilian experts in 

security sector governance for future efforts to advise ministerial-level security sector personnel in key areas of logistics, human resources, internal 

affairs, and finance. 

6. DOD and State should mandate professional development and training

for all civilian and military members involved in SSA activities, as well 

as review curricula from the current training programs to align training 

with mission requirements and fully prepare deploying SSA personnel. 

[Lesson 1]

Mandatory professional development and training should apply to 

both career professionals and rotational civilian and military trainers 

and advisors. DOD and State currently have professional development 

institutions aimed at providing support to SSA initiatives, including the 

Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS), the Air Force’s 

Air Advisor Academy, and the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). These 

institutes provide tactical to strategic and regional-specific programs to 

career and deployable rotational advisors. DISCS provides mobile training 

teams to Afghanistan to train deployed advisors. Despite the capability 

of these institutions to train several hundred new students per year, predeployment training at any of these institutions was not mandated for U.S. 

trainers and advisors deployed to support the development of the ANDSF. 
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This resulted in a cadre of U.S. military and civilians without the proper 

training and education to complete the mission they were tasked 

to perform. 

Former and current advisors who had pre-deployment training identified 

deficiencies in the curricula and noted the training’s failure to properly 

prepare them to execute mission requirements. Therefore, pre-deployment 

training programs should be continuously reviewed and updated with 

current lessons learned in order to prepare advisors for the dynamic 

requirements of an SSA environment. To institutionalize this capability, 

DOD, State, and Justice should create a Security Cooperation Workforce 

Development program for SSA professionals to ensure these individuals 

have the required training and intellectual foundations required at the onset 

of future SSA efforts. 

7. To overcome staffing shortages within a coalition, DOD and State 

should bolster political and diplomatic efforts to ensure better 

compliance with agreed-upon resource contributions from partner 

nations and, if unsuccessful and unable to fill the gaps, reassess 

timeframes and anticipated outcomes to accommodate new realities. 

[Lesson 7]

Senior DOD and State officials should continue international outreach to 

NATO member states to fill gaps in NATO requirements in Afghanistan. If 

NATO countries are unwilling to commit, or chronically delay deployments 

of NATO personnel, the United States should consider filling the gaps with 

United States personnel. The U.S. will likely have more success filling NATO 

requirements if an assessment of mission requirements is matched to the 

political and military limitations of the assigned NATO member. 

From 2010 to 2011, staffing of required trainer positions at NTM-A 

remained under 50 percent. Furthermore, due to the national caveats of 

some NATO countries, deployed trainers were unable to be appropriately 

assigned throughout Afghanistan. In late 2011, ANP trainers in Kabul 

were overstaffed by 215 percent, while police trainers in hostile and nonpermissive areas of eastern Afghanistan were at a shortfall of 64 percent, 

leaving the advisory mission severely understaffed. Chronic understaffing 

remains today, as Resolute Support still has gaps in its advisory program. 
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DOD-SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Prior to the initiation of an SSA mission—and periodically

throughout the mission—DOD should report to the U.S. Congress 

on its assessments of U.S. and host-nation shared SSA objectives, 

alongside an evaluation of the host nation’s political, social, 

economic, diplomatic, and historical context, to shape security sector 

requirements. [Lesson 2]

These reports should be designed to appropriately align DOD activities 

with long-term U.S. funding, serve as a tool for congressional oversight, and 

improve transparency. DOD’s assessments should include different courses 

of action for SSA missions based on (1) the U.S. political strategy, (2) the 

U.S. military capacity, (3) the impact that improving a partner nation’s 

operational and governing capabilities has on long-term sustainability, and 

(4) any dependency concerns. DOD must obtain input from State, Justice, 

and the intelligence community when drafting these assessments. Finally, 

DOD should request independent, third-party assessments to ensure 

“groupthink” and “mirror imaging” issues are identified and mitigated. 

2. DOD should lead the creation of new interagency doctrine for security

sector assistance that includes best practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, 

Bosnia, Kosovo, and Vietnam. [Lesson 1]

The United States lacks an interagency framework and decision-making 

processes for SSA sufficient to address the scope and magnitude of issues 

that arise in post-conflict or developing-world nations. Doctrine that 

addresses raising, training, and fiscally supporting an entire military and 

police force and its sustainment institutions and infrastructure is critical, 

because these efforts are very different from the typical SSA models where 

the United States provides advanced military support to a standing force, 

for example, in Pakistan, Jordan, Japan, or Israel. Constructing an entire 

security sector for a partner nation is likely to occur in post-conflict, 

fragile states and in the developing world, where construction of the 

nation’s critical infrastructure will be a requirement for the development 

and training of the national security forces. Any commitment to undertake 

security sector construction activities will require DOD, State, Congress, 

and the White House to commit to long-term planning and resourcing. 

The lack of security sector construction models undermines the U.S. 

government’s ability to develop a sound approach to security force 

development and appropriately link training combat forces with the 

necessary critical infrastructure and equipment requirements. The 

absence of common language and authoritative concepts has impeded 
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communication and coordination within the U.S. government and partner 

nations, and often pulled efforts in different directions. 

3. DOD should review the evolution of command structures and

assessment methodologies used in Afghanistan and Iraq to determine 

best practices and a recommended framework to be applied to future 

SSA missions. DOD should design new monitoring and evaluation tools 

capable of analyzing both tangible and intangible factors affecting 

force readiness. [Lesson 5]

For more than 15 years, the United States has been involved in largescale security sector reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 

both theaters of conflict, the U.S. military has used a variety of command 

structures and assessment tools to manage and evaluate the development 

of the host nation’s security forces. However, in each theater (and even 

over a period of time in each theater), the United States used approaches 

that differed organizationally and programmatically. To establish a baseline 

and be able to more accurately assess progress over time, a comprehensive 

methodology must be developed and, importantly, remain in use without 

substantive changes. 

U.S. officials had difficulty measuring the effectiveness of the Afghan army 

and police units. Too often, they relied upon tangible data, such as staffing, 

equipping, and training status, to assess readiness. In the U.S. military, 

such factors do not necessarily correlate to unit performance or battlefield 

effectiveness; intangibles such as leadership and unit cohesion play critical, 

often decisive, roles. In developing-world militaries, the correlation is 

likely to be even more tenuous due to the heightened impact of intangibles. 

Leadership and cohesion play key roles, but so do dependency, political 

influence, corruption, and malign activities. Readiness evaluations must 

take greater account of such factors. 

Assessments of institutional performance and capacity were even more 

challenging due to the Afghan political-military interface that was often 

opaque to U.S. military officials. Improved assessments will also help senior 

U.S. officials more clearly and reliably gauge strategic risk to U.S. interests 

and objectives. 

DOD should create an internal mechanism to leverage independent 

subject matter experts to provide regular assessments of SSA programs. 

Expert analysis must then be compared against internal DOD assessments 

and intelligence community assessments to identify irregularities and 

discrepancies. Additionally, any changes to assessment methodology must 

be noted, and historical reports must be annotated and updated, as needed.
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4. DOD should conduct a human capital, threat, and material needs

assessment of the host nation and design a force accordingly, with the 

appropriate systems and equipment. [Lesson 4]

If the host nation requires less advanced systems and equipment, DOD 

should consider leveraging foreign military allies to provide material 

and sustainment support to the U.S.-led SSA program. Through literacy 

programs, education, and long-term partnering, the U.S. military can 

gradually improve and advance systems and equipment to meet the 

changing human capital profile of the force. Prior to deployment, U.S. 

advisors should receive training in equipment and systems suitable for the 

host nation’s security forces, or develop agreements with partner nations 

who can provide training expertise the United States does not have. 

5. When creating specialized units such as special forces, DOD should

submit human capital assessments and sustainability analyses for 

both the specialized and conventional forces to the House and Senate 

Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. Force capability 

assessments must determine the best course of action, including 

redesigning requirements for each unit. [Lesson 4]

Human capital assessments should identify the strengths and limitations of 

the current force demographics within each service and the potential pool 

of recruits available. They should also take into account expected rates of 

attrition. Based on the capabilities of each service, the United States should 

clearly define a strategy as to what the force is expected to accomplish. 

As part of the report, DOD should include an assessment on the impact 

specialized units could have on the civil-military relations of the host 

nation, to include risk assessments on the potential of a military coup or the 

likelihood specialized units could be used as personal security for senior 

government officials. 

Removing the most literate and capable recruits while simultaneously 

continuing to design a modern conventional force with Western systems 

and weapons will slow the conventional force’s development. If specialized 

units are required in a developing-world nation, then the design of the 

conventional forces must be revisited. 

6. DOD should diversify the leadership assigned to develop foreign

military forces, to include civilian defense officials with expertise 

in the governing and accountability systems required in a military 

institution. [Lesson 8]

Uniformed military personnel often prioritize enhancing foreign military 

capabilities with less focus on the critical items of reform, management, 

and leadership. The U.S. government deploys a senior military commander 
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to oversee U.S. military operations in a foreign country. However, when 

the mission involves the development of a foreign security force, the 

deployment of a DOD civilian to oversee security sector governance and 

institutional development often does not occur. This leaves a void in subject 

matter expertise and experience required to help develop the non-kinetic 

aspects of the host nation’s security forces. 

7. DOD and the military services should institutionalize security sector

assistance and create specialized SSA units that are fully trained 

and ready to deploy rapidly for immediate SSA missions. DOD should 

create an institution responsible for coordinating and deconflicting 

SSA activities between the services and greater DOD, provide predeployment training, and serve as the lead proponent for security 

sector governance requirements, including defense institution building. 

[Lesson 1]

In 2017, the U.S. Army announced the creation of six Security Force 

Assistance Brigades (SFAB). This is a positive first step, and we recommend 

other services consider similar models. Currently, at Moody Air Force Base 

in Georgia, the U.S. Air Force has a group of air advisors who are serving 

four-year tours training Afghans on the C-29. Institutionalizing that program 

could serve as a positive first step for the U.S. Air Force to create a longterm internal capability.

DOD should also consider creating an institution responsible for security 

sector governance. Since most U.S. military units primarily focus on—and 

are better suited to address—the needs of the fighting force, an institutional 

capability with a deployable force of experts in defense institution building 

ensures the United States provides holistic support to the host nation’s 

security needs. 
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AFGHANISTAN-SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

While the United States continues to support the development and 

professionalization of the ANDSF, there are several actions that can be taken 

now to improve our SSA efforts. 

Executive Agency Recommendations

1. Realign the U.S. advisor mission to meet the operational and

organizational roles and responsibilities of the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI. 

[Lessons 2, 6, 9] 

DOD and State, working with DOJ, DHS, and NATO military leadership, 

should support an Afghan government top-to-bottom reevaluation of the 

operational and organizational roles and responsibilities of each element 

of the ANDSF. Under the proposed Afghanistan four-year plan, ANCOP 

and Afghan Border Police will transition to the MOD, and ANA special 

forces and the Afghan Air Force will be expanded to meet offensive 

operational requirements. The ANP will assume the role of community 

policing with a focus on rule of law. As the ANP becomes a community 

police force, DOD and State should review mission requirements and 

properly align U.S. advisors to train the ANP accordingly. An analysis of 

the ALP mission should be conducted to determine if the program should 

continue to exist and, if so, how the force should be properly aligned to 

mission requirements. A review of the proper alignment of the Afghan Air 

Force is needed to determine if it should be a separate military service 

that requires its own governing backbone or an element reliant on ANA 

institutional infrastructure. Finally, with the allocation of additional forces 

to MOD, a correlated increase of governing personnel, for example, in 

human resources, payroll, training and medical, is necessary. The United 

States should restructure its ministerial advisory effort to align with the 

new changes in force to ensure full coverage of critical security sector 

governing elements. 

2. Re-create proponent leads for the ANA and ANP. [Lessons 1, 2, 6]

DOD, State, DOJ, and DHS must identify the proper agency to serve as the 

proponent lead for the ANA and ANP. Both the Afghan special forces and 

Afghan Air Force have proponents in Afghanistan that serve as the lead 

element for the professional development of the force and at times serve 

as a key advocate for the force with the larger international community. 

Proponent leads are able to speak on behalf of the entire force and can 

ensure international assistance is properly aligned. Proponent leads for the 

ANA and ANP no longer exist, which removes an international advocate and 

results in support being provided at the regional level, but not throughout 

the entire chain of command. 
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3. Create a rear element to provide persistent and comprehensive

support to CSTC-A and the TAACs. [Lessons 1, 2]

DOD, State, DOJ, and DHS should create an element in the Washington, 

DC, area responsible for providing persistent and comprehensive support 

to forward-deployed elements involved in the train, advise, and assist 

mission. This organization should have a habitual relationship with CSTC-A 

and the TAACs, to include a rotation of deployed personnel to Afghanistan. 

Currently, the rotational schedules at CSTC-A and the regional and 

functional TAACs preclude the United States from optimizing its ability 

to assess ANDSF development and the effectiveness of the U.S. advisory 

mission over the long-term. A stateside element should be staffed with 

civilian and uniformed personnel on tours of no less than four years in 

support of the Afghanistan four-year plan. 

4. Synchronize troop decisions with NATO force generation conference 

schedules and begin discussions for post-2020 NATO support to 

Afghanistan. [Lesson 7]

The White House and DOD should synchronize troop decisions with NATO 

force-generation conference schedules. NATO typically meets twice per 

year to decide on NATO troop contributions for NATO-approved missions. 

Failure to synchronize the decision-making process in Washington and 

Brussels could result in extended timelines for NATO troop deployments. 

With a four-year plan to enhance the ANDSF under review, deployment of 

additional trainers and advisors with the required skillset will need to be 

decided soon. The White House and NATO should also synchronize support 

to the ANDSF post-2020, as draft design changes for the ANDSF will likely 

result in necessary training beyond the 2020 commitment. 

5. Mandate SSA pre-deployment training at service-level training centers.

[Lessons 1, 5, 8, 11]

DOD and State should require all future trainers, advisors, and SSA 

monitoring and evaluation personnel to attend an SSA certificate program 

at service-level training centers (like the Air Advisor Academy or the new 

Army Advisor Academy) or one of the department-level training centers, 

such the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies or the Foreign 

Service Institute. DISCS and FSI should modify programs and curricula to 

prioritize training for deploying units and ensure courses are focused on 

their country-specific requirements. CSTC-A advisors currently involved 

in plans to develop a “CSTC-A Academy” for deployed personnel should 

synchronize needs and pre-deployment requirements with stateside 

training missions. 
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6. Create incentives for military and civilian personnel with expertise in

SSA. [Lesson 11]

DOD and State should consider enticements for deployed military and 

civilian personnel who are experts in SSA activities and engaged in training 

and advising host-nation military and security forces. DOD should consider 

an equivalent of joint credit for deployed uniformed and civilian personnel 

in SSA missions. Congress should evaluate the pay cap threshold for 

deployed civilian Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel to ensure they 

receive full financial compensation during their deployment to an active 

combat zone. Additional incentives should be considered for personnel 

willing to commit to deployments of 24 months or more. 

7. Improve ANDSF governing, oversight, and accountability systems.

[Lessons 2, 3, 10]

The U.S. government must continue to support aggressive anticorruption 

investigations into the ANDSF leadership. While the Afghan government has 

taken some steps to investigate and arrest corrupt ANDSF leaders, more 

needs to be done. The United States should devote additional uniformed 

and civilian experts to partner with Afghan MOD and MOI personnel to 

develop improved governing, oversight, and accountability systems. 

8. Impose stringent conditionality mechanisms to eliminate the ANDSF’s 

culture of impunity. [Lessons 2, 5]

The U.S. military and civilian leadership should continue to use stringent 

conditionality mechanisms to eliminate the ANDSF’s culture of impunity. 

Historically, the United States provided blanket support for ANDSF 

development and increasing support to offset ANDSF weaknesses. For 

many, the ANDSF was “too big to fail.” It is imperative that senior Afghan 

leaders assume greater responsibility to sanction corrupt officials to break 

the cycle of expectation that positions of power lead to personal gain at 

the expense of those under their command. Where conditionality has been 

imposed, positive movement has been possible. 

9. Develop a civilian cadre of security sector governance personnel at

MOD and MOI. [Lessons 1, 2, 8]

DOD, State, and other key civilian agencies should support Afghan 

initiatives to create a civilian cadre of security sector governance personnel 

at MOD and MOI. Supporting the growth of a civil service should balance 

the current dominance of Afghan uniformed military in governing and 

sustainment departments. 
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194 | CHAPTER 9 | RECOMMENDATIONS

10. Institutionalize rotational schedules that allow for continuity in

mission and personnel. [Lessons 1, 5, 11]

DOD, State, and other key stakeholders should institutionalize new 

rotational schedules that allow for continuity in mission and personnel. 

Many senior military officers in Afghanistan are attempting to fix the 

“brain drain” issue that has plagued the ANDSF development mission; 

however, these efforts are based on personal initiative and have not been 

institutionalized as a best practice. 

11. Increase civilian advisors to the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI. [Lessons 6, 8]

The United States should increase the number of civilian advisors to the 

ANDSF, MOD, and MOI. SSA is a whole-of-government mission; however, 

military forces and contractors continue to dominate the train, advise, and 

assist mission, with limited to no parallel civilian effort. While the current 

advisory mission will help the development of kinetic and operational 

capabilities, the lack of comparable civilian advising on security sector 

governance and institutional development will cause the sector to lag. 

Based on the non-permissive environment and the requirement for a high 

level of security for personnel movements, the increase in civilian advising 

capabilities needs to be accompanied by an increase in security personnel 

to improve freedom of movement. 

DOD-Specific Recommendations

1. Implement best practices and develop mitigation strategies for the

Afghan Air Force recapitalization. [Lessons 1, 2, 4, 5, 8]

With congressional funding approved, DOD should apply best practices and 

develop mitigation strategies for the potential challenges the United States 

may encounter during the Afghan Air Force’s recapitalization (RECAP), 

based on lessons identified over the past 15 years in Afghanistan. DOD 

must ensure that operational requirements do not reduce the training and 

professional development standards required for the transition from Mi-17s 

to UH-60 Black Hawks. Also, with the introduction of over 100 UH-60 Black 

Hawks, the regional TAACs should increase training for ANA infantry units 

on combat arms integration between ground forces and air power. With 

the introduction of the UH-60 platform, the U.S. train, advise, and assist 

mission for the AAF should become a joint mission between the USAF 

and U.S. Army. The TAAC-Air advisory mission would benefit from and 

should consider a hybrid command structure between the two services and 

between the fixed-wing and rotary platforms of the AAF. As we have seen 

with the USAF’s training for the A-29, the U.S. Army must fully own the 

mission and requirements for the UH-60 transition. 
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At a minimum, DOD should consider mitigation strategies for the 

following potential situations. First, as this report highlights, operational 

requirements are routinely prioritized over the training and professional 

development of the force. With the planned introduction of UH-60 Black 

Hawks during the 2018 fighting season, DOD must identify what the U.S., 

NATO, and Afghan plans are to transition combat and lift capabilities when 

operational requirements are at their highest. Within this analysis, DOD 

must also acknowledge and resolve the Afghan army’s dependence on airlift 

and close air support during this time. Second, if the Afghans decide to 

maintain a higher level of Mi-17 airpower, either through leasing airframes 

from another NATO member or through other means of support, DOD must 

show how that will impact the initial training plans for the UH-60, which 

rely on the downsizing of the Mi-17 platform. Third, based on historically 

high levels of attrition, DOD must identify how the U.S. Army’s training 

plans will properly forecast the development of more than 100 pilots, most 

of whom are likely not part of the current Afghan Air Force. Fourth, with 

the current deficit in U.S. Army warrant officers, DOD must determine how 

the U.S. Army will staff the trainer and advisor needs of RECAP. Finally, 

DOD must identify the mechanisms the United States will put in place 

to prevent overuse of the UH-60, which would result in an increase in 

maintenance requirements and a shorter airframe life cycle. 

2. Conduct a human capital assessment of the ANDSF conventional and

special forces. [Lessons 2, 4, 5, 9]

The U.S. military leadership in Afghanistan should conduct a human capital 

assessment of the ANDSF conventional and special forces. Afghan special 

forces and the Afghan Air Force have proven to be the most capable and 

formidable offensive forces in the Afghan military, while the conventional 

forces struggle to implement the necessary security sector reforms, 

accountability, and oversight. Future efforts to bolster the ANDSF must 

be grounded in a better understanding of the strengths and limitations 

of the current human capital of each service and the potential pool of 

recruits available. If only certain recruits receive higher-end capabilities 

and advanced training, we need a clearly defined strategy as to what each 

component of the force is expected to accomplish. 

3. Review combat and logistics enabler support to the ANA. [Lessons 1, 2, 5]

DOD should review combat and logistics enabler support to the ANA and

draft a transition plan for aviation requirements. In part, the U.S. military’s 

train, advise, and assist efforts since 2002 resulted in conventional ANA 

units dependent on close air support, medical evacuation, route clearing, 

protected mobility, accurate fires overmatch, and ISR capabilities. This lack 

of combat enablers and resulting equipment losses and high casualty rates 
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196 | CHAPTER 9 | RECOMMENDATIONS

has resulted in fewer offensive operations for larger conventional forces 

who are more prone to stay on base in the absence of combat enablers. 

Afghan combat enablers were not part of initial design decisions and are 

still largely underdeveloped, compared to the operational requirements. 

As shown recently, the development of the Afghan A-29 close air support 

platform has resulted in more combat mobility for offensive operations by 

larger ANA formations. In 2017, the U.S. military has dramatically increased 

U.S. airstrikes to support the ANDSF; however, less support has been 

provided in the form of medical evacuation and logistics. 

4. Increase advisory capacity in ANA military academies and ANA

and ANP training centers. [Lessons 1, 2, 10]

DOD should place advisors in ANA military academies and training centers 

to develop and improve the ANA’s military doctrine and professional 

development system. The U.S. military greatly benefits from the value 

added by the U.S. academies and training centers, such as the Army’s 

Combined Arms Center, TRADOC, War College, and other institutions 

that leverage battlefield experience to improve future generations of the 

force. The ANA would likely derive equal benefits from similar professional 

development opportunities. 

In addition to prioritizing advisor support for these institutions, DOD 

should leverage U.S. and coalition institutional training, service schools, 

and academies to create ANDSF subject matter experts who have the 

knowledge base needed to deliver instruction and to define and develop 

training, doctrine, and force structure. Long-term sustainment and development of the ANDSF requires that ANDSF has resident subject matter experts. The current “train-the-trainer” model needs to be modified to ensure 

that real depth and expertise is developed. 

5. Expand the train, advise, and assist mission below the corps level.

[Lessons 1, 2]

DOD should expand the current train, advise, and assist mission to allow 

for close, enduring partnerships and increased opportunities for mentoring 

below the corps level. In 2012, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin 

Dempsey testified, “You can’t commute to work to train and advise.... The 

bond between our forces and the Afghan forces will ultimately be what gets 

[the Taliban] defeated.” If expansion below the corps level is implemented, 

DOD needs to provide guidance to military advisors to be wary of capacity 

substitution, furthering the dependency of Afghan units. A balance between 

close mentoring by U.S. subject matter experts and allowing the Afghans to 

lead and learn is critical. 
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6. Consider security requirements, such as guardian angels for trainers

and advisors, when making decisions on contributing additional troops. 

[Lessons 1, 2, 8]

SIGAR observed during a spring 2017 visit to Afghanistan that diminishing 

security has increased security requirements for U.S. military and civilian 

trainers and advisors. According to current U.S. military advisors, the 

military calculates guardian angel requirements based on the current 

threat, ranging from one to three security personnel for every advisor. For 

civilians, those numbers are significantly higher. Therefore, to get 3,000 

to 5,000 additional U.S. military advisors, the U.S. would have to deploy 

3,000 to 15,000 additional security personnel.

7. Ensure that the necessary technical oversight is available when

maintenance or training tasks are delegated to support contracts.

[Lessons 1, 4]

DOD must ensure that sufficient U.S. government expertise is provided to 

oversee contracts providing logistics, maintenance, or training support for 

the development of the ANDSF. In the case of training, there must be clearly 

articulated and measurable performance standards and methods to evaluate 

the quality of the training being provided. 

8. Consider deploying law enforcement professionals to advise the ANP.

[Lessons 6, 8] 

Conventional U.S. military units are ill-suited to train a foreign police force on 

community policing methods and rule of law. If U.S. civilian agencies (State 

or DOJ) remain risk-adverse and are unwilling or unable to deploy advisors 

to the sub-national level because of security concerns, DOD should consider 

leveraging the National Guard to deploy law enforcement professionals or 

use Military Police with expertise in community policing to perform the ANP 

advisory function. 

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 199

APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

SIGAR conducts its lessons learned program under the authority of 

Public Law 110-181 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, 

and in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity 

and Efficiency’s Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General

(commonly referred to as “the Silver Book”). These standards require that we 

carry out our work with integrity, objectivity, and independence, and provide 

information that is factually accurate and reliable. SIGAR’s lessons learned 

reports are broad in scope and based on a wide range of source material. To 

achieve the goal of high quality and to help ensure our reports are factually 

accurate and reliable, the reports are subject to extensive review by subject 

matter experts and relevant U.S. government agencies. 

The Reconstructing the ANDSF research team drew upon a wide array of 

sources. Much of the team’s documentary research focused on publicly available 

material, including reports by DOD, State, GAO, NATO, ISAF, Congressional 

Research Service, and coalition partner nations, as well as congressional 

testimony from government officials and experts. The team also consulted 

declassified material from an archive maintained by former Secretary of Defense 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Donald Rumsfeld. These official sources were complemented by hundreds of 

nongovernmental sources, including books, think tank reports, journal articles, 

press reports, academic studies, international conference agreements, field 

research, and analytical reports by international and advocacy organizations. 

The research team also benefited from SIGAR’s access to material that is 

not publicly available, including thousands of documents provided by U.S. 

government agencies. State provided cables, internal memos and briefings, 

opinion analysis reports, and planning and programmatic documents. DOD 

provided documents on the U.S. military’s plans and programs to develop 

the ANDSF. NATO provided access to the NATO archives that allowed our 

researchers to view reports concerning NATO’s plans and assessments of 

ANDSF development. Team researchers also reviewed documents obtained from 

the U.S. Army Center of Military History. A body of classified material, including 

U.S. embassy cables and intelligence reports, provided helpful context; however, 

as an unclassified document, this report makes no use of that material. Finally, 

the team also drew from SIGAR’s own work, embodied in its quarterly reports to 

Congress and its investigations, audits, inspections, and special project reports.

While the documentary evidence tells a story, it cannot substitute for the 

experience, knowledge, and wisdom of people who participated in the 

Afghanistan reconstruction effort. Therefore, the research team interviewed 

or held informal discussions with more than 100 individuals with direct and 

indirect knowledge of facts on the ground that affected U.S. efforts to train, 

advise, assist, and equip the ANDSF. Interviews and informal roundtable 

discussions were conducted with U.S., Afghan, and other international experts 

from academia, think tanks, NGOs, and government entities; current and former 

U.S. civilian and military officials deployed to Afghanistan; and personnel 

from intelligence agencies and the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice. 

The team also drew upon dozens of interviews conducted by other SIGAR 

researchers and auditors. 

Interviews provided valuable insights into the rationale behind decisions, the 

debates within and between agencies, and the frustrations that spanned the 

years, but often remained unwritten. Due, in part, to the politically sensitive 

nature of security sector assistance efforts, a majority of the interviewees 

wished to remain anonymous. For those still working in the government, 

confidentiality was particularly important. Therefore, to preserve anonymity, our 

interview citations often cite a “senior U.S. official” or “U.S. military advisor.” 

We conducted our interviews during research trips to military installations 

and Afghanistan, and in visits to U.S. government departments and agencies 

in Washington. 
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SEPTEMBER 2017 | 201

Reconstructing the ANDSF reflects careful, thorough consideration of the wide 

range of sources; however, it is not an exhaustive treatment of the topic. Given 

the timeline and scale of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and the divided 

responsibility of security sector assistance among the coalition and military 

services, the report does not aim to fully address how tens of thousands of 

U.S. civilian and military officials dealt with the SSA mission on a daily basis 

since 2002. Rather, the report focuses on certain key events and issues, and 

provides context on the development of the ANDSF, relevant U.S. policies and 

initiatives, and competing U.S. priorities. From these, we derive lessons and 

recommendations to inform current and future contingency operations. 

The report underwent an extensive process of peer review. We sought and 

received feedback on the draft report from six subject matter experts;

five additional subject matter experts reviewed the draft lessons and 

recommendations. These experts included Americans, Afghans, and Europeans, 

each of whom had significant experience working on or in Afghanistan. These 

reviewers provided thoughtful, detailed comments on the report, which we 

incorporated, as possible. 

Over the course of this study, the team routinely engaged with many officials 

at the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice to familiarize them with our 

preliminary findings, lessons, and recommendations and to solicit formal and 

informal feedback to improve our understanding of the key issues, as viewed 

by each department. DOD, State, and Justice were also given an opportunity to 

formally review and comment on the final draft of the report. In addition, we 

met with departmental representatives to receive their feedback on the report 

firsthand. Although we incorporated agencies’ comments where appropriate, the 

analysis, conclusions, and recommendations of this report remain SIGAR’s own. 
202 | APPENDIX B

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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF RELEVANT AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS

Since its establishment in 2008, SIGAR has conducted a series of audits and 

inspections focused on U.S. reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. Of 

those, 49 were related specifically to the development of the ANDSF:

• Capabilities of the ANDSF and assessments of those capabilities (5 reports)

• Infrastructure (27 reports)

• Contracting and management (5 reports)

• Equipment and other resources provided to the ANDSF, and maintenance of that 

equipment (8 reports)

• Training (1 report)

• Personnel management of the ANDSF (3 reports)

This is a summary of these 49 audits and investigations.

Capabilities

1. SIGAR Audit 10-11, Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of 

Afghan Security Force Assessments, June 29, 2010.

SIGAR found that the rating system in use at the time, the Capability 

Milestone (CM) system, had not provided reliable or consistent assessments 

of ANDSF capabilities, had overstated ANDSF operational capabilities, 

and had inadvertently created disincentives for ANDSF development. 

Moreover, the highest-level rating criteria for ANDSF units did not include 

the capability of sustaining independent operations.

2. SIGAR Audit 13-13, Afghan Special Mission Wing: DOD Moving 

Forward with $771.8 Million Purchase of Aircraft that the Afghans 

Cannot Operate and Maintain, January 17, 2013.

SIGAR found that, as of January 2013, challenges facing the Afghan 

Special Mission Wing (SMW) included: 1) having less than one-quarter of 

the necessary personnel to achieve full strength; 2) ongoing recruitment 

difficulties due to illiteracy and vetting requirements; 3) lack of a plan 

to achieve full strength; 4) DOD contractors performing 50 percent of 

maintenance and repairs and 70 percent of logistics for the SMW’s current 

fleet; and 5) only 7 of the 47 Afghan pilots assigned to SMW were fully 

mission qualified to fly with night-vision goggles.

3. SIGAR Audit 14-33, Afghan Security Forces: Actions Needed to 

Improve Plans for Sustaining Capability Assessment Effort, 

February 2014.

SIGAR found that Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) rating 

definition levels for ANDSF units assessed from January 2012 to July 2013 

showed there was some improvement in the ANDSF’s capacity to man, 
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train, and equip its forces. However, the number of ANA and ANP units not 

assessed also increased during this time due to the drawdown of coalition 

forces. As coalition forces draw down and fewer advisor teams are assigned 

to ANDSF units, IJC officials stated they will have less insight into the 

ANDSF’s capabilities and will rely more on the ANDSF for assessment 

data. Officials stated, this will decrease their overall confidence in ANDSF 

assessments as a whole. SIGAR noted that the IJC had developed a new 

assessment tool, the Regional ANDSF Assessment Report (RASR), because 

the CUAT was too difficult to read, inconsistently applied, and not useful.

4. SIGAR Audit 16-03, Afghan Local Police, October 2015.

SIGAR found that the effectiveness of the ALP was hindered by lack of 

logistical support, including supplies that were often diverted, delayed, of 

inferior quality, or heavily pilfered, increasing the likelihood of attrition. 

SIGAR also identified several payroll irregularities, primarily regarding the 

salary disbursement process

5. SIGAR Audit 16-15, Afghan National Engineer Brigade, January 2016.

SIGAR found that the National Engineer Brigade (NEB) was incapable of 

operating independently, largely due to delays in basic training and the 

provision of engineer training equipment, even after USFOR-A lowered the 

goal to train the NEB by December 31, 2014, to a “partially capable” level.

Infrastructure 

1. SIGAR Audit 10-09, ANA Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All 

Quality and Oversight Requirements; Serious Soil Issues Need to Be 

Addressed, May 30, 2010.

SIGAR found that the project was behind schedule and identified 

construction problems, serious soil stability issues (including severe 

settling of the soil under several garrison structures), and improper grading 

at the site that put the U.S. investment in the garrison at risk. In addition, 

SIGAR found that Afghanistan Engineer District‐North did not meet certain 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) requirements for conducting 

oversight and maintaining contract files.

2. SIGAR Audit 10-10, ANA Garrison at Gamberi Appears Well Built 

Overall but Some Construction Issues Need to Be Addressed, 

May 30, 2010.

SIGAR found that overall, the garrison appeared to be well-built, but some 

construction issues needed to be addressed, including poor flood-control 

measures, inadequate grading, and a deteriorating bridge, as well as 

potential difficulties securing the weapons training range. 
204 | APPENDIX B

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

3. SIGAR Audit 10-12, ANP Compound at Kandahar Generally 

Met Contract Terms but Has Project Planning, Oversight, and 

Sustainability Issues, July 22, 2010.

SIGAR found there were several project delays and inadequate project 

planning. In addition, USACE quality assurance procedures were not fully 

adhered to. CSTC-A officials stated GIROA did not have the financial or 

technical capacity to sustain ANDSF facilities in the near term once they 

were completed. 

4. SIGAR Audit 10-14, ANA Garrison at Farah Appeared Well Built 

Overall, but Some Construction Issues Should Be Addressed, 

July 30, 2010.

SIGAR observed some construction issues related to site grading, asphalt 

roads, and silt accumulation that needed to be addressed, but overall 

contract management and oversight met contract requirements. SIGAR 

also found that, according to CSTC-A, GIROA did not have the financial or 

technical capacity to sustain all ANDSF facilities. 

5. SIGAR Audit 11-03, ANP District Headquarters Facilities in Helmand 

and Kandahar Provinces Have Significant Construction Deficiencies 

Due to Lack of Oversight and Poor Contractor Performance, 

October 27, 2010.

SIGAR found that the project was delayed and that minimal funds were 

withheld from contractor payments to cover deficient work. Although 

USACE and the Afghan contracted firm, Basirat Construction, developed 

project-specific quality assurance and control plans, these plans were not 

implemented effectively. USACE made payments based on incomplete 

quality assurance reports and photographs taken by the contractor.

6. SIGAR Audit 11-06, Inadequate Planning for ANSF Facilities 

Increases Risks for $11.4 Billion Program, January 26, 2011.

SIGAR found that CSTC-A had not developed a long-term construction plan, 

placing the facilities program at risk of not meeting ANDSF strategic and 

operational needs. In addition, portions of the ANDSF Comprehensive Plan 

for Facilities Development were out of date, and most ANDSF facilities 

plans were not completed; nevertheless, this plan was the most complete 

listing and analysis of ANDSF facilities that CSTC-A could provide. 

SIGAR also found that CSTC-A did not have a maintenance plan linking 

requirements to long-term construction plans.
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7. SIGAR Audit 11-09, ANA Facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat 

Generally Met Construction Requirements, but Contractor Oversight 

Should Be Strengthened, May 25, 2011.

SIGAR found that the projects at Mazar-e Sharif and Herat experienced cost 

increases and project delays, but the quality of construction at both sites 

generally met the terms of the contract requirements. However, SIGAR 

identified minor problems, including inadequate grading in some areas that 

could lead to flooding. Although U.S. Air Force Center for Engineering and 

the Environment (AFCEE) and CSTC-A have taken steps to provide for the 

sustainment of the Mazar-e Sharif and Herat facilities, these efforts did not 

occur in a timely manner.

8. SIGAR Audit 12-02, Better Planning and Oversight Could Have 

Reduced Construction Delays and Costs at the Kabul Military 

Training Center, October 26, 2011.

SIGAR found that the Kabul Military Training Center’s (KMTC) construction 

cost more and took longer than planned. Costs for the project increased by 

$12.5 million and were delayed by over 18 months. In addition, inadequate 

quality assurance contributed to electrical problems. Finally, KMTC may be 

unsustainable without continued U.S. assistance. 

9. SIGAR Audit 12-03, Afghan National Security University Has 

Experienced Cost Growth and Schedule Delays, and Contract 

Administration Needs Improvement, October 26, 2011.

SIGAR found that construction at the Afghan National Security University 

(ANSU) experienced cost growth and schedule delays. The task order 

ceiling price grew from $70.2M to $91.5M, and the scheduled completion 

was delayed from June 2010 to October 2011. The cost growth and 

schedule delay were due to a combination of added work, costs the 

contractor incurred while waiting for site demining, CSTC-A’s changing 

design preferences, and increased construction costs. Overall, AFCEE paid 

$21.3 million more for 18 fewer facilities and eight fewer projects than 

originally planned.

10. SIGAR Inspection 12-01, Construction Deficiencies at Afghan Border 

Police Bases Put $19 Million Investment at Risk, July 30, 2012.

SIGAR found construction deficiencies at the three bases it inspected. One 

base, Lal Por 2, had no viable water supply and therefore was not being 

used. The Nazyan base was also deemed to be potentially uninhabitable 

in the future if the septic system continued to back up into the pipes, 

causing overflow.
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

11. SIGAR Inspection 13-01, Kunduz ANA Garrison: Army Corps of 

Engineers Released DynCorp of All Contractual Obligations despite 

Poor Performance and Structural Failures, October 25, 2012.

SIGAR found that, despite the unsatisfactory performance of the contractor, 

DynCorp, in completing construction at the site, USACE released DynCorp 

from further contractual liability in December 2011 and paid it $70.8 million 

as part of a negotiated settlement. SIGAR found USACE did not comply 

with provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) 49.107(a), 

which required an independent audit and review of a settlement proposal 

exceeding $100,000.

12. SIGAR Audit 13-01, Afghan National Security Forces Facilities: 

Concerns with Funding, Oversight, and Sustainability for Operations 

and Maintenance, October 30, 2012.

SIGAR found that the Afghan government would likely be incapable of fully 

sustaining ANDSF facilities after the transition in 2014 and the expected 

decrease in U.S. and coalition support. The Afghan government’s challenges 

in assuming operations and maintenance responsibilities included a lack 

of sufficient numbers and quality of personnel, as well as undeveloped 

budgeting, procurement, and logistics systems.

13. SIGAR Inspection 13-02, Wardak Province National Police Training 

Center: Contract Requirements Generally Met, but Deficiencies and 

Maintenance Issues Need to be Addressed, October 30, 2012.

SIGAR found that, although the building intended as a fire station met 

contract requirements, the National Police Training Center (NPTC) did 

not have any firefighters or firefighting equipment. In addition, the living 

quarters intended for firefighting staff were being used to house visiting 

personnel. Deficiencies included roof leaks around the vehicle exhaust 

ventilation pipes in the vehicle maintenance building and a missing 

storm water outlet grating in the perimeter wall, which could enable a 

person to gain unauthorized access to the compound. In addition, lack of 

maintenance had allowed silt and construction debris to accumulate in the 

storm drain system, which could result in flooding and sediment buildup.

14. SIGAR Inspection 13-03, Gamberi Afghan National Army Garrison: 

Site Grading and Infrastructure Maintenance Problems Put Facilities 

at Risk, October 2012.

SIGAR found several problems with flood control measures, site grading, 

and a deteriorating bridge at the $129.8 million Gamberi garrison site. 

SIGAR also observed that USACE had done little to prevent or repair 

problems with a deteriorating bridge near the entrance which was then 

being replaced, and its site grading efforts were ineffective. Further, SIGAR 
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determined that the hydraulic design had flaws that could lead to a future 

structural failure, making the culvert unsafe or unusable.

15. SIGAR Inspection 13-04, Kunduz Afghan National Police Provincial 

Headquarters: After Construction Delays and Cost Increases, Concerns 

Remain about the Facility’s Usability and Sustainability, January 2013.

SIGAR’s inspection identified usability and sustainability issues with the 

facility. Specifically, a failure of the facility’s only source of power could lead 

to significant sewage overflows that would threaten the health and safety of 

the facility and its occupants. There were also no plans for an operations and 

maintenance contract or to train Afghans to keep complex systems such as 

sewage treatment and electrical power in good working order.

16. SIGAR Inspection 13-05, Iman Sahib Border Police Company 

Headquarters in Kunduz Province: $7.3 Million Facility Sits Largely 

Unused, January 2013.

SIGAR’s inspection was limited, covering only portions of three buildings 

at the 12-building facility because most buildings were locked and on-site 

personnel did not have keys. No major construction quality issues were 

identified at the buildings SIGAR inspected. Built with a capacity for 175 

persons, only about 12 Afghan personnel were on site during SIGAR’s 

inspection, and they were unaware of plans to move additional staff to the 

facility. Additionally, there was neither an operations and maintenance 

contract nor a plan to train Afghan personnel to operate and maintain 

equipment, raising questions about the Afghan government’s ability to 

sustain the facility.

17. SIGAR Inspection 13-06, Afghan National Police Main Road Security 

Company, Kunduz Province, Is behind Schedule and May Not Be 

Sustainable, April 2013.

SIGAR observed a soil compaction process that put the ANP Main 

Road Security Company compound at risk for future structural failure. 

Further, at the time of the inspection, no plans existed for who would be 

responsible for operations and maintenance of the facilities when the site 

was transferred to the Afghan government. Failure to address the soil 

compaction, back-up power source, and operations and maintenance issues 

could place the $1.7 million U.S. investment in this facility at risk.

18. SIGAR Audit 13-18, Afghan National Security Forces: Additional 

Action Needed to Reduce Waste in $4.7 Billion Worth of Planned and 

Ongoing Construction Projects, September 13, 2013. 

CSTC-A lacked a comprehensive basing plan for the ANDSF that considered 

future ANDSF reductions and excess capacity in existing facilities. 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Current construction requirements reflected the approved 352,000 ANDSF 

personnel level and did not take into account planned reductions in the 

number of ANDSF personnel. As a result, when the ANDSF decreased to 

228,500 personnel, ANDSF facilities would have excess personnel capacity. 

Using CSTC-A’s 2012 base construction schedule, SIGAR identified 52 

projects that might not meet ISAF’s December 2014 construction deadline, 

increasing cost and oversight risks if these projects were continued. 

SIGAR’s assessment differed from that of CSTC-A, which estimated 

that only one facility, worth $16 million, would not meet the 2014 ISAF 

construction deadline.

19. SIGAR Inspection 14-05, Archi District Police Headquarters: 

Extensive Mold, Lack of Running Water, and Inoperable Electrical 

Systems Show Facilities Are Not Being Sustained, October 2013.

SIGAR found that, although the force protection measures appeared to be 

well constructed, it was unable to determine whether they had been built 

in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction 

standards, because USACE officials could not locate the project’s essential 

construction files, including documents such as the contract’s technical 

specifications and requirements. Additional buildings had been constructed 

on site, but neither USACE nor Afghan officials knew who built these 

additional buildings, when they were built, or how much they cost. SIGAR 

found during its November 2012 inspection that these additional facilities 

were in a state of disrepair, with an estimated 40 ANP personnel living and 

working in facilities with extensive mold.

20. SIGAR Inspection 14-41, Camp Monitor: Most Construction Appears to 

Have Met Contract Requirements, but It Is Unclear if Facility Is Being 

Used as Intended, March 12, 2014.

SIGAR found that the facilities inspected at Camp Monitor appeared 

to be well constructed, but SIGAR could not fully assess the camp’s 

lighting, heating, water, sewer, and other mechanical systems because 

the generators were not operational at the time of inspection. The camp’s 

greatest shortcoming was the lack of a dining facility, which prevented the 

ANA from occupying and using the facility.

21. SIGAR Inspection 15-25, ANA Camp Commando Phase II: Power Plant 

and Fuel Point Not Fully Operational Nearly Two Years after Project 

Completion, January 6, 2015.

SIGAR found that USACE accepted all three facilities built under Phase II at 

Camp Commando and paid the contractor the full amount of the contract, 

roughly $18.7 million. However, during SIGAR’s inspections in February and 

April 2014, SIGAR found that the generators were not synchronized and could 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 209

only provide about 25 percent of the planned total power output, that the 

fuel pumps at the fuel point had not been used, and that the dining facility 

was built for 280 Afghan soldiers but was handling 1,600 soldiers. SIGAR 

was concerned that the U.S. government had issued a new contract, which 

included approximately $3.1 million in Phase III to complete work on or 

make repairs to the camp’s power system and construct another fuel point. 

22. SIGAR Inspection 15-27, Afghan Special Police Training Center’s 

Dry Fire Range: Poor Contractor Performance and Poor Government 

Oversight Led to Project Failure, January 13, 2015.

SIGAR found that within four months of the U.S. government spending 

nearly a half a million dollars to construct the Afghan Special Police 

Training Center’s Dry Fire Range (DFR), the range’s buildings began to 

disintegrate. This disintegration was caused by the contractor failing to 

adhere to contract requirements and international building standards, and 

using substandard materials. Further, the DFR’s construction was plagued 

by poor government oversight throughout all phases of the contract. 

RCC failed to ensure proper design of the facility and failed to hold the 

contractor accountable for its work. Due to the range’s safety and long-term 

sustainability being compromised, Afghan authorities demolished the DFR 

and were rebuilding it with funds from the MOI.

23. SIGAR Inspection 15-51, Afghan National Army Slaughterhouse: 

Stalled Construction Project Was Terminated After $1.25 Million 

Spent, April 20, 2015.

SIGAR found that the ANA slaughterhouse construction project in Kabul 

Province was terminated for convenience in October 2013, nine months 

after construction began and the contractor was paid $1.25 million 

for incurred costs. Prior to termination, in September 2013, USACE 

suspended the contract because of the contractor’s unsatisfactory 

performance. At the time of the suspension, ISAF was terminating or 

de-scoping some construction projects, in order to reduce the ANDSF’s 

infrastructure inventory, to increase the likelihood that the Afghans would 

be able to sustain some of the facilities following ISAF withdrawal. The 

slaughterhouse was terminated as part of this process, with ISAF citing 

the potential for saving the U.S. government $10.5 million in additional 

construction costs.

24. SIGAR Inspection 15-74, $14.7 Million Warehouse Facility at 

Kandahar Airfield: Construction Delays Prevented the Facility from 

Being Used as Intended, July 15, 2015.

SIGAR found that the $14.7 million warehouse facility was well-built, but 

lengthy construction delays led to the facility never being used as intended. 
210 | APPENDIX B

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

SIGAR also found that the U.S. Army, which developed the requirement 

for the warehouse, did not take action to prevent more than $400,000 

in modifications from being made to the project after the August 2013 

decision was made to end the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) mission 

in Kandahar.

25. SIGAR Inspection 16-16, Afghan Ministry of Defense Headquarters: 

$154.7 Million Building Appears Well Built, but Has Several 

Construction Issues that Should Be Assessed, February 11, 2016.

SIGAR found that the MOD headquarters in Kabul, with some exceptions, 

generally met contract requirements and appeared well-built. However, 

delays resulting from the ANA refusing the contractor access to the 

site, and others such as weather, security, and funding issues, emerged. 

As a result, the cost to complete the building rose from $48.7 million 

to $154.7 million, or more than three times the original estimated cost. 

Similarly, although the headquarters building was essentially complete, it 

took almost five years longer to complete than originally anticipated. As of 

January 7, 2016, the building was not fully occupied.

26. SIGAR Inspection 16-26, Afghan Air Force University: Contract 

Requirements were Generally Met, but Instances of Non-compliance, 

Poor Workmanship, and Inadequate Maintenance Need to be 

Addressed, March 30, 2016.

SIGAR found that the Afghan Air Force University’s renovation work and 

new construction was largely completed according to the terms of the 

contract. However, during the inspection, SIGAR found some instances 

of noncompliance with the contract, as well as some instances of poor 

workmanship. Noncompliance issues involved the lack of required 

plumbing insulation, missing ventilation fans, and the lack of protective 

metal strips on stairways. SIGAR also found that the contractor substituted 

lower-grade materials in at least 14 buildings without prior approval, worth 

roughly $80,000 in cost adjustments.

27. SIGAR Inspection 17-03, Special Mission Wing Facilities at Kandahar 

Airfield: Construction Generally Met Contract Requirements, but 

Problems with Noncompliance, Maintenance, and Quality Assurance 

Need to be Addressed, October 14, 2016.

SIGAR found that the Special Mission Wing facilities and infrastructure 

were generally constructed in accordance with contract requirements 

and technical specifications. However, SIGAR found five instances in 

which ECC did not fully comply with contract requirements and technical 

specifications, some of which had health and safety implications, and that 

USACE did not fully comply with its own quality assurance procedures.
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 211

Contracting and Management

1. SIGAR Audit 9-01, Contract Oversight Capabilities of the Defense 

Department’s Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

(CSTC-A) Need Strengthening, May 19, 2009.

SIGAR found that CSTC-A lacked effective contract oversight capabilities. 

Although CSTC-A was responsible for the management of training programs 

for the ANDSF, it did not have mechanisms necessary to ensure that U.S. 

funds were managed effectively and spent wisely.

2. SIGAR Audit 13-03, Afghan Police Vehicle Maintenance Contract: 

Actions Needed to Prevent Millions of Dollars From Being Wasted, 

January 2013.

SIGAR found that CSTC-A unnecessarily paid $6.3 million from April 2011 

to September 2012 because the U.S. Army Contracting Command and 

CSTC-A based the firm fixed-price rates on vehicles purchased for the ANP, 

but they did not account for vehicles that had not been seen for service 

in over a year or had been destroyed. CSTC-A took steps to address these 

concerns beginning on December 30, 2012, by removing 7,324 vehicles 

that not been seen for service in over a year or which had been destroyed. 

CSTC-A estimated the changes would save the government approximately 

$5.5 million per year.

3. SIGAR Audit 13-15, Afghanistan Public Protection Force: Concerns 

Remain about Force’s Capabilities and Costs, July 30, 2013.

SIGAR found that the effect of the transition to the Afghanistan Public 

Protection Force (APPF) had been minimal on projects in SIGAR’s sample, 

but only because implementing partners hired risk management companies 

(RMCs) to fill APPF capacity gaps and perform critical functions. Without 

RMCs, the APPF would be unable to provide the full range of security 

services needed by USAID implementing partners. Implementing partners 

reported that APPF personnel provided little benefit and were unable to 

perform required duties.

4. SIGAR Audit 13-06, Contracting With The Enemy: DOD Has Limited 

Assurance that Contractors with Links to Enemy Groups Are 

Identified and their Contracts Terminated, April 11, 2013.

SIGAR identified several weaknesses in DOD’s process for ensuring U.S. 

government contracting funds were not provided to persons and entities 

supporting the insurgency and opposing U.S. and coalition forces. As a 

result of these weaknesses, millions of contracting dollars could be diverted 

to forces seeking to harm U.S. military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan 

and derail the multi-billion dollar reconstruction effort.
212 | APPENDIX B

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Equipment, Resources, and Maintenance 

1. SIGAR Audit 12-04, DOD Improved Its Accountability for Vehicles 

Provided to the Afghan National Security Forces, but Should Follow 

Up on End-Use Monitoring Findings, January 12, 2012.

SIGAR found that CSTC-A had not previously submitted claims for vehicles 

damaged or equipment and parts lost or stolen during transit, and so was 

not reimbursed by the transportation contractors. Rather, CSTC-A paid 

separately for repairs and replacement of missing equipment and parts. 

SIGAR also observed that CSTC-A was providing fuel to the ANA for 

vehicles that had, in fact, been destroyed.

2. SIGAR Audit 12-14, Interim Report on Afghan National Army 

Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants, September 10, 2012.

SIGAR found that CSTC‐A did not have accurate or supportable information 

on how much U.S. money was needed for ANA fuel, where and how the 

fuel was actually used, or how much fuel had been lost or stolen. Despite 

these significant weaknesses, CSTC‐A proposed to increase future ANA 

petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) funding levels through direct ASFF 

contributions. SIGAR determined that, before investing additional resources 

and transferring fuel responsibilities to the Afghan government, CSTC‐A 

needed to develop accurate and supportable ANA fuel requirements and 

address outstanding fuel accountability issues.

3. SIGAR Audit Report 13-04, Afghan National Army: Controls over Fuel 

for Vehicles, Generators, and Power Plants Need Strengthening to 

Prevent Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, January 2013.

SIGAR found CSTC-A lacked accountability in the process used to order, 

receive, and pay for POL for the ANA. Deficiencies included missing 

records, incomplete and inaccurate records, and overestimates of the 

amount of POL required by the ANA. SIGAR was also critical of CSTC-A’s 

plans to directly contribute more than $1 billion in U.S. funds to the Afghan 

government to purchase fuel for the ANA in light of the questionable ability 

of the MOD to act as a responsible steward of these resources.

4. SIGAR Audit Report 14-01, Afghan National Police Fuel Program: 

Concerted Efforts Needed to Strengthen Oversight of U.S. Funds, 

October 2013.

SIGAR found that the U.S. Central Command Joint Theater Support 

Contracting Command (C-JTSCC) and CSTC-A had limited oversight of fuel 

purchases for the ANP.
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5. Audit Report 14-03, Afghan National Army: Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan Lacks Key Information on 

Inventory in Stock and Requirements for Vehicle Spare Parts, 

October 2013.

SIGAR found that CSTC-A was placing orders for vehicle spare parts 

based on inaccurate information provided by the ANA. The ANA had not 

consistently maintained inventory records and continued to place orders 

for parts without accurate demand or usage data. The audit arose after 

the ISAF Commander’s Advisory and Assistance Team reported in October 

2012 that CSTC-A could not account for about $230 million worth of spare 

parts and had ordered $138 million of additional parts without sufficient 

accountability. SIGAR also found that CSTC-A could not provide adequate 

documentation to confirm transfers to the ANA of vehicle spare parts 

delivered from 2010 through 2012.

6. SIGAR Audit 14-84, Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed 

to Improve Weapons Accountability, July 2014.

SIGAR found that errors and discrepancies often occurred between the two 

main systems used by DOD to account for weapons provided to the ANDSF 

because they were not linked to each other and required manual data entry.

7. SIGAR Audit 16-49, Afghan National Army Technical Equipment 

Maintenance Program: DOD Has Taken Steps to Remedy Poor 

Management of Vehicle Maintenance Program, July 2016.

SIGAR found that the capacity of the Afghans to manage the supply chain 

was lacking, the costs of spare parts were significantly underestimated, 

performance metrics did not accurately assess the contractor performance 

or progress, ANA maintenance capability did not develop as anticipated, 

contract oversight declined due to deteriorating security conditions, and the 

contractor was paid based on the number of vehicles in the fleet, instead of 

the number of vehicles repaired.

8. SIGAR Audit 14-85, Afghan Mobile Strike Force Vehicles: Contractor 

Met Requirements, but Long-Term Operation and Maintenance 

Remain a Concern, July 2014.

SIGAR found that all of the vehicles were properly documented and 

transferred to DOD. In addition, as of March 25, 2014, DOD had transferred 

419 Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV) to the ANA and could account for 

the remaining 215 vehicles, 204 of which would eventually be transferred 

to the ANA and 11 of which DOD would retain as test vehicles. One of the 

two contractors involved, Textron, also met other contract requirements, 

such as receiving and inspecting MSFVs upon arrival; providing initial spare 

parts; and maintaining training vehicles.
214 | APPENDIX B

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Training 

1. SIGAR Audit 14-30, Afghan National Security Forces: Despite 

Reported Successes, Concerns Remain About Literacy Program 

Results, Contract Oversight, Transition and Sustainment, 

January 2014.

SIGAR found that, despite a $200 million literacy training contract, the overall 

literacy rate of the ANDSF was unknown. Additionally, the training programs 

focused heavily on the numbers of graduates, neglecting to track how many 

graduates remained on active duty, became casualties, or left the force.

Personnel Management

1. SIGAR Audit 11-10, Despite Improvements in MOI’s Personnel 

Systems, Additional Actions are Needed to Completely Verify ANP 

Payroll Costs and Workforce Strength, May 25, 2011.

SIGAR found that many weaknesses identified earlier by other U.S. 

government audit agencies, such as irreconcilable and unverified data, a 

lack of data-reconciliation and verification procedures, and difficulties 

implementing electronic systems, continued to pose challenges to CSTC-A, 

the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Law and Order Trust Fund 

for Afghanistan (LOTFA), and the MOI and MOF.

2. SIGAR Audit 15-26, Afghan National Police Personnel and Payroll 

Data, January 2015. 

SIGAR found problems with tracking and reporting ANP personnel and 

payroll data that could result in personnel being paid for days not worked. 

This was data that CSTC-A and UNDP relied on the MOI and ANP to collect 

and accurately report.

3. SIGAR Audit 15-54, Afghan National Army Personnel and Payroll 

Data, April 2015.

SIGAR found that, despite U.S. and coalition efforts to develop effective 

ANA personnel and payroll processes, those processes exhibited extensive 

internal control weaknesses. Essential human resource management 

tools in place in Afghanistan relied on the MOD and ANA to collect and 

accurately report ANA personnel and payroll data; however, the ANA’s 

process for collecting unit-level attendance data, upon which all ANA 

personnel and payroll data was based, had limited oversight and weak 

controls, and was not consistently applied across ANA locations.
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 215

APPENDIX C: ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym Definition

AABIS Afghan Automated Biometric Identification 

System

AAF Afghan Air Force

AAN Afghanistan Analysts Network

AECA Arms Export Control Act

AHRIMS Afghan Human Resource Information 

Management System

AIA Afghan Interim Authority

ALP Afghan Local Police

AMF Afghan Militia Force

ANA Afghan National Army

ANAAC Afghan National Army Air Corps

ANAP Afghan National Auxiliary Police

ANASF Afghan National Army Special Forces

ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police

ANDSF Afghan National Defense and 

Security Forces

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

ANDSF ID ANDSF Identification Card System

ANP Afghan National Police

ANASOC Afghan National Army Special 

Operations Command

APPF Afghan Public Protection Force

AP3 Afghan Public Protection Program

APPS Afghan Personnel Pay System

ASFF Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

AUP Afghan Uniformed Police

AWOL Absent Without Official Leave

BPC Building Partner Capacity

CAPTF-A Combined Air Power Transition 

Force–Afghanistan

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program

CFC-A Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CJSOR Combined Joint Statement of Requirements

CLS Contractor Logistics Support

CM Capability Milestone

COIN Counterinsurgency

COMISAF Commander, International Security 

Assistance Force

CRS Congressional Research Service

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition 

Command–Afghanistan

Acronym Definition

CTC Central Training Center

CUAT Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, 

and Reintegration

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DIAG Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups

DIB Defense Institution Building

DIRI Defense Institutional Reform Initiative

DISCS Defense Institute of Security Cooperation 

Studies

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DODIG Department of Defense Inspector General

DOJ Department of Justice

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

EAP Expeditionary Advisory Package

EF Essential Function

EPS Electronic Payroll System

ETT Embedded Training Team

EU European Union

EUPOL European Union Police Mission for 

Afghanistan

FDD Focused District Development

FID Foreign Internal Defense

FMF Foreign Military Financing

FMS Foreign Military Sales

FRAGO Fragmentary Order

FSI Foreign Service Institute

FY Fiscal Year

G8 Group of Eight

GAO Government Accountability Office

GPPT German Police Project Team

GVHR Gross Violation of Human Rights

HRW Human Rights Watch

ICG International Crisis Group

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training 

Assistance Program

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IJC ISAF Joint Command

IMET International Military Education and Training

INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law 

Enforcement

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs
216 | APPENDIX C

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Acronym Definition

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

IWA Integrity Watch Afghanistan

IWPR Institute for War and Peace Reporting

JANIB Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board

JCMB Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board

KMTC Kabul Military Training Center

LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan

MAAR Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report

MOD Ministry of Defense

MOF Ministry of Finance

MOI Ministry of Interior

MODA Ministry of Defense Advisors

MPRI Military Professional Resources, 

Incorporated

NATC-A North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training 

Command–Afghanistan

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NADR Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, 

and Related Programs

NCO Noncommissioned Officer

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

NTM-A North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training 

Mission–Afghanistan

OCO Overseas Contingency Operation

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OFS Operation Freedom’s Sentinel

OIR Operation Inherent Resolve

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OMC-A Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan

OMLT Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams

OND Operation New Dawn

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

USD(C) Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

PKO Peacekeeping Operations

PMT Police Mentoring Team

POMLT Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison 

Team

PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution

PPD Presidential Policy Directive

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

PSC Private Security Contractor

RASR Regional ANDSF Status Report

RC Regional Command

RS Resolute Support

RTC Regional Training Center

SASC Senate Armed Services Committee

Acronym Definition

SEN Shura-e Nazar

SES Senior Executive Service

SFA Security Force Assistance

SFAB Security Force Assistance Brigade

SFAT Security Force Assistance Team

SGI Security Governance Initiative

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction

SOAG Special Operations Advisory Group

SPP State Partnership Program

SRAP Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan

SSA Security Sector Assistance

SSC Security Sector Coordinator

SSR Security Sector Reform

TAA Train, Advise, and Assist

TAAC Train, Advise, and Assist Command

TAF The Asia Foundation

TF Task Force

UAE United Arab Emirates

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UMAMA United Nations Assistance Mission to 

Afghanistan

UNSC United Nations Security Council

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

USAF U.S. Air Force

USFOR-A U.S. Forces–Afghanistan

USIP United States Institute of Peace

VSO Village Stability Operations
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 217

1. Jason Howk, A Case Study in Security Sector 

Reform: Learning from Security Sector Reform/

Building in Afghanistan, Strategic Studies 

Institute, November 2009, p. 10.

2. United Nations General Assembly Security

Council (UNGASC), “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace 

and security,” A/57/762-S/2003/333, March 18, 

2003, p. 6.

3. Lowell E. Jacoby, “Current and Projected 

National Security Threats to the United States,” 

Statement for the Record Senate Armed Services 

Committee, February 26, 2004.

4. Donald Rumsfeld, “Afghan National Police,”

Memorandum to Condoleeza Rice, Rumsfeld 

Papers, February 23, 2005. 

5. Donald Rumsfeld, “General McCaffrey’s Report 

on Afghanistan,” Memorandum to General Pete 

Pace, Rumsfeld Papers, June 15, 2008, p. 6. 

6. Washington Times, “‘Caveats’ neuter NATO 

allies,” July 15, 2009. 

7. Joseph Dunford, “The Situation in Afghanistan,”

Prepared for U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, March 12, 2014.

8. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 3.

9. Tolo News, “Ghani Vows to Reform MOI as EU, 

UN Warn against Corruption,” May 8, 2017.

10. DOD, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” January 2012, 

p. 3; Congressional Research Service (CRS), 

In Brief: Assessing the January 2012 Defense 

Strategic Guidance (DSG), R42146, August 13, 

2013, p. 7.

11. Mary Louise Kelly, “Calculating the Cost of War 

in Afghanistan,” NPR, October 29, 2009. 

12. DOD, “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,” delivered at The Nixon 

Center, Washington, D.C., February 24, 2010.

13. RAND, From Patchwork to Framework: A

Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security 

Cooperation, May 16, 2016; Querine Hanlon and 

Richard H. Shultz, Prioritizing Security Sector 

Reform: A New U.S. Approach, U.S. Institute of 

Peace (USIP), 2016, p. 186.

14. CRS, Security Assistance and Cooperation:

Shared Responsibility of the Departments of 

State and Defense, R44444, May 26, 2016, p. 6. 

15. CRS, Security Assistance and Cooperation, 

R44444, May 26, 2016, p. 3.

16. White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector

Assistance Policy,” April 5, 2013. 

17. DOD, Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms, November 8, 

2010, p. 210.

18. CRS, Security Assistance and Cooperation, 

R44444, May 26, 2016, p. 4.

19. White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector

Assistance Policy,” April 5, 2013; DOD, “Directive 5132.03 – DOD Policy and Responsibilities 

Relating to Security Cooperation,” December 29, 

2016.

20. White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector

Assistance Policy,” April 5, 2013.

21. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 1205.1.

22. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 333.c.4.

23. Jack Porter, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

Transformation Under Fire,” in Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan: The Politics of Alliance, 

eds. Gale Mattox and Stephen Grenier (Stanford, 

California: Stanford University Press, 2015), 

p. 184.

24. David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, 

NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, 

Fighting Alone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), pp. 44–45.

25. Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan,

pp. 5, 37–38; Porter, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Transformation Under Fire,” 2015, pp. 186, 

190.

26. Porter, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

Transformation Under Fire,” 2015, p. 192.

27. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York, New 

York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), pp. 215, 243; Gary 

Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The 

Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal 

Account by the CIA’s Key Field Commander 

(New York, New York: Crown Publishers, 2005), 

pp. 50–60. 

28. Condoleezza Rice, “Declaratory Policy on

Afghanistan,” Memorandum to White House and 

Cabinets, Rumsfeld Papers, September 27, 2001, 

p. 1.

29. White House, “Presidential Address to the Nation,” news release, October 7, 2001.

30. Donald Rumsfeld, “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,”

Memorandum to Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy Doug Feith, Rumsfeld Papers, October 

30, 2001.

31. Seymour Hersh, “The Other War: Why Bush’s 

Afghanistan Problem Won’t Go Away,” New 

Yorker, April 12, 2004; CNN, “U.S. rejects Taliban 

offer to try bin Laden,” October 7, 2001; CNN, 

“Taliban agree to surrender Kandahar on Friday,” 

December 6, 2001.

32. Associated Press, “Taliban Official Says Surrender of Kandahar to Begin Friday,” New York 

Times, 2001; CNN, “Taliban Agree to Surrender 

Kandahar on Friday,”December 6, 2001.

33. United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Resolution 1386,” S/RES/1386 (2001), December 20, 

2001, p. 2.

34. Civil-Military Fusion Centre, “Bonn Agreement

on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan 

Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent 

Government Institutions,” in Afghanistan Agreements: A Collection of Official Texts from 2001 

to 2011, 2012, p. 11; UNSC, “Resolution 1386,” S/

RES/1386 (2001), December 20, 2001, p. 2.

35. Institute for the Study of War, “International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF),” http://www.

understandingwar.org/international-security-assistance-force-isaf (accessed February 9, 2017)

36. Sam Zia-Zarifi, “Losing the Peace in Afghanistan,” in Human Rights Watch World Report 

2004: Human Rights and Armed Conflict, Hu-
218 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

man Rights Watch, January 2004, p. 62; RAND, 

Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: 

Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts, 2011, 

pp. 18, 27.

37. UNGASC, “The situation in Afghanistan and its

implications for international peace and security,” A/57/762-S/2003/333, March 18, 2003, p. 7.

38. Zalmay Khalilzad, The Envoy: From Kabul to the 

White House, My Journey Through a Turbulent 

World, (New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 

2016), p. 137.

39. Human Rights Watch, “Killing You Is a Very 

Easy Thing for Us”: Human Rights Abuses in 

Southeast Afghanistan, vol. 15, no. 5, July 2003; 

Mark Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma, Bonn International 

Center for Conversion, September 2003; UNGASC, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 

A/57/762-S/2003/333, March 18, 2003, pp. 7, 18. 

40. UNSC, “Lack of Security In Afghanistan

Threatens Peace Process At All Levels, Security 

Council Told,” SC/7708, press release, March 27, 

2003. 

41. Colonel Mark Milley, interview by Lynne Chandler Garcia in Eyewitness to War, Combat Studies Institute, Volume III, ed. Michael G. Brooks, 

June 6, 2007, p. 96; Lieutenant General Karl 

Eikenberry, interview by Dr. Lisa Beckenbaugh 

in Eyewitness to War, Combat Studies Institute, 

Volume III, ed. Michael G. Brooks, November 27, 

2006, p. 16; Ali Jalali, “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s 

National Army,” Parameters, vol. 32, Autumn 

2002, p. 72.

42. Mark Sedra, “Security First: Afghanistan’s 

Security Sector Reform Process,” Ploughshares 

Monitor, vol. 24, no. 4, Winter 2003; International 

Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), “Afghanistan SSR Snapshot,” http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/

Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Afghanistan-SSR-Snapshot (accessed May 31, 2017); 

Caroline A. Hartzell, Missed Opportunities: The 

Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan, USIP, 

April 2011, p. 3.

43. Sedra, “Security First: Afghanistan’s Security 

Sector,” Winter 2003, p. 2.

44. Donald Rumsfeld, “U.S. Financial Commitment,”

Memorandum to Secretary of State Colin Powell 

and Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice, Rumsfeld Papers, 

April 8, 2002.

45. Colin Powell, “U.S. Financial Commitment,”

Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld and Assistant to the President on 

National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice,

Rumsfeld Papers, April 16, 2002.

46. Powell, “U.S. Financial Commitment,” Rumsfeld 

Papers, April 16, 2002.

47. Howk, A Case Study in Security Sector Reform, 

November 2009, pp. 8–9.

48. Howk, A Case Study in Security Sector Reform, 

November 2009, p. 10.

49. Donald Rumsfeld, “Afghan National Army,” attachment to memo to General Franks, Rumsfeld 

Papers, January 28, 2002; David Rohde, “Training 

an Afghan Army That Can Shoot Straight,” New 

York Times, June 6, 2002; Antonio Giustozzi, 

“Military Reform in Afghanistan,” in Brief 28: 

Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma-Military Reform, Bonn International Center 

for Conversion, 2003, p. 26. 

50. Rumsfeld, “Afghan National Army,” attachment 

to memo to General Franks, Rumsfeld Papers, 

January 28, 2002. 

51. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 17.

52. ANA Design Team Chief, SIGAR interview, October 28, 2016. 

53. Giustozzi, “Military Reform in Afghanistan,”

2003, p. 24.

54. Giustozzi, “Military Reform in Afghanistan,”

2003, p. 24.

55. Giustozzi, “Military Reform in Afghanistan,”

2003, p. 25.

56. Giustozzi, “Military Reform in Afghanistan,”

2003, p. 24.

57. Giustozzi, “Military Reform in Afghanistan,”

2003, p. 24.

58. Giustozzi, “Military Reform in Afghanistan,”

2003, p. 25.

59. Civil-Military Fusion Centre, “Bonn Agreement

on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan 

Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent 

Government Institutions,” 2012, p. 6; RAND, 

Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, 

p. 24.

60. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 24.

61. ANA Design Team Chief, SIGAR interview, October 28, 2016. 

62. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 38.

63. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 17. 

64. ANA Design Team Chief, SIGAR interview, October 28, 2016. 

65. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, pp. 52, 66, 

122. 

66. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 17.

67. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 19.

68. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, pp. 19, 46

69. Milley, interview by Garcia in Eyewitness to 

War, June 6, 2007, p. 98.

70. Milley, interview by Garcia in Eyewitness to 

War, June 6, 2007, p. 98.

71. Milley, interview by Garcia in Eyewitness to 

War, June 6, 2007, p. 105; Richard D. Hooker Jr. 

and Joseph J. Collins, Lessons Encountered: 

Learning from the Long War, (Washington, D.C.: 

National Defense University Press, September 

2015), p. 280.

72. Hooker Jr. and Collins, Lessons Encountered, 

p. 280.

73. U.S. Army Center of Military History, “Operation 
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 219

Enduring Freedom: March 2002–April 2005,” 

2013, p. 29.

74. U.S. Army Center of Military History, “Operation 

Enduring Freedom,” 2013, p. 30.

75. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 23.

76. White House, “Progress Report on the Global

War on Terrorism,” September 2003, p. 2.

77. Bob Hacksell, “Guard Enhanced Brigade Prepares for Afghan Duty,” DOD News, November 

7, 2003; U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

“Operation Enduring Freedom,” 2013, p. 28.

78. U.S. Army Center of Military History, “Operation 

Enduring Freedom,” 2013, p. 28.

79. William E. Bradley, “Joint Task Force Phoenix 

II,” United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, May 28, 2009, p. 4. 

80. ANA Design Team Chiefs, SIGAR interviews, 

October 28, 2016.

81. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 25.

82. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, pp. 24, 107.

83. Former senior OMC-A official, SIGAR interview, 

November 3, 2016; ANA Design Team Chief, 

SIGAR interview, October 28, 2016.

84. Former senior OMC-A official, SIGAR interview, 

November 3, 2016.

85. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police Have Made Progress, but 

Future Plans Need to be Better Defined, GAO-05-

575, June 30, 2005, p. 9.

86. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in 

Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 25; 

GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish 

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

pp. 6, 13, 40. 

87. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, pp. 24–25.

88. Milley, interview by Garcia in Eyewitness to 

War, June 6, 2007, p. 101.

89. Hacksell, “Guard Enhanced Brigade Prepares for

Afghan Duty,” November 7, 2003. 

90. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in 

Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, pp. 9, 

20; Milley, interview by Garcia in Eyewitness 

to War, June 6, 2007, p. 104; ANA Design Team 

Chief, SIGAR interview, October 28, 2016. 

91. Giustozzi, “Military Reform in Afghanistan,”

2003, p. 27.

92. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 19.

93. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 20.

94. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 26. 

95. Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks: Final 

Report to Congress, Arlington, VA, August 2011.

96. Antonio Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan: A 

Political History of a Fragile Institution (London, United Kingdom: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2015), 

pp. 131–132.

97. Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan, p. 127.

98. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 39.

99. Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan, p. 127.

100. Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan, p. 127.

101. Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan, pp. 127, 

129; RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 27.

102. Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan, p. 127.

103. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 65.

104. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 33.

105. Hacksell, “Guard Enhanced Brigade Prepares

for Afghan Duty,” November 7, 2003; Eikenberry, 

interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to 

War, November 27, 2006, p. 18. 

106. Rohde, “Training an Afghan Army That Can 

Shoot Straight,” June 6, 2002. 

107. Milley, interview by Garcia in Eyewitness to 

War, June 6, 2007, p. 102.

108. Brookings Institution, Afghanistan Index, 

March 31, 2016, p. 6.

109. DOD and State Inspectors General, Interagency 

Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and 

Readiness, November 2006, p. 5; RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 28; 

German Missions in the United States, “Key 

Messages on Engagement in Afghanistan,” http://

www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/06__Foreign__Policy__State/02__Foreign__Policy/05__

KeyPoints/Afghanistan__Key.html (accessed 

December 2, 2016).

110. Mark Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma, September 2003, p. 33; 

ISW, “Afghan National Police (ANP),” http://

www.understandingwar.org/afghan-national-police-anp (accessed March 6, 2017); UNGASC, 

“The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 

A/56/875-S/2002/278, March 18, 2002, p. 11. 

111. Mark Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma, September 2003, p. 33.

112. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 28.

113. Mark Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma, September 2003, p. 33.

114. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 29.

115. DOD and State Inspectors General, Interagency 

Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and 

Readiness, November 2006, p. 5; ISW, “Afghan 

National Police (ANP).”; U.S. Embassy Kabul, 

“Status of US Initiative on Police Training and 

Ministry of Interior Reform,” Kabul 002500 cable, 

September 4, 2003, p. 5. 

116. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs: Police Reform - Meetings 

with Interior Minister, Afghan Police Training Officials, German Ambassador and German Police 

Advisors; Tour of Police Academy,” Kabul 001333 

cable, July 15, 2002, p. 4; GAO, Afghanistan 

Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police, 

GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, p. 8.
220 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

117. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 27; Robert Perito, Afghanistan’s 

Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector 

Reform, USIP, August 2009, p. 3.

118. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 27–28; Perito, Afghanistan’s 

Police: The Weak Link, August 2009, p. 3.

119. Amnesty International, Afghanistan: Police 

Reconstruction Essential for the Protection of 

Human Rights, March 12, 2003, pp. 9, 11; Sedra, 

Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s Security 

Dilemma, September 2003, pp. 35–36.

120. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs: Police Reform - Meetings 

with Interior Minister, Afghan Police Training Officials, German Ambassador and German Police 

Advisors; Tour of Police Academy,” Kabul 001333 

cable, July 15, 2002.

121. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 29; DOD and State Inspectors 

General, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, November 

2006, p. 23.

122. ISW, “Afghan National Police (ANP)”; Rohde, 

“Overhaul of Afghan Police Is New Priority,” 

New York Times, October 18, 2007; Donald 

Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir

(New York, New York: Penguin Group, 2012), 

p. 685; RAND, Security Force Assistance in 

Afghanistan, 2011, p. 30.

123. International Security Assistance Force, “ISAF

Strategic Assessment Capability: Final Workshop,” December 10–12, 2014, pp. 50–51. 

124. Mark Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma, September 2003, 

pp. 33, 63; RAND, Security Force Assistance 

in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 30; GAO, Afghanistan 

Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police, 

GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, pp. 24–25.

125. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 19; RAND, Security Force Assistance in 

Afghanistan, 2011, p. 30.

126. According to the Institute for the Study of War, 

“German officials reported that they viewed their 

role in Afghanistan, primarily, as ‘advising and 

consulting,’ rather than ‘as the major implementer.’” (ISW, “Afghan National Police”); GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army 

and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, p. 26.

127. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 29, 31; Perito, Afghanistan’s 

Police: The Weak Link, August 2009, p. 3; Mark 

Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s 

Security Dilemma, September 2003, p. 33; Scott 

Chilton, Eckart Schiewek, and Tim Bremmers, 

Evaluation of the Appropriate Size of the 

Afghan National Police Force Manning List 

(Tashkil), European Comission and IBF International Consulting, July 15, 2009, p. 35.

128. Mark Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma, September 2003, p. 33. 

At a maximum 1,500 could have completed training, based on the following sources indicating 

the first training group of 1,500 began in August 

2002. Only a portion of this group – NCOs in the 

one year program – could have graduated by the 

end of 2002. A memo from Secretary of Defense 

Donald Rumsfeld from September 2004 notes 

that by June 2004 a maximum of about 18,508 

police had been trained, with 12,558 trained 

by the U.S. that year and about 5,950 trained 

by Germany since 2002. (Donald Rumsfeld, 

“Afghanistan Briefing Papers,” Memorandum to 

Secretary of State Colin Powell, Rumsfeld Papers, September 21, 2004.) Brookings Institution, 

Afghanistan Index, November 30, 2015, p. 6; 

UNGASC, “The situation in Afghanistan and its 

implications for international peace and security,” A/57/850-S/2003/754, July 23, 2003, pp. 5, 

11; Mark Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma, September 2003, p. 33; 

Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry 

of the Interior, “Assistance for rebuilding the 

police force in Afghanistan,” December 2005, 

p. 11.

129. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, 

August 2009, p. 4

130. Amnesty International, Afghanistan: Police 

Reconstruction Essential for the Protection of 

Human Rights, March 12, 2003; Sedra, Brief 28: 

Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma, 

September 2003, pp. 8, 12, 33.

131. United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP), “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA),” http://www.af.undp.org/content/

afghanistan/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_

prevention_and_recovery/lotfa.html (accessed 

January 30, 2017); UNDP, “Law and Order Trust 

Fund for Afghanistan: Management Review,” 

December 15, 2012, p. 19.

132. UNDP, “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).”

133. Atos Consulting and Technology Services, Evaluation of the Law and Order Trust Fund for 

Afghanistan (LOTFA) Phase V: Report, April 17, 

2012, p. 6.

134. Atos Consulting and Technology Services, 

Evaluation of the Law and Order Trust Fund 

for Afghanistan (LOTFA) Phase V: Report, April 

17, 2012, p. 6; Atos Consulting and Technology 

Services, Evaluation of the Law and Order 

Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) Phase IV: 

Report, February 22, 2009, p. 2.

135. UNDP, “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan: Management Review,” December 15, 2012, 

p. 39.

136. UNDP, “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).”

137. UNDP, “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).”

138. SIGAR, Afghan National Police: More than

$300 Million in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary 

Payments Is Based on Partially Verified or 

Reconciled Data, SIGAR 15-26-AR, January 2015, 

pp. 7, 12. 

139. Nathan Hodge, “U.N. Report Flags Afghanistan

Fraud,” Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2013.
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 221

140. Hodge, “U.N. Report Flags Afghanistan Fraud,”

February 27, 2013.

141. SIGAR, Afghan National Police: More than

$300 Million in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary 

Payments, SIGAR 15-26-AR, January 2015.

142. SIGAR, Afghan National Police: More than

$300 Million in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary 

Payments, SIGAR 15-26-AR, January 2015, p. 7.

143. SIGAR, Afghan National Police: More than

$300 Million in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary 

Payments, SIGAR 15-26-AR, January 2015.

144. SIGAR, Afghan National Police: More than

$300 Million in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary 

Payments, SIGAR 15-26-AR, January 2015.

145. SIGAR, Afghan National Police: More than

$300 Million in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary 

Payments, SIGAR 15-26-AR, January 2015.

146. UNDP, “UNDP statement on the new Report of 

SIGAR,” news release, January 12, 2015.

147. State, “Diplomacy in Action - Program Overview

and Budget Summary - International Narcotics and Law Enforcement: FY 2004 Budget 

Justification,” https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rpt/

cbj/fy2004/21880.htm (accessed March 7, 2017); 

State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs, “Asia and the Middle East 

- International Narcotics and Law Enforcement: 

FY 2004 Budget Justification,” June 2003.

148. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 25, 32; Rumsfeld, “U.S. Financial 

Commitment,” Memorandum to Colin Powell 

and Condoleezza Rice, April 16, 2002; Donald 

Rumsfeld, “Afghan Security Responsibility,” 

Memorandum to General Dick Myers, Deputy 

Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, 

Rumsfeld Papers, April 7, 2004.

149. The previous Minister of Interior, Taj Mohammad Wardak, served for less than a year in the 

position, as he proved unable “to assert his 

authority over the security services, let alone 

enact [the] tough reforms” necessary to continue 

to improve and professionalize the ANP. Jalali, 

on the other hand, was described as a “much 

stronger political figure” who “displayed the 

necessary resolve and vision to bring change.” 

(Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma, September 2003, p. 34.) Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness 

to War, November 27, 2006, p. 29. 

150. Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s 

Security Dilemma, September 2003, p. 34; U.S. 

Embassy Kabul, “Pool of Core Instructors for 

Accelerated ANP Training Initiative Complete 

US-Led Programs,” Kabul 002430 cable, August 

31, 2003; RAND, Security Force Assistance 

in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 30–31; Eva Gross, 

Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the 

EU’s contribution, European Union Institute for 

Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 78, April 

2009, p. 28.

151. Hooker Jr. and Collins, Lessons Encountered, 

p. 292; Colum Lynch, “Misconduct, Corruption 

by U.S. Police Mar Bosnia Mission,” Washington 

Post, May 29, 2001; Human Rights Watch, “Hopes 

Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls to 

Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovena for 

Forced Prostitution,” November 2002.

152. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 30–31; Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma, 

September 2003, p. 34; DOD and State Inspectors 

General, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, November 

2006, p. 7.

153. Hooker Jr. and Collins, Lessons Encountered, 

p. 292. 

154. Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongman 

Governors, and the State in Afghanistan (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University 

Press, 2014), p. 1; Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting 

Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma, September 2003, pp. 32–33; According to one report, 

“political figures may conveniently disassociate 

themselves from their militias or argue their 

factions are part of the national military set-up 

rather than private armies.” (Crispin Thorold, 

“Analysis: Disarming Afghan Militias,” BBC 

News, October 24, 2003.)

155. Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s 

Security Dilemma, September 2003, pp. 8–16, 

33; Ray Salvatore Jennings, The Road Ahead: 

Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, 

Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq, 

Peaceworks No. 49, USIP, April 2003, p. 23; U.S. 

Embassy Kabul, “Progress Report: Assessment 

of Afghan Police,” Kabul 00251 cable, March 2, 

2002. 

156. Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s 

Security Dilemma, September 2003, pp. 32–38; 

Andrew Wilder, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle 

to Reform the Afghan National Police, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, July 2007, 

pp. 4, 25–26.

157. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Progress Report: Assessment of Afghan Police,” Kabul 00251 cable, 

March 2, 2002. 

158. Khalilzad, The Envoy, pp. 148–149.

159. Darivoa, “Afghan President Karzai Names

Qanuni to National Security Post,” June 22, 2002; 

Khalilzad, The Envoy, p. 149.

160. Hafizullah Emadi, Dynamics of Political Development in Afghanistan, (New York, New York: 

Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 212; Amin Tarzi, 

“Afghanistan: Top Security Official Resigns Amid 

Controversy,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 

September 28, 2005.

161. Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s 

Security Dilemma, September 2003, p. 33.

162. Khalilzad, The Envoy, p. 149.

163. Sedra, Brief 28: Confronting Afghanistan’s 

Security Dilemma, September 2003, p. 10.

164. Amnesty International, Afghanistan: Police 

Reconstruction Essential for the Protection of 

Human Rights, March 12, 2003.

165. UNGASC, “The situation in Afghanistan and its

implications for international peace and security,” A/56/875-S/2002/278, March 18, 2002, pp. 7–8; 
222 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

UNSC, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 

S/2003/1212, December 30, 2003, pp. 2–3; Human 

Rights Watch, “Killing You Is a Very Easy Thing 

for US”: Human Rights Abuses in Southeast 

Afghanistan, July 2003, pp. 10–13; Sedra, “Security First: Afghanistan’s Security Sector Reform 

Process,” Winter 2003. 

166. State, “Media Availability at Bagram Air Base 

with Paul Wolfowitz and Dan McNeil,” January 

15, 2003.

167. UNSC, “Report of the Security Council mission

to Afghanistan, 31 Oct–7 Nov 2003,” S/2003/1074, 

November 11, 2003. 

168. UNSC, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 

S/2003/1212, December 30, 2003, p. 2; Sedra, 

“Security First: Afghanistan’s Security Sector 

Reform Process,” Winter 2003; Sedra, Brief 28: 

Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilema, 

September 2003, p. 11.

169. Lowell E. Jacoby, “Current and Projected 

National Security Threats to the United States,” 

Statement for the Record Senate Armed Services 

Committee, February 26, 2004.

170. UNGASC, “The situation in Afghanistan and its

security implications for international peace and 

security,” A/58/868-S/2004/634, August 12, 2004, 

p. 6.

171. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “Afghanistan Security Incidents Database, Afghanistan: 

Violent Incidents in Afghanistan 2002–2015,” 

December 31, 2015.

172. UNGASC, “The situation in Afghanistan and its

implication for international peace and security,” 

A/58/742-S/2004/230, March 19, 2004, p. 4.

173. London Conference on Afghanistan, The 

Afghanistan Compact: Building on Success, 

January 31–February 1, 2006, p. 3; Government 

of Afghanistan, “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: 

Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward,” March 17, 2004, p. 80; Jalali, “Rebuilding 

Afghanistan’s National Army,” Parameters, vol. 

32, 2002, p. 79.

174. Marin Strmecki, “Afghanistan at a Crossroads:

Challenges, Opportunities, and a Way Ahead,” 

August 17, 2006, p. 6.

175. U.S. Mission Afghanistan and Combined Forces

Command–Afghanistan, “Strategic Directive for 

Afghanistan,” September 11, 2006, p. 8.

176. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, 

August 2009, p. 5; CSTC-A Command Historian, 

“Annual History Summary 1 January 2006–31 

December 2006.” 

177. CSTC-A Command Historian, “Annual History

Summary 1 January 2006–31 December 2006.” 

178. CSTC-A and the Government of Afghanistan,

“Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Campaign 

Plan for the Development of Enduring National 

Military Forces and Police Services,” December 

2007, p. 10. 

179. CSTC-A and the Government of Afghanistan,

“Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Campaign 

Plan for the Development of Enduring National 

Military Forces and Police Services,” December 

2007, pp. 10, 16.

180. CSTC-A and the Government of Afghanistan,

“Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Campaign 

Plan for the Development of Enduring National 

Military Forces and Police Services,” December 

2007, pp. 14–16.

181. CSTC-A and the Government of Afghanistan,

“Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Campaign 

Plan for the Development of Enduring National 

Military Forces and Police Services,” December 

2007, p. 14.

182. U.S. Mission Afghanistan and Combined Forces

Command-Afghanistan, “Strategic Directive for 

Afghanistan,” September 11, 2006, p. 53.

183. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 13; RAND, Security Force Assistance in 

Afghanistan, 2011, p. 32. 

184. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 13; RAND, Security Force Assistance in 

Afghanistan, 2011, p. 33. 

185. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 13; RAND, Security Force Assistance in 

Afghanistan, 2011, p. 33. 

186. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 13.

187. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 6.

188. CSTC-A and the Government of Afghanistan,

“Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Campaign 

Plan for the Development of Enduring National 

Military Forces and Police Services,” December 

2007, p. 11.

189. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanistan–JCMB VIII

Welcomes SRSG Kai Eide, Restructures JCMB, 

Hears GIROA Plans for ANDS Implementation 

and ANA Increase,” Kabul 001709 cable, July 8, 

2008.

190. Forrest L. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force 

Pilots 2006–2011,” Air Power History, Spring 

2016, p. 24.

191. Marion, “The Destruction and Rebuilding of the

Afghan Air Force, 1989–2009,” Air Power History, Summer 2010, p. 25.

192. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. i.

193. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, p. 24.

194. Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, “Afghanistan’s Air 

Corps Struggle to Rebuild,” NPR, November 28, 

2007.

195. Nelson, “Afghanistan’s Air Corps Struggle to 

Rebuild,” November 28, 2007.

196. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, p. 25.

197. Marion, “The Destruction and Rebuilding of the

Afghan Air Force, 1989–2009,” Summer 2010, 
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 223

pp. 27–28; NATO Air Training Command–Afghanistan (NATC-A), The Afghan Air Force Master 

Plan: Our Story 2013–2017, May 13, 2014, p. 28; 

NATC-A, Sustainable Cost Structure for the 

Afghan Air Force, June 2014, p. 15.

198. Nelson, “Afghanistan’s Air Corps Struggle to 

Rebuild,” November 28, 2007. 

199. Nelson, “Afghanistan’s Air Corps Struggle to 

Rebuild,” November 28, 2007.

200. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. i; NATC-A, The Afghan Air Force 

Master Plan, May 13, 2014, p. 24.

201. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. i; NATC-A, The Afghan Air Force 

Master Plan, May 13, 2014, p. 24.

202. Gordon Lubold, “Americans build elite Afghan

commando force,” Christian Science Monitor, 

May 1, 2008.

203. Lubold, “Americans build elite Afghan commando force,” May 1, 2008.

204. Matthew Chlosta, “ANA Commandos First on

the Ground in Marjah,” NATO Resolute Support 

News, http://www.rs.nato.int/article/rs-news/anacommandos-first-on-the-ground-in-marjah.html 

(accessed June 6, 2017).

205. Chlosta, “ANA Commandos First on the Ground

in Marjah.” 

206. Lubold, “Americans build elite Afghan commando force,” May 1, 2008. 

207. NATO, “ANA Trust Fund,” media backgrounder, February 2015; NATO, “Frequently Asked 

Questions About Making Donations to the Afghan 

National Army (ANA) Trust Fund,” http://www.

nato.int/isaf/topics/ana/faq.html (accessed January 

31, 2017).

208. NATO, “Funding NATO,” http://www.nato.int/

cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed February 3, 2017); NATO, 

“Consensus decision-making at NATO,” http://

www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm 

(accessed February 8, 2017). 

209. NATO, “Funding NATO”; NATO, “Consensus 

decision-making at NATO.”

210. NATO, “Trust Funds: supporting demilitarization 

and defence transformation projects,” http://

www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50082.htm# 

(accessed February 3, 2017); NATO, “Afghanistan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund,” media 

backgrounder, July 2016.

211. NATO, “ANA Trust Fund,” February 2015; NATO, 

“Afghanistan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund,” 

media backgrounder, December 2016; NATO, 

“NATO Member Countries,” http://www.nato.

int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm (accessed 

June 6, 2017).

212. NATO, “ANA Trust Fund,” February 2015; NATO, 

“Afghanistan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund,” 

December 2016; NATO, “NATO Member Countries.” 

213. NATO, “Warsaw Summit Declaration on Afghanistan,” July 9, 2016.

214. DOD, “Justification for FY 2017 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Afghanistan Security 

Forces Fund (ASFF),” February 2016, pp. 3–4.

215. ANA Design Team Chief, SIGAR interview, October 28, 2016; Oklahoma National Guard Member, 

SIGAR interview, February 6, 2017; Former U.S. 

Military Advisor, SIGAR interview, November 22, 

2016. 

216. Hurel Johnson, interview by Laurence Lessard

in Eyewitness to War, Combat Studies Institute, 

Volume III, September 17, 2006, pp. 263–264.

217. Bradley, “Joint Task Force Phoenix II,” May 28, 

2009, p. 4.

218. Dominic Cariello, interview by John McCool in

Eyewitness to War, Combat Studies Institute, 

Volume III, September 17, 2006, pp. 61–64.

219. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure 

Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and 

Sustain Capable Afghan National Security 

Forces, GAO-08-661, June 18, 2008, p. 11.

220. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 35.

221. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, pp. 7–8.

222. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 13.

223. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 40.

224. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, p. 19.

225. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, p. 19.

226. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 41.

227. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 41.

228. Hooker Jr. and Collins, Lessons Encountered, 

p. 289. 

229. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 17.

230. Mirtha Villarreal, “Embedded Training Teams 

Making History in Afghanistan,” American Forces Press Service, March 21, 2005.

231. John Schroeder, interview by John McCool in 

Eyewitness to War, Combat Studies Institute, 

Volume III, February 16, 2007, p. 114.

232. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 42.

233. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 42.

234. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, p. 38.

235. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, 

pp. 38–39.

236. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 35.
224 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

237. Donald Rumsfeld, “General McCaffrey’s Report 

on Afghanistan,” Memorandum to General Pete 

Pace, Rumsfeld Papers, June 15, 2008, p. 6. 

238. Rumsfeld, “General McCaffrey’s Report on Afghanistan,” Memorandum to General Pete Pace, 

June 15, 2008, p. 6.

239. Rumsfeld, “General McCaffrey’s Report on Afghanistan,” Memorandum to General Pete Pace, 

June 15, 2008, p. 6.

240. Eikenberry, interview by Beckenbaugh in 

Eyewitness to War, November 27, 2006, p. 26; 

Rumsfeld, “General McCaffrey’s Report on Afghanistan,” Memorandum to General Pete Pace, 

June 15, 2008. 

241. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, pp. 27, 30.

242. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 11; RAND, Security Force Assistance 

in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 45.

243. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 45–46.

244. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 2008, 

p. 9.

245. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Equipping the ANA,”

Kabul 003589 cable, August 10, 2006.

246. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Equipping the ANA,”

Kabul 003589 cable, August 10, 2006.

247. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 32–35, 40.

248. John Schroeder, interview by John McCool in 

Eyewitness to War, February 16, 2007, p. 117.

249. David Barno, “Fighting ‘The Other War’: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan 2003–2005,” 

Military Review, September–October 2007, 

p. 39.

250. UNGASC, “The situation in Afghanistan and its

implications for international peace and security: 

Emergency international assistance for peace, 

normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken 

Afghanistan,” A/59/581-S/2004/925, November 26, 

2004, p. 7.

251. UNGASC, “The situation in Afghanistan and its

security implications for international peace and 

security,” A/58/868-S/2004/634, August 12, 2004, 

p. 8.

252. According to a January 2009 DOD report to

Congress, “The ANA continues to demonstrate 

increasing competence, effectiveness, and 

professionalism. The five ANA Commando 

battalions, mentored and trained by U.S. Army 

Special Forces deployed in Afghanistan, are 

feared by the insurgents and respected by the 

Afghan people. In August 2008, the ANSF took 

over responsibility for security in the capital 

city of Kabul and will take charge of the Kabul 

Province.” (DOD, Report on Progress toward 

Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 

2009, pp. 7–9.)

253. Anthony H. Cordesman, Shaping Afghan 

National Security Forces: What It Will Take to 

Implement President Obama’s New Strategy, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

April 20, 2010, pp. 14–17.

254. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 2008, 

pp. 6–7; GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further 

Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-

661, June 18, 2008, p. 17.

255. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 2008, 

p. 5; Cordesman, Shaping Afghan National 

Security Forces: What It Will Take to Implement 

President Obama’s New Strategy, April 20, 2010, 

pp. 64–65.

256. CSTC-A, “Measuring ANSF Capabilities through

Milestones,” The Enduring Ledger, vol. 3, no. 4, 

p. 18; SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces: 

Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 

14-33-AR, February 2014, pp. 1–2. 

257. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining 

Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 14-33-AR, 

February 2014, p. 7.

258. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 15.

259. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, pp. 6–7.

260. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, pp. 6–7.

261. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2009, p. 33; 

DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 111. 

262. SIGAR, Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments, 

SIGAR 10-11-AR, June 29, 2010, pp. 5–6; SIGAR, 

High Risk List, January 2017, p. 15.

263. SIGAR, Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments, 

SIGAR 10-11-AR, June 29, 2010, p. 5.

264. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 94.

265. SIGAR, Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments, 

SIGAR 10-11-AR, June 29, 2010, p. 5.

266. SIGAR, Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments, 

SIGAR 10-11-AR, June 29, 2010, p. 6.

267. SIGAR, Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments, 

SIGAR 10-11-AR, June 29, 2010, p. 6.

268. SIGAR, Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments, 

SIGAR 10-11-AR, June 29, 2010, p. 7.

269. SIGAR, Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments, 

SIGAR 10-11-AR, June 29, 2010, p. 4.

270. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining 

Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 14-33-AR, 

February 2014, p. 3.
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 225

271. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining 

Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 14-33-AR, 

February 2014, p. 3.

272. GAO, Long-standing Challenges May Affect

Progress and Sustainment of Afghan National 

Security Forces, GAO-12-951T, July 24, 2012, 

pp. 3–4.

273. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining 

Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 14-33-AR, 

February 2014, pp. 4–6.

274. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 104.

275. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining 

Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 14-33-AR, 

February 2014, p. 7.

276. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, 

pp. 75–78; DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2014, 

pp. 60–61; DOD, Report on Progress Toward 

Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 

2014, p. 60. 

277. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, October 30, 2014, p. 94.

278. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining 

Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 14-33-AR, 

February 2014, p. 7.

279. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, 

pp. 75, 78.

280. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining 

Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 14-33-AR, 

February 2014, p. 8.

281. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining 

Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 14-33-AR, 

February 2014, p. 8.

282. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining 

Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 14-33-AR, 

February 2014, p. 8.

283. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in

Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 21.

284. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in

Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 23.

285. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 15.

286. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 29, 36; International Crisis Group, 

Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, Asia Report 

No. 138, August 30, 2007, pp. 6–7; GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and 

Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, pp. 20–21.

287. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Status of U.S. Initiative on

Police Training and Ministry of Interior Reform,” 

Kabul 002500 cable, September 4, 2003; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “INL Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State Schrage Meetings on Police Training With 

Minister of Interior Jalali,” Kabul 000739 cable, 

March 17, 2004; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Minister 

of Interior Police Reform Review,” Kabul 003683 

cable, October 26, 2004.

288. Mattox and Greiner, Coalition Challenges in 

Afghanistan: The Politics of Alliance, pp. 22–23.

289. House of Lords, “The EU’s Afghan Police Mission: Report with Evidence,” European Union 

Committee, February 16, 2011, pp. 6, 14.

290. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Launch of ESDP Mission

in Afghanistan,” Kabul 001968 cable, June 18, 

2007.

291. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

pp. 24–25.

292. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 25.

293. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 25.

294. Rumsfeld, “Afghanistan Briefing Papers,”

Memorandum to Powell, September 21, 2004; 

Rumsfeld, “Afghan Security Responsibility,” 

Memorandum to Myers, Wolfowitz, and Feith, 

Rumsfeld Papers, April 7, 2004.

295. Rumsfeld, “Afghan Security Responsibility,” 

Memorandum to Myers, Wolfowitz, and Feith, 

April 7, 2004.

296. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, 

August 2009, p. 5; DOD and State Inspectors 

General, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, November 

2006, pp. 35–37.

297. OSC-A formerly known as OMC-A, later known

as CSTC-A.

298. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Minister of Interior Police

Reform Review,” Kabul 003683 cable, October 

26, 2004.

299. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link,

August 2009, pp. 1, 5, 10–11, 13.

300. Ronald Neumann, The Other War: Winning and 

Losing in Afghanistan (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), pp. 62, 74.

301. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 24.

302. Rumsfeld, “General McCaffrey’s Report on Afghanistan,” Memorandum to General Pete Pace, 

June 15, 2008, p. 7.

303. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “The Afghan National Police: Where We Are, Where We’re Going,” Kabul 

001267 cable, April 15, 2007; GAO, Afghanistan 

Security: Further Congressional Action May 

Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 18, 2008, p. 41; 

DOD and State Inspectors General, Interagency 

Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and 

Readiness, November 2006, pp. 11, 16.

304. Rumsfeld, “Afghan National Police,” Memorandum to Condoleeza Rice, Rumsfeld Papers, 

February 23, 2005.

305. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 47–48; Wilder, Cops or Robbers? 

The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National 

Police, July 2007, p. 30.

306. Wilder, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to 
226 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Reform the Afghan National Police, July 2007, 

pp. 29–30.

307. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 48.

308. Hooker Jr. and Collins, Lessons Encountered, 

p. 292; For corroboration on this analysis as 

well as a more thourough assessment of police 

training comparisons also see David Bayley and 

Robert Perito, The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime (London, United Kingdom: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 

Inc., 2010). 

309. Discover Policing, “Training /Academy Life,” 

http://discoverpolicing.org/what_does_take/?-

fa=training_academy_life (accessed May 23, 

2017.)

310. Wilder, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform 

the Afghan National Police, July 2007, pp. 29–33; 

DOD and State Inspectors General, Interagency 

Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and 

Readiness, November 2006, pp. 15–16; RAND, 

Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, 

p. 48.

311. Former Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald E.

Neumann (ret.), “SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Report,” correspondence with SIGAR, May 8, 2017.

312. Former Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald E.

Neumann (ret.), “SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Report,” correspondence with SIGAR, May 8, 2017.

313. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 47.

314. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 8. 

315. UNGASC, “The situation in Afghanistan and its

implications for international peace and security: 

Emergency international assistance for peace, 

normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken 

Afghanistan,” A/59/581-S/2004/925, November 26, 

2004, p. 8.

316. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 11.

317. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 11.

318. Chilton, Schiewek, and Bremmers, Evaluation 

of the Appropriate Size of the Afghan National 

Police Force Manning List (Tashkil), July 15, 

2009, p. 35; RAND, Security Force Assistance in 

Afghanistan, 2011, p. 31.

319. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “PRT Jalalabad: Police

Training with Minimal Resources Yields Maximum Results,” Kabul 005845 cable, December 

14, 2006, p. 4.

320. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “CSTC-A Police Census:

A First-Ever Head Count,” Kabul 003310 cable, 

September 30, 2007, pp. 2–3.

321. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “CSTC-A Police Census:

A First-Ever Head Count,” Kabul 003310 cable, 

September 30, 2007, pp. 2–3.

322. Rumsfeld, “Afghan National Police,” Memorandum to Rice, February 23, 2005; UNGASC, 

“The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 

A/57/850-S/2003/754, July 23, 2003, p. 6.

323. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 23.

324. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 23.

325. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 23.

326. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish

Army and Police, GAO-05-575, June 30, 2005, 

p. 23.

327. Rumsfeld, “Afghan National Police,” Memorandum to Rice, February 23, 2005. 

328. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 50.

329. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 4.

330. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 48–49, 63; ICG, Reforming 

Afghanistan’s Police, August 30, 2007, p. 11; 

Hooker Jr. and Collins, Lessons Encountered, 

p. 299; Combat Advisor for Task Force Phoenix (2007–2008) Mr. Victor Glaviano, SIGAR 

interview, April 11, 2017; Former Ambassador to 

Afghanistan Ronald E. Neumann (ret.), “SIGAR’s 

Lessons Learned Report,” correspondence with 

SIGAR, May 8, 2017.

331. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, testimony

before the Committee on Armed Services, September 23, 2008, p. 14.

332. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 4; DOD, Report on Progress toward 

Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 

2009, p. 44. 

333. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 11.

334. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 115.

335. London Conference on Afghanistan, The Afghanistan Compact: Building on Success, January 

31–February 1, 2006, pp. 3, 6; Mathieu Lefèvre, 

“Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of 

Government-backed Initiatives,” Afghanistan 

Analysts Network, May 27, 2010, pp. 1, 4; Wilder, 

Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the 

Afghan National Police, July 2007, p. 8. 

336. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 51–52; Wilder, Cops or Robbers? 

The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National 

Police, July 2007, pp. 13–17; ICG, Reforming 

Afghanistan’s Police, August 30, 2007, pp. 13–14.

337. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 27, 

2010, p. 6.

338. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 27, 

2010, p. 6.

339. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Re-
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 227

view of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 27, 

2010, p. 6.

340. The Economist, “There’s Marijuana in Their 

Socks; Afghanistan’s Auxiliary Police,” November 18, 2008.

341. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 27, 

2010, p. 7.

342. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 27, 

2010, p. 7.

343. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A

Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 

27, 2010, pp. 7–8; ICG, Reforming Afghanistan’s 

Police, August 30, 2007, p. 14.

344. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 27, 

2010, p. 7; Wilder, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle 

to Reform the Afghan National Police, July 

2007, pp. xi, 17; Economist, “There’s Marijuana 

in Their Socks; Afghanistan’s Auxiliary Police,” 

November 18, 2008; IRIN, “Child Soldiers Operating on Several Fronts,” December 19, 2007.

345. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 52–53.

346. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, 

August 2009, p. 9; Lefèvre, “Local Defence in 

Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed 

Initiatives,” May 27, 2010, p. 7; White House, 

Accelerating Success in Afghanistan in 2004: 

An Assessment, January 18, 2005, p. 2.

347. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 27, 

2010, p. 9; Wilder, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle 

to Reform the Afghan National Police, July 2007, 

pp. 15, 17.

348. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghan National Civil

Order Police,” Kabul 000435 cable, February 8, 

2007, pp. 5–6.

349. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “ Afghan National Civil

Order Police: First Battalions Graduated and 

Ready For Duty,” Kabul 001727 cable, May 24, 

2007, p. 3.

350. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 62–64; DOD, United States Plan 

for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 2008, pp. 4, 21, 24; DOD, Report 

on Progress toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, January 2009, pp. 45–46, 49.

351. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 62.

352. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 62–63; DOD, Report on Progress 

toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 

January 2009, p. 9.

353. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 63.

354. DOD IG, Summary of Lessons Learned–DOD IG 

Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, Assist, 

and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and Coalition 

Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD IG-2015-

093, March 31, 2015, p. 3.

355. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “MOI Makes Progress

on Final Phases of ANP Rank Reform,” Kabul 

002384 cable, July 26, 2007; RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, 

pp. 50–51. 

356. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “New ANP Pay Distribution

System a Positive Step,” Kabul 005566 cable, 

November 22, 2006.

357. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 40.

358. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “The Afghan National Police: Where We Are, Where We’re Going,” Kabul 

001267 cable, April 15, 2007.

359. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “MOI Makes Progress

on Final Phases of ANP Rank Reform,” Kabul 

002384 cable, July 26, 2007.

360. DOD, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund:

FY 2009 Overseas Contingency Operations 

Supplemental Budget Request, March 2009,

p. 2; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 

States Congress, January 30, 2016, pp. 186–187. 

361. CRS, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, R44519, June 13, 

2016, pp. 10–11; DOD, Afghanistan Security 

Forces Fund: FY 2009 Overseas Contingency 

Operations Supplemental Budget Request, 

March 2009, p. 2.

362. DOD IG, Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better Accountability and Transparency Over Direct Contributions, DOD IG-2014-102, August 29, 2014, p. 1.

363. DOD IG, Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better Accountability and Transparency Over Direct Contributions, DOD IG-2014-102, August 29, 2014, p. 1.

364. DOD IG, Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better Accountability and Transparency Over Direct Contributions, DOD IG-2014-102, August 29, 2014, p. 2.

365. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2016 Justification for FY 2016 Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) Afghanistan Security Forces 

Fund (ASFF), February 2015, p. 6.

366. DOD IG, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better 

Accountability and Transparency Over Direct 

Contributions, DOD IG-2014-102, August 29, 

2014, p. 14.

367. DOD IG, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better 

Accountability and Transparency Over Direct 

Contributions, DOD IG-2014-102, August 29, 

2014, p. 14.

368. DOD IG, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better 

Accountability and Transparency Over Direct 

Contributions, DOD IG-2014-102, August 29, 

2014, p. 17.

369. SIGAR, Afghan National Army: Millions of

Dollars at Risk Due to Minimal Oversight of 

Personnel and Payroll Data, SIGAR 15-54-AR, 

April 2015, p. 1.

370. SIGAR, Afghan National Army: Millions of

Dollars at Risk Due to Minimal Oversight of 
228 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Personnel and Payroll Data, SIGAR 15-54-AR, 

April 2015, p. 6.

371. SIGAR, Afghan National Army: Millions of

Dollars at Risk Due to Minimal Oversight of 

Personnel and Payroll Data, SIGAR 15-54-AR, 

April 2015, p. 6.

372. SIGAR meeting with CSTC-A leadership, April

2017. 

373. SIGAR meeting with TAAC-Air, May 2017. 

374. White House, “White Paper of the Interagency

Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward 

Afghanistan and Pakistan,” March 27, 2009, p. 1.

375. Stanley A. McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009, pp. 2–19.

376. McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, 

August 30, 2009, pp. 1-1, 2–20, G-4.

377. Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York, New 

York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), pp. 291, 329.

378. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 

“Remarks by the President in Address to the 

Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan,” transcript, December 1, 2009. 

379. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 

“Remarks by the President in Address to the 

Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan,” transcript, December 1, 2009. 

380. Rem Korteweg, “The Netherlands: To Fight, or 

Not to Fight? The Rise and Fall of a Smaller 

Power,” in Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan, 

eds. Gale Mattox and Stephen Grenier (Stanford, 

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SEPTEMBER 2017 | 229

of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan,” 

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Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 34; Ahmad, Dress Like Allies, Kill Like Enemies, April 

4, 2017.

422. Sangar Rahimi and Alissa Rubin, “Koran Burning

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divided over suspension of joint operations,” 

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pp. 13, 17.

426. U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress 

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427. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

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Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 10.

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Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 51.

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430. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

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p. 11.

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Afghan National Security Forces, April 2009, 

p. 7.

434. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghan National Security Forces, April 2009, 

p. 26.

435. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghan National Security Forces, April 2009, 

p. 26.

436. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 30, 2014, p. 103.

437. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 43.

438. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 45 

439. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 64.

440. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 64; Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan, p. 156.

441. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 64.

442. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 64.

443. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, pp. 64–65.

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Research Evalution Unit, February 2014, p. 6.

445. Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan, pp. 155–

161; DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 64.

446. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 64.

447. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 65.

448. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 62.

449. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 13. 

450. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

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451. Giustozzi and Quentin, The Afghan National 

Army: Sustainability Challenges, pp. 12–13; 

Oklahoma National Guard Member, SIGAR interview, February 6, 2017. 
230 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

452. David H. Park, “Identifying the Center of Gravity

of Afghan Mentoring,” Military Review, November–December 2010, pp. 44, 47. 

453. Park, “Identifying the Center of Gravity of

Afghan Mentoring,” November–December 

2010, p. 43; Giustozzi and Quentin, The Afghan 

National Army: Sustainability Challenges, February 2014, pp. 12–13; Oklahoma National Guard 

Member, SIGAR interview, February 6, 2017.

454. U.S. Advisor to the Afghan Air Force, SIGAR

interview, April 10, 2017. 

455. Giustozzi and Quentin, The Afghan National 

Army: Sustainability Challenges, February 

2014, p. 13.

456. Giustozzi and Quentin, The Afghan National 

Army: Sustainability Challenges, February 

2014, p. 14.

457. Giustozzi and Quentin, The Afghan National 

Army: Sustainability Challenges, February 

2014, p. 14.

458. Giustozzi and Quentin, The Afghan National 

Army: Sustainability Challenges, February 

2014, p. 21.

459. NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Preparing the 

Afghan National Security Forces for Transition,” 

November 12–16, 2010. 

460. NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Preparing the 

Afghan National Security Forces for Transition,” 

November 12–16, 2010.

461. Giustozzi and Quentin, The Afghan National 

Army: Sustainability Challenges, February 

2014, p. 13.

462. Gary Owen, “Paint it Pink: The U.S. Redefining

ANA Success,” Afghanistan Analyst Network, 

August 1, 2012.

463. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 43; 

DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, p. 21; 

Adam Mausner and Anthony H. Cordesman, 

“Reforming ANSF Metrics: Improving the CUAT 

System,” Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, August 9, 2010. 

464. Owen, “Paint it Pink: The U.S. Redefining ANA

Success,” August 1, 2012; DOD, Report on 

Progress Toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 44; Mausner and 

Cordesman, “Reforming ANSF Metrics: Improving the CUAT System,” August 9, 2010.

465. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 48.

466. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 122.

467. Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan, p. 161; 

DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 122.

468. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 28.

469. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, 

pp. 28–29.

470. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, 

pp. 28–29.

471. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 29.

472. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 24.

473. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 24. 

474. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 24. 

475. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 61.

476. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 61.

477. As described by DOD, VSO is a “population-centric COIN strategy” with the objective of reestablishing “traditional informal governance mechanisms at the village-level” and linking these 

structures to “the informal governance to the 

formal GIRoA system at the district-level.” VSO 

ends are achieved through both development 

and security programs, in collaboration with 

the Afghan Local Police program. (DOD, Report 

on Progress Toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2012, pp. 61, 77–78.) 

478. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 61.

479. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, 

pp. 49–50.

480. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, 

pp. 49–50.

481. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 49.

482. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 46. 

483. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 46.

484. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 47.

485. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, p. 37.

486. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, p. 25.

487. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghan National Security Forces, April 2009, 

p. 8.

488. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2009, pp. 26, 32.

489. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 111. 

490. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, pp. 111–112. 

491. United Nations General Assembly, “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) Terms of 
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 231

Reference,” p. 1; London Conference on Afghanistan, The Afghanistan Compact: Building on 

Success, January 31–February 1, 2006, pp. 6, 15.

492. London Conference on Afghanistan, The Afghanistan Compact: Building on Success, January 

31–February 1, 2006, pp. 6, 15; DOD, Report on 

Progress Toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, November 2010, pp. 17, 68. 

493. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. ii.

494. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. ii.

495. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. ii.

496. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. ii.

497. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 88. 

498. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 88. 

499. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 111. 

500. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, p. 32.

501. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 112. 

502. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 112. 

503. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, p. 25.

504. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, p. 25.

505. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, pp. 26–27.

506. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, p. 25.

507. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 33.

508. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, p. 27.

509. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, p. 27.

510. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, p. 28.

511. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 33.

512. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, pp. 20, 

32.

513. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, pp. 28–29; DOD, Report 

on Progress Toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 32.

514. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, p. 29.

515. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, p. 29.

516. Marion, “Training Afghan Air Force Pilots 

2006–2011,” Spring 2016, p. 30.

517. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. ii; Associated Press, “Rebuilding 

Afghanistan’s Air Force: from winging it to a 

fighting fit force,” The National, January 18, 

2012.

518. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. ii; Associated Press, “Rebuilding 

Afghanistan’s Air Force: from winging it to a 

fighting fit force,” January 18, 2012.

519. Associated Press, “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Air 

Force: from winging it to a fighting fit force,” 

January 18, 2012.

520. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 28, 2012, p. ii.

521. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. iii.; Associated Press, “Rebuilding 

Afghanistan’s Air Force: from winging it to a 

fighting fit force,” January 18, 2012.

522. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 28, 2012, p. iii.

523. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 28, 2012, p. iii.

524. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, pp. iii–iv.

525. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 28, 2012, p. iv.

526. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, 

pp. 46, 64. 

527. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 63.

528. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 63.

529. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, 
232 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

pp. 64–65.

530. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 66.

531. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. iv.

532. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. iv.

533. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DOD IG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. iv.

534. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, 

pp. 39, 54.

535. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, 

pp. 56–57.

536. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 47.

537. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, pp. 47, 

49.

538. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 50

539. NATC-A, The Afghan Air Force Master Plan: 

Our Story 2013-2017, May 13, 2014, p. 7. 

540. McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, 

August 30, 2009, pp. G-1, G-3, G-5.

541. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghan National Security Forces, April 2009, 

pp. 34–35; DOD, Report on Progress toward 

Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 

2009, p. 25; DOD, Report on Progress toward 

Security and Stability in Afghanistan and the 

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, April 2010, 

p. 122; Donald J. Planty and Robert M. Perito, 

Police Transition in Afghanistan, USIP, February 2013, pp. 2, 5.

542. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 65–66.

543. Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Interior, 

“Afghan National Police Strategy,” December 

2010, pp. 9, 11.

544. Felbab-Brown, Afghanistan Field Trip Report 

VII, May 11, 2012. 

545. Michelle Hughes, The Afghan National Police in 

2015 and Beyond, USIP, Special Report No. 346, 

May 2014, p. 2.

546. Hughes, The Afghan National Police in 2015

and Beyond, May 2014, p. 2.

547. Hughes, The Afghan National Police in 2015

and Beyond, May 2014, p. 3.

548. GAO, Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs

to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and 

National Police Challenged by Lack of Military 

Personnel and Afghan Cooperation, GAO-09-

280, March 2009, p. 12; RAND, Security Force 

Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 62; DOD, 

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan 

National Security Forces, April 2009, pp. 31–32.

549. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 62–63; GAO, Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry 

of Interior and National Police, GAO-09-280, 

March 2009, p. 15.

550. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghan National Security Forces, April 2009, 

pp. 31–32; DOD, Report on Progress toward 

Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 

2009, p. 29; RAND, Security Force Assistance in 

Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 62–64.

551. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 63.

552. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 13–14.

553. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 13–14, 63–64.

554. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 64.

555. CRS, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military 

Operations, and Issues for Congress, R40156, 

June 8, 2010, p. 43.

556. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 64.

557. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 64.

558. Robert Perito, Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police: 

Victim of Its Own Success, USIP, Special Report 

No. 307, May 2012, p. 8.

559. NTM-A, “ANP Professionalization: The Basic

Patrolman Course,” May 7, 2011. 

560. Joanna Buckley, “Building the Police through the 

Focused District Development Programme,” in 

Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned 

Lessons of Afghanistan’s Decade of Assistance 

(2001–11), Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 

2012, p. 4. 

561. Buckley, “Building the Police through the Focused District Development Programme,” 2012, 

p. 4; Planty and Perito, Police Transition in 

Afghanistan, February 2013, p. 9.

562. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 2008, 

pp. 4, 11, 21, 23–27; DOD, Report on Progress 

toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 

January 2009, pp. 9, 36, 43–49; DOD, United 

States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National 

Security Forces, April 2009, pp. 31–45; DOD, 

Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2009, pp. 29–30; 

DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, April 2010, pp. 122, 125, 

131–132. Although FDD is noted to be successful 

and making progress in the aforementioned 

reports, there is no mention of FDD in DOD reports to Congress past April 2010. (DOD, Report 

on Progress Toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, November 2010; DOD, Report on 

Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, 
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 233

April 2011; DOD, Report on Progress Toward 

Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 

2011; DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012; DOD, Report on 

Progress Toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2012.)

563. NTM-A, “ANP Professionalization: The Basic

Patrolman Course,” May 7, 2011. 

564. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link,

August 2009, p. 4.

565. NTM-A, “ANP Professionalization: The Basic

Patrolman Course,” May 7, 2011. 

566. NTM-A, “ANP Professionalization: The Basic

Patrolman Course,” May 7, 2011. 

567. NTM-A, “ANP Professionalization: The Basic

Patrolman Course,” May 7, 2011; Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, August 2009, p. 4

568. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, 

August 2009, p. 4.

569. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link. 

August 2009, p. 4.

570. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 66; NTM-A, “ANP Professionalization: The Basic Patrolman Course,” May 7, 2011. 

571. NTM-A, “ANP Professionalization: The Basic

Patrolman Course,” May 7, 2011; Planty and Perito, Police Transition in Afghanistan, February 

2013, pp. 5–6.

572. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, p. 25.

573. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, p. 34.

574. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghan National Security Forces, April 2009, 

pp. 22, 36–37.

575. DOD and State Inspectors General, Interagency 

Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and 

Readiness, November 2006, p. 24. 

576. Robert Perito, Former Director of the Center

for Security Sector Governance at USIP, SIGAR 

interview, October 20, 2016. 

577. NTM-A, “ANP Professionalization: The Basic

Patrolman Course,” May 7, 2011. 

578. NTM-A, “ANP Professionalization: The Basic

Patrolman Course,” May 7, 2011. 

579. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces:

Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain 

about Literacy Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment, SIGAR 

14-30-AR, January 2014, p. 10.

580. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, January 30, 2010, p. 68.

581. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, January 30, 2010, p. 68.

582. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, January 30, 2010, p. 68.

583. Richard Holbrooke, Special Representative for

Afghanistan and Pakistan, “Special Briefing on 

July 2009 Trip to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 

Brussels,” State, July 29, 2009.

584. Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan,

“Communiqué: A Renewed Commitment by 

the Afghan Government to th Afghan People; 

A Renewed Commitment by the International 

Community to Afghanistan,” in Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, July 20, 2010, 

p. 7. 

585. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 27, 

2010, p. 8.

586. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security

and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2010, 

pp. 30–31.

587. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 27, 

2010, p. 9.

588. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 27, 

2010, p. 1.

589. Mathieu Lefèvre, “The Afghanistan Public

Protection Program and the Local Defence 

Initiatives,” in Snapshots of an Intervention: 

The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan’s Decade 

of Assistance (2001–11), Afghanistan Analysts 

Network, July 2012, p. 75. 

590. Lefèvre, “The Afghanistan Public Protection

Program and the Local Defence Initiatives,” July 

2012, p. 75.

591. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 27, 

2010, p. 10.

592. Lefèvre, “The Afghanistan Public Protection

Program and the Local Defence Initiatives,” July 

2012, p. 76; Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The 

Weak Link, August 2009, p. 10; International 

Crisis Group, The Future of the Afghan Local 

Police, Asia Report No. 268, June 4, 2015, p. 5; 

DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 117. 

593. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 117. 

594. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, p. 68; 

Lefèvre, “The Afghanistan Public Protection 

Program and the Local Defence Initiatives,” July 

2012, pp. 76–77; ICG, The Future of the Afghan 

Local Police, June 4, 2015, p. 6.

595. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, p. 6.

596. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in

Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 91.

597. Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 27, 

2010, pp. 2–3.

598. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, 

p. 68; Lefèvre, “Local Defence in Afghanistan: A 

Review of Government-backed Initiatives,” May 

27, 2010, pp. 2–3. 

599. The VSO program is described by DOD as “a

bottom-up COIN initiative that establishes secu-
234 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

rity areas around rural villages to promote local 

governance and development. VSO uses Afghan 

and ISAF Special Operations Forces embedded 

in the community full-time to help improve 

security, governance, and development in more 

remote areas of Afghanistan where the ANSF 

and ISAF have a limited presence.” (DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability 

in Afghanistan, October 2011, pp. 67–68). 

600. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, p. 7; DOD, Report on Progress 

Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 

November 2010, p. 68. 

601. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, p. 7.

602. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in

Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 92. (Guardian is the 

term used for someone participating in the ALP 

program, versus “policeman” which would be 

used for the regular ANP force.)

603. According to a report issued by the International

Crisis Group in 2015, “The mixed record suggests that the ALP contribute to security where 

local factors allow recruitment of members from 

the villages they patrol and where they respect 

their own communities. But such conditions do 

not exist in many districts. The ALP and pro-government militias are cheap but dangerous, and 

Kabul should resist calls for their expansion. 

Reforms are needed to strengthen oversight, 

dismiss ALP in the many locations where they 

worsen security and incorporate the remaining 

units into the ANSF.” (ICG, The Future of the 

Afghan Local Police, June 4, 2015, p. i.) Ali Jalali, 

Afghanistan National Defense and Security 

Forces: Mission, Challenges, and Sustainability, Peaceworks No. 115, USIP, 2016, p. 16.

604. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, p. i.

605. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, pp. 6, 10–11; Jalali, Afghanistan 

National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, 

Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, p. 16; Vanda Felbab-Brown, Afghanistan Trip Report V: 

The Afghan Local Police: “It’s Local, So it Must 

be Good”–Or is it?, Brookings Institution, May 9, 

2012.

606. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, p. 7.

607. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, p. 6.

608. Kate Clark, “For a Handful of Dollars: Taliban 

Allowed to Join ALP,” Afghanistan Analysts 

Network, January 8, 2011, p. 1; Afghanistan Human Rights Comission (AIHRC), “From Arbaki 

to Local Police: Today’s Challenges and Tomorrow’s Concerns,” Spring 2012, pp. 26–27; Javid 

Ahmad, Dress Like Allies, Kill Like Enemies, 

April 4, 2017, pp. 12–16; Tolo News, “Mission Not 

Jeopardised by Afghan Police Killing 6 NATO 

Troops: Katz,” September 16, 2012; VOA News, 

“7 Afghan Police Killed in Insider Attack,” March 

24, 2016; Khaama Press, “Policeman Kills His 

9 Comrades in an Insider Attack in North of 

Afghanistan,” March 23, 2017.

609. Planty and Perito, Police Transition in Afghanistan, February 2013, p. 4.

610. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in

Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 91; Planty and Perito, 

Police Transition in Afghanistan, February 

2013, p. 4.

611. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, 

pp. 69–70.

612. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 69.

613. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 59.

614. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 59.

615. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015.

616. ICG, “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,”

http://old.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/southasia/afghanistan/268-the-future-of-the-afghan-local-police.html (accessed February 14, 2017).

617. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 90. 

618. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, November 

2013, pp. 60–69; DOD, Enhancing Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, 

pp. 80–85.

619. Planty and Perito, Police Transition in Afghanistan, February 2013, p. 4.

620. Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call It a Militia” Impunity, Militias, and the “Afghan Local 

Police”, September 2011, pp. 50–51; DOD, Report 

on Progress Toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 67.

621. HRW, “Just Don’t Call It a Militia” Impunity, Militias, and the “Afghan Local Police”, 

September 2011, p. 50; Planty and Perito, Police 

Transition in Afghanistan, February 2013, 

pp. 4–5.

622. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 67.

623. DOD, “Press Briefing by General Nicholson in

the Pentagon Briefing Room,” news transcript, 

December 2, 2016.

624. The Australian, “Afghan gains not yet sustainable: NATO,” June 15, 2013.

625. Joseph Dunford, “The Situation in Afghanistan,”

Prepared for U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, March 12, 2014.

626. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 14.

627. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, January 31, 2017, p. 58; Central 

Intelligence Agency, “Afghanistan,” The World 

Factbook, May 1, 2017.

628. Mark Lander, “U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan 

by End of 2016,” New York Times, May 27, 2014.

629. Richard Sisk, “Obama Approves Expanded US

Airstrikes against Taliban in Afghanistan,” Military.com, June 10, 2016.

630. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 

“Remarks by President Obama and President 

Ghani of Afghanistan in Joint Press Conference,” 
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 235

transcript, March 24, 2015.

631. Wall Street Journal, “Transcript: Obama’s Remarks on Afghanistan Troop Withdrawal Shift,” 

October 15, 2015.

632. Gordon Lubold and Carol Lee, “U.S. Eases Restrictions on Fight Against Taliban in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2016.

633. Neelsh Moorthy, “Obama increases U.S. troops 

to remain in Afghanistan past 2016,” Politifact, 

July 6, 2016.

634. White House, “Statement by the President on

Afghanistan,” transcript, July 6, 2016.

635. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 8.

636. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 10.

637. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 12.

638. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 12.

639. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, 

pp. 12–15.

640. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Former 

Advisor Offers Hopeful Afghanistan Outlook: Interview with Barnett Rubin,” September 8, 2016. 

641. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, January 31, 2017, p. 90. 

642. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, January 31, 2017, p. 90.

643. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “As towns in Helmand

Province fall, Marines speak out,” Washington 

Post, August 27, 2015; BBC News, “Taliban 

capture key Helmand district of Musa Qala,” 

August 26, 2015.

644. Ali Obaid, “The 2015 Insurgency in the North (3):

The fall and recapture of Kunduz,” Afghanistan 

Analyst Network, October 16, 2015, pp. 2, 4.

645. Sisk, “Corrupt Afghan Army Leaders Hinder

Fight in Helmand Province,” January 20, 2016.

646. Obaid, “The 2015 Insurgency in the North (3):

The fall and recapture of Kunduz,” October 16, 

2015, p. 4.

647. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 43.

648. DOD, “Press Briefing by General Nicholson in

the Pentagon Briefing Room,” news transcript, 

December 2, 2016.

649. DOD, “Press Briefing by General Nicholson in

the Pentagon Briefing Room,” news transcript, 

December 2, 2016.

650. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, October 30, 2016, p. 111.

651. Tim Craig, “These are the 11,000 soldiers who 

might save Afghanistan,” Washington Post, 

March 8, 2016.

652. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Not their job: Turning 

Afghanistan’s special forces into regular troops,” 

Washington Post, October 7, 2016. 

653. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 15.

654. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 15.

655. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 30, 2016, p. 96.

656. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 38.

657. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 38.

658. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 33.

659. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 33.

660. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 33.

661. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 33.

662. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 33.

663. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 43.

664. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, 

pp. 46–48.

665. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 47.

666. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 47.

667. Antonio Giustozzi and Ali Mohammad Ali, The 

Afghan National Army After ISAF, Afghanistan 

Research Evaluation Unit, March 2016, p. 5.

668. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Band-Aid on a Bullet

Wound: What America’s new war looks like in 

Afghanistan’s most violent province,” Washington Post, October 16, 2016.

669. Sisk, “Obama approves expanded U.S. airstrikes

against Taliban in Afghanistan,” February 7, 

2017.

670. Associated Press, “Afghanistan requests U.S. air

support for combat operations,” Military Times, 

February 7, 2017.

671. DOD, “Department of Defense Press Briefing

by General Nicholson via Teleconference from 

Afghanistan,” news release, September 23, 2016.

672. Adam Kealoha Causey, “Jacksonville lands 

$355 million contract to build military planes,” 

Florida Times Union, December 30, 2011. 

673. Kenneth Rapoza, “Lawsuit Aside, U.S. Air Force

Sticks By Brazilian Fighter Plane Purchase,” 

Forbes, March 22, 2013.

674. Rapoza, “Lawsuit Aside, U.S. Air Force Sticks

By Brazilian Fighter Plane Purchase,” March 22, 

2013.

675. Rapoza, “Lawsuit Aside, U.S. Air Force Sticks

By Brazilian Fighter Plane Purchase,” March 22, 

2013.

676. Rapoza, “Lawsuit Aside, U.S. Air Force Sticks

By Brazilian Fighter Plane Purchase,” March 22, 

2013.

677. Slobodan Lekic, “Arrival of Super Tucanos 

provides major boost to Afghanistan’s air force,” 

Stars and Stripes, February 13, 2016.

678. A-29 Training Site, Moody AFB, Georgia, SIGAR 

site visit, November 2016.

679. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 60.

680. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 61.

681. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 61.
236 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

682. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 62.

683. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 62.

684. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 4.

685. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 59.

686. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, 

pp. 54–59.

687. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 57.

688. “Contractor Logistics Support” is defined by the

Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and 

Terms as “contracted weapon system sustainment that occurs over the life of the weapon 

system.” Additionally, the term can be defined 

as “the performance of maintenance and/or materiel management functions for a DOD weapon 

system by a commercial activity or contractor 

sustainment of a weapon system that is intended 

to cover the total life cycle of the weapon 

system.” (DOD Defense Acquisition University, 

Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and 

Terms: Sixteenth Edition (Fort Belvoir, Virginia: 

Defense Acquisition University Press, September 

2015.)) 

689. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 64; DOD, 

Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 58; A-29 Training Site, Moody AFB, Georgia, SIGAR site visit, 

November 2016.

690. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 60.

691. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 67.

692. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 67.

693. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, pp. 67–68.

694. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 68.

695. Brookings Institution, Afghanistan Index, May 

14, 2014, p. 6; DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 

2016, p. 50; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the 

United States Congress, January 31, 2017, p. 99.

696. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 37.

697. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, January 31, 2017, p. 102. 

698. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 13.

699. Khaama Press, “Rise in Afghan army casualties 

as MoD reports 12 martyred in past 24 hours,” 

September 7, 2016.

700. Hasib Danish Alikozai, “Afghan Forces Struggle

in Increasingly Deadly Fight,” Voice of America, 

September 27, 2016.

701. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 13.

702. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 13.

703. Associated Press, “Afghan forces struggle as

ranks thinned by ghost soldiers,” U.S. News and 

World Report, January 10, 2016 2016; Giustozzi, 

The Army of Afghanistan, p. 158.

704. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 17.

705. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, pp. 17–18.

706. Schroden correspondence with SIGAR, May

2017. 

707. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 18.

708. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, 

p. 61; DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 71. 

709. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 71.

710. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, pp. 71–72.

711. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 72.

712. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 69.

713. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 69.

714. General Nicholson, testimony before the

Committee on Armed Services, hearing on “The 

Situation in Afghanistan,” February 9, 2017, p. 51; 

Craig, “These are the 11,000 soldiers who might 

save Afghanistan,” March 8, 2016. 

715. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, pp. 70–71.

716. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, pp. 70–71.

717. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, pp. 69–70.

718. Jessica Donati and Habib Khan Totakhil, “Afghan 

Special Forces Are Stretched Thin With Frontline Duties,” Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2016.

719. Gibbons-Neff, “Not their job: Turning Afghanistan’s special forces into regular troops,” October 7, 2016. 

720. According to a DOD report to Congress, Afghanistan is broken down into eight police zones 

which “generally align with ANA corps areas of 

responsibility.” (DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2017, 

p. 77.) DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, pp. 7–8; 

Anthony H. Cordesman, The Afghan War: Reshaping American Strategy and Finding Ways 

to Win, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, September 12, 2016, pp. 34–35. 

721. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, pp. 5, 75.

722. Hughes, The Afghan National Police in 2015

and Beyond, May 2014; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 30, 2016, 

pp. 94–100; SIGAR, High Risk List, January 

2017, pp. 13–19.

723. European Union External Action, “The EU

Police Mission in Afghanistan comes to a successful close after nine years of progress,” press 

release, December 14, 2016; Phillip Walter Wellman, “EU Police Mission in Afghanistan to End; 

Police More Involved in Fighting than Policing,” 

Stars and Stripes, December 29, 2016.

724. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 237

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, 

pp. 78–79.

725. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2017, p. 76.

726. Hughes, The Afghan National Police in 2015

and Beyond, May 2014, pp. 2–3; Mujib Mashal, 

“Afghanistan Forces Struggle to Hold Firm 

Against Taliban in South,” New York Times, 

August 14, 2016. 

727. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, pp. 25, 27.

728. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 76.

729. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 76.

730. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, pp. 37, 

78–80, 82–83; Gibbons-Neff, “‘Band-Aid on a bullet wound’: What America’s new war looks like 

in Afghanistan’s most violent province,” October 

16, 2016.

731. Mashal, “Afghanistan Forces Struggle to Hold

Firm Against Taliban in South,” August 14, 

2016; Cordesman, The Afghan War: Reshaping 

American Strategy and Finding Ways to Win, 

September 12, 2016, p. 37; DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 

December 2016, p. 33. 

732. Calculations done by SIGAR based on figures

provided for ANP taskhil in June 2016 DOD 

report to Congress. (DOD, Report on Enhancing 

Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 

2016, p. 87.)

733. Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Interior

Affairs, “Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National 

Police: 1392–1402,” 2013, p. 2.

734. DOD and State Inspectors General, Interagency 

Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and 

Readiness, November 2006, p. 5; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 

30, 2016, p. 100; Cordesman, The Afghan War: 

Reshaping American Strategy and Finding 

Ways to Win, September 12, 2016, pp. 35, 39.

735. Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, pp. 3, 25; SIGAR, Quarterly Report 

to the United States Congress, January 31, 2017, 

p. 101. 

736. SIGAR, SIGAR Letter to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the U.S. 

Ambassador to Afghanistan, dated April 15, 

2015, SIGAR 15-45-SP, May 4, 2015, p. 2.

737. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, April 30, 2017, p. 113.

738. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2017, p. 68.

739. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 81.

740. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 87.

741. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 83.

742. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 71.

743. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015; Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges, 

and Sustainability, 2016, p. 16; DOD, Report on 

Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, pp. 82–83.

744. HRW, “Just Don’t Call It a Militia” Impunity, 

Militias, and the “Afghan Local Police”, September 2011; ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local 

Police, June 4, 2015, pp. 8–9.

745. HRW, “Just Don’t Call It a Militia” Impunity, Militias, and the “Afghan Local Police”, 

September 2011; ICG, The Future of the Afghan 

Local Police, June 4, 2015; Jalali, Afghanistan 

National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, 

Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, pp. 13, 16.

746. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, 

p. 58; DOD, Report on Enhancing Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, 

pp. 91–93; DOD, Report on Enhancing Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, 

pp. 82–83.

747. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, p. 8.

748. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, p. i. 

749. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, p. 1.

750. SIGAR, Afghan Local Police: A Critical Rural

Security Initiative Lacks Adequate Logistics 

Support, Oversight, and Direction, SIGAR 16-3-

AR, October 2015, p. 1.

751. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, p. 2.

752. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2017, p. 33; SIGAR, 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

January 31, 2017, pp. 86, 101. 

753. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, p. 7; SIGAR, Afghan Local Police: 

A Critical Rural Security Initiative Lacks Adequate Logistics Support, Oversight, and Direction, SIGAR 16-3-AR, October 2015, p. 1; DOD, 

Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 82. 

754. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, 

pp. 9–10, 68; DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, 

pp. 91–93.

755. SOF News, “Afghan Local Police (ALP),” August 22, 2016.

756. Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Interior

Affairs, “Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National 

Police: 1392–1402,” 2013, p. 12.

757. Mark Moyar, Village Stabilty Operations and the 

Afghan Local Police, Joint Special Operations 

University, JSOU Report 14-7, October 2014, p. 1; 

ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, p. i; Cordesman, The Afghan War: 

Reshaping American Strategy and Finding 

Ways to Win, September 12, 2016, p. 65; Jalali, 

Afghanistan National Defense and Security 
238 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Forces: Mission, Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, pp. 13, 16. 

758. SOF News, “Afghan Local Police (ALP),” August 

22, 2016; Cordesman, The Afghan War: Reshaping American Strategy and Finding Ways to 

Win, September 12, 2016, p. 35; Moyar, Village 

Stabilty Operations and the Afghan Local 

Police, October 2014, pp. 48–49. 

759. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 91; DOD, 

Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December, 2016, pp. 82–83.

760. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 91.

761. SIGAR, Afghan Local Police: A Critical Rural

Security Initiative Lacks Adequate Logistics 

Support, Oversight, and Direction, SIGAR 16-3-

AR, October 2015, p. 8.

762. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 91.

763. Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, p. 16.

764. Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, p. 16.

765. Moyar, Village Stabilty Operations and the 

Afghan Local Police, October 2014, p. 1; ICG, 

The Future of the Afghan Local Police, June 4, 

2015, p. 25; Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense 

and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges, and 

Sustainability, 2016, pp. 13, 16; DOD, Report on 

Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 91. 

766. Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, pp. 16–17.

767. Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, p. 11.

768. Planty and Perito, Police Transition in Afghanistan, February 2013, pp. 5–6; Wais Bakhshi, “Corruption and Human Rights violations are Still 

a Huge Challenge On the Way to a Trustworthy 

Afghan National Police,” Voice of Change, June 

20, 2015; ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local 

Police, June 4, 2015, pp. 8–9; Mashal, “Afghanistan Forces Struggle to Hold Firm Against 

Taliban in South,” August 14, 2016. 

769. ICG, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 

June 4, 2015, p. i.

770. Planty and Perito, Police Transition in Afghanistan, February 2013; Jalali, Afghanistan 

National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, 

Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, p. 11.

771. Planty and Perito, Police Transition in Afghanistan, February 2013, p. 5; Cordesman, The 

Afghan War: Reshaping American Strategy and 

Finding Ways to Win, September 12, 2016, p. 40. 

772. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, January 31, 2017, p. 92.

773. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 72.

774. State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 

Labor, Afghanistan 2015 Human Rights Report, 

Spring 2016, pp. 1–5, 32, 39, 41, 45; Mashal, “Afghanistan Forces Struggle to Hold Firm Against 

Taliban in South,” August 14, 2016; Planty and 

Perito, Police Transition in Afghanistan, February 2013, p. 5. 

775. State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 

Labor, Afghanistan 2015 Human Rights Report, 

Spring 2016, p. 9. 

776. Salam Watandar, “Ministry of Interior Pronounced the Most Corrupt Institution,” May 8, 

2017.

777. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 17.

778. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 18.

779. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, January 30, 2017, p. 92.

780. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 18.

781. Hughes, The Afghan National Police in 2015

and Beyond, May 2014, p. 2; Bakhshi, “Corruption and Human Rights violations are still a huge 

challenge on the way to a trustworthy Afghan 

National Police,” June 20, 2015; Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: 

Mission, Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, 

p. 11.

782. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 6; DOD, 

Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 81.

783. Saeed Parto, Corruption and Development Aid: 

Necessary Evil or Curable Disease?, Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization, June 

1, 2015, p. 2; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the 

United States Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 153. 

According to SIGAR’s Corruption in Conflict

Report, “Afghanistan has consistently ranked as 

one of the three most corrupt countries in the 

world,” based on World Bank and Transparency 

International data from 2001–2015. (SIGAR, 

Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. 

Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR 16-58-LL, 

September 2016, pp. 5, 10.)

784. SIGAR, Corruption in Conflict, SIGAR 16-58-LL, 

September 2016, p. 4; SIGAR, Quarterly Report 

to the United States Congress, July 30, 2015, 

pp. 26, 153, 156; Transparency International, 

Corruption: Lessons from the International 

Mission in Afghanistan, February 2015, p. 15; 

Antonio Giustozzi and Mohammad Isaqzadeh, 

Policing Afghanistan (New York, New York: 

Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 20; Institute 

for Defense Analyses, Policing in Afghanistan 

Reform that Respects Tradition: Need for a 

Strategic Shift, May 2010, p. 1.

785. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 9.

786. Kate Bateman, corruption expert at CNAS, correspondence with SIGAR, May 23, 2017.

787. SIGAR, Corruption in Conflict, SIGAR 16-58-LL, 

September 2016, p. 6; United Nations Office on 

Drugs and Crime and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent 

patterns and trends, December 2012, p. 5; The 

Asia Foundation, The Growing Challenge of 
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 239

Corruption in Afghanistan: Reflections on a 

Survey of the Afghan People, Part 3 of 4, Occasional Paper No. 15, July 2012, pp. 2, 4.

788. Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh, Policing Afghanistan, 

pp. 140–141.

789. The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan 

People: Afghanistan in 2016, 2016, p. 108.

790. Transparency International, Corruption: Lessons from the International Mission in Afghanistan, February 2015, p. 23; SIGAR, Corruption 

in Conflict, SIGAR 16-58-LL, September 2016, 

p. 4.

791. Sharif Walid, “Afghan generals face charges in 

crackdown on military corruption,” Washington 

Post, March 29, 2017.

792. Antonio Giustozzi and Mohammad Isaqzadeh,

On Afghanistan’s Roads: Extortion and Abuse 

Against Drivers, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 

November 2013, p. 4; Institute for Defense 

Analyses, Policing in Afghanistan Reform that 

Respects Tradition: Need for a Strategic Shift, 

May 2010, p. ES-2.

793. The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan 

People: Afghanistan in 2016, 2016, p. 109.

794. The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan 

People: Afghanistan in 2016, 2016, p. 109.

795. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, 

2009, p. 7; RAND, Securing Tyrants or Fostering 

Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to 

Repressive and Transition Regimes, 2006, p. 96.

796. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, 

2009, p. 7.

797. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, 

2009, p. 7.

798. Bilal Sarwary, “Bribery rules on Afghan roads,” 

BBC News, July 29, 2008; Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh, On Afghanistan’s Roads, November 2013, 

p. 4. 

799. Monira Haqjo and Feroz Zia, “Heratis Angered at

Afghan Security Forces,” Institute for War and 

Peace Reporting, August 30, 2011.

800. Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh, On Afghanistan’s 

Roads, November 2013, pp. 7, 15.

801. Haqjo and Zia, “Heratis Angered at Afghan Security Forces,” August 30, 2011. 

802. Haqjo and Zia, “Heratis Angered at Afghan Security Forces,” August 30, 2011. 

803. Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh, On Afghanistan’s 

Roads, November 2013, p. 5.

804. Enqelabi Zwan, “Highway Roberry on Major

Afghan Road “ Institute for War and Peace 

Reporting, September 25, 2012; Giustozzi and 

Isaqzadeh, On Afghanistan’s Roads, November 

2013, p. 5.

805. SIGAR, Afghan National Police: More than

$300 Million in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary 

Payments, SIGAR 15-26-AR, January 2015, p. 1. 

806. SIGAR, Afghan National Police: More than

$300 Million in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary 

Payments, SIGAR 15-26-AR, January 2015, p. 1.

807. SIGAR, Afghan National Army: Millions of

Dollars at Risk, SIGAR 15-54-AR, April 2015, 

pp. 9–10.

808. SIGAR, Afghan National Army: Millions of

Dollars at Risk, SIGAR 15-54-AR, April 2015, 

pp. 9–10.

809. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 47; DOD, 

Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 122.

810. Mohammad Razaq Isaqzadeh and Antonio Giustozzi, Senior Appointments and Corruption 

within the Afghan MOI: Practices and Perceptions, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2015, p. 33.

811. Mirwais Harooni, “Waste fears as Afghan soldiers cash in on spent ammo,” Reuters, July 21, 

2016.

812. Harooni, “Waste fears as Afghan soldiers cash in 

on spent ammo,” July 21, 2016.

813. CRS, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, 

Security, and U.S. Policy, RL30588, January 12, 

2017, p. 33.

814. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces:

Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability, SIGAR 14-84, July 2014, pp. 6, 8–9.

815. SIGAR, Afghan National Army: Controls Over

Fuel for Vehicles, Generators, and Power Plants 

Need Strengthening to Prevent Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse, SIGAR 13-4-AR, January 2013, p. 7.

816. Antonio Olivo, “Hard-boiled cops of Afghan major mrimes unit up against ‘ocean’ of lawbreaking,” Washington Post, June 4, 2016.

817. Rod Nordland and Fahim Abed, “Afghan General

Tasked With Cutting Corruption Is Now Accused 

of It,” New York Times, March 28, 2017.

818. SIGAR, Corruption in Conflict, SIGAR-16-58-LL, 

September 2016, p. 62; DOD IG, Oversight of 

U.S. Military and Coalition Efforts to Improve 

Healthcare Conditions and to Develop Sustainable Afghan National Security Forces Medical 

Logistics at the Dawood National Military 

Hospital, DOD IG-2013-053, March 13, 2013.

819. Isaqzadeh and Giustozzi, Senior Appointments 

and Corruption within the Afghan MOI, 2015, 

p. 35.

820. Isaqzadeh and Giustozzi, Senior Appointments 

and Corruption within the Afghan MOI, 2015, 

p. 34.

821. Isaqzadeh and Giustozzi, Senior Appointments 

and Corruption within the Afghan MOI, 2015, 

p. 33.

822. Isaqzadeh and Giustozzi, Senior Appointments 

and Corruption within the Afghan MOI, 2015, 

p. 37.

823. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, pp. 39–40; Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: 

The Weak Link, 2009, p. 12; Isaqzadeh and Giustozzi, Senior Appointments and Corruption 

within the Afghan MOI, 2015, p. 37.

824. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, 

2009, p. 12.

825. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, 

2009, p. 12.

826. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, 

2009, p. 12.

827. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link, 

2009, p. 12.
240 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

828. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 17.

829. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 17.

830. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 22.

831. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 3.

832. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 37.

833. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 37.

834. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 37.

835. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 4; Todd T. Semonite, 

“Building capacity, capability of Afghan Forces,” 

Army.mil, October 2, 2015. 

836. This is reflected in a statement by the Afghan

Minister of Defense, which Major General 

Semonite paraphrased, “You make it sound like 

the lack of discipline and capacity is our fault. 

For 13 years, the Coalition has fed us on a silver 

spoon and we never had to learn, never had to 

plan, and never had the opportunity to build the 

capacity that we need now that you’re leaving. 

Before we even knew what we needed you 

brought it to us and in greater quantities than we 

could ever use.” (Semonite, “Building capacity, 

capability of Afghan Forces,” October 2, 2015.)

837. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 3.

838. Semonite, “Building capacity, capability of 

Afghan Forces,” October 2, 2015. 

839. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 9.

840. Trent Ruder, Donor Aid Challenges in Shaping 

Incentive Programs and Spurring Afghan Reform, PeaceBrief No. 181, USIP, November 2014, 

p. 2.

841. National Academy of Public Administration,

Why Foreign Aid to Haiti Failed, February 

2006, p. 27.

842. National Academy of Public Administration,

Why Foreign Aid to Haiti Failed, February 

2006, p. 27.

843. DOD IG, The Government of Islamic Republic 

of Afghanistan’s Controls Over the Contract 

Management Process for U.S. Direct Assistance 

Need Improvement, DOD IG-2015-082, February 

25, 2015, p. i, 14.

844. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 11; Todd Semonite, 

CSTC-A Commander, SIGAR interview, July 1, 

2015. 

845. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 101. 

846. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 87.

847. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, 

pp. 87–88.

848. Jessica Donati and Ehsanullah Amiri, “U.S.

Military Moves to Clear ‘Ghost Soldiers’ from 

Afghan,” Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2017. 

849. Donati and Amiri, “U.S. Military Moves to Clear

‘Ghost Soldiers’ from Afghan,” January 19, 2017.

850. Donati and Amiri, “U.S. Military Moves to Clear

‘Ghost Soldiers’ from Afghan,” January 19, 2017.

851. Khaama Press, “Afghanistan Fired 1,394 Army 

Personnel on Charges of Corruption,” March 28, 

2017. 

852. Khaama Press, “Afghanistan Fired 1,394 Army 

Personnel on Charges of Corruption,” March 28, 

2017.

853. General Nicholson, testimony before the

Committee on Armed Services, hearing on “The 

Situation in Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional 

Transcript, February 9, 2017.

854. General Nicholson, testimony before the

Committee on Armed Services, hearing on “The 

Situation in Afghanistan,” CQ Congressional 

Transcript, February 9, 2017.

855. Harooni, “Senior Afghan general arrested on

corruption charges,” March 27, 2017.

856. Sonil Haidari, “Top Security Officials Survive 

Impeachment In Wolesi Jirga,” Tolo News, March 

27, 2017.

857. Harooni, “Senior Afghan general arrested on

corruption charges,” March 27, 2017. 

858. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces:

Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain 

about Literacy Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment, SIGAR 

14-30-AR, January 2014, p. 2; UNESCO Institute 

for Statistics, 50th Anniversary of International 

Literacy Day: Literacy rates are on the rise but 

millions remain illiterate, September 2016, p. 1; 

Heath Druzin, “Watchdog: $200 million literacy 

program misses mark in Afghanistan,” January 

28, 2014; UNESCO Office in Kabul, “Enhancement of Literacy in Afghanistan (ELA) Program,” 

http://www.unesco.org/new/en/kabul/education/

enhancement-of-literacy-in-afghanistan-ela-program/ (accessed March 21, 2017).

859. Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, Afghanistan National Literacy Action 

Plan: 1391–1394 (2012–2015), p. 8.

860. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces:

Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain 

about Literacy Program, SIGAR 14-30-AR, January 2014, p. 4.

861. Nominations before the Senate Armed Services

Committee, First Session, 111th Congress 

(September 15, 2009) (statement of Michael G. 

Mullen, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff), p. 1261; 

Frank James, “Afghan Army’s 90% Illiteracy Rate 

Big Training Obstacle,” NPR, September 16, 

2009.

862. Rob McIlvaine, “Rising Literacy in Afghanistan

Ensures Transition,” U.S. Army, June 13, 2011. 

863. Ian Graham, “Buildup of Afghan Security Forces

Continues,” DOD News, July 9, 2010.

864. Associated Press, “Illiteracy undermines Afghan

army training,” NBC News, September 14, 2009. 

865. Institute for Defense Analyses, Policing in 

Afghanistan Reform that Respects Tradition: 

Need for a Strategic Shift, May 2010, p. 33.

866. DOD and State Inspectors General, Interagency 

Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and 
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 241

Readiness, November 2006, pp. 22, 27.

867. DOD and State Inspectors General, Interagency 

Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and 

Readiness, November 2006, pp. 27–29.

868. Tahir Qadiry, “Afghan notebook: Illiterate Army,” 

BBC News, March 1, 2014.

869. Institute for Defense Analyses, Policing in 

Afghanistan Reform that Respects Tradition: 

Need for a Strategic Shift, May 2010, pp. 18–19.

870. Mark Silinsky, The Taliban: Afghanistan’s Most 

Lethal Insurgents (Santa Barbara, California: 

ABC-CLIO, LLC., 2014), p. 73.

871. William B. Caldwell IV. and Nathan K. Finney, 

“Security, Capacity and Literacy,” Military 

Review, January–February 2011, p. 23.

872. Caldwell IV and Finney, “Security, Capacity and 

Literacy,” January–February 2011, pp. 23–24.

873. Caldwell IV. and Finney, “Security, Capacity and 

Literacy,” January–February 2011, p. 23.

874. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, p. 31.

875. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, p. 25.

876. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Equipping the ANA,”

Kabul 003589 cable, August 10, 2006; RAND, 

Assessing the Ability of the Afghan Ministry 

of Interior Affairs to Support the Afghan Local 

Police, 2016, p. 43. 

877. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 16; 

RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 

2011, p. 76; UNSC, “Lack of Security In Afghanistan Threatens Peace Process At All Levels, 

Security Council Told,” SC/7708, press release, 

March 27, 2003.

878. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, p. 76; SIGAR, High Risk List, January 

2017, p. 16.

879. Graham, “Buildup of Afghan Security Forces

Continues,” July 9, 2010. 

880. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, p. 16.

881. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, p. 18.

882. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, p. 16.

883. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, p. 22.

884. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, p. 25.

885. RAND, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 47–48.

886. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, p. 25.

887. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces:

Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain 

about Literacy Program, SIGAR 14-30-AR, January 2014, p. 4. 

888. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 106. 

889. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 119. 

890. Caldwell IV and Finney, “Security, Capacity and 

Literacy,” January – February 2011, p. 26.

891. Dr. Timothy Shanahan, Distinguished Professor 

Emeritus at the University of Illinois at Chicago, 

SIGAR interview, March 27, 2017; Dr. Bechir 

Oueslati, Doctor of Philosophy and language 

education expert on early reading in Arabic at 

the University of Montreal, correspondence with 

SIGAR, March 30, 2017. 

892. DOD and State Inspectors General, Interagency 

Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and 

Readiness, November 2006, p. 24.

893. Caldwell IV and Finney, “Security, Capacity and 

Literacy,” Janaury – February 2011, p. 25.

894. Qadiry, “Afghan notebook: Illiterate Army,” 

March 1, 2014. 

895. Qadiry, “Afghan notebook: Illiterate Army,” 

March 1, 2014. 

896. Thomas G. Sticht, Reading for Working: A Functional Literacy Anthology, Human Resources 

Research Organization, 1975. 

897. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2011, p. 21. 

898. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces:

Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain 

about Literacy Program, SIGAR 14-30-AR, January 2014, p. 7.

899. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces:

Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain 

about Literacy Program, SIGAR 14-30-AR, January 2014.

900. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, p. 9; 

Caldwell IV and Finney, “Security, Capacity and 

Literacy,” January – February 2011, p. 26.

901. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces:

Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain 

about Literacy Program, SIGAR 14-30-AR, January 2014, p. 10.

902. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 31, 2014, pp. 98–99. 

903. SIGAR, High Risk List, January 2017, p. 17.

904. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, January 30, 2016, p. 78.

905. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, October 31, 2015, p. 98; SIGAR, 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

January 30, 2016, p. 78.

906. Organization for Security and Co-operation

in Europe, “Afghanistan’s Women: Keeping 

the Peace,” Issue 3–4, 2015; DOD, Report on 

Progress Toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 4. 

907. UNSC, “Resolution 1325 (2000),” S/RES/1325,
242 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

October 31, 2000.

908. Government of Afghanistan, The Constitution of

Afghanistan, January 26, 2004, pp. 6, 14.

909. Government of Afghanistan, The Constitution of

Afghanistan, January 26, 2004, p. 25.

910. Government of Afghanistan and United Nations,

“Millennium Development Goals Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Report 2005: Vision 

2020,” 2005, p. 11.

911. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, p. 28.

912. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2015, p. 12.

913. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2011, p. 27.

914. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 30, 2012, p. 77.

915. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, July 30, 2012, p. 77.

916. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 108.

917. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 108.

918. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 25. 

919. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 25. 

920. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 25. 

921. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 93. 

922. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 61.

923. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, 

pp. 38–39.

924. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 61; 

DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, 

p. 4; DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 18.

925. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 123. 

926. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 123. 

927. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 37; 

DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 74.

928. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 123. 

929. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and

Stability in Afghanistan and the United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2010, p. 123. 

930. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, p. 40.

931. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, p. 41.

932. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, p. 41.

933. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 37.

934. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 37; 

DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 34. 

935. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 34. 

936. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 69.

937. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 86.

938. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 86.

939. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2015, p. 69.

940. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 34. 

941. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 117; 

DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 39.

942. Farangis Najibullah, “Afghan Women Joining 

Armed Forces In Greater Numbers, Challenging 

Convention,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 

November 1, 2010. 

943. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 34. 

944. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2015, p. 44.

945. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 74.

946. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, April 30, 2013, p. 100.

947. Michelle Barsa, Prepared Testimony to the 

House Armed Services Committee, on “Challenges to Security Afghan Women’s Gains in a 

Post-2014 Environment,” October 29, 2013.

948. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 39.

949. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, October 30, 2014, p. 102.
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 243

950. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 18; DOD, 

Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2015, p. 12.

951. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2015, p. 12.

952. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 117.

953. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 117.

954. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 117.

955. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 118.

956. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 118.

957. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, p. 118.

958. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 66.

959. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, pp. 39, 

66.

960. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 86.

961. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 16.

962. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, pp. 18–19.

963. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 71.

964. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 71.

965. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 61; DOD, 

Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2015, p. 48.

966. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 16.

967. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 16.

968. RAND, Building Afghanistan’s Security Force 

in Wartime: The Soviet Experience, 2001, 

pp. 68–69.

969. Beata Gorka-Winter, Policy Paper: Afghan 

National Army: Improved but Still in Need of 

Massive Support, Polish Institute of International Affairs, June 2015, p. 4.

970. Gorka-Winter, Policy Paper: Afghan National 

Army, June 2015, p. 4.

971. Gorka-Winter, Policy Paper: Afghan National 

Army, June 2015, p. 4; SIGAR, Afghan National 

Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve 

Weapons Accountability, SIGAR 14-84, July 

2014, p. 6.

972. Gorka-Winter, Policy Paper: Afghan National 

Army, June 2015, p. 4.

973. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Blood and Faith in 

Afghanistan: A June 2016 Update, Brookings 

Institution, June 2016, p. 10.

974. Felbab-Brown, Blood and Faith in Afghanistan, 

June 2016, p. 10.

975. DOD IG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD 

IG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 5.

976. Felbab-Brown, Blood and Faith in Afghanistan, 

p. 10.

977. Felbab-Brown, Blood and Faith in Afghanistan, 

p. 10.

978. DOD IG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD 

IG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 5; Felbab-Brown, 

Blood and Faith in Afghanistan, p. 10.

979. DOD IG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

DOD IG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 8; Tommy 

Tracy, “Afghanistan Army Development: What 

Went Wrong,” Interagency Journal, vol. 6, no. 1, 

Winter 2015, p. 5.

980. DOD IG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD 

IG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 8; Felbab-Brown, 

Blood and Faith in Afghanistan, p. 10.

981. DOD IG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD 

IG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 8.

982. SIGAR, Afghan National Security Forces:

Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability, SIGAR 14-84, July 2014, p. 8; Lauren 

Chadwick and R. Jeffrey Smith, “The Pentagon 

has shipped more than a million small arms to 

Iraq and Afghanistan’s defense forces,” Public 

Integrity and TIME Magazine, August 31, 2016. 

983. Jonathan Broder and Sami Yousafzai, “Arming 

the Enemy in Afghanistan,” Newsweek, May 18, 

2015.

984. John F. Sopko, SIGAR, “Prepared Remarks of 

John F. Sopko – Afghanistan Reconstruction: 

Enduring Challenges for the New Administration 

and Congress,” delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 

January 11, 2017. 

985. DOD IG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD 

IG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 3.

986. DOD IG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD 

IG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 3.

987. DOD IG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD 

IG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 4.

988. DOD IG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 
244 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Local 

Police, DOD IG-2012-109, July 9, 2012, p. 31; DOD 

IG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD IG 

Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, Assist, 

and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and Coalition 

Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD IG-2015-

093, March 31, 2015, p. 6.

989. RAND, Assessing the Ability of the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs to Support the Afghan 

Local Police, 2016, p. 40.

990. DOD IG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD 

IG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 6.

991. Tracy, “Afghanistan Army Development: What 

Went Wrong,” Winter 2015, p. 5.

992. Tracy, “Afghanistan Army Development: What 

Went Wrong,” Winter 2015, p. 5.

993. Tracy, “Afghanistan Army Development: What 

Went Wrong,” Winter 2015, p. 5.

994. Tracy, “Afghanistan Army Development: What 

Went Wrong,” Winter 2015, p. 5.

995. DOD IG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD 

IG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, pp. 5, 23.

996. DOD IG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD 

IG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 7.

997. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 14; DOD, Report 

on Progress toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan and the United States Plan for 

Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security 

Forces, April 2010, pp. 104–105, 111, 116–117; 

DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, p. 4; 

GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, pp. 3, 33.

998. Slobodan Lekic, “NATO: Afghan attrition 

remains stubbornly high,” Associated Press, 

February 23, 2011; DOD, Report on Progress 

Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan 

and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, April 2011, 

p. 22; DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2012, p. 21; DOD, Report 

on Progress Toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 3; C.J. Chivers, 

“Gains in Afghan Training, but Struggles in 

War,” New York Times, October 12, 2010; Jalali, 

Afghanistan National Defense and Security 

Forces: Mission, Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, pp. 17–18; SIGAR, Quarterly Report 

to the United States Congress, January 31, 2017, 

p. 98.

999. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 21.

1000. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 37.

1001. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2011, p. 23. 

1002. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2011, p. 23. 

1003. According to an April 2012 DOD report to Congress, an ANA soldier is listed as absent without 

leave (AWOL) after 24 hours of not reporting 

for an assigned duty; soldiers and NCOs are 

dropped from rolls after 45 days and officers 

after 30 days. (DOD, Report on Progress Toward 

Security and Stability in Afghanistan and 

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, April 2012, 

p. 21). According to a June 2016 DOD report to 

Congress, ANA individuals are dropped from the 

rolls when they leave their units without authorization for more than 30 days. (DOD, Report on 

Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 37.)

1004. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 37.

1005. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2011, p. 31. 

1006. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2011, p. 31. 

1007. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2011, p. 31. 

1008. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2011, p. 31. 

1009. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, October 30, 2010, p. 69; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 

30, 2011, p. 116.

1010. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 39.

1011. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 39.

1012. Phillip Walter Wellman, “Afghans reshuffle military leadership to thwart Taliban gains,” Stars 

and Stripes, February 27, 2017.

1013. John F. Campbell, testimony before the 114th 

Congress, on “The Situation in Afghanistan,” 

March 4, 2015. 

1014. John F. Campbell, “The State of Afghanistan 

and Prospects for the Future: A Discussion with 

General John Campbell,” Brookings Institution, 
RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 245

August 4, 2015. 

1015. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, p. 39; 

DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 2011, pp. 22, 25; DOD, 

Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for 

Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security 

Forces, April 2012, p. 5; DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 

2016, p. 37.

1016. SIGAR, Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments, 

SIGAR 10-11-AR, June 29, 2010, pp. 19–20. 

1017. Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, p. 24.

1018. Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, pp. 17–18, 24.

1019. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 23.

1020. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 23.

1021. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 34. 

1022. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, pp. 18, 31.

1023. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 26.

1024. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, p. 29.

1025. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed, GAO-08-661, June 

18, 2008, pp. 28–29.

1026. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 46. 

1027. TAAC-South, interview with SIGAR, April 2017. 

1028. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 3.

1029. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 11. 

1030. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2016, p. 37. 

1031. DOD, “Media Availability with Secretary Gates 

en route to Afghanistan,” transcript, December 8, 

2009.

1032. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 47. 

1033. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 47.

1034. Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges, and Sustainability, 2016, pp. 17–18.

1035. DOD, “Media Availability with Secretary Gates 

en route to Afghanistan,” transcript, December 8, 

2009.

1036. DOD, “Media Availability with Secretary Gates 

en route to Afghanistan,” transcript, December 

8, 2009; Jalali, Afghanistan National Defense 

and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges, and 

Sustainability, 2016, p. 18.

1037. DOD, “Media Availability with Secretary Gates 

en route to Afghanistan,” transcript, December 8, 

2009.

1038. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the

Afghan National Security Forces, April 2009, 

p. 34.

1039. DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013, p. 47.

1040. Jason Dempsey, “Our Generals Failed in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, October 18, 2016, p. 11; 

SIGAR and USIP, “Lessons Learned from the 

Coalition: International Experiences from the Afghanistan Reconstruction,” Conference Report, 

Washington, D.C., April 19–20, 2016. 

1041. Dempsey, “Our generals failed in Afghanistan,” 

October 18, 2016; RAND, Advising the Command: Best Practices from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan 

2015, p. 15. 

1042. Cordesman, Shaping Afghan National Security

Forces: What It Will Take to Implement President Obama’s New Strategy, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, April 20, 2010, p. 104.

1043. Dempsey, “Our generals failed in Afghanistan,” 

October 18, 2016.

1044. SIGAR and USIP, “Lessons from the Coalition: 

International Experiences from the Afghanistan 

Reconstruction,” April 19–20, 2016, p. 11.

1045. Dempsey, “Our generals failed in Afghanistan,” 

October 18, 2016; Robert Rush, “What’s better to 

use in combat: Unit replacement or individual 

troop rotation?” Foreign Policy, January 26, 

2016. 

1046. SIGAR and USIP, “Lessons from the Coalition: 

International Experiences from the Afghanistan 

Reconstruction,” April 19–20, 2016, p. 11.

1047. Dempsey, “Our Generals Failed in Afghanistan,” 

October 18, 2016.

1048. Robert Rush, “What’s Better to Use in Combat: 

Unit Replacement or Individual Troop Rotation?,” January 26, 2016.

1049. U.S. Army Center of Military History, “Operation 

Enduring Freedom, March 2002 – April 2005,” 

p. 28; Daniel J. Hill, “Mentoring Afghan National 

Army Judge Advocates: An Operational Law 

Mission in Afghanistan and Beyond,” The Army 

Lawyer, March 2007, p. 12; Steven Parks, “218th 

Brigade Combat Team assumes command of 

205th RSCA,” DVIDS News, June 2, 2007; Paul 

Fanning, “Guard Combat Brigade Completes 

Three-Week Training at Fort Drum,” New York 

State, Division of Military and Naval Affairs, 

October 26, 2007; Mike Chrisman, “Mission 

Complete: 33rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team 

Finishes Yearlong Mobilization,” Department 

of Military Affairs: Illinois Army and National 

Guard, news release, October 28, 2009; Michael 

Thompson, “48th IBCT returns home,” DVIDS 

News, August, 27, 2014.
246 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

1050. Heather Reed, “Wartime Sourcing: Building Capability and Predictability Through Continuity,” 

Military Review, May–June 2011, p. 64.

1051. Senior Defense Contractor for TAAC-South, 

interview with SIGAR, April 10, 2017. 

1052. RAND, Advising the Command: Best Practices

from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan 2015, p. x.

1053. RAND, Advising the Command: Best Practices

from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan 2015, pp. viii, 23.

1054. RAND, Advising the Command: Best Practices

from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan 2015, p. 45.

1055. Robert Burns, “Military Begins Huge Rotation

of Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Associated 

Press, January 8, 2004.

1056. RAND, Advising the Command: Best Practices

from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan 2015, p. 9; RAND, Building 

Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond: Challenges and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia, 2015, 

p. 12.

1057. RAND, Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond: Challenges

and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

Colombia, 2015, p. xi.

1058. RAND, Advising the Command: Best Practices

from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan 2015, p. 15.

1059. RAND, Advising the Command: Best Practices

from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan 2015, p. viii.

1060. RAND, Advising the Command: Best Practices

from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan 2015, p. 15.

1061. RAND, Advising the Command: Best Practices

from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan 2015, p. 10.

1062. RAND, Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond: Challenges

and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

Colombia, 2015, pp. xiii, 94.

1063. Dempsey, “Our generals failed in Afghanistan,” 

October 18, 2016; RAND, Advising the Command: Best Practices from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan 

2015, p. 43; SIGAR and USIP, “Lessons from the 

Coalition: International Experiences from the 

Afghanistan Reconstruction,” April 19–20, 2016, 

p. 11.

1064. Dempsey, “Our Generals Failed in Afghanistan,” 

October 18, 2016. 

1065. Reed, “Wartime Sourcing: Building Capability 

and Predictability Through Continuity,” May–

June 2011, p. 63.

1066. Reed, “Wartime Sourcing: Building Capability 

and Predictability Through Continuity,” May–

June 2011, p. 64.

1067. RAND, Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond: Challenges

and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

Colombia, 2015, p. xi.

1068. National Guard, “State Partnership Program

(SSP),” http://www.nationalguard.mil/Leadership/Joint-Staff/J-5/International-Affairs-Division/

State-Partnership-Program (accessed February 7, 2017).

1069. National Guard, “State Partnership Program

(SSP).” 

1070. National Guard, “State Partnership Program

(SSP).” 

1071. RAND, Advising the Command: Best Practices

from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan 2015, p. x.

1072. RAND, Advising the Command: Best Practices

from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan 2015, p. 45.

1073. John W. Nicholson, testimony before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, hearing on “The Situation in Afghanistan,” statement for the record, 

February 9, 2017, pp. 12, 17; Cheryl Pellerin, 

“Afghan Soldiers Demonstrate Improvement, 

U.S. General Says,” DOD News, January 19, 2016; 

Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: 

Report to the United States Congress, May 17, 

2017, p. 5.

1074. UNSC, “Lack of Security In Afghanistan

Threatens Peace Process At All Levels, Security 

Council Told,” SC/7708, press release, March 27, 

2003.

1075. Marin Strmecki, “Afghanistan at a Crossroads:

Challenges, Opportunities, and a Way Ahead,” 

Rumsfeld Papers, August 17, 2008, p. 6.

1076. SIGAR meeting with the CSTC-A leadership,

TAAC-South, and TAAC-East, April–May 2017. 

1077. SIGAR meeting with the CSTC-A leadership,

TAAC-South, and TAAC-East, April–May 2017. 

1078. Tolo News, “Ghani Vows to Reform MOI as EU, 

UN Warn against Corruption,” May 8, 2017. 

1079. SIGAR meeting with the CSTC-A leadership,

April 2017. 

1080. SIGAR meeting with TAAC-Air, May 2017. 

1081. John W. Nicholson, testimony before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, hearing on “The Situation in Afghanistan,” statement for the record, 

February 9, 2017, pp. 2, 20. 

1082. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact 

Sheet: Security Governance Initiative,” August 6, 

2014. 

1083. Government of Afghanistan, Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the 

Strategic Path Forward, March 17, 2004.
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANDSF

SEPTEMBER 2017 | 247

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

SIGAR acknowledges the invaluable contributions to this report from scores 

of individuals. 

We thank Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies; James Dobbins, former State Department 

Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan; Antonio Giustozzi, visiting 

professor at King’s College; Ali Jalali, professor at National Defense University; 

Christopher D. Kolenda, former Senior Advisor on Afghanistan and Pakistan 

to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Ronald Neumann, former U.S. 

Ambassador to Afghanistan; Robert Perito, former Acting Director of the 

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program; Jon Schroden, 

Director of the Center for Stability and Development at CNA; Mark Sedra, 

President and Research Director at the Canadian International Council; and 

Stephen Watt, Senior Political Scientist at RAND.

In addition, we thank and acknowledge the individuals who gave generously of 

their time and allowed us to interview them. We appreciate the contributions of 

all those at the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice and thank them for 

hosting several roundtable discussions over the course of this project. 

Finally, we express our gratitude to General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, U.S. Central 

Command; Major General Richard G. Kaiser, former Commander, Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan; and the deployed units at CSTC-A, 

TAAC-East, TAAC-South, TAAC-Air, and USFOR-A for their hospitality, support, 

and protection during our visits to Afghanistan. 

Report Staff

James Cunningham, Project Lead

Kim Corthell, Acting Lessons Learned Program Director (May 2016–July 2017) 

Samantha Hay, Student Trainee

Clint Hougen, Research Analyst

Kristin Pettersen, Research Analyst

Ashley Schortz, Research Analyst

Joseph Windrem, Lessons Learned Program Director

Elizabeth Young, Editor 
Cover photo credit: DOD Photo by Ryan DeBooy 

PAKTIKA

KHOWST

TAKHAR

BADAKHSHAN

BAGHLAN

BAMYAN

FARYAB

WARDAK

KUNAR

KUNDUZ

NURISTAN

NANGARHAR

FARAH

NIMROZ

HELMAND

KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL

GHOR

GHAZNI

BALKH

BADGHIS

KABUL

KAPISA

PAKTIYA

LOGAR

LAGHMAN

JOWZJAN

PARWAN

SAR-E PUL

HERAT

DAYKUNDI

SAMANGAN

PANJSHIR

FINAL_Security Report Cover.indd 2 
SIGAR

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

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