Filed 6/13/16 In re Jazmin H. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re JAZMIN H., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B269370

 (Los Angeles County 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RAUL H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 Super. Ct. No. DK10808) 

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Rudolph A. 

Diaz, Judge. Affirmed.

Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Acting Assistant County 

Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________
2

The juvenile court sustained a dependency petition alleging that Rita G.’s mental 

health problems and drug use placed her children at risk of harm. The children’s 

noncustodial parent, Raul H., requested custody of the children pursuant to Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 361.2. The court, however, assessed his request under Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c)(1), concluding that placing the children 

with him would be a substantial danger to their safety and was therefore not appropriate. 

Father argues the trial court erred in assessing his custody request under section 

361, subdivision (c), which governs the circumstances under which a child may be 

removed from a custodial parent, rather than under 361.2, subdivision (a), which governs

a noncustodial parent’s request for custody of a child that has been removed from a 

custodial parent. We affirm, concluding that although the court applied the wrong 

statute, the error was harmless. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Referral and Detention

1. Events preceding the section 300 petition

Rita G. (mother) was living in an apartment with her 22-year-old son Samuel H., 

her 15-year-old daughter Jazmin H. and her two-year-old son Alfonso H. The children’s 

presumed father, Raul H. (father), did not reside with the family and was not involved in

their lives.

On April 2, 2015, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging mother had stated she “wanted to kill herself 

and take her children with her.” Mother was placed on a psychiatric hold at an urgent 

care facility, where she received a urinalysis that tested positive for marijuana and

methamphetamine. 

On April 3, 2015, an employee of the facility informed DCFS mother was

returning home. The employee explained that mother’s children had not been present 

when she disclosed her suicidal thoughts, and that she had remained calm and 

cooperative throughout her hospitalization. The employee also stated that mother denied 
3

having any suicidal ideations when she left the hospital, and had promised to follow 

through with mental health services. The employee confirmed mother had tested positive 

for methamphetamine and marijuana. 

DCFS travelled to mother’s apartment to interview the family about the referral 

allegations. Mother explained that the incident began after she informed her “GAIN”

representative (see Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1334 

[describing “GAIN” as a California “work program for welfare recipients”]) she wanted 

mental health counseling. The representative instructed mother to fill out a questionnaire 

in which she disclosed she had thought about killing herself and “taking her kids with 

her.” Mother informed DCFS that despite the statement in her questionnaire, she had 

never actually intended to harm her children. Mother explained that she occasionally felt 

“overwhelmed” by Alfonso, who exhibited “autistic symptoms” that included limited 

speech capabilities and an inability to follow directions. Mother stated that Alfonso was 

currently working with two therapists to address his issues. Mother also admitted she had 

been taking drugs to “cope” with her depression and loneliness. 

Mother stated that she had separated from father when Jazmin was one year old. 

Mother briefly renewed her relationship with father in 2011, at which time she became 

pregnant with Alfonso. Mother reported that father had been physically and emotionally

abusive toward her, and believed the family was better off without him. Father’s abuse 

included calling mother a “worthless bitch” and throwing food at her. Mother also stated 

that father was not involved in the children’s lives, and had never helped her support 

them. According to mother, father had previously “failed to reunify” with his two other 

children during “a prior DCFS case.” 

Jazmin informed DCFS mother had previously told her she “felt like committing 

suicide but that was in the past.” Jazmin stated that mother had never actually attempted 

to hurt herself or made any recent statements about wanting to do so, and had never 

threatened to hurt Jazmin or her siblings. Jazmin explained mother was frustrated with 

Alfonso, who “throws toys everywhere” and “acts crazy.” Jazmin had never seen mother 

under the influence of drugs, and did not believe that she took drugs. Jazmin also stated 
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that she had never been subjected to any physical or mental abuse, and that she felt safe 

around mother. Jazmin reported her father was “not involved in their lives,” and that she 

had not seen him in more than a year. 

DCFS also interviewed Samuel, who said he was not aware that mother had 

sought mental health services or that she felt like she wanted to hurt herself. Samuel also 

said he had never seen mother use drugs, but had smelled marijuana in the car. He stated 

that his father was not involved in the family’s life, and that he did not want to have any 

contact with father. Samuel said he was his willing to care for his siblings with help from

his mother’s relatives. 

2. Section 300 petition and detention

On April 14, 2015, DCFS filed a petition alleging Jazmin and Alfonso fell within 

the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institution Code section 300, 

subdivision (b).

1 Count one of the petition alleged mother had a history of substance 

abuse that endangered the children’s “physical health and safety.” Count two alleged 

mother had a history of mental and emotional problems that rendered her unable to care 

for the children, and placed them at “risk of serious physical and emotional harm.”

DCFS filed a detention report in support of the petition summarizing the results of 

its initial investigation. The report stated that DCFS had been unable to locate father, 

whose whereabouts were unknown. The report contained a printout from the “California 

Law Enforcement Telecommunications System” (CLETS) (see People v. Martinez

(2000) 22 Cal.4th 106 [discussing CLETS]) showing father had prior felony convictions 

for drug possession (1996, 2006), robbery (1999), possession of a firearm by a felon 

(1999) and violation of parole (2001, 2003, 2007). The CLETS report also listed several 

misdemeanor convictions and juvenile matters. 

In its evaluation and summary, DCFS concluded that mother’s substance abuse 

and mental health issues, combined with Alfonso’s young age and developmental 

 

1 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory citations are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
5

problems, placed the family at high risk of abuse. DCFS recommended that the court 

detain the children from mother and place them with Samuel. 

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found DCFS had provided prima facie 

evidence that the children were persons described in section 300 and ordered them 

detained. The court ordered DCFS to provide mother reunification services, and 

scheduled a jurisdictional hearing. 

B. Jurisdiction and Disposition

1. Summary of Jurisdiction/Disposition Report and the jurisdiction hearing

On May 18, 2015, DCFS filed a “Jurisdiction/Disposition Report” stating that 

Jazmin and Alfonso had been placed with Samuel in mother’s home. Mother had agreed 

to leave the home, and was residing with the maternal grandmother. DCFS reported that

it had still not located father.

The jurisdiction report summarized additional interviews the agency had 

conducted with the family. Mother informed DCFS she had started dating father when 

she was 13 years old, and had remained in a relationship with him for 12 or 13 years. 

Mother was 16 years old when she gave birth to Samuel, and 22 years old when she gave 

birth to Jazmin. Mother said she ended her relationship with father because he was 

“always in prison.” Mother also stated father was in a gang named “Street Saints.” 

Mother reported that Alfonso had recently been diagnosed with autism, and that Jazmin 

had been placed in special education classes at her school. Mother expressed concern 

about Jazmin’s mental health, explaining that she hoped the child would receive 

treatment and services. 

DCFS reported that it had not interviewed father because he had made no effort to 

participate in the proceedings or visit his children. According to DCFS, its investigation 

revealed that father had an “extensive criminal history including felony convictions[] for 

possessing of a controlled substance, robbery, weapons and assault.” These convictions 

had resulted in “several prison sentences.” DCFS also reported father had “failed to 

reunify with two other children in a previous dependency case, [had] failed to provide for 
6

the basic need of his children, and [had] failed to maintain contact for at least 6 months.” 

DCFS concluded that although father was not “a named parent on the petition, it [would] 

certainly not be in the children’s best interest for [father] to have unlimited access to his 

children.” DCFS recommended that if father did choose to contact Jazmin or Alfonso, 

the court should only provide him enhancement services “until . . . he can address any 

and all issues that may place his children at risk of harm.” 

At the jurisdiction hearing, the court sustained the section 300 petition and ordered 

DCFS to provide reunification services for mother only. The court scheduled a 

disposition hearing for June 22, 2015. 

2. Summary of “Addendum/Disposition Report” and disposition hearing 

On June 22, 2015, DCFS provided an “Addendum/Disposition Report” updating 

the court on the agency’s “attempts to notice father.” The report included a “Declaration 

of Due Diligence” describing the agency’s efforts to contact father, all of which were

unsuccessful. According to DCFS, father remained “uninvolved, and disinterested in his 

children’s lives.” The agency requested that the court: (1) find due diligence as to father 

had been completed; (2) order the children “suitably placed”; (3) provide mother 

reunification services and monitored visitation; and (4) provide father enhancement 

services. 

Following a hearing, the court entered an order removing the children from the 

mother’s custody. The court also ordered DCFS to continue providing mother 

reunification services, but denied services to father based on his absence from the 

proceedings. (See § 361.5, subd. (b)(1) [“Reunification services need not be provided to 

a parent . . . when the court finds . . . That the whereabouts of the parent or guardian is 

unknown”].) The court scheduled a progress hearing for September 21, 2015, and a six 

month review hearing (see § 366.21, subd. (e)) for December 18, 2015. 
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C. Denial of Father’s Custody Request 

1. Father’s initial request for custody

On September 21, 2015, DCFS filed an “Interim Review Report” informing the 

court that father had contacted the agency and said he wanted to be “involved in visiting 

with the children and . . . reunify with [them].” The interim report included a summary 

of father’s prior dependency history. On October 27, 2011, the court had sustained a 

petition against father alleging he had failed to provide his then four- year-old daughter 

Sienna H. and his then two-year-old daughter Scarlett H. the “necessities of life, 

including food, clothing, shelter and medical treatment as father has been incarcerated on 

numerous occasion of which some have been drug related.” The 2011 petition further 

alleged that father’s “failure to provide” and “history of incarcera[tion]” placed the 

children at risk of harm. Although father was initially provided reunification services, his 

services were terminated in December of 2012, and the children were placed with their 

mother. 

At the progress report hearing, the court announced it intended to authorize 

reunification services for father. Father’s counsel, however, informed the court that 

father wanted immediate custody of the children. The court ordered DCFS to interview 

father and make a recommendation on the issue. The court scheduled a hearing for 

October 20, 2015. 

2. Court’s denial of father’s custody request

On October 20, 2015, DCFS provided a report summarizing its interview with 

father, who was then working full time and living with the paternal grandmother. Father

admitted he had a “past criminal history” that included convictions for “fire arms and 

conspiracy.” He denied, however, any prior convictions for substance abuse, which 

conflicted with the information in his CLETS report. In response to questions about his

2011 dependency case, father stated that he was “not present when the case got opened

and felt that he should not have had to fulfill [c]ourt requirements because it was not his 

fault.” Father stated that the juvenile court had ordered him to attend a parenting class,
8

which he had done, and to participate in a substance abuse program and drug testing. 

Father stated that although he had not complied with his case plan in the 2011 matter, he

did intend to comply with whatever requirements the court might impose as a condition 

of reunifying with Jazmin and Alfonso.

DCFS reported that father’s prior dependency case file indicated he had failed to 

comply with drug testing requirements, resulting in his termination from the drug 

program for “lack of compliance.” Father had also failed to demonstrate compliance with 

an order requiring individual counseling. DCFS confirmed that the children at issue in 

the 2011 petition had reunified with their mother, and that father’s reunification services 

were terminated. 

DCFS recommended that Jazmin and Alfonso remain placed with Samuel, and

that both parents continue to receive reunification services. DCFS also recommended 

that the court order father to comply with a substance abuse program with random drug 

testing. 

At the October 20th hearing, the court informed the parties that it intended to

provide father reunification services. Father’s counsel objected to reunification services, 

explaining that father wanted the children “released to his custody and to have family 

maintenance services in place.” Counsel argued that placement with father was

appropriate because he was a “non-offending” parent under the current petition, and

because no “new allegations had been brought against him.” Counsel contended that “the 

lack of new charges against father after a lengthy investigation by the Department” was 

“evidence” that he had resolved all of the issues that gave rise to his dependency case in 

2011.

Counsel for Alfonso and Jazmin opposed father’s custody request, arguing that 

returning the children to his care would be improper under section 361.2: “Your honor, 

[under] 361.2, even if the father is non-offending, . . . there is a detriment to returning the 

children to his care at this time. . . . This father has an unresolved case history. He had 

reunification services with two other children for . . . criminal activity and for drugs. He 

did not participate in the services. There [i]s no evidence that father has addressed or 
9

resolved the issue that brought those children into court. Further, father has not had 

contact with the children [in this case] for quite some time. I think it would be premature 

to release the children to him.”

DCFS also opposed father’s request, arguing that “pursuant to 361.2, the 

Legislature absolutely envisioned a scenario where a . . . non-offending parent can still 

pose a detriment to that child and that is this case.” Counsel for DCFS explained the 

agency “could accommodate . . . father and file a petition [against him, but] though[t] he 

would want reunification services. . . . I would ask the court to find a detriment under 

361.2.”

In response, the court explained that DCFS “certainly could have filed a petition 

and requested no [reunification services] specifically as to [father] because he does have 

a prior child who was removed and not returned. So the Department . . . was pretty 

generous in recommending that he be given an opportunity for reunification services. 

I’m going to deny father’s request. . . . I don’t think it’s appropriate.” The court was then 

asked to clarify whether its statements constituted a “find[ing] that there’s detriment. . . .” 

The court stated: “I have to make findings. [¶]. . . [¶] The court has considered the 

evidence , . . . [and] finds by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to section 361(c) 

that there is a substantial danger if the children were returned home to the physical health, 

safety, protection, physical or emotional well-being of the children. There are no 

reasonable means by which the children’s physical health can be protected without 

removing the children from father’s physical custody. The court orders the children are 

removed from father’s custody.” 

The court also ordered father “to participate in the following reunification services 

case plan . . . A DCFS court-approved program for drug and alcohol services, a full drug 

and alcohol program with aftercare, . . . random or on-demand drug and alcohol testing. 

Father shall also participate in individual counseling to address all case issues, including 

those contributing to father’s lengthy criminal lifestyle and unresolved substance abuse 

history, as well as father’s neglect to parent any of his children, including father’s family 

reunification services being terminated in 2011 for two older children.” 
10

DISCUSSION

Father appeals the court’s order denying him custody of Alfonso and Jazmin. 

Father contends we must reverse the juvenile court’s ruling because it erroneously 

assessed his custody request under section 361, subdivision (c), which is a removal 

statute applicable to custodial parents, rather than section 361.2, which governs a 

noncustodial parent’s request for custody of a child who has been removed from the 

custodial parent.

A. Summary of Relevant Statutes

“The dependency statutory framework distinguishes between a parent with whom 

the child was residing at the time the section 300 petition was initiated (custodial parent), 

and a parent with whom the child was not residing at the time the events or conditions 

arose that brought the child within the provisions of section 300 (noncustodial parent). 

(§§ 361, subd. (c), 361.2, subd. (a).)” (In re V.F. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 962, 969

(V.F.).) Section 361, subdivision (c) describes several circumstances under which a child 

may be removed from the physical custody of a custodial parent. Subdivision (c)(1) 

provides, in relevant part: “A dependent child may not be taken from the physical 

custody of his or her [custodial parent or parents] . . . unless the juvenile court finds clear 

and convincing evidence of any of the following circumstance . . . [¶] (1) There is or 

would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or 

emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no 

reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without 

removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s or guardian’s physical custody.”

Section 361.2, in contrast, governs the child’s placement following his or her 

removal from a custodial parent. Subdivision (a) of the statute requires the court to 

initially consider placement with a noncustodial parent: “When a court orders removal of 

a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of 

the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions 

arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume 
11

custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with 

the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the 

safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Section 361.2, 

subdivision (c) further requires the court to make “a finding either in writing or on the 

record of the basis for its determination under subdivisions (a).” Although the statute 

does not specify the burden of proof necessary to deny a noncustodial parent’s custody 

request, our courts have held that “[t]o comport with due process, the detriment finding 

[under section 361.2, subdivision (a)] must be made under the clear and convincing 

evidence standard.” (In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400; see also In re 

D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 292, 302 (D’Anthony D.) [“there [must be] clear 

and convincing evidence of detriment before placement with a noncustodial parent can be 

denied”].)

In sum, despite the similar standards set forth in section 361, subdivision (c)(1)

and section 361.2, subdivision (a), the statutes serve separate purposes and apply to 

different categories of parents. Section 361, subdivision (c) governs the removal from a 

custodial parent and “‘does not, by its terms, encompass the situation of the noncustodial 

parent.’” (V.F., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 969.) Section 361.2, subdivision (a), on the 

other hand, “is not a removal statute” (ibid.), but rather governs “placement [of a 

removed child] with a noncustodial parent.” (D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 303 [“section 361 applies to a custodial parent, while placement with a noncustodial 

parent is to be assessed under section 361.2”]; see also R.S. v. Superior Court (2008) 154 

Cal.App.4th 1262, 1270 [§ 361, subd. (c) “does not . . . encompass the situation of the 

noncustodial parent.’ [Citation.] . . . . Rather, section 361.2 governs the child’s . . . 

placement with the noncustodial parent”].) 

B. Although the Court Erred in Applying Section 361, Subdivision (c), the 

Error Was Harmless

DCFS does not dispute mother was a custodial parent of Jazmin and Alfonso, and 

that father was a noncustodial parent. Nor does it dispute that because father was a 
12

noncustodial parent seeking custody of children who had been ordered removed from 

their custodial parent, the court should have assessed his custody request under section 

361.2, subdivision (a), rather than under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). DCFS contends,

however, that the record demonstrates there is no reasonable probability the court would 

have reached a different result had it applied section 361.2, rendering the court’s error 

harmless. 

“Before any judgment can be reversed for ordinary error, it must appear that the 

error complained of ‘has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) 

Reversal is justified ‘only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, 

including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result 

more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the 

error.’ [Citations.] A reasonable probability for these purposes does not mean an 

absolute probability; the likelihood that the error affected the outcome need not be greater 

than the likelihood that it did not. [Citation.]” (In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 

1078-1079 (J.S.).) Our courts have previously held that this “harmless error” analysis is 

applicable to the specific type of error at issue in this case: improperly assessing a 

noncustodial parent’s custody request under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), rather than 

section 361.2, subdivision (a). (See D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 303; 

In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 463-464 [erroneous decision to apply 

section 361 rather than section 361.2 could not be “reverse[d] . . . unless . . . ‘“it [was]

reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been 

reached in the absence of the error”’”]; cf. J.S., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1079-1080

[juvenile court’s failure to make findings required under § 361.2, subd. (c) subject to 

harmless error analysis].) 

In D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th 202, the court found that a juvenile 

court’s misapplication of section 361 was harmless under circumstances analogous to 

those presented here. DCFS filed a section 300 petition alleging mother had physically

abused her two children, placing them at substantial risk of harm. The father, a 

noncustodial parent living in Mexico, requested that the children be released to his 
13

custody. During a subsequent DCFS interview, both children stated that father had 

previously struck his son with a belt. The son provided similar statements at the 

disposition hearing, testifying that father had recently struck him in the face and hit him 

with a belt. 

The juvenile court denied father’s custody request, stating that it had found “‘by 

clear and convincing evidence there exist[s] a substantial danger to the children’s 

health.’” (D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 297.) The court explained that 

after hearing the child’s testimony, it was “‘not comfortable releasing [the children] to 

[father] period.’” (Ibid.) Following the hearing, the juvenile court filed a minute order 

“reflecting its substantial danger findings pursuant to section 361. The court made no 

finding with respect to section 361.2.” (Ibid.) Father appealed the order, arguing “that 

the juvenile court erred by failing to consider his request for custody under section 

361.2.” (Id. at p. 298.)

The appellate court agreed that because father was a noncustodial parent, the 

juvenile court should have assessed father’s custody request under section 361.2, rather 

than section 361, subdivision (c)(1). The court further concluded, however, that the error 

was harmless “[i]n view of the juvenile court’s ‘substantial danger’ finding under section 

361, subdivision (c)(1), and the evidence supporting that finding with respect to father.” 

(D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 303.) In its analysis, the court noted the 

“similarity between” the “substantial danger” finding necessary to remove a child under 

section 361, subdivision (c), and the “detrimental” finding necessary to deny custody to a

noncustodial parent under section 361.2. (Ibid.) The court further explained that the 

record demonstrated the juvenile court had made an “unequivocal” finding against father

“under section 361” (id. at p. 304), and that the finding was supported by evidence he had 

physically abused his son. The court concluded that “in view of this evidence, and the 

court’s express finding under section 361, we cannot say it is ‘reasonably probable’ that 

the court would have made a different finding had it considered whether the placement 

would be detrimental to the children’s safety or physical well-being under section 361.2.” 

(Id. at p. 304.)
14

We agree with D’Anthony D.’s analysis, which applies equally here. As explained 

in D’Anthony D., the mandatory finding necessary to remove a child from a custodial 

parent under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) is very similar to the finding necessary to 

deny a noncustodial parent custody request under section 361.2, subdivision (a). Under 

section 361, subdivision (c)(1), the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing 

evidence that returning the child to the custodial parent would be a “substantial danger to 

the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.”

Under section 361.2, subdivision (a) the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing 

evidence that placing the child with the noncustodial parent “would be detrimental to the 

safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” To the extent the 

two standards differ, section 361, subdivision (c)(1)’s requirement of a “substantial 

danger” findings appears to impose a stricter standard than the finding of “detriment” 

required under section 361.2. 

In this particular case, as in D’Anthony D., the trial court made an express finding 

that placing the children with father would be a substantial danger to their “physical 

health, safety, protection, physical or emotional well-being.” The court’s decision was 

based on evidence in the record showing that: (1) father had previously failed to reunify 

with two other children who he had neglected; (2) father had an extensive criminal 

history that included firearms offenses, drug offenses, violent crimes, parole violations 

and several periods of incarceration; and (3) father had previously neglected Alfonso and

Jazmin, and had not seen them for approximately one year. 

In view of this evidence, and the court’s express finding against father under 

section 361, subdivision (c)(1), it is not “reasonably probable” the court would have 

made a different factual finding had it considered whether the placement would be 

detrimental to the children’s well-being under section 361.2.
15

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed. 

ZELON, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

BLUMENFELD, J.



 



Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.