COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Annunziata, Humphreys and Senior Judge Coleman 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

BILL LARRY WELLS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1016-00-2 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 MAY 1, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY 

James A. Luke, Judge 

 Peter D. Eliades (Homer C. Eliades; Eliades & 

Eliades, P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Amy L. Marshall, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Appellant, Bill Larry Wells, appeals the trial court's 

denial of his motion to suppress evidence of his intoxication 

and refusal to take a blood or breath test.1 Wells contends the 

evidence was the fruit of an illegal seizure. We disagree and 

affirm the trial court's ruling. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

1

 Because the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over issues 

involving a refusal to take a blood or breath test, Commonwealth 

v. Rafferty, 241 Va. 319, 323-24, 402 S.E.2d 17, 20 (1991), we 

granted Wells's petition for review on the issue of his motion 

to suppress the evidence of his intoxication only. 
BACKGROUND

 In the early morning hours of July 3, 1999, Officer J.L. 

Warren of the Prince George County Police Department initiated a 

traffic stop after he observed Wells make a "U-turn" in front of 

a Prince George Volunteer Fire Department station. After 

stopping Wells for the alleged traffic offense, and detecting an 

odor of alcohol about his person, Officer Warren asked Wells to 

perform various field sobriety tests, all of which Wells failed. 

Wells refused to submit to either a breath or blood test, and 

Officer Warren charged Wells with violating Code § 18.2-268 for 

such refusal. In addition, Officer Warren charged Wells with 

driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-266, and for making an illegal turn, in violation of Code 

§ 46.2-845. 

 Prior to trial, Wells filed a motion to suppress the 

evidence of his intoxication and refusal to take a blood or 

breath test. The trial court denied the motion and found Wells 

guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol and 

guilty of refusing to take a breath or blood test. However, the 

court found Wells not guilty of making an illegal turn because 

the evidence did not support the charge. Code § 46.2-845 

provides, "[t]he driver of a vehicle within cities, towns or 

business districts of counties shall not turn his vehicle so as 

to proceed in the opposite direction except at an intersection." 

A zoning administrator testified at trial that the business 

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district ended just before the fire station and that the station 

was actually in a residential area. Therefore, because the fire 

station was not in a city, town or business district, Wells did 

not violate Code § 46.2-845 by making a "U-turn" in front of the 

station. 

 Wells contends that because he did not, in fact, commit a 

traffic violation, Officer Warren's act of stopping Wells was 

illegal and, therefore, any evidence obtained as a result of 

that stop should have been suppressed. We disagree. 

ANALYSIS

 The Commonwealth has the burden of proving that a 

warrantless seizure did not violate the defendant's Fourth 

Amendment rights. Simmons v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 204, 

380 S.E.2d 656, 659 (1989). On appeal, we view the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences deducible from such evidence, in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the party prevailing 

below. Weathers v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 652, 656, 529 

S.E.2d 847, 849 (2000). While we are bound by the trial court's 

findings of historical fact, we review de novo determinations of 

probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); Reel v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. 

App. 262, 265, 522 S.E.2d 881, 882 (2000). 

 An officer may "stop and briefly detain a person for 

investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion 

supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be 

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afoot.'" United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) 

(citation omitted); Buck v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 298, 302, 

456 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1995). However, "[a]ctual proof that 

criminal activity is afoot is not necessary . . . ." Harmon v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 440, 444, 425 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1992); 

see also Yeatts v. Minton, 211 Va. 402, 405, 177 S.E.2d 646, 648 

(1970); Reel, 31 Va. App. at 265, 522 S.E.2d at 883; Richards v. 

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 612, 617, 383 S.E.2d 268, 271 (1989).2

 In this case, Officer Warren observed Wells make a U-turn 

in front of the fire station. At this location, only a few feet 

separated the business district from the residential district. 

Officer Warren believed the U-turn was made in a business 

district and was, therefore, illegal. On that ground, he 

stopped Wells and charged him with a traffic violation. 

Although the evidence at trial showed that Wells's U-turn was 

not illegal, Officer Warren had reasonable suspicion to stop 

Wells's vehicle for conduct that was possibly illegal. See Hoye 

v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 132, 134, 442 S.E.2d 404, 406 

(1994) ("'A police officer may stop a motor vehicle, without 

probable cause, for investigatory purposes if [the officer] 

 2

 Wells's reliance on Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 525 

S.E.2d 921 (2000), is misplaced. In Bass, the Supreme Court did 

not hold that a defendant's conduct must in fact be illegal to 

justify an investigatory stop. Rather, the Court held that, 

based on the facts of the case, the officer did not have a 

reasonable suspicion that the defendant may have committed a 

crime. Id. at 477-78, 525 S.E.2d at 925. 

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possesses a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist 

is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that 

either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to 

seizure for violation of law.'" (citations omitted)). The fact 

that Wells was later found to be not guilty of the alleged 

traffic violation does not make the investigatory stop illegal. 

 Where a seizure is made pursuant to a mistake of fact, the 

seizure will be deemed legal and evidence obtained during the 

seizure will not be suppressed if the officer's mistaken belief 

was held in good faith and was objectively reasonable. Barnette 

v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 581, 584, 478 S.E.2d 707, 708 

(1996); Shears v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 394, 399, 477 S.E.2d 

309, 311 (1996). In this case, Officer Warren believed, in good 

faith, that Wells had made an illegal turn. Furthermore, his 

belief was objectively reasonable. The distance between the 

location of Wells's turn and the business district was minimal 

and the nature of the buildings in the area, such as the fire 

station, supports the conclusion that his mistaken belief was 

reasonable. 

 Because the investigatory stop was lawful, the evidence of 

Wells's intoxication, obtained as a result of that stop, was 

properly admitted. The trial court, therefore, properly denied 

the motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm. 

 Affirmed. 

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