In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18-1909

MALCOLM COBB, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 17-cv-00703 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED MARCH 5, 20191 — DECIDED AUGUST 29, 2019

____________________

Before KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Malcolm Cobb, Jr., an Indiana prisoner, brought a state-court negligence action against Aramark 

Correctional Services, LLC (“Aramark”) for failing to clean up 

 1 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because 

the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, 

and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 18-1909

a spill in the kitchen at the Pendleton Correctional Facility, 

causing him to slip and fracture his ankle. Aramark removed 

the case to federal court, then asserted that Cobb had filed too 

late; the district court agreed. Cobb appeals, maintaining that 

his complaint should be deemed “filed” under the prison 

mailbox rule on the date he handed it to his counselor for 

mailing. Because the district court misinterpreted Indiana’s 

prison mailbox rule, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.2

Cobb initially filed this action in state court. He claimed 

that Aramark’s failure to train its employees in safety rules, 

such as posting signs signaling a wet floor, caused his injury 

on December 15, 2014. The parties do not dispute that Cobb’s 

personal-injury claim accrued on that date. 

Aramark, a limited liability company whose sole member 

is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business 

in Pennsylvania, removed this action to the Southern District 

of Indiana on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1332, 1441. Aramark then moved for summary judgment, 

arguing that Cobb’s complaint was not timely under Indiana 

law, which provides that a personal-injury action must be 

brought no more than two years after the cause of action accrues. IND. CODE § 34-11-2-4. 

Cobb responded that on December 9, 2016—six days before the statute of limitations expired on December 15, 2016—

 2 We note that one of the controlling Indiana state court cases that has 

informed this opinion was decided on December 10, 2018, and thus the 

district court would not have had the benefit of that Indiana Appellate 

Court’s interpretation of the prison mailbox rule when it issued its April 

10, 2018 opinion.
No. 18-1909 3

he handed his notarized complaint to a prison counselor, who 

delivered this complaint to the mail room on the same day.

The counselor confirmed in an affidavit that he notarized 

Cobb’s complaint on December 9, 2016, walked it to the 

prison mail room, and dropped it off in the outgoing mailbox. 

Prison records show that Cobb’s complaint was mailed on December 19, 2016—ten days after being deposited in the outgoing mailbox.3 Cobb did not mail his complaint by registered, certified, or express mail, because, he stated, he lacked 

the necessary funds to do so (and the prison does not advance 

costs for certified mail). 

The district court granted Aramark’s motion for summary 

judgment. It concluded that the state statute of limitations 

controlled, and Cobb’s action was too late unless his delivery 

of the complaint to the counselor on December 9, 2016 constituted filing. The district court concluded that Indiana law controlled, and that under Indiana’s law, a pleading must have 

been sent to the state court clerk by registered, certified, or 

express mail with a return receipt requested in order to be 

considered filed when submitted for mailing. R. 47 at 5 (citing 

Dowell v. State, 922 N.E.2d 605. 609 (Ind. 2010)). Otherwise, the 

district court concluded, the pleading is considered filed upon 

receipt by the state court clerk. Id. Because the record shows 

that Cobb’s complaint was sent by regular first-class mail and 

received on January 31, 2017, the district court held that 

Cobb’s action was barred by the statute of limitations. Cobb 

appeals, arguing that the court should have applied the federal prison mailbox rule, which requires only prepaid firstclass postage and deems prisoners’ legal papers filed on the 

 3 There is nothing in the record explaining this delay. 
4 No. 18-1909

date delivered to prison authorities for mailing to the court 

clerk. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 

275–76 (1988); Taylor v. Brown, 787 F.3d 851, 858–59 (7th Cir. 

2015) (federal mailbox rule applies to district court filings as 

well as appeals). He also appears to be arguing that his filing 

was timely under the more demanding Indiana prisoner mailbox rule, which requires prisoners to provide reasonable, legitimate, and verifiable documentation supporting a claim 

that a document was timely submitted to prison officials for 

mailing. Dowell, 922 N.E.2d at 607. 

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment based on a statute of limitations. Stepney v. Naperville Sch. Dist. 203, 392 F.3d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 2004). Here, the 

parties’ dispute boils down to whether we apply Indiana’s 

prison mailbox rule or the federal prison mailbox rule. If the 

federal rule applies, then Cobb’s action would not have been 

barred, because his complaint would have been timely filed 

at the moment he handed it to the prison counselor. Indiana’s 

prison mailbox requires a bit more—it requires “reasonable, 

legitimate, and verifiable documentation supporting a claim 

that a document was timely submitted to prison officials for 

mailing.” Dowell v. State, 922 N.E.2d at 607. 

We agree with the district court that Indiana’s prison mailbox rule applies. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c) provides that the federal rules apply to a civil action after it is 

removed from state court. And we have instructed courts to 

distinguish between actions that occur before and after removal to federal court when applying federal procedure to 

removed cases. Romo v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 250 F.3d 1119, 

1122 (7th Cir. 2001). “The Federal Rules make clear that they 

do not apply to filings in state court, even if the case is later 
No. 18-1909 5

removed to federal court.” Id. Therefore, the federal prison 

mailbox rule does not apply. Indiana’s does. 

We therefore must analyze when Cobb’s complaint was 

filed under Indiana’s prison mailbox rule. In 2010, the Indiana 

Supreme Court expressly adopted its prison mailbox rule 

(recognizing that Indiana courts had been using this approach 

without expressly adopting it). It did so by first analyzing the 

Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 5 that defines what constitutes a filing and when filings are deemed to have occurred:

(F) Filing With the Court Defined. The filing of 

pleadings, motions, and other papers with the 

court as required by these rules shall be made 

by one of the following methods:

(1) Delivery to the clerk of the court;

(2) Sending by electronic transmission under the 

procedure adopted pursuant to Administrative 

Rule 12;

(3) Mailing to the clerk by registered, certified or 

express mail return receipt requested;

(4) Depositing with any third-party commercial 

carrier for delivery to the clerk within three (3) 

calendar days, cost prepaid, properly addressed;

(5) If the court so permits, filing with the judge, in 

which event the judge shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk; or
6 No. 18-1909

(6) Electronic filing, as approved by the Indiana Office of Judicial Administration (IOJA) pursuant 

to Administrative Rule 16.

Filing by registered or certified mail and by 

third-party commercial carrier shall be complete upon mailing or deposit

Any party filing any paper by any method other 

than personal delivery to the clerk shall retain 

proof of filing.

Ind. R. Trial P. 5

Based on its analysis of these rules, the Indiana Supreme 

Court declared that a court shall deem a court filing timely if 

a pro se prisoner litigant submits the filing to prison officials 

for mailing on or before its due date, and the prisoner “provide[s] reasonable, legitimate, and verifiable documentation 

supporting a claim that a document was timely submitted to 

prison officials for mailing.” Dowell, 922 N.E.2d at 607. The 

prisoner-plaintiff in the Dowell case, however, did not have 

verifiable documentation supporting his claim of mailing. He 

did not use certified mail, return receipt requested; he did not 

have a receipt from a third-party carrier; he did not get an affidavit from a prison official, or have any other proof of filing. 

Id. at 608–09. 

After considering Dowell, the district court concluded that 

“under Indiana’s mail box rule for trial courts, for any pleading, motion, or other paper to be considered filed when 

mailed, it must have been sent to the state court clerk by registered, certified, or express mail with a return receipt requested.” R. 47 at 5. This, however, is too narrow a reading of 

Dowell. In Dowell, the plaintiff had no such “reasonable, 
No. 18-1909 7

legitimate, and verifiable documentation supporting [his] 

claim” and therefore the court had no reason to evaluate what 

forms of documentation would be acceptable. Dowell, 922 

N.E.2d at 607. But as appellate courts have interpreted the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Dowell, it has become clear 

that a certified mail return receipt is one way, but not the only 

way, for a prisoner-plaintiff to submit verifiable documentation. In other words, the Indiana prison mailbox rule is simply 

that “the date a pro-se prisoner delivers notice to prison authorities for mailing should be considered the date of filing as 

opposed to the date of receipt [and] the burden is on the petitioner to show that the notice was timely delivered to prison 

authorities.” Morales v. State, 19 N.E.3d 292, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014). A return receipt from certified mail is certainly one reliable and simple way for a prisoner to show that his documents were delivered on time to prison authorities, but it is 

not the only way. And thus in Harkins v. Westmeyer, 116 

N.E.3d 461, 469 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), the Indiana Court of Appeals accepted a letterhead statement from the facility administration explaining the reason the mail was late in reaching 

the court. The appellate court noted that the “letter was not a 

sworn affidavit submitted under penalty of perjury,” but decided to give the prisoner-plaintiff, Harkins, the benefit of the 

doubt as the evidence taken as a whole “creates a presumption that Harkins functionally filed his documents” before the 

deadline. Id. at 470 (internal citations omitted). The appellate 

court explained the rule just as the Indiana Supreme Court 

had (and in fact cited Dowell in doing so):

The prison mailbox rule provides that “a pro se 

incarcerated litigant who delivers a [document] 

to prison officials for mailing on or before its 

due date accomplishes a timely filing”; and the 
8 No. 18-1909

document is deemed “filed” on the date of submission to prison officials. [Dowell, 922 N.E.2d 

at 605]. A pro se prisoner must provide “reasonable, legitimate, and verifiable documentation 

supporting a claim that a document was timely 

submitted to prison officials for mailing.” Id. at 

608. “Where a prisoner’s proof is lacking, however, the opposite result obtains.” Id.

Harkins, 116 N.E.3d at 469. We know that the appellate court 

in Harkins properly interpreted the Indiana Supreme Court’s 

decision in Dowell, because the court in Dowell gave as an example of acceptable proof “an affidavit from [a] prison employee verifying that [the plaintiff] presented the record to her 

on the date it was due but that [the prison employee] did not 

mail the record until the next day.” Dowell, 922 N.E.2d at 608. 

The example Dowell set forth said nothing about requiring 

certified mail or return receipts. 

In short, the Indiana prison mailbox rule is not limited to 

instances involving certified mail. Although certified mail is 

certainly one mode of proof, the Indiana courts simply “require a pro se prisoner to provide reasonable, legitimate, and 

verifiable documentation supporting a claim that a document 

was timely submitted to prison officials for mailing.” Dowell, 

922 N.E.2d at 607. Cobb submitted an affidavit from a prison 

counselor that attested to the fact that Cobb submitted his 

documents to the counselor on December 9, 2016—six days 

before the statute of limitations expired. The counselor stated 

that he notarized the documents on that date and delivered 

them to the mail room on the same day. R. 39-1 at 171. Cobb, 

therefore, submitted reasonable, legitimate, and verifiable 
No. 18-1909 9

documentation supporting his claim that his documents were 

timely submitted to prison officials for mailing.

This leaves us with one last issue upon which to comment. 

The district court also noted that Cobb alleged in his filings 

that the Madison County Clerk turned away his parents when 

they tried to file his complaint in person, well before the limitations period expired. Indeed, the record contains a letter 

from the Clerk of the Madison County Circuit Court to Cobb 

which states, “If you are wanting to file a new suit while in 

the Department of Correction [sic] you may either have someone file on your behalf who has power of attorney over you 

or you may send in the paperwork yourself. ... They also 

must bring a copy of the paperwork showing that they do 

have power of attorney over you. If they do not have the appropriate paperwork we will not accept it.” R. 39-1 at 177. The 

facts behind this allegation have not been developed, but on 

remand, the district court might want to consider whether 

such a requirement by the Clerk of the Madison Circuit Court 

unconstitutionally restricts access to the courts, particularly if 

the rule is applied differently to prisoners than the rest of the 

litigants. There are, after all, myriad people who perform the 

ministerial task of dropping off paperwork at clerks’ offices 

including secretaries, messengers, law firm runners, courier 

services, and the like. We would hope that this rule is not being used to discourage prisoners from filing cases in the Madison County Courts. As the Supreme Court has said, “Unlike 

other litigants, pro se prisoners cannot personally travel to the 

courthouse to see that the notice is stamped ‘filed’ or to establish the date on which the court received the notice,” and they 

are at a significant disadvantage in filing documents with the 

court. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271 (1988). 
10 No. 18-1909

For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is 

REVERSED and this appeal is REMANDED to the district 

court for further proceedings consistent with this order.