NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JOSEPH W., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, C.W., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0043

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. L8015JD201407012

The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Amanda Adams

Counsel for Appellees
JOSEPH W. v. DCS, C.W.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Joseph W. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his minor child, C.W., on three grounds,

including substance abuse under A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(3). For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In April 2014, the Department of Child Safety1

(“Department”) received a report that Father had physically abused then 

three-year-old C.W., causing his lip to bleed. When a Department 

investigator spoke with Father, Father admitted that he used 

methamphetamine. The investigator also noted that Father had inadequate, 

dirty housing and learned that before this incident, C.W. lived in filthy 

motel rooms and moved between the care of his parents and maternal 

grandmother. As a result, the Department removed C.W. and placed him 

with his maternal grandmother. The Department then petitioned for 

dependency, alleging that Father neglected C.W. by committing domestic 

violence, using illegal substances, and failing to provide C.W. with the basic 

necessities of life.

¶3 Over the next month, the Department provided Father with 

substance abuse treatment, random drug testing, mental health services, 

parenting classes, and supervised visitations. Father, however, failed to

attend his mental health services and parenting classes. Although the 

Department had scheduled numerous supervised visits during that time, 

Father attended only two. Father also missed ten required drug tests. Of the 

five drug tests Father completed in that month, three were positive for 

methamphetamine. Then in May 2014, Father, who was on probation for 

drug offenses committed before the Department petitioned for 

 

1 The Department of Child Safety is substituted for the Arizona 

Department of Economic Security. See S.B. 1001, Section 157, 51st Leg., 2nd 

Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) (enacted); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 27.
JOSEPH W. v. DCS, C.W.

Decision of the Court

3

dependency, was arrested for violating that probation by testing positive 

for methamphetamine and had his probation revoked. Because of his arrest 

and incarceration, Father did not complete any of the reunification services 

that the Department provided.

¶4 The week following Father’s arrest, the juvenile court 

conducted a dependency hearing on the Department’s petition. Father 

denied the allegations in the petition, but entered a no contest plea and 

submitted the dependency to the court. The court adjudicated C.W. 

dependent as to Father and ordered family reunification concurrent with 

severance and adoption as the case plan. After the hearing, in June 2014, 

Father was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for the previous drug 

offenses. 

¶5 In September 2015, while Father remained incarcerated, the 

Department moved to terminate Father’s parental rights to C.W. The 

Department alleged that Father neglected C.W. and was unable to 

discharge his parental responsibilities due to substance abuse and that 

Father’s incarceration length was such that it would deprive C.W. of a 

normal home for a period of years. At the contested severance hearing, the 

Department introduced a February 2014 pre-sentence investigation report 

from Father’s criminal case, in which Father reported that he had abused 

methamphetamine since the age of 16. According to the report, Father 

stated that he then was using the drug three or four times each week and 

had abused other drugs in the past, including marijuana, cocaine, LSD, and 

heroin.

¶6 The case manager testified that Father remained unable to 

properly parent C.W. due to his substance abuse and his inability to provide 

adequate housing while incarcerated. The case manager testified that she 

believed Father’s substance abuse would continue for a prolonged period 

of time because he tested positive for methamphetamine before being 

incarcerated and was incarcerated for a drug related offense. She further 

believed Father’s substance abuse would continue because, before he was 

incarcerated, he failed to comply with his random drug tests and did not 

complete any substance abuse treatment. 

¶7 Regarding C.W.’s best interests, the case manager testified 

that C.W. was placed with his maternal grandmother. The case manager 

stated that this was the least restrictive placement and that the placement 

was meeting C.W.’s needs. She further stated that C.W. was adoptable and 

that his maternal grandmother was willing to adopt him. The case manager

testified that termination of Father’s parental rights was in C.W.’s best 
JOSEPH W. v. DCS, C.W.

Decision of the Court

4

interests because C.W. needed a permanent, good, and stable home, but 

Father could not meet those needs. Additionally, the case manager testified 

that if Father’s parental rights were not terminated, he would still need to 

successfully complete reunification services upon his release before the 

Department could return C.W. to him. The case manager stated that this 

would harm C.W. because C.W. would not have a permanent home in the 

meantime.

¶8 During his testimony, Father stated that he had completed 

drug counseling while incarcerated. But Father admitted that while in 

prison, he could not parent C.W., which included “taking care of[,]

feeding[,] playing with[, and] clothing” him. The juvenile court terminated 

Father’s parental rights to C.W., finding that the Department proved all 

three grounds alleged in its motion by clear and convincing evidence.

Specifically, the juvenile court found that although the time between C.W.’s 

removal and Father’s incarceration was brief, Father was unable to control 

his drug addiction even for that time. The court also noted that Father 

should have known that he might be incarcerated if he violated his 

probation for the drug offenses, but “that wasn’t enough to get him to stop 

using drugs, stay out of custody and be in a position where he could work 

on a case plan and be a father.” 

¶9 The court also found that termination was in C.W.’s best 

interests because his placement was meeting his needs and C.W. was 

excelling there. The court specifically stated that waiting for Father’s release 

from custody to see if he could properly parent C.W. and remain drug free 

was too speculative to be in C.W.’s best interests. Father untimely appealed, 

but the juvenile court granted his motion to allow the appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶10 Father argues that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s order terminating his parental rights on any of the three grounds. 

We review a juvenile court’s termination order for an abuse of discretion. 

E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 58 ¶ 9, 344 P.3d 842, 844 (App. 2015). 

We accept the juvenile court’s factual findings unless no reasonable 

evidence supports them and will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly 

erroneous. Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 508 ¶ 1, 200 

P.3d 1003, 1005 (App. 2008). Additionally, we will affirm the juvenile 

court’s termination order if any one statutory ground is proved and if the 

termination is in the child’s best interests. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 376 ¶ 14, 231 P.3d 377, 380 (App. 2010). Because sufficient 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s parental 
JOSEPH W. v. DCS, C.W.

Decision of the Court

5

rights for substance abuse and its finding that termination was in C.W.’s 

best interests, the juvenile court did not err. 

1. Statutory Ground for Termination

¶11 As relevant to our disposition of this appeal, Father argues 

that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s order terminating 

his parental rights to C.W. for chronic substance abuse. Although a parent’s 

right to care, custody, and control of his child is fundamental, it is not 

absolute. Linda V. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 76, 78 ¶ 6, 117 P.3d 

795, 797 (App. 2005). The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s 

fundamental right to a child if clear and convincing evidence shows the 

existence of at least one statutorily enumerated ground in A.R.S. § 8–533. 

A.R.S. § 8–533; Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(C). 

¶12 As relevant here, the juvenile court may terminate parental 

rights if (1) the parent has a history of chronic substance abuse; (2) the 

parent is unable to discharge his parental responsibilities because of his 

chronic substance abuse; and (3) reasonable grounds exist to believe that 

the abuse will continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period. A.R.S. 

§ 8–533(B)(3); Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 377 ¶ 15, 231 P.3d at 381. The juvenile 

court must also consider the “availability of reunification services to the 

parent and the participation of the parent in these services.” A.R.S. 

§ 8–533(D). 

¶13 The juvenile court did not err in terminating Father’s parental 

rights because sufficient evidence supports the elements of the substance 

abuse ground. First, the record shows that Father has a history of chronic 

substance abuse. Father began abusing methamphetamine when he was 16 

years old and used the drug up to four times per week at least until 

February 2014. Even after the Department removed C.W. in April 2014, 

Father continued to abuse methamphetamine. In the span of just one month 

between C.W.’s removal and Father’s subsequent May 2014 arrest, Father 

missed ten required drug tests. Of the five he completed, three were 

positive for methamphetamine. Father also failed to attend his substance 

abuse treatment in that month. This shows, as the juvenile court found, that 

Father was unable to control his addiction even briefly. In addition to 

methamphetamine, Father admitted to using other serious drugs in the 

past. 

¶14 Second, sufficient evidence supports the finding that Father 

could not discharge his parental responsibilities because of his substance 

abuse. Parental responsibilities include, among other things, providing a
JOSEPH W. v. DCS, C.W.

Decision of the Court

6

child with food, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care. Matter of 

Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-5209 & No. JS-4963, 143 Ariz. 178, 

185, 692 P.2d 1027, 1034 (App. 1984). The record shows that Father could 

not discharge his parental responsibilities due to his substance abuse even 

before he was incarcerated. On one occasion, Father was under the 

influence of methamphetamine while caring for C.W. and physically 

abused the child, giving him a bloody lip. The Department investigator 

noted that at that time, Father had provided inadequate and dirty housing 

for C.W. In addition to inadequate housing, Father did not provide C.W. 

with stable housing because of his drug use. C.W. constantly moved 

between different homes and filthy motel rooms with Father and was 

shuffled between the care of Father and the maternal grandmother. Father’s 

incarceration for violating his probation further shows that Father had little 

consideration for C.W.’s health and safety, as he admitted that he could not 

parent C.W. or provide him with care, food, or clothing while incarcerated. 

¶15 Finally, reasonable grounds exist to believe that Father’s 

substance abuse will continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period. 

Although Father stated that he had completed drug counseling while 

incarcerated, the record shows that when out of prison, Father cannot 

maintain his sobriety. As the juvenile court found, even though Father 

knew he would be incarcerated and possibly lose his child if he used 

methamphetamine and violated his probation, this was not enough to keep 

him from using the drug. See Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379 ¶ 29, 231 P.3d at 

383 (“Father’s failure to remedy his drug abuse, despite knowing the loss 

of his children was imminent, is evidence that he has not overcome his 

dependence on drugs.”). Even with the assistance of the services that the 

Department provided, Father continued to test positive for

methamphetamine. He failed to attend his substance abuse treatment class 

and failed to report for several required drug tests. Because Father could 

not maintain sobriety for even that brief time, reasonable grounds exist to 

believe his addiction will continue for a prolonged period. 

¶16 The record further shows that the Department made diligent 

efforts to provide Father with reunification services but Father failed to 

make the necessary sobriety changes to permit reunification. The 

Department provided Father with referrals for drug testing, substance 

abuse treatment, parenting classes, mental health services, and supervised 

visitations. But Father only sporadically appeared for scheduled drug

testing and failed to appear for any other service during the dependency. 

Because Father was then incarcerated for violating his probation for drug 

offenses by using methamphetamine, his referrals to these services expired. 

Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s order 
JOSEPH W. v. DCS, C.W.

Decision of the Court

7

terminating Father’s parental rights to C.W. on the ground of chronic 

substance abuse and we need not address the other grounds. See Jesus M. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 3, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002). 

2. Child’s Best Interests

¶17 Father next argues that insufficient evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in C.W.’s 

best interests. Finding one of the statutorily enumerated grounds by clear 

and convincing evidence does not suffice to terminate a parent’s rights. 

A.R.S. § 8–533(B). Instead, the juvenile court must also find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination would be in the child’s best 

interests. Id.; Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 

(2005). Termination is in the child’s best interests if the Department proves 

that the child would either benefit from the termination or be harmed by 

the continuation of the parent-child relationship. Shawnee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179 ¶ 20, 319 P.3d 236, 241 (App. 2014). Relevant 

factors in determining whether a child would benefit from the termination 

include whether the current placement is meeting the child’s needs, an 

adoption plan is in place, and the child is adoptable. See Tina T. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 236 Ariz. 295, 300 ¶ 19, 339 P.3d 1040, 1045 (App. 2014); Mario 

G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 282, 288 ¶ 26, 257 P.3d 1162, 1168 

(App. 2011). 

¶18 Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that 

terminating Father’s parental rights was in C.W.’s best interests. C.W. had 

been in his maternal grandmother’s care for over a year at the time of the 

severance hearing. Even though Father wants to have contact with C.W., 

severance is in C.W.’s best interests because it provides the child with 

permanency and consistency. The record shows that C.W. was adoptable 

and excelling in his placement, which was meeting C.W.’s needs. C.W.’s 

maternal grandmother also was willing to adopt him. Finally, the case 

manager testified that if Father’s rights were not terminated, Father would 

still need to successfully complete his reunification services once released 

from prison before the Department would return C.W. to him. C.W. would 

consequently not have a permanent home for a longer, indeterminate

period of time. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in finding that 

terminating Father’s parental rights was in C.W.’s best interests. 
JOSEPH W. v. DCS, C.W.

Decision of the Court

8

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.