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*********************************************** 
KRISTINE CASEY ET AL. v. GOVERNOR

NED LAMONT

(SC 20494)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,

Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 28-9 (a)), ‘‘[i]n the event of serious disaster . . . the

Governor may proclaim that a state of civil preparedness emergency

exists . . . .’’

The plaintiffs, the owners of a pub located in Connecticut, sought relief in

connection with the issuance of certain executive orders by the defendant, the governor of the state of Connecticut, amid the COVID-19

pandemic. In response to the pandemic, the governor proclaimed a civil

preparedness emergency pursuant to § 28-9 (a) and issued the challenged

executive orders in an attempt to contain and mitigate the spread of

COVID-19, including orders that limited various activities at bars and

restaurants throughout the state. The plaintiffs closed their pub after

determining that it would not be profitable to operate the pub while

complying with the executive orders. The plaintiffs sought an injunction

precluding the enforcement of the executive orders and a judgment

declaring the orders unconstitutional. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ requests for relief and rendered judgment for the governor. The

plaintiffs appealed to this court upon certification by the Chief Justice

pursuant to statute (§ 52-265a) that a matter of substantial public interest

was involved. Held:

1. The governor did not exceed his statutory authority when he issued the

challenged executive orders: on the basis of the text and legislative

history of both § 28-9 (a) and another related statute (§ 28-1 (2)) that

refers to civil preparedness emergencies under § 28-9 and that defines

the term ‘‘major disaster,’’ as well as a declaration by the president of

the United States that the COVID-19 pandemic was of sufficient severity

and magnitude to be deemed a major disaster under federal law that

embraces a narrower definition of ‘‘major disaster’’ than that set forth

in § 28-1 (2), this court concluded that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a ‘‘serious disaster’’ for which the governor could proclaim the

existence of a civil preparedness emergency under § 28-9 (a); moreover,

such a proclamation empowered the governor, pursuant to § 28-9 (b)

(1), to modify or suspend any law or requirement that conflicts with

the efficient and expeditious execution of civil preparedness functions

or the protection of public health, and, pursuant to § 28-9 (b) (7), to

take steps that are reasonably necessary in light of the emergency to

protect the health, safety and welfare of the people of Connecticut,

and all of the challenged executive orders fell within either or both of

those provisions.

2. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that § 28-9 (b) (1) and

(7) was an unconstitutional delegation by the General Assembly of its

legislative powers to the governor, in violation of the separation of

powers provision of the Connecticut constitution: in enacting § 28-9,

the General Assembly set forth the policy for the governor to follow in

the event of a serious disaster and provided standards that both limited

the governor’s authority to act and were sufficient to guide the exercise

of his authority, as the governor could act under § 28-9 (b) (1) only after

he proclaimed a civil preparedness emergency or declared a public

health emergency, his actions under that provision were limited in duration and to suspending or modifying, rather than repealing, laws, and

only to the extent that they were in conflict with the execution of civil

preparedness functions or were required to protect public health, and

the governor could act under § 28-9 (b) (7) only after he proclaimed a civil

preparedness emergency and only to the extent reasonably necessary

to protect the health, safety and welfare of the people of Connecticut;

moreover, it was reasonable for the legislature to conclude that the

executive branch would be far better suited to respond to a serious

disaster with the speed and flexibility needed to protect the public health
and welfare, as the legislature is not in session continuously and would

not be well positioned to mount a rapid response to a serious disaster,

especially one that develops and evolves quickly and unpredictably, and

thus requires an ongoing and agile response; furthermore, a legislative

committee with statutory authority to disapprove of the governor’s public health emergency declaration provided oversight of his actions, and

the legislature had the ability to impose greater oversight or to amend

or repeal § 28-9 to further limit the governor’s authority.

Argued December 11, 2020—officially released March 29, 2021*

Procedural History

Action to enjoin the defendant from enforcing certain

executive orders, and for other relief, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven

and transferred to the judicial district of Waterbury,

Complex Litigation Docket, where the case was tried

to the court, Bellis, J.; judgment denying the plaintiffs’

request for injunctive and declaratory relief, and the

plaintiff, upon certification by the Chief Justice pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a that a matter of substantial public interest was at issue, appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Jonathan J. Klein, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Philip Miller, assistant attorney general, with whom,

on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, Clare

E. Kindall, solicitor general, and Alma Rose Nunley,

assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

McDONALD, J. For more than one year now, the

world has been in the unyielding grip of a highly virulent

infectious disease that, to date, has infected approximately 127 million people worldwide and has killed

more than 2.7 million individuals. Of those deaths, about

20 percent, or approximately 549,000, have been in the

United States of America. In Connecticut alone, more

than 305,000 people have been infected and more than

7800 have died.1 These numbers, while jarring on their

own, tell but one part of the enormous toll inflicted on

society since the pandemic’s onset. Around the country—indeed the world—large segments of economic

activity have been severely disrupted, if not fallen into

collapse, millions of people have lost their employment,

many hospitals and other health-care operations have

been overrun by gravely ill and dying patients, and

extraordinary lockdowns ordered by government officials, in an effort to abate the rate of infection, have

limited the free flow of personal and commercial activity. As this opinion is issued, it is uncertain when, or

how, the pandemic will end.

The disease that has caused so much death and damage is known as COVID-19. It is a respiratory disease

caused by a virus that is transmitted easily from person

to person and can result in serious illness or death.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the virus is primarily spread through

respiratory droplets from infected individuals coughing,

sneezing, or talking while in close proximity to other

people. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, How

COVID-19 Spreads (last updated October 28, 2020),

available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/

prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html (last visited March 29, 2021). On January 31, 2020, the United

States Department of Health and Human Services

declared a national public health emergency, effective

January 27, 2020, on the basis of the rising number of

confirmed COVID-19 cases in the United States. United

States Department of Health & Human Services, Press

Release, Secretary Azar Declares Public Health Emergency for United States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus

(January 31, 2020), available at https://www.hhs.gov/

about/news/2020/01/31/secretary-azar-declares-publichealth-emergency-us-2019-novel-coronavirus.html (last

visited March 29, 2021). The CDC explained that COVID19 ‘‘represents a tremendous public health threat.’’ Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Press Release,

Update on COVID-19 (February 21, 2020), available at

https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/t0221-cdc-telebriefing-covid-19.html (last visited March 29, 2021).

With this context in mind, we turn to the matter before

us, which requires this court to consider the extent of

the governor’s authority to issue executive orders during the civil preparedness emergency he declared pursu-
ant to General Statutes § 28-9 in response to the COVID19 pandemic. In particular, we consider whether the

defendant, Governor Ned Lamont, lawfully issued certain executive orders that limited various commercial

activities at bars and restaurants throughout the state.

To that end, we must determine whether the COVID19 pandemic constitutes a ‘‘serious disaster’’ pursuant

to § 28-9 and whether that statute empowers the governor to issue the challenged executive orders. Because

we conclude that § 28-9 provides authority for the governor to issue the challenged executive orders, we also

consider whether § 28-9 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the governor in violation

of the separation of powers provision of the Connecticut constitution. See Conn. Const., art. II. We conclude

that the statute passes constitutional muster.

The pleadings and the record reveal the following

undisputed facts and procedural history. On March 10,

2020, ‘‘[i]n response to the global pandemic of [COVID19],’’ Governor Lamont ‘‘declare[d] a public health

emergency and civil preparedness emergency throughout the [s]tate, pursuant to [General Statutes §§] 19a131a and 28-9 . . . .’’ Governor Lamont has renewed

the declaration of both emergencies twice, most recently

on January 26, 2021. The emergencies currently remain

in effect until April 20, 2021. On March 13, 2020, three

days after Governor Lamont’s declaration, President

Donald J. Trump made ‘‘an emergency determination

under [§] 501 (b) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster

Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. [§§ 5121

–5207 (Stafford Act)].’’ Letter from President Donald J.

Trump to Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Chad F. Wolf (March 13, 2020) p. 1. On

March 28, 2020, President Trump determined that,

beginning on January 20, 2020, the impacts of the

COVID-19 pandemic on Connecticut ‘‘are of sufficient

severity and magnitude to warrant a major disaster

declaration under the [Stafford Act] . . . .’’ Federal

Emergency Management Agency, Connecticut, Major

Disaster and Related Determinations, 85 Fed. Reg.

31,542 (May 26, 2020).

Following Governor Lamont’s declaration of the public health and civil preparedness emergencies, he promulgated a series of executive orders in an attempt to

contain and mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Relevant

to this appeal, on March 16, 2020, he issued Executive

Order No. 7D, which provides, among other things, that

‘‘any location licensed for [on premise] consumption

of alcoholic liquor in the [s]tate of Connecticut . . .

shall only serve food or [nonalcoholic] beverages for

[off premise] consumption.’’ Executive Order No. 7D

(March 16, 2020). In response to the rapidly evolving

COVID-19 pandemic, Governor Lamont continued to

promulgate a series of executive orders modifying

Executive Order No. 7D. Specifically, in April, 2020,

Governor Lamont issued Executive Order No. 7X, which
extended to May 20, 2020, Executive Order No. 7D’s

limitations on bars and restaurants. Given that the state

had made some progress in stemming the spread of

COVID-19, in May, 2020, Governor Lamont issued guidance called ‘‘Reopen Connecticut’’ to begin reopening

portions of the state’s economy. The goal of Reopen

Connecticut was to ‘‘[p]roactively protect public health

and speed up the pace of economic, educational, and

community recovery while restoring Connecticut’s quality of life.’’ N. Lamont, Reopen Connecticut: Sector

Rules for May 20th Reopen (May 18, 2020) (Reopen

Connecticut), available at https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/

DECD/Covid_Business_Recovery/CTReopens_Offices_C4

_V1.pdf (last visited March 29, 2021). In service of that

goal, Governor Lamont issued Executive Order No. 7MM,

which permitted restaurants to serve food outside and

ordered that ‘‘[a]lcoholic liquor may be served only in

connection with outdoor dining . . . .’’ Executive

Order No. 7MM (May 12, 2020). Thereafter, he issued

Executive Order No. 7ZZ, which allowed the resumption

of some indoor dining except that the ban on ‘‘the sale

of alcohol by certain permittees without the sale of

food . . . shall remain in effect and [is] extended

through July 20, 2020.’’ Executive Order No. 7ZZ (June

16, 2020). In July, 2020, and in response to certain

developments related to COVID-19, Governor Lamont

announced that he was suspending phase 3 of the Reopen

Connecticut plan, which was previously scheduled to

start on July 20, 2020.

In compliance with Executive Order No. 7D, and after

determining that it would not be profitable to operate

a takeout business, the plaintiffs, Kristine Casey and

Black Sheep Enterprise, LLC, closed their establishment, Casey’s Irish Pub, on March 16, 2020. Casey is

the permittee of a cafe ́ liquor permit for the pub, which

has fifteen stools at the bar, two high-top tables, a pool

table, and a maximum capacity of fifty-nine patrons.

The pub does not typically serve hot meals, and approximately 90 percent of its revenue comes from the sale of

alcohol. The parties agree that, because of the physical

location of the pub, ‘‘[o]utdoor service is not a viable

option . . . because the tables would completely block

the sidewalk, and there would be no protection from

cars approaching to park . . . .’’ The parties also stipulate that ‘‘[p]reparing takeout meals and sealed alcoholic beverages for [off premise] consumption is not a

viable option . . . as Casey knows from her experience in operating the pub and dealing with her customer

base that, without the pub atmosphere, there would be

insufficient interest from her clientele to justify the

expense of providing such service.’’ The plaintiffs’ pub

remains closed, and the parties stipulate that ‘‘it is not

economically or physically feasible for [the plaintiffs]

to reopen the pub.’’ Since the pub’s shutdown, the plaintiffs have continued to pay rent in the amount of $3200

per month and operating expenses totaling approxi-
mately $14,000 per month without any income stream.

In June, 2020, the plaintiffs commenced this action

against Governor Lamont, requesting the court to

declare that he acted beyond his statutory and constitutional authority when he issued Executive Order Nos.

7D, 7G, 7N, 7T, 7X, 7MM and 7ZZ.2 The operative complaint sought a ‘‘temporary and permanent injunction’’

against the enforcement of the challenged executive

orders. The complaint also requested a judgment declaring the executive orders unconstitutional. The parties

filed a stipulation of facts, and, after the filing of briefs,

the case was tried to the court by way of oral argument

and based on the briefs and the parties’ stipulation

of facts.3

Thereafter, the trial court, Bellis, J., issued a memorandum of decision, in which it denied the plaintiffs’

request for injunctive and declaratory relief, and the

court rendered judgment for Governor Lamont. The

court reasoned that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes

a ‘‘serious disaster’’ under § 28-9 (a) and Governor

Lamont’s executive orders were authorized by § 28-9

(b) (1) and (7). The court also concluded that § 28-9 is

not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the governor because, when the General Assembly

passed § 28-9, ‘‘it set forth a clear legislative policy’’ and

‘‘gave the governor the ability to implement measures

to achieve this goal.’’

The plaintiffs appealed directly to this court pursuant

to General Statutes § 52-265a, and the Chief Justice

subsequently certified that this action involves a matter

of substantial public interest. On appeal, the plaintiffs

do not contend that the restrictions Governor Lamont

imposed on the pub were unreasonable or were not

related to the public health, safety, and welfare of the

people of this state. Rather, they claim that Governor

Lamont exceeded his statutory authority by issuing the

challenged executive orders. The plaintiffs further contend that, even if Governor Lamont’s executive orders

are valid under § 28-9, § 28-9 (b) (1) and (7) is an unconstitutional delegation by the General Assembly of its

legislative powers in violation of the separation of powers provision of the Connecticut constitution. See Conn.

Const., art. II.

Governor Lamont disagrees and contends that,

because the COVID-19 pandemic is a ‘‘serious disaster,’’

§ 28-9 provides him with statutory authority to limit

the pub’s operation. Governor Lamont further contends

that § 28-9 does not violate the separation of powers

provision of the Connecticut constitution because it

does not infringe on legislative authority and it provides

sufficient standards for implementation.4

Following oral argument, we issued a per curiam

ruling on December 31, 2020, in which we affirmed the

judgment of the trial court, explaining that Governor
Lamont’s actions to date had been constitutional. We

indicated at that time that a full opinion would follow.

This is that opinion.

I

We begin with the plaintiffs’ contention that, by issuing the challenged executive orders, Governor Lamont

exceeded his statutory authority. Whether the governor

has statutory authority to issue the challenged executive orders during a proclaimed civil preparedness

emergency turns on whether the COVID-19 pandemic

constitutes a ‘‘serious disaster’’ under § 28-9 (a). This

presents a question of statutory interpretation over

which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Gould v. Freedom

of Information Commission, 314 Conn. 802, 810, 104

A.3d 727 (2014). We review § 28-9 in accordance with

General Statutes § 1-2z and our familiar principles of

statutory construction. See, e.g., Sena v.American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., 333 Conn. 30, 45–46,

213 A.3d 1110 (2019).

We begin with the text of § 28-9 (a), which provides

in relevant part: ‘‘In the event of serious disaster, enemy

attack, sabotage or other hostile action or in the event

of the imminence thereof, the Governor may proclaim

that a state of civil preparedness emergency exists, in

which event the Governor may personally take direct

operational control of any or all parts of the civil preparedness forces and functions in the state. Any such

proclamation shall be effective upon filing with the

Secretary of the State. . . .’’ Governor Lamont does not

contend that the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted from

an ‘‘enemy attack, sabotage or other hostile action

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 28-9 (a). Rather, the governor

relies on the term ‘‘serious disaster’’ to justify the civil

preparedness emergency proclamation. The plaintiffs

contend that the COVID-19 pandemic is not a ‘‘serious

disaster’’ because the General Assembly did not intend

that term ‘‘to include the contagion of disease.’’ Governor Lamont contends that, regardless of whether the

statute is plain and unambiguous, the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a ‘‘serious disaster.’’

The term ‘‘serious disaster’’ is not defined in § 28-9 or

in Chapter 517 of the General Statutes. The term ‘‘major

disaster,’’ however, is defined in the definitional provision of Chapter 517.5 Specifically, General Statutes § 28-

1 (2) defines ‘‘major disaster’’ as ‘‘any catastrophe

including, but not limited to, any hurricane, tornado,

storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm or drought, or, regardless of cause,

any fire, flood, explosion, or man-made disaster in any

part of this state that, (A) in the determination of the

President, causes damage of sufficient severity and

magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under

the [Stafford Act], as amended from time to time, to

supplement the efforts and available resources of this
state, local governments within the state, and disaster

relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by such catastrophe, or (B)

in the determination of the Governor, requires the declaration of a civil preparedness emergency pursuant to

section 28-9.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Because the term ‘‘catastrophe’’ is not defined in § 28-

1, we look to its common dictionary definition. See,

e.g., Studer v. Studer, 320 Conn. 483, 488, 131 A.3d 240

(2016); see also General Statutes § 1-1 (a). ‘‘Catastrophe’’ is often defined as ‘‘a momentous tragic usu[ally]

sudden event marked by effects ranging from extreme

misfortune to utter overthrow or ruin . . . .’’ Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary (1961) p. 351; accord

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003)

p. 194. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused vast disruption to everyday life, and it has had a devastating impact

on our economy. K. Phaneuf, ‘‘CT Economy Will Struggle Until at Least 2030 To Recover from COVID, UConn

Report Warns,’’ CT Mirror, October 23, 2020, available

at https://ctmirror.org/2020/10/23/ct-economy-will-struggle

-until-at-least-2030-to-recover-from-covid-uconn-report

-warns/ (last visited March 29, 2021). Most tragically,

the United States has now recorded more COVID-19

deaths than the total number of Americans killed during

World Wars I and II combined. See Congressional

Research Service, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics (Updated July 29,

2020) p. 2, available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/

product/pdf/RL/RL32492 (last visited March 29, 2021).

Thus, by any reasonable measure, the COVID-19 pandemic certainly fits the dictionary definition of catastrophe.

The plaintiffs note, however, that the enumerated

list that follows the term ‘‘catastrophe’’ in § 28-1 (2) is

limited to ‘‘weather conditions, seismic activity, fire,

explosion and man-made conditions . . . .’’ As a result,

the plaintiffs argue that there is no language in § 28-1

(2) that indicates any legislative ‘‘intent to include the

contagion of disease.’’ The plaintiffs argue, albeit implicitly, that we should apply the statutory interpretation

rule of ejusdem generis, which provides that, ‘‘when a

general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the

general word or phrase will be interpreted to include

only items of the same class as those listed.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Terwilliger, 314

Conn. 618, 658, 104 A.3d 638 (2014).

Although it is true that the listed examples of catastrophes do not include the contagion of disease, the plaintiffs’ argument fails to consider that the list is preceded

by the phrase ‘‘including, but not limited to . . . .’’

(Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 28-1 (2). By

including this phrase, the legislature evinced its intent

that a ‘‘major disaster’’ not be limited in scope to the

enumerated events, as the plaintiffs contend.6 See
United States v. West, 671 F.3d 1195, 1200–1201 (10th

Cir. 2012) (citing cases holding that doctrine of ejusdem

generis is inapplicable when statutory enumeration is

preceded by phrase ‘‘including, but not limited to’’); see

also Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 324 Conn.

470, 479, 153 A.3d 615 (2016) (‘‘[r]eading the phrase

‘including but not limited to,’ as expansive’’); Lusa v.

Grunberg, 101 Conn. App. 739, 756, 923 A.2d 795 (2007)

(‘‘the phrase [including but not limited to] convey[s] a

clear intention that the items listed in the definition do

not constitute an exhaustive or exclusive list’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, as Governor Lamont

contends, an expansive reading is warranted in this

context given that the General Assembly instructed him

to exercise the powers delegated to him under § 28-9

broadly for ‘‘the protection of the public health’’; General Statutes § 28-9 (b) (1); and ‘‘to protect the health,

safety and welfare of the people of the state . . . .’’

General Statutes § 28-9 (b) (7). A narrow interpretation

of the circumstances under which the governor would

have authority to proclaim a civil preparedness emergency, as the plaintiffs contend, would frustrate this

legislative intent.

Moreover, it would be absurd for the statutory scheme

to be interpreted such that the governor could declare

a civil preparedness emergency for an event such as a

snowstorm, but not for the worst pandemic that has

impacted the state in more than one century. We decline

to construe the meaning of ‘‘major disaster’’ in such a

manner. See, e.g., Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v.

Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 803, 955 A.2d

15 (2008) (‘‘[i]n construing a statute, common sense

must be used and courts must assume that a reasonable

and rational result was intended’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

To the extent the meaning of ‘‘major disaster’’ is ambiguous given the tension between the enumerated list of

catastrophes and the legislature’s use of the phrase

‘‘including, but not limited to,’’ we look to extratextual

sources to gain further insight into whether the legislature intended that a global pandemic could constitute

a major disaster. The legislative history of both §§ 28-1

(2) and 28-9 provides further support for the conclusion

that the General Assembly did not intend the term ‘‘major

disaster’’ to be limited only to catastrophes caused by

weather conditions, seismic activity, fire, explosion and

man-made conditions, as the plaintiffs contend. Under

earlier versions of § 28-9, the governor was authorized

to proclaim a civil preparedness emergency ‘‘[i]n the

event of serious natural disaster, enemy attack, sabotage or other hostile action or in the event of the imminence thereof . . . .’’ General Statutes (1958 Rev.) § 28-

9; see also General Statutes (1955 Supp.) § 1913d (adding ‘‘serious natural disaster’’ to list of events). At that

time, Chapter 517 did not contain a definition of ‘‘disaster’’ or ‘‘serious national disaster.’’ In 1975, however,
the General Assembly inserted a definition of ‘‘disaster’’

into § 28-1. See Public Acts 1975, No. 75-643, § 1 (P.A.

75-643), codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 28-

1 (b). It provided in relevant part: ‘‘ ‘Disaster’ means

occurrence or imminent threat of widespread or severe

damage, injury or loss of life or property resulting from

any natural or manmade cause, including but not limited

to, fire, flood, earthquake, wind, storm, wave action,

oil spill or other water contamination . . . epidemic,

air contamination, blight, drought, infestation, explosion, riot or hostile military or paramilitary action.’’

(Emphasis added.) P.A. 75-643, § 1. Accordingly, at least

as early as 1975, the General Assembly clearly anticipated that an epidemic could constitute a ‘‘disaster.’’

Since 1975, the General Assembly has amended the

definitions in § 28-1 on several occasions in order to

align state law with the federal Stafford Act. See Sena

v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.,

supra, 333 Conn. 50 n.13. Specifically, in 1979, the General Assembly removed the definition of ‘‘disaster’’ from

§ 28-1 and added the definition of ‘‘major disaster’’ to

better align state and federal law. Public Acts 1979, No.

79-417, § 1 (P.A. 79-417), codified at General Statutes

(Rev. to 1981) § 28-1 (b); see 22 H.R. Proc., Pt. 5, 1979

Sess., p. 1648 (‘‘The intent of this [b]ill is to align the

[s]tate laws with the [f]ederal laws. . . . Further, [the

bill] inserts two new definitions for major disasters

and emergency, while repealing the old definition for

disaster. Again, this is done to align [f]ederal and [s]tate

legislation.’’). Public Act No. 79-417 defined ‘‘major

disaster’’ in relevant part as ‘‘any hurricane, storm,

flood, high water, wind driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, drought, fire, explosion, or other

catastrophe in any part of this state which, in the determination of the president, causes damage of sufficient

severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974

. . . .’’ P.A. 79-417, § 1. This definition was nearly identical to the federal definition of ‘‘major disaster’’ in the

federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974. See Disaster Relief

Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 102, 88 Stat. 143,

144, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5122 (2) (Supp. IV 1974).

Although the definition of ‘‘major disaster’’ did not list

epidemic or pandemic, there is nothing in the legislative

history to indicate that the General Assembly intended

that an epidemic or pandemic of sufficient severity

could not constitute a ‘‘major disaster,’’ when, just four

years earlier, it evinced its intent that it could constitute

a ‘‘disaster.’’ The changes to the definition were merely

intended to align state and federal law.7

The plaintiffs’ contention that the term ‘‘major disaster’’ is limited to weather conditions, seismic activity,

fire, explosion and man-made conditions is further

belied by the legislature’s changes to the definition of

‘‘major disaster’’ in Number 06-15 of the 2006 Public
Acts (P.A. 06-15). In 1988, Congress amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and changed the definition of

‘‘major disaster’’ to ‘‘any natural catastrophe (including

any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven

water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought)

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The Disaster Relief and

Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988, Pub. L.

No. 100-707, § 103, 102 Stat. 4689, 4690, codified at 42

U.S.C. § 5122 (2) (1988). Rather than adopting the new

federal definition, as the General Assembly had previously done, in P.A. 06-15, it enacted a broader definition of ‘‘major disaster’’ by omitting the word ‘‘natural’’

and adding the phrases ‘‘including, but not limited to’’

and ‘‘manmade disaster . . . .’’ P.A. 06-15, § 1, codified

at General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 28-1 (2). Thus, the

current statutory definition of ‘‘major disaster’’ under

Connecticut law is broader than the federal definition,

which is limited to ‘‘natural catastrophe[s]’’; 42 U.S.C.

§ 5122 (2) (2018); and encompasses a wider category

of catastrophes beyond those listed in the federal definition. See General Statutes § 28-1 (2). Significantly, however, although the federal definition of ‘‘major disaster’’

is narrower than the state definition, President Trump

concluded that the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic

on Connecticut were ‘‘of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a major disaster declaration under

the [Stafford Act] . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Federal

Emergency Management Agency, supra, 85 Fed. Reg.

31,542. It would be illogical to conclude that the effects

of the COVID-19 pandemic in this state were of sufficient severity to constitute a ‘‘major disaster’’ under the

narrower federal definition of ‘‘major disaster’’ but not

sufficient to satisfy the broader state definition of the

same term.8 We decline to construe the statute in such

a manner. Accordingly, we conclude that the COVID19 pandemic constitutes a ‘‘major disaster,’’ as that term

is defined in § 28-1 (2).

Logically, it would seem that the meaning of the term

‘‘major disaster’’ set forth in § 28-1 (2) is substantially

similar to the term ‘‘serious disaster’’ in § 28-9 (a). See

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, supra,

pp. 1363, 2073 (defining ‘‘major’’ as ‘‘involving grave

risk: serious’’ and defining ‘‘serious’’ as ‘‘grave in disposition, appearance, or manner’’). As this court has often

explained, however, ‘‘we assume that the legislature

has a different intent when it uses different terms in

the same statutory scheme.’’ Southern New England

Telephone Co. v. Cashman, 283 Conn. 644, 662, 931

A.2d 142 (2007) (Katz, J., concurring). Thus, we must

determine whether a major disaster also constitutes a

serious disaster. This question is quickly resolved based

on a review of the statutory scheme. Section 28-1 (2)

provides that a ‘‘major disaster’’ includes ‘‘any catastrophe’’ that ‘‘(B) in the determination of the Governor,

requires the declaration of a civil preparedness emer-
gency pursuant to section 28-9.’’ The General Assembly’s reference to a civil preparedness emergency under

§ 28-9 in the definition of ‘‘major disaster’’ set forth in

§ 28-1 (2) makes clear that it intended that any event

that constitutes a ‘‘catastrophe’’ under § 28-1 (2) also

constitutes a ‘‘serious disaster’’ if the governor declares

a civil preparedness emergency under § 28-9. Put differently, if an event constitutes a ‘‘catastrophe’’ under § 28-

1 (2), and the governor determines that the proclamation of a civil preparedness emergency under § 28-9 is

required to address it, then the ‘‘catastrophe’’ necessarily is both a ‘‘major disaster’’ and a ‘‘serious disaster.’’9

Because, as we have explained, the COVID-19 pandemic

constitutes a ‘‘catastrophe,’’ and Governor Lamont has

declared a civil preparedness emergency under § 28-9,

we conclude that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes

a ‘‘serious disaster’’ under § 28-9 (a).

Having concluded that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a serious disaster and, therefore, that Governor

Lamont was statutorily authorized to proclaim a civil

preparedness emergency, we must determine whether

such proclamation empowered him to issue the challenged executive orders. Relevant to this appeal, subsection (b) of § 28-9 provides in relevant part that, ‘‘upon

[a civil preparedness emergency] proclamation, the following provisions of this section and the provisions of

section 28-11 shall immediately become effective and

shall continue in effect until the Governor proclaims

the end of the civil preparedness emergency:

‘‘(1) Following the Governor’s proclamation of a civil

preparedness emergency pursuant to subsection (a) of

this section or declaration of a public health emergency

pursuant to section 19a-131a, the Governor may modify

or suspend in whole or in part, by order as hereinafter

provided, any statute, regulation or requirement or part

thereof whenever the Governor finds such statute, regulation or requirement, or part thereof, is in conflict

with the efficient and expeditious execution of civil

preparedness functions or the protection of the public

health. The Governor shall specify in such order the

reason or reasons therefor and any statute, regulation or

requirement or part thereof to be modified or suspended

and the period, not exceeding six months unless sooner

revoked, during which such order shall be enforced.

. . .

* * *

‘‘(7) The Governor may take such other steps as are

reasonably necessary in the light of the emergency to

protect the health, safety and welfare of the people of

the state, to prevent or minimize loss or destruction of

property and to minimize the effects of hostile action

. . . .’’

In short, following the proclamation of a civil preparedness emergency pursuant to § 28-9 (a), subsection
(b) (1) empowers the governor to modify or suspend

any statute, regulation or requirement that conflicts

with the efficient and expeditious execution of civil

preparedness functions or the protection of the public

health. Subsection (b) (7) additionally empowers the

governor to take other steps that are reasonably necessary in light of the emergency to protect the health,

safety, and welfare of the people of the state. All of the

challenged executive orders fall squarely within either

or both of these provisions.

Executive Order Nos. 7D and 7G, which closed bars

and restaurants to all on premise service of food and

beverages, were promulgated as part of a series of community mitigation strategies that were designed to

encourage social distancing and protect public health

and safety and to ‘‘increase containment of the virus

and to slow transmission of the virus . . . .’’ Executive

Order No. 7G (March 19, 2020). As the trial court noted,

it is ‘‘now common knowledge that COVID-19 is spread

by people who are in close physical contact with each

other, and it is also well known that people who are

drinking alcohol in bars tend to gather in close proximity in order to socialize.’’ Other executive orders similarly provided logistical guidance to bars and restaurants

in an effort to limit the number of people within these

establishments or otherwise effectuate Executive Order

No. 7D. See Executive Order No. 7N (March 26, 2020)

(directing businesses that remained open to serve food

and drink for off premise consumption to ‘‘limit

entrance of customers into their locations to the minimum extent necessary to pick up and/or pay for orders,

use touchless payment systems, and require remote

ordering and payment’’); Executive Order No. 7T (April

2, 2020) (expanding list of sealed containers of alcohol

that liquor permit holders could sell under conditions

set forth in Executive Order No. 7G); Executive Order

No. 7X (April 10, 2020) (extending Executive Order No.

7D’s limitations on bars and restaurants through May

20, 2020). Governor Lamont noted the importance of

each executive order to ‘‘reduc[ing] [the] spread of

COVID-19,’’ ‘‘increas[ing] containment of the virus,’’ and

‘‘slow[ing] transmission of the virus . . . .’’ Executive

Order No. 7G (March 19, 2020); accord Executive Order

No. 7T (April 2, 2020). These executive orders fell within

Governor Lamont’s authority under § 28-9 (b) (7) to

‘‘take such other steps as are reasonably necessary in

the light of the emergency to protect the health, safety

and welfare of the people of the state . . . .’’ Indeed,

the plaintiffs do not contend that the restrictions Governor Lamont imposed on the pub were unreasonable or

were not related to the public health, safety, and welfare

of the people of this state.

Finally, Governor Lamont issued Executive Order

Nos. 7MM and 7ZZ as the state began making progress

in stemming the spread of COVID-19 in order to ‘‘[p]roactively protect public health and speed up the pace of
economic, educational, and community recovery while

resorting Connecticut’s quality of life.’’ Reopen Connecticut, supra. Executive Order No. 7MM permitted

restaurants to serve food outside and ordered that

‘‘[a]lcoholic liquor . . . be served only in connection

with outdoor dining . . . .’’ Executive Order No. 7MM

(May 12, 2020). Governor Lamont explained in the executive order that, when on premise dining was first permitted, it was limited to outdoor service because

‘‘public health experts ha[d] determined that the risk

of transmission of COVID-19 [was] reduced in outdoor

areas, including where there is more sunlight, greater

air movement, and greater space to maintain distance

between people . . . .’’ Id. Thereafter, Governor

Lamont issued Executive Order No. 7ZZ, which allowed

the resumption of indoor dining except that the ban on

‘‘the sale of alcohol by certain permittees without the

sale of food . . . [was to] remain in effect and [was]

extended through July 20, 2020.’’ Executive Order No.

7ZZ (June 16, 2020). As with his earlier executive orders

restricting activities at bars and restaurants, Executive

Order Nos. 7MM and 7ZZ also fell within Governor

Lamont’s authority under § 28-9 (b) (7) to ‘‘take such

other steps as are reasonably necessary in the light of

the emergency to protect the health, safety and welfare

of the people of the state . . . .’’ In each of the challenged executive orders, Governor Lamont explained

the public health rationale that required the action in

order to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the

people of this state.

Moreover, Executive Order Nos. 7MM and 7ZZ are

also authorized by the governor’s authority under § 28-

9 (b) (1) to modify or suspend a statute if it conflicts

with ‘‘the efficient and expeditious execution of civil

preparedness functions or the protection of the public

health.’’ Executive Order No. 7MM specifically provides

that ‘‘[t]itle 30 of the . . . General Statutes, including

[§§] 30-22 (a) and 30-22a (a) . . . are modified to the

extent they conflict with, or create additional requirements [with respect to], the sale of alcoholic liquor

. . . .’’ Executive Order No. 7MM (May 12, 2020). General Statutes § 30-22a sets forth the terms of cafe ́ liquor

permits for the sale of alcoholic liquor. Executive Order

No. 7MM plainly modified § 30-22a (a), directing that,

if a cafe ́ intends to resume sales of alcoholic liquor for

on premise consumption, such liquor may be consumed

only outdoors and can be sold only in conjunction with

the sale of food. Executive Order No. 7ZZ expanded on

this modification of § 30-22a (a) by also requiring that

the sale of food be accompanied by the sale of alcoholic

liquor upon the resumption of indoor dining. Executive

Order No. 7ZZ also explicitly provides that ‘‘[§] 28-9 (b)

. . . authorizes the modification or suspension . . . of

any statute . . . that conflicts with the efficient and

expeditious execution of civil preparedness functions

or the protection of public health . . . .’’ Executive
Order No. 7ZZ (June 16, 2020). Both executive orders

are thus also supported by the governor’s authority

under § 28-9 (b) (1), which authorizes the governor to

modify or suspend any statute, regulation or requirement, if it conflicts with the efficient and expeditious

execution of civil preparedness functions or the protection of the public health. Accordingly, we conclude that

Governor Lamont did not exceed his statutory authority

when he issued the challenged executive orders in an

effort to contain the spread of COVID-19.

II

We now consider the plaintiffs’ contention that § 28-

9 (b) (1) and (7) is an unconstitutional delegation by

the General Assembly of its legislative powers to the

governor, in violation of the separation of power provision of the Connecticut constitution. See Conn. Const.,

art. II.

We begin with the relevant legal principles. A challenge to ‘‘[t]he constitutionality of a statute presents a

question of law over which our review is plenary. . . .

It [also] is well established that a validly enacted statute

carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality,

[and that] those who challenge its constitutionality must

sustain the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The court will

indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute’s

constitutionality . . . . Therefore, [w]hen a question

of constitutionality is raised, courts must approach it

with caution, examine it with care, and sustain the

legislation unless its invalidity is clear.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keane v. Fischetti, 300 Conn. 395,

402, 13 A.3d 1089 (2011).

‘‘The [c]onstitution of this state provides for the separation of the governmental functions into three basic

departments, legislative, executive and judicial, and it

is inherent in this separation, since the law-making function is vested exclusively in the legislative department,

that the [l]egislature cannot delegate the law-making

power to any other department or agency.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) University of Connecticut

Chapter, AAUP v. Governor, 200 Conn. 386, 394, 512

A.2d 152 (1986). We have explained that ‘‘[t]he primary

purpose of [the separation of powers] doctrine is to

prevent commingling of different powers of government

in the same hands. . . . The constitution achieves this

purpose by prescribing limitations and duties for each

branch that are essential to each branch’s independence

and performance of assigned powers. . . . It is axiomatic that no branch of government organized under a

constitution may exercise any power that is not explicitly bestowed by that constitution or that is not essential

to the exercise thereof. . . . [Thus] [t]he separation of

powers doctrine serves a dual function: it limits the

exercise of power within each branch, yet ensures the

independent exercise of that power.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Persels & Associates, LLC v. Banking Commissioner, 318 Conn. 652, 668–69, 122 A.3d

592 (2015).

Unlike the separation of powers doctrine that has

developed under the federal constitution, ‘‘the historical

evolution of Connecticut’s governmental system [has]

established a ‘tradition of harmony’ among the separate

branches of government . . . .’’ State v. McCleese, 333

Conn. 378, 419, 215 A.3d 1154 (2019). ‘‘Recognizing that

executive, legislative and judicial powers frequently

overlap, we have consistently held that the doctrine of

the separation of powers cannot be applied rigidly.’’

Bartholomew v. Schweizer, 217 Conn. 671, 676, 587 A.2d

1014 (1991). As we have recognized, ‘‘the great functions

of government are not divided in any such way that all

acts of the nature of the function of one department

can never be exercised by another department; such a

division is impracticable, and if carried out would result

in the paralysis of government. Executive, legislative

and judicial powers . . . of necessity overlap each

other, and cover many acts which are in their nature

common to more than one department.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Commission, 255 Conn. 78, 107, 762 A.2d 880

(2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 951, 121 S. Ct. 2594, 150

L. Ed. 2d 752 (2001). For example, the General Assembly

does not have exclusive responsibility for legislating.

Rather, the legislature and the governor work together

to pass legislation. See, e.g., Conn. Const., art. IV, § 15

(‘‘Each bill which shall have passed both houses of the

general assembly shall be presented to the governor.

. . . If the governor shall approve a bill, he shall sign

and transmit it to the secretary of the state, but if he

shall disapprove, he shall transmit it to the secretary

with his objections, and the secretary shall thereupon

return the bill with the governor’s objections to the

house in which it originated.’’).

A statute will be held unconstitutional on the ground

that it violates the separation of powers only if it ‘‘(1)

confers on one branch of government the duties which

belong exclusively to another branch . . . or (2) if it

confers the duties of one branch of government on

another branch which duties significantly interfere with

the orderly performance of the latter’s essential functions.’’ (Citation omitted.) University of Connecticut

Chapter, AAUP v. Governor, supra, 200 Conn. 394–95.

Applying these standards to § 28-9 (b) (1) and (7), we

conclude that the plaintiffs cannot meet their heavy

burden of establishing that the statute is a violation of

the separation of powers provision of article second of

the Connecticut constitution on the basis that it impermissibly delegates legislative authority to the governor.

Section 28-9 sets forth the General Assembly’s policy

that the state must be able to mount a rapid and agile

response to a ‘‘serious disaster,’’ and the executive
branch, namely, the governor, is most capable of carrying out that response. Significantly, although the ‘‘lawmaking power is in the legislative branch of our government and cannot constitutionally be delegated . . . the

General Assembly may carry out its legislative policies

within the police power of the state by delegating to

an administrative agency the power to fill in the details.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

New Milford v. SCA Services of Connecticut, Inc., 174

Conn. 146, 149, 384 A.2d 337 (1977). Put differently, the

General Assembly has ‘‘the right to determine in the

first instance what is the nature and extent of the danger

to the public health, safety, morals and welfare and

what are the measures best calculated to meet that

threat.’’ Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 55, 156 A.2d

508 (1959), appeal dismissed sub nom. Poe v. Ullman,

367 U.S. 497, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 6 L. Ed. 2d 989 (1961). Once

the General Assembly has made that determination, it

may carry out that policy by delegating to the executive

branch the power to ‘‘fill in the details’’ in order to

effectuate that policy.10 ‘‘In order to render admissible

such delegation of legislative power, however, it is necessary that the statute declare a legislative policy, establish primary standards for carrying it out, or lay down

an intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body must conform, with a proper regard for the

protection of the public interests and with such degree

of certainty as the nature of the case permits . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hogan v. Dept. of

Children & Families, 290 Conn. 545, 572, 964 A.2d

1213 (2009). As the United States Supreme Court has

explained, ‘‘[s]o long as Congress shall lay down by

legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated

authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action

is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mistretta v. United

States, 488 U.S. 361, 372, 109 S. Ct. 647, 102 L. Ed. 2d

714 (1989); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153

(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and

opinion of the court) (‘‘[w]hen the [p]resident acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes

all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate’’). That is, ‘‘[t]he constitutional question is whether Congress has supplied an intelligible

principle to guide the delegee’s use of discretion.’’

Gundy v. United States, U.S. , 139 S. Ct. 2116,

2123, 204 L. Ed. 2d 522 (2019) (plurality opinion). ‘‘[T]he

answer requires construing the challenged statute to

figure out what task it delegates and what instructions

it provides.’’ Id.

In enacting § 28-9, the General Assembly set forth the

policy for the governor to follow in the event of a serious

disaster. Specifically, through § 28-9 (b) (1), the General
Assembly’s policy directs that, upon the proclamation

of a civil preparedness emergency, or upon the declaration of a public health emergency under § 19a-131a,

the governor may ‘‘modify or suspend . . . any statute,

regulation or requirement or part thereof whenever the

Governor finds such statute, regulation or requirement,

or part thereof, is in conflict with the efficient and

expeditious execution of civil preparedness functions

or the protection of the public health.’’ (Emphasis

added.) Section 28-9 (b) (1) further requires the governor to specify the reasons for suspending or modifying

the statute, regulation or requirement and ‘‘the period,

not exceeding six months unless sooner revoked, during which such order shall be enforced.’’ (Emphasis

added.) The legislature set forth the standards that limit

the governor’s authority to act under § 28-9 (b) (1) in

three primary ways. First, the governor may act pursuant to subsection (b) (1) only after the governor has

proclaimed a civil preparedness emergency or declared

a public health emergency. Second, the governor’s

actions are limited to modifying or suspending—not

repealing—statutes or other regulations only to the

extent that they are in conflict with the execution of

civil preparedness functions or are required to protect

the public health, and the governor is required to specify

the reasons for the modification or suspension. Finally,

the governor’s actions have temporal limitations,

namely, the period of time the modification or suspension may be enforced is limited to six months.11 Therefore, any actions the governor takes under subsection

(b) (1) are temporary, that is, he cannot modify or suspend any statutes or regulations permanently.

Section 28-9 (b) (7) similarly makes clear that the

governor may take other steps to address the serious

disaster, only if they ‘‘are reasonably necessary in the

light of the emergency to protect the health, safety and

welfare of the people of the state, to prevent or minimize

loss or destruction of property and to minimize the

effects of hostile action.’’ In other words, the governor

may act under subsection (b) (7) only after he has

proclaimed a civil preparedness emergency, and his

actions are limited to those that are reasonably necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the

people of this state. Moreover, the governor may act

only to the extent that the health, safety, and welfare

of the people are implicated by this particular serious

disaster. The governor would not, for example, be able

to issue an executive order forbidding restaurants from

selling unhealthy foods during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Although eating healthy foods is undoubtedly related

to the health and welfare of the people of this state,

such an action is not reasonably necessary to address

the current pandemic. Likewise, should a hurricane of

sufficient severity require the governor to proclaim a

civil preparedness emergency, mandating that Connecticut citizens wear masks would not be a proper action
under subsection (b) (7) merely because it might have

the incidental health benefit of reducing the spread of

the common cold. Rather, the governor’s actions under

subsection (b) (7) must be reasonably necessary to

address the specific serious disaster that warranted the

civil preparedness emergency proclamation.

Our case law supports the conclusion that § 28-9 (b)

(1) and (7) is not an unconstitutional delegation of

legislative authority. In University of Connecticut

Chapter, AAUP v. Governor, supra, 200 Conn. 386, this

court upheld the constitutionality of General Statutes

(Rev. to 1985) § 4-85 (b), which authorized the governor

to ‘‘reduce budgetary allotments by up to 5 percent

under certain specified circumstances.’’ Id., 387. The

plaintiffs argued that the statute violated the separation

of powers provision because it attempted to delegate

a strictly legislative function, namely, budgeting. Id.,

393. This court rejected that argument. We explained

that, rather than interfering with a legislative function,

§ 4-85 (b) enabled the governor ‘‘to supervise the execution of the budget.’’ Id., 396. We explained that this role

was particularly suited to the executive branch, which is

‘‘most capable of having detailed and contemporaneous

knowledge regarding finances. Under the constitutional

separation of powers, the governor uses that knowledge

in making such spending decisions and to see that the

laws are faithfully executed.’’ Id., 397. Here, the General

Assembly similarly expressed its policy that the governor is most appropriately suited to use the expertise

of the executive branch—particularly in this case, the

Department of Public Health—to respond to a potentially, rapidly evolving serious disaster and to take the

most appropriate steps to safeguard the people of this

state. In University of Connecticut Chapter, AAUP, we

also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the standards

‘‘ ‘deems necessary’ ’’ and ‘‘ ‘a change of circumstances’ ’’ did not provide sufficient standards to the

governor. Id., 398. We noted that requiring more specific

standards ‘‘would hamper the flexibility needed for the

governor to monitor and administer expenditures and

to supervise the execution of the budget.’’ Id., 399. The

standards set forth in subsection (b) (1) and (7) similarly provide sufficient standards to guide the governor’s exercise of his authority.

By contrast, in State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 633–

34, 13 A.2d 586 (1940), this court reversed a defendant’s

criminal conviction and struck down a statute that

authorized the milk administrator to set the minimum

price for milk. The only guidance the General Assembly

provided to the administrator in setting the price was

to ‘‘take into consideration the type of container used

and other cost factors [that] should influence the determination of such prices.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 625. This court concluded that this language did not provide ‘‘such prescribed standards or

principles, courses of procedure, and rules of decision
as is [required] to justify the delegation of powers

attempted thereby . . . .’’ Id., 633. We conclude that,

contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertions, the standards

imposed by subsection (b) (1) and (7) provide greater

guidance to the governor than did the statute in

Stoddard.

We acknowledge that subsection (b) (1) and (7) is a

broad grant of authority from the General Assembly to

the governor. A broad grant of authority, however, is

not the same as limitless or standardless authority. As

we have explained, although the General Assembly may

not delegate its ‘‘law-making’’ function, it may delegate

‘‘some considerable segment of its legislative authority.’’ (Emphasis added.) Salmon Brook Convalescent

Home, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care,

177 Conn. 356, 363, 417 A.2d 358 (1979). The United

States Supreme Court has similarly explained that, once

the legislature has made a policy determination, ‘‘[i]t is

no objection’’ that the legislation ‘‘call[s] for the exercise of judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary

administrative policy within the prescribed statutory

framework.’’ Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425,

64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. 834 (1944); see also Whitman

v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457,

475, 121 S. Ct. 903, 149 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2001) (‘‘[a] certain

degree of discretion, and thus of [law-making], inheres

in most executive or judicial action’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)). In a recent concurrence in connection

with the United States Supreme Court’s denial of injunctive relief pertaining to the California governor’s

COVID-19 restrictions on the number of people permitted in houses of worship, Chief Justice John Roberts

emphasized the need for elected leaders to have broad

authority to respond to rapidly evolving emergencies.

See South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom,

U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 1613, 207 L. Ed. 2d 154 (2020)

(Roberts, C. J., concurring in denial of application for

injunctive relief). He explained that ‘‘[t]he precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities

should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and

fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement. . . . When [elected] officials undertake . . . to

act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, their latitude must be especially broad.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.

In enacting § 28-9 (b), the General Assembly was as

precise as it could be in defining the contours of the

governor’s authority given that there are myriad serious

disasters that could arise and the actions the governor

would be required to take could vary significantly from

one serious disaster to another. See, e.g., University

of Connecticut Chapter, AAUP v. Governor, supra, 200

Conn. 398 (‘‘these standards are constitutionally sufficient under our law in that they are as definit[e] as is

reasonably practicable under the circumstances’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); see also American

Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 329 U.S. 90, 105, 67 S. Ct. 133, 91 L. Ed. 103 (1946)

(‘‘[t]he legislative process would frequently bog down

if Congress were constitutionally required to appraise

[beforehand] the myriad situations to which it wishes a

particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific

rules for each situation’’); Hogan v. Dept. of Children &

Families, supra, 290 Conn. 572 (‘‘[i]n order to render

admissible such delegation of legislative power . . . it

is necessary that the statute declare a legislative policy,

establish primary standards for carrying it out . . . and

with such degree of certainty as the nature of the case

permits’’ (emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted)).12 What could be statutorily or constitutionally appropriate in one serious disaster may not be in

another. As Senator Martin M. Looney explained during

a special, statutorily created legislative committee’s

September 4, 2020 meeting to discuss Governor Lamont’s

public health emergency declaration, § 28-9 is broad

because the governor must be able to quickly address

the serious disaster. Declaration of a Public Health

Emergency Committee Meeting (September 4, 2020),

available at https://ct-n.com/ctnplayer.asp?odID=17659

(13:10 through 13:36) (last visited March 29, 2021).

Requiring more specific standards ‘‘would hamper the

flexibility needed’’ for the governor to respond to the

myriad different circumstances that may constitute a

serious disaster. University of Connecticut Chapter,

AAUP v. Governor, supra, 399.

Moreover, it is reasonable for the legislature to conclude that the executive branch of government would

be far better suited to respond to a serious disaster

with the speed and flexibility needed to protect the

public health and welfare. Specifically, the legislature

itself is not in session continuously and would not be

well positioned to mount a rapid response to a serious

disaster, especially one that develops and evolves

quickly or unpredictably, and thus requires an ongoing

and agile response. Indeed, the former speaker of the

House of Representatives, Joe Aresimowicz, noted during the September, 4, 2020 meeting of the Declaration

of a Public Health Emergency Committee that, because

the Connecticut legislature is part-time, they are ‘‘not

structured to handle [a serious disaster].’’ Declaration

of a Public Health Emergency Committee Meeting,

supra, (17:56). Similarly, Senator Mary Daugherty Abrams,

the senate chairperson of the Public Health Committee,

explained there are times ‘‘we need to take swift, deliberate action as a government to protect the public’s

health, and the Executive Branch is best equipped to

do that. . . . There are 187 members of the legislative

body, and the thought that we could all come together

swiftly and deliberately to respond to what’s come up

with the COVID . . . crisis is not realistic.’’ Id., (1:09:19

through 1:09:54).
In rejecting a similar argument that emergency powers of the governor of Kentucky during the COVID-19

pandemic violated the separation of powers provision

of that state’s constitution, the Supreme Court of Kentucky explained that it was reasonable for the governor

to have greater authority in times of emergency ‘‘given

[the] government’s tripartite structure with a legislature that is not in continuous session.’’ (Emphasis

added.)Beshear v.Acree, 615 S.W.3d 780, 806 (Ky. 2020).

The court further explained that ‘‘[h]aving a citizen legislature that meets part-time as opposed to a full-time

legislative body that meets year-round, as some states

have, generally leaves [the Kentucky] General Assembly

without the ability to legislate quickly in the event of

emergency unless the emergency arises during a regular

legislative session.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 807. The

same rationale applies here.

That having been said, we pause to note that the

legislature chose not to include a mechanism for more

direct legislative oversight of a declared civil preparedness emergency, as it did for a man-made disaster under

§ 28-9 (a) or a public health emergency declaration

under § 19a-131a. See General Statutes § 28-9 (a) (‘‘[a]ny

such proclamation, or order issued pursuant thereto,

issued by the Governor because of a disaster resulting

from man-made cause may be disapproved by majority

vote of a joint legislative committee’’); see also General

Statutes § 19a-131a (b) (1) (‘‘[a]ny . . . declaration [of

a public health emergency] issued by the Governor may

be disapproved and nullified by majority vote of a committee consisting of the president pro tempore of the

Senate, the speaker of the House of Representatives,

the majority and minority leaders of both houses of the

General Assembly and the cochairpersons and ranking

members of the joint standing committee of the General

Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to public health’’). Several high courts of our sister states have

noted the importance of such legislative oversight under

similar statutory schemes. See, e.g., Beshear v. Acree,

supra, 615 S.W.3d 811–12 (‘‘the [Kentucky] General

Assembly [is allowed] to make the determination itself if

the [g]overnor has not declared an end to the emergency

‘before the first day of the next regular session of the

General Assembly’ ’’); Desrosiers v. Governor, 486

Mass. 369, 384, 158 N.E.3d 827 (2020) (‘‘the [Massachusetts] [l]egislature also has at its disposal a way to curb

the [g]overnor’s powers under the [Massachusetts Civil

Defense Act], should it desire to do so’’); Elkhorn Baptist Church v. Brown, 366 Or. 506, 526, 466 P.3d 30

(2020) (‘‘the [Oregon] [g]overnor’s emergency powers

are limited in that they can be terminated by the [Oregon] legislature’’). This observation does not alter our

constitutional analysis in the present case but warrants mention.

Legislative oversight has not been altogether lacking.
In the related context of considering Governor Lamont’s

public health emergency declaration, a legislative committee, namely, the Declaration of a Public Health Emergency Committee, formed pursuant to § 19a-131a (b)

(1), has met twice since Governor Lamont first declared

the civil preparedness and public health emergencies.

The committee, consisting of the president pro tempore

of the Senate, the speaker of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of both houses,

and the cochairpersons and ranking members of the

Public Health Committee, met for the first time in the

history of this state on March 11, 2020, just one day after

the governor first declared the public health and civil

preparedness emergencies. During that meeting, the committee met ‘‘to consider [Governor Lamont’s] declaration of a public health emergency.’’ Declaration of a Public Health Emergency Committee, Meeting Minutes (March

11, 2020) p. 1, available at https://www.cga.ct.gov/ph/tfs/

20200311_Public%20Health%20Emergency%20Committee/

20200311/Minutes_pdf (last visited March 29, 2021). Senator Looney explained to the committee that, ‘‘under the

statutes, this committee has the right to veto the [g]overnor’s plan within [seventy-two] hours of this taking action

. . . .’’ Id., p. 2. When asked by Senator Leonard A. Fasano

whether the committee would be required to reconvene

if Governor Lamont decided to reinvoke his authority

after six months, Senator Looney explained that, if the

governor ‘‘wanted to extend it beyond that time, it would

require a new order, and [the committee] would have a

new opportunity to meet like [it] did this time.’’ Id. Finally,

Senator Looney closed the meeting by noting that ‘‘it is

within the committee’s capacity to convene again by Friday [March 13, 2020] at 2:25 p.m., but, barring some other

emergency, the committee has met the statutory requirements.’’ Id., p. 4. The committee did not meet again within

seventy-two hours of the first proclamation.

Thereafter, the committee met again on September

4, 2020, three days after Governor Lamont’s September

1, 2020 declarations. After discussion regarding the

scope of Governor Lamont’s authority under both a

civil preparedness emergency and a public health emergency,13 the committee took up a motion to disapprove

of Governor Lamont’s declaration of a public health

emergency pursuant to § 19a-131a. Declaration of a Public Health Emergency Committee Meeting, supra,

(1:28:10 through 1:28:17). The motion failed, and the

committee did not vote to disapprove of Governor

Lamont’s public health emergency declaration. Id.,

(1:43:29 through 1:44:11). We take this inaction as an

indication of the committee’s acquiescence in Governor

Lamont’s actions pursuant to his public health emergency authority. Although we most often employ this

principle when ‘‘the legislature [fails] to take corrective

action as manifesting the legislature’s acquiescence in

our construction of a statute’’; (internal quotation marks

omitted) Spiotti v. Wolcott, 326 Conn. 190, 202, 163 A.3d
46 (2017); the same principle is insightful here. In this

case, the legislative committee with the statutory

authority to disapprove of Governor Lamont’s public

health emergency declaration met on two occasions

and declined to exercise its disapproval powers either

time. Although not the equivalent of full legislative ratification, this procedure should significantly ameliorate

concerns regarding legislative oversight. Should the

plaintiffs seek to impose greater oversight of the governor’s authority under the statutory scheme, whether in

the context of a public health emergency or a civil

preparedness emergency, the proper avenue is through

an amendment to the statute through the legislature,

not this court. See, e.g., Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420,

435, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988) (‘‘[I]t is up to the legislatures,

not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. . . . [C]ourts do not substitute their social and

economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies,

[whose members] are elected to pass laws.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.)).

In sum, § 28-9 sets forth the General Assembly’s policy that, in the event of a serious disaster, the health,

safety, and welfare of Connecticut’s residents is of

utmost importance. Section 28-9 (b) affords the governor considerable latitude to employ the ‘‘necessary

means’’ for accomplishing that policy objective. Norwalk Street Railway Co.’s Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 594,

37 A. 1080 (1897). But that latitude is neither standardless nor limitless. In addition to the limitations

explicated previously, in the event an aggrieved party

believes the governor has taken any particular action

that exceeds his lawful authority or violates the state

constitution, that party may seek redress from the

courts. The legislature may also deem it proper to

impose greater oversight of the governor’s actions during a proclaimed civil preparedness emergency or otherwise amend or repeal § 28-9 to further limit the

governor’s authority.

Our conclusion that, although subsection (b) (1) and

(7) represents a broad grant of authority to the governor, it is nonetheless constitutional finds support in the

analysis of similar issues from the high courts of our

sister states. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court recently rejected a separation of powers challenge to that state’s Emergency Management Services

Code, which permits the governor of Pennsylvania to

proclaim a disaster emergency and to take actions similar to those authorized by § 28-9. 35 Pa. Stat. and Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 7301 (c) (West Supp. 2020); see Friends of

Danny DeVito v. Wolf, Pa. , 227 A.3d 872, 892–93,

cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 239, 208 L. Ed. 2d

17 (2020); see also Wolf v. Scarnati, Pa. , 233

A.3d 679, 705 (2020) (recognizing that court had determined in Friends of Danny DeVito that Pennsylvania

governor’s exercise of authority delegated under Emergency Management Services Code did not violate sepa-
ration of powers doctrine under Pennsylvania

constitution). The court noted in Scarnati that the

‘‘[Pennsylvania] General Assembly, in enacting the statute, ‘ma[de] the basic policy choices.’ . . . The General

Assembly decided that the [g]overnor should be able

to exercise certain powers when he or she makes a

‘finding that a disaster has occurred or that the occurrence of the threat of a disaster is imminent.’ ’’ (Citation

omitted.) Wolf v. Scarnati, supra, 704. The court also

explained that ‘‘the [Pennsylvania] General Assembly

. . . provided ‘adequate standards which will guide and

restrain’ the [g]overnor’s powers. . . . The General

Assembly gave the [g]overnor specific guidance about

what he can, and cannot, do in responding to a disaster

emergency. . . . The powers delegated to the [g]overnor are admittedly [far reaching], but nonetheless are

specific. For example, the [g]overnor can ‘[s]uspend

the provisions of any regulatory statute . . . if strict

compliance with the provisions . . . would in any way

prevent, hinder or delay necessary action in coping with

the emergency.’ . . . Broad discretion and standardless discretion are not the same thing. Only those

regulations that hinder action in response to the emergency may be suspended. It may be the case that the

more expansive the emergency, the more encompassing

the suspension of regulations. But this shows that it is

the scope of the emergency, not the [g]overnor’s arbitrary discretion, that determines the extent of the [g]overnor’s powers under the statute. The General Assembly

itself chose the words in [the Emergency Management

Services Code]. The General Assembly, under its lawmaking powers, could have provided the [g]overnor

with less expansive powers under the Emergency Management Services Code. It did not do so.’’ (Citations

omitted; emphasis altered.) Id., 704–705.

The Supreme Court of Oregon has similarly reasoned

that, although the emergency powers of the governor

of Oregon are broad under that state’s statutory scheme,

they are not unlimited.Elkhorn Baptist Church v.Brown,

supra, 366 Or. 525. The court reasoned that the governor’s actions must be ‘‘exercised in a manner consistent

with the reason for which they are granted; that is, they

must be exercised to address the declared emergency.

. . . Second, the [g]overnor’s emergency powers . . .

may be exercised only during a declared state of emergency, [and Oregon’s emergency powers law] requires

the [g]overnor to terminate by proclamation when the

emergency no longer exists, or when the threat of an

emergency has passed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted) Id., 525–26. Finally, the court noted that the courts

may intervene if the governor’s regulations exceed constitutional limits. Id., 526.

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that

the extent of the Kentucky governor’s authority during

an emergency was not an unconstitutional delegation

of legislative authority in violation of the separation of
powers provisions of the Kentucky constitution. Beshear v. Acree, supra, 615 S.W.3d 806, 812. The court

acknowledged that the governor’s authority is broad,

but, ‘‘[g]iven the wide variance of occurrences that can

constitute an emergency, disaster or catastrophe, the

criteria are necessarily broad and result-oriented, protect life and property . . . and . . . public . . .

health . . . allowing the [g]overnor working with the

executive branch and emergency management agencies

to determine what is necessary for the specific crisis at

hand. Floods, tornadoes and ice storms require different

responses than threats from nuclear, chemical or biological agents or biological, etiological, or radiological

hazards but the emergency powers are always limited

by the legislative criteria, i.e., they must be exercised

in the context of a declared state of emergency . . .

designed to protect life, property, health and safety and

to secure the continuity and effectiveness of government . . . and exercised to promote and secure the

safety and protection of the civilian population.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

811.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also

recently rejected a separation of powers challenge to

the Massachusetts governor’s authority to issue emergency orders. Desrosiers v. Governor, supra, 486 Mass.

382, 384–85. The court reasoned that, ‘‘because the

[g]overnor’s actions were carried out pursuant to the

authority granted to the [g]overnor in the [Massachusetts Civil Defense Act], the emergency orders [did]

not violate [the separation of powers provision of the

Massachusetts constitution].’’ Id., 382. The court also

noted that the act did not interfere with the functions

of the legislature. Id., 383.

The plaintiffs, however, point to a recent decision of

the Supreme Court of Michigan that they claim supports

their contention that § 28-9 (b) (1) and (7) is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. In a

divided opinion, the Michigan high court concluded that

the governor of Michigan did not possess the authority

to exercise emergency powers under the Michigan

Emergency Powers of the Governor Act because that

act was an unlawful delegation of legislative power

to the executive branch in violation of the Michigan

constitution. In re Certified Questions from the United

States District Court, Western District of Michigan,

Southern Division, 506 Mich. 332, 372, 958 N.W.2d 1

(2020). The court reasoned that the powers conferred

by the act were ‘‘remarkably broad’’; id., 363; and there

were not sufficient standards in place to constrain the

governor’s actions. See id., 367–71. The plaintiffs in the

present case contend that, as with the Michigan statute,

subection (b) (1) and (7) ‘‘impermissibly confers truly

unlimited power on the governor . . . .’’ We are not

persuaded. As the Chief Justice of the Michigan

Supreme Court noted in her concurring and dissenting
opinion in that case, the statute does not violate the

separation of powers provision because ‘‘there are

many ways to test the [g]overnor’s response to this lifeand-death pandemic.’’ In re Certified Questions from

the United States District Court, Western District of

Michigan, Southern Division, supra, 422 (McCormack,

C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Namely,

‘‘the statute allows a legal challenge to the [g]overnor’s

declaration that COVID-19, as a threshold matter, constitutes a ‘great public crisis’ that ‘imperil[s]’ ‘public

safety.’ . . . For another example, any order issued

under the statute could be challenged as not ‘necessary’

or ‘reasonable’ to ‘protect life and property or to bring

the emergency situation within the affected area under

control.’ . . . In these ways and others, the courts can

easily be enlisted to assess the exercise of executive

power, measuring the adequacy of its factual and legal

bases against the statute’s language.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id. The Chief Justice also noted that the legislature

itself might revisit its decision to have passed the statute

in the first place. Id. Specifically, ‘‘[i]f the [l]egislature

saw fit, it could repeal the statute. Or, the [l]egislature

might amend the law to alter its standards or limit its

scope. Changing the statute provides a ready mechanism for legislative balance.’’ Id. The Chief Justice further explained that the governor is also politically accountable to voters, which serves as an additional check. Id.

Finally, the Chief Justice noted that the majority had

departed from one part of their long-standing test for

delegation of legislative power, namely, that ‘‘the standard must be as reasonably precise as the subject matter

requires or permits.’’ Id., 423 (McCormack, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We find the reasoning of the Chief Justice’s concurrence and dissent to

be more persuasive.

As we noted in our per curiam ruling in the present

case, we are mindful of the incredibly difficult economic

situation that the plaintiffs and thousands of others

across the state are in given the COVID-19 pandemic.

Individuals and families have been economically

upended as a result of the pandemic. We are also mindful of the more than 300,000 Connecticut residents who

have been infected with COVID-19 and, most tragically,

the nearly 8000 Connecticut citizens who have passed

away in the more than yearlong pandemic. As we

explained, the governor is charged with protecting the

health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of this state,

and the COVID-19 pandemic has presented a dynamic

and unpredictable ‘‘serious disaster.’’ The question of

when various restrictions imposed as a result of the

pandemic should be lifted is a fact intensive inquiry that

involves an understanding of ever evolving scientific

guidance, including the effects and impacts of newly

discovered strains of the virus and their resistance to

recently approved vaccines. It is likely that reasonable

minds may differ as to when each restriction should be
lifted, but, as Chief Justice Roberts explained, ‘‘[w]hen

[elected] officials undertake . . . to act in areas

fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, their

latitude must be especially broad.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) South Bay United Pentecostal Church

v. Newsom, supra, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (Roberts, C. J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief). As

long as Governor Lamont is acting within this admittedly broad statutory and constitutional authority—

which we conclude that he is—it is not the job of this

court to second-guess those policy decisions.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* March 29, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of

any postopinion motions or petitions.

1 See Coronavirus Resource Center, Johns Hopkins University & Medicine,

COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE)

at John Hopkins University (JHU), available at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/

map.html (last visited March 29, 2021); Connecticut Department of Public

Health, Connecticut’s COVID-19 Response, available at https://portal.ct.gov/

coronavirus (last visited March 29, 2021).

2

In addition to Executive Order Nos. 7D, 7X, 7MM, and 7ZZ, the provisions

of which we have set forth in the text of this opinion, Executive Order No.

7G clarified the limits of Executive Order No. 7D on businesses such as the

pub, allowing them ‘‘to sell sealed containers of alcoholic liquor for [pickup]

at such restaurant, cafe ́ or tavern’’ under certain conditions, including a

requirement that the alcohol purchase ‘‘accompany a [pickup] order of food

prepared on the premises . . . .’’ Executive Order No. 7G (March 19, 2020).

Executive Order No. 7N directed businesses that remained open to serve

food and drink for off-premise consumption to ‘‘limit entrance of customers

into their locations to the minimum extent necessary to pick up and/or pay

for orders, use touchless payment systems, and require remote ordering

and payment . . . .’’ Executive Order No. 7N (March 26, 2020). Executive

Order No. 7T expanded the list of sealed containers of alcohol that liquor

permit holders could sell under the conditions set forth in Executive Order

No. 7G.

3 Oral argument was conducted using remote technologies because the

Superior Court buildings at the time were closed to the public for most

purposes as a result of the pandemic.

4 Following oral argument, we ordered the parties to file supplemental

briefs addressing the questions of whether Governor Lamont abandoned

reliance on § 19a-131a as a legal basis to support the challenged executive

orders and, assuming he did not, whether his authority resulting from a

public health emergency declaration, alone, supports the challenged executive orders. In their supplemental brief, the plaintiffs contend, as the trial

court concluded, that Governor Lamont abandoned reliance on § 19a-131a.

Assuming he did not abandon reliance on § 19a-131a, the plaintiffs claim

that the governor’s authority resulting from a public health emergency,

alone, does not support any of the challenged executive orders. Governor

Lamont contends that he has not abandoned reliance on § 19a-131a as a

legal basis to support the actions taken pursuant to § 28-9 (b) (1). He also

contends, however, that he can rely on § 19a-131a as authority to issue only

Executive Order Nos. 7MM and 7ZZ because those are the only orders that

fall within the governor’s authority to modify statutes during a public health

emergency pursuant to § 28-9 (b) (1). Because the parties agree that § 19a131a, alone, does not provide authority for Governor Lamont to issue all of

the challenged executive orders, we must consider whether § 28-9 provides

that authority.

5 We subsequently discuss in this opinion whether there is any analytic

difference between a ‘‘serious disaster’’ and a ‘‘major disaster,’’ and conclude

there is not.

6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently reached a similar conclusion

under Pennsylvania law. See Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, Pa. ,

227 A.3d 872, 888–89, cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 239, 208 L. Ed.

2d 17 (2020). Under state law, the governor of Pennsylvania is authorized
to declare a disaster emergency ‘‘upon finding that a disaster has occurred

or that the occurrence or the threat of a disaster is imminent.’’ 35 Pa.

Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7301 (c) (West Supp. 2020). The Pennsylvania

Emergency Management Services Code defines ‘‘disaster’’ as ‘‘[a] man-made

disaster, natural disaster or war-caused disaster.’’ 35 Pa. Stat. and Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 7102 (West Supp. 2020). Similar to the definition of ‘‘major

disaster’’ in § 28-1 (2), the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Services

Code defines ‘‘natural disaster’’ as ‘‘[a]ny hurricane, tornado, storm, flood,

high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, earthquake, landslide, mudslide,

snowstorm, drought, fire, explosion or other catastrophe which results in

substantial damage to property, hardship, suffering or possible loss of

life.’’ (Emphasis in original.) 35 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7102 (West

Supp. 2020). The plaintiffs in Friends of Danny DeVito claimed that the

COVID-19 pandemic was not a ‘‘natural disaster’’ because it was ‘‘not of the

same type or kind’’ as those listed in the statutory definition in § 7102.

Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, supra, 888. The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court rejected this argument and concluded that the COVID-19 pandemic

qualified as a natural disaster. Id. The court explained that the ‘‘specific

disasters in the definition of ‘natural disaster’ themselves lack commonality’’;

id.; and, by ‘‘including the language ‘other catastrophe which results in

substantial damage to property, hardship, suffering or possible loss of life,’

it [was] clear that the General Assembly intended to expand the list of

disaster circumstances that would provide [the Pennsylvania governor] with

the necessary powers to respond to exigencies involving vulnerability and

loss of life.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 889.

7

Indeed, we note that General Statutes § 28-9a, which sets forth additional

actions the governor may take in the event of an emergency or major disaster,

explicitly provides that ‘‘ ‘[m]ajor disaster,’ ‘emergency’ and ‘temporary housing’ as used in this section have the same meanings as the terms are defined,

or used, in the [federal] Disaster Relief Act of 1974 . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)

General Statutes § 28-9a (d).

8

Just as the federal government was faced with major logistical challenges

in order to stem the spread of COVID-19, such as distributing supplies from

a national stockpile, so, too, was this state. Chapter 517 contains various

provisions that demonstrate the need for a civil preparedness emergency

to address the logistical challenges posed by a pandemic of the magnitude

presented by the COVID-19 pandemic. See General Statutes § 28-1 (4) (defining ‘‘civil preparedness’’ to include ‘‘all those activities and measures

designed or undertaken (A) to minimize or control the effects upon the

civilian population of major disaster or emergency’’ such as ‘‘the procurement and stockpiling of necessary materials and supplies’’); General Statutes

§ 28-11 (a) (during civil preparedness emergency or public health emergency,

governor may take possession ‘‘(3) of any antitoxins, pharmaceutical products, vaccines or other biological products’’ (emphasis added)); General

Statutes § 28-16 (‘‘commissioner [of emergency services and public protection] is empowered, in anticipation of . . . any disaster, to purchase and

maintain a stockpile of medical supplies . . . and any other supplies which

in his opinion are necessary and desirable to afford relief and assistance

to the people of the state in an emergency’’). These provisions make clear that

civil preparedness emergencies, under § 28-9, and public health emergencies,

under § 19a-131a, are related and interconnected.

9 Section 28-1 (2) also provides that a ‘‘major disaster’’ includes ‘‘any

catastrophe’’ that ‘‘(A) in the determination of the President, causes damage

of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance

under the [Stafford Act] . . . to supplement the efforts and available

resources of this state . . . in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or

suffering caused by such catastrophe . . . .’’ As we have explained, President Trump’s determination that the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on

this state were ‘‘of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a major

disaster declaration under the [Stafford Act]’’; Federal Emergency Management Agency, supra, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,542; provides further support for the

conclusion that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a serious disaster.

10 There are numerous statutory examples of the General Assembly’s delegating to the governor the responsibility of protecting the people of this

state. See, e.g., General Statutes § 3-1 (governor shall ‘‘take any proper action

concerning . . . the enforcement of the laws of the state and the protection

of its citizens’’); General Statutes § 3-6a (governor may restrict ‘‘movement

of persons and vehicles upon the streets and highways of the state’’ during

‘‘extreme weather conditions or other acts of nature’’); General Statutes

§ 16a-11 (governor may declare ‘‘energy emergency’’ and order energy emer-
gency plan); General Statutes § 19a-70 (governor may proclaim emergency

due to short supply of ‘‘antitoxin or other biologic product’’ during epidemic

and appoint advisory committee to recommend ‘‘the priority of the supply,

distribution and use of such biologic products in the interest of the health,

welfare and safety of the people of the state’’).

11 We acknowledge that the governor has twice renewed the civil preparedness emergency and, at the same time, declared new civil preparedness

emergencies, and has renewed the executive orders modifying or suspending

statutes and regulations. The statutory six month temporal limitation, however, requires the governor, at a minimum, to continuously evaluate the

necessity of the executive orders and to justify their continued existence.

As we discuss hereinafter, although this is a broad grant of authority, and

there may well be instances in which a challenger to the governor’s continued

actions can demonstrate that they have lasted an improper duration, that

issue is not squarely before us, and nothing in this opinion should be construed as offering an opinion on that separate issue. Indeed, the plaintiffs

do not challenge the governor’s renewal of the emergencies. Similarly, the

plaintiffs acknowledge that they ‘‘are not challenging the good intentions

of [Governor Lamont] in issuing his executive orders’’ and ‘‘are not asking

[this] court to second-guess the policy judgments of [Governor Lamont] or

to determine whether his executive orders and the sector rules make sense

or are fair.’’

12 We note that ‘‘[o]nly twice in this country’s history (and that in a single

year) [has the United States Supreme Court] found a delegation excessive—

in each case because Congress had failed to articulate any policy or standard

to confine discretion.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gundy v. United States, supra, 139 S. Ct. 2129 (plurality opinion).

13 We note that several members of the committee, including Senator

Fasano and Representative Aresimowicz, noted that the committee was not

authorized to take any action with respect to Governor Lamont’s actions

pursuant to the civil preparedness emergency declaration. See, e.g., Declaration of a Public Health Emergency Committee Meeting, supra, (08:27 through

09:06), remarks of Senator Fasano; id., (09:13 through 09:42), remarks of

Representative Aresimowicz. As we previously discussed in this opinion,

we fail to see why the legislature chose not to include a provision for

legislative oversight of a governor’s proclaimed civil preparedness emergency, other than for a man-made disaster. Certainly, this could be addressed

by the General Assembly in its current, or a future, legislative session, if

the legislature deems it appropriate.