COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Frank and Clements

CHRISTOPHER SHAWN HARRIS MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0741-04-3 PER CURIAM OCTOBER 5, 2004 CAMPBELL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY J. Samuel Johnston, Jr., Judge (Mark B. Arthur; Fralin, Feinman, Coates & Kinnier, P.C., on brief), for appellant. (David W. Shreve, County Attorney, on brief), for appellee. (Kristin B. Wright; Overby, Hawkins, Selz & Wright, on brief), Guardian ad litem for the minor children.
Christopher Shawn Harris, father , appeals the trial court’s decision terminating his parental rights to his two minor children. Father conten ds the evidence was insu fficient to support the termination of his parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B)(1) beca use the court erred in finding that he failed to follow through with recommende d and available treatm ent. Father also contends the evidence was insufficient to support th e termination of his parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B)(2) and 16.1-283 (C) because the court erred in finding that he was unwilling or unable within a reasonable amount of time to substantially remedy the conditions requiring that the children remain in foster care. Upon reviewing the record and brie fs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affi rm the decision of the trial court.
See Rule 5A:27.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - Background We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prev ailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fair ly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). So viewed, the evidence established that when the children initially entered the fost er care system, they had been living with their mother, Tammy Davis, while appellant was incarcerated for driving under the influence, third or subsequent offense, and for driving after havi ng been declared a habitual offender. Karen Tinsley, a foster care worker, initially worked wi th Davis. After appell ant was released from incarceration in July 2002, Tins ley “set him up” with Comprehens ive Family Servic es and offered him psychological testing, parenting classes, and visitations with the ch ildren. Appellant was attending weekly AA meetings; ot her services relating to alcohol were not offe red by Tinsley because that matter was being handled through appella nt’s probation and it wa s her “sense” that appellant had not been drinking since his release from incarceration. Dr. Andrew Anderson, a clinical psychologi st, performed a psychological evaluation of appellant and determined that appe llant’s limited understanding of child development and principles of parenting posed a risk to the children. Ande rson also noted the additio nal risk of appellant’s history of alcohol abuse, and noted that if appella nt drank as much alcohol as he said he did, he would be incapacitated a substantial amount of time. Appellant acknowledged he had never sought treatment for his alcohol abuse. At his first appointmen t with Anderson, appell ant told Anderson he had not been drinking for twenty-five months. On November 9, 2002, before his next appointment with Anderson, appellant was seen drinking and driving and was in volved in an altercation with Davis. Appellant moved frequently and failed to keep his probation office r apprised of where he actually lived or worked. Appellan t failed to provide verification of his attendance at AA meetings as required by his probation officer.- 3 - Michele Chaffin, a Comprehens ive Family Services employee, made an unannounced visit on November 9, 2002 to the reside nce where appellant and Davis were having an unsupervised visit with the children. Appellant was not there but when he returned, he smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on his feet, slurred hi s words and made nonsensical c onversation. Chaffin left the residence to avoid alarming appellant or the children and called her supervisor, Desiree Blankenship. While Blankenship waited to meet Chaffin at a nearby convenience store, she saw appellant “whiz” into the store’s parking lot and pa rk in an angle rather than in a parking “slot,” leave his car running while he ente red the store to buy beer, and th en return to his car and drive
away. Knowing that appellant had left the reside nce, Blankenship and another social worker, Crystal Roach, removed the children from the reside nce and returned them to their foster home. After the children were removed from the residence, Davis admitted to Chaffin that appellant had never stopped drinking and that he had been abus ive, resulting in a protective order being issued against appellant. Davis told Roac h that appellant had been drinking since he wa s released from jail and that she was “scared to sa y something” because it might pr event them from getting their children back. Regina Wright, another Comprehensive Family Services employee, worked primarily with Davis but did advise appellant about specific serv ices available to him and provided him with information. Wright stated that their role “was not to really do things for him so much but to provide him with information, encourage them and th en it’s up to them to follow through with what they need to do.” Know ing that appellant needed to attend AA meetings according to appellant’s probation officer, Wright provided sc heduling information about AA meetings. Roach, who worked with the family after Wrig ht, encouraged appellant to take a parenting class but appellant declined. Appellant stated that “he had done everything that Social Services had- 4 - asked him to do” and that “he felt it was not necessary to do anything else” and that he was “very unavailable.” Roach made recommendations to appe llant but understood that appellant’s probation officer “worked out” the recommendations and treatments for appellan t’s alcohol problem. On November 21, 2002, case worker Robbie Irby began work ing with appellant and was responsible for overseeing the case and managing the services. Due to appell ant’s history of alcohol abuse, Irby offered him the Arise residential progr am. Irby agreed to coor dinate that program and accompany appellant to the initial intake appointmen t. Irby told appellant the program would help him and that it was importan t for him to participate in the program in trying to get his children back. Appellant refused, stating that he already attended AA meetings and did not need a residential program. Appellant also refused th e individual counseling offered, bu t did attend parenting classes. Irby asked appellant about the incident on November 9, 2002, and appellant denied that the incident had occurred. Deborah Maxey, a family therapist who wo rked with appellant’s four-year-old child, advised Social Services that the child’s visits with appellant should be stopped because the child was traumatized and became disassociated when appellant was mentioned. When Maxey told appellant of her recommendation, appellant said he had a right to see his child and reacted as if he was being victimized. Maxey explained that this was not about his rights, but was about what was happening to the child and aske d appellant for his help. Ma xey asked seven times whether appellant could think of anything he could have d one that contributed to th e child being in foster care, and seven times appellant did not answer the que stion but continued talkin g about “his rights.” Maxey opined that appellant was only concerned abou t himself and did not seem to care about what was happening to his child.- 5 - Analysis When considering term ination of a parent’s residual rights to a child, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is th e child’s best interests.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 12 8, 409 S.E.2d at 463. On review, “[a] trial cour t is presumed to have thorou ghly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory require ments, and made its determinat ion based on the child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). “The trial court’s judgment, when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. Pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), the trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if the neglect or abuse suffered by the children presents a serious threat to their life, health or development. Proof that the parent is addicted to intoxicating liquors seriously impairing his parental ability and “without good cause, ha s not responded to or followed through with recommended and available treatment that could ha ve improved the capacity for adequate parental functioning” is prima facie evidence of the conditions set out in Code § 16.1-283(B)(2). Appellant clearly has an alcohol problem. He had been incar cerated for driving under the influence, third or subsequent offense. He was on probation on November 9, 2002, the day Chaffin visited the home and found appellant intoxicated an d the day Blankenship saw him bu y beer and drive away despite the fact that he was violating hi s probation by drinking and by dr iving. Davis ac knowledged that appellant had been drinking since his release from incarceration. After November 9, 2002, Irby encouraged appellant to enter the Arise residentia l program. Irby offered to coordinate the program and accompany appe llant to the initial intake appointment. Irby told appellant the program would help him and that it was important for him to partic ipate in the program in trying to get his children back. Appellant refused, sta ting that he already attended AA meetings and did not need a residential program. The Department of Social Services is not required to “force its services upon- 6 - an unwilling or disinterested parent.” Harris v. Lynch burg Div. of Soc. Servs. , 223 Va. 235, 243, 288 S.E.2d 410, 415 (1982). Pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C ), the trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if, based upon clear and convincing evidence, it is in the children’s best interest and if the parent without good cause has be en unwilling or unable wi thin a reasonable period of time to remedy the conditions which led to or required continuation of foster care, notwithst anding reasonable and appropriate efforts of services agencies. Appellant was offered extensive serv ices to enable him to remedy the conditions that led to the children’s plac ement into foster care. Appellan t’s drinking and driving on November 9, 2002, duri ng the time of his children’s vis itation, led to the return of his children to foster care. Although appellant attended some parenting cl asses, he refused to go to the Arise program and stopped verifying his attendance at AA meetings. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to sp end a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resu ming his responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifa x County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). This record supports the trial court’s finding th at the best interests of the children would be served by terminating appellant’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-28 3(B) and (C). It is apparent that appellant has been unwilling to reme dy the conditions that re quire continuation of the children’s foster care placement. Accordingl y, we summarily affirm the judgment. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.