[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8857.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of De cisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O . 2017-O HIO -8857
S TARK C OUNTY B AR A SSOCIATION v. B UTTACAVOLI

. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8857.] Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of th e professional-conduct rules, including knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal and committing an illegal act that reflects adv ersely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness—Two year suspension, with 18 months stayed on
conditions. (No. 2017-0227—Submitted April 5, 2017— Decided December 7, 2017.)
O N C ERTIFIED R EPORT by the Board of Professi onal Conduct of the Supreme Court, No. 2016-013.

_______________________ Per Curiam

. {¶ 1} Respondent, Glen F. Buttacavoli, of Massillon, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0024132, was admitted to the pr actice of law in Ohio in 1984. InS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 2002, we found that he had failed to fully disc lose to his clients hi s financial interest in investment recommendations that he made while acting as both their lawyer and their financial planner and we sanctioned him with a conditionally stayed six-month suspension. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli , 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio4743, 775 N.E.2d 818. {¶ 2} In 2016, relator, Stark County Bar Association, charged him with making false statements relating to his clients’ financial information while representing them in the Medicaid application process. Buttacavoli stipulated to some of the charges against him. After a hearing, the Board of Professional Conduct issued a report finding that he had engaged in some of the charged misconduct and recommending that we im pose a two-year suspension with 18 months conditionally stayed and require him to make restitution to two of his former clients before seeking reinstatement. Neither party has objected to the board’s report and recommendation. {¶ 3} Based on our review of the record, we adopt the board’s findings of
misconduct and its r ecommended sanction.
Misconduct Misrepresentations during the Medicaid application process {¶ 4} According to the parties’ stipulations, a significant portion of Buttacavoli’s practice is providing financial-planning advice to elderly clients, with the purpose of ensuring their eligibility to receive long-term-care benefits under
Medicaid. The board found that he had engaged in professi onal misconduct with regard to two such client matters. {¶ 5} First, in 2013 and 2014, Buttacavoli assi sted Marquerite A. Marchant in transferring assets to family members, including gifting her life-estate interest in real property to her children, gifting the ow nership of life-insurance policies to her daughter, and transferring stock owne rship to her daughter effective upon Marchant’s death. In May 2014, Buttaca voli applied for Medicaid assistance onJanuary Term, 2017

3 Marchant’s behalf, and the following m onth, the Stark County Department of Job and Family Services interviewed him as her representative. During that interview, he falsely stated that Marchant had not transferred, sold, or given away any resources within the previous five years. He also signed a statement attesting that the representations he made during the interview were truthful. During his disciplinary proceedings, Buttacavoli admitted that his representations to the agency were false, that he was required by law to disclose all prior transfers, and that he had made the misrepresentations fo r the purpose of inducing the agency to find that his client qualifie d for Medicaid benefits. {¶ 6} Upon investigation, the Stark Count y Department of Job and Family
Services discovered the life-estate interest that Marchant had gifted to her children
and determined that the transfer should have been disclosed. In April 2015, the department notified Buttacavo li that because of this error, Marchant received $8,640 more in Medicaid benefits than she wa s eligible to receive and that he, as her authorized representative, was respons ible for repaying the amount overpaid. Buttacavoli issued a check for the repaymen t about four months later—after relator notified him that a grievance had been filed against him and that relator had reported his conduct to the county prosecuting attorney’s office. {¶ 7} In September 2015, Buttacavoli pled guilty to a first-degree misdemeanor charge of falsification under R.C. 2921.13(A)(4), which prohibits a person from knowingly making a false statement with the purpose of securing a benefit administered by a governmental agency. The Stark County Court of
Common Pleas ordered him to serve a 180 -day suspended sentence and pay a $500
fine and court costs. {¶ 8} The second client matter involved Sally Daywalt, whom Buttacavoli represented around the same time that he represented Marchant. Similar to what
he had done in the Marchant matter, Buttacavoli assisted Daywalt with gifting her life-estate interest in real property to her children and then later failed to discloseS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 that transfer when seeking Medicaid benefits on Daywalt’s behalf. The Stark County Department of Job and Family Serv ices later discovered the life-estateinterest transfer and rest ricted Daywalt’s coverage. {¶ 9} Based on this conduct, the board f ound that in both client matters, Buttacavoli violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal), 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a la wyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresen tation), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudi cial to the administration of justice). {¶ 10} We adopt these findings of misconduct.
Failure to advise clients about the possibility of a refund {¶ 11} Buttacavoli stipulated that in the Marchant matter, the Daywalt matter, and a third client matter, he charged a fixed, nonrefundable fee but did not also advise his clients that they would be entitled to a refund of all or a portion of that fee if he failed to complete the representation. The board found that he
therefore committed three violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from charging a fee denominated as “nonrefundable” without simultaneously advising the client in writing that the client may be entitled to a refund of all or part of the fee if the la wyer does not complete the representation). {¶ 12} We adopt these findings of misconduct. We also dismiss any remaining charges against Buttacavoli that were not expressly dismissed during the board proceedings.
Sanction {¶ 13} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider several relevant factors, including the et hical duties that the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.January Term, 2017

5 Aggravating and mitigating factors {¶ 14} The board found the following aggravating factors: prior disciplinary offenses, a pattern of misc onduct, multiple offenses, and failure to
make restitution. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1), (3), (4), and (9). Indeed, Buttacavoli admitted that he had charge d Marchant $6,800 and Daywalt $5,500 to represent them in the Medicaid applica tion process and that he had failed to complete the representations or to refund their money. {¶ 15} In mitigation, the board found that Buttacavoli had made full and
free disclosures to the board and had had a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, he had presented evidence of good character and reputation, and he had been subjected to other penalties or sanctions—namely, the
misdemeanor conviction a nd the penalties associated with the conviction. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(4), (5), and (6). Applicable precedent {¶ 16} To support its recommended sa nction, the board relied on Toledo
Bar Assn. v. DeMarco , 144 Ohio St.3d 248, 2015-Ohio-4549, 41 N.E.3d 1237, and
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Farrell , 119 Ohio St.3d 529, 2008-Ohio-4540, 895 N.E.2d 800. Both cases recognize our precedent that an attorney’s course of conduct involving dishonesty usually warrants an actual suspension from the practice of
law. DeMarco at ¶ 12; Farrell at ¶ 19-21. {¶ 17} In DeMarco , an attorney made a series of false statements directly to a court about his possession of discovery materials. Specifical ly, he repeatedly represented to the court that he had neve r had the materials when, in fact, he had had them at one time. During one court proceeding, a w itness truthfully testified that he had given the materials to the attorney and the attorney responded by threatening to take the witness “outside.” Id. at ¶ 6, 14. Despite the egregious facts, we found that the attorney’s misconduct was an aberration in an otherwiseS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 unblemished 45-year legal career and imposed a one-year suspension with six months conditionally stayed. Id. at ¶ 14-16. {¶ 18} In Farrell , an attorney had forged his wife’s signature on a power of attorney, lied to another attorney to secu re notarization of the power of attorney, used the forged document to obtain a line of credit, and fabricated numerous other documents—including letters purportedly fro m a bank and the United States Postal Service—to cover up his deceit. Given the attorney’s “web of deception,” we suspended him for two years but stayed the second year on conditions. Id. at ¶ 17,
23. {¶ 19} Buttacavoli’s misconduct he re is more similar to the misconduct in
DeMarco than in Farrell . However, unlike the attorney in DeMarco , Buttacavoli has been disciplined before. We therefore agree with the board that the appropriate
sanction here lies between the sa nctions that we imposed in DeMarco and Farrell

. Conclusion {¶ 20} Having considered Buttacavoli’ s misconduct, the applicable mitigating and aggravating factors, and the sanctions imposed for similar misconduct, we adopt the board’s recomme nded sanction. Glen F. Buttacavoli is suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for two years with 18 months stayed on the conditions that he engage in no furt her misconduct and pay the costs of these proceedings. If Buttacavoli fails to comply with the conditions of the stay, the stay
will be lifted and he will serve the full two-year suspension. Buttacavoli’s reinstatement is conditioned upon his providi ng proof that he made restitution to Marchant in the amount of $6,800 and to Daywalt, by issuing payment to her son, Robert Venables, in the amount of $5,500. Judgment accordingly.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and O’D ONNELL , K ENNEDY , F RENCH , O’N EILL , F ISCHER , and D E W INE , JJ., concur.

_________________January Term, 2017

7 Richard S. Milligan, Bar Counsel, a nd James M. Conley, for relator. Robert H. Cyperski, for respondent.

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