LITTORAL COMBAT 

SHIP

Additional Testing and 

Improved Weight 

Management Needed 

Prior to Further 

Investments

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2014

GAO-14-749

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-749, a report to 

congressional committees

July 2014

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management 

Needed Prior to Further Investments

Why GAO Did This Study

LCS represents an innovative 

approach to Navy acquisitions and 

operations, consisting of a ship—called 

a seaframe—and reconfigurable 

mission packages. These packages 

provide combat capability to perform 

three primary missions: surface 

warfare; mine countermeasures; and 

anti-submarine warfare. The Navy 

plans to buy no more than 32 

seaframes in two variants from two 

shipyards, and 64 mission packages, 

with an estimated acquisition cost of 

over $25 billion in 2010 dollars. GAO 

was mandated to examine elements

related to the LCS program. This report 

examines (1) knowledge that the Navy

has gained since GAO issued a report 

on the LCS program in July 2013 and 

(2) outstanding acquisition risks with 

the LCS program. GAO analyzed key 

documents, including test and weight 

reports, and interviewed Navy officials 

responsible for the LCS deployment 

and program officials. This report is a 

public version of a sensitive but 

unclassified report issued in April 2014.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Navy (1) 

demonstrate certain capabilities for 

both LCS seaframe variants before the 

Navy is approved for future contract 

awards and (2) ensure a timely review 

of contractor seaframe weight reports 

and take actions to make contractors 

more responsive to comments on the 

reports’ content. DOD agreed with the 

weight report recommendation and 

partially agreed with the other, noting 

that it intends to complete as much 

testing as possible—but not all—before 

releasing the request for proposals for 

future contracts.

What GAO Found

Since July 2013, the Navy has continued to demonstrate and test various facets 

of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) systems and capability, but important questions 

remain about how LCS will operate and what capabilities it will provide the Navy. 

The first operational deployment of an LCS to Singapore gave the Navy an 

opportunity to examine key LCS concepts operationally. The deployment was 

limited to only one of the two variants carrying one of three mission packages. In 

addition, mechanical problems prevented the ship from spending as much time 

operationally as planned. As a result, some key concepts could not be tested. 

The Navy has completed some additional testing on the seaframes and mission 

packages, which has enabled the Navy to characterize performance of some 

systems, but performance has not yet been demonstrated in an operational 

environment.

Outstanding weight management and concurrency risks related to buying ships 

while key concepts and performance are still being tested continue to complicate 

LCS acquisitions. Initial LCS seaframes face capability limitations resulting from 

weight growth during construction. This weight growth has resulted in the first two 

ships not meeting performance requirements for sprint speed and/or endurance, 

as well as potentially complicating existing plans to make additional changes to 

each seaframe design. Several seaframes now do not have the required amount 

of service life allowance—margin to accommodate future changes without 

removing weight over the ship’s lifetime—but Navy officials said they have a plan 

to recover the service life allowance on the Independence class variant.

Status of Recent Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Service Life Allowances

Ship Currently meets service life allowance requirements?

Freedom 

a

Variant

LCS 1 No—24 tons less than requirement 

LCS 3 Yes—exceeds requirement by 106 tons

LCS 5 Yes—exceeds requirement by 17 tons b

Independence

Variant

LCS 2 No—67 tons less than requirement

LCS 4 No—34 tons less than requirement

LCS 6 No—19 tons less than requirement b

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. | GAO 14-749

a

LCS has a service life allowance requirement of 50 metric tons. Numbers are rounded. b

LCS 1-LCS 4 have been delivered and therefore builder’s margin remaining has become part of the service life allowance. LCS 5 and 

LCS 6 are still in construction and could gain available service life allowances if weight reserved for design and construction variations 

are not used.

The Navy has not received accurate or complete weight reports from the 

seaframe prime contractors, and the Navy’s lengthy review process has hindered 

a timely resolution of the Navy’s concerns. Additionally, a number of significant 

test events, including rough water, shock and total ship survivability trials, will not 

be completed in time to inform upcoming acquisition decisions—including future 

contract decisions. Finally, the Navy’s recent decision to accelerate low rate 

initial production of mission packages above the quantity necessary for 

operational testing limits the flexibility that the program will have to adjust to any 

problems that may arise during operational testing. View GAO-14-749. For more information, 

contact Michele Mackin at (202) 512-4841 or 

mackinm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Letter 1

Background 3

Initial Deployment and Further Testing Yielded Additional Learning 

about LCS Systems and Capabilities, but Gaps in Knowledge 

Remain 12

Outstanding Weight Management and Concurrency Risks 

Continue to Complicate LCS Acquisition 21

Conclusions 39

Recommendations for Executive Action 40

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 45

Appendix II Selected Navy Comments on Recent LCS Weight Reports 47

Appendix III 2014 National Defense Authorization Act Navy Reporting

Requirements 48

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 51

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 54

Tables

Table 1: Status of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframes 6

Table 2: Planned Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package 

Increments 9

Table 3: Questions about Littoral Combat Ship Operations and 

Lessons Learned from Initial Deployment of USS 

Freedom 14

Table 4: Problems with USS Freedom Equipment That Have 

Since Been Replaced on Later Freedom Class Littoral 

Combat Ships (LCS) 16

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Table 5: 7th Fleet Observations on Initial Littoral Combat Ship 

(LCS) Deployment 19

Table 6: Recently Completed Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Test 

Events 20

Table 7: Weight Analysis of Littoral Combat Ship Seaframes, 

January 2014 24

Table 8: Navy Recommended Service Life Allowances by Ship 

Type as Compared to Littoral Combat Ship Requirements 26

Figures

Figure 1: Two Variants of Littoral Combat Ships 5

Figure 2: Areas of Responsibility of the Navy’s 5th and 7th Fleets 

and Approximate Location of Singapore Deployment of 

Littoral Combat Ship USS Freedom 11

Figure 3: Current Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Weight 

Estimates, by Increment 30

Figure 4: Timing of Key Littoral Combat Ship Test Events and 

Demonstrations Versus Planned Issuance of Request for 

Proposals and Seaframe Contract Awards 35
Page iii GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Abbreviations

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare

COTF Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force

DAB Defense Acquisition Board

DOD Department of Defense

DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

ESWBS Expanded Ship Work Breakdown Structure

INSURV Board of Inspection and Survey

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

LCS Littoral Combat Ship

LCSRON Littoral Combat Ship Squadron 1

MCM Mine Countermeasures

NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

RFP Request for Proposal

RMMV Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle

RMS Remote Minehunting System

SUW Surface Warfare

TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

July 30, 2014

Congressional Committees

The Department of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a program 

framed by an innovative approach to shipbuilding acquisition and naval 

operations. Unlike other Navy surface combatants, which generally have 

fixed mission systems, LCS is intended to be reconfigurable to perform 

three different primary missions: mine countermeasures, surface warfare, 

and anti-submarine warfare. The LCS consists of two distinct parts—the 

ship itself (called a seaframe because of its ability to carry 

interchangeable payloads similar to an aircraft’s airframe) and the 

interchangeable package of sensors, weapons and aircraft that it carries 

and deploys, called a mission package. The mission package provides 

the majority of the ship’s combat capability. Two shipyards are currently 

building an equal number of two different versions of the LCS seaframe. 

According to current plans, the LCS will represent a large portion of the 

Navy’s future surface combatant fleet, and the Navy plans to spend over 

$25 billion in 2010 dollars to acquire up to 32 LCS seaframes and 64 

mission packages—a reduction of at least 20 seaframes based on the 

direction of the Secretary of Defense in February 2014.

1

In July 2013, we highlighted a number of risks related to the LCS 

program, including cost growth, schedule delays, and problems related to 

delivering intended capabilities; and questioned the soundness of the 

Navy’s business case of continuing to buy seaframes and modules given 

the unknowns related to the program’s key warfighting and support 

concepts.2

 1

This estimate does not include $3.6 billion of procurement money for mission package 

“replacement, attrition, and technology refresh.” 

Since that report was issued, the Navy has completed its first 

operational deployment of an LCS—USS Freedom—with a surface 

warfare mission package, to Singapore. Given the recent deployment and 

the issues that we and others have raised about the Navy’s acquisition of 

the LCS, the House’s and Senate’s committee reports for the National 

2

GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue 

Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost, GAO-13-530 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 22, 2013); and a testimony based on GAO-13-530: Navy Shipbuilding: 

Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns 

about Capabilities, Use, and Cost, GAO-13-738T (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2013). 
Page 2 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated that we 

examine a number of elements related to the program.3 In light of the 

Navy’s current plan to contract for additional ships in 2016 and its 

ongoing mission package purchases, this report examines: (1) knowledge 

that the Navy has gained as a result of the initial deployment of USS 

Freedom (LCS 1) to Singapore and ongoing testing of the LCS seaframes 

and mission packages and (2) outstanding risks with the LCS acquisition 

program.4

To evaluate the knowledge the Navy has gained since we issued our July 

2013 report, we analyzed Navy and Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation (DOT&E) reports on recent mission package testing and the 

approved LCS Test and Evaluation Master Plan, and discussed testing 

with LCS program office and DOT&E officials. We also analyzed 

documentation and data pertaining to the deployment of USS Freedom to 

Singapore. We traveled to Singapore to meet with Navy officials 

responsible for the LCS deployment, toured the ship, and interviewed the 

commanding officer and crew members. We also traveled to Japan and 

spoke with officials from the Navy’s 7th Fleet who were responsible for 

operational tasking of USS Freedom while it was in the 7th Fleet theater.

This report is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified 

report issued in April 2014. DOD deemed some of the information in the 

corresponding report as sensitive but unclassified information, which must 

be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits certain 

sensitive information, but the content of both reports is largely the same.

5

 3

H.R. Rep. No. 113-102, at 28-29 (2013) and S. Rep. No. 113-44, at 22-23 (2013).

To assess outstanding risks with the ongoing LCS acquisition program, 

we examined Navy and shipyard documentation on seaframe and 

mission package weight management and discussed ongoing design 

studies that are under way that will likely have an effect on seaframe 

weight with Navy program office and technical experts. We also assessed 

the remaining test events identified in Navy documentation against the 

planned program schedule. We spoke to subject matter experts in naval 

architecture with backgrounds in designing U.S. Navy ships, and visited 

4

GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in 

Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs, GAO-14-447 (Washington, 

D.C., July 8, 2014) focuses on LCS operational support and life-cycle sustainment issues.

5

The 7th Fleet’s area of responsibility encompasses more than 48 million square miles of 

the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
Page 3 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

both LCS shipyards. A more detailed description of our scope and 

methodology is presented in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to July 2014

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The LCS consists of two separate acquisition programs: one for the 

seaframe and one for the mission packages, which, when integrated with 

the seaframe and supplemented with aviation support, provide the ship’s 

mission capability. In order to demonstrate LCS mission capability both 

seaframe variants will be evaluated through developmental and 

operational testing. Developmental testing is intended to assist in 

identifying system performance, capabilities, limitations, and safety issues 

to help reduce design and programmatic risks. Operational testing is 

intended to assess a weapon system’s capability in a realistic 

environment when maintained and operated by warfighters, subjected to 

routine wear-and-tear, and employed in combat conditions.

The Navy is procuring two different seaframe designs from shipbuilding 

teams led by Lockheed Martin—which builds its ships at Marinette Marine 

in Marinette, Wisconsin—and Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama.6

 6

For LCS 2 and LCS 4, General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works was the prime contractor for 

the Austal USA-built ships. General Dynamics and Austal USA ended their teaming 

arrangement in 2010. Austal USA is the prime contractor for the 10 other even-numbered 

seaframes currently under contract.

This 

report refers to the Lockheed Martin ships as the Freedom variant and the 

Austal USA ships as the Independence variant. The two designs reflect 

different contractor solutions to meet the same set of performance 

requirements. The most notable difference is that the Lockheed Martin 

Freedom variant (LCS 1 and other odd-numbered seaframes, 3 through 

23) is a monohull design with a steel hull and aluminum superstructure, 

while the Austal USA Independence variant (LCS 2 and other evenBackground

Seaframe
Page 4 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

numbered seaframes, 4 through 24) is an aluminum trimaran.7

 7 A trimaran is a ship that has three separate hulls. The Navy is now referring to the 

Independence class variant as a slender stabilized monohull design. 

Figure 1 

shows the first two LCS seaframes.
Page 5 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Figure 1: Two Variants of Littoral Combat Ships
Page 6 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

The Navy currently has contracted for 24 seaframes. Twenty seaframes 

are covered under block buy contracts that anticipate funding construction 

of seaframes through 2015, with deliveries under those contracts 

continuing until 2019.8 The Navy then plans to award additional contracts 

in 2016 to continue seaframe acquisition beyond the first two block buy 

contracts. In late February 2014, the Secretary of Defense announced 

that as part of its fiscal year 2015 budget proposal the Navy would not 

contract for more than 32 ships, instead of 52 ships as planned.9

See table 1 for the current status of seaframe construction.

Our 

analysis is based on the approved acquisition strategy for the program at

the time of this report.

Table 1: Status of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframes 

Seaframe number Status as of February 2014

1-4 Navy has accepted delivery

5-12 Under construction at the two shipyards

13-20 Under contract with the two shipyards; congressional funding has 

been received

21-24 Under contract but not yet congressionally funded

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. | GAO-14-794

As we previously reported, the Navy is investigating potentially significant 

design changes to the ships while production is under way.

10

• Changes to improve habitability: Part of the LCS concept is to reduce 

the number of crew on the ship by relying extensively on shore-based 

support for the ship’s administrative personnel and maintenance 

Some of 

these initiatives include:

 8

The Navy awarded two block buy contracts for up to 10 ships to both shipyards; the Navy 

authorized construction of one ship at each shipyard at the time of contract award, and 

authorized construction of one ship at each shipyard in fiscal year 2011, and two ships at 

each shipyard per year, from fiscal years 2012-2015. GAO-13-530 contains additional 

information on the Navy’s contracting strategy.

9

At this time, the Secretary of Defense also instructed the Navy to submit alternate 

proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant generally consistent 

with the capabilities of a frigate to assist with fiscal year 2016 budget deliberations. 

10 GAO-13-530.
Page 7 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

needs. Prior to the deployment of LCS 1 to Singapore, the Navy 

added 20 extra beds—called berths—to the ship to accommodate 

extra people, and has also made a similar change to LCS 2 and 

subsequent ships. However, the Navy did not add equivalent amounts 

of crew storage space, additional water and sanitation systems, and 

food storage, and while the Navy officials stated that the ships still 

meet requirements, the Navy is investigating changes to better meet 

Navy standards. The Navy and the shipyards are now evaluating how 

to make these changes to both variant designs, but the effects have 

been described by the program office as pervasive throughout much 

of the ship.

• Changes to increase commonality: many of the systems on the two 

seaframe variants are not common; commonality can enhance 

efficient maintenance, training, manning, and logistics. The Navy is 

investigating making changes to improve commonality between the 

two variants, including selecting a common combat management 

system—an architecture that uses computers to integrate sensors 

(such as a radar) with shipboard weapon systems—for both

seaframes.

• Changes to improve safety: the Independence variant was designed 

without bridge wings, which are enclosed areas that extend out to the 

sides of the ship from the bridge to provide enhanced visibility and 

safety for the crew for maneuvers like docking the ship. The Navy has 

added bridge wings to LCS 2, and now plans to add bridge wings to 

all the ships of this variant.

As part of the decision to make any design changes to a ship, the 

designer needs to consider the effect that the changes might have on 

ship weight. Weight is a critical aspect of a ship design, and is measured 

in several ways:

• Light ship condition: The ship is complete and ready for service, 

repair parts are held onboard, and liquids in machinery are at 

operating levels. Light ship condition does not include items of 

variable load, such as officers and crew; ammunition; aircraft and 

vehicles that are fully fueled with repair parts available; full supply of 

provisions and stores; and full tanks for potable water, lube oil, and 

fuel. For LCS, the light ship condition does not include installation of a 

mission package.

• Full load condition: Light ship condition plus variable loads. For 

LCS, full load condition includes an installed mission package and is 

the condition against which performance requirements are assessed.

Ship Weight
Page 8 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

• Naval architectural limit: The maximum weight that a ship can 

displace while still meeting its stability and survivability requirements. 

For LCS, naval architectural limits are unique to each seaframe 

variant.

To ensure that ships meet required capabilities, the Navy and its 

shipbuilders typically engage in intensive estimating, weighing, and 

reporting processes throughout construction to identify and monitor a 

ship’s weight and stability. As part of these processes, shipbuilders 

actively estimate and track certain information, including the following:

• Builder’s margin, which consists of weight and vertical center of 

gravity allowances included in a weight estimate to cover slight 

variations of component weight and centers of gravity that take place 

throughout the design and construction of a ship.11

• Service life allowances, which refer to weight and vertical center of 

gravity budgets included in a ship’s design to accommodate changes 

due to ship alterations and unplanned growth during the ship’s 

operational lifetime, which tend to increase displacement and affect 

stability.

Weights are definitively determined as part of a ship’s inclining 

experiment, which involves moving known weights around the ship and 

measuring how they change the ship’s equilibrium. This allows for the 

Navy to determine a ship’s displacement and the height and longitudinal 

position of its center of gravity. For most ships, inclining experiments take 

place immediately prior to delivery and after significant post-delivery 

maintenance periods, when necessary.

The LCS mission package designs are based on standard shipping 

containers that are outfitted with a variety of unmanned systems, sensors, 

and weapons that can be loaded onto and off of the seaframe. Mission 

packages are also accompanied by an aviation detachment, consisting of 

an MH-60 helicopter and its flight and support crew, as well as vertical 

take-off unmanned aerial vehicles. These packages are intended to give 

the Navy flexibility to change equipment in the field to meet different 

 11Vertical center of gravity is defined as the vertical distance between the ship’s center of 

gravity and the keel.

Mission Packages
Page 9 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

mission needs and incorporate new technology to address emerging 

threats. The Navy plans on fielding one anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 

increment and four mine countermeasures (MCM) and surface warfare 

(SUW) increments.12 The Navy will upgrade all mission packages to the 

same configuration as additional increments are fielded. The Navy plans 

to buy a total of 64 mission packages—though this quantity could change 

if the number of seaframes acquired is reduced. See table 2 for a brief 

discussion of the mission packages.13

Table 2: Planned Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Increments

Mission package Increment Key systems

Surface warfare

24 packages planned

1 MK 46 30-milimeter gun system

2 Maritime security module (2 teams and associated equipment)

3

Vertical take-off unmanned aerial vehicle

Surface-to-surface missile 

4 Surface-to-surface missile upgrade (if needed)

Mine countermeasures

24 packages planned

1

Airborne laser mine detection system

Airborne mine neutralization system

AN/AQS-20a sonar

Remote multi-mission vehicle

2

Vertical take-off unmanned aerial vehicle 

Coastal battlefield reconnaissance and analysis system

3 Unmanned surface vehicle with unmanned influence surface sweep system

4 Surface mine countermeasure unmanned undersea vehicle (Knifefish)

Anti-submarine warfare

16 packages planned

2

Multi-function towed array

a Variable depth sonar

Light weight tow torpedo countermeasure

Vertical take-off unmanned aerial vehicle

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. | GAO-14-794

Notes: Each mission package is also accompanied by an MH-60 helicopter which carries additional 

systems and equipment. Mission package increments are cumulative, so an increment 4 mission 

 12The Navy has recently started referring to the mission package increments as “phases;”

however, we are retaining the term “increment” because that is the term in Navy 

acquisition documentation. 

13GAO-13-530 contains additional details about the planned mission packages and the 

timeframes for intended operational capability.
Page 10 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

package includes all systems from increment 1-3, with the exception of the SUW package increment 

4 surface-to-surface missile, which will replace the increment 3 missile if necessary.

a

The initial ASW increment was delivered in 2008, but the Navy canceled the increment after analysis 

showed the module did not contribute significantly to ASW capabilities. The newly configured ASW 

mission package is currently planned to be the only ASW increment.

To obtain operational experience with LCS, the Navy last year deployed 

USS Freedom carrying an increment 2 SUW mission package. The ship 

departed San Diego, California, for operations in the Western Pacific 

under the command of the Navy’s 7th Fleet in early March 2013. The ship 

was deployed for approximately 10 months, returning to the United States 

in late December 2013. The 7th Fleet area of responsibility poses unique 

challenges to the Navy given the vast distances it covers. While on this 

deployment, USS Freedom participated in an international exhibition as 

well as several multilateral naval exercises with regional navies, including 

Singapore; Malaysia; Brunei; and Indonesia. The ship also conducted 

some real-world operations as directed by the 7th Fleet, such as 

participating in humanitarian assistance disaster relief to the Philippines 

following a major typhoon. See figure 2 for a map showing the location of 

the Singapore deployment and the Navy fleet areas of responsibility in the 

Indo-Pacific region.

Initial LCS Deployment
Page 11 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Figure 2: Areas of Responsibility of the Navy’s 5th and 7th Fleets and Approximate 

Location of Singapore Deployment of Littoral Combat Ship USS Freedom
Page 12 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Since July 2013, the Navy has made progress demonstrating and testing 

various facets of LCS systems and capability but significant gaps remain 

in the Navy’s knowledge of how the LCS will operate and what 

capabilities it will provide the Navy. The deployment to Singapore 

provided the Navy with an opportunity to examine key LCS concepts 

operationally, including: the ship’s smaller manning profile, rotational 

crewing, and use of off-ship maintenance and support. The deployment 

was limited because only one of the two variants carrying one mission 

package was deployed, and mechanical problems prevented USS 

Freedom from spending as much time as planned underway—that is, at 

sea unanchored and not at port. As a result, some key concepts could not 

be demonstrated. While the deployment provided useful insight for the 

Navy, it was never intended to be a substitute for formal testing and 

evaluation activities. The Navy has also completed additional 

developmental testing on the seaframes and mission packages, which 

has enabled the Navy to characterize performance of some systems, but 

many capabilities have not been demonstrated in an operational 

environment.

Navy officials have stated that they were able to learn some valuable 

lessons from the deployment of USS Freedom to Singapore, and the 

Navy has taken several steps to analyze post-deployment lessons 

learned. According to the Navy, the deployment demonstrated the LCS’s 

ability to participate in cooperative exercises and helped carry out the 

Navy’s forward presence mission in Asia, thereby freeing up more costly 

multi-mission warships to carry out other high-priority Navy duties. Navy 

officials also said USS Freedom demonstrated how a LCS can fill the 

need for a smaller U.S. ship that can dock in more foreign ports than 

larger U.S. vessels, which they believe will be a valuable tool for 

engaging with certain countries that might otherwise be hard to access. 

Further, USS Freedom’s SUW mission package crew was able to conduct 

some launch and recovery operations with Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats and 

to participate in boarding exercises, which provided lessons about the 

operations of these boats as well as the systems on USS Freedom

needed to launch and recover them. These operations, although 

undoubtedly useful for the Navy, were never intended as formal testing 

and evaluation activities—or to replace them. Therefore, key unknowns 

remain regarding how the Navy will eventually be able to use the LCS 

and how well the ship meets its performance requirements.

Initial Deployment 

and Further Testing 

Yielded Additional 

Learning about LCS 

Systems and 

Capabilities, but Gaps 

in Knowledge Remain

Singapore Deployment 

Provided Useful 

Knowledge about

LCS Operations, but 

Significant Unknowns 

Persist Regarding LCS 

Concepts and Use
Page 13 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

USS Freedom’s deployment to Singapore represented an opportunity for 

the Navy to gain insight into the feasibility of the LCS’s unique operational 

concepts. However, some of the fundamental concepts on which the 

program is premised—such as the maintenance and manning concepts—

were demonstrated in a limited manner because the deployment involved 

only one ship of the Freedom variant and this ship is not representative of 

other ships of that variant. In other cases, certain concepts have not yet 

been demonstrated. Therefore, some of the lessons learned from the 

deployment cannot be extrapolated to the entire LCS class or all of the 

ships planned for the Freedom variant.14 Until additional deployments 

have been conducted—in conjunction with operational test events—the 

Navy will have insufficient data to evaluate the feasibility of these 

concepts on both variants. Table 3 identifies the key concepts that 

underpin the program and the degree to which the Navy was able to 

evaluate them on this deployment.15 Questions remaining regarding 

LCS’s underlying concepts will, in turn, have implications for the 

practicality of certain requirements and key differences between the two 

variants—issues that have the potential to affect future acquisition 

decisions.

 14Navy officials told us that LCS 5 and LCS 6 will be the first production representative 

seaframes that have the majority of various design changes incorporated.

15 GAO-14-447 focuses on LCS operational support and life-cycle sustainment issues.

Initial Deployment Provided 

Insight, but Key Concepts 

Remain Untested or

Not Validated
Page 14 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Table 3: Questions about Littoral Combat Ship Operations and Lessons Learned from Initial Deployment of USS Freedom

Key concept

Lessons learned from Singapore 

deployment Questions remaining

Two distinct seaframe 

variants operating in the 

same manner

The Navy was able to obtain some data about 

performance and strengths and limitations of 

the USS Freedom seaframe. 

Some major equipment has been changed on subsequent 

Freedom class ships, rendering USS Freedom different in 

several regards from later ships. Learning about these 

systems and how they performed on USS Freedom cannot 

predict how replacement systems might perform on 

subsequent ships.

An Independence class seaframe has not yet deployed, 

and Navy officials, including those in 7th Fleet and 

elsewhere, told us that the Independence variant will have 

different advantages and disadvantages than the Freedom

variant that will need to be identified through deployments. 

The Independence variant has completed test events and 

operations off the U.S. coast with contractor-based 

maintenance support, but this is not the same as an 

overseas deployment in which the ship must be supported 

remotely in a foreign country.

Navy officials told us that they notionally plan for a 

deployment of an Independence variant before 2017, so 

this deployment may not occur until after the Navy awards 

additional seaframe contracts—currently planned for 2016.

USS Freedom received a greater than 

envisioned level of underway refueling: 

instead of refueling every 13 days as initially 

estimated, the ship required refueling more 

frequently, although Navy officials said 

operations were not altered due to fuel 

constraints. A senior officer told us that fuel 

constraints made them less likely to operate 

the ship at higher speeds which require using 

the gas turbines in addition to the ship’s diesel 

engines, since use of the turbines limits fuel 

economy. 

7th Fleet logistics officials told us that this demand will be 

more stressing when there are multiple LCS assets 

operating within the area, although USS Freedom has the 

smallest fuel capacity of any LCS seaframe. Fuel 

consumption for an Independence class seaframe is 

different than for a Freedom class seaframe, so future 

deployments may show the logistics demand to be 

different.
Page 15 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Key concept

Lessons learned from Singapore 

deployment Questions remaining

Reduced manning The Navy increased the LCS core crew size 

from 40 to 50 and included contractor 

technical experts aboard USS Freedom

during the deployment.

LCS employs a rotational crewing concept, 

whereby multiple crews are assigned to one 

ship and rotate on and off while the ship 

remains forward deployed. Navy officials told 

us that rotational crewing is supposed to help 

ameliorate crew fatigue since the crew is on 

the ship for less than the full deployment.

Based on our conversations with the crew on the second 

half of the deployment, they were strained to keep up with 

some duties even with the additional people. Crew 

members reported lower than average amounts of sleep 

than the Navy standard of 8 hours per day, although Navy 

officials told us operational conditions on all Navy ships 

may cause a ship’s crew to receive less than 8 hours per 

day. It is unknown what the effect will be if the contractor 

support is removed.

The crew also reported heavy reliance on the mission 

package crew to conduct seaframe maintenance—which is 

not their role. The crew reported being more strained when 

the mission package crew was conducting their own 

operations. According to Navy officials, focusing the 

available labor on tasks at hand is consistent with existing 

fleet practice. However, the three mission packages 

require different crews and equipment, and can also 

require different skill sets, e.g., mechanics. It remains to be 

seen if the manning in each package could alter the extent 

to which the mission package crew will be able to support 

the seaframe crew and reduce strain, or how the crew 

manages if the mission package crew is more heavily 

tasked with mission package operations. 

Novel maintenance 

approach

USS Freedom also demonstrated a relatively 

limited range in the theater. This was in part 

driven by the novel maintenance concept 

requiring the ship to return to Singapore after 

25 days of operations for a 5-day 

maintenance period that was conducted by 

contractors flown in from the U.S.

The Navy plans to try a revised concept with a 

longer interval between in-port maintenance 

for the upcoming 2014 deployment of LCS 3 

to Singapore. The Navy also plans to add an 

additional maintenance location to increase 

how far LCS can travel.

Future deployments will help determine if revisions to the 

maintenance concept will improve flexibility. Future 

deployments will also illustrate whether different 

maintenance approaches may be needed for the 

Independence variant. 

In-theater mission 

package swaps

USS Freedom deployed with an increment 2 

SUW package, but did not swap out this 

package in Singapore. The Navy has only 

executed mission package changes in 

California. 

As identified in Navy wargames, it is unknown how the 

precise logistics of in-theater mission package swaps will 

work. There is no mission package change planned for the 

next deployment.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy analyses and post-deployment data. | GAO-14-794

In addition, mechanical problems hampered the Navy’s ability to operate 

USS Freedom as planned during the Singapore deployment. Based on 

information provided by LCS program officials responsible for LCS fleet 

introduction, USS Freedom’s mechanical failures resulted in 55 days of 
Page 16 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

mission days lost, which is a significant portion of its 10-month 

deployment. Navy officials stated many of these days were planned inport periods.16

Table 4: Problems with USS Freedom Equipment That Have Since Been Replaced on Later Freedom Class Littoral Combat 

Ships (LCS)

The ship could not fully participate in at least two planned 

or requested exercises and some operational 7th Fleet presence 

missions while repairs were conducted. According to the LCS program 

office, several of the more problematic pieces of equipment that resulted 

in significant lost underway days are either slated to be replaced on 

follow-on Freedom class ships or have already have been replaced on 

LCS 3 or LCS 5. Table 4 depicts some of the most significant equipment 

failures and how the Navy believes they have been corrected on 

subsequent seaframes.

System System description

Mission days 

lost Changes on future LCS seaframs

Ship service diesel 

generators

Generators that provide 

electrical power to the 

ship.

11 days Design changes have been made to these generators on 

LCS 5 and follow-on ships.

Starboard splitter gear 

and port combining gear

Gears that allow the ship 

to run on a combination of 

diesel engines and gas 

turbine engines.

20 days Changes have been or will be made to improve 

maintainability on LCS 1 and 3. The design will be changed 

on LCS 5 and follow-on ships to further improve 

maintainability. 

Starboard steerable 

water jet hydraulic 

power pack

Hydraulic system for the 

water jets.

17 days For LCS 3, the Navy has identified a means of facilitating 

easier flushing of the system. The Navy has funded efforts 

to redesign this system on LCS 5 and follow-on ships. 

Port steerable water jet Provides propulsion and 

steering for LCS.

7 days The water jet feedback cables have been modified on LCS 5 

and follow-on ships.

Total 55 mission

days lost 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. | GAO-14-794

Even with the reduced number of operational mission days, the 

Singapore deployment raised questions about the practicality of the small 

crew size. LCS is intended to operate with a crew that is smaller than 

comparable surface combatants. This reduced manning has long been a 

 16 There is disagreement within the Navy as to how many mission days were lost due to 

mechanical failures. The LCS fleet introduction program office provided us with 

documentation showing that 55 days were lost; other Navy offices stated that 28 days 

were lost, but did not provide documentation for how this number was determined.
Page 17 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

focus of Navy analysis, and the increase to a 50-person crew for the 

deployment was the maximum size allowed by current program 

requirements. This number was augmented by civilian contractor 

technical experts who could assist with troubleshooting and some 

maintenance. However, as shown in table 3, even with these additional 

people the deployment provided indications that the crew strained to keep 

up with duties.17

Additionally, some of USS Freedom’s equipment is unique to that ship, 

unique to the Freedom variant, or unique to LCS class, which we were 

told made some repair efforts cumbersome and slow. For example, crew 

members told us that in some cases they had to track down spare parts 

that were sometimes available only in foreign countries rather than being 

able to find them in Navy inventories. While some of this may be a first-ofclass issue, replacement of some ship systems with more reliable ones or 

with systems that are more commonly found in the Navy inventory may 

also reduce these burdens on the crew in the future. According to the 

LCS program office, replacing these less reliable systems should mean 

that future deployments of other ships from the Freedom class should not 

incur the same number of failures as USS Freedom. However, as DOT&E 

has observed, no formal operational testing has been conducted to verify 

and quantify these improvements, although Navy and DOT&E officials 

said that they were working together on operational test opportunities. 

Until the Navy completes further underway periods and/or testing it will 

not be able to determine the significance of improvements on ship 

availability.

Further, the ship is currently at capacity in terms of the 

number of crew members it can accommodate. Therefore, any increase 

in crew size would require a significant redesign of the seaframes and 

would necessitate a revision to the maximum 50-person manning 

requirement, which has been validated by the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council. Officials from the office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations told us after the deployment that they are not considering any 

further revision to the manning requirements for the ship, although some 

manning studies are under way to assess the rank and billet structure for 

the mission packages and aviation detachment.

 17 GAO-14-447 focuses more specifically on the effect of the reduced crew size during the 

deployment.
Page 18 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

This first deployment provided limited insight into how the LCS might be 

utilized in the different theaters in which the Navy operates. USS 

Freedom was deployed to Singapore and conducted operations for 7th 

Fleet largely consisting of participation in planned multi-lateral exercises. 

While 7th Fleet officials noted that a benefit of having LCS in theater was 

that the ship could participate in international exercises, thereby freeing 

up other surface combatants for other missions, they were still not certain 

about the ship’s potential capabilities and attributes, or how they would 

best utilize an LCS in their theater. Until the Navy completes additional 

testing and deployments, it will not have adequate operational data and 

operational experience on which to base assumptions regarding LCS 

utilization. Table 5 discusses some of the observations related to the LCS 

deployment that we discussed with 7th Fleet officials related to the LCS 

deployment.

Fleet Observations on 

Deployment Highlight Potential 

Limitations on LCS Usage
Page 19 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Table 5: 7th Fleet Observations on Initial Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Deployment

Fleet Observation Significance Considerations

Fleet users expressed uncertainty about LCS’s 

potential capabilities and attributes, or how they 

would best utilize an LCS in their theater. Several 

7th Fleet officials told us that they thought the LCS 

in general might be better suited to operations in 

the 5th Fleet theater (headquartered in Bahrain) 

than to 7th Fleet due in part to the smaller area of 

responsibility in 5th Fleet that would make range 

less of a consideration.

Determining how to best use 

LCS in different theaters 

could influence the Navy’s 

decision about the total 

number of seaframes and 

mission modules the Navy 

requires.

The Navy is planning future deployments of LCS 

to the 7th Fleet.

The Navy held a wargame in March 2014 to try to 

understand how well LCS supports Navy needs 

and war plans in various phases of operations in a 

Pacific theater crisis.

Fleet users expressed interest in several 

modifications that they would like to see made to 

the seaframes and/or mission packages to better 

suit their needs, based on their experience with the 

deployment. These include

• A replacement system for an unreliable and 

poorly performing electronic warfare system 

called WBR-2000 that is currently installed on 

the Freedom variant;

• An ability to make additional use of the MH-60 

helicopter by being able to carry sonar buoys 

on the ship for helicopter use regardless of 

whether or not the anti-submarine warfare 

package is onboard; and

• Developing an intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance-specific mission package to 

augment existing capabilities.

According to the 7th Fleet 

users, these changes would 

make LCS more reflective of 

their theater-specific needs.

Officials from the Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations stated that there were no such 

changes currently envisioned, though they are 

always open to potential improvements.

Fleet users said LCS fuel constraints contributed to 

a low average transit speed which, coupled with 

the very long distances ships have to travel within 

the 7th Fleet theater, make it hard for LCS to easily 

or efficiently get around the theater. 

If limitations of LCS 

complicate use in operations 

in the 7th Fleet theater, the 

Navy may need to consider 

the impact in terms of the 

total number of seaframes 

and mission packages the 

Navy requires.

Future deployments of LCS to the 7th Fleet theater 

are planned with different LCS seaframes, which 

may yield different observations.

Section 124 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2014 limits the availability of 

funds for LCS 25 and 26 until the Navy submits to 

the congressional defense committees, among 

other things, a certification that requires in relevant 

part that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

(JROC)—responsible for validating performance 

requirements— has assessed the adequacy of the 

current LCS capabilities development document to 

meet the requirements of the combatant 

commands and to address future threats.a

Source: GAO interviews with 7th Fleet officials and analysis of relevant documentation. | GAO-14-794

The 

JROC could approve increases or reductions or 

make no changes to requirements, including top 

speed, range, and endurance.

Note:

a

Pub. L. No. 113-66 (2013).
Page 20 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Since July 2013, the Navy has completed additional testing on the 

seaframes and mission modules and is seeing results but has not yet 

proven performance in an operational environment. Table 6 describes 

these recently completed events and some important considerations 

about the testing.

Table 6: Recently Completed Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Test Events 

System Test event Date Considerations

Seaframe Developmental 

Testing of LCS 

Launch, Handling, 

and Recovery 

Systems on LCS 2 

seaframe

August 2013 • Testing of the Launch, Handling, and Recovery Systems used to lower the 

mine countermeasures package’s minehunting Remote Multi-mission 

Vehicle (RMMV) and other systems out of the back of the ship.

• The Navy’s Commander of Operational Test and Evaluation Force and the 

office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) observed 

this testing and stated that systems showed improved functioning over 

prior tests.

• This testing also further demonstrated—although with some reliability 

problems—the use of multi-vehicle communication systems, a new system 

that allows the seaframe to control multiple RMMVs simultaneously. This 

testing showed only use of this system communicating in single-vehicle 

mode.

Combat System Ship 

Qualification Testing 

on USS Fort Worth 

(LCS 3)

Late 2012 • The Navy obtained initial test results and analysis from this testing in April 

2013 and is still evaluating the results.

• LCS 3 was the first LCS to complete this testing, which represents an 

opportunity to verify and validate combat and weapon systems 

performance for new ships. LCS 1 and LCS 2 have not yet formally 

completed this testing.a

LCS 2 rough water 

trials

USS Coronado (LCS 4) is expected to conduct this 

testing in 2014.

JanuaryFebruary 

2014

• These trials allow the Navy to capture data with instrumentation on how 

the seaframes react to heavy sea conditions, which can be used to verify 

and validate computer model predictions that help inform expectations 

about service life and how stress can result in fatigue areas of the ship’s 

structure. Results are not yet available.

• The Navy has not yet conducted rough water trials for the Freedom

variant; testing was initiated in 2011 for LCS 1 but was suspended when a 

hull crack was identified. Rough water trials for the Freedom variant are 

now planned to occur with LCS 1 in 2015.

Navy Has Made Progress 

with Recent Testing but 

Additional Testing Needed 

to Demonstrate LCS 

Capabilities
Page 21 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

System Test event Date Considerations

Mission 

packages

Developmental 

testing of the mine 

countermeasures 

package RMMV and 

the Remote 

Minehunting System 

(RMS)

FebruaryJune 2013

b

• Testing demonstrated marked improvements in the reliability of the RMMV 

and RMS which has been a problem for several years, measured by the 

extent to which the system could perform its mission without failures that 

prevent the successful completion of a mission.

• We reported in July 2013 that the contractor had improved reliability from 

7.9 hours between operational failures to 45 hours, as compared with the 

Navy’s 75-hour requirement. According to a recent test report, RMS 

demonstrated operating with hours between such failures exceeding both

the Navy’s requirement and the contractor’s goal of 129 hours.

• Several factors limit the significance of the testing:

• Testing was conducted using an older configuration of the RMMV 

than will be used for operational testing which is, according to 

DOT&E, incompatible with the LCS and will never be used 

operationally. DOT&E stated that using a non-representative RMMV 

in developmental testing limits the utility of the data obtained.

• DOT&E found that the definition of mean time between operational 

mission failures erroneously added the time that the crew would be 

spending conducting post-mission analysis of data obtained from 

RMS operations to the time that the vehicle was actually operating. 

DOT&E stated this artificially inflates the reliability rate by a factor of 

at least two. Officials from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

stated that there are two definitions of this parameter, one definition 

intended for the purpose of system’s engineering and reliability growth 

and the other intended for the purpose of operational test and 

evaluation.

• We noted that while Navy sailors were used to support testing, it did 

not involve an RMMV integrated with the LCS, but instead the RMMV 

was operated from a pier. Further testing will be required to replicate 

these results in a more operationally relevant environment. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy test reports. | GAO-14-794

a

Navy program officials told us they have conducted testing that is at least as rigorous as Combat 

System Ship Qualification Trials during the developmental testing phase. DOT&E officials disagree, 

emphasizing that operational effectiveness and suitability can be assessed only through operational 

testing.

b

The RMS consists of an RMMV, which operates as a semi-submersible to tow an AN/AQS-20A 

sonar that is used to detect, classify, locate, and identify minelike objects.

Although the Navy has gained knowledge related to LCS capabilities and 

concepts since our July 2013 report, there continue to be significant 

acquisition risks to the program. Key among these is managing the weight 

of the ships. Initial LCS seaframes face limitations resulting from weight 

growth during construction of the first several ships. This weight growth 

has required the Navy to make compromises on performance of LCS 1 

and LCS 2 and may complicate existing plans to make additional changes 

to each seaframe design. While weight growth is not uncommon over the 

life of a ship and the Navy builds a weight allowance into ships to account 

for this growth, LCS has significantly lower available margin compared to 

Outstanding Weight 

Management and 

Concurrency Risks 

Continue to 

Complicate LCS 

Acquisition
Page 22 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

other ship classes. Compounding these issues, the Navy has not 

received complete or accurate weight reports from the LCS seaframe 

prime contractors—and the Navy’s lengthy review process has hindered a 

timely resolution. Additionally, as we have previously reported, the Navy 

has considerable testing to complete before the program demonstrates 

operational capability. Further, the Navy has continued with the 

acquisition without the knowledge that would be gained from additional 

testing. For example, since our last report, the Navy has granted the 

mission modules program approval to accelerate the mission package 

production rate before completing key test activities to demonstrate their 

performance.

Weight growth occurred on the first four LCS seaframes, which affected 

the capabilities of both Freedom and Independence variant seaframes. 

This situation has led the Navy to accept lower than minimum 

requirements on two delivered seaframes (LCS 1 and 2) in endurance 

and sprint speeds, respectively. Further, weight growth has caused three 

delivered LCS seaframes (LCS 1, 2, and 4) to not achieve the required 

service life allowance for weight. Weight management in shipbuilding 

programs, including the LCS, is critical to ensuring that performance 

requirements associated with survivability, sea keeping (meaning the 

ability to withstand rough sea conditions), and the ability to accommodate 

upgrades during ship service lives, are met. For LCS seaframes, specific 

performance requirements that are sensitive to weight include the 

following:

• 3,500-nautical-mile range (endurance) when operated at a speed of 

14 knots,18

• 40-knot sprint speed,

• 20-foot navigational draft (the greatest depth, in feet, of the keel),

• 50-metric-ton service life allowance for weight, and

• 0.15-meter service life allowance for stability.19

 18In 2009, the Navy received authorization from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

to reduce LCS’s original endurance requirement, which was a 4,300-nautical-mile range 

when operated at a speed of 16 knots, to the current endurance requirement. This 

reduction followed a Navy assessment of the two seaframe designs.

19The stability service life allowance is associated with a seaframe’s vertical center of 

gravity as measured from its keel.

Seaframe Weight Growth 

Affects Performance and 

Design Changes, with 

Navy Oversight

Challenged by Inadequate 

Contractor Weight Reports
Page 23 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

In the LCS program, weight management and reporting processes also 

rely on accurate mission package weight data. The Navy provides 

mission package weight estimates to the shipbuilders to include in their 

full load condition estimates.

Table 7 identifies the Navy’s current weight estimates for each of the first 

six LCS seaframes under full load conditions, along with current service 

life allowance projections for each ship as compared to the required 50 

metric tons. As is depicted, there are several seaframes that do not have 

the required amount of service life remaining due to weight growth.
Page 24 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Table 7: Weight Analysis of Littoral Combat Ship Seaframes, January 2014

Estimates in metric tons

Ship

Naval 

architectural 

limit

Full load 

condition

Required 

service life 

allowance 

(weight)

Available 

service life 

allowance 

(weight)

Builder’s 

margin GAO observations

Freedom variant 

LCS 1 3,400.0 3,374.2 50.0 25.8 N/A Ship does not meet service 

life allowance requirements. 

LCS 3 3,550.0 3,394.3 50.0 155.7 N/A Ship meets service life 

allowance requirements.

LCS 5 3,550.0 3,482.7 50.0 67.3 30.4 Ship meets service life 

allowance requirements and 

has builder’s margin available.

Independence variant 

LCS 2 3,188.0 3,204.5 50.0 -16.5 N/A Ship exceeds its naval 

architectural limit and does 

not meet service life 

allowance requirements, but 

according to Navy officials, 

margin in fuel weight could 

compensate.

LCS 4 3,188.0 3,171.5 50.0 16.5 N/A Ship does not meet service 

life allowance requirements, 

but according to Navy 

officials, margin in fuel weight 

could compensate.

LCS 6 3,188.0 3,156.7 50.0 31.3 29.2 Ship does not meet service 

life allowance requirements, 

but according to Navy 

officials, available builder’s 

margin could provide an offset 

and margin in fuel weight 

could compensate.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. | GAO-14-794

Notes: 

LCS 1-LCS 4 have been delivered and therefore builder’s margin remaining has become part of the 

service life allowance. LCS 5 and 6 are under construction.

Contractor officials responsible for construction of the LCS seaframes told us that weight growth on at 

least some of the seaframes was due in part to design changes made by the Navy during 

construction.

LCS 2 faces the most significant weight challenges of any of the first six 

seaframes, but Navy officials stated they have a strategy to mitigate the 

issue while still meeting requirements. According to Navy estimates, LCS 

2 is so heavy in the full load condition that it exceeds its naval 

architectural limit—an outcome that provides no service life allowance for 
Page 25 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

weight and restricts the ship’s ability to execute its required missions. 

Subject matter experts in naval architecture who we interviewed stated 

that operating a ship in excess of its naval architectural limit can make it 

prone to failure in certain weather or damage conditions, and the ship can 

also see a decreased service life due to structural fatigue. Navy officials 

stated that they will limit fuel loads on LCS 2, as necessary, to ensure the 

naval architectural limit is not exceeded. In addition, the Navy is 

developing design modifications for Independence variant seaframes to 

reduce fuel capacity—estimated to total over 100 metric tons—in order to 

restore service life allowances. Although this reduction will reduce the 

endurance of these ships, the Navy reports that this variant has excess 

fuel capacity—as demonstrated during LCS 2 calm water trials in June 

2013—and will still meet LCS range at transit speed requirements after 

the fuel reduction.

Further, as table 7 shows, three of the other LCS seaframes—LCS 1, 

LCS 4, and LCS 6—also do not currently meet their service life allowance 

requirements for weight when configured in normal, full load conditions. 

For example, LCS 1 and LCS 4 have near or less than 50 percent of the 

required 50 metric ton service life allowances for weight (25.8 and 16.5 

tons, respectively), and the Navy projects LCS 6 will enter service with 

less than 63 percent (31.3 metric tons) of its required 50 metric ton 

service life allowance for weight. At present, LCS 6 has over 29 metric 

tons of builder’s margin available, which if still available at delivery could 

offset that particular ship’s estimated service life allowance deficit for 

weight.

Weight growth contributed to LCS 1 and LCS 2 not achieving some 

requirements related to endurance and sprint speed respectively, when 

operated in normal, full load conditions. For instance, although LCS 1 

meets its sprint speed requirement of 40 knots, excess weight growth to 

date in part prevents that ship from achieving the 3,500 nautical miles at 

14 knots endurance requirement. Alternatively, LCS 2 can only sprint at 

39.5 knots under full loads, but is predicted to exceed the endurance 

requirement by over 800 nautical miles, albeit at potential risk to its naval 

architectural limit, as discussed above.20

 20 LCS 2 contractor officials told us that the calculated speed in the full load condition LCS 

2 is 36.5 knots.
Page 26 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Complicating the weight growth on early LCS seaframes is the fact that 

LCS requirements for service life allowances already fall short of the 

growth margins called for under Navy and industry recommended 

practice.21

Table 8: Navy Recommended Service Life Allowances by Ship Type as Compared to 

Littoral Combat Ship Requirements

Table 8 outlines recommended service life allowances for 

different ship types as compared to LCS requirements.

Ship types

Weight 

(percentage)

Vertical center of gravity 

(meters)

Surface combatants

a

10.0 0.30 

Aircraft carriers 7.5 0.76

Amphibious warfare ships (large 

decks)

7.5 0.76

Amphibious warfare ships (other) 5.0 0.30

Auxiliary ships 5.0 0.15

Special ships and craft 5.0 0.15

LCS requirements 1.4 to 1.6 0.15 b

Source: GAO analysis of Navy and industry documentation. | GAO-14-749

Notes: Service life allowances are measured against the full load condition at the time of ship 

delivery.

a

Vertical center of gravity is the height of the ship’s vertical center of gravity measured from the 

bottom of the keel.

b

We calculated the percentage range by dividing the LCS service life allowance requirement for 

weight (50 metric tons) by the estimated full load condition displacements for LCS 5 and LCS 6 

(3,482.7 and 3,156.7 metric tons, respectively). We used LCS 5 and LCS 6 because the Navy views 

these as the first production representative ships.

Because of the LCS’s comparatively low service life allowance 

requirements, the Navy’s ability to accommodate alterations and growth 

on these ships over their expected 20-year minimum service lives will be 

significantly more constrained than is typical for other surface ships. In 

2012, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations highlighted the 

importance of this issue across ship classes, noting in an instruction that 

inadequate service life allowances for weight and vertical center of gravity 

have resulted in expensive corrective ship changes or in the inability to 

modernize ships through installation of new weapons systems.

 21Society of Allied Weight Engineers, Recommended Practice Number 14: Weight 

Estimating and Margin Manual for Marine Vehicles (Los Angeles, Calif.: May 22, 2001).

LCS Has Low Weight 

Growth Margins Compared 

to Other Ship Classes
Page 27 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Navy program officials told us they expect that most future weight—and 

capability—growth on LCS would occur within mission packages, not 

seaframes. However, as we previously reported, the Navy is considering 

changes to the seaframe designs that could further increase weight 

estimates.22

• Early estimates indicate that roughly 10 to 20 metric tons could be 

added due to accommodations for a larger crew, and would 

require pervasive modifications to each seaframe design. If so, 

these changes would heighten weight challenges and resulting 

service life allowance shortfalls.

As mentioned above, these changes could include increases 

in: (1) habitability to support larger crews than initially anticipated; (2) 

commonality between the seaframe variants and with other Navy ships; 

and (3) changes to improve safety. We reported in July 2013 that the 

Navy had undertaken several technical studies on these initiatives. These 

studies have not yet been completed. Navy officials stated that the 

possible changes are low risk and would not affect LCS performance 

requirements. However, some changes, including those related to 

habitability, are likely to add weight. According to the program office, 

weight considerations occur for every change and corresponding trades 

are required to be made in order to approve the change. For example:

• A change was made to LCS 2 in a recent maintenance period to 

increase the size of the rescue boat from 5 meters to 7 meters, 

which will make the boat more stable in heavier seas. This change 

resulted in an approximately 15 metric ton weight increase to LCS 

2; it is planned for all Independence variant seaframes. According 

to the contractor, by removing weight from other areas of LCS 6 

and follow-on ships designs, the larger rescue boat will add 1.3 

metric tons. 

• Another proposed change would increase commonality and 

combat capability by replacing the Freedom variant’s rolling 

airframe missile system with the heavier missile system found on 

the Independence variant. While the specifics of this potential 

change have not yet been determined or approved, Navy 

technical experts told us that such a modification would 

 22GAO-13-530.

Low Growth Margins May 

Complicate Future Changes
Page 28 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

subsequently increase the Freedom variant’s weight and could 

also result in center of gravity changes.

Weight constraints could make future modifications more costly than 

anticipated. For instance, subject matter experts in naval architecture told 

us that the Navy may find it has to seek lighter alternatives to the systems 

or equipment it wants, which could complicate the redesign and 

construction modification efforts or make them more costly—or both. 

Because the Navy has not yet completed technical studies evaluating its 

possible changes, the weight effects remain unknown. According to Navy 

officials, preliminary studies on the habitability changes should be

completed this year, and more detailed design work will not occur until 

fiscal year 2015. The Navy has established a weight working group with 

Navy and shipyard representatives that program officials said is intended 

to try and identify ways to offset weight growth from some of these design 

changes.

Additionally, once a ship is delivered and handed over to the fleet, fleet 

operators and maintainers assume responsibility for these weight 

management processes, which continue throughout the ship’s service life. 

For ships that are weight constrained—meaning, at or nearing their naval 

architectural limits for displacement—these weight management 

processes are typically more robust and costly. For instance, a Navy 

instruction states that weight must be kept within naval architectural limits 

and provides that for ships that are weight constrained, any additional 

weight must be compensated for by removing weight from the ship. 23

Inclining experiments must usually be completed following maintenance 

periods to ensure the ship’s naval architectural limits remain unbreached. 

As operational assets, LCS 1 and LCS 2 are—according to Navy 

reporting—both in a weight constrained status.24

According to Navy officials, the seaframes have low growth margins 

because the mission packages are supposed to be flexible enough to 

accommodate any future upgrades and growth. However, weight 

challenges exist on the mission packages as well, and weight and space 

 23Naval Sea Systems Command Instruction 9096.3E, Weight and Moment Compensation 

and Limiting Drafts for Naval Surface Ships (Feb. 14, 2005).

24LCS 3 exceeds the required service life allowance for weight and LCS 4 has not yet 

delivered and is not yet an operational asset, so it is not yet included in this reporting. 

Mission Package Weights 

Continue to Evolve, but Growth 

Margin Is Constrained
Page 29 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

constraints are limiting the extent to which the Navy can accommodate 

new mission package systems. Similar to the seaframes, the Navy also 

tracks and manages mission package weights. Mission packages 

(regardless of which type) are required to consume no more than 180 

metric tons when installed aboard a seaframe. Of this 180-metric-ton 

allocation, 105 metric tons are allotted to the actual mission package 

equipment, whereas 75 metric tons are reserved for fuel to power that 

equipment. However, LCS requirements documents do not include a 

service life allowance requirement for mission packages, and based on 

current weight estimates, room for future growth on the final increments 

ranges from approximately 14 metric tons for some configurations of the 

MCM mission package to none for the ASW mission package. According 

to Navy officials, future additions to mission packages—beyond the 

systems currently planned for increment 4 configurations—will be offset 

by removing existing systems, described below, to the extent required to 

meet the 105 metric ton weight limitation. For MCM, Navy officials stated 

that they cannot include all the current increment 4 systems that they are 

buying in a package at one time, so they have recently developed two 

options with different system configurations. Figure 3 highlights current 

mission package weights that are estimated for each increment of 

mission package capability, including the two MCM options but excluding 

potential weight reduction efforts.
Page 30 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Figure 3: Current Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Weight Estimates, by 

Increment

a

The Navy currently plans for only one increment of anti-submarine warfare capability, introduced in 

increment 2.

b

The projected weight of the mine countermeasures mission package at increment 4 will differ 

depending on the systems included. Mine countermeasures mission package increment 4 Option 

A+B reflects a configuration with the weight for the Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned 

Undersea Vehicle (Knifefish), the Unmanned Influence Sweep System, and the weight of the other 

increment 4 systems. This option with both systems onboard is not feasible as the two systems 

cannot be included in one mission package together due to space constraints. They are depicted to 

highlight weight challenges.

c

The mine countermeasures mission package increment 4 Option A reflects the weight for the 

Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (Knifefish) in addition to the other 

increment 4 systems, but without the Unmanned Influence Sweep System. The mine 

countermeasures mission package increment 4 Option B reflects the weight for the Unmanned 

Influence Sweep System in addition to the other increment 4 systems, but without Knifefish.

At present, the Navy anticipates that the equipment associated with an 

increment 4 SUW package will require slightly less than the 105-metricton allotment. This estimate is contingent on surface-to-surface missile 

systems not yet selected delivering within the assigned weight margins. 
Page 31 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

The Navy has identified a weight reduction plan to provide an additional 5 

metric tons.

Navy weight estimates for increment 4 of the MCM mission package, 

however, do not reflect all the systems being acquired for that package. 

Space and weight constraints have required the Navy to modify how it 

intends to outfit increment 4 of the MCM mission package. Although the 

Navy plans to acquire all the systems planned for that increment, space 

and weight limitations will not allow LCS seaframes to carry all of these 

systems at one time. According to LCS program officials, MCM mission 

commanders will have either (1) the Unmanned Influence Sweep System 

and the unmanned surface vehicle that tows it, or (2) the minehunting 

Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Undersea Vehicle—called 

Knifefish—available—but not both systems. As a result, LCS seaframes 

outfitted with the increment 4 MCM package may have decreased

minesweeping or mine detection capability.25

Further, ASW mission package equipment is also estimated to exceed its 

105-metric-ton allotment by approximately 4 metric tons. In response, the 

Navy has identified weight reduction options within that package that it 

estimates will shed a combined 10 metric tons of weight. Several of these 

options require redesign of existing systems, which could introduce risk.

These scenarios would 

preclude LCS from meeting its MCM minesweeping performance 

requirements; Knifefish is a new capability that was recently added to the 

program, and officials from the mission module program office stated that 

it is not a capability currently defined in LCS requirements documentation. 

The Navy has identified some options for weight reduction for this 

package that could bring the combined weight with these two systems 

included together to just under 105 metric tons, but physical space 

constraints would still prohibit both being carried together.

 25Minehunting is the process of using sensors to localize and identify individual mines for 

avoidance or later neutralization. Minesweeping uses either acoustic and magnetic 

emissions to detonate mines designed to target a ship’s acoustic or magnetic signature 

(called influence mine sweeping) or a physical device to cut the tether of moored mines so 

that they float to the surface, where they can be detonated or recovered for intelligence 

purposes (called mechanical minesweeping). While Navy mine warfare officials stated that 

minehunting is the preferred mode of clearing mines since it is more precise, 

minesweeping is sometimes the only option due to time or environmental constraints.
Page 32 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

The Navy has faced challenges obtaining accurate and complete weight 

estimates from the contractors. The Navy’s primary mechanism for 

tracking seaframe weights are quarterly weight reports, which are 

produced and delivered by each of the LCS prime contractors per 

contract requirements. These reports provide data on the physical 

characteristics of seaframes under construction, including the magnitude, 

location, and distribution of weight within each ship. These data are 

based on estimated and calculated weights derived from design 

drawings, historical data, and vendor-furnished information, and are 

updated with actual component weight information during construction by 

the shipbuilder. Under the terms of their contracts, LCS prime contractors 

are required to prepare and report data within weight reports in 

accordance with Navy and industry recommended practices, which 

include using the Navy’s Expanded Ship Work Breakdown Structure 

(ESWBS) classification system to structure and summarize data.26

An inclining experiment is important as it represents the point where 

weight data transitions from estimated or calculated data into actual data. 

According to Navy officials, when the weight of a ship is determined at an 

inclining experiment, the weight totals should be very close to those 

identified in the preceding weight reports. Acceptable deviation is 

considered to be only 0.5 percent or less, according to Navy technical 

experts. In the LCS program, however, inclining experiments for the first 

two seaframes revealed weight growth that the prime contractors had not 

fully accounted for within their weight reports. For example, the LCS 1 

inclining experiment that followed that ship’s initial post-delivery work 

periods revealed that the ship weighed approximately 90 metric tons 

more than expected. However, it was unclear to the prime contractor 

where this excess weight was located or how it was distributed within the 

ship, though Navy program officials told us that they now believe it was 

ESWBS facilitates the grouping of materials, equipment, and ship 

components in a consistent reporting format, which in turn positions Navy 

reviewers to audit the contractors’ work. At their highest level, ESWBS 

groupings are organized around major systems of the ship, such as the 

hull structure and propulsion plant, but ESWBS groupings are broken 

down to include individual components of these respective systems, such 

as diesel engines.

 26Society of Allied Weight Engineers, Recommended Practice Number 12: Weight Control 

Technical Requirements for Surface Ships, Revision Issue No. C (Los Angeles, Calif.: 

May 22, 2002).

Deficiencies in Contractor 

Reports Have Hindered Navy 

Oversight of LCS Weight

Challenges
Page 33 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

due largely to additional insulation and paint. In response, Lockheed 

Martin increased its weight estimates for LCS 3 and worked with the Navy 

to evaluate and resolve the 90 metric ton discrepancy. As part of these 

analyses, Lockheed Martin was able to assign much of the weight growth 

to individual ESWBS accounts, and subsequently inclined LCS 3 to within 

1 percent of that ship’s revised weight estimate. However, full resolution 

of the 90 metric tons weight discrepancy remains incomplete. Weight 

reports for LCS 5 and follow-on ships identified over 23 metric tons of 

weight that Lockheed Martin and the Navy have not yet identified as 

belonging within specific ESWBS accounts. Similar to LCS 1, LCS 2’s

inclining revealed an approximately 5 percent deviation from expected 

weight, and General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works and Austal USA have 

over 13 metric tons of weight, outside of the ESWBS accounts, on later 

Independence variant seaframes. Carrying forward excess weight can 

have impacts on the ships over the course of their service lives, and may 

have impacts on construction of follow-on seaframes. In order to remedy 

persisting deficiencies in the weight reports, Navy officials stated that the 

administrative contracting officer—responsible for ensuring that the 

contractor is fulfilling the contract under the specified terms, including 

price, schedule, and quality—could withhold a percentage of progress 

payments. To date, however, Navy officials report that they have not 

pursued such withholds in the LCS program.

As part of the terms of the block buy contracts for LCS seaframes, the 

Navy is required to review and comment on weight reports within 60 days 

after they are submitted by a prime contractor.27

 27According to Navy program officials, contracts for the first four seaframes included a 

requirement that the Navy complete its review and comment on weight reports within 45 

days.

During the past 2 years, 

the Navy has, in several cases, provided detailed comments back to the 

contractors on weight reports that it identified as deficient. Comments 

back to the prime contractors identified fundamental classification and 

estimating errors and the use of outdated weight information, among 

other reporting deficiencies, which the Navy judged as time sensitive and 

critically important to address (see appendix II, which contains excerpts 

from Navy comments on contractor weight reports). The Navy often 

requested LCS prime contractors to modify and resubmit the report within 

30 days—consistent with the terms of the contracts.
Page 34 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

However, the prime contractors have not addressed the Navy’s 

comments and resubmitted weight reports, largely because the Navy’s 

review is typically taking longer than 60 days. One contractor stated that 

the Navy’s review took 6 to 12 months. According to Navy officials, 

reviews of weight reports now take less than 6 months. Nevertheless, by 

the time that the Navy’s comments for one particular report are submitted 

to the contractor, the contractor has often already submitted the next 

quarter’s weight report. As a result, LCS contractors stated to us that they 

generally do not make revisions to the previously submitted reports. Thus, 

issues raised in the Navy’s comments are not immediately addressed by 

the contractors. These revisions can affect weight estimates, but cannot 

be identified until a corrected weight report has been submitted. As a 

result, serious issues within weight reports persist that could obscure 

timely identification of negative weight trends within one or both seaframe 

variants.

As we previously reported, the Navy’s acquisition approach to the LCS 

program involves a significant degree of concurrency; that is, the Navy is 

buying the ships while key concepts and performance are still being 

tested. Since we issued our report in July 2013, the Navy received 

approval from DOT&E for the LCS test and evaluation master plan 

(TEMP), which sets forth the testing that must be completed to ensure 

that the program meets requirements. In order to determine the degree to 

which the information from test events would be available to inform the 

Navy’s decision to purchase additional seaframes, we compared the 

Navy’s current acquisition strategy—which calls for releasing a request

for proposals in 2015 in support of a planned 2016 award of future 

seaframe contracts—with the program’s test schedule as outlined in the 

most recent TEMP. Figure 4 illustrates the test events that will be 

completed before and after these acquisition events.28

 28If the Department of Defense and/or the Navy opt to make a change to the program’s 

future acquisition strategy, these dates may change. As noted above, in February 2014, 

the Secretary of Defense announced that as part of its fiscal year 2015 budget proposal 

the Navy would not contract for more than 32 ships, instead of the 52 as planned.

Risk of LCS Concurrency 

Remains—with Mission 

Package Procurement 

Exceeding Levels Needed 

for Operational Testing
Page 35 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Figure 4: Timing of Key Littoral Combat Ship Test Events and Demonstrations Versus Planned Issuance of Request for 

Proposals and Seaframe Contract Awards

a

According to the Navy, the exact deployment date of the Independence variant is classified, but it is 

notionally planned to deploy before 2017.

b

This testing includes completion of air warfare testing.

c

Schedule depends on availability of replacement missile solution, if necessary.
Page 36 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

As shown in figure 4, we found that a number of significant test events as 

outlined in the TEMP will not be completed in time to inform the 

development or release of a request for proposals or the award of followon contract(s), or they will be completed on one variant but not both. 

Many of these test events are part of operational testing. Operational 

testing includes live-fire testing, which provides timely assessment of the 

survivability and lethality of a weapon system. The significance of 

conducting operational testing is reflected by the fact that statute requires 

a program to complete realistic survivability tests and initial operational 

testing before starting full rate production.29 The Navy plans to continue 

buying seaframes before completing operational test events that 

demonstrate the capability of the seaframes, that is, equipped with 

mission packages that can meet initial requirements.30 Other tests 

highlighted in the figure include shock and survivability tests, which 

demonstrate that the ship designs can safely absorb and control damage. 

Realistic survivability tests are required by statute before a program 

proceeds beyond low-rate initial production.31

Moreover, based on current test plans, DOT&E has concerns about the 

adequacy and nature of some tests, which led to lengthy revisions of 

earlier versions of the TEMP. Due to these concerns, DOT&E issued a 

conditional approval letter stating that the test plan was not adequate to 

support later phases of operational testing, and that the out-years of the 

program are still not well defined. Final performance requirements are 

defined in the program’s capabilities development document, and last 

year the Navy developed requirements for increment 2 SUW and 

increment 1 MCM to support testing. However, no requirements currently 

exist for the other increments. DOT&E granted the Navy approval to 

move to the operational testing of increment 2 SUW and increment 1 

MCM as described in the TEMP, which the Navy plans to begin in 2014 

and 2015, respectively, but DOT&E required the Navy to update and 

resubmit the TEMP to support testing for later increments. As such, the 

above schedule may change with subsequent TEMP submissions.

 2910 U.S.C. §§ 2399, 2366.

30GAO-13-530 contains additional information about mission package capabilities.

3110 U.S.C. § 2366.
Page 37 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

To help mitigate the concurrency in the LCS program—in particular to 

better align planned contractual actions with obtaining knowledge through 

some of these test events—we recommended in July 2013 that the Navy 

reassess its acquisition strategy. Specifically, we recommended that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) limit future seaframe acquisitions until it 

completed a full-rate production review. We also recommended that DOD 

report to Congress on the relative advantages of each seaframe variant 

for each key LCS mission prior to awarding any additional seaframe 

contracts. In its written response, DOD did not agree with our 

recommendations aimed at slowing the pace of seaframe procurements. 

DOD cited the need to buy ships at the planned pace to keep pricing low 

and saw no value in reducing production pending the full-rate production 

decision. DOD agreed that the Navy could, if requested by Congress, 

report on the performance of each seaframe variant against current LCS 

requirements, but did not address the need to provide an assessment of 

the relative costs and advantages and disadvantages of the variants 

against operational and mission needs. Such steps remain important to 

help ensure that the level of capability provided by LCS is militarily useful 

given the warfighter’s current capability needs and that continued 

investment in the program is warranted.

The Navy continues to move forward with a strategy that buys mission 

packages before their performance is demonstrated. The Navy held a 

Milestone B review for the mission packages in January 7, 2014, which 

would typically authorize a program to begin system design and 

demonstration efforts and determine the low-rate production quantity, 

which is necessary to—among other things—provide production 

configured or representative articles for operational tests.32 Based on this 

review, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, 

and Acquisitions authorized the program to effectively accelerate mission 

package production, granting the program approval to procure 5 test units 

and up to 27 production mission packages.33

 32Low-Rate Initial Production quantities are generally 10 percent of the total production 

quantity. 

According to DOD guidance, 

low-rate production usually begins at Milestone C, when programs are 

33In October 2012, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology changed the status of the LCS mission module program from an Acquisition 

Category (ACAT) ID to an ACAT IC, thereby giving the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 

Research, Development, and Acquisitions decision making authority for mission module 

acquisitions, including approval of the Milestone B decision. 

Pace of Mission Package 

Procurement Outpacing 

Levels Needed for

Operational Testing
Page 38 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

authorized to begin initial production. As we highlighted in our last report, 

continuing into what is essentially full-rate production—as this 32 mission 

packages is half of the total planned quantity of mission packages for the 

program—increases the risk that the Navy will be purchasing systems 

that have not been validated to meet requirements through testing.34

We also recommended in July 2013 that the Navy ensure that the 

program baseline submitted for the mission modules’ Milestone B 

establish program goals for cost, schedule, and performance for each 

mission module increment. DOD partially concurred with this 

recommendation, but our review of the program baseline found that it 

does not define the thresholds and objectives for performance for each 

increment of the mission modules. Officials from the office of the Chief of 

Naval Operations stated that there is no plan to update the baseline to 

include this performance information since they believe that the LCS 

mission package increments actually represent only one increment of 

capability. Without defined performance thresholds and objectives for 

each mission package increment, decision makers will continue to lack 

information needed to effectively monitor the development of the 

increments, and a baseline against which to measure performance.

We 

also recommended in July 2013 that the Navy only buy the minimum 

quantities of mission module systems required to support operational 

testing. DOD did not agree with this recommendation, stating that mission 

package procurements were at a rate necessary to: support (1) 

developmental and operational testing of the two seaframe variants with 

each mission module increment; (2) fleet training needs; and (3) 

operational LCS ships. In its memorandum on the Navy’s Remote 

Minehunting System (RMS) operational assessment and Milestone C 

decision, DOT&E raised similar concerns, stating for example that the 

Navy should strictly limit any production of RMS, including the Remote 

Multi-mission Vehicle (RMMV), until greater system maturity and reliability 

are demonstrated on the version of RMS that will be initially fielded.

 34If the Navy curtails LCS production at 32 seaframes, the end number of mission package 

quantities could change.
Page 39 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

We raised two matters for Congressional consideration in our July 2013 

report. First, to ensure that continued LCS investments are informed by 

adequate knowledge, we suggested that Congress consider restricting 

funding for additional seaframes until the Navy completes ongoing 

technical and design studies related to potential changes in LCS 

requirements, capabilities, and the commonality of systems on the two 

seaframe variants. Second, to ensure timely and complete information on 

the capabilities of each seaframe variant prior to making decisions about 

future LCS procurements, we suggested that Congress consider requiring 

DOD to report on the relative advantages of each variant in carrying out 

the three primary LCS missions.

In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014, 

Congress directed the Navy to complete a number of studies that are in 

line with our recommendations to provide additional information on some 

of the risk areas that we identified.35 The legislation restricts the obligation 

or expenditure of fiscal year 2014 funding for construction or advanced 

procurement for LCS seaframes 25 and 26 until the Navy submits the 

required reports and certifications. However, as LCS 25 and LCS 26 are 

not yet under contract, the Navy cannot use fiscal year 2014 money to 

fund these seaframes. As of the end of January 2014, Navy officials told 

us that they had just begun coordinating efforts and collecting data to 

write reports as required in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014. A copy of this 

NDAA requirement can be found in appendix III.

The Navy has made progress since our last report in demonstrating LCS 

capabilities. In particular, completing the initial deployment of an LCS with 

a mission package to an overseas location provided the Navy with 

important real-world lessons learned that are being used to refine plans 

for subsequent deployments. However, these deployments are not a 

substitute for operational testing. Completing further developmental and 

operational test events will continue to provide the Navy will valuable data 

with which it can evaluate the performance of systems and make 

adjustments, as needed. The Navy still has a great deal of learning to do 

about the ships, the integrated capability that they are intended to provide 

when equipped with the mission packages, and how the overall LCS 

concept will be implemented. Not having adequate knowledge—such as 

 35 Pub L. No. 113-66, § 124 (2013).

Additional Reporting Should 

Provide Congress with Key 

Information to Support 

Decision Making

Conclusions
Page 40 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

the results of additional deployments and key operational test events—

may result in the Navy buying ships that are more costly or burdensome 

to manage over the course of their service lives. Events such as rough 

water trials, shock and total ship survivability trials are intended to provide 

confidence that the ships will last their intended lifespan and are 

survivable, while deployments and operational testing of initial mission

packages help provide confidence that the LCS will meet its performance 

requirements. Moving forward without this information complicates 

potential design changes to seaframes or mission packages.

As we have concluded in past work, the Navy’s continued approach of 

procuring the ships before proving their capabilities through testing 

increases the risks of costly retrofits or reduced performance. In addition, 

the Navy’s recent decision to accelerate the acquisition of mission 

packages further limits the flexibility that the program will have to adjust to 

any problems that may arise during operational testing. With the Navy’s 

planned fiscal year 2016 contract awards for seaframes fast approaching, 

we believe the recommendations that we made in July 2013 are still 

important steps that the Navy can take to reduce risks to the program, but 

additional steps are also warranted.

Further, the Navy’s ability to manage the ships’ weight has been 

constrained, as the contractors’ reporting has not been accurate or in a 

format that would be most useful to naval engineers. The Navy could 

improve the expediency with which it reviews and comments on 

contractor weight reports. Tools are available to improve the contractor’s 

weight reporting, such as pursuing financial withholds, and modifying the 

LCS contracts to include additional mechanisms to ensure better 

reporting. More accurate and timely reporting will help the Navy target the 

drivers of weight growth and assess the feasibility of the additional design 

changes being considered for both seaframe variants.

1. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics require—before approving the release of 

the request for proposals for future contracts for either seaframe 

variant—that both variants:

a. Have deployed to a forward overseas location;

b. Have completed rough water, ship shock, and total ship 

survivability testing; and

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 41 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

c. Have completed initial operational test and evaluation of the SUW 

mission package on the Freedom variant and the MCM mission 

package on the Independence variant.

2. To improve the Navy’s ability to effectively oversee weight 

management of the LCS seaframes, we recommend the Secretary of 

the Navy direct the LCS Seaframe Program Manager to

a. Take steps to ensure that the Navy completes its reviews and 

submits comments, if any, on the weight reports to the contractors 

within the timeframes dictated by the contract; and

b. Consider actions to make the contractor more responsive to the 

Navy’s identified accuracy and content problems in the weight 

reports, including pursuing financial withholds or modifying the 

contract language.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its 

written comments, which are included in appendix IV, DOD partially 

agreed with our recommendations to complete certain testing and 

deployment activities before approving the release of the request for 

proposals for future seaframes. DOD agreed with our recommendations 

related to seaframe weight management. 

DOD officials stated that they have every intention of completing as many 

as possible of the test and demonstration items that we identified in our 

recommendation before releasing the request for proposals (RFP) for 

future seaframe contracts, but disagreed that the release of the RFP 

should hinge on completion of these events. DOD officials stated that 

creating a break in the production of the seaframes would increase 

program costs and have significant industrial base considerations. We are 

not advocating a production break, but we do believe it is conceivable that

subsequent seaframe unit cost increases could be lower than the 

potential increases in overall program costs if testing uncovered the need 

for costly retrofits, redesign, and/or requirements changes that would then 

have to be made to ships in production. We chose to use the release of 

the RFP as a decision point because we believe that drafting an RFP that 

is based on key knowledge of LCS performance serves as an important 

risk mitigation tool for the government. Specifically, if the government 

goes forward with an RFP that is not fully informed by the results of the 

important test activities we identified in our recommendation, any 

changes that might be later identified as necessary would have to be 

reflected in an amended RFP, which could delay the award of contracts 

and potentially cause a production break. The department noted that a 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 42 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review is planned in the fiscal year 

2016 time frame and that the Board will approve the Navy’s acquisition 

strategy for LCS before additional seaframe contracts are awarded. DOD 

stated that this review will take into account the progress of testing for 

both seaframes, and that every item we identified in our recommendation 

will be completed prior to the DAB except for the completion of the fullscale ship shock trials. We believe it will be important that the department 

makes certain that the DAB review occurs at a point when the Navy can 

be directed to pause and revise its acquisition strategy and the RFP for 

LCS if necessary to ensure it reflects the most current knowledge gained 

from testing and deployments. It is possible that continued testing could 

inform changes to the numbers of each variant procured, changes that

would need to be incorporated into the acquisition strategy before the 

DAB authorizes the Navy to continue to buy more seaframes. 

Further, we continue to believe that the Navy needs to identify a means to 

conduct a full-scale ship shock trial before committing to contracts for 

further seaframes. Because the LCS seaframes are based on commercial 

designs—though heavily modified—we believe these trials are important 

to ensure that the Navy is buying ships that will meet its survivability 

needs. This is especially true with the Independence class variant, which 

is based on a novel hullform for the Navy and represents the Navy’s firsttime use of aluminum for a ship of this size. The Navy has itself identified 

that it lacks sufficient data on which to confidently base assumptions of 

this variant’s performance in an underwater shock environment, which 

makes completing this test event before DAB review and award of 

contracts important. 

DOD agreed to take steps as we recommended to improve the weight 

management of the LCS seaframes, and plans to review within 180 days 

the process by which it reviews the contractor weight submissions and 

the methods by which it can ensure that the contractors are responsive to 

Navy accuracy and content concerns. 

We also provided relevant portions of the draft report (in particular, the 

sections on weight management) to the contractors and incorporated their 

technical comments as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretaries of Defense and the Navy. In addition, the 

report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.
Page 43 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at 202-512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix V.

Michele Mackin

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Page 44 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Committee on Appropriations

Subcommittee on Defense

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Committee on Appropriations

Subcommittee on Defense

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 45 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

To assess the Navy’s lessons learned from the deployment of the first 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to Singapore, we analyzed reports from 

various LCS stakeholders, including Navy 7th Fleet Destroyer Squadron 7 

(responsible for LCS during the deployment), and the Office of the Chief 

of Naval Operations (OPNAV). We also traveled to the forward-deployed 

location in Singapore, and interviewed USS Freedom’s commanding 

officer and some of the crew; as well as officials from the LCS fleet 

introduction program office (PMS 505); Destroyer Squadron 7; and 

Commander, Logistics Force Western Pacific. We also traveled to Japan 

to interview 7th Fleet officials involved with LCS logistics; policy and 

planning; warfare requirements; strategy; and operations. Furthermore, 

we conducted interviews with relevant Navy officials, such as the OPNAV 

office that is the resource sponsor for the LCS program (N96); LCS 

seaframe program office (PMS 501); and the LCS and Joint High Speed 

Vessel Council. To assess what knowledge the Navy has obtained about 

LCS since our previous report, we analyzed DOD, Navy and contractor 

documents, including test and evaluation letters of observation from the 

Commander, Operational Testing and Evaluation Force (COTF); testing 

reports from the Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E); 

as well as the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) reports. We 

analyzed documentation from the LCS mission module program office 

(PMS 420), including an LCS contractor test report. Furthermore, we 

interviewed officials from OPNAV; the LCS and Joint High Speed Vessel 

Council; Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA); DOT&E; COTF; 

INSURV; the Naval Surface Warfare Center; the LCS seaframe program 

office; the LCS mission module program office; and the Navy Modeling 

and Simulation Office. Finally, we leveraged previous GAO reports on the 

LCS dating back to 2005.

To assess additional risks for the LCS program related to weight 

management, we analyzed Navy and contractor documentation including 

weight reports; inclining experiment reports; LCS seaframe contracts; the 

LCS Capabilities Development Document; and seaframe building 

specifications. To understand weight management and reporting 

practices, we analyzed the Society of Allied Weight Engineers 

Recommended Practices and NAVSEA policies on weight management. 

Furthermore, we conducted interviews with Lockheed Martin; Bath Iron 

Works; Marinette Marine; Austal USA; the American Bureau of Shipping; 

and the Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding. To evaluate the naval 

architecture limits of the LCS seaframes, we interviewed retired naval 

architects with significant Navy ship design experience, as well as 

American Bureau of Shipping representatives. We also met with technical 

experts from the Naval Systems Engineering Directorate (SEA05).We 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 46 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

analyzed Navy and contractor documents, including the LCS test and 

evaluation master plan; DOT&E test and evaluation master plan approval 

memo; the LCS mission modules Milestone B documentation; and the 

Navy’s acquisition decision memorandum. Furthermore, we conducted 

interviews with officials from DOT&E; COTF; and INSURV.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to July 2014

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Selected Navy Comments on 

Recent LCS Weight Reports

Page 47 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Navy comment Comment date

Associated 

prime 

contractor Ships affected

Classification

errors

“Main structural elements such as shell, framing and decks 

are calculated by frame... This results in nearly impossible 

review and audit capability. This method does not adhere to 

Extended Ship’s Work Breakdown Structure (ESWBS)...”

May 2012 Austal USA LCS 6

“Weight report structure and format are problematic. The 

subject quarterly weight report consisted of various 

disjointed, mislabeled, and conflicting files which are difficult 

to assemble and correlate for reporting purposes.”

April 2013 Austal USA LCS 6 and 

follow-on

Independence 

variant 

seaframes 

“It appears the computer aided design effort to incorporate 

detail data for Group 1 weights is fraught with ESWBS 

classification errors...It appears Group 1 has been 

arbitrarily classified to the point of a loss of control of the 

details.”

November 2013 Austal USA LCS 6 and LCS 

8

Estimating

errors

“The LCS 3 quarterly weight reports overestimated the ship 

by approximately 90 tons. The details of that same 

database have essentially been carried over to the LCS 5 

accepted weight estimate and subsequent quarterly weight 

reports...The last two quarterly weight reports have not 

shown any progress toward improving the details (via 

recalculations) and reducing risk...”

April 2013 Lockheed Martin LCS 5 and 

follow-on

Freedom variant 

seaframes 

“The LCS 6 and LCS 8 calculated light ship condition with 

remaining margin is projected to be 56 tons lighter than LCS 

4 inclined light ship condition. When the...correction is 

incorporated into the projection, the full load condition for 

weight exceeds the (naval architectural limit) for 

displacement by...30 tons. Specifically, the service life 

allowance for weight is deficient by 30 tons. This is a 

serious and unprecedented situation that has to be 

addressed quickly.”

November 2013 Austal USA LCS 6 and LCS 

8

Non-submission “Submittal did not include an updated quarterly weight 

report...a no-submittal indicates the projected full load of 

the ship at delivery is currently unknown.”

December 2012 Austal USA LCS 6 and 

follow-on

Independence 

variant 

seaframes 

Use of outdated 

information

“Mission package descriptions, weights and centers have 

not been updated in years. The Contractor must update the 

mine countermeasures and surface warfare mission 

packages with the latest values.”

June 2013 Lockheed Martin LCS 5 and 

follow-on

Freedom variant 

seaframes 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. | GAO-14-794

Appendix II: Selected Navy Comments on 

Recent LCS Weight Reports
Appendix III: 2014 National Defense 

Authorization Act Navy Reporting 

Requirements

Page 48 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Section 124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2014 restricts the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2014 funding for 

construction or advanced procurement for LCS seaframes 25 and 26 until 

the Navy submits the required reports and certifications. This section 

reads:

SEC. 124. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITYOF FUNDS FOR LITTORAL 

COMBAT SHIP

(a) LIMITATION—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this 

Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2014 for construction or 

advanced procurement of materials for the Littoral Combat Ships 

designated as LCS 25 or LCS 26 may be obligated or expended until the 

Secretary of the Navy submits to the congressional defense committees 

each of the following:

1) The report required by subsection (b)(1).

2) A coordinated determination by the Director of Operational Test 

and Evaluation and the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics that successful completion 

of the test evaluation master plan for both seaframes and each 

mission module will demonstrate operational effectiveness and 

operational suitability.

3) A certification that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council—

a) has reviewed the capabilities of the legacy systems that the 

Littoral Combat Ship is planned to replace and has compared 

such capabilities to the capabilities to be provided by the 

Littoral Combat Ship;

b) has assessed the adequacy of the current capabilities 

development document for the Littoral Combat Ship to meet 

the requirements of the combatant commands and to address 

future threats as reflected in the latest assessment by the 

defense intelligence community; and

c) has either validated the current capabilities development 

document or directed the Secretary to update the current 

capabilities development document based on the performance 

of the Littoral Combat Ship and mission modules to date.

4) A report on the expected performance of each seaframe variant 

and mission module against the current or updated capabilities 

development document.

Appendix III: 2014 National Defense 

Authorization Act Navy Reporting 

Requirements
Appendix III: 2014 National Defense 

Authorization Act Navy Reporting 

Requirements

Page 49 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

5) Certification that a capability production document will be 

completed for each mission module before operational testing.

(b) REPORT—

(1) IN GENERAL—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 

of this Act, the Chief of Naval Operations, in coordination with the Director 

of Operational Test and Evaluation, shall submit to the congressional 

defense committees a report on the current concept of operations and 

expected survivability attributes of each of the Littoral Combat Ship 

seaframes.

(2) ELEMENTS—The report required by paragraph (1) shall set forth the 

following,

a) A review of the current concept of operations of the Littoral 

Combat Ship and a comparison of such concept of operations with 

the original concept of operations of the Littoral Combat Ship.

b) An assessment of the ability of the Littoral Combat Ship to carry 

out the core missions of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 

Seapower of the Navy.

c) A comparison of the combat capabilities for the three missions 

assigned to the Littoral Combat Ship seaframes (anti-surface 

warfare, mine countermeasures, and anti-submarine warfare) with 

the combat capabilities for each of such missions of the systems 

the Littoral Combat Ship is replacing.

d) An assessment of expected survivability of the Littoral Combat 

Ship seaframes in the context of the planned employment of the 

Littoral Combat Ship as described in the concept of operations.

e) The current status of operational testing for the seaframes and the 

mission modules of the Littoral Combat Ship.

f) An updated test and evaluation master plan for the Littoral 

Combat Ship.

g) A review of survivability testing, modeling, and simulation 

conducted to date on the two seaframes of the Littoral Combat 

Ship.

h) An updated assessment of the endurance of the Littoral Combat 

Ship at sea with respect to maintenance, fuel use, and 

sustainment of crew and mission modules.

i) An assessment of the adequacy of current ship manning plans for 

the Littoral Combat Ship and an assessment of the impact that 

increased manning has on design changes and the endurance of 

the Littoral Combat Ship.

j) A list of the casualty reports to date on each Littoral Combat Ship, 

including a description of the impact of such casualties on the 
Appendix III: 2014 National Defense 

Authorization Act Navy Reporting 

Requirements

Page 50 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

design or ability of that Littoral Combat Ship to perform assigned 

missions.

(3) FORM—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in 

classified form and unclassified form.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 51 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 52 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 53 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship
Page 54 GAO-14-749 Littoral Combat Ship

Michele Mackin, 202-512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, the following staff members 

made key contributions to this report: Diana Moldafsky (Assistant 

Director); Greg Campbell; Jenny Chow; Christopher R. Durbin; G. Oliver 

Elliott; Laura Greifner; Kristine Hassinger; Kenneth Patton; C. James 

Madar; Sabrina Streagle; Roxanna Sun; and Hai Tran.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(121223)
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