IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 263PA21

Filed 16 June 2023

IN THE MATTER OF: J.U.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 from an unpublished 

decision of the Court of Appeals, No. COA20-812 (N.C. Ct. App. July 6, 2021)

(unpublished), vacating in part an adjudication order entered on 12 February 2020 

and vacating a disposition order entered on 16 July 2020 by Judge Rebecca Blackmore 

in District Court, Cumberland County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 26 April 2023. 

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Janelle E. Varley, Assistant Attorney 

General, for the State-appellant.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Heidi Reiner, Assistant Appellate 

Defender, for juvenile-appellee.

BERGER, Justice.

We address here the jurisdictional sufficiency of allegations in a juvenile 

delinquency petition. Just as “it is not the function of an indictment to bind the hands 

of the State with technical rules of pleading,” State v. Williams, 368 N.C. 620, 623

(2016) (quoting State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 311 (1981)), the plain language of 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802 does not require the State in a juvenile petition to aver the 

elements of an offense with hyper-technical particularity to satisfy jurisdictional 

concerns. Because the juvenile petition sufficiently pled the offense of misdemeanor 
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Opinion of the Court

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sexual battery and provided adequate notice to the juvenile, the pleading 

requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802 were satisfied. We reverse the decision of the 

Court of Appeals. 

I. Background

A juvenile petition alleged that J.U. had committed misdemeanor sexual 

battery against B.A., a classmate.

1 J.U. and B.A. became friends when they were in 

seventh grade. In the fall of their eighth-grade year, J.U. snapped B.A.’s bra strap, 

prompting her to yell at him and draw the attention of their teacher. Thereafter, as 

part of the investigatory process, B.A. submitted an initial written statement which

detailed the incident. Two other students submitted written statements, one of which

described a separate incident in which J.U. had touched B.A. on her buttocks, breasts, 

and vaginal area. B.A. also submitted a second statement detailing inappropriate 

touching by J.U. B.A. testified that she did not report these actions to the school 

because she did not think anyone else witnessed the events and feared that she would 

not be believed. 

On 6 November 2019, the State filed a juvenile petition, which the State later 

dismissed. On 9 January 2020, the State filed three additional juvenile petitions 

alleging that J.U. committed simple assault and sexual battery. One of the juvenile 

petitions alleging sexual battery was later dismissed by the trial court. The other 

sexual battery petition specifically alleged that “the juvenile did unlawfully, willfully 

1 Initials are used to refer to juveniles pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 42(b).
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Opinion of the Court

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engage in sexual contact with [B.A.] by touching [her] vaginal area, against the 

victim[’]s will for the purpose of sexual gratification.” Prior to the adjudication 

hearing, J.U. waived the formal reading of the petitions and entered a plea of not 

guilty. J.U. did not object to the language of the sexual battery petition, nor did he 

move to dismiss due to a deficiency in the charging document.

On 12 February 2020, the Honorable Rebecca Blackmore of the District Court, 

Cumberland County, adjudicated J.U. delinquent for simple assault and sexual 

battery. The trial court entered a Level II disposition order, and J.U. was required 

to complete twelve months of probation and up to fourteen twenty-four-hour periods 

of secure custody in addition to fulfilling certain other requirements. 

J.U. timely appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that: (1) the juvenile 

petition charging sexual battery was “fatally defective in failing to allege the 

necessary element of force”; (2) the State “failed to present sufficient evidence of all 

elements of sexual battery”; (3) his trial counsel committed per se ineffective 

assistance of counsel by “conceding guilt to simple assault” without the trial court 

conducting a colloquy with J.U. to determine “whether the concession was knowing 

and voluntary”; and (4) the disposition order lacked “findings of fact sufficient to 

support the punishment imposed.” In re J.U., No. COA20-812, slip op. at 1–2 (N.C. 

Ct. App. July 6, 2021).

In analyzing the charging language in the juvenile petition, the Court of 

Appeals determined that “[a]s with criminal indictments, a juvenile petition ‘is 
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subject to the same requirement that it aver every element of a criminal offense, with 

sufficient specificity that the accused is clearly apprised of the conduct for which he 

is being charged.’ ” Id. at 6 (quoting In re S.R.S., 180 N.C. App. 151, 153 (2006)). 

Further, the Court of Appeals stated that the element of force in the sexual battery 

statute was defined as “force applied to the body,” id. at 7 (quoting State v. Scott, 323 

N.C. 350, 354 (1988)), and that element was “present if the defendant use[d] force

sufficient to overcome any resistance the victim might make.” Id. (quoting State v. 

Brown, 332 N.C. 262, 267 (1992)).2 

The Court of Appeals relied on State v. Raines, 72 N.C. App. 300 (1985), to 

conclude that the allegation in the petition that J.U. touched B.A.’s vaginal area 

against her will “does not, standing alone, disclose that he accomplished that act 

through an application of force to her body sufficient to overcome any resistance the 

victim might make.” In re J.U., slip op. at 7 (cleaned up). The Court of Appeals

therefore vacated the lower court’s adjudication order in part and disposition order

in whole, holding that the juvenile petition charging J.U. with sexual battery “was 

fatally defective and failed to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction over the petition.” 

Id. at 15.

On 4 May 2022, this Court allowed the State’s petition for discretionary review 

2 The Court of Appeals did not address the juvenile’s arguments concerning sufficiency 

of the evidence or the contents of the trial court’s disposition order; however, the case was 

remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim.
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under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 to determine a single issue: whether the Court of Appeals 

erred in holding that the sexual battery petition was fatally defective and failed to 

invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. 

II. Analysis

A. Pleading Standards

The district court division “has exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case 

involving a juvenile who is alleged to be delinquent.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1601(a) (2021). 

Generally, a delinquent juvenile is an individual under the age of eighteen but over 

the age of ten who “commits a crime or infraction under State law or under an 

ordinance of local government.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1501(7) (2021). 

A juvenile petition is the pleading in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1801 (2021). To properly allege that a juvenile is a delinquent juvenile,

and thus under the court’s jurisdiction, juvenile petitions must “contain a plain and 

concise statement, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserting facts 

supporting every element of a criminal offense and the juvenile’s commission thereof 

with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the juvenile of the conduct which is the 

subject of the allegation.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802 (2021). 

The General Assembly has instructed that the statutes related to juvenile 

delinquency are to be “interpreted and construed”:

(1) To protect the public from acts of delinquency.

(2) To deter delinquency and crime, including patterns of 

repeat offending:
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a. By providing swift, effective dispositions that 

emphasize the juvenile offender’s accountability 

for the juvenile’s actions; and

b. By providing appropriate rehabilitative services 

to juveniles and their families.

(3) To provide an effective system of intake services for the 

screening and evaluation of complaints and, in 

appropriate cases, where court intervention is not 

necessary to ensure public safety, to refer juveniles to 

community-based resources.

(4) To provide uniform procedures that assure fairness and 

equity; that protect the constitutional rights of 

juveniles, parents, and victims; and that encourage the 

court and others involved with juvenile offenders to 

proceed with all possible speed in making and 

implementing determinations required by this 

Subchapter.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1500 (2021).

While juvenile delinquency proceedings are not “criminal prosecutions,” In re 

Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 529 (1969), the General Assembly utilized nearly identical 

language to describe the necessary content of juvenile petitions and criminal 

pleadings. Compare N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802, with N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(5) (2021). Our 

appellate courts have long held that petitions alleging delinquent acts “serve[ ] 

essentially the same function as an indictment.” In re S.R.S., 180 N.C. App. at 153 

(quoting In re Griffin, 162 N.C. App. 487, 493 (2004)). Despite obvious procedural 

differences in the issuance of a juvenile petition and a true bill of indictment, “juvenile 

petitions are generally held to the standards of a criminal indictment.” Id. (quoting 
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In re B.D.W., 175 N.C. App. 760 (2006)).

Criminal pleadings, including indictments, are:

[S]ufficient in form for all intents and purposes if [they] 

express the charge against the defendant in a plain, 

intelligible, and explicit manner; and the same shall not be 

quashed, nor the judgment thereon stayed, by reason of 

any informality of refinement, if in the bill of proceeding, 

sufficient matter appears to enable the court to proceed to 

judgment. 

N.C.G.S. § 15-153 (2021). 

It is well-established that “it would not favor justice to allow [a] defendant to 

escape merited punishment upon a minor matter of form.” Sturdivant, 304 N.C. at 

311. This Court has been consistent in retreating from the highly technical, archaic 

common law pleading requirements which promoted form over substance:

“[I]t is not the function of an indictment to bind the hands 

of the State with technical rules of pleading,” and . . . we 

are no longer bound by the “ancient strict pleading 

requirements of the common law.” Instead, contemporary 

criminal pleading requirements have been “designed to 

remove from our law unnecessary technicalities which tend 

to obstruct justice.” 

Williams, 368 N.C. at 623 (first quoting Sturdivant, 304 N.C. at 311, then quoting 

State v. Freeman, 314 N.C. 432, 436 (1985)). “An indictment need not conform to any 

technical rules of pleading but instead must satisfy both . . . statutory strictures . . . 

and the constitutional purposes which indictments are designed to satisfy,” i.e., notice 

sufficient to prepare a defense and to protect against double jeopardy. State v.
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Oldroyd, 380 N.C. 613, 617 (2022) (cleaned up).3

Initially, we observe that the plain language of “N.C.G.S. § 15A-924 does not 

require that an indictment contain any information beyond the specific facts that 

support the elements of the crime.” State v. Rambert, 341 N.C. 173, 176 (1995)

(emphasis added); see also Sturdivant, 304 N.C. at 309 (declaring that an indictment 

must set forth “a lucid prosecutive statement which factually particularizes the 

essential elements of the specified offense”). 

Moreover, the common law rule that defective indictments rob a court of 

jurisdiction is “an obsolete rule that detrimentally impacts the administration of 

justice in our State.” State v. Rankin, 371 N.C. 885, 919 (2018) (Martin, C.J., 

dissenting). Persuasively noting that jurisdictional concerns were a “relic of the code 

pleading era,” id. at 906, Chief Justice Martin’s dissent in Rankin thoroughly 

recounted the history of criminal pleadings, ultimately concluding that because “our 

criminal law and procedure became ‘hopelessly outdated,’ ” id. at 908, (quoting 

Legislative Program and Report to the General Assembly of North Carolina by the 

Criminal Code Commission, at i (1973)), by 1974, legislative reforms, including the 

adoption of N.C.G.S. § 15A-924, evolved from requiring elemental specificity to a more 

simplified requirement that indictments allege “facts supporting each essential 

3 Here, J.U.’s counsel conceded that the petition at issue provided adequate notice. 

Thus, the only question remaining is whether the petition satisfied relevant statutory 

strictures. See Oral Argument at 44:24, In re J.U. (No. 263PA21) (Apr. 26, 2023), 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HqMqqgKRxFI (last visited May 10, 2023).
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element of the charged offense.” Id. (citing N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(5) (2017)). 

Consistent with a proper understanding of indictment jurisprudence and the 

express language of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802, a juvenile petition “does not have to state 

every element of the offense charged,” so long as the elements are “clearly inferable 

from the facts, duly alleged.” State v. Jordan, 75 N.C. App. 637, 639, cert. denied, 314 

N.C. 544 (1985). Stated differently, magic words are not required; all that is required 

by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802 and our precedent concerning criminal pleadings is that the 

charging document contain factual allegations supporting the elements of the crime 

charged. 

“It is generally held that the language in a statutorily prescribed form of 

criminal pleading is sufficient if the act or omission is clearly set forth so that a person 

of common understanding may know what is intended.” State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 

435 (1984). Indeed, “[t]he purpose of a juvenile petition is to clearly identify the crime 

being charged and should not be subjected to hyper[-]technical scrutiny with respect 

to form.” In re D.S., 197 N.C. App. 598, 601–02 (2009) (cleaned up), rev’d in part on 

other grounds, 364 N.C. 184 (2010). As with criminal pleadings, “[n]o provision of 

Chapter 7[B] mandates that flawed [petitions] have the effect of depriving the trial 

court of jurisdiction,” Rankin, 371 N.C. at 911 (Martin, C.J., dissenting), and such a 

reading would be inconsistent with N.C.G.S. § 7B-1500. 

B. Sufficiency of the Petition 

The crime of sexual battery is committed when any person, “for the purpose of 
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sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse, engages in sexual contact with 

another person . . . [b]y force and against the will of the other person.” N.C.G.S. § 14-

27.33(a) (2021). The petition here alleged that J.U. “unlawfully [and] willfully 

engage[d] in sexual contact with [B.A.] by touching [her] vaginal area, against the 

victim[’]s will for the purpose of sexual gratification.” 

The Court of Appeals below relied on this Court’s statement that the force 

element “is present if the defendant uses force sufficient to overcome any resistance 

the victim might make,” In re J.U., slip op. at 7 (quoting Brown, 332 N.C. at 267), to 

conclude that the allegation that J.U. “touched B[.A.] does not, standing alone, 

disclose that he accomplished that act through an application of force to her body 

sufficient to overcome any resistance the victim might make.” Id. (cleaned up). In so 

doing, the Court of Appeals viewed the pleading requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802

through a hyper-technical lens not intended by the plain language of the statute and 

routinely cautioned against by this Court. 

Although the term “by force” is not defined in the relevant statutory scheme,

this Court has stated that “ ‘[p]hysical force’ means force applied to the body.” Scott, 

323 N.C. at 354. Further, the “requisite force may be established either by actual, 

physical force or by constructive force in the form of fear, fright, or coercion.” Brown, 

332 N.C. at 267 (quoting State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 45 (1987)). 

In Brown, the defendant “entered [a] hospital in which the victim was a 

patient[,] . . . pushed open the door of the victim’s hospital room[,] . . . pulled back the 
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bedclothes on the victim’s bed, pulled up her gown, [and] pulled down her panties” 

before sexually assaulting her. Id. at 270. The Court of Appeals reversed the 

defendant’s conviction for second-degree sexual offense after concluding that “no 

substantial evidence was introduced at trial to support a reasonable finding that the 

defendant . . . used force in the commission of the offense charged.” Id. at 265.

Because this Court concluded that the evidence presented in Brown “tended to 

show the defendant used actual physical force surpassing that inherent in the sexual 

act he committed upon the victim,” we reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. 

Id. at 269. However, this Court left open the question of whether the “physical force 

which will establish the force element of a sexual offense may be shown simply 

through evidence of the force inherent in the sexual act at issue,” and we “expressly 

defer[red] any decision on that question until we [we]re presented with a case which 

requires its resolution.” Id.

Put simply, the question this Court declined to answer in Brown was whether 

“physical force” is present when an assailant engages in unlawful, nonconsensual 

sexual contact with a victim, or whether “physical force” requires some level of force

beyond the unlawful, nonconsensual touching itself. Here, J.U. argues that the 

petition was fatally defective because it “did not allege physical force” and therefore, 

the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction. 

However, just as “common sense dictates that one cannot unlawfully kidnap or 

unlawfully restrain another with his consent,” Sturdivant, 304 N.C. at 310, one 
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cannot engage in nonconsensual sexual contact with another person without the 

application of some “force,” however slight. See Scott, 323 N.C. at 354; Brown, 332 

N.C. at 267.

The petition here alleged that J.U. “engage[d] in sexual contact with [B.A.] by 

touching [her] vaginal area, against the victim[’]s will for the purpose of sexual 

gratification.” By alleging that J.U. touched B.A.’s vaginal area without her consent, 

the petition asserted a fact from which the element of force was, at the very least,

“clearly inferable,” Jordan, 75 N.C. App. at 639, such that “a person of common 

understanding may know what [wa]s intended.” Coker, 312 N.C. at 435. Thus, the 

factual allegations in the juvenile petition supported each element of misdemeanor 

sexual battery. The petition, therefore, complied with statutory pleading standards,

and no jurisdictional defect existed. 

The Court of Appeals erred in requiring a rote repetition of the elements of the 

offense of misdemeanor sexual battery rather than analyzing the ultimate question 

of whether the element of force was clearly inferable from the facts alleged in the

petition. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to 

the Court of Appeals for determination of the issues not considered in its previous 

decision. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
IN RE J.U.

Earls, J., dissenting

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Justice EARLS dissenting.

It stands to reason that our laws must serve to protect people from unwanted 

touching, sexual assault, and unwanted sexual advances in general. This is especially 

true in the case of a minor victim, who through qualities inherent to childhood is 

rendered particularly vulnerable. In a perfect world, our laws would provide this 

protection through a victim-centered legal framework that emphasizes the victim’s 

sexual autonomy over the perpetrator’s intent. Under this framework, the focus 

would not be on whether the perpetrator used force or intended to hurt the victim. 

Rather, the focus would be on whether the actions taken by the perpetrator were 

welcome and whether in taking those actions the perpetrator violated the victim’s 

freedom to choose not to consent to that action. However, this is not the choice our 

General Assembly has made.

In North Carolina, our legislature has determined that force is required to 

commit sexual battery. N.C.G.S. § 14-27.33(a) (2021).1 Thus, any petition alleging 

sexual battery must provide facts supporting this element of the offense. N.C.G.S. § 

7B-1802 (2021). While North Carolina is not alone in requiring force as an element of 

sexual battery, see, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-505 (West 2021); Ind. Code Ann. § 

1 To be clear, North Carolina’s sexual battery statute requires the use of force unless 

the victim has “a mental disability[, is] mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, and the 

person performing the act knows or should reasonably know that the other person has a 

mental disability or is mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.” N.C.G.S. § 14-

27.33(a)(2).
IN RE J.U.

Earls, J., dissenting

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35-42-4-8 (West 2014), other states have determined that force is not necessary to 

commit this offense, see, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.1 (West 2023); Miss. Code. 

Ann. § 97-3-95 (West, Westlaw through 2023 Regular Session effective through April

21, 2023); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5505 (West 2021). Thus, if the General Assembly had 

wanted to, it could have written a statute similar to those in effect in Utah, 

Mississippi, and Kansas. However, “make no mistake: [the General Assembly] wrote 

the statute it meant to.” Sackett v. EPA, No. 21-454, 2023 WL 3632751, at *29 (U.S. 

May 25, 2023) (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment). Today the majority chooses to 

override that legislative choice. Cf. West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2628 (2022)

(Kagan, J., dissenting) (admonishing the majority for “overrid[ing]” Congress’s 

legislative choice to grant the EPA the power to curb emission of greenhouse gases).

In 2015, the previous sexual battery statute, N.C.G.S. § 14-27.5(a), was 

recodified as N.C.G.S. § 14-27.33, which is the version of the statute in effect today. 

While changes were made to other areas of the statute, the requirement that sexual 

battery be “[b]y force and against the will of the other person” remained the same. 

Compare N.C.G.S. § 14-27.5(a) (2015), with N.C.G.S. § 14-27.33 (2021). Furthermore, 

our Court has long held that we are to “presume that [when enacting a statute] the 

Legislature [chooses] its words with due care.” C Invs. 2, LLC v. Auger, 383 N.C. 1,

10 (2022) (citing Sellers v. Friedrich Refrigerators, Inc., 283 N.C. 79, 85 (1973)). Yet 

by determining that J.U.’s petition was sufficient to plead sexual battery, despite 

failing to include facts supporting the necessary element of force, the majority’s 
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Earls, J., dissenting

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opinion “alters . . . the statute [the General Assembly] drafted.” See Sackett, 2023 WL 

3632751, at *29 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment). Accordingly, I disagree with 

the majority that J.U.’s petition was sufficient to plead misdemeanor sexual battery 

under North Carolina law. I agree with the Court of Appeals that J.U.’s adjudication 

and disposition must be vacated because the State’s petition failed to allege all 

necessary elements of the offense. See In re J.U., No. COA20-812, slip op. at 5 (N.C. 

Ct. App. July 6, 2021) (unpublished). Thus, I respectfully dissent.

It is well established that a delinquency proceeding is not a criminal 

prosecution. In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 529 (1969). Unlike the North Carolina 

Criminal Procedure Act, our Juvenile Code specifically identifies the rehabilitation of 

juveniles as one of its primary purposes. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1500 (2021). Similarly, this 

Court’s own precedent explains that “[i]n the Juvenile Code, the General Assembly 

enacted procedural protections for juvenile offenders with the aim that delinquent 

children might be rehabilitated and reformed and become useful, law-abiding 

citizens.” State v. Dellinger, 343 N.C. 93, 96 (1996). Consistent with these principles,

“[t]he state has a greater duty to protect the rights of a respondent in a juvenile

proceeding than in a criminal prosecution.” State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 24 (1983)

(Martin, J., concurring in result). Accordingly, our Court “shall” protect “[t]he right

to written notice of the facts alleged in the petition” in order “to assure due process of

law.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-2405 (2021); see also N.C. Const. art. I, § 23 (identifying the rights

of the accused, including “the right to be informed of the accusation”).
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Earls, J., dissenting

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In delinquency proceedings, notice must “set forth the alleged misconduct with

particularity” and identify “the specific issues [the juvenile] must meet.” In re Gault,

387 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1967). Accordingly, our state statute requires a delinquency

petition to contain “a plain and concise statement, without allegations of an 

evidentiary nature, asserting facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and 

the juvenile’s commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the 

juvenile of the conduct which is the subject of the allegation.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802. 

Under subsection 14-27.33(a), sexual battery occurs, in pertinent part, when a person 

“for the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse, engages in 

sexual contact with another person . . . [b]y force and against the will of the other 

person.” N.C.G.S. § 14-27.33(a). Because force is an element of sexual battery, it must 

be pled alongside “facts supporting” J.U.’s use of force. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802. The 

element of force “may be established either by actual, physical force or by constructive 

force in the form of fear, fright, or coercion.” State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 45 (1987). 

Physical force refers to force that is applied to the body, State v. Scott, 323 N.C. 350, 

354 (1988), and “is present if the defendant uses force sufficient to overcome any 

resistance the victim might make[,]” State v. Brown, 332 N.C. 262, 267 (1992). 

“Constructive force is demonstrated by proof of threats or other actions by the 

defendant which compel the victim’s submission to sexual acts.” Etheridge, 319 N.C. 

at 45. 

Rather than plead the necessary element of force, J.U.’s petition only alleged 
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Earls, J., dissenting

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that J.U. “unlawfully, willfully engage[d] in sexual contact with [B.A.] by touching 

[B.A.]’s vaginal area, against [B.A.’s] will for the purpose of sexual gratification.” 

J.U.’s petition does not allege the use of physical or constructive force, nor does it 

allege that J.U. used “threats or other actions . . . which compel[led] [B.A.’s] 

submission to sexual acts.” Id. Additionally, the allegation that J.U. “touch[ed] 

[B.A.]’s vaginal area” does not, standing alone, show that J.U. accomplished this act 

by any application of physical force or force to B.A.’s body “sufficient to overcome any 

resistance [B.A.] might make.” Brown, 332 N.C. at 267. In short, the indictment does 

not allege facts supporting the required element of force.

Furthermore, while the petition alleges that J.U. acted “against [B.A.’s] will,” 

acting against the will of the victim and acting with force are not synonymous, and 

the law draws a distinction between both actions. See State v. Jones, 304 N.C. 323, 

330 (1981) (stating the four elements of first degree sexual offense are: “(1) a sexual 

act, (2) against the will and without the consent of the victim, (3) using force sufficient 

to overcome any resistance of the victim, [and] (4) effected through the employment 

or display of a dangerous or deadly weapon.”); State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 407 

(1984) (“[S]econd degree rape involves vaginal intercourse with the victim both by 

force and against the victim’s will.”). Moreover, a petition that only alleges the victim 

was “touch[ed]” is not sufficient to meet the necessary element of force as required 

under North Carolina’s sexual battery statute. See N.C.G.S. § 14-27.33(a). Thus, 

because J.U.’s petition did not contain “a plain and concise statement . . . asserting 
IN RE J.U.

Earls, J., dissenting

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facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the juvenile’s commission 

thereof,” his delinquency petition was fatally defective. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802. 

Additionally, while the majority argues that a juvenile petition “ ‘does not have 

to state every element of the offense charged’ so long as the elements are ‘clearly 

inferable from the facts, duly alleged,’ ” quoting State v. Jordan, 75 N.C. App. 637, 

639 (1985), the statutory language of section 7B-1802 and subsection 15A-924(a)(5) 

are not consistent with this idea. See N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1802, 15A-924(a)(5) (2021). 

While section 7B-1802 is concerned with the standards for juvenile petitions, 

subsection 15A-924(a)(5) provides the standard for a criminal indictment. Both 

statutes use similar language to state that a juvenile petition and criminal indictment 

require “[a] plain and concise factual statement” that “asserts facts supporting every 

element” of the offense and “the defendant’s [or juvenile’s] commission thereof.” 

N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(5); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802. These two statutes, both 

serving similar functions, do not contain any limiting language stating that a failure 

to “assert[ ] facts supporting every element of a criminal offense,” see N.C.G.S. § 7B1802, “is not ground[s] for dismissal of the charges or for reversal of a conviction.” See

N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(6).

In contrast, subsection 15A-924(a)(6) states that a pleading must contain 

[f]or each count a citation of any applicable statute, rule, 

regulation, ordinance, or other provision of law alleged 

therein to have been violated. Error in the citation or its 

omission is not ground for dismissal of the charges or for 

reversal of a conviction.
IN RE J.U.

Earls, J., dissenting

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N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(6) (emphasis added). By including subsection (a)(6), the 

General Assembly has shown that it knows how to use such language when it intends 

to. The General Assembly’s choice not to include similar language in section 7B-1802 

or in subsection 15A-924(a)(5) shows a clear intent by the General Assembly not to 

excuse the failure to list facts supporting every element of an offense and instead 

shows that such a failure is grounds for dismissal of the allegations or reversal of an 

adjudication or a conviction. 

It is not this Court’s function to usurp the role of the legislature and change 

the expressed will of the General Assembly or the people of North Carolina. Indeed, 

this Court “may not rewrite [the General Assembly’s] plain instructions because they 

go further than preferred.” See Sackett, 2023 WL 3632751, at *30 (Kagan, J., 

concurring in the judgment). Here, those instructions mandate that “[a] petition in 

which delinquency is alleged shall contain a plain and concise statement . . . asserting 

facts supporting every element of a criminal offense.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802. And 

because force is a necessary element of sexual battery, a delinquency petition alleging 

sexual battery must include “facts supporting” the use of force. See id.; N.C.G.S. § 14-

27.33(a)(1).

While the majority characterizes the pleading requirements listed in section 

7B-1802 as “highly technical[ ] [and] archaic[,]” those requirements are more properly 

characterized as constitutional procedural due process protections. Procedural due 

process is “a guarantee of fair procedure.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 
IN RE J.U.

Earls, J., dissenting

- 20 -

(1990). While state action that deprives a person of “ ‘life, liberty, or property’ is not 

in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an 

interest without due process of law.” Id. As Justice Frankfurter previously noted, 

“[t]he history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.” 

Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

In 1967, in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the United States Supreme Court 

determined that constitutional due process protections applied to juvenile offenders. 

To ensure that our legal system is fair and just, “[d]ue process of law [acts as] the 

primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom.” Id. at 20. Furthermore, 

procedural due process serves to “define[ ] the rights of the individual” while also 

“delimit[ing] the powers which the state may exercise.” Id. Notably, procedural due 

process protections allow courts to pursue the truth by “enhanc[ing] the possibility 

that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions [of events] and 

conflicting data.” Id. at 21. Thus, while the majority appears to reduce the pleading 

requirements under section 7B-1802 as only requiring that notice be sufficient “to 

prepare a defense and to protect . . . [against] double jeopardy,” State v. Oldroyd, 380 

N.C. 613, 618 (2022), due process protections are far broader and relate to all areas 

of procedural fairness, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 20. 

The statutory framework in section 7B-1500 is consistent with these 

constitutional principles and requires juvenile delinquency statutes to be 

“interpreted and construed so as to implement” a set of “purposes and policies.” 
IN RE J.U.

Earls, J., dissenting

- 21 -

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1500. Importantly, these statutes must be “interpreted and construed”:

(4) To provide uniform procedures that assure fairness and 

equity; that protect the constitutional rights of juveniles, 

parents, and victims; and that encourage the court and 

others involved with juvenile offenders to proceed with all 

possible speed in making and implementing 

determinations required by this Subchapter.

Id. Although the majority cites section 7B-1500, its opinion glosses over the fourth 

prong of the statute. But there is no “get-out-of-text-free card[,]” see West Virginia v. 

EPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2641 (Kagan, J., dissenting), and the majority cannot choose to 

ignore the statutory text in either section 7B-1500 or section 7B-1802.

Because section 7B-1802 requires that a delinquency petition “contain a plain 

and concise statement, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserting facts 

supporting every element of a criminal offense,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802, and the petition 

filed against J.U. failed to include facts supporting the necessary element of force, the 

adjudication and disposition should be vacated. Until the North Carolina General 

Assembly changes the law, force is a necessary element of the offense of sexual 

battery and not merely a technicality that can be inferred from an act against the 

victim’s will.

Justice MORGAN joins in this dissenting opinion.