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67–051PDF 2011

IRAN AND SYRIA: NEXT STEPS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 23, 2011

Serial No. 112–45

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable John Bolton, senior fellow, American Enterprise Institute 

for Public Policy Research (former U.S. permanent representative to the 

United Nations and former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 

and International Security) ................................................................................. 11

Mr. Olli Heinonen, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International 

Affairs, Harvard University (former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and head of its Department of Safeguards) . 30

Mr. Robert Satloff, executive director, Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy ..................................................................................................................... 38

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

The Honorable John Bolton: Prepared statement ................................................. 13

Mr. Olli Heinonen: Prepared statement ................................................................ 32

Mr. Robert Satloff: Prepared statement ................................................................ 40

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 78

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 79

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 81

Written response from Mr. Olli Heinonen to question submitted for the record 

by the Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Missouri .................................................................................................. 82

Questions submitted for the record to Mr. Robert Satloff by the Honorable 

Russ Carnahan ..................................................................................................... 83

(1)

IRAN AND SYRIA: NEXT STEPS 

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I am pleased to convene today’s hearing. So the committee will come to order. After recognizing myself 

and the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for 7 minutes each for our 

opening statements, I will recognize the chairman and the ranking 

member of our Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee for 3 

minutes each. And I will then recognize members for 1-minute 

statements if they have one. We will then hear from our witnesses. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us. I would ask that you 

summarize your prepared statements in 5 minutes each before we 

move to the questions and answers with members under the 5-

minute rule. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made a part of the record. And members may have 5 days to insert 

statements and questions for the record subject to the length limitations in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. Today’s hearing 

is part of a broader oversight effort by the committee to examine 

U.S. policy options to address the twin threats presented by both 

Iran and Syria. We will continue to be engaged in a number of 

other activities—from roundtable conversations with EU, Middle 

East, and other visiting dignitaries and ambassadors to meetings 

with panels of experts on Iran and Syria—to ensure that we do not 

take our eye off some of the most pressing threats to U.S. and global security. 

The date of May 24, 2011, a watershed in our efforts to confront 

the Iranian-Syria axis over their nuclear programs, passed with little fanfare. On May 24th, the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) issued two damning reports with respect to the nuclear programs of Iran and Syria. The first, with respect to Iran, cited significant increases in the production rate of low enriched uranium. 

Most concerning, it also cited ‘‘current undisclosed nuclear related 

activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of nuclear payload for a missile.’’ 

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms control estimates that as of last 

April 2011, Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium provides 

enough material to fuel four nuclear bombs. Additionally, the reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 Aug 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\062311\67051 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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port detailed a list of seven nuclear activities exclusive to a nuclear 

weapons program that Iran has refused to explain. 

The report with respect to Syria outlines in detail the evidence 

it has collected of a suspected covert nuclear reactor building under 

construction in Syria which, as we know, was destroyed, thankfully, by Israel in September 2007. Syria has long denied that it 

was building a covert nuclear reactor and systematically denied the 

IAEA access to the site. 

The level of specificity in the descriptions of the activities and 

the publicizing of information in each report suggests that the 

IAEA believes its evidence is credible. Thus, the nuclear ambitions 

of both Teheran and Damascus have been laid bare. 

And while President Obama has said that Iran’s acquisition of 

nuclear weapons is ‘‘unacceptable,’’ some in the administration appear resigned to the eventuality that the regime will build a bomb 

and the goal is to delay, rather than force permanent verifiable dismantlement. Iran with a nuclear weapon or a nuclear breakout capacity would embolden Iran’s pursuit of regional domination and 

could embolden the regime’s proxies to develop comparable capabilities. It could also set the Middle East down a cascade of proliferation that is unacceptable to U.S. security, to our interests and 

vital allies, such as Israel. 

President Obama stated that if the IAEA determines that Iran 

is noncompliant, ‘‘we will have no choice but to consider additional 

steps, including potentially additional sanctions, to intensify the 

pressure on the Iranian regime.’’ Such steps would have to be immediate, comprehensive, and dramatic. They must not continue to 

give a pass to Russia, to China, or to the likes of Total, and must 

not be based on persuading the so-called ‘‘international community’’ 

to act collectively—meaning agreeing to the lowest common denominator while continuing to cultivate ties with the regime in Teheran. 

Despite statements by outgoing Deputy Secretary of State James 

Steinberg, who told the online publication The Cable that new congressional legislation expanding sanctions on Iran is unnecessary, 

it is vital that Congress act to close loopholes identified in the current sanctions structure and compel the executive branch to fully 

and unequivocally augment the pressure on Iran, Syria, and their 

enablers. 

Last year, after a long, hard-fought struggle, the Comprehensive 

Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act was enacted. 

Although weaker than some of us had hoped, this law represents 

a strong step forward, especially through its energy, refined petroleum, and financial sanctions. This congressionally-driven effort 

has led some countries, including the EU, Japan, Australia, and 

South Korea, to finally impose their own, albeit more limited, sanctions on Teheran. 

Since the implementation of the 2003 Syria Accountability and 

Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, my colleagues from both 

sides of the aisle and I have been calling for the full implementation of the menu of sanctions contained under that act. 

To address the growing threats and compel the Iranian and Syrian regimes into abandoning their destructive policies, I have 

worked with my good friend, the distinguished ranking member, 

3

Mr. Berman, and Congressman Sherman and Congressman Engel 

along with the other bipartisan colleagues in introducing legislation aimed at expanding and strengthening existing sanctions on 

Iran and Syria, and ensuring their full implementation and enforcement by the executive branch. 

The tools we have must be used to their maximum effectiveness. 

We must look for new means of compelling both Iran and Syria to 

stop activities that threaten our security, our interests, and our allies. Our policies toward both Iran and Syria can no longer be bifurcated but must include an integrated, cohesive strategy with the 

singular goal of preventing Iran’s and Syria’s pursuit of nuclear 

and other non-conventional weapons, the missiles to deliver them, 

their sponsorship of terrorism, and other activities that threaten 

Americans, our interests, and our allies. 

Addressing these threats require tough choices. I look forward to 

receiving the testimony of our witnesses today and listening to 

their recommendations of what the United States can do to definitively deny the Iran-Syria axis the wherewithal to continue their 

dangerous policies. 

I am now pleased to yield to my friend Mr. Berman for his statement. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

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67051d-2.eps
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Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And you have truly convened an excellent panel on this subject. I 

look forward to hearing their testimony. 

Iran and Syria are the world’s two leading state sponsors of terrorism and present a broad range of threats to U.S. policy. None 

of these is of greater concern, however, than their programs for developing weapons of mass destruction. 

We have devoted considerable time to the Iranian nuclear threat 

over the past two Congresses. It is critical we continue to do that. 

We face no greater long-term challenge to our national security 

than preventing the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. And that 

is why I am co-sponsoring your bill, Madam Chairman, the Iran 

Threat Reduction Act, which strengthens sanctions on those who 

assist Iran’s nuclear program directly or indirectly. 

We must be firm in our insistence that Iran meet its U.N. Security Council obligation to suspend uranium enrichment. We should 

seek to achieve that goal by peaceful means but with full awareness that in order to make our diplomacy as effective as possible, 

all options must remain on the table. 

The United States and like-minded countries must do more to 

pressure other countries to implement U.N. sanctions on Iran, including a state-by-state effort to upgrade legal and practical export 

controls, greater effort to identify and take down Iran’s front companies, an institution of catch-all controls to prevent the export of 

prohibited items for Iran’s uranium enrichment program, including 

those that fall just below control thresholds but that could be upgraded and other similar measures. 

On the home front, I am encouraged by recent sanctions imposed 

by the administration using the authorities established by Congress last year. The administration’s actions have an important 

symbolic and deterrent effect, but I am still looking forward to the 

first energy-related sanctions on foreign companies that actually do 

business with the United States. 

And, as I have said before, there is significant evidence that Chinese companies are engaged in sanctionable investment activities 

in Iran. I would like to see those companies sanctioned. Many other 

companies and nations have ceased doing business with Iran at our 

behest. We don’t want them to get the idea that we are not really 

serious about sanctions. 

As for Syrian efforts to construct an illicit and clandestine nuclear reactor, the decision by the IAEA earlier this month to refer 

Syria’s noncompliance with its safeguards obligations to the U.N. 

Security Council was an important diplomatic achievement. The 

Security Council must take action to force Syria to come clean. I 

would like to see the administration pull out the stops to impose 

Security Council sanctions, though it will not be easy to overcome 

Russian and Chinese objections. 

Russia should drop its objection to the public release of the recently completed panel of experts who are put on the Iran Commission by the U.N. Security Council. The world must know about 

Iran’s nefarious efforts to elude sanctions, develop even longerrange missiles, and provide weapons to Syria. 

I would like to say a further word about Syria in the context of 

the so-called Arab Spring. If we are honest about the wave of 

7

uprisings over the past few months, we have to acknowledge they 

have evoked many conflicting emotions. On the one hand, they certainly do appeal to our and my democratic convictions and our bedrock values. On the other hand, we worry that they may produce 

regimes that are not supportive of our interests. And at the end of 

the day perhaps these regimes won’t even be democratic. 

In Egypt, for example, we are concerned that the new regime will 

be less committed to peace treaty with Israel. In majority Shiite 

Bahrain, we are concerned that a more democratic regime might be 

one that is closer to Iran, less hospitable to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. 

In Yemen, there is the question of whether a new and hopefully 

more humane regime would protect our counterterrorism interests 

as well as President Saleh, not protect him, protect our counterterrorism interests as well as he has done. He hasn’t done much else 

well. Never mind. 

These are concerns, not conclusions, but they constitute some of 

the more prominent examples of Arab uprisings where values and 

interests compete for the upper hand in U.S. foreign policy to date. 

There is one Arab country, however, where I see in the protests the 

potential for remarkable merging of our most critical interests, our 

most fundamental values. That is Syria. 

It is clear that the Assad regime through its murderous crackdown on armed civilians as they relinquish most or all of whatever 

legitimacy it may once have enjoyed among the Syrian people. Its 

demise would likely lead to the achievement of one of our most 

cherished strategic goals, breaking the bond between Damascus, on 

the one hand, and Teheran and Hezbollah, on the other. 

That would deprive Iran of its primary base of operations in the 

Middle East and mark perhaps its first major strategic setback in 

the region. It would also mark a setback for Hezbollah. I don’t 

think it would prevent Iran from arming Hezbollah altogether, but 

it would certainly make the job more difficult. 

To the extent the new Syrian regime wants to be part of the 

international community, it also may very well break its link to 

Sunni terrorist groups like Hamas. 

How do I know these desirable goals would be achieved with the 

fall of the Assad regime? I don’t know for certain, but to the extent 

that the U.S. can influence the process, it is certainly worth the 

risk. 

I reject arguments that we are better off with Assad in power. 

As for the claim that he is the devil we know, let’s keep the following in mind. During his tenure, there has been no progress toward peace with Israel. Hezbollah has emerged as a major regional 

power. Iraqi extremists have used Syria as a safe haven. And Iran 

has established a beachhead in the Middle East while advising and 

assisting Assad in his murderous repression of civilians. 

How much worse could the next devil be? The United States’ 

ability to influence the course of events in Syria may be limited. 

We should use what tools we have and produce sanctions targeted 

at regime leaders and human rights abusers to make clear that our 

sympathies, our shared visions are with the victims, not the victimizers. 

The administration has taken some important steps in that direction in recent weeks. One of these steps—I am getting near the 

8

end here. I am almost done. One of these steps was the sanctioning 

last month of Cham Holding, the flagship enterprise of Assad’s corrupt cousin Rami Makhlouf. 

We should encourage the European Union, Syria’s leading trading partner, to follow our lead in that regard. Makhlouf recently 

claimed he is giving up his various businesses. We and our friends 

should help them do that. 

For years now, many strategists in this country have encouraged 

Syria-Israeli peacemaking for the primary purpose of breaking Syrian-Iranian tie and beginning the process of pushing Iran out of the 

Arab Middle East. We now have a historic opportunity to accomplish these goals. Even before the peacemaking begins, this is an 

opportunity we should not pass up. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman, 

for that statement. 

Mr. McCaul is recognized for 1 minute, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you Madam Chair. I will be very brief. 

Thanks to the witnesses for attending the hearing today. It is an 

important issue. I have always viewed Iran as one of the greatest 

threats that we have had, even prior to 9/11. And I look forward 

to the testimony. And, Madam Chair, thank you for holding this 

hearing. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I want to 

welcome our witnesses today, particularly my old friend John 

Bolton. I was reminding him that I actually staffed his very first 

nomination hearing when he was in the Reagan administration a 

number of years ago. We are both a little grayer today. I want to 

thank you for holding this hearing. 

As we look at sort of the unfolding Arab Spring, it is important 

not to be distracted by the fact that there are other very serious 

security issues and certainly in Syria and Iran. 

I hope we will also explore the nuclear issue, not only in Iran, 

which is front and center, but also the disturbing report that was 

just issued about the now defunct Al-Kibar facility destroyed by 

Israel in Syria that seemed to have some North Korean links to it. 

The instability of both of these regimes is increasingly manifest, 

certainly in Syria but even in Iran in terms of the ongoing feud 

within that government. So I look forward to the testimony and our 

discussion. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Johnson of Ohio is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I want to 

thank our panel for being here today. 

You know, we face major diplomatic challenges with both Syria 

and Iran. In recent years, it has become very clear that the engagement process started by the administration is not working. Since 

we started that policy, Syria has maintained its support for terrorism, facilitated the trafficking of weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, continued to commit human rights violations, and repeatedly 

9

lied about its proliferation efforts. Similarly, Iran’s support of farflung terrorist activities and development of nuclear weapons have 

not been deterred by diplomatic efforts. 

The second policy of economic pressure has had some effect on 

Iran’s economy working to stall economic progress in the hopes of 

curbing their nuclear efforts. We should continue that. And I believe we need to reevaluate our current nonproliferation policy in 

the Middle East before escalating pressure on Israel triggers more 

drastic preventive measures in itself. 

So I thank the panel for being here. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Sires of New Jersey is recognized. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you very much 

for being here. 

I am also very concerned. Obviously both Iran and Syria, they 

just have no regards for international law. And they support terrorists at every turn. This is a concern for the security of this country. 

I am also very concerned. 

And I would like to hear about Iran. How soon do you really 

think that they can build an atomic weapon? This is a big concern 

to many people in my community. So I will look forward to your 

testimony, and I thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sires. 

Mr. Chabot is recognized for 3 minutes as the Subcommittee on 

Middle East and South Asia chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank 

you for calling this timely and very important hearing here this 

morning. 

I continue to be extremely frustrated with the administration’s 

Syria policy. In particular, I am frustrated with a lot of their other 

policies as well, but Syria I think maybe most of all. 

President Obama’s recent suggestion that Bashar al-Assad could 

remain in power if he makes the appropriate reforms is, at best, 

disappointing. I will leave it there. 

By ruthlessly cracking down and indiscriminately killing peaceful 

protesters, Assad has betrayed his people and has lost all legitimacy. No piecemeal reforms can wash away the blood on his 

hands. And, yet, the administration still refuses to say aloud what 

the entire world sees so clearly. Assad is not a legitimate leader. 

I have to confess that I find this lack of strength, clearness on 

the administration’s part baffling. For years, Bashar al-Assad has 

allowed Syria to function as a freeway for terrorists. 

Countless jihadists traveling to kill American soldiers in Iraq entered that country via Syria. Similarly, Iranian weapons have 

flowed freely across Syria’s borders and into the hands of 

Hezbollah. It is horrifying to stop and consider how much blood 

American, Syrian, Iraqi, Lebanese, and Israeli the Assad regime 

has on its hands. And, yet, we continue to confer legitimacy. 

Engagement has failed. And leading from behind is not leading 

at all. It is high time that the administration stands up and say 

what we all know to be true. Bashar must go. 

Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized. 

10

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for holding this hearing. 

The world is watching these countries in the Middle East and 

North Africa struggle to transition into states more representative 

of the aspirations of the people. There are no two more powerful 

forces in the world today than youth and technology, which is driving in large part this change. And, as we are seeing the calls for 

democratic reform in both Iran and Syria and Iran, despite internet 

censorship, Iranians are some of the most prolific bloggers in the 

world, 80 percent of the country is literate. 

With more than two-thirds of the population under the age of 30, 

the ability of Iran’s dynamic population to plug in and play to the 

world’s marketplace of ideas will continue to grow as a challenge 

to the country’s autocratic regime. 

And in Syria, decades of oppressive rule have begun to fray as 

a population. As New York Times columnist Tom Friedman writes, 

armed only with cell phone cameras and access to Facebook and 

YouTube, it will grow more and more difficult for the willing regimes to thwart the demands of their people, the demands for citizenship, for civil rights, and for opportunity. 

Our foreign policy must be sensitive to these dynamic changes, 

encouraging freedom of thought and expression, particularly as 

more stable and self-determined states in the Middle East are likely to create a more stable world. 

I look forward to discussing these issues with the witnesses before us today. And I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. Schmidt of Ohio? 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will be very brief. 

I am here today to listen to the experts regarding Iran and Syria 

and what our next steps should be. We cannot ignore either one of 

these countries. They are the bad actors in the Middle East, and 

they are rogue states that make it very, very dangerous, not just 

for the folks in the Middle East, but for those in the world, so I’m 

eager to listen to the panelists. 

Thank you. And I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Now the Chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses. I would like 

to welcome back to our committee Ambassador John Bolton. I love 

John Bolton. Ambassador Bolton currently serves as a senior fellow 

at the American Enterprise Institute. His area of research is U.S. 

foreign and national security policy. 

Prior to arriving at AEI, Ambassador Bolton served as the 

United States permanent representative to the United Nations 

from August 1, 2005, to December 9, 2006. From June 2001 to May 

2005, Ambassador Bolton served as Under Secretary of State for 

Arms Control and International Security, also in the Bush administration. Prior to this, Ambassador Bolton was senior vice president 

of the American Enterprise Institute. Welcome back. 

And we also would like to welcome back Dr. Olli Heinonen. Dr. 

Heinonen is currently a senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and 

International Affairs. 

Before joining the Belfer Center as a senior fellow in August 

2010, he spent 27 years at the International Atomic Energy Agency 

11

in Vienna, with the last 5 years as deputy director general of the 

IAEA and head of its Department of Safeguards. He led the agency’s efforts to identify and dismantle nuclear proliferation networks, including the one led by Pakistani scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan. 

And he oversaw its efforts to monitor and contain Iran’s nuclear 

program. Welcome back, Doctor. Thank you. 

And, finally, the committee would also like to welcome back Dr. 

Robert Satloff. Thank you, sir. The executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an expert on Arab and Islamic politics as well as U.S. Middle East policy, Dr. Satloff has 

written and spoken widely on the Arab-Israeli peace process, the 

Islamist challenge to the growth of democracy in the region, and 

the need for bold and innovative public diplomacy to Arabs and 

Muslims. 

We thank you, gentlemen. And, please, we will enter your statements into the record. And be brief or I will gavel you down, even 

the ones I love. And I like you guys, too. 

Mr. Bolton? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN BOLTON, SENIOR 

FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC 

POLICY RESEARCH (FORMER U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY) 

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you for the invitation to appear before the committee, Congressman Berman, many old friends. I think this is a very important subject. I think Iran’s nuclear weapons program remains one 

of the most important national security challenges we face. It has 

been trying to get nuclear weapons for close to 20 years. And, despite in the past 10 years some very vigorous efforts on the part 

of the United States to stop it, it is now closer than ever. 

I just want to start by saying, you know, we all talk confidently 

about what Iran’s capabilities are, what its centrifuges are doing, 

what its plans are. We are only talking, really, about what is publicly known. Our intelligence knows more, but our intelligence in 

Iran is far from perfect. And it is what we don’t know about Iran’s 

nuclear weapons program that particularly worries me. 

I think the evidence is clear from years of efforts at diplomatic 

resolution to the Iranian nuclear program, that that is not going 

to work. We can see that years of efforts on economic sanctions 

have failed to have a material effect on the nuclear weapons program. 

I am all in favor of the sanctions. I think anything that destabilizes the Iranian regime is a good thing because I think regime 

change in Teheran should be our national policy, but I don’t think 

we can operate under the view that sanctions can stop the Iranian 

effort to achieve nuclear weapons in a timely way. 

Look at North Korea. It is the most heavily sanctioned regime on 

the planet. It has exploded two nuclear devices. We know that its 

nuclear weapons program continues. It has now admitted again, as 

it did 8 years ago, it has a functioning uranium enrichment program. It is working ahead on its ballistic missile programs, all the 

12

most friendless regime on Earth. Iran has many more resources 

that economic sanctions are not going to stop. 

So I think what this means, unfortunately, is that the most likely outcome as of now for Iran is that in a very short period of time, 

it is going to get nuclear weapons absent some dramatic step by 

an outsider. And I think the change that this will have in the 

world is almost impossible to calculate. I think it is very important 

to understand just what a dramatic step it will be if Iran crosses 

the nuclear weapons threshold. 

First, it doesn’t have to be the case that Iran actually uses nuclear weapons. Simply having that capability in the region will 

have a profound effect. Imagine, for example, how we would have 

treated the breakup of Yugoslavia if Milosevic had had nuclear 

weapons. And then think of the possibility of weapons in the hands 

of the regime in Teheran. 

Second, it is a mistake to believe that American security guarantees to our friends and allies in the region against the possible Iranian program are going to provide much assurance at all. I think 

the outlook as of today is declining American influence in the region. I think our security guarantees are declining in value as well. 

Third, I think it is a big mistake to conclude, as I believe the administration has, that a nuclear Iran can be contained and deterred. The psychology of the regime in Teheran is very different 

from the psychology of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It 

is an asymmetric threat as well. And it would be foolish to look forward to a world in which we are at the discretion of the rulers in 

Teheran. 

But, even if I am wrong on that and Iran can be contained and 

deterred, it doesn’t stop with Iran. If Iran gets nuclear weapons, 

Saudi Arabia will get nuclear weapons. Egypt will. Turkey will and 

perhaps others. And you are going to have a very, very widespread 

proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. 

That is why I think we have honestly to confront the very unattractive alternative that absent military action against Iran’s nuclear weapons program, Iran will have nuclear weapons much sooner, rather than later. 

No one likes to contemplate this possibility, but there are only 

two options that currently exist in my view. One is that Iran gets 

nuclear weapons. The other is the preemptive use of force against 

them. 

Let me just touch briefly on Syria. I recount in my testimony, 

Madam Chairman, your hearing back in September of ’03, when I 

tried to warn about the interest of Syria in nuclear weapons. It was 

very controversial testimony. It was a very controversial issue in 

my confirmation hearing to be ambassador to the U.N. because 

Senator Biden and others thought that I had over-stressed the danger of the Syrian nuclear weapons program. 

I think the point was very well-handled when the Israeli defense 

forces destroyed a North Korean reactor—I underline a North Korean reactor—being built in Syria. We still don’t know what else 

is going on there, but I think there is every reason to believe that 

Syria, Iran, and North Korea have cooperated on other aspects of 

nuclear weapons programs there as well. 

13

So this threat is not simply an Iranian threat. It is a global 

threat. Syria is a piece of it. And I think the United States underestimates this threat at its peril. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bolton follows:]


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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ambassador. 

Dr. Heinonen, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. OLLI HEINONEN, SENIOR FELLOW, 

BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY (FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND HEAD OF ITS DEPARTMENT OF SAFEGUARDS) 

Mr. HEINONEN. Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Congressman 

Berman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for 

inviting me to address this hearing today. 

In my testimony, I intend to provide a snapshot of where the nuclear programs of Iran and Syria currently stand and highlight 

some of the key implications. Let me start with Iran. 

Iran’s nuclear program is disturbingly much further down the 

road today than when its nuclear this year was first brought to the 

IAEA Board of Governors’ attention in 2003. Before that, Iran was 

engaged in clandestine nuclear activities almost for two decades. 

The world discovered that Iran was secretly building an enrichment plant in Natanz. 

Iran’s history of clandestine nuclear pursuit, continuing enrichment and unresolved military related questions really reveal a 

comprehensive and committed approach that puts it on the path to 

achieving nuclear weapons’ capability. 

Today, the Natanz plant is an industrial sized enrichment facility with 8,000 installed IR–1 centrifuges. Since 2007, the plant has 

produced a total of 9,050 pounds, of 3.5 percent, enriched uranium. 

Since February 2010, Iran began enriching uranium to 20 percent. 

Two weeks ago, Iran announced that it will transfer production of 

20 percent enriched uranium from Natanz to Fordow, where it 

plans to triple the production. 

The Fordow facility was another nuclear installation that Iran 

built in secrecy until evidence of its construction surfaced in September 2009. In addition, Iran has announced that it would be constructing up to 10 new enrichment sites, but has not provided details about its plans nor locations. 

The significance of these developments is several-fold. Although 

there have been also ups and downs in this nuclear program and 

delays, there will be such delays also in the future. But, first, given 

the current and planned production rates on its declared available 

uranium stock, Iran can be expected to possess 550 pounds of 20 

percent enriched uranium by the end of 2012. This means that Iran 

would have subsequent uranium stocks, if further enriched and 

converted, to produce 275 to 330 pounds of high enriched uranium 

metal. 

Iran is also moving ahead, albeit with delay, on its heavy water 

reactor program. This means being able to produce weapons-grade 

plutonium, sufficient for one nuclear device per year from 2014 onwards. 

Second, Iran’s suspected military-related studies on: Special neutron sources without civilian applications, high explosives with precise timing, and missile re-entry vehicle design, alongside with the 

procurement, design, and manufacturing of nuclear-related equipment by military entities, add a dangerous dimension. 

31

Third, the possibility of secret nuclear facilities existing in parallel present a deeply troubling scenario. 

Now I want to turn to Syria. 

Syria’s nuclear dossier was brought to public attention in 2007, 

when a facility in Dair Alzour, suspected to house a clandestine nuclear reactor, was destroyed by aerial bombing. Information gathered indicates that the destroyed facility had a reactor design similar to that of a five-megawatt nuclear reactor built by the DPRK 

in Yongbyon. 

Apart from one restricted visit, Syria has refused to allow inspectors back to the Dair Alzour site. Questions remain concerning Syria’s nuclear program. Was the destroyed reactor built on the Dair 

Alzour site the only clandestine facility? Are the uranium particles 

found in Damascus and at Dair Alzour a sign of more substance 

activities yet to be uncovered? Et cetera. 

The Dair Alzour reactor no longer exists, but the IAEA needs to 

know the full picture to ensure that all nuclear material and facilities in Syria are declared and its nuclear activities are peaceful. It 

is, therefore, not a closed book. 

Both Iranian and Syrian nuclear dossiers have been referred to 

U.N. Security Council. Subsequent Security Council resolutions 

would benefit from provisions that would oblige member states to 

provide information relating to proliferation activities and nuclear 

programs of the two countries. 

It is important that the Security Council reinforces the IAEA’s 

request for full and unimpeded access to all relevant information, 

including claimed military sites or personnel. 

When it comes to the technical assessments made on nuclear programs, that standard cannot be compromised. In the case of Syria, 

the IAEA should have used all inspection rights it has, including 

conducting special inspection. The U.N. Security Council could also 

choose to provide wider authorities to the IAEA. 

Iran and Syria must be encouraged to turn to a different path 

on their nuclear programs. Iran and Syria must understand they 

bear responsibility for the choices they make and the consequences 

generated. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heinonen follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Dr. Satloff? 

STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT SATLOFF, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. SATLOFF. Madam Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank 

you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today. I salute you for your leadership in addressing issues of vital concern 

to American national interests in the Middle East, two of which are 

no greater than the ones on our agenda today. 

It is appropriate that the committee addresses Iran and Syria together because these states together as the principal poles of the 

region’s anti-West, anti-American, anti-peace axis have an organic 

linkage between them. 

Madam Chairman, on the technical and scientific matters on today’s agenda, I will defer to my colleagues, who are far better 

qualified than I. I will focus for a few moments on the broader strategic and policy matters at hand. 

Madam Chairman, there were two great competitions that define 

the Middle East today: One, the challenge from Shiite Islamist supremacist ideology, led by the Islamic Republic of Iran; and, second, the challenge of Sunni Islamist supremacist ideology, led by 

al-Qaeda. 

Thankfully, al-Qaeda is on the decline for many reasons. Iran, 

however, still retains enormous hegemonic designs; still sees American policy in the region at risk; still sees American power waning; 

still has its sights on expanding its influence throughout the region; and, perhaps most dangerously, is still investing in the pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

I believe we must first recognize that the tumultuous events of 

the last several months have had the effect of limiting our collective attention spans to address the problem of Iran. There simply 

has been so much to attract our attention in Arab countries that 

there have not been enough hours in the day for our senior officials 

to focus on the continuing urgent challenge of Iran. 

Secondly, the Iranians, however, have viewed regional change as 

moving very much in their direction. Even before the Arab Spring, 

Iran counted as successes the emergence of a Hezbollah-dominated 

government in Lebanon, the ongoing control of Gaza by Hamas, the 

crushing of their own internal dissent in June 2009, and our expected withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan. And the last 6 

months, they have seen American allies disappear in Egypt and 

Yemen and in Tunisia. They have seen violent tensions emerge between America and its two preeminent regional allies: Saudi Arabia and Israel. Only with the emergence of a challenge in Syria has 

the democratic wave begun to pose a threat to Iranian interests. 

Third, I believe that the direct threat posed by Iran, especially 

the nuclear aspect of this threat, is more acute today than before 

the Arab Spring. It only stands to reason, for example, that Iran 

looks at the situation in Libya and, through its eyes, sees what 

happens to a country that reaches a nuclear bargain with the West. 

It eventually gets bombed by the same countries with whom it 

reached the bargain. I am not criticizing our efforts in Libya. I am 

looking at this through Iranian eyes. 

39

The logical conclusion from the rulers in Teheran is to speed up 

their acquisition of a nuclear bomb. That is certainly what I would 

do. That is certainly what I think most strategists would do looking 

at their regional situation. 

Against this backdrop, I believe it is essential for America to 

counter Iranian ambitions with some strategic setbacks. There are 

three places where we can focus on doing this: One, Syria; two, 

Iraq; and, three, Iran itself. 

On Syria, I concur totally with the observations of the ranking 

member. This is one area, the first time in the Arab Spring, where 

our values and our interests are complementary. We should not 

withhold any effort in my view to hasten the demise of the Assad 

regime. And in my testimony, Madam Chairman, I list, I believe, 

more than a dozen very specific policy actions the administration 

could take short of using military force to do precisely that. This 

is not a moment for hesitance, reluctance, or caution. This is a moment to recognize the strategic opportunity to sever the alliance 

and to weaken Iran precisely at a moment when Iranian ambitions 

are at a height. 

On Iraq, just one sentence. The opportunity here is to create a 

new security relationship, which denies Iran the ability to fish in 

troubled waters in its neighboring country. 

On Iran itself, we should focus in two areas, Madam Chairman: 

First, making more real and believable the U.S. commitment to use 

all means necessary to prevent Iran from achieving a military nuclear capability. 

I believe there is considerable doubt in the minds of Iranians, 

which is what matters most, whether, in fact, we are committed to 

that objective; and, secondly, expanding our support for Iranian 

Democrats and readying the day when the green movement resurrects itself so that we should be ready to do next time what we did 

not do in June 2009, to be ready verbally and with effective action 

to support the potential for real change in that country. 

I will leave the rest of my comments for my formal remarks and 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Satloff follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Excellent testimony, gentlemen. 

Ambassador Bolton, under what conditions would you support 

nuclear cooperation agreements or 123 agreements with countries 

in the broader Middle East? And what criteria do you believe the 

U.S. must require to ensure that these agreements do not undermine our national security interests and specifically our efforts to 

counter Iran’s and Syria’s nuclear weapons ambitions? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I would favor 123 agreements under 

very limited circumstances, where the countries involved foreswear 

any uranium enrichment or reprocessing activities. 

If you look back, President Bush gave a speech in 2003 or 2004 

at the National Defense University where he outlined some of 

these circumstances where we could engage in that kind of activity. 

I think they need full export control regimes, protections against 

transshipments. They need to be completely free of any support for 

regimes that are engaged in state-sponsored terrorism. 

All of these criteria, I think, and others contained in the legislation you and Congressman Berman have introduced to reform the 

Atomic Energy Act, which I think is an excellent way of declaring 

our intention that if we are going to see the spread of peaceful nuclear power, we want it done under circumstances that are not 

going to be conducive to proliferation. It is a very, very important 

point. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

And given the realignment of rogues, Iran, Syria, North Korea, 

what actions do you believe are necessary to cut the links between 

and end the collusion among Iran, Syria, and North Korea? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, you know, this is a point that the 

State Department has struggled with in formulating our response 

to these nuclear programs because they have done it in silos, North 

Korea is an Asian problem, Iran is a Middle Eastern Bureau program when, in fact, we know that cooperation among the rogue 

states has been very extensive. That is one of the reasons President 

Bush used the phrase ‘‘axis of evil.’’

On ballistic missiles, we know that since 1998, at least, North 

Korea and Iran have conducted joint research and joint testing. 

They both have the same Soviet-era Scud missile technology. And 

they are not doing it because of their interest in weather satellites. 

They are creating launch vehicles to deliver nuclear payloads. 

I think it will become clear ultimately that this North Korean 

nuclear reactor, a clone of the Yongbyon reactor being built at alKabir in Syria, was a joint venture with Iranian involvement. Iran 

and North Korea share the common interest of hiding their illicit 

nuclear activities from prying eyes internationally. What better 

place to hide it than in a country that nobody is looking, as the 

United States was not looking? We were informed of that by Israeli 

intelligence in the spring of 2007. 

So I think acknowledging these linkages and the risk of other 

linkages developing. Looking at Venezuela’s extensive supplies of 

uranium in the ground, the risk is that this cooperation could grow. 

I think we need to use the proliferation security initiative even 

more than we do now to stop trade among the rogue states and nuclear, chemical, biological weapons technologies. I think we have 

50

simply got to apply more pressure on China, in particular not to 

facilitate trade between North Korea and the others. And I think 

we have got to make it clear that we are determined, in particular, 

to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons because the record will 

be that North Korea continued and expanded its program, despite 

U.S. opposition, that Iran, over heavy U.S. opposition, succeeded in 

getting nuclear weapons. And that will be a signal to every other 

country around the world that aspires to nuclear weapons, that if 

you have the patience and the will, you can get them. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And, lastly, in the 1 minute I have 

left, as we know, there are flights from Teheran to Caracas. Do you 

believe that it would be possible for the United States to sanction 

that airline company, that carrier that is involved in those flights? 

And do you think that there are other opportunities for us to sanction targeted sanctions against Venezuela for their collusion with 

Iran? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Absolutely. I think, as my colleague Roger 

Noriega at AEI has pointed out, this level of collusion between 

Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, and the Iranian regime is enormous. 

You know, Iran has probably its largest Embassy in the world in 

Caracas for purposes of evading international financial and other 

sanctions. And I worry very much about the developments of Venezuela and policy purchasing nuclear reactors from Russia and the 

possible introduction of a nuclear weapons concern in this hemisphere for the first time in many years. 

So I think there is a lot of work we should all be doing on that 

Venezuela-Iran connection. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Amen. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Berman is recognized. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you much, Madam Chair. And I thank 

the witnesses for their excellent testimony. Just to initiate, I would 

like to praise and agree with Ambassador Bolton’s shout-out for the 

current head of the IAEA. 

There are some very good people at that agency who have been 

there for a long time who care about proliferation. Now they have 

a leader who lets them do their work and make subjective and public announcements about what is happening. And I think it was 

very useful for you to say that, and I appreciate it. 

I think, Dr. Satloff, in your testimony, you said it is time for 

President Obama to say that Assad lost legitimacy in Syria and 

must go. 

But let me see if the witnesses, quickly because I have another 

question, can take the opposite argument. Someone is saying to the 

President, ‘‘Be careful. There is credibility here. You said that 

about Ghadafi.’’

The fact is the President could say that and Assad could remain 

in power. What is the implication of that? How do you answer the 

strategist who says, ‘‘Here is the problem with doing that?’’

Mr. SATLOFF. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

You are absolutely right. There are those people who will say at 

the first press conference after the President’s statement, ‘‘So what 

are you doing to make sure he is gone tomorrow? When is the 

Sixth Fleet going off the coast of Syria? When are we dropping 

51

bombs on Damascus?’’ since we cannot use military force to achieve 

our objectives in every scenario. 

The administration needs to face these questions sooner, rather 

than later, and not let all our policy around the world be hamstrung by the inability to answer the question. We have to be able 

to say that ‘‘Yes, we have objectives. We have strategies to achieve 

them.’’ And not every objective requires military force to achieve its 

ultimate goal. We should bite the bullet on this now and be on the 

right side of what is something which is clearly in our national interest. 

For the first time ever, we have a convergence between Turks, 

Arabs, Israelis, Europeans, and our own national interest on the 

future of Syria. They have all come to the conclusion that Assad 

is no longer a legitimate leader. We should build on this convergence and face down that obvious question and not let the bogeyman of that question, ‘‘When are you going to be forced to achieve 

it?,’’ stand in the way of doing everything else, the 20–30 other 

items on the menu, in order to achieve that goal. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Could I just say, Mr. Berman, we should 

have been doing this a long time ago, but there is one key difference in the case of Syria compared to the other Arab regimes, 

like Libya. And that is the presence of Iran’s not only interest in 

preventing Assad from falling but its active cooperation in stopping 

that from happening. 

People in the Iranian Embassy are working there. We have reports of Iranian——

Mr. BERMAN. Absolutely. 

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. Revolutionary guards and so 

on. So this is one reason I think you have to look at the regime 

in Teheran and overthrowing that as well as Assad. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, interesting answer. And I could take the 

whole 5 minutes for doing that. So let me try and get one out, one 

other question. 

Mr. Heinonen, Ambassador Bolton states that it would take—essentially Iran would be able, citing the very respectable institution—I forget the full name of it, Mr. Milhollin, the Wisconsin 

Project. It would take 11⁄2 months to enrich uranium to weaponsgrade uranium. I had the impression it would take somewhat 

longer, 6 months to 1 year, after kicking out IAEA inspectors, reworking pipes, other tasks. In other words, we have more notice 

than he thinks. 

What is your reaction to what Ambassador Bolton said? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Well, it depends, first of all, about how you define this capability and what Iran might have on top of that. 

Mr. BERMAN. Let’s assume for a second—and I sure hope we 

don’t operate on that rosy a scenario—that this is what they got. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Well, it will take quite some time because they 

have to feed this uranium through a reconfiguration of the cascades, either in Natanz or in Qom now that they are building more. 

That is a limited number, IR–1 centrifuge the best in the world. 

So, therefore, I would say, as you said, something between 6 

months to 1 year. And they had to turn it also to uranium metal 

machine, et cetera. 

52

So there is time, but the time is running out, as I said in my testimony, by the end of next year. 

Ambassador BOLTON. The estimate of 11⁄2 months obviously was 

calculated on the basis of what is publicly available information to 

the Wisconsin Center. The Nonproliferation Education Center estimated 2 months, so slightly longer than that. But I think it is important to understand that the technology is perfectly within the 

control of the Iranians, that it is simply a matter of the most efficient way of redesigning the pipes and feeding the Iranian end. 

When you get to reactor-grade levels of concentration of the U–

235 isotope, you have done two-thirds of the work you need to do 

to get the weapons-grade. Even though the differences look large 

in terms of percentage of U–235 isotopes, the actual amount of 

work is really quite small. 

Now, there are other steps, as my testimony says, including the 

fabricating of the metal and whatnot, but the Iranians, as we 

know, have continued work on a wide range of other aspects of 

this. And this, again, I want to say is only what we know. And you 

know the old adage. The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. 

Mr. BERMAN. I am done. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. That is an old adage? 

Michael McCaul, vice chair, Western Hemisphere? 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I agree with you that time is running out. It has been running 

out for a while. Madam Chair, you mentioned A. Q. Khan and his 

network proliferating to Iran, Syria, and North Korea. 

Secretary Clinton testified on Iran recently. I gave her that, in 

my judgment, diplomacy with Iran as a solution to this problem is 

a naive foreign policy. I believe that they are very close absent a 

cyber attack on their centrifuges, very close to getting nuclear 

weapons. 

We can’t afford a nuclear race in the Middle East. And that is 

precisely what I believe a nuclear Iran would present. And at the 

same time, we have the Arab Spring phenomenon, which, on one 

hand, brings a great promise of democracy and, yet, on the other 

hand, great threats. Middle East abhors a vacuum. And I believe 

that Iran wants to fill it. 

Ambassador Bolton, can you comment on what we can do at this 

late juncture to stop a nuclear Iran? And, secondly, assuming they 

get it, what impact would that have on this Arab Spring phenomenon in the region? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think we are very late in the game. 

I think, in fact, it is too late to do much of anything, even from 

cyber attacks. If you look at the production figures for low enriched 

uranium from the latest IAEA report last month, it is up dramatically from 2009. It is up substantially from the report earlier this 

year. They are going to introduce more sophisticated centrifuges. 

They are now obviously aware of the possibility of cyber attack. 

And I don’t doubt they have instituted countermeasures. 

I think that this proceeding toward nuclear capability is something that is going to proceed, even with the Arab Spring or maybe 

even accelerated by it. And it is one of the reasons that even the 

prospect of democratic change in Iran concerns me. 

53

If you imagine Iran, let’s say, in the next year achieving nuclear 

weapon status but then imagining the regime falling and seeing 

the creation of a representative government there, I am not sure 

that representative government in Iran would convince Saudi Arabia not to get nuclear weapons if the new government in Iran kept 

theirs. 

So that this risk of proliferation triggered by an Iranian success 

in achieving nuclear weapons is an enormous, enormous redline to 

cross. And we should not underestimate it. It is not simply a question of one country getting nuclear weapons. It is a risk of half a 

dozen nuclear weapon states in the Middle East in very short order 

thereafter. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And I agree. And I also want to echo and associate 

myself with the remarks of Madam Chair on the Caracas-Teheran 

connection. That greatly concerns me. I have had lawmakers from 

Latin America tell me uranium is being shipped from Latin America to Iran. And that is of great concern. 

Let me switch to another topic that a lot of people haven’t focused on. That is Azerbaijan. I met with Dr. George Friedman from 

Stratford yesterday. Obviously they are an ally. They are proIsrael. They have been an ally in our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are next to, close to Iran. And, yet, according to Dr. 

Friedman, they are sort of being shunned by the State Department 

in their ability to purchase military weapons. 

It seems to me that they are very strategically placed in the Middle East. And he believes this is one of the key sort of cornerstones 

in the Middle East that we are not paying enough attention to and 

needs to be stressed I think more. 

Ambassador Bolton, do you have any thoughts on that? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think our policy with respect to Azerbaijan does need to be modified. Obviously this is complicated by 

the conflict with Armenia and the range of disagreements with 

their internal policy there. But precisely for the reason that you 

mentioned, given Azerbaijan’s access to Black Sea oil and natural 

gas assets, the importance of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 

route, and just its geographical location, I think this is a place 

where one of these frozen conflicts, as they say, between Azerbaijan 

and Armenia needs more U.S. attention. I mean, I know there are 

a lot of things going on in the world, but this is in the space of the 

former Soviet Union, one of enormous strategic significance? 

I don’t think we can forget what Prime Minister Putin said a few 

years ago when he was still President of Russia, that the collapse 

of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 

twentieth century. I think most of us think it was a great way to 

end the twentieth century. That is obviously not Putin’s view. And 

his effort, as we have seen by the Russian attack on Georgia, is, 

at a minimum, to reestablish Russian hegemony in the space of the 

former Soviet Union. It is very much in our interest to prevent 

that. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Sires of New Jersey is recognized. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

54

You know, China has long been a roadblock to tougher international sanctions on Iran. Iran continues to use China’s companies to procure hardware for its nuclear and missile programs. In 

the past, it seems that both administrations have been willing to 

confront China on trade issues, but they seem to be reluctant to 

confront China on this issue. How do we balance our interests with 

China and then we confront China on this issue where they keep 

assisting Iran and keep blocking any strong sanctions against Iran? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I can tell you my personal view that 

I don’t think we have been strong enough with China in insisting 

that they conform to international norms and agreements and indeed sanctions against nuclear and other forms of proliferation. 

Many of the companies that we are concerned about in China are 

owned by the People’s Liberation Army. And it is very difficult for 

the civilians to influence them. 

I think China’s record has gotten better, but I think there is little question that China has been lax on dealing with the sanctions 

against North Korea, that its interest in securing natural resources, like oil and natural gas from countries like Iran, has led 

it to fly political cover for Iran, in the Security Council. And I think 

it is something—and I would say this was a mistake in the Bush 

administration and a mistake in the current administration. We 

have to make nonproliferation compliance and determination to 

stop it a higher priority and not sweep it behind other priorities, 

which is what tends to happen to them. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

Dr. Heinonen, would you like to add to that? No. I am concerned 

about Venezuela. And I am concerned because many people come 

to my office, including a recent Panamanian friend of mine tells me 

how Chavez is stirring up the peasants in that country, in the 

countryside. But I am also concerned about the airline, Conviasa. 

People tell me that crates and crates of things from these airplanes come through into Venezuela and out of Venezuela. And I 

was also told that the largest Embassy in terms of personnel is in 

Caracas now from Iran. Can you comment on that? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes. You are correct. I have heard exactly 

the same thing about the size of the Iranian Embassy in Caracas. 

And it is not because of their longstanding cultural ties. It is because the Iranians are using the Venezuelan banking system and 

ports and other facilities in Venezuela to evade sanctions. 

I think it has been a measure of substantial concern whether cutout companies, front companies, are being used to evade other 

sanctions, including the military sanctions, that have been imposed 

on Iran over the years and that Chavez is actively cooperating and 

assisting Iran in evading these sanctions. 

Mr. SIRES. There are two or three flights weekly. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes. I think those are the ones that we 

know about as scheduled, but I would worry that there are many 

more into airports and Venezuela that we are not monitoring or observing. 

Mr. SIRES. Dr. Satloff? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Just one further word on this. In addition to the 

direct Iranian-Venezuelan problem, I would call your attention to 

Hezbollah activity in Venezuela. And using Venezuela as a base 

55

throughout Latin America, there is considerable clandestine activity by Hezbollah, both fund-raising and operations. And I know 

that law enforcement in the United States is quite concerned about 

their ability to use this as a base for potential operations throughout the hemisphere, including here in the homeland. 

Mr. SIRES. Well, this is where my conversations with one of the 

Panamanians, the concerns that they have that Chavez through 

surrogates is stirring up the interior of——

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes. There are many concerns that we 

have had about what Chavez is doing with the revenues from his 

oil production in terms of destabilizing democratic governments in 

Latin America, providing assistance to the FARC guerrillas in Colombia, and other things like that as well. So when you look at the 

range of destabilizing activities he is undertaking, even before you 

get to the nuclear question, it is something that I think we just 

need to take a lot more seriously than we do. 

Mr. SIRES. I didn’t mean to take away from Syria and Iran, but 

I just think it is important to have the ties that are being established here, Madam Chair. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, very important. Thank 

you, Mr. Sires. 

And now I am pleased to recognize for 5 minutes Ms. Jean 

Schmidt of Ohio. And I would ask her to chair the committee for 

a few minutes. I have to return a few phone calls. 

And Ms. Schmidt and I are colleagues on a bipartisan congressional softball game, on a lighter note, than this heavy and important topic. It is a free game. You are all invited, Watkins Field, at 

7 o’clock p.m. today. Debbie Wasserman-Schultz and Jo Ann Emerson are our colleagues who are captains of the team. So come support us. And it is for breast cancer research. 

Ms. Schmidt of Ohio is recognized and am pleased to have her 

take over. 

Ms. SCHMIDT [presiding]. What the Chairlady didn’t tell you is 

we are playing the press corps. So pray for us. 

On a more serious note, Ambassador Bolton, given what you 

know about Syrian nuclear programs, do you agree that we cannot 

bifurcate our policies toward Syria, Iran, North Korea, and their 

enablers? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think this is a very important point. I 

think looking at the threat of nuclear proliferation from a global 

perspective is important because we know what the historical linkages have been. 

We know the prospect of cooperation. And that should tell us 

that there is a lot going on that we don’t fully understand. So that 

in the case of Iran, where there have been IAEA inspectors on the 

ground and some public disclosure, there is next to nothing out of 

North Korea. And in both cases, our intelligence is weak. 

So the prospect of cooperation on uranium enrichment, on ballistic missile testing and technology, on a whole range of activities 

designed to evade international sanctions, this kind of cooperation 

requires a comprehensive effort and not saying, ‘‘Well, North Korea 

is a case we deal with over here. And Iran we deal with over there. 

And Venezuela we deal with somewhere else.’’

Ms. SCHMIDT. Mr. Heinonen, do you want to add to that? 

56

Mr. HEINONEN. I think Ambassador Bolton has raised an important issue here when he earlier made a reference to the silos. I will 

repeat it. I have a very simple question. Who has the global overview on nonproliferation? Who has a global overview on these activities? 

For example, IAEA is very limited because IAEA verification is 

basically based on comprehensive safeguards agreements. And this 

kind of thing doesn’t exist between IAEA and North Korea. IAEA 

has instruments come from there, from Security Council. 

So we need to have somewhere a system which looks the whole 

thing in its totality and what is the connection with Venezuela and 

someone? North Korea delivered nuclear material to Libya at the 

same time Pakistan was providing technology to Libya. Pakistan 

was providing all. Technology went from Pakistan to North Korea 

and to Iran. 

So we have a very complex situation. I think that we need to get 

some kind of, I would say, global order to this. And then what is 

entirely almost out of this global picture are the missile programs, 

because there is no organization currently which is looking at it. 

However, these are interconnected. So we need to create perhaps 

a new system to tackle with this. 

Thank you. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you. 

Ambassador Bolton, along the same thing, would you agree that 

a holistic approach is necessary to ensure that these proliferators, 

to quote your 2003 testimony, understand that they will pay a 

steep price for their effort? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes. I think the other would-be 

proliferators around the world are watching how we deal, in particular, with Iran but also North Korea. And to the extent that 

they perceive that launching into a nuclear weapons program 

brings the United States or others to the table with inducements, 

economic or otherwise, to get them to stop the program is itself an 

incentive to get into the nuclear weapons business. 

And the ability of regimes like North Korea and Iran to evade 

sanctions, certainly not to feel the full pain of sanctions shows that 

the cooperation among these rogue states is something that we 

have not dealt with effectively. 

So while you can’t find anybody in Washington who doesn’t agree 

that proliferation is a problem, the blunt reality is for 10 years, 20 

years we have talked about it a lot, but we have not been effective. 

North Korea has tested nuclear weapons. Iran is getting very close. 

Others could be on the way. 

And what that means is the number of nuclear weapon states, 

admittedly with relatively small nuclear arsenals, is increasing. Dr. 

Heinonen mentioned Pakistan, a very grave concern should that 

government fall into the hands of radicals or terrorists, that its 

substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons would be available for terrorism on a worldwide basis. 

So, even though we don’t face the kind of civilizational threat 

that we faced during the Cold War from a potential exchange of 

nuclear salvos with the Soviet Union, the use of nuclear weapons 

as terrorist devices has to worry us. They are targeted against inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 Aug 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\062311\67051 HFA PsN: SHIRL
57

nocent civilians. That is the purpose that these states want the 

weapons. And we shouldn’t underestimate the danger that we face. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. I am going to let you finish it, Mr. Satloff. You 

wanted to say something. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Madam Chairman, I would like to focus the attention for a moment on the potential for loose WMD in Syria. Syria 

has, as we know, not just a nuclear issue but chemical weapons 

program, biological weapons program. The country is in disarray. 

Leadership may crack. We don’t really know what is going on inside the leadership of Syria. 

I would urge the United States to take a leadership position in 

organizing a contact group of interested countries to focus on what 

do we do with the potential for loose WMD in Syria to ensure that 

loose WMD does not get into the hands of terrorists. And this country borders the Mediterranean. This country borders our allies, our 

NATO ally, including Turkey; our friend Israel. 

I think this is a matter of huge importance. And I am not sure 

that adequate attention is being paid to this issue. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you. 

And now I am going to turn the questions over to Congressman 

Higgins from New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Dr. Satloff, you had indicated in your opening statement that the 

United States response to the 2009 Green Revolution perhaps 

should have been more direct and decisive. Would you elaborate a 

little bit further? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Thank you, Congressman. 

Yes. I would say, in retrospect, almost everyone in the administration would say that we missed an opportunity. We missed an opportunity to use our bully pulpit to more effectively support the aspirations of the Iranian people. We missed an opportunity to ensure that Iranians had the technical means to circumvent the Iranian Government’s use of communications technology to break 

down social networks and to stop the flow of information among 

the opposition. 

We didn’t use our technical means to prevent Iranian interference with satellite activity. There are all sorts of things that we 

chose not to do. 

I would hope that we are better prepared when I believe the Iranian people are going to rise up again. 

Mr. HIGGINS. We read recently that there are deep fissures within the Iranian leadership between Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader, and that of President Ahmadinejad. 

Some have argued that a stronger response—and this has been 

going on for some time, including the revolutionary guard. It is a 

generational divide in many respects. But some have argued that 

a stronger American response in 2009 would have helped to coalesce those forces back together because we are viewed as a larger 

enemy than the enemy than the enemy within. You reject that I 

presume? 

Mr. SATLOFF. I think it is apples and oranges, Congressman. I 

think that the division between the supreme leader and the President is a structural phenomenon of how the Islamic republic is created. 

58

It has one leader, the supreme leader, who is appointed by God, 

as it were, and the other who gets elected by mere people. And the 

one who gets elected by mere people has two terms. They expire 

at the end of 8 years, as he is now approaching the end of his second term, as is the case with the previous two Presidents, Khatami 

and Rasanjani. 

The differences emerge between the God-appointed and the 

human-appointed leader. This is just part of the system. It has 

nothing to do with the United States, I am afraid to say. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Ambassador Bolton, you had talked about Iran’s 

nuclear weapons program. And you expressed concerns not only 

about what is publicly known, but what is not publicly known 

should really concern us. 

Iran and North Korea, economic sanctions don’t appear to be 

working. A nuclear Iran cannot be contained or deterred. Are you 

advocating for a U.S. military action to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes. I have argued for that for about 31⁄2

years. I think that the only real alternative now is that Iran gets 

nuclear weapons. And I advocate that course, not happily, not because I am enthusiastic about it but because I think the alternative 

of a nuclear Iran is so much more dangerous for us and for our 

friends and allies in the region, that having seen all of the other 

options for dealing with the Iranian nuclear weapons program 

failed, that is what we are left with. 

Mr. HIGGINS. If such action was taken, what would be the regional consequences relative to the Middle East? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think there are two basic questions. 

First, how would Iran itself respond? And, then, second, what 

would some of the other countries do? I think the fact is the Arab 

regimes in the region would welcome the destruction of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. 

They fear it as much as we do or Israel does, but they appreciate 

that they don’t have the capability to do anything about it. They 

would certainly criticize us or criticize Israel if Israel were to undertake such a strike. They would criticize us publicly, but they 

would welcome it privately. 

The issue of how Iran would respond is obviously a crucial element of the calculus. And it is one we can’t know with certainty. 

But I have looked at this very carefully. And I think that Iran is 

unlikely to do anything that would bring it into direct confrontation 

with the United States beyond the destruction of the nuclear program itself. 

I think Iran’s most likely response would be to unleash 

Hezbollah, in particular, and possibly Hamas as well for rocket attacks against Israel. I think that would certainly be their response 

if it were Israel that did the attack. And that obviously puts at risk 

civilian populations. 

This is not a pleasant alternative, but it is a lot less pleasant to 

look at a future where Iran has nuclear weapons. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you. And I will yield back. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you. And now we will recognize Mr. Duncan 

from South Carolina for 5 minutes for questions. 

59

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. And, Ambassador Bolton, thank you for 

being here today. I followed your career with a lot of interest and 

admiration over the years, and I want to say thank you for your 

service to our country. 

First and foremost, I would like to delve into the connection between Iran and al-Qaeda a little bit more because, really, the links 

go back to the early 1990s with the Quds force and al-Qaeda, go 

back to the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia and a lot of 

links there. The 9/11 Commission report detailed a lot of those connections. 

And concurrently with support from a state sponsor like Iran, alQaeda would be in a better position than ever to strike both the 

West and our allies and from that chaos in both the Arab world 

and south Asia. 

What should the United States be aware of with that relationship? And what threat do you see from al-Qaeda with regards to 

Iran? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, certainly Iran has for many years 

been the world’s central banker for international terrorism. And it 

is a funder and an armor of terrorists pretty much on an equal opportunity basis: Hezbollah; Shia; Hamas, which Iran has funded 

and armed; Sunni. The Iranian regime has funded extremists in 

Iraq who have attacked American forces, but they have also funded 

their once-sworn enemy, the Taliban, in attacking NATO forces in 

Afghanistan. 

So I don’t think we really know what the connection is, but I 

think just as a target of opportunity, it is obviously something to 

worry about because the common enemy is the United States. 

Even if there is no connection at all, obviously the risk of alQaeda itself getting nuclear weapons I think is something we have 

to consider. It has been an objective of al-Qaeda almost since its 

inception. And to me it is the continuing perfect storm that terrorists of whatever stripe do get weapons of mass destruction and use 

them against the United States or our friends and you have 9/11 

on a dramatically more damaging scale. 

Mr. DUNCAN. On a different line of questioning because I am 

very interested in the Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Spring 

and what is going on with the rising democracy or move for a 

democratic self-governance within the Arabian Peninsula, northern 

Africa, it is my opinion and I am asking if you agree with me that 

the Muslim Brotherhood is pushing for a more democratic style 

government so they will have a seat at the table. And they can continue to grow their influence toward other things. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think that is certainly their objective. I think it is very hard to project what comes out of the 

changes that we have seen in different parts of the Arab world. 

You know, in Egypt today, we still have a military government. 

And that military government has brought Hamas and the Palestinian Authority together. 

It has opened the border between Egypt and Gaza Strip and allowed Hamas to have full communications with the Muslim Brotherhood, which is, in effect, its corporate sponsor. This government 

in Egypt has recognized the regime in Iran for the first time since 

60

1979. Leading figures in the regime as well as candidates for President have called into question the Camp David Accords. 

So I think we are in a very dangerous period ahead. And I don’t 

think that we can project on a straight line what organizations like 

the Muslim Brotherhood or others did from the past into the future 

because with the repression of the Mubarak era released, that they 

could move in any of several different directions. 

They could become legitimately democratic or they could become 

far more radical from a religious point of view. And that is why I 

think with conditions so uncertain we have to really be very worried about the future of the Camp David Accords under any new 

Egyptian Government and what effect that would have in Jordan 

and to the security of Israel and our other friends in the region 

more broadly. 

And when you lay over all of that uncertainty, the continuing, indeed growing risk of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, I think that 

conditions are right for more turmoil, more risk, more potential 

trouble in the region than at any time in decades. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, sir. And I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Payne, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Africa, 

Global Health, and Human Rights, is recognized. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I wonder what our assessment of the IAEA is currently, whether it is really strong enough. 

I do remember that during the Bush administration, we did watch 

inspections, which Saddam Hussein prevented IAEA to have the 

opportunity to inspect properly. 

However, I do recall that when Hans Blix was finally given the 

opportunity by Saddam Hussein, although albeit late knowing that 

they had no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, although all of 

our experts, Cheney and Rumsfeld and Bush and yourself, were 

convinced that there were weapons of mass destruction. 

And, of course, we ordered the IAEA to leave Iraq at the time 

that the Saddam Hussein regime said they could go anywhere they 

wanted to know because they, of course, knew they had no weapons 

of mass destruction nor did they have biological or chemical weapons. However, we ordered the IAEA out and then, of course, went 

on to have the attack on Iraq. And then we did finally conclude 

that there were no weapons of mass destruction. And, of course, we 

got rid of a bad guy. It cost us an awful lot. 

I wonder if anybody could tell me about your opinion of IAEA at 

this time and its effectiveness. Evidently it’s not what we would 

like it to be because this Ambassador Bolton said that the way to 

deal with Iran, of course, is to blow up their facilities. I wonder if 

that is a permanent solution or whether they may have an alternate site where they are developing the weapon at some other site 

that we may not have determined and that to destroy one may not 

end the problem. 

So I just wondered if anybody had any comments. Of course, Ambassador Bolton certainly could comment on anything that I have 

mentioned and that I have said since I referred to him and his administration. We have had these discussions before. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Right. Well, Congressman, I would love to 

get back into a discussion of Iraq. I will just say one thing on that 

61

score. One reason we believe Saddam Hussein had weapons of 

mass destruction because after the first Persian Gulf War, he declared to the United Nations that he had massive supplies of chemical weapons, which he never proved to the U.N.’s satisfaction that 

he had destroyed. And, actually, I am not aware of anybody before 

the second Persian Gulf war who didn’t believe that Saddam had 

massive amounts of chemical weapons. That turns out not to be 

true, for whatever reason, but I don’t remember before the war 

anybody doubting that his claims of those stocks were accurate. 

On the IAEA itself, I think, as Congressman Berman noted,—

and I appreciate his mentioning it—I think under the leadership 

of the new director general, Yukiya Amano, that there is a real 

chance that the IAEA can have the more prominent role in antiproliferation activities that we hope that it should. 

The IAEA has always been a different kind of U.N. specialized 

agency. It has a unique relationship with the Security Council. And 

it is one we should foster. 

I think it has been historically the case that the IAEA’s inspectors, like Dr. Heinonen and others, have been straight shooters. 

They have tried to report the facts as they have been able to find 

them out. Our trouble has been more at the top level. I think that 

problem is now corrected. I certainly hope so. And I certainly look 

forward to supporting the IAEA in its efforts, particularly on Iran. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. My time has just about expired, but we do recall that we did know that Iran, Iraq had biological and chemical weapons because we supplied them. They 

never had the capacity to make them themselves according to the 

report that I have seen. And I just wonder whether that is true or 

not that they had——

Ambassador BOLTON. It’s not true. Now, we did not supply Iraq 

with biological or chemical weapons. Their programs were known 

before. The question was before the attack what level of stockpiles 

that the Iraqis had. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ambassador BOLTON. And their declarations on the chemical 

weapons side, in particular, were very extensive. U.N. weapons inspectors asked repeatedly to see the stockpiles and to see them destroyed. And the Iraqi regime repeatedly said, ‘‘We have destroyed 

the’’——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Ambassador BOLTON. [continuing]. ‘‘But we are not going to let 

you see where.’’

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Chabot, the Middle East Subcommittee chair, is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Satloff, if I could begin with you first? I was in the region 

recently. One of the countries we were in, among others, was Saudi 

Arabia. I am interested in relative to Saudi Arabia and Iran. The 

Saudis believe quite strongly in fear that Iran is slowly but certainly encircling them and that there are Iranian influenced entities, terrorist organizations, and otherwise; in Egypt, for example, 

the warming relations between Egypt and Iran, Yemen, Bahrain, 

others, and that that is one of their real threats. Are they correct 

in that belief that they have? 

62

Mr. SATLOFF. I think that the Saudis are absolutely correct to 

take with the utmost seriousness the Iranian effort to encircle 

them and to erode first American strength in the Gulf and eventually to compel Saudi Arabia to recognize Iranian hegemony in the 

Gulf. 

The Saudis view what is going on in Yemen as an opportunity 

for Iran to be trouble-making via the Houthis. The Saudis view 

what happened in Bahrain as an Iranian exercise. I think to a certain extent the Saudis exaggerate the Bahrain situation. The Bahrain situation was legitimately overwhelmingly a domestic opposition movement for more pluralistic society, but the Iranian effort 

to take advantage of this is real. And, most importantly, I think 

the Saudis doubt America’s staying power, but America is not 

evincing toward the Iranians the view that we are truly committed 

to stop your nuclear program, that we are truly committed to roll 

back your intentions to expand your influence, that we are truly 

committed in Lebanon, truly committed in Syria, truly committed 

in Iraq. I think the Saudis’ view is that we are without a clear 

strategy to counter Iran’s hegemonic designs. 

And, therefore, you see this fundamental tension between Washington and Riyadh today. It is not over some symbolic issue. It is 

over a very real difference. 

Mr. CHABOT. I tend to agree with you. And, despite some of the 

administration have kind of poo-pooed Saudi’s belief in that, I 

think there is a lot of legitimacy in that belief and the threat that 

Iran plays toward Iran and the rest of the region. 

We have such limited time. Mr. Ambassador, if I could turn to 

you next? You said a couple of things that really struck me, and 

maybe you could expound upon them a little bit. One, you said that 

our security guarantees our declining. And I assume what you 

mean is that other countries, perhaps some that are relying upon 

the United States or what ultimately if they ally themselves with 

us or they cooperate with us, in some countries’ mind, that may be 

not necessarily the smartest thing to do in their view. Could you 

talk about that a little bit? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Right. The idea that some have advocated 

is that for the Gulf Cooperation Council nations; for example, the 

six Arab members of that organization, that if we gave them guarantees that we would protect them against Iran’s use of nuclear 

weapons, that that would help create a system of deterrence in the 

region that would mitigate against the risk of Iran once it gets nuclear weapons. 

I think that is, number one, a pretty minimal kind of guarantee. 

I mean, are we saying we are prepared ourselves to engage in hostilities with Iran if they use nuclear weapons or threaten them 

against the Gulf countries, number one? And, number two, I think 

for the Gulf countries themselves, they are not inclined at this 

point to believe the security guarantee when they see essentially 

a withdrawal of America from Iraq; substantial drawdown in Afghanistan; and, as Dr. Satloff mentioned, an inability over a sustained period of time to deal with the Iranian terrorist of nuclear 

weapons threats to begin with? 

Mr. CHABOT. Let me shift to one other gear, if I could. I have 

only got real limited time. You had also said that absent some I 

63

think you said significant step or some action or something from 

an outsider, Iran will get nuclear weapons. I tend to agree with 

that. I think that the sanctions and all of this stuff is just a way 

to kick it down the road and that they are bound and determined 

and they are going to do it unless there is some action. 

And I don’t have much time for you to respond, but any quick 

response you want to give? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I agree. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Sorry. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. That’s good. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Engel, my good friend, the Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and South—no—the ranking member on the Subcommittee on the 

Western Hemisphere? You switched regions on me. And I am still 

thinking of you in that area. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. And, of 

course, you and I did good work together passing the Syria Accountability Act many years ago. And we now have joint legislation 

against Syria again. 

Ambassador Bolton, it is good to see you again. I remember the 

time we visited the United Nations and appreciate your work and 

Mr. Heinonen and Mr. Satloff as well. Thank you. Thank you very 

much. 

When we sat down and did the Syria Accountability Act back in 

2003, I noted that the State Department’s list of terrorist countries 

that support terrorism included Syria. And it was a charter member of that list since 1979, when that list came through. And, yet, 

it was renewed every year as a charter member. And we continued 

to have normal diplomatic relations with Syria. 

Frankly—and I question some of the administration officials 

here—I couldn’t understand why we sent our Ambassador back to 

Syria. I didn’t think that their behavior was warranted for us to 

send an ambassador back. 

It seems to me, you know, we made a decision to go into Libya. 

And I supported that decision. But I think Syria is worse than 

Libya, quite frankly. 

Libya is a large country. Ghadafi is out of his mind. And, granted, he is a bad player and the Arab League did say that they wanted to get rid of him. But when you look at what Assad has done, 

you look at the fact that Lebanon, which had a war with Israel not 

long ago, and part of the agreement to end that war was that the 

weapons that Hezbollah had would not be replenished and, yet, 

Hezbollah has many, many more weapons today than it did before. 

And obviously those weapons came from Iran through Syria. And 

Syria is the closest ally with Iran. 

So I just don’t understand why we are turning our heads the 

other way when it comes to Syria. And I wonder, Ambassador 

Bolton, if you could comment on that. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I largely agree with that analysis. I 

was at the U.N. when we negotiated the cease-fire resolution to 

bring to a conclusion the Summer 2006 war between Israel and 

Hezbollah. And central parts of that resolution involved pushing 

Syria further out of Lebanon and demarcating the border, making 

64

sure Syria wasn’t supplying weapons to Hezbollah and Iran as 

well. 

And the fact was that we were trying to use the opportunity. At 

least that is where we started out, not only to buttress the Cedar 

Revolution in Lebanon but to apply pressure to the Assad regime 

in Syria as well. And we just simply did not follow through on that. 

And that has been a mistake. And we can see it in spades now 

given the violence against innocent civilians that is an Assad family tradition in Syria. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you something else. Back in 2007, during 

the Bush administration, it was generally felt that Iran was obviously producing weapons, nuclear weapons. And there was talk 

about the administration taking out Iran’s facilities. 

And then there became a national intelligence estimate, which 

said essentially, falsely obviously, that Iran had stopped its nuclear 

weapons programs in 2003 and, therefore, all the steam seemed to 

go out of the Bush administration. At least that is the way it appeared to me in terms of confronting Iran. 

You know, we would have been better off confronting them earlier. It is harder now. Can you tell me about that and what your 

feeling is about that because I think that was a disaster? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think that NIE was the most politicized intelligence estimate probably in the history of our intelligence services. It did real damage to the focus on Iran. And it was 

inaccurate when it was written. 

I give an example in my testimony of reports about the Parchin 

facility in Iran, an artillery and armor base where they were doing 

testing on simultaneous detonation capabilities. In the Fall of 2004, 

reported by ABC News, it was live testing going on then, the only 

purpose of which was to create the capability to explode a nuclear 

device. 

So I think that there were factual mistakes in that estimate. I 

think it was politicized. I think it has done enormous damage. And 

I don’t think we have operated for quite some time on the basis 

that it is accurate. And it certainly was not. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Satloff, let me ask you this. I have been frustrated with 

Saudi Arabia because obviously they could be more helpful in 

terms of the Middle East peace process and help bring the Arab 

countries over. Iran is obviously a major threat to Saudi Arabia. 

One of the Saudi royals was saying the other day that they thought 

that Saudi Arabia would try to bring down the price of oil in order 

to hit Iran in the pocketbook. 

Why isn’t Saudi Arabia doing more to help us bring the Iranian 

regime down or at least stop the nuclear weapons program vis-a`- vis reaching out to Israel? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And that is an excellent question that 

will be answered at a later time. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Rohrabacher, the Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations chair. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

On April 8th of this year, Iraqi troops stormed into Camp Ashraf, 

which is on the Iraq-Iran border, and massacred unarmed Iranian 

65

expatriates who were residents of that camp. This, in and of itself, 

was criminal activity. I mean, as a crime against humanity or at 

least a murder of those 35 unarmed people. And I would say the 

wounding of at least 100 others is a crime. 

But does this also, Mr. Bolton, indicate that Iran is having undue 

influence on Iraq? Here we did all of this we could do to create a 

democratic Iraq. And then they are under the tutelage of Iran? Because obviously the slaughter of these people, these unarmed people, in Camp Ashraf was done to the benefit of Iran. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think it is very troubling what happened, as you mentioned, what the Government of Iraq did there. 

I am aware also that they refused to allow U.N. and other members of a congressional delegation to visit Camp Ashraf in the past 

couple of months. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That was my delegation. Yes. 

Ambassador BOLTON. I just couldn’t believe that they did that. 

And I do think that there are many signs of Iran’s efforts to increase its influence inside of Iraq and very troubling and inadequate the responses by the current Government of Iraq. 

So that as our forces leave, here is a good example. We gave protection to the refugees at Camp Ashraf. Our military disarmed 

them, took their pledges of renunciation of terrorism, and believe 

they cooperated with us in a range of things. 

General Hugh Shelton, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has 

said publicly the MEK aided us before the invasion of Iraq. So it 

is a very troubling history. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. And I suggest that we, Madam Chairman, keep an eye on this. We will be holding a hearing with my 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of this committee, 

into the massacre at Camp Ashraf. 

Let me just note that, Mr. Satloff, your remarks were a breath 

of fresh air. I will just have to say I am tired of being the only one 

who is suggesting this strategy that you seem to be advocating 

today. That is an active promotion of democratic movements as a 

means to achieve ends, foreign policy ends, very similar to the 

Reagan doctrine, who we were supporting those who were fighting 

against Soviet tyranny during the Reagan years. 

When we were talking about Syria and Iran, let me just underscore the point that you made was so important for us to understand. Yes, we are supporting democracy except when it really, 

when the crisis, is upon us. 

And aren’t you disappointed that the United States, your testimony indicates that, we don’t seize the moment to fight for what 

we believe in or at least help those who are fighting for democracy 

but we sort of step back at a time of crisis in order to let history 

run its course? Is this the way you identify that, as I do? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Well, I appreciate your kind words, Congressman. 

Thank you very much. 

I do see in Syria and Iran enormous strategic opportunities for 

the United States. These are places where our values and our interests are synonymous. We don’t have to make the choice. We 

don’t have to wring our hands, as we did perhaps with Egypt, 

where we might have regretted the loss of a peace process partner 

66

but cheered the Democrats. Here we will lose an adversary and 

gain democracy. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. During the Cold War era, again, Reagan did 

this with the Soviets. We ended the Cold War without having a 

confrontation with the Soviet Union. 

On another subject, let me just say over the years I have depended on the IAEA for information and found it a good source of 

information, although not necessarily a good source for policy. Why 

is it that when you take a look at North Korea and Pakistan and 

Iran, you know, obviously these are—everyone has complained 

about that, but, again, my colleague mentioned earlier it’s China 

who is behind all of these people. 

I mean, if we are so gutless that we cannot bring up the Chinese 

relationship in this type of proliferation to these countries, we are 

going to have this proliferation. It is going to continue. And I would 

hope that we start paying attention to the role that China is playing. North Korea——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Didn’t develop these on its own. 

Neither did Pakistan. And neither is Iran. China is playing a horrible role. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Madam. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have 

raised the attack on Camp Ashraf directly with Secretary of State 

Clinton, with the Iraqi authorities, with the U.N. High Commissioners, Commissioner for Refugees, and Ranking Member Berman 

and I have worked together and will continue to do so to ensure 

the safety of the residents of Camp Ashraf. And we thank you for 

being here with us today. 

So pleased to yield time to my Florida colleague, Congressman 

Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I thank you, Madam Chair. And thanks to all of 

you for being here this morning. 

Dr. Satloff, current sanctions law allows the State Department 

alone to determine whether to investigate and whether to sanction 

companies involved in the energy sector of Iran. Process can often 

lead and, in fact, does to diplomatic relations, potentially trumping 

national security concerns, particularly when it comes to these Chinese companies. 

It is estimated that more than 100 Chinese companies operate in 

Iran currently. And, in fact, in February, the President of Iran’s petroleum engineering and development company was quoted as saying that ‘‘China will invest $2.5 billion in developing the South 

Azadegan Oil Field that straddles the border with Iraq.’’

If we are unwilling to sanction these companies, what leverage 

do we have with the Chinese? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Well, first of all, I agree very much with your assessment of the problem, Congressman. What I would urge to complement our efforts on sanctions or beyond the need to actually 

pursue this is to go to the Chinese with the choice. And this means 

working with the Saudis to be a larger diplomatic actor in this 

arena, to go to the Chinese with a choice: Do business with us or 

do business with Iran. And if the Saudis were willing to make that 

67

choice, to put the choice to the Chinese, then we might actually get 

a greater Chinese cooperation vis-a`-vis Iran. 

But because we go back to the earlier problem of Saudi disagreement with the United States or reluctance or disbelief in our commitment vis-a`-vis Iran, we don’t get full cooperation from the 

Saudis on what they might be willing to do vis-a`-vis China either. 

So I think we need to go back to a more serious discussion with 

the Saudis to get them to engage and compel the Chinese to make 

a choice: Business with us or business with the Iranians? 

Mr. DEUTCH. So is there additional leverage that the United 

States has? The suggestion of the Saudis putting the choice to 

them I understand, but is there additional leverage that we have? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Sure. Within the larger context of U.S.-Chinese relations, I would like to see this administration raise this level, raise 

this issue much higher on the ladder of our agenda. 

Nonproliferation I would like to think this President views as one 

of his very top priorities. If that is the case, then there are things 

that we should be willing to play with in the U.S.-Chinese relationship in order to get China to be far more cooperative on the Iranian 

issue. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Dr. Heinonen, I know you may have touched on 

some of these I am told, but I just would like to confirm. You spent 

20 years with IAEA. An awful lot of that time was spent focused 

on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Can you give us your assessment from 

the latest report, particularly Iran’s increased production of high 

enriched uranium, their claim to have faster, higher update and 

faster centrifuges? 

You spoke earlier apparently about breakout. And there seemed 

to be some slight disagreement between you and Ambassador 

Bolton on how long that might be. 

My question really is not just how long it would take if they 

choose to break out but how likely it is that we would know. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Thank you. First of all, I think that we have a 

little bit of disagreement with Ambassador Bolton only because 

whether they use current centrifuges or the ones which we may not 

know they have. So the number differs. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And, again, I understand that, if I may, from I 

think the perspective of most of us here, whether it is, in fact, 1 

year or 11⁄2 months, should they choose to do it, there is no reason 

to view either of those as less urgent. 

Mr. HEINONEN. So the known centrifuges are almost all the time 

under the control of IAEA. So if they manipulate the sensitive cascades, the international community knows it roughly in 2 weeks 

time that the IAEA has a program provided that the Secretariat 

takes the action and informs its Board of Governors. 

There are unannounced inspections. There are cameras. There 

are seals. Once they are compromised, these pictures will report it. 

So we know subsequent of a situation very fast. 

Mr. DEUTCH. But we can know there are additional facilities like 

Qom, right? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Yes. That is where the unknowns are. And that 

is where probably we have also some differences in those numbers. 

And that is what has happened now during last I would say 4 or 

5 years with Iran, since they suspended the implementation of the 

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additional protocol, that knowledge of international community 

about the nuclear program of Iran has come down while their capabilities are ramping up. So these two things go in the wrong direction. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. HEINONEN. That is the dilemma. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Fortenberry, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Africa, 

Global Health, and Human Rights, is recognized. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair. Gentlemen, thank 

you for coming today. I appreciate your testimony. 

Ambassador Bolton, given that sanctions seemingly are not slowly significantly the march toward Iran’s nuclear ambitions and 

their capability, we appear to be drifting toward a de facto containment policy should they obtain weapons. Can you unpack what 

that scenario looks like? 

Unfortunately, I read through your statement, but I didn’t have 

the last point. The paper wasn’t stapled to it. You said it is significantly different from the containment policies in the Cold War. Can 

you elucidate on what that scenario would look like? 

And then the parallel question is I would like all of you to just 

project out based upon the current trajectory of the situation what 

this is going to look like in 5 years. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think the differences between an 

Iran with a relatively small number of nuclear weapons and the 

Soviet Union during the Cold War cover a variety of grants. I was 

just giving one example there. They have got a different view of the 

value, the relative value, of life in the hereafter versus life here on 

Earth. That is one thing that——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. So do you think that religious value would 

beg the potential uses of a nuclear weapon? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think it is a very different calculus than 

the communist in Moscow in the Cold War who, whatever else you 

want to say about them, were atheists and thought they were only 

going around once and weren’t all that enthusiastic about throwing 

it away. 

But the real problem is the logic of deterrence itself, which, however successful it may have been as we understand the Cold War 

better, we can see how risky it was and how nearly on any number 

of occasions it didn’t work. When you have got an asymmetric 

threat, in particular, a threat that could be aimed not at the 

United States but at a friend or ally of the United States, that calculus is even harder. 

So that the perception that Iran has or is very close to nuclear 

weapons would give them a leverage in the Middle East that would 

completely undo the existing framework we have. And I think that 

is something that should undermine our confidence in our ability 

to contain and deter a nuclear Iran. 

But an even more fundamental point is if I am wrong about that, 

it doesn’t stop with Iran. And when other countries, like Saudi, 

Egypt, Turkey, and maybe others, have the prospect of getting nuclear weapons, then you are in a multi-polar nuclear Middle East 

where, you know, in the Cold War, it was a bipolar deterrence at 

69

work. In a multi-polar environment, it is inherently far more dangerous and unstable. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I basically knew what you were going to say 

before I asked the question, but I think it is important to paint 

that scenario. 

Dr. Satloff, you had mentioned that you believe the Iranian people will rise again. And it is related to your point earlier, Ambassador Bolton, that the only prospects here from your perspective on 

stopping this is a military intervention or an imminent regime 

change. 

A lot of us have placed a great deal of hope in anticipation and 

a lot of encouragement through this committee and in other places 

in the hands of good Iranian people who are simply seeking a new 

form of governance that is consistent with their tradition of justice. 

How real do you think that is now, though? 

Mr. SATLOFF. I think that the prospects are better today than 

they were a year ago for the very simple reason that Iranians are 

looking at what is going on elsewhere in the Middle East. The idea 

that not just friends of the United States, Egyptians, Tunisians 

arising up but friends of Iran, Syrian people. I think the Syrian 

model is hugely powerful and will have a major impact on whether 

the Iranian people themselves choose this path. And that is another reason why this is a strategic opportunity for the United 

States to help bring about change in Syria, which will help trigger 

change in Iran. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Short of those two objectives, military intervention of some kind and a regime change through a rising of the 

people, Mr. Deutch was pointing out the other leverage points that 

we may have. All of this tends to focus on our efforts. And, yet, we 

sometimes don’t think about these leverage points. 

You said, ‘‘Let’s tell the Chinese: Business with us or business 

with Iranians?’’ I think that is great. The problem here is we basically have shifted so much manufacturing overseas to them they 

make the stuff. Wal-Mart sells the stuff. They have the cash. And 

they buy our debt. 

So this completely dysfunctional relationship that we have with 

China does not empower us to actually ask them for leverage in 

helping us against Iran. We are almost supplicants. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Actually Congressman, I was referring rather specifically to what we hope the Saudis would do, which is the Iranians are——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I’m sorry. I didn’t——

Mr. SATLOFF [continuing]. In deep search for oil resources. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Yes. 

Mr. SATLOFF. If the Saudis would say, ‘‘Business with us or 

them?’’ that would hurt the Iranians greatly. The Saudis would 

provide all of the oil resources the Chinese need. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. But clearly there are linkages to China here 

as well that we could potentially leverage. And I’m sorry. I mixed 

the point up. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, is recognized. 

70

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to comment briefly on Mr. Fortenberry’s 

comments. I mean, an Iran with nuclear weapons is not only terrorism with impunity and this has been pointed out an end to the 

nonproliferation regime. 

I am old enough to have lived through the Cuban missile crisis, 

where you had a confrontation of two, military confrontation of two, 

hostile nuclear powers. We have gunboats versus American destroyers in the Persian Gulf from time to time. And I would hate 

to have one of those be a confrontation between two hostile nuclear 

powers, in part because we rolled the dice once with the Cuban 

missile crisis. I don’t want to do it again in my lifetime. But also 

Khrushchev was considerably saner than the Iranian regime. 

And then, of course, we dream, as Mr. Satloff does, of an uprising, but it may not come this year. It may come 5 years from now. 

Ambassador Bolton, if there really were 2 million people on the 

streets of Teheran in Shallah and if this regime was going to be 

swept out of power, would they act like Gorbachev, shrug their 

shoulders and walk off the world stage, or would they go out with 

a bang? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think they demonstrated in the 

aftermath of the fraudulent elections in the summer of 2009, they 

are prepared to kill the stay in power. And I think that is what 

is going on in Syria as well. So I think it——

Mr. SHERMAN. Are they prepared to use nuclear weapons against 

Israel in order to perhaps regain popularity in Iran or are they 

willing to use nuclear weapons against the United States if they 

feel that, ‘‘Well, they are going out anyway. They might as well go 

out that way’’? 

Ambassador BOLTON. You know, I don’t honestly know the answer to that question, but, as you suggested, I would rather not 

find out. That is why I think it is so critical, so critical to stop the 

regime in Teheran from getting these weapons to begin with. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador, the MEK is still on the terrorist list. 

Should they be? Why are they still on the terrorist list? You have 

some understanding of the inside of the State Department. And 

over the last 15 years, has the MEK done more to help American 

security or to hurt American national security? 

Ambassador BOLTON. It has done more to help American security, particularly on the nuclear weapons front I know of my own 

personal knowledge. And I can say this. I think the State Department is now under a court order to revisit the terrorist designation. 

And I think they should and should do it promptly. I think 

whether it’s a designation of a foreign terrorist organization or a 

state sponsor of terrorism, the State Department has got to look at 

the facts and let the facts fall where they may. And political considerations, one way or the other, should not enter into it. 

MEK was put on the terrorist list and kept on the terrorist list 

on several occasions in the hopes of getting friendlier diplomatic response. 

Mr. SHERMAN. How is that working out? 

Ambassador BOLTON. It has not worked out. So let’s look at the 

facts. Let’s let the chips fall where they may. And if they don’t deserve to be on the list, let’s not let political considerations keep 

them there. 

71

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to commend you for your comments on the 

infamous NIE and then ask you about a license that is pending in 

the Obama administration. And, unfortunately, it is very close to 

being issued. I believe the ranking member and chairwoman have 

joined me in trying to stop this. And that is a license to GE to repair the engines on the civilian Iranian aircraft. 

If we repair those engines, can we be confident that the planes 

will not be used to take weapons to Assad or Hezbollah? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Certainly not. You know, I opposed those 

licenses back in 2002 and 2003. I guess they are just persistent 

people. But I was against granting them then. I am against granting them now. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Should we be providing money or weapons to dissident elements in Syria? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think we should be providing whatever 

assistance they think would be helpful to them. And I would have 

done this on both an overt and covert basis going back years. And 

I would say the same with respect to Iran. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Satloff, do you have any comment on that? 

Mr. SATLOFF. In my testimony, I suggested the establishment of 

humanitarian zones on each of Syria’s borders that would be a base 

with which we could work with the Syrian opposition. If what they 

need are materiel, then let’s provide materiel. If what they need 

are just goods, let’s provide the goods. All of their neighbors want 

to help. We should be there for them. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are you talking humanitarian assistance or the 

tools to overthrow the Assad regime? 

Mr. SATLOFF. If they are looking for the tools, then we should 

help provide them. I think that what they are looking for most of 

all, Congressman, are not the weapons but the communications 

tools. 

The best weapon that the Syrian people are using in their fight 

against the regime is YouTube. And we should provide them the 

means to circumvent the Syrian Government’s efforts to repress information in the country. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Finally I want to comment on how important it is that we sanction Chinese companies for their business in Iran because if we 

don’t, not only do they take up the slack in Iran, but our European 

friends get very angry that the sanctions are not putting pressure 

on Iran. They’re just shifting the business opportunity to Beijing. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Could I just say on that——

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. 

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. When I was Under Secretary, 

we sanctioned a lot of Chinese companies. And it provoked howls 

of outrage from the State Department but also from China. It had 

a very important effect because it focused Chinese attention on 

things that were happening that sometimes I think the central government didn’t necessarily have control of. I wish we had sanctioned China more. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Burton, chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia? 

72

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman—Chairwoman. Excuse me. I always get that wrong. 

Mr. Bolton, good seeing you again, Ambassador. I watch you on 

television quite a bit. You are saying what I think. And I feel like 

I am helping write your speeches. So I just want you to know I 

agree with——

Ambassador BOLTON. I take all the help I can get, Congressman. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. BURTON. First of all, my big concern is the United States energy policies. Right now we still get somewhere around 30–35 percent of our energy from the Middle East. And if Iran continues 

with their nuclear program—and I read today where Ahmadinejad 

has said that they are not afraid to make a nuclear weapon. 

If they continue to do that with their goal, stated goal, to destroy 

Israel, what is your view on what might happen? Do you think 

Israel would take a first strike action against Iran before they had 

a weapon that could be delivered to Israel? And if so, how would 

that affect the United States energy policy? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, it certainly has been Israeli policy up 

until now not to permit hostile states to get capacities that would 

put them in the vicinity of nuclear weapons. That is why they 

bombed the Osirak reactor out of Baghdad in ’81. That is why they 

bombed the North Korean reactor in September of ’07. They have 

allowed Bushehr to go into operation. The Iranians are building a 

heavy water reactor, heavy water production facility at Arak. And 

obviously their uranium enrichment program is well underway. 

I obviously don’t know what the Government of Israel is going 

to do, but based on their past performance, faced with that kind 

of existential threat, it wouldn’t surprise me. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, I guess that is the concern that many of us 

have in the Congress that if that were to occur, there might be a 

real widespread conflict over there involving other countries. And 

that could bottle up maybe the Persian Gulf or the Suez Canal. 

And we would be right hip deep in there to get the energy we need 

to survive as a nation. 

Syria. I read in my notes here that they are getting chemical 

weapons from Iran. Is that correct? And if so, how do we deal with 

that? Because that again is a weapon of mass destruction. I wish 

my colleague Don was still here because those were weapons that 

were in Iran, at least we thought, Iraq, we thought when we first 

went in there. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, there is no doubt that both Iran and 

Syria have active chemical weapons programs. Whether they are 

working together or not at this point I don’t know, but that 

wouldn’t surprise me at all. Syria is one of the few countries that 

has used chemical weapons against its own citizens. And as long 

as they have that capability, it should be a concern of ours. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, it is pretty obvious to me that Iran and Syria 

have been working together. They have been a conduit for 

Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ weapons going through there. And, as I recall, Hamas still has headquarters in Damascus. So they are working hand in glove. So it really concerns me. 

I would like to just make one more comment. I have heard a 

number of you mention that we ought to use the Saudis or have 

73

the Saudis put pressure on Iran. The Saudis are business associates of ours. We buy our oil from there. But they continue to support the establishment of madrassahs, not only in the Middle East 

but around the world. And those madrassahs are teaching radical 

Wahhabism. And that is a threat to the entire world. 

So if we are putting our confidence in the Saudis to work with 

us, I think we need to do that with a jaundiced eye because so far 

they certainly haven’t stopped their expansion policy with the 

madrassahs. 

I had one more question here. The ballistic missile program of 

Iran, they have short-term missiles now. How far along are they 

with intercontinental ballistic missiles? And how likely is it that 

they would have the ability to deliver a missile to the United 

States at any time in the future? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, they just recently launched their second satellite. The first was in 2009. That is a critical demonstration 

that they have got ballistic missile capabilities. The real issue for 

them and for North Korea is whether they can downsize the nuclear device into a warhead-sized package or increase the thrust of 

their rocket capabilities to put the two together and deliver it over 

the long distances. 

But we know that both countries have been working hard on this 

for a long time. And reports concerning North Korea, in particular, 

are very troubling about their Taepodong 2 capabilities, which I 

think we have got to assume, at least in part, have been shared 

with Iran. 

So they are working from both ends perfecting the nuclear device, downsizing it, and increasing their rocket capabilities. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me make just one comment regarding regime 

change in Syria. I sincerely hope that the administration if they decide to take any military action, that it comes to Congress first. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

A question for all three panelists. What should we understand is 

going on internally in the Iranian Government right now in terms 

of the public feud between Ahmadinejad and the so-called supreme 

leader? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Congressman, I think the public feud is a reflection 

of the fact that President Ahmadinejad’s second term is coming to 

a close. And as it is coming to a close, Khamenei is exerting his 

authority, reminding people who the true supreme leader is, preparing for the next Presidential election to ensure that throughout 

the political system in Iran, they know who will be determining 

who the next President will be. So we are seeing clerics that for 

the last several years might have been edging toward Ahmadinejad 

because of his popularity now jumping ship from him knowing that 

Khamenei is the true source of power in this country. 

There isn’t a divide on policy vis-a`-vis the United States. One of 

them is not arguing to negotiate the nuclear agreement with the 

United States because out of a different ideological view, I think 

this is much more having to do with the distribution of power in 

the future next election and Khamenei’s continuing control over 

that political system. 

74

Ambassador BOLTON. I agree with that. I would just add one 

thing. I think in the past few years, there has been a shift of power 

toward the revolutionary guards in a variety of ways: Economic 

power. Certainly they control the nuclear weapons program. And I 

think part of the struggle that is playing out is the role of the revolutionary guards and whether indeed they are moving toward not 

just the theocracy, which they have now, but a kind of militarized 

theocracy. And I don’t think that is finished. I don’t think that 

power shift is finished yet. 

Mr. HEINONEN. And I believe that not very much will change in 

the nuclear program for a very simple reason, that when Iran 

started the last program in 1985–87, the President of the country 

was Khamenei. And the prime minister was Mousavi. So they both 

are the founding fathers of the current nuclear program. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And would you agree with your two colleagues on 

the panel that we should read this as jockeying for reassertion of 

dominance as pretty much an internal political thing in Iran with 

no significance in terms of shifting of form of government or policy? 

I am asking you, Mr. Heinonen. Mr. Heinonen? 

Mr. HEINONEN. I think that the way I see—I am not the policy 

person, but the way I see is that one of the few things which unifies Iran today is the nuclear program. It is a patriotic program. 

And they have seen in the last 8 to 10 years that it has brought 

the impact to the world states. And, therefore, I believe that they 

continue on this line, and they will be very unified. 

Mr. SATLOFF. I do want to concur with the thrust of Ambassador 

Bolton’s comment, which is that the Iranian regime is becoming 

more narrowly and narrowly militarized with less and less popular 

support. Even as it exerts control as it smashes dissent, it relies 

on a narrower and narrower base of support. 

It is still powerful. It is still in control of the country. But this 

is not the regime that can bring millions of people into the streets 

to chant ‘‘Death to America’’ as it did 20–30 years ago. The support 

is much narrower than ever before. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Does that suggest, Mr. Satloff, that there is longterm an instability built into that form of government, that regime, 

that, sooner or later, may manifest itself? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Absolutely. Just as there was a fundamental instability built into the Soviet system, there is fundamental instability 

built into the Iranian system. Our job is to hasten the decline so 

we don’t have to wait 70 years, as we did with the Soviets. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. How do we hasten the decline? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Well, here one way is to try to roll back Iranian 

successes. And I suggested in my testimony how to do that in Syria 

and Iraq and elsewhere. 

Secondly, I think that the projection of American power so that 

Iranians are convinced that we will use it to prevent their acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability is itself the key ingredient to 

a peaceful resolution. 

Here I have a somewhat disagreement with Ambassador Bolton. 

I don’t think we yet have the test of whether the Iranians have had 

to make the choice because I don’t think the Iranians are yet convinced that there is a significant price to pay for them approaching 

the line. Once they are convinced, then we will have the test. 

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Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam 

Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Excellent questions, Mr. 

Connolly. 

And we are so pleased to have had you gentlemen as our witnesses. It really was an enlightening committee hearing. And we 

thank you for taking the time to be with us. 

And, with that, the committee has adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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