U.S. Department of Energy 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Inspections and Special Inquiries 

Inspection Report 

Internal Controls Over Sensitive 

Compartmented Information Access 

for Selected Field Intelligence 

Elements 

DOE/IG-0796 July 2008 


INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED 

INFORMATION ACCESS FOR SELECTED FIELD 

INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS 

 

TABLE OF 

CONTENTS 

OVERVIEW

Introduction and Objective 1 

Observations and Conclusions 2 

DETAILS OF FINDINGS 

Background 3 

Database Issues 3 

Improper Facility Access 4 

Los Alamos SCI Access 

Authorization Termination 6 

RECOMMENDATIONS 7 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS 7 

INSPECTOR COMMENTS 7 

APPENDICES

A. Scope and Methodology 8 

B. Prior Reports 9 

C. Management Comments 10 
Overview 

 

Page 1 Internal Controls Over Sensitive 

 Compartmented Information Access 

 for Selected Field Intelligence 

 Elements 

INTRODUCTION As a member of the U.S. Government’s Intelligence Community, 

AND OBJECTIVE the Department of Energy (DOE) serves as the premier technical 

intelligence resource in the areas of nuclear weapons, 

nonproliferation, energy, science, and technology, as well as 

emerging nuclear threats. In addition to providing intelligence 

analyses, DOE offers specialized technology and operational 

support to both intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

DOE accomplishes its intelligence mission by drawing from 

technical expertise located throughout the Department complex, 

including the national laboratories. This necessitates 

Department-affiliated personnel having access to sensitive 

compartmented information (SCI), which is a designation given to 

classified information derived from intelligence sources, methods, 

or analytical processes that are required to be handled through 

designated access control systems. 

DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is 

responsible for granting SCI access authorization to DOE-affiliated 

personnel who need access to intelligence information. 

Individuals must have an active Top Secret or “Q” clearance to be 

granted and maintain SCI access authorization. The Office of 

Intelligence and Counterintelligence maintains an SCI personnel 

database called Lockbox. This database directly “feeds” into and 

supports the official national SCI personnel database. The Office 

of Inspector General recently completed an inspection of internal 

controls associated with the 969 individuals on a DOE 

Headquarters SCI access roster. We identified issues with 

(1) individuals who had left the Department or had been debriefed 

from the SCI program remaining on the Department’s SCI roster 

and (2) the execution of debriefing responsibilities by the Office of 

Intelligence and Counterintelligence. 

To complement this inspection, we initiated a review of local Field 

Intelligence Elements that the Office of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence maintains at several DOE sites in support of its 

intelligence mandate. These field sites have local SCI personnel 

databases, as well as local databases to control physical access 

systems, e.g., badge readers, for local SCI facilities. The objective 

of the inspection was to determine the adequacy of internal 

controls over access to intelligence information at two of these 

Field Intelligence Elements, Los Alamos National Laboratory
 

Page 2 Observations and Conclusions 

(Los Alamos) and Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia). 

According to Lockbox, as of October 1, 2007, there were 2,361 

DOE SCI access holders at these facilities: 856 at Los Alamos and 

1,505 at Sandia. 

OBSERVATIONS AND We concluded that the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 

CONCLUSIONS and the subordinate Field Intelligence Elements at Los Alamos and 

Sandia did not have adequate administrative internal controls over 

their databases used to track SCI access authorizations. Based on 

our comparison of Lockbox and four local databases containing the 

names, authorizations, and facility accesses of Los Alamos and 

Sandia SCI access holders, we found that: 

• The SCI personnel databases used by the Office of Intelligence 

and Counterintelligence, Los Alamos, and Sandia contained 

numerous errors, including incorrect database entries and 

failures to update information relevant to SCI access, which 

could lead to security incidents such as the one described 

below; 

• An individual physically accessed a Los Alamos SCI facility 

without escort after her SCI access authorization was 

terminated. Further, Los Alamos Field Intelligence Element 

officials did not report the security incident to the required 

Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence official; and, 

• The Los Alamos Field Intelligence Element had not terminated 

the SCI access authorizations of 13 individuals whose 

personnel security clearances had been terminated up to 101⁄2 

months previously. 

We note that in addition to the previously cited review of internal 

controls over SCI access authorizations on a DOE Headquarters 

access roster, other past reviews by the Office of Inspector General 

at Los Alamos and Sandia identified weaknesses in the internal 

controls intended to ensure that security clearances and access 

authorizations were terminated appropriately and expeditiously. A 

list of the associated reports is located at Appendix B. 
Details of Findings 

 

Page 3 Details of Findings 

BACKGROUND Individuals entering one or more SCI programs go through a series 

of in-processing actions. These actions are outlined in Director of 

Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 6/1 (previously 1/19), 

“Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information and 

Security Policy Manual.” They include being sponsored, being 

administratively reviewed and approved by Office of Intelligence 

and Counterintelligence officials, receiving one or more video 

briefs, and reviewing Form 4414 (EF), “Sensitive Compartmented 

Information Nondisclosure Agreement.” After reviewing the form, 

the individual signs and dates it to acknowledge an understanding 

of his/her security responsibilities. The individual also signs and 

dates the “Brief” block acknowledging receipt of the required 

briefings. DCID 6/1 states “Failure to sign an NdA [Nondisclosure 

Agreement] is cause for denial or revocation of existing SCI 

access. The NdA establishes explicit obligations on both the 

government and the individual signer for the protection of SCI.” 

When an individual no longer requires SCI access, the individual is 

to be debriefed on his/her continuing responsibility to safeguard 

SCI information. The individual then reviews the SCI 

Nondisclosure Agreement form and signs and dates the form in the 

“Debrief” block. The individual’s SCI access authorization is 

considered to be terminated at this point. 

We reviewed five databases. Los Alamos’ and Sandia’s local 

personnel databases were compared with Lockbox to determine if 

information relating to individuals with SCI access authorizations was 

accurate and consistent. The remaining two databases were associated 

with Los Alamos and Sandia SCI facility physical access systems and 

were reviewed to verify that personnel who were recently debriefed 

had not gained unescorted access to Laboratory SCI facilities. 

DATABASE ISSUES We found that the SCI personnel databases used by the Office of 

Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Los Alamos, and Sandia 

contained numerous errors, which could lead to security incidents 

such as the one described in the next section. Specifically, we 

identified 103 errors in Lockbox and local Los Alamos and Sandia 

personnel SCI access databases, including incorrect database entries 

and failures to update information relevant to SCI access. Of these 

identified errors: 

• Six of the Lockbox errors were individuals who still had 

active SCI access authorizations even though they had been 

formally debriefed from SCI programs;
 

Page 4 Details of Findings 

• Twenty of the Lockbox errors were individuals who were not 

entered, some for prolonged periods of time, to show that 

they were authorized to access SCI information; 

• In several instances, Lockbox data boxes were inaccurately 

checked, preventing parties/organizations external to the 

Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence from viewing 

the correct status of an individual’s actual SCI access 

authorization; and, 

• In some instances, the local databases contained inaccurate 

entries. For example, both Sandia and Los Alamos had wrong 

debriefing dates, and Sandia had instances where individuals 

whose SCI access requests had been denied or cancelled 

showed as being “Active” in the local SCI personnel database. 

(We did not find any evidence that any of these individuals 

had been SCI briefed or given unauthorized access to SCI 

information.) 

We were told that some of these errors occurred when the Office of 

Intelligence and Counterintelligence combined four separate 

databases into one, Lockbox, in November 2006. We determined 

that Sandia submitted corrections in August 2007 and Los Alamos 

in October 2007. On December 4, 2007, we found that not all of 

the corrections had been made by the Office of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence. However, at the conclusion of our inspection, 

all database issues had been corrected at all three locations. 

In discussing the accuracy of Lockbox with an Office of Intelligence 

and Counterintelligence senior official, we were told that the office 

had experienced a 300 percent increase in workload the last 2 years 

with no increase in manpower. We were told that this had led to 

delays with inputting SCI access information, delays in correcting 

identified errors, and an inability to perform sufficient quality 

assurance/control on the database. 

IMPROPER FACILITY We also found that an individual physically accessed a Los Alamos 

ACCESS SCI facility without escort after her SCI access authorization was 

terminated. Further, Los Alamos Field Intelligence Element 

officials did not report the security incident to the required Office 

of Intelligence and Counterintelligence official. 

On November 5, 2007, during our review of the Los Alamos SCI 

facility physical access system, we discovered that an individual who 
 

Page 5 Details of Findings 

was debriefed from the SCI program on November 8, 2006, gained 

unescorted access to a Los Alamos SCI facility on November 9, 

2006, contrary to DOE policy. Procedures are supposed to be 

established to remove “an individual’s authorization to enter an area 

when the individual is transferred, terminated, or the individual’s 

access is suspended, revoked, or downgraded to a level below that 

required for entry.” We immediately reported this previously 

undiscovered incident to Los Alamos officials. We were told that a 

Los Alamos Field Intelligence Element official subsequently 

initiated a telephonic conversation with the former employee. 

Reportedly, the individual told this official that she had returned to 

complete out-processing documentation. Another Los Alamos Field 

Intelligence Element official determined that the individual was able 

to gain access because her badge access authorization was not 

immediately removed from the Element’s SCI facility physical 

access system. Her facility access was not terminated until 

November 13, 2006, and no one had reviewed whether she had 

accessed the facility in the intervening period of time. 

We also determined that the Office of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence Special Security Officer had not been 

informed of the security incident by the Los Alamos Field 

Intelligence Element, as required. After the Office of Inspector 

General identified the issue to the Special Security Officer, the 

Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence requested additional 

information from Los Alamos. Los Alamos subsequently reported 

to the Special Security Officer that the security lapse occurred due 

to a series of events, to include the checklist executed for departing 

employees being reviewed and initialed as completed prior to 

collection of the employee’s badge and deactivation of the 

employee’s access in the badge reader system. 

On January 14, 2008, the Office of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence received an e-mail from Los Alamos stating 

that action was taken to ensure that no item on the checklist 

executed for departing employees is initialed as completed until 

the action has actually been completed. Based on this notification, 

the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence official said that 

all required actions had been completed. 
 

Page 6 Details of Findings 

LOS ALAMOS Finally, we found that the Los Alamos Field Intelligence Element 

SCI ACCESS had not terminated the SCI access authorizations of 13 individuals 

AUTHORIZATION whose personnel security clearances had been terminated up to 

TERMINATION 101⁄2 months previously. This appeared to be the result of the 

Element not having an effective means of being kept apprised of 

employee and personnel security clearance terminations. 

Specifically, the Element only had limited coordination with the Los 

Alamos entities handling employee and personnel security clearance 

terminations. In contrast, we noted that the Sandia Field Intelligence 

Element had taken actions to improve its integrated controls by 

establishing daily coordination with Sandia’s Human Resources 

organization. 

We also observed that this condition has the potential to result in the 

over-use of “administrative debriefings” by the Element. 

Administrative debriefings, which entail an authorized official 

annotating the SCI Nondisclosure Agreement with “Unavailable for 

Signature/Administrative Debrief,” are only supposed to be used 

when all means to properly inform an individual of his/her 

continuing SCI access responsibilities have failed. The overuse of 

administrative debriefings has been cited in previous Office of 

Inspector General reports. We identified seven administrative 

debriefings at Los Alamos during this current review. Los Alamos 

contended that it only executed an administrative debriefing when it 

had exhausted identified methods to contact the individual to obtain 

a signature. While this may be true, we believe that Los Alamos 

might have more success actually debriefing individuals if it had 

more timely notification of individuals’ departure. 

A Los Alamos Field Intelligence Element official acknowledged 

that a week or a month could pass without his office being notified 

concerning the termination of an employee who had SCI access. 

He said that sometimes his office was not even notified of an 

individual’s death. He also acknowledged that there were other 

Laboratory organizations that could assist with this issue. We 

believe that the Los Alamos Field Intelligence Element should 

coordinate with appropriate Laboratory organizations, such as the 

Human Resources and Personnel Security offices, in order to 

strengthen internal controls over SCI access authorizations. 
 

Page 7 Recommendations 

 Management and Inspector Comments 

RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that the Director, Office of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, ensures that: 

1. SCI access authorization information is processed in Lockbox 

in an accurate, timely, and complete manner. 

2. Lockbox and local databases are subjected to a periodic quality 

assurance/control regimen. 

3. Los Alamos Field Intelligence Element officials receive 

refresher training concerning security incidents, with specific 

emphasis on security incident reporting. 

4. The Los Alamos Field Intelligence Element establishes 

procedures with other Laboratory organizations to obtain 

timely notification concerning the termination of Laboratory 

personnel and personnel security clearances in order to ensure 

the timely termination of SCI access authorizations and 

minimize administrative debriefings. 

MANAGEMENT In comments on a draft of this report, the Office of Intelligence and 

COMMENTS Counterintelligence concurred with the report recommendations. 

Management identified corrective actions that have been or will be 

taken to address our recommendations. Management’s comments 

are included in their entirety at Appendix C. 

INSPECTOR We consider management’s comments to be generally responsive 

COMMENTS to our recommendations. 
Appendix A

Page 8 Scope and Methodology 

SCOPE AND We conducted our inspection fieldwork between September and 

METHODOLOGY December 2007. We looked at the Field Intelligence Elements that 

were administered in association with Los Alamos and Sandia. 

We interviewed officials from the Office of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, Los Alamos, and Sandia regarding DOE and 

local SCI-related policy, standard operating procedures, paper 

files, and electronic databases. We reviewed applicable Director 

of Central Intelligence; National Nuclear Security Administration 

Service Center; Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; and 

Laboratory policies, procedures, electronic databases, and paper 

files. 

We also compared five databases, three concerning SCI personnel 

access authorizations and two concerning physical access to SCI 

facilities; reviewed relevant Field Intelligence Element-related SCI 

personnel data entries; and in the case of SCI facility access, 

conducted a judgmental sample involving recently debriefed SCI 

access authorized personnel. At Los Alamos, we reviewed 76 of 

143 database files concerning SCI debriefed individuals and SCI 

facility access; and at Sandia, 100 of 195. During our inspection, 

we observed operations at Los Alamos and Sandia National 

Laboratory-New Mexico SCI facilities, and we reviewed data for 

both of these sites as well as for Sandia National LaboratoryCalifornia. 

Also, pursuant to the “Government Performance and Results Act 

of 1993,” we determined the Los Alamos and Sandia contractual 

performance measure processes did not address access control 

issues relating to the Field Intelligence Elements or their 

operations. However, the Office of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence and DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight 

evaluate a number of physical security topics that relate to Field 

Intelligence Element operations. 

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the “Quality 

Standards for Inspections” issued by the President’s Council on 

Integrity and Efficiency. 
Appendix B 

Page 9 Prior Reports 

PRIOR REPORTS The following Office of Inspector General reports involved work related 

to this inspection: 

• “Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Internal Controls 

Over the Department of Energy’s Sensitive Compartmented 

Information Access Program” (DOE/IG-0790, March 2008); 

• “Badge Retrieval and Security Clearance Termination at Sandia 

National Laboratory-New Mexico” (DOE/IG-0724, April 2006); 

and, 

• “Security and Other Issues Related to Out-Processing of 

Employees at Los Alamos National Laboratory” (DOE/IG-0677, 

February 2005). 
Appendix C 

Page 10 Management Comments 
Appendix C 

Page 11 Management Comments 
Appendix C 

Page 12 Management Comments 
Appendix C 

Page 13 Management Comments 
IG Report No. DOE/IG-0796 

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