NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re:

LANNY JAY DUGAR,

Debtor.

BAP No. CC-23-1056-SGC

Bk. No. 1:20-bk-11166-VK

Adv. No. 1:20-ap-01083-VK

MEMORANDUM*

DAVID BJORNBAK; QIANG 

BJORNBAK,

Appellants,

v.

LANNY JAY DUGAR,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Victoria S. Kaufman, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: SPRAKER, GAN, and CORBIT, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

In 2012, Chapter 71 debtor Lanny Jay Dugar’s contracting company 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for 

whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential 

value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the 

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules 

of Bankruptcy Procedure, and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

FILED

FEB 9 2024

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
2

contracted to remodel the residence of David and Qiang Bjornbak. A 

dispute quickly arose, and the parties have been litigating with each other 

since. Dugar eventually stipulated to entry of a $1.5 million judgment 

against him for breach of contract.

Dugar later filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and the Bjornbaks 

sued to deny his discharge pursuant to § 727(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), and (a)(5). 

The bankruptcy court denied the Bjornbaks’ summary judgment motion 

and ultimately entered a judgment for Dugar after trial. The Bjornbaks 

appealed. They have not demonstrated any reversible error. Accordingly, 

we AFFIRM.

FACTS2

A. Dugar’s bankruptcy.

In July 2020, Dugar, acting pro se, commenced his no-asset chapter 7

case. In his schedules, he listed a total of $555.00 in personal property and 

no real property. His personal property consisted mostly of clothing and 

other personal items. According to Dugar, his only financial asset was $5.00 

in cash. His schedules stated that he owned no vehicles or non-farm 

animals, and he had no interests in any businesses. As for his debt, he 

represented that he owed the Bjornbaks $1,500,000 and the IRS $3,000.

3 He 

2 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically 

filed in the underlying bankruptcy case and adversary proceeding. See Atwood v. Chase 

Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).

3 Oddly, Dugar listed his total debt owed to all unsecured creditors as $6,000--

$3,000 for taxes and $3,000 owed to all other unsecured creditors.
3

listed no other creditors or debt in his schedules. The chapter 7 trustee filed

a report of no distribution in February 2021.

B. The objection to discharge adversary proceeding.

The Bjornbaks timely objected to Dugar’s discharge under § 727(a)(2), 

(a)(3), (a)(4), and (a)(5). The Bjornbaks alleged that Dugar fraudulently 

concealed multiple assets, including financial accounts, real property, a 

family trust, motor vehicles, and horses. Foremost, they asserted that 

Dugar had undisclosed ownership interests in several businesses:

American Top Remodeling, Finest Home Remodeling, Inc., California 

Preferred Builders, Image Home Design, Inc., Hi Tech Remodeling Group, 

Inc., and ALP Networks, Inc. (collectively, the “Businesses”).4

According to the Bjornbaks, Dugar additionally concealed his role as 

an officer, director, or managing executive of the Businesses and his role as 

a partner with Moshe Ben Nissan and Jacob Sherif in operating the 

Businesses. The Bjornbaks further alleged that Dugar and his partners took 

cash derived from these businesses and fraudulently transferred the cash to 

friends, relatives, and business associates. At all times, they claim, he 

concealed income he derived from the Businesses and from the real 

property he secretly owned.

The Bjornbaks further alleged that Dugar concealed his employment 

4 As they prosecuted the adversary proceeding, the Bjornbaks added several

more business entities to this list. But the specific identity of each of these Businesses 

largely is irrelevant to our analysis and resolution of this appeal.
4

in 2018 and 2019—and failed to maintain records reflecting his personal 

financial condition and the condition of the Businesses. The Bjornbaks also 

alleged that Dugar failed to keep records of his transfers of cash and other 

assets, including a 2006 Mini Cooper he sold in 2019. Because each of the 

above-referenced assets, transfers, and management roles were omitted 

from Dugar’s schedules and statement of financial affairs, the Bjornbaks 

also claimed that Dugar filed materially false schedules and a false

statement of financial affairs.

Finally, according to the Bjornbaks, the Business known as Finest 

Home Remodeling, Inc. “made” millions from 2013 to 2016. The Bjornbaks 

complained regarding Dugar’s failure to keep records reflecting the 

Business’s receipt of these funds and Dugar’s failure to explain what 

happened to the cash.

Dugar timely answered the complaint. He denied the vast majority of 

the Bjornbaks’ allegations, but he did admit that he inadvertently failed to 

list the 2006 Mini Cooper in his schedules. Dugar explained that he sold the 

vehicle for scrap in 2019 for $800. He further admitted that he neglected to 

disclose in his schedules a lawsuit he filed against third party Carlos 

Dorado.

C. The motion to deem facts admitted and related proceedings.

In June 2021, the Bjornbaks served on Dugar their first set of requests 

for admission (“RFAs”). Dugar timely emailed unsigned responses to the 

RFAs. In December 2021, the Bjornbaks filed and served a motion to deem 
5

admitted the facts set forth in the RFAs. According to the Bjornbaks, Dugar

failed to properly respond to the RFAs because he did not include a signed 

verification.

Dugar opposed the motion. He submitted with his opposition a new 

version of his responses to the RFAs, which included a signed verification. 

Dugar asserted that he acted in good faith and that the Bjornbaks were not 

prejudiced by the delay in submitting his responses with a signed 

verification. He further maintained that his conduct was neither 

unreasonable nor willful and malicious, and the law favored adjudication 

of the contested facts rather than deeming them admitted. 

In January 2022, the bankruptcy court entered an order to show cause 

why the bankruptcy court should not excuse Dugar from the deemed 

admissions (“OSC”). After both parties responded to the OSC, the 

bankruptcy court entered a memorandum decision and an order denying 

the Bjornbaks’ motion and permitting Dugar to withdraw and amend his 

deemed admissions. The court noted that the Bjornbaks incorrectly 

contended that the responses to their RFAs needed to be accompanied by a 

written and signed verification. As the court explained, Civil Rule 36(a) 

merely required that the RFA responses be signed. On the other hand, the 

court acknowledged that Dugar had failed to sign the original version of 

his RFA responses or to mail them to the Bjornbak, though he did email the 

responses to them. The court further observed that the Bjornbaks’ RFAs 

failed to advise Dugar of the potential consequences if he failed to timely or 
6

properly respond.

The court determined that withdrawal or amendment of the deemed 

admissions would not prejudice the Bjornbaks’ substantive presentation of 

their claims and would facilitate trying the case on its merits. The court also 

remarked that the parties’ conduct with respect to the RFAs and the 

responses favored withdrawal of the deemed admissions. Consequently, it

permitted Dugar to withdraw and amend the deemed admissions.

D. The Bjornbaks’ summary judgment motion.

While the parties disputed the request for admissions discussed 

above, the Bjornbaks moved for summary judgment. They contended that 

Dugar conspired with Jacob Sherif, Moshe Ben Nissan, Hadas Pinto, Yaar 

Kimhu, and Grant Kahn to use the Businesses to hide cash and other assets

from the government and creditors.

Dugar admitted his ownership and control of Finest Home 

Remodeling (“FHR”), which he identified as the successor to his sole 

proprietorship American Top Remodeling (“ATR”).5 Notwithstanding 

Dugar’s denial that he owned or controlled any of the other Businesses, the 

Bjornbaks argued that he orchestrated the transfer of assets, operations,

and business opportunities to the other Businesses over the course of 

several years. They argued that he did so because he was experiencing 

5 There is a good deal of confusion in the record regarding a corporation formed 

by Ben Nissan known as ATR Inc. and Dugar’s sole proprietorship ATR. But any such 

confusion is irrelevant to our analysis and resolution of this appeal, given the 

bankruptcy court’s findings after trial.
7

significant legal troubles that exposed him to an increasing risk of liability.

The Bjornbaks claimed that at the time of his bankruptcy filing, 

Dugar had undisclosed interests in most or all the Businesses. The 

Bjornbaks insisted that Dugar’s ownership and control was “obvious” 

because many of them listed the same Ventura Boulevard address, 

employed the same employee (David Neiyer),6 were engaged in the same 

industry (contracting), and were putatively owned and controlled by 

Dugar’s friends and business associates. The Bjornbaks did not dispute that 

FHR was the successor to ATR and that FHR ceased operations no later 

than 2016—several years before Dugar filed bankruptcy. Yet based on the 

premise that he owned and controlled all the Businesses and that the other 

Businesses succeeded to FHR’s assets, operations, and business 

opportunities, the Bjornbaks believed that Dugar should have produced

business and financial records for all the Businesses. They further asserted 

that Dugar should have produced personal and Business income tax 

returns for the several years preceding his bankruptcy.

In support of their claim that Dugar owned and controlled all the 

Businesses, the Bjornbaks presented certified copies of several official 

corporate filings for California Preferred Builders, Inc. (“CPB”), formed in 

2009, which in 2015 became Image Home Design, Inc. (“IHD”). These 

6 City of Los Angeles tax records presented by the Bjornbaks indicate that Neiyer 

worked as a Certified Public Accountant for a company known as Creative Solutions 

(not one of the Businesses) but made various tax filings and payments with the city on 

behalf of the Businesses.
8

filings identified Jacob Sherif as a director of both Businesses, as well as the 

chief executive officer, chief financial officer, and secretary. On various 

bank signature cards, Sherif was listed as treasurer and secretary of these 

two Businesses. Dugar admitted that for a time he served as “RMO” for 

CPB, which Dugar variously identified as “responsible managing officer” 

or “responsible managing operator” and that he was paid a fee of $500 for 

serving in this capacity. However, aside from FHR, CPB, and IHD, there 

were no similar official corporate records suggesting Dugar’s ownership 

and control of any of the other Businesses.

7

In addition to the alleged shuttling of assets and income between the 

Businesses, the Bjornbaks pointed to evidence of several undisclosed

vehicles Dugar acquired between 2014 and 2019. According to the 

Bjornbaks, Dugar concealed and fraudulently transferred these vehicles, 

and wrongfully failed to disclose them in his schedules. They also 

maintained that his in-law, Bobby Joe Davis, paid spousal support to 

Dugar’s ex-wife Cindy Dugar, but Dugar failed to disclose this financial 

arrangement in his schedules.

7 Dugar later testified at trial that he ceased serving as the RMO for CPB in 2013, 

he formally “disassociated” himself from CPB at that time, and he never had any role in 

IHD. Even though several official corporate documents after 2013 identified Dugar as a 

director, Dugar insisted he never served as a director for either Business. He further 

admitted that some of these documents listed him as a shareholder, but he alternately 

testified that he never actually received any stock or that his purported equity interest 

had no value and that it was given to him solely because California law required RMOs 

to hold stock in the company for which they served as RMOs. According to Dugar, his 

purported equity interest served no other purpose and gave him no voting rights.
9

As for false oaths, the Bjornbaks pointed to the following 

representations and omissions:

• He claimed in his bankruptcy petition that he resided in the same 

office building where his Businesses were located;

• He told the chapter 7 trustee under oath that he was homeless;

• He stated in his schedules that he paid rent of $500 per month;

• He falsely scheduled that he only possessed $5.00 in cash;

• He omitted from his schedules horses, computers, and vehicles he 

owned;

• He omitted from his schedules his interest in the Businesses;

• He failed to disclose that he was a shareholder, director, and 

responsible managing operator in CPB and IHD, businesses 

putatively owned and controlled by Jacob Sherif; and

• He lied under oath that during his bankruptcy, he drove a Ford 

vehicle that burned up in a fire.

Finally, the Bjornbaks maintained that Dugar failed to account for all 

revenue the Businesses received between 2013 and 2018.

In his summary judgment opposition, Dugar told a much different 

story. According to Dugar, FHR failed after he suffered a series of heart 

attacks in 2014 and 2015, and he thereafter lost his contractor’s license.

Though he admitted that Moshe Ben Nissan and Jacob Sherif were friends 

and business associates, he denied that they were business partners.
10

Concerning the Bjornbaks’ claims of collusion and the use of the Businesses 

to hide cash and assets by transferring them back and forth, he maintained 

that this so-called corporate shell game scheme was a figment of the 

Bjornbaks’ imagination. He denied moving millions of dollars from FHR 

into other Businesses. And he denied that he ever had any genuine 

ownership or control of any Businesses other than FHR and its predecessor 

ATR. He further stated that any funds FHR transferred to other Businesses 

were for “valid consideration.” He explained that the Bjornbaks’ analysis 

and accounting of the Businesses’ finances—based on bank records and 

city tax records they obtained by subpoena—betrayed a lack of knowledge

and understanding that revenues in general contracting businesses are 

largely offset by expenses.

Dugar also denied that he intentionally misrepresented or omitted 

anything from his schedules. He stated that his failure to list his sale of a 

2006 Mini Cooper for $800 was inadvertent. He also claimed as inadvertent 

his failure to disclose his lawsuit against Carlos Dorado. According to 

Dugar, he had no financial stake in the outcome of that lawsuit. Rather, he 

brought it to help recover funds that Dorado had defrauded from a

construction bonding company. He also denied transferring any cash or 

other assets to his relatives.

Dugar additionally denied that he owned any horses or financial 

assets beyond the $5.00 he listed in his schedules. He further denied that he 

was a beneficiary of any family trust. According to Dugar, he lived solely 
11

off social security and food stamps after his health problems led to the 

failure of FHR and the loss of his contracting license.

E. The bankruptcy court’s summary judgment ruling.

The bankruptcy court denied the Bjornbaks’ summary judgment 

motion. The court considered the evidence that the Bjornbaks submitted 

regarding ownership and control of the Businesses and cash transfers 

between them. After considering the legal standards for summary 

judgment and for denial of discharge under § 727(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), and 

(a)(5), it held that the Bjornbaks had failed to establish the absence of 

genuine issues of material fact as to any of their claims for relief. 

The court highlighted Dugar’s serious health problems in 2014 and 

2015, which eventually led to the loss of his contractor’s license in June 

2016. It also noted Dugar’s contentions that in 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020, 

his only sources of income were Social Security and other government 

assistance. The court accepted these facts as true for summary judgment 

purposes. They largely undermined the Bjornbaks’ claims that Dugar failed 

to report income and Business activities and failed to maintain adequate

records.

As to the claims under § 727(a)(2) and § 727(a)(4), which require 

evidence of fraudulent intent, the court ruled that the Bjornbaks had failed 

to establish for summary judgment purposes that Dugar harbored the 

requisite intent as to any omission or transfer. Moreover, most of the 

alleged concealment or transfers challenged by the Bjornbaks were beyond 
12

the temporal scope of § 727(a)(2)(A) or (B), and many involved property in 

which neither Dugar nor his bankruptcy estate ever had any established

interest.

F. Trial and Judgment.

The bankruptcy court held a one-day trial in November 2022. Qiang 

Bjornbak and Dugar were the only witnesses who testified. Bjornbak’s 

testimony mirrored what she already had said in her summary judgment 

papers and was almost entirely derived from what she learned from 

documents she obtained from public records searches and over 100 

subpoenas served on banks and others concerning the finances of Dugar 

and the Businesses.

For his part, Dugar testified he suffered heart attacks followed by 

heart surgeries in 2014 and 2015. As a result, he neglected his contracting 

business. This led to his loss of his contracting license and dissolution of 

FHR in 2016. He testified that since that time he had been indigent and did 

not receive any funds from any of the Businesses. He explained that any 

inconsistency in his schedules or other bankruptcy papers regarding where 

he lived was a function of his transient lifestyle—living for a time in his car, 

then in homeless shelters, and finally (postpetition) in a rental property 

with the financial assistance of “Section 8” housing benefits.

After trial, the parties submitted closing briefs.8 On March 15, 2023,

8 The Bjornbaks’ complaint that the court should not have considered Dugar’s 

post-trial document as a closing brief because he called it a motion to dismiss is without 
13

the bankruptcy court entered a memorandum decision and a judgment in 

favor of Dugar.

The Bjornbaks timely appealed on March 21, 2023. 

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 

157(b)(2)(J). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUES

1. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion when it granted Dugar 

relief from his deemed admissions when he initially failed to properly 

respond to the Bjornbaks’ RFAs?

2. Is the bankruptcy court’s order denying the Bjornbaks’ summary 

judgment motion properly before us for review?

3. Did the bankruptcy court err when it found after trial that the 

Bjornbaks failed to establish that they were entitled to relief under 

§ 727(a)(2), (3), (4) and (5)?

4. Did the bankruptcy court deny the Bjornbaks due process of law by 

ruling in favor of Dugar?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The bankruptcy court’s granting of relief from deemed admissions is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sonoda v. Cabrera, 255 F.3d 1035, 1039 

merit. See generally Keys v. 701 Mariposa Project, LLC (In re 701 Mariposa Project, LLC), 514 

B.R. 10, 15 n.3 (9th Cir. BAP 2014) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 

699 (9th Cir. 1988)(federal courts are obliged to liberally interpret pro se filings)).
14

(9th Cir. 2001). The bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when it applies 

an incorrect legal rule or when its factual findings are illogical, implausible, 

or not supported by the record. See United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 

1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

“When there is a question as to our jurisdiction, we are entitled to 

raise that issue sua sponte and address it de novo.” Giesbrecht v. Fitzgerald 

(In re Giesbrecht), 429 B.R. 682, 687 (9th Cir. BAP 2010) (cleaned up). We also 

review de novo due process issues. Miller v. Cardinale (In re DeVille), 280 

B.R. 483, 492 (9th Cir. BAP 2002), aff'd, 361 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 2004). When 

we review a matter de novo, we give no deference to the bankruptcy 

court’s decision. See Francis v. Wallace (In re Francis), 505 B.R. 914, 917 (9th 

Cir. BAP 2014).

The bankruptcy court’s factual findings after trial are reviewed under 

the clearly erroneous standard and only will be reversed if they are, 

“illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.” Retz v. Sampson 

(In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010).

DISCUSSION

A. Relief from deemed admissions.

The Bjornbaks first attack the bankruptcy court’s decision to grant 

Dugar relief from his deemed admissions under Civil Rule 36(a)(3). This 

rule, made applicable in adversary proceedings by Rule 7036, states: “A 

matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to 

whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written 
15

answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its 

attorney.” In turn, Civil Rule 36(b) provides in relevant part that: 

A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless 

the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or 

amended. Subject to Rule 16(e), the court may permit withdrawal or 

amendment if it would promote the presentation of the merits of the 

action and if the court is not persuaded that it would prejudice the 

requesting party in maintaining or defending the action on the 

merits.

Under Civil Rule 36(b), the court may grant relief from matters 

deemed admitted under Civil Rule 36(a)(3) when “(1) the presentation of 

the merits of the action will be subserved, and (2) the party who obtained 

the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will 

prejudice that party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits.” 

Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). The 

first part of this test is met when the admissions would effectively preclude 

trial on the merits. Id. at 622. Under part two, the party relying on the 

deemed admission must prove prejudice. Id. Prejudice in this context is 

more than the inconvenience of having to present evidence at trial and 

persuade the trier of fact as to the truth of the party’s allegations. Id. 

Instead, prejudice for purposes of Civil Rule 36(b) focuses on any 

difficulties the adverse party might face in marshalling and presenting 

evidence to support its positions as a direct result of the sudden 

withdrawal of the deemed admissions. Id. The trial court also may take into 

account other factors, including the cause of any delay, the good faith of 
16

the party seeking relief, the relative strength of that parties’ positions on 

the merits, and whether the failure of the party seeking relief to properly or 

timely respond to the request for admission was the result of inadvertence 

or a more culpable state of mind. Id. at 625; Arias v. Robinson, 2022 WL 

36915, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 4, 2022).

The Bjornbaks have failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion or 

reversible error in the decision to grant Dugar relief from the deemed 

admissions. The bankruptcy court explained in detail how the deemed 

admissions would prevent Dugar from presenting facts central to his 

defense. It also considered the respective conduct of the parties regarding 

the RFAs, noting that the Bjornbaks never advised Dugar of the effect of a 

failure to timely or properly respond to the RFAs and never requested that 

he simply sign them. When the issue was raised Dugar promptly 

submitted a new, signed version of his RFA responses.

Nor did the Bjornbaks demonstrate any prejudice. First and foremost, 

Dugar did respond to the requests although he emailed them to the 

Bjornbaks and did not sign them. Similarly, they complain that Dugar 

never served on them his opposition to their motion to deem facts 

admitted. On this record, these were technical violations, which did not 

prejudice or adversely affect the Bjornbaks. Dugar promptly provided 

signed responses after the Bjornbaks first raised the issue in their motion to 

deem facts admitted. Similarly, they were made aware of Dugar’s 

opposition and substance of his arguments from the OSC entered by the 
17

court. The Bjornbaks do not dispute that they received the OSC and were 

able to fully present their arguments against granting relief from the 

deemed admissions. At most, these circumstances suggest harmless error.

We must ignore harmless error. See Van Zandt v. Mbunda (In re Mbunda), 

484 B.R. 344, 355 (9th Cir. BAP 2012). Moreover, no trial date had been set. 

The Bjornbaks were afforded ample time to take discovery and had done 

so. And to the extent that Dugar modified his RFA responses, the court was 

clear that it would provide the Bjornbaks with an opportunity to further 

depose Dugar if they desired to do so.

Incredibly, the Bjornbaks respond that Dugar would not have been 

prejudiced by the deemed admissions. Yet, at the same time they sought to 

deny Dugar trial on disputed questions of fact based on the deemed 

admissions. That is the quintessence of prejudice in this context—denial of 

a meaningful opportunity to challenge the opposing party’s factual 

contentions. See, e.g., Sonoda, 255 F.3d at 1040 (“Regarding prejudice, the 

district court found that because the motion was made pre-trial Sonoda 

would not be hindered in presenting his evidence to the factfinder.”

(emphasis added)).

In sum, the bankruptcy court did not err in relieving Dugar from the 

deemed admissions based on his initial failure to sign and mail his RFA 

responses to the Bjornbaks.
18

B. The bankruptcy court’s denial of the Bjornbaks’ summary 

judgment motion is not properly before us for review.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues 

of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Civil Rule 56 (made applicable in adversary proceedings by Rule 7056); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). For summary judgment 

purposes, an issue is considered genuine and will bar entry of summary 

judgment if a reasonable factfinder could find in favor of the non-moving 

party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Far Out Prods., 

Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, all facts genuinely 

in dispute must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party,” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007), and all reasonable inferences 

that can be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor must be so drawn, id. at 

378.

Ordinarily, adverse interlocutory rulings such as the denial of 

summary judgment merge into the final judgment and may be appealed 

after the final judgment is entered. See In re Giesbrecht, 429 B.R. at 688. 

However, there is an exception to this general rule. York v. United States (In 

re York), 78 F.4th 1074, 1084 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Dupree v. Younger, 598 

U.S. 729, 734-35 (2023)). When summary judgment is denied on 

“sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds” and trial occurs, the subsequent 

final judgment after trial renders the prior summary judgment ruling 

unreviewable because it has been “overcome by later developments in the 
19

litigation.” Dupree, 598 U.S. at 734; see also In re York, 78 F.4th at 1084 (citing 

Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 184 (2011)).

This is precisely the situation here. The Bjornbaks argue that based on 

the evidence they presented in their summary judgment motion, the 

bankruptcy court should have granted them summary judgment as to each 

of their claims for relief. But the subsequent trial on the merits effectively 

superseded the summary judgment proceedings. Under Dupree, Ortiz, and 

York we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of the Bjornbaks’ summary 

judgment ruling.9

C. Trial.

1. Section 727(a)(2).

Under § 727(a)(2), the bankruptcy court must deny the debtor a 

discharge when “the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay or defraud a 

creditor . . . has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed 

. . . (A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing 

of the petition; or (B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of the 

petition.”

To prevail on their § 727(a)(2) claim, the Bjornbaks needed to prove: 

“(1) a disposition of property, such as transfer or concealment, and (2) a 

subjective intent on the debtor’s part to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor 

9 Were we to consider the merits of the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment 

ruling, we would affirm that ruling largely for the same reasons we affirm the 

bankruptcy court’s decision at trial, noting that the court was bound to draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of Dugar on summary judgment.
20

through the act [of] disposing of the property.” In re Retz, 606 F.3d at 1200

(quoting Hughes v. Lawson (In re Lawson), 122 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir.

1997)). In addition, the Bjornbaks needed to show that Dugar disposed of 

“property of the debtor” within a year before the bankruptcy was filed. 

§ 727(a)(2)(A); In re Lawson, 122 F.3d at 1240. Alternatively, the Bjornbaks 

could have shown that Dugar disposed of “property of the estate, after the 

date of the filing of the petition.” § 727(a)(2)(B); see also In re Retz, 606 F.3d 

at 1203 (“§ 727(a)(2)(B) specifically governs transfers of property belonging 

to the estate.”).

The Bjornbaks apparently concede that many of the alleged property 

dispositions they originally complained of fall outside the temporal limits 

of § 727(a)(2). See Aplt. Opn. Brf. at 25:15-16; see also In re Lawson, at 1240 

(stating that conduct or state of mind occurring more than one year before 

the bankruptcy “will be forgiven” under § 727(a)(2)). Therefore, the 

Bjornbaks now focus on a limited number of dispositions.

First, they address the 2006 Mini Cooper, which Dugar sold in 2019 

for $800. The court accepted that this was an asset disposition incorrectly 

omitted from Dugar’s bankruptcy papers. But the bankruptcy court 

credited Dugar’s testimony that the omission was inadvertent rather than 

intentional and fraudulent. The Bjornbaks claim it is “not plausible” that 

Dugar simply forgot to disclose the Mini Cooper sale. They believe his 

denial or failure to state whether he had any other vehicles, bonds, or 

mutual funds, publicly traded stocks, non-publicly traded stocks, or 
21

interests in businesses demonstrates a general culpable intent. But the 

bankruptcy court credited Dugar’s trial testimony. Its finding was not

illogical, implausible, or without support in the record, and the Bjornbaks’ 

disagreement with the court is not error.

Next, the Bjornbaks claim that Dugar transferred or concealed the 

following assets within one year of his bankruptcy: two parcels of 

Washington real property; six horses; several motor vehicles; cash in CPB’s 

bank account; cash in another Business’s bank account (AHI); and his 

ownership of several Businesses: “CPB, IHD, IMD, CBG, AHI, Green NGR, 

APAC.” But the bankruptcy court found that the Bjornbaks had failed to 

present sufficient evidence to demonstrate Dugar’s ownership of these 

items. The Bjornbaks have again offered nothing but their disagreement 

with the court’s finding. They have failed to establish that these findings 

were illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.10

2. Section 727(a)(3).

Under § 727(a)(3), the bankruptcy court must deny the debtor a 

discharge when ”the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, 

10 The Bjornbaks additionally argue that the bankruptcy court’s intent finding 

with respect to Dugar’s alleged transfer or concealment of these items was clearly 

erroneous. These intent findings are largely irrelevant, because the Bjornbaks failed to 

prove with respect to almost all these items that Dugar transferred or concealed any 

property he owned prepetition. As to the Mini Cooper and the Dorado lawsuit, the 

Bjornbaks have not established that the bankruptcy court clearly erred when it found

that Dugar’s failure to disclose these items in his initial bankruptcy filings was 

inadvertent rather than intentional.
22

or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, including books, 

documents, records, and papers, from which the debtor’s financial 

condition or business transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or 

failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances of the case[.]”

“The statute does not require absolute completeness in making or keeping 

records. Rather, the debtor ‘must present sufficient written evidence which 

will enable his creditors reasonably to ascertain his present financial 

condition and to follow his business transactions for a reasonable period in 

the past.’” Caneva v. Sun Cmtys. Operating Ltd. P'ship (In re Caneva), 550 F.3d 

755, 761 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rhoades v. Wikle, 453 F.2d 51, 53 (9th Cir. 

1971)).

A prima facie case under § 727(a)(3) requires the plaintiff to prove 

that: (1) the debtor failed to “maintain and preserve” sufficient records; and

(2) the inadequacy of kept records prevented interested parties from 

learning about debtor’s current financial condition or his material business 

affairs for a “reasonable period” before the bankruptcy filing. Id. If the 

plaintiff presents a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the debtor to 

show that under all the surrounding circumstances, his or her failure to 

keep adequate records was justified. Id. at 761-63; Nevett v. U.S. Tr. (In re 

Nevett), 2021 WL 2769799, at *7 (9th Cir. BAP July 1, 2021).

The bankruptcy court held that the Bjornbaks failed to present 

sufficient evidence to satisfy either element of their prima facie case. The 

Bjornbaks argue that this was error because Dugar produced virtually no 
23

documents in response to their requests for production. According to them, 

this paucity of production demonstrates a patent inadequacy of records. In 

their own words: “Appellee’s companies are making millions of dollars 

each year. It is not possible that Appellee did not file tax returns for 

insufficient income.” Aplt Opn Br. at 29:16-17. But this argument assumes

that Dugar owned and controlled the Businesses (other than FHR). The 

bankruptcy court specifically found that the Bjornbaks presented 

insufficient evidence to establish his ownership and control of the 

Businesses other than FHR.

The Bjornbaks further assail Dugar for neither providing the full 

contact information of his accountant nor personally reaching out to his 

accountant to obtain additional documents that the Bjornbaks requested. 

But again they assume the accountant had, or should have had, critical 

information necessary to enable interested parties to assess his current

financial condition (as of the time of the bankruptcy filing) and to assess his 

material business transactions for a reasonable period of time before the 

bankruptcy filing. The court credited Dugar’s testimony about the severe 

deterioration of his health in 2014 and 2015, which included multiple heart 

attacks and heart surgeries. As a result, his contracting business failed. 

Dugar completely ceased operating and dissolved FHR, his sole corporate 

construction business, by no later than 2016. And again, there was 

insufficient evidence that Dugar should have had records of the Businesses 

the Bjornbaks wanted. 
24

The Bjornbaks’ § 727(a)(3) claim hinges on Dugar’s failure to 

produce: (1) tax returns he never prepared or filed (because he had 

insufficient income ); (2) business records for Businesses he neither owned 

nor controlled; and (3) business records for FHR, which failed at least four 

years before Dugar’s bankruptcy. On the evidence presented, we cannot 

say that the bankruptcy court clearly erred when it found that the 

Bjornbaks had failed to prove either prong of their prima facie case under 

§ 727(a)(3).

3. Section 727(a)(4).

In relevant part, § 727(a)(4)(A) requires the bankruptcy court to deny 

the debtor a discharge when the debtor “knowingly and fraudulently” 

makes a false oath “in or in connection with” the bankruptcy. To prevail on 

their § 727(a)(4) claim, the Bjornbaks needed to prove that: “(1) the debtor 

made a false oath in connection with the case; (2) the oath related to a 

material fact; (3) the oath was made knowingly; and (4) the oath was made 

fraudulently.” In re Retz, 606 F.3d at 1197 (quoting Roberts v. Erhard (In re 

Roberts), 331 B.R. 876, 882 (9th Cir. BAP 2005)). “A false statement or an 

omission in the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules or statement of financial 

affairs can constitute a false oath.” Id. at 1196 (quoting Khalil v. Devs. Sur. & 

Indem. Co. (In re Khalil), 379 B.R. 163, 172 (9th Cir. BAP 2007), aff'd & adopted, 

578 F.3d 1167, 1168 (9th Cir. 2009)). However, “[a] discharge cannot be 

denied when items are omitted from the schedules by honest mistake.” In 

re Khalil, 379 B.R. at 175 (cleaned up).
25

Here, the bankruptcy court acknowledged that Dugar’s schedules 

and statement of financial affairs contained several misstatements and 

omissions. These included:

• The failure to list his 2019 sale of the 2006 Mini Cooper; and

• The failure to list his lawsuit against Carlos Dorado.

In addition, the court acknowledged four omitted creditors. One of these 

omitted creditors was the California Contractor’s State Licensing Board 

(“CSLB”). The other three omitted creditors were complaining customers, 

whose complaints resulted in a 2018 CSLB Registrar of Contractors 

decision determining that Dugar owed them, in aggregate, more than 

$200,000, plus over $30,000 owed to the CSLB for costs of investigation and 

enforcement.

Dugar admitted at trial that he never paid anything to either the 

CSLB or these customers, and he did not list any of them in his schedules 

as creditors. But Dugar testified that at the time he filed his bankruptcy, he 

did not believe he was obliged to pay any of these amounts because of 

subsequent favorable settlements with the customers, or because of the 

running of the statute of limitations, or because he viewed the CSLB’s 

order as conditional—subject to his intent or desire to reinstate his 

contractor’s license, which he had no desire or intent to do.

The court also noted that there was at least some evidence that 

perhaps could have supported a determination that Dugar should have but 

failed to report either an ownership interest, management role, or 
26

directorial position in CPB and IHD, though the court elsewhere found that 

the only corporation Dugar owned was FHR. 

The bankruptcy court specifically found credible Dugar’s 

explanations for each of these omissions. The court also found that some of

his omissions were inadvertent (like with the Mini Cooper and the Dorado 

lawsuit), and it found that others were based on his honest and subjective 

belief that there was nothing that required disclosure, like with the CSLB 

order and his involvement with CPB and IHD. Based on these findings, the 

court ultimately found that when Dugar signed his petition, schedules, and 

statement of financial affairs, he believed them to be true and correct. This, 

in turn led the court to hold that § 727(a)(4) did not support denying Dugar 

his discharge.

The Bjornbaks again disagree with the bankruptcy court’s findings

and urge this Panel to adopt their view of the evidence to conclude that 

Dugar’s omissions were intentional. But they fail to explain why the 

bankruptcy court’s inferences drawn from the evidence were illogical, 

implausible, or without support in the record. “Where there are two 

permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them 

cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 

574 (1985).

The Bjornbaks next reference a host of additional assets, corporate 

interests, and corporate management roles that they insist Dugar owned or 

held. These include horses, motor vehicles, real estate, and the Businesses. 
27

But the bankruptcy court found, based on Dugar’s testimony, that he did 

not own or hold any of these alleged assets or interests at the time of his 

bankruptcy filing. The Bjornbaks further complain that Dugar’s schedules 

failed to deny that he had any “cars, or vans, collectibles of values [sic], 

sports equipment, firearms, jewelry, farm animals, other personal or 

household items” at the time he filed his petition. But Dugar testified at 

trial that he did not have any of these types of assets on the date he filed his 

bankruptcy petition. Nothing in the Bjornbaks’ briefing explains why the 

bankruptcy court’s findings regarding these assets and interests were

clearly erroneous. Again, we cannot say that the bankruptcy court’s 

findings were illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.

4. Section 727(a)(5).

Under § 727(a)(5), the bankruptcy court must deny the debtor a 

discharge when “the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily, before 

determination of denial of discharge under this paragraph, any loss of 

assets or deficiency of assets to meet the debtor's liabilities.” As the Ninth 

Circuit has explained, a claim under § 727(a)(5) requires the plaintiff to 

prove:

(1) debtor at one time, not too remote from the bankruptcy petition

date, owned identifiable assets; (2) on the date the bankruptcy 

petition was filed or order of relief granted, the debtor no longer 

owned the assets; and (3) the bankruptcy pleadings or statement of 

affairs do not reflect an adequate explanation for the disposition of 

the assets.
28

In re Retz, 606 F.3d at 1205 (quoting Olympic Coast Inv., Inc. v. Wright (In re 

Wright), 364 B.R. 51, 79 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2007)). If the plaintiff makes a 

prima facie case by establishing these elements, then the debtor must come 

forward with admissible evidence explaining the disposition of the 

“missing” assets. Id. “Whether a debtor has satisfactorily explained a loss 

of assets is a question of fact for the bankruptcy court, overturned only for 

clear error.”11 Id.

Here, the bankruptcy court focused almost exclusively on the assets 

Dugar derived from FHR. The court relied on the same facts that supported 

its § 727(a)(3) analysis, specifically the multiple heart attacks and heart 

surgeries in 2014 and 2015, the loss of his contractor’s license, and the 

failure of his business by 2016. The court similarly credited Dugar’s 

testimony that he thereafter did not work and earned no income in 2017, 

2018, and 2019. The court ultimately found that these facts satisfactorily 

explained why Dugar had little or no assets at the time of his bankruptcy 

filing. The record supports the bankruptcy court’s findings.

The Bjornbaks, in contrast, focus on the Businesses other than FHR

and the assets Dugar supposedly derived from them. They additionally 

focus on the same assets they claim Dugar owned as discussed above in 

11 Under § 727(a)(5), even a less than proper disposition of assets can be (if the 

bankruptcy court so finds) an “adequate” explanation for purposes of § 727(a)(5), so 

long as it explains their absence from the estate. See Kane v. Chu (In re Chu), 511 B.R. 681, 

687 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2014). The appropriateness of such disposition may be addressed 

in another paragraph of § 727(a) or elsewhere in the Code.
29

our § 727(a)(4) analysis—including horses, motor vehicles, and real estate. 

The Bjornbaks failed to establish Dugar’s ownership of these assets. The 

alleged ownership of these assets thus did not support the Bjornbaks’ 

§ 727(a)(4) argument and similarly cannot support their § 727(a)(5) claim.

At bottom, there is no basis to conclude that the bankruptcy court’s 

§ 727(a)(5) findings were clearly erroneous.

D. Due Process.

The Bjornbaks claim that the bankruptcy court denied them due 

process of law. To support their due process claim, the Bjornbaks must

demonstrate: (1) the bankruptcy court denied them a full and fair 

opportunity to be heard; and (2) prejudice. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 

Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 

545 F.3d 764, 776-77 (9th Cir. 2008), partially abrogated on other grounds as 

recognized by Nichols v. Marana Stockyard & Livestock Mkt., Inc. (In re Nichols), 

10 F.4th 956, 962 (9th Cir. 2021).

The Bjornbaks attempt to establish both impairment of their 

opportunity to be heard and prejudice based on the following allegations:

• the court several times excused Dugar’s failure to meet court ordered 

deadlines and also excused his noncompliance with Local 

Bankruptcy Rules;

• the court did not require Dugar to produce his tax returns; 

• the court granted Dugar relief from his deemed admissions;
30

• the court declined to require Dugar to disclose his residential address 

to the Bjornbaks;

• the court demonstrated racial bias by repeatedly crediting Dugar’s 

testimony over Ms. Bjornbak’s and ignoring her testimony;

• the court ignored the Bjornbaks’ evidence regarding the 2018 CSLB 

order because it did not recall during trial that this same evidence 

had been presented in the summary judgment proceedings;

• the court directed Dugar to add himself as a witness after the 

Bjornbaks stated that they would not be calling him as a witness; and

• the court treated Dugar’s post-trial motion to dismiss as a closing 

brief.

None of these points are sufficient to support the Bjornbaks’ due 

process claim. Most of them reflect a preference to allow a pro se debtor the 

opportunity to defend his discharge on the merits rather than deny his 

discharge for procedural defects. This is not evidence of bias, nor is it 

evidence of a denial of due process. Violation of court orders and local 

rules ordinarily do not support dispositive sanctions without a much more 

egregious showing of noncompliance. See Lee v. Roessler–Lobert (In re 

Roessler–Lobert), 567 B.R. 560, 572-73 (9th Cir. BAP 2017). Furthermore, the 

trial court enjoys broad discretion in deciding when and how to enforce its 

local rules, especially when as here there is no indication of prejudice to the 

opposing party. U.S. v. Hempfling, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1087 (E.D. Cal. 

2006); see also United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1979)
31

(“Only in rare cases will we question the exercise of discretion in 

connection with the application of local rules.”).

As for the tax returns, the bankruptcy court found that Dugar had 

filed no recent tax returns because he had insufficient income. The record 

supports that finding.

As for disclosure of his residential address, the Bjornbaks’ assertions 

that this information was critical to their claims rings hollow. In spite of 

their extensive third-party discovery efforts, they failed on multiple 

grounds to establish virtually all of the elements necessary to support their

objection to discharge claims.

The Bjornbaks’ complaint that the bankruptcy court credited Dugar’s 

testimony over their evidence and supposedly ignored some of their 

evidence is similarly unfounded. We have explained above why the court’s 

weighing of the evidence was not clearly erroneous. Adverse rulings 

typically will not support a claim of bias. See Jiminez v. ARCPE 1, LLP (In re 

Jimenez), 2021 WL 5193284, at *2 (9th Cir. BAP Nov. 4, 2021).

Finally, the Bjornbaks contend that the bankruptcy court’s failure to 

immediately recollect at trial the summary judgment evidence regarding 

the 2018 CSLB order somehow denied them due process. This argument is 

frivolous. The record demonstrates that the Bjornbaks presented the 

evidence and the court considered it. That the court ruled against them is 

not a denial of due process.
32

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM.