United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

 Argued July 7, 2009

 Decided July 15, 2009

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 08-4260

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LOUIS HOPKINS, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana,

Hammond Division.

No. 2:06-CR-110

James T. Moody,

Judge.

O R D E R

Louis Hopkins, Jr. pleaded guilty to one count of receiving child pornography, see

18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment. Hopkins now

appeals, contending that the court ignored his principal argument at sentencing: namely

that a long sentence would be counterproductive to his rehabilitation. Because the record

does not reflect that the court adequately considered this argument, we vacate and remand

for resentencing.

In June 2006 the police executed a search warrant at Hopkins’s residence, recovering

more than 8,000 images of child pornography from his computer. About a year later

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08-4260 Page 2

Hopkins pleaded guilty to receiving child pornography, see 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). The

probation officer then prepared a presentence investigation report, which calculated

Hopkins’s offense level at 37 and his criminal history category at I, resulting in an advisory

guidelines imprisonment range of 210 to 262 months.

Hopkins argued in a written memorandum and at sentencing that he should receive

a below-guidelines sentence because, among several other reasons, he was amenable to

treatment. At the sentencing hearing, Hopkins presented the testimony of Tiffany

Simpson, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist specializing in sex-offender treatment. Simpson,

who had examined Hopkins on two occasions and conducted psychological testing with

him, testified that he was “not a pedophile” and would be “very amenable to treatment.” 

She said that long-term incarceration could be counterproductive to Hopkins’s

rehabilitation. Based on these conclusions, Simpson opined that a five-year sentence (the

statutory minimum) and lifetime supervised release would be most conducive to his

rehabilitation. Following Simpson’s testimony, Hopkins argued against a long sentence in

favor of the minimum prison term and lifetime supervised release. The government, in

response, conceded that the statutory minimum sentence of five years was “certainly

appropriate” and also asked the court to impose lifetime supervised release.

The district court sentenced Hopkins to 210 months in prison and 15 years’

supervised release, making no mention at all of Simpson’s testimony. The court said only

that Hopkins’s “request for a sentence below the advisory guidelines is not persuasive to

this Court, and I choose not to do so because I believe a below guidelines range sentence is

not warranted under the facts and circumstances of this case.”

Hopkins contends on appeal that the district court ignored his principal argument

for a below-guidelines sentence. A properly calculated guidelines sentence is presumed

reasonable, see Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007); United States v. Arceo,

535 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2008), but a district court must give “meaningful consideration”

to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, see United States v. Panaigua-Verdugo, 537 F.3d 722, 727 (7th

Cir. 2008). Although the district court need not address every argument a defendant raises,

we have held that the court may not pass in silence over the “principal argument” made by

a defendant. United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005). The sentencing

court’s failure to address a defendant’s principal, nonfrivolous argument may require a

remand for resentencing if we cannot be confident in the judge’s individualized attention to

the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 795 (7th Cir. 2008); United

States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d 785, 794 (7th Cir. 2007). 
No. 08-4260 Page 3

Here, the district court’s conclusory rejection of a below-guidelines sentence gives

us insufficient confidence that it considered Hopkins’s argument that a long sentence

would be counterproductive to his rehabilitation. Unlike the defendant in Jackson, 547 F.3d

at 795-96, Hopkins developed and pressed this argument at sentencing. He offered

evidence of the lack of empirical support for a long sentence and cited similar cases in

which the sentences did not exceed ten years. Hopkins then called an expert who testified

that he was a good candidate for psychological treatment and that long-term imprisonment

would undermine his rehabilitation. The district court, however, addressed none of these

points. Instead, it simply reiterated that the guidelines were advisory, recited the language

of § 3553(a), and dismissed Hopkins’s request for a below-guidelines sentence as “not

persuasive.” Perhaps the court’s perfunctory dismissal of Hopkins’s request was an

implicit rejection of his principal argument, but it offers us no assurance that the court

actually exercised its discretion by considering Hopkins’s argument or Simpson’s

testimony. See, e.g., Miranda, 505 F.3d at 794; Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679.

 The government observes that the district court need not “harshly reject” Simpson’s

testimony or “articulate all of the facts” in making its sentencing decision. True enough. 

But, as in Miranda, 505 F.3d at 796, and Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679, Hopkins raised and

developed a nonfrivolous argument regarding the propriety of a lengthy sentence for

someone with his circumstances and characteristics. The court’s rote statement listing the

§ 3553(a) factors gives us no assurance that it specifically considered their application as to

Hopkins. The court rejected Hopkins’s principal sentencing argument—which he

supported with expert testimony—in a single conclusory sentence. This gives us nothing

meaningful to review. See Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679.

Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND for resentencing.