1

07 -52 49 -cv Arrowood Indem. Co. v. King 1 2 UNITED STATE S COURT OF APP EALS 3 FO R T HE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 4 5 August Term, 2008 6 7 8 (Argued: May 22, 2009) (Questions Cert ified: May 18, 2010) 9 10 Docket No. 07-5249- cv(L) 11 12

_____________________________________ 13 14 ARROW OOD INDE MNITY CO., 15 16 Plain tif f-C ou nte r-D efe nd

an t-C ro ss- De fen da nt- Ap pe lle e , 17 18 v. 19 20 PENDLET ON KING, D APHNE KING, and PENDLE TON KINGJR., 21 22 De fen da nts -C

ou nte rcl aim an ts- Th ird

-Par ty-Plain tif

fs- Ap pe lla nts, 23 24 CONOR McENTEE, 25 26 Defendant , 27 28 NATIONA L SURETYCORPO RATION, 29 30 Third-Party- Defendant-Appell ee, 31 32 NEW ENGLAN D BROKERAGE C ORPOR ATION, 33 34 Th ird -Par ty-De fen da nt- Cros s-C

lai ma nt- Ap pe lle e. 35

_____________________________________ 36

_____________________________________ 37Th e H on ora ble Er ic N . V ita liano , D istric t Ju dg e, Un ite d S tat es D istric t C ourt f or t he Ea ste rn 1 Districtof New York, sitting by designat ion

. 2 1 Before: KEARSE, L IVINGSTON, Ci rcu it J ud ges , VITALIANO, Di

str ict Ju dge. 1 2 3

_____________________________________ 4 5 Appeal from a judgm ent of the United Stat es Distri ct Court for the Dist rict of 6 Connecticut ( Stefan R. Underhill, Judge ), g rantin g s um m ary jud gm ent in

favo r of ins uranc e 7 co m

panie s whic h, ba sed

on the loc ati on

of the oc curre nc e, am on g o the r re aso ns , h ad dis cla im ed 8 any duty to defend or inde mnif y their pol icyholders in an acti on brought by a thi rd party ar ising 9 from

an accidentinvolving the policyholder s’ all- terrai n vehicle. 10 Questions cer tified. 11 12

_____________________________________ 13 14 R AL P H W. J OHNS ON III, Hall oran & Sage LLP (Daniel P. 15 Scapellat i, Coleman C. Duncan III, on the brief), Hart ford, 16 Conn., for Plain tif f-C ou nte r-D efe nd

an t-C ro ss- De fen da nt17 Ap pe lle e . 18 19 J A M ES T. H ARGR OVE , Goulston & Storr s (Peter F. Durni ng, 20 on the bri ef ), B os ton , M ass . (F red eri ck P. Ri ck les , G ilb rid e, 21 Tusa, Last & Spell ane LLC, Greenwich, Conn., on the 22 brief), for De fen da nts -C

ou nte rcl aim an ts- Th ird

-Par ty23 Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts

. 24 25 R OBERT G. O LI VER , M ulv ey , O liv er, Go uld & C rotta 26 (James D. Hine II, on the brie f), New Haven, Conn., for 27 Th ird -Par ty-De fen da nt- Ap pe lle e . 28 29 C HRI ST OPHER B. W EL DON , Keidel, Weldon & 30 Cunn ing ham , L LP , (R ob ert J. Gr an de , o n th e b rie f) , 31 W ilton, Conn., for Th ird -Par ty-De fen da nt- Cros s-C

lai ma nt32 Ap pe lle e . 33 34 _____________________________________ 353 1 V I TA LI ANO , District Judge : 2 De fe nd ants P en dle ton Ki ng , D ap hn e K ingan d P en dle ton Ki ng Jr. (“Jun ior ”) 3 (co lle cti ve ly, the “K ing s”) ap pe al f rom a d ecl arator

y ju dg m ent of

the Un ite d S tat es D istric t 4 Court for the Distr ict of Connecticut(Stefan R. Underhill, Judge ) ho ldi ng in f av or o f i ns ure rs 5 that none of the thr ee separat e residenc e-rela ted liabi lity ins urance poli cies owned by the Kings 6 covered thei r allege d liabil ity to a t hird part y child who was seri ously injur ed in an acci dent 7 inv olv ing anall -te rra in v eh icl e th e K ing s o wn ed (th e “A TV ”). Ce ntr al t o th e d ist ric t co urt ’s 8 de ter

m inatio n w as a

fi nd ingthat th e ac cid ent ha d n ot o ccu rre d at an “in sured loc ati on ”, as 9 defined by the polic ies. 10 W e conclude tha t this ca se requir es us to res olve significa nt questions concerning t he 11 appropriat e construct ion of the releva nt policy l anguage, involvi ng interpr etation of Connecti cut 12 insurance l aw and implicating public policy consi derations for Connecticut. For t hese reasons 13 and those thatfollow, we certify, pursuantto Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199b (2005) and 2d Cir. R. 14 27 .2 , s ev era l qu est ion s to the Su pre m e C ourt o f C onne cti cut. 15 BACKGROUND 16 Th e m ate ria l f act s ar e und isp ute d. Th e K ing s’ h om e, loc ate d in De er P ark , a

pri vate 17 res ide nti al d ev elo pm ent in Gr eenwi ch , C onne cti cut, t hat is m an ag ed

byaninc orp orated 18 ho m eo wn ers ass oc iat ion , s its at t he so uth eas ter

n c orn er o f t

he int ers ect ion

of De er P ark

Co urt 19 and Midwood Road, both privat e roads withi n the Deer Park boundar ies. On May 5, 2002, 20 Junio r an d a

ne igh bo r, C on or M cE nte e (“ Co no r”) , b oth the n 1 4 y ear s o ld, we re p lay ingoutdo ors 21 wi th an A TVowne d b y Jun ior ’s p are nts . Jun ior wa s d riv ingthe ve hic le whil e to wi ng Co no r,On March 31, 2008, we granted pl aintiffs-appell ees’ motion to amend the caption to r eflect the 2 substitut ion of Arrowood Indemnity Co. for RIC and RICA . For purposes of clar ity and consistenc y with the dist rict cour t record, t his opinion wil l reference onl y the names of the pre de ces so r entit ies

.

4 1 wh o w as s tan din g o n a sk ate bo ard

an d h old inga ro pe tie d to the ba ck of the AT V. Co no r w as 2 no t w ear inga h elm et. As the tee na ge rs trav ele d a lon g M idw oo d R oa d, be tw een De er P ark

Co urt 3 an d a

de ad en d, Co no r f

ell an d s tru ck

the pavem ent, whic h c au sed him to s us tai n a

life4 threate ning head tra uma. The accident occurred i n front of 63 Midwood Road, approximately 50 5 to 75 feet north of the i ntersect ion where the Kings r esided. 6 Th e In suran ce P oli cie s 7 Over a year afterthe ATV accident, the Kings receive d a lette r dated August 5, 2003, 8 from

an attorne y for Conor and his parent s (the “Mc Entees”) r egarding Conor’s injurie s. Long 9 before the acci dent’s happeni ng, through thei r insuranc e broker, New England Brokera ge 10 Corporation ( “NEBC”), the Kings had purchased t hree liability pol icies t hat were in effect atthe 11 tim e o f t

he acc ide nt: (1) a h om eo wn er’ s p oli cyiss ue d b y R oy al I nd em nit y C om pany(“RIC ”) 12 wi th a

$5 00 ,0 00 pe r oc curre nc e co ve rag e li m it; (2) anum bre lla po lic y is su ed

byRo ya l In suran ce 13 Co m

panyof Am eri ca ( “R IC A” ) w itha p er o ccu rre nc e li m it o f $ 5 m ill ion ; an d (3 ) an ex ces s 14 liabil ity polic y issued by Nationa l Surety Corpora tion (“Nati onal”), ins uring up to $5 million 15 m ore pe r oc curre nc e. Sh ort ly a ft er r ece ivi ng it, the Ki ng s f orw ard ed the let ter fr om the lawye r 2 16 fo r th e Mc Entee s to NE BC . N EB C, in t urn , n oti fi ed

RI C and RI CA(co lle cti ve ly, “R oy al” ), a s 17 well as Nationa l, of the May 5, 2002, ATV accident. 18 After conducting an i nvestigat ion, which include d intervi ewing Pendleton King and5 1 Junior, revi ewing the polic e report a nd examining the scene of the acci dent, Royal advise d the 2 Ki ng s in

wr iti ng , o n N ov em

be r 24 , 2 00 3, that ne ith er t he ho m eo wn er’ s p oli cyno r th e um bre lla 3 policy provi ded coverage for Conor’s claimed injuries . A few weeks later, on December 17, 4 2003, Royal filed a decla ratory j udgment action in the Unite d States Dist rict Courtfor the 5 Districtof Connecticut seeki ng an order tha t neitherRIC nor RICA had a duty to defend or 6 ind em

nif y th e K ing s w ithres pe ct t o th is a cci de nt. On Ap ril 27 , 2 00 4, the McE nte es f ile d th eir 7 by -th enan tic ipated tor t co m pla int in C onne cti cut S up eri or C ourt, nam ingall thr ee King s as 8 de fe nd an ts. 9 1. Th e H

om eo wn er’

s P oli cy 10 At issue is a provision of the King’ s homeowner’s policy which covers any person using 11 a re cre ati on al v eh icl e “o wn ed byanIns ure d and

on anIns ure d [ L] oc ati on .” Th e p oli cyde fi ne d 12 an“In sured

Lo cat ion ” to inc lud e: “ [t ]h e re sid en ce p rem ise s”; “[ t] he part o f o the r pr em ise s, oth er 13 structur es and grounds used by you [the pol icyholders ] as a residence and: (1) [w]hich is shown 14 on

yo ur D ecl aratio ns ; or

(2) [w ]h ich

is a cq uir ed byyo u d uri ng the po lic y p eri od

fo r yo ur u se a s a 15 residence ”; and finally, “ any premises used by you in connect ion with” eit her of the foregoing. 16 Th e d ecl aratio ns pa ge of the po lic y li ste d “ 1 D eer Park C t[ .] ” as the “re sid en ce p rem ise s. ” 17 Th e h om eo wn er’ s p oli cyge ne ral ly e xc lud ed co ve rag e f

or i nju rie s ar isi ng out of

any u se 18 ass oc iat ed

wi th a m oto riz ed

lan d c onve yanc e v eh icl e an d, sp eci fi cal ly, fo r any v icario us lia bil ity 19 ari sin g o ut o f t

he act ion s o f a

m ino r in co nn ect ion

wi th t he us e o f s uc h a

co nv ey an ce, ev enif 20 statut ori ly i m

po sed . E lse wh ere , h ow ev er, the po lic y p rov ide d th at this ge ne ral ex clu sio n d idAs no ted bythe dis tri ct c ourt, the re are m ult ipl e v ers ion s o f t

he RI CApo lic y and

the parti es 3 dis pute whic h s pe cif

ic v ers ion wa s in ef fe ct o n th e d ate of

the acc ide nt. Th e d if

fe ren ces be tw een the two are i mm ateria l for present purposes as the di strictcourt’s r ationale for finding no co ve rag e ap pli es r eg ard les s – bo th v ers ion s re qu ire the Ki ng s to lis t re cre ati on al m oto r ve hic les on the declar ations page for cove rage to appl y, and neitherone in fact lis ts the subj ect ATV.

6 1 “n ot a

pp ly t o . . . [a ] m oto riz ed

lan d c onve yanc e d esi gn ed fo r re cre ati on al u se o ff

pu bli c ro ad s, 2 no t su

bje ct t o m oto r ve hic le r eg istrat ion an d .

. . [o ]wne d b y an In su red an d o n an In sured 3 loc ati on .” 4 As for claim notification, the pol icy stat ed, in rele vant part, t hat “[i]n case of an accident 5 or an o ccu

rre nc e, the Ins ure d w ill

. . . [ g] ive wr itt enno tic e to us or o ur a ge nt a s so on as 6 pra cti cal .” 7 2. Th e U

mb rel la Poli cy 8 In g en era l, t he ve rsi on

of the um bre lla po lic y th at w as i n e ff

ect on May 5, 20 02 , p rov ide d 9 the Ki ng s co ve rag e f or p ers on al i nju

rie s re su lti ng fr om

the us e o f “ [r ]e cre ati on al m oto r ve hic les ” 10 they owned, includi ng when the vehicle was operated by Juni or. The policy ca tch here, t hough, 11 was that the c overage was not oper ative unle ss the rec reationa l motor vehicle was cover ed by 12 primary insurance ( the homeowner’s policy) and was “ described a s being covere d in the 13 de clarat ion s. ” T he AT V b ein g o pe rat ed byJunio r whe n C on or w as i nju red wa s n ot d esc rib ed

in 14 the um

bre lla po lic y’s de clarat ion s. Li ke the ho m eo wn er’ s p oli cy , th e um bre lla po lic y re qu ire d 3 15 the ins ure d to pro vid e n oti ce o f an a cci de nt o r oc curre nc e “a s so on as i s p rac tic al. ” 16 3. Th e E

xce ss L iab ili ty P oli cy 17 Lastly, a $5 million exce ss liabi lity poli cy issued by Nati onal “followed form” to theOn

Jan uary 1 9, 20 06 , c ouns el f

or R oy al a dv ise d th e K ing s th at R oy al w ou ld p rov ide a d ef en se 4 to the Kings in t he underlying s tate cour t action pur suant to a full r eservati on of rights. The Kings initi ally rej ected the t ender of defense coverage, t aking issue wit h Royal’s rese rvation of rights and t iming, but ultimately accepte d it to avoi d any risk of waiver orestoppel of covera ge claims. The posture of the appeal is unaffected by this de velopment.

7 1 RICA um

brella pol icy. As is typi cal, the exc ess policy r equired the Kings to listin the 2 de clarat ion s th e und erl yin g in suran ce, that is , th e p oli cie s o f i ns uranc e th at w ou ld b e in iti all y 3 tap pe d to pay a

co ve red los s, an d th enpro vid ed

fo r th e k ick -in

of the ex ces s co ve rag e, but on ly i f 4 the underlyi ng insurers did not succes sfully discla im coverage and their pa yments exhausted the 5 fu ll am ounts of

the ir r esp ect ive co ve rag e. If the se c on dit ion s w ere sat isf ied , N ati on al w as t o p ay 6 on the ex ces s lo ss, up to t

he po lic y li m it o f $ 5 m ill ion . O n th e sc he du le o f u nd erl yin g in suran ce, 7 the Ki ng s li ste d th e R IC A um bre lla po lic y, but di d n ot l ist

the ir RIC ho m eo wn er’ s in suran ce 8 policy. 9 Pr oc eed ing s in

the Di str ict

Co urt 10 In the decl aratory a ction, Royal soughtto discla im any duty to defend or indemnify the 11 Ki ng s f

or c lai m s ar isi ng fr om

the AT V a cci de nt u

nd er b oth the ho m eo wn er’ s an d um bre lla 12 po lic ies

. Su

bs tantiv ely , R oy al a sse rte d th at the ho m eo wn er’ s p oli cydid no t ap ply

be cau se 4 13 Conor’s injur ies were not s ustained on an “ insured loc ation” and t hat the umbrella poli cy did not 14 ap ply

be cau se t he AT V w as n ot l ist ed

in t he po lic y d ecl aratio ns ; pr oc ed ura lly , it ass ert ed that 15 co ve rag e und er b oth wa s f ore clo sed , in

any e ve nt, be cau se t

he Ki ng s h ad

fa ile d to co m

ply wi th 16 the ins ure d’s duty t o p rov ide no tic e o f t he acc ide nt t o th e in surer “as so on as p rac tic al. ” In 17 answer, the Kings ar gued that the accident s ite, Midwood Road, was in fact a n “insured l ocation”8 1 under the homeowner’s policy be cause it was a private way owned by the Deer Park Associat ion 2 fo r th e ex clu siv e u se and be ne fi t of

De er P ark

res ide nts , in clu din g th em sel ve s, an d th us wa s 3 “u sed ” b y th em

“in co nn ect ion

wi th” the ir “ res ide nc e p rem ise s. ” T he y a lso int erp os ed thr ee 4 countercl aims against Royal: bre ach of contract, br each of the ConnecticutUnfair Trade 5 Pr act ice s A ct ( “C UT PA ”), Co nn . G en . S tat . § § 4 2-1 10 a et seq. , and bre ach of the im pli ed 6 co ve nant o f g oo d f ait h and fa ir d eal ing . A dd iti on all y, the Ki ng s f ile d a thi rd- partyco m

pla int , 7 advancing cla ims (a) against t heir exces s insurer , National, for brea ch of contract and s eeking a 8 declarat ory judgment m andating cover age, and (b) aga inst thei r broker, NEBC, for breach of 9 contract , negligence a nd breach of fiduciary dut y. 10 In October 2004, the distri ct court gr anted Royal’s motion to dis miss the CUTPA 11 countercl aim for f ailure t o allege t hat Royal engaged i n a general bus iness prac tice in vi olation 12 of

the statut e, Co nn . G en . S tat . § 38 a-8 16 (6) , b ut w ithleave to r ep lea d, wh ich the Ki ng s d id. In 13 Ap ril 20 05 , th e d istric t co urt grante d N EB C’ s m oti on

to d ism iss the thi rd- partycla im s f or b rea ch 14 of contract and br each of fiduciary duty on t he grounds thatNEBC had no contract with the 15 Kings to breach a nd, with respectto the fiduciary claim, that the Kings had a t best ple d an action 16 in professional negligence. 17 In Aug us t 20 06 , N EB C f ile d c ros s-c lai m s ag ain st R oy al f or c om m on -law 18 ind em

nif icatio n, co ntr act

ua l in de mnif

icatio n an d c ontri butio n b ase d o n a lle gatio ns that, a ft er 19 NE BC fi rst

pro cured the Ki ng s’ um

bre lla po lic y in 19 99 , R oy al a cte d n eg lig entlyan d in 20 violati on of Connecticut law in uni latera lly reduci ng the policy’ s ATV coverage by limiting the9 1 coverage to ve hicles expr essly li sted in the declarat ions. 2 At

the ne xt r ound

of the lit igatio n, all parti es f ile d s um m ary jud gm ent m oti on s. In 3 Au gu st 2 00 6, RI CAm ov ed on its de clarat ory

jud gm ent ac tio n, co nte nd ingthat th e um bre lla 4 po lic y e xp res sly

ex clu de d c ov era ge of

rec reatio na l m oto r ve hic les no t de scr ibe d in the po lic y 5 de clarat ion s, wi th a “m e-t oo ” f

rom Natio na l ag ain st the Ki ng s’ thir d-p arty c lai m s o n th e b asi s 6 that the e xcess polic y followed form to the umbrella poli cy. In November 2006, the Kings and 7 RIC cross-moved in RIC’s declara tory judgment action r egarding the homeowner’s poli cy. A 8 month later, NEBC m oved on its cr oss-clai ms against Royal for indemnification and 9 contribut ion and, in the a lternat ive, for judgment against the Kings on their t hird-par ty claim of 10 negligence. 11 On

Se pte m be r 28 , 2 00 7, the dis tri ct c ourt r ule d a ga ins t th e K ing s o n a ll f ive summ ary 12 judgment m otions. The court“distil led” the par ties’ a rguments into three br oad queries, e ach of 13 wh ich

it ans we red

in t he ne gativ e: “ (1) Whe the r th e King s’ h om eo wn er’ s p oli cypro vid es 14 co ve rag e w ithres pe ct t o M cE nte e’s cla im s; ( 2) W he the r th e K ing s’ um

bre lla po lic y p rov ide s 15 co ve rag e w ithres pe ct t o M cE nte e’s cla im s; and (3) Whe the r N EB C w as n eg lig ent whe n it fa ile d 16 to p roc ure anum bre lla po lic y th at f

oll ow ed fo rm to t he ho m eo wn er’ s p oli cy .” Royal Indem. Co. 17 v. King , 512 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D. Conn. 2007). 18 The cascade of negati ve answers to t hese querie s, first and foremost, begins with t he 19 distri ct court’ s holding thatthe RIC homeowner’s policy did not cove r any liabi lity of the Kings 20 to the McEnte es because t he ATV accident had not occ urred on an “i nsured locat ion.” The ATV10 1 accident undi sputedly took pl ace in front of 63 Midwood Road, which was plai nly not partof the 2 Kings’ “resi dence premises” at One Deer Par k Court. Nor, the courtdecided, did t he locati on 3 qu ali fy

as a pre m ise s u sed

“in co nn ect ion

wi th” t he res ide nc e p rem ise s. Th e co urt expre ssl y 4 recognized t hat the cl aims for negligent supervi sion and negli gent entrus tment arose from the 5 elder Kings’ conduct at t he residenc e premises – where Junior’ s parents ha d, it was all eged, 6 negligentl y entruste d the ATV to him – but found that fact irrele vant because i t held thatthe 7 co ve rag e in qu irytur ne d o n th e lo cat ion

of the acc ide nt r ath er than th e lo cat ion wh ere the act

ua l 8 entrustment of the ATV had occurred. 9 Th e d istric t co urt fo un d th at the um

bre lla po lic y d id n ot a

pp ly b eca us e it expre ssl y 10 ex clu de d c ov era ge fo r al l A TV s ex cep t th os e lis ted in t he de clarat ion s, an d th e K ing s h ad fa ile d 11 to l ist

the AT V i nv olv ed

in t he acc ide nt. Ad dit ion all y, the dis tri ct c ourt f ound that R IC A h ad 12 acted in compliance wit h Connecticut l aw when it changed the umbrella pol icy to excl ude 13 unlisted ATVs, and, even i f RICA had not, the Kings had not shown that t he ATV accident 14 wo uld

have be enco ve red

un de r th e p rev iou s v ers ion of the um bre lla po lic y. Th e d istric t co urt 15 als o c on clu de d th at b eca us e th e K ing s’ e xc ess lia

bil itypo lic y “ fo llo ws fo rm ” to the um bre lla 16 policy, the Kings were not eli gible for covera ge under the exc ess policy. Las tly, given t he 17 finding that the primary hom eowner’s poli cy itsel f did not provide cover age for the acci dent, the 18 co urt

rea so ne d th at the Ki ng s su ff ere d n o h arm

fr om NE BC ’s f

ail ure to p roc ure anum

bre lla 19 policy thatfollowed form . As a result, i t granted s umm ary judgment in favor of NEBC on the 20 negligence c laim against it.11 1 As a ma tt erof j ud ic ia l h ou se ke ep in g, th e d is tr ic t c ou rtwe ntonto no te th atce rt ai n c la ims 2 rem ain ed

pe nd ingam on g v ari ou s p art ies but ob ser ve d th at “ m any, if

no t al l, o f t

ho se 3 [o uts tan din g] cla im s ar e ei the r: ( a) m oo t; ( b) h ing e u po n an inter

pre tat ion of the Ki ng s’ 4 ins uranc e p oli cie s expre ssl y re jec ted he rei n; o r (c ) ot

he rw ise inc on sis tent w ithmy ru lin g to day. ” 5 51 2 F . S up p. 2d

at 1 34 . T he co urt

ins tru cte d th e p art ies to r ep ort ba ck as t o th e st atu s o f o pe n 6 m att ers . A t an

Oc tob er 3 1, 20 07 co nf

ere nc e, the Ki ng s ar gu ed

that th eir CU TP A and

ba d f aith 7 countercl aims against Royal were st ill viable, and thatthey could purs ue additiona l theori es of 8 ne gli ge nc e ag ain st N EB C p rem ise d o n a lle gatio ns oth er than th e b rok er’ s f ail ure to p roc ure a 9 follow-form um

brella pol icy. The distr ict courtdisagreed; the Kings sought r econsidera tion. 10 The distri ct court e ntered final j udgment on January 8, 2008, declari ng that Royal had no 11 duty to defend or indemnify the Kings in connect ion with any cla ims arising out of the May 5, 12 20 02 , A TVacc ide nt and granti ng summ ary

jud gm ent to Ro ya l on

all of the Ki ng s’ 13 countercl aims. The district c ourt also gr anted summ ary judgment in favor of National on the 14 outstanding c ountercla ims brought against it . NEBC’s cross-clai ms against Royal for 15 indemnification and contri bution were dis missed as m oot. Finally, t he distri ct court de nied the 16 Ki ng s’ m oti on

fo r le av e to am en d th eir

co m pla int to a dd ne w f act s an d le ga l th eo rie s to su pp ort 17 their cl aims against NEBC and Royal, reasoning thatpermitting amendm ent after the merits of 18 these cla ims had been rejected on s umm ary judgment would be unfair and prej udicial. The 19 Kings appeal from that final judgment. 2012 1 DI SC US SI ON 2 3 1. Ne

gli ge nt E ntrus tm en t C

lai m 4 In the cours e of deciding whether t he basic homeowner’s insura nce policy cove red the 5 ATV accident that i njured Conor, the c ourt below held t hat the cover age-tri ggering phras e “on 6 an insured l ocation” r eferred to the location wher e the acci dent occurr ed (outside 63 Midwood 7 Ro ad ) an d e xp res sly rej ect ed any n oti on

that th e p hra se m ight re fe r to the loc us of the all eg ed

act 8 of parental ne gli ge nc e it sel f – the entru stm ent of

the AT V t o Jun ior , whic h m ayhave oc curre d 9 imm ed iat ely

be fo re the acc ide nt at th e und isp ute dly ins ure d h om e p rem ise s (O ne De er P ark 10 Court). The Kings argue on appeal thatthe distr ict court ’s analysi s was insufficient. We find 11 that Connecti cut law is unse ttled as to whether a negl igent entrustment claim in this context 12 sh ou ld b e d eem ed to aris e whe re the su

bje ct v eh icl e w as e ntr

us ted , whe re the ve hic le w as 13 housed, or where the accident i tself took plac e. 14 Al tho ug h R oy al a ck no wl ed ge s th at n o C onne cti cut ap pe llate c ourt h as s po ke n o n th is 15 sp eci fi c p oint, i t po stu lat es t hat th e C onne cti cut S up rem e C ourt h as d eci de d re lat ed iss ue s th at 16 sh owit w ou ld f

ind in R oy al’ s f

av or h ere ; sp eci fi cal ly, that “o n an in sured loc ati on ”, as u sed

in 17 the Ki ng s’ h om eo wn er’ s p oli cy , re fe rs s ole ly t o th e ac cid ent si te. Ho we ve r, t he cas e th at R oy al 18 cites for thi s predict ion, Se cu rit y In su ra nc e C

o. of H ar tfo rd v. Lu mb erm en s Mu tua l C as ua lty 19 Co. , 2 64 Co nn . 6 88 , 6 97 n. 12 , 8 26 A. 2d 10 7, 11 4 n .1 2 (2 00 3), ad dre sse s o nly anins ure r’s 20 responsibi lity for inj uries tha t occur withi n a policy per iod and focuses on the t emporal aspect of 21 an injury r ather tha n its situs. We do not find those attribut es to be anal yticall y intercha ngeable.13 1 The Kings rely heavi ly on a 2006 ConnecticutSuperior Court de cision, al so interpr eting 2 a Royal-issue d homeowner’s ins urance poli cy, which found that the i nsured’s l iabili ty there on a 3 cla im

fo r ne gli ge nt e ntr

us tm ent of

he r re cre ati on al m oto r ve hic le s urv ive d a sim ilar po lic y 4 exclusion due t o the locat ion where the r ecreati onal vehicl e (a go-car t) was garage d. Se e C he n v . 5 Celon , No. CV020391304S, 2006 W L 3008410, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 2006). The 6 policy at i ssue in Ch en , like the pol icy at is sue here, excl uded injuri es arisi ng from use of m otor 7 ve hic les fr om

co ve rag e, but co nta ine d a sav ing s p rov isi on

all ow ingco ve rag e f

or “ [a ] m oto riz ed 8 lan d c onve yanc e d esi gn ed fo r re cre ati on al u se o ff

pu bli c ro ad s, no t su

bje ct t o m oto r ve hic le 9 reg istrat ion , and

. . . o wn ed

byan‘in sured ’ an d o n an ‘i ns ure d lo cat ion .’” Id. at *2. The 10 undisputed facts wer e that the go-cart was unr egister ed and designed for re creati onal use off 11 public roads , the insure d had entrust ed the go-car t to the 12- year-old pl aintiff in the backya rd of 12 her home where the go-cartwas garaged, and the subsequent acc ident causi ng injury to t he 13 plainti ff took place on the public road where the i nsured’s home was situate d. As here, the 14 resoluti on of the dispute in Ch en rested on t he meaning of the term “on an insured locati on”, and 15 Ro ya l un su cce ssf ull y m ad e th e v ery

sam e ar gum ent in

that ca se t

hat it no w m ak es t o th is C ourt – 16 namely, that the ter m refers only to the site of the bodily injury. Se e id . at *3. Ch en fo un d th at 17 the po lic y w as am big uo us on

thi s p oint an d, con str

uin g th e am

big uit y a ga ins t th e in surer , 18 de ter

m ine d th at “ on

anins ure d lo cat ion ” re fe rre d to the phys ica l lo cat ion wh ere the go -cart w as 19 garag ed . T he Ch en co urt no ted that R oy al h ad

the op po rtunit

y to de fi ne the ter

m m ore narro wl y 20 when drafting the poli cy, but did not do so. Se e id . at *4.14 1 An oth er C onne cti cut tr ial co urt , h ow ev er, ha s f ound that a h om eo wn er’ s in suran ce p oli cy 2 excluded cover age for all li abilit y arising from an off-property ATV accident, re gardless of 3 whether the l iabili ty stemm ed from a claim of negligent entrustment or any other the ory of 4 recovery, bec ause of the locat ion of the accident

. See Pister v . Nationwide Mut. I ns. Co. , No. 5 DB DC V0 64 00 52 39 , 2 00 7 W L 2 20 03 48 , at *7 (C onn. Su pe r. C t. A pr. 13 , 2 00 7). In s tar

k 6 contrastto Ch en , Pi ste r attached no s ignificance t o the locat ion where the vehi cle was garage d. 7 See id. ; seege ne ra llyAl lst ateIns . C o. v. Fo ste r , No. CV07074026117, 2008 W L 2313313, at *5 8 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 14, 2008) (not ing, however, thatdecisional law interpr eting motor 9 vehicle exc lusions in homeowner’s insur ance polici es offers “less guida nce when it comes to a 10 claim of negligent entrus tment or supervision” ). 11 In other j urisdict ions, the pre vailing vi ew has deemed the site of the acci dent to be the 12 pro pe r re fe ren ce p oint f or ana lyz ingwh eth er an o ccu rre nc e o f n eg lig ent entru stm ent to ok pla ce 13 on

an“in sured

loc ati on .” See, e.g. , Al lst ateIns . C o. v. Sh ofn er , 5 73 So .2 d 4 7, 49 -50 (F la. Di st. 14 Ct. App. 1990) (explici tly rej ecting ar gument that liabil ity for neglige nt entrust ment of a 15 recreat ional vehic le was covered by homeowner’s poli cy when the entrus tment occurred on 16 ins ure d’s res ide nc e p rem ise s b ut t he acc ide nt o ccu

rre d o ff -pr em ise s); Bu ch me ier

v. Prok ott , No. 17 C6 -98 -18 3, 19 98 W L 3 72 78 4, at * 2 (M inn . C t. A pp . July 7, 19 98 ) (s am e); Ior io e

x re l. I or io v

. 18 Simone , 340 N.J. Super. 19, 23-24, 773 A.2d 722, 725 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (i nterpret ing 19 same relevant polic y language and finding t hat the motor vehicle exclusion appl ied to a cl aim for 20 negligent e ntrustment of a go-cart i nvolved in an acc ident on the s treet a block away from the15 1 ins ure d’s ho us e, altho ug h e ntr us tm ent to ok

pla ce i n in sured ’s d

riv ew ay , b eca

us e “t he car rie r 2 car ef

ull y e xc lud ed

cer tai n ri sk s, parti cu lar ly t

ho se aris ingfr om

the ins ure d’s owne d re cre ati on al 3 ve hic les on

the pu bli c w ay s”)

. 4 If the ConnecticutSupreme Court were to endorse the approach sta ted in Ch en , and all 5 oth er p oli cyco nd iti on s w ere sat isf ied , th e K ing s’ RIC ho m eo wn er’ s in suran ce p oli cywo uld 6 certai nly cover the m f or any liabi lity ar ising from the negligent ent rustment claim brought by the 7 McE nte es, as t

he su bje ct A TVwa s g ara ge d at th e in sured res ide nc e p rem ise s. As sum ingthat in 8 this case , as in Ch en , th e entru stm ent to ok pla ce whe re the ve hic le w as g ara ge d, an d a ll o the r 9 policy condit ions were sat isified, Conor’s a ccident would al so be covered i f the Connecticut 10 Supreme Court took the positi on that the r elevant l ocation is the site of the allegedl y negligent 11 en tru stm en t. I f, on the oth er h an d, the Co nn ect icut S up rem e C ourt w ere to e nd ors e th e m ajo rity 12 vie w that a n eg lig ent entru stm ent cl aim ari ses wh ere the acc ide nt o ccu rre d, the n a

su bs idi ary 13 issue would be pre sented, whetherthe accide nt, which occurr ed on a privat e road in which t he 14 ins ure ds ha d a

pro pe rtyint ere st d eri vativ e o f t he ir o wn ers hip of

the ins ure d re sid en ce p rem ise s, 15 took place on an “ insured loc ation” as de fined by another provi sion of the policy. Se e discussion 16 in secti on 2, infra. Given the absence of controlling Connect icut case law interpr eting 17 pro vis ion s o f i ns uranc e p oli cie s is su ed un de r C onne cti cut law a s th eyrel ate to t he se p ivo tal 18 iss ue s an d th e co ns ide rab le e xp ert ise of the Co nn ect icut S up rem e C ourt i n th e f iel d o f i ns uranc e 19 law , w e b eli ev e th e p rud ent co urs e is to i nv ite gu idanc e b y C onne cti cut’s hig h c ourt o n th ese 20 open questions.16 1 2. Whether Acci dent Occurred on an Ins ured Location 2 There is al so no binding or di spositive Connecticut pr ecedent to r esolve the que stion of 3 wh eth er a

ho m eo wn er’ s p oli cywh ich de fi ne s “i ns ure d lo cat ion ” as inc lud ing“p rem ise s” u sed 4 “in

co nn ect ion

wi th” a re sid en ce p rem ise s, but do es n ot d ef ine “p rem ise s”, co ve rs an o ccu rre nc e 5 on a p ort ion of a p riv ate roa d in

the ins ure d’s ho m eo wn er’ s as so ciatio n th at, un lik e o the r 6 portions of the sa me road, the insured does notregularl y use. 7 a. “P rem ise s” U sed “in Co nn ect ion

wi th” a R esi de nc e P rem ise s 8 Th e in iti al s tep in d ete rm ini ng wh eth er whe re the inj ury -pr od uc ingne gli ge nc e o ccu

rre d 9 in t

his cas e – the sit e o f t

he AT V a cci de nt o n M idw oo d R oa d, outsi de num be r 63 – w as c ov ere d 10 as a premises used in conne ction with a r esidence pr emises is determining whether a “ roadway” 11 can

co ns tit ute a “p rem ise s” at al l. T he wo rd “ pre m ise s”, as u sed in t he rea lm of rea l pr op erty 12 law , is ge ne ral ly d ef ine d b y B lac k’s Law D ict ion ary as “ [a ] h ou se o r a b uil din g, alo ng wi th i ts 13 gro un ds .” Blac k’s La w D ict ion ar y 12 19 (8t

h e d. 20 04 ). O the r de fi nit ion s in clu de : “p rop erty 14 that is c onveyed by bequest ordeed”; “a spe cified piece ortract of land wit h the struc tures on 15 it”; and “ a building, bui ldings, or par t of a building cover ed by or within the stated t erms of a 16 po lic y (a s o f f

ire ins uranc e). ” Webster' s Third New Internati onal Dictionary Unabridged 1789 17 (19 76 ). T hu s, on e p os sib le v iew is that th e te rm

“p rem ise s” c anno t de scr ibe the acc ide nt s ite , a s 18 Midwood Road proper is nota building, northe grounds of a buildi ng. 19 However, no Connecticut cour t has rule d whether a road ( public or pr ivate) s hould be 20 considered a “premises” within the meaning of an insurance contrac t. Nor have Connectic ut17 1 co urt s d eal t w iththe fo llo w- up qu est ion of wh eth er s uc h a

sit us can sat isf y th e “u sed

in 2 connection wit h a residenc e premises” standar d. Several othe r juris dictions, on t he other hand, 3 have de alt

wi th s im ilar f

act s an d p oli cylan gu ag e. Th is c oll ect ion of de cis ion al l awde m on str ate s 4 a rang e o f ana lyt ica l ap pro ach es r ou gh ly s um m ari zed as f oll ow s: r ep eat ed

us e; i nte gra l us e; l eg al 5 interes t or ownership; foreseeable use ; and actual use (which the c ourt below appear s to have 6 ch os enin t

he ab sen ce o f c ontro lli ng Co nn ect icut pr ece de nt) . W e d isc us s th ese stand ard s h ere 7 ins of

ar a s th eym aybe ins tru cti ve . T he Co nn ect icut S up rem e C ourt, of co urs e, m aych oo se t o 8 ad op t any o ne of

the m , o r bl aze a d if

fe rent path a lto ge the r. 9 (1) Re pe ate d U se 10 On e ap pro ach in d eci din g whe the r an

acc ide nt s ite oth er than a res ide nc e p rem ise s w as 11 an insured l ocation undera homeowner’s policy is to l ook for repeated use of the site by the 12 insured. Se e, e. g. , A lls tate In s. Co . v . D ru mh eller , 185 F. App’x 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2006) (non13 pre ced en tia l) ( “[ W ]e do no t be lie ve that th e p rec ise phys ica l re lat ion sh ip o f [ the res ide nc e 14 pr emi se s t o t he ac ci de ntsi te ] i s t he cruc ia l i nqui ry . . . . We thi nk th atth e P en ns yl va ni a S up re me 15 Court would follow [the] holding that ‘ in connecti on with’ means the repeat ed use of the ATV 16 em an ati ng fr om

an d re tur nin g to the ins ure d’s res ide nc e. ”); Fa rm ers Ne w C en tur y In s. Co . v . 17 Angerson , No. 4:04-cv-2608, 2008 WL 238622, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2008) (ATV accident 18 sit e, a f

iel d h alf a m ile aw ayfr om

res ide nc e p rem ise s, wa s an ins ure d lo cat ion

us ed “in 19 connection wit h the resi dence premises” since there was “frequentuse of the area i n which the 20 acc ide nt o ccu

rre d” ); Na tio nw ideMut. In s. Co . v . Prev atte , 108 N.C. App. 152, 156, 423 S.E.2d18 1 90, 92 (1992) (ATV accidenton a trail leading from insured’s prope rty and ending on a 2 ne igh

bo r’s pro pe rtyco ve red

be cau se t he tra il w as u sed

reg ularlybythe ins ure d f or s ev era l ye ars 3 to r ide AT Vs an d f or w alk ing , and

thu s w as u sed

“in co nn ect ion

wi th” ins ure d’s res ide nc e 4 premises). 5 But, even if adopted conceptually, subsi diary quest ions here t oo can produce conflic ting 6 co ve rag e sc en ari os . M os t br oa dly , if rep eat ed us e b y th e K ing s o f s om e p art of Mid wo od Ro ad 7 were to suffice, the homeowner’s policy would c over the acc ident inj uring Conor. Yet cover age 8 may not exist if the “repea ted use” inqui ry is geographically orfunctionally l imited either t o the 9 sp eci fi c p ort ion

of Mid wo od Ro ad wh ere the AT V a cci de nt o ccu rre d, or i f f

oc us ed sp eci fi cal ly 10 on

the Ki ng s’ u se o f t

he ir A TVon

the roa dw ay(as op po sed to t he ir u se o f o the r m oto r ve hic les 11 or n onve hic ular us ag e). Th e o ve ral l ge og rap hyis n ot d isp ute d. De er P ark Co urt , th e st

ree t 12 where the Kings li ve, runs in an ea st-west di rection a nd dead-ends atits east ern extre mity. The 13 we ste rn e nd

of De er P ark

Co urt fo rm s a “ T” int ers ect ion

wi th M idw oo d R oa d. Mid wo od Ro ad 14 runs in a nort h-south dir ection and dea d-ends at i ts northern end. The southern end of Midwood 15 Ro ad

fo rm s a “ T” int ers ect ion

wi th D eer

Park M ead owRo ad , whic h le ad s to the De er P ark 16 de ve lop m ent’s gate and the pu bli c ro ad . A s th e re co rd r ef lec ts, thi s ro ad

co nf igu rat ion lim ite d 17 the regula r automobile use of Midwood Road by the Kings to i ts southern portion, tha t is, the 18 stretc h leading to a nd from the housing devel opment’s connection pointwith the publi c road. 19 The Kings do not alle ge, and the rec ord does not indi cate, thatthey repeat edly (or eve r) drove 20 any v eh icl e o n th e n ort he rn p ort ion

of Mid wo od Ro ad , whe re the AT V a cci de nt o ccu rre d. Th ere19 1 is a lso no ba sis to f ind that any o f t

he Ki ng s ev er u sed

the su bje ct A TVon

Mid wo od Ro ad at a ll 2 pri or t o th e May 5 , 2 00 2, acc ide nt; no r th at M idw oo d R oa d w as e ve r us ed bythe m fo r ot he r 3 nonvehicularpurposes. If the “r epeated use” definition is to be adopted, gui dance on the 4 pertinenc e of these subsidar y points is a lso request ed. 5 (2) Int eg ral Us e 6 An

alt ern ate ap pro ach

is t o e xam ine the ne ces sit y o f t he “u se” at i ssu e, as w as a do pte d in 7 Massachuset ts Property I nsurance Underwriti ng Ass’n v. Wynn , 60 Mass. App. Ct. 824, 806 8 N.E.2d 447 (App. Ct. 2004). In that cas e, James Spina and Charles Wynn were driving ATVs on 9 a b eac h c los e to Sp ina ’s h om e whe n th e v eh icl es c oll ide d, inj uri ng Wynn. Sp ina ’s h om eo wn er’ s 10 ins uranc e p oli cy , li ke the Ki ng s’ p oli cy , c ov ere d b oth his “re sid en ce p rem ise s” and pre m ise s 11 used “in connect ion with” the r esidence pr emises. Further, Spina’s ATV was garaged at the 12 ins ure d re sid en ce p rem ise s. In c on str uin g th e p oli cy , th e Ma ssa chus ett s co urt fo un d th at, 13 alt

ho ug h S pin a f

req ue ntl y o pe rat ed

his AT V o n th e b eac h, “[ t] he de fi nit ion [o f ‘ ins ure d 14 loc ati on ’] is n ot m eant to en co m pa ss a dja cent, n on owne d land on wh ich anAT V m ight be us ed 15 any more than it is int ended to incl ude parks or r ecreati onal facilit ies in proxi mity to the 16 residence that the i nsured may enjoy and use regula rly.” 60 Mass . App. Ct. at 829-30, 806 17 N. E. 2d

at 4 51 . In

rej ect ingthe reg ular/r ep eat ed us e te st, the Wynn court opined t hat “[i]t is not 18 rea so na

ble that th e m ean ingof

the lan gu ag e ‘u sed

in c onne cti on

wi th [ the res ide nc e] ,’ and he nc e 19 the am

bit of the ‘in sured

loc ati on ,’ s ho uld

vary d ep en din g o n th e f

ort uit y o f an in sured ’s r eg ular 20 us e o f a

fi eld , tr ail , o r re cre ati on al area , p ub lic or p riv ate , in the ne igh bo rho od of his res ide nc e”,20 1 be cau se “ [s ]u cha co ns tru cti on wo uld req uir e k no wl ed ge byanins ure r of no t on ly t

he ins ure d’s 2 pro pe rtybut al so of ne igh bo rin g p rop ert

y and the ins ure d’s ho bb ies an d inter est s. ” 6 0 M ass . 3 App. Ct. at 830, 806 N.E.2d at 451-52. Wynn ult im ate ly c on clu de d th at “ the ter m ‘in sured 4 loc ati on ’ is int en de d and ap pro pri ate ly u

nd ers too d to be lim ite d to the res ide nc e an d p rem ises 5 integ

ra l to its us e a s a res ide nc e ”, tho ug h it expli cit ly d id n ot r eac h th e q ue sti on of wh eth er “ an 6 offsite pathway or approac h to [a] residence” ca n be “integr al” to the use of the reside nce. 60 7 Mas s. Ap p. Ct . at 83 0 & n .9 , 8 06 N. E. 2d at 4 52 & n. 9 (e m

ph asi s ad de d). 8 Similarly, in Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Coppa , 494 N.W .2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 9 19 93 ), a

Minne so ta a

pp ell ate co urt

fo un d n o c ov era ge of

anAT V a cci de nt t

hat oc curre d in

an 10 ad

jac en t, n on owne d h ay fi eld wh ere the ins ured ’s A TVm ight have be enus ed , c on clu din g th at 11 “[i]t is not reas onable to expec t that eve ry field or pat hway in the neighborhood leading to t he 12 ins ure ds ’ re sid en ce i s p rop erty ‘u sed in c onne cti on

wi th’ the res ide nc e”, an d a ff irm ingthe low er 13 court’s findi ng that the homeowner’s poli cy excluded cover age. Id. at 506. However, Coppa 14 notably dist inguished the uninsured hayfiel d from “approaches oreasements of ingress to or 15 eg res s f

rom the pro pe rty .” Id. 16 Should the Connectic ut Supreme Court choose to follow the “i ntegral us e” approach, t he 17 outco m e o f t

his ap pe al a ga in w ou ld i m pli cat e su bs idi ary co ns ide rat ion s. To the ex tent th at 18 Mid

wo od Ro ad in g en era l is co ns ide red

to b e th e re lev ant lo cat ion , a co urt wo uld pre sum ab ly 19 find the use of such premises to be int egral to t he use of the Kings’ re sidence pre mises, as the 20 Kings must use Midwood Road in order to r each the publi c highway. Under a more restri ctive21 1 view, in which the r elevant l ocation is defined as the nort hern porti on of Midwood Road, 2 dir ect ly o uts ide num be r 63 (th e ac tua l si te o f i nju ry) , c ov era ge wo uld

lik ely no t ex ist be cau se 3 that po rti on

of Mid wo od Ro ad pro vid es n o in gre ss o r eg res s to On e D eer Park C ourt, an d th

us is 4 no t “i nte gra l” t o th e K ing s’ u se o f t he ir r esi de nc e p rem ise s. Co rre lat ive ly, su pp ort fo r th at m ore 5 lim ite d c on str

uc tio n m aybe fo un d in

the warranty

de ed to O ne De er P ark

Co urt , whic h e xp res sly 6 grants the Kings “the ri ght to use in c omm on with others . . . for al l purposes of tra vel, the 7 private roads leading from the premises to and f rom the public hi

ghway insofar as the same may 8 bene ces sa ry o r co nv en ien t in pa ssi ng to a nd fro m t hepr em ises .” (A 01209) (emphasis added))

. 9 (3) Pr op erty O wn ers hip an d L eg al R ight to Us e 10 Th at the ir w arr anty d eed grante d th e K ing s a l im ite d e ase m ent w ith in t he gated De er P ark 11 de ve lop m ent w ou ld b e o f p aram ount s ign if icanc e if the Co nn ect icut S up rem e C ourt w ere to 12 adopt the rul e of decision announced i n Uguccioni v. U.S. Fideli ty & Guaranty Co. , 4 08 Pa

. 13 Su

pe r. 5 11 , 5 97 A. 2d

14 9 (1 99 1), wh ich

he ld t hat an AT V a cci de nt t

hat oc curre d o n a

pri vate 14 roa dw aywi thi n th e in sured ’s p riv ate ho us ingde ve lop m ent w as c ov ere d und er the ins ure d’s 15 ho m eo wn er’ s p oli cy . T he Uguccionico urt ob ser ve d th at “ [t ]h ese str eet s, it w ou ld s eem , are 16 private pr operty used by t he insureds i n connection wit h their i nsured resi dence. As such, the 17 streeton which [the ATV accident occurr ed] was an ‘ins ured locat ion.’” 408 Pa. Super. at513, 18 597 A.2d at 150. Uguccionico ns tru ed the po lic y te rm

“in sured loc ati on ” as “b roa d e no ug h to 19 inc lud e ro ad s in

a p riv ate de ve lop m ent which are availabl e for use in ac hieving acce ss to the 20 ins ur ed

res ide nc e .” 40 8 P a. Su

pe r. at 51 4, 59 7 A .2 d at 15 0 (e m ph asi s ad de d); see also Coppa ,22 1 494 N.W .2d at 506 (dist inguishing “approaches or e asements of ingress to or egr ess from the 2 property” a s covered by homeowner’s policy, a s opposed to an adj acent publi c field where ATV 3 accident oc curred). 4 At

the outer m os t li m it o f t

his ap pro ach

lie s No rth ern Se cu rit

y In su ra nc e C

o. v. Ro ssi tto , 5 17 1 V t. 5 80 , 5 83 , 7 62 A. 2d 86 1, 86 5 (2 00 0). Th ere , th e V erm ont S up rem e C ourt c on sid ere d an 6 ex cep tio n to anAT V e xc lus ion in a ho m eo wn er’ s p oli cy , and fo un d th at the po lic y te rm “in sured 7 location” unambiguously “encompasses [the insured’s] right -of-way.” Id. 8 Ag ain , th en , e ve n if the “le ga l ri gh t” a

pp roa chis a do pte d, its ap pli cat ion req uir es a 9 further deter mination of whether merely showing the existe nce of a property r ight in the accident 10 sit

us is s uf fi cie nt t o s ecu

re p oli cyco ve rag e as an“in sured loc ati on , ” or whe the r th e “l eg al r ight” 11 must be further conditioned on i t being a ri ght for purposes only of assur ing access t o the 12 residence premises – any other int erest bei ng irrel evant. Se e dis cu ssi on of “integ ral us e” 13 approach, infra. 14 (4) Fo res eea

ble Us e 15 Notwithstanding t hat it would notguarantee t heir succe ss on any remand, the Kings urge 16 the Co urt

to a do pt an a

pp roa chde scr ibe d in

Utica Mutual

Insurance Co. v. Fontneau , 7 0 M ass . 17 App. Ct. 553, 875 N.E.2d 508 (2007), which observed, as a ge neral matter, tha t “[t]o determine 18 wh eth er a

sit e is co ve red

byrea so n o f i ts u se i n c onne cti on wi th t he sp eci fi cal ly i ns ure d 19 res ide nti al p rem ise s, co urt s w ill ex am ine (1) the ch ara cte r of the us e as a re sid entia llyrel ate d 20 act ivi ty; (2) the dis tan ce b etw een the res ide nc e an d th e si te; an d (3 ) th e re su lti ng rea so na ble23 1 fo res eea

bil ityof the ris k o f t

he co nn ect ed

act ivi ty o n th e si te t o th e in surer .” 70 Mas s. Ap p. Ct

. 2 at 559, 875 N.E.2d at 514. 3 Th ere is a

de arth o f C onne cti cut autho rity le nd ingsu pp ort to a Fontneau -style approach. 4 Th e K ing s, ne ve rth ele ss, m aintai n th at Fontneau supports cover age of Junior’s ATV accident 5 be cau se i t oc curre d a s a r esu lt o f h is o pe rat ion of the AT V o n M idw oo d R oa d (whic h, byits 6 nature as t he development’s privat e road, was “res idential ly relat ed” by definition) , only 20 7 yards away from the border of the theirresidence premises. The proximity and private nature of 8 the roadway used as of right by the Kings, t aken together , they argue, made the ris k of the 9 acc ide nt o ccu

rri ng wh ere it o ccu

rre d re aso na

bly fo res eea ble to R oy al. Ro ya l co unter s th at, in 10 Fontneau , the insure d and his employees regular ly used the pr emises on which that ATV 11 acc ide nt o ccu

rre d, wh ere as t

he Ki ng s cann ot s aythe y d id. No ne the les s, thi s ap pro ach too can 12 meander to coverage of Conor’s inj uries if Connecti cut were to adoptit in det ermining the 13 meaning of “prem ises used i n connection wit h” the resi dence premises. 14 (5) Ac tua l U se 15 The distri ct court he ld that “a ctual use” of premises was a prerequisi te to finding use of a 16 pie ce o f p rop erty to be “in co nn ect ion

wi th” a re sid en ce p rem ise s an d e xp lic itl y re jec ted an 17 interpr etation of the t erm based on the insured’ s legal i nterestin or ownership of the off18 resident ial loca tion where the accident happened. Se e 51 2 F . S up p. 2d at 1 27 (“T he leg al r ight to 19 us e p rop erty m ay(or m ayno t) b e p rob ati ve , b ut i t is cer tai nly no t di sp os iti ve of

wh eth er p art ies 20 act

ua llyus e a p iec e o f p rop erty ‘i n c onne cti on wi th’ the ir r esi de nc e p rem ise s. ”). Th e d ist ric t24 1 court rea soned that, wit h the excepti on of Uguccioni , c ourts co ns ide rin g th e is su e h av e re qu ire d 2 a showing of “actual use ”. 3 Mo re b asi cal ly, ho we ve r, t he re i s n o C onne cti cut autho rity f or t he “ac tua l us e” a

pp roa ch 4 tak enbythe dis tri ct c ourt h ere – it is an e nti rel y o pe n q

ue sti on wh eth er the re i s any “ act ua l us e” 5 standard atall in t his contextunder Connecticutlaw, and even if there is, the barfor a showing 6 of “actual use” may be lower than t he bar set by t he distri ct court i n this case . For purposes of 7 the “ac tua l us e” i nq uir y, the co urt

res tri cte d it s d ef

ini tio n o f t

he acc ide nt l oc ati on

to t he no rth ern 8 portion of Midwood Road, despit e acknowledging tha t “Midwood Road is not ‘ officially’ 9 divided int o north and south.” 512 F. Supp. 2d at 125 n.7. As the Kings uncontes tably did not 10 us e th e n ort

he rn p ort ion

of Mid wo od Ro ad fo r in gre ss and

eg res s an d h ad

no t al leg ed

any o the r 11 regular orrepeated us e of that specific a rea, the cour t concluded t hat the Kings had fail ed the 12 “ac tua l us e” t est . Y et, if the co urt ha d d ef ine d th e ac cid ent lo cat ion to b e Mi dw oo d R oa d a s a 13 whole, as the Kings ar gue the courtshould have done, the Kings would have success fully shown 14 “actual us e” because t hey did regula rly use the southern port ion of that very sa me road for 15 ingress and e gress. And obviously, t he northern por tion of Midwood Road had be en“ac tua lly 16 used,” in the l iteral sense, by Juniorat leaston the day of the ATV accident. ( Implicitly, though 17 no t expre ssl y, the co urt de ter m ine d th at this on e-t im e u se d id n ot r ise to t he lev el o f “ act

ua l 18 use”.) Consequentl y, in the absenc e of Connecticut prec edent to guide us, we defer to the 19 Co nn ect icut S up rem e C ourt t o e va luate whe the r th e d istric t co urt ’s “ act ua l us e” ana lys is i s 20 su

pp ort ed bystate l awan d, if

no t, t o f ind that ei the r a r ef

orm ulatio n o f i t or

on e o f t he oth er25 1 ap pro ach es d isc us sed ab ov e o r, i nd eed , s om e o the r de fi nit ion al s tru cture s ho uld be us ed to 2 construe t his provisi on of a hom eowner’s poli cy regulat ed by Connecticut l aw. 3 b. Si gn if

icanc e o f P ub lic / P riv ate Natur e o f R oa d 4 Cl os er s crutiny is req uir ed of sev era l ar gu

m ents o ff ere d b y th e K ing s to de m on str ate that 5 Mid

wo od Ro ad is an “ ins ure d lo cat ion ” und er the ir h om eo wn er’ s in suran ce p oli cy . F irs t, t he y 6 ass ert

that Mi dw oo d R oa d is act ua llypart o f t

he ir “ res ide nc e p rem ise s”, on the log ic that 7 be cau se i t is a p riv ate roa d w ith in t he ho m eo wn ers ass oc iat ion of wh ich the y are m em

be rs, the y 8 can

cla im a re al p rop erty o wn ers hip int ere st i n it . A lte rnativ ely , th eyco nte nd that th e p riv ate 9 nature of Midwood Road brings i t into one orboth of the other ca tegories of “insured locat ion” 10 de scr ibe d in

the ir p oli cy– “ gro un ds us ed by[t he ins ure d] as a

res ide nc e” and

/or “any p rem ise s 11 us ed

by[t he ins ure d] in c onne cti on wi th [ the res ide nc e p rem ise s o r th e p art of oth er p rem ise s, 12 oth er s tru ctures an d g rou nd s u sed as a res ide nc e] .” 13 The first of the alt ernative grounds is eas ily dispat ched. As the decla rations pa ge of the 14 Kings’ homeowner’s policy speci fically li sts “1 Deer Par k Ct[.]” as the residence premises and 15 m ak es n o m entio n o f M idw oo d R oa d, it i s su ff ici entlycle ar that Mi dw oo d R oa d w as n ot i n f act 16 part o f t

he Ki ng s’ r esi de nc e p rem ise s. No r have the Ki ng s p res ented any e vid en ce t o in dic ate 17 that th eyev er u sed any p ort ion

of Mid wo od Ro ad “as a re sid en ce. ” H ow ev er, we fi nd that 18 Connecticut l aw is unsettl ed regardi ng whether Midwood Road, because it is a pr ivate roa d, 19 should be deemed a premises used “in connect ion with” the Kings ’ reside nce premises. 20 Th e K ing s cl aim that be cau se t

he y are r esi de nts of

De er P ark

an d v oti ng m em

be rs o f i ts26 1 ho m eo wn ers ass oc iat ion , th eyex ert so m e co ntr ol o ve r Mi dw oo d R oa d and the oth er p riv ate 2 roa ds wi thi n th e d ev elo pm ent. T hu s, the y s ay , M idw oo d R oa d s ho uld be de em ed

a p rem ise s 3 us ed

bythe m “in co nn ect ion

wi th” the ir h om e. To fu

rth er the ir argum ent, t

he Ki ng s p oint to 4 Uguccioni, 40 8 P a. Su pe r. at 51 3, 59 7 A .2 d at 15 0 (f ind ingthat st

ree ts i n a pri vate r esi de nti al 5 de ve lop m ent w ere “p riv ate pro pe rtyus ed bythe ins ure ds in c onne cti on wi th t he ir i ns ure d 6 res ide nc e”, an d, fo r th at r eas on , an A TVacc ide nt o n s uc h a pri vate r oa d w as c ov ere d und er that 7 provision of the homeowner’s polic y). 8 These arguments did not fly below. The dist rict cour t rejec ted Uguc cio ni as “ anoutli er 9 that has bee n expressly, i f not impliedly, overturned by s ubsequent deci sions.” 512 F. Supp. 2d 10 at 1 26 . T o b e su

re, co urt s in

oth er j uri sd ict ion s h av e eq uated su chpri vate r oa ds wi th p ub lic 11 roads or, ata minim um, have not found any distinction apposi te in consi dering the i ssue of 12 coverage undera homeowner’s liabili ty policy

. Se e, e. g. , S he lte r Mu t. I

ns . C o. v. Da vis , No. 13 05 -04 56 , 2 00 6 W L 9 29 23 9 (I ow a C t. A pp . Apr. 12 , 2 00 6) ( ho ldi ng that ho m eo wn er’ s p oli cy 14 excluded cover age because ATV accidenton private r oadway in homeowners association 15 occurred away from the insured pr emises). Indeed, Da vis reject ed the very sa me argum ent now 16 made by the Kings – that the ATV accidentwas covered becaus e the insur eds were mem bers of 17 the homeowners associati on which owned and maintained the pri vate road where the accide nt 18 took place – si nce the insur eds did not indi vidually own the pr ivate roa d that, for all relevant 19 purposes, was the functi onal equival ent of a public roa d. See id. 20 Another case, Fe de ra l K em pe r In su ra nc e C

o. v. De rr , 386 Pa. Super. 382, 563 A.2d 11827 1 (1989), found that an i nsurance poli cy with a similar definit ion of “insured loc ation” did not 2 cover an ATV accident t hat occurr ed on a similar ly owned and maintained privat e road. Like 3 the Kings, the i nsureds in De rr belonged to the homeowners associ ation thatowned the road, 4 paid fees for the road’ s maintenance and repai r and had an ease ment over it to the ext ent used for 5 eg res s an d in gre ss. Th e De rr co urt fo un d th at the roa d w as n ot an “ ins ure d lo cat ion ” b eca us e it 6 was public insofar a s it was dedic ated for use as a r oadway by all assoc iation members, and the 7 insureds coul d claim no true ownership overit. Specifical ly, while givi ng some credit to the 8 arg um en t th at the De rrs ’ ea sem ent co ns tit ute d a pro pe rtyint ere st, the co urt af fi rm ed the tri al 9 court’s findi ng that “al l ninety l ot owners are notindividual ly responsi ble for insuri ng the 10 easement, especiall y since a re al estat e corporat ion exists , which assumed the responsibi lity for 11 maintenance of the road.” 386 Pa. Super. at388-89, 563 A.2d at 121-22. De rr expla ine d f

urt he r 12 that “[t]he road in t his insta nce was a privat e road as to t he plan but not a s to any indivi dual . . . 13 [and was] dedicated to the publ ic use of all pr operty owners, notsubject t o individual control by 14 any o f t

he m . . . . Whe the r by

de ed or i m pli cat ion , th is r oa d is a p ub lic roa d a s f ar a s th e p lan

is 15 co nc ern ed , and

m ayno t be co ns ide red

pri vate p rop erty, part o f t he pre m ise s, or v acant p rop erty 16 within the cl ear inte nt of the policy.” 386 Pa. Super . at 389, 563 A.2d at 122. Although De rr 17 do es n ot s pe cif

ica llyad dre ss t

he co nc ep t of

us e “i n c onne cti on

wi th” res ide nc e p rem ise s in an 18 ins uranc e p oli cy ’s d ef ini tio n o f an “ ins ure d lo cat ion ”, it d oe s o ff er the vie w that “p riv ate ” 19 owne rsh ip o f M idw oo d R oa d m aybe irr ele vant i n d ete rm ini ng wh eth er the roa d is a co ve red 20 location by vi rtue of being withi n one or anotherdefinition of “premises” setforth in the poli cy.28 1 Accordingly, the significance of the publ ic/pri vate natur e of a road in deter mining 2 wh eth er a

roa d c ou ld b e co ns ide red an“in sured

loc ati on ” re m ain s an

op enqu est ion

un de r 3 Co nn ect icut law, an d g ive n th e unc ert ainty and de arth o f C onne cti cut ca se l awreg ard ingthi s 4 potential ly disposit ive issue, we r espectfully as k the ConnecticutSupreme Court to consider and 5 address it

. 6 3. To Gi ve N

oti ce “ as So on as Prac tic al” 7 Un de r C onne cti cut law, “ab sent w aiv er, anun ex cu sed , unre aso na ble de lay [b y an 8 ins ure d] in n oti fi cat ion [o f a co ve red oc curre nc e] co ns tit

ute s a f ail ure of co nd iti on

that entir ely 9 dis ch arg es an in suran ce c arr ier fr om any f urt he r li ab ili ty o n it s in suran ce c ontra ct. ” Ae tna Ca s. 10 & Sur. Co. v. Murphy , 2 06 Co nn . 4 09 , 4 12 , 5 38 A. 2d 21 9, 22 0 (1 98 8). Ho we ve r, a po lic yh old er 11 who fails to give ti mely notice of an insurable l oss does not forfeit hi s coverage i f he can prove 12 that his de lay did not pr ejudice hi s insurer

. Se e 20 6 C onn. at 4 18 , 5 38 A. 2d at 2 23 ; Ta ric an i v. 13 Nationwide Mut. I ns. Co. , 7 7 C onn. Ap p. 13 9, 14 0, 82 2 A .2 d 3 41 , 3 41 (20 03 ). A bs ent a 14 showing of “m ateria l prejudi ce”, the ins urance company has a continui ng duty to provide 15 coverage even i f the liter al terms of the notice pr ovision are not met. See Murphy , 2 06 Co nn . at 16 41 8, 53 8 A .2 d at 22 3. Thus , C onne cti cut re qu ire s tw o c on dit ion s to be sat isf ied be fo re an 17 ins ure r’s dutie s can b e d isc harge d p urs uant t o th e “n oti ce” pro vis ion of a p oli cy : (1 ) an 18 un ex cu sed , unre aso na ble de lay in n oti fi cat ion

bythe ins ure d; and

(2) res ult ingm ate ria l pr eju dic e 19 to t

he ins ure r. T he burde n o f e sta bli sh ingtim ely

no tic e o r la ck

of pre jud ice to t

he ins ure r re sts 20 with the insur ed. See Nat’l Publ’ g Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins . Co. , 287 Conn. 664, 675, 949 A.2d29 1 12 03 , 1 21 1 (2 00 8); Murphy , 206 Conn. at 417-19, 538 A.2d at 223-24. 2 In determining whether a delay in noti fication is unr easonable and, t hereby, untimely, a 3 court must remain cognizant thatan insured’ s “‘duty to gi ve notice does not arise unless and 4 until fa cts de ve lop wh ich wo uld su gg est to a pe rso n o f o rdi nary and

rea so na ble pru de nc e th at 5 li ab il it y may ha ve be enin cu rr ed , a ndis co mpl ie d wi th if no ti ce is gi ve n wi th in a r ea so nabl e t ime 6 af ter the sit uatio n s o a ssum es a

n a sp ect su gg est ive of

a p os sib le c lai m

fo r dam ag es. ’” Un ite d 7 Techs. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co. , 989 F. Supp. 128, 138 (D. Conn. 1997) (quoting 8 Silver v. I

ndem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. , 1 37 Co nn . 5 25 , 5 28 , 7 9 A .2 d 3 55 , 3 57 (19 51 )). Th e p urp os e 9 of the requirement for prompt notice is t o give the ins urer a full oppor tunity to i nvestigat e the 10 claim. Se e T

ar ica ni, 77 Conn. App. at 149, 822 A.2d at 346. 11 No t surpr isi ng ly, the duty t o n oti fy “d oe s n ot atta chin t

he cas e o f a

tri via l ac cid ent w he re 12 the re i s n o re aso na ble gro un d f

or b eli ev ingat the tim e th at i t invo lve s any in jur y in sured 13 ag ain st. ” Sil

ver , 1 37 Co nn . at 53 0, 79 A. 2d at 3 58 (inter

na l qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed ). W hil e 14 “what ap pe ars at the tim e to be a re lat ive ly t riv ial acc ide nt m aylat er e ve ntu ate in a ser iou s in

jur y 15 wh ich

af fo rds the ba sis fo r a s ub stanti al c lai m [, ][ t] hat th is i s so do es n ot e sta bli sh

. . . th at the re 16 wa s an

ob lig ati on

up on the ass ure d to giv e n oti ce at th e ti m e th e ac cid ent oc curre d. ” Id. 17 Apparent injur y resulti ng from the accide nt is only one of the fact ors consider ed in deter mining 18 whether the i nsured should have recognized t hat a clai m w ould likel y be made. Se e B ak er v . 19 Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. , 171 A. 7, 8 (Conn. 1934). As a result, pr ovisions in Connect icut 20 ins uranc e p oli cie s sp eci fy ingimm ed iat e n oti ce o r pr om pt n oti ce h av e b een

co ns tru ed

as30 1 requiri ng that noti ce be given withi n a reasonabl e time under the cir cumstances of the case. Id. ; 2 seeals o S

ilv er , 137 Conn. at 528, 79 A.2d at 357. 3 W ithres pe ct t o “ no tic e”, the Ki ng s’ h om eo wn er’ s p oli cystates in r ele vant p art : “I n c ase 4 of an accident or oc currence, t he insured wil l perform the following duties tha t apply . . . a. Give 5 written not ice to us orour agent as s oon as practi cal, which set s forth: (1) The i dentity of the 6 po lic y and

Ins ure d; ( 2) R eas on ab ly ava ila ble inf orm ati on on the tim e, pla ce and

cir cum stanc es 7 of the accident oroccurrence ; and (3) Names and addr esses of any clai mants and witnesses; b. 8 Promptly forward to us every notic e, demand, summons or other process re lating t o the accide nt 9 or o ccu

rre nc e . . . . N o a cti on

can be bro ug ht a ga ins t us un les s th ere ha s b een co m pli an ce w ith 10 the policy pr ovisions.” 11 Of course, there is no dispute tha t the Kings eventually gave not ice to the ir insur ers of the 12 ATV accident. What is contested i s whether itcame “as soon as practi cal.” The Kings cont end 13 that th eyno tif

ied Ro ya l throu ghthe ir b rok er at N EB C a s so on as t he sit uatio n a ssum ed

“an 14 asp ect

su gg est ive of

a p os sib le c lai m

fo r dama ge s, ” Un ite d T

ech s. , 989 F. Supp. at 138 (quoting 15 Silver, 137 Conn. at 528, 79 A.2d at 357). The Kings rel y on social i nteract ions with the 16 McE nte es a ft er the acc ide nt, cla im ingthat C on or and his m oth er c am e to vis it the Ki ng s at the ir 17 residence as guests, and di d not give any indi cation whatsoe ver during t he time after the acci dent 18 that a l aw su it w as f ort hc om ing . C on or’ s o wn

arg ua ble rec kle ssn ess in r idi ng wi tho ut a saf ety 19 he lm et o n a

sk ate bo ard

att ach ed be hin d a m ov ingAT V c ou ld h av e o nly giv enad de d im

pu lse to 20 the co m fo rt f

rom su it the Ki ng s cl aim

to h av e f ound in s uc h s oc ial int erc ourse . W ith in a m att er31 1 of days after recei ving the let ter from the McEntees’ couns el indica ting an int ent to sue t he 2 Kings for damages arising from the accident, soci al inter course notwit hstanding, the Kings 3 no tif

ied NE BC , whic h n oti fi ed

Ro ya l. W e f

ind that it is unc lear un de r C onne cti cut law whe the r 4 the Ki ng s’ r eli an ce o n s oc ial int era cti on is e no ug h to cre ate a m ate ria l is su e o f f act as t o whe the r, 5 prior to t heir rec eipt of the let ter from the McEntees’ couns el, the si tuation would have 6 “su gg est [e d] to a

pe rso n o f o rdi nary and

rea so na ble pru de nc e th at l iab ili ty m ayhave be en 7 inc urr ed .” Id. 8 As to t

he pre jud ice pro ng of

the “n oti ce” an aly sis , R oy al s ub m itt ed anaf fi davit fr om its 9 regional c laims m anager sta ting that , because of the dela y, Royal was unable to i nspect the ATV, 10 hin de rin g it s ab ili ty t o g ath er e vid en ce r eg ard ingany p ote nti al p rod uc t de fe ct o r f

ail ure to w arn 11 claims. (A 01835). The Kings essenti ally rel y on a contemporaneous police r ecord of the 12 accident whic h stated t hat “[n]o obvious defects [of the ATV] w ere noted”, ( A 01221), and 13 su

bm it that th e A TVha d b een so ld and res old in c om m erc e w ith out po st- acc ide nt r ep air . (A 14 02 15 9-6 0. ) S inc e th e in sured be ars the burde n o f e sta

bli sh inglac k o f p rej ud ice to t he ins ure r 15 un de r C onne cti cut law, it i s unc lear w he the r th e K ing s’ s ub m iss ion an d th e p oli ce r eco rd c reate a 16 genuine disput e regardi ng the lack of prej udice to Royal, as suming that “unreasonabl e delay” 17 ha s b een

oth erw ise est ab lis he d. Th ere is s om e autho rity th at, in C onne cti cut, an in surer ’s 18 inabili ty to invest igate facts t hat might reduce its liabil ity consti tutes material prejudice

. Se e 19 Hartford Ins. Co. v. Colonia I ns. Co. , 58 Conn. App. 39, 44, 750 A.2d 1158, 1161 (2000) 20 (affirming the trial cour t’s finding of material pre judice where t he “complete failure to not ify32 1 de pri ve d th e d ef

en dant o f i ts o pp ort

un ityto i nv est igate the po ssi bil itythat th e d am ag e w as 2 caused by the negl igence of another . . . [and] the opportunity to purs ue a comprom ise or 3 settle m en t”) . H ow ev er, esp eci all y g ive n s cant C onne cti cut pr ece de nt p rov idi ng co nto urs to 4 de ter

m ine wh eth er s oc ial int era cti on s su gg est inga cl aim wi ll n ot b e p urs ue d c anrea so na bly 5 ex cu se d elay in

giv ingno tic e, gu idanc e is ne ed ed to a sse ss whe the r a g enuin e d isp ute of m ate ria l 6 fa ct e xis ts a s to no tic e. Si nc e th e n oti ce i ssu e im pli cat es i m

po rtant p oli cyco ns ide rat ion s, wh ich 7 we be lie ve are lik ely to r ecu r, i n what ha s b een

“p ara dig m ati cal ly a

state f iel d, ” th ere is “ gre ate r 8 cause for this c ourt to st ay its hand”, Parrot v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 338 F.3d 140, 9 144-45 (2d Cir. 2003) ( internal quotation marks omitted), until such guidance i s obtained. 10 Thus, we respectfully a sk the Connectic ut Supreme Court to address t his questi on 11 reg ard ing fa ct c irc um stanc es t hat can b e ap pro pri ate ly c on sid ere d in de ter m ini ng wh eth er, as 12 he re, the re h as b een co m pli an ce w iththe duty t o n oti fy anins ure r of

anacc ide nt f

or whic h 13 coverage is claimed. 14 CE RT IF IC AT ION 15 Resolution of this a ction broughtin diversi ty is enti rely dependenton the construction 16 and applicat ion of Connecticut ins urance law. We are empowered no stra s po nteto certi fy a 17 qu est ion

of state l awto t

he hig he st c ourt o f t

he state who se l awap pli es. 2d Ci r. R . 2 7. 2; see 18 Riordan v. Nationwide Mut . Fire Ins. Co. , 977 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1992). Recipr ocally, 19 Connecticut st atutory l aw specificall y and expressl y countenances t he certi fication of a questi on 20 of state law by a federal court dir ectly to t he Connecticut Supr eme Court “if the answer may be33 1 determinative of an issue in pending li tigati on in the cer tifying court a nd if there is no 2 co ntr oll ing [C onne cti cut] ap pe llate d eci sio n, co ns tit uti on al p rov isi on

or s tat ute .” Conn. Gen. 3 Stat. § 51-199b(d) . 4 As set forth above, we have found no Connectic ut appella te precede nt direct ly addressi ng 5 certai n significant que stions of Connecticutlaw lying at t he heart of this case. Certi fication 6 regarding a n unsettle d area of state law is “[i]n keeping with ourpreference tha t state s define the 7 m ean ing of

the ir o wn

law s in the fi rst ins tan ce. ” Ci ty o

f N .Y . v . S mo kes -Sp iri ts. co m, Inc

. , 541 8 F. 3d

42 5, 45 7 (2 d C ir. 20 08 ) ( rev’d on other grounds, Hemi Group, LLC v. City of N.Y., N.Y. , 9 130 S. Ct. 983 (2010)) (i nternal quot ation marks omitted) (alt eration i n original ). The case for 10 cer

tif icatio n to the Co nn ect icut S up rem e C ourt i s es pe cia llyco m pe lli ng wh enthe un cer

tai nty 11 pertains to an insura nce dispute, gi ven the “est ablished pr eeminence” of that court i n the field of 12 insurance l aw. Israel v. St ate Farm Mut. Auto. Ins . Co. , 2 39 F. 3d 12 7, 13 5 (2 d C ir. 20 00 ); see 13 Employers’ Liab. Assuranc e Corp. v. Travelers I ns. Co. , 411 F.2d 862, 863 (2d Cir. 1969) 14 (no tin g th at the Co nn ect icut S up rem e C ourt i s “p art icu lar ly e xp ert ” in ins uranc e m att ers ). 15 Accordingly, we res pectfully reque st that the Supreme Court of Connecticut addr ess the 16 fo llo wi ng qu est ion s: 17 (1) W ithres pe ct t o a cla im fo r ne gli ge nt e ntr

us tm ent un de r a l iab ili ty p oli cythat ex clu de s 18 coverage for “[a]rising outof . . . [t]he entrustment by an insured” “to a ny person,” “of a 19 m oto r ve hic le” oth er than “ [a ] m oto riz ed lan d c onve yanc e d esi gn ed fo r re cre ati on al u se 20 of

f p ub lic roa ds , n ot s ub

jec t to m oto r ve hic le r eg istrat ion an d .

. . [o ]wne d b y an in sured34 1 and on an insured l ocation,” i s the insur ed locati on 2 (a) the pl ace where the e ntrustment of the vehicle took place, or 3 (b) the pl ace where the ve hicle is garaged, or 4 (c) the pl ace where the a ccident occ urred? 5 (2) In t

he ab sen ce o f a

po lic y d ef

ini tio n o f “ pre m ise s”, sh ou ld a pri vate r oa d lo cat ed 6 within a res idential development owned by the insured’ s homeowners association be 7 considered “ premises used . . . in connect ion with a [reside nce] premises” under the 8 ter

m s o f a ho m eo wn er’ s in suran ce p oli cyif the po rti on

of the roa d whe re the lia

bil ity 9 aro se i s n ot r eg ularlyus ed bythe ins ure d, altho ug h o the r po rti on s o f t he roa d are s o 10 used? 11 (3) Under Connecti cut law, where a l iabi lity ins urance poli cy require s an insured t o give 12 notice of a covere d claim “as soon as pract ical,” do soc ial int eracti ons between the 13 ins ure d and the cla im ant m ak ingno ref ere nc e to anacc ide nt c lai m jus tif y a de lay in 1 4 g iv in g n o ti c e o f ap o te n ti a l c la im

to th e in s ure r? 15 The linchpin conne cting cer tified questi ons 1 and 2 and the judgment appeale d from is the 16 dis tri ct c ourt’ s d ete rm inatio n th at the oc curre nc e d id n ot h ap pe n o n an “ ins ure d lo cat ion ”. Si nc e 17 we believe tha t construc tion of this li nchpin term by the ConnecticutSupreme Court in the 18 co nte xt o f c ert if

ied qu est ion s 1 an d 2 wo uld

m os t pr ob ab ly b e d isp os iti ve of the ap pe al, we ask 19 that co urt

to e sta bli shun de r C onne cti cut in suran ce l awthe pro pe r param ete rs o f t his po lic y 20 lan gu ag e.35 1 In formulating the questi ons for certifica tion as we have, we do not mean to limit the 2 Connecticut Supre me C ourt’s r esponse. The cert ified questions may be expanded to cover any 3 fu rth er p ert ine nt q

ue sti on s o f C onne cti cut law that th e S up rem e C ourt d eem s ap pro pri ate to 4 an sw er i n c onne cti on wi th t he se i ssu es. Th e C onne cti cut S up rem e C ourt’ s g uid an ce i s 5 we lco m ed

on any s tat e law i ssu es p res ented bythi s ap pe al. Th is p an el r eta ins jur isd ict ion to 6 co ns ide r al l is su es o nc e th e S up rem e C ourt h as e ith er p rov ide d u s w ithits gu idanc e o r ha s 7 declined ce rtificat ion. 8 Accordingly, itis hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of this Courttransmit to the Cler k of 9 the ConnecticutSupreme Court a Certificate, as set forth below, toge ther with a c omplete set of 10 the bri ef

s, ap pe nd ix, an d re co rd f

ile d b y th e p art ies in t

his Co urt . T he parti es are f urt he r 11 ORDERED to bear equall y any costs or fees i mposed by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 12 CERTIFIC ATE 13 Th e f

ore go ingis h ere bycer

tif ied to t he Co nn ect icut S up rem e C ourt, pursu ant to 2d Ci r. 14 R. 27.2 and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199b, as order ed by the United Sta tes Court of Appeals for the 15 Se co nd

Ci rcu it. 16