NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JALEN LEE EDDINS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0502

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-149246-001 DT

The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Law Offices of Michael J. Dew, Phoenix

By Michael J. Dew

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 4-2-2019
STATE v. EDDINS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Jalen Lee Eddins (“Appellant”) appeals his convictions and 

probation for two counts of robbery and two counts of burglary in the third 

degree. Appellant’s counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Smith v. 

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000), Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), stating he has searched the record on 

appeal and found no arguable question of law that is not frivolous.

Appellant’s counsel therefore requests that we review the record for

fundamental error. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999)

(stating that this court reviews the entire record for reversible error). This 

court allowed Appellant to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, but

he has not done so.

¶2 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona 

Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) 

sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A). Finding no reversible 

error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶3 In October 2016, a grand jury issued an indictment, charging 

Appellant with two counts of armed robbery (Counts I and II), each a class 

two felony, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1902 and 13-1904, and three counts 

of burglary in the third degree (Counts III, IV, and V), each a class four 

felony, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1506(A)(1). Count V was later dismissed 

without prejudice upon the Sate’s motion.

¶4 Before trial, the trial court twice granted defense motions for 

a Rule 11 examination of Appellant. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11. The first time, 

two mental health experts independently examined Appellant, found him 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict 

and resolve all reasonable inferences against Appellant. See State v. Kiper, 

181 Ariz. 62, 64 (App. 1994).
STATE v. EDDINS

Decision of the Court

3

generally uncooperative and likely to be malingering, and opined that he 

was fully competent to stand trial. The court then found Appellant 

competent to stand trial pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4510(B). The second time, 

the experts’ opinions were split, and the court appointed a third evaluator, 

who opined that Appellant was likely not competent to stand trial. The 

court found Appellant not competent but restorable, and ordered that he 

undergo restoration treatment, after which the court found he was 

competent to stand trial.

¶5 At trial, the State presented the following evidence: On 

October 17, 2016, the manager of a pharmacy store observed Appellant 

behind the register area—a protected, no-entry area of the store in which 

customers are not allowed2—with the cashier, who appeared “very scared.” 

The manager advised Appellant to leave the register area or the manager 

would call the police, but Appellant ignored the manager’s warning and 

tugged on the cash register drawer, which he could not open. Appellant 

eventually took some tobacco and an energy drink from the protected area 

behind the register, and then exited the store. After Appellant left, the 

police were called.

¶6 Meanwhile, Appellant walked to a nearby cellphone store. 

He went behind the counter in the employees-only area, and the store 

manager heard him curse at the cashier and tell her, “Bitch, give me the 

money.” Appellant then began opening drawers looking for cash.

¶7 The manager stepped between Appellant and the cashier, and

Appellant then approached the manager and stated he was the owner of 

the store and had come in to get money owed to him. The manager told 

Appellant to leave the store, but Appellant moved closer and said, “If you 

touch me, I will shoot you.” As he said this, Appellant reached for the back 

of his pants, simulating he had a gun.

¶8 The manager then told Appellant to take whatever he was 

going to take and leave. Appellant took $300 in cash, some wireless 

headphones, and speakers from behind the counter, and then left. During 

this time, the cashier was hiding behind the manager, shaking, and looked 

as if she was going to cry. Both the cashier and manager were nervous and 

 

2 See generally A.R.S. § 13-1501(2) (delineating between shoplifting and 

burglary of a retail establishment by specifying that when a person enters 

“any unauthorized areas of the premises” during otherwise normal 

business hours, he is “[e]nter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully” for purposes 

of the burglary statute).
STATE v. EDDINS

Decision of the Court

4

scared that Appellant might shoot them. After Appellant left the store, the 

manager called the police.

¶9 Police officers located Appellant at the bus stop next to the 

businesses he had robbed and found the property he had taken in his 

possession. The officers took Appellant into custody and found the $300 he 

had taken from the cellphone store in his pockets. They did not find a gun 

on his person or nearby.

¶10 Because no weapon had been found, the State moved to 

amend the indictment as to Counts I and II from A.R.S. § 13-1904(A)(1) to 

(A)(2) to conform to the evidence, but the court denied the motion. After a 

lengthy discussion and agreement between the court and both counsel, the 

court instructed the jury that, as to Counts I and II, the armed robbery 

charges were no longer before the jury and had been replaced by the lesserincluded charge of robbery for each count. The court also instructed the 

jury as to burglary in the third degree for Counts III and IV.

¶11 Appellant chose to be absent for most of the trial and did not 

testify. The jury found Appellant guilty of robbery as to Counts I and II 

and burglary in the third degree as to Counts III and IV. Although the State 

had alleged several aggravating circumstances, no aggravation phase was 

conducted. The court suspended sentencing and placed Appellant on

concurrent four-year terms of supervised probation for each count. 

Appellant timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

¶12 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300; Clark, 196 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 30. The 

evidence presented at trial was substantial and supports the verdicts. 

Appellant was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and 

was given the opportunity to speak at sentencing. The proceedings were 

conducted in compliance with his constitutional and statutory rights and 

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

¶13 After filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations 

pertaining to Appellant’s representation in this appeal have ended. 

Counsel need do no more than inform Appellant of the status of the appeal 

and of his future options, unless counsel’s review reveals an issue 

appropriate for petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. See State 

v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984). Appellant has thirty days from the 

date of this decision to proceed, if he desires, with a pro per motion for 

reconsideration or petition for review.
STATE v. EDDINS

Decision of the Court

5

CONCLUSION

¶14 Appellant’s convictions and probation are affirmed.