[Cite as Bunt v. Grange Ins. Co., 2012-Ohio-6103.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

WILLIAM BUNT 

 Appellant 

 v. 

GRANGE INSURANCE COMPANY 

 Appellee 

C.A. No. 12CA010174 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 07CV151760 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 26, 2012 

 

CARR, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellants, William and Carol Bunt, appeal an order of the Lorain County Court 

of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment to Grange Insurance Company. This Court 

affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} William Bunt was injured when unidentified men attempted to carjack his pickup 

truck at a gas station. He filed an action for declaratory judgment against Grange Insurance, 

which is the issuer of his automobile insurance policy, seeking declarations that he is entitled to 

medical payments and to uninsured motorist coverage under the terms of his insurance policy. 

Mr. Bunt’s wife filed a claim for loss of consortium. The trial court granted summary judgment 

to Grange and denied Bunt’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that his injuries were 

not caused by an accident and that they did not arise from use of the covered vehicle. The Bunts 

appealed. 
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II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The trial court erred when it granted Grange Insurance Company’s motion for 

summary judgment and denied William and Carol Bunts’ cross motion for 

summary judgment. 

{¶3} The Bunts’ assignment of error is that because Mr. Bunt’s injuries were sustained 

while he was at least partially in his vehicle and while he had the keys in his hand, the vehicle 

was “intertwined in his injury,” and the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to 

Grange. The parties agree that the analysis of whether Mr. Bunt is entitled to uninsured 

motorists coverage applies with equal weight to, and is dispositive of, his claim for medical 

payments coverage. 

{¶4} This Court reviews an order that grants summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. 

Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Summary judgment is proper if there are no 

genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

See Civ.R. 56(C). In applying this standard, evidence is construed in favor of the nonmoving 

party, and summary judgment is appropriate if reasonable minds could only conclude that 

judgment should be entered in favor of the movant. Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 73 Ohio 

St.3d 679, 686-87 (1995). 

{¶5} Mr. Bunt’s insurance policy provides that Grange “will pay damages which an 

insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle 

because of * * * Bodily Injury suffered by the injured and caused by an accident[.]” The policy 

also explains that “[t]he owner’s or operator’s liability for these damages must arise out of the 

ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle.” Neither party has argued that 

Mr. Bunt’s truck is not an “uninsured motor vehicle” as defined by the policy. For purposes of 
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this opinion, therefore, we assume without deciding that Mr. Bunt’s truck is an “uninsured motor 

vehicle.” See, e.g., Bakos v. Insura Property and Cas. Co., 125 Ohio App.3d 548, 552 (8th 

Dist.1997). 

{¶6} When an insured’s injuries arise from the intentional conduct of a tortfeasor, a 

claim for uninsured motorist coverage focuses not on the nature of the tortfeasor’s conduct, but 

on whether the insured is legally entitled to recover. Kish v. Cent. Nat. Ins. Group of Omaha, 67 

Ohio St.2d 41, 45-46 (1981). “Absent any enforceable contractual provisions to the contrary, the 

determination of whether an occurrence is an ‘accident’ for purposes of uninsured motorist, 

family compensation, and accident insurance must be from the standpoint of the insured.” Id. at 

paragraph two of the syllabus. The “determinative factor” is whether there is a causal nexus 

between the injury to the insured and the uninsured vehicle. Estate of Nord v. Motorists Mut. 

Ins. Co., 105 Ohio St.3d 366, 2005-Ohio-2165, ¶ 13. In other words, the injury itself must arise 

out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured vehicle under the insurance policy. 

See id. at ¶ 14. The focus is the instrumentality that causes the injury. Howell v. Richardson, 45 

Ohio St.3d 365, 369 (1989). 

{¶7} For these reasons, the Ohio Supreme Court has concluded that “[b]odily injury 

to an insured resulting from the discharge of a firearm by a tortfeasor is not encompassed within 

the terms of a policy of insurance which limits coverage to injuries ‘caused by accident resulting 

from the ownership, maintenance or use of’ an automobile.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

Injuries sustained after a carjacking and apart from use of the uninsured vehicle do not arise out 

of ownership, operation, or use of the vehicle. Lattanzi v. Travelers Ins. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 350 

(1995), syllabus. On the other hand, when bodily injury is caused by “[a] chain of events * * * 

unbroken by the intervention of any event unrelated to the use of the vehicle,” it does arise from 
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ownership, operation or use of the uninsured vehicle. Sanderson v. Ohio Edison Co., 69 Ohio 

St.3d 582 (1994), paragraph three of the syllabus (insured sustained injuries when a minor was 

negligently entrusted with the keys to a vehicle that he did not know how to drive). 

{¶8} Mr. Bunt’s deposition testimony is the only evidence related to the instrumentality 

of his injury, so the facts themselves are undisputed and straightforward. Because Mr. Bunt’s 

testimony was uncontroverted, we note that the Bunts’ argument that the trial court incorrectly 

weighed the evidence is misplaced. The undisputed facts, therefore, are as follows. 

{¶9} Mr. Bunt stopped to get gas after dark, leaving his driver’s side window down. 

He noticed several young men in the parking lot and acknowledged them after walking into the 

gas station to pay for his gas. When he got back into his truck, one of the young men reached 

through the open window, grabbed the keys from the ignition, and told Mr. Bunt that they were 

stealing the truck. Mr. Bunt resisted by grabbing the man’s wrist and holding on while trying to 

get the keys back. According to Mr. Bunt, the men were “beating on” him, punching him, and 

hitting him in the shoulder. Eventually, the men pulled Mr. Bunt about halfway from the truck 

so that his hands were on the pavement, and it was in that position that he sustained a blow to the 

jaw that caused his injuries. Soon after, another car pulled into the parking lot, and the men fled. 

{¶10} Mr. Bunt’s injuries, while unfortunate, did not arise from use of the uninsured 

vehicle within the meaning of the policy. The beating that Mr. Bunt sustained at the hands of the 

carjackers was unrelated to the use of the vehicle such that we cannot say his injuries resulted 

from “[a] chain of events * * * unbroken by the intervention of any event unrelated to the use of 

the vehicle.” Sanderson, 69 Ohio St.3d 582 at paragraph three of the syllabus. In other words, 

we conclude that this case is more like Lattanzi, 72 Ohio St.3d 350, in which the insured was 

carjacked, kidnapped, and brutally attacked once the carjacker reached his destination, than 
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Sanderson. In this respect, we note that Mr. Bunts’ argument that he was partially in the vehicle 

when the attack occurred is not dispositive, because the determinative factor is not whether the 

insured is in the vehicle at the time injuries are sustained. Estate of Nord, 105 Ohio St.3d 366, 

2005-Ohio-2165, at ¶ 14. 

{¶11} As mentioned above, the parties agree that the same analysis is employed with 

respect to the medical payments provision of the policy and, as such, neither have separately 

argued the issue. Accordingly, the Bunts’ assignment of error is overruled with respect to both 

uninsured motorists and medical payments coverage under the policy. 

III. 

{¶12} The Bunts’ assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the Medina 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 
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 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 DONNA J. CARR 

 FOR THE COURT 

DICKINSON, J. 

CONCURS.

MOORE, P. J. 

DISSENTING.

{¶13} Because I believe that a question of material fact existed as to the cause of Mr. 

Bunt’s injuries, I respectfully dissent. 

{¶14} As the majority notes, in Mr. Bunt’s deposition, he maintained that his assailants 

were attempting to pull him from his truck, and he was “half in” and “half out” of the truck when 

he received the blow to his head. He also stated that, at that time, he was “wedged” in the truck 

door, and his hands were on the pavement. Due to his bodily position, he was unable to see the 

source of the blow to his head, and “[he did not] know how it happened,” but he assumed that he 

was kicked. 

{¶15} Although I agree that these facts were undisputed, I disagree with the inference 

drawn from these facts by the majority that the beating alone caused Mr. Bunt’s injuries. I do 

not believe the facts warrant this inference at the summary judgment stage of proceedings. 

Instead, I believe this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Bunt, could 

reasonably indicate Mr. Bunt’s injuries were, at least in part, “achieved through use of the [truck] 

as an instrumentality.” See Lattanzi v Travelers Ins. Co., 82 Ohio St.3d 350, 432 (“it is how [the 
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tortfeasor] causes the injury that is important”). Therefore, I would conclude that a material 

question of fact remained as to Mr. Bunt’s claim. 

{¶16} Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this matter 

for further proceedings. 

APPEARANCES:

STEPHEN S. VANEK and CHRISTINE M. LASALVIA, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant. 

MICHAEL F. FARRELL, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.