### In th e



# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-1985

M I C HA E L S E I S E R

, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

C I T Y OF C H I C A G O and D E B R A K I R B Y , Defen dants-Appellees.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n. No. 12 C 2 35 3 — Jame s F. Hold erma n, Judg e.
A RGU E D D E C E MB E R 13, 2013

— D E C I D E D A UGUST 12, 2014

Before E AS T E R

B R OO K , K AN N E, and R OVN E R

, Circ uit Judges. R OVN E R , Cir cui t Judge. Chi cago poli ce offi cer Michael Seis er
w as arr ested and subjected to a breathalyze r examinati on after
sev eral wi tnesses repo rt ed seeing hi m d r inking from an a l c oh ol i c b e verag e container whi le driving hi s p e rs on a l ve hi c l e

. After the breathalyze r detected no alcohol in hi s bloodstre am, he w as ci ted for driving a moto r v ehi cle wi th an open container of alcohol in the pass e nger compartment. That charge w as dropped after testing of the contents of the container indi cated2 No. 13-1985
that i t di d not contain alcohol. Seis er fi led sui t again st the Ci ty of Chi cago ( the “Ci ty”) and the poli ce deputy s uperintendent who had o r d e r ed hi m to be processed cri minally , allegin g
v arious Four th Amendment and state -l aw clai ms. R. 48; see Seise r v
. City of Chicago , No. 12 C 2353, 2013 WL 1809916 (N.D. Ill. Apr

. 29, 2013). The di stric t court enter ed sum mary judgment in fav or of the defendants on all clai ms. Se ise r appeals,
co nt e nd ing that probable caus e di d not supp or t ei ther the
or der that he undergo a breathalyze r examinati on or the opencontainer ci tation. W

e affi rm. I. On the a ft ernoo n of Mar ch 29, 2011, Offi cer Seis er w as d rivin g hi s p riva te a u to mobi le betw een Ti lden Career Commu
ni ty Academy Hi gh School in Chi cago’s Canaryv i lle nei ghbor

hood to the nearby intersection of 50th St reet and Uni on A v enue, whe r e Seis er w as assi gned to stand post unti l 4:00 p.m. as part of the Ci ty’ s O p e r a t i on Safe Schools prog ram. Seis er w as on duty and in uni form as a poli ce offi cer

. 1 Seis er w as making an effort to consu me ext ra w ater as part
o f a w ei ght-loss prog ram. T ow ard that end, he had a l a r g e bott le of w ater wi th hi m in t he car and in fact w as drinkin g from i t whi le en ro ute to hi s assi gned post. In ret ro spect, hi s choi ce of bott le w as not the mo st prudent: the bott le w as a 1

. 75

- l i ter T.G.I. Fr i day’s Mudsli de bott le whi ch, when sold, had

Sei ser’s work with the schoo l safety pro gram was seco ndar y e mp l o y
1 ment, bu t there i s no di spute tha t he was nonethel ess consi dere d to b e o n duty as a pol i ce o ffi cer whil e engaged i n tha t wor k.No. 13-1985 3
contained a n a l co ho li c bev erag e and whi ch sti ll bore a label that r ead, “The li quor is in i t.” Gai l Glass ford (a priv ate employ ee of the S a fe Schools prog ram), her mother Kathleen Glassfo r d, and Roseann A nd e r son all saw Seiser drinkin g from the bott le as he dr o ve by them in t he 4 800 block of So uth Uni on A v enue. All per
cei v ed the bott le as one containing li quor based on the bott le’s si ze, shape, and l abeling. Gary Anderson, a priv at e sch ool secu rity guard and Roseann’s brother

, w as stationed at the same intersection (50th St reet and Uni on A

v enue) as Seis e r w as. Roseann called her brot her and asked hi m to obtain the li cens e plate numb er from Seis er’s car

, whi ch Seis er had just parke d across the street from where Gary w a s st a nd ing. As he w as talking wi th Roseann, Gary could see the driv er of the car drinkin g from what look ed li ke a bott le of v odka. Gary sub sequently w a lked across the street, copi ed down the plate numb er , and w as about to ret urn to hi s po st when Se i ser emerg ed from the car and confro nted hi m. Gary w ould later repo rt that Seis er stagge red as he exited the v ehi cle and that hi s breath smelled of alco ho l

. As Gary used hi s hand-h eld radio to sum mon hi s supervis or , Seis er got back into hiscar and drov e back to t he hi gh school. At 2:18 p.m., Kathleen Glass ford called 9 1 1 t o repo rt that she had seen someone driving in t he vic ini ty of 50 St reet and Uni on A v enue drinki

n g v od ka whi le driving; she described the
car and supp l i ed i ts li cens e plate numb er

. When poli ce chec ked the plate numb er

, they di scov er e d the car w as reg i stered to Seis er

. Kathleen Glass ford placed anot her call to the po l ice at4 No. 13-1985
2:29 p.m. to add that the d r iv er of the car w as a poli ce offi cer and to r equest that a police s upervisor respond to her r epor t. S e rg eant John V

ert a of the Chi cago P olic e Departmen t (“CPD ”) w as di spatched to inv esti gate the inci dent. He spoke

w i th both Gai l Glass ford and Roseann Anderson, who to l d hi m they had seen a poli ce offi cer driving whi le drinkin g from a gallon-si zed bott le of vo d k a. They also di rected hi m to the intersection sev eral blocks aw ay , where Seis er’s automobil e
w as once again parked. As V ert a approached Seis er’s v ehi cle fr o m the pass enger si de, he saw on the front pass enger seat a large bott le wi th the seal brok en and wi th clear li qui d insi de. Although V ert a could not read the bott le’s red and whi te label, whi ch w as t ur ne d tow ard the seat, he beli ev ed based on the si ze of the bott le and what Glass ford and Anderson had told hi m that it contained
a l co hol. V

ert a sum moned Seis er

, who w as standing not far
a w ay , and asked hi m what w as in the bott le. Seis er replied , “What bott le?” When V ert a indi cated the bott le ins ide of the
car , Seis er—by hi s own accoun t, whi ch we credi t—sai d that the bott le di d not contain alcohol. But when V ert a a sk ed hi m to open the car and turn the bott le ov er to hi m, Seis er demu rr ed after ascertaining that V ert a had nei ther a w arr ant nor an si gned affi davit from a complaining wit ne ss. “No, get a
w arr ant. I know my rights,” he told V ert a. V ert a reiterat ed hi s request but again met wi th Seis er’s refusal. When V ert a relat ed to Seis er what the wi tnesses had told hi m, S e i ser offered to accompany V

er t a back to the station and sub mi t to a breathalyze r examinati on in or der to demonstrate that the compla int w as false. V ert a contacted hi s w atch command er ,No. 13-1985 5 CaptainRober t Johnson, who ins tr ucted V ert a to bring Seiser into the station. V

ert a drove Seis er to the Ninth Di stric t station. At thi s poin t, the Inter nal Affai rs Di vis i on (“IAD”) of the CPD becam e inv olv ed in the matter

. After the call from V ert a, Johnson contacted IAD Li eutenant Davi d Nalew a y to inform hi m that a poli ce offi cer had repo rt edly been drinkin g whi le on duty

. Nalew ay in turn di spatched tw o IAD offi cers—Ser geants M a tthew Pri ce and T

err ance Cochran—to the Ninth Di strict station. After Pri ce w as bri efed on the allegations again st S e ise r , he vis i ted the scen e of the inci dent and conduc ted hi s own inv esti gation. He spoke wi th Gai l Gl a ss fo rd as w ell as Gary and Roseann Anderson, all three of whom reiterat ed that th e y ha d seen a uni formed poli ce offi cer drinkin g from what appeared to be bott le of alcohol whi le drivin g
. Roseann Anderson si gned an affi davit to th a t effect. Pri ce also examined S e ise r’s v ehi cle (wh i ch w as sti ll parke d near the hi gh sch ool ) and saw the large bott le in the front seat. Pri ce too thought that the bott le w as a li quor bott le, and he could see that i t contained
a clear li qui d. An evidenc e techni ci an photo gr aphed the bott le in si tu

. Pri ce repo rt ed back t o Nalew ay and conv ey ed what the wi tnesses had told hi m and what he had seen in S e iser’s car

. Th a t information w as commu ni cated up the chain of command to Deputy Superintendent Debra Kirb y , who headed the CPD’s Bureau of Professi onal St andards. Kirby’s assi gned duti es inclu ded ov ersi ght of the I A D, among other di vis i ons. Kirby instructed Ri v era t o hav e Seiser processed c rim inally for DUI ( i. e

. , a r r e sted) at the Ninth Di stric t, and to recov er the bott le from Seis er’s car

. She also d ir e ct e d that the IAD conduc t an6 No. 13-1985
admini strat i v e inv esti gation into the inci dent once the cri minal inv esti gation w as compl ete. Once informed of Kirby’s or ders, Johnson br ie fed offi cers Brian Madsen and Andrew Kr al and assi gned them to proceed wi th the cri minal inv esti gation and processing of Seis er. They met Seiser at the Ninth Di stric t station and at 4:45 p.m. began to process hi m. They admini stered fi eld sobri ety tests, whi ch Seis er pass ed. They then or dered hi m t o su bm it to a breathalyzer test, whi ch the recor d indi cates too k place at 5:07 p.m. (Although the defendants av er that Seis er sub mi tte d to the test
v oluntarily

, and it is agr eed that Seis er had prev i ously suggested the bre a t ha lyzer to V ert a, Seis er contends that he wi thdrew hi s consent once he learned that he w a s being
arr ested. In any case, he sub mi tte d to the breathal y z e r
. ) The test result indi cated a blood-alcohol content of 0.000. An arr est repo rt w as completed, and upon re view ing i t, Captain Johnson
or dered that Seis er be released without a DUI charge. Ser

geants V ert a and Cochran deci ded that, in view of the open li quor bott le in hi s v ehi cle, Seis er sh ould be ci ted for an opencontainer violati on

, an d Ma d s e n w ro te the c i tation accordingly

. At that poin t in the process, the IAD admini strat i v e inv esti gation commenc ed. Ser geants Cochran and Pri ce sol icit e d Seis er’s consent to search hi s v ehi cle and to ret rieve the bott le, but Seis er refused. The tw o sergeant s then gav e Seis er a wri tte n o rder to allow t he recov ery o f t he bott le, and Se ise r co mplied wi th the or der: he w as driven back to hi s
v ehi cle, where he unlocked the car and handed ov er the bott le. The bott le and i ts contents were inv entor i ed, and the latter

w ere sent t o the I llinoi s Stat e P olic e laborat or y for analysi s.No. 13-1985 7
On April 29, 2011, the laborat or y i ssu ed a repo rt indi cating that the contents of the bott le contained no alcohol. At a court hea ring on the open-container charge on May 18, Madsen advis ed the Assi stant St ate’s At tor ney of the negativ e laborator y r esult. The c ourtsub sequently di smi ssed the charge. Roughly one y ear later

, Seis er fi led the instant sui t against Kirby and the Ci ty

, assert ing clai ms under both secti on 1983 and stat e law

. Among the clai ms w ere the t w o at i ssu e in t hi s appeal: a Four th Amendment clai m again st Kirby founded on the contention that the inv oluntary breathalyze r amounted to
an i llegal search, as there w as no probable caus e to beli ev e that i t w ould yield evidenc e of a cri me and no w arr ant authorizing the search; and a state-law mali ci ous prosecuti on clai m again st the Ci ty premi sed on the contention that there w as no probable
caus e to beli ev e Seiser had vi olated the open-container law

. The di stric t cour t e nt ered sum mary judgment in fav or of the defendants on both of these clai ms. R. 48. The court rej ected the wrongful se a r ch clai m, reasonin g that on the facts prese nt e d , the poli ce had probable caus e to arr est Seis er for driving under the influ ence and there fore gr ounds to admini ster t he breathalyze r test. The court poin ted out that three wi tnesses h ad told Ser geant Pri ce t hey had seen Sei ser drinking from what appeared to be a bott le of alcohol whi le driving, and Roseann A nderson had si gned an affi davit to that effect. Gary Anderson had also repo rt ed smelling alcohol on Seis er’s b re a th. V ert a had found Seis er to be unc ooper ative when asked about the bott le, and Seis er had refused to turn the bott le ov er to V ert a when asked. Thi s evidenc e, in the di stric t court’s view supp or ted a reasonable beli ef that Seis er had oper ated a moto r
v ehi cle whi le under the influ ence of alcohol, notwi thstanding8 No. 13-1985
certain di screpanc i es in the wi tness accoun ts and the f act that V ert a di d no t o bser v e any si gns of intox i cati on in Seis er’s appe a r a nce and behavi or

. R. 48 at 8–9. Mor eov er , i t w as reasonable for the poli ce to admini ster the breathalyze r wi thout fi rst obtaining a w arr ant, in the court’s view , giv en the speed at whi ch alc ohol leav es the bloodstre am. R. 48 at 9. Th e c ou rt li kewi se rej ected the mali ci ous prosecuti on c l a i m, reasonin g that the open-container charge w as suppor ted by probable caus e. The bott le ret riev ed from Seis er’s v ehi cle bore
a label indi cating that i t contained li quor , and unti l the contents of the bot tle w ere analyzed by a laborat or y , the polic e had no

w ay of knowing that the bott le di d not, in fact, contain alcohol. R. 48 at 12. At that poin t, the charge again st Seis er w as di smi ssed. But unti l t he t esting proved negativ e, the Ci ty w as justifi ed in pursuing the charge . R. 48 at 12–13. II. W e rev i ew the di stric t court’s sum mary judgment deci si on d e novo

. E.g. , T

ownsend v
. Cooper

, No. 12-3620, — F .3d —, 20 1 4 WL 3511731, at *5 (7th C ir

. Ju l

. 17, 2014). W e construe the evidenc e in the li ght most fav or able to Seis er, gr anting hi m the benefi t of all reasonable inferences and resolv ing all credibi li ty di sputes in hi s fav or

. See id. In thi s case, the pert inent facts are large ly undi sputed. The di spute, ins tead, focus es o n whether the poli ce (and Kirby in particu lar) had reasonable gr ounds to beli ev e that Seis er had been driving whi le intox i cated and thus to subject hi m to the breathalyze r test; whether exig e nt ci rcums tances justifi ed the adm ini strat i on of that test wi thout
a w arr ant; and whether the Ci ty had probable caus e to charge Seis er wi th an open-container v i olation.No. 13-1985 9
A. Probable caus e to admini ster t he breathalyzer test A b re a th a lyz e r examinati on consti tu te s a s e a rch i m p l i c a ti n g the Four th Amendment. See Maryla nd v
. Kin g, 133 S. Ct . 1958, 1969 (2013) (ci tin g Skinn er v
. R y

. Labor Execs

. ’ Ass’n , 489 U.S. 6 0 2 , 616, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413 (1989))

. As such, i t mus t be supp or ted b y probable caus e to beli ev e that the test wi ll yield evidenc e of a cr i me. See Illinois v
. Gat es , 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983); United States v
. Sutton , 742 F .3d 770, 773 (7th Ci r
. 2014); Herz og v
. V ill. of W inn etka , Ill. , 309 F .3d 1041, 1044 (7th C ir

. 2002). If the Chi cago poli ce had probable caus e to beli ev e that Seis er had been drivin g while under the influ ence of alcohol, then they had a sub stanti al basi s on whi ch to beli ev e that the breathalyze r test w ould yield e v ide nce of that offense. See Schm erber v
. Californ i a, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S. Ct

. 1826, 1835 (1966). A poli ce offi cer has probable cau se to belie ve t hat an individu al has commi tte d an offense (and to make an arr est) i f the facts and ci rcums tances known to hi m
w ould w arr ant a reasonable person beli eving that the indi vidual has commi tte d or i s commi tting a cri me. E.g. , W illiamson v
. Curr an , 714 F .3d 432, 441 (7th Ci r
. 2013). The beli ef ne e d not ris e to the lev el of certainty

. Abbo tt v
. Sangamon Cnty., Ill. , 705 F .3d 706, 714 (7th Ci r . 2013). [A ]l t hough i t requires something more than a hunch, probable caus e does not require that i t w as more li kely than not that the arr estee w as enga ged in cri minal acti vity—the offi cer’s beli ef that the arr estee w a s commi tting a cri me need only be reasonable. Id. (ci tin g, inter alia, Henry v . United States , 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 S. Ct . 168, 171 (1959)) . Where, as her e, the offi cers inv olv ed in10 No. 13-1985

an inv esti gation w ere in commu ni cati on wi th one another , w e may , in asses sing probable caus e, attr i bute to one offi cer the fa ct s known to hi s fellow offi cers. E.g. , United States v
. L y on s , 733 F .3d 777, 782 n.1 (7th Ci r
. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1779 (2014); United States v
. Sawyer, 224 F .3d 675, 680 (7th Ci r
. 2000). Thi s means that w e may inve st Kirby wi th knowledge of the facts known to her subordin ate o ffi cers. The gener al rule i s that when the p olic e hav e information from a reasonably c redib le wi tness that a per son has commi tted a cri minal a ct , t hey may rely on that wi tness’s account,
e ven when the sus pect hi mself deni es wrongdo ing. E.g. , W illiamson , 714 F .3d at 441. The poli ce need no t exhaust all
av ai lable av enues of inv esti gation, inclu ding those that mi ght potent i ally exculpate the suspec t. Id. In thi s case, Kirby had repo rt s fro m three credible wi tnesses indi cating that S e ise r had been drinkin g whi le driving hi s personal v ehi cle. Gail Glass ford and Roseann Anderson both told V ert a, and then they along wi th Gary Anderson told Pri ce, that they had seen Seis er drin k ing from a large li quor bott le,
an d G a ry An d e rs on a d d i ti on a lly informed Pri ce of the confrontation he had wi th Seis er whi le copyin g Seis er’s l ice nse plate numb er , during whi ch he d e t e cted the odor of alcohol on Seis er’s breath. In addi tion, both V ert a and Pri ce had inspec ted Seis er’s v ehi cle and had seen the b ott le in the fro nt seat of the car; to both it appeared to be an alcoholicbev erag e contain er

. Both also saw that i t contained a clear li qui d insi de; and V ert a could see that the seal on the bott le had be e n brok en. And when V ert a had asked Seis er about the bott le, Seis er had beenNo. 13-1985 11

ev asi v e, fi rst replying “What bo ttle?”and then twi ce refusing V ert a’s requests to ins pect i t. W e note in thi s r egar d that Illinoi s court s hav e re p e a tedly held that a poli ce officer may reasonably infer from the di scov e ry of a beer or li quor container—ev en an empty container—in o r ne ar an indi vidu al’s car that the bott le had contained alcohol and had been open whi le the defendant w as driving. See People v
. Miller, 791 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (Ill. App. Ct. 2 0 0 3 ), abr

ogated on other grounds by People v
. V an Schoyck

, 90 4 N.E.2d 29, 32–33 (Ill. 2009); People v. Gray, 420 N.E.2d 856, 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); P e op l e v
. Zelle r, 367 N.E.2d 488, 491 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Stanford v
. Glowa cki, No. 12 C 7502, 2013 WL 6447947, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2013); Guidry v
. Boyd, No. 06 C 1600, 2007 WL 2317174, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 1 7, 2 0 07); see also Branch v
. Gorman , 742 F .3d 1069, 1073 (8th Ci r
. 2014) (“Courts
ro utinely find probable caus e under open container laws when p o l ice o ffi cers o bserv e empty bott les in v ehi cles.”) (collecting cases ). It w as no l ess reasonable in thi s case for the inv esti gating offi cers (and Kirby) to infer that the clear li qui d in the li quor bott le observ ed in Seis er’s car w as alcohol as opposed to
w a t er

. And giv en the multi ple wi tnesses who saw Seis e r drinkin g from t he bo ttle as he drove by them, i t w as equally reasonable to beli ev e that he had been drinkin g alc ohol whi le driving. A s Seis er poin ts out, there w ere certain inconsi stenci es o r inaccuraci es in the wi tness a ccounts whi ch w ould hav e been apparent to the o ff icer s at the tim e. The bott le w asn’t labeled “v odka,” as Gai l Glass ford ha d t ho ught. Nor w as i t a gallonsi zed container

, as multi ple wit ne ss es, inclu ding V ert a and12 No. 13-1985
Pri ce, had descri

bed i t. (The bott le w as ro ughly half that si ze.) But these are at w or st minor di screpanc ies. There i s no question that the bott le w a s, in fact, a li quor bott le, that i t w as labeled as such, and that i t w as relat i v ely large

. V ert a and Pri ce had both confi rmed the pr esence of the bottle in Sei ser’s car

. 2
Nor di d the negativ e results o f t he fi eld sobri ety tests that Kr al and Madsen admini stered nega t e the possi bi li ty that Seis er had been drinkin g. Of course, at the poin t that those tests w ere a d mini stered, a sub stanti al amount of tim e had pass ed since Seis er had been seen driving whi le drinkin g from the li quor bott le. Recall that Kathleen Glass ford made her fi rst call to the poli ce re p o r t ing the inci dent at 2:18 p.m.; Madsen and Kr al di d not begin to proce ss S e iser cri minally unti l 4:45 p.m., nearly tw o and one-half hours later

. So i t w ould be fai r to
assu me that if

Seis er had been drinkin g alcohol, hi s degree o f intox i cati on w ould hav e decreased and hi s abi li ty to pass such tests w o ul d have increased during that tim e. As w e noted in Kraushaar v
. Flanigan , 45 F .3d 1040, 1052 (7th Ci r
. 1995), the pass age of tim e coupled wi th the prospect of arr est wi ll

One of the i nconsi stencie s tha t Sei ser has highl i ghted conce rns the speed 2 at which he had repo rt e d l y b een dri v i ng when Glassfor d and Roseann Ander son saw him dri nking fro m the l i quor b ottl e. Al though i t do es appear i n retro spect tha t the y ha ve made i nconsi stent statem ents as to whether Sei ser wa s d r i v i ng ab ove or b el ow the speed l i mit, the reco rd do es not i ndic ate tha t they made i nconsi stent sta tements to the pol i ce of fi cers who i nv esti gated the i ncid ent, or tha t the of fi cers otherwi se woul d have b een awa re of any such i nconsi stency. In any case, the speed at which Sei ser was dri v i ng i s a poi nt col l ateral to whether or not he was dri nking alco hol whil e dri v i ng.No. 13-1985 13 naturally hav e a soberin g effe ct on a person who has been drinkin g. Mor e to the poin t, the fact that an indi v idu a l i s able to complete one or more fi eld sobri ety tests suc cess fully (the p a r ties dev ote no atte nti on in their bri efs to the types a nd si gni fi canc e of the particu lar tests admini stered to Seis er) does not negate probable caus e when other ci rcums tances giv e ris e to a reasonable beli ef that the indi vidu al i s intox i cated. See, e.g. , State v
. Bell , 429 S.W

.3d 524, 531–36 (T

enn. 2014) (so ho lding after surv eying case law from other jurisdi cti ons on thi s poin t). Each case necess arily mus t b e asses sed on i ts own facts, giv en that probable caus e turns o n t he tot ali ty of the ci rcums tances confronting the offi cer

. E.g. , Gibbs v
. Lomas , No. 13-3121, — F .3d

—, 2014 WL 2736066, at *5–*6 (7th Ci r
. June 17, 2014). Giv en the other cir cumstances w e hav e hi ghli ghted, the fact that Seis er
w as able to pass the fi eld sobri ety tests admini stered to hi m di d not foreclose probable caus e to belie ve t hat he had been driving whi le intox i cated some tw o and one-half hours earlier (and thus to beli ev e that a breathalyze r test w ould yield proo f of hi s intox i cati on). Sim i larly , the fact that none of the offi cers who had inter

acted wi th Seis er after the inci dent—inclu ding V ert a, Kr al, and Madsen—sai d they had notic ed the scen t of alcohol on Seis er’s breath or observ ed ov ert si gns of intox i cati on does not negate probable caus e. The k e y fa ct s t hat gav e ris e to the reasonable
sus pi ci on that Seis er had been driving whi le intox i cated w ere the wi tness si ghtings of hi m drinkin g from a li quor bott le whi le driving and the confi rmation afterw ard by V ert a and Pri ce that there w as an open li quor bott le in the front seat of Seis er’s car

. Mor ev er , Gary Anderson, who repo rt e d hav ing a confronta-14 No. 13-1985
tion wi th S e ise r after he copi ed down Seis er’s li cens e plate numb er , indi cated that he had smelled alcohol on Se ise r’s breath. The poli ce had no reason to di sregar d Gary Anderson’s st a tement in thi s reg ard, ev en i f the other offi cers did no t themselv es notic e the scent of alcohol. In sum, under the ci rcums tances confronting Kirby , t here

w as probable cau se t o admini ster the breat halyzer. Giv en the ey ewi tness accoun ts and the presence of a bo t t l e labeled as containing an alcoholi c bev erag e in Seis er’s car , a rea so na ble person w ould hav e beli ev ed that Seis er had commi tte d a DUI offense. It w as there fore reasonable to beli ev e that the breathalyzer w ould yield evidenc e of that cr i me. B. Quali fi ed i mmu nit y and admini stering the breathalyze r wi thout a w arr ant Becaus e a breathalyze r examinati on i s a form of search, a
w arr ant for the test or dinaril y i s required, absent, for example, the presence of exigent ci rcums tances that make ob t a ining a
w a r r ant i mpracti cal. See Missouri v
. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 , 1560–63 (2013); Schm erber, 3 8 4 U

. S

. at 770–71, 86 S. Ct. at 1835–36. The Su p re m e C ou rt’s deci si on in Schm erber recog ni zed that, in view of the natural metaboli zation of alcohol ov er tim e and the delays t hat can occur in obtaining a w arr ant, the need to tim el y a scertain an indi vidu al’s blood-alcohol lev el may present an exigency that j usti fi es a w arr antless examinati on. The offi cer in the present case

... mi ght reasonably hav e beli ev ed that he w as confro nted wi th an emerge ncy , in whi ch the delay necessar y to obtain a w arr ant, underNo. 13-1985 15
the ci rc um st ances, threat ened “the destructi on of evidenc e,” Preston v

. Uni ted St ates, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S. Ct. 881, 883. W

e are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood beg ins to di mini sh shortly after drinkin g stops, as the body func tions to eli minate it from the system. P art i cular l y in a case such as thi s, where tim e had to be t a ken to bring the accu sed to a hospi tal and to inv esti gate the scen e of the acci dent, there w as no tim e to seek out a magi strat e and secu re a
w arr ant. Gi v en these speci al facts, w e conclu de that the atte mpt to secu re evidenc e of blood-alcohol content in thi s case w as an appropr i ate inci de nt to petiti oner’ s arr est. Ibid

. In the w ake of the Schm erber deci si on, the Illinoi s Appellate Court, lik e a numb er of other courts, appears to hav e conclud ed that t he natural di ssi pation of alcohol fro m the bloodstream, coupled wi th the delay associ ated wi th see k ing a
w a r r a nt, consti tuted a per se ex i gency that ro utinely justifi ed the w arr antless admini st rat i on of a breathalyze r. Thus, in P e op l e v
. Carey, 898 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), t he court—wi thout addressing how much tim e had pass ed before the defendant poli ce offi cer w as or dered to take a breathalyze r test or how much a d d i tional delay an atte mpt to obtain a
w arr ant li kely w ould hav e caus ed—sai d si mply , “[A]lc ohol in the bloodstre am begins to natu rally di ssi pate shortly after d rinking stops and there fore the delay in obtaining a search

w arr ant w ould have ris ked the loss of evidenc e.” Id. (ci tin g16 No. 13-1985
Schm erber, 384 U.S. at 770–71, 86 S. Ct. at 1835–36). The di stric t 3 court in thi s case employ ed the same reasonin g in conclu ding that the breathalyze r w as a reasonable search. R. 48 at 9. Court s from other jurisdi cti ons, by contrast, had held that whe t he r there w ere “speci al facts” ( s e e Schm erber , 384 U.S. at 771, 86 S. Ct. at 1836) apa rt from the ev anesc ent nature of bloodalcohol content establi shing an exigency mus t be ev aluated on a case-by-cas e basi s. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 n.2 (collecting cases on both si des of thi s di vis i on of author i ty). Subsequent t o the di stric t court’s de cis io n in t hi s case, the Supreme Co urt in McNeelyresolv ed the spli t agains t a rule of per se ex i gency in bloo d-alc o ho l cases

. Relying in part on the fact that technological adv an c e s h a ve made i t possi ble to obtain

w arr ants more expediti ously thro ugh such means as telephone, radio, emai l and other electro ni c commu ni cati ons, and videoconferencing, the Court reasoned that the di ssipation of alcohol does not alw ays present an exige ncy justif yin g the

w arr antless admini strat i on of a blood-alcohol test. 133 S. Ct. at 1560–61. Instead, t he ci rcums tances mus t be ev aluated on a

Carey was deci ded b y the Fir st Distri ct appell ate cour t, which has 3 juri sdi cti on o v er C hicago. Co urts i n other di stric ts had held simi l arly. See People v. Ayres , 59 1 N.E.2 d 93 1, 93 3 (Il l

. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 19 9 2 ) (“ We note tha t the evidence was evanescent i n nature b ecause alco hol i n a DUI suspect’s b l oo d b egi ns to di ssipate sh or tly after the i ndivid ual stops consumi ng alco hol

. There i s no time to seek out a mag i strate to obtain a search warrant.”) (ci ting Schm erb er ); People v. Byrd , 57 4 N

. E

. 2 d 1 26 9, 12 71 (Il l

. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 19 91 ) (“ [T] he evidence i s evane scent i n nature. Al coho l i n the b l oo dstream of a DUI suspe c t b egi ns to di ssipate shortl y after dri nking stops. There i s no time to seek out a magi strate and secure a warrant.”) (ci ting Schm erb er ).No. 13-1985 17

c a s e
-b y- c a s e b a si s to deter mine whether w arr antl e s s a c ti on wa s justifi ed. Id. at 1563. Ev en i f w e assu me, in view of the Court ’s deci sio n in McNeely, that exigent ci rcums tances di d not excuse the fai lure to seek a w arr ant in thi s cas e, the doctrine of quali fi ed i mmu
ni ty nonethe l ess shi elds Kirby from li abi li ty

. Quali fi ed 4 i mmu ni ty bars a ci vil clai m for damages again st a government offi ci al when the offi ci al i s perfor ming a di screti onary func tion and her conduc t does not violate clearly establi shed rights of whi ch a reasonable person w ould hav e known. E.g. , Sutterfie ld

v
. City of Milwauk e e , 7 5 1 F .3d 542, 572 (7th Ci r
. 2014) (ci tin g , inter alia, Harlow v
. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982)) ; V

olkman v

. R

yker , 736 F .3d 1084, 1089–90 (7th Ci r
. 2013). Put another w ay , an offi ci al making a discret i onary deci si on i s entitled to the p r o t e ct i on of quali fi ed i mmuni ty when a reasonable person in her posi tion w ould no t hav e appreci ated that her conduc t w as i llegal und e r t he ci rcumstances

. Id. at 1090; Phelan v
. V ill. of L yons , 531 F .3d 484, 487 (7th Ci r . 2008). At the point that the breathalyze r test w as admini stered to Seis er , a reasonable poli ce offi ci al w ould hav e beli ev ed in li ght of Carey and li ke cases that so long as there w as probable caus e

The de f e nd an ts raise a questio n as to why Kirby shoul d b e exposed to 4 l i ab i l i ty b ased on admini stratio n of the b reatha l yzer test, as she di d not
or der tha t Sei ser b e sub jec t to such a test; rather, tha t was the deci sio n of of fi cers Madsen and Kral. But giving Sei ser the b enefi t o f the do ub t, we sh al l ass ume arguendo tha t Kirby’s decr ee tha t Sei ser b e cri minal l y pro cessed i nclud ed or tri ggered he r sub or di nat es’ pursui t of or di nary, fo reseeable te sts fo r i ntoxicatio n, i nclud i ng a b reatha l yzer test.18 No. 13-1985

t o j usti fy a breathalyze r examinati on, there w as no nee d t o consi der seeking a w arr ant fi rst. By the tim e Seis er w as bein g processed at the Ninth Di stric t, nearly tw o and one-half hours had tr anspi red since he w as seen drinkin g from the li quor bott le, and an atte mpt to obtain a w arr ant, thr ough whatev er means, w ould hav e p o rt ended at least some further delay

. Carey suggested that di spens ing wi t h a w arr ant appli cati on
w as a sound course. And as t he McNeely deci si on recog ni zes, there w a s a prior di vis i on of authority among courts on thi s
v ery poin t. 133 S. Ct

. at 1558 & n.2. Confli cting precedents present the v ery sort of unc ert ainty as to what the law requires that enti tles a publi c offi ci al to qualifi ed i mmu ni ty

. See Reichle

v
. Howards , 132 S. Ct . 2088, 2096 (2012) ( “If judges

... di sagree on a consti tutional questi on, i t i s unfai r to sub ject poli ce to
mo ne y damages for pi cking the losing si de of the contro

v ersy .”) (quoting W

ilson v
. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1701 (1999))

. Seis er suggests that Kirby should no t be giv en the benefi t of quali fi ed i mmu ni ty becau se, in hi s view , Kirby usu rped the
ro le of a line poli ce offi cer by or dering that Seis er be processed cri minally— i.e. , that she inserted herself into an a re a n ot wi thin the scope of her author i ty

. See Johnson v
. Phillips , 664 F .3d 232, 236–37 (8th Ci r
. 2011) (offi ci a l who acts outsi de clearly establi shed scope of hi s di screti ona r y a ut hority i s not entitled to assert quali fi ed i mmu ni ty) (collecting cases ). On t he recor d before us, we rej ect th e a r g um ent. Superv i si on of the IAD (among other di vis i ons of the department) w as one of Kirby’s responsibi li ties as a deputy superintendent of the poli ce force. Ki rby testifi ed that as an ext ensi on of her ov ersi ght responsibi l

it i es, i t w as wi thin her purview to make deci si ons as to theNo. 13-1985 19
proper handling of a poli ce offi cer who has been i mpli cated in a cri me. R. 44-1 Supp. Ex. C at 74–75. Th at testim ony , not to menti on or dinary logic, sugg ests that i t w as not bey ond her authority to i ssu e the or der that Seis er be processed cri minally

. See Anderson v
. Creighton , 4 8 3 U.S. 635, 643, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040–41 (1987) (“[W] e hav e been unw i lling to compli cate quali fi ed i mmu ni ty analysi s by making the scope or ext ent of i mmu ni ty turn on the preci se nature of v arious offi ci als’ duti es or the preci se character of the particu lar rights alleged to hav e been violated.”). Nor i s i t surpri sing that a hi gh-ranking offi cer wi thin the department w ould b e c om e inv ol ved in thi s instance, giv en the sens i tivi ty of the allegations—that a Chi cago poli ce offi cer w as dr inking whi le driving, in a sch o o l z o ne, en ro ute to hi s assi gned post as a sch ool safety offi cer—and the co rr esponding need to mak e sure the allegations w ere handled proper ly

. The negativ e r a mific ations for the department in ter ms of t he p ub l i c tr ust w ould hav e been seri ous w ere i t percei v ed that Seis er w as giv en leni ent tr eatment. In short, w e ar e giv en no reason to beli ev e, in li ght of Kirby’s ov ersi ght authority , that i t w as bey ond her pu rv i ew to di rect that Seis er be processed cri minally

. T o the ext ent the deci si on to admini ster the breat halyzer is p ro perly at tr ibuted to K i rby as a result of that or der

, w e ca n see no reason why she should be depriv ed of quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

. C. Malic i ous prosecuti on Seis er has also alleged that the deci si on to charge hi m wi th t he open-container violati on (unti l the test of the bott l e ’ s contents pr o ved negativ e for alcohol), consti tuted mali ci ous20 No. 13-1985 prosecuti on for whi ch the Ci ty should be li able. T o pro v e the 5 t or t of mali ci ous prosecuti on under Illinoi s law , Seis er be a r s the burden of prov ing t ha t (1) the Ci ty ini tiated cri minal proceedings again st hi m; (2) those pr o ce e d ings w ere ter mi

nated in hi s fav or ; (3) there w as no pr obable cau se to support the proceedings; (4) mali ce w as present, i.e. , t ha t t he offi cer who ini tiated the proceedings w as motiv ated by something other than a desi re to bring a gui lty party to justic e; and (5) he suffered damages as re sult of the proceedings. See, e.g. , W illiams v
. City of C h i c ag o , 733 F .3d 749, 759 (7th Ci r
. 2013); Aleman v

. V

ill. of Hanover Park

, 662 F .3d 897, 907 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (mali ce); Holland v
. City of Chicago , 64 3 F .3d 248, 254 (7th Ci r
. 2011). As the lack of probable caus e i s an element of mali ci ous prosecuti on, evi dence demonstrating that t here w as probable
caus e to beli ev e the plainti ff had co mm itted an offense i s a complete bar t o t he clai m. E.g. , V enson v
. Altamirano , 749 F .3d 641, 651 (7th Ci r . 2014). A ft e r the breathalyze r examinati on yielded a negativ e result, Seis er w as charged solely wi th the open-cont a iner violati on. The governing Illinoi s statute prov i des in r elev ant part that “no driv er may tr ansport, carry , possess or hav e any alcoholi c li quor wi thin the pass enger area of any moto r v ehi cle upon a hi ghw ay in [Illinoi s] except in the or i gina l container and wi th the seal unbroken.” 625 ILCS 5/11-502(a)

. There i s no di spute t hat the bott le that S ei ser had wi th hi m in hi s car w as “open” in the sens e that i ts seal had been brok en or that i t w as, in fact, a li quor bott l e. Of course, what w as in the bott le w as

Sei ser’s opening b ri ef ma kes cl ear that h e is pursuing this clai m aga i nst 5 the Ci ty alo ne. S ei ser Br . 2 3.No. 13-1985 21
not alc ohol, bu t that di d not become clear unti l a month later , when the results of the laborat or y testin g were di scl osed. So the essenti a l que st i on i s whether , at the tim e w as Seis er charged wi th the open-container violati on, the facts known to the poli ce (and, in particu lar , to Ser geants V

ert a and Cochran, who repo rt edly ma d e the deci si on to i ssu e the ci tation to Seis er) w ould hav e w arr anted a reas o na ble beli ef that the bott le contained alcohol. The answer to that questi on i s y es. Apart from the wi tness es who had seen Seis er drinkin g from what appeared to be
a li quor bott le, both V

ert a and Pri ce observ ed the bott le on the front seat of Seis er’s car

. The bott le matched (on the whole) the descri ption giv e n by the wi tnesses wi th whom they had spo k e n, and i t contained a clear li qui d. When asked by V ert a what w as in the bott le, Seis er w as ev asi v e. A reasonable person confronted wi th these ci rcums tances could reasonably beli ev e that t he open bott le contained alcohol. 6

To the extent Sei ser su g g e sts tha t Il l i noi s empl oys a more demanding 6 stan dard fo r ass essing pro b ab l e cause v i s-à-v i s the deci sio n to p u r sue a charge, we are not persuaded tha t i s true. Notwi thstanding recurr ent refe rences i n Il l i noi s mali ci ous pro secuti on cases to a b el i ef tha t the accused i s “pro b ab l y guil ty of an of fense,” e.g. , Howard v. Firmand, 88 0 N.E.2 d 11 39 , 11 42 (Il l

. App. Ct. 20 07 ) (i nternal quotatio n marks and c i tatio ns o mi t t ed) , those sa me ca ses conti nue to affi rm that “a sta te of facts tha t w oul d lead a perso n of or di nary care and prudence to b el i eve or to entertain an honest and sound suspicio n t

h a t the accused commi tted the of fense charged” i s suffi ci ent to estab l i sh pro b ab l e ca use to charge the accused, id. (emphasis suppl i ed)

. Indeed, the Il l i noi s A p p el l ate cour t has twice rej ected the noti on tha t the pro b ab l e cause stan dard fo r the deci sio n to charge i s meani ngfull y di ffe rent fro m the pro b ab l e cause stan dard fo r the deci sio n to arrest. See Joh nson v. (co ntinued. ..)22 No. 13-1985
Seis er pursues a second line of arg ument. Gi v en that he w as o r d ered to turn ov er the bott le, he reasons, the Ci ty fro m t he outset could not reasonably hav e expected that the bott le, and the laborat or y r e sults as to i ts contents, w ould be admi ssi ble again st hi m at tr i al. In other w or ds, whatev er i ts sus pi ci ons, the Ci ty could not expect that it w o ul d be able to prove i ts case again st hi m. Hi s arg ument i s based on Garrity v
. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S. Ct. 616 (1967), whi ch held that statements obtained fr o m a poli ce offi cer under threat of remov al from offi ce i f he exer ci sed hi s right to remain si lent are not admi ssi

ble against the offi cer in a subsequ ent crim inal proceeding. Contr ary to the premi se of Seis er’s arg ument, i t w ould not hav e been clear to the Ci ty or to Serg eants V ert a and Cochran that the bott le necess arily w as inadmi ssi ble again st Seis er in a cri minal pr oceeding. As t he defendants point o ut, the I l linoi s appellate court in Car

ey expr essly r ej ected an arg ument that the results o f a breathalyze r test to whi ch a pol ice o ffic er had been or dered to sub mi t on p a in of ter minati on i f he di d not
w ere inadmi ssi

ble again st the offi ce r pursuant to Garrity

. 898

( ...c onti nued) 6 Target Stores, Inc. , 79 1 N.E.2 d 12 06 , 12 25 (Il l

. App. Ct. 20 03 ) (de scri b i ng the two st an d ards as “f or all purpo ses, equal”; Ross v. Mauro Chevrolet, 86 1 N.E.2 d 31 3, 32 0 (Il l

. App. Ct. 20 06 ); see also London v. Harris , No. 09 C 77 97, 20 13 WL 14 05 25 0, at *7 (N.D. Il l

. Apr. 15 , 20 13 ) (po i nting out deci sio ns fro m b oth this cour t an d the Il l i noi s Appe l l ate Co urt which hav e treated pro b ab l e cause to arrest as di sposi tive of a mali ci ous pro secuti on cl aim). What may, i n practic al terms, d i st i ng u i sh the deci sio n to charge fro m the deci sio n to arrest i s any addi tio nal i nfor mati on tha t comes to l i ght b etween the time a perso n i s arrested and the poi nt at which he i s charged. Joh nson , 79 1 N.E.2 d at 122 5; Ross , 8 61 N.E. 2d at 320

.No. 13-1985 23
N

. E.2d at 1139–40. The court reasoned that the Fifth Am e nd

ment privi lege again st self- incri minati on, o n whi ch Garrity ’s holding i s based, appli es only to testi moni al and commu ni cativ e evidenc e, and not to physi cal e v i dence inclu ding the results of a compuls or y b lood or breat h test. Id. It t hus w ould hav e been reasonable for the chargin g offi cers to conclu de that Garrity posed no bar to the admi ssi on of the bott le, i ts contents,
a nd the results of the laborat or y testing again st Seis er in a cri minal proceeding. Becaus e there w as probable caus e to beli ev e that Seis er had violated the open-container statute, hi s mali ci ous prosecuti on clai m i s foreclosed. III.

The dis tr i ct court pr oper ly enter ed sum mary judgment in fav o r of the defendants as to both the unreasonable search clai m as w ell the malicio us prosecuti on clai m, as both the admini strat io n of the breathalyze r test and the deci si on to charge Seis er wi th an open-containe r vi ol a tion w ere supp or ted by pro bable c ause. AFF IRM ED.