The DISAM Annual, May 2012 ii

The DISAM Journal of International 

Security Cooperation Management

With the advent of the online DISAM Journal, which is continually updated, I don’t have as many opportunities 

to send periodic updates to our journal subscribers, and much has happened since the last hard copy printed journal. 

Let me first address the successes regarding the online DISAM Journal. We continue to push subscriptions to 

what we believe is a better publication. The “instantaneous” e-mail notifications to our subscribers when a major 

new article is posted is a terrific feature and facilitates the receipt of information more quickly, while also allowing 

any subscriber to delete those notifications dealing with areas not relevant to them. If you aren’t yet an online 

subscriber, it’s easy to do via our journal webpage. That said, as we publish this initial “Annual” printed edition, 

I’m hopeful that it also meets the needs of our community in its content of both original and “highlighted” articles 

from the past year online. With each year’s annual, we plan to have our traditional Security Cooperation legislation 

and policy for the year—an article that is one of our most popular in “rolling up” particulars of various programs 

that spread across our environment between a number of organizations, funding streams and with a variety of 

conditions for their application and use. In addition the numerous other articles in this publication span the various 

constituencies of DISAM—so enjoy the reading! 

At the last printed version of the journal, DISAM was in the middle of an immense task contained within a 

DEPSECDEF High Priority Performance Goal—a top ten DOD initiative to ensure that at least 95 percent of the 

SC workforce has their appropriate level of DISAM (SC) training by the end of FY2011. We did exceed that goal, 

achieving 98.3 percent as we ended FY11, due to the combined efforts of GCCs, military services, and other defense 

agencies. I continue to thank all involved as it truly was a community wide achievement. 

Over the past twelve months, there have been many changes to DISAM courseware. If you intend to register 

for a class, check our website for particulars on any course—online, resident, or on-site offerings are all included 

there and don’t take anything for granted—we continue to enhance all of our courses and if it’s been a while 

since you reviewed our Course Catalog, it could be significantly different. Our traditional cornerstone courses 

for both CONUS (SAM-C) and Overseas (SCM-O) have both changed dramatically. The SAM-C is now a oneweek resident or on-site offering preceded by approximately a week’s worth of online prerequisites that must be 

completed before attending the resident portion. The SCM-O is now a longer course, more fully encompassing 

the security cooperation environment (not simply the more traditional Security Assistance piece). That course is 

now three weeks with an additional week of tracks based on the position requirements of the individual Security 

Cooperation Officer attending. The tracks may be similar; however, the core portion is a week longer (from the 

previous two-week stint). For more details on DISAM courses and updates, you can view information on each 

course or review DISAM’s most current Curriculum Review Minutes (currently finalizing this past February’s 

session) at our website. 

DISAM online options continue to grow based on your needs. Whether it’s the short SC Familiarization Course, 

the longer Security Cooperation Orientation Course, International Programs Security Requirements Course, or other 

modules of instruction or practical applications, there are numerous opportunities that will continue to grow in both 

number and scope in the future. You also might take a look at the assorted publications available online through 

DISAM—it’s more than the “Greenbook” and “Redbook” that we use these days in a number of classes. 

Let me close with this: DISAM continues to be committed to meeting the education and training needs of the 

Security Cooperation Community, which numbers over 10,500 positions. More than DISAM courses, we continue to 

stress the Global Master of Arts Program, the International Affairs Certification and additional initiatives stemming 

from the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force to prepare the SC workforce for the challenges of tomorrow. As 

part of that commitment, DISAM will host a Council on Occupational Education Accreditation Reaffirmation Visit 

in CY2013—happening about every six years—which helps us ensure we’re taking the right academic steps to meet 

the needs of the security cooperation workforce.

DR. RONALD H. REYNOLDS

Commandant
iii The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Table of Contents

Legislation and Policy

Kenneth Martin, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“Fiscal Year 2012 Security Cooperation Legislation”................................................................................1

SC/SA Programs

Greg Sutton, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“Security Cooperation Initiatives” ...........................................................................................................59

Ron Yakkel, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“Are You Ready to Kick Some ‘ACSA?’”...............................................................................................61

Rob Cimperman, Cimperman, LLC

“DSCA Deploys RCPAMS System to Manage Event and Participant Information” ..............................65

Dr. Robert Weber, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“SCWD for SCWDiots”...........................................................................................................................71

Major Michael DeCicco, United States Air Force

“Strengthening Security Cooperation Through Force Management” ......................................................75

Foreign Military Sales

Susan McClure, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“Expeditionary Requirements Generation Teams” ..................................................................................85

Major James Swift, Defense United States Army

“Foreign Military Sales Observation in USCENTCOM” ........................................................................89

Logistics and Finance

Barton Chess, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“The Impact of Diminishing Manufacturing Sources on FMS Logistics Support” .................................95

Forrest Smith and Barbara Beaty-Johnson, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center

“A Primer for the United States Air Force: International Engine Management Program” ......................97

Acquisitions and IPSR

Choon-Joo Lee, Won-Joon Jang, Bong-Kyoo Yoon, Korea National Defense University and Institute for 

Industrial Economics and Trade

“Technology Acquisition Policy and Value Efficiency Analysis on Offsets in Defense Trade” ............103

Greg Sutton, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“A Perspective on FMS System Acquisition” ........................................................................................117

SCO Ops

Dr. Robert Weber, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“In SAARMS’ Way” ..............................................................................................................................119

Roger Scott, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“So, You’re Going to be a SCO Director of Training...”....................................................................... 123
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 iv

Training and Education

Christopher Burns, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“Advancing Security Cooperation Training Through Technology and Advanced Instructional Strategies”.

................................................................................................................................................................129

Gary Taphorn, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“DISAM Expands Curriculum and Courses for the SC Community” ...................................................137

Dr. Joanne Hawkins, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“2011 Distance Learning Survey Results” .............................................................................................141

Adam Jungdahl and Paul Lambert, National Defense University

“Winning Hearts by Broadening Minds: Measuring the Impact of International Military Education 

Assistance at the National Defense University”.....................................................................................153

John Smilek, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“The New Security Assistance Management-CONUS, SAM-C, Course”.............................................161

Lt. Col. Clay Benton, United States Air Force

“Efficacy of International Officer In-Resident Professional Military Education Attendance on Building 

Partnerships: A Survey of the International Officers Attending Air University MPE Programs During 

Academic Year 2010”.............................................................................................................................167

Dr. Mark Ahles, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Dr. Michael T. Rehg, Air Force Institute of Technology and California State University, Chico

Mr. Aaron Prince, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Ms. Litsu Rehak, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“State Department and DISAM Study on the Effectiveness of the International Military Education and 

Training (IMET) Program” ....................................................................................................................183

Regional Issues

Dr. Carlos Braziel, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“Relationship Building Considerations for Security Cooperation Officers in the Middle East” ...........199

Lt. Col. Tom Williams, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“Southeast Asia: Growing Security Cooperation?”................................................................................205

Jeffrey Fourman, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“Iran and the Bomb: Options for the United States”..............................................................................209

Book Reviews

Robert Van Horn, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define America’s Empire” .................................................................219

Lt. Col. Tom Williams, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace” ..........223

Robert Van Horn, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US 

Military” .................................................................................................................................................225
1 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

The defense authorization act, the major source 

for DOD security cooperation authorities, was 

enacted as the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA), Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.112-81, 31 December 

2011. As was the case for the last several years, there 

was no annual or biennial foreign relations or foreign 

affairs authorization act for FY2012.

The following three pieces of legislation are to 

be further summarized in this article as they relate to 

US security assistance and security cooperation. The 

highlights of the three laws are provided.

• Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 

Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012, 

Division I, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011.

◊ With prior consultation with Congress, most 

FY2012 military assistance funding programs 

may be used for the enhancement of foreign 

security forces in addition to military forces.

◊ “Graduating” from DOD funding assistance, 

Iraq is to receive significant foreign military 

financing program (FMFP) and international 

narcotics control and law enforcement 

(INCLE) funding assistance to use with Iraqi 

national funds.

◊ Using $100,000,000 from the FMS Admin 

Fund, the special defense acquisition fund 

(SDAF) is reinstituted.

◊ The use of FMFP funding continues to be 

prohibited for the sustainment of DOD “1206” 

initiated programs.

◊ $4,000,000 of IMET funding is to remain 

available through FY2013. In the past, this 

funding remained available until expended.

◊ The former section 620J, FAA, Limitation 

on Assistance to Security Forces [Leahy 

Amendment], is now section 620M, FAA. 

◊ Several countries are to be determined, 

certified, and reported by the Secretary of 

State to Congress to be in compliance with 

acceptable human rights standards prior 

allocation of FY2012 funding assistance.

Fiscal Year 2012 

Security Cooperation Legislation

By Kenneth W. Martin

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Please note that this summary is not legal 

advice and may not be relied on for official 

purposes. The reader should confer with 

one’s assigned general counsel for any 

related legal analysis or advice.

Introduction

Each year, the DISAM Annual publishes a 

summary of the legislation that impacts US security 

assistance, security cooperation, and other related 

international programs. This report is intended to 

alert all security assistance and security cooperation 

community members to the collective changes 

or continued requirements in legislation that will 

influence program planning and implementation for 

the coming years. As has been done in the past, the 

report is in outline form, with key topics highlighted 

to facilitate locating specific statutory references. 

This article does not include the initial funding 

allocations for FY2012 security assistance programs 

since the required Department of State report for the 

allocations to Congress in accordance with section 

653(a), FAA, is not yet available. This report is 

normally to be completed no later than thirty days 

after enactment of the Department of State and 

Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (S/FOAA) 

which for FY2012 was enacted on 23 December 2011 

as Division I, P.L.112-74. However, the Department 

of State congressional budget justifications (CBJ) for 

FY2013 provided the estimated FY2012 allocations 

along with the requests for FY2013 and are used 

within this article.

The FY2012 appropriations season included five 

continuing resolutions with the last, P.L.112-68, 17 

Dec 2011, lasting through midnight, 23 December 

2011. The S/FOAA for FY2012 was one of the nine 

required annual appropriations in P.L.112-74. The 

DOD Appropriations Act, 2012, was included as 

Division A. 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 2

» Extends the section 1004 authority of 

DOD providing support for counter-drug 

activities of other government agencies 

through FY2014

» Extends the section 1033 authority of DOD 

to provide additional support for counterdrug activities by other governments 

through FY2013 and adds thirteen 

additional countries to be eligible

» Extends the section 1021 authority 

of DOD to support counter-drug and 

counterterrorism campaign in Colombia 

through FY2012

» Provides authority through FY2014 for the 

assignment of DOD civilian employees as 

advisors to foreign country ministries of 

defense

» Amends 10 U.S.C. 407 to include DOD 

assistance in the clearance of stockpiled 

conventional munitions

» Extends section 1202 authority for DOD 

to provide through FY2014 the no‐cost 

loan of certain SME to coalition forces in 

Afghanistan

» Extends section 1208 authority for DOD to 

provide support not to exceed $50,000,000 

annually through FY2015 to forces 

supporting or facilitating ongoing US 

special forces operations

» Extends section 1206 authority for DOD 

to provide support through FY2013 for 

building the capacity of foreign military 

forces

» Establishes a two-year program at 

$35,000,000 annually through FY2013 to 

support forces participating in operations 

to disarm the Lord’s Resistance Army 

(LRA)

» Establishes the joint DOD/DOS Global 

Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) to be 

annually funded by DOD at $200,000,000 

and DOS at $50,000,000

 Until the GSCF is determined 

operational, authorizes a FY2012 GSCF 

Transitional program to provide up to 

$75,000,000 overall in counterterrorism 

assistance to military and security 

forces in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and 

the African Union Mission participants 

in Somalia.

◊ Emergent funding for Oversea Contingency 

Operations/Global War on Terrorism is 

provided in title VIII of the S/FOAA for 

assistance to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

• Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 

2012, Division A, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011

◊ Appropriations for the following programs:

» $47,026,000 for the Combatant 

Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF)

» $107,662,000 for the Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid 

(OHDCA)

» $508,219,000 for the Cooperative Threat 

Reduction Account

» $235,700,000 for the Israeli Cooperative 

Program

» $15,000,000 for the Asia Pacific Regional 

Initiative (APRI) Program

» $1,690,000,000 to reimburse key 

cooperating countries in South West Asia

» $400,000,000 for the Afghanistan 

Infrastructure Fund (AIF)

» $11,200,000,000 for the Afghanistan 

Security Forces Fund (ASFF)

» $200,000,000 for DOD contribution to the 

new Global Security Contingency Fund 

(GSCF)

» $400,000,000 in Army O&M for the 

Commanders’ Emergency Response Fund 

(CERP)

» $524,000,000 in Air Force O&M to fund 

operations and activities of the Office of 

Security Cooperation in Iraq

◊ Prohibits FY2012 funding for IMET, FMFP, 

EDA, “1206” assistance, licensing for DCS, 

and PKO for Chad, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, or Burma 

to support any military training or operations 

that include child soldiers.

◊ National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 

Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.112-81, 31 December 

2011

» Amends 10 U.S.C. 151 (a) adding the chief 

of the National Guard Bureau as a member 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

» Extends the section 1022 authority for 

joint task forces to provide support to 

law enforcement agencies conducting 

counterterrorism through FY2012
3 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

• P.L. 96-533: Peace Corps Act, Title VI, P.L. 96-

533, 16 December 1980.

• P.L. 99-239: Compact of Free Association, P.L. 

99-239, 14 January 1986.

• P.L. 99-415: Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act 

of 1986, P.L. 99-415, 19 September 1986.

• P.L. 101-179: Support for East European 

Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, P.L. 101-179, 

28 September 1989.

• P.L. 101-510: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 101-510, 5 November 

1990.

• P.L. 102-484: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484, 6 October 

1992.

• P.L. 102-511: Freedom for Russia and Emerging 

Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets 

(FREEDOM) Support Act (FSA) of 1992, P.L. 

102-511, 24 October 1992.

• P.L. 103-160: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 1994, P.L. 103-160, 30 

November 1993.

• P.L. 104-164: To amend the Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act 

to make improvements to certain defense and 

security assistance provisions under those Acts, 

to authorize the transfer of naval vessels to 

certain foreign countries, and for other purposes, 

P.L. 104-164, 21 July 1996.

• P.L. 104-201: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-201, 23 

September 1996.

• P.L. 105-85: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 1998, 18 November 1997.

• P.L. 106-113: Making Consolidated 

Appropriations for the Fiscal Year ending 

September 30, 2000, and for Other Purposes, 

P.L. 106-113, 29 November 1999.

• P.L. 106-429: Making Appropriations for Foreign 

Operations, Export Financing, and Related 

Programs for the Fiscal Year ending September 

30, 2001, and for Other Purposes, P.L. 106-429, 

6 November 2000.

• P.L. 107-115: Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign 

Operations, Export Financing, and Related 

Programs Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2002, 

P.L. 107-115, 10 January 2002.

• P.L. 108-136: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 2004, P.L. 108-136, 24 

November 2003.

 Also until the GSCF is determined 

operational, authorizes a similar 

FY2012 GSCF Transitional program 

to provide up to $75,000,000 in 

counterterrorism assistance for the 

Yemen Ministry of Interior.

» Amends the section 1234 logistics 

support program to coalition partners in 

Iraq and Afghanistan authorizing up to 

$450,000,000 through FY2012.

» Extends section 1216 authority in DOD 

annual support of $50,000,000 through 31 

Dec 2012 for the reintegration of former 

terrorists in Afghanistan

 However, prohibits the use of 50 

percent in funding until determined and 

reported that women in Afghanistan are 

an integral part of the reconciliation 

process

» Amends section 1217 authority for 

$400,000,000 in DOD support of the 

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) 

through FY2012

» Amends section 1224 authorizing the 

use of DOD funding within the Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) through 

FY2012.

Reference Sources

The following abbreviated titles will assist in 

identifying principal sources of information used in 

this article. The laws and associated congressional 

reports can be viewed at the Library of Congress 

“Thomas” webpage located at http://thomas.loc.gov.

• SAMM: Security Assistance Management 

Manual, DOD 5105.38-M, 3 October 2003, with 

changes. It is maintained electronically and can 

be viewed on the DSCA webpage at http://www.

dsca.mil/samm/.

• FAA: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 

amended, Public Law (P.L.) 87-195, 4 September 

1961 [22 U.S.C. 2151, et seq.].

• P.L. 87-510: Migration and Refugee Act of 1962, 

P.L. 87-510, 28 June 1962 [22 U.S.C. 2601]

• AECA: Arms Export Control Act, as amended, 

P.L. 94-329, 30 June 1976 [22 U.S.C. 2751, et 

seq.].

• P.L. 96-8: Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, 10 

April 1979.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 4

• P.L. 111-118: Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2010, Division A, P.L. 111-

118, 19 December 2009.

• P.L. 111-383: Ike Skelton National Defense 

Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2011, P.L.111-

383, 7 January 2011.

• P.L.112-10: Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2011, Division A, P.L.112-

10, 15 April 2011.

• P.L.112-10: Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations 

Act, 2011, division B, Title XI, P.L.112-10, 15 

April 2011.

• P.L.112-74: Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2012, Division A, P.L.112-

74, 23 December 2011.

• P.L.112-74: Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations 

Act, 2012, Title XI, P.L.112-74, 23 December 

2011.

• P.L.112-81: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.112-81, 31 December 

2011.

Legislation for Fiscal Year 2012

Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 

Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012 (S/

FOAA), Division I, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011

• The House Appropriations Committee (HAC) 

never passed an S/FOAA for FY2012 while the 

Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) passed 

S1601 on 21 September 2011 with S.Rpt. 112-85 

published on 22 September 2011. The bill was 

never acted upon by the Senate.

• The final S/FOAA was incorporated into 

HR2055, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, 

as Division I. HR2055 was originally introduced 

and passed months earlier by both houses as 

the Military Construction and Veteran’s Affairs 

Appropriations Act, 2012. HR2055 became the 

vehicle used by the conference committee to 

amend into the needed consolidated appropriation 

for the outstanding nine appropriations 

remaining for FY2012. The conference report 

was filed on 15 December 2011 as H.Rpt 112-

331 and immediately passed by both houses, on 

16 December by the House and 17 December by 

the Senate. The final omnibus appropriation was 

enacted on 23 Dec 2011 as P.L.112-74.

• P.L. 108-287: Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-287, 5 

August 2004.

• P.L. 108-375: Ronald W. Reagan National 

Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2005, 

P.L. 108-375, 28 October 2004.

• P.L. 109-163: National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, 6 January 

2006.

• P.L. 109-364: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 2007, P.L. 109-364, 17 October 

2006.

• P.L. 109-472: Department of State Authorities 

AP.L. 110-116: Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2008, Division A, P.L. 110-

116, 13 November 2007.

• P.L. 110-161: Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations 

Act, 2008, Division J, P.L. 110-161, 26 December 

2007.

• P.L. 110-161: Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act for Defense, 2008, Division 

L, P.L. 110-161, 26 December 2007.

• P.L. 110-181: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110- 181, 28 January 

2008.

• P.L. 110-417: Duncan Hunter National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, P.L. 110-

417, 14 October 2008.

• P.L.110-457: Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 

2008, Title IV, P.L. 110-457, 23 December 2008.

• P.L. 111-08: Department of State, Foreign 

Operation, and Related Programs Appropriations 

Act, 2009, Division H, P.L. 111-08, 11 March 

2009.

• P.L. 111-32: Supplemental Appropriations Act, 

2009, P.L. 111-32, 24 June 2009.

• P.L. 111-73: Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan 

Act of 2009, P.L. 111-73, 15 October 2009.

• P.L. 111-84: National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2010, P.L. 111-84, 28 October 

2009.

• P.L. 111-88: Further Continuing Resolution, 

2010, Division B, P.L. 111-88, 30 October 2009.

• P.L. 111-117: Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations 

Act, 2010, Division F, P.L. 111-117, 16 December 

2009.
5 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

• The Secretary of State is to submit a report to 

the appropriations committees detailing any 

crowd control items, including tear gas, made 

available with appropriated funds or through 

export licenses to foreign security forces that 

the Secretary has credible information have 

repeatedly used excessive force to repress 

peaceful, lawful, and organized dissent.

◊ The Secretary is to consult with the 

appropriations committees prior to obligating 

funds for such items to governments of 

countries undergoing democratic transition in 

the Middle East and North Africa

• No FY2012 FMFP funds shall be made available 

to support or continue any program initially 

funded under the section 1206, NDAA, FY2006, 

as amended, P.L.109-163, 6 January 2006, unless 

the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 

Secretary of Defense, has justified such program 

to the appropriations committees.

• FY2012 FMFP funds may be used for demining, 

the clearance of unexploded ordnance, and 

related activities and may include activities 

implemented through nongovernmental and 

international organizations.

• Not more than $62,800,000 may be obligated for 

necessary expenses, including the purchase of 

passenger motor vehicles for replacement only 

• Table 1 provides an overview for FY2012 

security assistance funding to include the final 

appropriation for FY2010 and the proposed 

request for FY2013.

Program FY 2011 Appropriation FY 2012 Appropriation FY 2013 Request

FMFP $5,374,230,000 $6,312,000,000 $6,383,320,000

IMET 105,788,000 105,788,000 102,643,000

PCCF 297,220,000 800,000,000 800,000,000

ESF 5,931,714,000 5,796,207,000 5,886,442,000

PKO 304,390,000 383,818,000 249,100,000

INCLE 1,593,806,000 2,004,705,000 2,506,502,000

NADR 738,520,000 710,770,000 635,668,000

Title IV, International Security Assistance, 

Funds Appropriated to the President: 

Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)

• Appropriated $5,210,000,000 in grant assistance 

to carry out the provisions of section 23, AECA.

◊ Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Global War on Terrorism, appropriated an 

additional $1,102,000,000 in FMFP grant 

assistance but to remain available only 

through 30 September 2013.

• Following consultation with the appropriations 

committees and regular committee notifications, 

these funds may be used to procure defense 

articles and services to enhance the capacity of 

foreign security forces. 

• The following earmarks are included:

◊ Not less than $3,075,000,000 for Israel of 

which not less than $808,725,000 shall be 

available for procurement in Israel to include 

research and development.

» FY2012 is the fourth year in which the US 

will provide $30 billion overall in FMFP 

assistance during a ten year period to 

Israel.

◊ $1,300,000,000 for Egypt to include border 

security programs and activities in the Sinai.

◊ $300,000,000 for Jordan

Table 1

Security Assistance Appropriations

Note: The FY2011 PCCF was a transfer from the DOD PCF account, and the FY2012 PCCF includes $50M 

which was transferred to the new Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF).

Source: State Department Executive Budget Summary for the Function 150 budget for FY2013 released 13 

February 2012.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 6

for use outside of the US, for the general costs of 

administering military assistance and sales.

◊ Not more than $4,000 may be available for 

entertainment expenses and not to exceed 

$130,000 may be available for representation 

allowances.

• And finally, not more than $836,900,000 of 

funds realized pursuant to section 21(e)(1)(A), 

AECA [admin fund], may be obligated for DOD 

expenses during FY2012 pursuant to section 

43(b), AECA [recovery of admin expenses]. 

◊ Section 7080 of this act allows for up to 

$100,000,000 in the Admin Fund to be 

transferred to the section 51, AECA, Special 

Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) to remain 

available for obligation through FY2015.

• Table 2 provides the estimated FMFP funding 

allocations for FY2012 along with actual 

allocations for FY2011 and requested funding 

for FY2013.

Table 2

Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) Allocations [$ in thousands]

Program FY2011 FY2012 FY2013

Africa $19,098 $16,118 $15,971

Botswana 339 200

Chad 399 200

Cote d’Ivoire 200

DR of the Congo 300 200

Djibouti 1,996 1,500 1,000

Ethiopia 843

Gabon 200

Ghana 449 350 350

Guinea 200

Kenya 998 1,500 1,096

Liberia 7,173 6,500 6,500

Mali 200 200

Mauritania 200 200

Nigeria 1,212 1,000 1,000

Rwanda 300 200 200

Senegal 399 325 325

South Africa 798 700 700

South Sudan 200

Tanzania 200 200 200

Uganda 300 200 200

Africa Regional 3,635 2,000 3,400
7 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

East Asia & Pacific $39,202 $35,658 $35,488

Cambodia 748 800 1,000

Indonesia 19,960 14,000 14,000

Mongolia 2,996 3,000 3,000

Philippines 11,970 14,555 13,500

Thailand 1,568 988 988

Vietnam 1,960 2.315 3,000

Europe & Eurasia $131,171 $106,865 $102,000

Albania 3,992 3,000 3,000

Armenia 2,994 2,700 2,700

Azerbaijan 2,994 2,700 2,700

Bosnia & Herzegovina 4,491 4,500 4,500

Bulgaria 9,481 8,500 7,800

Croatia 3,493 2,500 2,500

Czech Republic 5,988 5,000 5,000

Estonia 2,695 2,400 2,400

Georgia 15,968 14,400 14,400

Hungary 998 900 900

Kosovo 5,000 3,000 3,000

Latvia 2,794 2,250 2,250

Lithuania 2,994 2,550 2,550

Macedonia 2,992 3,600 3,600

Malta 399

Maldova 1,497 1,250 1,250

Montenegro 1,472 1,200 1,200

Poland 33,932 24,165 20,000

Romania 12,974 12,000 12,000

Serbia 1,896 1,800 1,800

Slovakia 1,397 1,000 1,000

Slovenia 748 450 450

Ukraine 8,982 7,000 7,000

Near East $4,470,177 $4,813,650 $4,836,150

Bahrain 15,461 10,000 10,000

Egypt 1,297,400 1,300,000 1,300,000

Israel 2,994,000 3,075,000 3,100,000

Jordan 299,400 300,000 300,000

Lebanon 74,850 75,000 75,000

Libya 150 150

Morocco 8,982 8,000 8,000

Oman 13,000 8,000 8,000

Tunisia 17,124 17,500 15,000
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 8

Source: State Department Executive Budget Summary for the Function 150 budget for FY2013 release 13 

February 2012.

Yemen 19,960 20,000 20,000

South & Central Asia $305,652 $107,625 $360,330

Bangladesh 2,957 1,500 1,650

Kazakhstan 2,395 1,800 1,800

Kyrgyz Republic 1,496 1,500 1,500

Maldives 400 400

Nepal 898 940 845

Pakistan 295,408 98,000 350,000

Sri Lanka 998 500 450

Tajikistan 750 800 1,500

Turkmenistan 750 685 685

Uzbekistan 1,500 1,500

Western Hemisphere 84,477 67,284 62,381

Belize 200 200 200

Colombia 47,904 37,000 30,000

Costa Rica 349 315 1,402

Ecuador 499 450 450

El Salvador 1,247 1,250 1,800

Guatemala 499 500 750

Haiti 1,597 1,600

Honduras 998 1,000 3,000

Mexico 7,984 7,000 7,000

Nicaragua 339 399 399

Panama 2,096 1,840 2,800

Paraguay 399 350 350

Peru 3,500 1,980 1.980

Uruguay 399

West Hemi Reg 16,467 15,000 10,000

FMFP Admin $54,453 $62,800 $60,000

Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO)

$1,102,000 $911,000

Iraq 850,000 900,000

Pakistan 197,408

FMFP Admin 11,000

Unallocated 54,592

Total FMFP $5,374,230 $6.312,000 $6,383,320
9 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Title IV, International Security Assistance, 

Funds Appropriated to the President: 

International Military Education and 

Training (IMET)

• Appropriation of $105,788,000 in grant assistance 

to carry out the provisions of section 541, FAA, 

of which up to $4,000,000 may remain available 

through FY2013 and may only be provided 

through regular congressional appropriations 

committees notification procedures.

• The civilian personnel to receive training 

funded by FY2012 IMET may include civilians 

who are not members of a government whose 

participation would contribute to improved civilmilitary relations, civilian control of the military, 

or respect for human rights.

• The Secretary of State shall provide a report not 

later than forty-five days of enactment of this 

act to both appropriations committees to include 

proposed uses of all IMET programs on a country 

by country basis with a detailed description of 

proposed activities.

• Not more than $55,000 of FY2012 IMET funding 

may be available for entertainment allowances.

• Table 3 provides the estimated IMET funding 

allocations for FY2012

Table 3

International Military Education and Training (IMET) Allocations [$ in thousands]

Program FY2011 FY2012 FY2013

Africa $16,110 $14,315 $13,255

Angola 418 365 280

Benin 236 230 210

Botswana 685 655 575

Burkina Faso 246 225 200

Burundi 352 325 275

Cameroon 285 270 250

Cape Verde 123 120 100

Cen Afr Rep 115 100

Chad 391 340 300

Comoros 125 100 90

Cote d’Ivoire 89 200

DR of the Congo 50 450 400

Djibouti 372 335 315

Ethiopia 650 575 500

Gabon 248 200 170

Ghana 825 765 700

Guinea 48 100 200

Guinea-Bissau 10 65

Kenya 929 890 750

Lesotho 186 100 90

Liberia 522 490 450

Malawi 400 285 270

Mali 397 350 350

Mauritania 184 150 150
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 10

Mauritius 155 120 90

Mozambique 402 385 370

Namibia 204 125 100

Niger 66 115

Nigeria 1,013 870 750

Republic of the Congo 123 110 90

Rwanda 559 500 500

Sao Tome & Principe 180 100 100

Senegal 1,026 850 750

Seychelles 94 100 90

Sierra Leone 394 375 350

South Africa 820 815 750

South Sudan 763 800 750

Swaziland 199 100 90

Tanzania 455 390 375

The Gambia 120 100 90

Togo 286 140 120

Uganda 608 600 550

Zambia 422 335 300

East Asia & Pacific $9,291 $8,740 $8,135

Cambodia 260 260 260

Indonesia 1,811 1,800 1,610

Laos 200 200 200

Malaysia 956 825 700

Marshall Islands 45 55 50

Mongolia 997 875 750

Philippines 1,971 1,850 1,665

Samoa 113 40 40

Thailand 1,568 1,325 1,250

Timor-Leste 297 300 300

Vietnam 476 650 750

E. Asia & Pacific Reg 597 560 560

Europe & Eurasia $30,287 $29,425 $28,600

Albania 1,064 1,000 1,000

Armenia 449 700 600

Azerbaijan 943 700 600

Bosnia & Herzegovina 986 1,000 1,000

Bulgaria 1,778 1,700 1,800

Croatia 956 900 900

Czech Republic 1,992 1,900 1,800

Estonia 1,143 1,125 1,100

Georgia 1,895 1,900 1,800
11 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Greece 1,895 1,900 1,800

Hungary 1,077 950 900

Kosovo 678 700 700

Latvia 1,135 1,150 1,150

Lithuania 1,143 1,125 1,100

Macedonia 1,041 950 900

Malta 153 150 150

Moldova 898 750 750

Montenegro 455 500 500

Poland 2,090 2,100 2,00

Portugal 93 100 100

Romania 1,750 11,750 1,700

Serbia 893 900 900

Slovakia 950 900 900

Slovenia 712 675 650

Turkey 3,990 3,800 3,600

Ukraine 1,925 1,900 1,900

Near East $17,294 $18,009 $18,945

South Sudan 763 800 750

Swaziland 199 100 90

Tanzania 455 390 375

The Gambia 120 100 90

Togo 286 140 120

Uganda 608 600 550

Zambia 422 335 300

East Asia & Pacific $9,291 $8,740 $8,135

Cambodia 260 260 260

Indonesia 1,8111 1,800 1,610

Laos 200 200 200

Malaysia 956 825 700

Marshall Islands 45 55 50

Mongolia 997 875 750

Philippines 1,971 1,850 1,665

Samoa 113 40 40

Thailand 1,568 1,325 1,250

Timor-Leste 297 300 300

Vietnam 476 650 750

E. Asia & Pacific Reg 597 560 560

Europe & Eurasia $30,287 $29,425 $28,600

Albania 1,064 1,000 1,000

Armenia 449 700 600
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 12

Azerbaijan 943 700 600

Bosnia & Herzegovina 986 1,000 1,000

Bulgaria 1,778 1,00 1,800

Croatia 956 900 900

Czech Republic 1,992 1,900 1,800

Estonia 1,143 1,125 1,100

Georgia 1,895 1,900 1,800

Greece 98 100 100

Hungary 1,077 950 900

Kosovo 678 700 700

Latvia 1,135 1,150 1,150

Lithuania 1,143 1,125 1,100

Macedonia 1,041 950 900

Malta 153 150 150

Moldova 898 750 750

Montenegro 455 500 500

Poland 2,090 2,100 2,000

Portugal 93 100 100

Romania 1,750 1,750 1,700

Serbia 893 900 900

Slovakia 950 900 900

Slovenia 712 675 650

Turkey 3,990 3,800 3,600

Ukraine 1,925 1,900 1,900

Near East $17,294 $18,009 $18,945

Algeria 953 1,225 1,150

Bahrain 435 700 725

Egypt 1,275 1,400 1,800

Iraq 1,736 2,000 2,000

Jordan 3,760 3,700 2,800

Lebanon 2,476 2,375 2,250

Libya 200 50

Morocco 1,989 1,805 1,710

Oman 1,622 1,650 2,050

Saudi Arabia 4 10

Tunisia 1,950 1,854 2,300

Yemen 1,094 1,100 1,100

South & Central Asia $13,088 $14,040 $14,259

Afghanistan 1,555 1,950 1,500

Bangladesh 994 950 900

India 1,601 1,330 1,260

Kazakhstan 876 785 707
13 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Kyrgyz Rep 820 1,000 1,000

Maldives 179 190 176

Nepal 1,010 950 900

Pakistan 4,055 5,000 6,000

Sri Lanka 952 665 626

Tajikistan 469 570 540

Turkmenistan 288 350 350

Uzbekistan 289 300 300

Western Hemisphere $14,458 $15,700 $14,446

Argentina 297 750 544

Belize 190 190 180

Bolivia 198 230 200

Brazil 631 640 625

Chile 821 855 810

Colombia 1,695 1,665 1,575

Costa Rica 394 375 350

Dominican Republic 600 810 765

Ecuador 400 380 360

El Salvador 1,521 1,050 1,000

Guatemala 192 760 720

Guyana 386 315 300

Haiti 220 220 220

Honduras 765 700 650

Jamaica 739 700 398

Mexico 1,006 1,635 1,549

Nicaragua 538 790 700

Panama 738 760 720

Paraguay 407 380 360

Peru 619 620 585

Suriname 251 240 225

The Bahamas 201 190 180

Trinidad & Tobago 253 180 180

Uruguay 590 465 450

Barbados & E. Carib. 806 800 800

IMET Admin Exp. $5,260 $5,559 $5,003

Total IMET $105,788 $105,788 $102,643

Source: State Department Executive Budget Summary for the Function 150 budget for FY2013 released 13 

February 2012.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 14

Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism, International 

Security Assistance, Funds Appropriated to 

the President: Pakistan Counterinsurgency 

Capability Fund (PCCF)

• $850,000,000 to remain available through 

FY2013 for necessary expenses to carry out the 

provisions of part I, chapter 8 (INCLE); and part 

II, chapters 2 (Military Assistance), 5 (IMET), 6 

(PKO), and 8 (Antiterrorism), FAA, and section 

23 (FMFP), AECA, for the purpose of providing 

assistance for Pakistan to build and maintain 

the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistani 

security forces (including the Frontier Corps), to 

include program management, training in civilmilitary humanitarian assistance, human rights 

training, and the provision of equipment, supplies, 

services, training, and facility and infrastructure 

repair, renovation, and construction.

Table 4

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) Allocations [$ in thousands]

Title III, Bilateral Economic Assistance, Fund 

Appropriated to the President: Economic 

Support Fund (ESF)

• Appropriation of $3,001,745,000 in grant 

assistance to carry out the provisions of Part II, 

Chapter 4, FAA, to remain available through 

FY2013.

◊ Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Global War on Terrorism, Bilateral 

Economic Assistance, Funds Appropriated 

to the President, appropriated an additional 

$2,761,462,000 in ESF grant assistance also 

to remain available through FY2013.

• $250,000,000 shall be available for Egypt, 

including not less than $35,000,000 for education 

programs of which not less $10,000,000 is for 

scholarships at not-for-profit institutions for 

Egyptian students with high financial need.

• Any funds made available for Cyprus shall only 

be used for scholarships, administrative support 

for the scholarship program, bicommunal 

projects, and measures aimed at reunification of 

the island and designed to reduce tensions and 

promote peace and cooperation between the two 

communities on Cyprus.

• $12,000,000 shall be for assistance for Lebanon 

for use in scholarships at not-for-profit institutions 

for students in Lebanon with high financial need.

• Not less than $360,000,000 shall be for Jordan.

• Up to $30,000,000 of the ESF funds previously 

appropriated by section 2109, Department 

of State, Foreign Operations, and Related 

Programs, Appropriations Act, 2011, division 

B, title XI, P.L.112-10, 15 April 2011, may be 

made available for the costs of loan guarantees 

for Tunisia.

• Notwithstanding any other provision of law 

except section 620M, FAA, such funds shall 

be available to the Secretary of State, with the 

concurrence of the Secretary of Defense.

• Such funds may be transferred by the Department 

of State to the Department of Defense or other 

federal departments or agencies to support 

counterinsurgency operations.

• Section 8004 of this Title VIII authorizes the 

Secretary of State to fund the new Global Security 

Contingency Fund (GSCF) with $50,000,000 

from INCLE, FMFP, or PCCF appropriations 

within Title VIII of this Act. The Secretary opted 

to use the PCCF account.

• The GSCF was later authorized by section 1207, 

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 

Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.112-81, 31 December 2011.

• Table 4 provides the estimated PCCF funding 

allocations for FY2012 along with actual 

allocations for FY2011 and requested funding 

for FY2013.

Program FY2011 FY2012 FY2013

PCCF $297,220 $800,00 $800,00

Notes: The FY2011 amount is from the DOD PCF and the FY2012 amount includes a $50M transfer to the new 

Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF).

Source: State Department Executive Budget Summary for the Function 150 budget for FY2013 released 13 

February 2012.
15 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

• In consultation with the Secretary of the 

Treasury, the Secretary of State may transfer 

up to $200,000,000 in FY2012 ESF to funds 

appropriated under the heading “Multilateral 

Assistance, Funds appropriated to the President, 

International Financial Institutions” for additional 

payment to such institutions. Prior to exercising 

this transfer authority, the Secretary of State shall 

consult with the congressional appropriations 

committees.

• Table 5 provides the estimated ESF funding 

allocations for FY2012

Table 5

Economic Support Fund (ESF) Allocations [$ in thousands]

◊ This amount for the costs of loan guarantees 

shall not be considered “assistance” for 

the purposes of provisions of law limiting 

assistance to a country.

• Not less than $179,000,000 shall be apportioned 

directly to USAID for alternative development/

institution building programs in Colombia.

• Not less than $7,000,000 of FY2012 ESF that is 

available for Colombia, shall be transferred to 

the heading “Migration and Refugee Assistance” 

and shall be made available only for assistance to 

nongovernmental and international organizations 

that provide assistance to Colombian refugees in 

neighboring countries.

Program FY2011 FY2012 FY2013

Africa $297,220 $800,00 $800,00

Cote d’Ivoire 14,715 14,715 13,500

DR of the Congo 45,915 47,915 50,100

Liberia 124,532 124,276 105,200

Sierra Leone 6,500 4,500 5,000

Somalia 19,627 19,627 19,400

South Sudan 223,431 305,360 288,499

Sudan 26,393 30,000 37,600

Uganda 5,000

Zimbabwe 25,578 25,578 23,600

African Union 760 760 900

Africa Regional 16,089 20,000 18,400

E. Africa Regional 10,000

E. Asia & Pacific $90.892 $88,115 $55,800

Burma 6,427 35,100 27,200

Cambodia 12,000 7,000 5,000

China 5,000 10,500 4,500

North Korea 3,493

Timor-Leste 2,994 1,000

Vietnam 18,463 15,000 7,100

E. Asia & Pac Reg. 12,515 12,515 12,000

Reg Dev Mission-Asia 7,000

Europe & Eurasia $15,852 $6,000 $358,077

Albania 10,025

Armenia 27,219

Azerbaijan 11,029

Belarus 11,000
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 16

Bosnia & Herzegovina 28,556

Cyprus 8,362 3,500 3,200

Georgia 42,660

Kosovo 42,544

Macedonia 9,812

Moldova 14,050

Montenegro 335

Poland 3,000

Russia 36,229

Serbia 19,913

Ukraine 53,957

Eurasia Reg 2,495 21,137

Europe Reg 2,495 20,911

Intl Fund for Ireland 2,500 2,500 2,500

Near East $1,675,925 $1,539,430 $1,394,350

Egypt 249,500 250,000 250,000

Iraq 325,700 299,400 262,850

Jordan 362,274 360,000 360,000

Lebanon 84,725 84,725 70,000

Morocco 2,281

Tunisia 5,000 5,000 10,000

West Bank & Gaza 395,699 395,699 370,00

Yemen 26,606 26,606 38,00

Egypt Debt Relief 100,00

ME Multilaterals 1,140 1,500 1,000

ME Partnership Init 80,000 70,000

ME Reg Cooperation 3,000 5,000 2,500

ME Reg Democracy 35,000 35,000 30,000

Trans-Sahara C/T 1,500

ME Regional 5,000 5,000

South & Central Asia $2,906,927 $32,003 $1,839,195

Afghanistan 1,967,509 811,399

Kazkhstan 6,892

Kyrgyz Rep 32,819

Nepal 16,979 26,979 17,000

Pakistan 918,904 928,250

Tajikistan 19,125

Turkmenistan 4,640

Uzbekistan 5,512

Cen Asia Reg 2,358

S & Cen Asia Reg 3,535 5,024 11,200

Western Hemisphere $435,130 $466,541 $434,200
17 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Colombia 184,426 179,000 155,000

Cuba 20,000 20,000 15,000

El Salvador 2,000

Haiti 131,000 148,281 141,000

Mexico 18,000 33,260 35,000

Venezuela 5,000 5,000 3,000

Western Hemisphere Reg 76,704 79,000 85,200

Other $303,448 $253,925 $204,750

Asia ME Reg 5,000

Counterterrorism 5,000 10,500

Demo, Conf, & HA 30,458 27,900

Demo, HR & Labor 6,000 64,000

Edu & Cultural Affairs 5,000

Eco Grow, Agr & Trade 15,352 15,352 13,500

Energy Resources 8,000 14,250

ME Response Fund 135,000 50,000

Ocean & Intl Environ 105,552 115,552 101,000

Policy Plan & Learning 1,000

Unallocated 9,836 13,521

Spec Reps 1,250 7,000 1,500

FA Prog Eval 600

Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO

$2,801,462 $1,037,871

Afghanistan 1,936,762 1,037,871

Pakistan 864,700

Total ESF $5,931,714 $5,796,207 $5,886,442

Source: State Department Executive Budget Summary for the Function 150 budget for FY2013 released 13 

February 2012.

Title IV, International Security Assistance, 

Department of State: Peacekeeping 

Operations (PKO)

• An appropriation of $302,818,000 for necessary 

expenses to carry out the provisions of section 

551, FAA.

◊ Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Global War on Terrorism, appropriated an 

additional $81,000,000 in PKO assistance 

but to remain available only through 30 

September 2013.

• These funds may be used to provide assistance to 

enhance the capacity of foreign civilian security 

forces, including gendarmes, to participate in 

PKO.

• Not less than $28,000,000 shall be used for the 

US contribution to the Multinational Force and 

Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai.

• Up to $91,818,000 may be used to pay assessed 

expenses of international peacekeeping activities 

in Somalia, but to remain available through 

FY2013.

• No funding appropriated in this Act should be 

used to support military training or operations 

that include children soldiers.

• No FY2012 PKO funding shall be obligated or 

expended except as provided through regular 

notification procedures with the congressional 

appropriations committees.

• Table 6 provides the estimated PKO funding 

allocations for FY2012 along with actual 

allocations for FY2011 and requested funding 

for FY2013.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 18

Table 6

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Allocations [$ in thousands]

Program FY2011 FY2012 FY2013

Africa $159,650 $182,968 $132,000

Cote d’Ivoire 2,000

DR of the Congo 21,520 19,000 15,000

Liberia 5,000 5,000 2,000

Somalia 73,300 91,818 51,000

South Sudan 41,870 58,000 40,000

Africa Regional 15,960 9,150 22,000

Near East 26,000 28,000 26,000

MFO-Sinai 26,000 28,000 26,000

State/PM $118,740 $91,850 $91,100

Trans-Sahara C/T 19,940 16,100

GPOA 98,800 91,850 75,000

Overseas 

Contingency 

Operations (OCO)

$81,000

Somalia 51,000

Africa Regional 10,000

Trans-Sahara C/T 20,000

Total PKO $304,390 $383.818 $249,100

Title IV, International Security Assistance, 

Department of State: International 

Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 

(INCLE)

• Appropriation of $1,061,100,000 for necessary 

expenses to carry out section 481, FAA, to 

remain available through FY2013.

◊ Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Global War on Terrorism, appropriated an 

additional $983,605,000 in INCLE assistance 

likewise to remain available through 30 

September 2013.

• Secretary of State is authorized during FY2012 

IAW section 608, FAA, to receive excess 

property from an USG agency for the purpose of 

providing the property to a foreign government 

or international organization under part I, 

chapter 8, FAA, International Narcotics Control, 

subject to regular notifications procedures to the 

congressional appropriations committees.

• The Secretary of State shall provide a report to 

the congressional appropriations committees not 

later than forty-five days after enactment of this 

act and prior to the obligation of any funds. This 

report is to include proposed uses of FY2012 

INCLE funds on a country by country basis for 

each proposed program, project, or activity.

• The provisions of section 482(b), FAA, regarding 

the prohibition for the procurement of weapons 

and ammunition, shall not apply to FY2012 

INCLE funding.

• No FY2012 INCLE funding shall be made 

available for assistance for the Bolivian 

military and police unless the Secretary of State 

determines and reports to the congressional 

appropriations committees that such funding is 

in the US national security interest.

• $5,000,000 should be used to combat the piracy 

of US copyrighted materials, consistent with 

the requirements of sections 688(a) and (b), 

S/FOAA, 2008, Division J, P.L.110-161, 26 

December 2007. 

Source: State Department Executive Budget Summary for the Function 150 budget for FY2013 released 13 

February 2012.
19 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

• The provision of assistance which is comparable 

to assistance made available under INCLE but 

which provided under other provision of law 

shall be provided IAW the provisions of sections 

481(b) and 622(c), FAA.

◊ Section 481(b), FAA, states the Secretary of 

State shall be responsible for coordinating 

all USG assistance to support international 

efforts to combat illicit narcotics production 

or trafficking.

◊ Section 622(c), FAA, states the Secretary of 

State, under the direction of the President, shall 

be responsible for the continuous supervision 

and general direction of economic assistance, 

military assistance, and military education and 

training programs to include but not limited 

to determining whether there shall be such 

assistance for a country and the value thereof, 

to the end that such programs are effectively 

integrated both at home and aboard and the 

US foreign policy is best served thereby.

• Table 7 provides the estimated INCLE funding 

allocations for FY2012 along with actual 

allocations for FY2011 and requested funding 

for FY2013.

◊ Sections 688(a) and (b) authorize the Secretary 

of State, in consultation with the World 

Intellectual Property Organization, to provide 

equipment and training for law enforcement, 

provide training for judges and prosecutors, 

and providing assistance in complying with 

obligations under applicable international 

treaties and agreements on copyright and 

intellectual property.

• The reporting requirements of section 1404, 

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, 

P.L.110‐252, 30 June 2008, shall apply to the 

funds made available by this Act. This report is 

to now include a description of modifications, 

if any, to the security strategy of the Palestinian 

Authority.

◊ Section 1404 requires a semi-annual 

report from the Secretary of State to the 

congressional appropriations committees on 

US provided assistance for the training of 

Palestinian security forces to include detailed 

descriptions of the training, curriculum, and 

equipment provided; an assessment of the 

training and the performance of the forces after 

training has been completed; and description 

of the assistance that has been pledged and 

provided to the Palestinian security forces by 

other donors.

Table 7

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) Allocations [$ in thousands]

Program FY2011 FY2012 FY2013

Africa $61,368 $85,900 $74,947

DR of the Congo 6,000 6,000 5,250

Ghana 500

Guinea 500

Kenya 2,000 2,000 1,800

Liberia 16,000 17,000 15,662

Mozambique 500 500 500

Nigeria 1,250

Somalia 2,000 1,800

South Africa 2,000 3,000 2,000

South Sudan 15,000 32,000 27,404

Sudan 2,000 2,000

Tanzania 450 450 450

Uganda 235 600 581

Africa Regional 4,933 22,350 17,500

E. Asia & Pacific $17,885 $24,645 $18,682
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 20

China 800 800 800

Indonesia 10,520 11,550 10,066

Laos 1,000 1,000 1,000

Malaysia 800

Philippines 2,065 2,450 2,450

Thailand 1,740 1,740 1,466

Timor-Leste 660 660 660

Vietnam 550 450

E. Asia & Pac Reg 1,100 5,895 990

Europe & Eurasia $48,633

Albania 4,450

Armenia 2,824

Azerbaijan 1,226

Bosnia & Herzegovina 6,735

Georgia 4,000

Kosovo 10,674

Macedonia 1,663

Moldova 3,230

Montenegro 1,826

Russia 4,182

Serbia 3,000

Ukraine 4,100

Eurasia Reg 323

Europe Reg 400

Near East $290,340 $135,395 $107,894

Egypt 1,000 7,894

Iraq 114,560

Jordan 250 500

Lebanon 19,500 25,000 15,500

Morocco 750 1,500 1,500

Tunisia 1,500 8,000

West Bank/Gaza 150,000 100,000 70,000

Yemen 1,750 7,395 4,000

Trans-Sahar C/T 1,030 1,000 1,000

South & Central Asia $522,558 $12,814 $554,619

Afghanistan 400,000 400,000

Bangladesh 350 674 674

Kazakhstan 1,471

Kyrgyz Rep 6,156

Nepal 3,700 3,700 3,330

Pakistan 114,298 124,000

Sri Lanka 1,440 1,440
21 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Tajikistan 7,255

Turkmenistan 550

Uzbekistan 743

South & Central Asia Reg 4,210 7,000 9,000

Western Hemisphere $506,220 $568,270 $476,450

Argentina 300 300

Bolivia 15,000 7,500 5,000

Brazil 1,000 3,000 2,000

Colombia 204,000 160,600 142,000

Ecuador 4,500 4,500 4,500

Guatemala 3,992 5,000 2,000

Haiti 19,420 19,420 17,500

Mexico 117,000 248,500 199,000

Paraguay 500 500 150

Peru 31,500 28,950 23,300

Western Hemi Reg 109,008 90,000 81,000

Office to Monitor and 

Combat Trafficking in 

Persons

$16,233 $18,720 $18,720

INCLE Affairs $179,202 $190,356 $156,557

Alien Smuggling 1,000 1,000 750

Anti-Moey Laund 4,150 4,150 3,600

Critical Flt Safety 16,250 16,250 12,385

Civilian Policing 4,000 4,000 3,800

Crim Youth Gangs 7,000 7,000 3,000

Cyber Crime 3,750 5,000 3,500

Demand Reduction 12,500 12,500 12,500

Fighting Corruption 4,750 5,004 3,900

Intl Law Enf Acad 34,000 31,300 24,000

Inter-reg Aviation 57,052 53,652 46,322

Intl Organizations 4,500 5,000 4,500

Intl Org Crime 1,000 1,000 750

Intl Police PKO 10,000 5,000

Prog Dev & Support 29,250 34,500 32,500

Mid East Resp Fund $25,000

Overseas 

Contingency 

Operations (OCO)

$943,605 $1,050,000

Iraq 500,000 850,000

Yemen 3,605

Afghanistan 324,000 200,000

Pakistan 116,000

Total INCLE $1,593,806 $2,004,705 $2,506,502
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 22

Title IV, International Security Assistance, 

Department of State: Nonproliferation, 

Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 

(NADR) Programs 

• Appropriation of $590,113,000 for necessary 

expenses to carry out the provisions of part II, 

chapter 8, FAA, for anti-terrorism assistance; part 

II, chapter 9, FAA, for nonproliferation and Export 

Control assistance; section 504, FREEDOM 

Support Act (FSA); section 23, AECA; or the 

FAA for demining activities, the clearance of 

unexploded ordnance, the destruction of small 

arms, and related activities, notwithstanding 

any other provision of law, including activities 

implemented through nongovernmental and 

international organizations; and section 301, 

FAA, for a voluntary contribution to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 

and for a US contribution to the Comprehensive 

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Preparatory 

Commission.

◊ Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Global War on Terrorism, appropriated an 

additional $120,657,000 in NADR Programs 

assistance to remain available through 30 

September 2013.

• FY2012 NADR funding available for 

Antiterrorism Assistance and Export Control 

Assistance shall remain available through 

FY2013.

• Not more than $30,000,000 may be available for 

the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and 

remain available until expended subject to prior 

consultation and regular notification procedures 

to the congressional appropriations committees.

◊ Such funds may also be used for such 

countries other than the Independent States 

of the former Soviet Union and international 

organizations when it is in the US/national 

security interest to do so.

• FY2012 NADR funds may be made available 

to the IAEA unless the Secretary of State 

determines that Israel is being denied its right to 

participate in the activities of that agency.

• FY2012 NADR funds may be made available 

for public-private partnerships for conventional 

weapons and mine action by grant, cooperative 

agreement or contract.

• Table 8 provides the estimated NADR Program 

funding allocations for FY2012 along with 

actual allocations for FY2011 and requested 

funding for FY2013.

Table 8

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR) Allocations [$ in thousands]

Program FY2011 FY2012 FY2013

Nonproliferation 

Programs $309,758 $293,829 $281,360

Nonproliferation and 

Disarmament Fund

53,263 30,000 30,000

Export Control and 

Related Border Security 

Assistance

59,984 60,909 55,000

Global Threat Reduction 70,088 68,978 63,560

IAEA Contribution 79,500 85,900 90,000

CTBT Intl Monitoring 

System 33,000 33,000 33,000

WMD Terrorism 2,000 6,042 5,000

UN Security Council 

Resolution 1540 Fund 3,000 1,5000 1,1350

CTBTO Prepatory 

Commission-Special 

Contributions

8,923 7,500 3,450
23 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Anti-Terrorism 

Programs $286,691 $146,284 $228,308

Antiterrorism Assistance 199,691 79,284 166,380

Countering Violent 

Extremism 15,000 4,500

Terrorist Interdiction 

Program 42,500 42,000 34,341

CT Engagement with 

Allies 9,500 8,000 7,000

Counterterrorism 

Financing 20,450 17,000 16,087

Regional Stability 

and Humanitarian 

Assistance

$142,071 $150,000 $136,000

Conventional Weapons 

Destruction 135,247 150,000 126,000

International Trust Fund 6,824

Overseas 

Contingency 

Operations (OCO)

$120,657

Total NADR $738,520 $710,770 $635,668

Other S/FOAA for FY2012

The following includes FY2012 appropriations 

for programs also funded by division I, P.L.112-74, 

23 December 2011, that may be of interest to the 

security cooperation community.

Title I Department of State and 

Related Agency, Department of State, 

Administration of Foreign Affairs

Diplomatic and Consular Programs

• $6,550,947,000 for necessary expenses of the 

Department of State and the Foreign Service 

not otherwise provided for, of which up to 

$1,355,000,000 is to remain available until 

expended for Worldwide Security Protection.

◊ Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Global War on Terrorism, Department of State, 

appropriates an addition $4,389,064,000 for 

Diplomatic and Consular Programs to remain 

available through FY2013, of which however 

$236,201,000 is to remain available until 

expended for Worldwide Security Protection.

• The heading of “Civilian Stabilization Initiative” 

in titles I and II of prior S/FOAAs is to be retitled 

“Conflict Stabilization Operations,” with up to 

$35,000,000 in FY2012 funding for Diplomatic 

and Consular Programs to be available until 

expended may be transferred and available 

within this new heading of Conflict Stabilization 

Operations.

Payment to the American Institute of 

Taiwan

$21,108,000 for necessary expenses to carry out 

the Taiwan Relations Act, P.L.96-8, 10 April 1979.

International Organizations

Contributions to International 

Organizations

• $1,449,700,000 for necessary expenses not 

otherwise provide for to meet annual obligations 

of membership in international multilateral 

organizations pursuant to treaties ratified 

pursuant to the advice and consent of the Senate, 

conventions or specific acts of Congress.

◊ Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Global War on Terrorism, Department of 

State, appropriates an additional $101,300,000 

under this heading.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 24

respond to emerging or unforeseen complex 

crises overseas.

◊ Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Global War on Terrorism, Department of State, 

appropriates an additional $30,000,000 under 

the same heading but to remain available only 

through FY2013.

Democracy Fund

• $114,770,000 to remain available through 

FY2013 for necessary expenses to carry out 

the provisions of the FAA for the promotion of 

democracy globally.

◊ $68,000,000 of this amount shall be 

made available for the Human Rights and 

Democracy Fund of the Department of State, 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 

Labor.

◊ The remaining $46,770,000 shall be made 

available for the Office of Democracy and 

Governance of the Bureau for Democracy, 

Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance within 

USAID.

Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central 

Asia (AEECA)

• $626,718,000 to remain available through 

FY2013 to carry out the provisions of the FAA, 

the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian 

Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) 

Support Act (FSA) of 1992, P.L.102-511, 24 

October 1992, and the Support for East European 

Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, P.L.101-179, 

28 September 89, for assistance and for related 

programs for countries identified in section 3, 

FREEDOM Support Act, and section 3(c), SEED 

Act.

Department of State, Migration and 

Refugee Assistance

• $1,639,100,000 to remain available until 

expended for necessary expenses enabling the 

Secretary of State to carry out the provisions of 

sections 2(a) and (b), Migration and Refugee 

Assistance Act of 1962, P.L. 87-510, 28 June 

1962, and other activities to meet refugee and 

migration needs

◊ $20,000,000 of this amount shall be made 

available for refugees resettling in Israel.

Contributions for International 

Peacekeeping Activities

• $1,828,182,000 for necessary expenses to pay 

assessed and other expenses of international 

peacekeeping activities directed to the 

maintenance or restoration of international 

peace of which 15 percent shall remain available 

through FY2013.

Title III, Bilateral Economic Assistance, 

Funds Appropriated to the President

Development Assistance

• $2,519,950,000 for necessary expenses to carry 

out the provisions of sections 103, 105, 106, and 

214, FAA; sections 251-255, FAA; and part I, 

chapter 10, FAA, all to remain available through 

FY2013.

International Disaster Assistance

• $825,000,000 to remain available until 

expended for necessary expenses to carry out the 

provisions of section 491, FAA, for international 

disaster relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction 

assistance.

◊ Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Global War on Terrorism, Department of 

State, appropriates an additional $150,000,000 

under the same heading but to remain available 

only through FY2013.

Transition Initiatives

• $50,141,000 to remain available until expended 

for necessary expenses for international disaster 

rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance 

pursuant to section 491, FAA, to support transition 

to democracy and to long-term development of 

countries in crisis

◊ Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Global War on Terrorism, Department of 

State, appropriates an additional $6,554,000 

under the same heading but to remain 

available only through FY2013.

Complex Crises Fund

• $10,000,000 to remain available until expended 

for necessary expenses to carry out the provision 

of the FAA enabling the Administrator, USAID, 

in consultation with the Secretary of State, to 

support programs and activities to prevent or 
25 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Reporting Requirement (Section 7010)

• The Secretary of State shall provide a quarterly 

written report, starting not later than 1 April 2012, 

to the congressional appropriations committees 

on the uses of FMFP, IMET, PKO, and PCCF 

funds. The report shall include a description of 

the obligation and expenditure of funds, and 

the specific country in receipt of, and the use or 

purpose of the assistance provided by such funds.

Availability of Funds (Section 7011)

• No funding appropriated by this act shall remain 

available for obligation after FY2012 unless 

expressly so provided in this act.

• However, FY2012 funds for the purposes of, inter 

alia, part II, chapter 8 (INCLE), part I, chapters 

4 (ESF), 5 (IMET), 6 (PKO), 8 (Antiterrorism), 

and 9 (NADR), FAA, section 23 (FMFP), AECA, 

and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central 

Asia shall remain available for four years from 

the date on which the availability of such funds 

would have otherwise have expired, if the funds 

are initially obligated before their respective 

periods of availability contained in this act.

Limitation on Assistance to Countries in 

Default (Section 7012)

• No part of any appropriation in titles III 

through VI in this act shall be used to furnish 

assistance to any country which is in default during 

a period in excess of one calendar year in payment 

to the US of principal or interest on any loan made 

to the country by the US pursuant to a program for 

which funds are appropriated under this act unless the 

President determines following consultations with 

the congressional appropriations committees that 

such assistance for the country is in the US national 

interest.

Prohibition on Taxation of US Assistance 

(Section 7013)

• None of the funds appropriated by titles III 

through VI of this act may be made available 

to provide assistance to a country under a new 

bilateral agreement governing the terms and 

conditions under which such assistance is to 

be provided unless such agreement includes 

a provision stating that US assistance shall 

be exempt from taxation, or reimbursed, by 

the government. The Secretary of State shall 

◊ Not less than $35,000,000 of this amount 

shall be made available to respond to smallscale emergency humanitarian requirements.

US Emergency Refugee and Migration 

Assistance Fund

• $27,200,000 to remain available until expended 

for necessary expenses to carry out the provisions 

of section 2(c), Migration and Refugee Assistance 

Act of 1962, P.L. 87-510, 28 June 1962.

Title VII, General Provisions

Unobligated Balances Report (Section 

7002)

• Any USG department or agency to which funds 

are appropriated or otherwise made available by 

this act shall provide a quarterly accounting to 

the congressional appropriations committees of 

cumulative unobligated balances and obligated, 

but unexpended, balances by program, project, 

and activity, and Treasury Account Fund Symbol 

of all funds received by such agency in FY2012 

or any previous fiscal year.

Prohibition against Direct Funding for 

Certain Countries (Section 7007)

• None of the funds appropriated or otherwise 

made available pursuant to Title III through VI 

of this Act shall be obligated or expended to 

finance directly any assistance or reparations for 

the governments of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, or 

Syria.

Coups d’Etat (Section 7008)

• None of the funds appropriated or otherwise 

made available pursuant to titles III through 

VI of this act shall be obligated or expended to 

finance directly any assistance to the government 

of any country whose duly elected head of 

government is deposed by military coup d’etat 

or decree or, after the date of enactment of this 

act, a coup d’etat or decree in which the military 

plays a decisive role. Such assistance may 

resume if the President determines and certifies 

to the congressional appropriations committees 

that subsequent to the termination of assistance, 

a democratically elected government has taken 

office.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 26

for direct commercial sales (DCS) contracts 

that are financed with US assistance funding.

◊ DSCA Policy Memo 10-10, 01 December 

2010, Subject: Update of Letter Of Offer 

and Acceptance (LOA) Standard Terms 

and Conditions, was published as SAMM 

E-Change 139 to DOD 5108.38-M, Security 

Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), 

updating the standard terms and conditions 

in figure C5.F3, SAMM, effective 1 January 

2011 on FMS LOAs. This includes standard 

term and condition 4.4.11 within the financial 

section exempting the FMS sale funded 

by the USG from all value added taxes and 

customs duties imposed by the country or for 

a required reimbursement by the purchasing 

country.

• The terms “taxes” and “taxation” refer to value 

added taxes (VAT) and customs duties imposed 

on commodities financed with US assistance for 

programs for which funds are appropriated by 

this act.

Reservations of Funds (Section 7014)

• Funds appropriated under titles II through VI of 

this act, which are specifically designated, may 

be reprogrammed for other programs within the 

same account notwithstanding the designation 

if compliance with the designation is made 

impossible by operation of any provision of this 

or any other act. Any such reprogramming is 

subject to regular notification procedures of the 

congressional appropriations committees.

Notification Requirements (Section 7015)

• None of the funds made available under Titles II 

through VI and VIII to include, inter alia, INCLE, 

Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia, 

ESF, PKO, FMFP, IMET, and PCCF shall be 

available for obligation for activities, programs, 

projects, type of material assistance, countries, or 

other operations not justified or in excess of the 

amount justified to the appropriations committees 

for obligation under any of these specific 

headings unless the congressional appropriations 

committees are notified fifteen days in advance.

• The President shall not enter into any 

commitment of any FMFP funds for the provision 

of major defense equipment (MDE) other than 

conventional ammunition, or other major defense 

expeditiously seek to negotiate amendments to 

existing bilateral agreements, as necessary, to 

conform to this requirement.

• An amount equivalent to 200 percent of the total 

taxes assessed during FY2012 by a government 

or entity against commodities financed under 

US assistance programs for which funds are 

appropriated by this act, either directly or through 

grantees, contractors, and subcontractors, as of 

the date of enactment of this act, shall be withheld 

from obligation from funds appropriated for 

assistance for FY2013 and allocated for the 

central government of that country and for the 

West Bank and Gaza Program to the extent 

that the Secretary of State certifies and reports 

in writing to the congressional appropriations 

committees that such taxes have not been 

reimbursed to the US.

• Foreign taxes of a “de minimis” nature [so 

insignificant or minimal that a court may 

overlook it in deciding an issue or case] are not 

subject to these reimbursement provisions.

• Funds withheld from obligation for each country 

or entity shall be reprogrammed for assistance 

to countries which do not assess taxes on US 

assistance or which have an effective arrangement 

that is providing substantial reimbursement of 

such taxes.

• The provisions of this section shall not apply 

to any country or entity the Secretary of State 

determines does not assess taxes on US assistance 

or has an effective arrangement that is providing 

substantial reimbursement of such taxes, or US 

foreign policy interests outweigh the policy of 

this section.

• The Secretary of State shall issue rules, 

regulations, or policy guidance, as appropriate, 

to implement the prohibition against the taxation 

of US assistance.

◊ DSCA Policy Memo 04-32, 21 August 

2004, Subject: Prohibition on Taxation of 

US Assistance, was published as SAMM 

E-Change 19 to DOD 5105.38-M, Security 

Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) 

providing a mandatory prohibition note 

for FMS case LOAs, amendments, and 

modifications financed with any type of US 

assistance funding. This same memo also 

provided a sample contract clause to be used 
27 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Act for the use of appropriated funds for specific 

countries that would receive such EDA. The 

notification is to include the original acquisition 

cost of such defense articles.

Allocations (Section 7019)

• Funds provided in this act shall be made available 

for programs and countries in the amounts 

contained in the respective tables included in the 

joint explanatory statement accompanying this 

act.

◊ These tables are included in the conference 

report Division I, H.Rpt. 112-331, 15 

December 2011.

◊ Any proposed deviations are subject to 

the regular notification procedures of the 

appropriations committees.

Prohibition of Payment of Certain Expenses 

(Section 7020)

• No FY2012 appropriations or otherwise made 

available for FFMP, IMET or ESF may be 

obligated or expended to pay for:

◊ Alcoholic beverages

◊ Entertainment expenses for activities that 

are substantially of a recreational character, 

including but not limited to entrance fees 

at sporting events, theatrical and musical 

productions, and amusement parks.

Prohibition on Assistance to Governments 

Supporting International Terrorism (Section 

7021)

• Within section 7021(a)

◊ None of the funds appropriated or otherwise 

made available by titles III through VI of 

this act may be available to any foreign 

government which provides lethal military 

equipment to a country the government of 

which the Secretary of State has determined 

is a terrorist government for the purposes 

of section 6(j), Export Administration Act 

(EAA) of 1979. 

◊ This prohibition shall terminate twelve months 

after that government ceases to provide such 

military equipment. This section applies with 

respect to lethal equipment provided under a 

contract entered into after 1 October 1997.

◊ The prohibition may be waived if the President 

determines that such assistance is important to 

items defined to be aircraft, ships, missiles, 

or combat vehicles, not previously justified to 

Congress or 20 percent in excess of the quantities 

justified to Congress unless the congressional 

appropriations committees are notified fifteen 

days in advance of such commitment.

◊ This notification requirement or any other 

similar provision of any other act shall not 

apply to any reprogramming for an activity, 

program, or project for which funds are 

appropriated under titles II through IV of 

this act of less than 10 percent of the amount 

previously justified to Congress for such 

obligation for current fiscal year.

◊ Further, this notification requirement or any 

other similar provision of any other Act may 

be waived if failure to do so would pose a 

substantial risk to human health or welfare. 

However, the required notification shall be 

provided as early as practicable but in no 

event later than three days after the waiver 

action.

• None of the funds appropriated under titles III 

through VI and VIII of this act shall be obligated 

or expended for assistance for Serbia, Sudan, 

South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Iraq, 

Pakistan, Cuba, Iran, Haiti, Libya, Ethiopia, 

Nepal, Colombia, Honduras, Burma, Yemen, 

Mexico, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the Russian 

Federation, Somalia, Sri Lanka, or Cambodia 

except as provided through congressional 

appropriations committees regular notification 

procedures.

Notification on Excess Defense Equipment 

(Section 7016)

• Prior to providing excess defense articles (EDA) 

in accordance with section 516(a), FAA, the 

DOD shall notify the appropriations committees 

to the same extent and under the same conditions 

as are other committees pursuant to section 

516(f), FAA.

• Before issuing a letter of offer (an FMS LOA) 

to sell EDA under the AECA, DOD shall notify 

the appropriations committees in accordance 

with the regular notification procedures of such 

committees if the defense articles are significant 

military equipment (SME) or valued (in terms of 

original acquisition cost) at $7,000,000 or more, 

or if the notification is required elsewhere in this 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 28

country, regional, and central program level 

funding within each account, either as:

◊ Justified to the Congress or

◊ Allocated by the Executive Branch IAW a 

report to be provided to the congressional 

appropriations committees within thirty days 

of enactment of this act as required by section 

653(a), FAA.

Eligibility for Assistance (Section 7027)

• Restrictions contained in this act or any other 

act with respect to assistance for a country shall 

not be construed to restrict assistance in support 

of programs of nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) from funds appropriated by this act to 

carry out provisions of part I, chapters 1, 10, 11, 

and 12, FAA; part II, chapter 4 (ESF), FAA; and 

from funds appropriated under “Assistance for 

Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia.”

• However, before using this authority to provide 

assistance to NGOs, the President shall notify 

the appropriations committees using regular 

notification procedures.

◊ This section shall not apply with respect to 

section 620A, FAA, prohibiting assistance to 

governments supporting terrorism.

◊ This section shall not apply with respect to 

section 116, FAA, prohibiting assistance to 

governments that violation internationally 

recognized human rights.

Financial Management and Budget 

Transparency (Section 7031)

• Within section 7031(b), National Budget and 

Contract Transparency:

◊ None of the funds appropriated under titles 

III and IV of this act may be made available 

to the central government of a country that 

does not meet minimum standards of fiscal 

transparency as developed, updated, and 

strengthened by the Secretary of State.

» The Secretary of State may waive this 

transparency requirement on a country by 

country basis if the Secretary reports to the 

congressional appropriations committees 

it is important to US national interests.

» This waiver is to identify any steps taken by 

the government of that country to publicly 

disclose its national budget and contracts 

which are in additional to those which were 

the US national interest. When exercised, the 

President shall submit to the appropriations 

committees a report with respect to the 

furnishing of such assistance detailing the 

assistance to be provided, including the 

estimated dollar amount of the assistance, and 

an explanation of how the assistance furthers 

US national interests.

• Within section 7021(b):

◊ Funds appropriated for bilateral assistance 

in titles III through VI of this act and funds 

appropriated under any such title in prior 

S/FOAAs shall not be made available to any 

government which the President determines:

» Grants sanctuary from prosecution to any 

individual or group which has committed 

an act of international terrorism,

» Otherwise supports international terrorism

» Is controlled by an organization designated 

as a terrorist organization under section 

219, Immigration and Nationality Act.

◊ This prohibition is waiverable if the 

President determines that national security or 

humanitarian reasons so justifies. Each waiver 

such waiver is to be published in the Federal 

Register and notified to the congressional 

appropriations committees at least fifteen 

days prior to the waiver takes effect.

Authorization Requirements (Section 7022)

• Funds appropriated by this act, except under the 

Trade and Development Agency heading, may be 

obligated and expended notwithstanding section 

10, P.L.91-672, section 15, State Department 

Basic Authorities Act of 1956, section 313, 

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 

Years 1994 and 1995, P.L.103-236, and section 

504(a)(1), National Security Act of 1947 [50 

U.S.C. 414(a)(1)].

Definition of Program, Project, and Activity 

(Section 7023)

• For the purposes of title II through VI of this act, 

“program, project, and activity” shall be defined 

at the appropriations act account level and shall 

include all appropriations and authorizations 

Acts funding directives, ceilings, and limitations 

with the exception that the ESF and FMFP 

accounts shall also be considered to include 
29 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

to support programs to disarm, demobilize, 

and reintegrate former members of foreign 

terrorist organizations into civilian society.

• Within section 7034(f), Contingencies

◊ During FY2012, the President may use up to 

$50,000,000 under the authority of section 

451, FAA, which already authorizes the 

use of up to $25,000,000 in a fiscal year for 

unanticipated contingencies.

• Within section 7034(k), Modification of 

Amendment.

◊ Redesignates section 620J, FAA, Limitation 

on Assistance to Security Forces, originally 

from section 651, P.L.110-61, 26 December 

2007, to now section 620M, thus removing 

duplication with the “first” section 620J, 

Depleted Uranium Ammunition, originally 

placed into the FAA by section 149, P.L.104-

164, 21 July 1996.

» The new section 620M is often referred to 

as the “Leahy Amendment” requiring the 

vetting of individuals or units for possible 

human rights violations prior to receiving 

US assistance.

» The new section 620M, FAA, was also 

amended to read as follows:

“Section 620M, Limitation on Assistance to 

Security Forces.

(a) In General.—No assistance shall be 

furnished under this Act or the Arms Export 

Control Act to any unit of the security forces 

of a foreign country if the Secretary of State 

has credible information that such unit has 

committed a gross violation of human rights.

(b) Exception.—The prohibition in subsection 

(a) shall not apply if the Secretary determines 

and reports to the Committee on Foreign 

Relations in the Senate, the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 

and the Committees on Appropriations that the 

government of such country is taking effective 

measures to bring the responsible members of 

the security forces unit to justice.

(c) Duty to Inform.—In the event that funds 

are withheld from any unit pursuant to this 

section, the Secretary of State shall promptly 

inform the foreign government of the basis for 

undertaken in previous fiscal years. Also 

include specific recommendations of short 

and long-term steps such government can 

take to improve budgetary transparency, 

and identify benchmarks for measuring 

progress.

• Within section 7031(c), Anti-Kleptocracy:

◊ Any officials of a foreign government and their 

immediate family members who the Secretary 

of State has credible information having been 

involved in significant corruption, including 

corruption related to the extraction of natural 

resources, shall be ineligible for entry into the 

US.

◊ This prohibition is waiverable by the Secretary 

of State if determined to serve a compelling 

national interest or that the circumstances 

have significantly changed.

◊ Individuals shall not be ineligible if entry 

into the US would further important US law 

enforcement objectives or is necessary to 

permit the US to fulfill its obligations under 

the UN Headquarters Agreement.

Multi-Year Commitments (Section 7033)

• None of the funds appropriated by this act may 

be used to make a future year funding pledge 

for any multilateral or bilateral program funded 

by titles III through VI of this act, unless such 

pledge was:

◊ Previously justified in a congressional budget 

justification,

◊ Included in the Act making the appropriations 

for the S/FOAA or previously authorized by 

an act of Congress 

◊ Notified IAW regular notification procedures 

of the congressional appropriations 

committees, or 

◊ The subject of prior consultation with the 

congressional appropriations committees 

and such consultation was conducted at least 

seven days in advance of the pledge.

Special Provisions (Section 7034)

• Within section 7034(d), Disarmament, 

Demobilization and Reintegration

◊ Funds appropriated by this Act and prior S/

FOAAs under the headings of ESF, PKO, 

International Disaster Assistance, and 

Transition Initiatives should be made available 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 30

◊ Section 495E, Turkey Relief, Rehabilitation, 

and Reconstruction.

◊ Section 495F, African Rehabilitation and 

Resettlement.

◊ Section 495G, Special Caribbean Hurricane 

Relief Assistance.

◊ Section 495H, Cambodian Disaster Relief 

Assistance.

◊ Section 495I, Assistance for Displaced 

Persons in Central America.

◊ Section 495J, Lebanon Emergency 

Relief, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction 

Assistance.

◊ Section 495K, African Famine Assistance.

• Within section 7034(o), Government 

Expenditures, no funds appropriated under title 

III and under INCLE in this act, should not be 

made available for assistance for any government 

for programs or activities in FY2013 if the 

Secretary of State or the Administrator, US AID, 

has credible information that such government is 

reducing its own expenditures for such programs 

or activities as a result of the assistance provided 

and for reasons that are inconsistent with the 

purposes of such assistance.

Limitations on Assistance for the Palestinian 

Authority (Section 7040)

• No FY12 ESF funding may be obligated or 

expended with respect to providing funds to the 

Palestinian Authority.

◊ This prohibition shall not apply if the President 

certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House, 

the President pro tempore of the Senate, and 

the appropriations committees that a waiver 

is important to US national security interests. 

This waiver shall be effective for no more 

than six months at a time and shall not apply 

beyond twelve months after enactment of this 

act.

» Any such waiver shall include a report to 

the appropriations committees detailing 

waiver justification, purposes for the 

fund, and the accounting procedures to 

be in place to ensure funds are properly 

disbursed. This report shall also detail the 

steps the Palestinian Authority has taken to 

arrest terrorists, confiscate weapons, and 

dismantle the terrorist infrastructure.

such action and shall, to the maximum extent 

practicable, assist the foreign government 

in taking effective measures to bring the 

responsible members of the security forces to 

justice.

(d) Credible Information.—The Secretary shall 

establish, and periodically update, procedures 

to—

(1) ensure that for each country the Department 

of State has a current list of all security 

force units receiving United State training, 

equipment, or other types of assistance;

(2) facilitate receipt by the Department of State 

and United States embassies of information 

from individuals and organizations outside 

of the United States Government about gross 

violations of human rights by security force 

units;

(3) routinely request and obtain such 

information from the Department of Defense 

and the Central Intelligence Agency, and other 

United States Government sources;

(4) ensure that such information is evaluated 

and preserved;

(5) ensure that when vetting an individual for 

eligibility to receive United States training the 

individual’s unit is also vetted;

(6) seek to identify the unit involved when 

credible information of a gross violation exists 

but the identity of the unit is lacking; and

(7) make publicly available, to the maximum 

extent practicable, the identity of those units 

for which no assistance shall be furnished to 

subsection (a).”

• Within section 7034(l), the following older FAA 

sections are repealed:

◊ Section 494, Disaster Relief Assistance.

◊ Section 495, Cyprus Relief and Rehabilitation.

◊ Section 495B, Italy Relief and Rehabilitation.

◊ Section 495C, Lebanon Relief and 

Rehabilitation.

◊ Section 495D, Romanian Relief and 

Rehabilitation.
31 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

to protect freedom of expression, association 

and religion, and due process of law.

◊ The Secretary of State may waive these 

prohibitions if determines and reports to the 

congressional appropriations committees 

with detailed justification that it is in the US 

national security interest to do so.

◊ The Secretary of State is to consult with the 

congressional appropriations committees 

prior to the transfer of FY2012 FMFP funds 

to an interest-bearing account for Egypt.

• Within section 7041(d), Iraq.

◊ Funds appropriated or otherwise made 

available by this act for Iraq assistance shall 

be made available in a manner that uses Iraqi 

entities to the maximum extent practicable and 

IAW the cost-sharing and other requirements 

in the Department of State’s 9 April 2009 

“Guidelines for Government of Iraq Financial 

Participation in United States GovernmentFunded Civilian Foreign Assistance Programs 

and Projects.”

◊ Funds appropriated by titles III and VI for 

Iraqi assistance may be made available for 

Iraq notwithstanding any other provision of 

law except this subsection and new section 

620M, FAA, Limitation on Assistance to 

Security Forces.

◊ FY2012 ESF funding assistance for Iraq shall 

be made available for programs and activities 

for which policy justifications and decisions 

shall be the responsibility of the US Chief of 

Mission in Iraq.

• Within section 7041(e), Lebanon.

◊ No FY2012 funds appropriated by this act 

may be made available for the Lebanese 

Armed Forces (LAF) if it is controlled by a 

terrorist organization as defined by section 

219, Immigration and Nationality Act.

◊ FY2012 FMFP funds for assistance to Lebanon 

may be made available only to professionalize 

the LAF and to strengthen border security 

and combat terrorism. These funds may not 

be made available for obligation until the 

Secretary of State submits a detailed spending 

plan to the congressional appropriations 

committees not to be submitted later than 30 

September 2012.

◊ Funds appropriated by titles III and VI for 

Iraqi assistance may be made available for 

» Any such waiver shall also include a 

certification and report from the Secretary 

of State to the appropriations committees 

prior to obligation of funds that the 

Palestinian Authority has established a 

single treasury account for all Palestinian 

Authority financing and all financing 

mechanisms flow through this account, 

no parallel financing mechanisms exist 

outside of the Palestinian Authority 

treasury account, and there is a single 

comprehensive civil service roster and 

payroll.

• None of the funds appropriated in titles III 

through VI of this act may be obligated for 

salaries of personnel of the Palestinian Authority 

located in Gaza or may be obligated or expended 

for assistance to Hamas or any entity effectively 

controlled by Hamas, any power-sharing 

government of which Hamas is a member, or that 

results from an agreement with Hamas and over 

which Hamas exercises undue influence.

◊ If the President certifies and reports to the 

congressional appropriations committees 

that all of its ministers or such equivalent has 

publicly accepted and is complying with the 

principles contained in sections 620K(b)(1)

(A) and (B), FAA, assistance may be provided 

to a power-sharing government.

• None of the funds appropriated under titles III 

and VI of this act may be obligated for assistance 

for the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Near East (Section 7041)

• Within section 7041(a), Egypt.

◊ None of the funds appropriated under titles III 

and IV of this act and in prior acts making 

appropriations for the Department of State 

may be made available for assistance for 

the central government of Egypt unless 

the Secretary of State certifies to the 

congressional appropriations committees that 

Egypt is meeting its obligations under the 

1979 Egypt‐Israel Peace Treaty.

◊ Prior to the obligation of FY2012 FMFP 

funds, the Secretary of State shall certify to 

the congressional appropriations committees 

that Egypt is supporting the transition to 

civilian government including the holding of 

free and fair elections, implementing polices 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 32

Serbia (Section 7042)

• The Secretary of State is to submit a report to 

the congressional appropriations committees 

that the government of Serbia is cooperating 

with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 

former Yugoslavia to include apprehending and 

transferring indictees and providing investigators 

access to witnesses, documents, and other 

information.

◊ Except for humanitarian assistance or 

assistance to promote democracy, funds 

appropriated by this act may be made available 

for assistance to the central government of 

Serbia after 31 May 2012 if the referenced 

report has been submitted.

◊ After 31 May 2012, the Secretary of the 

Treasury should instruct the US executive 

directors of international financial institutions 

to support loans and assistance to the 

government of Serbia subject to the condition 

for submitting the referenced report.

Africa (Section 7043)

• Within section 7043(a), Conflict Minerals.

◊ FY2012 FMFP may be available for 

assistance to Rwanda or Uganda unless the 

Secretary of State has credible information 

that the governments of Rwanda or Uganda 

is providing political, military, or financial 

support to armed groups in the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo that are involved in the 

illegal exportation of minerals out of the DRC 

or have violated human rights.

• Within section 7043(b), Counterterrorism 

Programs.

◊ Of the funds appropriated by this act, not less 

than $52,800,000 should be made available 

for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 

Partnership Program and not less than 

$21,300,000 should be made available for 

the Partnership for Regional East Africa 

Counterterrorism program.

• Within section 7043(d), Expanded International 

Military Education and Training (E-IMET).

◊ FY2012 IMET for Angola, Cameroon, 

Central African Republic, Chad, Cote 

d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Zimbabwe are to be 

only used for training related to international 

peacekeeping operations and E-IMET. This 

limitation is not to apply to courses that 

Lebanon notwithstanding any other provision 

of law except this subsection and new section 

620M, FAA, Limitation on Assistance to 

Security Forces.

• Within section 7041(f), Libya.

◊ Of the funds appropriated by this act and 

prior S/FOAAs, up to $20,000,000 should 

be made available to promote democracy, 

transparent and accountable governance, 

human rights, transitional justice, and the rule 

of law in Libya and for exchange programs 

between Libya and American students and 

professionals. Such funds shall be made 

available, to the maximum extent practicable, 

on a cost matching basis.

◊ No funds appropriated by this act may be made 

available for infrastructure projects in Libya 

except on a loan basis with terms favorable to 

the US and only after consultations with the 

congressional appropriations committees.

• Within section 7041(g), Morocco.

◊ Prior to the obligation of FY2012 FMFP 

funds for Morocco, the Secretary of State 

shall submit a report to the congressional 

appropriations committees on steps being 

taken by the government of Morocco to:

» Respect the right of individuals to 

peacefully express their opinions regarding 

the status and future of the Western Sahara 

and to document human rights violations, 

and

» Provide unimpeded access to human 

rights organizations, journalists, and 

representatives of foreign governments to 

the Western Sahara.

• Within section 7041(h), Syria.

◊ FY2012 funds shall be made available to 

promote democracy and protect human 

rights in Syria, a portion of which should be 

programmed in consultation with governments 

in the region as appropriate.

• Within section 7041(i), Yemen.

◊ No funds appropriated by this act may be 

made available for the armed forces of Yemen 

if such forces are controlled by a foreign 

terrorist organization as defined by section 

219, Immigration and Nationality Act.
33 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

• Within section 7043(g), South Sudan.

◊ FY2012 funds should be made available 

for assistance to South Sudan including 

increasing agricultural productivity, expand 

educational opportunities especially for girls, 

strengthen democratic institutions and the rule 

of law, and enhance the capacity of the federal 

legislative assembly to conduct oversight over 

government revenues and expenditures.

• Within section 7043(h), Uganda.

◊ Funds appropriated by this Act should be 

made available for programs and activities in 

areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army 

(LRA).

• Within section 7043(i), War Crimes in Africa.

◊ Funds appropriated by this act may be 

made available for assistance for the central 

government of a country in which individuals 

indicted by the International Criminal 

Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special 

Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) are credibly 

alleged to be living if the Secretary of State 

determines and reports to the congressional 

appropriations committees that such 

government is cooperating with the ICTR and 

SCSL.

» This subsection shall not apply to 

assistance provided IAW section 551, FAA 

(PKO), or to project assistance under title 

VI of this act.

» This prohibition may be waived on a 

country by country basis if the President 

determines it is in the US national security 

interest and prior to the waiver reports 

to the congressional appropriations 

committees to include justifications for 

the waiver, the steps being taken to obtain 

any cooperation of the government, and a 

strategy for bringing the indictee before 

such a court.

• Within section 7043(j), Zimbabwe.

◊ None of the funds appropriated by this act 

shall be available for assistance for the central 

government of Zimbabwe except for health, 

education, and macroeconomic growth 

assistance.

» This prohibition may be set aside if the 

Secretary of State determines and reports 

to the congressional appropriations 

committees that rule of law has been 

support training in maritime security for 

Angola and Cameroon.

◊ No FY2012 IMET may be made available for 

Equatorial Guinea or Somalia.

• Within section 7043(e), Ethiopia.

◊ No FY2012 FMFP funding shall be available 

for Ethiopia unless the Secretary of State:

» Certifies to the congressional 

appropriations committees that the 

government of Ethiopia is implementing 

policies to respect due process and 

freedoms of expression and association, 

and is permitting access to human rights 

and humanitarian organizations to the 

Somalia region of Ethiopia, and

» Submits a report on the types and amounts 

of US training and equipment proposed to 

be provided to include steps to ensure that 

such assistance is not provided to military 

units or personnel that have violated human 

rights and steps taken by the government 

of Ethiopia to investigate and prosecute 

members of the military who have been 

credibly alleged to have violated such 

rights.

◊ This prohibition shall not apply to assistance to 

the military efforts in support of international 

PKO, counterterrorism operations along 

the Somalia border, and for assistance to 

the Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff 

College.

• Within section 7043(f), Sudan Limitation on 

Assistance.

◊ None of the funds appropriated by this Act 

may be made available for the government of 

Sudan.

» This prohibition shall not apply to 

humanitarian assistance, assistance for the 

Darfur region, Southern Korofan/Nuba 

Mountain State, Blue Nile State, other 

marginalized areas and populations in 

Sudan, and Abyei.

» Likewise, this prohibition does not apply 

to assistance to support implementation 

of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

(CPA), mutual arrangements related to 

post-referendum issues associated with 

the CPA, or to promote peace and stability 

between Sudan and South Sudan, or any 

other internationally recognized viable 

peace agreement in Sudan.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 34

» Steps taken by Indonesia in the previous 

twelve months to revise its Code of 

Military Justice, Uniform Criminal 

Code, and other relevant statutes to deny 

promotion, suspend from active service, 

and/or prosecute and appropriately punish 

military officers credibly alleged to have 

violated human rights, and to refine further 

the missions and develop an appropriate 

national defense budget to carry out that 

mission;

» Efforts by the military in the previous 

twelve months to cooperate with civilian 

judicial authorities to resolve cases of 

violations of human rights;

» Efforts by the military in the previous 

twelve months to implement reforms 

that increase the transparency and 

accountability of the military’s operations 

and financial management and concrete 

steps taken to achieve divestment of all 

military businesses; and

» Whether the government of Indonesia is 

allowing public access to Papua, including 

foreign diplomats, NGOs, and journalists, 

and respecting due process and freedoms 

of expression and association in Papua.

• Within section 7044(e), North Korea.

◊ No FY2012 ESF funding may be used for 

energy-related assistance for North Korea.

• Within section 7044(f), People’s Republic of 

China.

◊ No funds appropriated under the Diplomatic 

and Consular Programs heading in this act 

may be obligated or expended for processing 

licenses for the export of US-origin satellites, 

including commercial satellites and 

satellite components, to the PRC unless the 

congressional appropriations committees are 

notified of the proposed action at least fifteen 

days in advance.

◊ The terms and requirements of section 620(h), 

FAA, shall apply to foreign assistance projects 

or activities of the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) to include such projects or activities by 

any entity that is owned or controlled by or an 

affiliate of the PLA. 

» Section 620(h), FAA, directs the President 

to adopt regulations and establish 

procedures to ensure that US foreign aid 

restored in Zimbabwe including respect for 

ownership and title of property, freedom of 

speech, and association.

Asia (Section 7044)

• Within section 7044(a), Tibet.

◊ FY2012 ESF assistance shall be made available 

to nongovernmental organizations to support 

activities which preserve cultural traditions 

and promote sustainable development and 

environmental conservation in Tibetan 

communities in the Tibetan Autonomous 

Region and in other Tibetan communities in 

China.

• Within section 7044(b), Burma.

◊ FY2012 ESF assistance may be available 

for Burma except no such funds are to be 

available to the State Peace and Development 

Council, or its successor, and its affiliated 

organizations.

◊ ESF assistance shall be made available for 

programs along Burma’s borders and for 

Burmese groups and organizations located 

outside Burma, and may be available to 

support programs in Burma.

◊ In addition to assistance for Burmese refugees 

appropriated under the Migration and Refugee 

Assistance heading in this act, funds shall be 

available for community-based organizations 

operating in Thailand to provide food, 

medical, and other humanitarian assistance to 

internally displace persons in Eastern Burma.

• Within section 7044(c), Cambodia.

◊ Funds made available in this Act for a US 

contribution to a Khmer Rouge tribunal may 

only be made available if the Secretary of State 

certifies to the congressional appropriations 

committees that the UN and the government of 

Cambodia are taking credible steps to address 

allegations of corruption and mismanagement 

within the tribunal.

• Within section 7044(d), Indonesia.

◊ Of the FY2012 FMFP appropriations available 

for assistance to Indonesia, $2,000,000 

may not be obligated until the Secretary of 

State submits a report to the congressional 

appropriations committees required by S.Rpt 

112-85, 22 September 2011, under the FMFP 

heading regarding Indonesia. This report is to 

include:
35 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Western Hemisphere (Section 7045)

• Within section 7045(a), Colombia.

◊ Funds appropriated by this act and made 

available to the Department of State for 

assistance to the government of Colombia 

may be used to support a unified campaign 

against narcotics trafficking, illegal armed 

groups, and organizations designated as 

foreign terrorist organizations, and successor 

organizations, and to take actions to protect 

human health and welfare in emergency 

circumstances, including undertaking rescue 

operations.

» No US armed forces personnel or US 

civilian contractor employed by the US 

will participate in combat operations in 

connection with assistance made available 

by this act for Colombia.

◊ Rotary and fixed wing aircraft supported with 

INCLE funds for assistance to Colombia may 

be used for aerial or manual drug eradication 

and interdiction including to transport 

personnel and supplies and to provide security 

for such operations.

» Such aircraft may also be used to provide 

transport in support of alternative 

development programs and investigations 

by civilian judicial authorities.

» The President shall ensure that if any 

helicopter procured with funds in this Act 

or prior S/FOAAs is used to aid or abet 

the operations of any illegal self-defense 

group, paramilitary organization, or other 

illegal armed group in Colombia, such 

helicopter shall be immediately returned 

to the US.

» Any complaints of harms to health or licit 

crops caused by aerial eradication shall be 

thoroughly investigated and evaluated, and 

fair compensation paid in a timely manner 

for meritorious claims.

» Funds may not be made available for aerial 

eradication unless programs are being 

implemented by USAID, the government 

of Colombia, or other organizations 

in consultation and coordination with 

local communities to provide alternative 

sources of income in areas where security 

permits for small-acreage growers and 

is not used in a manner which, contrary to 

the best interests of the US, promotes or 

assists the foreign aid projects or activities 

of any communist country.

◊ No funds appropriated or otherwise made 

available by this Act may be used to finance 

any grant, contract, or cooperative agreement 

with the PLA or any entity that the Secretary 

of State has reason to believe is owned or 

controlled by the PLA or any of its affiliates.

• Within section 7044(g), Philippines.

◊ Of the FY2012 FMFP appropriations available 

for assistance to Philippines, $3,000,000 

may not be obligated until the Secretary of 

State submits a report to the congressional 

appropriations committees required by S.Rpt 

112-85, 22 September 2011, under the FMFP 

heading regarding the Philippines. This report 

is to include that:

» The government of the Philippines is 

taking effective steps to prosecute those 

responsible for extra-judicial executions 

(EJE), sustain the decline in the number 

of EJEs, and strengthen government 

institutions working to eliminate EJEs.

» The government of the Philippines is 

implementing a policy of promoting 

military personnel who demonstrate 

professionalism and respect for 

internationally recognized human rights, 

and is investigating, prosecuting, and 

punishing military personnel and others 

who have been credibly alleged to have 

violated such rights, and

» The Philippine military does not have 

a policy of, and is not engaging, acts of 

violence or intimidation against members 

of legal organizations who advocate for 

human rights.

• Within section 7044(h), Vietnam.

◊ ESF funds shall be made available for 

remediation of dioxin contaminated sites 

in Vietnam, and may be made available for 

assistance for the government of Vietnam 

including the military for such purposes.

◊ Development Assistance funds shall likewise 

be made available for related health/disability 

activities.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 36

participated in the commission of a human 

rights violation in Colombia.

» The Secretary of State may waive this 

prohibition if certified to the congressional 

appropriations committees on a caseby-case basis that issuance of the visa is 

necessary to support the peace process 

in Colombia or for urgent humanitarian 

reasons.

• Within section 7045(b), Guatemala.

◊ FY2012, FMFP and IMET funding assistance 

may only be available for the Guatemalan Air 

Force, Navy, and Army Corps of Engineers.

◊ FY2012 Expanded IMET may be made 

available for assistance for the Guatemalan 

Army.

• Within section 7045(c), Haiti.

◊ The government of Haiti shall be eligible to 

purchase defense articles and services IAW 

the AECA for the Coast Guard.

• Within section 7045(d), Honduras.

◊ Prior to the obligation of 20 percent of 

the funds appropriated by this Act that are 

available for the Honduran military and police 

forces, the Secretary of State shall report in 

writing to the congressional appropriations 

committees the government of Honduras is 

implementing policies to protect freedom of 

expression and association, and due process 

of law; and is investigating and prosecuting 

in civilian justice system, IAW Honduran 

and international law, military and police 

personnel who are credibly alleged to have 

violated human rights, and the Honduran 

military and police are cooperating with 

civilian judicial authorities in such case.

◊ This subsection restriction is not to apply 

to assistance to promote transparency, 

anticorruption, and the rule of law within the 

military and police forces.

• Within section 7045(e), Mexico.

◊ Identical to the previous Honduran 

restrictions, prior to the obligation of 15 

percent of the funds appropriated by this act 

that are available for the Mexican military 

and police forces, the Secretary of State 

shall report in writing to the congressional 

appropriations committees the government 

of Mexico is implementing policies to protect 

freedom of expression and association, and 

communities whose illicit crops are 

targeted for aerial eradication.

» Funds appropriated by this Act may 

not be used for aerial eradication in 

Colombia’s national parks or reserves 

unless the Secretary of State certifies to the 

congressional appropriations committees 

that there are no effective alternatives and 

the eradication is IAW Colombian laws.

◊ No funds appropriated by this act or prior 

S/FOAAs may be made available for 

assistance for the Colombian Departmento 

Administrativo de Seguridad or successor 

organizations.

◊ No funds appropriated by this act for assistance 

to Colombia shall be made available for the 

cultivation or processing of African oil palm, 

if doing so would contribute to significant 

loss of native species, disrupt or contaminate 

natural water sources, reduce local food 

security, or cause the forced displacement of 

local people.

◊ Of the funds appropriated by this Act for 

assistance for the Colombian armed forces, 

25 percent may be obligated only after 

the Secretary of State consults with and 

subsequently certifies and reports to the 

congressional appropriations committees 

that the government of Colombia and the 

Colombian armed forces are meeting the 

conditions that appear under this section 

in the Joint Explanatory Statement that 

accompanied this Act.

» This withholding action does not apply 

to FY2012 INCLE funding for continued 

support for Critical Flight Safety Program 

or for any alternative development 

programs in Colombia administered by 

the Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs within the 

Department of State.

◊ No visas are to be issued to any alien 

determined to have willfully provided any 

support or benefitted from the Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the 

National Liberation Army (ELN), the United 

Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) or 

other illegal armed groups. Also, no visa is 

to be issued to any alien who has committed, 

ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise 
37 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

and accountability of national, provincial, 

and local governments.

» Representatives of Afghan national, 

provincial, or local governments and 

local communities and civil society 

organizations, including women-led 

organizations will be consulted and 

participate in the design of programs, 

projects, and activities.

◊ Funds appropriated or otherwise made 

available by this Act for Afghanistan made 

be available as a US contribution to the 

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 

(ARTF) unless the Secretary of State 

determines and reports to the congressional 

appropriations committees that the World 

Bank Monitoring Agent of the ARTF is 

unable to conduct its financial and audit 

responsibilities due to restrictions on security 

personnel by the government of Afghanistan.

◊ ESF and INCLE funds that are made available 

for Afghanistan:

» Shall be made available to the maximum 

extent practicable in a manner that 

emphasizes the participation of Afghan 

women, and directly improves the security, 

economic and social well-being, and 

political status, and protects the rights of 

Afghan women and girls and complies 

with later sections 7060 and 7061 of this 

act.

» May be made available for a US 

contribution to an internationally managed 

fund to support the reconciliation with 

and disarmament, demobilization and 

reintegration into Afghan society of former 

combatants who have renounced violence 

against the government of Afghanistan, 

but only if:

 Afghan women are participating at 

national, provincial, and local levels 

of government in the design, policy 

formulation and implementation 

of such programs and such process 

upholds steps taken by Afghanistan 

to protect the human rights of Afghan 

women, and

 Such funds will not be used to 

support any pardon or immunity from 

prosecution or any position in the 

due process of law; and is investigating and 

prosecuting in civilian justice system, IAW 

Mexican and international law, military and 

police personnel who are credibly alleged to 

have violated human rights, and the Mexican 

military and police are cooperating with 

civilian judicial authorities in such case.

◊ This subsection restriction is not to apply 

to assistance to promote transparency, 

anticorruption and the rule of law within the 

military and police forces.

• Within section 7045(f), Trade Capacity.

◊ Not less than $10,000,000 of FY2012 

appropriations for Development Assistance 

and not less than $10,000,000 of FY2012 

appropriations for ESF shall be made available 

for labor and environmental capacity building 

activities relating to free trade agreements 

with countries of Central America, Peru, 

and the Dominican Republic.

• Finally, within section 7045(g), Aircraft 

Operations and Maintenance.

◊ To the maximum extent practicable, the costs 

of operations and maintenance, including 

fuel, of aircraft funded by this fund should be 

borne by the recipient country.

South Asia (Section 7046)

• Within section 7046(a), Afghanistan.

◊ No FY2012 ESF or INCLE funding may 

be obligated until the Secretary of State, in 

consultation with Administrator, USAID, 

certifies to the congressional appropriations 

committees that:

» The funds will be used to design and 

support programs IAW the June 2011 

“Administrator’s Sustainability Guidance 

for USAID in Afghanistan.”

» The government of Afghanistan is:

 Reducing corruption and improving 

governance

 Taking credible steps to protect the 

human rights of women, and

 Taking steps to facilitate active public 

participation in governance and 

oversight.

» Funds will be used to support and strengthen 

the capacity of Afghan public and 

private institutions and entities to reduce 

corruption and to improve transparency 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 38

and carrying out cross border attacks in 

neighboring countries;

» Not supporting terrorist activities against 

US or coalition forces in Afghanistan, 

also that military and intelligence agencies 

are not intervening extra-judicially into 

political and judicial processes in Pakistan;

» Dismantling improvised explosive devices 

networks and interdicting precursor 

chemicals use in their manufacture;

» Preventing the proliferation of nuclearrelated material and expertise;

» Issuing visas in a timely manner for US 

visitors engaged in counterterrorism 

efforts and assistance programs; and

» Providing humanitarian organizations 

access to detainees, internally displaced 

persons, and other Pakistani civilians 

affected by the conflict.

◊ The Secretary of State may waive the 

requirements of this certification if to do so in 

the in the US national security interest.

◊ FY2012 FMFP funding assistance is 

only to support counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency capabilities in Pakistan 

subject to the Leahy vetting requirements of 

new section 620M, FAA.

◊ FY2012 ESF for Pakistan should be made 

available to interdict precursor materials 

from Pakistan to Afghanistan that are used 

for the manufacture of improvised explosive 

devices. This is to include support programs 

for training border and customs officials in 

Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for agricultural 

extension programs that encourage alternative 

fertilizer use among Pakistani farmers.

◊ $10,000,000 of FY2012 ESF shall be 

made available through the DOS Bureau of 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor for 

human rights and democracy programs in 

Pakistan.

◊ Funds appropriated under titles III and IV 

of this act for assistance to Pakistan may be 

available notwithstanding any other provision 

of law except the Leahy vetting requirements 

of new section 620M, FAA.

• Within section 7046(d), Sri Lanka.

◊ No FY2012 FMFP funding assistance, no 

DCS export license may be issued, and 

no military equipment or technology may 

government of Afghanistan or security 

forces for any leader of an armed group 

responsible for crimes against humanity, 

war crimes, or acts of terrorism, and

 May be made available for a US 

contribution to the NATO/ISAF postoperations Humanitarian Relief Fund.

» The authority within section 1102(c), 

P.L.111-32, 24 June 2009, allowing the 

purchase of Afghanistan-origin products 

and services, shall continue to apply to 

funding from this act.

» Not less than $50,000,000 in funds 

appropriated by this Act for Afghanistan 

assistance shall be available for rule of law 

programs.

• Within section 7046(b), Nepal.

◊ FY2012 FMFP funding assistance for Nepal 

may only be made available if the Secretary 

of State certifies to the congressional 

appropriations committees that the Nepal 

Army is:

» Cooperating fully with investigations and 

prosecutions of violations of human rights 

by civilian judicial authorities, and

» Working constructively to redefine 

the Army’s mission and adjust its size 

accordingly, implement reforms including 

strengthening the capacity of the civilian 

ministry of defense to improve budget 

transparency and accountability, and 

facilitate the integration of former rebel 

combatants into the security forces 

including the Army, consistent with the 

goals of reconciliation, peace and stability.

◊ This funding prohibition shall not apply 

to humanitarian relief and reconstruction 

activities in Nepal.

• Within section 7046(c), Pakistan.

◊ No FY2012 ESF, INCLE, FMFP, or PCCF 

may not be made available for assistance 

to Pakistan unless the Secretary of State 

certifies to the congressional appropriations 

committees that the government of Pakistan 

is:

» Cooperating with the US in 

counterterrorism efforts against specified 

terror groups, including steps to end 

support for such groups and prevent 

them from basing operating in Pakistan 
39 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

genocide or other violations of international 

humanitarian law, may direct a drawdown IAW 

section 552(c), FAA, of up to $30,000,000 of 

commodities and services for the UN War 

Crimes Tribunal established with regard for 

the former Yugoslavia or other such tribunals 

or commissions as the UN Security Council 

may establish or authorize without regard to the 

ceiling limitation ($25,000,000) contained in 

section 552(c)(2), FAA.

• This determination is in lieu of any determinations 

required under section 522(c), FAA.

Community-Based Police Assistance 

(Section 7050)

• Funds made available by titles III and IV of this 

act to carry out the provisions of title I, chapter 

1(development assistance), and title II, chapters 

4 (ESF) and 6 (PKO), FAA, may be used, 

notwithstanding Sec. 660, FAA (prohibiting 

police training), to enhance the effectiveness 

and accountability of civilian police authority 

through training and technical assistance in 

human rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption, 

strategic planning, and through assistance to 

foster civilian police roles that support democratic 

governance including assistance for programs to 

prevent conflict, respond to disasters, address 

gender-based violence, and foster improved 

police relations with the community.

Attendance at International Conferences 

(Section 7051)

• No funds made available by this act may be 

used to send or otherwise pay for the attendance 

of more than fifty US government employees 

stationed in the US at any single international 

conference occurring outside the US unless the 

Secretary of State reports to the congressional 

appropriations committees at least five days in 

advance that such attendance is important to US 

national interest.

Aircraft Transfer and Coordination (Section 

7052)

• Notwithstanding any other provision of law 

or regulation, aircraft procured with funds 

appropriated by this Act or prior Acts for S/

FOAAs for Diplomatic and Consular Programs, 

INCLE, Andean Counter-drug Initiative (ACI), 

be made available to Sri Lanka unless 

the Secretary of State certifies to the 

congressional appropriations committees that 

the government of Sri Lanka is:

» Conducting credible, thorough 

investigations of alleged war crimes and 

violations of international humanitarian 

law by government forces and the 

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam;

» Bringing to justice individuals who have 

been credibly alleged to have committed 

such violations;

» Supporting and cooperating with any UN 

investigation of alleged war crimes and 

violations of international humanitarian 

law;

» Respecting due process, the rights of 

journalists and the rights of citizens to 

peaceful expression and association, 

including ending arrest and detention 

under emergency regulations;

» Providing access to detainees by 

humanitarian organizations; and

» Implementing policies to promote 

reconciliation and justice including 

devolution of power.

◊ This prohibition shall not apply to assistance 

for humanitarian demining and aerial and 

maritime surveillance.

◊ Once the certification is provided, FY2012 

FMFP funding assistance should be used to 

support the recruitment and training of Tamils 

into the Sri Lankan military, Tamil language 

training for Sinhalese military personnel, 

and human rights training for all military 

personnel.

• Within section 7046(e), Regional Cross Border 

Programs.

◊ FY2012 ESF for assistance to Afghanistan and 

Pakistan may be provided notwithstanding 

any other provisions of law that restricts 

assistance to countries for cross border 

stabilization and development programs 

between the two countries, or between either 

country and the Central Asian republics.

War Crimes Tribunals Drawdown (Section 

7048)

• If the President determines that doing so will 

contribute to a just resolution of charges regarding 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 40

humanitarian purposes may be disposed of on 

a grant basis in countries

• Within section 7054(b).

◊ No military assistance shall be furnished for 

cluster munitions, DCS licenses for cluster 

munitions may be issued, and no cluster 

munitions or technology shall be sold or 

transferred unless:

» The sub-munitions of the cluster munitions, 

after arming, do not result in more 

than one percent unexploded ordnance 

across the range of intended operational 

environments, and

» The agreement applicable to the assistance, 

transfer, or sale of such munitions or 

technology will only be used against 

clearly defined military targets and will 

not be used where civilians are known to 

be present or in areas normally inhabited 

by civilians.

Programs to Promote Gender Equality 

(Section 7060)

• Programs funded under title III of this act shall 

include, where appropriate, efforts to improve 

the status of women, including through gender 

considerations in the planning, assessment, 

implementation, monitoring, and evaluations of 

such programs

Gender-Based Violence (Section 7061)

• FY2012 funds appropriated for, inter alia, ESF 

and INCLE shall be made available for genderbased violence prevention and response efforts.

• Programs and activities funded under Titles III 

and IV of this Act to train foreign police, judicial, 

and military personnel, including international 

peacekeeping operations, shall address, where 

appropriate, prevention and response to genderbased violence and trafficking in persons.

Central Asia (Section 7063)

• The terms and conditions of sections 7075(a) 

through (d) and 7076(a) through (e), S/FOAA for 

FY2009, Division H, P.L.111-8, 11 March 2009, 

are to apply for FY2012.

◊ Section 7075(a)-(b), P.L.111-8, applies to 

assistance for Kazakhstan only after the 

Secretary of State determines and reports to 

the congressional appropriations committees 

of significant improvements in human rights, 

and Andean Counter-drug Programs may be used 

for any other program and in any region, including 

for the transport of active and standby Civilian 

Response Corps personnel and equipment during 

a deployment.

• The responsibility for policy decisions and 

justification for the use of this transfer authority 

shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of 

State and the Deputy Secretary of State and not 

further delegated.

• This authority shall only apply after the 

Secretary of State determines and reports to the 

congressional appropriations committees that 

the equipment is no longer required to meet 

programmatic purposes in the designated country 

or region.

• The uses of aircraft purchased or leased by the 

DOS or USAID with funds made available by 

this Act or prior S/FOAAs shall be coordinated 

under the authority of the applicable Chief of 

Mission.

• Such aircraft may be used not a reimbursable 

or non-reimbursable basis to transport federal 

and non-federal employees supporting DOS and 

USAID programs and activities.

• Official travel for other agencies for other 

purposes may be supported on a reimbursable 

or non-reimbursable basis when traveling on a 

space available basis.

• This limitation shall only apply to aircraft which 

the primary purpose is the transport of personnel.

Parking Fines and Real Property Taxes 

Owed by Foreign Governments (Section 

7053)

• The terms and conditions of section 7055, S/

FOAA for FY2010, Division F, P.L.111-117, 16 

December 2009, regarding the same subject, are 

extended through FY2012 prohibiting FY2012 

funding assistance to countries owing unpaid 

parking tickets and property taxes in New 

York City and Washington DC.

Landmines and Cluster Munitions (Section 

7054)

• Within section 7054(a).

◊ Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, 

demining equipment available to DOS and 

USAID and used in support of the clearance 

of landmines and unexploded ordnance for 
41 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

and Refugee Assistance; no funds in this Act may 

be used for assistance to the central government 

of a country which has notified the DOS of its 

refusal to extradite to the US any individual 

indicted for a criminal offense for which the 

maximum penalty is life imprisonment without 

the possibility of parole or for killing a law 

enforcement officer.

• The Secretary of State may waive this 

prohibition on a case by case basis once certified 

to the congressional appropriations committees 

that such a waiver is important to US national 

interests.

Commercial Leasing of Defense Articles 

(Section 7069)

• Notwithstanding any other provision of law and 

subject to regular notification procedures of the 

congressional appropriations committees, FMFP 

funding may be used to finance commercial 

leases by Israel, Egypt, NATO and major nonNATO allies from US commercial suppliers.

◊ This may include leasing with an option to 

purchase.

◊ Other than helicopters and other types of 

aircraft having possible civilian application, 

this may not include major defense equipment 

(MDE).

• The President must determine that there is a 

compelling foreign policy or national security 

reasons for such a lease.

Prohibition on First-Class Travel (Section 

7073)

• No funds made available in this act may be used 

for first-class travel by employees of agencies by 

this Act in contravention of 41 CFR 301-10.122 

through 301-10.124.

Operating and Spend Plans (Section 7078)

• Not later than thirty days of enactment of this act, 

each department, agency, or organization funded 

in titles I through III of this act, shall submit to 

the congressional appropriations committees an 

operating plan for the appropriated funds or funds 

otherwise available for obligation in FY2012. 

The plan is to provide details of the use of such 

funds at the program, project, and activity level.

• Prior to initial obligation of funds, the Secretary 

of State, in consultation with the Administrator 

of USAID, shall submit a detailed spend plan for 

the following:

civil liberties, elections procedures, media 

freedom, freedom of religion, free assembly, 

and minority rights.

» This prohibition may be waived with US 

national security determination by the 

Secretary.

» Section 7075(c)-(d), P.L.111-8, applies 

to a required report regarding the use of 

defense articles and services and financial 

assistance provided by the US for units of 

the armed forces, border guards, or other 

security forces of countries in Central 

Asia to include Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and

Turkmenistan.

◊ Section 7076(a)-(e), P.L.111-8, applies to the 

central government of Uzbekistan requiring 

the Secretary of State to determine and 

report to the congressional appropriations 

committees regarding meeting commitments 

under the Strategic Partnership and 

Cooperation Framework between the 

Republic of Uzbekistan and the US before 

any US assistance is provided.

» This prohibition may be waived by the 

Secretary for six months periods through 

FY2013 if determined to be in the 

national security interest of the US and is 

necessary in obtaining access to and from 

Afghanistan.

» Also, if the Secretary has credible 

evidence that any current or former official 

of the government was responsible for the 

deliberate killings of civilians in Andijan 

in May 2005, or for other violations of 

international recognized human rights 

in Uzbekistan, the individual shall be 

ineligible for entry into the US.

 The Secretary may waive this entry 

prohibition if it is determined that it is 

necessary for the individual to attend the 

UN, or to further US law enforcement 

objectives.

» US assistance is to also include no provision 

of excess defense articles; however, the 

provision of E-IMET is now acceptable.

Extradition (Section 7068)

• Other than INCLE, NADR, Migration and 

Refugee Assistance, and Emergency Migration 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 42

• The provision of defense articles and services 

to countries or international organizations from 

SDAF shall be subject to the concurrence of the 

Secretary of State.

Limitations (Section 7086)

• No FY2012 ESF funding assistance may be 

made available to the Palestinian Authority 

if the Palestinians obtain, after enactment of 

this Act, the same standing as member states 

or full membership as a state in the UN or any 

specialized agency thereof outside an agreement 

negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.

• The Secretary of State may waive this prohibition 

if certified to the congressional appropriations 

committees that to do so is in the US national 

security interest and submits a report detailing 

how the waiver and the continuation of assistance 

would assist in furthering Middle East peace.

Use of Funds in Contravention of this Act 

(Section 7087)

• If the Executive Branch makes a determination 

not to comply with any provision of this Act on 

constitutional grounds, the head of the relevant 

federal agency shall notify the congressional 

appropriations committees in writing within five 

days of such determination, the basis for such 

determination, and any resulting changes to 

program and policy.

Title VIII, Overseas Contingency Operations/

Global War on Terrorism

• Table 9 provides the additional FY2012 

appropriations made in support of requested 

Overseas Contingency Operations.

◊ Funds appropriated under Democracy Fund,

◊ Funds made available in titles III and IV 

of this act for assistance for Iraq, Haiti, 

Colombia, and Mexico and for the Central 

American Regional Security Initiative and for 

the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.

◊ Funds made available for assistance for 

countries or programs and activities referenced 

in the following sections of this Act:

» Section 7040–Palestinian Authority.

» Section 7041(a), (e), (f), and (i)–Egypt, 

Lebanon, Libya, and Yemen.

» Section 7043(b)–Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership Program 

and Partnership for Regional East Africa 

Counterterrorism Program.

» Section 7046(a) and (c)–Afghanistan and 

Pakistan.

» Funds appropriated in title III for food 

security and agriculture development 

programs and for environment programs.

◊ The spend plans required by this section shall 

not be considered as meeting the notification 

requirements of section 7015 of this act or 

section 634A, FAA.

Rescissions (Section 7079)

• Of the prior S/FOAAs, the following amounts 

are rescinded:

• $13,700,000 from Diplomatic and Consular 

Programs, of which $8,000,000 shall be from 

Worldwide Security Protection.

• $400,000,000 from unexpended balances of 

Export and Investment Assistance, ExportImport Bank of the US, subsidy Appropriation.

• $100,000,000 from unexpended balances of ESF.

Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) 

(Section 7080)

• $100,000,000 from the FMS Administrative 

Fund authorized for obligation by title IV, FMFP, 

of this act pursuant to section 21(e)(1)(A), 

AECA, may be transferred to the SDAF pursuant 

to section 51, AECA.

• Not more than $100,000,000 may be obligated 

pursuant to section 51(c)(2), AECA, for the 

purposes of SDAF to remain available for 

obligation through FY2015.
43 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Table 9

Overseas Contingency Operations Appropriations

Program Funding

Diplomatic and Consular Programs $4,389,064,000

Worldwide Security Protection ($236,201,000)

Avail for transfer for ops and assistance in Afghanistan ($230,000,000)

Conflict Stabilization Operations 8,500,000

Office of Inspector General 67,182,000

Iraq reconstruction oversight ($19,545,000)

Afghanistan reconstruction oversight ($44,387,000)

Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs 15,600,000

Embassy Security, Construction & Maintenance 33,000,000

Contributions to International Organizations 101,300,000

International Broadcasting Operations 4,400,000

US Institute of Peace 8,411,000

USAID Operating Expenses 255,000,000

USAID Inspector General 4,500,000

International Disaster Assistance 150,000,000

Transition Initiatives 6,554,000

Complex Crises Fund 30,000,000

Economic Support Fund (ESF) 2,761,462,000

Migration and Refugee Assistance 229,000,000

International Affairs Tech Assistance 1,552,000

Int’l Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE) 983,605,000

Nonproliferation, A/T, Demining, & Related Programs (NADR) 120,657,000

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 81,000,000

Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) 1,102,000,000

Pak Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) 850,000,000

General Provisions

Section 8001

• Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 

funds appropriated under this title are in addition 

to amounts appropriated or otherwise made 

available in this act for FY2012.

Section 8002

• Unless otherwise provided for in this act, the 

additional amounts appropriated by this title 

to appropriations accounts in this act shall be 

available under the authorities and conditions 

applicable to such appropriations accounts

Section 8003

• Funds appropriated by this title under the 

headings, inter alia, ESF, INCLE, NADR, PKO, 

FMFP, and PCCF, may be transferred to, and 

merged with, funds appropriated by this title 

under such headings.

• Such transfers are subject to the regular 

notification procedures of the congressional 

appropriations committees.

• The transfer authority in this section is in 

addition to any transfer authority otherwise 

available under any other provision of law, 

including section 610, FAA.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 44

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic 

Aid

• $107,662,000 to remain available through 

FY2013 for expenses related to the Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid 

(OHDCA) programs provided under 10 U.S.C. 

401, 402, 404, 407, 2557, and 2561.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Account

• $508,219,000 to remain available through 

FY2014 for assistance to the republics of the 

former Soviet Union and, with appropriate 

authorization by DOD and DOS, to countries 

outside the former Soviet Union for the 

elimination, demilitarization, transportation, 

safe storage, and/or nonproliferation of nuclear, 

chemical, and other weapons and its components 

and technology.

◊ $13,500,000 shall be available only to support 

the dismantling and disposal of nuclear 

submarines in the Russian Far East and North.

Title VI, Other Department of Defense 

Programs

Defense Health Program

• Of the total appropriation of $32,482,059,000, an 

amount of $8,000,000 shall be available for HIV 

prevention educational activities undertaken in 

connection with US military training, exercises, 

and humanitarian assistance activities conducted 

primarily in African nations.

Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug 

Activities, Defense

• $1,209,620,000 for DOD drug interdiction and 

counter-drug activities.

Title VIII, General Provisions

Foreign National Employee Compensation 

(Section 8002)

• During FY2012, provisions of law prohibiting 

the payment of compensation to, or employment 

of, any person not a citizen of the US shall not 

apply to DOD personnel.

• Salary increases granted to direct and indirect 

hire DOD foreign national employees funded 

by this Act shall not be at a rate in excess of the 

percentage increase authorized by law for DOD 

civilian employees whose pay is computed under 

the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 5332, or at a rate in 

Section 8004

• If authorized during FY2012, there shall be 

established in the US Treasury the Global 

Security Contingency Fund (GSCF).

• The GSCF was later authorized by section 1207, 

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 

Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.112-81, 31 December 2011.

• Notwithstanding any provision of law, during 

FY2012, not to exceed $50,000,000 from funds 

appropriated under INCLE, FMFP, and PCCF 

under Title VIII of this Act may be transferred 

to the GSCF.

• This authority is to be implemented with the 

transfer of $50,000,000 from the FY2012 

INCLE, FMFP and PCCF appropriation.

• Not later than fifteen days prior to such transfer, 

the Secretary of State is notify the congressional 

appropriations committees to include the 

source of funds and a detailed justification, 

implementation plan, and time line for each 

proposed project.

Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 

2012, Division A, P.L.112-74, 23 December 

2011

• The House Appropriations Committee (HAC) 

originally passed and reported out the DOD 

appropriations bill as HR2219 on 14 June 

2011 with H.Rpt. 112-110, later to be passed 

by the House on 8 July 2011. The Senate 

Appropriations Committee (SAC) passed and 

reported out HR2219 on 15 September 2011 with 

S.Rpt.112-77. The Senate never took action on 

HR2219.

• Similar to the S/FOAA for FY2012, the final 

DOD appropriations bill was incorporated in 

HR2055, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 

2012, as Division A, to be finally enacted on 23 

December 2011 as P.L.112-74.

Title II, Operation and Maintenance

Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide

• $47,026,000 may be used for the Combatant 

Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF) authorized 

by 10 U.S.C. 166a.
45 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Congressional Defense Committees (Section 

8025)

• For the purposes of this act, congressional 

defense committees include the armed services 

committees of the House (HASC) and Senate 

(SASC) and the appropriations subcommittees 

for defense of the House (HAC-D) and Senate 

(SAC-D).

Assistance for the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea (Section 8042)

• No funds appropriated or otherwise made 

available in this act may be obligated or 

expended for assistance to the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea unless specifically 

appropriated for that purpose.

Drug Interdiction or Counter-Drug Activities 

(Section 8045)

• No funds available to DOD for any fiscal year 

for drug interdiction or counter-drug activities 

may be transferred to any other US department 

or agency except as specifically provided in an 

appropriations law.

• No funds available to the CIA for any fiscal year 

for drug interdiction or counter-drug activities 

may be transferred to any other US department 

or agency except as specifically provided in an 

appropriations law. 

Defense Funding for the Transfer of Defense 

Articles or Services to another Country or 

International Organization (Section 8049)

• No FY2012 DOD funds may be obligated 

or expended to transfer defense articles or 

services (other than intelligence services) to 

another country or international organization for 

below specified activities unless the defense and 

foreign relations committees are notified fifteen 

days in advance of the transfer.

◊ The specified activities include any 

international peacekeeping, peaceenforcement or humanitarian assistance 

operation, or similar UN activities under 

an authority of the UN Security Council 

resolution or any other international 

peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or 

humanitarian assistance operation.

• This notification shall include a description of the 

transfer, value of the transfer, a statement whether 

excess of the percentage increase provided by 

the appropriate host nation to its own employees, 

whichever is higher.

• This section shall not apply to DOD foreign 

service national employees serving at US 

diplomatic missions whose pay is set by the 

Department of State under the Foreign Service 

Act of 1980.

• The limitations of this provision shall not apply 

to DOD foreign national employees in the 

Republic of Turkey.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (Section 

8011)

• Within the funds appropriated for the operation 

and maintenance of the armed forces, funds are 

hereby appropriated pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 401 

for humanitarian and civic costs under 10 U.S.C. 

chapter 20. Such funds may also be obligated 

for humanitarian and civic costs incidental to 

authorized operations and pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 

401. These obligations shall be reported as 

required by 10 U.S.C. 401(d).

• Funds available for operation and maintenance 

shall be available for providing humanitarian 

and similar assistance by using Civic Action 

Teams in the Trust Territories of the Pacific 

Islands (TTPI) and freely associated states 

of Micronesia pursuant to the Compact of Free 

Association authorized by P.L.99-239.

• When determined by the Secretary of the Army 

that such action is beneficial for graduate medical 

education programs conducted at army medical 

facilities located in Hawaii, the Secretary may 

authorize the provision of medical services at 

such facilities and transportation, on a nonreimbursable basis, for civilian patients from 

American Samoa, the Commonwealth of 

the Northern Mariana Islands, the Marshall 

Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, 

Palau, and Guam.

Contributions from the Government of 

Kuwait (Section 8021)

During FY2012, DOD is authorized to incur 

obligations not to exceed $350,000,000 for purposes 

specified in 10 U.S.C. 2350j(c) in anticipation of 

receipt of contributions only from the government 

of Kuwait. Upon receipt of such contributions, the 

funding shall be credited to the appropriations or fund 

which incurred such obligations. 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 46

of Defense has received credible information 

from the Department of State that the unit has 

committed a gross violation of human rights, 

unless all necessary corrective steps have been 

taken.

• The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 

the Secretary of State, shall ensure that prior 

to a decision to conduct any such training, full 

consideration is given to all credible information 

available to the Department of State relating 

to human rights violations by foreign security 

forces.

• After consultation with the Secretary of State, 

the Secretary of Defense may waive this 

prohibition if determined such waiver is required 

by extraordinary circumstances.

• Not more than fifteen days after such waiver, the 

Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the 

congressional defense committees describing 

the extraordinary circumstances, the purpose 

and duration of the training program, US and 

foreign forces involved in the training, and the 

information relating to human violations that 

necessitated the waiver.

Israeli Cooperative Programs (Section 8071)

• $235,700,000 of the FY2012 DOD funds 

appropriated under Research, Development, Test, 

and Evaluation, Defense-Wide shall be made 

available for the Israeli Cooperative Program.

◊ $110,525,000 shall be for the Short Range 

Ballistic Missile Defense (SRBMD) program, 

including cruise missile defense research and 

development

» $15,000,000 of this amount shall be for the 

production activities of the SRBMB in the 

US and Israel.

◊ $66,220,000 shall be available for an uppertier component to the Israeli Missile Defense 

Architecture

◊ $58,955,000 shall be for the Arrow System 

Improvement Program including development 

of a long range, ground and airborne, detection 

suite

• These funds for the production of missiles 

and missile components may be transferred to 

appropriations available for the procurement 

of weapons and equipment, to be merged with 

and to be available for the same time period and 

the same purposes as the appropriation to which 

transferred.

the inventory requirements of all elements of 

the US armed forces, including the reserve 

components, for the type of transfer have been 

met; and whether the items to be transferred will 

have to be replaced. If replacement is required, 

how does the President propose to provide the 

funds for such replacement.

F-22A Advanced Tactical Fighter (Section 

8056)

• No FY2012 DOD funds may be used to approve 

or license the sale of the F-22A advanced tactical 

fighter to any foreign government.

• DOD may conduct or participate in studies, 

research, design and other activities to define 

and develop a future export version of the F-22A 

that protects classified and sensitive information, 

technologies and US war fighting capabilities.

Procurement from Foreign Sources (Section 

8057)

• The Secretary of Defense, on a case by case 

basis, may waive with respect to a foreign 

country each limitation on the procurement of 

defense items from foreign sources provided 

in law, if determined that the application of the 

limitation with respect to that country would 

invalidate cooperative programs entered into 

between DOD and the foreign country, or would 

invalidate reciprocal trade agreements for the 

procurement of defense items entered into 

under 10 U.S.C. 2531, and the country does not 

discriminate against the same or similar defense 

items procured in the US for that country. This 

Section applies with respect to:

◊ Contracts and subcontracts entered into on or 

after enactment of this act, and

◊ Options for the procurement of items that are 

exercised after such enactment date under 

contracts that were entered into before such 

enactment if the option prices are adjusted for 

any reason other than the application of this 

waiver authority.

• This wavier authority does not exist for certain 

listed items.

Training with Foreign Security Force Units 

(Section 8058)

• No FY2012 DOD funds may be used to support 

any training program involving a unit of the 

security forces of a country if the Secretary 
47 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Title IX, Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Operation and Maintenance

Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide

• An additional amount of $9,252,211,000 for 

O&M, Defense-Wide

◊ Of which not to exceed $1,690,000,000 

to remain available through FY2013 for 

payments to reimburse key cooperating 

nations for logistical, military, and other 

support, including access, provided to US 

military operations in support of Operation 

Enduring Freedom, Operation New Dawn, and 

post-operation Iraq border security related to 

activities of the Office of Security Cooperation 

(OSC) in Iraq, all notwithstanding any other 

provision of law.

» Such reimbursement payments may be 

made in such amounts as the Secretary 

of Defense, with the concurrence of the 

Secretary of State, and in consultation with 

the Director of the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB), may determine, in 

his discretion, based on documentation 

determined by the Secretary of Defense 

to adequately account for the support 

provided, and such determination 

is final and conclusive upon the US 

accounting officers, and fifteen days 

following notification to the appropriate 

congressional committees.

» These funds may be used for the purpose 

of providing specialized training and 

procuring supplies and specialized 

equipment and providing such supplies 

and loaning such equipment on a nonreimbursable basis to coalition forces 

supporting US military operations in 

Afghanistan.

» A fifteen-day advance notification to the 

appropriate congressional committees 

must be provided with required quarterly 

usage reports of such authority.

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)

• $400,000,000 to remain available through 

FY2013 for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund 

(AIF) to be available for infrastructure projects 

in Afghanistan to be undertaken by the Secretary 

of State, unless the Secretaries of State and 

• This transfer authority is in addition to any other 

transfer authority in this act.

Asia Pacific Regional Initiative Program 

(Section 8086)

• Up to $15,000,000 in funding appropriated under 

Operation and Maintenance, Navy may be made 

available for the Asia Pacific Regional Initiative 

(APRI) Program for the purpose of enabling the 

Pacific Command to execute Theater Security 

Cooperation activities such as humanitarian 

assistance and payment of incremental and 

personnel costs of training and exercising with 

foreign security forces.

• This funding made available for this purpose 

may be used, notwithstanding any other funding 

authorities for humanitarian assistance, security 

assistance, or combined exercise expenses.

• None of this funding may be obligated to 

provide assistance to a country that is otherwise 

prohibited from receiving such assistance under 

any other provision of law.

Global Security Contingency Fund (Section 

8089)

• During FY2012, an amount not to exceed 

$200,000,000 may be transferred from the 

Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide 

to the Department of State Global Security 

Contingency Fund (GSCF)

• No less than thirty days prior to making transfers 

to the DOS GSCF, the Secretary of Defense shall 

notify the defense committees in writing with 

the source of funds and a detailed justification, 

execution plan, and timeline for each proposed 

project.

Non-Support of Military Training or 

Operations that include Child Soldiers 

(Section 8128)

• No funds made available by this Act for IMET, 

FMFP, EDA, assistance IAW section 1206, 

P.L.109-163, issuance [of export licenses] for 

DCS of military equipment, or PKO for the 

countries of Chad, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burma 

may be used to support any military training or 

operations that include child soldiers as defined 

by the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, 

Title IV, P.L.110-457, 23 December 2008.

• No waiver authority is provided.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 48

General Provision—This Title

AIF and ASFF Administrative Costs (Section 

9003)

• Supervision and administration costs associated 

with a construction project funded with O&M 

appropriations available for the Afghanistan 

Infrastructure Fund (AIF) or the Afghanistan 

Security Forces Fund (ASFF) provided in this 

Act and executed in direct support of overseas 

contingency operations in Afghanistan may be 

obligated at the time a construction contract is 

awarded.

• For the purpose of this section, supervision 

and administrative costs include all in-house 

government costs.

Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (Section 9005)

• Not more than $400,000,000 of Army O&M 

appropriated under this title may be used, 

notwithstanding any other provision of law, to 

fund the Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP) for enabling military 

commanders in Afghanistan to respond to 

urgent, small-scale, humanitarian relief and 

reconstruction requirements.

◊ No project is to exceed $20,000,000.

◊ Any project exceeding anticipated cost for 

completion of $5,000,000 is to be notified 

to the congressional defense committees not 

less than fifteen days prior to making funding 

available.

Coalition Force Support (Section 9006)

• DOD O&M funds may be used, notwithstanding 

any other provisions of law, to provide supplies, 

services, transportation, including airlift and 

sealift, and other logistical support to coalition 

forces supporting military and stability 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council 

(Section 9009)

• No funds provided for Afghanistan Security 

Forces Fund (ASFF) may be obligated prior 

to the approval of a financial and activity plan 

by the DOD Afghanistan Resources Oversight 

Council (AROC).

◊ The AROC must approve the requirement and 

acquisition plan for any services requirements 

Defense jointly decide that a specific project will 

be undertaken by DOD.

• Infrastructure projects are to be in support of the 

counterinsurgency strategy requiring funding for 

facility and infrastructure projects including, but 

not limited to, water, power, and transportation 

projects and related maintenance.

• The projects are to be jointed formulated and 

concurred in by the Secretaries of State and 

Defense.

• Funding may be transferred to DOS for such 

projects and considered to be economic assistance 

under the FAA. Any unexpended funding shall 

be transferred back to the AIF

◊ The Secretary of Defense shall notify the 

appropriate congressional committees not 

less than fifteen days prior to funds transfers 

to or from the AIF or obligations from the 

Fund. The appropriate committees are to 

include both armed services, appropriations, 

and foreign affairs committees.

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)

• $11,200,000,000 to remain available through 

FY2013 available to the Secretary of Defense, 

notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the 

purpose of allowing the Commander, Combined 

Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, or 

the Secretary’s designee, to provide assistance 

with the concurrence of the Secretary State to the 

security forces of Afghanistan.

◊ This assistance may include the provision 

of equipment, supplies, services, training, 

facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, 

and construction, and funding.

◊ This authority is in addition to any other 

authority to provide assistance to foreign 

nations.

◊ Not fewer than fifteen days prior to obligating 

from this appropriation, the Secretary of 

Defense shall notify the congressional defense 

committees of details of any such obligations.

Other Department of Defense Programs

Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug 

Activities, Defense

• An additional $456,458,000 to remain available 

through FY2013.
49 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq 

(Section 9013)

• Notwithstanding any other provision of law, up 

to $524,000,000 in title IX, O&M, Air Force 

for Overseas Contingency Operations, may be 

used by the Secretary of Defense to support 

US government transition activities in Iraq by 

funding the operations and activities of the 

Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) in Iraq

and security assistance teams, including life 

support, transportation and personal security, and 

facilities renovation and construction.

Reduced Appropriations (Section 9014)

• Reflecting reduced troop strength in theater, 

$4,042,500,000 is reduced within title IX 

(Overseas Contingency Operations) of this act. 

The reduction shall be applied to the military 

personnel and operation and maintenance 

(O&M) appropriations.

National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA), Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.1121-81, 31 

December 2011

• HR1540 was introduced in the House on 14 April 

2011 to be later reported out of the HASC on 17 

May 2011 with H.Rpt. 112-78. A supplemental 

report was filed by the HASC on 23 May 2011 

as H.Rpt. 112-78, part II. The House almost 

immediately passed the bill on 26 May 2011.

• S981 was introduced in the Senate on 12 May 

2011 but it never was reported out of the SASC. 

A follow-on S1867 was introduced and reported 

out of the SASC on 15 November 11 without 

a report. S1867 was incorporated into H1540 

as an amendment and passed by the Senate on 

1 December 2011. A conference was held and 

reported out on 12 December 2011 with H.Rpt. 

112-329. The conference report was agreed upon 

by the House on 14 December 2011 and the 

Senate on 15 December 2011. 

• HR1540 was enacted on 31 December 2011 as 

P.L.112-81 with Division A being the Department 

of Defense authorization for FY2012.

in excess of $50,000,000 annually and any 

non-standard equipment requirements in 

excess of $100,000,000 using ASFF.

• The AROC must approve all projects and 

the execution plan under the Afghanistan 

Infrastructure (AIF) and any project in excess of 

$5,000,000 from the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program (CERP).

• DOD must certify to the congressional defense 

committees that the AROC has convened and 

approved a process for ensuring compliance 

of this Section and an accompanying report 

language for the ASFF, AIF, and CERP.

• The AROC was established by the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense on 3 August 2011 to oversee 

the use of CERP, AIF, and ASFF within DOD at 

a senior level. The initial plan is for the AROC 

to meet quarterly with working groups meeting 

on a weekly basis to oversee ongoing planning, 

execution, and oversight of Afghanistan 

reconstruction resources. The major reference is 

a joint statement by the Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for AT&L and the Director 

for Logistics, Joint Staff, before the SASC, 

subcommittee on Readiness and Management, 

on 19 October 2011, Subj: “Transforming 

Wartime Contracting Recommendations of the 

Commission on Wartime Contracting.”

Task Force for Business and Stability 

Operations (Section 9012)

• Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 

up to $150,000,000 in title IX, O&M, Army 

for Overseas Contingency Operations, may be 

obligated and expended for purposes of the Task 

Force for Business and Stability Operations 

subject to the direction and control of the 

Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of 

the Secretary of State, to carry out strategic 

business and economic assistance activities in 

Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring 

Freedom.

• Not less than fifteen days before making funds 

available pursuant to this Section for any project 

with a total anticipated cost of $5,000,000 

or more, the Secretary shall submit a written 

notice to the congressional defense committees 

containing a detailed justification and time line 

for each proposed project.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 50

Title V–Military Personnel Policy

Subtitle B–Reserve Component 

Management

Leadership of National Guard Bureau 

(Section 511)

• Amends 10 U.S.C. 10502(d) so that the Chief of 

the National Guard Bureau shall be appointed 

to the grade of general.

Membership of the Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau on the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(Section 512)

• Amends 10 U.S.C. 151(a) with a new paragraph 

(7) adding the Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Title IX–Department of Defense 

Organization and Management 

Subtitle A–Department of Defense 

Management

Qualifications for Appointments to the 

Position of Deputy Secretary of Defense 

(Section 902)

• Amends 10 U.S.C. 132(a) so that the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense shall be appointed from 

among persons mostly highly qualified for the 

position by reason of background and experience, 

including persons with appropriate management 

experience.

Memoranda of Agreement on Identification 

and Dedication of Enabling Capabilities 

of General Purpose Forces to fulfill certain 

Requirements of Special Operations Forces 

(Section 904)

• By not later than 180 days of enactment of 

this act, and annually thereafter, each secretary 

of a military department shall enter into a 

memorandum of agreement with the Commander, 

USSOCOM, that identifies or establishes 

processes and associated milestones by which 

numbers and types of enabling capabilities of 

general purpose forces under the jurisdiction of 

such secretary can be identified and dedicated to 

fulfill the training and operational requirements 

of special operations forces under USSOCOM.

Division A–Department of Defense 

Authorizations

Title I–Procurement

Subtitle E–Joint and Multiservice Matters

Limitation on Availability of Funds for 

Aviation Foreign Internal Defense Program 

(Section 142)

• Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by 

this Act or otherwise made available for FY2012 

for the procurement of fixed-wing non-standard 

aviation aircraft in support of the aviation foreign 

internal defense program, not more than 50 

percent may be obligated or expended until the 

date that is thirty days after the date on which the 

Commander, US Special Operation Command 

submits a report not later than 15 March 2012 to 

the congressional defense committees to include:

◊ Overall description of the program, including 

its goals and proposed metrics of performance 

success

◊ Analysis of alternatives and efficiencies 

reviews for contracts awarded,

◊ Assessment of advantages and disadvantages 

of procuring new aircraft, procuring used 

aircraft, or leasing aircraft,

◊ Comprehensive strategy outlining and 

justifying the overall projected growth of 

aviation foreign national program to satisfy 

the increased requirements of the GCCs, and

◊ Examination of efficiencies that could be 

gained by procuring platforms such as those 

being procured for light mobility aircraft.

Authority for Exchange with the United 

Kingdom of specified F-35 Lightning II Joint 

Strike Fighter Aircraft (Section 147)

• Authorizes the exchange, to include title, of 

one US F-35 carrier variant acquired by the US 

for the USMC for one F-35 short-take off and 

vertical landing configuration being acquired on 

behalf of the United Kingdom.
51 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Extension of Authority to Support Unified 

Counter-Drug and Counterterrorism 

Campaign in Colombia (Section 1007)

• Amends section 1021, NDAA, FY2005, as 

amended, P.L.108-375, 28 Oct 2004, allowing 

DOD support of the counternarcotics and 

counterterrorism campaign in Colombia through 

FY2012.

Subtitle I–Miscellaneous Authorities and 

Limitations

Authority for Assignment of Civilian 

Employees of the Department of Defense 

as Advisors to Foreign Ministries of Defense 

(Section 1081)

• Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the 

concurrence of the Secretary of State, to assign 

DOD civilian employees as advisors to foreign 

country ministries of defense or security 

agencies serving in a similar defense function in 

order to:

◊ Provide institutional, ministerial-level of 

advice, and other training to personnel of 

the ministry to which assigned in support of 

stabilization or post-conflict activities, or

◊ Assist such ministry in building core 

institutional capacity, competencies, and 

capabilities to manage defense-related 

processes.

• This authority expires at the end of FY2014

◊ However, the assignment of such US 

employees may continue after FY2014 using 

funds available for FYs 2012–14.

Use of State Partnership Program Funds for 

Certain Purposes (Section 1085)

• Subject to section 1210, NDAA, FY2010, 

P.L.111-84, 28 October 2009, of the funds made 

available to the National Guard, the Secretary 

of Defense may use up to $3,000,000 to pay 

for travel and per diem costs associated with 

the participation of US and foreign civilian and 

non-defense agency personnel in conducting 

activities under the State Partnership Program 

(SPP) of the National Guard.

Title X–General Provisions

Subtitle B–Counter-Drug Activities

Extension of Authority for Joint Task Forces 

to provide Support to Law Enforcement 

Agencies conducting Counterterrorism 

(Section 1004)

• Amends section 1022(b), NDAA for FY2004, 

as amended, P.L.108-136, 24 November 2003, 

extending the authority through FY2012 for 

a joint DOD task force to provide support 

to law enforcement agencies conducting 

counterterrorism activities. Any such support is 

only to be provided in the geographic area of 

responsibility of the joint task force.

Three-Year Extension and Modification of 

Authority of Department of Defense to 

provide Additional Support for CounterDrug Activities of Other Governmental 

Agencies (Section 1005)

• Amends section 1004, NDAA, FY1991, as 

amended, P.L.101-510, 5 November 1990, 

allowing DOD to provide support for counterdrug activities by other government agencies 

through FY2014.

• Also amends section 1004 allowing such support 

to Indian tribal law enforcement agencies.

Two-Year Extension and Expansion of 

Authority to Provide Additional Support for 

Counter-Drug Activities of Certain Foreign 

Governments (Section 1006)

• Amends Section 1033, NDAA, FY1998, as 

amended, P.L.105-85. 18 Nov 1997, allowing 

DOD to provide additional counter-drug support 

for up to $100,000,000 annually through FY2013.

• Also amends Section 1033 to include the 

following thirteen additional governments:

Benin Ivory Coast

Nicaragua Cape Verde

Jamaica Nigeria

The Gambia Liberia

Sierra Leone Ghana

Mauritania Togo

Guinea
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 52

Agreement (ACSA) to now expire at the end of 

FY2014.

• Additionally amends section 1202 to only 

include loans to coalition forces participating in 

operations in Afghanistan.

Extension and Expansion of Authority for 

Support of Special Operations to combat 

Terrorism (Section 1203)

• Amends section 1208, NDAA, FY2005, as 

amended, P.L.108-375, 28 October 2004, 

authorizing the provision of support to foreign 

forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals 

engaging in supporting or facilitating ongoing 

US special forces operations to combat terrorism 

to now an annual value of $50,000,000 to expire 

now at the end of FY2015.

Modification and Extension of authorities 

relating to Program to Build the Capacity 

of foreign Military Forces (Section 1204)

• Amends section 1206, NDAA, FY2006, 

as amended, P.L.109-163, 6 January 2006, 

authorizing up to $350,000,000 annually in 

equipment, supplies, and training assistance 

through now FY2013 to building the capacity 

of a country’s national military force to conduct 

counterterrorism operations or to participate in 

or to support military and stability operations 

in which US armed forces are a participant. 

Also used to build the capacity of a foreign 

country’s maritime security forces to conduct 

counterterrorism.

Two-Year Extension of Authorization 

for Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery 

Capabilities (Section 1205)

• Amends section 943, NDAA, FY2009, P.L.110-

417, 14 October 2008, authorizing the annual use 

of up to $20,000,000 in DOD-wide Operations 

and Maintenance funding for support to foreign 

forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals to 

facilitate the recovery of DOD/USCG military 

or civilian personnel or other personnel who 

become separate or isolated during US military 

operations and cannot rejoin their units without 

such assistance.

• The recipient entities are to also include those 

conducting activities relating to operational 

preparation of the environment.

• This authority is extended through now FY2013.

Subtitle J–Other Matters

Expansion of Scope of Humanitarian 

Demining Assistance Program to include 

Stockpiled Conventional Munitions 

Assistance (Section 1092)

• Amends 10 U.S.C. 407 to also include assistance 

in the clearance of stockpiled conventional 

munitions in addition to demining assistance.

• The term “stockpiled conventional munitions 

assistance” as it relates to the support of 

humanitarian assistance efforts, means training 

and support in the disposal, demilitarization, 

physical security, and stockpile management of 

potentially dangerous stockpiles of explosive 

ordnance, and includes activities related to the 

furnishing of education, training, and technical 

assistance with respect to explosive remnants of 

war, and the disposal, demilitarization, physical 

security, and stockpile management of potentially 

dangerous stockpiles of explosive ordnance.

Title XII–Matters relating to Foreign 

Nations

Subtitle A–Assistance and Training

Commanders’ Emergency Response 

Program (CERP) in Afghanistan (Section 

1201)

• Authorizes the use of up to $400,000,000 in 

funds made available during FY2012 for DOD 

Operations and Maintenance for CERP in 

Afghanistan.

• Any one project is not to exceed $20,000,000

• The Secretary of Defense is to notify the 

congressional defense committees fifteen days 

prior to obligation of any project that is to exceed 

$5,000,000.

Three-Year Extension of Temporary 

Authority to use Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreements to lend Military 

Equipment for Personnel Protection and 

Survivability (Section 1202)

• Amends section 1202, NDAA, FY2007, as 

amended, P.L.109-364, 17 October 2006, 

extending the authority to no-cost loan certain 

significant military equipment for up to one 

year using the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing 
53 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

◊ Security Programs: To enhance the 

capabilities of a country’s national military 

forces, and other national security forces that 

conduct border and maritime security, internal 

defense, and counterterrorism operations, as 

well as the government agencies responsible 

for such forces to:

» Conduct border and maritime security, 

internal defense, and counterterrorism 

operations, and

» Participate in or support military, stability, 

or peace support operations consistent with 

US foreign policy and national security 

interests.

◊ Justice Sector and Stabilization Programs: For 

the justice sector to include law enforcement 

and prisons, rule of law programs, and 

stabilization efforts in a country in cases 

which the Secretary of State, in consultation 

with the Secretary of Defense, determines that 

conflict or instability in a country or region 

challenges the existing capability of civilian 

providers for such assistance.

• Assistance for Security Programs may include the 

provision of equipment, supplies, and training.

◊ These programs shall be jointly formulated 

by the Secretaries of State and Defense 

with such programs to be carried out to be 

approved by the Secretary of State, with the 

concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, 

before implementation.

• The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 

Secretary of Defense, shall formulate the Justice 

Sector and Stabilization Programs with such 

programs to be carried out be approved by the 

Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the 

Secretary of Defense, before implementation.

• The contribution of the Secretary of State to an 

activity under this authority shall not be less 

than 20 percent of the total amount for such 

activity while the contribution of the Secretary 

of Defense to such activity shall not be more than 

80 percent of the total amount required.

◊ Section 8004, S/FOAA, 2012, division I, 

P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011, authorizes the 

Secretary of State to use up to $50,000,000 

in FY2012 INCLE, FMFP, and PCCF to be 

transferred to GSCF during FY2012.

Support of Foreign Forces Participating in 

Operations to Disarm the Lord’s Resistance 

Army (LRA) (Section 1206)

• Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the 

concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide 

up to $35,000,000 in logistics support, supplies 

and services annually during FYs 2012 and 2013 

for foreign forces participating in operations to 

mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the 

Lord’s Resistance Army to include to:

◊ The national military forces of Uganda, or

◊ The national military forces of any other 

country determined by the Secretary of 

Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary 

of State, to be participating in such operations.

• No US armed services personnel, civilian 

employees, or civilian contractor personnel may 

participate in combat operations except in selfdefense, or in the rescue of any US citizen.

• The Secretary of Defense may not use this 

authority to provide any type of support other is 

otherwise prohibited by any provision of law.

◊ Likewise, the Secretary may not use this 

authority to provide support for the national 

military forces of a country determined to be 

eligible for such support until the Secretary 

notifies the appropriate congressional 

committees of the eligibility of the country 

for such support.

◊ The meaning of logistics support, supplies, 

and services in this authority is that as defined 

by 10 U.S.C. 2350(1) which generally 

includes only non-lethal services, logistics 

support, and part parts but specifically not 

military equipment designated as significant 

military equipment (SME) IAW section 38(a), 

AECA.

Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) 

(Section 1207)

• Authorizes the establishment of this account in 

the US Treasury.

• Notwithstanding any other provision of law (other 

than sections 620A [no support of international 

terrorism] and new 620M [Leahy vetting], 

FAA), this fund shall be available to either the 

Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State to 

provide assistance to countries designated by the 

Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the 

Secretary of Defense, for the following purposes:
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 54

◊ Ability of the Yemen Ministry of Interior 

Counterterrorism forces to conduct 

counterterrorism operations against the 

al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the Arabian 

Peninsula. 

» This assistance for the Yemen Ministry 

of Interior may not exceed $75,000,000 

during FY2012.

» This Transitional Authority and the section 

1206, NDAA, FY2006, as amended, may 

not be used for Yemen until thirty days 

after the Secretaries of State and Defense 

jointly certify in writing to the specified 

congressional committees that the use 

of such authority is important to the US 

national security interests to include 

(1) the reasons for the certification, (2) 

justification for such assistance, and (3) 

acknowledgement that the government of 

Yemen as assured to both secretaries that 

any provided assistance will be used in a 

manner consistent with such authority.

• The specified congressional committees include 

both armed services committees, both foreign 

relations committees, and both appropriations 

committees.

Subtitle B–Matters relating to Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan

Extension and Modification of Logistical 

Support for Coalition Forces Supporting 

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Section 

1211)

• Amends section 1234, NDAA, FY2008, as 

amended, P.L.110-181, 28 January 2008, 

authorizing up to now $450,000,000 through 

FY2012 in US-provided logistics support to 

coalition partner countries in Afghanistan and 

Iraq.

One-Year Extension of Authority to Transfer 

Defense Articles and Provide Defense 

Services to the Military and Security Forces 

of Iraq and Afghanistan (Section 1212)

• Amends section 1234, NDAA, FY2010, 

as amended, P.L.111-84, 28 October 2009, 

extending the authority to transfer excess US 

defense articles located in Kuwait and Iraq as 

28 December 2008 to the governments of Iraq 

or Afghanistan not later than now 31 December 

2012.

• DOD appropriations for O&M Defense-wide 

may be transferred to the GSCF with the amount 

in any one year not to exceed $200,000,000.

◊ Section 8089, DOD Appropriations Act, 2012, 

division A, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011, 

provides for this transfer during FY2012.

• GSCF funds shall remain available through 

FY2015 except that amounts appropriated or 

transferred to the fund before 30 September 

2015 shall remain available for obligation and 

expenditure after this date for activities under 

programs commenced before this date.

• Personnel from other US agencies may be 

detailed, with or without reimbursement, to 

the Department of State to carry out the GSCF 

program.

• Specified congressional committees are to be 

notified fifteen days prior to any transfer of funds 

or initiating any GSCF assistance program.

• Likewise, the Secretary of State, with the 

concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, shall 

notify specified congressional committees 

fifteen days after the date on which all necessary 

guidance has been issued and processes for 

implementation of this GSCF authority are 

established and fully operational.

• Section 1207(n) of this Act provides a GSCF 

Transitional Authority for the Secretary of 

Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary 

State, to provide equipment, supplies, and 

training plus minor military construction 

assistance only during FY2012 until the GSCF 

program is determined and reported by the 

Secretary of State being operational as follows, 

to enhance the:

◊ Capacity of the national military forces, 

security agencies serving in a similar defense 

function, and border security forces of 

Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to conduct 

counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda, 

its affiliates, and al-Shabaab.

◊ Capacity of national military forces 

participating in the African Union Mission 

in Somalia to conduct counterterrorism 

operations against al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and 

al-Shabaab,

» This assistance for Djibouti, Ethiopia, 

Kenya and the African Union Mission 

participants may not exceed $75,000,000 

during FY2012.
55 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

State, determines and certifies to Congress that 

women in Afghanistan are an integral part of the 

reconciliation process between the government 

of Afghanistan and the Taliban.

Authority to Establish a Program to Develop 

and Carry Out Infrastructure Projects in 

Afghanistan (Section 1217)

• Amends section 1217, NDAA, FY2011, P.L.11-

383, 7 January 2011, authorizing the use of 

$400,000,000 in DOD FY2011 O&M through 

now FY2012 for the Afghanistan Infrastructure 

Fund (AIF).

• In the case of new DOD funds for the program 

during FY2012, the funds are to remain available 

through FY2013.

◊ Title IX, DOD Appropriations Act, 2012, 

division A, P.L.112-74, 23 December 2011, 

provides an additional $400,000,000 in 

FY2012 funding for the AIF.

Limitation on Availability of Amounts for 

Reintegration Activities in Afghanistan 

(Section 1219)

• Prohibits the use of 50 percent of FY2012 funding 

for the previous section 1216 reintegration of 

former terrorists into Afghanistan society until 

the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 

the Secretary of State, determines and certifies 

to Congress that women in Afghanistan are 

an integral part of the reconciliation process 

between the government of Afghanistan and the 

Taliban.

Extension and Modification of Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) (Section 

1220)

• Amends section 1224, NDAA, FY2010, 

as amended, P.L.111-84, 28 October 2009, 

authorizing the use of DOD funds within the 

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF)

through FY2012.

• However, not more than 40 percent of such funds 

may be obligated or expended until the Secretary 

of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary 

of State, submits to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report on a strategy to use the funds 

with metrics used to determine progress with 

respect to the fund, and a strategy to enhance 

Pakistani efforts to counter improvised explosive 

devices.

One-Year Extension of Authority for 

Reimbursement of Certain Coalition 

Nations for Support Provided to US 

Military Operations (Section 1213)

• Amends section 1233, NDAA, FY2008, as 

amended, P.L.110-181, 28 January 2008, 

authorizing reimbursement to coalition 

countries during FY2012 for overseas 

contingency operations. Also increases the value 

of reimbursement to $1,690,000,000 with the 

reimbursement specifically to Pakistan extending 

through FY2013.

Authority to Support Operations and 

Activities of the Office of Security 

Cooperation in Iraq (Section 1215)

• Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to support 

USG transition activities in Iraq by providing 

funds for operations and activities of the Office 

of Security Cooperation in Iraq and also of 

security assistance teams in Iraq.

• The funding is not to exceed $524,000,000 in 

FY2012 with funds coming from the FY2012 

Air Force Operations and Maintenance account.

◊ Section 9013, DOD Appropriations Act, 2012, 

division A, P.L.112-74, 23 Dec 2011, provides 

for the use of up to $524,000,000 in FY2012 

Air Force, O&M, for the Office of Security 

Cooperation in Iraq.

• The President is to ensure that FMS sale offers 

after enactment of this Act includes, consistent 

with section 21, AECA, charges sufficient to 

recover the costs of O&M and activities of 

security assistance teams in Iraq in connection 

with such sale.

One-Year Extension of Authority to use 

Funds for Reintegration Activities in 

Afghanistan (Section 1216)

• Amends section 1216, NDAA, FY2011, P.L.111-

383, 7 January 2011, extending the authority 

for the Secretary of Defense annual use of 

$50,000,000 in O&M through 31 December 

2012 to support the reintegration of former 

terrorists into Afghanistan society.

• Section 1219 of this Act prohibits not more 

than 50 percent of FY2012 funding for this 

program may be used until the Secretary of 

Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 56

Title XV–Authorization of Additional 

Appropriations for Overseas Contingency 

Operations

Subtitle A–Authorization of Additional 

Appropriations

Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug 

Activities, Defense-Wide (Section 1508)

• Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated 

for the DOD for FY2012 for expenses, not 

otherwise provided for, for Drug Interdiction 

and Counterd-Drug Activities, Defense-Wide.

Subtitle C–Limitations and Other Matters

Availability of funds in Afghanistan Security 

Forces Fund (Section 1533)

• Funds available to the DOD for the Afghanistan 

Security Forces Fund (ASFF) for FY2012 

shall be subject to the conditions contained in 

sections 1513(b) through (g), NDAA, FY2008, 

P.L.110-181, 28 January 2008, as amended by 

section 1531(b), NDAA, FY2011, P.L.111-383, 

7 January 2011.

• Assistance provided using the ASFF may 

include literacy instruction and training to build 

the logistical, management, and administrative 

capacity of military and civilian personnel of 

the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, 

including through instruction at training facilities 

of the NATO mission in Afghanistan.

Division B–Military Construction 

Authorizations

• Entitled Military Construction Authorization for 

Fiscal Year 2012, did not include any material of 

significant security cooperation interest.

Division C–Department of Energy National 

Security Authorizations and Other 

Authorizations

• Did not include any material of significant 

security cooperation interest.

Division D–Funding Tables

• Includes funding tables specifying dollar amounts 

authorized for a project, program, or activity. The 

obligation and expenditure of the specified dollar 

amount for the project, program, or activity is 

hereby authorized, subject to the availability of 

appropriations.

◊ For this report, the appropriate congressional 

committees include the foreign relations and 

armed services of both houses.

◊ This report is to be updated and submitted 

annually at the same time as the annual budget 

submission.

Title XIII–Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Funding Allocations (Section 1302)

• Of the $508,210,000 in funding authorized to 

be appropriated for FY2012 DOD funding, the 

following may obligated for the Cooperative 

Threat Reduction purposes specified:

◊ $63,221,000 for strategic offensive arms 

elimination,

◊ $9,804,000 for chemical weapons destruction,

◊ $121,143,000 for global nuclear security,

◊ $259,470,000 for cooperative biological 

engagement,

◊ $28,080,000 for proliferation prevention,

◊ $2,500,000 for threat reduction engagement, 

◊ $24,001,000 for activities designated as Other 

Assessments.

Limitation on Use of Funds for 

Establishment of Centers of Excellence 

in Countries Outside of the Former soviet 

Union (Section 1304)

• Not more than $500,000 of FY2012 Cooperative 

Threat Reduction funds may be obligated or 

expended to establish a center of excellence in 

a country that is not a state of the former Soviet 

Union, until fifteen days after the Secretary of 

Defense submits to the congressional defense 

committees a report that includes:

◊ Identification of the country in which the 

center will be located.

◊ Description of the purpose for which the 

center will be established.

◊ The agreement under which the center will 

operate.

◊ A funding plan for the center to include:

» The amount of funds to be provided by the 

government of the country in which the 

center will be located, and

» The percentage of the total cost of 

establishing and operating the center in 

which the host government will provide.
57 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

of Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) to fund 

global counterterrorism operations, and operations 

and assistance in Southwest Asia.

The S/FOAA funding for FY2012 security 

assistance remained at a high level to be extended 

into FY2013 at a similar level. The congressional 

requirement for pre-consultation, determinations, 

certifications and reporting remain ever presentation 

especially with the congressional appropriations 

committees. The three significant items in the FY2012 

S/FOAA were the authorized use of FMFP funding 

for security forces, the funding and reestablishment 

of the special defense acquisition fund (SDAF), 

and redesignating the “Limitation on Assistance to 

Security Forces” to now section 620M, FAA .

DOD appropriations for FY2012 likewise 

continued at a high level but with no additional 

funding for the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). 

However, $524,000,000 in Air Force O&M is 

identified to support the operations and activities of 

the new Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq.

The NDAA for FY2012 extended and funded 

most security cooperation programs into FY2012 or 

beyond. The act also established three new temporary 

programs:

• Support of forces participating in operations to 

disarm the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

• The joint DOD/D)S managed and funded Global 

Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) to also 

include a FY2012 transitional program until 

GSCF is determined operational.

• Provision for the assignment of DOD civilians to 

duties as advisors to foreign country ministries 

of defense.

About the Author

Ken Martin has been at DISAM for over twenty 

years as an associate professor for the management of 

security assistance. In addition to teaching, his duties 

include being the legislation and policy functional 

manager and a contributing author for the annually 

republished DISAM “Greenbook,” The Management 

of Security Assistance. He is a retired US Navy 

surface warfare officer. His education includes an 

undergraduate degree in the field of economics from 

the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago and 

a master’s degree in administration from Central 

Michigan University.

Title XLI–Procurement

• Section 4101–Procurement

• Section 4102–Procurement for Overseas 

Contingency Operations

Title XLII–Research, Development, Test, and 

Evaluation

• Section 4201–Research, Development, Test, and 

Evaluation

• Section 4202–Research, Development, Test, and 

Evaluation for Overseas Contingency Operations

Title XLII–Operation and Maintenance

• Section 4301–Operation and Maintenance

• Section 4302–Operation and Maintenance for 

Overseas Contingency Operations

Title XLIV–Military Personnel

• Section 4401–Military Personnel

• Section 4402–Military Personnel for Overseas 

Contingency Operations

Title XLV–Other Authorizations

• Section 4501–Other authorizations

• Section 4502–Other Authorizations for Overseas 

Contingency Operations

Title XLVI–Military Construction

• Section 4601–Military Construction

Title XLVII–Department of Energy National 

Security Programs

• Section 4701–Department of Energy National 

Security Programs

• Division E–SBIR and STTR Reauthorization 

• Entitled SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 

2011. Did not include any material of significant 

security cooperation interest.

◊ SBIR is Small Business Innovation Research.

◊ STTR is Small Business Technology Transfer 

Research.

Conclusion

This article for FY2012 included a summary 

of three pieces of legislation that impacted US 

international programs especially those of security 

assistance and security cooperation. Any funding 

allocations were taken from the State Department 

provided congressional budget justifications for FY 

2013 which included country and program funding 

levels for FY2011 and FY2012. Both the S/FOAA 

and the DOD appropriations act incorporated the use 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 58
59 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

category to the DOD goal of 95percent trained by the 

end of FY 2011. The goal was met in September 2011 

with over 97 percent of the SC workforce determined 

to be trained to the desired level established by 

their organizations. To say this was a monumental 

achievement may be an understatement. DISAM, as 

the DSCA executive agent for the effort, could build 

a database—a combination of assigned personnel 

and contractor support—but it took the MILDEPS 

and combatant commands to provide positional, 

incumbent, training level requirements and other 

requisite information to populate the system. DISAM 

course managers/directors needed to evaluate training 

capacities to ensure adequate training opportunities 

were available once those personnel deficient in 

training were identified. Also, they were tasked with 

determining the optimal training methodology and 

courses to meet their needs—online, in residence, and 

at off campus venues. In the roughly two years effort, 

DISAM trained over 22,000 students in resident, onsite, and distance learning venues. Recall, many of 

our SC workforce members were determined by their 

organizations to need more than one or two courses 

to meet their desired training level—hence why the 

number of students trained exceeds the number of 

personnel in SC billets. We also needed to account 

for the new entries to our security cooperation 

community and the additional effort to educate and 

train them as they assumed their responsibilities. 

After the analysis was complete, DISAM 

determined that, at a minimum, we needed to double 

the number of training opportunities for our SAM-C 

(CONUS) course. So, that’s what we did—in fact, we 

nearly quadrupled them—from an average throughput 

of approximately 260 students per year to over 950 

trained from the last quarter of FY 10 to the end of 

FY 11. In order to meet our goal, we restructured 

the course from a lecture-based, two-week resident 

course, to a forty-hour distance learning (online) 

prerequisite combined with a one-week resident 

Security Cooperation 

Initiatives

By Greg Sutton

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

By now, many of you are likely well aware 

that the training of the Department of Defense’s 

security cooperation and security assistance 

workforce has drawn attention at the highest levels 

of the US Government (USG). A Memorandum 

from the Executive Office of the President, Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB), to all USG 

Departments and Agencies stated in part:

Over the next several months, OMB will work 

with Congress, interagency management councils, 

experts in Federal management policy, Federal 

employees, and other key stakeholders to craft a 

broad management and performance framework that 

will achieve near term priorities and overcome long 

standing management challenges. This effort will 

include addressing the high-priority performance 

goals [of each USG Agency].and will impact budget 

decisions. 

Though this was an Executive Office 

Memorandum, when the DOD identified security 

cooperation training as one of their high priority 

performance goals, it matched very well with the 

current Quadrennial Defense Review. 

The above, plus a synopsis of the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR) Report, February 2010, was 

provided to the community about a year ago in our 

DISAM Online Journal. So...

Where are we Today?

The information provided above was drafted 

in December of 2010 and since that time, DSCA/

DISAM has collected position, personnel, and training 

information on over 10,000 security cooperation 

billets and personnel in both US and OCONUS 

organizations (SCOs and GCCs). This data is 

contained in the the Security Cooperation Workforce 

Database (SCWD), maintained by organizational 

administrators and originally designed to provide 

a “measuring stick” on progress from a workforce 

initially measured in the 50-60 percent “trained” 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 60

more proud of our DISAM staff and faculty—just in 

case you didn’t notice. 

Now That We’ve Met the DOD Goal, What’s 

Next?

We intend to keep the database relevant with 

enhancements and updates of positional and 

incumbent information, and we plan to sustain 

the training levels directed by DOD. Shortly after 

achieving the DOD goal, we held a meeting of 

organizational administrators to map out the way 

ahead. We identified and implemented systemic 

enhancements desired by users, and we identified 

how to avoid returning to the days when so many 

workers found themselves without the proper 

training for their job. We have recently implemented 

the first round of those enhancements to include the 

ability for organizational administrators to add new 

information data fields to meet the needs of individual 

organization, MILDEPs, or GCCs. We have added 

columns to track all completed DISAM courses and 

dates so the organizations may get a better total picture 

of the training specific individuals have completed. 

There are more to come, and we will keep you 

posted. DISAM has begun to work with other DOD 

training activities to validate specific training courses 

as meeting a specific SCWD training level. As that 

effort grows, we will keep the community advised 

via the SCWD administrator’s newsletter, posted 

on the DISAM website (www.disam.dsca.mil) and 

the DISAM Online Journal: www.disamjournal.org. 

Keep up with these efforts and if you have questions, 

drop us an e-mail at: hppg.scwd@disam.dsca.mil.

About the Author

Gregory W. Sutton is currently the Director 

of Research at the Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management. He has over twenty-two 

years experience in the SC/SA arena serving in an 

SAO (now SCO)—the US Military Training Mission, 

Saudi Arabia, and the Air Force ILCO (AFSAC), 

while on active duty as an AF Officer. As a contract 

FMS advisor, he was involved in several major 

international FMS system sales. He joined the faculty 

at DISAM in 1994 and was appointed Director of 

Research in 2001.

course utilizing hands-on exercises. Not only were 

we able to increase the number of opportunities, 

but also, based on student and instructor feedback, 

we enhanced the overall learning experience by 

getting the facts online and using that knowledge in 

the resident component exercises. As a cost-saving 

measure, DISAM was also able send three to four 

instructors to locations where a large number of 

personnel were in need of training—we conducted 

twelve SAM-CX classes (X designating onsite at the 

student’s facility) with over 650 students graduated. 

The CX course also utilized the principle of online 

knowledge in conjunction with classroom exercises 

and discussion. 

We also nearly doubled our throughput of the 

Security Cooperation Overseas course (SCM-O). 

This course is required by DOD Instruction 5132.13 

for all personnel assigned SC positions within our 

security cooperation offices overseas. Analysis of 

the SCWD data indicated a significant number of 

personnel assigned to SC positions in the SCOs had 

not received this required training. To remedy that 

problem, senior officers became increasingly involved 

with GCCS and established working sessions with 

the then DSCA Director VADM Wieringa. Soon, we 

realized that this involvement created the desired, 

albeit challenging result—an onrush of students 

attempting to register for the SCM-O course. Class 

sizes needed to be nearly doubled to address the 

need, so we double taught SCM-O—for each class, 

e.g., SCM-O2-11, there was a concurrent SCM-22-11 

class. This was the case for more than half of the FY 

11 SCM-O courses. DISAM also identified overseas 

locations where conducting a SCM-O course could 

provide the most “bang for the buck” in terms of 

correcting training deficiencies. Working with the 

GCCs, DISAM’s faculty and staff were the heroes 

of this effort—people took on the extra teaching and 

support requirements with a vigor and cooperation 

that had not seen in several years. Another challenge 

included the significant number of vacant billets in 

both the staff and faculty when we first started the 

HPPG push. The needs had been identified and our 

parent organization DSCA provided the authorization 

and funding. As many are aware, the hiring process is 

not rapid, nor is transforming a newly hired individual 

into a maximally productive employee, or instructor 

in this case. Both the “old heads” that did the training 

and load carrying, and the “new folks” who jumped 

in with both feet made it happen. We could not be 
61 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

to ACSA transactions. Similarly, although LSSS 

can be provided to partner countries through other 

authorities, including authorities in the Arms Export 

Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act, ACSAs 

provide a simplified approach to fill discrete LSSS 

requirements that can be implemented quickly and at 

relatively low levels.

In some cases, Acquisition Authority may be 

all the US Commander needs to support a particular 

operation. An ACSA is not a prerequisite for this type 

of authority and may be attained at the Geographic 

Combatant Commander (GCC) level. The 

Acquisition Authority provided by 10 U.S.C. 2341 

is only used to acquire LSSS to support US Forces 

deployed outside the US and is implemented via 

contracts or international agreements; however, the 

statutory authority provides that certain requirements 

of standard DOD contracts do not apply to such 

acquisitions (See 10 U.S.C. 2343).

You may be wondering how an ACSA is used. 

Simple, the ACSA allows US Forces and Partner 

nations to mutually exchange LSSS using one of 

three methods of reimbursement: cash, equal value 

exchange, or replacement in kind. What sort of LSSS 

are we talking about? A broad range of items from 

food, transportation, fuel, billeting, security services, 

maintenance, port services, to ammunition, loan of 

fire-fighting equipment, construction, and laundry 

and storage services to name a few. Items that cannot 

be provided under an ACSA include major weapon 

systems, other major end items, guided missiles/kits, 

“initial” spares, and chemical, biological and nuclear 

ammunition.

In recent years, section 1202 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, as 

amended, known as “Enhanced ACSA,” was added 

and allows GCC to loan certain Significant Military 

Equipment (SME—like MRAPS) for personnel 

protection and survivability to coalition partners 

in, Afghanistan, and in UN peacekeeping missions 

Are You Ready to Kick

Some “ACSA?”

By Ron Yakkel

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Around the globe, US Armed Forces and many 

of our allies and partners are taking advantage of the 

ever-increasing flexibility offered by Acquisition and 

Cross-Servicing Agreements, or ACSAs for short. An 

ACSA may also be called a Mutual Logistics Support 

Agreement or a Logistics Support Agreement, 

depending upon which partner country the agreement 

is with. 

As Shakespeare once wrote, “A rose by any other 

name would smell as sweet.” In other words, the name 

of the agreement does not matter (different name 

but all the same), just the fact that each represents a 

bilateral agreement between our DOD and a foreign 

military defense establishment.

So how did ACSAs evolve into what they 

are today? During the 1970s, troop reductions 

in Europe led to an increased reliance on NATO 

forces for logistics support. In 1980 the NATO 

Mutual Support Act (NMSA) was passed to provide 

simplified authority for acquiring NATO support. 

In 1982, NMSA morphed into ACSA and over time 

significantly expanded its benefit, making it a tool of 

choice for commanders operating around the world. 

What’s the big deal? Why is an ACSA important? 

First and foremost, it provides our forces with the 

“legal authority” to mutually exchange logistics, 

support, supplies, and services (LSSS) with partner 

forces on a reimbursable basis. Believe it or not, 

DOD must have legal authority to engage in mil-tomil buying, selling, loaning, and reciprocal provision 

of support to another country. An ACSA is comprised 

of both Acquisition Authority (allows us to buy 

LSSS) and Cross-Servicing Authority (allows us to 

provide LSSS on a reciprocal basis), two distinct 

legal authorities under 10 U.S.C. subchapter 1 to 

chapter 138 (10 U.S.C. 2341 and 10 U.S.C. 2342). 

Although US Forces may contract for acquisition of 

support under other statutes, the ACSA authorities 

provide a simplified acquisition process for LSSS as 

a number of contracting requirements do not apply 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 62

reduces the logistics tail, provides flexibility to the 

commander, affords global coverage, and increases 

interoperability. While there are numerous examples 

of ACSAs paying enormous dividends, one worth 

noting is the US-Australia Talisman Sabre Exercise, 

where ACSA transactions have grown (over three 

iterations of the exercise) from satisfying 5 percent 

of the logistics requirements for US Forces to nearly 

85 percent, saving tremendous transportation costs 

and significantly reducing the logistics tail for the 

exercise.

This article was intended to “wet your whistle” 

regarding the benefits of having an ACSA with a 

Partner Nation. It is also important to note that while 

these agreements provide huge benefits, they’re 

limited to logistic support, supplies, and services, 

and do not provide a “total package approach,” and 

therefore are not intended to replace the Foreign 

Military Sales Process. For more information on the 

benefits of ACSA, visit the Joint Staff ACSA Wiki 

Site at https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Acquisition_

and_Cross-Servicing_Agreements_%28ACSA%29.

in which the United States is participating. Section 

1203 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2011 was later added to support 

coalition partners further by loaning of certain SME 

(like MRAPS) for training prior to deployment to 

Afghanistan so that partner forces would know how 

to use the equipment they would be provided in 

combat or for the peacekeeping mission before they 

deployed into theater.

Although obtaining an ACSA is not an 

overnight process, GCC ACSA Managers are well 

equipped to negotiate an agreement and navigate 

the approval “waters” that flow through Joint Staff, 

OSD, and DOS. The entire process, to include 

eligibility determination, Congressional notification, 

concluding negotiations, obtaining signatures, and all 

the legal reviews, may take up to 120 days. Is it worth 

the effort? Yes, and the ninety-six ACSAs shown in 

the figure below are a good indicator of their value. 

What are the benefits to having one of these 

agreements? In short, an ACSA enhances operational 

readiness, provides cost effective mutual support 

(neither side makes or loses money in a transaction), 
63 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

About the Author

Ron Yakkel was born in Cleveland, Ohio and 

earned a commission through the Air Force Reserve 

Officer Training Corps program in August of 1982. 

He was a career logistician and served nearly twentynine years before retiring as Colonel from the United 

States Air Force. His career included assignments 

in supply, aircraft maintenance, and logistics units 

worldwide, and he commanded at the Squadron, 

Group, and Regional levels. His deployments 

include Kabul, Afghanistan (Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM); Tuzla Eagle Base, Bosnia-Herzegovina 

(Operation JOINT FORGE); and Al Dhafra Air Base, 

the United Arab Emirates (Operation SOUTHERN 

WATCH). His last four years of service were at 

United States Pacific Command in Hawaii where 

he served as Chief, Multinational Logistics and 

Technology Division. Colonel (ret) Yakkel is 

currently an instructor and Asia-Pacific Regional 

Seminar Director at the Defense Institute for Security 

Assistance Management located at Wright-Patterson 

AFB, OH. 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 64
65 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

This application is based on a configured version 

of enterprise-class software called SageCRM. It 

is web-based, flexible to configure, and is built 

to meet DOD security standards such as login and 

authentication based on the Common Access Card.

RCPAMS was completed on time and on budget. 

According to Ric Cantu, Chief of Admissions/

Registrar for the George C. Marshall European Center 

DSCA Deploys RCPAMS System 

to Manage Event and Participation 

By Rob Cimperman Management

Cimperman, LLC

Background

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

(DSCA) is the central agency that synchronizes the 

policy, processes, training and financial management 

necessary to execute security cooperation within 

the DOD and around the globe. DSCA’s Centers 

Management Office manages the five Regional 

Centers (RCs), which collectively host security 

cooperation events for no less than 159 countries.

Historically, each RC was responsible for tracking 

and reporting on similar operational and financial 

information about its events, enrollments and 

people they interact with using their own standalone 

systems. Each RC had to synchronize its participant 

and cost data with the Defense Security Assistance 

Management System (DSAMS), which was a manual 

re-keying effort. Furthermore, each RC responded to 

data calls from DSCA, which compiled reports about 

DSCA activities for entities such as the US Congress. 

The entire process suffered from redundant entry into 

multiple systems, lack of standard data definitions, 

and lack of standard processes across the RCs.

Solution

DSCA HQ collaborated with the RCs to build the 

Regional Centers Person and Activity Management 

System (RCPAMS). The rollout to approximately 

250 RC users completed in August 2011 following 

one year of design and development. All five RCs 

now share a single user interface with standardized 

terminology and data elements. It eliminates 

duplicate manual data entry tasks—now planned 

events loaded into DSAMS and participants enrolled 

by the Security Cooperation Offices (SCOs) in the 

embassies around the world flow into RCPAMS 

automatically, and status updates flow back to those 

systems. RCPAMS tracks foreign military students 

and faculty in the same system, as well as USA 

students who are not tracked in DSAMS. It also 

holds event activities, such as receptions, field study 

trips and breakout sessions, so it covers all of the RCs 

operations and reporting needs.

Figure 1. RCPAMS data model that drives the screens and tabs 

in the user interface
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 66

strong and communication channels open 

by working with vendor project manager, 

Rob Cimperman, and Senior Engineer David 

Bergert to co-host weekly meetings with all 

RC representatives throughout the one year 

scheduled for requirements gathering and 

development (despite there being no convenient 

time for Hawaii, Germany, and Washington, 

DC, participation was consistent). She also 

actively promotes collaboration between the 

RCs, which now, more than ever, can benefit 

from sharing lessons learned, best practices 

and improvement ideas.

• Requirements: DSCA and the five RCs 

collaborated on functional and technical 

requirements for the initial vendor solicitation. 

The STI team did not simply build to the initial 

100+ requirements in the statement of work; 

instead, the team visited each RC for a week in 

to gain an understanding of the intent of each, 

their process context, and all data migration 

implications for each RC’s legacy system. 

This resulted in nearly 250 documented 

requirements for the target system.

• Procurement: DSCA commissioned a 

feasibility study to narrow down the field 

of software products based on the initial 

requirements as input to the implementation 

contract, but the implementation contract 

had the STI team make the final software 

selection. This two-step procurement approach 

let the STI team perform a detailed product 

comparison of the two finalists, SageCRM and 

Microsoft Dynamics, after fully understanding 

the RCs needs. They found SageCRM best 

met functional, security and architectural 

requirements, and had the lowest lifecycle cost 

and speed of configuration. It also had the most 

positive opinions expressed in interviews with 

five current public sector customers of each 

application.

• Development: STI selected LexNet, as an 

authorized SAGE reseller and a company with 

deep experience in SageCRM. Lexnet used an 

iterative development methodology for each 

assigned subtask. In addition to the STI team 

and DSCA gaining insights into requirements 

during the on-site visits to the RCs, they 

also built relationships with the numerous 

functional experts at each site. They reviewed 

for Security Studies, “Folks who were trained felt 

that RCPAMS was very user friendly, uncomplicated, 

more than exceeded their expectations and very 

flexible to our GCMC needs.” Other benefits of the 

RCs moving to a shared platform include cutting 

the redundant system administration effort and risk 

associated with hosting four separate systems (two 

of the five RCs shared one system). RCPAMS reports 

can be created by one RC and used by all, or can be 

run by DSCA directly without any need to reconcile 

disparate data from different management systems. 

Also, RCPAMS merges participant data from each 

RC to build a common profile and history of each 

person covering events they attended from all RCs.

While RCPAMS is now the system of record for 

events, enrollments, persons, and most operations 

and reporting purposes, the RCs still have autonomy 

to devise standard operating procedures and 

business rules that match their preferred practices. 

Furthermore, RCPAMS was built with enough 

flexibility to accommodate additional DOD 

schoolhouses interested in configuring the system to 

meet their functional, reporting and interface needs.

DSCA competed this work among the 8aSTARS 

government-wide acquisition contract (GWAC) 

vendors; Staff Tech Inc (STI) offered a compliant 

and complete proposal that met all the requirements 

within the price of the Independent Government 

Estimate. STI, as systems integrator, assembled a 

small team of senior staff from its partners Tesseraic 

(technical architecture lead, data migration, and 

systems interfaces), Lexnet (configuration of 

the Sage software, custom coding and licensing) 

and Cimperman, LLC (project management and 

requirements/functional lead). In addition to an expert 

staff, STI presented verifiable past performance with 

all technical and management aspects of designing 

and deploying complex management support IT 

systems.

Keys to Success

• Program Management: RCPAMS has a 

strong program manager, Suellen Raycraft, 

who provided the top-down message that 

RCPAMS is to be the system of record, and 

to find the right balance between a centralized 

system and the appropriate level of RC 

ownership, responsibility, input and autonomy 

to arrive at a single usable system accepted 

by all. Ms. Raycraft kept the “battle rhythm” 
67 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

• Data Integration: To reduce duplicate entry 

of data into multiple systems, Tesseraic built 

an interface to pull events, enrollments and 

person data into RCPAMS directly from a 

system called the Security Assistance Network 

(SAN) that is already integrated with DSAMS. 

Then RCPAMS sends progress messages back 

to the SAN throughout the enrollment lifecycle, 

which updates DSAMS. This dataflow avoids 

the potential conflicts and update loops 

associated with two-way updates. The STI 

team also built a table outside of RCPAMS to 

present incoming data for users to review and 

confirm before any values in RCPAMS get 

overwritten by different (possibly outdated) 

data from the SAN for the same person. The 

STI team is also building an interface to 

accept nominations via a form separate from 

the SAN interface. This will accommodate 

self-nominations, US students and other use 

cases that do not involve an SCO entering 

nominations through the SAN. Furthermore, 

the STI team is collaborating with the team 

that supports GlobalNet (formerly known as 

Regional International Outreach System), 

which enables international outreach and 

collaboration among alumni of the students and 

the prototype formally with the RCs, and also 

communicated openly with the various experts 

as questions arose during development and 

testing. 

A particularly useful feature for describing the 

international student population is the dropdown 

tables for users to choose from the valid service 

branches for 159 countries, and then from about 

4500 military ranks associated to each.

• Data Migration: The STI team member 

Tesseraic migrated historical data from four 

source systems (two RCs shared a system) into 

the new RCPAMS system by building four 

sets of scripts to translate data and pull it into 

a staging table, which then was loaded into 

RCPAMS as each RC was ready to go live. Part 

of the one-week requirements review involved 

walking through every data element requested 

to be in RCPAMS with a cross-functional team 

of functional and data subject matter experts 

to determine whether that data existed in the 

previous system and whether historical data 

was important to carry forward (e.g., was that 

data kept clean enough to be useful? Does it 

have value after the event, or is it only needed 

while an event is occurring?

Figure 2. Overview of dataflow
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 68

This article is not an endorsement by DOD of 

the US Federal Government, of Staff Tech, Inc., its 

subcontractors or team members, or the products and 

processes they employ. The article does not indicate 

any preferential treatment for Staff Tech. The views 

of individual DOD employees do not necessarily 

represent the views of DOD or its components.

About the Author

Rob Cimperman (robc@cimperman.com) is the 

president of Cimperman, LLC and project manager 

for the STI team on the DSCA RCPAMS project.

For more information about RCPAMS, contact 

Suellen Raycraft, DSCA Centers Management Office 

(CMO), at suellen.raycraft@dsca.milor or by calling 

703-601-3654.

Staff Tech is available at 916-932-1234. Ask for 

Dan Kohnke or dan@staff-tech.net.

Tesseraic is available at: 703-266-1737. Ask for 

David Bergert or david.bergert@tesseraic.com.

alumni of the RCs, DSCA and the School of 

International Graduate Studies. RCPAMS will 

share information with GlobalNet to establish 

and maintain user profiles and facilitate 

nominations for event participation. 

• Training: The STI team provided instructorled on-site training over a one-week period at 

each location. The week was broken out into 

two sessions of the twelve-hour functional 

overview class, plus additional sessions for 

administrators and privileged users, and an 

executive overview. The training was most 

effective when the RCs provided their own 

real-world scenarios as the exercises to work 

through as cross-functional teams in class. It was 

also effective to have some more specialized 

groups of users, like Resource Management, to 

have their own condensed session tailored to 

their unique system functions.

• Hosting: During rollout, the presumed home 

for the application defined in the request 

for proposals left gaps in certification and 

accreditation compliance. To close those gaps 

DSCA tasked STI with locating a qualified 

hosting center. With one month of research 

STI recommended a data center a few miles 

from DSCA Headquarters that met all C&A 

requirements for this application to be grated 

interim authority to operate, and full ATO is 

anticipated by January 2012.
69 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Figure 4. Screenshot of RCPAMS event summary screen.

Figure 3. Screenshot of RCPAMS person summary screen.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 70
71 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

position and personnel data as possible. The number 

of positions topped off at around 12,000. After some 

validation, the number stabilized at about 10,000 

positions, but slight growth is expected over the next 

couple years.

The SCWD application has three primary tabs 

for the majority of its administrators:

1. Add/Edit Workforce—the grid that contains all 

the position and personnel data

2. Metric Overview—the grid that shows the 

training status of the workforce

3. Requirement Report—the grid that lists the 

number of personnel in each organization that 

need DISAM courses

Higher level administrators also have two 

additional tabs to help manage SCWD users and the 

hierarchy of organizations. The information in these 

two tabs affects what each user can see and how the 

totals roll up for the organizations. These tabs may or 

may not be visible to users depending on their level 

of permissions.

Identifying Personnel and Training 

Achieved

As the positions were added to the Add/Edit 

Workforce tab, the personnel occupying them were 

also added. Currently, approximately 95 percent of 

the more than ten thousand positions are filled. To 

enable the calculation of training level achieved, the 

architecture of the SCWD includes a data feed from 

the DISAM student database that passes all DISAM 

training records to the SCWD. The SCWD then 

identifies the training level achieved by each person 

in the SCWD. Here are some current facts from the 

SCWD:

• 7221 (72 percent) persons can be matched to 

DISAM student records

• 97.1 percent of security cooperation personnel 

are sufficiently trained

• 512 need DISAM resident training

• 268 need DISAM online training

The Security Cooperation Workforce Database 

(SCWD—pronounced “squid”) is a tool created to 

monitor the level of training earned by the Security 

Cooperation (SC) workforce around the world. The 

SCWD is a web-based tool that performs two separate 

but interwoven functions. First, it identifies all the 

SC-associated positions globally and the required 

level of training for each position, and second, it 

identifies the personnel occupying the positions and 

their current level of training achieved. With these 

pieces of information, it is possible to compute the 

percentage of people who are trained to the appropriate 

level. In addition to these two functions, the SCWD 

also provides data to allow the Defense Institute of 

Security Assistance Management (DISAM) to better 

plan course offerings for the future.

Overview

The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) identified 

several High Priority Performance Goals (HPPGs) 

for the Department of Defense, one of which was 

to “Enhance the Security Cooperation Workforce.” 

The intent of this goal was to determine the required 

training level for personnel in the SC community and 

to determine if the workforce is sufficiently trained 

to that level. The actual goal statement reads, “By 

the end of 2011, Department of Defense (DOD) will 

increase the percent of incumbents that have been 

trained in security cooperation in positions that require such training to 95 percent or greater.”

Identifying Security Assistance Positions

In order to meet the goal, it is necessary to have 

a tool in place that gathers data and determines the 

training level of the workforce. DISAM worked 

with the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to 

create such a tool now known as the SCWD. The 

database was ready for initial operational capability 

in May 2010, but DISAM and IDA continue to 

make improvements to it. After May 2010, DISAM 

pushed to populate the SCWD by gathering as much 

SCWD for SCWDiots

By Dr. Bob Weber

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 72

You can also open this information in a PDF file 

from the pop-up box. See figure 2 on the following 

page.

Note that this is not an official transcript; the 

DISAM Registrar is responsible for maintaining 

training records and providing official transcripts. 

This report provides SCWD administrators detailed 

information about the DISAM training recorded in 

the SCWD.

The HPPG Metric

The data in the Add/Edit Workforce tab supports 

the HPPG metric in the Metric Overview tab. The 

Metric Overview lists all organizations and their 

statistics including total positions, total personnel, 

number of sufficiently trained personnel, number of 

deficient personnel, total personnel in a grace period, 

and most importantly, the percentage of personnel 

sufficiently trained. It also breaks down the deficient 

number by those who need online training and those 

who need resident training. The Metric Overview tab 

also includes subtotals by organization and totals by 

funding source.

Planning Course Offerings

As noted above, DISAM schedulers can use 

the Requirements Report tab to identify which 

courses they need to offer when planning for the 

upcoming fiscal year. The table under this tab lists 

each organization in the SCWD and their training 

requirements by course. Knowing the class size 

maximums, DISAM can identify how many offerings 

of each course they need in the next fiscal year.

Future of the SCWD

So where does the SCWD go from here? There 

are two major additions currently planned for the 

SCWD. The first is to enable it for use as a worldwide roster. The roster is difficult for the Defense 

A recent addition to the SCWD includes the 

concept of a “grace” period. As an organization gains 

new personnel, it requires some time to train all of 

their people, especially for in-residence training. The 

SCWD allows new personnel 180 grace days before 

it counts them as deficient. This grace period also 

includes personnel who move to a higher trainingrequired position. Currently, there are 501 personnel 

within the grace period.

Other Features

The Add/Edit Workforce tab also includes the 

following features that are available to SCWD 

administrators in each organization:

• L3 trng req’d and L4 trng req’d—These 

two columns identify which level 3 or level 

4 courses an individual requires for their 

position. This helps training managers identify 

personnel to register for courses offered by 

DISAM, and it helps DISAM project existing 

training requirements when they schedule 

future course offerings.

• Registered column—This column lists any 

course for which the individual is registered. 

Administrators can use this column to quickly 

tell who is scheduled for training in their 

organization.

• Remarks—In this column, SCWD 

administrators can enter notes about personnel 

and positions for everyone to view. This can 

help administrators remember pertinent facts 

about various personnel and positions.

• Training Report—If a SCWD administrator 

wants to know which DISAM classes a person 

took, they can click to highlight that person’s 

record in the grid, hover over the person’s 

name at the bottom of the screen, and click the 

button that appears. See figure 1 below.

Figure 1. SCWD Metric Overview tab. After you click the name, a box pops-up that lists any course they have registered for and its 

status (C = complete, S = scheduled, and N = not completed). See Figure 2.
73 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

https://www.idss.ida.org/san/: After you sign on, 

select Libraries, click SCWD, click List Items in 

SCWD Library, click the title for the SCWD User’s 

Guide, and click the Download link to open the most 

recent SCWD User’s Guide.

About the Author

Dr. Bob Weber is an Associate Professor of 

Security Cooperation with the Defense Institute 

of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). 

He is Project Manager for the Security Assistance 

Network (SAN), and IT Developer for the Security 

Assistance Automated Resource Management Suite 

(SAARMS) and the Security Cooperation Workforce 

Database (SCWD). Dr. Weber retired from the 

Air Force after twenty years as a communications 

officer and logistician. He holds a PhD in computer 

and information science from the University of 

Minnesota.

Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to keep upto-date as personnel changes frequently around the 

world. With the entire SC workforce listed in the 

database, the addition of some data fields can enable 

the community to use the SCWD as a world-wide 

roster as well as a training tracking tool. SCWD users 

could identify certain positions as world-wide roster 

billets, and those positions would then appear in a 

world-wide roster report. This capability exists, but 

the database needs to be updated with the appropriate 

information for the world-wide roster.

Secondly, the SCWD will evolve to become 

a storehouse of experience information helping 

the geographic combatant commands and military 

services to identify personnel with the qualifications 

to fill certain positions. The SCWD will retain who 

filled which positions, and the database will identify 

personnel who could fill a particular position based 

on their specific skills or experience matching the 

requirements of that position.

Summary

The SCWD was created to identify personnel in 

the SC workforce and to calculate the percentage of 

personnel trained sufficiently. Through the efforts 

of people throughout the Department of Defense, 

the SCWD does this. In addition, it provides more 

information to training managers and enables them 

to better slate personnel for training. It also provides 

training requirement data to DISAM that enables 

them to project course offerings needed for the 

upcoming fiscal year.

For more information about HPPG, go to http://

www.disam.dsca.mil/hppg.

For more information about the SCWD, refer to 

the SCWD User’s Guide available on the Security 

Assistance Network (SAN) at 

Figure 2. Pop-up training report.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 74
75 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

can meet their own security challenges. Terrorism, 

violent extremist organizations, ungoverned spaces, 

illicit trafficking, insufficient economic stability, 

humanitarian issues, and undemocratic governance 

significantly challenge partner nations to make lasting 

contributions towards stability and security. With 

the recent resource-conscious US defense guidance 

rebalancing the Department of Defense (DOD) 

focus from heavy, land-based organizations to leaner 

forces, regionalized maritime force projections, and 

advanced niche technologies, the means to oppose 

such challenges are becoming constrained in places 

such as Africa, Latin America, and Southwest Asia—

even with the full support and cooperation of our 

interagency and traditional international alliances.

As the pace of Joint combat operations in 

Asian theaters decrease, the need for security 

cooperation is increasing. The Joint Staff (2012) 

defines SC as “all Department of Defense [DOD] 

interactions with foreign defense establishments 

to build defense relationships that promote 

specific US security interests, develop allied and 

friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 

multinational operations, and provide US forces 

with peacetime and contingency access to a host 

nation” (p. 296). The Secretary of Defense empowers 

combatant commanders to invest American 

resources in building partner nation institutional 

and organizational capabilities to meliorate regional 

security and stability. GCCs annually program and 

execute hundreds of millions of dollars towards 

accomplishing those objectives via diverse SC 

engagements, including Security Force Assistance, 

Military-to-Military events, and annual training 

exercises. Moreover, GCCs widely interact vis-àvis the Interagency, synchronizing, assisting, and 

influencing programming in DOD agency resources, 

namely 1206 and 1207 funding, and even other US 

government agency resources, such as International 

Military and Education (IMET), Peacekeeping 

 Vignette

A geographical combatant command (GCC) 

country desk officer is asked by the Deputy Chief, 

Security Cooperation Office (SCO) Chief assigned 

to a United States Embassy for assistance in opening 

a medical equipment excess defense article case 

to increase medical capabilities of the host nation 

during peacekeeping missions. The desk officer, the 

command’s medical planners, and the SCO initialize 

the case by submitting a host nation-written Letter of 

Request (LOR) to the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA) and the appropriate military 

department (MILDEP). The easy part is done. 

What lies ahead are years of coordination to 

receive the equipment, integrate it into the host 

nation military, and maintain it with a long-term 

sustainment cycle. Is the desk officer prepared? Has 

the medical staff prepared the host nation military 

for this equipment with familiarization and training? 

Have any assessments been completed to specifically 

identify what capabilities are needed in the country’s 

military medical directorate? 

The train-integrate-sustain process will subsume 

reactive responses as the command prepares its 

partner nation to accept the case. An enhanced, 

proactive approach would be the GCC analyzing 

the foreign medical directorate’s capabilities while 

convincing the host country to submit their LOR after 

this analysis is complete and long-term execution and 

assessment plans are developed. In the interests of 

peace, security, and stability, a mutual commitment 

to a sustainable year over year engagement plan 

addressing existing shortfalls would better serve the 

United States (US)– host nation security cooperation 

(SC) relationship. 

Introduction

Since World War II, the US has been an international 

leader in shaping partner nation capabilities and 

capacities through security cooperation so partners 

Strengthening Security Cooperation 

Through Force Management

By Major Michael DeCicco

United States Army
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 76

Problem

The 2011 Budget Control Act obligates DOD 

to decrease future departmental expenditures by 

approximately $487 billion over the next decade. 

FY2013 funding will feel the brunt first as the 

department requests $525 billion, compared to nearly 

$750 billion in recent years, already $32 billion 

less than FY2012. A particular problem will be the 

mismatch between tasks and available manpower. 

Personnel reductions due to civilian hiring freezes, 

temporary duty restrictions and diminished funding, 

and service end-strength cuts will all have an impact. 

Simultaneously, the weapons systems key to building 

capabilities are becoming increasingly complex and 

expensive—not only in terms of purchase prices, but 

also in terms of initial training, support equipment, 

facilities, continuing maintenance, and other costs. 

In turn, GCCs must refocus their SC investment 

priorities to engage only where US strategic priorities 

are tangibly and positively affected. However, this is 

possible as long as SC managers have the means to 

precisely define requirements and project solutions 

into long-term engagement planning. 

Vision

A combatant commander must have a cadre with 

diverse skill sets. Strategic and planners, foreign 

area officers, logisticians, communication specialists, 

intelligence analysts, resource managers, and force 

management officers are essential to increase the 

commander’s range and depth to execute the lines of 

effort (LOE) prescribed through the theater campaign 

plan. Adding to the GCC a SC Force Management 

division staffed with officers and enlisted possessing 

the right expertise, education, and skills, would have 

tremendous multiplying effects on GCC missions 

as they progressively focus more on SC than on 

contingency operations. This staff, possessing a mix 

of planning or interagency experience coupled with 

Level III Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management (DISAM) education, would perform 

long-term capability gap analysis, integrate solutions, 

and continually assess international partner capacities 

using a DOTMLPF framework. The Doctrine, 

Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 

Training, and Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) 

framework provides a familiar, yet appropriate tool 

to drive the development of international partners 

just as successfully as it drives the pursuit of US 

Joint capabilities introduction, improvement, and 

expansion

Operations (PKO), and Foreign Military Financing 

funding. Every investment seeks to limit destabilizing 

influences posed by global security challenges. 

Unfortunately, as current fiscal realities necessitate 

significant funding and personnel reductions, 

our Department of Defense must increasingly 

prioritize US military equipment development and 

training programs, which will inevitably impact 

our abilities to reach out to partner governments 

through SC. Therefore, SC managers will be 

required to implement more efficient and effective 

methods to facilitate engagement that rationally 

and systematically analyze partner capabilities and 

focus limited resources on prioritized, critical, and 

mutually-recognized needs. This article presents one 

such method calling for DOD to stand up Security 

Cooperation Force Management (SCFM) divisions 

within all GCCs. Supporting this presentation, this 

article identifies the problem, envisions how to 

solve it, describes solution enablers, and prescribes 

how the new divisions would achieve the solution. 

Further, this article draws upon precedents from 

recent operations and proposes other efforts to be 

combined for maximizing security cooperation’s 

potential effects.

“The United States 

remains the world’s 

preeminent power, even 

as a growing number of 

state and non-state actors 

exhibit consequential 

influence...There are 

global and regional powers 

exhibiting nationalism and 

assertiveness that tests 

our partners’ resilience 

and US leadership.”

General Martin Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
77 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Why Add A Security Cooperation Force 

Management Division (SCFM)

Each US military service performs Force 

Management (FM). The Army has professionalized 

FM as a career field with over 260 military personnel 

assigned. They are distributed throughout GCCs 

and Army headquarters to strategically analyze, 

organize, build, equip, train, and develop US forces 

with the right capabilities needed for accomplishing 

national defense priorities. Force Management is the 

professional mechanism to transform an organization 

into the type its leaders visualize for the missions 

leaders assign to it. 

The Army might take five years designing and 

equipping new infantry brigades to match designated 

capabilities, but a GCC might spend less than 

twenty percent of that time doing the same thing 

for its international partners. Security cooperation 

managers are often in a time crunch from the 

moment they receive authority to propose a solution 

to the expiration of that authority. Thus, for about 

a year, the GCC is in a reactive mode, complicated 

further by high turnover rates of staff officers who 

are often not SC or programming experts, and have 

to devote their time to other labor intensive tasks 

within the scope of their professional duties. As 

leaders consider amounts of money being invested 

in partners’ capabilities, particularly as resourcing 

is constrained, it would benefit them even more and 

bring GCCs closer to their end state to implement 

Security Cooperation Force Management divisions 

for deliberate and patient capability-based planning 

using the DOTMLPF framework. 

Enablers

Each GCC staff directorate has a primary function, 

and security cooperation is typically planned and 

programmed within the J5. The GCC J5 organizational 

construct consists of Strategic Plans, Regional 

Engagements, Security Cooperation Programs, and 

International Engagements divisions. The J5 also 

normally performs direct management of the SC 

field-level execution through the assigned Security 

Cooperation Organizations (SCO) embedded in US 

embassies. Strategic Plans designs and develops the 

GCC’s theater campaign plans, regional campaign 

plans, and additional contingency plans varying in 

length between sixty days to five years. Campaign 

plans identify the commander’s theater security 

objectives and lines of effort to achieve end states 

prescribed in the DoD Guidance for Employment 

of the Force (GEF) manuscript. These end states 

envision a steady-state where nations align their 

progress toward good governance, security, stability, 

and professionalism. Nested into these strategic 

goals are various regional campaign and country 

work plans (CWP). Regional Engagement divisions 

(RED) provide information, analysis, guidance, and 

recommendations on political-military matters and 

policy. They collaborate with SCOs and senior Defense 

Attaché Officers in the embassies to devise CWPs 

to intertwine investments in operations, exercises, 

security cooperation engagements, and interagency 

programs focused on campaign plan objectives. The 

Security Cooperation Programs division develops 

and manages funding lines and authorities used 

to support SC activities. Programmers directly 

interface with the interagency to push proposals 

through the approval process between DoD and the 

State Department (DoS). The fundamental security 

cooperation lynchpins are the SCOs at the embassies. 

They are primary interlocutors between GCC and 

DoS (which funds DoD-executed security assistance 

programs that are considered security cooperation) 

and the partner nations who host them. GCCs rely on 

SCOs for their local knowledge and relationships to 

acquire permission and access through dialogue with 

sovereign institutions in preparation to conduct the 

mutually advantageous SC engagements. The SC 

enablers consistently present the GCC commander 

with ideas to achieve theater security cooperation 

objectives and are the principle facilitators to ensure 

those ideas come to fruition.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 78

• Integrate and manage solution set glidepath into 

individual country work plans in accordance 

with theater and regional campaign plans.

• Assess partner nation improvement

• Collaborate with Interagency subject matter 

experts including, Immigrations and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), Department of Energy, 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 

Department of Treasury, and Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI), to acquire improvement 

metrics and analysis of non-DoD centric 

functions, but require solutions within a 

particular nation

In short, these functions attest to selecting nations 

to work with based on a number of criteria, namely 

the GCC commander’s priorities, making plans to 

help build their capabilities, addressing a wider set of 

applicable Interagency needs, and assessing results 

of investments to ensure the GCC is on the correct 

glidepath towards SC objectives. 

How It Works 

A SCFM division in each GCC J5 would 

perform capability-based planning to identify 

suitable solutions for a wide range of challenges and 

circumstances, while working within an economic 

framework that necessitates hard choices. Upon 

analysis of international partner military and defense 

institutions through a DOTMLPF framework 

in concert with engagement planners, program 

managers, and the interagency, SCFM divisions 

integrate long-term security cooperation solution 

sets into individual country work plans through the 

respective country desk officers in the Regional 

Engagement divisions (see figure 1). Below are the 

division’s five primary functions: 

• Prioritize partner nations to engage in analysis 

• Develop an engagement plan and assessment 

criteria for conducting the analysis

Security Cooperation Force Management Division
79 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

personnel commands to groom more officers into 

those positions or transfer them from other billets. 

Though this article does not propose from where 

each service would assign these billets, the issue 

is plaguing because several skill sets represent 

high demand, low supply specialties. Overcoming 

shortfalls in such personnel situations requires 

a greater organizational prioritization, possibly 

including growing new billets in those niches, at the 

expense of larger group skillsets. 

Strengthening the SCFM division also means 

ensuring the core personnel are trained in security 

cooperation. Attending the three week Defense 

Institution for Security Assistance Management 

Security Cooperation Overseas Course would be 

mandatory. Completing mid-career level command 

and staff planning education would also be important. 

These professional development pedagogic tools 

would successfully prepare these personnel for 

missions they would perform within various partner 

nations. 

The division is headed by an O-6, preferably 

a Foreign Area Officer, for his or her proficiency 

in international relations building and cultural 

awareness. Under the chief is one deputy O-5 or GS14 and two to five regional teams led by an Army O-5 

Force Management Officer with skill identifier 50A 

(See figure 2). Regional teams comprise a core group 

with a senior non-commissioned officer (NCO), who 

brings training, NCO development, and advisement 

expertise, and a logistics, a communications, an 

intelligence, and two operations/training subject 

matter experts. For many developing and underresourced partner nations whom the US government 

engages, particularly in Africa, these core personnel 

possess the functional knowledge that DOD seeks 

first to build capacity through security cooperation. 

Within the SCFM division itself, but not assigned to 

a specific regional team, would be other personnel 

with human resource, finance, civil affairs, medical, 

aviation, special forces, engineer, and military police 

skill sets. Excluding the core, the division would 

have ten personnel; each core team would consist of 

seven. Ranging between two to five teams, a division 

can have between twenty-four to forty-five personnel. 

Certain skill sets, such as 50A, would require service 

Employment of the Security Cooperation Force 

Management Division
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 80

of all the partner nation requirements. Under the 

SCFM division, whatever capability is needed would 

have been researched and vetted over the past year, 

followed by a three to five year SCFM integrated 

solution set. This powerful combination provides 

new desk officers in high turnover environments to 

concentrate on short term engagement execution, 

while still trying to learn about the job itself. 

With SCFM divisions also comes SC engagement 

discipline. Recipients of the US government (USG) 

SC solutions may not realize all the efforts that go 

into planning and distributing just a million dollars 

worth of equipment and training. There is a feeling 

that if the GCC and country agreed to an engagement 

plan last year, it would not be disingenuous to ask 

to cancel those capacity development events in 

favor of what the country wants this year. Granted, 

sovereign nations have full rights to request what 

they would like to see in their country, and as 

long as the USG continues to offer its services, it 

will do its bests to support its partners to the exact 

specifications regarded by partners. However, for 

USG’s own processes and methods, such as when 

congressional notifications are published for support 

packages, last minute changes and frequent requests 

can disrupt a nested sequential security cooperation 

plan. The underpinning foundation for all these 

efforts is advancement of US national interests. With 

SCFM divisions, GCCs have a supportive structure 

to integrate capability development and maintain 

discipline needed to keep the organization on track 

with appointed objectives. 

Security Cooperation, whether in the form of 

Mil to Mil, FMF, 1206, should consider the level of 

technology, education, training, and facilities within 

the targeted host nations. In addition, many partner 

nations have much smaller defense budgets, industrial 

capacities, and other complex problems affecting 

quality development of their armed forces. As US 

forces undertake their own new roles harnessing 

highly specialized capabilities, (e.g. networked 

special operations, cyber domain management, and 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), 

GCCs will have to leverage innovative engagement 

ideas so partners are not left behind in collaborative 

efforts to improve security and stability. Any other 

way would arguably overburden the host nations 

with DOTMLPF solutions they cannot absorb. 

The first step to achieving success is gaining 

access into the partner nation’s military structure. 

The regional teams need collegial relationships 

with each foreign Chief of Defense and/or their 

representatives. Diplomacy up front will gain better 

access into each organization and functional area the 

teams plan to analyze. Once the team is organized, 

the second step is to travel on temporary duty orders 

for as long is reasonable and cost effective over a 

period of one to two years meticulously identifying 

the capabilities the GCC needs help with in obtaining 

security and stability. For example, if the shortfall is 

countering piracy and maritime illicit trafficking, the 

team researches how organizations performing those 

missions might prevent those activities. Since the 

core team does not have a maritime planner, it could 

borrow one from either the GCC maritime planning 

staff or from the Naval or Marine component 

command. The DOTMLPF framework allows the 

division to pinpoint where the shortfalls exist. 

After thorough analysis, the third step is to 

synchronously link capacity building efforts with a 

time-phased plan for all the engagements relating 

each identified shortcoming according to the function 

within the framework. To counter illicit trafficking, 

might recommend equipping the partner’s Navy 

with a patrol boat unit, a pier, a maintenance facility, 

maintenance team with equipment, and appropriate 

doctrine. The engagement solutions themselves must 

conceptually fit into the GCC’s campaign plan lines 

of efforts, and include combinations of military to 

military events, foreign military financing projects, 

training exercise participation, 1206 train and equip 

proposals, region-specific funded train and equipment 

packages, and much more. The division works with 

the country desk officers to integrate these plans into 

country work plans. 

From that point, the CDO can realistically 

synchronize each engagement inside the partner 

nation in the short term, six to twelve months ahead. 

The CDO maintains another two years of conceptual 

engagement plans, to be validated each year with the 

country itself through the SCO. Furthermore, as each 

fiscal year defense budget offers special SC funding 

authorities, the DOTMLPF analysis and integration 

would provide a rational and substantive basis for 

the GCC proposals to be forwarded to congress for 

approval. The GCC would not have to send ad hoc 

teams on immediate deployment to conduct analysis 

surveys in hope of trying to gain a good understanding 
81 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

can open the door to larger avenues of change by 

integrating other transformational institutions. 

One such avenue is DOD’s Ministry of Defense 

Advisors (MODA) program. Pairing US senior 

defense civilians with partner nation ministry officials, 

this program fills gaps in institutional reform that SC 

activities could not impact due to the overwhelming 

time and manpower requirements requisite in 

building military capacity. While a partner nation’s 

armed services acquire a brand new equipment fleet 

and provide personnel to operate them, if ministerial 

bureaucracies cannot budget funding, replace or pay 

personnel, or even sustain the hardware investments, 

all those SC gains will be lost to continued ineffective 

governance. Secretary Gates (2010) addressed the 

same issue arguing, "The United States has made 

great strides in building up the operational capacity 

of its partners by training and equipping troops and 

mentoring them in the field. But there has not been 

enough attention paid to building the institutional 

capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human 

capital (including leadership skills and attitudes) 

needed to sustain security over the long term." 

A second approach for the future is teaming up 

with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s 

(DSCA) program called Defense Institution Reform 

Initiative (DIRI). DSCA, a financial management 

and synchronization clearinghouse for DOD, DOS, 

and GCC engagements must manage and implement 

the funding to achieve activity objectives. In 2009, 

it tasked the Naval Post Graduate School Global 

Center for Security Cooperation (GCSC) creating 

DIRI to help partner nations countries evolve 

accountable, professional, and transparent defense 

institutions to manage, sustain, and employ their 

forces and the capabilities developed through US 

security cooperation programs. DIRI would make an 

invaluable team asset to the GCC security cooperation 

repertoire for its complementing phased efforts to 

build partner capabilities through the institution 

sector. 

The US military teaches its own leaders throughout 

their careers about the mission-leveraging effects 

from unity of command and economy of effort. For 

the future, the USG should consider expanding DIRI 

and MODA to enhance GCC security cooperation 

programs, especially as the US defense strategy 

turns toward smaller scale operations coupled with 

resource constraints. Once SCFM divisions operate 

and MODA and DIRI expand, GCCs can harvest 

Precedent 

The proposed SC planning method and 

organizational concept has precedent in Iraq 

during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and NEW 

DAWN. From the earliest phases of security and 

stabilization efforts, the US military created ad hoc 

and formalized training teams to assess, prioritize, 

develop, and integrate basic needs for Iraqi security 

forces. A positive result of these efforts is a large pool 

of trained, combat-experienced officers and NCOs 

skilled in advising and mentoring partner nations 

on their stability and security capacity building 

activities. Army Force Management Officers are 

an institution themselves, having stood up cells at 

the highest echelons of theater commands whose 

missions were to advise new democratic partners’ 

militaries how to design and build force structures, 

equipment tables, training plans, doctrines, and 

ministerial capabilities. Fighting land and maritimebased insurgents in protracted tactical combat is not a 

21st century end state we seek. The US is safer when 

it uses its own national security assets to develop 

self-sufficient security forces and institutions among 

partner nations who have just as much interest in 

protecting themselves from the common threats to 

peace and stability. Former Secretary of Defense 

Robert M. Gates (2010) precisely articulated this 

sentiment stating, “Helping other countries better 

defend themselves or fight beside us—by providing 

equipment, training, or other forms of support—

is something the United States has been doing in 

various ways for nearly three-quarters of a century. 

It dates back to the period before America entered 

World War II, when Winston Churchill famously 

said, “give us the tools, and we will finish the job.” 

Future

The US remains an international leader to build 

capacities and assist where it can, how it can, around 

the globe. Each nation’s citizenry, from the Central 

African Republic to Turkmenistan to Colombia seek 

fair governments engaged in peacefully protecting 

their own ways of life, while allowing enough 

freedom to feel they can enjoy the fruits of their labor 

without the threat of violent conflict. What draws 

many nations back into a vicious pattern holding back 

their growth is corruption, lack of resources, opaque 

governance, and general abuse of power. Geographic 

combatant commands, efficiently advancing 

American interests in conjunction with partners, 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 82

the tripartite to fully engage all aspects of partner 

nations’ military capacities. 

Conclusion

As GCCs promote engagements to advance US 

interests, partners share in those advancements. It is to 

each GCC’s advantage to ensure willing and accessible 

partners have the capabilities to work alongside the 

US and have capacity to sustain themselves in those 

efforts. The current security cooperation planning 

staff stands to benefit by creating an organization 

focused on wholly DOTMLPF analysis and 

requirements development. By integrating these 

requirements into long term country work plans and 

allowing Regional Engagement Divisions to harness 

near term execution synergies, GCCs will have a 

synchronized and accurate glidepath for building 

partner capabilities. As these abilities mature, the 

GCCs can take the next step in combining efforts 

with new DOD enabling initiatives carrying out 

similar objectives. 

Defense policy instructs combatant commanders 

to treat security cooperation as an important 

national security tool and an integral element. The 

GCC mandates security cooperation activities to be 

planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with 

the same high degree of attention and efficiency as 

other integral DOD activities. They must boldly 

manage security cooperation to confront the global 

security challenges using tools, organizations, and 

skill sets available throughout the government and 

military. Enhanced, proactive analysis integrated 

with long-term engagement planning will increase 

the DOD’s ability to positively affect security and 

stability and thus, further project the US legacy in 

partner nation development.

About the Author

Major Michael DeCicco is currently the Uganda 

Country Desk Officer at US Africa Command, J5. 

He is an Army Force Management Officer (50A) and 

has worked in the HQDA G8 Force Development 

Directorate analyzing and programming equipping 

requirements. Before that he was a logistics and 

infantry officer, serving as an advisor in Iraq and 

commanding a Cavalry Forward Support Company 

in Korea. He holds bachelor’s degree in economics 

and a master’s degree in homeland security.
83 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

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The DISAM Annual, May 2012 84
85 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

at the country level in the early stages of a program is 

mostly reactive and generally initiated in response to 

a formal Letter of Request (LOR) from the partner. A 

comprehensive LOR that clearly communicates the 

partner’s needs is absolutely essential in that it sets 

the stage for effective implementation and execution 

of a program. DSCA’s schoolhouse, the Defense 

Institute of Security Assistance Management 

(DISAM) at Wright-Patterson AFB, dedicates a 

significant amount of instruction time to discussions 

about the LOR. And in coordination with DISAM 

and the military departments, DSCA disseminated 

a March 2011 memo to all Security Cooperation 

Offices (SCOs) informing them of various references 

and tools available to assist partners with developing 

complete and actionable LORs. 

Producing a “good” LOR is a significant 

challenge in today’s fluid security cooperation 

landscape. Too often requirements definition focuses 

on acquiring a specific piece of equipment or weapon 

system instead of viewing the potential acquisition 

in terms of developing a partner capability that 

mutually supports US and partner security objectives. 

The additional planning and coordination associated 

with capability building efforts, as well as a lack of 

experience with the specific equipment or system 

to be delivered, makes it difficult for in-country 

SCOs to adequately identify and address country 

requirements. This adversely impacts the effective 

and timely development of partner capabilities and 

can result in failure to plan for long term sustainment 

requirements.

The SCRTF report also concludes that FMS is 

a slow process. It is decentralized in nature with 

dependence on numerous key stakeholders and built 

in checks and balances that are often cumbersome 

in practice. The traditional FMS system is generally 

effective in supporting the routine defense 

requirements of partner countries. However, the 

current processes are just not equipped to respond to 

Expeditionary Requirements 

Generation Teams

By Susan McClure

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Introduction

In today’s dynamic and unpredictable security 

environment, the United States must increasingly 

rely on partnership and cooperation with our Allies 

and other nations. This can pose a dilemma when 

our Allies and partners lack the skills and equipment 

necessary to effectively meet their security needs, 

especially in a coalition environment. By necessity, 

US security cooperation objectives evolved from a 

traditional peacetime emphasis on “influence and 

access” to incorporate a more contingency based 

focus that builds capacity of partner country security 

forces.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

stresses that the ability to develop alliances and 

partnerships is critical to achieving our National 

Defense Strategy objectives. In fact, the QDR 

identifies building partner capacity as one of the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) six key mission areas. 

To help address the challenges inherent in building 

partner capacity, former Secretary of Defense Gates 

established the Security Cooperation Reform Task 

Force (SCRTF) in the fourth quarter of FY2010. The 

SCRTF was tasked to conduct a comprehensive review 

of DOD’s internal security cooperation processes 

and to provide recommendations conducive to quick 

implementation. Though the SCRTF’s Phase I report 

to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) included 

numerous findings and associated recommendations 

across the security cooperation spectrum, only those 

relevant to Expeditionary Requirements Generation 

Teams (ERGTs) are referenced in this article.

The Issues

 In the context of this changing security cooperation 

environment, the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA) recognized the need to improve and 

manage performance across the entire timeline of a 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. A key finding 

by the SCRTF was that security cooperation planning 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 86

core team members of an ERGT should be the DSCA 

team chief; regional/desk officers from the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (Policy) as well as from the 

Department of State; and GCC personnel (to include 

component commands if required). To be effective and 

credible, an ERGT must also include the right mix of 

technical and operational experts accompanying the 

core team. Despite disparate country requirements 

and unique team compositions, both the Uzbekistan 

and Bulgaria ERGTs conducted capability planning 

that successfully achieved the same goal—producing 

LORs that addressed mutually-agreed upon 

objectives that were complete enough for DOD to 

prepare a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) 

that accurately reflects the requirements. These two 

ERGTs generated a combined total of thirty-three 

actionable LORs for country consideration. As of 

August, fourteen of those LORs have been officially 

submitted for LOA development, of which four have 

been implemented. 

With the success of the Uzbekistan and Bulgaria 

pilot teams, DSCA formally implemented the ERGT 

concept in DSCA policy memo 11-18 (31 March 

2011), titled “Interim Policy for Deployment of 

Expeditionary Requirements Generation Teams 

(ERGT) to Augment Geographic Combatant 

Commands (GCC) Staff and Security Cooperation 

Organizations (SCO).” DSCA will coordinate any 

future GCC request for an ERGT with the requesting 

GCC, military departments, DOD agencies, and 

interagency stakeholders to organize and deploy an 

ERGT, as appropriate. ERGTs will focus on assisting 

SCOs with partner nation requirements assessment 

across the Ministry of Defense or military service 

level and developing solutions and options through 

comprehensive “capability package planning” 

leading to actionable LORs. Consideration for ERGTs 

will focus on: (1) new partners; (2) current partners 

seeking a first time major or complex FMS program; 

or (3) urgent requirements for coalition partners 

engaged in contingency or combat operations. While 

DSCA funded the two pilot ERGTs, policy memo 

11‐18 states that subsequent teams will be funded by 

the applicable agencies involved.

DSCA plans to issue a follow on policy directive 

that details ERGT request procedures and team 

formation and deployment processes. In the interim, 

inquiries about ERGT or requests for ERGT support 

should be forwarded to the DSCA Principal Director 

for Security Cooperation Operations.

unplanned urgent requirements that provide partners 

with a critical capability in an operational contingency 

based security environment. In response, the security 

cooperation community is forced to hand massage the 

current FMS process or to develop ad hoc procedures, 

placing additional stress on resources already taxed 

by the dramatic increase in recent years’ FMS sales.

To address these issues, the SCRTF proposed 

a two pronged approach. The first prong involves 

transitioning the security cooperation system 

from a reactive to a more deliberative posture that 

emphasizes the pre-LOR planning stage. The second 

prong focuses on tweaking current processes or 

implementing new processes to help enable quicker 

delivery times. In broad terms, what is needed is a 

more anticipatory system with fast-track processes 

in place that facilitate rapid delivery of defense 

articles and services in response to urgent partner 

requirements.

The Birth of ERGT

Achieving a more anticipatory posture requires 

significant upfront planning. The SCRTF reports that 

there are no standard or formal processes in place 

for accomplishing “capability package planning” 

that takes into account such factors as production 

timelines, availability of people and resources, 

construction of infrastructure, training requirements, 

and sustainment. Additionally, Geographic 

Combatant Commands (GCCs) and SCOs may not 

always have the in-house resources, experience, or 

technical expertise to conduct such an extensive 

planning effort. As a result, the SCRTF recommended 

the establishment of ERGTs. The intent of an ERGT 

is to deploy a DSCA-led team of security cooperation 

subject matter experts to a partner country to assist 

GCCs and SCOs with quickly defining partner 

capability requirements and identifying defense 

articles and services that can potentially satisfy those 

requirements. 

Based on preliminary recommendations from the 

SCRTF, DSCA deployed two pilot ERGTs in March 

2011, one each to Uzbekistan and Bulgaria. The 

Uzbekistan ERGT consisted of fourteen personnel 

representing eight agencies across the security 

cooperation community, and the Bulgaria ERGT 

included thirteen personnel from nine different 

organizations. Because every country has different 

needs, no two ERGTs will look alike as this will be 

tailored to the specific country needs. In general, the 
87 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Conclusion

On 25 July 2011, SECDEF approved the 

SCRTF Phase I report and directed to implement 

the report’s recommendations in accordance with 

applicable law, regulation, and policy. The SCRTF, 

under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, will oversee the implementation of the 

task force recommendations. The ERGT concept, 

as one of the key recommendations to come out of 

the task force, potentially has far-reaching impacts 

across the security cooperation community to include 

DISAM. DISAM personnel were afforded the 

opportunity to participate in both the Uzbekistan and 

Bulgaria pilot ERGTs to reinforce key concepts for 

producing complete LORs and to gather data for the 

establishment of lessons learned and best practices 

database.

Based on the preliminary SCRTF findings and the 

two pilot teams, DSCA’s implementation of the ERGT 

program in March 2011 represents a significant step 

toward establishing the anticipatory posture necessary 

to effectively accomplish capability planning to 

satisfy partner security requirements. After two 

successful pilot ERGTs in March 2011, DSCA is 

currently coordinating the deployment of two more 

ERGTs within the next few months. To keep up with 

developments, DISAM is adapting its curricula by 

incorporating information and procedures pertaining 

to ERGTs (as well as other recommendations to 

come out of the SCRTF) in order to provide the best 

possible security cooperation education in today’s 

contingency-based coalition environment.

About the Author

Susan McClure has been an Instructor of Security 

Cooperation Management at DISAM since January 

2009. She is currently the Functional Coordinator 

for FMS Process, and also teaches Financial 

Management. In addition to DISAM, her thirty years 

of Security Cooperation experience include five years 

at the Air Force Security Assistance Management 

Center (AFSAC), eighteen years at the Deputy 

Under Secretary of the Air Force for International 

Affairs (SAF/IA), and four years at the Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency. Prior to working for 

the government, Ms. McClure taught junior high 

school English for four years. She holds a bachelor 

of science degree in education and a master’s degree 

in public administration, both from the University of 

Dayton.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 88
89 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

the LOR Tracker mentioned earlier are excellent 

tools for managing dozens of LORs simultaneously 

but lack the functionality to prioritize requirements 

and have no connectivity to the larger DOD security 

cooperation information network. The salient point 

here is that systems like EBMIS and the LOR Tracker 

were developed internally out of sheer necessity and 

are not DOD solutions. Although FMS customers’ 

requirements for such systems vary based on their 

budget, the fact that these systems were developed at 

all highlights the need for better visibility across the 

entire FMS process.

Many of the blind spots are hard-wired into the 

system; blind spots are most prevalent in the seams 

between organizations. The first of five examples 

is the seams among the Implementing Agency 

(IA), the life-cycle management commands, the 

security cooperation activity in the host nation and 

the DSCA. The Implementing Agency is organized 

geographically around FMS customers. The lifecycle management commands (TACOM, AMCOM, 

NAVSEA, etc) are built around functional hardware 

lines such as helicopters, tanks, or ships because they 

have to interface with the larger military departments’ 

supply chains. The security cooperation activity 

in the host nation usually reports back through 

the Geographic Combatant Commander, which 

is organized around geographic considerations. 

Although the DSCA has oversight over the entire 

process, they are organized by FMS customer—

meaning by country. DSCA relies on the security 

cooperation activity (i.e. Offices of Defense/Military 

Cooperation) and the IA for much of the information 

before the case is implemented. Once a case is 

implemented and the contracts have been awarded, 

the DSCA and the IA are in the best position to report 

on the status of the case, especially the financial status 

of the case. The security cooperation activity and the 

FMS customer are often the least knowledgeable 

about which requisitions have been paid and how 

By Major James Swift

United States Army

Foreign Military Sales 

Observations in USCENTCOM

Security Cooperation and Security Assistance 

initiatives often rely heavily on the capabilities 

acquired through the formal Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) process. At the Department of Defense 

level, there are a variety of organizations and tools 

already in place to manage the FMS process. These 

tools include the Security Cooperation Information 

Portal (SCIP), the Defense Finance and Accounting 

Services (DFAS), the Defense Security Assistance 

Management System (DSAMS), the Defense 

Integrated Financial System (DIFS), and the Security 

Assistance Network (SAN) to name a few. But what is 

missing is a responsive common operating picture for 

all of the shareholders that depicts the entire process 

including: requirements determination, requirements 

prioritization, Letter of Request tracking, case 

writing milestones, contract award milestones, and 

case closure milestones. An enterprise resource 

system (ERS) could go a long way in establishing 

that common operating picture.

To be fair, some USCENTCOM FMS customers 

have mechanisms in place to help see through blind 

spots in the current network of information systems. 

Two examples of this are the Egyptian Budget 

Management Information System (EBMIS), an 

information system designed and managed by the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and 

the Letter of Request (LOR) Tracker developed by 

the Office of Military Cooperation–Egypt (OMC-E). 

EBMIS is a good start in that it is a programmatic tool 

used to load all prospective LORs, including planned 

Price and Availability requests; into a format that 

forecasts payment schedules and other critical case 

information. EBMIS also pulls updates from DSAMS 

and incorporates manual inputs from DFAS. But 

EBMIS falls short in providing a status of the FMS 

case once the US military department Implementing 

Agency accepts the LOR and again between the time 

the customer signs the Letter of Offer and Acceptance 

(LOA) and subsequent contract award. Systems like 

USCENTCOM Security Cooperation Practitioners Require an Enterprise Resource Tool 

That Allows True End-to-End Visibility Throughout the Foreign Military Sales Process
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 90

Substantial reductions in cost over time are possible 

due to leveraging the timing of other FMS customer 

buys of like articles but the reverse is also true. 

FMS customers and security cooperation activities 

are often forced to estimate future costs in the out 

years based on historical expenditures of similar 

items and normalized by personal experience. Some 

FMS customers can and do use inflation indices to 

forecast costs with success but not all FMS customers 

demonstrate the sophistication required to accurately 

predict costs in the out-years. This not only creates 

discrepancies in what programs are budgeted for 

in the short term but introduces uncertainty in the 

long-term acquisition strategy by using inaccurate 

cost estimates for future programs. Using the formal 

P&A request is a method worthy of sustaining. It 

keeps the FMS customer from diverting valuable 

life-cycle management command manpower away 

from managing FMS requisitions and requirements 

to a potentially endless parade of queries from the 

FMS customer. But there has to be a more responsive 

way to identify a rough order of magnitude cost for 

planning purposes. A formal P&A is typically valid 

for about ninety days. 

much money is left on specific lines within an 

implemented case because neither has access to 

the IA’s financial system. These two organizations 

are also the least knowledgeable on the statuses of 

amendments and modifications to existing cases 

because neither of these organizations has access to 

the case development milestones.

The FMS customer receives daily electronic 

updates from the military departments from their 

respective supply chains via: the Centralized 

Integrated System for International Logistics (US 

Army), the Management Information System for 

International Logistics (US Navy), and the Security 

Assistance Management Information System (US 

Air Force). FMS customers are often task organized 

in a different fashion than their US counterparts (see 

figure 1) which only complicates how they interface 

with the US agencies (see figure 2).

The second blind spot is cost estimation outside 

the formal Price and Availability (P&A) request 

process. Requests for P&As are informal pricing 

estimates that try to account for future costs based on 

a given quantity and have a specified expiration date. 

P&As are program office cost estimates and are not 

necessarily on specific vendors or sources of supply. 

Figure 1. Notional FMS Customer Task Org Chart

National FMS Customer Task Organization
91 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

The fourth blind spot in the USCENTCOM FMS 

arena is visibility of contract award after an FMS case 

has been implemented. An FMS case is essentially 

an agreement between the US government and a 

US provider of defense articles or services. The US 

government (DSCA, USASAC, security cooperation 

activity, etc) acts on the FMS customer’s behalf. Once 

the LOA has been signed and the case implemented, 

there is usually a period for contract award. Based 

on the complexity and scope of the requirement, 

there can be several contracts spanning billions of 

dollars. There is currently no formal mechanism 

for any security cooperation activities or the FMS 

customer to know when the contracts are awarded. 

These contract award data have to be “pulled” by the 

FMS customer on a case-by-case basis from CISIL, 

MISIL, or SAMIS rather than “pushed” from the 

implementing agencies. As with case writing and 

case development milestones, contract awards can 

be stalled for long periods waiting on additional 

information or clarification. Adding contract award 

A third blind spot is case writing and case 

development milestones. The service security 

assistance commands (USASAC, AFSAC, NAVIPO, 

etc.) and DSCA write FMS base cases as well as 

amendments and modifications. FMS cases vary in 

complexity from relatively low-cost straightforward 

cases like military uniforms all the way up to very 

complex cases costing hundreds of millions of 

dollars with countless lines and notes as in the F-16 

example. Cases often understandably spend months 

in development before the case is offered via the LOA 

with no apparent change in status. It is not uncommon 

for case development to be stalled awaiting a specific 

answer from a subject matter expert only to find out 

weeks or months later that the question was never 

answered. From the performance metric and critical 

path perspectives, there is no clear time to expect 

the case writing task to culminate given the broad 

range of case complexity mentioned earlier. Adding 

an expected case writing completion date to the ERS 

would help the developing FMS case stay on track.

US Security Cooperation Framework Snapshot

Figure 2. US Security Cooperation Framework Snapshot
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 92

to collect the relevant information to make the 

decision. 

In other words, many prospective FMS cases are 

culled without ever having been formally declined. 

This assertion is relevant to the matter at hand because 

barring the most cutting-edge US defense articles, 

there seems to be no readily available information 

as to why a weapon system is not releasable to a 

particular FMS customer and when that assessment 

is expected to change. Adding a rational political 

release status, justification, and expected release date 

of US defense articles to the ERS would improve the 

responsiveness of the security cooperation activities, 

codify the results of the inter-agency staffing process, 

hopefully entice the inter-agency to examine political 

release more regularly, and help the FMS customer 

program funds in the appropriate year in anticipation 

of a political release.

The Exception to the National Disclosure 

Policy (ENDP) process is the deliberate system of 

determining whether or not a US defense capability 

can be released under the auspices of security 

cooperation. Release of weapons systems is a complex 

bureaucratic process involving various elements 

of the US government, including the services, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of 

State and Congress. Not all USCENTCOM countries 

use the formal ENDP. The ENDP codifies the results 

of the NSA release decision. Some strategic partners 

prefer to use the Letter of Request (LOR) process to 

determine a weapon system’s political “releasability.” 

Using an LOR to request release of a weapon system 

is sometimes seen as preferable to the formal ENDP 

process. This is because an ENDP decision persists to 

a degree that an LOR decision does not. A “no” using 

the ENDP process, while more deliberate and welldocumented than the LOR method, is unlikely to be 

reversed anytime soon. But a disapproved LOR can 

be re-submitted without the same sense of finality an 

ENDP decision. It is easy to see why not all countries 

want to subject themselves to the ENDP process. 

In July 2008, DSCA and the Business 

Transformation Agency (BTA) partnered to develop 

what has now become known as the Security 

Cooperation Enterprise Solution (SCES). If this 

solution works as designed, it will go a long way in 

reducing the blind spots mentioned earlier. SCES 

is currently in the contract award phase. Security 

cooperation operators could see SCES online as early 

as June 2011.

parameters to the ERS would help make execution 

of a new FMS action more efficient by informing 

the shareholders when the contract was awarded but 

could also flag stalled cases that have exceeded their 

planned contract award thresholds. 

Not all FMS cases require contracts. If the case 

does not require manpower and if the case is for 

materiel which is already available in stock, then 

a contract may not be necessary. Those cases that 

require contracts are often for items that must be 

procured through the services’ procurement systems, 

both non-standard and otherwise. This is another 

reason why visibility on contract awards is so difficult 

—each of the three US military departments uses 

different procurement automation systems to manage 

the necessary procurement actions. Across all three 

military departments, there are four common reasons 

for delays in awarding the contract: statement of work 

incorrect; the contract failed the audit performed by 

Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA); 

protests by contractors; and, using Direct Commercial 

Sales verbiage in an FMS contract. These reasons, 

coupled with an acute shortage of experienced 

contracting officers, often result in lengthy delays in 

awarding FMS contracts.

The fifth and final blind spot is political 

“releasability.” There is a host of US strategic policy 

documents and US law that pertain to security 

cooperation. Some of these documents naturally 

create inconsistencies when carried to their logical 

conclusions. US presidential administrations 

change with a greater frequency than the refresh 

rates of some of the policy documents. And many 

of the mid-level functionaries in the Defense and 

State Departments are not particularly sensitive to 

changes in administration. What this means is that 

official US departmental positions on arms export 

control, technology transfer, or political release 

are often more dated than one would think for 

countries in the USCENTCOM AOR. And given the 

lengthy process and substantial staff work required 

to change a position, one can easily see how the 

status quo becomes the most tenable bureaucratic 

option. Anecdotally, many requests for new defense 

capability in the FMS purview tend to be given a 

preliminary, informal inter-agency staffing attempt 

too often followed by a restatement of the agency’s 

last official position. The final decision for release of 

US weapon systems rests with the National Security 

Agency, which uses the inter-agency staffing process 
93 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

In closing, it is important to state that the current 

system of managing FMS cases in the USCENTCOM 

AOR works, in spite of its numerous blind spots. It is 

certainly not broken. But it is fraught with convoluted 

lines of communication that unnecessarily hinder 

synergy. An enterprise resource system that could 

help determine and prioritize requirements (LORs); 

outline case development milestones; notify the FMS 

customer when the contracts have been awarded; 

clearly articulate a given weapon system’s political 

release status; and provide responsive rough order 

of magnitude costing data for planning would 

streamline the execution of the FMS process. As 

the US shapes its footprints in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

responsive security cooperation initiatives could 

play an ever-increasing role in our nation’s foreign 

policy relative to the USCENTCOM AOR. An FMS 

ERS would improve a host nation’s ability to quickly 

and efficiently dispense its national funds or Foreign 

Military Financing funds toward domestic and 

regional security interests.

In today’s context, advocating yet another 

“box” to put on one’s desk in the spirit of efficiency 

should be viewed with ample skepticism. But that’s 

not what is being proposed here. What is being 

suggested is access to existing information in ways 

that provide timely situational awareness across the 

Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational 

(JIIM) security cooperation environment. It is a tall 

order, but one worth filling if we hope to bring the 

security cooperation into the twenty-first century.

About the Author

The author would like to thank the teammates at 

DSCA, USASAC, US Embassy-Cairo, OMC-E, and 

USCENTCOM for their thoughtful review of this 

manuscript prior to its publication. Major Swift is 

assigned to USCENTCOM with duty as a Security 

Cooperation Officer in the Arab Republic of Egypt. 

He is a 2009 graduate of the Defense Institute for 

Security Assistance Management (DISAM). Major 

Swift is a Logistics Corps officer.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 94
95 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Phasing out equipment without notifying our 

international partners who still operate that system 

could lead to a public relations nightmare and 

create mistrust between governments. This begs the 

questions of how we make sure our international 

partners are still able to get support when we are in an 

environment of Diminishing Manufacturing Sources 

(DMSMS) or obsolescence.

You will hear the terms obsolescence and DMSMS 

used interchangeably. In fact, obsolescence is the 

lack of availability due to statutory changes, process 

changes, DMSMS, new designs, etc. DMSMS is the 

lack of sources or materials. The problem of DMSMS 

affects all categories of materials. These issues 

impact not only US forces but also our international 

partners who are operating US equipment. 

DMSMS can occur in any stage of a product 

life cycle, but it has the greatest impact on our 

international partners during the phase-out stage, at 

which point the US is using a new technology but the 

older technology is still in use by our international 

partners. It is vital that the US government program 

managers are cognizant of the risk associated with 

DMSMS and be proactive and have an active risk 

management plan in order to continue support 

for those FMS purchasers. Some of the keys to a 

successful program include a program centered on 

having a predictive tool and a knowledgeable team, 

bill-of-material (BOM), management commitment, 

and ensuring the international partner has the 

financial resources available. We must also have 

a long range plan for every system that establishes 

when and what will be replaced or redesigned in 

order to forestall future problems. DMSMS cannot 

be done in a vacuum, as both sides have a major role. 

Working together, we have to conduct an operations 

impact analysis to determine what effect DMSMS 

will have on a country’s operational readiness, the 

failure and replacements rates of components, and 

number of spares in a system, for example. 

The Impact of Diminishing Manufacturing 

Sources on FMS Logsistics Support

By Barton D. Chess

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Our international partners purchase and operate 

a variety of weapon systems from the United States 

Department of Defense (DOD). Some of those systems 

are no longer in the United States DOD inventory, but 

our international partners still require support. Some 

of that equipment will one day be phased out while 

our international partners will continue to operate the 

older version of the system. The Security Assistance 

Management Manual (SAMM) states: 

C4.3.3. Logistics Support. The Department 

of Defense considers the support of US 

origin defense articles critical to the success 

of the Security Assistance program. Systems 

in use with US Forces are supported through 

the DOD procurement system. Support items 

that are stocked, stored, and issued due to 

common application with end items in use, 

should be provided even though the end 

items may have been acquired commercially 

or system support buyout is complete. 

C4.3.3.1. When a system is to be phased out 

of the DOD inventory, countries that have 

acquired the system under FMS are given the 

opportunity to determine item requirements 

and to place final orders designed to maintain 

system capability through its service life. 

These orders are consolidated to ensure 

economic buys. 

C4.3.3.2. The Department of Defense shall 

take reasonable steps to support systems 

that are not used by US Forces including 

items that were never adopted by US Forces. 

Support is provided for these items when 

mutually satisfactory arrangements are made 

with the country involved and supply sources 

are available. Effort is made to support 

non-standard items, whether acquired 

commercially or through FMS, when this 

effort serves US interests. 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 96

The program manager is guided by certain laws 

and regulations when dealing with DMSMS and 

support to our international partners. US Code Title 

10, chapter 131, section 2213 prohibits buying more 

stock than will be consumed in two years. Air Force 

Policy Directive (AFPD) 23-1, Requirements and 

Stockage of Material, implements DOD 4140.1-R 

and serves as a bridge to AFCMI 23‐103. AFMCI 

23-103, Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and 

Material Shortages Program, lists the DMSMS 

responsibilities and appoints AFMC as single 

manager. Army Material Command Pamphlet 

(AMCP) 5-23, Diminishing Manufacturing Sources 

and Material Shortages, implements DOD 4140.1‐R 

and describes the Army program. Navy Supply 

(NAVSUP) Instruction 4800.6A, Diminishing 

Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages,

states Navy Supply Systems Command (Code 05) 

has the lead responsibility. 

There a various barriers in providing support 

to our international partners in an environment 

of DMSMS and obsolescence, including short 

deadlines, lack of communication from vendors and 

original equipment manufacturers, and issues of 

releasability of information. The bottom line is that 

our international partners use platforms long after the 

United States Government has retired them. When 

the Letter of Offer and Acceptance is signed, they 

expect a certain level of commitment from the US in 

terms of service and support.

About the Author

Barton D. Chess, Sr. is an instructor of 

security assistance management at DISAM with a 

concentration on FMS logistics and finance. He is 

level III International Affairs Career certified. His 

experience includes an assignment as a Security 

Cooperation Officer in Amman Jordan, a Command 

Country Manager for the continent of Africa at the Air 

Force Security Assistance Center, and currently an 

instructor at DISAM. He is a retired Army Lieutenant 

Colonel logistician. He was awarded a master of 

science in administration from Central Michigan 

University and a bachelor of science in management 

from Wright State University. He has been awarded 

the Legion of Merit, the Defense Meritorious Service 

Medal, and three Meritorious Service Medals, among 

other awards.

There are a number of guidance and reference 

sources that can steer a DMSMS program in the right 

direction. A good place to start is the DMSMS Center 

of Excellence website, www.dmsms.org, which is 

sponsored by the DOD. Additional sources include 

but are not limited to (1) the Defense Supply Center 

Columbus, www.DSCC.dla.mil, which is a gateway 

for technical assistance with access to specifications, 

drawings, and qualified lists and (2) the Government 

Industry Data Exchange Program, www.GIDEP.

org, which has an outstanding library and links with 

weekly listings of discontinued parts. 

Probably the most important resource is the 

Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material 

Shortages (DMSMS) Guidebook. This DOD 

guidebook is a compilation of the best proactive 

practices from across DOD services and agencies 

for managing the risk of obsolescence. With material 

extracted from various DOD DMSMS management 

documents, the guidebook provides the DMSMS 

program manager (PM) with a central repository 

of best practices. Additionally, it identifies assorted 

measurement tools that may be useful in analyzing 

and tracking the effectiveness of DMSMS Programs. 

There are numerous logistic tools available, both 

government-owned and commercial. They include 

WebCATS, http://www.dscr.dla.mil/procurement/

CATS/cri.html, which retrieves supply data on 

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) aviation managed 

items and provides a snapshot of logistics posture of 

a DLA managed item of supply, and Haystack, http://

www.ihs.com/products/product-design-sourcing/

component-supplier-data/haystack-militarygovernment.aspx which provides data from over 

forty sources and updates quarterly. 

There are also subscription based tools such as 

Q-Star, (https://www.qtec.us/) which can assist in 

determining the status of parts on your BOM and 

other features such as life cycle projections, lifetime 

buy notices, availability predictions from eight to 

twenty years (depending on which website you use), 

and information on potential substitute parts. The 

website, Windchill Quality Solutions (formerlyRelex) 

(http://www.ptc.com/products/windchill/quality/

index-v2.htm), can assist in determining component 

reliability and mean time between failure. Of course, 

the program manager’s first stop should be the DOD 

DMSMS Center of Excellence (http://www.dmsms.

org/). 
97 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

avionics, and other components to support the B-1, 

B-2, B-52, C/KC-135, E-3, and 25 other Contractor 

Logistic Support aircraft. The center manages over 

23,000 jet engines that range from Korean conflict 

vintage to state of the art. Many of these engines 

are in the inventories of our international partners. 

Both the Fighter and Specialty Engine International 

Engine Management Program offices are located on 

Tinker AFB.

For the United States, “Foreign policy is a 

complicated tapestry whose intricate pattern is woven 

with US goals, ideals, needs, and aspirations.”1 

“One of the primary methods used to carry out US 

foreign and national security policy has been, and 

still remains, the transfer of defense articles, defense 

services, military training, and economic assistance.”2

The IEMP is a separate organization dedicated 

exclusively to the service of the foreign purchasers of 

military engines. Engine technology has come a long 

way since the Wright Flyer’s four cylinder model 

was built in 6 weeks by Charles Taylor in 1903. The 

Fighter Engine IEMP manages the F110 and F100 

engines, while the Specialty Engine IEMP manages 

the T56, J85, J69, TF33, J79, and F108. Combined 

member engine inventories today total more than 

8,900 engines, and maintaining these engines requires 

a great deal of technical expertise. The current IEMP 

mission is supported by specialized engineering, 

technical, and related logistics support organizations 

at Tinker AFB.

The Wright engine was a little crude, even 

by the standards of the day, but it was designed to 

fulfill a specific purpose and nothing more. It had 

four horizontal inline cylinders. The 4-inch bore, 

4-inch stroke, cast-iron cylinders fitted into a cast 

aluminium crankcase that extended outward to form 

a water jacket around the cylinder barrels. The engine 

was cooled by water from a narrow vertical water 

reservoir mounted on a forward wing strut.

A Primer for the United States Air Force: 

International Engine Management Program

By Forrest Smith and Barbara Beaty-Johnson

Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center

“Total Package Approach (TPA). A TPA ensures 

that FMS purchasers can obtain support articles and 

services required to introduce and sustain equipment. 

The complete sustainability package must be 

offered to the purchaser when preparing Price and 

Availability (P&A) data or LOAs. In addition to 

the system itself, other items to consider in a total 

package include: training, technical assistance, 

initial support, ammunition, follow-on support, etc.” 

(SAMM C4.5.4)

This article provides a long overdue discussion 

on the workings of the International Engine 

Management Program (IEMP) and the Component 

Improvement Program (CIP). It is designed to answer 

queries by our students and international partners 

who must work with extremely complex engine 

maintenance issues on a daily basis. The information 

presented in this article is the result of the combined 

effort of the Fighter and Specialty IEMP Chiefs, their 

staffs, and AFSAC/XPO, the United States Air Force 

(USAF) TCP/IEMP Coordinator. (Editor’s Note: 

Formerly two terms were used, the International 

Engine Management Group (IEMG) and the IEMP. 

With the 15 February 2011 revision of AFMAN 16-

101 International Affairs and Security Assistance 

Management, the term IEMG was discontinued). 

This article reflects the organizations as they were 

structured on 1 March 2011.

Introduction

Tinker Air Force Base, an 

Air Force Materiel Command 

base located in Oklahoma, is 

home to many operational and 

support missions, with the 

Oklahoma City Air Logistics 

Center OC-ALC) serving as 

the host organization.

The center is the worldwide manager for a 

wide range of aircraft, engines, missiles, software, 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 98

The T56 military turboprop and its commercial 

version, the 501-D, are the leading large turboprop 

engines in the world with over 18,000 engines 

produced and more than 200 million flying hours. 

The engine has been in production since 1954 and 

operates in nearly seventy countries worldwide. 

The success of the T56 engine is unrivalled and it is 

anticipated that operation will continue beyond 2020.

Benefits of IEMP Membership

The IEMP is a unique cost-sharing program 

that applies to AF-managed engines and to partner 

countries that choose to participate in the program. 

Funded entirely by member countries, the IEMP 

works exclusively for the international partners, 

and provides no service to USAF or non-member 

partners, with the exception of safety notifications. 

The IEMP provides a single point of contact 

(POC) on all engine related issues and acts as 

intermediary between the FMS partners, USAF, other 

DOD agencies, and contractors. FMS partners have 

direct and frequent contact with their respective IEMP 

POCs. The IEMP has direct access and interface 

to the US supply system, bases, depots, support 

contractors, and management personnel. The IEMP 

also provides repair and return service upon request.

The IEMP does not provide the following 

functions or services:

• Increased basic engine performance 

beyond that found in the engine model 

specification (for example, thrust, specific fuel 

consumption, and weight)

• Labor beyond that necessary for CIP service 

evaluation testing, unless specifically funded 

in the LOA

• Engineering support for the engine production 

process

• Data necessary for the manufacture of engines 

or changes to them

Currently, forty-one countries are members of 

the IEMP including Australia, Austria, Bahrain, 

Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 

Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, 

Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 

Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 

Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of 

Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, 

Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 

United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom.

Formation of the First International Engine 

Management Group

In 1984, the original IEMPs were established at 

the two engine Air Logistics Centers, Tinker AFB, OK, 

and Kelly AFB, TX, under the respective Propulsion 

Division leadership of Mr. George Davis and Mr. Don 

McFall at Tinker, and Col. Jim Peterka and Mr. A. 

Bruce Richter at Kelly. The Tinker IEMP, identified 

organizationally as OC-ALC/MMPMA, was located 

within the Propulsion Operations Branch and headed 

by Ms. Joyce Woods. Mr. Jim Kirk was the original 

IEMP chief at Kelly, where the organization was a 

branch of the Propulsion Division known as SAALC/MMPI. Mr. Ed Brewer of Kelly AFB added the 

“I” in the office symbol, representing “International,” 

and that naming convention continues.

As a result of a 1995 Defense Base Realignment 

and Closure Commission (BRAC) decision, Kelly 

AFB was closed and the Kelly AFB IEMP moved 

to Tinker AFB in September 2000. At that time 

the two IEMPs were realigned, placing the fighter 

engines and specialty engines together. The current 

Fighter Engine Chief is Mr. Gregory Broardt, OCALC/GKGIA and the Specialty Engine Chief is Ms. 

Barbara Beaty-Johnson, OC-ALC/GKGIC.

Source: http://www.griffwason.com/ wright_flyer_engine-info.htm

Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allison_T56
99 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

IEMP Reviews

Two types of program reviews are available to 

IEMP members. CONUS (within the continental 

United States) reviews include CIP conferences, 

Logistic Management Reviews (LMRs), and Program 

Management Reviews (PMRs). All members are 

invited to attend USG-sponsored reviews. LMRs and 

PMRs are conducted based on partner requirement/

request. (AFMAN 16-101, para.7.4.11)

In-Country Reviews (ICRs) are held in the 

partner's country when requested. The ICR includes 

a review of the member’s program, case financial 

status, common technical problems, and potential 

improvements. IEMP personnel provide information 

on current and upcoming engine issues and any 

new engine developments such as proposed engine 

modifications and upgrades. Any country-specific 

problems or concerns are addressed, and the IEMP 

technical personnel are available to troubleshoot 

engine problems.

• Inspection activities of any kind

• Training requirements

• CIP data for non-IEMP members

• TO status information

The Component Improvement Program (CIP), a 

contract between the USAF and the original engine 

manufacturer (OEM), funds follow-on engineering 

efforts to improve engine safety, reliability, 

maintainability, and serviceability. CIP benefits are 

available only to IEMP members. The cost is shared 

between the USAF and all IEMP member countries 

based on an engine fair share rate. Annual CIP 

conferences provide members with an opportunity 

to present their issues and attend briefings related to 

maintaining and supporting their engines. General 

meetings allow for the discussion of items of 

interest to all. Side meetings on specific topics are 

held between individual country representatives, 

the IEMP, and USAF/OEM technical and 

engineering personnel. These conferences provide 

forums for direct communication/interaction with 

representatives from other member countries, USAF, 

OEM, Navy, and multiple other agencies that impact 

the entire engine community. The most recent T56 

IEMP/CIP Conference was held December 2010 

in Indianapolis, Indiana in conjunction with Rolls 

Royce, and the J85/J69 Conference sponsored by 

General Electric (GE), occurred May 2011 in Lynn, 

Massachusetts. The F110 CIP Conference was held 

March 2011 in Evendale, Ohio in conjunction with 

GE. Tinker AFB along with Pratt & Whitney hosted 

the F100 Conference in May 2011.

International Engine Management Program CIP Conference, 9 

May 2011, Lynn, MA. Courtesy of OC-ALC/OC-ALC/GKGIC

Photo provided by IEMP. Fall 2010

IEMP personnel discussing T56 and F100/F110 issues with 

partner representatives at OC-ALC—front row left to Right 

are Mr. Larry Waite IEMP J79/TF33 Program Manager, Ms. Diane 

Carkhuff IEMP T56 Program Manager, Mr. Terry Stine IEMP F100 

Program Manager, Ms. Consuelo (Connie) Contero IEMP T56 

Program Manager, Mr. Luis Camacho IEMP TF33/F108/J85 Program 

Manager. Back row left to right Capt. Torstein Bjora'/Norway EPG, 

Capt. Erik De Wael/Belgian EPG, Adjutant Erik Van Gaal/Belgian 

EPG, Mr. Fernando Zepeda IEMP F110 Program Manager, Capt. 

Elvis Pinto Teixeira/Netherlands EPG, and Mr. Manford Thompson 

IEMP F100 Technical Lead.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 100

* USAF expertise/best practices 

(engineering/technical, MPWG, 

budgeting for maintenance 

requirements, etc.)

* USAF managed repair contracts

* IEMP Website

* Forum for technical distribution 

(ITCTOs, RACs, OEM/USAF Position 

Papers, Maintenance Awareness 

Messages, etc.)

* Conference Opportunities (Worldwide/

CIP Conferences)

* Expedite critical item requisitions/kit 

deliveries

* Represent members’ concerns and 

priorities

• Line 003: Overseas Travel (Optional): 

◊ Funds travel for the IEMP member to 

and from the country to conduct engine 

business, e.g., IEMP reviews in country

• Line 004: Contract Services (Optional): 

◊ Engineering or technical assistance that 

exceed the IEMP internal capability, which 

may include contractor travel to technically 

augment the IEMP

◊ Services such as engineering or technical 

investigation

◊ Printing and reproduction of data may also 

be funded under this line

IEMP Home Page

Members of the IEMP gain access to the IEMP 

website by contacting the IEMP Program Manager or 

by filling out the on line User Request Format https://

apps.tinker.af.mil/iemp/. The website is an essential 

communication tool in providing users with program 

and engine related information. 

FMS Cases In Support of the IEMP

Membership in the IEMP is for a minimum of 

three (3) years. As noted earlier, the IEMP is a cost 

sharing program; therefore, membership must be 

stable to ensure maximum benefits to all members. 

Furthermore, multi-year memberships ensure 

uninterrupted support. The Letter of Offer and 

Acceptance (LOA) for participation in the IEMP is 

typically a Technical Service (G) case. However, 

these services may be provided as line items on other 

types of cases such as a Major Aircraft System Sale (S) 

case or Specialized Follow-on Sustainment Support 

(Q) case. The LOA is prepared with the assistance of 

the IEMP, and is implemented and administered by 

the Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC).

The IEMP provides services to our international 

partners through the following LOA implemented 

lines:

• Line 001-Contractor Services 

◊ Component Improvement Program services

• Line 002-Internal Services: 

◊ IEMP Salaries

◊ Supplies and Equipment

◊ Benefits and CONUS Travel 

* Engine Working Group Establishment

* Key Personnel participation 

(Maintenance, Operations & Budget)

OC-ALC/GKG personnel and Republic of Korea officers 

after taking a scheduled tour of OC-ALC Maintenance area. Left 

to right Mr. Greg Broardt, Section Chief GKGIA, Mr. David Haas, 

Branch Chief GKGI, Mr. Greg Hughes former Division Chief GKG, 

Brigadier General Sung Ryong Hong, Republic of Korea Air Force, 

Major Alex Hong, Republic of Korea Air Force, Major Mansik Hur, 

Republic of Korea Air Force, Mr. Steve Goss, J85 IEMP Program 

Manager. Photo provided by IEMP. Date unknown.
101 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

About the Authors

Mr. Forrest “Ed” Smith is currently an Associate 

Professor of Security Assistance Management at 

DISAM. He has also held positions as a Logistics 

Analyst for DSAMS Training and Field Support; 

Chief, Arabian Programs Branch, Air Force Security 

Assistance Center (AFSAC); and Chief, Cost 

Sharing Branch, Assistant Chief of Staff (J‐4), 

Yongsan, Korea. He was awarded a master of 

science in logistics management from the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, and a bachelor of business 

administration in business and finance from the 

University of Massachusetts.

Ms. Barbara Beaty-Johnson is currently the 

International Engine Management Program Section 

Chief for Specialty Engines at Tinker AFB. She has 

been an engine Item Manager, Program Manager, 

Systems Analyst, and TCTO manager for the TF30, 

TF33, J79, F100 and F110 engines. She was the 

lead for FMS F100/F110 Organic Repair Return 

before assuming her current position. She has Level 

3 certification in international affairs, is a graduate 

of Air Command Staff College, and she received her 

master’s of business administration from Oklahoma 

City University, Oklahoma.

Final Thoughts

For nearly twenty-seven years, the IEMP and 

USAF have been supporting Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) and Security Assistance (SA) programs. The 

International Engine Management Program fulfills a 

vital role in supporting our international partners, as 

a member’s single point of contact for technical and 

logistical sustainment support.

Acknowledgements

A special mention is required for Mr. Bradley 

Smith, AFSAC/XPO, TCG Program Coordinator, 

and Ms. Lana Brooks, IEMP Program Management 

Support, OC-ALC/GKGIC for their assistance in 

completing this article.

Data was gathered from historical summaries 

and reports submitted by the IEMP. Additional 

program information was extracted from AFMAN 

16-101, International Affairs and Security Assistance 

Management, the Tinker AFB Home Page, the IEMP 

Home Page and various briefings prepared for the 

December 2010 and May 2011 IEMP/CIP Engine 

Conferences and listed sources within the article.

Notes

1. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management,The Management of Security 

Assistance, 21st Edition, June 2001, p.3

2. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management,The Management of Security 

Assistance, 21st Edition, June 2001, p.5

3. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratt_%26_

Whitney_F100

4. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

File:Engine.f15.arp.750pix.jpg

F-110-PW-229 Engine3 Powers the F-15 Aircraft4
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 102
103 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

to ensure competitiveness of technology for domestic 

industry, promote exports, and build infrastructure. 

In addition, sellers want to exploit further chances of 

business interests.7,8,9 Thus the definition of an offset 

is different for sellers and buyers of defense articles 

and services.

Even though there are a number of different 

definitions and practices for offsets depending 

on the amount of trade, offsets can be considered 

the opportunity of industrial development and 

international cooperation accompanying defense 

trade. Considering that the type of offsets includes 

mandatory coproduction, licensed production, 

subcontractor production, technology transfer, 

countertrade, and foreign investment in defense 

offsets, these may provide potentially more flexible 

freedom for the importers to pursue their future 

opportunities as exporters in the world’s defense 

markets.10,11

Figure 1 shows the classification of offset 

transaction categories. Offsets are subdivided into 

direct offsets and indirect offsets. Direct offsets are 

offset transactions that are directly related to the 

defense items or services exported by the defense 

firm. These are usually in the form of subcontracting, 

coproduction, technology transfer, overseas 

investment, licensed production, counter trade, 

training, and miscellaneous other forms. Indirect 

offsets are offset transactions that are not directly 

related to the defense items or services exported by 

the defense firm. Indirect offsets include purchases, 

technology transfer, overseas investment, licensed 

production, counter trade, training, and miscellaneous 

other offsets. Therefore, the common type of offsets 

that work for direct and indirect categories includes 

technology transfer, overseas investment, licensed 

production, counter trade, training, and miscellaneous 

other offsets.

Technology Acquisition Policy and Value 

Efficiency Analysis on Offsets in Defense Trade

By Choon-Joo Lee, Korea National Defense University

 Won-Joon Jang, Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade

 Bong-Kyoo Yoon, Korea National Defense University

Introduction

“Defense offset” is a form of defense 

procurement and it provides the recipient with some 

degree of industrial involvement to establish the 

channel of technology transfer, R&D, and production 

of the system being procured. It has been growing 

in practice as a common feature of international 

arms trade since the Cold War came to an end in the 

early 1990s with the Berlin Wall dismantling and the 

former Soviet Union collapse.

Offset is pursued when a buyer negotiates 

primary contracts of defense articles to exploit some 

sort of leverage to obtain compensatory benefits in 

the case of high value off-shore purchases by forcing 

the seller to undertake well-designated activities for 

international cooperation and parts export that can 

promote the infrastructure in appropriate domestic 

sectors.1

It is estimated that offsets and related forms of 

counter-trade constitute 5 to 30 percent of global trade, 

and more than one hundred countries use the offsets 

in their arms contracts.2 Business and trade analysts 

put the exact volume of defense offsets at a global 

level of over $5 billion each year.3 Since offsets are 

pursued while the contractual arrangements of arms 

trade are negotiated, the large arms exporters like the 

US, France, and Italy are obviously big providers 

of offsets. In 2007, the United States signed nearly 

$3.76 billion worth of offset contracts with more 

than eighteen companies located in thirty different 

countries. The actual value of the offset transactions 

from 1993-2007 was $45.73 billion.4,5

The environment of the US defense market is 

characterized by near monopolistic hegemony, which 

was created through the Ministry of Defense policy 

and political pressure for defense firms to consolidate 

in response to post-Cold War economic realities.6

Offsets are defined in several terms depending 

on market size and the scope of offset. The main 

purposes of buyer-through-offsets arrangements are 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 104

recipient but also as a provider. Almost every nation 

systematically considers offsets in the acquisition 

decision making process.

Second, the market size of offsets in defense 

trade was as large as 4 percent of world GDP in 

2008. The economic dimension of offsets in defense 

trade suggests that offsets become more important 

as defense trade grows. For example, the defense 

budget for Korea shares 18 percent of the national 

fiscal year budget. Around 50 percent of the defense 

budget is allocated to defense force capability 

building programs. When defense decision makers 

are constrained by procurement time and the limited 

technology development infrastructure, direct buying 

from advanced countries is the only option that 

they can choose. In fact, this is true for developing 

countries including the Republic of Korea. It is 

ranked sixth among major importers in the world 

defense market as of 2008 and considers offsets as an 

important channel for defense trade and international 

cooperation.

Third, in the aspect of technology acquisition, 

offsets provide the opportunity to obtain hightechnology because the defense industry of advanced 

countries is usually categorized as the hightechnology industry, such as the aerospace industry, 

engineering and electronics. The developing 

countries confront this with a lack of technology 

and experience, political barriers, and a high risk of 

Defense technology acquisition through offsets 

is important in terms of strategic context for the trade 

contractual arrangement, defense economics, and 

management of technology. First, it is strategically 

viable in trying to acquire the core technologies 

through offsets using the leveraging power of primary 

contracts. Core technology is prohibited or controlled 

through various regulations or appropriability such 

as MTCR, ITAR, EAR99 or Intellectual Property. 

Even if the buyer wants to pay for the technology 

and is actually prepared for the payment, the core 

technology will be denied transfer.12 As noticed from 

the statistics of US provided offsets, each nation 

considers offsets when negotiating defense contracts 

on a regular basis. Therefore, offsets are considered 

a means to obtain core technologies through the 

purchasing power of defense contracts.

In addition, as an exception of the WTO 

government procurement article to the general 

prohibition of offsets, it should be noted that 

exceptions from the obligations of the Agreement 

are also allowed for developing countries in certain 

situations (Article V) and for non-economic reasons 

such as to protect national security interests; improve 

public morals; provide public order or safety; 

improve human, animal or plant life or health; or 

protect intellectual property.13 As a country advances 

to the major defense exporters’ group, it is required 

to be prepared for offset arrangements not only as a 

Figure 1. Classification of Offsets Transaction Categories
105 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

efficiency performance with DEA and derives some 

policy implications on defense offset management 

followed by conclusions.

World Trends Of Defense Offsets

Offsets As A Regular Procurement Process

It is worthwhile to review the offsets trend 

provided by the US considering that there is no 

comprehensive data source of offsets statistics, and 

the US provides the largest number of offsets. Figure 

2 shows the US offset trend in terms of actual offset 

value and number of countries that participated from 

1993 to 2007. It is estimated that the actual offset 

value has averaged 45 billion dollars since 2003.15

According to US DOC, in 2007, eighteen US firms 

finished 589 offset transactions in thirty countries, and 

in 2006, fifteen US defense contractors reported 653 

offset transactions in twenty-nine countries. During 

1993-2007, a total of fifty-three US firms reported 

9,249 offset transactions in forty-eight countries. The 

offset transactions from 1993-2007 have increased 

as defense trade increased, on an average, from 34.3 

percent in 1993 to nearly 125 percent in 2003, before 

decreasing to some 71 percent in 2006.16

The use of offsets in international trade is 

widespread, and more than 130 countries practice 

it in different forms. Offsets and related forms of 

countertrade account for about 5 to 30 percent of 

world trade. The volume of offsets and its greater 

percentage applicability in arms contracts is quite 

large.17 Table 1 summarizes the title of offsets 

policy, the designated agency, and the status of 

offset decisions in formal procurement procedures 

of the major offset countries.18,19 Most countries 

accept the offsets decision as a formal procurement 

decision procedure and apply policies codified by the 

designated agency.

investment to enter the high tech area. Also, various 

offset programs like bank credit, coproduction, and 

FDI can provide some bridging measures to cope 

with the valley of death and cross the sea of Darwin 

to reach a market.

The roles of offsets can be categorized into 

the following major issue areas.14 First, they 

provide opportunities to contribute to both national 

security building and to economic development 

at the same time. Second, they are a mechanism to 

promote international exports and cooperation of 

the defense industry under the exceeding openness 

and competitive environment. Third, they are a 

channel to acquire the high-technology of advanced, 

complex systems of defense equipment in the 

situation where the advanced countries prohibit 

core technology transfer. Fourth, they provide 

incentives for defense firms to invest in R&D in 

order to achieve the technological advancement in 

the technology based acquisition system. Fifth, they 

promote the development of indigenous defense 

research, development and production capabilities 

for self-defense. Sixth, they enhance the long-term 

international relationship among nations that share 

common security, economic, and strategic interests. 

Finally, they open new paradigms of innovation, 

as they allow countries to cross the nations’ and 

firms’ managerial boundaries in terms of products, 

technology, services, intellectual property, banking 

credits, and know-how through the various types of 

offsets transactions.

This paper unfolds as follows. The next section 

describes the world trends of defense offsets. 

Section 3 explains the defense offset policy and 

the importance of value efficiency for the major 

countries in the world. Section 4 measures the offset 

Figure 2. US Offset Trends in its Actual Offsets Value and Number of Countries (1993-2007)
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 106

that the technology itself is not the ultimate purpose of 

the procurement. That is, the technology acquired by 

offset trade should be applied to products, business, 

or technology transfer for promotion of economic 

and strategic performance. Therefore, the agency 

for defense technology acquisition is responsible 

Offset trade is negotiated in terms of valuation.20 

This puts both buyer and seller in a complicated 

situation. Naturally, the value gap between offset 

providers and recipients makes it troublesome to 

negotiate offset transactions. Technology acquisition 

is different from product procurement in the sense 

Table 1 Offsets Decision as a Formal Procurement Decision Procedure

Countries Title of Policy Agency Designated Formal Procurement 

Decision Procedure Multipliers

Australia Australia Industry 

Involvement Programme

Department of Defense, 

Defense Material Organization

Yes, for military 

procurement

Yes

(none in 

policy)

Canada Industrial & Regional 

Benefits Policy

Industry Canada under the 

Ministry of Industry Yes

Yes 

(none in 

policy)

Denmark Industrial Cooperation 

Program

National Agency for Enterprise 

and Construction, under the 

Ministry of Economic 

and Business Affairs

Yes

Yes 

(none in 

policy)

Greece Policy of Offsets Benefits

Hellenic Ministry of National 

Defense/General Armaments 

Directorate, Division of Offsets

Yes Max 10

Israel Industry Cooperation 

Program

Industrial Cooperation Authority, 

Ministry of Trade and Industry Yes 1–1.5

Italy Not Codified National Armament Directorate, 

Ministry of Defense Yes (Armed Services) Max 3

Netherlands Industrial Benefits and 

Offsets Policy

Ministry of Economic Affairs–

Commissariat for Military 

Production

Yes 1–5, 5–10, 

10–30

Norway

Establishment and 

Implementation of 

Offsets in Connection 

with Defense 

Procurements

Ministry of Economic Affairs–

Commissariat for Military 

Production

Yes 0–5

Republic of 

Korea

Korean Defense Offset 

Program

Defense Acquisition Program 

Administration Yes

Yes 

(Determined 

by DAPA)

Spain Policy of Armament and 

Material Agency

Ministry of Defense–General 

Direction of Armaments and 

Material; Industrial Cooperation 

Agency of Spain

Yes 2–5

Switzerland Swiss Offset Policy Armasuisse Yes Max 2–3

Taiwan Industrial Cooperation 

Program Ministry of Economic Affairs No 1–10

Turkey Industrial Participation /

Offset Directive

Undersecretariat for Defense 

Industries Yes 1–5

United 

Kingdom

Industrial Participation 

Policy

Industrial Participation Unit, 

Defense Export Services 

Organization, MoD

No

Yes (No 

multipliers for 

IP credit)
107 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

because there will be increasing pressure for the 

compensating actions to exporting defense goods. 

This will force every participant in defense market to 

open the sectors of technology, industry, and service.

There have been changes other than just a 

position change. For example, today China can buy 

defense equipment from the EU or NATO countries, 

and Korea buys equipment from Russia, the EU, and 

the US. This complex market requires managing the 

defense programs in the open innovation manner. 

That is, in the case of Korea, it is required to 

encompass the offsets trade with more flexible and 

wider windows to promote the international defense 

cooperation and defense exports. India allows private 

firms to fully participate in the defense sectors and 

raised the FDI ceiling from 26 percent to 49 percent 

starting in 2009.

As the largest offset provider, the US offers various 

types of offsets including coproduction, purchase, 

FDI, technology transfer, and subcontractors, and it 

is noticeable that the transactions in coproduction, 

FDI, and purchase have increased for the last ten 

years in offsets trade. The recipient countries set 

offset priorities and reveal their utility by means 

of multipliers. Multipliers are determined by 

the procurement authorities who care about the 

defense acquisition program. It is noticeable that 

most countries allow multipliers within some range 

depending on the bottom line and the ceiling.

A multiplier is defined as a factor applied to the 

actual value of certain offset transactions to calculate 

the offset credit value.24,25 Foreign governments use 

multipliers to provide firms with incentives to offer 

offsets in targeted areas of economic growth.

for establishing the system for the identification, 

valuation, implementation, and absorption of 

core technologies that are acquired by offsets. In 

this manner, offsets provide the options of offset 

transactions like technology finance and products 

commercialization, for the defense procurement 

agency to pursue technology acquisition. Most 

advanced nations establish the information system 

that provides the technical information, like DTiMS 

in Korea, and Internet information access service 

available (except for Italy among the countries 

considered in table 1).21

Offset minimum value and multiplier work as 

the leverage for offsets value gaps between provider 

and recipient. The buyer side has different utility on 

offsets. Defense Acquisition Program Administration 

(DAPA), Republic of Korea, recently revised the key 

performance indicators to manage the absorption 

capability of offsets and promote the offset execution 

level as shown below in table 2.22

Offset participants pursue open innovation 

to incorporate these different positions in terms 

of technology management. Scopes of offsets are 

different in each county. However, they tend to be 

more flexible and open to the civilian sector. For 

example, Korea formally accepted the defense sector 

for offsets, but allowed the products of the midsized firms and widened the scope of the FDI offsets 

in 2009 aiming to achieve the key performance 

indicators as shown in table 2.23 Defense sector 

offsets are accepted by Korea, Australia, Italy, and 

UK and both defense and civil sectors are accepted 

by the US, Canada, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, 

Taiwan, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey.

Korea is transitioning from the unbalanced 

consumer to potential provider of offsets. Korea 

is preparing to get ready to provide offsets as the 

defense trade balance becomes positive in the future 

Table 2 Korea’s Key Performance Indicators of Offsets

Offsets Type Key Performance Indicators Common Indicators

R&D Technology

Upgrade the level of technology, 

technology and equipment to help 

developments

Technology Network, Technology 

Report, Future area of applications

Parts Export

Operation hours, input manpower, 

technology and equipment to help 

developments

Technology Network, Technology 

Report, Future area of applications

Logistics Support Logistics support frequency, 

performance upgrade

Technology Network, Technology 

Report, Future area of applications
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 108

UK, Denmark, and Italy prefer only defense related 

offsets. These countries tend to set the minimum 

offsets level high. As for the minimum offset level on 

contractual arrangements, Israel, Korea, Taiwan, and 

Turkey set it around 40 percent, and other countries 

like Canada, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and 

the UK set the minimum near 100 percent. Australia, 

Denmark, Israel, Switzerland, and UK countries 

focus on international cooperation and others on 

promotion of high-tech development as shown in 

Table 3.

Defense Offsets Policy And Value Of 

Defense Offsets

Defense Offsets Policy

Table 3 shows offset policies of the major 

offset countries in terms of minimum value of 

contract, offset sector, minimum offset of contract 

value, multiplier, and main focus.26 Israel requires 

the minimum threshold of offset value for defense 

contracts be US $0.5 million and is well below that of 

the major offset countries. In Europe, the relatively 

advanced and industrialized countries such as the 

Table 3 Offsets Policies of the Major offset

Countries Min. Value 

Contract Offset Sector Min. Offset (%) Focus

Australia $3.75 million Defense No specification

Long-term partnership with an emphasis 

on operational requirements, life support 

systems, and R&D—all defense related

Canada $1.7 million Defense, Civilian 100 Investment in high-tech sectors of economy

Denmark €3.3 million Defense 100 Enhance tech. level, market access and coop.

with foreign suppliers

Greece $10 million Defense 100

Upgrade production and technology 

infrastructure, reinforce armed forces, reduce 

procurement costs

Israel $.5 million Defense, Civilian 35 Development of close, long-term working 

relationship

Italy €5 million Defense, Civilian 70–100 Provide export opportunities for Italian 

defense companies

Netherlands €5 million Defense, Civilian 100 Tech. innovaton, marketing support for 

innovative products

Norway $6.7 million Defense, Civilian 100 Strengthen and maintain the technical 

capability of Norwegian Defense Industry

Republic of 

Korea $10 million Defense, Civilian 30–50 Defense core technology, parts production, logistics support

Spain N/A Defense, Civilian 100, vary

Technology similar to product purchased, 

improve armed forces and defense-related 

industry, increase R&D, increase employment

Switzerland $17 million Defense, Civilian 100 Swiss manufacturing industries,technology 

transfer, and cooperation with universities

Taiwan $10 million Defense, Civilian Min. 40

Upgrade industries and industrial 

infrastructure, stimulation for domestic 

investment, introduce high-tech and core 

technologies, support export growth

Turkey $10 million Defense, Civilian 50

Increase Turkish defense exports, compensate 

deficit of balance of payments, strengthen 

defense industrial infrastructure, expand 

investment and R&D cooperation

UK $17.2 million Defense N (Target 100) Competitive and leading-edge domestic 

industry and added overseas business
Figure 3. Trends of US Offsets Transactions with Multipliers (1993-2007).

Figure 4. Number of US Offered Offsets with Multipliers (1993-2007).

109 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Value matters in Defense Offsets

Defense offset valuation becomes important 

when sellers and buyers negotiate the offset trade. 

Figure 3 shows that transactions with multipliers are 

kept well under 20 percent of total transactions and 

are not the usual US provided offsets trade. 

Figure 4 displays the number of US offered 

offsets with multipliers between 1993 and 2007. 

Purchases, technology transfer, and subcontracts 

occupy the largest portion of the transactions. Buying 

nations either put their weight on purchases for the 

first priority or utilize it as the most prevalent offset 

practice among buying nations as well as selling 

countries.

Figure 5 illustrates the trends for multipliers 

applied to US offset transactions between 1993 and 

2007, and the multipliers for indirect and unspecified 

It is interesting that there was a great increase in 

transactions with multipliers in the periods of 1993–

1994, right after the Cold War ended, 1997–2001 

after economic crises, and again starting in 2007.

transactions are, on average, higher than the direct 

transactions. This means that offset transactions not 

directly related to the defense items or services are 

well accepted by the buying countries as well as the 

sellers. The kinds of offsets that may be considered 

indirect include purchases, technology transfer, 

overseas investment, licensed production, counter 

trade, training, and miscellaneous other offsets. This 

matches with the status of US offered offsets with 

multipliers as shown in figure 4.
Figure 5. Trends of Multipliers for US Offsets Transactions (1993-2007).

The DISAM Annual, May 2012 110

Offsets Efficiency Performance Measures

Data and Terms

Table 4 shows the data set used to estimate the 

value efficiency of offset trade for the major offset 

countries. Offset data are officially available only 

from US DOC.27,28 Therefore, countries presented 

in Table 4 represents part of the offset trade market 

players. Even though most developing countries 

and Asian countries are not included in this list, it 

is meaningful to analyze the data of the major offset 

countries because the number of transactions of the 

major offset countries occupies more than half of the 

offset trade.

The data represents the aggregated amount of 

offset value in US$ from 1993 to 2007. Contract 

award is the value of a defense trade contract that 

is required to consider the offset arrangement. 

And offset agreement is a contract specifying what 

percentage of the total sale is to be offset, the forms 

of industrial compensation required, the duration of 

the agreement, and the penalty clauses, if any.29 When 

offset agreements are executed actually, the market 

value of the offset transaction measured in US dollars 

is called the actual value of offset transactions. Credit 

value of offset transactions is the value credited for 

the offset transaction by application of a multiplier or 

other methods. Therefore, the credit value can vary 

from the actual value of the offset.
111 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

This equation is applicable for constant returns 

to scale; however, variable returns to scale can be 

easily considered by adding the additional constraint 

to (1), where a row vector with all elements equal 

to 1. Though measuring value efficiency is the 

objective of this paper, technical efficiency measures 

can be useful substitutes for it because prices are not 

available to make good use of technical efficiency. In 

offset trade, the multiplier is the only measure of the 

willingness to pay for the offset goods available in 

public. The basic DEA models are readily available 

from the textbook level references.32

Table 5 defines the input-output variables. The 

aggregated data of inputs and outputs are used due to 

the non-availability of quantities of inputs and outputs 

and their prices, and also to the contract award and 

offset agreement as input variables with net actual 

value for the output variable. The multiplier is used 

as a proxy for output unit price considering that it 

is the revealed preference of offset recipient, and 

credit value is based on it. Value efficiency measured 

by revenue efficiency is considered in terms of two 

cases as shown in table 5. An offset’s contractual 

value efficiency (VE1) is estimated with contract 

award as input and actual value as output. An offset’s 

execution value efficiency (VE2) is estimated with 

offset agreements as input and actual value as output. 

The multiplier represents unit output price.

Value Efficiency Measures

There are two typical types of methods that can 

be used to incorporate value judgments in DEA. 

One is to apply restrictions on the DEA weights, 

called weights restrictions, and the other is to change 

implicitly the comparative set of DMUs. If the unit 

price of output is known, the revenue model gives the 

same results as with the weights restrictions method.30

The revenue DEA model, assuming constant returns 

to scale, can be driven as follows:31

First, obtain the optimal solution from 

equation (1).

 ............... (1)

s.t. 

where vector in in space,

the common unit price vector for the output .

Second, obtain revenue efficiency by calculating

 ......... (2)

Country Contracts Award ($) Offset Agreement ($) Actual Value ($) Credit Value ($)

Australia 3,499,462,000 1,603,885,000 1,641,061,283 1,693,122,110

Canada 4,627,362,694 4,488,332,872 1,986,149,155 1,956,089,447

Denmark 874,619,000 874,629,000 628,353,693 764,035,467

Greece 7,464,342,343 8,522,872,271 2,311,057,718 4,610,889,808

Israel 4,356,730,606 2,102,176,627 4,203,586,252 4,356,583,424

Italy 2,680,257,000 2,515,257,000 2,423,539,035 2,443,539,287

Netherlands 2,149,566,176 2,522,126,176 2,335,085,015 2,641,820,923

Norway 1,347,751,824 1,372,651,824 1,002,126,424 1,289,495,728

Republic of Korea 9,215,188,892 5,386,723,454 2,841,206,220 3,155,189,170

Spain 1,955,992,588 1,743,813,004 1,237,986,175 1,484,175,543

Switzerland 2,557,612,040 2,017,612,040 1,381,467,504 1,387,122,885

Taiwan 11,391,270,700 2,510,242,030 1,115,984,683 2,033,425,228

Turkey 3,860,043,000 1,837,850,000 1,128,587,322 1,189,401,253

United Kingdom 12,812,901,286 10,509,292,643 7,247,637,813 7,114,246,409

Table 4 Offsets Data of the Major offset Countries
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 112

S&T infra, GCI, and TRI are considered proxy 

variables for the absorption ability of offset 

transactions. NATO membership is considered 

because often defense contracts are decided under the 

strong influence of political considerations. Offset 

percent and offset scopes are the policy options 

of offset recipient countries and can rule as the 

determinants of efficiency gaps between competitive 

countries.

Table 6 shows the possible determinants of 

efficiency gaps considered. S&T infra stands for the 

science and technology infrastructure index by the 

IMD 2009 world competitiveness yearbook. The 

World Economic Forum (WEF) provides the data 

for the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) and 

Technological Readiness Index (TRI) as of 2009. 

Efficiency 

Estimates Definition Data Input Data Output Unit Output Price

VE1 Offsets Contractual 

Value Efficiency Contract Award Actual Value Multiplier

VE2 Offsets Execution 

Value Efficiency Offset Agreement Actual Value Multiplier

TE1 Technical Efficiency Contract Award Offset Agreement N/A

TE2 Technical Efficiency Offset Agreement Actual Value N/A

TE3 Technical Efficiency Actual Value Credit Value N/A

TE4 Technical Efficiency Offset Agreement Credit Value N/A

Table 5 Definition of Efficiency Estimates

Table 6 Possible Determinants of Efficiency Gaps Consideration

Countries S&T Infra GCI TRI NATO Offset Percent Offset Scope Offset Focus

Australia 19.71694 5.15 5.39 No 0.60 Defense Cooperation

Canada 23.09689 5.33 5.63 Yes 1.00 Defense, civilian Tech Transfer

Denmark 19.85346 5.46 5.92 Yes 1.00 Defense Cooperation

Greece 7.196802 4.04 3.86 Yes 1.00 Defense Tech Transfer

Israel 24.39729 4.8 5.11 No .35 Defense, civilian Cooperation

Italy 7.98906 4.31 4.5 Yes 1.00 Defense Tech Transfer

Netherlands 20.00935 5.32 6.02 Yes 1.00 Defense, civilian Tech Transfer

Norway 14.81757 5.17 5.81 Yes 1.00 Defense Tech Transfer

Republic of Korea 17.24659 5 5.5 No .30 Defense, civilian Tech Transfer

Spain 9.36811 4.59 4.77 Yes 1.00 Defense, civilian Tech Transfer

Switzerland 22.96472 5.6 6.01 No 1.00 Defense, civilian Cooperation

Taiwan 20.92689 5.2 5.43 No .40 Defense, civilian Tech Transfer

Turkey 6.133007 4.16 3.83 Yes .50 Defense, civilian Tech Transfer

United Kingdom 19.57196 5.19 5.79 Yes 1.0 Defense Cooperation
113 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

as it influences the overall rank shown at the TE4 

score. Greece shows poor performance in TE2, but 

is excellent at obtaining the credit value among the 

actual value.

Figure 7 shows the efficiency scores that are 

calculated in terms of offset contractual value 

efficiency and execution value efficiency for the 

aggregated data of offset transactions provided by the 

US from 1993 to 2006. The trends for efficiency scores 

measured over countries look consistently steady for 

VE1 and VE2, with some fluctuations for Greece, 

Australia, and the Netherlands, i.e. the Netherlands 

ranked at 1st place for VE1 and at 4th place for VE2, 

Australia jumped up to 2nd place for VE2 from 9th 

place for the VE1 score, and Greece moved down 

to 14th place from 11th place. Further analysis was 

conducted to see the differences between groups of 

S&T infra, offset percentage, and offset scope shown 

in Table 6. Rank-sum statistics on value efficiency 

scores showed no difference between groups with 10 

percent significance level.

Results

Figure 6 shows the technical efficiency estimates 

of the major offset countries. First, TE1 measures the 

relative level of the achievement of offset agreements 

from international defense contracts. The higher the 

level of offset agreement, the more efficient under the 

condition that the offset arrangement is considered 

as the normal procedure in the regular procurement 

process. Second, TE2 compares the market value 

obtained from the offset agreement. A high level of 

efficiency score means that the offset agreement is 

well conducted after the offset trade was agreed upon 

between both sides. Third, TE3 compares the levels 

of satisfaction of the offset recipients. Therefore, 

the matches of offset goods with the recipient’s 

preference will determine the efficiency score. 

Finally, TE4 measures the efficiency of the whole 

process of offset activities from offset arrangement 

to credit value accounting. The Netherlands has 

placed highest in the technical efficiency measure. 

Israel shows good performance in TE2 as much 

Figure 6. Technical Efficiency Estimates of the Major offset countries
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 114

There are limitations of the study that need to be 

acknowledged and addressed. With the shortage of 

datasets, there are limited countries which deal with 

the defense offset as their mandatory prerequisite for 

the acquisition of weapon systems. Especially many 

of the non-European countries are not considered in 

this study mainly for the same reason. Also, the use of 

the aggregated data for the efficiency measures could 

dampen the effect of environmental changes, e.g. offsets policy changes in offset percent and scope.

Notes

1. S. Gopalaswamy, “Offset Investment Inflow 

Priorities for Ordnance Factories,” Journal of 

Defense Studies 4, no.1 (2009).

2. J. Brauer and J. P. Dunne, Arms Trade and 

Economic Development: Theory, Policy and 

Cases in Arms Trade Offsets(New York: 

Routledge, 2004), 2.

3. A.K. Antony, “Perspective: Keynote Address,” 

Journal of Defense Studies 3, no.1 (2009):1–3. 

4. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade: 

Twelfth Report to Congress, 2007.

5. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade: 

Thirteenth Report to Congress, 2008.

6. Anthony W. Potts, Strategic Framework for the 

Defense Acquisition System: Understanding 

Defense Consolidation, US Army War College, 

2007.

7. Department of Commerce, “Offsets In Defense 

Trade,” DISAM Journal 20, no. 2 (1997-98): 

65–92.

8. Department of Commerce, “Offsets In Defense 

Trade,” DISAM Journal 21, no. 2 (1999): 

57–97.

9. Department of Commerce, “Offsets In Defense 

Trade Eleventh report to Congress,” DISAM 

Journal 29, no. 3 (2007): 39–62.

10. L. K., Definition, Forms and Types of Offsets, 

Journal of Defense Studies 3, no. 1 (2009).

11. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade: 

Thirteenth Report to Congress, 2008.

12. S.R. Prahlada and P. Kumar, “Leveraging 

Defense Offset Policy for Technology 

Acquisition,” Journal of Defense Studies 3, no. 

1 (2009) 114–116.

13. World Trade Organization, Government 

Procurement: The Plurilateral Agreement: 

Conclusions

This paper reviews the offset trends of the major 

offset countries and measures the technical and value 

efficiencies of offsets with the use of DEA. The 

paper also provides an analysis on the efficiency gaps 

among nations to derive policy implications.

First, the paper is meaningful for analyzing the 

offset technical and value efficiencies using the Data 

Envelope Analysis (DEA) technique which has been 

accepted as an efficiency index for the first time in 

offset fields. With the current offset dataset from US 

DOC, the value of efficiency is different among the 

major countries in the world, and this could affect 

their offset policies and priorities in the near future.

Second, it also shows the offset trends in the 

world today with some concrete datasets. It also 

presents the importance of offset values between the 

buyer and seller, and the value is crucial to tradeoffs between two bodies. The buyer should consider 

his offset value, not only the credited value but 

also the performance value, with its smart usages 

in his country. The seller should also understand its 

importance as a leverage tool to increase his main 

contract acquisition. Finally, it contributes to the 

wise use of defense offset policy and its processes 

with some meaningful quantitative performances and 

outcomes.

Figure 7. Value Efficiency Estimates of the Major offset Countries
115 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

31. Cooper, W.W., L.M. Seiford, and K. Tone, 

Introduction to Data Envelopment Analysis 

and its Uses: with DEA-Solver Software and 

References, Springer, 2006.

32. Ibid.

About the Authors

Professor Choon-Joo Lee has received his 

PhD in techno-economic policy Program from 

Seoul National University, Republic of Korea. 

He graduated from the University of California, 

Berkeley in 1997 with an MS degree in Nuclear 

Engineering. And he also graduated from KDI School 

of Public Policy and Management in 2005 with an 

MPP degree in International Relations. He works 

for the Department of Weapons System at Korea 

National Defense University. His research interests 

include R&D management, technology transfer, 

weapons acquisition policy, network-based defense 

robots operation, and performance management 

methodologies.

Dr. Won-Joon Jang has received his PhD in 

economics from the Seoul National University, 

Republic of Korea. He has graduated from the US Air 

Force Institute of Technology in 1998 with an MS in 

logistics management. He has served for a defense 

offset program manager in the Defense Agency 

for Technology and Quality (DTAQ) from 2006 

to 2008. He is now an associate research fellow at 

Defense Industry Team, Korea Institute for Industrial 

Economics and Trade (KIET), Seoul. He is also a 

board member of Korean Society for Innovation 

Management and Economics and an editorial board 

member of Korea Association of Defense Industry 

Studies since 2009. He has published numerous 

papers and reports for defense offset domestic and 

abroad. His major interests include defense offset, 

technology valuation, open innovation, technology 

transfer, performance evaluation, priority selection, 

and RAM/ILS.

Dr. Bong-Kyoo Yoon has received his PhD 

in industrial engineering from Korea Advanced 

Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), 

Republic of Korea. He provided consultancy on 

financial management and cost innovation to various 

global companies at IBM BCS. He has been working 

for the Department of Operations Research at Korea 

National Defense University (KNDU) since 2006. 

His major interests include logistics optimization and 

performance innovation.

Overview of the Agreement on Government, 

2009.

14. C. Lee and B. Yoon, Defense Offsets: the 

Frontline of International Technical Cooperation 

and Products Trade, 2009 Global Joint Research 

Report, KNDU Unpublished Report, 2009.

15. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade: 

Thirteenth Report to Congress, 2008.

16. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade: 

Thirteenth Report to Congress, 2008.

17. J. Brauer, and J. P. Dunne, Arms Trade and 

Economic Development: Theory, Policy and 

Cases in Arms Trade Offsets, (New York: 

Routledge, 2004) 2.

18. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade: 

Twelfth Report to Congress, 2007.

19. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade: 

Thirteenth Report to Congress, 2008.

20. Won-Joon Jang, Chul-Whan Kim, Tai-Yoo Kim, 

Tae-Yun Joung, “The Defense Offset Valuation 

Model,” DISAM Journal 29, no. 4(2007): 

91–101.

21. DTiMS is an acronym of Defense Technology 

Information Management System of the DTaQ, 

RoK.

22. DAPA, Defense Offset Guidelines, 2009.

23. DAPA, Defense Offset Guidelines, 2009.

24. DAPA, Defense Offset Guidelines, 2009.

25. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade: 

Thirteenth Report to Congress, 2008.

26. www.epicos.com

27. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade: 

Twelfth Report to Congress, 2007.

28. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade: 

Thirteenth Report to Congress, 2008.

29. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade: 

Twelfth Report to Congress, 2007.

30. E. Thanassoulis, M.C.A.S. Portela, and R. 

Allen, Incorporating Value Judgments in DEA. 

In Cooper, Seiford and Zhu editors, Handbook 

on Data Envelopment Analysis, (Kluwer 

Academic Publishers, 2004) 99–138.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 116
117 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

longer viable for a number of reasons and led to 

problems of communication between the ultimate 

user, the USG/DOD and the contractors involved in 

producing the end items. When DSCA introduced 

the concept of “transparency” and provided the 

customers a much more active role in source selection, 

program determination, and progress reporting; this 

was viewed with some degree of skepticism and 

downright resistance from some members of both 

the acquisition and security assistance/cooperation 

communities. It has evolved from resistance, to 

grudging acceptance, to an acknowledgement that 

there are many more positive results than problems 

associated with a fully knowledgeable partnership 

between the DOD and international purchaser. 

This has resulted in not only improved 

international cooperation, but also a more robust 

interaction between the Acquisition Community 

where policy and training are primarily provided by 

DOD-AT&L and DAU respectively, and the SC/SA 

community where policy and training are primary 

functions of DSCA and DISAM. The collaboration 

by the two policy makers and the two “schoolhouses” 

has resulted in numerous joint efforts to the benefit of 

all concerned—acquisition and SC/SA communities 

and our international partners. Just to mention a 

few of these collaborations—DSCA, DISAM, 

AT&L, and DAU jointly collaborate on policy and 

training issues via both a steering and working 

group structure, which allows for coordinated policy 

issuance and training activities. At the working group 

level, DAU and DISAM have been collaborating on 

course material for both communities for several 

years now —the DAWIA structure now includes 

“Core+” training requirements for SPO personnel 

involved in acquisition in support of an international 

customer. This training, often conducted jointly with 

DAU and DISAM faculty, acknowledges the need 

for a greater understanding of unique aspects as they 

apply to agreements (generally, the Letter of Offer 

A Perspective on FMS 

System Acquisition

By Greg Sutton

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

The significant growth of Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) over the last several years has accounted for a 

growing interface between our Acquisition community 

and our FMS/Security Cooperation community. This 

interface has provided our International partners with 

significant benefits in terms of capability and has 

been equally supportive of US foreign policy. Each 

community is staffed by dedicated professionals, but 

many have little experience working in the other’s 

areas of expertise. A graphical display would show 

our unique workforces as circles with an intersection 

where both communities play a cooperative role to 

meet mission requirements.

As with the functional areas of finance, logistics, 

training, and nearly all areas where the USG and 

specifically DOD is involved in providing goods 

and services for international partners, acquisition of 

major weapons systems does not provide a separate 

workforce or infrastructure, but rather utilizes the 

efficiencies gained by already in-place and functioning 

DOD acquisition processes—contracting by USG 

personnel in accordance with the FAR and DFARs, 

assignment of specific program managers within a 

System Program Office (SPO) already established 

with technical expertise available, etc. Acquisition as 

a topical area is so broad encompassing local or “intheatre” contracting, acquisition of follow on support 

and services, cooperative acquisition (such as the 

JTF/F-35), that a treatise that attempted the “cover 

the waterfront” could easily become a life’s work and 

comprise volumes—much like the FAR. The purpose 

of this treatise is much narrower and will focus upon 

some of the recent lessons learned in major weapons 

systems acquisitions of in-production end items for 

the international partner.

The days of old (more than ten to fifteen years 

ago) when international customer involvement in 

systems acquisitions was minimal, generally, tell the 

USG/DOD what it is you want, provide the funding, 

and then sit back and let us “drive the train” is no 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 118

within SCIP. So, if you have a CAC but do not have 

a SCIP account yet and you want the details, go to: 

https://www.scportal.us/home/registrationInfo.asp 

and establish a SCIP account. The LL/BP database 

is accessible on both the “Corporate” and “SCO/

COCOM” community pages. Not only will you be 

able to access the subject LL, but you also may find 

the numerous other entries helpful to avoid problems 

in your current and future professional activities. 

Look forward to more information of this nature in 

the DISAM Online Journal [www.disamjournal.org] 

and DISAM Annual articles—these are available in 

the public domain and require only knowledge of 

the URL to get there. It is our fervent hope that this 

information will prove to be not only of interest, but 

of benefit as you pursue your career aspirations.

About the Author

Gregory W. Sutton is currently the Director 

of Research at the Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management. He has over twenty years 

experience in the SC/SA arena serving in an SAO 

(now SCO)—the US Military Training Mission, 

Saudi Arabia, and the Air Force ILCO (AFSAC), 

while on active duty as an AF Officer. As a contract 

FMS advisor, he was involved in several major 

international FMS system sales. He joined the faculty 

at DISAM in 1994 and was appointed Director of 

Research in 2001.

and Acceptance [LOA]), and the standard terms 

and conditions of those LOAs. Conversely, DAU 

faculty members with a plethora of knowledge and 

experience in the aspects of acquisition—program 

management, contracting, initial establishment 

of logistics capabilities, etc.—provide input in 

curriculum development and guest lecturers to 

DISAM courses. These efforts have been developing 

for nearly ten years, with increasing cross-flow of 

information and personnel every year since. So, what 

motivated this “cooperative environment” in the first 

place?

As is often the case, the impetus to begin 

came about from a recognition by the parent 

organizations—DSCA and AT&L—that a significant 

blunder in a major acquisition in support of an FMS 

sale demanded a greater level of understanding 

between the two communities. We needed to ensure 

the participants knew what was required to achieve 

the goals of each. Since the effort was modest at 

first, there continued to be blunders (let’s call them 

Lessons Learned as a more acceptable/polite term) 

but with lesser frequency and consequence. Just 

as DISAM and our collaborators at DAU were 

beginning to congratulate ourselves for how far we 

had progressed, we got a reminder that there is still a 

way to go in the effort.

For the purposes of this writing, suffice it to say 

that our most recent Lesson Learned pointed out that 

members of the acquisition and security assistance/

security cooperation community did not adequately 

consider and communicate the relationship of 

activities by one group acting independently upon the 

other to the detriment of the international purchaser. 

The good news is that the problem was solvable. 

The bad news is that it required unprecedented 

involvement and actions at the senior DOD level 

(to read General/ Flag Officer and Undersecretary 

Level) to solve. More good news—this activity 

helped spur the establishment of a Lessons Learned/

Best Practices data base—brought online via the 

Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) to 

all USG CAC holders with a SCIP account. Further, 

this Lesson Learned is being incorporated in the 

curriculum of both educational institutes to further 

the training environment of both communities. 

Within the next few weeks, a team research project, 

spanning more than four months and delineating 

the entire issue alluded to above, will be published 

on that Lessons Learned/Best Practices data base 
119 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

4. Special exhibits—provides additional items 

that are of interest to the SCO, but paid for by 

DSCA. The SCO has no mandatory entries in 

these exhibits.

5. Reports—provides ten reports for the 

SCO, including budget reports, unfunded 

requirements, and vehicle and computer 

inventories.

Each GCC is given a funding target ceiling, 

which is broken down into targets for each of the 

SCOs within the GCC. This target is the basis for 

the direct charges portion of the budget. This target, 

when the budget is finally approved, becomes the 

annual funding program total in the execution of the 

budget.

Budget Execution

The resource management application for 

executing the Security Assistance (SA) portion of 

the SCO budget is SAARMS Budget Execution, 

hereafter referred to as Execution. This application 

must be used by the SCO to track SA funds but can 

also be used to track non-SA fund types.

Each fiscal year, the SCO creates a new SA 

funds account. The appropriate GCC then assigns 

a portion of their SA funds to each SCO’s account. 

This allowance is loaded into Execution either by 

the SCO or the GCC, and is the SCO’s Obligation 

Authority/Funds Certification Authority (OA/FCA), 

the SA funds ceiling for obligation documents for 

the SCO. The GCCs provide OA/FCA on a quarterly 

basis with interim adjustments provided on an asneeded/if-available basis. The OA/FCA amount 

is further distributed within Execution to one or 

more management categories (MGTCAT) that are 

specified by the GCC. To prevent Anti-Deficiency 

Act violations, Execution does not allow the SCO 

to obligate more funds than are available at the time 

of obligation. The SCO then creates obligations 

and records payments in Execution for local 

management of the funds; obligations will then be 

In SAARMS’ Way

By Dr. Bob Weber

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Overview

The Security Assistance Automated Resource 

Management Suite (SAARMS) is a set of three 

applications designed to enable Security Assistance 

personnel to manage their budgets and property. 

Budgets are managed through the Budget Preparation 

and Budget Execution applications, and the Property 

Management application is an automated form of the 

Army Property Book. Getting “in SAARMS’ way” 

is a great way to keep track of all security assistance 

resources.

Budget Preparation

The Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) 

uses the SAARMS Budget Preparation application, 

hereafter referred to as Budget Prep, to submit their 

requirements to their geographic combatant command 

(GCC). Budget Prep is a web-based application, 

accessible through the Security Assistance Network 

(SAN) portal website (https://www.idss.ida.org/

san/). This allows for all budget submissions to be 

available to the GCC and the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency (DSCA) as soon as the SCOs 

save their data.

The application is broken into five major sections:

1. Set-up—provides the capability of uploading a 

commander’s statement. This statement should 

delineate the major issues in the budget and not 

each individual line item.

2. Direct charges—provides entry screens for 

each object class in the SCO’s budget. This 

is the portion of the budget submission over 

which the SCO will have execution authority.

3. Indirect charges—provides entry screens for 

additional budget items that are not included in 

the SCO’s budget for execution, but that will 

be monitored by the SCO during the execution 

year. These items are paid for out of DSCA’s 

budget and include International Cooperative 

Administrative Support Services (ICASS), 

Foreign Service National Separation Trust pay, 

and Enhanced End-Use Monitoring (EEUM).
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 120

passed to the BQ system, since it is coming from 

other feeder systems, primarily the Department of 

State (DOS) Momentum accounting system. When 

the SCO enters an obligation, the paperwork is 

usually given to the Embassy accounting office, to 

allow them to disburse funds to pay for the goods and 

services for which the obligation was created. The 

Embassy accounting system then passes a request for 

reimbursement to the BQ system and BQ creates the 

reimbursement. This information is then recorded in 

the ODL and passed to SAARMS in the ODL.

Two applications are available to the SCO 

to check the status of obligation documents, the 

Consolidated Overseas Accountability Support 

Toolbox (COAST) and the Commander's Resource 

Integration System (CRIS). COAST is a State 

Department application that allows users to query 

the DOS Momentum accounting system and retrieve 

the vouchers that were created from the input of their 

obligations in the Momentum system. CRIS is a 

DOD system used to run queries on the BQ data, as 

mentioned above. SCOs can contact the Embassy’s 

Financial Management Office for access to COAST, 

and can contact their GCC to request access to CRIS.

Figure 1 shows the interaction among the various 

IT systems.

passed to the official accounting system, known as 

“BQ”, which is located at the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service-Indianapolis Center (DFAS-IN) 

in Indianapolis, Indiana.

As a feeder system to the DFAS-IN, SAARMS 

Budget Execution is a resource management 

information system; BQ is the official accounting 

system. Execution currently passes obligation data to 

BQ via a twice-weekly update process started by the 

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management 

(DISAM) and completed by DFAS-IN. Processes on 

SAARMS compile the obligation data and format it 

for transfer to DFAS-IN via the Security Assistance 

Network (SAN). DFAS-IN retrieves the data file 

and then pushes it to BQ for processing. The next 

day, DFAS-IN compiles an Open Document Listing 

(ODL), which is posted to the SAN, where the data 

is available to SAARMS for reconciliation purposes. 

The ODL contains dollar totals for both obligations 

and disbursement (payments) for each open document 

in Execution. A special code is assigned to Defense 

Travel System (DTS) obligations, which allows 

Execution to not pass these records to BQ, since they 

are passed directly to BQ from DTS.

It is important to note that payments are entered 

into Execution by the SCO as soon as the data for 

the payment is available. This information is not 

Figure 1. Interaction among various IT systems
121 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Property

The SAARMS Property module is a stand-alone 

Microsoft Access-based database, modeled after 

the Army Property Book. The application can track 

property purchased with different funds, maintain 

Table of Allowance authorizations, record property 

held in multiple physical locations, and print hand 

receipts. It also contains reports on nearly all data 

fields. 

Future of SAARMS

Over the next couple years, the SAARMS 

Budget Execution and Budget Preparation 

applications are being rewritten to improve their 

performance, enhance their usability, and improve 

their maintainability. During this time, SCOs should 

feel free to inform their GCCs of any changes they 

would like to see made to these applications.

Summary

The web-based applications, Execution and 

Budget Prep, can be accessed via the SAN, provided 

the GCC has granted the SCO member SAARMS 

access. The Property module and installation 

instructions can be downloaded from the SAN 

Budget Library. In regards to resource management, 

SAARMS is a valuable suite of resource management 

applications, all designed to make the SCO’s life 

easier.

About the Author

Dr. Bob Weber is an Associate Professor of 

Security Cooperation with the Defense Institute 

of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). 

He is Project Manager for the Security Assistance 

Network (SAN), and IT Developer for the Security 

Assistance Automated Resource Management Suite 

(SAARMS) and the Security Cooperation Workforce 

Database (SCWD). Dr. Weber retired from the 

Air Force after twenty years as a communications 

officer and logistician. He holds a PhD in computer 

and information science from the University of 

Minnesota.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 122
123 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Mission

 I worked as the Director of Training for the SCO’s 

Air Force Division. Although it seems obvious, it was 

crucial to remember that we worked for the Chief of 

the Air Force Division and for the Chief of the SCO. 

We worked for the US government to advise and 

assist BAF, providing them customer service, but not 

at the expense of our rules, regulations, instructions, 

or policies. Our main job was to help BAF get their 

members qualified (English Comprehension-Level 

[ECL] testing, medical/dental exams, visas, etc.) to go 

to the United States for formal training. We advised 

and assisted them in filling their quotas for US classes 

and avoiding class cancellations if at all possible. 

We sent them to many different types of training, 

including pilot, navigator, leader development, 

enlisted technical, officer-management-related, and 

in-country training. Was the position rewarding 

professionally? Yes, definitely! I think I taught my 

counterparts how to be more organized, how to work 

harder, how to be professional, and I represented how 

kind and professional Americans can be. Also, this 

position is considered a strategic relationship by our 

President, the State Department, and Congress, which 

illustrates its importance. I had a sense of satisfaction 

every day. I also knew that every Bandarian I sent 

to the States would become a friend of the US; they 

loved going to the US, and they returned praising 

America and Americans. The BAF members I 

interacted with were all just trying to do their best 

for their countrymen and train as many individuals 

as possible. This is what I was trying to do as well.

Specific Focus and Tasks

Some of my primary goals as the Director of 

Air Force Training were to improve BAF members’ 

English-language skills; assist BAF with their longrange planning and execution, thereby decreasing 

class cancellations; continuously improve our 

strategic partnership and BAF-USAF relationship; 

Background

 The United States military offers tremendous 

education and training not only for US military and 

civilian personnel, but also for our international 

partners. After working for a year with our friends 

in the Bandarian Air Force (BAF), I have a few 

observations and lessons to share about international 

training management.

Teamwork

 First, you can’t do this job in a vacuum. The 

outstanding training I received at the Defense Institute 

of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) 

(especially the Training track in the third week of 

the SCM-O [overseas] course) in March 2008 set me 

up for success. Second, the two outstanding USAF 

noncommissioned officers working with me provided 

fantastic on-the-job training, which amplified what I 

was taught at DISAM. Third, the Air Force Security 

Assistance Training (AFSAT) squadron was our 

main “headquarters” organization within the Air 

Force implementing agency, and I talked to them 

every single day. Their guidance and support was 

phenomenal. I couldn’t have done the job without 

them. Fourth, my Bandarian counterparts also worked 

extremely hard to try to get as many BAF members 

trained as possible. I worked about five hours every 

day downtown at the BAF HQ with a Maj Gen (BAF/

Director of AF Training [BAF/DAFT] for the entire 

country of Bandaria), a Major, a Captain, and two 

civilians, and then I would come back to base to work 

another eight hours typing invitational travel orders 

(ITOs) and amendments and answering a plethora 

of questions and e-mails. The weekends were also a 

great time to get caught up on ITOs and amendments, 

because I did not have to travel downtown to the BAF 

HQ on those days.

“So, you’re going to be a SCO 

Director of Training...”

By Roger Scott

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 124

they scored high enough to fill the WCN. I did this 

with one of my main BAF counterparts. We found a 

quiet room at BAF where we wouldn’t be disturbed, 

and we went through every single test score to see 

if the BAF member scored high enough to go to 

training.

For instance, on 8 September 08, they could have 

tested seventy-five people but only fifty arrived for 

testing. Of those fifty, only twenty-seven scored high 

enough to be submitted for the WCN. That no-show 

rate and the poor ECL test scores were two of the 

reasons why they had cancellations, and I am sure 

many non-English speaking countries face the same 

challenge. I gave a letter to the BAF/DAFT showing 

the testing results each time.

A Closer Look at SCO Training 

It was very hectic; we had to keep up with hundreds 

of planning ITOs, final ITOs, and amendments—all 

while talking to a multitude of people each day and 

answering an endless number of questions, often 

while handling many other hot issues. I did not have 

time to get any reports, letters, ITOs, amendments, 

or e-mail answers done downtown at BAF HQ. I was 

too busy engaging with about ten people every day, 

not to mention the other twenty or so who would stop 

me in the hall or office to ask me a question about 

training, visas, etc. 

Downloading the Training Management System 

STL and T-MASL took nearly an hour every day, due 

to the slow Internet connection. Also, on days we 

had testing, three of us (the two NCOs and I) went 

downtown to manage that huge event—setting up, 

administering, grading, importing into excel, and 

sharing the results with BAF/DAFT.

Testing

Per, DLI, we could only test twice a month, and 

testing had to take place on certain days. On test 

day, we tested at 0800, 0915, and 1030—twenty-five 

people in each session, seventy-five people total—a 

different test version for each of the three sessions. 

They had to be on the list provided to us by DAFT 

in order to be tested. Of course, we had to ensure 

we never left a booklet or answer sheet unsecure, 

which would have resulted in a test compromise. 

Once again, after they tested, we had to determine if 

they scored high enough to go to training, and if so, 

DAFT would provide visa applications and security 

clearances for them so we could cut their planning 

produce hundreds of amendments and Invitational 

Travel Orders (ITOs) in a timely manner; administer 

an English language test to 1,500 BAF members a 

year, and process and deliver approximately 800 visa 

applications to the US embassy.

The Process

I would pore over the Standardized Training 

List (STL) and testing roster every day to help BAF 

determine whom to test first. Then, we would take 

those who scored the highest and turn in their visa 

applications to the US embassy. While waiting for 

their visas to come back, we would get their security, 

medical, and dental clearances from BAF. Once 

we had their visas, BAF would give us their flight 

itineraries, and we would produce the final ITOs and 

send an arrival message to DLI.

In September, we would remind BAF to contact 

the bases throughout Bandaria to find out what type of 

training they would need for the next two upcoming 

fiscal years. Around 1 December, we would receive 

their training plan and scrub it to ensure they were 

asking for legitimate, necessary courses that were 

in fact listed in the Training Military Articles and 

Services List (T-MASL).

In early January, I would submit a Combined 

Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP) to 

AFSAT. In March or April, one of our NCOs would go 

to the Security Cooperation Education and Training 

Working Group (SCETWG—formerly known as 

Training Program Management Review [TPMR]) 

in Tampa FL, and he, along with the representative 

from the AFSAT Bandaria team, would attempt to get 

all of the classes requested in our CETPP and other 

documents.

In late July or early August, we received the 

STL of classes that BAF received for the upcoming 

fiscal year. We gave a hard copy of the STL to BAF 

every two weeks. We also gave them a list of which 

Worksheet Control Numbers (WCNs—used to track 

a student assigned to a course or courses) to test first 

because of the soonest upcoming courses. We always 

tried to test everyone 105 days before their first class 

report date (couldn’t test them any earlier than that, 

or their ECL test would expire), giving us plenty of 

time to get their visas back.

After they tested, we checked the Defense 

Language Institute–English Language Center 

(DLIELC) wheel, the number of weeks of English 

they had programmed on the STL, and determined if 
125 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

they received their visas, by having BAF submit 

their medical clearances and flight itineraries so we 

could cut the final ITOs. We kept track, throughout 

the year, of which WCNs had been cancelled and 

why. The overwhelming majority of the cancellations 

were because they couldn’t find someone to go to the 

class, couldn’t get someone to score high enough on 

the ECL, or submitted visa applications too late. With 

our help, though, they did a great job of dramatically 

reducing cancellations.

Take-Aways

 Planning, planning, and more planning is 

crucial. It is vitally important to use the STL daily 

to determine who needs to test next, to test 105 

days in advance, and to fill up all of the WCNs as 

soon as possible to minimize cancellations. It is 

also important to have your counterparts use the 

STL daily. You and your counterparts have to do a 

training gap analysis to anticipate what training will 

be needed and how to fill it. “Flexibility is the key 

to airpower”: while the Joint Security Cooperation 

Education and Training publication states that SCO 

training managers are supposed to send arrival 

messages to the International Military Student 

Officers (IMSOs) in the US schoolhouses sixteen 

days before the student is going to arrive (or thirty 

days prior if the student is bringing his or her family), 

sometimes we don’t receive the visas until one or 

two days before the report date. We are working 

our tails off to get this done much sooner, but only 

so much is in our control. Another lesson learned: 

lean heavily on the outstanding people at AFSAT, 

NETSAFA, SATFA, SATMO, MCSCG, CG-DCO-I, 

and DLI. They have a plethora of experience and are 

extremely helpful. Make sure you attend DISAM 

before you arrive in–country. Otherwise, you will 

have an extremely difficult time understanding what 

is going on, what you are supposed to do, and where 

you fit in. Remember, you work for and represent the 

US government. Work well with your international 

counterparts and remember that building and 

improving upon that strategic relationship is one of 

the most important goals for your job.

Author’s Update

 It has been several months now since I wrote 

this article, and I wanted to revisit it to ensure it was 

still applicable. The good news is the information is 

ITOs. If they did not score high enough, they had to 

wait thirty days to test again using a different version 

of the test.

Visas

Unfortunately, we somehow got roped into the 

visa business. This only added time and frustration 

to the process—adding an unnecessary middleman. 

I think a previous SCO thought it would be a great 

customer service for us to take visa applications 

to the US embassy for the Bandarians and that we 

could possibly help hustle the embassy along. I think 

the idea was good in theory. However, in practice, 

we had no clout with the embassy, even though 

BAF members thought we did. We would tell BAF 

members that they needed to submit visa applications 

three months prior to the formal training, and if they 

did that, they had a 95+ percent chance of getting 

their visa in time. If they submitted it in less than that 

time, they had no one to blame but themselves. We 

were just the couriers; we took the applications to the 

embassy, and when the embassy was done with them, 

we brought the passports with visas back to BAF/

DAFT. BAF members were constantly complaining 

about how long it took for them to get a visa, and I 

understood their pain; however, once again, we were 

just the messengers.

Reports

When DLI sent their monthly report of how the 

hundreds of BAF students were doing in Englishlanguage training at DLI, I would share these reports 

with BAF/DAFT. He would have his Major call any 

student who was stagnating or regressing in their 

scores and tell them to shape up and study harder or 

he was going to bring them home and cancel their 

follow-on training. I really respected him for holding 

his students accountable like that. I would have 

done the same thing in his position. He also wanted 

a weekly report on every single one of his students 

in the States. However, our training centers weren’t 

staffed to provide weekly reports on 300+ students 

(not to mention the thousands of students from other 

countries, too).

Cancellations 

We worked tirelessly and endlessly to help BAF 

bring down their cancellations by ensuring that they 

tested people 105 days before class report date, by 

confirming that they turned in visa applications after 

testing (if they scored well enough), and then once 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 126

Evansville, IN. He also completed Air War College by 

correspondence and earned the Defense Meritorious 

Service Medal, four Meritorious Service Medals, and 

four Air Force Commendation Medals, among other 

awards.

still on target and helpful to you, as SCO Training 

Managers (TMs). While I have this opportunity 

though, I’d like to add a few more important points. 

First, I have added a checklist to help you do your 

job more effectively. Second, I wanted to remind you 

to complete the mandatory Leahy vetting, which can 

be coordinated through your embassy in-country. 

Third, I’d like to remind you not to send dependents 

to schools unless they are listed in SAMM, Table 

C10.T3. This is because those other schools and 

their respective bases and posts are not set up to 

handle dependents (e.g., there isn’t enough billeting). 

Fourth, please ensure you review the medical and 

dental forms turned in to you, so the country isn’t 

sending a student to the US with active tuberculosis, 

etc. Fifth, you need to give a thorough pre-departure 

briefing to the students so they are well-prepared 

when they arrive at the schoolhouse. Sixth, since 

this article was originally published, we have gone 

to TMS 8, which is a web-based version of TMS. 

As a result, you no longer have to download TMS to 

your desktop and then upload it at the end of the day. 

This will save you a lot of time and frustration. In 

summary, there are a multitude of steps to complete 

each day as a SCO TM, and it is an extremely hectic 

job. Please ensure you do not skip any steps, or it 

can cause major problems when students arrive to the 

schoolhouse, and people in the US, and the students, 

have to suffer the repercussions.

 About the Author

Roger Scott is an assistant professor of 

Security Assistance Management at DISAM with 

a concentration on the FMS process, training, 

logistics, end-use monitoring, and cross-cultural 

communications. His experience includes working 

one year as the Director of Air Force Training for 

the SCO in Saudi Arabia, and eighteen months as 

an instructor at DISAM. He is a retired Air Force 

Lieutenant Colonel who taught Air Force ROTC at 

Indiana University on two different occasions, for 

five years total. He also taught and commanded at 

the US Air Force Academy Preparatory School and 

was the Military Equal Opportunity Chief at Tyndall 

AFB, FL, among other assignments. He was awarded 

a master of arts in human resources development 

from Webster University in St. Louis, MO, and a 

bachelor of science in communications (journalism 

emphasis) from the University of Southern Indiana in 
127 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Training Process Checklist

 September: As the SCO Training Manage (SCO/TM), you advise your host nation (HN) to identify 

training they will need for the next two years; they may use the T-MASL in I-SANweb (if they have 

access to I-SAN) to determine courses available. Also, you ask your HN for any inputs you need to 

complete the Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP), which you will input using 

the SCO-T web

 1 January: HN turns that list of training needs and also CETPP inputs in to you (SCO/TM). 

 1 February: After analyzing/scrubbing the list, complete the CETPP and submit to the COCOM. Also, 

identify course requests to the MILDEP trng organization (i.e., AFSAT, SATFA, NETSAFA, SCETC, or 

CG-DCO-I) counterparts/country program managers to be programmed into the STL.

 March–June: You attend Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group (SCETWG) 

that your COCOM hosts. At the SCETWG, you will discuss the requested courses with the MILDEPs, 

DSCA, and State Department. Also, invitational courses (e.g., Army War College) requested in the 

CETPP will be discussed and justifications made.

 After the SCETWG and throughout the year, the MILDEPs will adjust training line status in the STL 

as needed. 

 Throughout the year: HN requests courses, as needs arise, in addition to what they already have 

on the STL.

 You send the request to the MILDEP with the T-MASL number, quarter/year desired, and funding 

source (e.g., IMET, FMFP, CTFP, or FMS)

 MILDEP puts the class on the STL (Programmed [P] or Scheduled [S] status) and requests the class 

from the schoolhouse

 Once the schoolhouse confirms that your country has a seat, the MILDEP marks the training as 

confirmed (C) on the STL and puts dates of the class on the STL (However, you can’t cut a final ITO 

yet, until the MILDEP loads funds against it/gives you the ITO Line Authorization).

 Once dates of the class are on the STL, ask the HN to identify a student for the class

 English comprehension level (ECL) test the student 105 days or less prior to the class start date—

give yourself plenty of time to complete human rights vetting, visa, etc.

 Have the student fill out the visa application forms, and they should turn their visa applications in 

to the US Embassy right away. 

 Type up the planning ITO in TMS (you may even have to submit this with the vetting request)

 The HN gives you a security clearance letter and the medical and dental forms. Pre-departure 

medical examinations (conducted within three months preceding the departure of the IMS and 

authorized accompanying or joining dependents) are required prior to issuance of the ITO. Required 

medical examinations will be recorded in English on DD Forms 2808 and 2807-1.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 128

 If the student is going to a course that requires it, give them a physical fitness test

 When you have the security clearance, medical/dental, an ECL score of 55 or more, student vetting 

results, and a copy of the student’s passport and visa, make the flight arrangements, if IMET or CT. 

If FMS, the country makes their own flight reservations for the student and gives you a copy of the 

flight itinerary. If a Regional Center is paying for the training (i.e., case ID 11C), contact them to 

determine who makes flight arrangements.

 Cut the final ITO and arrival message (both are in TMS) and upload to the SAN.

 Do pre-departure briefing with the student and give them printout of the location information for 

the schools they will be attending, as well as Course Description and International Notes.

 While student is in training, if you get any academic progress reports on them, you may want to 

share with HN. For example, if the student is struggling or slacking, you may want to let your HN 

know, so they can tell him to shape up and work harder, or he’s going to get pulled from the training 

by the HN.

 When they return from training:

 Give them the retainable instructional materials (RIM—e.g., books) that the schoolhouses shipped 

back to you

 Get feedback from the student on how they did, what they liked, what they didn’t like, what could 

have been better about the whole process

 Check their utilization (i.e., are they applying/using their training)

 If IMET or CT, file the travel voucher
129 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Advancing Security Cooperation Training 

Through Technology and Advanced 

Instructional Strategies

By Christopher Burns

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Introduction

DISAM has had a long standing reputation of 

having a talented cadre of instructors and dedicated 

leadership with vision for the training needs of 

security cooperation professionals across the 

government. DISAM has been working tirelessly to 

address the growing needs of the security cooperation 

community by harnessing leading edge technologies 

and advanced instructional strategies to provide the 

most effective training for our students. This article 

will outline where we have come from and where we 

are headed in terms of instructional enhancements.

DISAM started offering courses in 1977 with 95 

students in the first year and has grown to over 12,500 

students in FY11. We began offering online classes in 

2002 with just over 200 students and have grown to 

accommodate 8685 online students in FY11. Figure 

1 below depicts the steady growth in both online and 

resident student numbers over the years.

Because of the influx of individuals requiring 

security cooperation (SC) training, limited classroom 

space, and the requirements for specific types of 

SC training, DISAM has had to look beyond the 

classroom for ways to meet the training needs of 

the SC community. In the last five years at DISAM, 

there has been a gradual shift toward enrollment 

in courses delivered online. Although DISAM has 

offered online training since 2002, it is now looking 

to expand the ways in which it uses the Internet and 

other advanced technologies to disseminate training, 

education, and provide performance support.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 130

Current Research and Industry Trends

DISAM has been closely monitoring current 

research and industry trends to prepare a five-year 

strategic plan for distance learning and instructional 

technology. Some of the more interesting research 

provides insight into the effectiveness of new 

technologies and trends in:

• Mobile Learning (mLearning)

• Performance Support Tools

• Implementing Simulations and Games

• Integrating Scenario-Based Training

• Implementation Strategies for Synchronous 

eLearning (live-online)

• Rapid eLearning Authoring Tools

• Learning Management Systems 

• Blended Learning (hybrids of classroom and 

online asynchronous and/or synchronous)

Some industry leading experts have said that the 

World Wide Web has caused the biggest change in 

education and learning since the advent of the printed 

book. Government and business leaders understand 

that change is happening faster than ever before and 

new information is flowing at a much faster rate than 

can be consumed. Skills and knowledge required 

for consistent performance are changing rapidly. 

There is a continuous but steady shift from training 

to performance. Newer methods that encourage 

learning in the workplace are increasingly gaining 

traction. The early days of instructional design for 

the military followed the format of:

• Introduction—“tell them what we are going to 

tell them”

• Content/Lecture—“tell them”

• Summary—“tell them what we told them”

Although this strategy is still sound design in 

some respects, there are additional instructional 

strategies that can be integrated to build upon this 

foundation which can greatly improve learning 

retention. With the recent SECDEF goals for training 

the Security Cooperation Workforce, there has been 

increased emphasis to ensure that our personnel have 

SC professional development and training. DISAM 

is not only meeting and exceeding the SECDEF goals 

but focusing on improved retention of the knowledge 

gained in the courses. Educational research shows 

that learning retention can be greatly diminished after 

two weeks of the training session. The instructional 

strategies being used in the design of a course directly 

impact the learning retention of the student. The 

diagram of Edgar Dale’s “Cone of Learning” in figure 

2 illustrates the fact that we retain more of what we 

experience or do within “active learning” strategies 

and retain less of what we learn through “passive 

learning” strategies such as reading or lectures. For 
131 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

this reason DISAM is actively working to integrate 

more experiential learning exercises across the 

entire curriculum that will provide opportunities 

for students to apply new knowledge gained in our 

courses. We are doing this by integrating advanced 

instructional strategies such as:

• Scenario-based exercises

• Immersive learning simulations

• Game-based learning

• Problem-based learning

• Engaging vignettes

Each of these instructional methods is on the 

leading edge of what industry leaders are incorporating 

into their training and education programs.

There is an increasing interest in delivery 

methods that provide live, online, just-in-time 

learning opportunities and performance support. 

DISAM is analyzing how such solutions can help the 

SC community, what options are available, and how 

the use of these technologies can aid us in delivering 

effective learning and support in the workplace. 

Online Courseware Fidelity Enhancements

DISAM is working diligently to upgrade 

the overall fidelity of its online courseware. The 

courseware enhancements that we are implementing 

are evident in several areas. The whole interface has 

undergone a facelift and we have integrated more 

synchronized audio with multimedia animations that 

improves comprehension of the content. The courses 

will now include much more interactivity, more 

variations in assessment types, and more media types 

being utilized within the courseware. There has also 

been increased emphasis on incorporating immersive 

learning simulations and complex scenarios in which 

to apply new knowledge gained within the course. 

These enhancements have been implemented in the 

new Security Cooperation Familiarization course 

scheduled to be online March 2012. DISAM is also 

beginning experimentation to deliver all online 

courses through alternative devices such and tablets, 

phones, and televisions.

Blended Learning Initiatives

Traditional blended learning combines face 

to face classroom instructional methods with 

computer mediated instruction to form an integrated 

instructional approach. Blended learning approaches 

can combine teaching 

strategies as well as 

delivery media. Essentially, 

blended learning seeks an 

approach to course design 

to will leverage that which 

is best done in person in 

combination with that which 

can be more effectively 

done online. DISAM has 

experimented with blended 

learning for a few years but 

has more recently utilized it 

in a larger scale. The new 

SAM-C (CONUS) course uses a blended approach 

to shorten the required classroom time for students 

that work in CONUS. The original two week resident 

course was redesigned to have two components: one 

week of web-based training and one week of resident 

classroom training. During the week of online 

training students build core knowledge of security 

cooperation before attending the resident portion of 

the course. The classroom component of the course 

is designed to be very hands-on with extensive use 

of exercises, scenarios, learning games, and the like. 

This approach to active, experiential learning is 

extremely popular with the students and is achieving 

better results. This strategy also allowed DISAM 

to effectively quadruple (from about 270 students 

in FY09 to 970 in FY11) the number of SAM-C 

students between resident and on-site offerings 

with our existing staff and classroom facilities. This 

approach proved to be a key element in facilitating 

the achievement of the High Performance Priority 

Goal (HPPG) of having 95 percent of the Security 

Cooperation workforce trained by FY2012, as 

directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In the 

future, this restructure will enhance DISAM’s ability 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 132

to use its calendar more effectively as additional 

courses are added to the schedule. It will also allow 

DISAM to better accommodate the expansion of the 

SCM-O course which is now four, vice three, weeks 

in duration as we began FY12. 

DISAM is implementing a hybrid blended 

learning approach within the new four-week SCM-O 

(Overseas) course to include the integration of 

immersive learning simulations as well as webbased training modules. The course now contains a 

three-week core followed by a one-week group of 

tracks that students attend based on the need of their 

positions overseas (some do not stay into week four). 

This blended learning approach utilizes a different 

strategy from the traditional blended approach. The 

goal of this new approach is merge the best aspects of 

both classroom and computer mediated instruction.

Students of the new SCM-O course will receive 

traditional classroom training during their three to 

four weeks at DISAM. However, the course will also 

include complex multimedia scenarios that may be 

experienced in three different modes: individually, in 

small groups, or as a class (figure 5). The scenarios 

will allow students to go through experiential learning 

activities that will engage students, provide simulated 

experience, generate meaningful discussions, 

improve knowledge retention, and allow students to 

actively apply new knowledge gained in the course. 

This approach falls in line with the concepts outlined 

in Edgar Dale’s “Cone of Learning” summarized 

earlier in this article.

Another hybrid blended learning approach that 

DISAM is beginning to experiment with is the blend 

of synchronous learning or Webinar technology with 

either classroom training or traditional asynchronous 

web-based training. In this case synchronous webinar 

sessions can occur before during or after classroom 

or web-based training sessions. This option can 

help enhance DISAM’s course delivery options by 

enabling the following possibilities:

• Allow instructors or guest speakers to present 

to classroom students without traveling to 

DISAM

• Allow DISAM instructors to provide advanced 

training sessions to students after attending 

DISAM resident training

• Blend “live” online sessions within traditional 

web-based training curriculum

• Research has shown that some of the advantages 

of implementing blended learning can be very 

beneficial to learner experiences to include:

• Increase student flexibility and training options

• Access to materials while retaining a sense of 

community

• Cost efficiency of delivering and receiving 

training

• Reduced “seat time” in resident classroom 

setting

• Eases facility issues—limited classroom space

• Early evidence of positive impact on learning 

outcomes

The reality is that we all live and operate in a 

blended environment consisting of a face-to face 

world and an online world so why shouldn’t our 

learning strategies include the same mix?

Performance Support

One definition of performance support states 

that it is a repository of information, processes, 

and perspectives that can be easily accessed to aid 

workers in performing a specific task or function more 

efficiently. The idea behind performance support is 

that valuable information and training is available at 

the “point of need” of the student. This point of need 
133 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

is when the individual needs to “apply” knowledge 

that they may no longer have access to in the recesses 

of their memory. This is when refresher training or 

just-in-time training is extremely valuable. Security 

Cooperation is a field that often requires specific 

training in an area of specialization. Some important 

tasks occur only once a year and may need refresher 

training. DISAM is working to provide innovative 

performance support tools for our students to aid 

them at their moment of need when they need to 

perform critical tasks. We plan to broaden our 

approach from the traditional classroom and online 

training to include other formal or informal training 

methods that can help our students to improve their 

overall performance on the job. Performance support 

tools can provide additional informal learning paths 

to compliment our more traditional learning paths 

or courses. In our efforts to integrate performance 

support into our overall learning strategy, you will 

see new tools offered by DISAM that could take the 

form of mLearning applications, webinars, online 

refresher training, and job aids.

Mobile Learning (mLearning): Landscape 

and Trends

DISAM is working on an mLearning Strategy, 

which will articulate how we plan to integrate mobile 

learning within our overall curriculum and learning 

architecture. Our position is that although mLearning 

is not yet a mainstream mechanism for training 

delivery, it is definitely coming fast and is possible 

now. Since companies like Google are now designing 

their products to be primarily deliverable for mobile 

devices first, we believe that it is crucial that we 

include mobile learning as part of our strategic plan 

to play a part in future training and performance 

support. DISAM is analyzing how our culture is using 

mobile devices and how we can best leverage the 

massive growth that is occurring in this technology 

field. mLearning encapsulates not only mobile 

phones but the influx of many others mobile devices 

such as eReaders, (Kindle, Nook, etc.), media players 

(iPod, etc.), tablets (iPad, Android, etc), and gaming 

platforms (Xbox, Playstation, and Nintendo). Many 

of these devices are very sophisticated and have 

expanded capabilities such as GPS, cameras, web 

cams, video capture, and PDA capabilities as well as 

countless apps that may also run on these devices. 

In addition, many of these devices have expanded 

connectivity and access to multiple networks such as 

Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and mobile networks GSM/CDMA 

(Verizon, Sprint, etc.).

Mobile learning should not be considered a 

replacement for traditional web-based training. 

Rather, it should augment and enhance other forms of 

training delivery and performance support. As such, 

DISAM is beginning experimentation for future 

deployment of mLearning applications.

Current Accomplishments and Future Plans

The five-year strategic plan for Distance Learning 

and Instructional Technology was developed to 

create a vision and blueprint for distance education 

and instructional technologies at DISAM. Its purpose 

is to realize the potential institutional growth that 

exists by continued investment in the distance 

education, curriculum design, and professional 

development programs at DISAM. The strategic 

plan was developed after a careful analysis of how 

industry leaders are using leading edge technologies 

and advanced instructional strategies to provide 

meaningful learning experiences for the workforce. 

The analysis also took into consideration the training 

and performance support needs of the SC community. 

DISAM’s distance learning mission is to provide 

robust online training solutions to supplement 

DISAM’s traditional classroom training in order to 

meet the expanding security cooperation training 

needs of the Department of Defense (DOD). Another 

goal of the strategic plan is to identify potential 

solutions that extend the reach of DISAM beyond 

existing boundaries. 

During the execution of the first year for the 

strategic plan (FY11), DISAM accomplished the 

following initiatives:

• Customized the Blackboard Learning 

Management System to accommodate 

the specific needs of DISAM and the SC 

Community

◊ Customized the LMS user interfaces

◊ Enabled CAC login

◊ Created interfaces between Blackboard 

databases and the DISAM student 

database

◊ Improved distribution of course 

completion certificates to students

• Upgraded courseware fidelity and overall 

quality of our online courses

◊ Developed a courseware style guide
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 134

Curriculum Review 2012

 During DISAM’s recent annual Curriculum 

Review, several new instructional technologies 

were unveiled along with other future initiatives that 

have been outlined earlier in this paper. In addition, 

attendees were provided a “sneak peek” of the new 

Civilian Diplomatic Attire CBT and participated in 

an evaluation of the new SC Familiarization CBT 

(figure 6). Further discussions with attendees focused 

on a synergy of efforts and resources with other DOD 

schoolhouses who are conducting training relevant to 

Security Cooperation. As a result of these discussions, 

DISAM made a number of its Security Cooperation 

courseware initiatives available to the Defense 

Acquisition University in support of an effort to 

incorporate Security Cooperation lessons into a new 

online course for the acquisition workforce. 

DISAM is actively working to build relationships 

with other organizations that could benefit from 

DISAM’s curriculum and faculty expertise. DISAM is 

encouraging close dialogue with these organizations 

to provide assistance in developing SC training and to 

ensure that both the instructional content and media 

are kept up to date and accurate. DISAM regularly 

sends its faculty members to other organizations as 

guest speakers and provides expertise in conducting 

formal curriculum reviews of instructional content 

used by these other organizations. We certainly 

believe that in these times of financial constraints, 

organizations should be pooling their talent and 

resources to avoid “reinventing the wheel.”

◊ Established standards for interactivity, 

usability, interfaces, and graphical 

treatments

◊ Developed new assessment strategies to 

enhance learning retention

• Established the capability to deliver 

synchronous “live online” webinars

◊ Explored the potential of delivering 

advanced topic webinars

• Procured advance authoring tools and 

templates to develop interactive courseware

• Developed and integrated new Instructional 

Systems Design (ISD) processes

• Developed the capability to easily record 

classroom presentations to be delivered across 

the web

During the second year of the strategic plan 

(current/FY12) DISAM is focused on:

• Continuing to upgrade our online curriculum 

with the new format and enhancements 

established in FY11.

• Developing blended learning applications for 

the SCM-O course, specific lessons include:

◊ Computer based training covering 

“Civilian Diplomatic Attire” basics

◊ Computer based training covering 

“Protocol”

• Developing individual, small group, and large 

group scenarios for the SCM-O course

• Integrating more Game-Based Learning into 

the DISAM classroom courses to provide 

engaging assessments and lesson summaries

• Integrating an Audience Response System 

into DISAM classroom in order to poll 

students and monitor learning progress

• Experimenting with delivering computer 

based training, reference materials, text books, 

and manuals on android tablet devices for the 

SCM-O course

• Developing advanced topic webinars/course 

to be delivered “live online”

• Making online refresher training available to 

DISAM students

• Expanding the use of blended learning 

techniques

• Exploring the development of SC functional 

area portals on the DISAM corporate website

• Exploring offering subscriptions to functional 

area newsletters and/or blogs

• Experimenting with mLearning applications
135 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Conclusion

DISAM is working on several fronts to ensure that 

it is keeping up with industry leading trends but more 

importantly, DISAM is carefully selecting advanced 

instructional strategies that can extend its reach to 

more students, more often, and best accommodate 

the needs of the SC community. Our aim is to reach 

out to students on a regular basis using various forms 

of formal and informal training to provide continuous 

educational opportunities for our students throughout 

their SC careers. For more information on DISAM’s 

courses and the approaches to each in terms of 

distance and resident learning, information on all of 

our courses and module is available at our website at 

http://www.disam.dsca.mil/. 

About the Author

Christopher Burns is a senior instructional 

technologist for the Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management. He has been involved in 

the design, development, and management of DOD 

distance learning programs for over twenty years. 

He has an undergraduate degree in computer and 

information science from the University of Maryland 

and graduate degrees in library and information 

science and instructional systems technology from 

the University of Central Arkansas and Indiana 

University, respectively. His research interests are in 

the areas of instructional design, immersive learning 

simulations, interactive video, augmented reality, 

and performance support tools.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 136
137 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

stand-up in 2008 of United States Africa Command, 

with its many partner nations reliant on US security 

cooperation support, has also been a factor. Finally, 

the SECDEF approval in July 2011 of the Security 

Cooperation Reform Phase 1 Report Force mandated 

improvements in DOD “training, education, and 

workforce development” across the board.

DISAM has seen the need for an expanded 

“overseas” curriculum for a number of years. At 

its annual curriculum reviews in 2009 and 2010, a 

broadened SCM-O curriculum was a major topic. 

Perhaps the major limiting factor was DISAM’s lack 

of instructor staffing (and/or expertise) to develop 

new areas of curriculum. This was exacerbated by a 

dramatic surge in through-put (compare 237 resident 

students in 2001 with 660 in 2011), which caused 

DISAM to split, or “double-teach” about half of the 

annual offerings in recent years. However, in early 

FY 2011, DISAM received the authority and O&M 

funding to hire five instructors who would focus 

on the security cooperation mission, as opposed 

to traditional security assistance, starting with the 

DISAM Expands Curriculum and 

Courses for the SC Community

By Gary Taphorn

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

In October 2011, DISAM took an unprecedented 

step in broadening its curriculum with the introduction 

of an expanded “overseas course,” formally known 

as Security Cooperation Management-Overseas 

(SCM-O). This initiative, which was coordinated 

carefully with DSCA and the geographic combatant 

commands (GCCs), was the result of the increased 

importance of the security cooperation (SC) mission 

and the role of SC organizations (SCOs) over the 

last few years. The era of SCOs (formerly security 

assistance offices or SAOs) focusing primarily 

on security assistance programs such as Foreign 

Military Financing is increasingly outdated. The 

advent of numerous new authorities and funding 

streams to DOD since 2001 has required that SCO 

personnel become familiar with a much broader 

suite of “tools” beyond those in traditional security 

assistance. Additionally, the requirements articulated 

in the “Guidance for Employment of the Force” 

(GEF) are driving the GCCs and SCOs toward 

a more comprehensive, efficient, and integrated 

approach to security cooperation planning. The 

Figure 1. Note the surge in SCM-O students beginning in 2008, which is a function of several factors, primarily 

the establishment and growth of SCOs in Iraq and Afghanistan. The entry for FY 2012 represents only input to date.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 138

problem. This suite of planning blocks is DISAM’s 

interim answer to the major deficiency identified 

by the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force in 

2011, when it noted that “DOD...does not assess, 

anticipate, prioritize or address partner requirements 

as well as it should.” In the four iterations of the 

expanded course to date, this exercise has been well 

received by students and it continues to evolve as 

more “sets of eyes” examine the problem. 

A second area of new emphasis is the use of 

DSCA’s Security Cooperation Information Portal 

(SCIP). The previous single practical exercise, in 

which students accessed only the Case Information 

Community within SCIP, has now been expanded to 

three exercises. The additional blocks of instruction 

expose students to four other communities of value 

to SCO personnel – SCO/COCOM, case execution, 

SCMS, and end-use monitoring. Additionally, 

personnel assigned to SCOs are now receiving their 

permanent SCIP accounts while in residence at 

DISAM. Previously, the SCIP accounts issued by the 

Defense Security Assistance Development Center 

(DSADC) to SCM-O students were temporary, 

expiring upon their departure from DISAM. This 

necessitated SCO personnel having to apply for SCIP 

accounts essentially “from scratch” upon arrival in 

their country of assignment. As SCIP users are well 

aware, the registration process is both laborious 

and complicated. With the streamlined procedures 

recently developed jointly by DSADC and DISAM, 

SCO access has become significantly easier and 

faster. 

SCM-O now also addresses in much more detail 

a number of well-recognized challenges related to the 

execution of FMS. For example, DSCA has recently 

placed more emphasis on the importance of receiving 

complete letters of request (LORs) from partner 

nations. To this end, DISAM has created a new block 

entitled “Actionable LORs.” In this lesson, students 

learn about the various tools available to ensure 

a “total package approach” and they also critique 

a number of sample LORs for completeness. On a 

parallel track, DISAM has begun to introduce the 

“pseudo” FMS process for title 10 appropriations 

within a separate block of instruction, rather than as 

an “add-on” to traditional FMS. This new approach, 

combined with requirements in the SCIP practical 

exercises, is helping students to better understand the 

differences between normal and “pseudo” FMS and 

how the role of the SCO changes accordingly.

SCM-O course. As part of the overall hiring scheme, 

each new hire has come with regional experience 

which qualifies the new instructors to manage one of 

DISAM’s five regional seminars. As this article goes 

to press, four of the five new instructors (Europe, 

Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and Africa) are on board 

and the fifth (Latin America) is expected by summer 

2012. Already, these instructors are making an impact 

by both improving the quality of regional seminars 

and helping develop new blocks of instruction.

The expansion of the overseas course entails 

the addition of one week of mandatory curriculum, 

increasing the former two-week core by a third full 

week. The optional “specialized training” for SCO 

personnel, previously offered during the third week, is 

still offered following the end of the core curriculum, 

thereby making SCM-O a four-week course on the 

DISAM calendar. Students still receive a thorough 

grounding in Foreign Military Sales (FMS), logistics, 

finance, acquisition, international training, and 

several other subjects. However, the curriculum has 

broadened in several areas. No area has received 

more attention than security cooperation planning. 

The previous curriculum, consisting of a 1.5 hour 

overview, has been expanded to a suite of four blocks of 

instruction totaling seven hours and including a small 

group practical exercise. Students are introduced to 

the planning process through the block of instruction 

entitled “National Guidance Documents,” from the 

president’s National Security Strategy down through 

the GEF. Then, in “SCO Planning Tools,” students 

see the four planning processes available to them 

at the SCO level and their upward submission and 

coordination through both State and DOD channels. 

Additionally, this block incorporates and juxtaposes 

the two annual forecasting documents required by 

Congress: the Javits and FMS Forecasting Reports. 

In the third block, “Capabilities-Based Planning,” 

DISAM presents a methodology for executing the 

planning process at the country level, consistent with 

current doctrine and other DOD guidance, which 

itself is still evolving. Finally, a practical exercise 

entitled “Country Needs Assessment” places student 

groups in a notional SCO, complete with overarching 

guidance such as a country campaign plan, an 

embassy mission strategic resource plan, etc. Given 

a scenario involving an emergent threat to the host 

nation, the students must use existing guidance, 

resources, and the planning process to identify 

tasks, activities and funding sources to address the 
139 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

country. Participating organizations include OSD, the 

Joint Staff, the military departments, State PM and, 

of course, the appropriate DSCA country director. 

The C’s and B’s are currently being executed during 

the students’ lunch and study hall period at mid-day. 

Although they require an extraordinary amount of 

coordination, they are being generally well received 

by students.

The guest speaker program is also enhanced 

with the new course. The traditional guest speaker 

program, not including speakers for specific regional 

seminars, has been comprised of five blocks:

• The Defense Attaché Office, presented by DIA 

or the Joint Military Attache School (JMAS)

• Human Rights, presented by the Defense 

Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)

• The Vendor Perspective, presented by a 

representative of a major defense contractor 

through the American League of Exports and 

Security Assistance (ALESA)

• The SCO Perspective, presented by a sitting or 

recently departed SCO chief or SDO/DATT

• The Executive Perspective, presented by a 

senior military officer or USG civilian typically 

representing a DOD organization, such as a 

combatant command or a military department.

These five speakers have now been augmented 

by three others, which have helped to expand the 

scope of the course. They include:

• State Political-Military Affairs, presenting 

an orientation of how State Department 

complements the DOD role in security 

assistance and integrates it into foreign policy.

• Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), 

presenting information on the Small Arms/Light 

Weapons (SA/LW) program which is applicable 

and beneficial to most SCOs around the world.

• Finally, United States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), which provides an 

orientation on how SCOs can benefit from the 

variety of authorities and funding unique to the 

special operations community.

As a final point, the expanded curriculum is 

being developed with a new emphasis toward on-line 

learning. Although SCM-O, as currently presented, 

is still almost entirely instructor-led, plans are well 

underway to transition some blocks of instruction to 

computer-based training (CBT). The first candidate 

block is Civilian Diplomat Attire, which should 

transition to CBT status in the next few months. 

The expanded course also offers a suite of blocks 

totaling six hours on the topics of Humanitarian 

Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR). Although 

this has been a core DSCA mission for many years, the 

overseas course had previously given it only minimal 

attention, due to lack of time and instructor expertise. 

The new blocks utilize a holistic approach and 

address the role of non-DOD entities, especially the 

United States Agency for International Development 

(USAID) and even non-USG entities, particularly 

non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Ongoing 

consultation with DSCA and USAID should make 

the HA/DR curriculum stronger and more relevant in 

the coming months.

Also offered for the first time in SCM-O are 

a number blocks related to the operational and 

administrative environment of the SCO. As examples, 

the students now receive lessons on the management 

of DOD visitors, embassy crisis action, SCO ethics, 

and protocol. These blocks were coordinated with 

DISAM’s sister institution, the Joint Military Attaché 

School (JMAS). Finally, two blocks of instruction 

specifically related to traditional GCC programs have 

been added—one on the combined exercise program 

and a second on military-to-military engagement 

programs. 

Not all the changes in the overseas course are 

related to formal academic blocks in the classroom. 

One change of significance is that, effective with 

the start of FY 2012, locally employed staff (LES) 

of SCOs are no longer in attendance. To better 

accommodate their training needs, DISAM has 

developed and initiated a two-week course specially 

tailored for them, entitled the Security Cooperation 

Management-Locally Employed Staff Orientation 

Course (SCM-LO). The absence of LES personnel 

(or foreign service nationals, to use their traditional 

name) from the overseas course also allows for a 

greater degree of candid discussion among the US 

students and their instructors. 

A second non-academic change, prompted by 

DSCA, was the incorporation of “Consultations 

and Briefings” (or C’s and B’s) into the course. This 

consists of a series of video teleconferences (VTCs), 

organized by theater and country, between DISAM 

students and their various desk officers in the National 

Capitol Region. Coordinated on the Washington 

end by the DSCA Strategy Directorate, all DISAM 

students a period of time to become acquainted with 

both desk officers and major issues pertaining to their 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 140

companion courses. Other changes will follow, the 

most important of which is the transition of SCO 

classrooms into a classified environment (expected 

by FY 2014) which will allow greatly facilitated 

access to a variety of sensitive documents and data. 

DISAM looks forward to continued collaboration 

with DSCA, the geographic combatant commands, 

and other organizations to maintain a first-rate 

training product for security cooperation personnel.

About the Author

Mr. Gary Taphorn is a DISAM Assistant 

Professor and a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel. 

As a Middle East foreign area officer, he served tours 

of duty in two SCOs, USCENTCOM, and the OSD 

staff. He has managed the Middle East Seminar for 

DISAM, served as the functional coordinator for 

SCO Operations, and functioned as the SCM-O 

course manager since 2006. With the publication of 

this article, he hands over the reins of the expanded 

SCM-O course to two new and energetic DISAM 

faculty members, Mr. Ron Yakkel and Mr. Tim Burke.

Other blocks will follow and a particular emphasis 

is being placed on a security cooperation planning 

scenario to be presented at least partly through the 

CBT approach.

As mentioned above, the unique training 

requirements of locally employed staff within the 

SCOs has driven DISAM to create a course specific 

to their needs. Likewise, DISAM has seen the need 

to generate a second new course targeted at security 

cooperation “action officers,” primarily field grade 

officers in the joint world such as GCCs and their 

component commands. This course, entitled Security 

Cooperation Management-Action Officer (or SCMAO) is now in development and prototyping and will 

be fully available in FY13. The requirement to develop 

the SCM-AO course is another result of the SCRTF 

Phase 1 report which specifically recommended 

that “DSCA develop training/education programs 

that enable DOD to grow expertise in security 

cooperation/security assistance authorities, funding, 

and roles of DOD and DOS.”

The SCM-AO course will be one week in length 

and will be offered six times annually—once at 

each GCC headquarters (less NORTHCOM) and 

once in the NCR. It will be open to DOD personnel 

assigned to OSD, JS, MILDEP Headquarters, GCCs, 

DOD component commands, other DOD entities 

(includes training and education institutions), 

and other USG interagency staffs who have a 

role and/or responsibility in security cooperation/

security assistance. The course will focus on 

providing action officers a functional knowledge of 

security cooperation/security assistance planning 

considerations, authorities, funding and roles of 

the DOD, DOS, and other members of the USG 

interagency. As can be imagined, it will draw heavily 

from the newly developed SCM-O curriculum. 

SCM-AO will also rely on GCC/HQ staffs to provide 

practical application narratives and/or presentations 

specific to the organization hosting the class. The 

course will not include regional seminars, nor will 

it present detailed instruction on the traditional 

security assistance processes (FMS, logistics, and 

finance) or SCO responsibilities. DISAM is currently 

in discussions with the GCCs and other organizations 

to refine requirements and scheduling. 

In summary, DISAM has significantly expanded 

the scope and relevance of training for SCOs and 

other security cooperation personnel with the 

advent of the new overseas course and its two new 
141 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

course. Since February 2011, the SAM-C course 

consists of the Security Cooperation Orientation 

Course (SCM-OC) done through computer-based 

training (CBT), followed by five days of classroom 

instruction. The classroom discussions and practical 

exercises reinforce the basic education from the CBT, 

to develop a deeper understanding of SC programs 

and procedures. The SCM-OC also serves to educate 

SC civilian, military and contractor personnel whose 

position requires only basic knowledge of security 

cooperation programs and procedures. DISAM’s 

computer-based training products helped fill the 

training shortfall and completed the requirement to 

have 95 percent of the SC workforce trained by the 

end of September 2011 (DISAM, 2011). DISAM 

continues to develop computer-based training 

courses and learning modules for various areas 

of specialization that are exportable to a growing 

workforce. 

As a course developer and instructor, I 

questioned the effectiveness of computer-based 

training in preparing employees in basic skills and 

concepts necessary for effective job performance. 

My skepticism of learning effectiveness stemmed 

from numerous negative comments DISAM students 

provided in discussions and in course surveys about 

course design and content. One of my reasons 

for wanting to research the acceptance of CBT in 

workforce development was the frequent complaint 

from DISAM students that they were uncomfortable 

learning through the computer. Numerous research 

studies have pointed out that comfort with the 

method of delivery, and comfort with the learning 

environment, significantly impacts on the ability of 

the adult learner to absorb and retain information 

(Brown, 2001; Calvin and Freeburg, 2010; DeTure, 

2004; Frankola, 2001; Hairston, 2007; Hornik, 

Johnson and Wu, 2007; Moore, 1997; Saade and 

Kira, 2007). I was curious if younger civilian 

employees were more receptive to learning through 

2011 Distance Learning 

Survey Results

By Joanne B. Hawkins, PhD

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

If you completed an online course with DISAM 

between October 2010 and July 2011, you may have 

received an invitation from me to participate in an 

online survey of your distance learning preferences. 

The survey was part of a larger study on distance 

learning effectiveness in workforce development, 

and distance learning acceptance by learners in the 

workplace. The study was an independent doctoral 

research study, not commissioned by DISAM or 

any other defense organization. DISAM graciously 

permitted me to contact students enrolled in a 

distance learning course during that ten-month period 

to assess learner acceptance of distance learning, and 

their learning preferences. This article reveals the 

findings of that survey.

The Purpose of the Survey

The focus of the study was the civilian workforce 

engaged in Security Cooperation (SC) activities. 

The SC workforce consists of approximately 

10,000 people (DISAM, 2011). There are nearly 

7,200 civilian employees and nearly 2,000 military 

personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 

Marine Corps. The workforce is supported by over 

800 civilian support contractors who also must be 

trained in SC concepts and programs. According to 

a 2011 Department of Defense Civilian Personnel 

Management Service report, the level of education 

among civilian employees varies widely, with many 

employees having only a high school education. 

The average age of the DOD civilian employee 

is fifty‐eight, and nearly one-third of the civilian 

workforce is eligible to retire this year (CPMS, 2011; 

GAO, 2009; GAO, 2007). 

In 2009, the Secretary of Defense mandated an 

immediate improvement in SC workforce education 

and training by the end of fiscal year 2011. To meet 

the needs of an increased number of learners, DISAM 

reorganized its introductory two-week resident 

CONUS course (SAM-C) into a two-phased hybrid 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 142

through face-to-face classroom instruction while the 

remaining 37 percent of workplace training is done 

through some technology-based delivery system 

(ASTD, 2011). 

Distance learning is defined as any form 

of instruction in which learners and instructors 

are separated by space. It ranges from video 

teleconferencing, which is delivered synchronously, 

and web-based instruction, which may be delivered 

synchronously, to asynchronous instruction, in which 

learners and instructors are separated by both space 

and time. Distance learning also includes instruction 

that is delivered by electronic means to one person 

at a time. In short, distance learning is a substitute 

for traditional classroom learning. One widely used 

form of distance learning in academic institutions 

is web-based synchronous or asynchronous online 

learning in which learners interact with one another 

and with an instructor or facilitator. This interactive 

form of distance learning usually involves specific 

timeframes for online participation, submission of 

assignments, and course completion. Another form 

of distance learning is instructional content delivered 

by computer either through a CD or DVD, or by 

a computer network or the Internet. This type of 

learning product is often referred to as distributed 

learning, computer-based instruction, or computerbased training (CBT). This self-paced method of 

learning provides no course facilitator or instructor, 

and allows no interaction between learners. CBT 

is often used to provide instruction in a corporate 

or government setting. The course content may be 

repeated as often as necessary to reinforce learning. 

Learning resources are embedded in the courseware 

or are accessible from the Internet. Learners evaluate 

their own performance through embedded multimedia 

content. Most CBT produced today for individualized 

self-paced learning includes multimedia elements to 

stimulate interest and enhance learning by providing 

audio and video in addition to text and graphics. 

My study focused on this latter form of distance 

learning, CBT, that is, the non-interactive, self-paced 

instruction that is delivered by computer network or 

digital media. 

A limited number of studies have examined the 

effectiveness of different types of distance learning 

programs in a corporate environment (Dobbs, 2000; 

Dobrovolny, 2006; Frankola, 2001; Hairston, 2007; 

O’Dell, 2009; O’Lawrence; Stone, 2007; Strother, 

2002). Their findings suggest that employees who 

a computer than older adults, and whether one’s 

level of education had any impact on acceptance 

of self-paced computer-based training. One of my 

hypotheses was that older adults would be less 

willing to engage in computer-based training because 

distance learning requires a change in study habits 

and adaptation to a new learning environment. A 

second hypothesis was that employees with less than 

a college education would not perform as well with 

self-paced computer-based training because they had 

not had the opportunity to develop study habits that 

are necessary to be successful in distance learning. 

The data from the survey did not support either 

hypothesis. There was no significant difference in 

attitude toward distance learning based on age or 

level of education. However, the survey data revealed 

that employees in general lacked organizational 

support for distance learning. Employees were often 

pressured to complete their training on their own 

time because their work environment did not provide 

the time or resources to engage in computer-based 

training for workforce development. This result was 

surprising, given that the requirement for completing 

the training was mandated by DSCA in support of 

the SECDEF’s workforce improvement initiative. 

An earlier study by DISAM in 2000 revealed similar 

results. At that time, employees complained of a 

lack of time for distance learning in the workplace, 

and a lack of organizational support to provide 

an environment conducive to distance learning 

(Hawkins, 2001). In terms of distance learning 

support, my recent research shows that little has 

changed in a decade within the SC community. This 

finding is disappointing because distance learning 

has evolved into a major method of workplace skills 

development in both government and industry.

In both the private and public sector, it is not 

considered time or cost-effective to train employees 

more than once to learn basic job skills and 

concepts. Corporations and government agencies 

have turned to distance learning as a means of 

replacing or supplementing traditional classroom 

instruction (ASTD, 2011; Brown, 2001; Dobbs, 

2000; Dobrovolny, 2006; Hairston, 2007; O’Dell, 

2009; O’Lawrence, 2006; Stone, 2007; Strother, 

2002). The amount spent on distance learning by 

corporations and government agencies in 2010 was 

estimated to be around $171.4 billion. In terms of 

learning hours, approximately 63 percent of formal 

workplace training continues to be conducted 
143 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Data Collection

The survey consisted of fifty-four questions 

in five sections and was based on a combination 

of two previously developed instruments used in 

educational research. The sections were (a) a notice 

of informed consent, (b) employee demographics, 

(c) employees’ impressions of the CBT course, (d) 

employees’ learning preferences, and (e) employees’ 

assessment of their work and training environment. 

The email invitation provided the participant with 

information about the purpose of the survey and it 

provided assurance of confidentiality and anonymity. 

Informed consent was assumed granted when the 

participant chose to take the survey. 

The survey was designed so that participants 

were required to respond to each item, and no 

question could be skipped or left blank. This structure 

may account for some rather high percentages of “no 

opinion” responses. Participants were able to provide 

comments at the end of the survey regarding their 

learning experience. This section was not required, 

yet 93 participants (26 percent) chose to provide 

comments. 

Participant Demographics

Data for the study consisted of the responses from 

306 DOD civilian employees and 52 civilian support 

contractors for a total of 358 respondents. Their age 

groups and level of education are shown in tables 1 

and 2 respectively. Participants self-disclosed their 

occupation or position, shown in table 3.

Table 1. Participant Age Groups (N = 358)

Category Frequency Percent

Under 25 18 5%

26 to 34 48 13%

35 to 44 50 14%

45 to 54 140 39%

55 to 64 96 27%

65 and over 6 2%

Table 2. Participant Levels of 

Education (N = 358)

Category Frequency Percent

High school or equivalent 16 4%

Some college, no degree 46 13%

Associate’s Degree 86 24%

Bachelor’s Degree 142 40%

Master’s Degree 65 18%

Doctorate Degree 3 1%

have limited computer skills, or those who lack time 

and support in the workplace for online learning are 

the most disadvantaged by the implementation of 

CBT for workforce development. Employees who 

are not motivated to learn on their own time are also 

disadvantaged. These studies show that older workers 

are less receptive to using technology, although their 

performance results are as good as those of younger 

workers. 

My desire to survey the learning preferences 

of the SC workforce was driven by the limited 

research of the effectiveness of CBT for employee 

training. Since research shows that learning styles 

are as important to the learning process as are the 

environment and method of delivery, I believe it is 

important to survey learning preferences before a 

large investment of time and manpower is spent to 

develop more distance learning products. The survey 

portion of this research study examined employees’ 

attitudes toward computer-based training and 

employee characteristics that may contribute to or 

limit their ability to learn through CBT. 

Survey Participants

Invitations to participate in the survey were sent 

to 1,650 individuals. The online survey was hosted 

by SurveyMonkeyTM, a commercial survey host. 

The participants consisted of 306 DOD civilian 

employees, 47 military personnel, and 52 civilian 

support contractors for a total of 405 respondents 

(24.5 percent). Survey responses from military 

personnel were excluded from this study because 

their demographic data was significantly different 

in terms of age, level of education, and distance 

learning experience, from the demographic data of 

civilian personnel. However, the survey responses of 

military personnel are addressed separately at the end 

of this article. The survey data were collected between 

October 2010 and July 2011from students enrolled in 

the Security Assistance Management Online Course 

(SAM-OC), the Security Cooperation Management 

Orientation Course (online) (SCM‐OC), the Security 

Cooperation Familiarization Course (online), the 

International Programs Security Requirements 

Course Online (IPSR-OL), or the Security Assistance 

Management Logistics Support Online Refresher 

Course (SAM-CS). 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 144

the median was 4 and the mode was 4. Seventy-one 

percent of all participants indicated that they agreed 

or somewhat agreed that they enjoyed taking courses 

through the computer, regardless of age or education.

Table 4. I enjoy taking courses through the 

computer (N=358)

Rating Frequency Percent

Disagree 34 9%

Somewhat Disagree 43 12%

No Opinion 27 8%

Somewhat Agree 154 43%

Agree 100 28%

For the item “I can learn equally well online or 

through computer-based training as I can in a faceto-face classroom environment,” the mean score was 

3.09 (SD=1.42); the median was 4 and the mode 

was 4. Participants were almost evenly divided 

among those who disagreed or somewhat disagreed 

that they could learn equally well with either CBT 

or traditional learning (46 percent), with those who 

agreed or somewhat agreed (51 percent), regardless 

of age or education.

Two-hundred thirty-nine participants (67 percent) 

had less than two years of work experience in Security 

Cooperation, with the remaining 119 participants (33 

percent) having between two and five years’ work 

experience in the field. Three hundred and forty 

participants (95 percent) were in non-supervisory 

positions, while the remaining eighteen participants 

(5 percent) indicated they were supervisors. All 

participants had completed a required introductory 

course through a stand-alone CBT between October 

2010 and July 2011.

Of the fifty-four survey questions, the responses 

to four survey statements were analyzed in detail with 

regard to the respondents’ age and level of education. 

The four survey statements are

1. I enjoy taking courses through the computer.

2. I can learn equally well through computerbased training as I can in a face-to-face 

classroom environment.

3. I think learning through the computer is a 

frustrating process.

4. Working through the computer-based training 

module was an unpleasant experience for me.

The range of scores was 1-5 based upon a Likert 

scale. Participants rated each statement on a scale 

from 1 = Disagree to 5 = Agree for all questions. The 

results are shown in Tables 4 through 7. 

For the item “I enjoy taking courses through the 

computer,” the mean score was 3.65 (SD = 1.27); 

Table 3. Participant Occupations/Positions (N=358)

Category Frequency Percent

Country Manager or Country Desk Officer (DSCA, NIPO, SAF/IA, USASAC–Huntsville, other) 23 6%

FMS CASE Manager (ILCO or training activity) 27 8%

Contracting Officer or Contract Administrator 41 11%

Transportation Coordinator or Manager (DCMA, DLA, ILCO, TRANSCOM, SDDC, AMC, Freight 

Forwarder, Support Contractor or Service ICP) 9 3%

Supply Technician or Supply Specialist 39 11%

Foreign Liaison Officer or FMS Customer 5 1%

Overseas Security Cooperation Office, Defense Attaché or Embassy (Military, Civilian, or Locally 

Employed Staff) 3 1%

Financial Manager or Financial Analyst 61 17%

Security Cooperation Policy Analyst 21 6%

Instructor (DISAM, DAU, DLA, Service School, Regional Center) 18 5%

FMS Case Writer (CWD, ILCO or Program Office) 4 1%

IT or Automation Systems Support/Developer 2 1%

Foreign Disclosure Officer, Security Specialist, or Export Licensing Official 22 6%

Other 12 3%
145 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

ability to learn through computer-based training. The 

data revealed no significant differences between age 

or level of education and willingness to engage in 

CBT.

Learning Style Assessment

One portion of the online survey included the 

commercial learning style assessment “Is Online 

Learning Right for Me?” used by many schools and 

universities to help students determine their readiness 

to engage in distance learning. The questions 

address learner schedules, learning style, and 

learner personality. Each question has three possible 

responses, with the first response in each category 

corresponding to a characteristic most appropriate 

for distance learning. The second response is less 

desirable for distance learning, but not an indicator of 

incompatibility with distance learning, and the third 

response reflects a characteristic incompatible with 

distance learning. Thus by scoring each response in 

the survey with a 1, 2 or 3, learners with an overall 

score ranging between 10 and 16 are candidates 

who have characteristics that are indicators of good 

distance learners, those between 17 and 23 have 

some characteristics that are suitable for distance 

learning, but those who scored between 24 and 30 are 

less likely to be comfortable with distance learning. 

Of the 358 participants, 183 (51 percent) scored 

between 11 and 16, indicating many characteristics 

suitable for distance learning. The remaining 175 

participants (49 percent) scored between 17 and 23, 

reflecting fewer characteristics of successful distance 

learners. No participant scored above 23. This 

outcome suggests that regardless of age or level of 

education, all of the participants could be successful 

distance learners. The ten question survey, however, 

is most applicable to distance learning done through 

facilitated interactive courses. When I examined 

responses to individual questions, three questions 

in the areas of learner personality and learning style 

reflected a higher preference for social contact in 

learning. Sixty-seven percent of survey participants 

indicated that feeling that they are part of a class, 

engaging with other students, is very important to 

them. Seventy-two percent indicated that classroom 

discussions are important to them. These two aspects 

of social learning are missing in computer-based 

training in which the employee learns in isolation, and 

could reduce learning effectiveness. Alternatively, 

72 percent of survey participants responded that they 

Table 5. I Can Learn Equally Well Through 

Computer-Based Training as I can in a Faceto-Face Classroom Environment (N = 358).

Category Frequency Percent

Disagree 59 16%

Somewhat Disagree 106 30%

No Opinion 12 3%

Somewhat Agree 111 31%

Agree 70 20%

 For the item “I think learning through the 

computer is a frustrating process,” the mean score 

was 2.31 (SD = 1.32); the median was 2 and the mode 

was 1. The majority of participants (68 percent), 

regardless of age or education, responded that they 

disagreed or somewhat disagreed that computerbased learning is a frustrating process.

Table 6. I Think Learning Through the 

Computer is a Frustrating Process (N = 358)

Category Frequency Percent

Disagree 136 38%

Somewhat Disagree 107 30%

No Opinion 28 8%

Somewhat Agree 61 17%

Agree 26 7%

For the item “Working through the computerbased training module was an unpleasant experience 

for me,” the mean score was 2.18 (SD = 1.32); 

the median was 2; and the mode was 1. Again, the 

majority of participants (67 percent) responded that 

they at least somewhat disagreed that their CBT 

experience was unpleasant, regardless of age or 

education.

Table 7. Working Through the ComputerBased Training Module was an Unpleasant 

Experience for Me (N = 358)

Category Frequency Percent

Disagree 158 44%

Somewhat Disagree 81 23%

No Opinion 46 13%

Somewhat Agree 45 13%

Agree 28 8%

I further analyzed the data using a series of oneway Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to determine 

if there was any relationship between age, level of 

education, and participants’ perceptions about their 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 146

use for initial or refresher training in the workplace, 

but expressed a preference (56 percent) for taking a 

scheduled web-based course which included student 

and instructor interaction over self-paced CBT 

without student and instructor interaction. Fifty-three 

percent of participants agreed or somewhat agreed 

that they would be willing to take an online course 

which required posting graded assignments to an 

instructor. 

Lack of time is one of several reasons why 

corporate distance learners fail to complete a 

computer-based training course (Frankola, 2001). 

Many workers have distractions and interruptions by 

coworkers and supervisors who insist that a task has 

to be done right away. Frankola reported that online 

course completion in the corporate environment was 

dependent upon whether supervisors and managers 

tracked employee progress and whether the employee 

received positive reinforcement for the worker’s 

participation in the online course. When employees 

are pressured to complete an online course without 

being given adequate time or the environment to 

learn, learning retention decreases. The employee 

skips learning tasks to complete the course quickly 

or tries to learn in a distracting environment, which 

reduces the quality of the learning process and the 

learning outcome.

Discussion of Participant Comments

Ninety-three survey participants chose to provide 

comments at the end of the survey about their CBT 

learning experience. I analyzed these comments 

for common themes and key words in a qualitative 

research method. Qualitative research is interpretive, 

in which the researcher makes a personal assessment 

of a situation or occurrence based on interviews, 

observations, survey comments or documents. 

I grouped the survey comments into four 

categories: Organizational Support, Learner 

Interaction, Information Relevance and Technology. 

Many participants’ comments fell into more than one 

category, so total numbers of responses exceeded 93. 

Organizational Support. The largest number 

of survey comments fell into this category. Thirtytwo participants responded that their organization 

did not give them time at work for computer-based 

training. Participants complained that frequent 

interruptions at work made it difficult to absorb 

and retain information, that they felt rushed if they 

attempted to conduct training during business hours. 

preferred to follow directions on their own and be 

responsible for their own learning. Only a minority 

of participants (2 percent) expressed an aversion to 

using technology, and only 2 percent indicated that 

they were slow readers. Good reading skills and the 

ability to navigate through various web screens and 

computer applications are essential to being able to 

learn well through computer-based training.

The Learning Environment

The learning environment impacts the amount 

of attention the learner focuses on the topic. 

Distractions, interruptions, and lack of time impede 

the learning process, as well as a lack of employer 

support. Six questions in the survey targeted the 

learning environment. These included one question 

from the learning style assessment that indicated that 

the majority of participants (86 percent) completed 

the CBT because it was required for work. The 

remaining five questions were

1. My supervisor is interested in my training 

needs.

2. My supervisor gives me time at work to take 

work-related computer-based training courses.

3. My supervisor has established a training plan 

for me and a timetable to follow.

4. If I try to conduct training at work, I experience 

frequent interruptions that make learning 

difficult.

5. My work obligations make it difficult for me 

to conduct training or continue my education 

during work hours.

Nearly 83 percent of participants agreed or 

somewhat agreed that their supervisor had an interest 

in their training needs. Yet, only 44 percent of survey 

participants indicated that their supervisor established 

a training plan and timetable for the employee to 

follow.

Sixty-eight percent of participants indicated 

that their supervisor did not give them time at work 

to engage in computer-based training, which is 

supported by 53 percent who agreed or somewhat 

agreed that their work obligations make it difficult 

to conduct training during work hours. Seventy-six 

percent of participants agreed or somewhat agreed 

that they experienced frequent interruptions while 

conducting training at work. Despite this apparently 

inadequate learning environment, 73 percent of 

survey participants responded that they would like 

to take more computer-based training courses to 
147 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Learner Interaction. The second category 

to receive several comments concerned learner 

interaction with others. Participants expressed a 

preference to learn by sharing ideas and experiences 

with other learners. Some expressed a need for 

feedback from an instructor and suggested that 

learning in an environment that included study 

groups and an ability to meet others was preferential 

to the isolated CBT environment. Several participants 

acknowledged the cost benefit of delivering instruction 

through the computer, but recommended delivering 

training through a synchronous or asynchronous 

web-based course in which learners had contact with 

other people, instead of the static CBT. While several 

participants expressed a preference for face-to-face 

classroom learning, others enjoyed learning through 

the computer as long as they had contact with other 

learners. One participant explained:

Classroom learning is still the best. Online 

learning is ok if there is contact with an 

instructor and other students, and everyone 

is required to participate. Self-paced online 

learning without contact with an instructor 

or other students is tedious and boring. I 

have taken online college courses where 

everyone was required to post information 

and assignments and I enjoyed it a whole lot 

more than this. I don't think people should 

be expected to learn new requirements by 

themselves. It might be ok for reviewing 

things you might have forgotten. I learn 

a lot from other people, so if I have to 

learn through the computer I want to have 

contact with other people online.

Table 9 shows the recurring themes in the 

comments pertaining to interaction with other 

learners. The comments in this category support the 

survey responses in which at least half the participants 

indicated a preference for online learning involving 

other participants.

Table 9. Learner Interaction

Theme Frequency

Need to share ideas and experiences 34

Prefer synchronous/asynchronous 18

CBT feels isolated/impersonal 11

Prefer face-to-face 9

Need instructor feedback 7

Enjoy study groups and networking 7

Many commented that they had to conduct training 

outside of work hours or outside the workplace 

because of the lack of time or because of a poor 

learning environment at the workplace. Several 

participants suggested that organizations provide a 

training center or a location away from the job site 

for employees to conduct training during business 

hours. Despite these negative comments concerning 

organizational support for computer-based training, 

the lack of organizational support appears not to have 

made learning through CBT a frustrating experience, 

as indicated by the findings in table 6. One comment 

seemed to sum up the issues that fell into the category 

of organizational support:

If training the workforce is so 

important, and organizations are required 

to meet a SECDEF workforce development 

goal, then why aren’t supervisors giving 

time to employees to do the training? 

My entire division had to complete two 

distance learning courses in a matter of 

a few weeks, but none of us were given 

time at work to get it done. The training 

required at least a couple of hours each 

day for two weeks to really understand 

the material, but “the mission” was too 

important to make the time...Most of us 

had to do it at home after work, or stay 

late, or come in on the weekend. Then it 

was a fire-hose of information and it was 

really hard to absorb. I understand training 

budgets are getting cut and facilities are 

limited for holding classes, so computer 

learning is the replacement. But you can’t 

expect people to do the training alone on 

their own time and get anything out of it.

The recurring themes in this category of 

Organizational Support are shown in table 8.

Table 8. Organizational Support

Theme Frequency

No time to train at work 32

Interruptions and distractions 29

Trained during personal time 13

Feeling rushed 6

Prefer training away from job site 5
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 148

Table 11. Technology

Theme Frequency

Login difficulty 14

Enjoy learning through technology 11

Boring course design 9

Complex course design 6

Appreciate ability to repeat sections 6

Slow connectivity 4

Summary and Discussion of Survey Results

The responses to the survey provided some 

interesting data on the learning preferences of 

employees and factors that facilitate or inhibit their 

participation in distance learning. 

The data revealed that neither age nor education 

appears to be a factor in the acceptance of CBT in the 

workplace. The data support previous educational 

research that age or education do not impact on 

acceptance of technology and computer anxiety 

(Dobrovolny, 2006; Jennings and Onwuegbuzie, 

2001; Park and Choi, 2009; Willis, 2006). On the 

contrary, only 2 percent of employees participating 

in the survey indicated an aversion to learning to use 

new technology.

However, organizational support does appear to 

be a factor in the acceptance of distance learning in the 

workplace. Participants expressed more frustration 

with the lack of time their organizations gave them 

to engage in compulsory distance learning, than with 

the CBT products themselves, or with the style of 

learning. Several participants also commented on 

experiencing an unfavorable learning environment 

when attempting to learn at work. Research shows 

that frustration during learning can lower performance 

and attitudes toward learning (Bandura, 1986; 

DeTure, 2004; Dobrovolny, 2006; Frankola, 2001; 

Gagne, 1985; Knowles, 1989; Moore, 1997; Ormrod, 

2008; Park and Choi, 2009). An environment that is 

not conducive to learning limits both the learning 

outcome and knowledge retention.

While most participants appear to accept CBT 

for workforce training, a majority of participants 

indicated a preference for a form of learning that 

includes contact with other learners, either in a 

face-to-face classroom environment, or through a 

synchronous/ asynchronous online course. 

I analyzed the research data to determine if there 

was a statistically significant difference in learners’ 

perceptions concerning their ability to learn through 

Information Relevance. Another area that drew 

comments from participants was the relevance of the 

training to the employee. Themes that emerged in this 

category are shown in table 10. Twelve participants 

indicated that the majority of information in the 

CBT they took had little or no relevance to their 

job, but they were required to take it for certification 

or recertification. Alternatively, some participants 

expressed appreciation at having helpful information 

immediately available. Some commented that the 

material was difficult to comprehend, requiring 

them to go back and repeat lessons, and they did not 

understand how the training was relevant to their job. 

Table 10. Information Relevance

Theme Frequency

Training was required but information did 

not apply 22

Information was useful/appropriate 16

Information was immediately available 4

Information was too detailed 4

Information was learned through experience 4

Technology. The fourth noteworthy category of 

participants’ comments centered on the CBT design 

and the technology used to deliver the course. Some 

participants experienced difficulty with logging into 

the BlackboardTM learning system. Some participants 

complained about the slowness of connection speeds 

and timing-out while downloading course materials. 

A few participants complained of complex layering 

and branching of lesson material, and losing track 

of where they were within the course lessons. 

Others complained that the lessons were tedious and 

boring, and time was wasted while clicking through 

screens in order to finish quickly. A few participants 

appreciated the ability to repeat sections of lessons 

to reinforce learning, and several participants 

commented that they enjoyed using technology for 

self-paced learning. These comments support the 

survey data that participants expressed a preference 

for online and self-paced training courses for initial 

or refresher training.
149 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

It may be beneficial to replicate this study using a 

survey with open-ended questions for participants to 

identify what it was that caused them frustration or 

helped them through the learning process. A further 

limitation of the survey was that it was only available 

online. Employees who may have experienced 

connectivity problems or who had aversions to using 

computers may have chosen not to participate for 

those reasons. Had they participated, the responses 

to many of the survey questions may have resulted in 

different levels of satisfaction. 

Responses from Military Participants

This study surveyed the civilian Security 

Cooperation workforce. This study did not take 

into account the survey responses from military 

personnel. I excluded military participants’ responses 

because the military participants generally had more 

experience with various forms of distance learning, 

since distance learning is widely used in military 

training. Additionally, most military personnel in the 

SC community have at least a bachelors’ degree, and 

have a more limited age range (25-45). Nevertheless, 

the responses of the forty-seven military participants 

are noteworthy. All of the military participants had 

a college degree, with 89 percent having a master’s 

degree. Ninety-one percent of military participants 

were in the age range of 35 to 44, and the remaining 

9 nine were in the age range of 26 to 34. Overall, the 

responses of military survey participants to the four 

primary research questions were more positive than 

their civilian counterparts.

For the item “I enjoy taking courses through the 

computer,” 82 percent of all military participants 

indicated that they agreed or somewhat agreed that 

they enjoyed taking courses through the computer, 

compared to 71 percent of civilian participants. 

Ninety-five percent of military participants responded, 

“I can learn equally well online or through computerbased training as I can in a face-to-face classroom 

environment,” compared to 51 percent of civilian 

participants. This higher preference by military 

personnel may be due to their increased experience 

with distance learning for their military and civilian 

education.

The majority of military participants (87 percent) 

responded that they disagreed or somewhat disagreed 

that computer-based learning is a frustrating process, 

compared to 68 percent of civilian participants. 

Ninety-one percent of military participants disagreed 

CBT relative to their age or relative to their level of 

education. The result of the data obtained from the 

online survey indicated that there were no significant 

differences in either category, although learners 

without at least a bachelor’s degree were somewhat 

more frustrated with the CBT learning process than 

those learners with a college degree. These results 

support previous educational research that suggests 

that age has no bearing on learning outcome, but time 

on task and learner attitude has a major impact on 

learning outcome (Knowles, 1989; Ormrod, 2008; 

Park and Choi, 2009). Park and Choi’s research 

revealed that the learning environment was the 

greatest factor in online learning completion and 

learner satisfaction. 

The overall frustration with the CBT learning 

process was low (24 percent) among all the survey 

participants. The slightly higher frustration level 

expressed by learners without a college degree may 

be related to limited metacognitive skills that are 

often developed through continued education, but 

it also may be caused by other factors. Since the 

survey did not ask participants to identify what was 

frustrating about the CBT learning process, I could 

only rely on the comments provided as part of the 

survey from those who chose to provide additional 

information. 

The findings of this research study support 

previous studies that age and education have no 

bearing on distance learning course completion. 

There is a general acceptance of distance learning 

for workplace training, although the environment 

under which the learning takes place appears to need 

improvement. Previous research has shown that 

the learning environment has an impact on learner 

satisfaction, which contributes to the learning process 

and knowledge retention. The learning in this study 

was compulsory for most participants. It is unknown 

how many employees would not have enrolled in the 

CBT or who would have dropped out of the CBT if 

they had been given a choice.

Limitations to the Study

There were some limitations to this research 

study that may have affected the results. The survey 

consisted of closed-end questions and required 

participants to select a response. The large number 

of “no opinion” responses in several questions 

may be due to participants’ lack of experience in 

that category, or refusal to disclose their opinion. 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 150

About the Author

Dr. Joanne Hawkins is a professor with 

twenty‐five years of teaching experience. She is a 

retired Army logistician and is the coordinator of all 

logistics instruction at DISAM. She also instructs 

in the topics of Security Cooperation programs, 

technology transfer and export controls, the FMS 

process, FMS finance, legislation and foreign policy. 

She holds a doctorate degree in education from 

Capella University, Minneapolis.

or somewhat disagreed that working through the 

CBT was an unpleasant experience, compared to 

67 percent of civilian participants. Nine military 

participants expressed a preference for asynchronous 

online courses in which they could interact with other 

learners and receive instructor feedback. 

The Future of Distance Learning

Computer-based training offers numerous 

advantages that appeal to corporate and government 

organizations. Training can be delivered to 

geographically dispersed individuals as needed. 

Computer-based training requires no special facilities 

or equipment, other than a computer, and perhaps 

an Internet connection. There is no requirement to 

travel to a training site. Employees conduct training 

at times that are convenient to them and learn at their 

own pace. For large organizations that have frequent 

and standard training requirements, CBT is cheaper 

to produce and distribute than is bringing employees 

to centralized training locations for face-to-face 

instruction.

Several Defense organizations including the 

Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Acquisition 

University, the Army Logistics Management College, 

and the Air Force Institute of Technology, are 

expanding their distance learning course offerings 

and products to keep pace with a rapidly changing, 

geographically dispersed workforce. To support the 

security cooperation community better, DISAM is 

considering developing additional CBT modules to 

provide just-in-time training on specialized skills, as 

well as more online courses. The feedback received 

through this online survey indicates that employees 

accept distance learning and are willing to use it for 

workforce development.

The results of this independent distance learning 

online survey may assist DISAM in developing 

instruction that meets the learning style preferences 

of the SC workforce. However, the educational 

products alone will not adequately train the workforce 

without improvement of the environment in which 

the employee is expected to learn. As distance 

learning continues to grow as a method of training 

the workforce, so must the organizational support to 

the employee to ensure that adequate learning and 

knowledge transfer takes place.
151 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

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153 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

domestic policy and American life, including the 

US commitment to human rights, American values, 

cultural events, American businesses, government 

institutions, the American legal system, and most 

importantly, exposure to American people. The 

blending of academic and cultural experiences is 

designed to present a fuller, richer picture of American 

society than could otherwise be had in the classroom. 

Ultimately, the primary objective of the International 

Fellows Program is to build lasting international 

partnerships by educating future foreign political and 

military leaders. 

Background

In order to assess how well NDU is accomplishing 

the objectives of the International Fellows program, 

the NDU Academic Affairs Office and International 

Student Management Office came together to design 

a study focused on student academic development 

and attitudinal changes. This collaboration resulted 

in a pair of complementary pre and post surveys 

delivered to the students upon their arrival in June 

2010 and at the time of their departure in June 2011. 

The surveys included several quantitative questions 

regarding the IF’s understanding of US political and 

social institutions, their perceptions of democracy 

and internationally recognized Human Rights in their 

home country, and a series of open ended questions 

dealing with their initial expectations and lessons 

learned from their time in the United States. 

Within the larger goal of assessing the 

effectiveness of the International Fellows Program, 

there are two objectives for developing the survey 

and conducting this research. First, the project is an 

attempt to capture in a systematic fashion the feedback 

of our international students and their impressions of 

the United States and the National Defense University. 

For years, students and alumni have shared with our 

faculty and staff their appreciation for their experience 

at NDU. The students often comment on the value of 

Winning Hearts By Broadening Minds:

By Adam Jungdahl and Paul Lambert

National Defense University

Measuring the Impact of International 

Military Education Assistance at the National Defense University

Introduction

The International Fellows (IF) Program at the 

National Defense University (NDU) is a one year 

fellowship for senior-level military officers and 

defense agency officials from around the globe. On 

average, some fifty different nations are represented 

at two of NDU’s senior Joint Professional Military 

Education (JPME) colleges: the Industrial College 

of the Armed Forces and the National War College. 

The selection process starts with a letter from 

the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff to his 

counterpart in invited nations, indicating that 

participants should be senior level officers with 

significant command experience. Attendees are 

then selected by their respective militaries based 

on their potential for future advancement and their 

desire to continue their academic and professional 

studies abroad. Historically, over forty percent of 

the Fellows go on to make flag officer or equivalent 

rank1, including several who go on to fill the highest 

positions in their country’s military and civilian 

defense agencies, including 42 Ministers of Defense, 

Chiefs of Defense, and Service Chiefs. 

During their time at NDU, the Fellows receive 

a broad, strategic level introduction to national and 

international security strategy. The international 

students learn side by side with their American 

counterparts from the US military and government 

agencies. With over fifty military and civilian 

organizations represented at NDU, International 

Fellows are guaranteed exposure to a wide variety of 

perspectives and opinions in the classroom. Outside 

the classroom, Fellows are encouraged to meet and 

interact with both their American and international 

colleagues. 

Beyond their academic studies, the Fellows 

also participate in outreach and cultural activities. 

These activities include a robust travel program 

throughout the United States that provides exposure 

to many aspects of United States (US) foreign and 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 154

perceptual questions assessing student expectations 

for the upcoming academic year. The post survey 

included both the comparison questions and several 

broader, open-ended questions on potential program 

improvements. Roughly sixty percent of the survey 

questions were identical in the pre and the post 

evaluations. The analysis below focuses on these 

questions for comparison purposes but also includes 

a few illustrative comments from the qualitative 

portion of each survey. 

The responses were aggregated for both 

surveys and are presented below on charts for 

visual comparison. ‘Difference of means’ tests were 

conducted on the scaled question responses. Given 

the relatively small sample size (n=46 and 34 on pre 

and post respectively), statistical significance was 

difficult to ascertain on certain questions though we 

feel the responses we received generally represent 

larger trends. We expect that as we gather more data 

from year to year, these trends will become easier to 

identify. 

Results

The survey results are arranged around three 

types of questions. The first set of responses required 

students to answer on a six point Likert scale the 

following question: “How confident are you that you 

understand the following items?” The question asked 

about confidence rather than level of understanding 

to avoid asking the students to rate understanding of 

subjects for which they would be receiving instruction 

that year. Asking an incoming student how much they 

understand prior to receiving instruction could be 

self-defeating as students are often unaware of what 

they do not know. Instead, students were allowed to 

self assess by indicating, in essence, how comfortable 

they are talking/writing/thinking about each subject.

Figure 1 compares the mean responses of the pre 

and post surveys for each subject area. First we find, 

perhaps not surprisingly, that students have varying 

degrees of comfort with different subject areas. 

Whereas respondents generally felt comfortable 

with the English language, they were more hesitant 

to assert their confidence in understanding the US 

health care and education systems. This is reasonable 

considering nearly all of the International Fellows are 

military officers focused on national security related 

issues and dealing only infrequently with domestic 

civilian institutions. As such, we see that beyond their 

confidence in the English language, the categories 

the lessons learned in the classroom, on travel, and 

in discussions with their fellow students. Comments 

like the following are not uncommon: “I truly derived 

inspiration from the teachings I received from NDU 

within the International Fellows Program, especially 

on Military Strategy. I applied my new knowledge 

and it was quite useful to me and the military.”2 Or, 

as another stated, “The education I received at NDU 

gave me new skills to better analyze events and make 

decisions. The knowledge I received allows me to 

better analyze every situation, critically think about 

problems and think strategically to find solutions 

with the collaboration of partners in the security 

community.”3 This survey tool allows us to collect 

this anecdotal evidence in a structured, quantifiable 

format in order to provide both program directors 

and academic advisors a better understanding of 

the elements of the international student experience 

that are having a measurable impact, and what areas 

require more attention. 

Second, in an environment of increasing 

budgetary constraints, the United States must 

allocate its foreign assistance assets in the most 

efficient way possible. In order to do so, decision 

makers must have a clear understanding of the 

return on investment that comes from international 

education and training programs. A long-standing 

challenge in foreign assistance, and in education and 

training assistance in particular, is gathering useful, 

coherent data that expresses the value and worth of a 

particular program. As such, this study was driven by 

the need to establish both the level and type of value 

international students receive from their year at NDU. 

At the outset we hoped that the data gathered from 

this study would complement the wider scholarly 

work on professional military education and training 

assistance4 and serve to highlight the most important 

aspects of the international student experience. As 

such, the results may be viewed as both an indicator 

of institutional effectiveness and a guide to overall 

programmatic improvement. 

Method

The desire to capture the effects of both the 

academic and cultural components of the international 

program influenced the design of the survey and its 

method of deployment. Early on we decided that pre 

and post evaluative surveys would be used to measure 

changes in student knowledge and perceptions. In the 

pre survey, comparison questions were mixed with 
155 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

student understanding in these areas. This finding 

is borne out in the qualitative feedback from other 

program surveys specifically designed to assess 

the International Fellows’ travel experiences. For 

example, one student wrote that “exposure to the 

American society has enhanced my knowledge on 

American culture, history and politics so that I am 

better able to understand how the United States sees 

the world.” Another student noted that, “traveling 

throughout the United States has immensely helped 

me in knowing about the country, its people, its 

advancements, and its values.”5

The second set of survey questions (figure 3) 

focused less on student understanding and more 

on student attitudes towards US institutions. The 

purpose of this section was to assess changes in the 

perception of the United States and its various civilian 

and military components. Survey respondents were 

asked: “Please rate your attitude towards/perception 

of the following items on a scale from 1 (Very 

Negative) to 7 (Very Positive).” Surprisingly, the 

results in the pre and post surveys to this section were 

quite similar and showed little statistical difference. 

As such, we were unable able to make any strong 

conclusions regarding student attitudinal change. 

We address this as a possible problem in the survey 

design in our conclusion. 

in which they report the most initial confidence in 

understanding are US government institutions, US 

political process/democracy, US foreign policy, and 

US culture. Confidence in understanding the US 

judicial system lies somewhere between these two 

clusters.

Second, figure 1 shows confidence levels in all 

eight subject areas improved considerably from pre 

to post survey. The increases in the mean scores in 

all subject areas were statistically significant at the 

.05 level. Figure 2 shows the percentage increase 

in confidence levels over the pre survey. Among 

the subject areas the smallest increase was seen on 

English language (10.4 percent) while the largest 

increase was on US culture (31.1 percent). All other 

items displayed an improvement of 20 percent or 

more. We speculate that the high initial confidence 

on the English language made it difficult to improve 

upon the mean score given the scale maximum of 

six. This could have artificially limited the possible 

improvement in confidence with the English 

language.

The consistent improvements in all eight areas, 

and the especially large increase in confidence 

in understanding US culture may be attributable 

to the combined effects of classroom and travel 

experiences. The opportunity to traverse the country 

and be exposed to the pillars of American life such 

as American values, cultural events, American 

businesses, government institutions, and the 

American people appears to significantly increase 

Figure 1. Average response scores for pre- and post-surveys by subject area
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 156

Figure 2. Percentage increase in student confidence levels by subject area

Figure 3. Average response scores of student attitudes by subject area.

Figure 4. Student home country level of democracy
157 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Conclusion

In the end, our findings indicate that the NDU 

experience is producing distinct learning outcomes 

in our international students. The survey results 

show a marked increase in student confidence in 

their ability to understand American social and 

political institutions. This seems to indicate that the 

IF program is achieving its goal of enlightening and 

educating students on the full range of political and 

security issues. It also implies that students are more 

adequately equipped to think strategically and speak 

confidently on issues of international security.

Particularly encouraging is the pre to post 

increase in student confidence regarding American 

culture. A vital component of the IF experience is 

the opportunity to meet and interact with American 

people outside of formal channels. Presenting 

American society as it really is rather than as it is 

portrayed in the movies and on the news is valuable 

in creating cultural, social, and political connections 

between our country and theirs. Ideally students 

will take back with them a more complete picture of 

American life; one they can share with their political 

and military leaders, colleagues, friends, and family 

members.

Unfortunately our results on attitudinal change 

questions were somewhat inconclusive. While there 

was little change from the pre to post survey, this 

does not necessarily imply that attitudinal change did 

not occur. Measuring an individual’s opinion towards 

an abstract concept like “the American political 

system” is notoriously difficult. Using a survey 

We did find, however, that student attitudes 

toward both the US military and the National Defense 

University were significantly higher than mean 

scores in the other categories. These high ratings 

for both NDU and the US military appeared in both 

the pre and post surveys. Student attitudes towards 

US foreign policy were lowest among the six listed 

items. Finally, IF attitudes towards the US political 

system, US civilian agencies, US culture, and the 

US commitment to human right lie somewhere in 

between these two clusters. 

Finally, the survey included two questions 

dealing specifically with democracy and human 

rights practices in the students’ home countries. 

The first question asked the students to rate their 

home country on a scale from very democratic to 

very authoritarian. The pre-test results show that 87 

percent of students feel their home countries are at 

least somewhat democratic (See figure 4). The next 

question asked, “Compared to the rest of the world, 

how does your country rank in its respect for Human 

Rights?” Figure 5 shows a clear downward shift 

in the perceptions of the IF’s home countries from 

the pre to post survey. This is also expressed in the 

change in mean scores from 3.83 to 3.68. In the pre 

survey a large majority of respondents indicated that 

their home countries were better than average in the 

realm of human rights (69.5 percent). In the post 

survey this dropped to 52.9 percent. For many IFs, 

it appears that the year at NDU may have provoked 

a more critical analysis of democracy and human 

rights in their home country.

Figure 5. Student home country human rights ranking
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 158

are repeated in future academic years. Whatever the 

result, we have much work to do in reporting further 

findings in our efforts to measure the effectiveness 

of the International Fellows Program and the larger 

efforts in International Military Education and 

Training. By seeking out what elements of the IF 

program work and what elements need attention, we 

can continually improve the international student 

experience while achieving larger US foreign policy 

goals. For now, however, we take heart in the fact 

that our data strongly suggests that the IF program is 

having an impact for good in the world. 

Notes

1. NDU International Student Management Office 

Alumni Database

2. Taken from a compilation of testimonials from 

alumni compiled by International Student 

Management Office at the National Defense 

University.

3. Taken form an alumni survey given at the 

National Defense University International 

Alumni Continuing Education Seminar at Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates, 2011.

4. See “State Department and Defense Department 

Study on the Effectiveness of the IMET Program: 

2007-2009” Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management and the Air Force 

Institute of Technology (March 2010).

5. See “Testimonials from NDU International 

Alumni,” International Student Management 

Office, National Defense University, 2011.

About the Authors

Adam Jungdahl is a research associate in the 

Office of Institutional Research, Planning, and 

Assessment at the National Defense University. 

This office is charged with assessing the full range 

of academic programs at the university, developing 

strategic and academic planning documents, and 

collecting information on students, staff, faculty, and 

other personnel for external reporting. Adam holds a 

bachelor’s degree in political science and history from 

Miami University and a master’s degree from George 

Washington University where he is also a doctoral 

candidate in the Political Science Department.

to do so is problematic given the various outside 

factors that can influence one’s mood at any given 

moment. Judging from the qualitative feedback and 

the comments made by past students we expect that 

the “non-finding” here may be a limitation of the 

method (survey research) rather than an indication of 

reality. For the upcoming academic year we intend 

to reevaluate the questionnaire design and explore 

alternative methods for collecting student feedback. 

Focus groups, for instance, may allow us to tease 

out more fully if and how foreign student attitudes 

and perspectives are altered over the course of the 

academic year. 

The last portion of the survey is useful in giving 

a sense of how the international students approach 

human rights practices and democracy more 

generally. The results show that the vast majority of 

IFs at NDU come from what the students describe 

as somewhat or fully democratic countries. This 

indicates that, at least from the student’s perspectives, 

many of their home countries are similar in political 

structure to the United States. For these students 

the democratic system and the American politicalmilitary relationship may not be quite as unique as 

we initially expected. 

The results of the question asking how students’ 

host countries rank on human rights are somewhat 

surprising. Here we find that their year of study 

at NDU may have changed several students’ 

conceptions of human rights practices or at least their 

perception of their home countries’ attitudes towards 

them. This is similar to the results of the previous 

question focusing on democracy where some IFs 

rated their home country as more authoritarian in the 

post-survey than in the pre-survey. 

A cursory look at the chart (figure 5) appears to 

reveal a shift in viewpoint from pre to post-survey. 

This shift includes fewer students ranking their home 

countries as “Above Average” and more indicating 

“Average” or “Below Average.” We speculate that 

the opportunity to witness American political and 

social freedoms first hand through field studies and 

as residents in the US, combined with scholarly 

discussions on human rights and liberal democracy 

topics, may have influenced their the international 

students’ post-survey responses. 

As noted previously, after thorough analysis 

of the survey tool and necessary modifications, we 

intend to continue this project and gather more data. 

We are eager to see if the trends we have identified 
159 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Paul Lambert is an assistant professor at the 

National Defense University and serves as the 

Academic Officer in the International Student 

Management Office. In this capacity, Paul oversees 

the academic objectives and assessment of NDU's 

international student programs. Paul holds a 

bachelor’s degree in American studies from Brigham 

Young University and a master’s degree from the 

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts 

University.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 160
161 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

services, and training or supervising that work within 

the context of the CONUS support environment, 

the SAM-C course fits the bill as the cornerstone of 

their training. The SAM-C is a prerequisite for the 

advanced SC courses that concentrate on a specific 

part of the SC process. Think of it this way: a college 

student usually begins their education by completing 

an undergraduate program in a specified field, like 

engineering, business, or education. Consider the 

SAM-C course as your specified field and completion 

of the course as your bachelor’s degree in security 

cooperation. You go into the SC workforce and soon 

you realize that your specific job requires an expertise 

in logistics. You have completed your SCM-C 

undergraduate studies, so now it is time to complete 

your graduate level degree, which in our case is the 

advanced course in logistics management, SAM-CS. 

The same scenario applies for advanced training in 

case management (SAM-CM), case reconciliation 

(SAM-CR), case financial management (SAM-CF), 

and advanced training, (SAM-AT). There are other 

courses offered both by residence and distance 

learning that may be of value too. To find out more 

about all of the DISAM courses, visit the DISAM 

web page at http://www.disam.dsca.mil/ and click on 

“Course Catalog/Registration” on the left side of the 

page.

Now that we know where SAM-C fits in the 

overall SC training regimentation, why change the 

course? The answer actually goes back many years. 

One of the biggest changes to the structure and 

method of teaching the course was the decision to 

teach half of it using Distance Learning (DL) while 

leaving the other half as a residence course. With 

the new century came the rapid growth in DL. One 

of DISAM’s first DL courses was the International 

Programs Security Requirements (IPSR) course. The 

IPSR was first taught by DISAM in 2002 and with 

the fresh course came the opportunity to add a DL 

version, which debuted in February 2004. During 

The Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management (DISAM) leadership developed and 

implemented the largest change to the CONUS 

course in its 34+-year history. In fact, the course 

structure and presentation method changed more in 

the last two years than if had in the previous twenty! 

Why the change? Why now? What is the structure of 

the new course?

To answer these questions and others, we must 

understand the role the SAM-C course fills in the 

larger picture of educating the Security Cooperation 

(SC) workforce. The SAM-C is but one of a multitude 

of courses offered by DISAM. The number and 

diversity of courses—along with methods of teaching 

them—has increased in recent years with the growth 

of SC as a whole. With this growth came increased 

visibility of the need for all persons involved in 

SC to have some level of training which, with 

experience, should translate to a degree of expertise 

that would have a positive impact on our processes 

and practices. This led to the task of determining 

who should be trained, at what level, and finally, how 

many people were deficient in required training. This 

data was a driving force for changes to the SAM-C 

course. Changes in adult learning, a faster work pace, 

major growth in the number of students, the need 

for more flexibility, the expansion in complexity of 

the subject, and other academic factors demanded a 

revolution, not an evolution, in how the course was 

taught. This leads to a discussion of how the new 

SAM-C is offered, structured and taught.

 Before we can answer the first big question of 

“Why the change?” you must understand where the 

SAM-C course fits in the full curriculum offered 

by DISAM to the very broad and diversified SC 

community. DISAM offers approximately seventeen 

different courses, some of which are taught in 

multiple formats and/or modified curriculum to fit 

the audience needs. For those working SC programs 

directly involving the transfer of military articles, 

The New Security Assistance 

Management-CONUS, SAM-C, Course

By John Smilek

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 162

Losing a valuable employee for two weeks of training 

is difficult not only for the supervisor but also for the 

employee who may return home to a huge backlog 

of work. With the addition of the DL portion of the 

SAM-C, the residence portion was reduced from ten 

days to five. Breaking the DL portion of the course 

into multiple modules gives students flexibility to 

complete the DL portion of the course over a twomonth period prior to their arrival at the residence 

portion. This also gave DISAM the leverage to 

offer the SCM-C more times a year and to take the 

course on the road. This leads to the final reason for 

changing the course at this time: the large increase in 

the number of students! 

So why the increase in students? Like many 

questions, there are multiple answers. The most basic 

answer is the rapid increase in the total amount of 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in recent years. In just 

four years, Fiscal Years 2005–2009, the amount of 

FMS signed Agreements went from under $10 billion 

a year to over $30 billion (See figure 1). The amount 

of personnel needed to carry out those agreements 

did not triple, but it did go up significantly. Further, 

while the level of agreements has dropped slightly in 

recent years, it will still take many people many years 

to execute the cases and they all need to be trained. 

the years since, the number of DL courses, and the 

DISAM staff to support this method of teaching, 

has experienced great growth. When the decision 

was made to convert the SAM-C into a hybrid DLresidence course in 2008 (and it had been considered 

for two or three years previously), the first part of 

the puzzle, the DL technology, was already in place. 

However, this still meant determining which pieces 

of the resident course could/should be placed online, 

and how to create modules to bring the online 

courses to fruition. Another reason for the change 

was the realization that the rise of PowerPoint in the 

1990s, while still a good tool, was not the best way 

to teach adult learners. This is especially true if a 

student has to spend six to seven hours a day looking 

at slides, resulting in the often-stated term, “Death 

by PowerPoint.” While PowerPoint is still used 

sparingly in the new version of the SAM-C, exercises 

during the residence portion of the course take 

precedence. DISAM students are a well-educated, 

and in some cases, a well-experienced lot. Learning 

from each other in group exercises, when guided by 

scenarios and armed with the references like The 

Management of Security Cooperation, better known 

as “The Green Book,” makes for a more constructive 

learning environment. Another reason for the change 

of the course is the increasingly hectic pace of work. 

Figure 1. Defense Security Cooperation Administration Historical Fact Book. September 2009.
163 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

levels and appropriate training is indicated in figure 

2 below. For example, if a person requires Level 3 

training, one way to achieve this is to complete the 

SAM-C course (noting that there are various Level 

3 DISAM courses largely based on the audience.) 

More information on the HPPG/SCTI can be found 

at http://www.disam.dsca.mil/hppg/.

Once the research for the number of SC persons 

in each level was completed, it became obvious that 

many more persons needed Level 3 training and the 

SAM-C course in particular, than were previously 

anticipated. Still, the HPPG/SCTI 95 percent 

completion goal, set by the DEPSECDEF, did not 

change. This resulted in an all out effort to revise and 

implement the new SAM-C course format in time to 

facilitate the needed throughput of the course. The 

two-week format literally would have taken more 

time than was available. Having the new course ready 

in February of 2011 made for a very tight schedule. 

DISAM added five of the two-week SAM-C courses 

This requirement alone did not demand the 

rapid change in the SAM-C, but adding DOD’s High 

Priority Performance Goal/Security Cooperation 

Training Initiative (HPPG/SCTI) did. Late in 2009, 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) 

reported to the Office of Management and Budget 

10 High Priority Performance Goals, one of which 

directed a concerted effort on SC workforce 

training. An interim goal was to have 80 percent 

of the SC workforce trained by the end of FY10. 

The ultimate goal was 95 percent of the workforce 

trained to appropriate levels, as designated by their 

supervisory chain, by the end of FY11. DISAM’s 

constituency organizations worked tirelessly 

since November 2009 identifying the workforce 

by billet, designating appropriate training levels, 

and providing this information, along with current 

incumbent information, to DISAM. This was a task 

never previously attempted because DISAM never 

had to account for particular billets. Specific training 

Figure 2. Training Levels

Level Position Details Training Required Website for Training

0 Positions with no substantive SC/SA 

involvement No training required N/A

1

Positions needing only an awareness 

of basic SC terminology or senior 

commanders and staff indirectly 

responsible for SC supervision

1–2 hour SC Familiarization

Security Cooperation 

Familiarization Course, 

or contact DISAM for 

CD

2

Positions needing only a basic 

understanding of SC terminology 

and processes or positions directly 

responsible for some aspects of SC, but 

for which extensive knowledge of SC 

programs is not required

Online SC Course (10–20 hours) 

plus International Programs Security 

Requirements Course

DISAM Online Learning

3

Positions working SC programs directly 

involving the transfer of military articles, 

services, and training or supervising that 

work

Requires Introductory SC Course 

(CONUS SA Management, 

OCONUS SC Management, 

Executive Training Officer, NG State 

Partnership Director, etc.)

Resident Training 

Information

4 Positions requiring advance understanding 

of SC/SA processes and policy

Requires Advanced SC Course (Case 

Management, Financial Management, 

Logistics Support, Advanced Training 

Management, etc.)

Resident Training 

Information
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 164

by a DL portion of the course, which culminates in a 

one-week residence course made up of presentations 

and exercises. The prerequisite is the International 

Programs Security Requirements (IPSR) course. 

Since October 2000, the IPSR course material has 

been integrated into the SCM-C course. Much of 

the material was covered in the Technology Transfer 

block with other material in Legislation, Acquisition 

and Logistics. IPSR has had a DL version since 

2004 and in Phase I of the course modification, four 

of the twelve lessons that made up the IPSR course 

were added as the first DL lessons of SCM-C. In 

1999, John J. Hamre, then DEPSECDEF, signed a 

memo establishing the IPSR course. In the memo, 

Dr. Hamre states, “All DOD personnel responsible 

for negotiating, overseeing, managing, executing 

or otherwise participating in international activities 

shall successfully complete the International 

Programs Security course.” To reinforce the need for 

this training, the following paragraph was added to 

DOD Directive 5230.20, “Visits and Assignments of 

Foreign Nationals.” Policy, Part 4.12 states, “All DOD 

personnel responsible for negotiating, overseeing, 

managing, executing or otherwise participating in 

international activities shall successfully complete 

one or more of the courses required by Deputy 

in FY10 in anticipation of the student number need 

which doubled the throughput of FY09, yet the 

FY11 student graduation rate was very impressive 

compared to past years. Figure 3 above shows the 

growth in SCM-C graduation over the last Fiscal 

Years.

Now that you can see all that drove the revision 

of SAM-C, let’s answer the questions as to what 

changed and what must be done to complete the 

course. Actually, the course went through two 

phases. In FY10 there was a review of the course 

structure. Repetitive and lengthy administrative 

blocks of instruction were shortened or deleted. 

The daily start/end times of the course were slightly 

extended and standardized. This allowed the duration 

of the SAM-C to be reduced from ten to nine days. 

Small group exercises and scenarios were added 

along with a DL block to reduce the amount of power 

point instruction and foster group learning. This gave 

the DISAM course Manager and Subject Functional 

Coordinators an opportunity to see what new material 

worked and what needed to be modified or replaced. 

Lessons learned in Phase I helped prepare for the 

major class structure changes implemented in Phase 

II. The second phase, which is the current structure 

of the SAM-C, consists of one prerequisite followed 

Figure 3. DISAM student registration data.
165 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

giving us the ability to surge throughput at the right 

time with less resident classroom requirements that 

take students away from their jobs. Also, it is easier 

to take a one-week course on the road than a twoweek course, thus facilitating throughput at locations 

where there is a high/priority demand. Third, 

DISAM’s academic calendar and classroom space 

are at a premium as the schoolhouse is presented with 

greater challenges for additional courses. 

The High Priority Performance Goal was met for 

FY11. That does not mean that the SAM-C course will 

stop evolving. There will always be new information 

to present and new methods through which it is 

presented. Through the work and dedication of the 

DISAM instructors and staff, along with feedback 

from the students, the course will continue to grow 

and improve. It is up to all of us to prepare the new 

SAM-C students so they can be trained and ready to 

take on the complicated, but rewarding, tasks that 

make up Security Cooperation Management. 

About the Author

John Smilek is a DISAM Associate Professor 

for the management of Security Cooperation (SC). 

He is the Functional Coordinator for the Technology 

Transfer and International Programs Security 

Requirements academic field and is the course 

Manager for the Security Assistance Management 

CONUS (SAM-C) course. He is also an instructor in 

SC logistics, acquisition, process and foreign policy 

academic specialties. John has a bachelor’s degree 

in technical education from the University of Akron 

and a master’s degree in management and public 

administration from Webster University.

Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated October 

22, 1999.” The DL version of the IPSR course is one 

of the authorized courses so it became the prerequisite 

for SAM-C. Any student enrolling in SAM-C that 

has completed the IPSR course previously need 

only send the DSIAM Registrar a copy of their 

certificate of completion and the IPSR prerequisite 

will be waived. Having students take the IPSR course 

by DL accomplishes two things: (1) It satisfies the 

requirement stated in the Dr. Hamre Memo, and (2) it 

makes best use of the academic time in the shortened 

resident SAM-C course.

The first stage of the new SAM-C is now DL. 

The emphasis is on the facts, figures and structure 

of Security Cooperation. The lessons that make up 

the DL portion of the course are the same topics 

that will be covered in the residence portion of the 

course, but now the student comes in with a baseline 

of factual information to build on. In order to retain 

the concepts learned in the DL portion of the course, 

students may not start the DL lessons until seventy 

days prior to the start of the residence course, and 

they must be completed no later than ten days prior. 

The ten day leeway allows the DISAM Registrar to 

tabulate the data and confirm the student has a billet 

in the class at least one week before the start of the 

residence portion of the course. 

The residence week consists of five days of 

academics that run between eight o’clock and four 

o’clock every day, including Friday. The classroom 

lessons include blocks of instruction that start with a 

fifteen to twenty minute PowerPoint overview of the 

topic followed by exercises that reinforce the online 

lessons and serve to simulate actual procedures, 

decision trees, work flows and problems associated 

with Security Cooperation. Topics addressed include 

US Government regulatory framework, technology 

transfer, FMS process, training, acquisition, logistics 

principles, financial management, introduction to 

the Security Cooperation Information Portal, and 

FMS and Direct Commercial Sales comparison. A 

complete syllabus for both the DL and Residence 

portion of SAM-C can be found at http://www.disam.

dsca.mil/disam1/external%20links/SAM-C.asp#syl. 

We accomplished a great deal in transforming 

SAM-C into its current format, which benefits both 

DISAM and our students and reflects a better use of 

all resources. First, and above all, we believe that it is 

a higher quality course than its predecessor. Second, 

we made the course easier for students to attend while 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 166
167 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

component of partnering. Building partnerships is 

a specific joint capability area (JCA) and a US Air 

Force core function. JCAs and core functions drive 

the resourcing of how military departments organize, 

train, and equip forces to support joint and combined 

operations. 

My assignment to Air University’s (AU) 

International Officer School (IOS), Maxwell Air 

Force Base (AFB), Alabama presented a unique 

opportunity to directly interact with hundreds of 

international military students (IMS) and families 

from around the world. It also gave me a chance to gain 

additional insight into their views and opinions about 

attending professional military education (PME) in 

the United States. During the 2010–11 academic year, 

AU had 171 students from 78 countries attending 

various courses at Maxwell AFB. This number also 

includes attendees at the Senior NCO Academy 

(SNCOA) on Gunter (an annex of Maxwell), as well 

as students at the Air Force Institute of Technology 

(AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Almost three 

quarters of the international student population were 

officers attending year-long courses at the Air War 

College (AWC) and the Air Command and Staff 

College (ACSC) at Maxwell. The remaining students 

attended the Squadron Officer School (SOS) at 

Maxwell, SNCOA, AFIT, and various short-duration 

professional continuation courses (PCE). Over 200 

international students pass through the doorways of 

the various colleges, centers, and schools located 

at Maxwell each year. Counting AWC and ACSC 

students and the families who accompany them, 

more than 500 “internationals” call Maxwell and 

the Montgomery area “home” during some point of 

the year. With education as the medium, IOS lays 

the foundation for building partnerships with our 

international students and families.

International student attendance at AU is an 

opportunity to promote mutual understanding and 

to establish good working relationships with US 

Efficacy of International Officer In-Resident Professional 

Military Education Attendance on Building Partnerships: 

A Survey of International Officers 

Attending Air University PME Programs 

By Lt. Col. Clay Akaishi Benton, USAF During Academic Year 2010

33rd Fighter Wing, F-35 Academic Training Center

Background

I have always been interested in the education 

and training of international military officers and 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs), to include the 

role they might play in building partnership capacity 

and, more importantly, their link to our operational 

and strategic goals. While I was at United States 

Pacific Command (PACOM) my peers and I were 

tasked to prepare the commander for his annual 

congressional testimony. When doing this, we were 

always asked to provide background and talking 

points on the role foreign military sales (FMS), foreign 

military financing (FMF), and international military 

education and training (IMET)—emphasizing how 

these programs performed in the larger context of 

theater security cooperation. The commander’s input 

to Congress would highlight the positive impact 

that programs like IMET have on establishing or 

maintaining our partnerships and alliances, but 

the words lacked supporting data to back them up. 

Other than the amount of money spent and the types 

of training provided, the input was not quantitative. 

It was generally accepted that IMET is a positive 

aspect of our engagement. After all, who could argue 

against shared experiences in education and training 

as a precursor to changing attitudes pertaining to the 

United States, democracy, human rights, and building 

enduring partnerships?

The US Air Force’s Global Partnership Strategy 

provides guidance to all Air Force organizations 

including the conduct or support of partnership 

activities for the combatant commander. The 

strategy states that the US Air Force must build, 

sustain, and expand relationships with partner 

air forces of all economic means and available 

resources. These foundational relationships are 

built upon, among other things, shared experiences 

in training and education. Shared experiences play 

a key factor in the formation of enduring relations 

between individuals and groups and are a necessary 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 168

FMS, in the context of providing military 

equipment, builds interdependency, while training 

and education programs, whether part of hardware 

purchases or a stand-alone program, are the bedrock 

for building enduring relations between people and 

countries. Until my assignment to IOS, I never had 

the opportunity to investigate and quantify this 

relationship. During my assignment I decided to 

collect data on IMS experiences and thoughts through 

a questionnaire.

The Questionnaire

The survey was a seventeen-question anonymous 

questionnaire with an attached envelope that was 

provided to each IO attending AWC, ACSC, and 

SOS (see survey in annex A). If the IO did not bring a 

spouse or family, only the first twelve questions were 

answered. Prior to distribution, the survey’s purpose 

was explained during group assemblies. The IOs 

were told that I was conducting research for a paper 

and that their honest feedback would be useful. I told 

them that their feedback would be anonymous and 

providing their country’s name was not necessary 

but I would appreciate if they indicated their home 

region. They were asked to fill out the survey, place it 

in the envelope provided and drop it in a box located 

at the IOS. 

Questions 1 through 3 were designed to see if 

there was any correlation between the amount of 

time the IOs had spent in the United States and their 

attitude and opinion of the United States. Questions 

4 and 5 gauged attitudinal change. Question 6 asked 

their opinions about the other international students.

Questions 7 and 8 attempted to determine if there 

was any correlation between time spent outside the 

classroom environment in a purely social setting and 

the student’s attitudes and outlook. The questions 

were born out of curiosity about group dynamics 

and the level of interaction or bonding between 

international students and their peers once they left the 

classroom. Adhering to a transactional model of IMS 

education and training, questions 9 through 11 got to 

the crux of determining the return on investment for 

the United States––an individual’s inclination, based 

upon positive or negative experiences, to provide 

assistance if or when needed.

Question 12 was an attempt to gauge the desire 

among IOs to continue their AU experience once they 

leave and to solicit recommendations on ways this 

could be achieved. Questions 13 through 17 were for 

officers and civilians and officers from other nations. 

The international officers (IO) regularly interface 

with US personnel, and the personal relationships 

that develop enhance future military-to-military 

relations and provide a basis for future interaction 

with US leaders and policy makers. Also, AWC and 

ACSC students are encouraged to bring their families 

with them during the academic year, although some 

may be prohibited by their countries due to lack of 

funding or internal political issues. Bringing families 

provides a unique opportunity to present a positive 

image of the United States. Since spouses and children 

usually interact with different sets of peer groups in 

their home countries, they can also serve as conduits 

for relaying tangible experiential impressions about 

the United States and its people. Although tax dollars 

cannot be used for specific programs geared towards 

dependents, IOS does provide support to families 

through various volunteer supported programs or 

nonprofit private organizations. IOS’s programs 

include the International Family Loan Program 

(IFLP), the International Family Orientation Program 

(IFOP), and the International Dependents English 

Course (IDEC).

IFLP is a private and voluntary organization 

affiliated with the IOS that provides international 

officers and their families the ability to use household 

items and car seats during their attendance at AU 

schools. The items are provided at nominal cost, and 

the IFLP does not make a profit. Money received as a 

result of the program is returned to the program. IFOP 

is a two-week; four-hour-per-day program focused 

on the families of AWC and ACSC international 

students and is wholly supported by volunteers. The 

program orients families to the local area and culture 

and eases the stress of relocating to a foreign country. 

Annual participation averages over 300 spouses and 

families; volunteers act as instructors for both children 

and spouses, and IOS personnel provide all planning, 

organization, and logistic and administrative support. 

IDEC focuses solely upon the spouses of the students. 

IDEC is a voluntary English language program that 

uses English as a second language curriculum for 

its program of instruction. The program is designed 

to help spouses learn and improve their English 

language skills. The overall goal of IFOP and IDEC 

is to make spouses and families comfortable enough 

to go out into the community and see and experience 

life in the United States.
169 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

been in the United States at least that long, while 

thirty-one respondents (48 percent) had not. 

Interestingly, I observed that of the twenty-two 

respondents whose attitude became more positive, 

over 70 percent had never been in the United States 

longer than a thirty‐day period until they attended 

school at AU. Thus, it would not be a stretch to 

say that internationals who actually spend time in 

the United States tend to have a generally positive 

attitude toward it. This result also shows that there 

is no substitute for actually experiencing a culture 

firsthand. One African student noted, “I have been 

coming to US for some time now and I have positive 

attitudes towards America and Americans despite that 

most of the people in the part of the world I come from 

just make speculations” (note: all quotations from the 

surveys are transcribed exactly as they were written). 

Similarly, another African student expressed, “I have 

managed to debunk some myths about Americans, 

but reinforced the belief that Americans will always 

remain exceptional.”

After their studies at AU, over 90 percent of the 

respondents either maintained a generally neutral or 

positive attitude towards the United States or saw 

their already-positive attitudes become even more 

favorable. Three respondents had a net decrease in 

their attitudes. The written input of one indicated that 

he or she experienced racism. Another found that 

Americans (which I interpreted to mean the local 

community) lacked interest in himself and his family. 

The third respondent did not provide enough written 

feedback for us to discern a particular reason(s) for 

the decrease in attitude. One respondent did not 

answer the questions related to attitudes.

Questions 1–5

Questions 1–5 were not an attempt at affirmation 

for the United States, and not all the input was 

affirming. For example, a respondent from the 

Asia-Pacific region commented that “America has 

used its ‘Democracy’ as an agenda to dominate the 

world in terms of economic, political, and social. 

Most of the people outside USA see USA is a very 

dangerous country more than communist country.” 

That respondent also said, “Generally the American 

people don’t like war but their foreign policy makes 

them involved in war.”

Many of the respondents acknowledged how 

the media had influenced their perception of the 

United States and its people. All respondents who 

those students who brought along a spouse/family. 

As with the questions directed towards the IOs, these 

questions sought to provide insight into attitudes and 

interaction.

The Respondents

There were 145 potential respondents; 64 

completed surveys were recieved, a 44 percent 

response rate. Over 200 IOs from more than 77 

countries attend AU’s schools annually. AU is a fully 

accredited university (accredited by the Southern 

Association of Colleges and Schools) and is the 

US Air Force’s (USAF) institution for professional 

military education for all levels of a commissioned 

officer’s development. PME occurs in three distinct 

levels of an officer’s development––beginning (SOS), 

intermediate (ACSC), and senior level (AWC).

Through a highly competitive process, the 

countries represented at AU are invited by the US 

government and the Air Force to nominate junior-, 

mid-, and senior-level officers from their service to 

attend the schools as full participants in the USAF 

beginning, intermediate, and senior developmental 

education (BDE, IDE, and SDE, respectively) inresident programs. Attendance at the schools serves 

as a key link for US foreign policy and for military 

interactions with other nations.

Students attending PME schools at AU are ranked 

as follows: O-1 (second lieutenant) to O-3 (captain), 

SOS; O-4 (major) to O-5 (lieutenant colonel), ACSC; 

and O-5 to O-6 (colonel), AWC, although an O-7 

(brigadier general) occasionally attends. The majority 

of the attendees are typically rated (pilots, navigators 

& etc.) officers (80 percent). At AWC, most have 

senior-level command experience and come from 

influential positions within their militaries and 

return to positions of equal or greater responsibility. 

Approximately one-third of past international AWC 

graduates have reached general officer rank, and 

several have achieved the highest position within 

their country’s respective service. Historically, 3 to 

4 percent of the attendees at AU PME schools go on 

to attain the senior post within their military (chief of 

staff equivalent); most also attain influential positions 

within their governments after retirement.

The Responses

Five respondents (7 percent) did not indicate 

whether this was the first time they had spent 

thirty days or more in the United States; however, 

twenty‐six respondents (40 percent) had previously 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 170

“I like the American attitude how they managing 

problem solving. They have rules, regulations, 

checklist for everything. This is also disadvantage 

because it could be a reason to ignore individual 

thoughts.”

“I thought the US was about shooting people in 

the streets and sex. The reason were your movies.”

Mexico/Central/South America

“Your society is like a huge laboratory that stands 

as a mirror on the future to the challenges mine will 

be confronting soon...very interesting!”

Middle East

“I didn’t expect (for) so warm relationships with 

Americans.”

South Asia

“As far as the people are concerned, I thought 

US is a very good nation for their country, but as 

for the US government is concerned. Their policies 

were always negative for the most of third world 

countries.”

If I did the survey over, I would refine questions 

4 and 5. The intent was to see if the way students 

described what they thought of the United States 

before course attendance changed or stayed the 

same. The intent may not have been clear based on 

the wording of the questions, but the input is no less 

valuable. The following tables represent the “before” 

and “after” statements:

mentioned the media noted that the picture portrayed 

was generally not positive.

An IO from the Asia-Pacific region offered 

interesting input about attitudes before and after 

course attendance. Some had identified their attitude 

before arrival as neither positive nor negative; 

the aforementioned IO offered this explanation: 

“By stating ‘neither positive nor negative’ I meant 

the perceptions I had on the basis of ‘surfaced 

information.’ The surfaced information I had about 

US was mostly media and cyberspace based which 

were misleading mostly. On the same note, the 

perception made here (after course attendance) 

is on the basis of ‘believe in seeing.’ My limited 

experience in US, specifically within the ‘social 

imperative’ of US military provided very positive 

impressions which have removed the misleading 

perception I had earlier.” Whether these comments 

were seen as generally positive or negative is of little 

consequence. What is not lost is the importance of 

IO’s allowing experience to form the basis of their 

thoughts or opinions.

The following are various comments, based upon 

region, for questions 2 and 3:

Africa

“I have a better understanding how domestic 

politics, interest group pressure the International 

policies of the US.”

“I am not concerned personally with USA issues 

and interests as long as they did not directly involve 

my country.”

“Base on the media coverage I had, I expected a 

bunch of arrogant people, totally full of themselves. 

I understood that most of their actions on the world 

stage had good intentions at the beginning, but the 

way they seemed to ignore everybody didn’t seem 

right to me.”

Asia-Pacific

“Having seen the things with own eyes and 

experienced systems, institutions and processes 

working, I am having a positive appreciation and 

attitude towards the US There are some deficiencies 

therefore room for improvement.”

 Europe

“I come from a great country, and this is also 

a great country, except that politics suck in both 

countries as everyone would agree.”
171 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Africa

Before After

“Insensitive” about the feelings and thoughts of other 

people especially those whose interests conflict with 

Americans interests. “Arrogant” in approach to securing 

their interest.

Proactive and Adaptive

Great Still great, but not so knowledgeable about the world 

out there. Think being a super power makes you inward 

looking.

Arrogant Cooperative and Caring

Asia-Pacific

Before After

Very punctuate (timely) & kind Not punctuate & arrogant

Blond, beautiful, anti-Muslim, racist, impatient, arrogant, 

extravagant, superficial, world police, materialistic, 

paranoid, show-off, and rude & open minded about sex.

Not all blond, big, overweight, individualistic, loud, can do 

mentality, patriotic, civic minded, like to volunteer, sincere, 

mostly conservative about sex especially those who have 

daughter and Americans are very much extreme either 

to the left or right. Either you are very fit or you are very 

big/fat most of the Americans including military students 

assume/generalize that all muslins are Arab; all Muslims 

are wither fundamentalist or very strict or religious. 

Islam is very tolerance or life and never condones any 

terrorist get. I’m glad that I’ve the opportunity to clear 

this matter out in my class. Not all Americans know that 

muslins are not Arabs or middle eastern.

Big city, people not much interaction with each other Not whole country as in #4, but in Alabama people are 

very nice

Europe

Before After

Hardworking, consumer oriented, polarized society 

(Dem X Rep - pres. Candidates), pro-neocon armed 

forces, superficial in cultural differences, patriotic, 

beautiful nature, same as the administration

Some are hardworking, differences in regions focus 

on state (not federal country), interpretation is very 

important and often changes, patriotic, realist - to - 

neoisolationist military, growing gap between people and 

politics(ticians)

Diverse, rich or poor, cowboys and Indians, capitalists, 

business as usual

Hard working, enduring, faithful to God and country, 

loyal, determined and opinionated. Have a big heart for 

other suffering

Acultural - Self Made Religious - Individualistic - Self Made - Idea Driven – 

Generous
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 172

Mexico/Central/South America

Before After

In general; arrogant!!! But professional Now I cannot generalize the American people you can 

find arrogant but less that I though most American are 

very kind. People inside military are better than the 

normal population.

US Centric, Low level of culture awareness, materialistic, 

hard workers

Religion, Mission/Work oriented, direct, equality, 

impatient, diversity, social networks, US centric, 

technology, and individualism.

Self discipline, responsibility, honesty, freedom Own space consciousness, personal friendship...official 

coldness, race, sex, religious tolerance

Middle East

Before After

Not friendly Not friendly, they concentrate on the task too much. 

They work for the whole week and have fun in the 

weekends; they have to eat too much.

Lonely people (not-engaging and caring) Very Friendly and Open minded to other people and 

respectful to other attitudes.

Business oriented, maybe a little bit arrogance and cold. Business oriented, warm, open to build relationships, 

military personnel is very high educated and professional.

South Asia

Before After

Outspoken, Confident, Insensitive Outspoken

Most of them have no knowledge about the events taking 

place in the world/out of the US

They have a strong belief to realize and maintain the US 

interests

Individual Pride, patriotic and have great respet for the 

people in uniform.

My perception has been validated.

Question 6

Feedback on question 6 (“Based upon your 

interaction with your fellow internationals, can you 

describe a particular belief or view you held about 

them/their country which was either validated or 

dispelled?”) highlighted several things. Just as US 

Airmen will seldom, if ever, get an opportunity to 

interact with such a diverse international group, 

the same can be said of the IOs. Also, as much as 

we believe that we ultimately benefit from this 

interaction, the same is also true for the IOs. Every 

country benefits by sending their officers to AU, not 

just to learn from and educate their US counterparts 

but their international ones as well. The following 

comments highlight some of the benefits:

“It’s so interesting to learn a lot of things from 

different countries, culture, traditions...I’ve never 

had such an opportunity...I had it this year, it was 

awesome.”

I imagined Afghanistan to be a country of 

narcotics, Al Qaida and Taliban, and dangerous. 

However, my interaction with my fellow IO from 

Afghanistan, there is hope to overcome all this.”

“The IO’s who are sent here are supposed to be 

sharp, open-minded people. Thus I’m not surprised 

that they are able to adapt to all these new cultures 

they are facing. It’s extraordinary to see how this 

very diverse group could get along so well in such 

a short period of time. The sad thing, though is that 

they’ll most likely blend in their societies again when 

they go back home. I think the merit of the US is 
173 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

It is interesting to note that there is a greater 

inclination to provide assistance if asked than to 

ask for it. The respondent who disagreed was from 

a European country, and his comments indicated 

that he did not believe his US counterparts were 

willing to cooperate with his particular country. 

This was surprising because his country enjoys very 

good military, political, and economic relations with 

the United States. The respondents who strongly 

disagreed were from Europe, Africa, and Asia Pacific. 

Regrettably only the respondent from Africa provided 

any comment associated with his feedback. In that 

case as well, the feedback indicated that the United 

States had no interest in his country. Respondents 

who agreed at any level often would add the caveat 

to their comments that their inclination to reach out 

was bounded by whether or not it was authorized/

approved by their government/military.

The responses serve as a reminder to be attuned 

to the needs for assistance among our current or 

potential partners and to possibly initiate contact. 

It is important in these and other cases to view the 

issues from differing perspectives: “I’d certainly be 

inclined to ask for help. I have reservations about 

whether they would be able to truly understand my 

problem from a non-US focused standpoint. I think 

they would genuinely like to help me. I’m just not 

sure they would know how to, or if their solution 

wouldn’t be worse. Despite the recent emphasis on 

cultural awareness, I think there’s still much to do.”

One hundred percent of the respondents to 

question 10 agreed they would be favourably 

inclined to assist if asked; this feedback could be 

viewed as validation of the worth of IO participation 

in PME. The comments include such feedback as the 

following:

“Again, one would be more inclined to go out the 

way and assist a US counterpart who has been close, 

and with whom I have established a bond. For others, 

one would definitely assist but not out of the way. So 

depends on relationships developed here in 1 year.” 

(Asia-Pacific)

“I appreciate the US people. I can understand 

their political leaders’ decisions, sometimes better 

than my US counterpart do. I’d be glad to help them 

whenever I’m in a position to do so. And I think it 

wouldn’t hurt the overall image of the US if they 

could be perceived as honestly requesting help in 

some areas instead of appearing to impose their 

views.” (Africa)

to create this open atmosphere where Arab officers 

had no apparent problems openly talking to Jewish 

people.

“Europeans are staunch ally of Americans—

Partly disputed partly validated—some disagree. 

Africans were not so smart–dispelled. Middle 

Easterners are no good, completely dispelled. Asians 

friendly, Validated.”

“I had not a good opinion about Serbs, especially 

after the war on Balkans. But after my stay here, I’ve 

changed my opinion absolutely.”

“Europeans are staunch ally of Americans - Partly 

disputed partly validated—some disagree. Africans 

were not so smart—dispelled. Middle Easterners

Questions 7 and 8

When IOs attending PME schools arrive at 

AU, they go through a seven-week prep course. 

The course is conducted prior to the arrival of their 

US counterparts for the PME course. During the 

prep course, the IOs share common experiences, 

challenges, and opportunities to interact on a social 

level. At the conclusion of the prep course, they start 

their respective PME course alongside US attendees. 

By this time, IOs have established social bonds and 

friendships among themselves. Although the prep 

course classes are exclusively for IOs, once they join 

their PME course, there may only be one to three IOs 

in their classrooms. Does the prep course actually 

facilitate closer personal relationships among IOs, 

more so than with their US counterparts once they 

arrive? Questions 7 and 8 were attempts to provide 

insight on this issue. Based upon the responses and 

feedback, the relationships among IOs established in 

the prep course do not appear to suffer when they are 

integrated into a new peer group.

Questions 9–11

Questions 9–11 could be considered the “money” 

questions. They provide insight as to whether 

international PME school attendance benefits the 

IOs’ countries and ours. We can look at the benefits 

from several perspectives––potential for attaining 

strategic goals related to PME school attendance; 

building partner capacity; establishing enduring 

relationships; and facilitating understanding 

between countries and cultures, thus reinforcing 

positive opinions or dispelling negative ones. The 

respondents were asked about their attitude toward 

either asking for assistance from or providing it to 

their US counterparts.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 174

The similar distribution of answers to questions 

10 and 11 should not be surprising since the US and 

international officers have so many shared experiences 

in the PME programs and the feedback from previous 

questions shows a high level of interaction between 

IOs and other IOs and between IOs and their US 

counterparts. As previously mentioned, these answers 

should also serve as validation to countries that either 

send or will consider sending officers to AU. The 

answers show one of many ways those countries reap 

the benefits of in-resident PME school attendance.

Question 12

While working security assistance programs at 

the combatant command (COCOM), major command 

(MAJCOM), and the country level, with respect to 

military education programs, I noticed that we have 

never done a good job with the follow-up needed to 

cultivate the initial relationships that were begun at 

our various education and training facilities. I tried 

to capture the receptiveness our international officers 

have for extending their AU experience and define 

ways this could be done.

Questions 13–17

International spouses and family potentially 

play a large role in imparting an understanding of 

the United States in their home countries based upon 

their personal experiences. Spouses and children 

have different peer groups, and it is reasonable to 

expect they will interact at many different levels 

socially and formally. No doubt their US and AU 

experience would be a topic of discussion. Because 

of restrictions on the use of funding to support 

spouse and family programs and because they are 

supported by volunteers, the ability of IOS to support 

such programs as IFOP, IDEC, and IFLP is always 

tenuous. These programs are specifically designed 

for acculturation, and they ease the shock of the 

international families’ moves. The families’ exposure 

to these programs occurs in the beginning of their 

transition, and they can immediately form the first 

lasting impressions. These programs, coupled with 

the entire year of living in the area, could have an 

impact on attitudes. Questions on these attitudes were 

included in the survey for the officers who brought 

their family along.

Twenty-one respondents (33 percent) indicated 

they did not have family with them during their course. 

Seven respondents (16 percent) did not indicate 

whether their family had ever been in the United 

States thirty days or more. Twenty-one percent of 

the families had been in the United States thirty days 

or more, but, for 63 percent, this was the first time 

they spent thirty or more days in the United States. 

The range of responses on the survey goes from very 

positive (VP) to very negative (VN). Thirty-eight 

respondents reported their family’s attitude toward 

the United States. Twenty-one respondents whose 

families had a positive (P) (seven respondents) or 

very positive (forteen respondents) attitude to the 

United States before coming here reported no shift 

in attitude. Some comments from this group include 

the following:

“My wife loved the IFOP program. She loved 

her staying here, my daughter too. You know what, I 

have to save money because she told me that the best 

present I could give her is to take her back to the US 

for a vacation.”

“They want to stay.”

“Especially my kids, they speak now English 

fluently. My wife established good relations with a 

lot of women (American and international).”

Fifteen respondents reported that their family’s 

attitude became more positive––two slightly 

negative (SN) became neither positive nor negative 

(NPN); one slightly positive (SP) became very 

positive (VP); four NPN became P; one SP became 

P; seven P became VP. Of the fifteen respondents, 

ten (66 percent) indicated this was the first time they 

had spent thirty or more days in the United States. 

One additional respondent indicated this was not the 

first time his family had spent that length of time in 

the United States. He said his wife liked this stay but 

not their first one and further commented, “She is sad 

to leave ‘Sweet Home Alabama’ many friends inside 

military community as well as outside.”

Some additional comments from this group 

include the following:

“Schooling was good and for spouse shopping 

was very good.”

“Very favourable and positive due to the love and 

care provided by local volunteers.”

“The Social environment and the freedom they 

had here doing nothing but socialize transformed my 

wife to like this place very much.”

“They don’t want to go home! What to do now!”

Not all attitudes remained or became more 

positive. One respondent went from P to SN, and one 

went from P to SP. The P to SN respondent indicated 

that issues related to US policy on healthcare 
175 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

was shared with our directorate or any of the incountry security cooperation offices.

2. Develop legislative initiatives that allow the use of 

funds to support programs specifically designed 

for the spouse and families of international 

officers. Currently there are restrictions for using 

US government funds to support spouses and 

families. Because the impact families can have 

on perceptions and partnerships, at the Air Force 

and COCOM level, advocacy for change in the 

form of legislative initiates should be developed. 

A combined Air Force and COCOM legislative 

initiative could have even greater effect due to 

the partnership and theater security cooperation 

benefits each derives from having families 

accompany the IO to in-resident PME schools.

3. Develop means to extend the AU/US experience 

for IOs and their families. This could be done 

through the wide use of alumni associations 

and the regular solicitation of IO alumni to 

provide articles or updates on their professional 

development. The key is to keep in contact and 

update IOs on “their” university. AU should 

continue to press the theme: as an alumnus, you 

are indeed different based upon your experience 

and accomplishment.

4. Line the academic circle with the flags of 

international partners. Because AU’s academic 

circle is the home to SOS, ACSC, and AWC, flags 

of international partners should be displayed 

in the same manner as the flags of US states. 

Although each of the colleges does display 

international flags in its building, a better, more 

visible reminder of our international audience 

is required. Having worked with IOs, never 

underestimate the power of visual symbology. 

This display would punctuate the fact AU is a 

world-class institution of higher education.

5. Provide the ability to purchase standardized 

medical coverage to meet US government policy 

requirements. Much progress has been made by 

each of the individual services, but there should 

be a standard offering or review process among 

all services.

6. Work with in country Security Cooperation 

Office to track progress of IOs. Although the 

SCOs are required to keep track of IOs who have 

coverage for international spouses and families had 

an impact on his family’s attitude. This officer said 

that his wife initially was more excited than he was 

about attending a course in the United States, and then 

they had issues with the medical policy: “My spouse 

could not stay for whole period because of ‘insurance 

issue’––an issue which I think IOS and my country 

needs to work out very seriously. I accepted this one 

as my fate. It had serious implications on my study.” 

Although the respondent categorized this as an IOS 

issue, any shortcomings with the policy will actually 

have to be resolved at a level much higher than IOS. 

However, this incident does illustrate an unintended 

impact on our ability to build lasting relationships 

with our partners. The P to SP respondent stated, 

“Americans, Esp. spouses, were not keen to engage 

IO spouses.”

Recommendations

The following recommendations are based not 

only upon the responses from the survey but also on 

my past experience in previous security cooperation/

building partnership (BP) capacity jobs and on my 

daily interaction with IOs and their families. These 

recommendations are intended to further the Air 

Force’s core function of BP and, more importantly, 

set the conditions for enduring relationships with our 

international partners. The recommendations reflect 

actions at both the strategic and operational levels.

1. Institutionalize a survey similar to this one and 

share the results. AU, as well as the other service 

PME/PCE schools, is a cache of data that could be 

mined, providing insight into ways of increasing 

cross-cultural competence and advancing the 

Air Force’s BP mission. AU, however, is unique 

compared to the other services’ schools because 

all its BDE, IDE, and SDE schools are in one 

location. A survey such as this provides what I 

refer to as quantifiable qualitative data. Although 

the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

(DSCA) does require students who attend AU’s 

PME/PCE courses to complete an IMET survey, 

the ability to assess our effectiveness is limited 

because feedback is not received from every 

non-IMET attendee. Also, the IMET survey in its 

current form does not solicit the type of feedback 

that would be the most useful for those charged 

with operationalizing our BP mission. In all 

my time at PACOM, I cannot recall an instance 

when any results or analysis of the IMET survey 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 176

About the Author

Clay Benton is the International Military Student 

Officer (IMSO) and Foreign Affairs Specialist for the 

Joint Strike Fighter / F-35 Lightning II program and 

is assigned to the F-35 Academic Training Center, 

33rd Fighter Wing, Eglin AFB, FL. He is responsible 

for matters related to student administration for 

the programs international partner countries—

UK, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, 

Denmark, and Norway, as well as other countries 

that will purchase the F-35 through Foreign Military 

Sales. Clay retired from active duty 1 April 2011; 

his last assignment was as Dean of Students and 

IMSO, International Officer School, Air University 

(AU), Maxwell AFB, AL. In that capacity he was 

responsible for the Air Force’s largest population 

of international officers and non-commissioned 

officers attending professional military education, 

including their families. He has also served as 

Chief, Security Cooperation Programs at Camp 

Eggers Afghanistan and Chief, Security Assistance 

Programs for US Pacific Command. He is a DSCA/

SAF IA Professional Level III and is a member of the 

Society for International Affairs. He can be reached at 

clay.benton@eglin.af.mil

completed training and education, this is usually 

a low priority compared with other duties. AU 

has a vested interested in keeping in touch with 

IOs because their AU experience can make a 

difference.

7. Incorporate enlisted members into the 

International Honor Roll. IOS is home to 

the International Officer Hall of Fame. For 

IO attendees at AU courses, those who have 

attained the highest position in their military or 

a prominent government position are eligible for 

induction to the hall. Because of the important 

role a professional enlisted corps plays, the 

same consideration should be afforded senior 

NCOs that attain their country’s highest enlisted 

position, similar to the chief master sergeant of 

the Air Force.

8. Provide a separate welcome package for families. 

Although the IOs are provided a package of 

useful information upon arrival/in-processing, 

this information does not always make it into the 

hands of the spouses/families, and its purpose 

is different than that of a family packet. A 

packet of information designed to help ease the 

family’s transition would do much to further the 

acculturation process.

Acknowledgement

I want to thank Air University and International 

Officer School for allowing me to further the Air 

Force Building Partnership function; they truly do 

make a difference one international student and 

family at a time. To Air Force Research Institute for 

their invaluable assistance in editing this paper, and 

to every international military student and family— 

you came here to learn, but ended up teaching as well.
177 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Annex A

AWC / ACSC / SOS International Student Research Survey

I am doing research for a paper and would like to have you fill out this survey. This survey is and 

will be anonymous, but I do ask you at least provide the region of the world you are from—this will 

be relevant to determine any attitudinal trends based upon what part of the world you are from. 

The survey includes an envelope so you can seal your survey in order to ensure your anonymity 

and privacy is protected. Please return your sealed envelope to the individual who provided you 

the survey, they in turn will ensure it gets to me. Please provide the answer(s) which best fit 

your thoughts/feeling. As with all things academically related, the rules of academic freedom and 

non-attribution are in force. Thank you very much.

Lt Col Clay Benton

(OPTIONAL) What country are you from? _______________________________________

If you do not want to provide your country, please provide what region of the world you are from 

(please circle)?

North America

Mexico/Central/South America

Europe

Middle East

Africa

South Asia

Asia-Pacific

1. This is the first time I have spent 30 or more days in the United States. YES NO

2. Before my course attendance, my general attitude toward the United States was:

VERY 

POSITIVE POSITIVE SLIGHTLY POSITIVE

NEITHER 

POSITIVE OR 

NEGATIVE

SLIGHTLY 

NEGATIVE NEGATIVE VERY NEGATIVE

Comments: 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 178

3. My current attitude towards the United States is: 

VERY 

POSITIVE POSITIVE SLIGHTLY POSITIVE

NEITHER 

POSITIVE OR 

NEGATIVE

SLIGHTLY 

NEGATIVE NEGATIVE VERY NEGATIVE

Comments: 

4. Before my course attendance, the word/words which best describe what I thought about the 

people of the United States is:

Comments: 

5. After my course attendance, the word/words which best describe what I think about the people 

of the United States is:

Comments: 

6. Based upon your interaction with your fellow internationals, can you describe a particular belief 

or view you held about them/their country which was either validated or dispelled?

Comments: 
179 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

7. Outside of the classroom / academic environment, how much time did you spend interacting 

with your United States class counterparts?

NEVER

OCCASIONALLY 

(At least twice a month or less than 

2 hours a month)

FREQUENTLY

(At least twice a month or more 

than 2 hours a month)

VERY FREQUENTLY

(At least once a week)

Comments: 

8. Outside of the classroom / academic environment, how much time did you spend interacting 

with your fellow internationals?

NEVER

OCCASIONALLY 

(At least twice a month or less than 

2 hours a month)

FREQUENTLY

(At least twice a month or more 

than 2 hours a month)

VERY FREQUENTLY

(At least once a week)

Comments: 

9. Based upon my experience this past year, if I needed assistance related to my position in my 

countries military/government, I would contact one of my United States counterparts if I 

believed they were in a position to assist me?

STRONGLY 

AGREE AGREE SLIGHTLY AGREE

SLIGHTLY 

DISAGREE DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE N/A

Comments: 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 180

10. Based upon my experience this past year, if I am in a position to do so, I am favourably inclined 

to assist one of my United States counterparts if they contacted me?

STRONGLY 

AGREE AGREE SLIGHTLY AGREE

SLIGHTLY 

DISAGREE DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE N/A

Comments: 

11. Based upon my experience this past year, if I am in a position to do so, I am favourably inclined 

to assist one of my international counterparts if they contacted me?

STRONGLY 

AGREE AGREE SLIGHTLY AGREE

SLIGHTLY 

DISAGREE DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE N/A

Comments: 

12. I am interested in staying in touch with events related to Air University and/or International 

Officer School?

STRONGLY 

AGREE AGREE SLIGHTLY AGREE

SLIGHTLY 

DISAGREE DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE N/A

Comments: 
181 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

If you have a spouse and/or children who were with you 30 or more days at any time during your 

course attendance, please answer questions 13-17

13. This is the first time my spouse/children have spent 30 or more days in the United States?

YES NO

14. Before my spouse/children’s stay in the United States, their general attitude towards the United 

States was:

VERY 

POSITIVE POSITIVE SLIGHTLY POSITIVE

NEITHER 

POSITIVE 

NOR 

NEGATIVE

SLIGHTLY 

NEGATIVE NEGATIVE VERY NEGATIVE

Comments: 

15. The current attitude of my spouse/children towards the United States is: 

VERY 

POSITIVE POSITIVE SLIGHTLY POSITIVE

NEITHER 

POSITIVE 

NOR 

NEGATIVE

SLIGHTLY 

NEGATIVE NEGATIVE VERY NEGATIVE

Comments: 

16. How much time did your spouse/children interact with anyone they met from the United 

States?

NEVER

OCCASIONALLY 

(At least twice a month or less than 

2 hours a month)

FREQUENTLY

(At least twice a month or more 

than 2 hours a month)

VERY FREQUENTLY

(At least once a week)

Comments: 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 182

17. How much time did your spouse/children interact with any of their fellow internationals?

NEVER

OCCASIONALLY 

(At least twice a month or less than 

2 hours a month)

FREQUENTLY

(At least twice a month or more 

than 2 hours a month)

VERY FREQUENTLY

(At least once a week)

Comments: 
183 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

their home nations. IMET offers great benefit to 

the US taxpayers and improves the perceptions 

of the US in the minds of graduates.

2. The IMETP should receive additional funding 

to increase student training in the United 

States. For over fifteen years, Republicans 

and Democrats have argued that IMET should 

increase to $100 million. Inflation adjusted, this 

target value would exceed $150 million since 

the $100 million proposed as a long-term goal 

by President Clinton’s administration in te late 

1990s. The proven benefits of this program 

justify such an increase along with an increase 

in international student capacity at US military 

schools.

3. IMET expansion should include maximum 

participation in US residence courses. Short 

duration mobile training teams likely would 

not have the same benefits as indicated in this 

study—but further research would need to be 

conducted to validate this opinion.

4. Professional military education courses should 

continue as the cornerstone of the IMETP. In 

every question category, graduates of PME 

returned more positive scores indicating greater 

benefit from their training. PME also permits 

the US to reach the “best and brightest” of our 

emerging partners.

“The IMET program is a great opportunity for 

military personnel around the world to develop their 

skills and better understand the US approach to 

dealing with issues worldwide. It builds connections 

that will hopefully facilitate diplomacy and peaceful 

resolution of crises.”—2008 US-trained international 

military student

State Department and DISAM Study on the 

Effectiveness of the International Military 

Education and Training (IMET) Program

By Dr. Mark Ahles, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Dr. Michael T. Rehg, Air Force Institute of Technology and California State University, Chico

Mr. Aaron Prince, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Ms. Litsu Rehak, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Executive Summary

This paper analyzes the results of a survey 

administered to a representative sample of 

International Military Education and Training 

(IMET) Program graduates in 2007–2009 at US 

military schools. The survey focuses on questions 

related to the “purposes” of IMET as defined in US 

law: (1) effective and mutually beneficial relations 

and increased understanding between the United 

States and foreign countries in furtherance of 

the goals of international peace and security; (2) 

improved ability of participating foreign countries to 

utilize their resources with maximum effectiveness, 

thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by 

such countries; and (3) to increase the awareness of 

nationals of foreign countries participating in such 

activities of basic issues involving internationally 

recognized human rights

All IMET students at a statistically-representative 

sample of schools completed an online questionnaire 

at graduation assessing their self-perception of 

any gain in knowledge and understanding related 

to IMET purposes. An analysis of the results of 

the surveys shows a strong increase in student 

understanding of the goals of international peace and 

security, utilization of defense resources, increased 

military capability, and improved understanding of 

internationally recognized human rights. Therefore 

the IMET program is achieving its Foreign Assistance 

Act mandated purpose.

This paper conducts further detailed analysis 

and makes four recommendations based upon this 

analysis: 

1. The IMETP should continue. It meets its 

mandated purposes at very low cost to the US 

each year (less than $100 million). Other studies 

show great benefit to the US forces and the rise 

of IMET graduates to positions of prominence in 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 184

IMET funded training. Because of the breadth and 

reach of the IMET program, it is the flagship of US 

military training efforts.

The US Congress requires evaluation of all 

government programs regarding performance 

as related to program goals and measurements 

(Government Performance and Results Act of 

1993).4 The State Department meets this requirement 

in the annual Congressional Budget Justification 

by describing the broad IMET goals and specific 

country allocations and plans.5 This performance 

measurement, however, does not indicate if the 

program is meeting the broader Congressional 

purposes of the IMET program. Until 2007 the US 

Defense and State Departments had never conducted 

a wide-spread analysis as to the effectiveness of the 

IMETP in meeting these Congressionally mandated 

goals. In 2007, the US State Department requested that 

the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 

assist in just such an evaluation of the IMETP. State 

Department designed a survey for IMET students. A 

long-term study analyzing of the results of this survey 

would be used to demonstrate IMET performance (or 

lack thereof) and potential areas for improvement in 

the execution of the IMETP.

This paper analyzes the surveys of IMET 

graduates in 2007, 2008, and 2009 to determine if 

IMET is accomplishing the legal goals of the program. 

Analysis of the survey results will also show areas for 

program improvement. The analysis will show that 

the International Military and Education Training 

Program does meets the congressionally mandated 

purpose for the program.

Background And Related Research 

Congress initially authorized the International 

Military Education and Training Program in 1976 

with two purposes: (1) to encourage effective 

and mutually beneficial relations and increased 

understanding between the United States and foreign 

countries in furtherance of the goals of international 

peace and security; (2) to improve the ability of 

participating foreign countries to utilize their 

resources, including defense articles and defense 

services obtained by them from the United States, 

with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to 

greater self-reliance by such countries. A third goal, 

(3) to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign 

countries participating in such activities of basic 

issues involving internationally recognized human 

rights, was added as a purpose in 1978.6

Introduction

The United States government conducts a wide 

variety of foreign aid programs. Significant among 

these are US security assistance programs. Security 

Assistance programs authorize military sales and 

fund the US State Department grants of militaryrelated equipment, support, training, and services 

to friendly and allied nations. In addition, Congress 

has authorized and made funds available for the US 

military to provide military equipment, services, and 

training to allied nations under a variety of security 

cooperation programs. The vast majority of security 

cooperation and security assistance programs 

provide and supports military equipment. Although 

less financially significant, the US State Department 

and the Department of Defense also fund military 

education and training of recipient nations by the US 

military via a variety of programs. 

Each year the US military conducts extensive 

training of our foreign military partners under security 

cooperation and security assistance programs—

averaging approximately 75,000 total students each 

year. In 2006, for example, the US trained 77,100 

students from 149 countries with a total training value 

of $431.3 million.1 These students represented every 

region of the world, military and civilian defense 

staff, and officers and enlisted soldiers. Training and 

education ranged from enlisted basic schools through 

senior officer professional military education.

The training for the majority of these students is 

funded directly by a relatively small number of more 

prosperous US friends and allies through the foreign 

military sales process. Most nations, however, do 

not have sufficient resources to fund training of 

their officers in the United States. To permit security 

assistance training with these nations, representing 

the majority of the world’s nations, Congress 

authorized the International Military Education 

and Training Program (IMETP or IMET) in 1976. 

Because IMET permits training and education with 

the 140 partner-nations (2008 numbers)2 with whom 

the US military might otherwise be unable to partner 

(or would have limited options due to limited partner 

nation funds) it is an invaluable engagement tool 

for US international efforts. As previously stated, in 

2006 the US trained with 149 partner nations. 107 

of these nation’s students were funded via IMET.3

These students represent a wide range of military 

ranks—with many key senior leaders participating in 
185 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Congress has often asked questions of both the 

State and Defense Departments regarding the efficacy 

of foreign military training. The United States 

Government Accountability Office conducted a 1990 

report designed to make general observations on the 

IMET program based upon a request by Senators 

Leahy and Graham in 1990. Specifically, the GAO 

attempted to determine “whether the Department of 

State and Defense had (1) complied with program 

policies and (2) met the US foreign policy objective 

of exposing IMET trainees to US values, including 

human rights.”17 In broad terms, they reported that 

the IMETP was exposing IMET trainees to US 

values and human rights. This was a beneficial 

finding, but not a broad validation that IMET was 

meeting its purpose as designed. For example, the 

2002 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act 

stated in section 581 that “Not later than June 30, 

2003, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 

the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the 

Committees on Appropriations describing in detail 

the steps that the Departments of State and Defense 

are making to improve performance evaluation 

procedures for the International Military Education 

and Training (IMET) program and the progress that 

the Departments of State and Defense are making in 

implementing section 548 of the Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961.’’18 The response was a report on the 

existing programs (not publically accessible) and a 

decision by the Political-Military Bureau of the State 

Department to further pursue a more comprehensive 

study.

The US Defense and State Departments have 

had numerous and valuable anecdotal stories of the 

success of IMET. Each year every embassy provides 

a list of IMET graduates in “positions of prominence” 

as part of their Combined Education and Training 

Program Plan. These success stories are similar 

to Amnesty International’s report—they validate 

individual successes, but not broad program success. 

Specific school curriculum are also validated as to 

their content relationship to IMET. But until 2005, 

neither department had directed a broad attempt to 

demonstrate that the IMET program as a whole is 

accomplishing its legal purpose. Recognizing that 

both departments could improve IMET performance 

evaluation, the State Department and DSCA has 

recently funded two efforts to provide a more 

comprehensive evaluation of IMET.

Due to the often contentious nature of international 

military training (not all recipient militaries have broad 

support in the United States), a number of American 

and/or international organizations have concerns with 

these programs (Amnesty International’s Report on 

Human Rights Violations in Countries Receiving US 

Security Assistance,

7

 for example) and cite anecdotes 

related to the IMET to demonstrate program failure, 

but they do not conduct analytic research to validate 

their broad concerns. The one in-depth book on the 

topic, Clarke, Connor, and Ellis’s Send Guns and 

Money: Security Assistance and US Foreign Policy8 

provides a comprehensive overview of US Security 

Assistance Programs and their relationship to 

National Security. The book is a broad exploration of 

the history and current execution (macro level only) 

of US programs—but not an evaluation of IMET.

A number of primarily military writers have 

analyzed aspects of the IMET program. US senior 

military school students have done a number of 

IMET papers and The Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management Journal provides a further 

wealth of such information. All of these papers 

typically are based upon a single writer’s SA 

experiences and do provide excellent background 

material. Brewer (“United States Security Assistance 

Training of Latin American Militaries: Intentions and 

Results”10) and Crawford (“The Search for Stability 

in Sub-Saharan Africa: An American Perspective”11), 

in their respective research, provide a good sample 

of Security Assistance research within the military. 

Calhoun, in his graduate thesis “Evaluating Security 

Assistance Programs: Performance Evaluation and 

the Expanded International Military Education 

and Training (E-IMET) Program”12 at the Naval 

Postgraduate School, proposes a method for evaluating 

the Expanded International Military Education and 

Training Program (E-IMET), but Calhoun’s proposed 

evaluation was never implemented. Other research 

(Cope,13 Keeling,14 Kratsas,15 and Reynolds16) 

explore the IMET program’s value in specific regions. 

Each of the studies demonstrates that the IMET 

program has value as specifically studied, and that 

the program provides and will continue to provide 

significant advantages to the US in foreign relations 

and military operations. Again, however, the research 

does not focus on the entirety of the IMET program, 

just specific countries or regions.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 186

The “IMET Survey”

The second study, or the “IMET Survey,” is the 

subject of this paper’s analysis. It began with a proofof-concept in 2006. The questions for the survey 

were designed by a team of State Department staff 

experienced in surveys of international subjects. 

These questions (listed below) approached the goals 

of IMET from a variety of overlapping angles. The 

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management 

was then asked to implement and analyze the results 

of this survey (the Air Force Institute of Technology 

has partnered with DISAM in the research).

Students were asked to provide a likert-scale 

response (value 1–4 relating to each question, using 

an even number designed specifically to force a 

positive or negative response with a “no comment” 

option which was not considered in survey results) to 

the following questions related to the FAA purposes 

of IMET:

FAA IMET Purpose One: Encourage effective 

and mutually beneficial relations and increased 

understanding between the United States and foreign 

countries in furtherance of the goals of international 

peace and security.

FAA IMET Purpose Two: Improve the ability 

of participating foreign countries to utilize their 

resources, including defense articles and defense 

services obtained by them from the United States, 

with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to 

greater self-reliance by such countries.

FAA IMET Purpose Three: Increase the awareness 

of nationals of foreign countries participating in such 

activities of basic issues involving internationally 

recognized human rights.

One of the projects was conducted by the 

Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the 

Naval Post Graduate School (NPS). This study was 

conducted in 2007 and included interviews with 

US policy–makers, administrators, and US security 

assistance staff in-country, a written survey instrument 

administered to embassy security assistance staff, 

and a separate survey instrument administered by 

the CCMR research team to graduates of IMET 

programs in sixteen countries with an emphasis on 

graduates who had completed master’s or doctoral 

degree programs.

This study concluded that “the findings from the 

analysis of the quantitative data are supported by 

nine findings from the qualitative data. The findings 

include: 

• 94 percent of respondents reported that their 

IMET experience either significantly or 

somewhat increased their knowledge within 

their specialty. 

• 88 percent of respondents reported that their 

IMET experience either significantly or 

somewhat increased their knowledge outside of 

their specialty. 

• 95 percent of respondents reported increased 

knowledge of US systems and practices.”20

This study’s results reflect very positively upon 

IMET, but are results primarily for senior officers 

attending graduate education. These officers are 

critical to IMET, but only represent dozens of the 

thousands of IMET graduates each year. So although 

extremely valuable, this study did not validate the 

performance of the entire IMET program.

FAA Purpose 

One

FAA Purpose

 Two

FAA Purpose 

Three

How much did your training and other experiences in the 

United States improve your ability to successfully participate (as 

a member of a military organization in your own country) in a 

combined military activity with US forces or other multinational 

forces?

✓

How much did you learn about US military terminology? ✓

How much did you learn about equipment, tactics, and procedures 

of a US/multinational force? ✓ ✓

How much did you learn about US military command and control 

structure and planning? ✓ ✓

Before training, what is your view of the civilian control of the 

military? ✓ ✓

After training, what is your view of the civilian control of the 

military? ✓ ✓
187 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Another approach would indicate that “Perhaps 

both material reality and perception are important.”21 

The Constructivist school of international relations 

holds that “ideas, attitudes, and preferences really 

matter in international relations. Interests are not 

objective realities once and for all, like a rock or a 

tree, but what we “believe” them to be—with the 

“we” being the social groups to which we belong.”22

In the Constructivist theory of international relations, 

the US can determine that it will impact the behavior 

of its international partners by altering the people 

of the partner nation’s perceptions of the United 

States. The “IMET Survey” attempts to measure 

the change in perspective of a critical group of that 

population, military leaders, by the most simple and 

direct method—measuring the IMET students’ self 

described change in behavior. So if the first mandated 

purpose of IMET is to “Encourage effective 

and mutually beneficial relations and increased 

understanding between the United States and foreign 

countries,” then constructivism would hold that 

such relations should improve if we can alter the 

perceptions of the United States by foreign leaders 

(and their followers) in a positive direction. This, 

then, is the goal of the “IMET Survey”—to look for 

positive, or negative, changes in perception of IMET 

graduates based upon their IMET experience.

Thus an “IMET Survey” of a representative 

sample of all IMET graduates, not just a national or 

school subset, is critical to complete an evaluation 

of the value of IMET. The State Department’s 

“IMET Survey” questions offer the opportunity 

for a complete analysis of IMET graduates as they 

complete their training and education in the United 

States. An analysis of the survey questions will also 

In addition, narrative data was gathered to 

provide further details as to the students’ learning 

under IMET and to permit an automated analysis 

of narrative responses in comparison to qualitative 

responses. 

The survey method is similar to advertising focus 

group questions where corporations ask participants 

before/after questions on products. In this case the 

“focus group” questions are for IMET students and 

the product is US training. The result is the IMET 

students’ perceptions of how well the US has 

achieved the purposes of the IMETP.

This technique relies heavily upon international 

relations theory to determine positive results for the 

US based upon the students’ experiences in the US 

For years, the primary measurements of the IMETP 

have been concrete, but limited: how many students 

trained and educated, how many IMET graduates 

in positions of prominence, and how well did the 

Departments of State and Defense execute the 

assigned budget. These are “real” measures. But these 

concrete measurements ignore the more important 

question of whether IMET impacts the behavior 

of the students and their governments (or military 

components of their governments). International 

relations “Realists” might argue that the key measures 

of success for IMET is related somehow to measures 

of the behavior of the IMET graduates governments 

as influenced by the graduates modified behavior 

(such as: after X IMET students, recipient countries 

are Y% more likely to participate in multilateral 

peace training exercises). Such measurements (which 

do not exist) could be an aid in evaluating IMET, but 

these measurements would be extremely difficult to 

determine and to control for outside interference. 

Before training, what was your view of democracy in the United 

States? ✓

After training, what is your view of democracy in the United 

States? ✓

How beneficial was this training for your provessional 

development ✓

Before training, what was your understanding of international 

human rights standards? ✓

After training, what was your understanding of international 

human rights standards? ✓

Did the training meet your expectations?

How valuable was this training for your professional development?
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 188

conclusions. In 2006, DSCA authorized full-scale 

implementation of the IMET Survey permitting the 

analysis which follows.

A group of schools were selected for the study 

which would match the demographics of the entire 

IMET population in world regions, military status, 

and type of training received. All intermediate and 

senior level officer professional military education 

courses were also included due to the high-interest 

in Congress in these programs. Participation in the 

study was mandated by the Department of Defense 

for the schools, but individual student participation 

was optional. Students were asked to complete the 

online survey during “out processing” at their final 

training installation as they prepared to return to their 

home nation. 

permit multiple queries as to the conduct of IMET 

such as:

• Which type of training has the most positive 

impact upon students?

• What categories of students are impacted most 

positively by IMET?

• How can the execution of the IMETP be 

altered to enhance the benefits, or decrease the 

problems, of IMET?

Initial results of a prototype “IMET Survey” 

conducted in 2006 demonstrated that students were 

willing to answer the online questionaire, that they 

were willing to give both positive and negative 

feedback, and that an analysis of qualitative responses 

(narrative feedback) validated the quantitative 

results. All that remained was to gather and analyze 

more results to have a large enough data set to draw 

Participating Military Schools

(The Army War College was also selected but it has been unable to coordinate student participation)

San Antonio, Texas—Defense Language Institute English Language Center

Fort Benning, Georgia—Infantry School

Maxwell AFB, Alabama—Air University

Monterey, California—Defense Resources Management Institute

Yorktown, Viriginia—Coast Guard Training Center

San Antonio, Texas—Army Medical Department Center and School

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—Engineer School

Quantico, Virginia—Commanding General, Education Command

Fort Bliss, Texas—Sergeants Major Academy

Monterey, California—Naval Postgraduate School

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas—Command and General Staff College

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—Military Police School

Fort Bliss, Texas—Air Defense Artillery School

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio—Defense Institute of Security Assistance Managment

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—Chemical School

Camp LeJune, North Carolina—USMC School of Infantry (East)

Fort Benning, Georgia—Non-Commissioned Officer Academy

Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Assistance

Campe LeJune, North Carolina—USMC Engineer School

Campe LeJune, North Carolina—USMC Staff NCO Academy (East)

Campe LeJune, North Carolina—USMC Combat Service Support School

Keesler AFB, Mississippi
189 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Questions relating to the value of the training 

and education received:

• How much did your training and other 

experiences in the United States improve your 

ability to successfully participate (as a member 

of a military organization in your own country) 

in a combined military activity with US forces 

or other multi-national forces? (Improved ability 

partic.)

• Did the training meet your expectations? (Met 

expectations)

• How valuable was this training for your 

professional development? Profession develop)

• How much did you learn about US military 

terminology? (Learned mil terms)

• How much did you learn about equipment, 

tactics, and procedures of a US/Multinational 

Force? (Learned equip, tactics, etc)

• How much did you learn about US military 

command and control structure and planning? 

(Learned US C & C)

• How much did this training improve your 

understanding of US values? (Understanding US 

values)

The “IMET Survey” Results

The IMET Survey results have meaning in many 

dimensions. First, each individual question delves 

into a specific topic of interest for the Department 

of State in support of the Congressionally mandated 

purposes of IMET. Second, reviewing select subsets 

of data (different regions, different training types, 

etc) can influence decisions upon the future “best 

uses” of IMET.

Also meaningful are the narrative responses 

to the questions. The surveys have provided tens 

of thousands of written clarification of the survey 

results. In the discussion of the results below, select 

narratives assist in describing a subset of students’ 

perceptions of the questions.

The discussion of specific responses are grouped 

below into two broad discussions – questions on the 

value of the training and questions relating to an 

understanding of US democracy, international human 

rights, and civilian control of the military. 

Monterey, California—Center for Civil-Military Relations

Randolph AFB, Texas—12th Operations Support Squadron

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—Centere for SEABEES and Facilities Engineering Detachment

Fort McNair, Washington DC—National Defense University (includes NWC, ICAF, and IRMC)

San Antonio, Texas—Brooke Army Medical Center

Camp Pendleton, California—USMC Staff NCO Academy (West)

Fort Bliss, Texas—USAMMC (Hawk training only)

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—Non-Commissioned Officer Academy

Inter-American Defense College

Fort Bliss, Texas—Non-Commissioned Officer Academy

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—MANSCEN Army Training Center

San Antonio, Texas—Joint Medical Readiness Training Institute

San Antonio, Texas—Non-Commissioned Officer Academy

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio—Air Force Institute of Technology

San Antonio, Texas—Defense Language Institute English Language Center

Fort Benning, Georgia—Infantry School
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 190
191 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

In all cases, the average response indicated a 

moderate to great amount of value in the training 

received. Less than 10 percent of students indicated 

little to no value in any of the categories. Most of 

the low value responses related to courses of a very 

technical nature. For example, only 3 percent of 

students attending a “Professional Military Education” 

course indicated a low increase in their understanding 

of US Command and Control procedures, while 33 

percent of students attending “technical training” 

indicated a low increase in understanding. Such 

results are predictable by the content of the course—

Professional Military Education courses (such as the 

War and Staff Colleges, Captains Career Courses, 

Squadron Officers’ School, NCO development, etc) 

focus on high-level military skills, while technical 

courses (such as airborne (parachute) or electrician 

training) train on just a specific military skill set.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 192

Student Narratives

“I think that people need the right to speak freely 

in order to participate actively in the development of 

their countries.” – IMET field-grade officer’s thoughts 

on protecting human rights

“People are really free, there is nobody in jail 

because he expressed his political points of view.”

“I saw how people can express their opinion at 

any time without being afraid of any thing and this 

was my idea about US before i come but now it is 

more.”– Two field-grade IMET students’ thoughts on 

US democracy

These responses are consistent across multiple 

years of data collection—further confirming the 

validity of the data.

Questions relating to democracy in the United 

States, the civilian control of the military and human 

rights:

• Before training, what was your view of civilian 

control of the military?

• After training, what is your view of civilian 

control of the military?

• Before training, what was your view of 

democracy in the United States?

• After training, what is your view of democracy 

in the United States?

• Before training, what was your understanding 

of international human rights standards?

• After training, what is your understanding of 

international human rights standards?

These responses also indicate that IMET training 

significantly alters student perceptions about civilian 

control of the military, democracy in the United 

States, and internationally recognized human rights. 

These changes are significant statistically and are 

even more meaningful when broken out by region on 

the following page.

Student Narratives

“People are friendly in the US and multiracial 

society works apparently good. Otherwise the US 

society might have explode if incinated from the 

outside—as it was in tsar’s Russia in year 1917!”

“Before coming here, I thought that USA is a 

mixture of nations without identity. While staying 

here, I changed my thinking completely and I can tell 

you that you have a strong identity and I like that the 

nationalism is a very important issue here.”—Two 

IMET senior civilians’ thoughts on what they have 

learned about the US in training.
193 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

change in understanding, but less than twice the 

difference of African nations—many of whom have 

historically viewed military control of civilians as a 

needed post-colonial reality on their continent. IMET 

training in the US influences significant numbers 

of these military members to have a much more 

favorable view of civilian control of the military.

The regional breakout shows meaningful 

difference in each region between pre-and posttraining views on civilian control of the military. 

Regionally, the differences between pre and post 

values are also significantly different. European and 

Western-hemisphere nations, with a longer history 

of civilian control of the military, show a positive 

Civilian Control of the Military, 2008 Data

Question (mean score)

(1=very negative; 4=very positive)

Region (N)

Pre-training view 

of Civilian control 

of military

Post-training view 

of Civilian control 

of military

Pre to Post 

difference

T value 

(significance—

indicating 

high degree of 

certainty in all 

regions)

Western Hemisphere 3.14 3.45 .31 4.3

European and Eurasian 3.21 3.44 .23 6.16

Near Eastern 3.03 3.53 .50 4.21

African 3.03 3.68 .65 8.36

South and Central 

Asian 3.11 3.61 .50 5.44

East Asian and Pacific 3.14 3.55 .41 3.75

Change in View of Democracy in the US, 2008 Data

Question (mean score)

(1=very negative; 4=very positive)

Region (N)

Q14. Pretraining view of 

democracy in US

Q15. Post-training 

view of Civilian 

control of military

Mean Difference

T value 

(significance—

indicating 

high degree of 

certainty in all 

regions)

Western Hemisphere 3.45 3.66 .21 3.35

European and Eurasian 3.42 3.53 .11 3.13

Near Eastern 3.58 3.69 .11 .94 (not signficiant)

African 3.47 3.78 .31 3.27

South and Central 

Asian 3.40 3.68 .28 3.27

East Asian and Pacific 3.57 3.70 .14 1.63 (low significance)
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 194

Again, the data shows significant regional 

differences – in this case the change in perception of 

democracy in the US Once again, African students 

show the most improvement in perceptions of US 

democracy. They start with an average view of 

US democracy, and end training with the highest 

opinion of US style democracy. Of interest also is 

the improvement in Western Hemisphere and South/

Central Asians from a lower view of US democracy 

(albeit still averaging very positive) to a predominantly 

very positive view. Finally, Europeans start with the 

second lowest view of American democracy and 

this view improves the least among surveyed IMET 

students. As this data was collected during the Bush 

years with negative perceptions of the US electorate 

which elected President Bush,23 it will be interesting 

to view any possible changes in the 2009–2010 data. 

Student Narratives On The Most Important 

Human Right To Protect

“Freedom of speech, mobility and ownership 

of property—all this are link to security—free 

elections as well—also US should help countries like 

Zimbabwe either forcefully or not and not only oil 

rich nations. If you want to help Africa really.”

—Government civilian

“The right to work, study, speak, live happily.”

—Junior enlisted

“No human is more human than another human. 

All humans are equal and should be treated with 

respect, whether during war or peace time.”—Junior 

officer

“Life of the people, their right to live, as SAR 

[Search and Rescue] School says, always ready, that 

others may live.”—Field grade officer

“Based on my training and other experiences in 

the United States, the most important human rights 

to preserve and defend are freedom of speech, of 

movement.”—General officer

Change in Knowledge of International Human Rights, 2008 Data

Question (Question mean score and sample size for each region)

(1=very limited; 4=extensive)

Region (N)

Q17. Pre-training 

knowledge of 

international 

human rights 

standards

Q15. Post-training 

knowledge of 

international 

human rights 

standards

Mean Difference

T value 

(significance—

indicating 

high degree of 

certainty in all 

regions)*

Western Hemisphere 3.26 3.54 .28 4.75

European and Eurasian 3.27 3.63 .36 9.04

Near Eastern 3.17 3.72 .56 4.54

African 3.16 3.73 .57 8.99

South and Central 

Asian 2.98 3.58 .59 6.78

East Asian and Pacific 3.12 3.44 .33 3.31

*All T values significantly exceed the threshold for statistical significance of difference
195 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Once again, African IMET students show 

high improvement in another IMET focus area – 

international human rights. South and Central Asian, 

as well as Near Eastern, students also indicate a 

significant increase in self-perceived knowledge. 

Review of the narrative responses confirms that 

students have retained many of the key points of 

human rights instructions. As one student states, 

“Based on the background of the country (South 

Africa) that I am coming from, US is very much 

advanced regarding human rights. There is lot to 

learn from the US they way they do their things.”

Potential for Student Bias

 A weakness of the method of the “IMET Survey” 

is the high likelihood of student bias. The students 

have just received a full-expense-paid training 

experience in the US A likely response is to complete 

this survey in a manner which reflects gratitude for 

the US (although such bias in itself indicates potential 

benefits to the US in paying for military leaders 

education in the US, it is not the rationale for IMET). 

It would be very difficult to eliminate this bias, 

but one method to determine validity of the data 

in spite of this bias is to examine repeat IMET 

students. If students’ “pre-training” response in 

survey questions improves when returning to the US 

for additional training, then this indicates that the 

original benefit was valid; that improvements “stuck” 

to IMET graduates as is evident by improving pretraining scores. 

The data, in fact, demonstrates that IMET 

benefits do “stick” to graduates.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 196
197 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

demonstrates that the IMET program is meeting its 

mandated purpose. 

Recommendations Based On This Research

In addition to demonstrating that the IMET 

program meets its mandated purpose, analysis of the 

data permits the following recommendations.

1. The IMETP should continue. It meets its 

mandated purposes at very low cost to the US 

each year (less than $100 million). Other studies 

show great benefit to the US forces and the rise 

of IMET graduates to positions of prominence in 

their home nations. IMET offers great benefit to 

the US taxpayers and improves the perceptions 

of the US in the minds of graduates.

2. The IMETP should receive additional funding to 

increase student training in the United States. For 

over fifteen years, Republicans and Democrats 

have argued that IMET should increase to $100 

million. Inflation adjusted, this target value 

would exceed $150 million since the $100 

million proposed by President Clinton. The 

proven benefits of this program justify such an 

increase along with an increase in international 

student capacity at US military schools.

3. IMET expansion should include maximum 

participation in US residence courses. Short 

duration mobile training teams likely would not 

have the same benefits as indicated in this study – 

but further research would need to be conducted 

to validate this opinion.

4. Professional military education courses should 

continue as the cornerstone of the IMETP. In 

every question category, graduates of PME 

returned more positive scores indicating greater 

benefit from their training. PME also permits 

the US to reach the “best and brightest” of our 

emerging partners.

 Student Narrative

“There is clear freedom in presenting the point 

of views among people and American people can 

express their point of view without any fear or 

pressure...democracy has been conducted well in the 

USA.”—IMET PME graduate

In all three studied areas, returning IMET students 

showed a higher initial self-perception than their firsttime IMET student peers. Thus it is demonstrated 

that IMET values “stick” to graduates after their 

IMET training in the US The post-training values 

tend to cluster together, indicating less differential 

as training concludes, but the spread in pre-training 

perceptions of knowledge directly relates to the 

number of times the student has previously trained 

in the US and indicates a benefit to repeat training 

experiences.

Conclusions

Every single question evaluated showed 

significant improvement in student understanding 

of topics related to the purposes of IMET, and these 

values exceed the statistical thresholds for random 

chance. The “IMET Survey” shows a positive benefit 

from IMET in all measured categories and all studied 

subgroups in questions relateing to the purposes of 

IMET.

The IMET program is based upon a belief that 

educating militaries in the areas of IMET emphasis 

will change national behavior. Because any US IMET 

recipient nation receives only a small amount of 

training in any given year, measurements of change in 

national behavior due to IMET receipt is impossible 

(any change would be overwhelmed by uncontrolled 

factors). The Constructivism theory of international 

relations, however, argues that international 

relationships of a nation are “constructed” by the 

shared ideas of the society. As IMET attempts to 

change the ideas of the military, a measure of the 

change in the ideas of IMET students (as directed 

by the FAA purposes for IMET) provides a good 

measure as to the IMET program’s effectiveness 

in meeting FAA required purposes. IMET student 

attitudes as measured in the “IMET Survey,” in fact, 

demonstrate significant improvement after training. 

This relationship is validated further as returning 

students retain a higher belief in their understanding 

of these issues.

International Relations theory shows that such 

changes will impact the military/national behavior 

in IMET graduates’ organizations. This point has 

also been demonstrated by Atkinson in her study 

on military engagement and the socialization of 

states24 . . . international military training programs 

demonstrate effectiveness in influencing military 

behavior. This analysis of the results of this data 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 198

15. James J. Kratsas, International Military 

Education and Training: A Force Multiplier with 

Relevance for the 21st Century (United States 

Army War College, 1997).

16. Ronald H. Reynolds, E-IMET: Is it Accomplishing 

its Human Rights Focus in Latin America? (Diss. 

The University of Alabama: 2001).

17. United States of America. General Accounting 

Office, Security Assistance: Observations on the 

International Military Educational and Training 

Program (Washington, DC, 1990).

18. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

19. Thomas C. Bruneau, Kathleen Peggar, and 

Elisabeth Wright, Impact of International 

Military Education (IMET) on Graduate 

Education (Naval Post Graduate School: Center 

for Civil-Military Relations, 2007 Draft). 

20. Ibid.

21. US Army War College, States Under Anarchy, 

https://dde.carlisle.army.mil/documents/

courses_09/DE2202/DE2202_ebook.

cfm?block=1.

22. Charles Krupnick, Constructivism, https://

dde.carlisle.army.mil/documents/courses_09/

readings/2202-Constructivism-script.doc.

23. Andrew Grice, “Most Europeans Dislike Bush’s 

Foreign Policies,” The Independent, September 

7, 2005, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/

world/europe/most-europeans-dislike-bushsforeign-policies-505817.html. 

24. Carol Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications 

of Material Power: Military Engagement 

and the Socialization of States, 1972-2000,” 

International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2006).

About the Authors

The research for this paper was complied 

by Dr. Mark T. Ahles of the Defense Institute of 

Security Assistance Management, Dr. Michael T. 

Rehg of the Air Force Institute of Technology and 

California State University, Chico, Mr. Aaron Prince 

of the of the Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management, and Ms. Litsu Rehak of the Defense 

Institute of Security Assistance Management.

Endnotes

1. US Departments of State and Department of 

Defense. Foreign Military Training Report 

(Washington, DC, 2007).

2. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management Presentations Web Page, 

http://www.disam.dsca.mil/Research/

Presentations/2%20introsc.ppt.

3. Ibid.

4. Government Performance and Results Act of 

1993, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmtgpra/gplaw2m.html.

5. US Department of State. Congressional Budget 

Justification: Foreign Operations (Washington, 

DC, 2007), http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/.

6. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 

www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf.

7. Amnesty International USA., Report on Human 

Rights Violations in Countries Receiving US 

Security Assistance (New York, 1996).

8. Duncan L.Clarke and Daniel D. O’Connor, Send 

Guns and Money: Security Assistance and US 

Foreign Policy (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 

1997).

9. For background on IMET and security 

assistance programs see DISAM Journal Indices, 

available from http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/

JOURNAL_index.asp.

10. Barry L. Brewer, United States Security 

Assistance Training of Latin American Militaries: 

Intentions and Results (Air Force Institute for 

Technology, 1995).

11. Anthony K. Crawford, The Search for Stability 

in Sub-Saharan Africa: An American Perspective 

(United States Army Command and General 

Staff College, 1998).

12. Todd R. Calhoun, Evaluating Security Assistance 

Programs: Performance Evaluation and the 

Expanded International Military Education and 

Training (E-IMET) Program (Naval Postgraduate 

School, 1998).

13. John A. Cope, International Military Education 

and Training: An Assessment (Washington, DC, 

National Defense University: 1995).

14. Stephen E. Keeling, International Military 

Education and Training: A Shaper of the Security 

Environment of the Future (United States Army 

War College, 1999).
199 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

throughout the subsequent regional turmoil” 

(McKenzie and Packard 2011, 103). For instance, 

some experts believe the SC strategy was integral 

in strengthening Egyptian military support for a 

democratically elected government during delicate 

regime transition period. Overall, SC relationships 

in the Middle East can open doors to unprecedented 

communication that secures US strategic access and 

strengthens and expands our network of partnerships 

across the region.

SCOs play a major role in the SC strategy because 

in some countries, they are the only US military 

presence on the ground. They are the host nation’s 

first point of contact for facilitating communication 

between their own military and the US military. 

Therefore, it is imperative that SCOs understand how 

the host nation’s values, norms, customs and decisionmaking processes shape and form the content of their 

interactions with host nationals. Accordingly, SCOs 

must have the ability to effectively understand what 

is being communicated during these interactions 

and implement appropriate behavior, which conveys 

an intended message of mutual trust. Failure 

for SCOs to understand the perspective of their 

foreign counterparts and appropriately respond to 

social interactions can often lead to misunderstood 

intentions and in many cases; negatively impact the 

relationship. 

Learning to interact and build relationships with 

people of different cultural norms and beliefs can 

present major challenges for SCOs. For example, the 

ideas, behaviors, values, and norms of Americans 

and their host nation counterparts can cause “cultural 

friction,” potentially isolating them from future 

interactions (McFarland 2005). British Lieutenant 

Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known 

as “Lawrence of Arabia,” highlighted this problem 

while serving as a military liaison officer during 

the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turkish 

Empire during World War I. He explained that 

Relationship Building Considerations for 

Security Cooperation Officers 

In the Middle East

By Dr. Carlos Braziel

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Dr. Peter Bechtold, a professor at the Foreign 

Service Institute, once advised his student, future 

Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command, 

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf about the 

importance of relationships in the Middle East. Dr. 

Bechtold said, “In the Arab world, your position gets 

you through the door, but your personal relationships 

get you commitments from the Arabs.” (Schwarzkopf 

and Petre 1992, 277)

Introduction

Military security cooperation officers (SCOs) 

are on the frontline of the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) strategy of building partner capacity in 

the Middle East. These diplomatic specialists are 

charged with promoting US security interests as well 

as gaining host nation access through the execution 

and oversight of security cooperation (SC). Their 

effectiveness and success not only lies in their 

technical capability, but it also lies in their ability 

to build long-term relationships by influencing and 

advising host nation counterparts. This article will 

attempt to explore the competencies SCOs need in 

order to develop military-to-military (mil-to-mil) 

relationships in the Middle East.

Security Cooperation’s Role in Relationship 

Building

SC activities are designed to “build defense 

relationships that promote specific US security 

interests, develop allied and friendly military 

capabilities for self-defense and multinational 

operations, and provide US forces with peacetime 

and contingency access to a host nation” (US 

Department of Defense 2004, GL-9). The benefits 

associated with SC relationships range from gaining 

deeper understanding of the Middle East region to 

developing support for mutual security interests. 

In fact, the formation of personal and professional 

relationships generated by SCO tactical engagements 

“have proven to be enduring and invaluable 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 200

create an initial barrier of distrust for SCOs working 

in a culture where the relationship drives the business. 

By acknowledging the previous issues and taking 

the appropriate steps to address to them, SCOs can 

develop the skills and confidence needed to build 

the rapport and expand strategic partnerships in the 

Middle East. Therefore, it is recommended that SCOs 

develop an action plan to increase their cross-cultural 

awareness and relationship building competencies.

Cross-Cultural Awareness Competency

The first step SCOs can take to maximize their 

intercultural experiences and ability to establish 

relationships is by developing their cross-cultural 

awareness. Cross-cultural awareness is defined 

as the act of understanding the need to consider 

the characteristics of a particular group, tribe, 

organization, and society in order to operate 

effectively in that environment (Skelton and Cooper 

2004). This competency can facilitate understanding 

of one’s own worldview while encouraging the ability 

to see beyond one’s own culture; thus avoiding the 

ever-present danger of ethnocentrism.1 The process 

of self-understanding begins with comparing and 

contrasting “culture differences or situations in 

which such differences exist” (Stewart and Bennett 

1991, xii). Wunderle’s (2008) book, A Manual for 

American Servicemen in the Arab Middle East: 

Using Cultural Understanding to Defeat Adversaries 

and Win the Peace provides a basic framework 

for SCOs attempting to undertake their cultural 

analysis. Wunderle offers a framework in figure 1 

that facilitates the understanding and development 

of cross-cultural awareness through the evaluation of 

the following major components: cultural influences, 

cultural variations, and cultural manifestations.

Cultural influences are the major social or 

institutional factors that shaped the host nation’s 

culture (Wunderle 2008). These factors are 

cultural commonalities that bind people together. 

Major factors such as history, heritage, traditions, 

language, and religion are instrumental in shaping 

the country’s national identity and ethnicity. Cultural 

variations analyze culture from the differences or 

characteristics that define variations in a particular 

culture (Wunderle 2008). These characteristics 

include behaviors (the outward observable artifacts), 

values (the base judgments of good and bad common 

to a culture) and cognition (the preference based 

strategies used in decision-making, perception, 

military operations and national security decisions 

could suffer when military members lack sufficient 

knowledge of their host nation culture (McFate 

2005). Lawrence’s statement rings true today for 

US strategy in the Middle East. Thus, without an 

adequate level of cultural awareness and relationship 

building competency, SCOs can risk “alienating the 

people the people the US is trying to influence,” 

ultimately eroding the nation’s strategic legitimacy 

and credibility in the Middle East (Sargent 2005, 12). 

Unfortunately, developing the expertise for 

relationship building in the Middle East could take 

years of experience and study; this is a luxury new 

SCOs do not normally have before starting their 

assignments. Despite the growing concern in DOD 

for the need for more cross-culturally trained military 

personnel, only a small percentage of SCOs receive 

formalized language and cross-cultural training. 

SCOs that do possess some type of in-depth crosscultural awareness and language training normally 

come from the US Air Force Regional Affairs 

Strategist (RAS) and US Army/Navy Foreign Area 

Officer (FAO) communities. Military members with 

FAO or RAS experience make up approximately one 

third of the current SCO population in the Middle 

East. The remaining SCO billets in the Middle East 

are comprised of military members from a variety of 

career fields. 

For brand new SCOs with limited language and 

regional training, the experience of establishing 

relationships in the Middle East could be daunting. 

The cross-cultural training offered by DOD and 

other organizations are often too simplistic; focusing 

on a list of “do’s and don’ts” that provide guidelines 

for behavior and etiquette. SCOs overwhelmed 

with these requirements may lose focus on their 

initial purpose of relationship building because 

they are too worried about offending their host 

nation counterparts. As well, SCOs are at a slight 

disadvantage when it comes to building relationships 

with Middle East counterparts. To put it frankly, 

SCOs view business and personal relationships as 

two entirely separate entities (Wunderle 2006). The 

SCOs’ extremely task-focused, highly individualist 

culture makes it difficult for them to develop rapport 

with their Middle East counterparts, especially when 

the business can be completed in a matter of minutes. 

This Western business approach can often clash with 

the highly collectivistic, relationship-focused culture 

of the Middle East. Likewise, these differences can 
201 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Stevens, Bird, and Oddou 2008, 9). The development 

of the following relationship building competencies 

may aid SCOs in their interactions with host nation 

counterparts: 

• Relationship interest

• Interpersonal engagement

• Empathy 

• Self awareness 

• Social flexibility

Relationship Interest

The relationship interest competency “refers to 

the extent to which people exhibit interest in, and 

awareness of, their social environment” (Mendenhall 

et al. 2008, 10). Individuals with a high level of 

relationship “strive to understand the kind of people 

they are, what their cultural norms, are, and so on” 

(Mendenhall et al. 2008, 10). SCOs that rate high 

in this competency possess the desire to learn as 

much about the host nation’s cultural influences (i.e. 

language, history, geography, etc.). They learn about 

their foreign counterpart’s interests and ask questions 

about them during the “small talk” phase of their 

engagements. Also, when asked a question by their 

Middle Eastern counterpart, SCOs that rate high in 

relationship interest competency do not respond with 

a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ Socially skillful SCOs have 

the ability to turn the question into an opportunity to 

and knowledge representation. Analyzing the host 

nation’s cultural influences and variations can help 

SCOs understand the reason or the “why” of their host 

nation counterparts’ actions. The final component 

of the framework, cultural manifestations, deals 

with “what” SCOs may witness as a result of the 

host nations’ cultural influences and variations. 

Factors such as the concept of wasta,2 suspicion, 

and negotiation style are examples of Middle East 

cultural manifestations that may negatively impact 

relationship building if SCOs are not prepared.

SCOs are encouraged to use the above framework 

as a guide for undertaking “a more intensive and 

holistic analysis” of their own culture and culture of 

the host nation (Wunderle 2008, 41). By constantly 

working towards developing their cross-cultural 

awareness, SCOs may become more comfortable 

with the cultural differences and move towards the 

path of relationship building.

Relationship Building 

Relationship building is the ability to establish 

respectful and responsive relationships with host 

nation counterparts. The cross-cultural leadership 

and expatriate adjustment literature highlights the 

“ability to create and maintain relationships with 

individuals in cross-cultural/global settings” as a key 

competency domain for global leaders (Mendenhall, 

Figure 1.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 202

understand sustaining relationships in the Middle 

East will require a lot of time and effort on their part.

Empathy 

The empathy competency is another common 

relationship building theme. This competency refers 

to the ability of “being participative and sensitive to 

others’ needs and assumptions” (Jokinen et al. 2005, 

207), while expressing genuine concern for them in 

the process (Gregersen, Morrison, and Black, 1998). 

The Middle East culture can be full of great emotion 

and sentimentality. As a result, host nationals take 

great care in considering the human factors of a 

situation such as relationship dynamics and personal 

feelings. These emotions may manifest themselves 

whenever conflicts arise or counterparts become 

frustrated with the complexities of a situation. In 

contrast, Western culture tends to place less emphasis 

on the human aspect of a situation. As a result, 

Middle East counterparts may feel that SCOs are 

too objective in their dealings and lack sensitivity 

toward people. In the host national’s eyes, the lack of 

sensitivity prevents SCOs from seeing the situation 

from their perspective.

SCOs who rate high in the empathy competency 

attempt to understand how things may affect their 

counterparts. Even though they may not always agree 

with them, SCOs with a greater capacity for empathy 

accept the differences and verbalize their concern by 

stating, “I understand your frustration,” or something 

to that effect. When SCOs train themselves to 

“see things as others do,” they are less likely to 

misinterpret another’s position; thus limiting spirals 

of exaggerated or mistaken hostility (Walt 2008).

Self Awareness

Self awareness “refers to the degree to which 

people are aware of (1) their strengths and weaknesses 

in interpersonal skills, (2) their own philosophies and 

values, (3) how past experiences have helped shape 

them into who they are as a person, and (4) the impact 

their values and behavior have on relationships with 

others” (Mendenhall et al. 2008, 12). Successful 

SCOs are extremely aware of their own values, 

strengths and limitations, and behavioral tendencies 

and how they impact and affect others. SCOs with 

a high level of self awareness understand how to 

leverage their strengths and develop their weaknesses 

for relationship building purposes. SCOs that lack 

develop rapport. For example, General Schwarzkopf 

explains that when your Middle East host asks, 

“How was your flight?” it is uncouth to provide a 

terse response such as, “Fine, thanks.” General 

Schwarzkopf infers that military members serving 

in diplomatic roles should use this opportunity 

to exhibit their interest in the host nation and the 

surrounding environment by saying something like, 

“The trip took seventeen hours, and during that time 

it became difficult to tell night from day and my 

body was in turmoil. But now I am better, because 

I landed in your beautiful capital, and driving here 

from the airport I was able to see the sights and hear 

the sounds of your city, and I feel as though I’m 

home again.” (Schwarzkopf and Petre 1992, 277). By 

demonstrating a sincere interest, SCOs can establish 

the rapport for building trust.

Interpersonal Engagement

Interpersonal engagement refers to the degree 

to which SCOs “have a desire and willingness to 

initiate and maintain relationships with people 

from other cultures” (Mendenhall et al. 2008, 10). 

Individuals who step outside themselves and try to 

emotionally connect with host nationals are more 

prone to be successful at establishing long lasting 

relationships than those who do not (Mendenhall and 

Oddou 1985). Unfortunately, this competency can 

present a problem for SCOs who tend to be reserve 

and introverted. Interpersonal engagements in the 

Middle East could sometimes appear too intrusive 

and intense for SCOs. Middle East counterparts may 

ask SCOs probing questions like “How much money 

do you make?” or if you are unmarried, “Why are 

you not married?” If uncomfortable discussing these 

subjects, it is suggested that SCOs speak on these 

subjects in general. After sometime, the host nation 

counterpart will realize that you do not intend to give 

a substantive answer and will move onto another 

subject without losing face. 

Another element of interpersonal engagement 

in the Middle East requires both the SCO and host 

nation counterpart to maintain the relationship 

with routine visits and phone calls. SCOs may feel 

overwhelmed with this practice; however to the 

Middle East counterpart, it is an obligation. The lack 

of frequent and timely interpersonal engagement 

may be misinterpreted by host nationals and may 

negatively impact the relationship. SCOs have to 
203 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

(Omar) Nydell’s (2002) Understanding Arabs: A 

Guide for Westerners; and Raphael Patai’s (2002) 

The Arab Mind are books SCOs should consider 

reading before their assignment to the Middle East.

Notes

1. Ethnocentrism: Belief in the inherent superiority 

of one’s own group and culture; it may be accompanied by a feeling of contempt for those 

considered as foreign; it views and measures 

alien cultures and groups in terms of one’s own 

culture

2. Wasta: A Middle East cultural manifestation that 

encompasses anything from personal influence, 

networking, prestige and political power.

About the Author

Dr. Carlos Braziel is the Director of Middle East 

Studies at DISAM and a retired US Air Force officer. 

He served in a variety of operations and positions in 

the Middle East as an Air Force civil engineer and a 

US defense contractor. He holds a doctoral degree 

in organizational leadership from Indiana Wesleyan 

University. 

self awareness tend to have little concern or interest 

in knowing themselves or how their actions affect 

their host nation counterparts. High self-awareness 

provides a foundation for strategically acquiring 

new skills, whereas low self-awareness promotes 

self‐deception and arrogance.

Social Flexibility

Lastly, the flexibility competency refers to an 

individual’s ability and willingness to substitute 

his/her own personal interests with interests of the 

host nation culture in order to facilitate relationship 

building (Mendenhall et al. 2008). This competency 

involves the ability to perceive, learn, and respond 

appropriately in cultural settings. SCOs with high 

social flexibility are able to adjust their behaviors to 

fit the situation and make favorable impressions. For 

example, if a host nation counterpart prefers to sit on 

the floor, thumb his prayer beads, and listen to flute 

and drum music, the SCO should be adept at doing 

the same (Metrinko 2008). SCOs demonstrating the 

willingness to adapt to social situations and acting 

comfortable will speak volumes for their commitment 

to their relationships with host nationals.

Conclusion

This article explored the essential competencies 

SCOs need in order to establish and maintain milto-mil relationships in the Middle East. The Middle 

East is a relationship-centered culture that has 

an unbounded window for relationship building. 

Thus, newly assigned SCOs need to understand 

the importance of the cross-cultural awareness 

and relationship management dimensions of their 

SCO toolbox and how to effectively master them. 

Therefore, it is highly encouraged they develop the 

skills and competencies for establishing personal 

rapport, mutual respect, and trust. Although this 

article mainly focused on the Middle Eastern 

culture, the framework for developing cross-cultural 

awareness and relationship building can be applied 

globally. As previously mentioned, Wunderle’s 

(2008) framework is a good start for SCOs beginning 

the cultural analysis process. Also, it is recommended 

that SCOs develop a robust reading list that explores 

the political, social and historical cultural aspects of 

the Middle East. Bernard Lewis’ (1995) The Middle 

East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years; Glen 

Fisher’s (1997) Mindsets: The Role of Culture and 

Perception in International Relations; Margaret K. 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 204

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Arab and Middle Eastern Countries. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press.
205 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Unrest from the Arab Spring in the Middle East 

is calling into question ongoing security cooperation 

programs in places like Egypt, Yemen, and Kuwait—

economic gains, increasing stability, and budding 

democratic movements in the countries of Vietnam, 

Laos, and Cambodia are leading to growth in security 

cooperation and security assistance between the 

United States and Indochina. Vietnam, Laos and 

Cambodia are traditionally thought of as occupying 

the part of the world referred to as Indochina. 

Vietnam is one of five countries in the world 

that practice a communist form of government, and 

the remaining four are China, North Korea, Laos, 

and Cuba. These five countries account for nearly 

1.5 billion of the world’s population of 7+ billon, 

which means that at least one out of every seven 

people in the world are Asian and live under a 

communist regime. Communism as a political force 

did not disappear from the world stage at the end of 

the Cold War; it just became much less common in 

the West (Cuba being the lone holdout). With this 

in mind, is it really all that surprising that, with 

increased globalization in the years since the fall of 

the Berlin Wall, there has been growing economic 

interactions between the United States and China 

and a growing security dialogue between the US and 

the communist countries of Indochina? Under the 

general prohibitions of the Foreign Assistance Act, 

security assistance is not eligible for a nation that “Is a 

communist country.” However, a Presidential waiver 

can be granted when the President determines that it 

is in the US’s best interests do so. For Cuba, North 

Korea, and to a lesser extent, China, this communist 

country restriction holds true, but for the communist 

countries of Vietnam and Laos, these restrictions 

are being loosened. For instance, in FY 2011 the US 

provided Vietnam with $450,000 in International 

Military Education and Training (IMET) funds and 

$1,345,000 in Foreign Military Financing Program 

(FMFP) funds. For FY 2012, Vietnam was projected 

South East Asia: Growing 

Security Cooperation?

By Lt. Col. Tom Williams, USAF

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

In January 2012, the Secretary of Defense 

released a new strategic guidance document titled 

“Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities For 

21st Century Defense.” At the front of this document 

was a letter from President Obama that stated the 

following:

This review has been shaped by America’s 

enduring national security interests. We 

seek the security of our Nation, allies and 

partners. We seek the prosperity that flows 

from an open and free international economic 

system. And we seek a just and sustainable 

international order where the rights and 

responsibilities of nations and peoples are 

upheld, especially the fundamental rights of 

every human being. 

The President emphasized the importance 

of human security, free market prosperity, and 

democratic reforms to achieve a more stable and 

safer world. Additionally, the chapters of President 

Obama’s May 2010 National Security Strategy 

have a similar emphasis with titles such as Security, 

Prosperity, Values & International Order. 

This US foreign policy emphasis on greater 

human security, leading to greater economic 

prosperity, which in turn leads to more democracies 

and greater world peace, has been a standard US 

foreign policy goal for decades and has its roots in 

the Democratic Peace Theory. The Democratic Peace 

Theory promotes the idea that democratic countries 

do not go to war with each other. Therefore, the birth 

of more democratic countries in the world should 

lead to greater peace and stability. But how is the 

first step—greater human security—achieved? To 

answer this question, the US has promoted security 

cooperation and security assistance in many of its 

foreign policy initiatives. Security cooperation refers 

to all interactions between the US government and 

another nation’s government to improve US security 

and our partner nation’s security while increasing 

US access to that nation’s security forces and 

government.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 206

state-owned enterprises when they joined the World 

Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007, allowing private 

enterprises to invest and compete fairly. Like many 

centrally planned economic countries that are new to 

the WTO, Vietnam has been designated a “nonmarket 

economy” for the upcoming decade. As a result, they 

are given time to complete their transition to a marketbased economy while protecting other countries from 

unfair advantages that state-owned enterprises may 

have at the beginning of the transition period. 

The communist government of Laos has 

followed a similar path as Vietnam, when it comes 

to liberalizing their economy. They also are seeking 

admittance to the WTO but are years, if not decades, 

behind Vietnam. Unfortunately, their human rights 

record is even more dismal than Vietnam’s and this 

is hampering their attempts at normalized diplomatic 

relationships and greater market liberalization. 

Diplomatic relations between the US and Laos never 

completely ceased after the end of the Vietnam War 

but they did deteriorate greatly over the years. Full 

ambassadorial relations were restored between the 

two countries in 1992 and In 2004 President Bush 

extended normal trade relations to Laos, culminating 

in a 2005 a bilateral trade agreement (BTA). In 2011 

the US provided $200,000 in IMET funds to Laos, 

mostly to support efforts to account for missing US 

serviceman from the Vietnam War.

Cambodia, unlike Vietnam and Laos, is not 

a communist country, and in the years following 

the Vietnam War, Cambodia saw a period of slow 

rebuilding but one of unimaginable horror. To put this 

in perspective, during this time period, the Hmong 

Civil War peaked in Laos (and is still sputtering on 

today) and Vietnam was invaded by China (border 

skirmishes are still taking place today). Both of 

these events were minor episodes compared to what 

Cambodia went through. In fact, Vietnam invaded 

Cambodia in an attempt to stop the carnage. 

From 1975 to 1999, the Khmer Rouge, led by Pol 

Pot, killed nearly 3 million people—approximately 

half the country’s population. Almost every teacher 

in the country was killed, and all but forty of the 

nation’s medical doctors and nurses were murdered. 

At the height of Pol Pot’s reign, all forms of currency 

were abolished, all religious manifestations were 

destroyed, and the entire population of the country 

was forced into rural communes. For example, in 

the “class enemies” family extermination facility 

at Tuol Sleng, there were only seven survivors out 

to receive $1,960,000 in FMFP and $650,000 in 

IMET. How did a communist country, which was at 

war with the United States only forty years ago, get 

to a point that it now receives US security assistance?

In 1975, North Vietnam overran the South, 

and all of Vietnam became communist. Diplomatic 

relations between the US and the Socialist Republic 

of Vietnam ceased. In 1995, President Clinton 

announced the formal normalization of diplomatic 

relations between the two countries. Soon, diplomatic 

ties grew stronger and each country opened a 

consulate in the other. In fact, in 1997, President 

Clinton appointed US Congressman and formerPOW, Douglas Peterson as the first US Ambassador 

to Communist Vietnam. Communist Vietnam, like 

its large northern neighbor China, has a poor human 

rights record and continuously suppresses freedom 

of political expression. However, unlike China, 

Vietnam has allowed greater freedom of religion. 

In 2006, because of Vietnam’s passing of religious 

freedom legislation the year before, the US State 

Department determined that Vietnam was no longer 

a serious violator of religious rights for its citizens.

Economically speaking, Vietnam has also 

been making gains in changing its centrally-driven 

economy to one that is more decentralized and market 

driven. The first signs of this shift occurred in the 

1980s, when the country abandoned collective farms 

in favor of private ownership. These collective farms 

were divided into separate plots and redistributed to 

individual families who were empowered to manage 

their land as they saw fit and sell their agricultural 

products in a domestic supply-demand free market 

system. Seventy percent of Vietnam’s population 

still works the land, and the increased leniency in 

agricultural markets has led the country to become 

one of the world’s leading exporters of rice, has 

brought inflation under control, has increased 

household incomes, and has greatly reduced hunger 

throughout the country. 

This land reform also gave rural populations a 

stronger voice in local government and served as an 

economic model for liberalization in other aspects 

of the economy. Industrial production, investment, 

savings, monetary policy, and international trade 

policies have all been economically reorganized, 

resulting in relatively fast economic growth (taking 

into account the global recession of the past few 

years), and improved technical capabilities and 

infrastructure. For instance, Vietnam further reformed 
207 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

In addition to relatively small amounts of IMET 

and FMFP funds, these Indochina countries have 

received hundreds of millions of dollars over the last 

decade in various types of humanitarian assistance. 

For example, in the years from 2005 to 2008, 

Cambodia received $113,508,000 in child survival 

and disease funds (CSH), $30,442,000 in DA funds, 

and $61,443,000 in economic support funds (ESF). 

Vietnam received $1,200,000 in CSH, $13,468,000 

in DA, $14,573,000 in ESF, and $204,193,000 in 

Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) funds. Laos 

received $16,744,000 in INCLE and NADR funds, 

which were focused on anti-terrorism and demining 

activities.

What about the other countries in South East 

Asia such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Burma (called 

Myanmar by the existing government)? Thailand 

is an important US ally in the region and receives 

funds for domestic counterterrorism programs, 

border security, and IMET—whenever the military 

has decided not take over, that is. In response to 

the September 2006 coup in Thailand, the State 

Department suspended nearly $24,000,000 foreign 

assistance. Aid resumed after the democratic 

elections of 2008. Malaysia is not a recipient of US 

DA but does receive IMET, INCLE, and NADR to 

help in antiterrorism and nonproliferation activities, 

mainly to counter regional terrorist groups such as 

Jemaah Islamiyah. Now, what about Burma?

Over the past year, there have been surprising 

political changes in the country of Burma, starting 

in November 2010, when the democratic activist 

and Nobel Peace Prize-winner Aung San Suu Kyi 

was released from house arrest. The changes have 

come quickly and unexpectedly—a partial end to 

censorship, return of exiles, freeing of political 

prisoners, privatization of some state companies, 

a mostly free and open election, and the halting of 

a major dam project as a result of public pressure 

toward the government. These changes are 

particularly surprising for a country that spent nearly 

fifty years living under a military dictatorship and 

was so isolated from the world, it resisted emergency 

aid even after the country was hit by Cyclone Hargis 

in May 2008, killing at least 138,000 of its people. 

Burma’s surprising political transformation 

has resulted in increased diplomatic interactions 

with the US. In December 2011, Secretary of State 

Hillary Rodham Clinton traveled to the country and 

visited with both Aung San Suu Kyi and government 

of the eighteen thousand women and children who 

were sent there. A slogan displayed in many of the 

farming communes at the time illustrates the horror 

in a way that statistics cannot: “To preserve you is no 

gain, to destroy you is no loss.” In 1997, Pol Pots’ 

nihilistic approach to governance came to an end 

when his devout followers and fellow rebels could 

no longer stomach their leader’s brutality, and he was 

overthrown. He later committed suicide. By 1999, 

the last remnants of the Khmer Rouge ceased to exist.

Over twenty years of civil war have decimated 

nearly all of Cambodia’s physical infrastructure, and 

Pol Pots’ persecution of the educated populace has 

eradicated the intellectual framework necessary to 

rebuild the country. Those responsible for rebuilding 

the nation’s civil, administrative, and economic 

structures are doing so without the requisite 

knowledge. As a consequence of losing nearly half 

the population a generation ago, the median age of 

Cambodia’s population is only nineteen, and most of 

this age-group is uneducated. Further, this generation 

was raised under the shadow of the Khmer Rouge and 

has been traumatized to the extent that post-traumatic 

stress disorder is almost a universal condition in 

the country. The US has provided significant aid to 

Cambodia with the hope of rebuilding the country. 

In 2011, the State Department provided $5 Million 

in Economic Support Funds along with nearly $36 

Million in development assistance (DA). 

Currently, Cambodia is a multiparty liberal 

democracy under a constitutional monarchy that was 

established in the 1990s. However, the possibility 

of another civil war seems to be roiling just under 

the surface, ready to boil over at any given moment. 

The new civil war could be caused by renewed 

Khmer Rouge proponents, divisions in Cambodia 

society, or from rampant corruption. With this in 

mind, US security assistance has focused on efforts 

to improve training and education in order to 

improve Cambodia’s border patrol and surveillance 

capabilities. In 2011, the US provided $100,000 in 

IMET funds and $1,000,000 in FMFP. In that same 

year, nearly $3 Million in humanitarian demining 

(HD) was made available to help to remove the 

mines and booby-traps left behind from over two 

decades of civil war. Additionally, Cambodia was 

made eligible for Excess Defense Articles, mostly for 

communication and transportation to support IMET, 

anti-terrorism, and HD activities. 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 208

Also, it should be noted that the Arab Spring has 

yet to bring about a field of budding democracies. 

Several countries in the Middle East have 

successfully stopped the movement or are in the 

process of violently suppressing it. Bahrain, Iran, 

and Syria are prime examples. On top of that, just 

because a country gives its citizens a chance to vote 

does not mean that democracy will take root and 

grow. Iran, a religious theocracy, allows its citizens 

to vote for their president but only from a group of 

candidates approved by country’s religious council of 

elders. Last year in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood 

and a group of ultraconservative Islamists won 70 

percent of the parliamentary seats with campaign 

promises to ban alcohol, enforce a dress code for 

women, and cover Egypt’s ancient pharaoh statues 

in wax. In Yemen, people had a chance to vote for 

Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi or Abd-Rabbu Mansour 

Hadi for president. Outside of Tunisia, Jordon and 

Libya, it appears the Arab Spring is being stopped 

or turned into meaningless elections. When votes 

are counted, they are used to implement a “tyranny 

of the majority,” denying minority populations the 

fundamental human rights of speech and expression.

If the US is going to continue its tradition of 

foreign policy initiatives to create more democracies 

and greater international stability trough human 

security, free trade, and human rights, it might have 

a better chance of success with the countries of 

South East Asia. If this were the case, perhaps we 

could repeat the success that we had with the former 

Eastern Bloc countries of the Cold War. Still, in 

order for the US to successfully rebalance its focus, 

increase defense cooperation in the region, and help 

with democratic springs that have been peacefully 

building in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, a 

greater portion of the foreign aid budget should be 

directed to South East Asia, say 10 percent of the 

2013 budget proposed for Iraq and Egypt.

About the Author

Lt. Col. Tom Williams is assistant professor and 

deputy director of research at the Defense Institute 

of Security Assistance Management. He spent over 

a year in Iraq managing Foreign Military Sales 

construction cases and currently teaches classes in 

FMS, security cooperation offices operations, and 

middle regional studies. He has a PhD in public 

administration. 

officials, becoming the first senior American official 

to visit the country in decades. At the time of this 

article’s publication, there have been three separate 

delegations to the country, and there is talk of David 

H. Petraeus, the Director of the CIA, also visiting. 

The Obama Administration has announced that it 

is looking at upgrading diplomatic ties, appointing 

an ambassador, and relaxing restrictions on Burma. 

At this rate can greater security cooperation be far 

behind? 

In November 2011, President Obama traveled 

to the Asia-Pacific region and became the first US 

President to attend the East Asia Summit. This 

distinction, in addition to other comments and events 

on his tour, drew attention to his administration’s 

foreign policy concentration shifting from the 

Middle East to the Far East, which has been titled 

“rebalancing toward Asia.” This rebalancing is not 

just empty words spoken for the benefit of 24/7 news 

channels; it has been followed by concrete steps—

the removal of all combat troops from Iraq at the end 

of 2011; the US-Australia agreement to rotationally 

deploy US Marines to Darwin, Australia; and the 

release on 5 January 2012 of the new strategic 

guidance for the US Department of Defense (DOD) 

that stated, “we will of necessity rebalance toward 

the Asia-Pacific region” (emphasis in the original). 

This new strategic guidance went on to describe the 

importance of expanding cooperation with emerging 

partners in the region and greater constructive 

defense cooperation.

It is still too early to determine if this rebalancing 

toward the Asia-Pacific will be a success. US troops 

will be in Afghanistan for years to come, there may 

be a new presidential administration that chooses 

not continue the Asia-Pacific rebalancing, and the 

Arab Spring has turned into the Arab Summer. Fall, 

winter, and spring part II are constantly drawing time, 

attention, and money away from US involvement in 

the Far East. In response to the ongoing unrest in 

the Middle East, the Obama Administration recently 

announced plans to help the Arab Spring countries 

with more than $800 million in economic aid. When 

added to the $1.3 Billion that was proposed for Egypt 

and the $4 Billion for Iraq, the total surges to $6.1 

billion. By comparison, the total amount spent on 

four years of foreign assistance to Vietnam, Laos, 

and Cambodia is $0.46 Billion—7.5 percent of the 

proposed spending for Iraq and Egypt in FY 2013.
209 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Iran’s existing Shabab-3 missile delivery system, 

with a range of nearly 1300 km, this would put Israel 

well within striking distance. Therefore, any step 

taken by Iran toward obtaining a nuclear weapon is 

very concerning for the US, Israel, and other allies 

who do not want to disrupt the balance of power in 

an already volatile region.3

Due to intelligence gaps, many countries, 

including some of the US’s closest allies in Europe, 

are not convinced that Iran has a true desire to obtain 

a nuclear weapon. This is important to consider, 

because whether there is evidence of an official 

program will largely determine the support that 

the US will get from other nations when choosing 

military options. The rhetoric coming from Iran’s 

regime is often conflicting. On one hand, Iranian 

Officials have publicly denounced their nuclear 

weapons ambitions by stating that they “consider the 

acquiring, development, and use of nuclear weapons 

Inhuman, Immoral, Illegal, and against our basic 

principles” and also stating that nuclear weapons 

“have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine.”4 On the 

other hand, the regime vehemently opposes giving 

up their Uranium enrichment efforts. In 2004, the 

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that “Iran will 

not give up its enrichment program at any price,” 

and in 2005 former Iranian President Khatami 

announced that ending Iran’s enrichment program 

is “completely unacceptable.”5 Statements coming 

from current Iranian President Ahmadinejad are no 

less encouraging. 

Domestic groups opposed to the current Iranian 

regime have also voiced their disapproval of 

nuclear weapons. In 2009, the late Grand Ayatollah 

Hussein‐Ali Montazeri issued a Fatwa that declared, 

“nuclear weapons are not permitted according to 

reason or Sharia.”6 Strong statements coming from 

the regime’s opposition could indicate that they 

have first-hand knowledge about a clandestine 

nuclear weapons program and they are attempting to 

Iran and The Bomb: Options 

for the United States

By Jeffrey F. Fourman

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

When will Iran have the bomb? This is the 

question policy makers in the West are asking. More 

importantly, however, is what would prevent Iran 

from obtaining a nuclear weapon in the first place. 

Answering this requires a deeper look at Iran’s 

current capabilities and motivations, as well as the 

likely response from other countries with a stake 

in the situation. In short, we must understand what 

makes it unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear 

weapons program and what the impacts are to the 

US, its allies, and the international community as a 

whole. After gaining this understanding it is possible 

to analyze the available options for dealing with the 

situation and to suggest a course of action that will 

result in the best possible outcome for the US and its 

partner nations around the globe.

What most people do not know is that Iran’s 

nuclear program actually began in 1959 under 

the auspices of the US when the Shah purchased 

nuclear reactors for peaceful research purposes.1 The 

program came to a very abrupt halt in 1979 when 

revolution swept away the Shah and brought the 

Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khamenei to power. From 

most accounts, there was no active nuclear program 

until after the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. Iran’s program 

began in earnest under the current regime when 

Russian contractors took advantage of the weak postSoviet Yeltsin Administration and began construction 

of two nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes in Iran.2

Since that time, the Iranian regime has had ambitions 

for nuclear power and has what appears to be an 

on‐again-off-again nuclear weapons program.

Based on Iran’s official policy statements, it is 

unclear if there is currently an official nuclear weapons 

program. However, the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) and intelligence agencies around the 

globe have serious concerns about Iran’s production 

of 20 percent Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), 

which is considered a major milestone in reaching 

weapons-grade 90 percent HEU. Combined with 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 210

it is hard to imagine that Iran would simply turn over 

their nuclear weapons to terrorists after spending 

billions of dollars over several decades to develop. 

Moreover, if they did launch a nuclear attack on Israel, 

the retaliation on Iran would be merciless. Although 

these scenarios are extremely improbable, there is 

still more to pay than the US appearing weak and 

ineffective at stopping further nuclear proliferation if 

the US stands by while Iran gets nuclear weapons. 

If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, a substantial and 

indefinite intelligence campaign would be required to 

monitor the threat and to ensure they do not transfer 

technology or fissile material to other non-nuclear 

nations or terrorist organizations. This alone would 

likely cost billions to successfully maintain. Further, 

the US would be required to develop partner nation’s 

missile defense capabilities which would likely 

require a surge of Foreign Military Sales (FMS). 

Given the relatively complex nature of missile 

defense systems and the existing international 

treaties banning anti-ballistic missile defenses, the 

simultaneous implementation of multiple FMS 

agreements would be very challenging, especially 

when some of the partner nations include former 

Soviet republics. Further, this would leave a window 

of vulnerability that Iran could exploit to further 

project their power throughout the region. 

Allowing Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon is 

also likely to trigger further proliferation throughout 

the region. Saudi Arabia has already publically 

announced that if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, they 

would do the same, resulting in a regional arms race.7

Other Middle East nations could also follow suit, and 

it is hard for anyone to imagine a positive outcome 

with multiple nuclear armed countries in a region as 

volatile as the Middle East.

Lastly, a nuclear armed Iran could embolden 

Hezbollah and other allies of the Shia Iranian regime. 

Hezbollah has already indicated that they would 

consider an attack on Iran as an attack on Lebanon, 

and it would be no stretch to assume that Hezbollah 

would come under the protection of an Iranian 

nuclear umbrella.8 This would in turn limit Israel’s 

ability to project its power throughout the region and 

protect its own borders. While it is unlikely that Iran 

would immediately use any small arsenal they obtain 

in a first strike on Israeli cities, Israel would still 

need to live with the possibility of a nuclear attack. 

Dr. Matthew Kroenig, a Nuclear Security Fellow at 

the Council on Foreign Relations summarizes the 

differentiate themselves from the ruling party. One 

would think that an opposition statement would lend 

credence to the existence of a program, or at least the 

existence of true ambition within the current regime 

to obtain nuclear weapons. Either way, it is important 

to note that there are some large groups in Iran who 

do not want nuclear weapons.

Moreover, whether Iran has an official policy 

to develop nuclear weapons or not is of little 

consequence to the US in their opposition to Iran’s 

nuclear program. The US still finds it unacceptable 

for Iran to even maintain a civil nuclear program 

that could provide a means to develop nuclear 

weapons. These fears are not unfounded, because 

Iran is currently operating a heavy water production 

facility near Arak, indicating that it could be looking 

for a way to reprocess spent nuclear fuel into 

fissile material for nuclear weapons. Likewise, the 

existence of Uranium enrichment facilities that are 

capable of producing 20 percent HEU indicates that 

Iran is also likely able to produce 90 percent HEU in 

time. While not necessarily a smoking gun, the US 

and its allies find the existence of such facilities and 

capabilities curious when it is not necessary to enrich 

Uranium beyond 5 percent for use in civil nuclear 

energy production. Compounded with Iran’s history 

of negligence in reporting nuclear activities to the 

IAEA only after they are discovered by third parties, 

makes it a very real possibility that there are other 

unknown nuclear sites whose purpose and capability 

are undefined. In short, the uncertainty surrounding 

the true capabilities and intentions of Iran’s nuclear 

program makes choosing an appropriate course of 

action very difficult.

The first option for dealing with Iran is to simply 

do nothing and allow Iran to continue its nuclear 

program under the assumption that their motivations 

are truly for peaceful purposes. However, the bottom 

line remains that without full disclosure of all nuclear 

sites and a guarantee that there are no clandestine 

nuclear weapon programs in Iran, there is no way for 

the US and its closest allies in the region to accept 

even a peaceful nuclear program. 

If the US bets on a peaceful Iranian nuclear 

program and does nothing, there will be some very 

significant consequences if they are wrong. Although 

a very remote possibility, Iran could use their nuclear 

arms in an immediate attack on Israel or perhaps 

provide nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. 

Both of these scenarios are extremely unlikely, and 
211 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

greatly delaying any progress of obtaining nuclear 

weapons, it would solidify the regime’s desire to 

have nuclear weapons in the long run. Any future 

development is most likely to occur exclusively 

in hardened underground facilities that are much 

more likely to survive future air strikes. Even a 

very limited “surgical” air campaign could have a 

severe backlash and endanger US citizens abroad. 

In a seemingly strategic move, Iran moved one of 

its Uranium enrichment operations from Tehran to 

a location near the Islamic holy city of Qom. Any 

airstrike that targets this facility could be viewed as 

a deliberate attack on Islam. As the recent accidental 

Koran burning incident in Afghanistan has shown, 

a perceived attack on Islam will certainly result in 

outrage among Iran’s Muslim supporters and could 

result in mass violence and acts of terrorism targeting 

US civilians and military personnel throughout the 

world. There appear to be few long term benefits 

of a preemptive air strike that can only delay Iran’s 

progress and make them even more determined to 

obtain a nuclear weapon. Barring any further action, 

an airstrike-only option would ultimately result in a 

very similar situation than if the US did nothing at 

all.

Although the precise actions are undefined, 

Secretary Panetta has outline “red lines” that if 

crossed will result in US military action against 

Iran.14 First, there will be a military response if Iran 

actually obtains a nuclear weapon or there is credible 

evidence that Iran made a definitive decision to obtain 

one. Second, the US will act if Iran closes or attempts 

to close the Strait of Hormuz which nearly 20 percent 

of the global oil supply flows through. Finally, the US 

will act militarily if Iran continues to spread violence 

and supports terrorism abroad. If Iran crosses these 

lines, it will likely result in action by not only the US 

and Israel, but also by many partner nations around 

the globe. In fact, Japan is already debating whether 

to send minesweepers to help keep the Strait of 

Hormuz open as nearly 80 percent of their oil supply 

goes through it.15

On the extreme end of the spectrum, a full-scale 

invasion and occupation of Iran would certainly 

prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon 

but may not be worth the cost and is not seriously 

advised. The rhetoric leading up to the Iraq invasion 

and the rhetoric surrounding the current situation 

with Iran is very similar. There is suspicion of hiding 

or developing weapons of mass destruction, and 

“do nothing” option by claiming that “attempting to 

manage a nuclear armed Iran is not only a terrible 

option but the worst.”9

Because the Israelis are eager to do all the 

bidding, the US may not need to do much anyhow. 

Israel has far more to fear from a nuclear armed 

Iran than anyone else, and they have executed joint 

exercises for this scenario for a very long time. 

The biggest problem with allowing a unilateral 

preemptive strike from Israel is that in reality, it would 

not be a unilateral action. The Obama Administration 

has reiterated their resolve to stand by Israel, and 

defense cooperation with Israel is probably as close 

as it has ever been. At the recent AIPAC policy 

conference, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 

became the first US Defense Secretary in twenty 

years to give a speech. This closeness is exemplified 

not only through public statement but also with 

increased security assistance. Secretary Panetta 

stated, “The cornerstone of this unprecedented 

defense cooperation is our commitment to maintain 

and expand Israel’s qualitative military edge.”10

This year security assistance to Israel is likely to 

top $3.1 billion compared to $2.5 billion in 2009.11 

This includes $650 million to fund missile defense 

systems that would defend against short, medium, 

and long range ballistic missiles and also includes the 

delivery of new F-35 Joint Strike Fighters that would 

make Israel the only country in the Middle East with 

this next generation tactical capability.12

An attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would 

require cooperation from not only the US but also 

several other nations. In order to reduce the number 

of jets required to enter hostile Iranian airspace, 

Israel would need to arm their existing fleet of long 

range F-15I and F-16Is with the heaviest possible 

payload. The need to swap fuel pods for armaments 

combined with the distance from Israeli air bases to 

their targets would require mid-air refueling over 

other countries such as Turkey, Iraq, and Saudi 

Arabia. Although Israeli defense doctrine allows for 

refueling over hostile territory, permission to use 

neighboring airspace would make refueling en route 

much easier.13

The most immediate consequence of allowing 

Israel to act unilaterally with tacit support from the 

US would be a rally of the Iranian population around 

the current regime. In the aftermath of an airstrike, 

there would be little incentive for Iran to continue 

any diplomatic negotiations on the matter, and while 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 212

such as Saudi Arabia to increase their oil production 

to help mitigate a global supply shortage. Although 

President Obama recently claimed that “sanctions are 

working” and “Iran is isolated as never before,” the 

most recent IAEA report on Iran states that “contrary 

to the resolutions of the Security Council, Iran has 

not suspended its enrichment related activities.”20 

This shows that sanctions are ultimately ineffective 

and will do little to coerce the current regime. One 

would need to look no further than North Korea to 

see how sanctions and isolation do not prevent a 

regime from obtaining nuclear weapons if they are 

willing to let their own people suffer in the process.

Participating in multilateral diplomatic 

negotiations also has several problems. Following the 

framework of the NPT, most countries agree that Iran 

should not be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons and 

should not be allowed to enrich their own Uranium 

or produce Plutonium. However, the US and Israel 

depart with the rest of the international community 

by not accepting even a civil nuclear energy program 

in Iran. In order for multilateral negotiations to work 

there must be an agreed upon end goal, and either 

the US must accept a civil nuclear energy program 

where a third-party such as Russia controls the 

nuclear material or the EU must be willing to take 

a harder stance and give up economic ties to Iran 

which amounts to nearly 25 billion Euros annually.21 

While the EU has put some pressure on the Central 

Bank of Iran (CBI), the EU is not likely to budge 

much more, and the US is not likely to accept a civil 

nuclear program. 

However, all parties involved are indicating a 

willingness to talk, and it is possible that the IAEA 

could facilitate effective negotiations if everyone 

sits down together. However, one of the largest 

roadblocks to effective negotiations is the media 

hype surrounding any talks that occur. Iran’s history 

of poor communication with the IAEA combined 

with the lack of regular negotiations makes it hard 

to meet without the media sensationalizing the 

event. Any meeting in the spotlight is very unlikely 

to produce any productive negotiations for Iranian’s 

fear of being embarrassed or “forced to comply.” If a 

diplomatic route occurs, it must be one that helps the 

Iranians convince themselves that obtaining a nuclear 

weapon is not beneficial for their regime. This can 

only happen if regular ongoing meetings take place 

with the IAEA on either a monthly, biweekly or even 

a weekly basis. Eventually the media will get bored 

there are credible accusations of state sponsored 

terrorism. In fact, a strong case can be made that 

Iran is much further along than Iraq was in pursuit of 

nuclear weapons and there is much more evidence of 

Iranian sponsored terrorism than there was with Iraq. 

In reference to the October 2011 bombing plot to 

assassinate a Saudi Ambassador in Washington, DC, 

President Obama cited “slam-dunk proof that Tehran 

hatched the plan.”16 However, on the heels of the 

Iraq drawdown and a continuing counter insurgent 

campaign in Afghanistan, the US is unlikely to pursue 

a full-scale invasion option as it would likely result 

in another decade long war and could spark further 

violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Muslim 

countries that are already on the brink of civil war. 

Moreover, there is truly little evidence that 

indicates Iran will obtain a nuclear weapon within 

the next year or two, which gives some time before 

purely military options are the only available solution. 

Assuming that Iran has made a definite decision 

to obtain a nuclear weapon, the 2007 National 

Intelligence Estimate indicated that “Iran could 

develop a functioning nuclear weapon sometime in the 

2010–2015 time frame, but is unlikely to develop one 

before 2013.”17 This estimate was produced before 

a sabotage campaign was unleashed on the Iranian 

nuclear program that delayed progress significantly. 

In reference to the Stuxnet computer virus that Israel 

is suspected of releasing into the Iranian computer 

systems, the retiring Mossad Chief Mier Dagan told 

the Israel Knesset that Iran had run into “technical 

difficulties” that could delay the development of a 

nuclear weapon until 2015.18

Turning to some available non-military options, 

the first is to ratchet up diplomatic pressure and 

enforce sanctions. All parties with an interest in the 

matter, including the Russians, agree that Iran has 

been in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty (NPT) and other UN Security Council 

resolutions.19 To this extent, Iran has already taken 

steps toward isolating itself from the international 

community with a repeated history of non-disclosure 

of nuclear facilities until after the sites are discovered 

by third parties. However, China is currently the 

largest sanction violator with respect to Iranian oil 

exports, and they must stop purchasing Iranian oil 

for any sanctions to be effective. If China does not 

support sanctions, an Iranian oil boycott would do 

little more than drive up the price of oil in the West. 

Further, it would require other oil producing nations 
213 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

while the Iranians dismantle all Uranium enrichment 

and heavy water production facilities. To round out 

the agreement, IAEA inspectors must have a blanket 

mandate to access any facility at any time. Although 

an agreement that places limits on the US’s closest 

ally in the region while encouraging the Russians to 

provide nuclear fuel to Iran is probably ludicrous, it 

is still a solution for policy makers to consider if all 

options are “on the table.” However, there is still no 

way to guarantee that Iran or others do not renege on 

their agreement if tensions heighten in the future, and 

with spotty intelligence it is still hard to know what 

the Ayatollah’s true intensions are as negotiations are 

on-going. While Iranian diplomats are hammering 

out negotiations in good faith, hardliners within the 

regime could continue to develop nuclear weapons 

covertly. Therefore, just as military action warrants 

hard evidence that a nuclear weapons program exists, 

good-faith negotiations require hard evidence that 

one does not and will never exist.

Somewhere between doing nothing and executing 

a full scale invasion of Iran there is a way forward. 

The facts surrounding the situation must guide the 

US to the correct course of action. Currently, the 

US knows that Iran would benefit from obtaining a 

nuclear weapon, and they know that IAEA has made 

clear that Iran has the capability to develop a nuclear 

weapon. They also know that EU, Israel, and other 

allies agree that a nuclear armed Iran is unacceptable, 

while Russia and China are not as concerned about 

the threat. The US also knows that Israel could 

strike unilaterally at any moment, and would likely 

give the US very short notice if they do. Therefore, 

perhaps the best approach for long‐term success is to 

maintain covert operations in the short run that focus 

on diminishing Iran’s nuclear capability while at the 

same time providing support to popular opposition 

groups within Iran with an ultimate goal of regime 

change. The key to this approach is to convince 

Israel to not launch a preemptive air strike, but give 

them free reign and even support where necessary 

to continue any current covert operations. Israel 

has already proven they can disrupt and sabotage 

Iranian nuclear capabilities through the suspected 

assassination of Iranian scientists, the release of 

computer viruses, the introduction of impurities 

into centrifuge systems, and financial sabotage of 

funding and procurement for Iran’s nuclear program. 

Meanwhile, the US can offer more support to the 

opposition leaders and populations within Iran who 

with the negotiations and finally all sides will be 

able to address the issues that matter most without 

the need to talk tough for the cameras. At a recent 

conference at the Stimson Center in Washington 

D.C., Ambassador James Dobbins said,

In my experience, these kinds of talks 

aren’t going to make much progress until 

the press loses interest in them...I do 

believe that one of the most productive 

things that could come out of the current 

session would be an agreement to meet 

more frequently, to meet very frequently, 

to meet every week until we’d solved the 

problem...22

The US’s hardline stance in opposition of civil 

nuclear energy in Iran is not without merit. Although 

Iranian President Ahmadinejad holds little political 

power and is essentially a figure head, he has stated 

on several occasions that Iran “will not yield to 

UN, US, or EU pressure to halt a peaceful nuclear 

program.” Assuming Iran is a rational actor, there are 

only a few possibilities as to why Iran would snub the 

international community and not be swayed to forgo 

their nuclear ambitions. First, it is understandable that 

nuclear energy would allow Iran to more efficiently 

exploit their oil reserves and to capitalize on 

lucrative exports. The current regime has also cited 

their “right” to nuclear energy for medical research 

purposes as an explanation for producing 20 percent 

HEU. However, the most rational reason why Iran or 

any other state on the verge of regime collapse would 

want nuclear power is to ultimately develop a nuclear 

weapon and thus ensuring its survival. Coming to the 

negotiation table under these assumptions creates 

some very challenging problems. 

Negotiating a peaceful resolution would require 

Iran to overcome their nuclear weapons ambition and 

for the US and Israel to accept a civil nuclear program 

in Iran. In order for Iran to give up their desire for a 

nuclear weapon they would need some guarantee of 

security for their regime. To accomplish this, the US 

could place more restrictions on the sale and use of 

major defense articles to Israel and require end-use 

monitoring agreements to ensure Israel does not use 

any security assistance provided by the US to defend 

beyond their current boarders. Although this may seem 

unrealistic and very challenging, it would in theory 

help Iran be more comfortable with giving up their 

desire to have a nuclear weapon. In turn, the Russians 

could provide nuclear fuel for Iran’s peaceful reactors 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 214

Notes

1. Sharon Squassoni, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: 

Recent Developments,” Congressional Research 

Service–The Library of Congress, February 22, 

2007, 1.

2. Anton Khlopkov and Anna Lutkova, “The 

Busheur NPP: Why Did It Take So long?” 

Center for Energy and Security Studies, August 

21, 2010, 1.

3. “Iran Tests Shahab 3 Ballistic Missile,” Jane’s 

Missiles and Rockets, August 1, 1998.

4. G. Ali Koshroo, Statements made during the 

Second Session of the Prepcom for the 2005 

NPT Review Conference, April 29, 2003.

5. Sharon Squassoni, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: 

Recent Developments,” Congressional Research 

Service–The Library of Congress, December 26, 

2006, 2.

6. Abbas Milani, “Exclusive: A Green Ayatollah’s 

Fatwa Against Nukes,” The New Republic, 

October 20, 2009. 

7. Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran,” 

Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (2012): 77.

8. Michael Stott and Samia Nakhoul, “Hezbollah 

says attack on Iran would set Middle East 

ablaze,” Reuters, February 29, 2012.

9. Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran,” 86.

10. Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, Speech at 

the AIPAC Policy Conference, Washington DC, 

6 March 2012. Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense-Public Affairs.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid. 

13. Alon BenDavid, “Israel Bolsters KC-707 

Refueling Fleet,” Aviation Week, January 11, 

2010.

14. Elaine Sanchez, “Panetta Cites ‘Red Lines’ Iran 

Should Avoid,” American Forces Press Service, 

February 16, 2012.

15. Takeo Kumagai, “Japan Mulls Sending SDF 

Escort Vessels to Strait of Hormuz: Repot,” 

Platts Oilgram News, February 16, 2012.

16. Thomas M. DeFrank, “President Obama Ready 

to Punish Iran Over Failed Assassination Plot 

on Saudi Ambassador,” New York Daily News, 

October 13, 2011. 

17. National Intelligence Estimate, “Iran: Nuclear 

Intentions and Capabilities,” Office of The 

are increasingly jaded by the current regime. For 

example, Iranian oil industry workers frequently go 

without pay. Just last year, oil refinery workers went 

on strike after not receiving pay for over six months.23

Covert action combined with support for 

opposition groups is the best available option because 

it is the most likely to succeed. Without a regime 

change in Iran, there is no guarantee that Iran will not 

eventually obtain nuclear weapons and there is no 

guarantee that nuclear weapons will not proliferate 

throughout the Middle East. Already, covert action 

has delayed Iran’s progress by at least two years 

and continued efforts could delay it even further. 

Likewise, the recent toppling of Muammar Gaddafi 

in Libya shows how quickly the tide can turn against 

an oppressive regime when the US and its partner 

nations throw their support behind an opposition 

movement. Coupled with Iran pushing the boundary 

of Panetta’s red lines, and in some cases already 

crossing them with their support of terror plots on 

US soil, the US should easily find allies around the 

globe to support a new regime in Iran.

Although it seems as though the current regime 

may have an enduring grip on Iran, it is quite likely 

that they know their grip is slipping and that a sure 

fire way to bolster their domestic support base would 

be to draw the US or Israel into a limited military 

campaign. Therefore, the US must convince Israel to 

show restraint in not taking overt military action in 

order to allow time for popular uprisings to bubble 

up again. With the wave of uprisings and regime 

changes currently occurring in North Africa and the 

Middle East it seems like it is only a matter of time 

before the protestors appear again in Tehran as they 

did in 2009. 

In conclusion, the US has a multitude of options 

available to deal with the situation in Iran, and all 

of them have implications that go well beyond Iran’s 

borders. Only time will tell exactly how the situation 

will play out, but it is certain that the Iranian nuclear 

crisis will not end until the question of when will Iran 

get “the bomb” is answered by saying “never.”
215 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

Director of National Intelligence, November 

2007, 7. 

18. William J Broad, John Markoff, and David E. 

Sanger, “Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in 

Iran Nuclear Delay,” New York Times, January 

15, 2011. 

19. Sergey Lavrov. Interview with Russia Today, 

February 25, 2010.

20. Yukiya Amano, “Report by the Director 

General of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 

Agreement and relevant provisions of Security 

Council resolution in the Islamic Republic 

of Iran,” Prepared for the IAEA Board of 

Governors, November 8, 2011, 3.

21. Benjamin Weinthal, “How to Punish Iran,” 

Slate Magazine, November 9, 2011.

22. James Dobbins, “Diplomatic Strategies for 

Preventing a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Arms 

Control Association, February 9, 2012.

23. Rooz, “Strikes Begin at Abadan Refinery,” The 

Green Voice of Freedom, February 21, 2011.

About the Author

Jeffrey Fourman is an analyst and research 

consultant for the Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management. He has a bachelor’s degree 

in international studies from the University of Dayton 

and is a student in the International Comparative 

Politics master’s program at Wright State University. 

He works on several security cooperation workforce 

initiatives, and his research focuses on the study 

of terrorism, European integration, and other US 

national security issues.
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 216

Bibliography

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Council resolution in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Report by the Director General of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency Yukiya Amano. Prepared for the IAEA Board of Governors, November 8, 2011.

BenDavid, Alon. “Israel Bolsters KC-707 Refueling Fleet.” Aviation Week, January 11, 2010. Accessed 

February 17, 2012. http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/jsp_includes/articlePrint.jsp?storyID=news/

awst/2010/01/11/AW_01_11_2010_p22 194785.xml&headLine=Israel%20Bolsters%20KC 707%20

Refueling%20Fleet

Broad, William J., John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. “Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran 

Nuclear Delay.” New York Times, January 15, 2011. Accessed March 6, 2012. http://www.nytimes.

com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?pagewanted=all

DeFrank, Thomas M. “President Obama ready to punish Iran over failed assassination plot on Saudi 

Ambassador.” New York Daily News, October 13, 2011. Accessed February 12, 2012. http://articles.

nydailynews.com/2011-10-13/news/30293919_1_iranian-government-president-obama-tehran

Dobbins, James. Statement by Ambassador James Dobbins, Director of the RAND International Security 

and Defense Policy Center and Former Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Special Assistant to 

the President, and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for the Balkans. “Diplomatic 

Strategies for Preventing a Nuclear Armed Iran.” Arms Control Association, February 9, 2012. Accessed 

February 12, 2012. http://www.armscontrol.org/events/Diplomatic-Strategies-for-Preventing-a-NuclearArmed-Iran%20

“Iran Tests Shahab 3 Ballistic Missile.” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, August 1, 1998. Accessed March 3, 

2012. http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Missiles-And-Rockets-98/IIRAN-TESTS-SHAHAB-3-

BALLISTIC-MISSILE.html

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Security Studies, August 21, 2010, 1.

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News, February 16, 2012. Accessed March 2, 2012. http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/

RSSFeed/Oil/7216042

Lavrov, Sergey. “Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.” Russia Today, February 25, 

2010. Accessed February 12, 2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eonOWCp381g

Milani, Abbas. “Exclusive: A Green Ayatollah’s Fatwa Against Nukes.” The New Republic, October 

20, 2009. Accessed February 15, 2012. http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-plank/exclusive-greenayatollah%E2%80%99s-fatwa-against-nukes

National Intelligence Estimate. “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities.” Office of The Director of 

National Intelligence, November 2007.

Panetta, Leon E. Speech delivered by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta at the AIPAC Policy 

Conference, Washington DC, March 6, 2012. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Public 

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February 2, 2012. http://en.irangreenvoice.com/article/2011/feb/21/2834
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The DISAM Annual, May 2012 218
219 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

because Truman had been “successfully 

portrayed has soft on communism” by 

followers of Senator Joseph McCarthy during 

the Red Scare of the 1950s.5

President Truman chose not to run for reelection 

in 1952. Eisenhower instead ran against Adlai 

Stevenson that year (and again in 1956).6 Glain’s 

error is particularly perplexing because he correctly 

identifies Stevenson as Eisenhower’s opponent in 

1952 later in the book.7

• Glain states that Elihu Root served as Secretary 

of State under Presidents William McKinley 

and Theodore Roosevelt.8

Root served as Secretary of War under both 

McKinley and Roosevelt, from 1899 to 1904. He 

served as Secretary of State only under Roosevelt, 

from 1905 to 1909.9

• Glain identifies the Director of the Office of 

Chinese Affairs in the US State Department 

during the build-up to the Korean War in 1950 

as Edmund Chubb.10

The gentleman’s correct surname is Clubb. 

Oliver Edmund Clubb was one of the Department of 

State Foreign Service Officers known as the “China 

Hands” who were hounded out of office by Joseph 

McCarthy and his supporters during the Red Scare.11

• Glain refers to an announcement by the Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in 2009 

that it was going to double the size of a chapter 

on humanitarian affairs “in its manual for flag 

officers advising foreign governments.”12

A review of the source Glain cites for this 

information reveals that the manual in question is 

DOD 5105.38-M: Security Assistance Management 

Manual (SAMM).[13] DSCA does plan to update 

the SAMM, including chapter 12 which is currently 

entitled “Humanitarian Assistance and Mine 

Action.” However, while the SAMM is an important, 

influential, and useful document, it can hardly be 

considered a “manual for flag officers.” On the 

State vs. Defense: The Battle to 

Define America’s Empire

By Robert H. Van Horn

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define America’s 

Empire, Stephen Glain

New York: Crown, 2011

496 pp, $26.00

Stephen Glain has written what could have been 

an important addition to the discussion about the 

roles of the Department of State and the Department 

of Defense (DOD) in the development and execution 

of US foreign policy. The thrust of State vs. Defense 

is that State and DOD have been jockeying for 

preeminence in formulating and implementing US 

foreign policy since World War II. Glain contends that 

State lost the shoving match. As a result, US foreign 

policy has become more and more “militarized” over 

time, to the detriment not only of US interests, but 

to the rest of the world as well. Glain points out that 

DOD has State outnumbered and outflanked in every 

measurable area, including budget, personnel, access, 

and influence. He laments that the dominance of the 

military component in US foreign policy is “more 

consistent with an empire than a republic,” an empire 

that “not only sought dominion, it did so for its own 

sake.”1 He asserts that this militarization goes against 

the most basic of American values, calling it “the 

worst betrayal of the nation’s republican ideals.”[2]

These are strong words, portending a lively and 

interesting discussion. Unfortunately, the book is rife 

with distracting errors which over time become as 

annoying as a mosquito in a bedroom.

A sampling:

• Glain states that General Douglas MacArthur 

dispatched Major General George S. 

Patton to suppress the Bonus March staged 

by unemployed World War I veterans in 

Washington, DC, in the summer of 1932.3

Patton was a major in 1932. He was not promoted 

to major general until April 1941.4

• Glain says that Harry Truman lost to Dwight 

Eisenhower in the 1952 presidential election 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 220

and have been since their inception. Moreover, the 

last decade has seen a torrent of alternative funding 

streams under such rubrics as counterterrorism, 

humanitarian assistance, and train-and-equip that 

are administered directly by DOD and that tend to 

nudge State aside Whether this is a good thing is a 

legitimate question.

Although the intensity of DOD’s involvement in 

foreign policy may have increased in recent years, 

the story Glain tells in State vs. Defense shows that it 

is not new. “Militarists” in the US government have 

been arguing since World War II for an aggressive 

and muscular foreign policy. Contrary to what one 

might expect, many of those Glain places on the 

“militarist” team are civilians, such as Nitze, Walt 

Rostow, Donald Rumsfeld, and Richard Perle. Glain 

notes that, “American militarism is unique for its 

civilian provenance.”18 On the other hand, many 

of those who have advocated a less belligerent 

approach, such as Eisenhower, George Marshall, 

and Colin Powell, were military men. For example, 

Glain points out that Colin Powell spent the latter 

years of his public career “trying to stay the cavalier 

impulse among civilian leaders for military solutions 

to foreign policy challenges. He would not pander to 

the militarist instincts of civilian leaders, nor would 

he be seduced by their interventionist muse.”19 This 

conflict between “militaristic” civilian officials 

and more cautious military officers was starkly on 

display during the Clinton Administration, when 

Powell, as Chairman of the JCS, cautioned against 

US intervention in the Balkans, only to be taken to 

task by then UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, 

who asked, “What’s the point of having this superb 

military that you’re always talking about if we can’t 

use it?”20

This aggressive “militarist” attitude, according to 

Glain, has been the cause of virtually every military 

confrontation the US has found itself in since 1941, 

from Pearl Harbor and Korea, through the Cuban 

missile crisis and Vietnam, to the 9/11 attacks and 

the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He notes that 

although the US may not have struck the first blow in 

many of these conflicts, “acts of aggression are rarely 

unprovoked, a fact that complicates tidy narratives of 

victimhood and redemption.”21 I disagree with much 

of Glain’s postulation, but that really does not matter. 

The hypothesis that the world would be a better 

place if the US had, in the past, just implemented a 

kinder, gentler foreign policy has the advantage of 

contrary, the SAMM provides basic policy guidance 

on the administration of US security cooperation. It 

is used widely by lower and mid-level government 

employees, most of whom are civilians, to administer 

such programs as Foreign Military Sales (FMS), 

International Military Education and Training 

(IMET), grant transfers of excess defense articles 

(EDA), and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and 

Civic Aid (OHDACA). (The latter encompasses 

humanitarian assistance and mine action.) Note that 

the article Glain cites as his reference does not refer 

to the SAMM as a “manual for flag officers.”14

These errors detract greatly from Glain’s argument. 

One or two such slips might be understandable, but 

they become as grating as fingernails on a chalkboard 

as they continue to follow one after the other. To 

be fair, all of the errors pointed out above are only 

tangential to Glain’s main theme, but in some ways 

that makes them even more annoying.

This irritation is compounded by Glain’s 

tendency to snarkiness and hyperbole, such as his 

reference to distinguished public servant Paul Nitze 

as Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s “trophy wife”15 

or his assertion that an overeager, trigger-happy 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) posed a greater threat to 

US national security during the Cold War than did 

the USSR and other communist countries.16 After a 

while, the reader can’t help but think to himself, “Oh, 

c’mon! Really?”

These flubs naturally cause the reader to question 

what else Glain has gotten wrong, misrepresented, 

or exaggerated. Take for example his depiction of 

DOD’s Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)17, 

which included provisions for a retaliatory strike 

in the event of a nuclear attack against the US, and 

about which I have only a dusting of knowledge. 

Glain’s assertion that the SIOP in 1962 called for 

massive retaliatory nuclear strikes against both the 

Soviet Union and China in response to a Soviet 

attack, whether or not the Chinese were a party to the 

initial attack, is startling and disturbing—Assuming, 

of course, that it is true.

All of this is unfortunate because State vs. 

Defense addresses an important topic and Glain has 

important things to say about it. There is no question 

that US foreign policy has a large military component 

and that it has grown in recent years. Even many 

foreign assistance programs that are ostensibly run 

by State, such as FMS, IMET, and Foreign Military 

Financing (FMF), are actually executed by DOD 
221 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

That said, it is appropriate to examine the degree 

to which defense overshadows the other components 

in a policy that rests on the “3 Ds” of diplomacy, 

defense, and development. If nothing else, the dire 

budget straits in which the US finds itself will drive 

a reevaluation of what our military can and should 

be doing. This will have significant foreign policy 

implications. What purpose does NATO serve now 

that the Soviet Union is but a distant memory and 

many members of the defunct Warsaw Pact are NATO 

members? Do we really need US forces stationed in 

Korea, Japan, and Germany when these countries 

seem to be perfectly capable of looking after their 

own defense needs? What are the foreign policy 

implications of a US withdrawal from NATO or from 

one or more of these countries? Could State step in to 

fill whatever vacuum may result if DOD leaves? Does 

Iran’s nuclear program warrant a military response? Is 

the People’s Republic of China really the new enemy 

on the horizon, as the Obama administration seems 

to be implying? Could US actions make this a selffulfilling prophecy? Should the recent announcement 

of American intentions to station Marines in Australia 

be seen by China and other Asia-Pacific nations as 

engagement or provocation? What type of military 

presence, if any, should we maintain in the Middle 

East or Southwest Asia? Where should it be based? 

What would it do? Under what conditions? What are 

the military and foreign policy implications of the 

Arab Spring? Should there be a military component 

to counternarcotics programs in Latin America, and if 

so, what should it be? How do we deal with whatever 

may happen in North Korea? In Africa?

Stephen Glain provides an interesting and needed 

perspective to this discussion. It’s just too bad he 

didn’t hire an intern to spend a couple of weeks on 

Google checking his facts.

Notes

1. Stephen Glain, State vs. Defense: The Battle to 

Define America’s Empire (New York: Crown, 

2011), x.

2. Ibid., 4.

3. Ibid., 25.

4. “George Patton,”Biography.com, http://www.

biography.com/people/george-patton-9434904.\ 

“George S. Patton,” Wikipedia, http://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_S._Patton.

5. Glain, State vs. Defense, 75.

being untestable. What has happened has happened 

and there are no do-overs allowed. I think it is fair to 

say, however, that there have been—and still are—

people, organizations, and countries in the world 

whose interests are antagonistic to ours and many of 

them have wished us ill. Therefore, a strong military 

and the willingness to use it when required is an 

essential element to any viable foreign policy the US 

may bring to bear.

There is no doubt that DOD has experienced 

mission creep. As Glain points out several times, the 

DOD overseas mission set now includes tasks not 

traditionally considered within the military’s purview, 

such as building roads, schools, and other development 

projects; training domestic security organizations; 

providing health care; mitigating climate change; 

disaster relief; and instituting economic, legal, and 

political reform. However, this has not always been 

the result of deliberate power grabs by DOD. Often, 

these responsibilities fall to the military by default 

because in many contexts it is the only organization 

with the wherewithal—money, manpower, and other 

resources, not to mention attitude, leadership, and 

culture—to get things done. For example, State has 

had difficulty in the past getting enough volunteers 

to fill billets in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, even 

if every Foreign Service billet in every US embassy 

around the world were filled, that is no guarantee 

that military influence would diminish. Foreign 

Service Officers, especially those in the career cones 

of Political Affairs, Economic Affairs, and Public 

Diplomacy, are not known to be doers. Instead, their 

jobs require them to collect information, analyze, 

debate and discuss, write, and report. Most of them 

do this quite well and provide a great service to 

their country in the process. However, if there is a 

US program producing a tangible result in a country 

(e.g., lower infant mortality rates, higher agricultural 

output, professionalized police forces, expanded 

educational opportunities), there is a good chance 

someone besides the Department of State is executing 

it. That “someone” is often the US military. As one 

officer explained to me during a discussion of US 

military efforts at stabilization and reconstruction in 

Iraq, “We had to step up. There was no one else there 

to do it.” This challenge still exists in many ways.22
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 222

About the Author

Robert Van Horn has been an instructor at the 

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management 

since August 2004. He served in the US Army from

1973–1994 as an Armor Officer and a Foreign Area 

Officer (China). While in the Army, his security 

assistance tours included Chief, Army programs, 

Office of the Defense Representative, US Embassy, 

Islamabad, Pakistan, and Chief, Performance 

Evaluation Group, Logistics and Security Assistance 

Directorate (J44), Headquarters, US Pacific 

Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii. After retiring 

from the military service in 1994, he worked for 

a short time as the Director, Trade Development, 

Kansas Department of Commerce and Housing in 

Topeka, Kansas. In July 1997, he joined the security 

assistance office in the American Institute in Taiwan 

(AIT), located in Taipei, Taiwan, where he served till 

July 2004. His academic degrees include an MBA 

from the University of Kansas, a master’s degree in 

political science from the University of Arizona, and 

a bachelor’s degree in economics from Iowa State 

University.

6. “Presidential Elections, 1789-2008” Infoplease, 

http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781450.html.

7. Glain, State vs. Defense, 154.

8. Ibid., 78.

9. “The Nobel Peace Prize 1912: Elihu Root,” 

Nobelprize.org, http://www.nobelprize.org/

nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1912/root-bio.

html. “ROOT, Elihu (1845-1937)”, Biographical 

Directory of the United States Congress, 

1774-Present, http://bioguide.congress.gov/

scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=r000430.

10. Glain, State vs. Defense, 108 and 163.

11. “O. Edmund Clubb is Dead at 88; China 

Hand and McCarthy Target,” The New York 

Times, 11 May 1989, http://writing.upenn.

edu/~afilreis/50s/clubb-obit.html. O. Edmund 

Clubb, China and Russia: The “Great Game.” 

(New York and London: Columbia University 

Press, 1971), p. iv (author biographical blurb).

12. Glain, State vs. Defense, 399.

13. http://www.dsca.mil/samm> As of this writing 

(January 2012), DSCA expects to release a new 

version of the SAMM within the next several 

months. It should include updates to chapter 12.

14. Fawzia Sheikh, “DSCA Revamping DOD 

Manual’s Humanitarian Assistance Guidance,” 

Inside the Pentagon 25, no.16 (April 2009).

15. Glain, State vs. Defense, 85. On the other hand, 

I did enjoy some of the swipes Glain took at 

others, such as his description of the “upwardly 

bound failure” as, “a species that is not unique 

to Washington but is certainly overrepresented 

in it.” (195) Perhaps one man’s snark is another 

man’s wit.

16. Ibid., 340.

17. Ibid., 137–140.

18. Ibid., 3.

19. Ibid., 345.

20. Ibid., 354. Powell recounted this incident in his 

memoirs. See Colin L. Powell, My American 

Journey (New York: Random House, 1995).

21. Ibid., 322.

22. For a discussion of the challenges and obstacles 

to expanding the US government’s civilian 

presence overseas, see Hans Binnendijk and 

Patrick M. Cronin, eds., Civilian Surge: Key 

to Complex Operations (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 2009).
223 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

governance, and sustainable development. 

Unfortunately for those readers who are already 

familiar with the concepts of sustainability, peak oil, 

and environmental security this section of the book 

is covering familiar ground. In chapter 6, the authors 

propose the concept of “Engagement Brigades,”3 

a hybrid military/civilian structure that not only 

provides security but can help with local economic 

development, respond to public health concerns, 

and help with establishing legitimate local political 

governance. Like the chapters before, the concept of 

Engagement Brigades echoes an earlier concept and 

call (from the military) for active duty “Civil Affairs” 

brigades to help with building local civil authority.

In the second-to-last chapter of the book, the 

authors talk about how addressing their Human 

Security principles by fielding their Engagement 

Brigades could make a significant difference in the 

lives of Africans. This is the best part of the book 

where their arguments and examples come across 

most clearly and convincingly. Near the very end, 

the authors state that “many will take offense to this 

book...some will blame us for wanting to beat swords 

into plowshares.”4 Beebe and Kaldor were absolutely 

right. If you put yourself in the Realist camp of 

international politics, which believe that there is no 

international order and that nations are constantly 

trying to position themselves to achieve the greatest 

gain, guided solely by self-interest (insecurity just 

being part of doing business in Realist international 

order)—you will not like this book. However, 

if you lean toward liberal intuitionalism, which 

proposes that nations working together on issues 

like international trade, disease prevention, and 

environmental issues can lead to long-term mutual 

cooperation and gains—you will find the principles 

of Human Security to be welcomed arrows that you 

can add your conceptual quiver of solutions to the 

world’s ills.

The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human 

Security and the New Rules of War and Peace

By Lt. Col. Tom Williams, USAF

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human 

Security and the New Rules of War and Peace

Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldo

New York: PublicAffairs, 2010

256 pp, $25.95

Shannon Beebe, an Army Lieutenant Colonel 

who served as a senior Africa analyst at the 

Pentagon and Professor Mary Kaldor, Director 

of the Centre for Study of Global Governance, 

London School of Economics and Political Science, 

wrote this book. These two individuals, from very 

different backgrounds, came together to argue that 

the traditional concepts of national security that 

focus on State on State conflicts are inadequate in 

addressing the complexity of current conflicts. 

They argue that “Human Security,” which concerns 

itself “about the everyday security of individuals 

and the communities in which they live”1 is the 

best to way to prevent violence to said individuals 

and to increase overall security. They propose six 

principles of Human Security: “(1) the primacy of 

human rights, (2) legitimate political authority, (3) 

a bottom-up approach, (4) effective multilateralism, 

(5) regional focus, and (6) clear civilian command.”2 

To support how an emphasis on these six principles 

can lead to less violence to the individual in this 

age of persistent conflict and constant upheaval, the 

book discusses some growing twenty-first century 

risks such as increasing economic disparity (the dark 

side of globalization) and the fracturing of societies 

into more dispersant groups that traditional national 

security approaches have not been able reverse. With 

that in mind, they then go on to discuss the wars 

in Afghanistan and Iraq and argue that if Human 

Security is not addressed in these countries then 

stability and peace will remain elusive. 

Following chapters further expand on Human 

Security, discussing how it is made up of sustainable 

security, sustainable livelihoods, sustainable 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 224

On a sad note, on 7 August 2011, LTC Shannon 

Beebe, who was then serving as an Africa specialist 

in the Europe and Africa division of the Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency, died in a private plane 

accident in Warrenton, VA. On page 201 of his book, 

Beebe mentioned that both of his grandfathers lived 

to be almost one hundred, and he hoped to do the 

same. Unfortunately, he couldn’t meet that goal, but 

he did succeed in challenging people to think about 

how they could make the world more secure place.

Notes

1. Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor, The Ultimate 

Weapon is No Weapon: Human Security and the 

New Rules of War and Peace, 5

2. Ibid., 8–9.

3. Ibid., 119.

4. Ibid., 202. 

About the Author

Lt. Col. Tom Williams is assistant professor and 

deputy director of research at the Defense Institute of 

Security Assistance Management. He spent over a year 

in Iraq managing Foreign Military Sales construction 

cases and currently teaches classes in FMS, security 

cooperation offices operations, and middle regional 

studies. He has a PhD in public administration. He 

has served as an assistant professor at Air Command 

and Staff College and as an instructor and adjunct 

professor at the Air Force Institute of Technology. 
225 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

of climate change. Security cooperation is no longer 

a secondary mission for the Department of Defense 

(DOD). It has moved to the forefront.

For a security cooperation strategy to be 

effective, DOD must also work in close concert with 

other US government agencies through a “whole of 

government” approach, so that military and nonmilitary programs are mutually supporting or at 

least not in opposition to one another. This change in 

emphasis has even affected the way DOD is organized. 

For example, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) 

was established explicitly as a security cooperation 

organization with interagency coordination as part 

of its DNA. Even before AFRICOM stood up, US 

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) morphed from a 

traditional combatant command headquarters to one 

focused on security cooperation, with interagency 

coordination also integral to its make-up. Other 

combatant commands have created staff directorates 

that have the expressed responsibility to promote 

interagency and non-governmental coordination 

(e.g., US European Command (EUCOM) ECJ9: 

Interagency Partnering Directorate, and US 

Pacific Command (PACOM) J9: Pacific Outreach 

Directorate).

Not everyone in the US supports this shift. 

Some lament the loss of focus on traditional 

military missions. They see security cooperation as 

a distraction and a drain on manpower, acquisition, 

and other resources. Other detractors see DOD’s 

emphasis on security cooperation as usurping the 

roles of the Department of State and other civilian 

government agencies. They see this as DOD mission 

creep and the militarization of foreign aid.

Derek Reveron of the US Naval War College 

(NWC) disagrees. On the contrary, he argues in his 

book Exporting Security: International Engagement, 

Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of 

the US Military that DOD’s turn toward security 

cooperation and interagency coordination is not only 

Exporting Security: International 

Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the 

Changing Face of the US Military

By Robert H. Van Horn

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Exporting Security: International Engagement, 

Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the 

US Military, Derek S. Reveron

Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2010

224 pp, $29.95

The US military has always done more than 

fight wars. Humanitarian assistance and civic action, 

disaster relief, providing equipment and training to 

foreign militaries, and myriad other activities that 

fall under what is now called “security cooperation” 

have long been among tasks performed by military 

personnel. In the past, these missions were done 

largely, but not solely, by special operations forces. 

They were not considered to be in the mainstream.

The aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 brought 

increased emphasis to security cooperation activities. 

Many threats to US interests today come not from 

peer competitors with traditional military forces, 

but rather from weak or failing states that provide 

sanctuary to subnational and transnational actors. 

These threats cannot be addressed solely, or even 

primarily, through combat operations. Instead, 

US strategy stresses using security cooperation 

tools to “build the capacity” of other countries so 

that they can counter local and regional threats 

themselves, thus supporting “stabilization and 

reconstruction.” This requires more than just tanks 

and planes, guns and bullets. Programs that address 

public security in a particular country may have to 

address concurrently such disparate needs as health, 

clean water, and sanitation; professionalization and 

reform of law enforcement, correctional, and judicial 

systems; fighting trafficking in persons, piracy, and 

drug smuggling; and infrastructure development for 

education, communications, and transportation. US 

military teams around the world dig wells, build 

schools, develop programs to prevent HIV/AIDS 

and other diseases, conduct training on protecting 

fisheries, and hold conferences on the implications 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 226

civilian agencies did not have the wherewithal to 

implement viable programs. Reveron cites as an 

example the Department of State’s efforts to be more 

assertive in the security arena through its Office of 

Coordination for Stabilization and Reconstruction 

(S/CRS). While S/CRS’s efforts have been stymied 

in part by its limited success in recruiting staff, 

even with its full complement of people, it could 

not supplant a “modest” DOD civil affairs effort 

such as Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa 

(CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti.4 Moreover, calls for State 

to do more in the area of security cooperation often 

assume competencies that are not there. As Reveron 

notes, just because diplomats are civilians does not 

mean that they are any more prepared to rebuild 

countries than are their counterparts in the military.5

Furthermore, while military-managed programs may 

not be the cure for what ails a country or society, the 

same may well be said for civilian aid programs that 

State can bring to bear.

Not surprisingly, given his affiliation with 

the NWC, Reveron presents US Navy security 

cooperation as a case study to support his argument. I 

found this the most enjoyable part of the book, if only 

because my own Army background has not given me 

much exposure to Navy programs. His discussion 

of such activities as Global Fleet Station, maritime 

partnerships, and the East Africa and Southwest Indian 

Ocean Initiative illuminates the breadth and depth of 

Navy security cooperation. He notes, “Piracy, illegal 

fishing, and illegal trafficking by sea have forced 

the US Navy to adapt its mission and think beyond 

major warfare with another maritime power. Instead, 

maritime civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, and 

disaster relief are becoming core competencies.”6 

Not only are activities like these key to US security, 

the US Navy is the only US government organization 

that has what it takes to pull them off, even though 

“these are very different missions from those for 

which warships are designed.”7

As well as Reveron makes his case, I think even 

he would caution that we should not support increased 

emphasis on security cooperation without some 

caveats. First and foremost, the US military must not 

lose sight of the fact that its raison d’être is to fight 

our nation’s wars. Of all the organizations in the US 

government, only the military can conduct combat 

operations. DOD must strike a fine balance between 

security cooperation on one hand and fighting or 

preparing for war on the other. This is certainly true 

appropriate, it is necessary. Security cooperation is 

a principal means by which the US engages with 

most other countries around the world. That being 

so, Reveron stresses, “it is imperative for the military 

to develop concepts and capabilities appropriate 

to work with partners outside of combat zones in 

permissive environments.”1 He stresses that since 

the goal of security cooperation is to enable partner 

nations to meet their own security challenges, and 

thus by implication obviate the need for US forces 

to do it for them, security cooperation missions are 

“arguably more important and more likely for the US 

military than combat.”2

Reveron notes that even the wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan involve much more than combat 

operations. They too have a huge stabilization and 

reconstruction component. Iraq and Afghanistan 

prove that military victory and strategic success are 

not the same. Defeating an enemy force may really 

be only the first and easiest step in achieving strategic 

objectives. Stabilization and reconstruction efforts 

that follow military victory may be the greater and 

more important challenge. 

Reveron argues that rather than being the 

militarization of foreign aid, security cooperation is 

merely the government using the military in civilian 

applications. He responds to those who favor the 

primacy of economic and other non-military aid by 

pointing out that “security and stability are essential 

to socioeconomic development.”3 For example, 

reliable seaport and airport security, modern air 

traffic control procedures, and professional and 

trustworthy immigration and customs officers can 

have significant impacts on trade. Thriving markets 

and political liberalization may be possible only 

when citizens feel reasonably safe. 

Reveron makes a strong case defending security 

cooperation and the military’s role in foreign aid. 

DOD has more people, money, and other resources 

than any other agency in the US government. 

Moreover, its culture promotes an action-oriented 

“can do” spirit, so projects that otherwise might 

get bogged down are pushed forward when run 

by DOD. The military has stepped up to assume 

responsibility for political-military programs, civic 

action projects, and even economic development 

activities in many places either because the local 

security environment was not safe for civilians, or 

an insufficient number of qualified civilians were 

willing to go where the need is, or often just because 
227 The DISAM Annual, May 2012

invested in a project or country, becoming tied down 

indefinitely. 

Finally, it remains to be seen how long DOD 

will continue its emphasis on counterinsurgency in 

general and security cooperation in particular once 

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan draw to a close. 

Those of us of a certain age can recall how the US 

military jettisoned its counterinsurgency experience 

at the end of the Vietnam War, settling comfortably 

into a collective amnesia. We turned our attention 

back to the Fulda Gap almost as if Vietnam had 

never happened. It is possible that once operations 

in Afghanistan and Iraq wind down, security 

cooperation will again be pushed to the background 

and traditional concerns will once again become 

paramount. Should this happen, military professionals 

who have bought into security cooperation may find 

themselves shunted aside. Even the Secretary of 

Defense has questioned whether military personnel 

systems will adequately recognize and reward those 

who fill security cooperation assignments, which are 

“still not considered a career-enhancing path for the 

best and brightest officers.”11 In my opinion, slighting 

security cooperation in the future would be as big a 

mistake as ignoring other possible future threats in 

favor of security cooperation. Again, there has to be 

a balance between security cooperation that tamps 

down current threats to prevent them from flaring into 

conflagrations, and preparing for whatever awaits us 

over the next rise.

Posing these few qualifications is not meant to 

denigrate Reveron’s work in Exporting Security. To 

be fair, Reveron acknowledges each of the issues 

raised above, at least in passing. All in all, he has 

provided a welcome addition to the discussion about 

the proper place of security cooperation in the array 

of strategic tools available to DOD. His chapters 

providing an overview of select security cooperation 

programs and discussing implications for US 

force structure and doctrine are especially useful. I 

recommend this book to anyone who is working in or 

wants to understand security cooperation.

Notes

1. Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security: 

International Engagement, Security 

Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the 

US Military, 145.

2. Ibid., 145–146

3. Ibid., 42.

in Iraq and Afghanistan. While building schools, 

drilling wells, and drinking the requisite “three cups 

of tea” are important, as has been noted elsewhere 

at some point in a counterinsurgency you have to 

counter the insurgent.8 When a rifleman is training 

to perform a security cooperation mission, he is not 

training to use his rifle, which is and must be his 

primary core competency.

This is not only true with regard to current 

conflicts. Even though there is now no peer 

competitor that poses a threat to vital US interests, 

DOD must still plan, equip, and train to meet one 

should it arise, no matter how unlikely that may 

be. Given the lag time for funding, acquisition, and 

train-up, this cannot wait till such a threat clears the 

horizon. While it is certainly healthy to debate the 

type of force that may be required to meet possible 

future threats and the flanks on which those threats 

may appear (e.g., cyberspace), in my opinion it would 

be a mistake to give these threats short shrift in favor 

of current security cooperation efforts.

Another important caveat is that to be successful, 

security cooperation must have a long-term 

perspective. Security cooperation aims to change 

attitudes, earn trust, and gain access. This takes 

time and repetition. It cannot be “one and done.” 

Furthermore, sustainability must be an integral part 

of the plan for any security cooperation program. It 

does not serve US interests to provide capabilities 

that begin to decay as soon as US forces leave. For 

example, in his discussion of the Global Peacekeeping 

Operations Initiative (GPOI), Reveron notes that 

although the US supports dozens of peace operations 

training centers around the world, the true measure 

of success for GPOI will be whether partner nations 

sustain the training centers and actually participate 

in peacekeeping operations when the US eventually 

curtails its involvement.9 Providing a capability 

without also providing the wherewithal to maintain 

it may be worse than providing nothing at all. As 

Reveron notes in another discussion, at a minimum, 

where projects are not sustained “investment will fall 

short of expectations.”10

By the same token, security cooperation 

projects normally should not involve a permanent 

US presence. The goal of any security cooperation 

effort should be for the partner nation eventually 

to “graduate” and become self-sufficient. There is 

always the danger that the US military will get overly 
The DISAM Annual, May 2012 228

4. Ibid., 58–59.

5. Ibid., 171.

6. Ibid., 139.

7. Ibid., 123.

8. John T. Bennett, “Olson: Counterinsurgency 

Ops Should ‘Involve Countering the 

Insurgents,’” Defense News, 26 May 

2010, http://www.defensenews.com/story.

php?i=4643956&c=LAN&s=TOP.

9. Reveron, op. cit, 115.

10. Ibid., note 62, 143.

11. Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: 

Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New 

Age,” Foreign Affairs 88, no.1 (January/

February 2009), 37.

About the Author

Robert Van Horn has been an instructor at the 

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management 

since August 2004. He served in the US Army from

1973–1994 as an Armor Officer and a Foreign Area 

Officer (China). While in the Army, his security 

assistance tours included Chief, Army programs, 

Office of the Defense Representative, US Embassy, 

Islamabad, Pakistan, and Chief, Performance 

Evaluation Group, Logistics and Security Assistance 

Directorate (J44), Headquarters, US Pacific 

Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii. After retiring from 

the military service in 1994, he worked for a short 

time as the Director, Trade Development, Kansas 

Department of Commerce and Housing in Topeka, 

Kansas. In July 1997, he joined the security assistance 

office in the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), 

located in Taipei, Taiwan, where he served until 

July 2004. His academic degrees include an MBA 

from the University of Kansas, a master’s degree in 

political science from the University of Arizona, and 

a bachelor’s degree in economics from Iowa State 

University.

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