[Cite as Chagrin Falls v. Calabrese, 2014-Ohio-5340.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 101197 

VILLAGE OF CHAGRIN FALLS

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs. 

NICOLE N. CALABRESE

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE 

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Bedford Municipal Court 

Case No. 13 TRC 01824 

BEFORE: McCormack, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and E.T. Gallagher, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 4, 2014 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Thomas M. Hanculak 

Mark V. Guidetti 

1360 Som Center Road 

Cleveland, OH 44124

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Joseph J. Triscaro 

Scott M. Kuboff 

Demarco & Triscaro, Ltd. 

3050 Bainbridge Rd. 

Suite 110 

Solon, OH 44139 
TIM McCORMACK, J.: 

{¶1} The village of Chagrin Falls appeals from a judgment of the Bedford Municipal 

Court that granted a motion to suppress in favor of defendant-appellee, Nicole M. Calabrese, in 

an OVI matter. Finding merit to the appeal, we reverse the trial court and remand the matter for 

further proceedings. 

Substantive Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} Around 11:00 p.m. on March 27, 2013 p.m., Chagrin Falls police department 

dispatch received a call from a citizen informant, Corrine Cathcart. Cathcart reported that she 

and her daughter just witnessed a hit-skip incident. A white female came out of the Wine Bar 

and got into a dark BMW SUV. The vehicle struck, “almost flattening,” a railing outside a 

store, “Haven Style House.” The driver left the scene without stopping. 

{¶3} The informant Cathcart was able to provide the BMW’s license plate number. 

Cathcart and her daughter also provided their names, current location, phone number, and 

address. Cathcart indicated in addition that she would be available for further contact with the 

police. 

{¶4} The dispatch immediately relayed the citizen informant’s report to Sgt. Jason 

Weiskopf and Officer Greg Ferrell. A check of the BMW’s license plate showed it was 

registered to Nicole Calabrese, a resident of Chagrin Falls. Within minutes, the two officers 

were at Calabrese’s residence, a half mile away from where the incident occurred. A dark blue 

BMW with the reported license plate number was parked in the driveway. Sgt. Weiskopf 

observed a large dent with brown paint transfer on the hood of the vehicle, which appeared to be 

fresh. The vehicle’s engine was still warm to the touch. 
{¶5} Officer Ferrell knocked on the side door of the residence while Sgt. Weiskopf 

knocked on the front door. Calabrese came to the side door. Officer Ferrell advised her that the 

police were investigating a reported hit-skip incident, and asked her to come outside for some 

questions. Calabrese appeared to be confused and unsteady on her feet. When she walked out 

of the house, she almost fell down the steps. She was initially holding a small dog when she 

answered the door. When she put the dog back into the house, she closed the door on the dog. 

 Officer Ferrell also observed that she was “speaking with a thick tongue and her speech was a 

little bit slurred.” Her eyes were red and glassy, and she had an obvious odor of an alcoholic 

beverage coming from her mouth. 

{¶6} Calabrese admitted she just returned from the Wine Bar ten minutes ago. Officer 

Ferrell pointed out to her the dent and the paint transfer on her vehicle’s hood. Calabrese said 

she did not know how or when the damage happened. When asked how much alcohol she had 

consumed at the bar, she first stated she did not remember, but then stated she had one glass of 

wine. 

{¶7} Because Calabrese showed signs of intoxication and admitted she had just 

returned home from the bar, Officer Ferrell suspected she had driven while intoxicated and 

proceeded to ask her to perform the field sobriety tests. The officer observed six clues on the 

HGN test, four clues on the walk-and-turn test, and two clues on the one-leg-stand test. 

Because she failed the tests, Officer Ferrell arrested her for OVI. 

{¶8} The village of Chagrin Falls subsequently cited Calabrese for OVI, leaving the 

scene of an accident, and failure to control. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence. The 

Bedford Municipal court held a hearing and granted the motion to suppress. Chagrin Falls now 

appeals. Its sole assignment of error states: “The trial court erred by granting Defendant’s 
motion to suppress evidence relating to Defendant’s intoxication on the grounds that the Village 

did not possess reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop of defendant.” 

Standard of Review

{¶9} An appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and 

fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. We accept 

the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. 

Preztak, 181 Ohio App.3d 106, 2009-Ohio-621, 907 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). Once we 

accept the factual findings as true, however, we must independently determine, as a matter of law 

and without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the trial court’s decision meets the 

applicable legal standard. State v. Lloyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95, 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). 

Analysis

{¶10} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits warrantless 

searches and seizures, rendering them per se unreasonable unless certain delineated exceptions 

apply. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). When a 

search and seizure matter involves the presence of police officers in a home, the courts require 

the existence of exigent circumstances. Absent certain enumerated exigent circumstances, a 

warrantless search or seizure effected in a home is per se unreasonable.1 State v. Freeman, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95608, 2011-Ohio-5651, ¶ 16, citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 

590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). 

 1

The courts in Ohio have identified several exceptions to the warrant requirement justifying a 

warrantless search of a home: (1) an emergency situation, (2) search incident to an arrest, (3) “hot 

pursuit” of a fleeing felon, and (4) easily destroyed or removed evidence. State v. Cheers, 79 Ohio 

App.3d 322, 325, 607 N.E.2d 115 (6th Dist.1992); State v. King, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80573, 

2003-Ohio-1143, ¶ 16. 
{¶11} In this case, however, the heightened protection for a home does not apply, because 

this case does not involve a warrantless forced entry into a home. The suspect here voluntarily 

came out of her residence to talk to the investigating officers. Therefore, we are not presented 

with an opportunity to analyze the propriety of a warrantless arrest in a home. In this case, the 

Fourth Amendment is not implicated until Calabrese was subjected to the field sobriety tests. 

{¶12} Both Chagrin Falls and Calabrese analogize the police’s action in this case to a 

“Terry stop,” an exception to Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 

1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Under this exception, a law enforcement officer may 

lawfully stop an individual if the officer possesses the requisite reasonable suspicion based on 

specific and articulable facts that the person is, was, or is about to be engaged in criminal 

activity. 

{¶13} It is unclear whether the unique circumstances of this case should be construed and 

analyzed as a Terry stop. Regardless of whether we couch the analysis in terms of a Terry stop, 

the same standard should apply: a police officer must have a reasonable suspicion based upon 

articulable facts that the suspect is intoxicated before the officer may administer field sobriety 

tests. Cleveland v. Harding, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98916, 2013-Ohio-2691, ¶ 6. Thus, the 

issue in this appeal is whether the facts in this case demonstrate that Officer Ferrell had a 

reasonable suspicion that Calabrese had operated a vehicle while intoxicated, to justify a brief 

detention of her for field sobriety testing. 

{¶14} Reasonable suspicion means something more than an inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or “hunch,” but something less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause. 

Terry at 21. To show a suspicion is reasonable, an officer must point to specific and 

articulable facts that, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant the intrusion. State v. Gustin, 87 Ohio App.3d 859, 860, 623 N.E.2d 244 (12th 

Dist.1993). Also, an objective and particularized suspicion that criminal activity was afoot 

must be based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565 

N.E.2d 1271 (1991). Under the totality-of-the circumstances analysis, a court should consider 

“‘both the content of the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’” State v. 

Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1997), quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 

325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). 

{¶15} This case involved a report from an identified citizen informant. Of the three 

classes of informants (the anonymous informant, an informant from the criminal world who has 

provided previous reliable tips, and identified citizen informant), the courts have always credited 

the identified citizen informant with greater reliability. Weisner at 300. 

{¶16} Here, the dispatcher related to the officers a citizen informant’s report that a BMW 

SUV with a certain license plate number hit a railing outside a store and left the scene. The 

license plate number led the officers to Calabrese’s residence, within minutes of the citizen 

informant’s call. The officers saw the reported BMW parked on the driveway. The vehicle 

had a large dent and fresh paint transfer on the front right side of its hood, corroborating the 

informant’s tip of the vehicle’s involvement in a hit-skip. 

{¶17} Continuing their investigation of the incident, the officers talked to Calabrese at her 

door. She admitted to have just returned from the Wine Bar; her eyes appeared glassy to the 

officers and her speech slurred; and she seemed unsteady on her feet. When the officers pointed 

out the large dent and the paint transfer on the hood of her vehicle, she stated she did not know 

how or when the damage occurred. Under these circumstances, the officers had a reasonable 

suspicion based on specific and articulable facts to make the brief detention of Calabrese to 
administer the field sobriety tests, to confirm — or dispel — the suspicion that Calabrese had 

driven under the influence. When the field sobriety tests indicated that she was intoxicated, the 

officers had probable cause to arrest her for OVI. 

Alleged Inconsistency in Information Supplied by Citizen Informant 

{¶18} Calabrese’s argument in support of her motion to suppress focuses on certain 

inconsistency in the information provided by the citizen informant. Calabrese points out that 

the informant described the vehicle as “backing into” the railing in her 911 call to the dispatcher, 

yet, the damage to the vehicle occurred on the front right portion of the hood. Calabrese claims 

that, because of the inconsistency, the officers could not possibly have a reasonable suspicion of 

a criminal activity justifying any further investigation, including the administration of the field 

sobriety tests. The trial court was persuaded by this argument and granted Calabrese’s motion 

to suppress on this ground. 

{¶19} Our review of the record, including the 911 tape, reflects that Cathcart stated to the 

dispatcher that the BMW backed into the rail. According to the incident report filed 

subsequently by Sgt. Weiskopf, who interviewed Cathcart within an hour of the incident, 

Cathcart stated that she saw the driver “get into the driver’s position of the BMW, back up, then 

pull forward, and strike the railing position of the ramp.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶20} The 911 tape also revealed that the dispatcher informed the officers that a witness 

saw the BMW striking a railing, without giving the officers any further detail. Sgt. Weiskopf 

testified consistently on direct examination. When asked by the defense counsel on 

cross-examination if the initial call that came into the police department referenced a vehicle 

backing into the railing, Sgt. Weiskopf answered “yes,” presumably based on his subsequent 

knowledge of the 911 call. 
{¶21} That information, however, does not change the fact that at the time the officers 

investigated the incident, they were only aware that the BMW struck a railing. Regardless of 

whether the vehicle moved forward or backward into the rail, the issue here is whether the 

officers had a reasonable suspicion that Calabrese drove the vehicle while intoxicated. 

{¶22} The existence of a reasonable suspicion must be evaluated by the facts and 

circumstances known to the officer at the time of the alleged improper search or seizure. Our 

review of the audiotape shows that the dispatcher related to the officers that a BMW struck a 

railing outside a store. The officers’ observation of a large dent and fresh paint transfer on the 

hood of the vehicle was consistent with that information. The officers reasonably decided to 

further investigate the incident. Subsequently, Calabrese’s admission that she was drinking 

earlier in the Wine Bar and had just returned from the bar, coupled with the officers’ observation 

of her slurred speech and glassy eyes, provided a reasonable suspicion justifying the field 

sobriety tests. 

{¶23} Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court improperly granted the motion 

to suppress the evidence. The assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶24} Judgment reversed and remanded. 

It is ordered that appellant recover of said appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Bedford Municipal 

Court to carry this judgment into execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

______________________________________________ 

TIM McCORMACK, JUDGE 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR