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No. 99-001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1999 MT 306N

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

BOBBI JO HACKMANN, 

f/k/a BOBBI JO BELLANGER, 

Petitioner and Respondent,

and

LELAND H. BELLANGER, 

Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial 

District,

In and for the County of Richland,

The Honorable Richard G. Phillips, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

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Loren J. O'Toole, II; O'Toole & O'Toole, Plentywood, Montana

For Respondent:

Phillip N. Carter, Attorney at Law, Sidney, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: July 22, 1999

Decided: December 7, 1999

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.

1. ¶ Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal 

Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be 

filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be 

reported by case title, Supreme Cgourt cause number, and result to the State 

Reporter Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of 

noncitable cases issued by this Court.

2. ¶ Leland H. Bellanger (Leland) appeals from the judgment of the District Court for 

the Seventh Judicial District, Richland County, dissolving his marriage to Bobbi Jo 

Bellanger (Bobbi Jo) and dividing their marital assets and liabilities. We affirm.

3. ¶ We restate the sole issue on appeal as whether the District Court’s allocation of the 

parties’ assets and liabilities in dividing the marital estate constituted an abuse of 

discretion. Leland’s notice of appeal states that he is appealing from the District 

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Court’s August 13, 1998 judgment. The District Court’s Findings of Fact, 

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage were actually filed on 

August 7, 1998, but we interpret the notice of appeal as referring to that judgment 

rather than the order denying Leland’s motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant 

to Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P. The record reflects that Leland did not file a notice of 

appeal from the Order denying his Rule 59(g) motion dated October 9, 1998. Rule 4

(c) of the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the notice of appeal 

"shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from." We will not 

construe an appeal as encompassing an order not designated in the notice of appeal. 

See State v. Spotted Blanket, 1998 MT 59, ¶ 12, 288 Mont. 126, ¶ 12, 955 P.2d 

1347, ¶ 12 (citing State v. Delap (1989), 237 Mont. 346, 350_51, 772 P.2d 1268, 

1271). We therefore do not consider whether the District Court properly denied 

Leland’s Rule 59(g) motion.

Standard of Review

4. ¶ We review a district court’s division of marital property to determine whether the 

findings of fact are clearly erroneous. If substantial credible evidence supports the 

court’s findings and judgment, we will not change the district court’s decision 

unless the court abused its discretion. See In re Marriage of Smith (1995), 270 Mont. 

263, 267-68, 891 P.2d 522, 525 (citation omitted). In a marriage dissolution 

proceeding, the test for an abuse of discretion is " 'whether the trial court acted 

arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds 

of reason resulting in substantial injustice.' " See In re Marriage of Meeks (1996), 

276 Mont. 237, 242, 915 P.2d 831, 834 (citations omitted). Property valuation is a 

factual issue within the province of the trial court. When reviewing findings of fact, 

we do not set aside findings of a court sitting without a jury unless the findings are 

clearly erroneous. Marriage of Meeks, 276 Mont. at 247-48, 915 P.2d at 838.

Factual and Procedural Background

5. ¶ Bobbie Jo and Leland were married in Daniels County, Montana in 1994. They 

separated in 1997 and Bobbi Jo petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. After a 

hearing, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 

Decree of Dissolution of Marriage. Leland subsequently moved the court to alter or 

amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(g) of the Montana Rules of Civil 

Procedure. The District Court denied Leland’s motion after briefing by both parties. 

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Leland appeals from that portion of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 

Decree of Dissolution dividing the parties’ assets and liabilities.

Discussion

6. ¶ Did the District Court’s allocation of the parties’ assets and liabilities in dividing 

the marital estate constitute an abuse of discretion?

7. ¶ The District Court’s allocation of assets and liabilities between Leland and Bobbi 

Jo was set forth in the court’s Exhibit B, which was incorporated by reference into 

the court’s findings of fact. Leland contends that the court abused its discretion in 

omitting his $29,680 debt to Larrie and Karen Smith (Smith debt), his $25,000 debt 

to Bliss Farms (Bliss Farms debt), and his $10,000 debt to Commodity Credit 

Corporation (Commodity Credit debt) from Exhibit B. He further contends the court 

abused its discretion in valuing Leland’s swather at $10,000 and in allocating a 

$10,000 truck and corresponding $9,351.24 truck debt to Leland. Leland claims that 

as a result of these omissions and overstatements, his net worth was overvalued.

8. ¶ Judge Phillips noted in his findings of fact that he viewed Leland’s testimony with 

some distrust, that the financial information Leland provided was internally 

inconsistent, and that Leland had disposed of the swather in violation of a 

restraining order.

9. ¶ The division of property in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage is governed 

by § 40-4-202, MCA. Under this statute, the District Court has broad discretion to 

equitably distribute the parties’ property between them. See, e.g., In re Marriage of 

Baer, 1998 MT 29, ¶ 30, 287 Mont. 322, ¶ 30, 954 P.2d 1125, ¶ 30.

10. ¶ Leland argues that his Smith and Bliss Farm debts are undisputed in the record. 

Without further elaboration, Leland asserts that the court abused its discretion in 

ignoring these liabilities. Bobbi Jo responds and the record shows that Leland failed 

to list these debts on pretrial interrogatories and on a balance sheet admitted at trial 

which Leland and his father had submitted to the federal government for an 

operating loan. 

11. ¶ We must give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 

credibility of witnesses. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P. It is the duty and function of the 

district court to resolve conflicts in evidence, and we will not substitute our 

judgment for that of the district court on such matters. In re Marriage of Pearson, 

1998 MT 236, ¶ 51, 291 Mont. 101, ¶ 51, 965 P.2d 268, ¶ 51 (citation omitted). It 

was within the province of the District Court to weigh Leland’s testimony that he 

owed the Smith and Bliss Farm debts with conflicting information and find that 

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Leland had not credibly established that he owed these debts. The fact that the 

District Court did not list the Smith and Bliss Farm debts on its Exhibit B does not 

indicate that the court simply ignored these debts and was not an abuse of discretion. 

12. ¶ Leland also argues that the District Court’s Exhibit B failed to list or take his 

Commodity Credit debt into account. Leland first claimed he owed this debt in the 

middle of the trial and provided no documentation concerning this debt. The District 

Court’s omission of the Commodity Credit debt from its Exhibit B was also not an 

abuse of discretion.

13. ¶ Next, Leland argues that the District Court overstated his net worth by awarding 

him a 1989 Ford 4 x 4 pickup truck valued at $10,000 and the corresponding debt of 

$9,351.24 owed to Citizen State Bank. Leland argues that the truck has been 

repossessed by the bank and his net worth has therefore been overstated. If the truck 

had been repossessed, the bank would have extinguished the debt. Therefore, the 

District Court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the truck and the 

corresponding debt to Leland.

14. ¶ Finally, Leland argues that the District Court incorrectly valued his swather at 

$10,000. Leland argued at trial that the swather was worth $0 because it had no 

motor. Leland also testified at trial that he had given the swather away. This violated 

the District Court’s restraining order, of which Leland testified he was aware. Bobbi 

Jo valued the swather at $10,000. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by 

estimating the value of the swather Leland had given away in violation of a court 

order to be $10,000 and assigning that asset to Leland. 

15. ¶ Affirmed. 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

We concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

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/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

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