No. 81-567 

IK THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1982 

IN RE THE NARRIAGE OF 

RONALD CLYDE HECHT, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

DOLORES ANN HECHT, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Gallatin 

Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Petitioner: 

Bolinger & Higgins, Bozeman, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Berg, Coil, Stokes & Tollefsen, Bozeman, Montana 

Submitted on briefs: May 27, 1982 

Decided: August 11, 1982 

Y 4 Clerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered the Opinion 

of the Court. 

This is an appeal by husband of the October 29, 1981, 

judgment and decree of the Eighteenth Judicial District 

Court distributing the property of the parties. We affirm. 

Ronald and Dolores Hecht were married October 25, 1968. 

They resided in Shelby, Montana, for four years before 

moving to West Yellowstone. Respondent taught school in 

Shelby for three years. After moving to West Yellowstone, 

she assisted in the office of her husband's plumbing business. 

She also operated a dog grooming business the last two years 

of the marriage. 

Respondent's parents financed the purchase of a lot and 

building in West Yellowstone for appellant's plumbing business. 

Respondent contributed $1,000 cash toward that purchase. A 

later contribution from respondent enabled the parties to 

borrow $20,000 to build a shop and store building on their 

land. They also purchased and resided in a mobile home. 

The later contribution of $4,737 came from respondent's 

teachers' retirement fund and the sale of her cattle. 

The parties separated in December 1979. Respondent 

returned to her parents' home in Dillon. Appellant remained 

in the mobile home in West Yellowstone and continued operating 

the plumbing business. 

A decree of dissolution dissolving the parties' marriage was issued February 19, 1980. That decree stated that 

the property division dispute would be subsequently heard. 

It also ordered appellant to pay respondent "as maintenance 

and support the sum of five hundred fifty and no/100 dollars 

($550.00) per month starting on the 20th day of February, 

1980, and monthly thereafter until September 20, 1980." 
Respondent used those funds to return to college and reinstate her teaching certificate. She has been unable to 

obtain a teaching position and currently works as a bookkeeper in Dillon for $3.50 an hour. Appellant earns approximately $25.00 an hour. Both parties are approximately fortythree years old. 

In its findings of October 19, 1981, the District Court 

determined the property of the marriage to consist of the 

following: 

1. Lot 5, Block 7, West Yellowstone, Montana: 

Value of Land $30,000 

Value of Improvements 28,000 

Sss,ooo 

First Mortgage 

Second Mortgage 

Net Equity $24,000 

2. Peerless Mobile Home $12,000 

3. Hecht Plumbing and 

Heating Inventory, 

including vehicles $12,000 

4. Pontiac Automobile $ 6,000 

5. Hebgen Lake Lot: 

Value of Land $12,000 

Balance Due on Contract 

Net Equity 

6. Miscellaneous Property 

and Collectibles $ 3,736 

Respondent was awarded the lot in West Yellowstone, 

together with all improvements; the Peerless mobile home; 

the Hebgen Lake lot; the Pontiac station wagon; and all 

furniture and collectibles then in her possession. Due to 

her "real potential of securing a teaching position," respondent was awarded no maintenance. 

Appellant was awarded the Hecht Plumbing and Heating 
inventory; the business vehicles; and all furniture and guns 

then in his possession. This apportionment left husband 

with approximately one-fourth of the marital assets. 

Appellant filed a motion to amend and supplement findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment on November 

9, 1981. Appellant's motion was summarily denied November 

19, 1981. He now appeals both the judgment and the order 

denying his motion to amend. 

The issues presented to us on appeal are: 

(1) Did the District Court act arbitrarily and abuse 

its discretion when it divided the parties' marital property? 

(2) Did the District Court err in arriving at its 

findings of fact and conclusions of law by misstating the 

value of the marital assets? 

This appeal centers around the value of the assets 

awarded each party and appellant's desire to have the property divided equally between the parties. We grant great 

deference to the District Court's resolution of property 

divisions in marital dissolutions. Jerome v. Jerome (1978), 

175 Mont. 429, 574 P.2d 997. The judgment of the ~istrict 

Court will only be disturbed where there is a clear abuse of 

discretion resulting in substantial injustice. Creon v. 

Creon (1981), - Mont. - , 635 P.2d 1308, 38 St.Rep. 1828. 

The District Court did not act arbitrarily. Rather, 

the District Court followed the statutory guidelines for 

disposition of marital property set forth in section 40-4- 

202, MCA. That section does not require equal distribution 

of assets between the parties. It does require the court to 

consider such things as the duration of the marriage, and 

"the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources 
of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties. . ." The District Court did so. 

The District Court noted that respondent gave up a 

teaching career in Shelby when her husband established a 

plumbing business in West Yellowstone. It also considered 

respondent's financial and time contributions to the plumbing business. Both parties' present incomes as well as 

their potential future incomes were considered. 

In addition, the financial values placed on the various 

properties were reasonable and supported by independent 

appraisal. The District Court appears to have considered 

all encumbrances as well as the amount owing on the Hebgen 

Lake property contract. All marital assets were valued and 

a net worth, though not specifically referred to, can easily 

be determined from the court's findings on asset values and 

existing encumbrances. We find the apportionment, though 

granting more equity to wife than to husband, to be within 

the court's discretion. 

The judgment is affirmed. 

We concur: