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ARE WE LOSING THE SPACE RACE TO CHINA? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

September 27, 2016 

Serial No. 114–95 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan 

STEVE KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

DARIN LAHOOD, Illinois 

WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts 

DON S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

MARK TAKANO, California 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

HON. BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama, 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

STEVE KNIGHT, California 

WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

AMI BERA, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

September 27, 2016 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 4 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 6 

Statement by Representative Donna Edwards, Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 8 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14 

Witnesses: 

The Hon. Dennis C. Shea, Chairman, U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 17 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19 

Mr. Mark Stokes, Executive Director, Project 2049 Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 36 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 38 

Mr. Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, Heritage 

Foundation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 44 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 46 

Dr. James Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies 

Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 56 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 58 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 64 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

The Hon. Dennis C. Shea, Chairman, U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission ............................................................................................. 80 

Mr. Mark Stokes, Executive Director, Project 2049 Institute .............................. 100 

Mr. Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, Heritage 

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 101 

Dr. James Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies 

Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies ................................... 113 
Page

IV 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Statement submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 

Representatives .................................................................................................... 122 
(1) 

ARE WE LOSING THE SPACE RACE TO CHINA? 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brian Babin 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
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Chairman BABIN. The Subcommittee on Space will come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of 

the Subcommittee at any time, and welcome to today’s hearing titled ‘‘Are We Losing the Space Race to China?’’ 

I now recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

After the Columbia accident, President George W. Bush sought 

to revitalize our nation’s space program by challenging NASA to return to the Moon and then chart a course to Mars. Steady advances 

were made towards those goals with strong Congressional support 

for the Constellation program. 

NASA made solid progress towards the development of the Ares 

I and Ares V vehicles. The Commercial Cargo program was initiated and the International Space Station neared completion. 

All of that success came to a screeching halt when President 

Obama was sworn in. His fiscal year 2010 budget request slashed 

well over a billion dollars from the exploration budget. 

He then tasked a blue ribbon commission to evaluate NASA’s 

current plans. The panel found that the original plan was not executable, something that should have come as no surprise given the 

Obama Administration’s budget cut. President Obama cancelled 

Constellation in its next budget request, redirected even more 

money to Earth Science to support its radical political agenda, and 

then guaranteed dependence on Russia for access to space for an 

extended period of time, which is still ongoing. 

So what does this have to do with China? Well, this vacuum of 

leadership has led not only to extended dependence on Russia for 

access to space, but also facilitated the ascendance of China as a 

leading spacefaring nation. China has capitalized on this Administration’s weakness by offering partnerships with other nations on 

missions, like a return to the Moon, which the United States chose 

to walk away from. 

Rather than charting a bold course that inspires the international community to engage with us, the Obama Administration 

has alienated historic allies and potential partners alike. Only because of Congress is NASA building deep space exploration capabilities. 

Unfortunately, the administration refuses to let NASA show any 

detailed plans for a Journey to Mars beyond a PowerPoint chart. 

China, on the other hand, has demonstrated a willingness to answer calls for collaboration with open arms. This has clearly 

strengthened their soft power and international standing. 

China’s near-term plans for space exploration continue their nation’s philosophy of steady and measured progress, but their longterm goals are very ambitious. They have already placed astronauts in orbit five times, launched a space station, and placed a 

rover on the Moon. They have announced plans for a larger space 

station, a first-of-a-kind mission to the far side of the Moon, and 

potentially a manned mission to the Moon in the 2030s. 

The Administration’s abdication of leadership in space exploration has significant consequences. If we do not lead, someone else 

will. Leadership in space means security, technological prowess, 

and innovation. Our future prosperity depends on our leadership in 

space. If we do not lead, we will not set the terms and condition 

for those who follow. 
5 

When the United States explores and embarks on adventures of 

discovery, we take with us our ideologies and our principles. I, for 

one, want to ensure that space becomes a domain of freedom and 

liberty, not autocracy and oppression. If we do not lead, we will 

weaken our partnerships. I want countries to embark with us into 

the cosmos, rather than team with China as a last resort. 

The Obama Administration has already told the Europeans that 

they are not interested in their Moon Village proposal. They’ve 

tried to walk away from their commitments to the Germans on 

SOFIA and actually abandoned ExoMars. International partners 

have memories. They also have options. 

China is building a resume of accomplishments that positions 

them as a viable alternative. Given their recent provocative actions 

in the South China Sea, and the longstanding oppression of their 

own people, we should all be wary of perpetuating conditions that 

push other nations to partner with China. 

Furthermore, we should ensure that any U.S. cooperation with 

China in space is mutually beneficial, appreciates the risk of technology exploitation, and fits into a larger strategic perspective that 

recognizes Chinese provocation. 

Aside from recent tensions in the South China Sea, China also 

threatens our nation’s cyber security. Couple that with their irresponsible antisatellite tests, one is hard-pressed to find a reason to 

reward their behavior with increased cooperation. We may not be 

in a space race with China. We may not even be competing with 

China in space, but the strategic choices we make clearly impact 

China’s space capabilities, something that we should all pay attention to given that China’s civil space activities are inseparable from 

their military. 

I look forward to our witnesses’ testimony today, and I thank 

them for appearing. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Babin follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentlewoman from Maryland, for an opening statement. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Good morning, and welcome to our distinguished 

witnesses today. I want to thank Chairman Babin for calling this 

hearing. 

You know, on October 4, 1957, 59 years ago next week, the Soviet Union stunned the world when it launched Sputnik I into 

outer space. That launch, marking the first time a manmade satellite was placed into Earth orbit, caught Americans by surprise 

and indeed sparked fears that the Soviet Union might also be capable of sending missiles with nuclear weapons from Russia to the 

United States. 

Not long after, Congress passed legislation establishing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The agency’s 

budding space program became important in America’s efforts to 

demonstrate U.S. preeminence and technological prowess over the 

Soviet Union. 

To that end, President John F. Kennedy stood before Congress 

on May 25, 1961 proposing that ‘‘this nation should commit itself 

to achieving the goal before this decade is out of landing a man on 

the Moon and returning him safely to the Earth.’’ 

Following a series of interim achievements that demonstrated 

NASA’s ability to dock and perform extravehicular activities in 

space, the space race ended with the successful July 20, 1969, Apollo 11 landing of the first humans on the Moon. How different would 

today’s world be if NASA had not responded to President Kennedy’s challenge? 

And now, almost 50 years since that historic event, some are asking if we are again in a space race, but this time with China. Two 

weeks ago, China successfully placed in orbit its Tiangong-2 experimental orbiting space lab, and that accomplishment comes on the 

heels of China’s landing a robotic rover on the Moon, with plans 

announced to do the same on Mars. 

So should we be concerned that China may be closing the gap in 

spaceflight capabilities? Well, today’s panel is well qualified to address this question. In particular, I look forward to hearing about 

China’s pace of progress in exploring space and how our track 

record fares in comparison. 

I’d also like to know if the recent success of China’s space program is due to its ability to stay on course. In addition, I’d like to 

get the witnesses’ views on what they believe the goals and objectives of the Chinese space program are and what impacts other domestic priorities have on the conduct of their space activities. So 

I look forward to hearing the panel’s views on whether the U.S. 

should seek greater cooperation with other space-faring nations, including China, and what challenges we face if we choose to do so. 

And just in closing, and in reference to the Chairman’s statement, you know, I think that there’s a lot of blame that can be 

passed along Pennsylvania Avenue from one end to the next for the 

uncertainty, for the contrary priorities and confusing priorities 

across Republican and Democratic Presidents and Members of Congress, and in my very short eight years on this Subcommittee and 

on this Committee, I’ve witnessed that conflict in priorities, and I 

think that as Democrats and Republicans here in the House and 
9 

the Senate that we would do our nation well and our nation’s space 

program well for the future to make sure that we set down priorities that put us all on the same page when it comes to our priorities for space exploration, engage our international partners, and 

commit the resources across Presidents, Republicans and Democrats that it’s going to take to get the job done. 

And so I look forward to hearing from our panel today about 

those and other priorities, and with that, I yield the balance of my 

time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. 

And I now recognize the Chairman of our full Committee, Chairman Smith. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our 

witnesses for being here today as well. 

Just this month, China launched its second experimental space 

station. While it’s just a single module and is smaller than the 

International Space Station, it signifies continued Chinese progress 

and persistence. 

The Soviets flew their first large, modular space station, Mir, 3– 

1/2 decades after the first cosmonaut went to space. China plans 

to have their own slightly smaller equivalent to the Mir space station in operation by the mid-2020s. This is roughly two decades 

after China launched its first astronaut into orbit. 

Meanwhile, the Obama Administration’s cuts to exploration and 

disruption of exploration planning has eliminated our opportunities 

to return to the Moon, and the Administration has no real plan for 

landing people on Mars. China continues to make progress. We 

cannot resign ourselves to the remembrance of past achievements. 

It is time for the United States to reassert its leadership. 

For over 50 years, the United States has been committed to the 

peaceful use and exploration of outer space. Our philosophical principles of freedom, the rule of law, and transparency are evident in 

the actions we take. The United States shares scientific data and 

findings, promotes international cooperation, and maintains international peace and security in outer space. The world has benefited 

from U.S. space leadership. 

The success of China’s space program will be different. China 

does not hold the same values of our society. Unlike the United 

States, China does not have distinct military and civilian space 

programs. The Chinese military is functionally in charge of all 

space activities, with the Chinese National Space Agency responsible for international affairs and intergovernmental agreements. 

China already has demonstrated a strong disregard for interests of 

other countries in outer space through its antisatellite tests. Here 

on Earth, illegal incursions into the South China Sea represent a 

blatant disregard for the international rule of law. Will their disregard of international law continue to extend into outer space? 

When China launched its first person into space in 2003, it 

caught the world’s attention. Over the years, our focus has waned 

and now China’s accomplishments in space have become commonplace. We cannot ignore Chinese achievements and become complacent. 

Just yesterday, the New York Times featured a large article on 

the largest single dish radio telescope, which is being built in 

China. China is making steady progress in all fields of exploration, 

including astronomy. 

If the United States fails to reassert its leadership, China’s rise 

may undermine U.S. plans to transfer low-Earth orbit habitation 

and human spaceflight from a governmental activity to a sustainable economic activity undertaken by the private sector. China 

stands to fill another void left by this Administration’s disinterest 

in maintaining leadership in exploration. 
13 

By abandoning plans to return to the Moon, the administration 

invited the rise of China as a leader in space. By reallocating funding from exploration to Earth science, the administration has put 

our leadership in space exploration at risk. Our allies stand ready 

to partner in an ambitious exploration program. Unfortunately, the 

current administration won’t allow NASA to propose one. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Smith follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Thank you. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. 

Okay. Now we’ll move on to—I don’t see our Ranking Member 

here so I want to introduce our witnesses at this time. 

The first one is the Hon. Dennis C. Shea, our first witness today. 

He is Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission. He was reappointed by Senate Majority Leader Mitch 

McConnell for a term expiring December 31st, 2016, and Mr. 

Shea’s government service began in 1988 when he joined the Office 

of Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole as Counsel and subsequently becoming the Senator’s Deputy Chief of Staff in the Office 

of the Senate Majority Leader. He’s an attorney with more than 25 

years of experience in government, in public policy, and the Founder of Shea Public Strategies LLC, a public affairs firm based in Alexandria, Virginia. Mr. Shea received his J.D. and an M.A. in history and a B.A. in government from Harvard University. 

Mr. Mark Stokes, our second witness today, Executive Director 

of the Project 2049 Institute. Previously, he was Vice President and 

Taiwan Country Manager for Raytheon International and later, 

Founder and President of Quantum Pacific Enterprises, an international consulting firm. Mr. Stokes has also served as Team Chief 

and Senior Country Director of the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan and Mongolia in the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for International Security Affairs. He holds a B.A. from Texas 

A&M University and graduate degrees in international relations 

and Asian studies from Boston University and the Naval Postgraduate School. Thank you for being here. 

Mr. Dean Cheng, our third witness today, Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation. Prior 

to joining the Heritage Foundation, he was a Senior Analyst with 

the China Studies Division at the Center for Naval Analysis from 

2001 to 2009. He specialized on Chinese military issues with a 

focus on Chinese military doctrine and space capabilities. He has 

written a number of papers and book chapters examining various 

aspects of Chinese security affairs including the Chinese military 

doctrine, the military and technological implications of the Chinese 

space program, and Chinese concepts of political warfare. Mr. 

Cheng earned a bachelor’s degree in politics from Princeton University. Thank you for being here. 

And then our final witness today is Dr. James Lewis, Senior Vice 

President and Program Director for the Strategic Technologies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or 

CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS, Dr. Lewis worked at the Departments 

of State and Commerce as a Foreign Service Officer and as a member of the Senior Executive Service. His government experience included work on a range of political, military and Asian security 

issues as a negotiator on conventional-arms transfers and advanced 

military technology, and in developing policies for satellite exports, 

encryption, and the internet. Dr. Lewis received his Ph.D. from the 

University of Chicago. 

So I now recognize Mr. Shea for five minutes to present his testimony. Mr. Shea. 
17 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. DENNIS C. SHEA, CHAIRMAN, 

U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND 

SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 

Mr. SHEA. Well, thank you, Chairman Babin, Ranking Member 

Edwards, Chairman Smith, and the members of the Subcommittee 

for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

I have to note these are my own personal views and not necessarily the judgments of the U.S.-China Commission though I 

draw heavily from the Commission’s work. 

Examining China’s space program has never been more crucial. 

Over the next six years, China is poised to take major steps that 

will draw significant attention to its efforts in space and potentially 

set the stage for a larger leadership role. 

Specifically, China plans to collect soil samples from the Moon 

and return them to Earth in 2017, send an unmanned spacecraft 

to land on the Moon’s dark side before 2020, send a Rover to Mars 

in 2020, and complete a space station in 2022. 

In this testimony, I want to briefly address three main points: 

the key characteristics of China’s space program, the contributions 

it provides in economical, political and diplomatic terms, and the 

implications it presents for future U.S. leadership in space. The 

military aspects of China’s space program are covered more fully 

in the Commission’s report of last year. 

China’s climb to its current status is one of the world’s top space 

powers as the result of decades of leadership attention and steady 

investment. It has also involved a significant effort to buy or otherwise obtain technologies from foreign sources, especially the United 

States. In particular, China’s large-scale state-sponsored theft of 

intellectual property through cyber espionage has no doubt helped 

fill knowledge gaps in its space R&D. 

China’s space initiatives have progressed as a much slower, more 

deliberate and more methodical pace than those of the United 

States. For example, the United States achieved manned 

spaceflight for the first time in 1961 and the Moon landing in 1969, 

whereas China conducted its first manned spaceflight in 2003 and 

may not plan to land on the Moon until the 2030s, as revealed just 

this year. However, China is also pursuing multiple large-scale efforts at the same time rather than the more sequential approach 

taken by the United States, making it difficult to compare the two 

directly. 

As pointed out by Chairman Smith, China does not have distinctly separate military and civilian space programs as the United 

States does. Rather, China’s military controls the majority of the 

country’s space assets and operations and state-owned defense conglomerates are the key actors in the commercial space sector. Thus, 

even apparently civilian projects such as space exploration can directly support the development of PLA, space, counter-space, and 

conventional capabilities. Beijing also provides little transparency 

regarding its intentions in space, for example, does not release detailed budget information on its space activities. 

China’s space program has furthered its leaders strategic ambitions. China’s advancements in space, specifically its plans for a 
18 

space station, lunar exploration, and Mars exploration provide domestic legitimacy and international prestige. 

China’s global commercial efforts in areas such as space launch 

services, satellite exports and satellite application technologies provide revenues and are expected by policymakers to spark spin-off 

developments in key economic sectors. Both space exploration and 

commercial activities open the door to China’s participation in key 

international and bilateral initiatives, which I list in my written 

testimony. 

China has sought to work with advanced space powers where 

possible to improve its capabilities, most notably the European 

Space Agency. China has seen its greatest success in marking commercial space services to developing countries, which are less likely 

to demand advanced technologies subject to U.S. ITAR restrictions. 

China’s space program has economic implications for the United 

States in the areas of commercial satellite and spaced launch services, downstream satellite navigation industries, and the potential 

for European countries and their industries to pursue non-U.S. 

technologies in order to reach the Chinese market. The full deployment of China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system plans to provide global service by 2020, and the introduction of policies to promote its adoption in downstream industries may affect U.S. firms 

and these industries in the future. 

On the political side, China’s activities have implications for U.S. 

leadership and international cooperation efforts in space. If the 

United States has a Mars program but no space station and no 

lunar program in the near future while China has all three, China 

will be able to dictate participation in manned spaceflight as well 

as in scientific projects involving its space station. China has already signed agreements with the U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs and the Russian and European space agencies regarding 

space station cooperation. 

Although the United States is prepared to maintain its leadership in the space domain, China’s highly controlled, methodical and 

comprehensive approach will open up opportunities for Beijing in 

the near term. 

Despite the fact that China’s accomplishments and investments 

in space have been far outpaced by our own, it will likely appear 

over the next six years that China is reaching major milestones 

and gaining ground. Meanwhile, the United States will be focused 

on longer-term exploration projects and observers will be well 

aware of the planned deorbiting of the International Space Station 

in 2024. This underscores how important it is for the United States 

to see through its long-term space exploration projects so this apparent disparity does not continue. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shea follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Shea. 

I now recognize Mr. Stokes for five minutes to present his testimony. Mr. Stokes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. MARK STOKES, 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE 

Mr. STOKES. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee. It’s an honor and privilege to be able to have this opportunity to come and present before you today. 

I’d like to make three points. The testimony should be able to 

speak for itself, and I can provide more details in the question-andanswer session. But I’d like to make three points to sort of emphasize various aspects of developments in China’s space capabilities. 

Number one, it’s important to draw upon and augment what Mr. 

Shea mentioned about the difficulty between distinguishing military capabilities and civilian capabilities in China’s space program, 

and this is part of a conscious policy referred to these days as military-civilian fusion—MCF for short. There is a long history behind 

military-civilian fusion dating back perhaps to the 1980s. Dong 

Zhou Ping, he had a 16-character slogan in which military programs or military projects or civilian projects and investments were 

intended to support each other with the military taking priority. 

The term previously was referred to in English as integration so 

the military integration, not military-civilian fusion, presumably to 

imply a greater degree of cooperation between the two sectors. 

It is difficult to distinguish military and civilian programs but 

one can at least make an attempt to identify an end user or sponsor, in other words, who is actually managing the program. There 

are some aspects of China’s space program that are managed by civilian organizations, and then there are some military end users. 

This was not always the case. When China embarked upon their 

space program in the beginning, there was very much of even more 

of a blurring. Over the last decade or 10, 15 years, there’s been an 

increasing effort with PLA developing dedicated military systems, 

particularly, for example, remote sensing programs, and there also 

of course are other organizations, civilian organizations, that have 

their own systems, say, for example, there’s an ocean organization 

under the state council that’s important. But, you know, part of 

this has to do with both spin-on and spin-off capabilities in space. 

The second point I’d like to make is related to technological progresses being made, particularly in the research, development and 

acquisition system. This is probably where China has made the 

most significant achievements, not necessarily in the technology 

itself but in the ability to mobilize resources and to organize in a 

very progressive and reasonable fashion in terms of increasing capabilities. 

As mentioned in the written testimony, there is sort of a stagephase pathway to fielding systems ranging from preliminary research or basic research to concept development, to engineering, research and development, then all the way up to testing and then 

fielding. It’s important to understand where each individual program is in the cycle to get a feel for how far along that they are. 

There’s a pretty wide body of information that outlines the various 
37 

programs all the way from satellites, remote sensing satellites, 

communication satellites, guidance navigation satellites, significant 

increasingly diverse set of launch vehicles that are being fielded to 

include starting last year a solid-fuel launch vehicle, one of their 

first to be deployed and operationalized. There’s significant investments in the counter-space systems to include the ability to be able 

to track and surveil space assets, and of course, the manned space 

program. So there are significant capabilities that are being developed in this field. 

There are three goals, to put it simply, in my view. One of the 

key goals of course is political, political legitimacy. One has to remember that ultimately the People’s Republic of China is a oneparty system, that the Chinese Communist Party seeks legitimacy 

in various ways and which the space program is certainly one of 

these. There are military goals, and again, there’s a wide body of 

literature that outlines these goals and capabilities. And then there 

are economic goals as well. 

And then finally, directly addressing the issue of the Space Race. 

It’s difficult to define exactly what the Space Race is, and it’s not 

even clear if we’re even competing or we even view space as an 

area of competition with the People’s Republic of China. And there 

may be different playing fields. For example, the political playing 

field, I think, is significant. But regardless from a technology perspective, Beijing and authorities in Beijing are closing the technology gap. It’s my view that the United States technologically is 

likely to maintain advantage, bearing in mind that I’m not an expert on U.S. space systems, given the United States makes proper 

investments in our space capabilities. 

In terms of future and goals in terms of what the United States 

should do in order to understand this better, in terms of defining 

what the competition would be, there’s technological aspects. 

There’s the ability to be able to apply capabilities that are being 

deployed, and then some comparison of the ability to mobilize resources in terms of personnel, budgets, and then organization. 

And with that, I will save the rest of my comments for the question-and-answer session. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stokes follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Stokes. 

Now I recognize Mr. Cheng for five minutes to present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. DEAN CHENG, 

SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, 

ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, 

HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. CHENG. Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Edwards, Chairman Smith, distinguished Members of the Committee, my name is 

Dean Cheng. I’m the Senior Research Fellow for Chinese Political 

and Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation but I’d like to emphasize that my comments today are my own. 

Directly to the point of whether or not there is a space race underway between the United States and China, I would like to suggest that there is not a space race per se but rather that there is 

a race between the United States and China on multiple different 

aspects and fronts, political, diplomatic, security, all of which have 

a space component, and that is the Chinese perspective because the 

Chinese view space as being an essential part of the larger effort 

to raise China’s comprehensive national power. 

Comprehensive national power is how the Chinese basically look 

at various countries including themselves, how they rank with each 

other how capable they are. It includes economic, diplomatic, political, cultural, science and technology, as well as military aspects, 

and from the Chinese perspective, space development contributes 

to every one of those elements of comprehensive national power. 

With regards to the economy, space is seen as a pivotal technology. Because it is so dense, as the Chinese put it, in science and 

technology, in high technology, because it touches on such aspects 

as advanced materials, telecommunications, computing, and above 

all, systems engineering and systems integration. The Chinese see 

an advancing space capability that’s almost like a locomotive that 

will pull along other parts of the Chinese economy. The space 

workforce in particular is seen as building expertise in key areas 

including systems integration, and we have seen key leaders in 

China’s space industry transfer to areas such as the Commercial 

Aircraft Corporation, China’s effort to build their own wide-bodied 

aircraft in the belief that their experience in the space sector can 

be translated into building Chinese challengers to Boeing and Airbus. 

We also see this in terms of the Chinese folks on indigenous innovation. The perception is that China’s ability to field a full-blown 

space program will spark innovation in other areas, other key subtechnologies. 

In addition, of course, we also see the Chinese using space in 

terms of their political efforts, and this is both domestic and foreign 

relations. Space is a source of prestige, and prestige in this case 

supports both the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party but 

also the prestige of the People’s Republic of China. For example, 

space achievements are often described as CCP achievements, and 

so China’s space program, which grew out of the so-called two 

bombs, one satellite program, not only is a reflection of the relationship the Chinese view space with regards to key strategic 
45 

weapons but also as a means again of promoting innovation. We 

also see the expectation that economic development through space 

will basically again help spark a revival of the Chinese economy, 

which right now seems to be slowing down. 

With regards to foreign relations, again, we see space being used 

as a key diplomatic tool in both the bilateral and the multilateral 

aspects, bilaterally, in terms of sales of satellites to such states as 

Venezuela, Bolivia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, all of whom are key 

sources of raw materials that help power the Chinese economy, but 

also at the multilateral level, again such as the Asia-Pacific Space 

Cooperation Organization, which brings in Thailand, Malaysia, 

Mongolia. These are not major space powers per se, but they are 

key neighbors of the People’s Republic of China, and they are using 

APSCO as a diplomatic tool. 

Of course, it is implicit that the ability to maintain space-based 

surveillance and to put payloads into orbit obviously affects Taiwan, obviously affects Japan. I would also suggest to the Committee that when, not if, the Chinese are able to go to the Moon, 

first with a robotic lander on the far side, to think about how you 

will communicate with something on the far side of the Moon. In 

order to do that, it will require the establishment of a lunar satellite, satellites that will orbit the Moon. The implications for military and security aspects are self-evident. But also, the day that 

the Chinese land a human being on the Moon will be an enormous 

impact on the United States because how often have we heard 

we’ve gone to the Moon, why haven’t we, you know, solved the common cold, why haven’t we solved traffic problems in downtown DC. 

The reality is that the day the Chinese are able to do the same 

thing is the day that American uniqueness will be openly challenged and Chinese prestige will be put on the same level as that 

of the United States. 

Thank you very much, members of the Committee, for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cheng follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cheng. 

I now recognize Dr. Lewis for five minutes to present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. JAMES LEWIS, 

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, 

STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I’d like to thank the Committee for 

the opportunity to testify on whether we’re in a space race with 

China, but it’s also useful to ask if we have the right strategy for 

space exploration in what’s become a very different international 

environment. 

A comparison of the U.S. and Chinese space programs suggests 

each reflects different goals rather than being a race. China’s goals 

are political. Ours are scientific. There is a degree of parallelism 

between the U.S. and Chinese efforts but with the exception of 

human space exploration, the two programs are not really comparable. 

In most areas, the United States remains unmatched in its space 

capabilities. Our unmanned space exploration program has no 

equal in its successes, but when we talk about a space race, we’re 

talking about human spaceflight, the area of activity where the 

United States is weakest. The classic space race between the 

United States and the Soviets centered on human spaceflight and 

landing on the Moon. Each side tried to surpass the exploits of the 

other. I think it’s now safe to say that the United States does not 

consider itself in a space race with China. The United States is focused on the manned exploration of Mars, and from a scientific perspective, going to Mars makes sense, but it doesn’t make sense 

from a strategic perspective. 

China does not talk about space races but there is an unavoidable comparison and competition with the United States. China’s 

focus in space exploration is on human spaceflight and its leaders 

have a great interest in landing on the Moon. 

In the United States and Soviet space race, the objectives are 

prestige and global influence. Having won the race, the United 

States largely lost interest in space. In contrast, China uses its 

space programs to gain political advantage. Its human space programs serve important domestic and foreign policy purposes. 

Human spaceflight was a central part of the Cold War contest. 

The assumption was that the system that won the space race was 

superior. The competition between the U.S. and Chinese systems is 

not as clear-cut, but the rest of the world thinks we’re in a competition with China and that space exploration is a part of this. 

We should be clear that the Chinese space program largely duplicates U.S. and Soviet exploits from the 1970s and 1980s. What we 

do not want, however, is a tortoise-and-hare scenario where a slowmoving China passes the United States. American performance in 

space is an important element in how China will decide between 

confrontation or cooperation. We do not want a situation where 
57 

China’s leaders think, as a PLA general said last year, that the 

United States has ‘‘great capability, no will.’’ 

The future of space exploration requires the United States to 

make difficult choices. These choices will determine the outcome of 

any space race with China. A strong case can be made that the 

United States would be best served by human spaceflight programs 

that focus on incremental and achievable goals. We’re in a very difficult international situation, and our space programs need to adjust to this. 

I thank the Committee, and look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lewis follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Lewis. 

I thank all the witnesses for their testimony. I now recognize myself for five minutes. 

Mr. Cheng, a July article in the Wall Street Journal reported 

that the Director General of the European Space Agency was open 

to the idea of cooperating with China onboard the International 

Space Station. China’s long-term lunar plans are also consistent 

with Europe’s lunar village concept. President Obama cancelled the 

Constellation program that would have returned the United States 

to the Moon and take astronauts onto Mars. In a speech announcing the cancellation, he argued against returning to the Moon by 

stating ‘‘We’ve been there before,’’ rather arrogantly, I thought. 

The NASA Administrator has stated the U.S. does not have to 

be the country that says we’re going, follow us, we’re all going back 

to the surface of the Moon, but it’s just that the United States has 

no intention of leading that effort. We will support and be along 

with anybody that goes. 

The National Academy of Sciences’ report, ‘‘Pathways to Exploration,’’ indicated that returning to the Moon would offer significant advantages as an intermediate step to Mars. It appears as 

though the Administration’s policies are pushing our allies to cooperate with China rather than with us. Furthermore, it appears 

as though China may be adopting a more robust architecture for 

future exploration than the one proposed by this Administration. 

What impact does that have on our nation’s economic competitiveness, international standing, and national security? 

Mr. CHENG. Sir, to begin with, it should be noted that the previous head of the European Space Agency opined that it would be 

very delighted to work with China on manned space literally within a week of the Chinese ASAT test in 2007, widely considered to 

be the single worst regenerating event in space. So I think it is safe 

to say that the current head of the European Space Agency apparently is continuing a policy of basically being open to Chinese behavior, cooperating with China regardless of Chinese behavior. I 

would suggest that the idea that we do not need to lead in the 

process of going to the Moon is consisting with a leading-from-behind philosophy that this Administration has enunciated with regards to terrestrial objectives as well. 

But I would also emphasize here, sir, that the most important 

consideration is that China has been attempting to push the limits 

of its sovereignty into international common spaces. As I said in 

my spoken testimony, Chinese behavior is not about space, it is 

about terrestrial, but what we see in the oceans, what we see in 

outer space, what we see in cyberspace is China pushing its position into all of these international spaces, and if the United States 

does not lead, we will find ourselves operating in the Chinese 

framework. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you very much. 

And now, Mr. Stokes, Mr. Shea’s testimony highlights that the 

Chinese military and civil space programs are tightly intertwined. 

Some of you have already alluded to this. But I would like to hear 

it again. If not the same organization, they’re tightly intertwined. 
65 

Some argue for increased cooperation with China on civil space. 

Could this be done without directly benefiting Chinese military capabilities? 

Mr. STOKES. The short answer, it’s possible, but I would recommend doing it very, very carefully. 

Chairman BABIN. Amen. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very 

much. 

And now, current U.S. plans called for a crewed mission to Mars 

in the 2030s, and from what we can tell, the Chinese plan to land 

a crew on the Moon in the same time frame. U.S. space exploration 

efforts have been characterized by uncertainty lately, particularly 

in the wake of the Administration’s cancellation of Constellation, 

that would have returned the United States to the Moon no later 

than 2020 if the Administration had not raised NASA’s exploration 

budget. Conversely, China has been fairly successful in accomplishing the goals that it sets for its space program, and Mr. Shea, 

in 15 years, could we find ourselves watching a Chinese astronaut 

land on the Moon when we are years away from a U.S. Mars mission and no capability to return to the Moon? 

Mr. SHEA. It is possible. I mean, earlier this year, officials within 

the Chinese space program have indicated that they want to land 

a Chinese astronaut on the Moon in the 2030 time frame, so that 

is possible, yes, sir. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. Thank you. And I think we’ll go to the 

next question. Ms. Edwards, the gentlewoman from Maryland. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you very much to our witnesses today. 

I want to start with Dr. Lewis. The National Academies’ Pathways to Exploration report recommended that NASA should vigorously pursue opportunities for international and commercial collaboration in order to leverage financial resources and capabilities 

of other nations and commercial entities. The report goes on to say 

an international collaboration would be open to the inclusion of 

China and potentially other emerging space powers in addition to 

traditional international partners. 

Notwithstanding existing prohibitions on NASA’s ability to engage in bilateral cooperation with China, do you agree with the National Academies’ recommendation? 

And then after you answer, I’d like to turn to Mr. Shea, because 

in your testimony, you point to some of the public relations wins 

that China has achieved, making it look like the resistance to 

peaceful kind of cooperation and scientific cooperation is—rests 

with the United States. And so Dr. Lewis first? 

Dr. LEWIS. Thank you for the question. Essentially, people like— 

other countries like cooperating with the United States. We have 

better technology. We spend a little more money. It’s more fun to 

visit here. But to get that cooperation, you actually need to have 

programs that promise immediate and tangible results. So I don’t 

think that saying that working with the private sector or with 

other countries by itself is an adequate strategy. 

On cooperation with China, just in the last few years, the relationship has changed to such a degree that I don’t think that absent indications from China that they were more interested in a serious and peaceful relationship that cooperation would be a good 
66 

idea. We can cooperate with other countries if we can show them 

how working with the United States will get them goals in space, 

but at the moment, with the tensions, the bilateral tensions, I don’t 

think cooperation with China is in our interest. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Mr. Shea? 

Mr. SHEA. Well, the question reminded me of something completely different but very much related: Hollywood. If you haven’t 

noticed, the Chinese companies are buying a lot of Hollywood. One 

Chinese company, Wanda Dalian, owns what may be the largest or 

second largest theater chain, AMC, in the United States, and they 

are aggressively pursuing other Hollywood acquisitions, so this relates to the public perception. I think of—and there’s pressure 

within Hollywood to portray China in a benevolent manner, to portray in a very positive manner in order to have access to the Chinese market, and I’m thinking of two movies that are space-related, American movies, like The Martian, where the Chinese come 

in at the end and—— 

Ms. EDWARDS. Save the day. 

Mr. SHEA. —save the day, and the China National Space Administration is viewed as a civilian, genteel, you know, organization. 

I’m also thinking of gravity where—the movie where the Chinese 

space station helps Sandra Bullock get back to Earth, but also portrays the Russians as creating the largest space debris that put the 

Americans at risk rather than the fact that, as alluded to, the Chinese created the largest space debris with their antisatellite test in 

2007. So I am—this is linking Hollywood with the space program, 

and I think we could see more of that. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Dr. Lewis—thank you. Your report titled ‘‘Space 

Exploration in a Changing International Environment’’ states that 

the international environment for space has changed significantly. 

You pointed to that in your prepared testimony. Can you expand 

on that environment? And then the report also goes on to state 

that the new environment necessitates the development of a new 

framework for international cooperation. What would such a framework look like given the end of the operational life of the International Space Station in 2024? 

Dr. LEWIS. Thank you. The fundamental change in the last few 

years, we are now in a contest, and not just with China but with 

other countries including Russia and maybe in particular Russia, 

and a space strategy, all of our international strategies need to recognize this. Now, a contest is not a war, it’s not a new Cold War, 

but we are in a conflictual relationship, and I don’t think that inactivity is the—or the perception of inactivity is the right way to deal 

with this. 

The ISS is an interesting question. When it is deorbited, should 

it be deorbited, the United States could face a situation where it 

no longer has a presence in space. That would be really disastrous 

for our international reputation. So we need to think about the ISS. 

Some of the international partners are beginning to ask about the 

utility of the ISS. We really need a new project that they would be 

willing to fund and participate in, one where we could help lead the 

international community because given our technology, our budget, 

our past efforts, we are the default leader if we choose to exercise 

that. So we need a new project to take the place of the Space Sta-
67 

tion or maybe a new way to think about the Space Station and the 

Moon to energize the nations that want to work with us. But 

among those nations, we should be very cautious not to work with 

those who are de facto opponents. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you very much. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today’s hearing is entitled ‘‘Are We Losing the Space Race to 

China?’’ and if I were to try to summarize your collective testimony, as I understand it, you’re saying that the United States is 

not losing the race to China but China is gaining ground. 

Mr. Shea, would that be a fair summary of your remarks? 

Mr. SHEA. I think that’s a fair summary. I think over the next 

six years you’ll see a lot of activity by China—Moon missions, sending a rover to Mars, completing a space station—while at the same 

time we won’t see similar activity by the United States, and we’ll 

see the deorbiting of the ISS scheduled for 2024. So within this 

window of time, I think you’ll see that the public perception may 

very well be that the Chinese are gaining ground, significant 

ground, on the United States while the United States is standing 

still. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Stokes, did I accurately summarize your viewpoint? 

Mr. STOKES. Yes, you did, sir. When you say space race, it implies a competition and it implies that we’re aware of a competition. I just don’t see that there’s that much of an awareness, at 

least on the U.S. side. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Cheng, did I accurately summarize your view 

on this issue? 

Mr. CHENG. Yes, sir, I believe you did. 

Mr. BROOKS. And Dr. Lewis, did I accurately summarize your 

view on this issue? 

Dr. LEWIS. The thing I wonder about is that we have such a successful space program in other areas, why doesn’t that translate 

over to the manned space program? And unfortunately, when you 

talk about a race, you’re talking about how do you keep scores, and 

the score is determined largely by the manned program. So I think, 

yeah, you did summarize my views. 

Mr. BROOKS. I come from a district in the northern part of Alabama, home of the Marshall Space Flight Center, and some would 

say it’s the birthplace of America’s manned spaceflight program. I 

still have about 6,000 people who are employed either by NASA at 

the Marshall Space Flight Center or as support contractors for 

NASA, so in my district, people are pretty well educated about 

NASA and space, and why it is or is not important. But that having been said, in practical day-to-day terms, why should Americans 

care about whether the Chinese are catching the United States of 

America in the space race, or perhaps even one day surpassing us, 

and whoever would like to handle that question, please feel free to 

interject. Mr. Cheng. 

Mr. CHENG. Sir, politics is as much about perception as it is 

about reality, and in this context here, the People’s Republic of 

China has mastery of how to present itself as winning, and the 
68 

issue isn’t necessarily to the good folks in your district. The problem is how we are perceived in the context of an international competition, whether it is conflictual or not, and whether or not we are 

seen as winning, and in that regard, a China that scores what is 

touted by a state-run media as winning that falls on receptive ears 

in Africa, in South America, in Southeast Asia, in East Asia winds 

up creating a situation that works against our interests. 

Mr. BROOKS. Interesting concept. You’re talking then in terms of 

geopolitical politics and perceptions of the different nations. 

Mr. Shea or Mr. Stokes or Dr. Lewis, why should the American 

people care that China may be gaining on us, or perhaps one day 

surpassing us? 

Dr. LEWIS. One of the lessons from the first Space Race was that 

space is part of being a superpower, it’s part of being able to influence global politics. It’s part of being able to shape how the world 

works. And if I had to choose, I’d rather have the United States 

shape the world than China. 

There is this larger narrative that asks, is the United States in 

decline? And a lot of European outlets, every time the economists 

get a chance, they say the United States is in decline. They’re 

wrong, but our inability to perform in manned space flights contributes to this narrative that the United States is in decline, China 

will be the most powerful nation in 2020 or 2030 or sometime. 

That’s not an outcome we want. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Stokes or Mr. Shea, why should the average citizen, say, in Lexington, Massachusetts, care about whether the 

Chinese? 

Mr. SHEA. Well, I agree with what Mr. Cheng and Dr. Lewis 

have said in terms of the diplomatic and geopolitical implications 

but also their economic implications. There’s been a lot of technology and economic growth generated from a successful space program, and we need to keep those benefits here in the United 

States. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Stokes, do you have anything to add? 

Mr. STOKES. Very briefly. One of the reasons why the United 

States chose to compete against the Soviet Union, the former Soviet Union, in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s is—part of the explanation 

is that it was viewed as part of a broader competition in terms of 

legitimacy, that between that of a Marxist Lenin or the Soviet 

Communist Party and then free and open society, democracy, the 

United States. I would argue that the Chinese Communist Party 

should be viewed in a similar light, and that’s just in terms of legitimacy, and that’s just one of many, many reasons, I think. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time is expired. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Brooks. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Beyer. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all so much 

for coming. 

Mr. Shea, you—in your written and oral testimony, you talked 

about—let me quote—‘‘Beijing has heavily emphasized both commercial launch services and satellite exports as the space industry 

has developed, and both activities provide China’s space industry 

with revenues, opportunities to measure the quality of its products 
69 

and services against international competitors, and industrial development synergies, et cetera.’’ 

One of the things this Committee has done in a very bipartisan 

way is try to be champions for the development of the commercial 

space industry here in the United States. Does China represent a 

real threat to our commercial space industry or is the competition 

good for our commercial space industry? 

Mr. SHEA. Not—it doesn’t represent a threat, not at the high end, 

but there is—one of our recommendations last year was to look at 

the ITAR regulations to see whether they’re overly restrictive and 

China would have access to technologies that are otherwise restricted by ITAR through non-U.S. sources so that’s one thing we 

recommended last year. 

But China’s satellite launch services and satellite business is 

really for now at least directed at developing countries that don’t 

necessarily need the best technology but need a cheap solution or 

cheaper solution. So right now that’s where the Chinese are focusing their efforts. But they want to compete. When we went to Beijing last year, we met with the Great Wall Industry Corporation, 

which performs—state-led performs their satellite launch services 

for international customers, and they’re very negative about the 

ITAR restrictions, not surprisingly, but they want to have greater 

access to the market. 

Mr. BEYER. Great. Thank you. 

And Dr. Lewis, again, this Committee has tried to really be a 

champion for open data often directed in different political things, 

whether it’s the data that the EPA uses to proclaim its rules or our 

support for all the scientists that the U.S. Government funds making their data available to other scientists. Do you see any of the 

possibility for open data coming from the Chinese investments in 

space? What will we learn from their new telescope, for example, 

compared to what we’ll be able to make available to the world from 

James Webb or from Hubble? 

Dr. LEWIS. The Chinese in some ways are still ambivalent about 

how to deal with the United States, and there’s a strong national 

sentiment that calls for confrontation, but there’s also a recognition 

of the benefits of cooperation and the strength of the United States, 

not somebody you might want to pick a fight with. So we have opportunities to—maybe niche opportunities—I don’t know what my 

other panelists would say—to cooperate with them. Their scientists 

are like our scientists but their scientists are not always in charge, 

so the Chinese will look for cooperation, Chinese scientists will look 

for cooperation, and perhaps their government will let them do it 

to some extent. 

Mr. BEYER. Is the merging of their version of NASA with their 

version of the Department of Defense the real bar for us, that they 

don’t have an independent space agency that’s not militaristic?; 

Dr. LEWIS. No, I don’t think so, Congressman. I think that it’s 

the larger Chinese policies of pushing back on the United States, 

of challenging us in as many areas as possible. So even if it was 

a purely civilian space agency, they would still be answering to 

President Xi and the party. 

Mr. BEYER. We had the author of The Martian here a few 

months ago, and as you will recall from the book and the movie, 
70 

they turned to China to help when the guy was stranded on Mars. 

Is that just a space fantasy? 

Dr. LEWIS. I wouldn’t use the book as a guideline for space policy. I loved the movie, great movie, but not—— 

Mr. BEYER. Mr. Stokes, you know, we’ve heard a number of times 

that China really lags, you know, they’re 40 years behind us in 

terms of getting people into space but their quantum experiments, 

you know, QESS satellite, seem to be an exception, that they may 

be able to beam quantum encrypted information between orbiting 

satellites and ground stations, a revolutionary technology. Does 

this give them a specific advantage over us? Are they experimenting in places that we’re ignoring? 

Mr. STOKES. Sir, when you mentioned quantum satellites, I 

mean, it goes way over my head. 

Mr. BEYER. Oh, okay. 

Mr. STOKES. But in general, my understanding is that the end 

user of the sponsoring organization based in Shanghai under the 

China Academy of Sciences ostensibly civilian. It’s experimental in 

nature. What the—I think it’s safe to assume that it has military 

applications as well related to encryption and other aspects of military capabilities but it’s something we should watch very carefully, 

and I’ll leave it there. 

Mr. BEYER. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Chair, I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Beyer. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you to all of our panelists. I’m glad to see there’s so much agreement on our panel today. There’s been a lot of talk about the Space 

Race. I want to be clear, we’ve put men on the Moon. We got two 

rovers currently operating on the surface of Mars. We have explored the furthest reaches of the solar system. The Space Race is 

over, and we won. 

The question is now how are we utilizing space and how are our 

near-peer competitors utilizing space, and the question is, are we 

ceding leadership to the Chinese. China is building a new station, 

as has already been identified. It has a Moon rover, recently 

launched the world’s quantum communications satellite, as we just 

talked about, which does have very specific military implications, 

and it’s expanding its BeiDou PNT system. Taking into account 

that there is no distinction between China’s peaceful and military 

space programs, and these developments become very alarming 

quickly. Given their notorious lack of transparency, we do not know 

their true intentions with a space station nor do we even know 

what they are currently doing on the Moon. 

Quantum technology is virtually unhackable and would give the 

Chinese a distinct advantage over any current military communications that we have as a nation. Utilizing BeiDou gives the Chinese 

an outlet for PNT that is separate from our own GPS. As they are 

developing their own GPS-type constellation, they are also developing and undertaking direct ascent antisatellite missile capabilities such as the 2007 direct ascent test that destroyed a LEO satellite. They are advancing spoofing and dazzling technologies and 

carrying out pernicious state-sponsored cyber espionage including a 
71 

hack of the National Weather Service, which compelled us to shut 

down ground stations for two days in this country, deteriorating 

forecasts and putting my constituents in danger, and that threatened also the safety of millions of Americans including the constituents of everybody on this panel. 

It is clear that China views space as the ultimate high ground 

and they are rapidly making moves to establish themselves in a position of strength while also improving their ability to deny us the 

use of space. Given the threat from China, we cannot afford to have 

the DOD doing extraneous activities not within its mission. As a 

point of departure, we must give the responsibility for providing 

space situational awareness for commercial and foreign entities to 

a civil agency, namely FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation. The Department of Transportation and the DOD concurred 

and endorsed this proposal in a recent report ordered by Section 

110 of the Commercial Space bill recently enacted in 2015. I urge 

all of my colleagues to read the Section 110 report. 

Next, we have a chance to pass a NASA authorization this year. 

That bill should direct NASA to utilize the Moon on our journey 

to Mars. Mr. Chairman, I think that’s a great idea that you said 

and I think we need to go forward with that. Our allies want to 

go there as does a wide swath of our domestic commercial space industry. If we do not, our allies will work with China. They’re either 

going to come into our orbit or they’re going into their orbit—no 

pun intended. 

Further, the bill should include the formation of a plan for a 

post-ISS world. We cannot afford a gap in LEO platforms similar 

to our gap in human transportation that currently exists. Including 

these policies will go a long way toward ensuring that we do not 

leave a power and leadership vacuum for China to fill. 

Unfortunately, NASA under this Administration seems more focused on forcing partnership with China than in maintaining our 

leadership. Former Chairman Frank Wolf was a leader on this, and 

our country is grateful for his work. He first codified restrictions 

on cooperation with China in space. 

On top of their belligerent space activity, China is run by a brutal regime that imprisons dissidents and persecutes minorities. 

State-sponsored cyber-crimes have robbed our companies of billions 

of dollars of intellectual property, doing untold damage to our economy. When does it stop is the question? 

Mr. Chairman, any NASA bill should permanently codify the restrictions on cooperation with China while also discouraging others 

from partnering with the Chinese. We must treat China’s actions 

in space for the threat that they are and ensure that we stay ahead 

of them technologically while preventing any vacuums in leadership that they might exploit. 

Mr. Cheng, my question is for you. Given that China considers 

space security equivalent to maritime security, as you’ve kind of already talked about, is it reasonable to expect that China will behave in space similar to how it has behaved in the South China 

Sea? 

Mr. CHENG. Representative, obviously it’s going to be a little bit 

difficult to build artificial islands in space but I think that what 

we should expect to see is the Chinese attempting to redefine the 
72 

international rules to new sets that will basically benefit the Chinese. There have been comments about, for example, the requirement that foreign aircraft and ships should turn off their radars 

when operating in China’s claimed waters. It would not be surprising if there was a comparable effort to basically say to operators of space-based surveillance systems, you turn them on over 

China at your own risk. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I’m out of time. 

Chairman BABIN. The gentleman’s time is expired. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Johnson. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

I’d like each member to comment on this. What are the implications that China might match or surpass the U.S. civilian space capabilities in the near future or the distant future? And if they do, 

what are the key areas, what are the implications of that possibility, and also comment, the risks and benefits associated with 

NASA collaborating with China in space activities? So let me start 

with Mr. Shea, but I’d like each panel member to comment on that. 

Mr. SHEA. Well, I’ll answer, Congresswoman, your second question first. I agree that we need to be very skeptical with cooperative efforts with China. It has been well documented they’ve engaged in a large-scale cyber and other types of espionage directed 

at the United States. Their space program is predominantly a military program as we’ve outlined in our report. They’re heavily engaged in counter-space activities such as antisatellite, kinetic antisatellite missiles, co-orbital antisatellite systems like robotic arms 

that could grab satellites. They know that the United States is 

heavily dependent on space for its projection of military power so 

they are, you know, engaged in a very robust counter-space program to deter us from taking action or to attack our satellites in 

the eventuality of a conflict. 

So, you know, I think it would be—you know, your first question, 

the broader answer, I think it would be an absolute shame—I don’t 

see it happening but I think it would be an absolute shame if the 

United States somehow were behind China technologically because 

of all the political implication—in space because of the political implications of that, because of the economic implications of that for 

our own country, so I don’t see it happening, as I said in my testimony. I think over the next six years people might perceive the 

Chinese as gaining significant ground, which just reinforces the 

need for the United States to keep its eye on the ball and to have 

a very strong and robust space program. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. STOKES. If I can make two quick points. First of all, as previously discussed, I wouldn’t automatically rule out cooperation in 

certain aspects of space. I would advocate looking at our relationship with the People’s Republic of China for a much broader perspective in terms of competitive sense, that is, a competition in universal values and a competition in principles. From that perspective, there may be areas of cooperation, and if there are areas of 

cooperation, they should be done from the perspective of how it creates leverage for the United States in terms of our fundamental interests and our fundamental values. That’s the first one. 
73 

The second point is, there are other areas of which I’m not—I 

don’t sense that we are really competing and China is making 

heavy investments. It’s in an area—I’m not sure how one would describe it—but near space. That’s that domain between, let’s say, 20 

kilometers in altitude and perhaps 100 kilometers in altitude. Normally it’s an area to get through, for example, in terms of returning 

through the atmosphere to get back to Earth, but this is an area 

where they’re making significant investments including the establishment of dedicated research institutes in the defense industry 

both in terms of precision—long-range precision strike weapons 

systems as well as reconnaissance systems able to linger in that 

particular domain. 

Mr. CHENG. One of the great areas of American strength is our 

private sector, and we are seeing with folks like SpaceX and Blue 

Horizon an interesting revival of the private sector’s interest in 

space. Where they are likely to go in terms of innovation I suspect 

is something the Chinese are desperately afraid of because they understand that companies are more flexible and can often be driven 

harder because of the vision of their directors. At the same time, 

as a result, one suspects that the Chinese are likely to therefore 

try and, quote, unquote, partner with our private sector or simply 

buy, you know, controlling interests in stock and the like. In that 

regard, I think that one of the areas that we need to be wary of 

is quote, unquote, collaboration between Chinese state-owned enterprises and our private sector. 

Dr. LEWIS. Thank you for the question. You know, just to maybe 

put this a little bit in perspective, the real issue here is who lands 

first, and I don’t care if it’s on the Moon or on Mars but when you 

see that picture, do you want the picture of the astronaut holding 

the flag to be holding an American flag or a Chinese flag. We all 

remember the picture from the Apollo program. So if we could land 

on Mars before China can go to the Moon, great, let’s do it, but I 

don’t feel confident in saying that, who lands first. 

On cooperation with the Chinese, and this might be the first 

question where the panel sort of disagrees a little bit so I’m glad 

we finally got there, they’re hostile but they’re also pragmatic. 

They can be engaged. You can come to arrangements with them. 

I think the agreement on commercial cyber espionage is a good example of that. They are pragmatic in a way that the Russians are 

not but we need engagement and agreement on the rules for how 

we will operate in space before we can cooperate. The Chinese will 

test us, and right now if we don’t push back, cooperation is not in 

our interest. It’s a complicated relationship but it’s one where we 

have many of the advantages, particularly in technology, and in 

most of the areas of space, we just do better. So the question is, 

how do we take advantage of our leadership? How do we come up 

with a strategy to lead, and not only with the rest of the world but 

with China? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you. 

I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Knight. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 
74 

You know, competition is part of life. I think that America has 

led in this endeavor for many, many years. But there’s so much 

that is going on right now with the technological advances that are 

happening today. There are so many things that we can do. 

Back in the early 1960s, we were trying to go to the Moon because I do believe it was part of the competition. We also had many 

programs that were going on in the early 1960s like maybe the X– 

20 Dinosaur program that would’ve been the first space shuttle, 

and we decided not to do that. We decided to go to the Moon, and 

which is the goal that everyone looks to today. 

But the point is, is we always have an awful lot of things that 

are happening, and I think the Chinese are now discovering that 

maybe if they put their goals on some finite situations, they might 

be able to beat us at certain things so we broke the sound barrier 

first, we were on the Moon first. We did all of these things first, 

and they might be able to do some of these finite goals and we 

might be looking at a hundred different goals. 

So is that what we’re kind of looking at today that competitively, 

look, we want to be on Mars first, we want to do this first, or are 

we looking at the expanse of space exploration and achieving some 

of these goals for a much bigger product, a much bigger program? 

Mr. SHEA. I think that’s a fair point, Congressman. I think the 

Chinese, it’s my understanding that if they fulfill their goal of landing an unmanned spacecraft on the Moon’s dark side before 2020, 

they’ll be the first country to have done that. So you’re right, they 

may be seeking smaller niche goals, maybe not the big-picture 

goals but to proceed with a domestic audience seeking goals that 

have maybe not as powerful but goals nonetheless. 

Mr. KNIGHT. And I’ll jump in just real quick. I want to thank the 

Chairman for talking about one of the programs that’s in my district, the SOFIA program, that is an American-German kind of connection there that we have a telescope that goes into space and 

goes above the water vapors and we can do that type of exploration 

on a daily basis and change the technology on a daily basis. Is that 

something that we should be better having and having better connections with other countries that can help us, not just with money 

but with technology, with all of the things that we’re looking at to 

advance and maybe advancing with a connection to other countries 

and saying this is what we’re trying to get to. Mr. Cheng, go ahead. 

Mr. CHENG. Representative, leadership is a matter of not simply 

saying we are going to head in a particular direction but being able 

to persuade others to join us, and as my fellow panelists have also 

pointed out, other nations do want to join us. It does entail, however, having a vision, having an objective, having a target, and 

having the persistence, which is the one great advantage the Chinese have. Their manned space program dates back at least to the 

late 1980s and it has enjoyed consistent top-level support through 

multiple changes of leadership. Whether or not we have that persistence is something the Chinese are looking at but also our allies, 

and so I would hope that the SOFIA program and other programs 

will be the start, not the end of that kind of cooperation. 

Let me also just note very quickly that we are the main explorer 

of the outer solar system. We have sent more, I believe, probes out 

beyond Mars than any other nation or even a group of nations com-
75 

bined, and that too is an area that could be one of leadership and 

encouraging cooperation with our friends and allies. 

Dr. LEWIS. Maybe to follow up, thank you for the question. I 

think the real issue is, you know, what do we want to do about exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, and low-Earth orbit we know 

how to do it. It’s great. But what do we get out of LEO, right? And 

what’s the best way to do that? And there’s some issues that I 

think fall under the purview of this Committee but also the larger 

discussion. Do we focus on manned missions or do we focus on 

robotic? We’ve had tremendous success in robotic. Do we go for 

Mars or do we go for the Moon? I tend to like the Moon because 

I know we can get there. Mars, it’s kind of a long shot but it’s a 

legitimate question. And finally, we need to rethink the outlines of 

cooperation both with our European partners, with the other spacefaring partners but maybe also with China, and in that sense, to 

your original point, I think having a clear goal helps. Having a lot 

of efforts may not be the best way to achieve cooperation. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. 

I now call on the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Mr. Chair, and gentlemen, thank you 

for your testimony today. I really do appreciate the panelists almost nodding as each of you is speaking because you all seem to 

be pretty much on the same page, and I think for the Members up 

here, very similar kind of view of this, and so I appreciate your testimony. I’m not often on the same page as the Heritage Foundation, I can tell you that, Mr. Cheng. 

Mr. Bridenstine—so we agree, this panel on a lot of the space exploration components and this potential for a space race that we’re 

not winning. We’ve been able to win in the past, and Mr. 

Bridenstine is pretty single-minded in talking about commercial 

space and the ability to expand that and the potential innovation 

that our private sector brings to, you know, exploring at least lowEarth orbit if not farther. There’s a thing I’m pretty single-minded 

about, and Mr. Knight will start laughing at me, but 2033, okay, 

so we’ve had testimony by NASA engineers and other experts that 

2033 orbits of Mars and Earth are in pretty good alignment to save 

a lot of space travel time, and that 17 years helps us put the building blocks in place to get to Mars, get our astronauts to Mars, so 

human spaceflight, Dr. Lewis, which is what you’ve been talking 

about, and one of those building blocks certainly could be going 

back to the Moon. Now, I’m not the engineer, I’m not the scientist, 

I don’t know the best way to do it, but I do know as a Member of 

Congress, we need to have long-term mission that we as Members 

of Congress stand behind from Administration to Administration. 

So Mr. Cheng, to your point, we’ve seen different Administrations change how we looked at our space program. So I think we 

do have a potential for a mission that is long-term in nature that 

will continue to add to our expertise and our leadership in space. 

Here’s my question. We do—we’ve had testimony by prior panels 

that one of the last places where we’ve had some decent diplomatic 

dialog between ourselves and the Russians has been with respect 

to our scientists and our space programs, continue to use their 
76 

rockets to help us get to the Space Station. Is there the potential 

for us to have that kind of dialog with the Chinese scientists? Is 

it—you know, you’ve all used words like ‘‘wary’’ and ‘‘skeptical.’’ 

You’ve used ‘‘cooperation’’ and ‘‘competition,’’ ‘‘hostile’’ and ‘‘pragmatic.’’ Is there a way for us to work with their scientists to really 

start broadening cooperation, if you will? And I’ll open it to anybody on the panel if you feel like answering. 

Mr. STOKES. If I can just draw one thread that you put out. You 

mentioned about the United States using Russian launch vehicles 

for some of our satellites and space programs. Of course, I think 

it’s well known that we formerly did both satellites to the People’s 

Republic of China and also licensed some of our companies to be 

able to use Chinese launch vehicles in terms of delivering payloads 

into space. That was restricted in 19—let’s call it 1996, and if I’m 

not mistaken, it continues to be restricted until today. I mean, this 

is something that every once in a while it’s raised again in terms 

of allowing the licensing of U.S. satellites and in terms of sales of 

satellites and also allowing U.S. companies to contract launch vehicle providers. The main restrictions that requires, if I’m not mistaken, a munitions license and there are restrictions under the 

1989 Tiananmen sanctions that exist until today and perhaps for 

good reason. But that’s certainly something that could be looked at 

again, I suppose. It’s not cooperation but it’s actually licensing and 

a technical issue. 

Mr. SHEA. You know, in our report, I think in my testimony as 

well, we outlined—the Wolf restriction doesn’t prohibit all sorts of 

interactions between Chinese scientists and U.S. scientists so there 

are some interactions that are not covered by the Wolf law. We do 

cooperate in collision avoidance. My colleagues could correct me. 

There’s debris. U.S. space operators inform their counterparts in 

China when debris is getting near a Chinese satellite or other—so 

we do cooperate in that sense. 

You raised the Russians. I mean, one thing I would be looking 

at is increased China-Russian cooperation. We see that here on 

planet Earth, China and Russia engaged in joint naval exercises in 

the South China Sea recently, so I could see China-Russia cooperation on joint rocket engine development, maybe Russian participation in the Chinese Tiangong-2, Chinese space station, going forward. So I’d keep an eye on that well. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. Thank you. 

And I just think there’s this yin and the yang going on between 

competition and cooperation to the degree the competitive juices of 

America start flowing, I think that’s to the benefit of all of us but 

also cooperation just to keep peace in our time doesn’t hurt us. 

I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. 

Now I recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Davidson. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Cheng, in your comments you mentioned a Chinese program 

called One Satellite, Two Bombs. What does that mean and what 

does it stem from? 

Mr. CHENG. In the 1960s, China under Mao Zedong basically 

said that in order to be a competitive major power, China first off 

needed to develop nuclear weapons, and in fact, there’s all sorts of 
77 

rather breathtaking language by Mao about how the Chinese people will eat grass if necessary. But what that led to was in 1964 

on its own without external assistance, China exploded its first 

atomic bomb. In 1967, it exploded its first hydrogen, or fusion 

bomb, and in 1970 it launched its first satellite, the Dong Fang 

Hong I, two bombs, one satellite. It is now embodied in Chinese 

terminology as evidence of two things: one, how far China is prepared to go in order to achieve strategic objectives, and two, the 

self-reliance. Now, self-reliance doesn’t mean that you don’t do 

cyber espionage and other things but it does mean that at the end 

of the day, China sets goals and they will achieve them. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thanks for that. 

One of the ways that the United States collaborated with China 

with commercial technology, pseudo-commercial technology, was to 

help them launch multiple low-Earth orbit satellites off of one 

launch vehicle. Is anyone familiar with this program wherein the 

early 1990s almost immediately after removing release-of-sensitivetechnology authority from Defense and giving it to Commerce, we 

helped China develop this technology? Was that good collaboration? 

Mr. STOKES. If I can take the first hack at it, that was the Motorola program, if I’m not mistaken. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Iridium, I think. 

Mr. STOKES. The Iridium, yeah, the Iridium program. In particular, I believe it was certifying their what’s called smart dispenser that has direct application, of course, to a MIRV capability, 

and if you look at the timeline, research and development timelines 

that match up, it’s kind of hard to not conclude that there was a 

connection. 

Dr. LEWIS. It’s difficult to answer this question in an unclassified 

setting but it was not purely advantage to China. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Okay. Mr. Chairman, could I yield 30 seconds to 

my colleague, Mr. Bridenstine? 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I just wanted to directly respond to something 

that my good friend, Mr. Perlmutter from Colorado, said, which 

was the cooperation with the Russians and using their launch capabilities for our civil space programs. It was an article in Aviation 

Week and Space Technology probably about seven months ago. I 

read the defense minister for Russia stated very clearly—they were 

asking how are you financing your military communication, spacebased communications programs, how are you financing your military remote sensing and imagery capabilities, and he said very 

clearly in the article that they’re financing it with off-balance-sheet 

financing from expenditures from launching foreign satellites and 

astronauts. So when we cooperate in that way, we have to be really 

clear about what we’re doing: we are financing the defense and 

military capabilities of the Russians. And I just wanted to get that 

on the record. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you. 

And I want to tie that together in terms of collaboration, sometimes perhaps some ways that have benefited us, some ways that 

have not been beneficial to us. Clearly, the whole panel has talked 

a lot about soft power, and I’m curious, where is China particularly 

successful with existing space powers like Russia, like European 
78 

countries, but also with non-space powers. So how has China been 

successful with their use of soft power in their space program? 

Mr. SHEA. Well, China is using space—I think Mr. Cheng mentioned this earlier. China is using space as part of a broader relationship with countries, less-developed countries. With Pakistan, it 

provides space assistance but it’s tied into this China-Pakistan economic corridor which is on the ground. China is building out something called One Belt, One Road initiative, and it intends to provide BeiDou coverage to most One Belt, One Road countries by 

2018. So space is a component of a broader foreign policy diplomatic outreach to less-developed countries. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you, and I apologize because I have very 

little time, but I was glad you connected the One Belt, One Road, 

and Mr. Cheng in particular referenced China’s ability to stay on 

a unified, coherent national strategy, and I would argue that since 

the end of the Cold War, they have been the single nation that has 

done that with success. 

Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you very much, Mr. Davidson. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Mr. Chairman, may I—— 

Chairman BABIN. You sure can. Go ahead. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks. I’d like to just say to my friend from 

Oklahoma, I agree. I wasn’t talking about the fact we’re paying for 

these launch vehicles but to have a back channel for diplomatic 

purposes sometimes is very important if the political systems between the two countries aren’t working. So scientists sometimes 

lend us that back channel. That’s really what I intended to convey. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. 

This concludes this hearing. It’s been very informative, very educational. I want to thank the witnesses profusely for their valuable 

testimony and the members for your questions. The record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments and written 

questions from the members. 

So this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Hon. Dennis C. Shea 
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89 
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91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
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97 
98 
99 
100 

Responses by Mr. Mark Stokes 
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Responses by Mr. Dean Cheng 
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105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
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112 
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Responses by Dr. James Lewis 
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(121) 

Appendix I 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
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STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY FULL COMMITTEE

RANKING MEMBER EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

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