IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0635

Filed September 22, 2021

JAMES DEAN ARNESON,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Rustin T. 

Davenport, Judge.

James Arneson appeals the denial of his application for postconviction 

relief. AFFIRMED.

Travis M. Visser-Armbrust of TVA Law P.L.L.C., Sheldon, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J. and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

A jury found James Arneson guilty of two counts of third-degree sexual 

abuse in connection with acts committed on a teen. The court of appeals affirmed 

his judgment and sentence. See State v. Arneson, No. 16-0808, 2017 WL 

4049324, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2017). Of relevance to this appeal, we 

stated, “Before charges were filed, a police officer asked Arneson if he would agree 

to an interview. Arneson went to the police station and was questioned about the 

sex-abuse allegation. During the interview, he provided police with a DNA 

sample.” Id. at *4. We rejected a claim that the DNA sample was obtained in 

violation of Arneson’s right to counsel. Id. We preserved a claim that Arneson’s

“trial attorney was ineffective in failing to challenge the interview and seizure of his 

DNA under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 

article I, sections 8 and 9 of the Iowa Constitution.” Id. at *5.

Arneson filed a postconviction-relief application in which he raised the

preserved ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. To prevail, Arneson had to 

show (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court 

concluded Arneson failed “to establish his burden for even the first prong of the 

test.” The court dismissed the application. Arneson appealed. 

“Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 

section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches 

and seizures.” State v. Warren, 955 N.W.2d 848, 859 (Iowa 2021) (citing U.S. 

Const. amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8). “Subject to a few carefully drawn 

exceptions, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.” State 
3

v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Iowa 2004); see also State v. McGee, 959 N.W.2d 

432, 445 (Iowa 2021). One of the exceptions recognized by the supreme court is 

a consensual search or seizure. See Lewis, 675 N.W.2d at 522. “We ordinarily 

‘interpret the scope and purpose of the Iowa Constitution’s search and seizure 

provisions to track with federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment’ due to 

their nearly identical language, though we remain cognizant of our duty to 

independently interpret the Iowa Constitution.” Warren, 955 N.W.2d at 859

(citation omitted).

Arneson argues the two constitutional provisions as one. He concedes he 

consented to the warrantless seizure of his DNA but asserts his consent was 

involuntary and his trial attorney should have raised the issue. 

Voluntariness of consent requires consideration of several factors:

[P]ersonal characteristics of the [consenter], such as age, education, 

intelligence, sobriety, and experience with the law; and features of 

the context in which the consent was given, such as the length of 

detention or questioning, the substance of any discussion between 

the [consenter] and police preceding the consent, whether the 

[consenter] was free to leave or was subject to restraint, and whether 

the [consenter’s] contemporaneous reaction to the search was 

consistent with consent.

State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 378 (Iowa 2007) (emphasis omitted). The district 

court addressed these factors as follows:

During the police interview, the detective questioning Arneson 

is in plain clothes and seated at the end of the table from Arneson.

The detective is not in between Arneson and the door of the interview 

room. Arneson even states at one point, “See I’m not looking at you 

as a detective prosecuting me, I’m looking at you as the guy in the 

middle.” As pointed out in the State’s Brief in Resistance, the 

detective told Arneson that he was free to go, told him he was not 

under arrest, and explained the way that Arneson could easily leave 

the building. Further, Arneson arrived at the police station voluntarily 
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and was not arrested until approximately one year later. Arneson 

even left the room at one point to use the restroom.

. . . .

. . . [T]he detective begins by asking Arneson if he 

understands what DNA is and the different sources of DNA. The 

detective then provides explanation and information to these

questions. The detective asks Arneson if his DNA would show up on 

the victim’s body after an examination. The detective proceeds to 

say that he is asking Arneson for his DNA to compare to the victim’s 

examination kit. Arneson then responds, “This is crazy! You can 

have my DNA, I don’t care.” Later on in the interview, Arneson also 

says, “Let’s do your DNA. I’m going to give my DNA because I didn’t 

do anything . . . .” Therefore, the Court finds that Arneson gave

voluntary consent to the DNA sample and it was not coerced.

The record, including a recording and transcript of the police interview, supports 

the district court’s findings. Reviewing the record de novo, we also note that 

Arneson was sixty-two years old, had a GED and “a degree in reinforced plastics, 

fiberglass,” and had extensive work experience including employment “as a 

superintendent for a construction company” and supervisory duties over nineteen 

people. Arneson seemed unimpaired during the interview, although he 

acknowledged an addiction to cold pills. As for Arneson’s familiarity with the law, 

he knew the matter was serious enough to ask for an attorney. He also asked the 

detective “why” the detective wanted his DNA and, when told it was for comparison 

purposes, said “I understand.” Notably, the detective did not dissuade Arneson 

from retaining counsel, nor did he sugar coat the purpose of the DNA sample. 

Even with an understanding of its import, Arneson said, “I want to give you the 

DNA, I think that’s fair.” He repeated, “I haven’t done anything, but you’re more 

than welcome to have the DNA.” “Want” and “welcome” are not words of coercion.

Like the district court, we conclude Arneson voluntarily consented to give 

the detective a DNA sample. It follows that Arneson’s trial attorney could not have 
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performed deficiently in failing to seek suppression of the sample under the Fourth 

Amendment. 

Arneson also mounts a Fifth Amendment challenge to the concededly 

consensual taking of his DNA. At the same time, he acknowledges “[t]he taking of 

a sample of a person’s bodily fluids was a matter under the purview of the Fourth 

Amendment’s restrictions.” His concession is apt. The Fifth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution protects testimonial evidence. See State v. Decker, 744 

N.W.2d 346, 354–55 (Iowa 2008). The DNA sample was non-testimonial 

evidence. See id. at 355 (“[C]ompelling an arrested suspect to submit to 

fingerprinting, photographing, or other physical measurements . . . or to submit to 

a blood test does not result in the gathering of testimonial evidence.”); see also

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (“Since the blood test evidence, 

although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner’s testimony 

nor evidence relating to some communication or writing by the petitioner, it was 

not inadmissible on [Fifth Amendment] privilege grounds.”); cf. Mitchell v 

Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2532–39 (2019) (analyzing a warrantless seizure of 

blood from an unconscious person under the Fourth Amendment); McGee, 959 

N.W.2d at 435 (applying Mitchell “to cases of suspected driving while under the 

influence of controlled substances, in addition to alcohol-related cases”). Because 

the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable, Arneson’s attorney did not perform deficiently 

in failing to seek suppression on this ground.

We affirm the district court’s denial and dismissal of Arneson’s 

postconviction-relief application.

AFFIRMED.