Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 13, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-17-00897-CR

NO. 14-17-00898-CR

CECIL DARNELL WORTHY, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 182nd District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause Nos. 1469652 & 1469653 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

Appellant Cecil Darnell Worthy was convicted by a jury of two felony 

offenses of indecency with a child and sentenced by the trial judge to life 

imprisonment. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting 

extraneous offense evidence during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial and that the 

evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.
2

BACKGROUND

 Appellant is married to the complainant’s grandmother. In January 2015, 

when the complainant was eight years old, the complainant’s mother took her to her 

pediatrician because her grades had been falling, she had insomnia, and she had 

alleged that she had been inappropriately touched two to three weeks earlier at her 

grandmother’s house. The complainant told the pediatrician that her step-grandfather 

had “touched her in her privates.” The complainant’s mother also called the police. 

After a criminal investigation, appellant was charged by indictments with two 

offenses of indecency with a child. 

 At the time of trial, the complainant was eleven years old. The complainant 

testified that appellant had touched her “middle part” with his hand on two separate 

occasions.1 On a third occasion, appellant got on top of the complainant on her 

grandmother’s bed and “moved around” on her. Appellant told the complainant not 

to tell anyone, but she eventually told her mother. The complainant could not 

remember when the incidents occurred or how long it was before she told her mother. 

The complainant testified that her mother was not in court with her and was not 

going to testify. 

ANALYSIS

 In his first three issues, appellant contends that the trial court committed 

evidentiary error by (1) admitting extraneous offense evidence in violation of 

appellant’s right to due process; (2) allowing extraneous offense evidence in 

violation of Texas Rule of Evidence 403; and (3) admitting a previous judgment for 

aggravated sexual assault of a child into evidence during the guilt/innocence phase 

of trial. In his fourth issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to 

 

1 The complainant testified that the “middle part” is where pee comes out.
3

support the jury’s verdicts. We first address appellant’s fourth issue because it 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and seeks rendition and a judgment of 

acquittal. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 In his fourth issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to 

support his convictions. Appellant points out that the complainant was the sole 

witness to the alleged encounters, and there is no physical evidence, forensic 

evidence, or medical evidence to corroborate the complainant’s allegations. 

Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient because the complainant’s 

credibility was improperly bolstered by the admission of the extraneous offense 

evidence which is the subject of appellant’s first three issues on appeal. 

A. Standard of Review 

 We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction by viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any 

rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See Arroyo v. State, No. PD-0797-17, 2018 WL 4344410, at *2 

(Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979)). This standard gives “full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly 

to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). 

The jury, as the judge of the facts and credibility of the witnesses, may choose to 

believe or not believe the witnesses or any portion of their testimony. Sharp v. State, 

707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). We must consider all the evidence 

admitted at trial, even improperly admitted evidence, when performing a sufficiency 

review. Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 489–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
4

 A person commits the offense of indecency with a child if, with a child 

younger than seventeen years of age, the person engages in sexual contact with the 

child or causes the child to engage in sexual contact. Tex. Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1). 

“Sexual contact” includes any touching by a person, including touching through 

clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a child, done with the intent 

to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Id. § 21.11(c)(1). The 

indictments against appellant in each case alleged that appellant unlawfully engaged 

in sexual contact with the complainant, a person younger than seventeen years of 

age, by touching the complainant’s genitals with the intent to arouse and gratify 

appellant’s sexual desire.2

 The jury charges tracked the language of the indictments. 

B. Application of the Law to the Facts 

 The complainant testified that the first time appellant touched her middle part, 

she was at her grandmother’s house. The complainant, her younger sister, and 

appellant were on the living room couch playing “tickle fight” while the 

complainant’s mother and grandmother were upstairs. During the tickle fight, 

appellant put his hand under her shorts and underwear and touched her middle part. 

The complainant made hand gestures to demonstrate how appellant moved his hand 

around on her middle part. The complainant did not know if her sister saw anything. 

Appellant’s actions made the complainant feel sad, and she told appellant to leave 

her alone. Appellant then took the complainant to the kitchen and told her not to tell 

anyone. 

 The complainant testified that the second time appellant touched her, it was a 

different day at her grandmother’s house. The complainant was on the living room 

couch playing with her phone while her sister, mother, and grandmother were at the 

 

2 Cause No. 1469652 alleged an offense date of on or about December 3, 2014, and Cause 

No. 1469653 alleged an offense date of on or about December 15, 2014.
5

kitchen table. Appellant came up next to her, put a pillow on top of her, and put his 

hand under her clothes and started touching her middle part. Using a tissue box, the 

complainant demonstrated how appellant touched her with his hand and index finger. 

The complainant testified that appellant’s actions made her feel sad and she walked 

away. 

 The complainant testified that the third time appellant touched her, she had 

gone upstairs to get some perfume from her grandmother’s bathroom. When the 

complainant came out of the bathroom to tie her shoe, appellant got on top of her on 

the bed and began “moving around” on her. She did not remember appellant 

touching any particular parts of her body that time. When the complainant’s sister 

came in, appellant got off the complainant and acted like he was tying her shoe. 

Appellant did not say anything and went downstairs. 

 The complainant testified that after the third incident with appellant, she told 

her mother that appellant had inappropriately touched her. The complainant’s 

mother was the first person the complainant told. After that, the complainant also 

told her aunt, the police, and her doctor. The pediatrician’s testimony at trial and his 

notes concerning what the complainant told him about appellant’s conduct were 

consistent with the complainant’s testimony. Although the pediatrician found no 

physical injuries after examining the complainant, he testified that he would not 

expect to find injuries based on an allegation of touching only. The officer who 

responded to the complainant’s mother’s call testified that the complainant was 

willing to answer his questions and her answers remained consistent throughout the 

interview. After interviewing the complainant and her mother, the officer contacted 

the appropriate police division and Child Protective Services. 

 The jury also heard evidence of an extraneous offense committed by appellant. 

The extraneous offense evidence showed that appellant was convicted of aggravated 
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sexual assault of a child in 1999. The complainant in that case was ten or eleven 

years old at the time of the offense, and it was alleged that appellant placed his finger 

in the child’s female sexual organ. 

 The uncorroborated testimony of a child seventeen years of age or younger is 

sufficient to support a conviction for indecency with a child. See Tex. Code. Crim. 

Proc. art. 38.07; Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2004), aff’d, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The State is not required to 

produce any corroborating or physical evidence. Martines v. State, 371 S.W.3d 232, 

240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Moreover, the intent to arouse 

or gratify may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct. McKenzie v. State, 617 

S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); see also Billy v. State, 77 S.W.3d 427, 

429 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet ref’d) (holding that complainant’s testimony that 

the “appellant put his hand inside her panties, on her private part, and moved his 

hand around for a couple of minutes” was sufficient to support an inference that 

appellant acted with requisite intent). 

 Appellant acknowledges that a child complainant’s testimony alone is 

sufficient to uphold a conviction for a sexual offense, but he argues that in this case 

the extraneous offense evidence improperly bolstered the complainant’s testimony. 

Even if the extraneous offense evidence was admitted in error, this court is required 

to consider all the evidence presented at trial, whether properly or improperly 

admitted, in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the appellant’s 

conviction. See Moff, 131 S.W.3d at 489–90; see also Jessop v. State, 368 S.W.3d 

653, 663 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (“In determining the legal sufficiency 

of the evidence, we must consider all the evidence in the record, whether direct or 

circumstantial, properly or improperly admitted, or submitted by the prosecution or 

the defense.”). 
7

 As appellant notes, the State’s prosecution rested largely on the complainant’s 

testimony. The complainant’s credibility and the weight of the evidence is a matter 

solely for the jury to determine. See Arroyo, 2018 WL 4344410, at *2; Sharp, 707 

S.W.2d at 614. This court’s role on appeal is restricted to guarding against the rare 

occurrence when the fact finder does not act rationally. Arroyo, 2018 WL 4344410, 

at *2. On this record, we conclude that the jury acted rationally in finding appellant 

guilty of the charged offenses, particularly given that the complainant’s testimony 

was clear, consistent, and corroborated by the pediatrician’s testimony and notes 

made soon after the offenses occurred. 

 We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s convictions for 

indecency with a child. We overrule appellant’s fourth issue. 

II. Admission of Extraneous Offense Evidence

Appellant raises three issues concerning the trial court’s admission of 

extraneous offense evidence, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting (1) extraneous offense evidence pursuant to article 38.37, section 2(b) of 

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in violation of appellant’s right to due 

process; (2) extraneous offense evidence in violation of Texas Rule of Evidence 403; 

and (3) a previous judgment for aggravated sexual assault of a child during the 

guilt/innocence phase of trial. We address each issue in turn. 

A. Relevant Background 

The State gave notice in both cases that it intended to use extraneous offenses 

and prior convictions. In response, appellant’s counsel objected and filed a lengthy 

trial brief in support of his arguments. A pre-trial hearing was conducted, during 

which the State offered as its intended evidence: (1) a stipulation by appellant that 

he had been convicted of aggravated sexual assault in 1999; (2) a penitentiary packet 
8

corresponding to the stipulation; and (3) a witness to testify that she saw appellant 

with the extraneous offense complainant (T.W.) in the kitchen, T.W. appeared 

distraught, appellant made certain statements, and the witness helped T.W. get out 

of that room and gave T.W. a safe place to stay. The trial court determined that the 

evidence likely to be admitted at trial was adequate to support a finding by the jury 

that appellant committed the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and held that the 

evidence was admissible. 

At trial, appellant’s stipulation and penitentiary packet were admitted into 

evidence. The witness, appellant’s niece, testified that, on December 25, 1998, her 

cousin T.W. was ten or eleven years old and spending Christmas with the family. 

Appellant’s niece testified that she went into the kitchen and saw appellant with 

T.W. Appellant was either standing over or in front of T.W. with his hand on her 

shoulder, and T.W. was crying. Appellant’s niece asked was what wrong, and 

appellant said, “What? What? Did I bite you?” Appellant’s niece told T.W. to go 

upstairs. T.W. did not want to talk and stayed upstairs with her. Appellant’s niece 

was aware that after that, a police investigation of appellant ensued, charges were 

filed against appellant with T.W. as the complainant, and appellant was convicted. 

The trial court included in the jury charge a limiting instruction concerning 

this evidence: 

The State has introduced evidence of extraneous crimes or bad 

acts other than the one charged in the indictment in this case. This 

evidence was admitted only for the purpose of assisting you, if it does, 

for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the 

character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the 

character of the defendant. You cannot consider the testimony unless 

you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

committed these acts, if any.
9

B. Constitutionality of Article 38.37, Section 2(b) 

In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting the extraneous offense evidence pursuant to Article 38.37, Section 2(b) of 

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides:

(b) Notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, and 

subject to Section 2–a, evidence that the defendant has committed a 

separate offense described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) may be admitted 

in the trial of an alleged offense described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) 

for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the 

character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the 

character of the defendant. 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37, § 2(b). Appellant asserts that the admission of this 

evidence violated his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments of the United States Constitution by depriving him of the right to an 

impartial jury, infringing on the presumption of innocence, and lowering the State’s 

burden of proof. 3

 As appellant acknowledges, this court has previously addressed similar 

complaints in Harris v. State and held that Article 38.37, Section 2(b) does not 

violate due process. See 475 S.W.3d 395, 400–03 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2015, pet. ref’d). Among other things, the Harris court concluded that an appellant’s 

right to a fair and impartial trial is protected by the numerous procedural safeguards 

provided in the statute. Id. at 402. The court also concluded that the statute neither 

 

3 Appellant also complains that admission of the evidence also violated Article 1, Section 

19 of the Texas Constitution and Article 1.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. To the 

extent appellant relies on Article 1.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, appellant did not 

raise this ground in either his pretrial brief or the hearing on his objections and so has failed to 

preserve it. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. And, because appellant has not argued that the state 

constitution offers greater protections than the federal constitution, he has waived his state 

constitutional claim. See Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Appellant’s 

complaint is thus limited to a federal due process claim.
10

lessens the appellant’s presumption of innocence nor alters the State’s burden of 

proof. Id. And, as in this case, the trial court included an appropriate limiting 

instruction. See id. at 403; see also Distefano v. State, 532 S.W.3d 25, 37–39 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (holding that Article 38.37, Section 2 

did not violate due process and noting that the court’s charge included a limiting 

instruction on the extraneous offense).

 Other Texas intermediate courts have also rejected similar challenges to the 

constitutionality of Article 38.37, Section 2(b). See, e.g., Buxton v. State, 526 S.W.3d 

666, 688–89 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d); Bezerra v. State, 485 

S.W.3d 133, 139–40 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. ref’d); Robisheaux v. State, 

483 S.W.3d 205, 213 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. ref’d); Belcher v. State, 474 

S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.). In contrast, appellant cites no 

authority that is on point and contrary to this court’s prior holding. We decline 

appellant’s invitation to reconsider our decision in Harris because we are required 

to follow our precedent absent an intervening decision from a higher court or from 

this court sitting en banc. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 478 S.W.3d 936, 943 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied); Medina v. State, 411 S.W.3d 15, 20 n.5 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). We overrule appellant’s second 

issue.

C. Admissibility of the Evidence Under Rule 403

 In his third issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

in admitting the extraneous offense evidence over his objection because its probative 

value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tex. R. 

Evid. 403. Even when evidence of a defendant’s extraneous acts is otherwise 

relevant and admissible under Article 38.37, the trial court is required to conduct a 

Rule 403 balancing test upon proper objection or request. Distefano, 532 S.W.3d at 
11

31; Cox v. State, 495 S.W.3d 898, 903 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. 

ref’d). Appellant argues that the balancing test weighs in favor of excluding the 

evidence. 

 We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of 

discretion. Winegarner v. State, 235 S.W.3d 787, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As 

long as the trial court’s decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement and 

is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, it must be upheld. Id.

4

 In 

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, 

we balance the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with 

the proponent’s need for that evidence against (1) any tendency of the evidence to 

suggest decision on an improper basis; (2) any tendency of the evidence to confuse 

or distract the jury from the main issues; (3) any tendency of the evidence to be given 

undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of 

the evidence; and (4) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume 

an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. West v. 

State, 554 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (citing 

Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). 

 Appellant argues that the probative value factors (the inherent probative force 

of the evidence and the proponent’s need for that evidence) weigh in favor of 

excluding the extraneous offense evidence. Appellant complains that the court 

 

4 Appellant urges us to review de novo the trial court’s ruling admitting the extraneous 

offense evidence because the ruling does not involve a credibility determination, citing State v. 

Stukes, 490 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). In Stukes, this court 

reviewed de novo an order quashing an indictment, which this court noted was “a question of law 

that does not turn on an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of a witness.” Id. Stukes does

not hold that an appellate court may review de novo a trial court’s ruling on an objection to the 

admission of evidence on Rule 403 grounds. We decline appellant’s request that we depart from 

the well-established general rule that a trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of 

discretion.
12

documents and the testimony of appellant’s niece, who merely saw appellant 

standing near T.W. in 1998, provided no factual or credible detail regarding the 

factual allegations of the extraneous conviction, and T.W. did not testify against 

appellant. Thus, appellant maintains, any potential probative value of the extraneous 

offense evidence was diminished by the absence of facts and circumstances that 

would have provided the trier of fact with the proper context in which to place the 

evidence. Further, appellant argues that admission of the extraneous offense 

evidence with so little corroborative evidence served only to confuse or distract the 

jury, and also provided an avenue for the jury to conclude that appellant committed 

the charged offense in conformity with his character rather than the actual evidence 

of the charged offense, making it unfairly prejudicial. 

 The Court of Criminal Appeals has long stated that sexual misconduct 

involving children is inherently inflammatory. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 

372, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g). At the same time, however, 

“evidence that a defendant has sexually abused another child is relevant to whether 

the defendant sexually abused the child-complainant in the charged case.” Caston v. 

State, 549 S.W.3d 601, 612 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see

Alvarez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 362, 371 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. 

ref’d) (explaining that the Rule 403 balancing test normally favors admission of the 

defendant’s prior sexual assaults of children in child sexual offense cases because 

such evidence “was especially probative of [the defendant’s] propensity to sexually 

assault children”) (quoting Belcher, 474 S.W.3d at 848). Thus, the evidence that 

appellant has sexually abused another child is relevant to whether appellant sexually 

abused the complainant in this case and weighs in favor of admission. 

 Appellant’s prior conviction is also relevant to the complainant’s credibility, 

as the complainant was the only eyewitness to the offense and no physical evidence 
13

supported her allegations against appellant. See Robisheaux, 483 S.W.3d at 220 

(concluding that State’s need for extraneous evidence weighed “strongly in favor of 

admission” because the case was based on the complainant’s testimony alone); 

Belcher, 474 S.W.3d at 848 (affirming trial court’s admission of prior alleged 

extraneous offenses against children when complainant was the only eyewitness to 

the charged offense, there was no physical evidence to support her accusation, and 

her credibility “was clearly the focal issue in the case”). Thus, the State’s need for 

the evidence also weighs in favor of admission. 

 And, although appellant complains that the extraneous offense evidence 

offered provided “no credible detail” of appellant’s prior offense against T.W., the 

extraneous offense evidence included an indictment which alleged that appellant 

penetrated the female sexual organ of T.W., who was younger than fourteen years 

old, by placing his finger in T.W’s female sexual organ—conduct that is very similar 

to the conduct the complainant alleged against appellant and thus weighs in favor of 

admission. See Bezerra, 485 S.W.3d at 141 (holding that despite remoteness of the 

extraneous offense, the trial court could have reasonably determined that the 

“remarkable similarities” between the extraneous offenses and charged offenses 

strengthened the probative force of the evidence). 

 Finally, we note that the presentation of the extraneous offense evidence did 

not take much time and was not cumulative of any other evidence presented. It is 

also unlikely that the extraneous offense evidence confused the issues, since the jury 

was instructed on the limited purpose for which the evidence could be considered, if 

at all, by the jury. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 

the extraneous offense evidence over appellant’s Rule 403 objection. We overrule 

appellant’s second issue. 
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D. Admissibility of Previous Judgment 

 In his third issue, appellant contends that even if the evidence of his

extraneous conviction was not improperly admitted, the trial court nevertheless 

abused its discretion in admitting appellant’s Texas Department of Criminal 

Justice—Institutional Division penitentiary packet (pen packet) because the pen 

packet included documents containing prejudicial information. Specifically, 

appellant argues that certain documents in the pen packet informed the jury that the 

appellant had been an “inmate” of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—

Institutional Division and thus had been to prison as a result of the extraneous 

conviction; the indictment provided factual details concerning the extraneous 

allegation that the State was unable to produce through live testimony; and the 

mandate of affirmance from the appellate court informed the jury that appellant’s 

conviction was upheld with “no error in the judgment below.” Appellant asserts that 

in light of his stipulation, the pen packet was cumulative and thus highly prejudicial.

 The State argues that appellant failed to preserve this issue for appellate 

review. We agree. In his trial brief, appellant argued generally that the totality of the 

“extraneous conduct evidence” should be excluded under Rule 403, but he did not 

argue that the evidence was cumulative or make any objection specific to the pen 

packet or its contents. At the hearing on appellant’s objections, the State indicated it 

intended to offer the pen packet as a separate exhibit. The trial judge approved the 

State’s redaction of information concerning appellant’s sentence on the face of the 

judgment contained in the pen packet, and appellant agreed that the redaction had 

been made correctly. Although appellant was granted a running objection on his 

Rule 403 objection to the extraneous offense evidence generally, appellant did not 

object to the admission of the pen packet as overly prejudicial considering the 

stipulation and witness testimony about the extraneous offense. Nor did appellant 
15

object to specific statements in particular documents included in the pen packet as 

overly prejudicial or cumulative. We conclude that appellant’s general objection to 

the extraneous offense evidence under Rule 403 was not adequately specific to 

inform the trial court of the complaint urged on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 

33.1(a)(1); Moff, 131 S.W.3d at 489.5

 Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s third 

issue. 

CONCLUSION

 We overrule appellant’s issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

 

 /s/ Ken Wise

 Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Donovan, Wise, and Jewell.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

 

5

 Even assuming appellant’s general objection to the extraneous offense evidence on Rule 

403 grounds was sufficient to inform the trial court that specific information in the pen packet was 

cumulative and thus unduly prejudicial, any error in admitting the exhibit was harmless in light of 

appellant’s stipulation to his prior conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child, the lack of 

emphasis on the exhibit by the State after its admission, and the record as a whole, as discussed 

above. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).