1 No. 3-- 06--0453

______________________________________________________________________________ Fi led Apri l 23, 2008 IN THE A PPELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS THIRD DI STRICT A.D., 2008 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court ILLINO IS, ) f or th e 1 4th Ju di ci al Ci rc ui t, ) Me r ce rCo un t y, I llino is ) Plai ntif f-A ppel lee, )

) No. 05-CF-68 v. ) ) BRUCE L. FISH, ) Honorable ) Ja mes G. Co nw ay, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JU STI CE CA RTER de l iv ered th e op in i on

of th e c our t:

______________________________________________________________________________ Defend ant , Bru ce L. Fish, w as c onvict ed o f thr ee c ou nt s o f agg ra vat ed d riving und er t he in fl uence (625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2006) ) (hereinaf ter D UI) and o ne count o f dri vi ng whi le l icen se revoked (625 ILC S 5 /6 -3 03 ( West 200 6) ). At sente ncing , th e tri

al court m erg ed the thr ee cou nts of aggravatedDUI in

to one count. Defenda

nt was gi ven an ext ende d- t er m 10- year s ent ence on t he aggravatedDUI due

to a prior co nvi

ction for reckless homi

cide (730 ILCS 5/5- 5-3.2 (b)(1) ( West 2006) ). De fen da nt ap pe als his se nt en ce , ar gu ing t he t r ial c o ur t impr o pe r ly invo ke d t he sa me pri or con vi cti on in sentenci ng def endan t t o an extended term

that had al

ready b een used to ele

vate the DUI from a m is dem eanor to a felony . We af

fi rm def endan t’s sentence
.2 FA CTS Defend ant was char ged , via a mended informat ion, wi th t hre e co unt s o f agg ra vat ed d riving under the in fl uence an d one count of driv

in g whi le li cense rev oked stemm

in g from a traff ic stop t hat occurred o n O ct o be r1, 20 05
. Co un t I all eged that de fen da nt dr o ve un de rt he influ en ce at a t ime when hi s d ri vi ng pri vi l eg es we re sus pe nd

ed orrev oked f

or a statutory

sum mary sus pen si on, a Class 4 f el ony (625 IL CS 5/1 1-501 (c-1)(1 ) (We st 2006 )). Co unt II alleged t hat defend ant dr ove unde r t he in fl uence at a t ime when hi s dri

vi ng privi leges were revoked for r eckless h omici de and had al so pr ev io us ly

been convi cted for two prior DUIs i

n the 1980s, a Cl

ass 3 f el ony (625 ILCS 5/11-501 (c1) (2 ) ( West 200 6) ). Co unt II I a lleged t hat defend ant dr ove un de rt he influ en ce wh ile t ra nspo rt ing pe o ple unde r t he age of

16 wh il e h aving p

revi ousl y be en conv i cted f or two DUIs i

n the 198 0s, a

Class 4 felony (6 25 I LCS 5/ 11- 501 (c -5 )( 5) (Wes t 200 6) ). Co unt IV alleged t hat defend ant dr ove upo n a pu blic road at a ti

m e wh en hi s dri ve r’sl i cen se w as suspe

nded or revoked f

or statutory

sum mary sus pen si on, a C l ass

A m i sdem ean or (625 ILCS 5/6 -303(a

) (We st 2006 )). Defe ndan t pro ceeded to jury

trial and wasf

ound g ui l ty on al l coun ts on F ebruary 23, 2006, wi th a sentencin

g hear ing sche dul

ed f or Apri l 10, 200 6. A

t the se nten ci ng h eari ng, th e tri al court merg ed t he three

conv i cti ons f or aggra va ted DUI i nto one coun t, count II, the cou nt with the most seri ous class

of f el ony , a Cl ass 3. In cou nt II, th

e b as i s f or the e nh an cem en t f rom a m i sd em ea n or to
a f el on y w as de fen

dant’s pri or co nvi ctions f or reckless h

omi ci de from a 1998 crash. In that case, defend ant wa s c onv

i cte d of t wo co unt s o f rec kless ho micide, st emming from a D UI acc ident where defend ant cr as h ed

h i s c ar in to anothe

r v eh i cl e, k ill ing two of the othe r ve hi cl e’s occupa nts. Pe o ple1 Our court , in the above cas e, reversed an d reman ded defe ndan t’s convi ction f or im proper admo nishments by the t rial co ur t re gar ding d efenda nt ’s st ipulat ed be nch t rial. O n re mand defen dant pled guil

ty to bot h counts of reckl ess homi ci de and was

sentenced on March 21, 2001, by the tr ial cour t t o co ncurrent sentences o f 13 y ears in pri son on bot h counts. 3 v. Fi sh , 316 Ill .App.3d 795, 797, 737 N.E. 2d 694, 696 (2 000). 1 The St at e as ked t hat defend ant be sentenced as extended-term el igi bl e, stating: “Bruce Fi sh rec eiv

ed a sentence of two convictions of aggravated reckless hom ic ide , Cl as s Two fel

ony, wi thin ten years of thi s current off ense that he f

aces t o da y, so t h e def en da n t f ac esth e p oss i

b il ity of extended term

sente nc e on Cou nt T wo, of f ive to ten yearsof i

m pri sonm en t.” Af ter ar gu men t by d efe nd an t ( so me o f wh ich we nt t o t he “d o ub le en h an cem en t” ar gument regardin g the reckle ss hom

icide convi ctions), the trial

court is sued i

ts ruli ng on sen tenci ng: “Regardsto the double

enhancem

ent I don’t thin

k t h er e’ s a ny d o ub le enhanc ement here, i

t’s going to be i

n Count One, aggravated driv in g a veh ic le under t he in fl uence of alcohol, that’s a Cl

ass Four, and the Count Three i s a C l ass Four, those are both going to be m

erged in to Count Two whi

ch is the Class T hre e felony off ense. In consi

derin g al l the f actors, considerin

g the ci rcums tances of the of

fen se, your hi story, ch ara cte r, y our cha racter, the

Cou rt i s of the op inio n and it wo uld be incons iste nt with the e

nds of justice t o p lace yo u o n pr oba t ion, I t hink impriso nment i s nece ssa ry f or the protec tion

of th e pub l i c.” The tri al court th en

sente nc ed de f en da nt to 1 0 y ea rs in p ri son on the extended- term Class 3 aggravatedDUI (c ou nt II ) a nd 36 4 da ys on t he dr iving while li cens e r evo ked , to be serv ed
concurre ntly . Defendant now appeals.4 AN AL YSIS On ap pe al, de fen da nt r ais es t he so le c o nt en t io n t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in fi ndi ng hi s sen tence
on the aggravated DUI ch ar ge ( co un t I I ) t o be ex t en de d- t er m elig ible. I n su pp o r t o f t his co nt ent ion, defend ant ar gu es t ha t sinc e t he ba sis for the upgr ade on t he DUI from m isdem eanor t o Class 3 felo ny was hi s prior con

vi cti ons f or re ck l es s h om i ci de , to u se those same reckless hom ici de convictions, whi ch ar o se fr o m t he sa me a ct , as a b as is fo ran ex t en de d- t er m se nt en ce wo uld be an impe r miss ible “d o ub le en

ha nc em en t” a nd a v i ol ati on of state law. The State counters t hat defe ndant was extendedterm el igi bl e becaus e, since d efenda nt had two convictions f or reckless h

omi ci de, even though they resul ted fr o m t he sa me a ct , o ne co nvic t io n c o uld be used to upgrade th e D UI f rom m i sd em ea n or to felony and the other conviction could b e used to make def

endan t eli gib le for extended-ter m se nt en cin g. Fo rt he r ea so ns t ha t fo llo w, we affir m. The do uble enha ncement ru le is a ru le of st at ut or y cons t ru ct ion, and t hus, when d eciding whether a tr ial cou rt ’s sente

nc e re pre sented i

m prop er doub le enh

an cem en t, the s tanda

rd of revi ew is de novo . People v . Phel ps , 211 Il l .2d 1, 12 , 809 N .E.2d 121 4, 1220 (2004 ). The stat ute under w hi

ch defen dant was co nvi

cted o f aggravated DUI st ates: “A pers on wh

o vi ola tes su bs ection (a) a

thi rd ti m e, i f the thi rd v i ol ati on occurs dur ing a period i

n wh ic h hi s or her driv

in g priv il eges are revoked

or susp en ded whe

re t he rev oca ti on or su sp en si on w as f or a v i ol ati on of subsection (a), Section 11-501.1, paragraph (b) of Secti

on 11-401, or for reckless homi ci de as de fine d in Secti

on 9-3 of t he Crim in al Code of 1961, is guil

ty of a Cl ass 3 fel

ony.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501(c1)(2) (W est 200 6). The section of

the statut e under

whi ch def endan t was giv en an extended-term s entence

stat es:5 “The follow ing fact or s may becon si de re d by th e c our t asre as on s to im

pose an extended term

sen tenc e un der Se cti on 5-8 -2 upon

an y off en der: Wh en a d efe nd an t is co nvi ct ed o f a ny fe lo ny, after hav in g been pr ev io us ly

convi cted in I llino is or an

y othe r j urisd i cti on of the sa m e or si mi la rcla ss fe lo ny o rgr ea t er cla ss fe lo ny, wh en su ch con vi cti on has occurred wit hin 10 year s aft er t he pr eviou s co nvictio n, ex clu din g t ime spe nt in cu sto dy , a

n d s uc h charge s a

re se pa ra te l y b rought and tried
an d ari se out of

di f f eren t seri es of acts.” 730 IL CS 5/5 -5-3.2(b)(1) (W

est 200 6). The issue of doubl

e enhan cemen t has been addressed before by Ill in ois court s. In Pe o ple v. Ho bbs , 86 Ill .2d 242, 427 N.E .2d 558 ( 1981), the defendant was convicted o f a 1979 theft as a Class 4 f elo ny. The 1 979the

f t ha d b een e nh an ce d f rom a m i sdem ea nor to a fel ony b ecause h e had b een co nvicte d o f a felony thef t in Octobe r 1978
. Ho bbs , 86 Ill .2d at 244, 427 N.E .2d at 559. T he trial courtthen used that sam e October 1978 theft, which had bee n used to enhan ce the 1979
m i sdem ea nor t heft into a felony, t o impo se a n ext ende d- t er m sent ence on t he 1979 th ef t. Ho bbs , 86 Ill .2d at 244, 427 N.E.2d at 559. Our supreme court vacatedthe i m posi tion of th e ex tended-term
se n ten ce , holdi n g that: “An ex t en de d t er m wo uld have been permissi bl e here, if, for example, t he value of t he l i quor taken i n 1979 ha d exceeded

$150 so as t o mak e it s t ak ing a fe lo ny. Bu t it did
n ot, and i ts taking b ecam

e a fe lony under section 16-1(e) so lely by re aso n of t he 1978 fel ony c onviction. T o ag ain use that 1978 felony conviction to tr igger t he cou rt ’s
au th ori ty to im pos e a n e xte nd ed term pur su an t to se cti on 5 -5- 3.2 (b ) i s, i

n ou r6

judgm ent, incompa t ible with t hat sec t ion’s r equ irement t hat t he cha rg es must be ‘sep ar at ely brought and tried an d aris e out o f di

ff erent series of acts.’” Ho bbs , 8 6 Ill .2d at 245-46, 427 N.E.2d at 559-60. In Peopl e v . Martin , 2 40 Ill .App.3d 260, 606 N.E.2d 1265 ( 1992), the defen dant was convi cted of prostitut ion a

nd on appeal

argued that her sentence

wa s t he pr o du ct o f impr o pe rdo ub le enhanc ement beca use t he co ur t use d t he same ag gr avat ing f ac tor b oth to e

nh an ce the se rious ne ssof t he off en se a nd to i m pose a n exten ded-ter m sen tenc e. Ma r t in , 240 Ill .App.3dat 262, 606 N.E.2d at 1267. On r ev iew , o ur co ur t no t ed t ha t “[ a] n e xt en de d- t er m se nt en ce is pro per in a case wh ere a p rior offen se i s u se d to e

nh an ce a m i sdem ea n or to a f el ony wh ere oth er pr i or of f en se s a re av ai l abl e to provide a b asis f or an e xten ded-ter m sentence .” Ma r t in , 240 Ill .App.3d at 262, 606 N.E.2d at 1267. In the case b efore i

t, o urcourt found n

o im proper do ubl

e enhancem

ent occurred be caus e the

re we re ot her prior felony

offen ses avai

lab le f or t he trial court t o use for i mposi ng an extended-term s entence. Ma r t in , 240 Il

l .App.3d a

t 262, 606

N.E.2d a t 1267. Morer ec en t ly, t he issue of d ou ble enhanc ement was aga in addr esse d byour suprem e court in People v . Hicks , 1 64 I ll.2d 2 18, 647 N. E. 2d 2 57 ( 199 5) . I n Hic ks , t he de fen da nt wa s c ha r ge d in 19 92 wit h misd eme an o rr et ail th ef t, whi ch was then

upgraded to a Class 4 f

el ony b ecause h e had a pri orconvi ction f or ret ail thef

t in 19 84. T he

def en dan t was th en sen tenc ed to an

extended-term sentence on t he 19 92 r et ail theft beca use he al so ha d a 19 85 f el ony retai l thef t conv i cti on. Hic

ks , 164 Ill.2d at 221 , 6 47 N .E .2 d at 259 . T he su pr eme co ur t fou nd t he sit uat ion befo re t hem different and distinguishab

le from that whic h was pr ese nt in Ho bbs , be cau se in Hic ks se pa ra te conv i cti ons w ere reli edupon to en ha nc e th e c l as si f i ca ti on of the de f en da nt’ s c onv i cti on a nd to ex tend h i s te rm of im pr i son m en t. Hic ks , 164 I ll .2d

at 2 26 , 647 N .E. 2d

at 2 61 . Si

n ce two d if f eren t an d s ep ar ate7

co nvictio ns were reli

edupon to enhan ce the classi

fi cation of the defendant’s off ense and to increase t he l en gth of h i s pri son

ter m , the tr i al cou rt di d n ot er r i n im pos in g th e ex te nded -t er m sent ence. Hic ks , 164 Ill .2d at 228, 647 N.E.2d a t 262. See

al so People v . Gonzalez , 151 Ill .2d 79, 600 N.E. 2d 118 9 (1 992 ) (a

ca se wh ere the de f en da nt w as con

vi cte d i n 1 988f or un l aw f ul us e of a w ea pon by a felon, enhanc ed fr om a misde meano r t o a felony base d o n a 19 79 fe lony ro bber y convict ion, and was then sentence d to an ex

tended term ba sed on a 1980 fel ony a ggravated battery conv

iction, our suprem e court held that

no im pro per do ubl

e enhan cemen t o ccurred because “no sin gle factor” was used bot h t o e st ablish the el

em en ts o f th e def en da n t’s cr im e a n d to se nt en ce him t o an ex t en de d t er m, but rather a separate, inde penden t factor was used in

each capa

ci ty (the 1979 robbery

vs. the 1980 aggra va ted b attery

conv i cti on)). A s a prel im ina ry matter, d ef

en da nt p oints in h i s b ri ef to People v . Laval

li er , 187 Ill .2d 464, 719 N. E.2 d 6 58 (1 99 9) , w h ere ou r s up re m e c our t h el d that a defend ant who drove whi le in to xi cated and inju r ed mult iple peopl e coul d onl y be conv i cted of one c ount of

aggra va ted DUI. H owev er, t he si tua ti on t hat pr ese nt ed it self in Laval li erwit h re gar d t o t he aggravated DUI st at ut e is dis t ing uis ha ble f rom that whic

h presen ts itsel f wh en the reck

les s ho mi cide s t at ut e is involved . I n Laval li er , t he
su pr eme co ur t fo cu se d o n t he un de r lying in tent and pu rp os e o f the DUI st at ut e, finding tha t t he be ha vi orthe s tatute waspun

i sh ing w as th

e ac t of dri

vi ng u nde r t he infl ue nc e a

nd an y de ath s or in juri es t hat re sult ed fr om t he single a ct of d riving und er t he influence c ons t itu t ed a n agg ra vat ing f ac tort ha t , wh ile it wo uld se rve to enhan ce the offense f

rom a mi sdemean

or t o a felony , nevertheless did no t al

l ow the St at e t o c har ge mult iple co unt s o f agg ra vat ed D UI for eac h injury or dea t h. Laval li er , 187 Il l .2d at 4 69, 719N.E .2d

at 6 60- 61. The th

rus t and pu

rpos e of t he reckle ss hom

icide st at ut e, o n t he o t he rha nd , is t ha t it is a cr ime a ga inst an ind ivid ua l an d t he fo cu s is on th e dea th of8

t he vi ctim or the re sul

t of the off en der’ s ac t. Peopl

e v . My ers , 352 Ill .App.3d 684, 690, 816 N.E.2d 820, 82 5 ( 20 04 )
. A d efe nd an t , wh o se sing le act o f dri vi ng whi le i ntoxicated caused multipl e deaths,
can be cha rg ed a nd co nvicte d o f multiple co unt s of reckless homicide fo r e ach o f tho se d eat hs becauseth e i

n j ur y occur re d to s ep ar ate

persons. See People v . Mercado , 119 Ill .App.3d 461, 463, 456 N.E.2d 3 31, 333 (1983 ). De f en da n t wa s prop er

l y charge d a

n d c on v i cte d of

th e tw o cou

n ts of reckle ss hom

icide based on the two deaths resul ting f rom his si ngl e act in the 1998 case. We now turn to defen

dant’s contenti on that im

prope r do ub le e nha nc eme nt o cc ur r ed
. I t is clear from the caselaw t ha t , wh er e a pr io rfelo ny is use d t o e nhance a misdemeano r t o a felony, a nd then th at s am e pri or f el ony i s u se d to im

pos e a n e xte nd ed -ter m sente nc e on t he enha nced felony, t he
extended-term

sentence is im proper. S ee Ho bbs , 86 Ill .2d at 245-46, 427 N.E.2d at 559-60; Ma r t in , 240 Ill .App.3d at 262, 606 N.E .2d at 1267. It is also clear that when one cri me is used to enhanc e a misdemeano r t o a felony, a nd t hen a separat e offen se is used to im

pose an exten

ded-term sen

tence, t he ext ende d- t er m sent ence is pro per and no impr op er do uble enha ncement has occurred. See Hic ks , 164 Ill .2d at 226, 647 N. E. 2d a t 261 . I n t he inst ant cas e, how ever , t he question rem ai ns of whether it is proper, in a si tuation wh ere defe ndan t’s conduct in

volv ed two victi

ms and resul

ted in two
se pa ra te convictions, to use one of those conv ictions to enhan

ce a m is dem eanor to a felony

and then to use the other con

vi cti on to im

pose a n exten ded-ter m sen tenc e. Inst ru ct ive

t o o ur analysis in the inst ant cas e is a r eview o f the on e- ac t, one-crim e prin ci ple
. The I llino is S up r eme Co ur t onc e co nsider ed w het her multiple c onvict ions should resul t from a seri

es of mult iple act s und er t he “indep ende nt mot ivatio n” t est ar t iculat ed in Peopl e v . Stewart , 45 Ill .2d 310, 259 N.E.2d 24 (1970). The Stewart co ur t loo ked t o d et er mine whether the en

tire seri es of ac ts
were par t of t he same t ra nsac t ion while co nsider ing t he def en dan t’s m otiv ati ons. Stewart , 45 Ill .2d9

at 313, 259 N .E.2d at 26
. In Peo ple v. King , 66 Ill .2d 551 , 3 63 N .E .2 d 83 8 ( 197 7) , ho weve r, t he courtrejected its previ

ous “i ndepen dent motivation” test in

fav or o f the one-act, one-crim e rule. The King courtde fin ed a n “act ” as “any ove rt or ou t war d manifest at ion which w ill sup po rt a differe nt off en se.” King , 66 Il

l .2d at 56 6, 363 N .E.2d at 844-45. Thus, when more than one of

fen se ari ses f rom inci de nta l orclos ely relat ed a ct s and ar e no t lesser included offense s, s epa ra t e co nvictio ns can be en tered wi th con current se nten ces . King , 66 Ill .2d at 566, 363 N. E.2d at 84 5. T his approach was
re visited and a ffi

rmed by our sup re me co ur t in People v . Crespo , 203 Ill .2d 335, 788 N.E.2d 1117 (2001 ). We b el ie ve that under the approach ar t iculat ed in King and af fi rmed in Crespo , defendant ’s two co nvictio ns f

or reck l es s h om i ci de con sti tute two s ep ar ate

offense s and t hat one of t he co nvictio ns ca n b e u se d f orthe enhancem

ent from misdem eanor to felony

and the other

convi ction can be used to impose an ext ende d t er m sent ence . T he offen se of reckless homicide fo cus es o n t he de at h of t he vic t im resul ting f rom the def

endan t’s act. The reckles s hom icide convi ction as to one vi

ctim was se pa ra te and apart from

the reckle ss hom

icide co nvic t io n r ela t ed t o t he o t he rvic t im. See Mercado , 119 Ill. App .3 d a t 46 3, 45 6 N .E .2 d a t 33 3. Mu lt iple c rime s c an a ris e o ut o f a si ngl e course of conduct where se pa r at e in div idu als ar e t he vic t ims of t he ac t . As s uch, defend ant was char ged wit h and convi cted of two o ff

enses . In the i

nstant case def

enda n t atte

m ptsto tre at th

e tw o se pa ra te
co nvictio ns as one because they both arose out of the sam e conduct. Under

Illinois law d efenda nt pr o pe r ly re ceived t wo co nvictio ns an d the re i s no ju stif

i cation f or pretendi

ng th ere wasonl y one. To acceptthe argumen

t advanced

by defenda nt would be to retu rn to the “in dependent motivations” test of the pre- King era when

con si deri ng en ha nc ed cl as si f i ca ti on and ex tended-term sen

tences. That we will not do . We are bound to fol low suprem

e court pr ecede nt. People v . Gersch , 135 Ill .2d 384,10

396, 553 N.E .2d 281 , 28 6 (1 990 ); Peopl e v . Moore , 30 1 I ll. App.3d 728, 732, 704 N.E.2d 80, 83 (1998 ). We

theref ore f ind th e tri al courtproperly

im posed an ex ten de d- ter m se n ten ce on de f en da n t. The im posit ion of the ext ended-t erm sentence by the t rial court was not in error . Defendant ’s two convi

ctions f or reckless h

omi ci de, de sp it e b ein g t he r esu lt o f a single co ur se o f co nduc t by de f en da n t, can b e separated and one used to en h an ce th e of f en se charge d f rom a m i sd em ea n or to a felony whi

le the other is used

to impose an ext ende d- t er m sent ence . Fo r t he fo re go ing re aso ns, t he judgm ent of the trial

court is aff irm ed. Af fi rmed. HOL DRID GE an

d W RIGHT, J. J. c oncu

rri ng.