Be cause Scott, J asmine, and Scott’s mother L inda all share the Cowan surna me, we r efe r 1 to eac h by

his or her f

irst name. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 050 -CR

Ra ym an La r nc e Howa r d , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B URNET COUNTY , 33RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 3407 2 , HO NORAB LE DONALD H . LANE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap p el l an tR ay

m an L arn ce Ho wa rdwa s co n v i ct edb y a j u ry o f b u rgl ary o f ab u i l d i n g. Te x. Pe na l Co de Ann. § 3 0. 02 (a )( 1) (We st 20 03 ). The jur y se nte nc e d h im t o tw e nty y e ars ’
c on fi ne me nt i n th e ins tit

uti on a l divi sio n o f t

he Te xas D e pa

rtme nt o f C ri min a l Just ic e and fi ne d h im $1 0, 00 0. I n tw o is su e s o n a pp e a l, appe lla

nt c la ims that th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa c tua lly insufficient to sustain the jury ’s ver dict. We will affirm the judg ment of convic tion.

BACK GR OUND The jury hear d evidenc e that in the ea rly afte rnoon of Marc h 27, 2007, Scott Cowan, h is w if e Ja s mi ne, th eir inf

ant c hil d, and

the ir fr ie nd Ki rs tie To rr e z we re dr ivi ngto t he Cow ans ’ 1S c o t t ’ s m o t h e r , L i n d a C o w an , o w n e d

t h e t r a i l e r

t h a tw a s b u r g l ar i z e d
. In h i s t e s t i m o n y, 2 Scott refe rs to it as his. I t appea rs from the evidenc e that some of the proper ty stolen from the tra iler belong ed to Scott, and some belong ed to L inda. L inda testified t h at s h e h ad purc hased the ref rig erator from he r boss at the Qua lity I nn 3 wh e re sh e wo rk e d. Th e re fr ig e rator wa s a pp are ntl y ve ry dis tin c tiv e . I t w a s a

min i- re fr ig e rator

wi th a pla sti c fr on t on

it that ha d b e e n u se d at th e ho te l to ho ld a n in fo rm a tio n s he e t. Ac c or din g to a

pp e lla nt’ s w if e , th e do g , d e sc ri be d b y

Sc ott a s a “ br ow n w ie ne r d og ” wi th 4 one g rey ey e and one brown e y e, sustained only an abr asion above its ey e. 2 tr a ile r in the De e r Spr ing s are a of B ur ne t, T e xas. As they pulled into the C owans’ drivewa y , they 2
saw a white, late -model Chevrole t pickup coming from their tra iler. Scott testified that the drivew ay led only to their trailer. Torre z stated t hat “nobody ’s supposed to be down the re unle ss it’s a Cowan b e c a u s e th a t’ s th e ir p r o p e rty
. ” A t tr ia l, Sc o tt , Ja s mi n e , T o r r e z, an d Ja me s “ Ju n io r ” Smith, a neig hbor, ea ch desc ribed the truc k as havingan emblem of some sort on its side. All four witnesses identified the driver as the appellant. Scott, J asmine, and Smit h testified t hat t he refrig erator from the Cowans’ tra iler wa s in the back of the truck. Acc ording to the testimony of Scott, J asmine, and 3 Torre z, appellant stopped his truck, appr oache d them, and aske d wher e he c ould find someone
name d Joh n o r “ B ill y

Ta llt a le .” None of th e wi tne sse s te sti fi e d to kn ow ingsu c h a pe rs on . Sc ott fu rt he r t e sti fi e d th a t a

pp e lla nt then drove of

f t ow ard a de a d e nd . Sc ott

state d th a t he dr ov e to h is aunt’s house, which was located on the same r oad. When they arr ived, he told his mother, who wa s at the house, to c all the police. Scott stated that he then saw appe llant drive bac k past Scott’s aunt’s ho u se hea ding in the opposite dire ction from that which he had first g one. Scott, J asmine, and To rr ez re tur

ne d to the ir

ve hic le and

fo llo we d a

pp e lla nt i n o rd e r t o ta

ke no te of

his lic e ns e plate number. Scott testified that appellant “sped off” and that “his truck kind of je rked . . . a nd his dog fell out, and some of

our CDs and a

clock fell out, and he had to stop and g et his dog .” Scott noted 43

that a Play Station video game console and g ames for the Play Station also fell out. It is unclear f rom the testimony

of the other witnesses whether the items that c ame out of the truck we re thrown out
or fe ll o ut o f t

he do or, whi ch may

have be e n o pe ne d in te nti on a lly or may have fl ow n o pe n o n it s
ow n. Sc ott

te sti fi e d th a t th e ite ms that fe ll out of the tr uc k ( e xce pt f

or the do g ) b e lon g e d e ith e r t o him or his family . Scott stated that appellant stopped his ve h icle whe n the dog fell out, and he sto pp e d be hin d a

pp e lla nt. Smith, wh o wa s sta

nd ing ne arb y , te sti fi e d that he c a lle d th e do g ov e r t o him and the n h and e d th e do g ba c k to app e lla nt. Smit h s tate d th a t a

pp e lla nt p ut t he do g ba c k in

his truck and drove a

way . Scott testified that he had noted the license pla te number of

the truck w hen it w a s st op pe d, so he dis c on tin ued his purs uit

of a pp e lla nt a nd re tur ne d to his a

un t’ s h ou se to c a ll the police. Bur

net County

Sheriff’ s Offic e investig ator De n t o n Wil ls, J r., testified that he
rec eived a

call about the bur g lary

at 12:36 p.m. H e s ai d t h at wh i le re sponding to the c all, he observe d a white truc k matching the descr iption of the suspect’s vehicle. Wil ls init iated a tr aff ic stop at 1:31 p.m. at the R ed Top Ba it Shop, which is located just west of Bur net. Will s testified that he ide nti fi e d h ims e lf

to t he dr ive r, Samanth a

Wal la c e , a

pp e lla nt’ s c omm on -l aw wi fe ; a

pp e lla nt w a s in the passeng er se at of the ve hicle. Wills testified that he notice d that the appe llan t m at ch ed the descr iption he had been g iven of the burg lary suspect. When Will s questioned appe llant, he denied any knowledg e of the repor

ted burg lary . Wil ls further tes t i fied that the r efr ige rator that had bee n repor ted stolen was not in t he bed of appellant’s truck and that he did not sear ch the c ab of the truck for a ny smaller prope rty . Wallace testified that appellant went with othe r law enfor ceme nt office rs4

while she a

nd Wil ls we n t t o h er residenc e whe re, w ith her conse nt, office rs per formed a sear ch. Wil ls testified that they

found nothing related to criminal ac tivity at Wallace’ s residenc e. B ur ne t Co un ty

She ri ff ’s Of fi c e de pu ty

Ste ve n Savo y

te st if ied that he re sp on de d to the burg lary

call as w ell. Savoy

testified that he me t Scott, J asmine, Torr ez, and L inda at Scott’s aunt’s house. Savoy

stated that he individually interviewe d the witnesses a nd obtained a de scription of the suspec t and his vehicle. Savoy testified that he obtaine d an inventory of what had be en stolen. Savoy did not take any

fing erpr ints, nor did he find any phy sical evide nce that there ha d been f orce d entry into the trailer. Howev er, the inside of the trailer appea red to have bee n ransa cked. Savoy state d that he wa s un a

ble to de te rm ine ho w re c e nt the ra ns a c kin g ha d be e n. Sc ott

te sti fi e d th a t so me te le vis ion s h a d n ot b e e n ta ke n b y the burg lar, bu t no te d th a t th e the se ite ms w e re pr omi ne nt ly eng rave d with the Cowans’ names.

Wal la c e te sti fi e d that app e lla nt le ft the ho us e that mor

nin g to me e t th e ir

fr ie nd B ill y in Deer Springs. She stated that appellant was only g one for ten to f ifteen minutes. She also testified that when a

ppellant re turned, he told her the doghad fallen out of the truck and that she noticed the dog had an a

brasion above its ey e.

STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW I n a leg al-suff

iciency revie w , a c o u r t must ask whether “ anyratio na l tr ie r o f f a c t c ou ld have f ound the essential elements of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt”—not whether “ it believes that th e ev i d en ce at the trial established guilt bey ond a re asonable doubt.” Las te r v . S tate , No. PD-1276-07, 2009 Te x . Crim. App. L EXI S 5, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. J an. 14, 2009) (citing5

J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)) (empha sis in orig inal). “This standar d acc ounts for the fa ctfinder ’s duty

‘to resolve conflicts in th e testimony , to weig h the evidenc e, and to dr aw
rea sonable infe renc es fr om basic fa cts to ultim ate f acts.’” Clayton v . S

t ate , 235 S.W .3d 772, 778 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Jack son , 443 U.S. at 319). I t is not ne cessa ry that ever

y fac t point direc tly and independe ntly to the defe ndant’s g uilt, but it is enoug h if the conclusion i s war rante d by the combined a

nd cumulative for ce of

all the incriminating circ umstances. Ho op e r v . State , 214 S.W .3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

I n a fa c tua l- su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, we c on sid e r wh e the r, a ft e r vie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in a neutr al light, a rational trier of fac t w as justified in finding g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt. See W ats on v . S tate , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We “must be cog nizant of the fac t that a jury has alre ady

passed on the fac ts a

nd must give due defe renc e to the dete rminations of the jury .” Lan c on v . S

tate , 253 S.W .3d 699, 704–05 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “A verdic t should be set aside only if the evide nce suppor

ting the ve rdict is so weak as to r ender the verdic t c lear ly wrongor manifestly

unjust.” Id . at 70 5; Kor e ll v . S tate , 253 S.W .3d 405, 412 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. re f’d) . There fore , we will not reve rse a judgme nt on a factual suff iciency challeng e unless we
can sa y , with some objective ba sis in the recor d, that the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e contr adicts the ve rdict. W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 417. A fa ctual suff

iciency revie w i s “b ar el y

distinguishable” from a le g al suffic iency revie w. Ma rsh all

v . S tate , 210 S.W .3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), cert. de nied , 128 S.Ct . 87 (2007). How ever , a cour t must begin its fac tual sufficie ncy revie w with t h e as s u m p t i o n that the evidenc e is leg ally

sufficie nt under Jack

son . See Laster , 2009 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 5, at *8.6

De te rm ini ngthe le g a l and fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y of e vid e nc e re qu ir e s th e imp le me ntatio n o f s e pa rate and distinct standards. Id
. at * 1 0 (c i t i n g J oh ns on v . S

tate , 23 S.W .3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). Courts a nd litigants should not combine their le g al and f actua l sufficienc y

analy ses. Id . Whil e any
ana ly se s o f t

he fa c ts i n a

g ive n c a se wi ll n a tur a lly ov erl ap, a se pa rate re vie w und e r t

he a pp lic a ble standard is nece ssary

to ensure that the law wa s proper ly applied. Id . at *1 0- 11 . T he re fo re , w e wi ll examine appellant’s c laim of leg al i nsufficie ncy befor e, and se parate from, his cla im of fac tual i n s u f f i c i e n c y.
DI SCU SSIO N Legal sufficiency

Ap pe lla nt c omp la ins that th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tr ia l w a s le g a lly insuf fi c ie nt t o
su sta in a g uil ty ve rd ic t. A per son commits the offe n s e o f b urg lary if, without the eff

ective c onsent of the
ow ne r, the pe rs on

e nte rs a bu ild ingno t th e n o pe n to the pu bli c wi th t

he in ten t to commit the ft
. Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 30.02(a) (1) ( W es t 2 0 0 3). Guilt of burg lary can be established circ umstantially

by the combined and cumulative forc e of all the incriminating circ umstances, but proof of g uilt by

acc ompanying c ircumstance s is subject to the same rig orous standar d require d of direc t evidence , proof be y ond a re asonable doubt. M e d ra no v . Stat e , 658 S.W .2d 787, 790 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 83 , p e t. r e f’ d) . Jur ie s a re pe rm itt e d to make reas on able infere nces f

rom the evide nce pr esente d at trial, and c ircumstantial evidenc e is as probative as direc t evidenc e in establishing the g uilt of an ac tor. Hooper , 214 S.W .3d at 12. Circumstantial evidenc e alone c an be suf

ficient to establish g uilt. Id
. W h e r e th e r e i s i n d e p e n d e n te v i d e n c e o f a b u r g l ar y,7

un e xpla ine d p os se ssi on

of the re c e ntl y

sto le n g oo ds may

c on sti tut e su ff

icien t evi den c e of

g uil t to support a convic tion. Ha rri s v . S tate , 6 56 S.W. 2d

48 1, 48 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 83 ); Di x on v . S tate , 43 S.W. 3d

54 8, 55 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 01 , n o p e t.) ; Ro ge rs v . S tate , 929 S.W .2d 103, 108 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 1996, no pet.). Rec ent, unexplained possession of st olen goods may g ive
r i s e t o ani n f

e r e n c e o f g u i l tan d m ay b e s u f f i c i e n tt o s u

p p o rta c o n v i c t i o nf

o r t h e f to r b u r g l ar y, dependingon circ umst an ce s s u ch as how c lose in time to the theft the def endant possesse d the g oods. Ha rd

esty v . S tate , 656 S.W .2d 73, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Whil e presence at the sce ne
o f th e o f f e n s e , w it h o u t m o r e , is in s u f

f ic ie n t t o s u

p p o rt a b u r g la r y c o n v ic ti o n , it

is a c ir c u ms ta nce tending to connec t one with t he cr ime and, take n in conjunction with other fa cts, may be suff icient to show g uilt. T

ho mps on v. Stat e , 563 S.W .2d 247, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Flig ht is also a circ umstance indicating guilt. Ha rd esty , 6 56 S.W. 2d

a t 78 ; Thompson , 563 S.W .2d at 250. I n Ha rri s , t h e co m p l ainant discove red he r purse had bee n stolen from a f riend’s unlocked va

n while the two we re br iefly inside the friend’ s office building. 656 S.W.2d at 482. The
co m p l ainant’s friend instructed he r to lock her self inside the off ice building and wa it while he
sear ched the are a. Id . The fr iend found the complainant’s makeup case i n an alley and som e of the contents of her purse in a trash dumpster. Id
. A wit ness s hortly there afte r saw the def endant e nter th e k it c h e n o f th e r e s ta

u r an t w h e r e he worked. Id . T he ow ne r o f t he re sta ur ant a rr ive d s ho rt ly there afte r and sa

w the man c oming out of the “deliver y room” (stoc k room). Id
. Ul timately , the complainant’s pur se wa s found inside the re staurant’ s g rea se bar rel, a nd the def

endant wa s later found standing next t o a ca r conta ining tools stolen from the complainant’s friend’s van. Id . at 483. He wa s also found in possession of the exact amount of c as h stolen from the re staurant owne r’sFur thermore , g iven the use of the hig hly

unlikely n am e “B illy

Talltale,” and the 5 inconsistency of asking for one person first and another soon there afte r, the j u ry co u l d h ave conclude d that “B illy

Talltale” was a

fictitious person and that a ppellant was lying a

bout his reason for be ing in the a

rea . 8 office
. Id
. The c ourt found the e vidence sufficie nt to sustain the defenda nt’s conviction for bur g lary of a building and burg lary of a ve hicle. Id
. I n R o g e rs , witnesses testified that they saw the de fenda

nt with items t hat had be en
re po rt e d s tol e n b y

the c omp la ina

nt. 92 9 S. W.2 d a t 10 5- 06
. Th e de fe nd ant w a s se e n b y a wi tne ss outside of the complaina

nt’s house. Id . at 105
. Th e de fe nd ant la te r j ump e d o ut o f a mov ingve hic le and fle d from investig ating police off icer s. Id
. at 106. No fing erpr ints or footprints wer e take n by the police. Id
. The stol en property was never recove red. Id
. Th e c ourt fo un d th e e vid e nc e le g a lly sufficie nt to sustain the conviction. Id . at 108.

I n the instant case , Scott, J asmine, Torr ez, and Smit h t es t ified that they saw the appellant in possession of the Cowa ns’ prope rty . Most notable among the i tems appellant ha d was a distinctive mini-refr ige rator. H e wa s found in possession of the proper ty while coming from the direc tion of the Cowans’ tra iler. Torr ez stated that “nobody ’s supposed to be down ther e unless it’s a Cowan beca

use t hat’s their property .” Scott stated that the drive way appellant wa s coming out of when he first saw him leads only to his trailer. A j ury

could have rea sonably

conclude d that appellant wa s coming from the Cowa ns’ trailer . Moreove r, based on witnesses’ testimony that
a pp e lla nt e xpla ine d th a t he wa s lo ok ingfo r a “ John ” or a “ B ill y Ta llt a le ,” the jur y c ou ld r e a so na

bly have de termined that a

ppellant fa iled to provide a r easona ble explanation for his p re s en ce i n the vicinity of the Cowans’ proper

ty , which the testimony

depicts as a

somewhat re mote are a. 59 Scott further te stified that appellant “sped off” as he f ollowed him while attempting to note hi s license plate number. Flig ht is a circ umstance indicating guilt. Ha rd esty , 656 S.W .2d
a t 78 ; Thompson , 5 6 3 S
. W
. 2 d at 2 5 0
. A j u ry co u l d re as o n ab l y co n cl u d e t h at ap p el l an twa s fl ee i n g, having been c aug ht leaving the sce ne of a burg lary . Wallace’ s t es t i m ony corr oborate d the other witnesses’ testimony

th at ap p ellant’s dogfell out of his truck while he sped aw ay from the C o w an s ’ p r o p e rty.

Appellant ar g ues that bec au s e the house had not bee n visited for some time bef ore th e b u r g la

r y , th e e v id e n c e w a s le g a ll y in s u f f ic ie n t to s h o w th a t h e b u r g la r iz e d th e h o u s e. We dis a g re e . A jur

y c ou ld have re a so na

bly c on c lud e d that a

pp e lla nt w a s le a vin g the Cow ans ’ t ra ile r i n possession of their prope rty beca use he ha d rec ently

burg larized the trailer . Appellant further argues that beca use he w as l ater found not in possession of any of the items that wer e re ported stolen, the
e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly

ins uf fi c ie nt. Witn e sse s te sti fi e d to the c on tr ary . Ap pe lla nt wa s se e n b y

Sc ott , J asmine, Torr ez and Smith i n possession of the Cowans’ pr operty . A def endant ne ed not be f

ound in possession of stolen property by law enf orce m en t o ff

i ce rs. Se e Ro ge rs , 929 S.W .2d at 105-07 (def endant wa s seen in possession o f s t olen camera and jewe lry

by two non-law e nforc ement witnesses, and the stolen proper ty was ne ver r ecove red) . A jury could have rea sonably

conclude d that a p p e ll an t b u r g la

r iz e d th e h o u s e an d d is p o s e d o f th e p r o p e rty in th e a p p r o xim a te ly o n e hour b e tw e e nth e ti me th e b u r g la r y w a s r e p o rte d

an d th e ti me h e w a s d e ta in e d b y la w e n f o r c e me n t. We hold that give n the combined a nd cumulative for ce of al l the incriminating circ umstances, a
re a so na ble tr ier of fact c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt. We therefor e over rule a ppellant’s first point of er ror.10

Factual su

fficie ncy Ap pe lla nt c omp la ins that th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tr ia l w a s f a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o
su sta in a g uil ty ve rd ic t. The hear t of appellant’ s argument is that be cause no direc t e vidence es t ab l ished appellant’ s entry of the trailer, the evidenc e is f actua lly insufficient to sustain his conviction. The law of this s tate is to the contra ry . Where ther e is independe nt evidence of a bur g lary , unexplained po sse ssi on

of the re c e ntl y

sto le n g oo ds may

c on sti tut e su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nce o f g uil t to su pp or t a conviction. Ha rri

s , 6 56 S.W. 2d

a t 48 3; Ro ge rs , 929 S.W .2d at 108. J uries are permitted to make
rea sonable infe renc es fr om the evidenc e pre sented at trial, and circ umstan tial evidence is as p ro b ati ve as dire ct evidenc e in establishing the g uilt of an ac tor. Hooper , 2 1 4 S. W. 3 d at 12. Circumstantial evidenc e alone can be s ufficie nt to establish g uilt. Id . I t was a r easona ble infer ence for the jur y to find that appellant ha d enter ed the Cowans’ trailer, despite the absenc e of fore nsic or
e y e wi tne s s e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h i n g e n t r

y . T h i s i n f

e r e n c e i s s u

p p o rt e d b y t e s t i m o n y

f r o m m u l t i ple wi tne sse s th a t a

pp e lla nt w a s in po sse ssi on

of the Cow ans ’ pr op e rt

y wh ile pu lli ngou t of

the Cow ans ’ drivewa y . The jury

was in the be st positi on to evaluate the cre dibilit y of the witnesses, and we g ive due def ere nce to its finding s of fact. We find no objective ba sis in the recor d that would allow us to say that the g reat w ei gh t and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e contr adicts the ve rdict or that the verdic t is clearly

wrongor manife stly

unjust. Viewing the evid en ce in a neutra l light, but being cog nizant that a jury

has alre ady

passed on the fac ts and g iving the jur y ’s deter minations due d e f e r e n c e , w e h o ld

th a t t h e e v id e n c e w a s f

a c tu a ll y s u f

f ic ie n t to s u s ta in th e ju

r y ’ s g u il ty v e r d ic t. We there fore overr

ule appe llant’s second point of e rror .11 CO NC LU SION Th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly

and fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o s us ta in t

he jur y ’s g uil ty ve rd ic t. We affir m the judgme nt of conviction.

J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Apr il 10, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh