1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r: ___ ____ ____ 3 Fi lin g D at e: O ct obe r 17, 201 6 4 N O. 33, 618 5 CRAIG B EAUDRY, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v

. 8 FA RM ERS INSU RA NC E EX CHA NGE , 9 TRU CK INSU RA NC E EX CHA NGE , 10 FIRE INS UR

AN CE EXC HAN GE, 11 MID-CE NTURY INSURANCE COMPANY, 12 FARMERS NEW W ORLD LI FE INSURANCE 13 COMPANY, FARMERS I NSURANCE 14 COM PA NYOF ARIZ ONA , L AN CE CA RR OLL, 15 an d CRAIG AL LI N, 16 D ef

en da nts -Appe llants , 17 an d 18 F A R M E R S G R O U P , I N C . , T O M G U T I E R R E Z, 19 an d CHRI STO PHER KE RR, 20 D ef

en da nts

. 21 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF SA NTAFE CO UN TY 22 Sa ra h M . S in gle to n, D ist ri ctJu dg e1 Law O ffice of Jane B. Yohalem

2 Jane B. Yohalem 3 San ta Fe, NM 4 O’ Friel and Levy , P .C. 5 Pi er re L ev y 6 Aim ee Be van 7 San ta Fe, NM 8 Law O ffice of Bar

ry Gr een 9 Barr y Gr een 10 San ta Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Lewis Ro ca Ro th ge rb er Ch ris ti e LLP 13 Ro ss L. Crown 14 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 15 Le wis Roca

Rothgerber Christie L LP 16 Steven J. H ulsm an 17 K ri sti naN

. H olm str om 18 Ph oe ni x, AZ 19 Sk ad de n, Arp s, Sl at e, Mea gh er & Fl om LLP 20 Ra oul D

. K en ne dy 21 Jam es P. Schaef

er 22 Palo A lto, CA 23 fo r Appe llants 24 Bro wns te in Hy at t Fa rb er Sc hr eck , LLP 25 E ri c R. Burr is 26 N ur y H

. Y oo 27 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 28 for A m icus Curiae A ssociation of Com m erce and Industry

of N ewMexico18 Farm e r s I ns ur a nc e E xc hang e , T r uc k I ns ur a nc e E xc ha

ng e , F i r e I ns ur a nc e 1 19 Exchange, Mid-Century Insurance Com

pany , F arm ers N ewW orld Life Insurance 20 Com pany , and Farm ers Insurance Com pany of A rizona. 1 OPIN ION 2 SU TIN, Judge. 3 { 1} Pl ai nti ff

Cr ai g B ea

udr y r ec ei ve d su

bst an tia l c om

pe nsa tor y a nd p uni tiv e 4 dam ages j ury

verdicts on his clai m of prim a fa cie tort against various Farm ers 5 In sur an ce c om

pa nie s ( the Co m

pa ni es ) a nd tw o F ar

m er s e m plo y ee s, L an ce Carr oll 1 6 an d C ra ig A lli n ( al tog ethe r, D ef en da nts ). A t tr ia l, P la int if

f pr ove d th at , in te rm ina tin g 7 his i n s u r a n c e a g e n t a g r e e m e n t ( t h e A g r e e m e n t ) , D e f e n d a n t s i n t e n d e d t o h a rm a nd 8 actually

harm ed Plaintiff w ith m alice and w ithou t j ustification. Defendants’ appeal 9 as se rt s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

a s am at te r of

law in subm itt ing pr im a fa ci e tort t o 10 the j ury

because ter

m ination of the Agre em ent wa s determ ined by the district court 11 to be lawf

ul and a utho rized under the term s of the Agre em ent. D efendants also attack 12 the pun iti ve da m ag es a w ar d a s un co nst itu tio na l. 13 { 2} The a

pproaches of the parties diverge significantly . D efenda nt s tr e at the f a c tual 14 de ta il of

the ir pr ove d m al ic io us , i nte nti ona lly harm fu l c ondu ct

in te rm ina tin g th e 15 Agre em ent as irre levant as a m atter of law, wher eas Plaintiff focuses heavily on that 16 co nduc t a s th e unde rl y ing appr opr ia te ba sis f or appl ic at ionof prim a fa ci e tort. 17 D ef en da nts r ep re se nt that, ba se d onthe ir glo ba l l eg al r es earc h, “ [u ] phol din g th e2

1 ve rd ic t [ in this c as e] w oul d m ak e thi s Co urt the f ir st a ppe llate tr ibu na l i n A m er ic a to 2 hold that prim a facie tort can be used on a contract te rm ination expressly authorized 3 by the c ontra ct

it se lf

. ” Pl ai nti ff

int er pr et s N ewMe xic o c as e law a s pe rm itt ing the 4 ap pli ca tio n of pr im a fa ci e tort i n th e ci rc um stanc es und er w hic h D ef

en da nts ’ 5 te rm ina tio n of

the A gr ee m en t w as e xpr es sly auth or iz ed

by af or -c au se te rm ina tio n 6 pr ovi sio n inthe A gr ee m en t. 7 { 3} A s th is O pin ionlay s ou t, howthi s ca se w as tr ie d by the pa rt ie s is a c ru ci al a nd 8 co m pe lli ng con sid er at ion in how the au tho r of thi s Opi nio n ( re fe rr ed to he re af te r in 9 the first person) decides D efendants’ issues on appeal. I hold that, under the particular 10 m an ne r in wh ic h this ca se w as tr ie d, pr im a fa ci e tort wa s prop er ly se nt t o th e j ur y , a nd 11 the m aj ority

aff irm s t h e judgm ent and the orders deny ing Defe ndants’ post-trial 12 m otion s for j udgm ent as a m atter of law. The m aj ority also hold s that the jury ’ s award 13 of pun iti ve da m ag es w as not unc onst itu tio na l and a ff

irm s th e aw ar d. 14 BACKGRO UND 15 A. De fend ants’ P resent ation of F acts 16 { 4} In conform ity

with th eir approach that purely legal issues are to be addressed 17 an d de ci de d, D ef

en da nts li m it the ir

pr es en tatio n of

the f ac ts to the fe w tha t r el at e to 18 the A gr ee m en t and tha t be ar upo n th e ap pe llate iss ue s, the m aj or ity of w hic h I quo te 19 here f rom De fendants’ brief in chief

.3

1 { 5} “ [P la int if

f] w as an ins ur an ce ag en t wh o contra ct ed to se ll ins ur an ce pol ic ie s on 2 behalf of the Com

panies und er [ the] . . . Agreem ent[.]

. . . Lance Car roll contracted 3 with the Com

panies to be a District Manager for the territory that inc l u ded 4 [Plaintiff’ s] agency . . . . Craig A llin served as the Com panies’ State D irector in N ew 5 Mex ic o.” “ The Agr eem en t sp eci fie d th at [Pl ai nt iff ] was an ‘ in de pe nd en t co nt ract or .’ 6 T he A gr ee m en t ob lig at ed [ Pl ai nti ff ] to ‘ subm it to the Co m

pa nie s e ve ry

r eque st o r 7 ap pli ca tio n f

or ins ur an ce f

or the c la sse s and l ine s un de rwri tte n by the Co m pa nie s and 8 el igi ble in ac co rd an ce w ith the ir Ru le s and Manua ls. ’ It f urthe r pr ovi de d th at , ‘ [a ] ll 9 busi ne ss a cc ep ta

ble to the Co m

pa nie s and w ri tte n by the A ge nt w ill be pla ce d w ith 10 the Co m

pa nie s, ’ a nd tha t the A ge nt m ust ‘se rv ic [e ] a ll pol ic yhol de rs of the 11 Co m pa nie s insuc h am an ne r as to adva nc e the int er es ts o f the pol ic yhol de rs , the 12 Agent and the Com

panies.’ The Agre em ent was te rmin ab l e u pon th ree m onth s[] 13 wr itten not ice and term inable for specified re as o n s on thi rty day s[] wr itten not ice. 14 O ne of

the spe ci fi ed

r ea sons was ‘ [s ] w itc hin g in sur an ce f ro m the Co m pa nie s to 1 5 an o th erca rr i er .’ ” 16 { 6} “ Fr om

200 0 th ro ugh 2011 , [ Pl ai nti ff ] ope rate d an in sur an ce a ge nc y in T ao s, 17 [N ewMe xic o, ] se lli ng p oli ci es to the Co m pa nie s’ pol ic yhol de rs pur suant t o th e 18 A gr ee m en t. O ne of

tho se pol ic yhol de rs w as Mo is es Mart ine z. I n S ep te m be r 2010 ,1 9 T h e r e c o r di n d i c a t e s t h a tP l a i n t i f f ’ s e m p l o y e e , Ap r i l G r a n g e r , p l a c e dt he 2 20 po li cy

wit h C NA. 4 1 [Pl ai nt iff

] pl aced on e o f Mar ti ne z’s po li ci es wit h a riv al carr ie r, i.e., CNA. 2 2 [D ef en da nts ] inv estig at ed

a nd c onc lud ed

that [ Pl ai nti ff

’ s] a ge nc y

ha d br ea ch ed

the 3 A gr ee m en t. [ D ef

en da nts ] e le ct ed

to te rm ina te the A gr ee m en t in a cc or da nc e w iththe 4 Co m p a n i e s ’ p o l i c y

o f t e rm i n a t i n g a g e n t s w h o p l a c e e l i g i b l e b u s i n e s s o u t s i d e t he 5 Com panies.” “ By

letter dated F ebruary

1, 2011, the C o m

panies noti fied [P laintiff] 6 tha tt h e A g r e e m e n tw o u l db e t e rm i n a t e de f f e c t i v e M a r c h 5 , 2 0 1 1

. T h e t e rm ina tio n 7 date wa s later changed to March 24, 2011 . [ Plaintiff] , ther efore, rec eived [fifty -one] 8 da y s[ ] not ic e of

his te rm ina tio n—w el l i n e xc es s of the [ thi rty ] da y s re qui re d f or 9 term ination based on a brea ch o f the A greem ent.” “ [Plaintiff’ s] term ination wa s 10 co nsi de re d b yaT er m ina tio n R ev ie w Bo ar d and u lti m at el y uph el d by

the 11 Co m pa ni es .” 12 B. Plaintif

f’s P resent ation of F acts 13 { 7} In

sta rk co nt ras t, i n h is an swe r br ie f, Pla in ti ff rec it es ap pr ox im at el y twen ty-one 14 pa ge s of

f ac ts c ove ri ng, in de ta il, e ve ry thi ng tha t w en t t o th e j ur

y on his pr im a fa ci e 15 tort c la im , inc lud ing pr oof of m al ic iou s in te nt t o harm him , a ct ua l and signif

ic an t 16 ha rm to him , im

pr ope r, of

fe nsi ve , a nd u nf

ai r m eans em

plo y ed by vari ous Farm er s’ 17 em plo y ees, abse nc e of

j ust if ic at ion , a nd c om

pe nsa tor y da m ag es . A cc or din g to 18 Pl ai nti ff

, de spi te his ste llar rec or d a s an a ge nt, his c ontra ct w as te rm ina te d a ft er

he5

1 co m pla ine d to his sup er

vis or , Carr oll , a nd h is supe rv iso r’ s supe rv iso rs about af el low 2 ag en t w ho w as “ poa ch ing ” cl ie nts

. A ddi tio na lly , P la int if f sta te s th at

by te rm ina tin g 3 the A gr ee m en t, Carr oll a nd A lli n pr of ite d fin an ci al ly

a nd i n j ob s ec ur ity

by 4 t er m i n at i n g Pl ai n t i ff

an dd i s t ri b u t i n g t h e p o l i ci es p re v i o u s l y h el dat Pl a i n t i f f’s 5 ag en cy . A m ong m an y

oth er de ta ils , P la intif

f out lin es br oke n pr om ise s D ef en da nts 6 m ade to P laintiff, includi ng D efendants’ assurance that his har d work would pay off 7 and that only “ deadbeat” agents w ere term inated. Plaintiff adm its that his em ploy ee 8 m ist ak en ly

a nd t em por ar ily tr an sf er re d aF ar m er s po lic y

to an oth er

co m pany , but 9 ex pla ins tha t the er

ro r w as qui ck ly re m ed ie d. T his er ro r oc curr ed

a t a ti m e w he n th e 10 agency

wa s stressed due to th e absence of Plaintiff’ s wife , Dee , who hand led 11 ope ratio ns a t the a ge nc y , but w ho h ad los t bo th k idn ey s and w as fo rc ed to r el oc at e to 1 2 D e n v e r

f o r i n t e n s i v e t r e a t me n t

. De s p i t e h i s h a v i n g c o rr e c t e dt h e mi s t a k e qu i c k l y, 13 Plaintiff states that he w as am bush ed, that his term ination wa s engineered, and that 1 4 he w a s n e v e r g i v e n a f u l l o p p o rtu n i t y t o e x p l a i n t h e s i tu a t i o n e i t h e r be fo re his 15 te rm ina tio n or af

te r. H e de sc ri be s fe el ing s of shoc k, be tr ay al , a nd d ep re ssi on. I t i s a 16 giv en , ba se d onthe j ur y ve rd ic t, that the f

ac ts Pl ainti ff

pr es en te d sh ow ed

the 17 term ination of Plaintiff’ s agency wa s based on un j ustifiable m otives, includin g actual 18 an d m al ic iou s in te nt t o harm Pl ai nti ff , gr ee d, pe rs ona l se lf

-i nte re st, a nd r etri but ion

. 19 In t hei r

r e pl y b r i e f , D e f e nd a nt s c har a c t e r i z e P l a i nt i f f ’ s f a c tua l p r e se nt a t i onas19 Al t ho ug h “ t or tuo us ” ( i

. e . , c om

pl i c a t e d or

c om pl e x) m a y

b e t he p r op e r

t e rm 3 20 to de sc rib e th is cas e, it is cle ar Pl ai nt iff m ean t “ to rti ou s” (i.e ., cau si ng a to rt)

. 6 1 “ ir re le va nt” a nd a s “ a ske w ed ve rs ion of the r ec or d ina n a tte m

pt t o garn er

sy m pa thy 2 an d d iv ert att en ti on fro m th e fat al leg al de fect s i n h is pri m a fac ie to rt c la im .” 3 { 8} Ba s ed o n t h e r ec o r d , t h e majo ri t y t re at s t h e f ac t s as p ro v i d ed i n Pl ai n t i ff ’s 4 a n s w e r b r i e f a s e s t ab l i s h e da n du n c o n t r o v e rt i b l e. Inco n s i d er i n g th e e l e me n t s o f p r i ma 5 fa ci e tort, the j ur

y obv iou sly

be lie ve d e noug h of

P la int if f’ s extens ive f

ac tua l de ta il 6 to c onc lud e tha t the e le m en ts w er e sa tis fi ed

. 7 C . P ro ce du ra l 8 { 9} Pl ai nti ff

’ s op er at ive c om

pla int se t ou t e igh t c la im s f

or r el ie f soun din g in 9 co ntr ac t and t ort: “ tortuo us[ ] int er fe re nc e w ithc ontra ct ”; “ tortuo us i nte rf er en ce w ith 3 10 pr ospe ct ive c ontra ct

ua l r el at ion s” ; bre ac h of contra ct ; bre ac h of the co ve na nt of good 1 1 f a i t h a n df a i r d e a l i n g ; c o n s p i r a c y; i n t e n t i o n a l i n f l i c t i o n o f e mo t i o n a l d i s t r e s s ; p r i ma 1 2 f a c i e t o rt ; a n dv i o l a t i o n o f

t h e N e w M e x i c o I n s u r a n c e C o d e . P r e s u mab l y, t h e s e c l a i ms 13 w er e se t ou t be ca

use P la int if

f be lie ve d th at

e ac h of th e ei ght

c la im s st at ed

ac la im 14 uponw hic h r el ie f co uld be gr an te d. P la int if

f al so s ough t punit ive da m ag es . 15 { 10} D ur ing the c o ur s e o f l i t i g at i o n , D e f

e n da nts f ile d nu m er ous dis posi tiv e m oti ons, 16 includi ng a m otion for sum m ary j ud g m en t on what D efendants charac terized a s 17 Pl ai nt if

f’ s c la im f or w ro ngf ul t er m ina tio n of

the A gr ee m en t. I n th is m oti on, 18 De fendants sou ght a ruling th at the term inati o n o f the Agre em ent was a utho rized7

1 unde r the te rm s of

the A gr ee m en t, a nd thus, P la int if f’ s c la im s f

or br ea chof c ontra ct , 2 br ea chof

the im pl ie d c ove na nt o f good

f ai th and f ai r de al ing , a nd any

oth er c la im 3 “ pr em ise d inw ho le or [ in] part on wro ngf

ul t er m ina tio n of

the A gr ee m en t” sho uld 4 be dism issed. In re spon se, Plaintiff argued that genuine issu es of m aterial f act existed 5 as to whet he r “ Defen da nt s l eg it im at el y fir ed[Pl ai n t i f

f ] fo r br each of c on tra ct .” 6 Pl ai nti ff

’ s arg um en t i n op posi tio n pr im ar ily f oc us ed on the que sti on o f w he the r he 7 co uld be f ound to ha ve br ea ch ed the A gr ee m en t, a nd thus be sub j ec t t o te rm ina tio n, 8 wh en h i s empl o yee s wi t ch ed an i n s u re d ’s p o l i cy i n v i o l at i o n o f Pl ai n t i ff

’s 9 instructio ns. Plaintiff a lso argued that there we re “ dispu t es o f fact on whether 10 D ef en da nts a ct

ua lly f ir ed [P la int if

f] f or br ea ch ing his c ontra ct ” an d th at D ef en da nts ’ 11 “ inconsi stent reasons” for term inating Plaintiff cr eated “ a re asonable inference that 1 2 t h e r ea s o n s we re b o g u s [. ]” 13 { 11} T he dis tr ict co urt gr an te d D ef en da nts ’ m oti on “ on the iss ue of br ea chof 14 co ntr ac t r eg ar din g th e te rm ina tio n” a nd c onc lud ed that “ the c ontra ct

w as pr ope rl y 15 term inated” because it w as u ndisp uted that an existing insured’ s policywa s m oved 16 to anoth er insurer in violation of the Agreem ent an d b ec au se the district court 17 co nc lud ed

that Pl ai nti ff bor e the r es pons ibi lity of his e m plo y ee ’ s br ea ch

. P la int if

f did 18 not appe al the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n and o rd er , a nd the part ie s a ppe ar to ha ve 19 ag re ed

that, in ad dit ionto dis m iss ing the br ea chof c ontra ct c la im , the de ci sio n and8

1 or de r al so d ism iss ed

the br ea chof

the im pli ed co ve na nt of good fa ith an d fa ir de al ing 2 c l a i m. 3 { 12} The only

claim s for re lief ultim ately presented to the jur

y we re ( 1) conspiracy 4 by indiv idual defendants to com m it prim a fa cie tort, and (2) prim a fa cie tort 5 com m itted by all defendants as to the term ination of the A greem ent. T he rem ainder 6 o f t h e c l ai m s fo r r el i ef

we re ei t h er d i s m i s s ed b y t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt b as ed o n t h e c o u rt ’s 7 determ ination that the claim s wer e not m eritorious or wer e dism issed when Plaintiff 8 chose not to pursue the claim s because he fe lt thos e claim s wer e not viable giv en 9 ce rt ai n r

uli ngs by the c ourt. 10 { 13} T he j ur

y f ound a ga ins t Pla int if

f on the co nspi ra cy cl ai m but f ound in favor of 11 Plaintiff on the prim a facie tort claim , awarding $1 m illion in com pensatory dam ages 12 an d $2. 5 m ill ion in puni tiv e da m ag es . Po st tr ia l, D ef en da nts fi le d a re ne w ed

m oti on 13 for j udgm e nt a s a m a t t e r of l a w , on t he gr ound t ha t t he pr i m a f a c i e t or t c l a i m wa s 14 legally

deficient, and a re newed m otion for j udgm ent as a m atter of law or for a new 15 t ri al because the prim a fa cie tort claim wa s not su pported bythe evidence. In 16 ad dit ion , D ef

en da nts f ile d a m oti on t o va ca te or r em it the pun iti ve da m ag es a w ar d. 17 T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d a ll thr ee pos t- tr ia l m oti ons. 18 { 14} D ef

en da nts appe al a sse rt ing that ( 1) the pr im a fa ci e tort c la im ev ad ed the 19 stringent requirem ents of m ultip le estab lished doctrines of l aw ; (2) Plaintiff failed as16 A lth oughone of D ef en da nts ’ pos t- tr ia l m oti ons que sti one d th e suf fi ci en cy of 4 17 the evidence to supp ort Plaintiff’ s prim a facie tort claim and in the notice of a ppeal 18 D ef en da nts pur

port t o a ppe al the or de r de ny ing tha t m oti on, in the ir br ie fs a nd d

ur ing 19 or al a rg um en t onappe al D efen da nts f oc us p ri m ar ily

on the ir le ga l arg um en t, a nd 20 De fendants e xplicitl y stated during oral argum ent that their appeal is not a sufficiency 21 of the e vid en ce appe al

. Be ca use D ef en da nts c hose to fo cu s onle ga l arg um en ts and 22 did no t continu e to argue that there wa s i n s u ff i ci en t evidence, I narrowthe review 2 3 a c c o r d i n g l y. 9 1 a m at te r of

law to sa tis fy

a t l ea st f our of the fi ve es se nti al el em en ts of pr im a fa ci e tort; 2 (3 ) af fi rm an ce of

the j udgm en t w oul d m ean th at part ie s w ho pr ope rl y pe rf orm the ir 3 co ntr ac ts f

ac e g re at er

e xpos ur e than th ose w ho b re ac h th em ; and ( 4) the pun iti ve 4 da m ag es a w ar d is unc onst itu tio na l. 4 5 D. Pr im a Facie T ort Law in N ew Mexico 6 { 15} I pr ef

ac e disc uss ion of the iss ue s and the a na ly sis w ithabr ie f intro duc tio n to 7 pertinent prim a fa cie tort law i n Ne w Mexico. T hese cases and som e additional on es 8 will be discussed in th is Opinion as needed and as I address the parti es ’ legal 9 ar gum en ts. 10 { 16} Pr im a fa ci e tort be cam e pa rt of our c om m on l aww ithit s a dopt ionin 1990 in 11 Schmitz v. Smentowski , 19 90 -NMSC -0 02 , 10 9 N.M. 3 86 , 78 5 P .2d 72 6. Sc hm itz se ts 1 2 o u tt h e f

o l l o w i n g f

o u r e l e me n t s t h a ta r e r e qu i r e dt o e s t ab l i s h a p r i ma f a c i e t o rtc l a i m: 13 (1) an intentional, law ful act by the defendant; (2) an i n t ent to injure the plaintiff; 14 (3 ) inj ur

y to the pla int if

f, an d; ( 4) the abse nc e of j ust if ic at ionor

ins uf fi ci en t 15 jus ti fic at io n fo r th e de fen da nt ’s act s. Id

. ¶ 37. T he Sc hm itz Co urt m old ed the doc tr ine10

1 fr om m ixt ur es of N ewY ork and M iss our i c as e la w an d the Re sta te m en t (S ec ond) of 2 Tort s § 87 0 (Am . Law Ins t. 1 97 9)

. Sc hm itz , 19 9 0

- N M S C-0 02 , ¶¶ 35 -4 8. “ To 3 co nst itu te a pr im a fa ci e tort, the tor t- fe as or m ust a ct m al ic iou sly , w iththe int en t t o 4 cause inj ury , and without j ustification o r sufficient j ustification.” Id

. ¶ 45; see als o 5 Re sta te m en t ( Se co nd) of T orts § 870 c m

t. e ( ind ic at ing that “ inj ur

y . . . m eans tha t the 6 ha rm m us t b e to a le ga ll y

pro te ct ed in te res t of t he pl ai nt iff ”). “ [I]t n eed no t b e sh own 7 that the act w as solely

intended to injure plaintiff.” Sc hm itz , 1990 -N MS C- 002, ¶ 47. 8 “ [I] f a def

endant offers a purpos e other than the m otivatio n to h ar m t h e plaintiff as 9 j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r h i s a c t i o n s , t h a tj u s t i f

i c a t i o n m u s tb e b a l a n c e dt o d e t e rm i n e i f it 10 outweighs the bad m otive of t he defendant in attem pting to cause injury .” Id

. ¶ 46. I n 11 assessing that m otive, “ the intent [is to] be balanced to determ ine if the activity wa s 12 bey ond th e bound s of what society shoul d tolerate. ” Id

. ¶ 57. This balancing test has 13 s i n ce b een ap pl ie d i n a nu m be r of cas es . Se e, e . g. , P o r t a l e s N a t ’ l B a n k v . R i b ble , 14 2003 -N MC A -0 93, ¶

¶ 3, 10, 134 N

. M. 238 , 75 P

. 3d 8 38 ( em plo y ing the ba lanc ing te st 15 and finding that there w ere genuin e issues of m aterial fa ct that precluded summ ary 16 j udgm ent); Martinez v. N. Rio A rriba Ele c. Coop., Inc. , 200 2- N MC A -0 83, ¶ ¶ 26- 31, 17 132 N.M. 510, 51 P.3d 1164 (r eversing a j ury verdict based on prim a facie tort after 18 co nsi de ri ng the fa ct or s, co nc lud ing tha t none of the pla int if f’ s proo f ta ke n a lon e or 19 tog ethe r “ [ro se ] to the le ve l of both be ha vio r an d in

j ur y that i s e nvi sio ne d by

the11

1 the or y of pr im a fa ci e tort[ , ] ” an d ho ldi ng tha t the pla int if f “ did not ha ve a n a ct ion ab le 2 claim for prim a fa cie tort”); B ea ve rs v . J ohns on C ontrol s W orld Se rv s. , In c. ( B ea ve rs 3 II) , 199 5-NMC A- 070, ¶¶ 20-22 , 120 N. M. 343 , 901 P. 2d 76 1 (balancing the factors 4 and determ ining that, under the facts, the plaintiff’ s claim “ passed the thre shold of a 5 subm issib le prim a fa cie tort” c laim ). 6 { 17} Fu rth er, Sc hm itz states that “ prim a facie tort m ay be pleaded in the a lternative; 7 how ev er , if

a t the c los e of

the e vid en ce , [ the ] pla int if f’ s pr oof is sus ce pti ble to 8 su bm issionund er

one of the a cc ep te d c at eg or ie s of tor t, the a ct ionsho uld

be 9 subm itted to th e j ury

on t h at ca u s e and not u nder prim a fa cie tort. ” 1990-NMSC10 002, ¶ 48. T his is b ecause “ doub le rec overy m ay n o t b e m aintained, and the theory 11 unde rl y ing pr im a fa ci e tor t—to p ro vid e [a ] r em edy fo r int en tio na lly co m m itt ed a ct s 12 tha t do not

f it w it hi n th e co nto ur s of a cc ep te d to rt s—m ay

be f urthe re d, w hil e 13 rem aining con sistent with m odern pleading practice .” Id

. In re co gni zi ng the li m its of 14 pr im a fac ie to rt, Sc hm itz state s th at

“ pr im a faci e to rt shou ld n ot b e use d to e va de 15 stringent requirem ents of o ther establ ished doctrines of law .” Id

. ¶ 63. T his li m itatio n 16 ha s b een reco gn iz ed , res ta te d, an d refo rm ul at ed at va rio us ti m es by thi s C ou rt. See, 17 e. g. , Hea lt hs ou rc e, In c. v. X-Ray Ass oc s. o f N.M. , 200 5- N MC A -0 97, ¶ 35, 138 N.M. 18 70, 116 P.3d 861 (stating that “ prim a fa cie to rt s houl d not li e w hen the pleaded 19 factual basis is within the scope of an established tort” an d affir m ing th e ra tionale that12

1 “ a pr im a fa ci e tort c la im m ay not be use d a s a m eans of av oid ing the m or e str ing en t 2 re qui re m en ts o f oth er

tor ts” ); B ogl e v. Sum m it In v. Co

. , 200 5- N MC A -0 24, ¶ ¶ 21- 24, 3 137 N

. M. 80, 107 P. 3d 520 (r ev er sin g a pr im a fa ci e tort j udgm en t be ca use , a lth ough 4 the pla int if

f w as unab le to e sta

bli sh a c la im und er int en tio na l i nte rf

er en ce w ith 5 co n tr a c t , i n t en tio na l i nte rf er en ce w ithc ontra ct

w as the a ppr opr ia te c la im

to br ing , a nd 6 thu s “ e x i s t i n g c au s e s o f a c t i o n p r o v i d e d r e a s o n ab l e a v e n u e s t o a r e m e d y fo r the 7 as se rt ed

w ro ngf ul c ondu ct ”) ; R i b b le , 200 3- N MC A -0 93, ¶ ¶ 11- 12 ( re co gni zi ng the 8 re qui re m en t tha t “ pr im a fa ci e tort shoul d not be used to ev ad e str ing en t r equir em en ts 9 of o t h er established d octrines of law [, ] ” but determ ining that prim a fa cie tort w as 10 ap pr opr ia te be ca

use no oth er ac ce pte d tort w as pur sue d (a lte ratio n, int er na l qu ota tio n 11 m arks, and citation om itted)); Sto ck v . G rant ham , 1998 -N MC A -0 81, ¶¶ 38- 39, 125 12 N. M. 564, 964 P. 2d 12 5 (holdin g that dism issal of t h e plaintiff’ s prim a fa cie tort 13 cl ai m w as pr ope r be ca

use “ [t ] he onl y func tio n of the cl ai m of pr im a fa ci e tort i n [ the 14 pla int if

f’ s] c om pla int [ w as ] to es ca

pe pos sib le r es tr ic tio ns i m pose d o n th e torts o f 15 int en tio na l i nf

lic tio n of e m oti ona l di st re ss and i nte rf er en ce w ithe nti tle m en t t o 16 une m plo ym en t c om

pe nsa tio n” ). P ri m a fa ci e tort i s no t “ a ca tc h- al l a lt ern at ive f or 17 every action that cannot stand on its own l egs,” and courts m ust cons ider w hether a 18 pr im a fac ie to rt c la im is “ m erel y du pl ic at iv e” of som e ot he r cl ai m . H age bak v . Sto ne ,13

1 2003 -N MC A -0 07, ¶

¶ 27, 29, 133 N

. M. 75, 61 P. 3d 201 (in te rn al quot at ion m ar ks and 2 citation om itted). 3 DISC US SION 4 A. Stand ard of R eview 5 { 18} U nde r D ef

en da nts ’ pure a s- a- m at te r- of -l awappr oa cha s to the pr opr ie ty of 6 pr im a fac ie to rt, d e n ov o i s t he pro pe r st an da rdof r ev ie w. A poda ca v . A A A G as C

o. , 7 2003 -N MC A -0 85, ¶

15, 134 N

. M. 77, 73 P

. 3d 2 15 (“ Q ue sti ons of law r equir e de 8 novo review .” ). Additionally , the a ppellate courts review the puni tive dam ages aw ard 9 de no vo . Ak

en v. Plains Elec

. Ge neratio n & Transmission Coop., Inc. , 2002-NMS C10 021, ¶ ¶ 17- 19, 132 N

. M. 401 , 49 P

. 3d 6 62 ( sta ting th at ap pe llate c ourts r ev ie w de 11 novo the c onst itu tio na lity of apun iti ve da m ag es a w ar d by “ m ak [i ng] a n in de pe nde nt 12 assessm ent of the rec ord”). 13 B. Introdu ctory Se tting 14 { 19} Before addressing Defe ndan t s ’ sp ec i fi c a rg u m en t s , i ti s i m portant to un derscore 15 the difficulty

of this appeal both conceptually and under the particular cir cum stances 16 of thi s c as e. T his appe al sho w s ho w the unc er ta int ie s an d in co ngr

uit ie s of pr im a fa ci e 17 tort c an

c re at e tr ia l and a

ppe llate c onun dr

um s. 18 { 20} First, under NewMexico law , an essential elem ent o f prim a fa cie tort is that 19 th e wro ng do er’s con du ct m us t b e la wfu l. Se e Sc hm itz , 1990-NMS C-002, ¶ 37. T hat14

1 el em en t w as a rg uably

pr ove d in thi s c as e giv enthat the dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed the 2 te rm ina tio n of

the A gr ee m en t w as pr ope r unde r an ex pr es s f or -c au se pr ovi sio n inthe 3 A gr ee m en t. T he “ law fu lne ss” e le m en t e xpos es a na ly ti ca l t en sio n be tw ee n to rt a nd 4 contrac tl a w

— at e ns i ont ha ts e e m s l og i c a l l y i rr e c on c i l abl e w he n ac on t r a ct 5 te rm ina tio n, de em ed law ful u n d e r c o n t r a c tp r i n c i p l e s , mu s tn e c e s s a r i l y a tt h e s a me 6 tim e be a n unl aw

ful c ontra ct te rm ina tio n inpr im a fa ci e tort. T his c as e show s ho w 7 problem atic a c ase can be when it involv es term ination of a c ontract that im plicates 8 both contract and tort claim s for re lief. 9 { 21} Se co nd, howa nd w he n pr im a fa ci e tort can pr op erl y be appl ie d su ff

er s f ro m 10 a la ck of c lari ty in our c as e law . T he re e xis ts an in he re nt t en sio n be twee n the 11 re co gni tio n of

pr im a fa ci e tort a s a va lid tort cl ai m tha t can be a lte rn at ive ly ple ad ed , 12 on the one hand, a nd the str ic t r equir em en ts i m pose d onappl ic at ionof

the tor t, 13 inc lud ing that the tor

t c an not be use d to e va de e sta

bli she d do ctri ne s of

law , on the 14 other hand. T his tensi on, as to when prim a fa cie tort ought to be subm itted to a j ury 15 an d w he n it

sho uld not be ca

use it e va de s othe r es ta

bli she d do ctri ne s of

law , is 16 hig hli ght ed

a nd e vid en ce d by

the f ac t tha t the thr ee pa ne l m em be rs ha ve sig nif

ic an tly 17 dif fe re nt v ie w s onhowthi s a ppe al sho uld

be de ci de d. T his te nsi on is palp ab le in the 18 pr es en t c as e w he re P la int if f m ay ha ve ha d avia

ble c ontra ct

cla im ha d he pr ope rl y 19 ple ad ed

a nd pu rsue d th at

c la im , a nd w he re appl ic at ionof apr im a fa ci e tort c la im 2 0 c o u l dh a v e b e e ns h o w n t o b e e v a s i v e h a d t h e p a r t i e s l i t i g a t e dt h e c a s e d i f f e r e n t l y.15

1 A lth oughnot

spe ci fi ca lly

hig hli ght ed

by e ith er party on a ppe al , that inhe re nt t en sio n 2 has been exacer

bated by our case law, which does not clarify when and under w hat 3 ci rc um stanc es ( 1) adoc tr ine of law is es ta

bli she d, an d (2 ) ane sta

bli she d do ctri ne of 4 law is to b e co nsi de re d on e tha t c an not be e va de d by

the applicat ionof

pr im a fa ci e 5 tort. 6 { 22} For exam

ple, in one instance, this Cou rt held that the existen ce of an 7 established, but ultim ately unprov ed, claim prohibi ted subm issio n of prim a fa cie tort 8 to th e jury. Se e B ogl e , 2005 -N MCA -024, ¶¶ 22-24 (c onclud ing that prim a facie tort 9 w a s p r o h i b i t e db e c au s e t h e p l a i n t i f f ’s i n t e n t i o n a l i n t e r f

e r e n c e w i t h c o n t r a c tc l a i m, 10 al tho ugh ult im at el y

not m er ito ri ous, w as appr opr ia te a nd th us “ ex ist ing c au se s of 11 action provided reasonable avenues to a rem edy for the asserted wr ongful con duct”). 12 In another instance, this Court held that a plaintiff’ s decision n ot to pu rsue an 13 established to rt claim

and the defendant’ s failure to identify a duplicative claim

under 14 ana cc ep te d c at eg or

y of tort cl ai m s, m eant tha t pr im a fa ci e tort co uld pr oc ee d to the 15 jury. Se e R ibb le , 2 0 0 3

- N M C A

- 0 9 3 , ¶¶ 1 1

- 1 2 ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a tt h e p l a i n t i f f ’s p r i ma 16 fa ci e tort c la im

w as appr opr ia te be ca

use no o the r ac ce pte d to rt w as pur sue d, a lth ough 17 an oth er

a cc ep te d to rt

c la im w as ple ad ed ). T he la ck

of c lari ty a s to the pa ram et er s of 18 pr im a fa ci e tort gi ve s r ise to a num be r of unansw er ed

que sti ons: S houl d apr im a fa ci e 19 tort claim

be subm itted to a jury

if th er e i s som e established dup licative claim that 20 ex ist s bu t w as not

ple ad ed ? Wha t i f a dupl ic at ive c la im w as ple ad ed but dis m iss ed ?16 A s sta te d in the pr oc ed ur al se ct ion of thi s O pin ion , the pa rti es appare ntl y 5 17 agreed that the o r der, which concluded that the term ination wa s authorized, dism issed 18 the br ea chof

c ontra ct c la im a s w el l as th e br each of

the im pli ed c ove na nt o f good 19 fa itha nd f

ai r de al ing c la im

. I w ill e xpl or e thi s in te rp re ta tio n inm or e de tail la ter in 20 thi s O pin ion , how ev er , for na rrat ive c lari ty , it is not ed he re that the part ie s be lie ve 21 tha t the c ourt’ s or de r dis pose d of both co nt rac t- re la te d c la im s a s th ey pe rt ai n to 22 wro ng fu l t erm in at io n, an d n ei th er p art y ap pe al edth atord er. 16 1 Does it m atter if the dupl icative claim wa s pleaded but d ism issed on t h e m erits, as 2 oppo se d to di sm iss ed

f or f ai lur e to s ta te ac la im

upo n w hic h r el ie f can be gr an te d? 3 A lth oughI do n ot a ddr es s a ll of the se que sti ons in this O pin ion , thi s c as e ne ve rthe le ss 4 brings th ese tensions to the surface

. 5 { 23} T h i r d , t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h i s c a s e w a s t r i e di n d i s t r i c tc o u rt , c o up l e dw ith 6 al l of the a fo re m en tio ne d te nsi ons, f or ce s ar es ult

w ithw hic h I a m

not part ic ul arl y 7 com fortable and results in an opin ion th at w ill likelybe of little value to future parties 8 seeking to resolv e w hether prim a fa cie tort is app ropriate. As stated in the procedural 9 se ct ionof

thi s O pin ion , the dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed m an y of Pla in tiff ’ s to rt a nd 10 co ntr ac t c la im s, inc lud ing P la int if f’ s br ea chof

c ontra ct c la im

a nd b re ac h of

the 11 im plied covenant of g ood faith an d fair dea ling claim based on the court’ s ruling th at 12 the term ination of the Agre em ent wa s proper and authorized. As a result of that order 5 13 re ga rd ing the appr opr iaten es s of the te rm ina tio n, a nd w ith out obj ec tio n by 1 4 D e f e n d a n t s , P l a i n t i f

f d i dn o tb e l i e v e t h a t h i s r e ma i n i n g c o n t r a c t

- r e l a t e do r t o rtc l a i ms 15 w er e via

ble a nd d ec ide d no t t o pu rs ue tho se c la im s. T hus, by the ti m e the c as e w en t17

1 to tri al , the re w er e n o other tor t or c ontra ct c la im s be ing pur sue d by or a va ila ble to 2 Pl ai nti ff

that c oul d a ddr es s th e m al ic iou s te rm ina tio n c ar ri ed out by D ef en da nts

. 3 { 24} I not e tha t the re e xis t di ff er en ce s w ith in the pane l in reg ar d to the m an ne r in 4 w hic h this ca se w as tr ie d. T he D iss en t, w hic h se ek s r ev er sa l, say s th at the m an ne r in 5 w hic h th e ca se w as tr ie d is “ ha rd ly the f au lt of D ef en da nts

. ” D iss en t inf

ra ¶ 94. T he 6 S p e c i a l C o n c u r

r e n c e “ s e e [ s ] n o r e a s o n t o s e c o n d

- g u e s s t h e p a rt i e s ’ l i t i ga tio n 7 st rat eg y [,]” Sp. Co n. inf ra ¶ 66, and conclud es that “ [t] here is no t h i n g to be gained 8 an d m uc h to be los t” by se co nd gue ssi ng the m an ne r in w hic h the c as e w as tr ie d. S p. 9 Co n. inf

ra ¶ 81. I n view of the diff erence s with i n the panel as to the proper 10 application o f p rim a fa cie tort and the unfortunate circum stance that viable, 11 es ta bli she d c ontra ct -r el at ed

the or ie s of

unl aw fu l ter

m ina tio n e sc ap ed

the a tte nti on o f 12 the part ie s and a

ppare ntl y the c ourt, I pr ef

er to hig hli ght the pr obl em s, unc er ta int ie s, 13 an d a m

big uit ie s st em

m ing f ro m the appl ic at ion of pr im a fa ci e tort, a nd p re fe r to 14 poin tedly

lim it its appli cation to the facts and circum stances o f h o w t his case wa s 15 tr ie d. 16 { 25} U nde rs tandi ng tha t this c as e re qui re s r es olu tion de spi te the pr obl em s, 17 un cert ai nties , and i nc ongr uit ie s inthe appl ic at ionof pr im a fa ci e tort, I pr oc ee d to 18 dis cu ss why

the m aj or ity

a ff irm s th e distri ct co urt’ s subm iss ion of pr im a fa ci e tort t o 19 the j ury

under the circum stances here. I view this Opinion as lay ing th e groundwork14 D ef

en da nts ’ arg um en ts are suppo rted by a nd e xpande d up on i n an A m ic us 6 15 Curiae brie f filed by

the Association of Com

m erce & Industry

of N ewMexico (A CI). 16 A CI state s th re e poi nts in its appe llate br ie f as t o ap pli ca tio n of pr im a fa ci e tort: 17 (1 ) “ cr ea te s a m

big uity an d unpr ed ic ta

bil ity in co ntr ac tua l r el at ion s, upe ndi ng l ong18 es ta bli she d bu sin es s pri nc ipl es an d expe ct at ion s” ; ( 2) “ co ntr ad ic ts e xis tin g bo die s of 19 subs tanti ve law ”; a nd ( 3) “ cr ea te s ahos til e busi ne ss e nvi ro nm en t i n N ewMe xic o f or 2 0 i n d i v i du al s an db u s i n es s es , a n dt h er eb y s t i fl es ec o n o m i c g ro wt h an di n v es t m en t [. ]” 19 Be ca use A CI ’ s po int s larg el y

dup lic at e D ef

en da nts ’ a rg um en ts o n a

ppe al , the poi nts 20 ar e not

a ddr es se d inthi s O pin ion

. 18 1 fo r our S upr em e Co urt to es ta

bli sh m or e cl ar ity

a s to the appr opr ia te appl ic at ionof 2 pr im a fa ci e tort. 3 C. De fend ants’ A pproache s 4 { 26} I see De fendants’ prim a facie tort argum ents on app eal as f alling within th ree 5 categories: doctrinal, e lem ent -b as ed , a n dp o l i cy-o ri en t ed , each presenting purely legal 6 iss ue s. D ef

en da nts ’ f ir st arg um en t—tha t P la int if f’ s pr im a fa ci e tort c la im

e va de d th e 7 st rin ge nt re qui re m en ts o f m ult ipl e es ta

bli she d do ctri ne s of

law—f oc use s onthe 8 funda m en ta l do ctri na l di ff er en ce s be twee n contra ct law a nd t ort l aw . D ef

en da nts ’ 9 se co nd arg um en t f

oc use s on the a lle ge d in ab ili ty of P la int if f to m ee t the e le m en ts o f 10 pr im a fa ci e tort i n li ght of the dis tri ct co urt’ s r

uli ng tha t the c ontra ct

w as pr ope rl y 11 term inated. Finally , D efendants’ third argum ent appeals to the practical an d poli cy 12 co nc er

ns a sso ci at ed

w ithappl y ing pr im a fa ci e tort t o c ondu ct gove rn ed by an d law fu l 13 unde r co ntr ac t l aw . E ac h arg um en t i s e xa m ine d intur n. 619

1 1. De fend ants’ D octrinal A pproach 2 { 27} D ef

en da nts f irst at ta ck

the appl ic at ionof

pr im a fa ci e tort i n th is c as e on the 3 gr ound that a llo w ing th e cl ai m im pe rm iss ibl y

e va de s stri nge nt r equir em en ts o f 4 e s t ab l i s h e dd o c t r i n e s o f l a w , a s wa rn e d a g a i n s tb y Sc hm itz

. W ith in this poi nt, 5 D ef en da nts c ont en d P la int if

f ev ad ed the fo llo w ing doc tr ine s: (1 ) tort law is b as ed on 6 instances of breach of a legal duty

and not on bre ac h o f a c ontractual duty ; (2) tort 7 law does n o t override the right not to con tract w ith oth ers, regar dless of m otive; 8 (3 ) tort law cannot be use d to r ewri te c ontra ct s; and ( 4) tor t r em ed ie s are not

a va ila ble 9 to r em edy

the br ea chof

the c ove na nt o f good

f ai th and f ai r de al in g. I do n ot f

ind 10 De fendants’ argum ents convin cing giv en the circum stances of this case. 11 { 28} First, De fendants assert that torts provid e re m edies for th e b reac h of duties that 12 ar ise by

law , but tor ts d o no t c re at e le ga l du tie s. D ef en da nts poi nt ou t tha t this 13 “ es ta bli she d do ctri ne ” w as a llu de d to in Sc hm itz , which stated that p ri m a fa cie tort 14 “ provides a rem edy

for plaintiffs w ho have been harm ed by a defe ndant’s intentional 15 an d m al ic io us act s th atfal l o ut si de of t he rig id tra di ti on al in te nt io na l t or t ca te go rie s.” 16 Sc hm itz , 1990-NMS C-002, ¶ 35. De fendants further po int to Ne w Me xico case law 17 tha t “ [c ] ourts h av e lon g f oll ow ed th e ru le that the dif fe re nc e be tw ee n ator

t and 18 co ntr ac t a ct ionis tha t a br ea chof c ontra ct is a fa ilure of pe rf

orm an ce of a duty

a ri sin g 19 orim po se d b y ag r e e m en t; wher eas , a to rt i s a v io la ti on of a du ty im po se d b y law.” 20 Kr ei sc he r v . A rm ijo , 199 4- N MC A -1 18, ¶ 6, 118 N

. M. 671, 884 P. 2d 827 (a lte ratio n,20

1 int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks, a nd c itat io n om itt ed ); see also Cotton wood Enters. v. 2 M cA lpi n , 1991-NMS C-044, ¶ 11, 1 11 N. M. 793 , 810 P. 2d 812 (stating that “ the tort 3 of negligence m

ust be based up on a dutyother than one im posed bythe contract”)

. 4 Based on the distin ction between a legally im posed du ty

and a contractually

im posed 5 duty , D ef

en da nts ar gue tha t the gr av am enof P la int if f’ s pr im a fa ci e tort c la im

w as the 6 br ea chof

a co ntr ac tua l duty by

D ef en da nts , na m el y , the w ro ngf ul t er m ina tio n of

the 7 Agre em ent, not breac h of a separate legal duty . Def endants note that the claim wa s 8 subm itt ed

to the j ur y ba se d onD ef

en da nts ’ te rm ina tio n of

the A gr ee m en t, not

on any 9 duty im pose d by law se pa rate f

ro m the obl iga tio ns des cr ibe d inthe A gr ee m en t. T hus, 10 Plaintiff “ never identified— m uc h l e ss e st a

bl i sh e d— a

d ut y c reate d by

law(as opposed 11 to one created solely

by contract) that [ De fendants] breac hed” with re gard to the act 12 of te rm ina tin g th e A gr ee m en t. 13 { 29} D ef

en da nts the n turnto Sc hm itz

. A cc or din g to D ef en da nts , nothin g in Sc hm itz 1 4 sugg es t s t h a tp r i m af a c i e t o rtap p l i e s t o c o n du c tt h a ti s au t h o r i z e db y c o n t r a c t. 15 D ef en da nts a rg ue that Sc hm itz instead stands for t h e p ro p o sition s that the condu ct 16 co m pla ine d of

c an not f it int o any oth er e sta bli she d to rt

c at eg or y , m ust f al l ou tsi de of 17 the r igi d tr ad iti ona l t ort c at eg or ie s, a nd c an not be use d to ev ad e str ing en t 18 re qui re m en ts o f oth er

e sta bli she d do ctri ne s of law , inc lud ing the e m plo ym en t a t- w ill 19 doc tr ine

. D ef

en da nts the n arg ue that Sc hmitz w as ba se d onauth or ity f ro m 20 j ur isd ic tio ns tha t have he ld tha t pri m a facie tor t do es not

appl y to co nduc t tha t i s21

1 ex p re s s l y authorized by contract. Specific ally , D efendants rely on cases from

Ne w 2 Y ork and M iss our i tha t have he ld tha t pr im a fa ci e tort do es not appl y to w ro ngf

ul 3 te rm ina tio n c la im s ina t- w ill e m plo ym en t sc en ar ios an d ar gue tha t m al ic iou s e xe rc ise 4 of a contrac tual ri g h t i s g en erally not an actionable claim . D efendants contend th at 5 Sc hm itz

wa s form

ulated from

tracing the developm ent o f p rim a fa cie tort in Ne w 6 Yor k a nd Mi ss ou ri, se e Sc hm itz , 199 0- N MS C- 002, ¶ ¶ 35 -4 8, and tha t the hig he st 7 co urts i n th es e sta te s have he ld th at pr im a fa ci e tort do es not appl y to w ro ngf

ul 8 te rm ina tio n c la im s by at -w ill e m plo y ee s. D ef

en da nts r el y

on D ak e v. T ue ll , 687 9 S. W .2d 191, 192 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), which held that discharged at-will e m ploy ees 10 cannot

sue f or w ro ngf ul d isc ha rg e by

“ cl oa kin g th ei r cl ai m s inthe m isty shr oud of 1 1 p r i ma fa ci e tort. ” D ef

en da nts al so r el y

on M urph y v. A m er ic an H

om e P rodu ct

s C orp ., 12 448 N

. E

. 2d 8 6, 91 (N

. Y

. 198 3) , w hic h he ld tha t the pr im a fa ci e tort do ctri ne c an not 13 be used to circum

vent the at-will em

ploy m ent doctrine. 14 { 30} D ef

en da nts a tte m

pt t o a tta chto thi s ar gum en t line alog ic al pr ogr es sio n f ro m 15 V igi l v

. A rzo la , 19 83 -NMCA- 08 2, ¶ 1 7, 1 02 N.M. 68 2, 6 99 P.2d 61 3, rev’d on other 16 grou nds by198 4- N MS C- 090, 101 N

. M. 687, 687 P. 2d 1038, w hic h held tha t the a t17 will em

ploy m ent “ rule rests upon the concept of freedom of co ntract” and has been 18 de sc ri be d “ as pe rm itt ing an em plo y er to dis ch ar ge , f

or goo d c au se , f

or no c au se [, ] or 19 even for cause m orally wr ong, without there by being guilty of legal wr ong.” (Inter nal11 W ith regard to De fendants’ argum ent that prim a facie tort cannot, in the face 7 12 of w ro ngf ul t er m ina tio n c la im s, appl y

in at -w ill e m

plo ym en t sc en ar ios , the m aj or ity 13 sees no ap pli ca tio n he re . I a gr ee w ithP la int if f tha t D ef en da nts tr ie d th ei r ca se on a 14 for-c ause theo ry , w illing ly abandoned th eir at- will ar gum ent, and cannot n ow seek 15 to ba ck

pe da l on th ei r st rat eg ic de ci si on . See G racia v. B ittner , 1995 -N MC A -0 64, ¶ 1, 16 120 N

. M. 191 , 900 P

. 2d 3 51. L ike w ise not c om pe lli ng i s D ef

en da nts ’ a ttem

pt to 17 circumv en t t h eir decision to proceed on a for-c ause theory by draw ing a parallel 18 be tw ee n thi s c as e an d a t- w ill c as es , a s op pose d to a rg uin g th at the A gr ee m en t w as a t19 will. De fendants have not cited any authority that supp orts the propos ition that parties 20 te rm ina te d “ fo r ca

use ” ha ve no “ le ga lly

pr ote ct ed in te rest” und er pr im a fa ci e tort. 21 Where a

party provides no suppo rt for a proposi tion, the appellate courts assum e that 22 no ne ex is ts

. See In re A dopt ion of D oe , 198 4-NMSC- 024, ¶ 2, 100 N

. M. 764 , 676 23 P. 2d 1 329 (s ta tin g th at w he re aparty ci te s no au tho ri ty to supp ort an ar gum en t, the 24 appellate courts m ay

assum e no such authorityexists); ITT Ed uc . Ser vs ., Inc . v. N.M. 25 Taxation & Re venue D ep’t , 199 8- N MC A -0 78 , ¶ 10, 125 N

. M. 244 , 959 P

. 2d 9 69 26 (s ta tin g th at

thi s C ourt w ill not

c onsi de r pr opos iti ons tha t are uns uppo rt ed by c itatio n 2 7 t o au t h o r i t y)

. 22 1 quot at ionm ar

ks and c itatio n om itt ed

. ) D ef en da nts sup port this the m e by tr ac ing the 7 2 Missou ri cases of Lundberg v. Prudential Insu rance Co. of A me rica , 661 S. W

. 2d 6 67 3 (M o. Ct

. App. 198 3) , a nd P ort er v . Craw ford & Co

. , 611 S

. W

. 2d 2 65 ( Mo. Ct

. App. 4 1980 ), r el ie d onin Sc hm itz , to lan gu ag e in an earl y Mi ss ou ri c as e, Lo ewe nb er g v . De 5 V oig ne , 123 S

. W

. 99 ( Mo. Ct

. App. 190 9)

. D ef en da nts co ntend

that, a cc or din g to 6 Porter , 61 1 S.W .2d at 2 73 , Lo ew en be rg indicated “ that no am ount of bad intent can 7 render a lawf

ul act actionable in dam ages” and that under Lo ew en be rg , 123 S.W . a t 8 99, e ve n th e “ m al ic iou s” ex er ci se of a co ntr ac tua l ri ght is not a ct ion ab le a nd “pr oof 9 that the thin g d o n e wa s d one from the worst of m otives will not m ake the m atter 10 co m pl ai ne d o f act io na bl e.”23

1 { 31} Co nne ct ing Sc hm itz t o a l a t e r a n a l y s i s b y o u r S up r e m e C our t i n Beavers v. 2 Johnso n Contro ls W

orld Servs., Inc. (B eavers I) , 199 4-NMS C-094, ¶ 39, 118 N.M

. 3 391, 881 P

. 2d 1 376, a s to w he the r its Sc hm itz r u l i n g s c o u l db e ap p l i e dr e t r o a c t i v e l y, 4 D ef en da nts poi nt t o B ea ve rs I ’ s ana ly sis of th e im portanc e of

r el ianc e in ana ly zi ng 5 whether the Sc hm itz

r uli ng w as to be ap pli ed re tr oa ct ive ly

. D ef en da nts r ea d B ea ve rs 6 I to hol d th at Sc hm itz

appl ie d r etro ac tiv el y

be ca use “ pr im a fa ci e tort do es not appl y 7 w h e r e p a rt i e s r e l y o n t h e t e rm s o f a c o n t r a c t t o g o v e rn t h e i r c o n du c t an d to a voi d 8 lia bil ity [, ] ” an d a cc ording to D ef en da nts , “ [t ] ha t i s pr ec ise ly w ha t ha ppe ne d inthe 9 pr es en t ca se .” 10 { 32} L ist ed

a s ase pa rate su b-poi nt, D ef en da nts ’ se co nd d oc tr ina l arg um en t i s 11 sim ilarl y

ba se d onf

re ed om of c ontra ct . De fe ndants e m pha siz e the sig nif

ic an ce of 12 fr ee dom to co ntr ac t by hig hli ght ing our Su pr em e Co urt’ s publ ic pol ic y de te rm ina tio n 13 in Th arp v. A lli

s- Ch alm er

s M anuf ac tur ing Co

. , 1938 -N MS C- 044, ¶ 13, 42 N

. M. 443 , 14 81 P .2d 703, that is, “ [I] f there is one thing which m ore than anoth er pu b l i c p o l i cy 15 re qui re s it

is tha t m en of fu ll ag e and c om pe te nt unde rs tandi ng s ha ll ha ve the utm ost 16 lib er ty of c ontra ct ing , and tha t the ir c ontra ct s, w he n e nte re d in to f re el y a nd 17 vo lu nt ari ly, sh al l b e en fo rced [.]” (I n t e r n al qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d.) 18 De fendants also cite U nit ed W hol es ale L iqu or C

o. v . B r o w n -F

o r m an D ist ill er

s C orp ., 19 1989 -N M SC -0 3 0, ¶¶

8, 13-14, 108 N. M. 467, 775 P. 2d 23 3, w hich expresses New 20 Me xic o’ s stro ng publi c poli cy of fr ee dom of co ntr ac t, sta tin g that “ [g ] re at da m ag e is24

1 done w he re bus ine sse s c an not c ount on c er ta inty in the ir le ga l r el at ion shi ps and 2 str ong re ason s m

us t support a

c ourt w he n it

int er fe re s inale ga l r el at ion shi p 3 vo lu nt ari ly ass um edby the pa rti es .” (In te rn al qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d.) 4 In ad d i t i o n , De fe n d an t s b u t t re s s t h ei r p o l i cy ar g u m en tb y ci t i n g t o t h i s Co u rt ’s 5 opi nio n in Q uin tan a v. F irs t Int er sta te B ank

of A lbu que rque , 198 7- N MC A -0 62, ¶ ¶ 6, 6 12, 14, 105 N

. M. 784 , 737 P

. 2d 896, w hic h held tha t “ re ga rd le ss o f the m oti ve f or it s 7 de ci sio n[ , ] ” a pa rty

ha s th e ri ght

“ to r ef use to do b usi ne ss w ith[ an oth er party , ] ” an d 8 the e xe rc ise of

that r igh t w ill not

giv e ri se to a cl ai m

f or tor tio us i nte rf

er en ce w ith 9 co ntr ac tua l or

pr ospe ct ive c ontra ct

ua l r el at ion s be ca

use “ [t ] he r igh t t o c hoos e fr ee ly 10 one ’ s bu sin es s r el at ion s ha s be ende sc rib ed as af undam en ta l r igh t[

. ] ” D ef en da nts 11 the n e xte nd N ewMe xic o’ s po lic y f av or ing f re ed om of co ntr ac t to the pr es en t c as e by 12 as se rt ing that c ourts i nte rp re tin g N ewMe xic o law ha ve co ns id ered f re ed om of 13 co ntr ac t and the appr opr ia te ne ss o f pr im a fa ci e tort in the c ont ex t of te rm ina tio n of 14 at -w ill e m

plo y ee s and i nde pe nde nt c ontra ct or s, a nd D ef en da nt s c ont en d th at

the se 15 co ur ts ha ve pro pe rly hel d t ha t p rima facie to rt i s i napp li cab le

. Se e Sc hm itz , 199 0- 16 N MS C- 002, ¶ 63 ( ci tin g Lu ndbe rg , 661 S

. W

. 2d a t 67 1) ; se e als o E wi ng v . Sta te F

arm 17 M ut. A uto

. I

ns. Co

. , 6 F

. S upp. 2d 1 281, 129 1 ( D

. N

. M. 1998 ) (rec og niz ing the 18 hol din g in Sc hm itz tha t pr im a fa ci e tort cannot be use d to a voi d th e em plo ym en t- at

19 w ill doc tr ine an d conc lud ing tha t “ it is unli ke ly tha t [pr im a fa ci e tort] w as m eant t o10 In the ir br ie f in ch ie f an d ap pa re ntl y as a sub- poi nt to thi s ar gum en t, 8 11 D ef en da nts inc lud e a fo otn ot e arg uing th at the re is re ve rs ibl e er

ro r ba se d onthe 12 district court’ s refusal to give a requested instructio n on w hether the Agre em ent was 13 te rm ina

ble a t w ill

. A s st at ed in the pr ev iou s f ootnot e, the m aj or ity

de cl ine s to 14 co nsi de r D ef

en da nts ’ a rg um en t. T he r ec or d r ef le ct s th at be fo re t ria l D ef

en da nts 15 soug ht a determ ination that Plaintiff’ s agency wa s or could have b ee n t erm inated 16 unde r ana t- w ill te rm ina tio n prov is io n in the A gr ee m en t bu t tha t D ef en da nts 17 vol unt ar ily

dr oppe d th e iss ue a ft er

the c ourt r

ule d onD ef

en da nts ’ le ga l r igh t t o 18 term inate Plaintiff. De fendants chose not to pursue their term inable-at-w ill angle at 19 tr ia l bu t, r athe r, ba se d th ei r de fe nse on the ir r igh t t o te rm ina te the a ge nc y f or c au se 20 as ar es ult

of P la int if f’ s br ea chof the A gr ee m en t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r ef usa l t o pe rm it 21 D ef en da nts ’ la st m inu te pr of fe r of a n in str uc tio n onat- w ill status w as appr opr ia te 22 giv enthat D ef

en da nts w ill ing ly

aba ndon ed

the ir a t- w ill the or

y . De fen dants ’ la st 23 m inu te a tte m

pt t o r ai se the te rm ina

ble -at- w ill ins tr

uc tio n is sue co nst itu te s a c as e of 24 to o l it tl e to o l at e, an d t he m at te r w i l l n o t b e co ns id ered

. Se e G rac ia , 19 95 -NMCA25 064, ¶ 17 ( “ [A ] lle ga tio ns of er

ro r tha t w er e not pr es er

ve d in a tim el y fa shi on t o a llo w 26 the trial court to corre ct the err or [w ill] not be the sub j ect of re v er s al on appeal.”) ; 27 W oolwine v. Furr’s, Inc. , 1 98 7- NMCA-1 33 , ¶ 20 , 1 06 N.M. 49 2, 74 5 P.2 d 71 7 (“ To 28 pr es er ve a n is su e fo r re vie w on a ppe al , it m ust appe ar that [ the ] appe llant f

ai rl y 29 inv oke d ar

uli ng o f the tr ia l c ourt onthe sa m e gr ound s arg ue d i n th e ap pe llate 30 court.”)

. 25 1 int er fe re w ith a co m

pa ny ’ s pr er oga tiv e to se le ct its em plo y ee s or in de pe ndent 2 contractors”). 8 3 { 33} D ef

en da nts f urthe r re ly

on an unpubl ish ed

T enth Ci rc uit

Co urt of Appe al s 4 or de r an d j udgm en t i n Ja ck son v. F re igh tli ne r C

orp. , N o. 94- 2163 , 199 6 W L 500 666, 5 at*4 -5 (10 th Cir . Sep t. 5 , 19 96 ) (o r d e r ) , as h ol di ng , un de r New Mex ic o l aw, 6 p r i n c i p a l l y Q uin tan a , 198 7- N MC A -0 62, ¶ ¶ 11- 12, that a

party is j ust if

ie d init s 7 co ntr ac tua l dec isi ons an d pr im a fa ci e tort c an not be use d to m odi fy

the absol ute r igh t 8 of busin esses to choos e w ith whom they want to do busin ess. D efendants offer Sm ith 9 v. Price ’s Cream eries , 1982- N MS C- 102, ¶ ¶ 23- 24, 98 N

. M. 541 , 650 P

. 2d 8 25, in26

1 w h i c h o u r S up r e m e C o u rt d e t e rm i n e d t h a t t h e r e w a s n o n e e d t o i n quir e int o th e 2 de fe ndant’ s m ot iv es in see kin g to te rm ina te adis tr ibu tor shi p c ontra ct be ca use the 3 Co urt ha d no pow er

to m odi fy

the “ canc el la tio n ‘ fo r an y r ea son[] ’ ” pr ov ision and 4 because the plaintiff could not recover even if the defendant term inated the contract 5 in b ad f ai th. D ef en dants a cknow le dge tha t the re ar e som e lim itatio ns o n th e fr ee dom 6 o f co n t ra ct but denythat any such lim itations apply

in this case, and thus, Plaintiff 7 e v a d e dt h e f

r e e d o m o f

c o n t r a c td o c t r i n e i n p u r s u i n g h i s p r i maf a c i e t o rtc l a i m. 8 { 34} T hir d, D ef

en da nts a sse rt

that “ pa rt ie s shou ld not be al low ed to use tort l awto 9 alter or avoid the bargain struck in the cont ra ct ” an d t h at “ [t] he law of contract 10 provides an adequ ate re m edy .” A m R ep Sw

. , I nc . v . Sho lle nbar

ge r W ood Tr ea tin g, 11 Inc. , 199 5- N MS C- 020, ¶ 28, 119 N

. M. 542 , 893 P

. 2d 4 38. I n add it io n, D ef en da nts 12 ret ur n to Sm ith , 1 98 2- N M S C

- 10 2, ¶ ¶ 2 4- 26 , i n w hi c h t he C ourta f f i rm e d su m

m a ry 13 j udgm ent f

or t he de f e nd a nt a nd r e

j e c t e d t he pl a i nt i f

f ’ s c l a i m t ha t a qu e st i on of fac t 14 ex ist ed

a s to w he the r the c ontra ct ha d be en

te rm ina te d ingo od fai th. D ef en da nts 15 ar gue f

ro m the se ca se s tha t “ [t ] he dis tr ic t co urt er re d in usi ng pr im a fa ci e tort a s th e 16 vehicle for allow ing th e j ury to rew rite the A greem ent to im pose a ‘ proper m otive’ 17 li m it at io n o n [De fen da nt s’] ter m in at io n ri gh ts .” 18 { 35} Fourth and finally within their doctrinal attack, De fendants argue that a brea ch 19 of the im

plied c ovenant of good faith and fair dealing cla im and remed i es we re 20 evaded by

subm itting prim a fac i e t o rt t o the jury . D efendants contend th at N ew27

1 Me xic o r ec ogni ze s ac la im fo r br ea ch of the im pli ed c ove na nt o f good

f ai th and f ai r 2 de al ing w ithr es pe ct

to co ntr ac ts tha t are not te rm ina ble a t w ill a nd tha t the c la im 3 soun ds in cont ract, and for that re ason, such claim s are not s u b ject to tort rem edies 4 fo r th e b reac h. See B ourg eo us v. H ori zon H ea lth ca re Co rp . , 199 4- N MS C- 038, ¶ 17, 5 117 N.M. 434, 872 P.2d 852 (statin g that “ tort rem edies are not available for bre ach 6 of the im

plied covenant in an em

ploy m ent contract”). 7 { 36} A ddi tio na lly , D ef en da nts poi nt t o United States ex rel. C ustom Grading, Inc. 8 v. G re at A m er ic an I

nsuranc e Co

. , 952 F

. S upp. 2d 1 259, 126 9- 70 ( D

. N

. M. 201 3) 9 (m em .), i n w hic h th e co urt di sm iss ed the pla int if

f’ s pr im a fa ci e tort c la im be ca use 10 “Ne w Me xico law adher es to the econom ic-loss doctrine,” w hich “ prevents plainti ffs 11 fr om r ec ove ri ng i n to rt

e co nom ic los se s to w hic h th ei r en tit le m en t f low s on ly f ro m 12 a co ntr ac t[

. ] ” (I nte rn al quot at ionm ar ks and c itatio ns o m itt ed

. ) D ef en da nts a rg ue that, 13 by perm itting Plaintiff to p ro ceed w ith his prim a fa cie tort claim , the district court 14 erre d in a llowing P laintiff’ s claim “ to e vade both (i) his burden of proving a brea ch 15 of the im pli ed c ove na nt and ( ii) the c ontra ct -d am ag es -o nly li m itatio n fo r a br ea chof 16 the im pli ed c ove na nt[ , ] ” re sul tin g inP la int if f re ce ivi ng s ubst an tia l t ort dam ag es “ fo r 17 th e la wfu l ex erci se of a co nt ract ua l ri gh t.” 18 { 37} De fend an t s’ point s regarding the differe nces betwe en tort and contract 19 doctrines are solid reasons for requiring Plaintiff to have pleaded an d pursued 20 co ntr ac t c la im s ba se d onathe or y that hi s te rm ina tio n w as w ro ngf ul, pr et ex tua l, a nd1 7 Al t h o u g h n o t ra i s ed as an i s s u e o n ap p ea l , I qu es t i o n wh et h erP l a i n t i f f’s 9 18 br ea chof

c ontra ct an d br ea ch of the im pli ed co ve na nt o f good

f ai th and f ai r de al ing 1 9 cl ai m s ac tu a l l y s o u g h tr e c o v e ry b a s e do nt h e a l l e g e dw r o n g f u l t e rmi n a t i o n . P l a i n t i ff

’s 20 ope rativ e co m

pla int al le ge d bre ac h of c ontra ct ba se d onD ef

en da nts ’ c ondu ct

dur ing 21 an d af te r the te rm ina tio n (i

. e. , fa ilure to pa y Pl ai nti ff c ontra ct va lue , f ai lur e to s uppl y 22 a pr ope r U 5 f

orm , a nd f

ai lur e to p ro vid e m eanin gf ul r ev ie w by

the T er m ina tio n 23 ReviewBoard), not the term ination itself. 28 1 carr ie d ou t w iththe m al ic iou s in te nt t o harm a nd w ith out

suf fi ci en t j ust if

ic at ion

. A nd, 2 in fact, the Dissent looks to the doctrinal differe nces bet we en tort and contract as 3 pr ov id in g g ro un ds forrev ers al

. Se e ge ne ral lyD iss en t inf ra ¶¶ 92, 104. As has been 4 the m at ic f

ro m start to fi nis h inthi s O pin ion , how ev er , the m an ne r in whic h th is c as e 5 w as tr ie d le ad s to a

r es ult that di sf av or s D ef en da nts ’ a nd the D iss en t’ s po sit ion s. T he 6 fact that the j ury

verdict favore d Pl ai n t i ff in prim a fa cie tort in eff ect shows that 7 Defen da nt s ch os e th ei r fo r-ca us e co nt ract claus e as a c o ve r fo r th ei r true in te nt . As 8 hig hli ght ed

e ar lie r in the pr oc ed

ur al se ct ionof

thi s O pin ion, D ef

en da nts ur ge d and 9 the dis tr ic t c ourt a

ppare ntl y a gr ee d th at

P la int if f’ s c ondu ct

c oupl ed w iththe pla in 10 language of the Agre em ent allowed De fendants to term inate Plaintiff under the for11 cause t erm s of the Agre em ent. I n deciding the m erits of Plaintiff’ s contract-re lated 12 cla i m s, I se e no i nd i c a t i on t ha t t he di st r i c t c ourt t oo k i nt o c on si de r a t i on or that 1 3 P l a i n t i f

f a d e qu a t e l y p l e a d e d o r i n a n y w a y a c tu a l l y p u r s u e d t h e a r g u m e n t tha t t he 9 14 re a so ns g i ve n f

or h i s t e rm i na t i onw e r e “ bo gu s” a nd , i m po rt a nt l y , t he p arties 15 ap pa re ntly ag ree d th at the c ove na nt g en er al ly

r equir ing that the part ie s a ct in good 16 fa ithdid

not appl y giv en the dis tr ic t cour t’ s rul ing on the ex pr es s pr ovi sio n a llo w ing29

1 te rm ina tio n. A lth oughnot r ai se d by

e ith er party , I se ri ousl y

que sti on whe the r the 2 ex pr es s langua ge of

the A gr ee m en t a llo w ing te rm ina tio n or ar uli ng tha t D ef

en da nts 3 w er e au tho ri ze d to te rm ina te pur suant t o an e xpr es s pr ov isi on i n th e A gr ee m en t 4 ne ce ssari ly

w oul d have pr ohi bit ed co ntr ac t- re la te d cla im s base d onpr et ex t or r use if 5 the y ha d be enc ar ef

ull y a nd c le ar ly

pur sue d. 6 { 38} T he dis tr ic t c our t and the part ie s se em ed to be lie ve that i n f

ind ing that the 7 Agre em ent could be prop erl y t er m i n at ed under the facts of this case, as a logical 8 ex te nsi on, the re co ul d be no b re ac h of the im pli ed c ove na nt o f good

f ai th and f ai r 9 de al ing

. A lth ough br ea ch of the im pli ed c ove na nt c an not

be use d to ne ga te a n e xpr es s 10 te rm in a co ntr ac t, “ ev er

y c ontra ct im pose s aduty

of goo d f ai th and fair d ea lin g on 11 the parties w ithr es pe ct to the pe rf

orm an ce a nd e nf

or ce m en t of

the te rm s of

the 12 contract. ” Sanders v. Fe dEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. , 2008 -N MS C- 040, ¶ 7, 144 13 N

. M. 449 , 188 P

. 3d 1 200; se e M el nic k v. Sta te Far m Mu t. A uto

. I ns. Co

. , 198 8- 14 NMS C-012 , ¶ 1 7 , 1 0 6 N. M. 726, 749 P. 2d 11 05 (agreeing with “ those courts th at 15 ha ve re fu se d to ap ply an im pli ed co ve na nt of good

f ai th and f ai r de al ing to ove rr ide 16 ex pr es s pr ovi sio ns a ddr es se d by the te rm s of an in te gr at ed , w ri tte n c ontra ct ”)

. I n th e 17 pr es en t c as e, I se e no d ef ini tiv e an al y sis f

ro m the dis tr ic t cour

t tha t the br ea chof

the 18 im pl ie d c ov en an t cl ai m was ne ces sa ril y di sm is se d in li gh t of any pa rti cu la r ru li ng . I 1 9 am n o tw h o l l y

c o n v i n c e d , g i v e n t h e f

a c t s s up p o rt i n g b a df

a i t h a n dt h a tD ef

en da nts 20 use d th e A gr ee m en t t o carry o ut the ir m al ic iou s m oti ve s, that the c ove na nt w as so30

1 ea sil y dis posa ble abse nt s om e ex pli ci t de te rm ina tio n that the co ve na nt did n ot a ppl y 2 under a con t ra ct t h eo ry of term ination based on pretext or ruse. H ad Plaintiff 3 ag gr es siv el y

pur sue d hi s “bogu s” a ngl e as to Defendant s’ state d r ea sons f or 4 term inating Plaintiff by arguing, based on the facts ultim ately proved at trial, that 5 Defen da nt s’ tru e mo t i ve was t o h arm Pla in ti ff wit ho ut su ffi ci en t ju st ifi cat io n, we 6 m igh t be in a dif

fe re nt s itu ation

. I pos it tha t P la int if f co uld ha ve ple ad ed

a nd 7 pe rs ua siv el y

a rg ue d th at

his te rm ina tio n w as unl aw f u l un d e r b re ac h of c ontra ct a nd/ or 8 br ea chof

the im pli ed c ove na nt of good fa ith an d fa ir de al ing on the gr ound

that the 9 te rm inat io n wa s no thi ng m or e than apr et ex t or r use to ac co m

pli sh the te rm ina tio n 10 ba se d onm al ic iou s in te nt t o harm that en ds in ha rm , w ith out suf fi ci en t j ust if

ic at ion

. 11 Se e, e . g. , Hartnett v. Papa John’s Pizza USA , I nc. , 912 F. Su

pp. 2d 10 66 , 11 14-15 1 2 (D .N. M . 2 0 1 2 ) ( m em.) (d en yin g a mot i o n fo r s u m m ar y ju d g m en to n t h e p l ai n t i ff ’s 13 breach of e m

ploy m ent contract claim

because there we re genu ine issues of m aterial 14 fact a s to whether the def endant com

plied with its agreem ent to term inate the plaintiff 15 for ca use); H unt er v . B d. of Tr

s. of B road

law ns M ed

. Ct r. , 481 N.W .2d 5 10, 516 16 (Iow a 1992 ) (holdin g that “ the j ury wa s entitled to find that [the em ploy er’ s] stated 17 re as on f

or dis ch ar ge —asta ff

r ed uc tio n—w as pr et ex tuo us and thus co nst itu te d a 18 breach of c ontract”); Cannon v. Nat’l B y-Produ cts, I

nc. , 42 2 N.W.2d 6 38 , 64 2 (I owa 19 1988 ) (s ta tin g th at , in the c ont ex t of abr ea chof an em

plo ym en t contra ct

c la im , “ the 20 j ury could have found that the stated reason for the em ploy er’ s term ination of [the]31

1 pla int if f’ s e m plo ym en t w as not

sin ce re , a nd the r ea sons giv enw er e pr et ex tuo us” a nd 2 that such f

indin gs “ shou ld not be disturbed on appeal”); Keste nbau m v. P en nzoi l C o. , 3 1988 -N MSC- 092, ¶¶ 1, 15, 36, 108 N. M. 20, 766 P. 2d 280 (uph oldin g a j ury verdict 4 ba se d onbr ea chof

a n em plo ym en t co ntr ac t in favor of the pla int if f w ho co uld

onl y 5 be term inated for cause and who was no t ac t ually term inated for good cause); 6 Ki ed rowski v. Ci tiz en s B ank , 199 5- N MC A -0 11, ¶ ¶ 14- 15, 119 N

. M. 572 , 893 P

. 2d 7 468 (hol ding that there w ere genuin e issues of m aterial f act that prec luded su m

m ary 8 j udgm en t onthe p la in tif f’ s br ea chof

c ontra ct c la im be ca use the re w er e fa ct s to 9 sugg es t tha t the em

plo y er w as m oti va te d by ill eg iti m at e an d se lf -s er vin g r ea sons a nd 10 term inated the plainti ff under the pre text of poor perform ance). Ha d Plaintiff pursued 11 a co ntr ac t the or

y that D ef en da nts ’ te rm ina tio n of the A gr ee m en t w as ba se d onpr et ex t 12 an d/o r a ru se to cov er the tr ue , m al ic iou s, a nd u nj ust if ie d r ea sons f

or the te rm ina tio n, 13 I doub t tha t a

r uli ng f ro m the dis tr ic t c ourt tha t D ef en da nts we re te ch nic al ly 14 au tho ri ze d to te rm ina te the A gr ee m en t purs ua nt to its e xpr es s pr ovi sio ns w oul d have 15 be endis posi tiv e of

P la int if f’ s c ontra ct -r el at ed

c la im s. 16 { 39} I fi rm ly

be lie ve tha t the m an ne r in w hic h th is c as e w as tr ie d w ar rants ade ci sio n 17 tha t c au tio usl y

a nd n ar ro w ly a ff irm s bu t lim its the ap pli ca tio n of pri m a fa ci e tort t o 18 the circum stances in which the clear ly via b l e, available, and establish ed 19 co ntr ac t- re la te d do ctri ne s of unl aw fu l ter m ina tio n base d on pr et ex t, ru se , m al ic e, a nd 20 la ck of j ust if ic at ion ne ve r cam e to lig ht. T he S pe ci al Co nc ur re nc e dis ag re es , se ei ng32

1 this to sim

ply be a ca se in which t h e contract- related c laim s failed as viable, 2 av ai la ble , a nd e sta

bli she d c ontract-r el at ed

doc tr ine s, notw ith standi ng tha t those 3 cl ai m s were ne ve r ba se d onathe or y of a n un law fu l t er

m ina tio n ba se d onpr et ex t, 4 ru se , m al ic e, an d l ackof ju st ifi cat io n. See Sp . Con

. inf ra ¶ 80. I be lie ve that ha d th is 5 co ntr ac t the or

y be enple ad ed

a nd p ur sue d, t he doc tr ine of pr im a fa ci e tort, w ithit s 6 el em en t of

alaw fu l t er

m ina tio n in ste ad

of la ck of su che le m en t, w oul d ne ce ssari ly 7 ha ve be ene lim ina te d. T he S pe ci al Co nc ur re nc e m ist ak en ly t ak es the vie w that a 8 pretextual term ination claim and theory

of D efendants’ unlawful conduct wer e before 9 th e d is tri ctco ur t. See Sp . Con

. inf ra ¶ 80. A s indicated earlier in this Opinion, they 10 w er e not

. T he O pin ion ’ s a ppr oa chhard ly

part ak es of

gue ss w ork or

m usi ng. I ts 11 ap pr oa chis to s howthat w ha t ha ppe ne d inthi s c as e, i.e., the m an ne r in whic h th is 1 2 ca s e w as t ri ed , c en t er i n g o n l y o n t h e l aw fu l n es s o f t er m i n at i o n b as ed o n Pl ai n t i ff ’s 13 technical breac h, lef

t established, viable contract theories of unlawf ul pretextual 14 term ination unaddressed, thereby leaving no alternative th an to send prim a fa cie tort 15 to the j ur

y . A ny via

ble co ntr ac t the or

y of unl aw fu l pr et ex tua l t er m ina tio n c oul d have 16 ove rr idd ena ny

te ch nic al ly

“ law fu l” te rm ina tio n. A s in dic at ed e ar lie r, be ca

use of the 17 pa rt ic ular na tur e of

thi s c as e, no o pin ion in this ca se shou ld be co nsi de re d pr ec ed en t 18 or auth or ity f or a ny e xpansi on o f pr im a fa ci e tort. 19 { 40} I do not e tha t D ef en da nts , in the ir fo urth sub- poi nt, now tr y to re ly on the 20 ex ist en ce of

the c ove na nt o f good

f ai th an d fa ir

de al ing to ar gue that P la int if f shou ld33

1 be pr ohi bit ed

f rom pur sui ng a

pr im a fa ci e tort c la im

. H ow ev er , D ef en da nts do n ot 2 pr ovi de ac ite to the re co rd w he re thi s ar gum en t re ga rd ing Pl ai nti ff ’ s a lle ge d a tte m

pt 3 to evade the requirem ents of a breac h of the im plied covenant and its rem edies wa s 4 m ade before the district court. A nd based on a review of the record, it does no t appear 5 th atDefen da nt s d e v e lo pe d a ny argu m en t t ha t Pl ai nt iff ha d, b ut fai le d t o p ur su e, a 6 breach of the im

plied covenant claim

based on a

pretextual term ination use of the for7 ca use c lause a s ac ove r fo r th e co nductult im at el y pr ove d un de r pr im a fa ci e tort. 8 The refo re, t he m a

jo r i t y h ol ds th atth e arg um en t was no t p res erv ed

. Se e In re T .B. , 9 1996 -N MCA -035, ¶ 13, 121 N.M. 465, 913 P. 2d 272 (“ [W ] e re view the ca se litigated 10 be low , not

the c as e tha t i s f

le she d ou t f

or the fi rs t tim e on a

ppe al

. ”) ; G rac ia , 199 5- 11 N MC A -0 64, ¶

17 ( “ [A ] lle ga tio ns o f er

ro r tha t w er e not

pr es er ve d inati m el y

f as hio n 12 to a llo w the tri al c ourt t o c or re ct the e rr or [ w ill ] not

be the sub

j ec t of r ev er sa l on 13 appeal.” ); W

ool wi ne , 198 7- N MC A -1 33, ¶ 20 ( “ T o pr es er

ve a n is sue f

or r ev ie w on 14 ap pe al , it

m ust appe ar that [th e] ap pe llant fa ir ly inv oke d a ruli ng of the tr ia l c ourt on 15 the sa m e gr ound s arg ue d inthe appe llate co ur t.”)

. E ve n w er e the m aj or ity to 16 de te rm in e th atDefen da nt s s om eh ow b arel y pre se rv edth is arg um en t b y th e b ro ad not e 17 tha t P la int if

f’ s c la im e va de d th e re qui re m en ts of ac ontra ct

c la im , c onsi ste nt w ithour 18 log ic a s e ar lie r ex pla ine d, be ca use D ef en da nts m ove d to dis m iss the im pli ed c o v en an t 1 9 of g o o d f

a i t h a n d f

a i r d e a l i n g c l a i m a n d w e r e s u c c e s s f u l i n u l t i m a t e lyge tti ng a 20 dism issal of that claim , the m aj ority likewise r ej ects D efendants’ argum ent that34

1 Pl ai nti ff

’ s us e of pr im a fa ci e tort allow ed P la int if f to e va de his bur de n of

pr ovi ng 2 br ea chof

the im pli ed c ove na nt and the “ co ntr ac t- da m ag es -o nly ” lim itatio n. 3 { 41} Ina ddi tio n to c onc er ns w ithD ef

en da nts ’ doc tri na l po sitionin lig ht o f the 4 pa rt ic ular ci rc um stanc es of thi s ca se , the m aj or ity doe s not ac cept Defend an ts’ 5 ar gum en t th at co ntr ac t l awc ange ne ra lly pr ovi de a n a de qua te r em edy a t l awin 6 ci rc um stanc es w he re a te rm ina tio n is c ar ri ed out pur suant t o an e xpr es s pr ovi sio n in 7 an ag re em en t an d w he n br ea ch of the im pli ed co ve na nt of good fa ith an d f ai r de al ing 8 is una va ila

ble

. D ef en da nts sou ght

a nd a gr ee d to a dis m iss al of Pl ai nti ff ’ s br ea chof 9 the im plied c ovenant claim

. De fendants’ posit ion fr om the start and through out was 10 tha t a te rm ina tio n e ff

ec tua te d pu rs ua nt t o an e xpr es s c lause in a co ntr ac t sh oul d be 11 de em ed

law fu l an d not subj ec t to or in vio la tio n of the im pli ed c ove na nt o f good

f ai th 12 and fair dealing, while sim ultaneous ly taking the posit ion that term inating a contrac t 13 fo r m al ic iou s and u nj ust ifi ab le r ea sons is not pun ish ab le in tort. A cc ep tin g 14 D ef en da nts ’ pr opos iti ons w oul d pe rm it a pa rty to m al ic iou sly

a nd u nj ust if

ia bly 15 term inate a contract under the g uise of som e technicality without restriction. In 16 De fendants’ ideal world, t here would never b e a way for a party to obtain relief in for17 cause term ination s that are technically authorized but nevertheless prete xtual and are 18 ac tua lly

c ar ri ed out a s a ru se an d cove r fo r a te rm ina tio n base d on m al ic e w ithint en t 19 to h ar m the te rm ina te d party

a nd w ith out

j ust if ic at ion

.35

1 2. De fend ants’ Ele m ent- Based A pproach 2 { 42} De fendants’ second attack is that Plaintiff fa iled, as a m atter of law, to satisfy 3 at le as t thr ee of

the f our e sse nti al e le m en ts of

pr im a fa ci e tort ou tli ne d in Sc hm itz , 4 na m el y , in te nt to in

jure , in jury, an d abs en ce o f jus ti fic at io n. See 1990- N MS C- 002, 5 ¶ 37. D efendant s as s er t t h at Plaintiff a lso failed to satisfy a fif th “ uniq ue fac tual 6 al le ga tio ns” re qui re m en t. D ef en da nts r el y

on Ca rre on v . G oodt im es W ood P rodu ct

s, 7 In c. , N o . C I V 0 9

- 1 6 1 B B / C E G , 2 0 1 1 W L 9 6 8 6 8 9 5 , * 1 3 ( D

. N

. M

. M a r . 22, 201 1) 8 (m em . ), w hic h st at es tha t “ a pla int if f cannot sim

ply ba se [a pr im a fa ci e tort] c la im on 9 the sa m e al le ga tio ns tha t su ppor t his oth er cl ai m s” an d tha t “ the pr im a fa ci e tort c au se 10 of actio n is useful only when th ere are f actual allegations that are som ehow unique, 11 that do no t give r ise to anoth er tort or contracts claim , but that dem and redress. ” T hey 12 al so r el y

on H ea lth source, In c ., 2005 -N MCA -097, ¶ 36, that affir m ed a district 13 co urt’ s di sm iss al of

apr im a fa ci e tort c la im

w he n t he pl ainti ff

did “ not a sse rt a ny 14 se pa rat e fac tu al ba si s t o s up po rt i ts pri m a fac ie to rt c la im .” 15 { 43} A s to the int en t t o in j ur e an d in

j ury r equir em en ts, D ef

en da nts f oc us o n th e 16 U nit ed St at es D istri ct Co urt of N ew Me xic o’ s ru lin g in Hill v. Cray R esearch, I nc. , 17 8 64 F. S upp. 1070 , 1079-80 (D. N. M. 1991) (m em .) , that dism issed the plain t i ff ’s 18 pr im a fa ci e tort c la im ag ai nst his f orm er e m plo y er e ith er be ca use the te rm ina tio n of 19 the pla int if

f’ s a t- w ill e m

plo ym en t w as a br ea ch of an im pli ed co ntr ac t or a w ro ngf ul 20 dis ch ar ge , a nd the re fo re w as unl aw fu l an d not subj ec t to pr im a fa ci e tort, or be ca use36

1 t h e p l a i n t i f

f ’s t e rmi n a t i o n w a s l a w f

u l a n dt h u s t h e r e w a s n o i n t e n t t o i n j u r e h i m. 2 D ef en da nts sim ilarl y

a rg ue that be ca

use the y did not br ea ch the A gr ee m en t, the int en t 3 to i nj ur e an d in

j ur y r equir em en ts c oul d no t be e sta bli she d gi ve n th at

the int en t t o 4 inj ur e an d in

j ur y onl y appl y to a le ga lly pr ote ct ed int er es t of Pl ai nti ff a s r equir ed

by 5 the Re sta te m en t (S ec ond) of T orts § 87 0, c m t. e , a s a dopt ed

in Sc hm itz , 1990-NMS C6 002, ¶ ¶ 46- 47. D ef

en da nts c ont en d th at

P la int if f, a s am at te r of la w, h ad no leg al ly 7 pr ote ct ed

int er es t on ce the dis tr ic t c ourt r ule d th at the A greem en t w as law fu lly 8 te rm ina te d. W ith in this a rg um en t, D ef en da nts ta ke the opp ortunity to re as se rt

the ir 9 posi tio ns ( 1) that pr im a fa ci e tort c an not be u se d to avo id the e m plo ym en t- at -w ill 10 doc tr ine , a nd ( 2) tha t it is unl ike ly that pr im a fa ci e tort w as m eant t o in te rf er e w itha 11 co m pa ny’ s p rero ga ti ve to sel ect it s emplo y ees or i nd ep en de nt co nt ract or s. Se e id. ¶ 63 12 (r ec ogni zi ng tha t “pr im a fa ci e tort c an not be us ed to a voi d e m

plo ym en t[ -] at [- ] w ill 13 doc tr ine ”) ; se e a ls o Ewi ng , 6 F

. S upp. 2d a t 12 91 (“ [I ] t is unli ke ly that [ pr im a fa ci e 14 tort] w as m eant t o in te rf er e w ithac om

pa ny ’ s pe ro ga tiv e to s el ec t i ts e m plo y ee s or 15 ind ep en de nt c ontra ct or s. ”) ; Yei tr ak is v

. Sc he rin g- P lough C

orp. , 804 F

. S upp. 238 , 16 247- 49 ( D

. N

. M. 199 2) ( m em . ) (h o ldi ng tha t “pr im a fa ci e tort i s un av ai la ble to re m edy 17 the te rm ina tio n of

a n a t[ -] w ill e m

plo y ee ” (e m

pha sis om itt ed ))

. A lth oughD ef en da nts 1 8 d o n o ta r g u e t h a tt h i s i s a n e mp l o yme n t

- a t

- w i l l s i tu a t i o n , t h e y d o a r g u e t h a tt h e s a me 19 ratio na le in Sc hm itz , E wi ng , Yei tra ki

s , a nd H ill s h o u l dap p l y.37

1 { 44} As to the absence of suff icient j ustification re quirem ent, De fendants argue that 2 co nd uc t t ha t i s aut ho riz ed by co nt ract is jus ti fie d fo r pu rp os es of p rima facie to rt. See 3 Ca rre on , 201 1 W L 968 6895 , a t *1 3 ( sta tin g th at if the re w as no b re ac h of c ontra ct , 4 the de fe ndant’ s “ lega l po si ti on w as j ust if ie d and c an not

be the ba sis of

ac la im f or 5 pr im a fa ci e tort” ); se e als o J ac ks on , 1996 W L 5006 66, at *5 (a ff irm ing dis m iss al of 6 a pr im a fa ci e tort c la im w he re the de fe ndant “ was j ust if ie d inw ith hol din g c onse nt 7

. . . b ec au se it had an absolut e right to choos e the individ uals with whom it wished 8 to have contractual relations”). 9 { 45} And as to the uniqu e fa ctual allegations requirem ent, D efendants reiter ate that 10 a plaintiff cannot sim ply base a prim a fa cie tort claim on the sam e allegations th at 11 would supp ort other claim s available or asserted and that th e prim a fa cie tort 1 2 a l l e g a t i o n s mu s tb e u n i qu e a n dn o tg i v e r i s e t o a n o t h e r t o rto r c o n t r a c tc l a i m. 13 De fendants argue that an actor’ s lawf ul c ondu ct cannot be br ough t within or overlap 1 4 o t h e r mo r e t r a d i t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s o f l i ab i l i t y a n dt h a tt h e f

a c tu a l b a s i s f

o r t h e p r i ma 15 facie tort claim

cannot be identical to the factual basis f o r al l of the other alleged 16 cl ai m s. T hus, D ef

en da nts a rg ue , uni que ne ss w as la ck ing giv en tha t, in se tti ng o ut h is 17 cl ai m s f

or r el ie f, P la int if

f inc or por at ed a ll of the a ve rm en ts i n a ll of

the pr ec ed ing 18 pa ra gr ap hs o f his c om pla int , inc lud ing al le ga tio ns re la tin g to br ea chof c ontra ct a nd 19 breach of the i m

p l i ed covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that the district17 Although De fendants r epresent that “ [t] he j ury wa s specifica l l y i n structed 10 18 tha t [ D ef

en da nts ’ ] te rm ina tio n of

the A gr ee m en t was the on ly c ondu ct that c oul d 19 c o n s t i t ut e p rima facie to rt[ ,] ” th e m ajor it y do es no t re adth e in st ru ct io n s o b ro a d l y. 20 Inf ac t, the j ur

y w as ins tr

uc te d th at

“ [i ] n or de r to r ec ove r da m ag es f ro m a ny 21 D ef en da nt on this cl ai m , Pl ai nti ff m ust sho w a s to that D ef

en da nt: [ t] ha t D ef

en da nt 22 int en tio na lly

te rm ina te d or

int en tio na lly

too k a ct ion s th at

r es ult ed in the te rm ina tio n 2 3 o f [ t h e] Ag re emen t [. ]” 38 1 co urt i nstru ct ed

the j ur y that D ef en da nts ’ te rm ina tio n of

the A gr ee m en t w as the onl y 2 co nduc t tha t c oul d c onst itu te pr im a fa ci e tort. 10 3 { 46} D ef

en da nts ’ ar gum en t aga ins t the int en t to inj ur e and inj ur y e le m en ts h ing e on 4 D ef en da nts ’ em

plo ym en t- at -w ill -r el at ed ar gum en t m ad e in the ir doc tr ina l a ppe al a nd 5 on the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r uli ng tha t the ter m in at io n of the A gr ee m en t w as auth or iz ed

. 6 O ur r ej ec tio n of

D ef en da nts’ use of

the c onc ep t e ar lie r in this O pin ionli ke w ise 7 ap pl ie s h ere. Se e supra , notes 7-8. De fendants have provided no per suasive ca se law 8 supp ort f

or the ir pr opos iti on tha t the li m itatio n onpr im a facie to rt c la im s inthe 9 em plo ym en t- at -w ill a re nasho uld appl y in the pr es ent c as e. N or

ha ve the y

f or the ir 10 pr opos iti on tha t “ [t ] he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r uli ng tha t th e A gr ee m en t w as law fu lly 11 te rm in at ed [] rend ered [Pl ai nt iff’s] pri m a fac ie to rt cla im de fect iv e, as a m at te r of law, 12 be ca use he no l onge r ha d th e le ga lly pr ote ct ed

int er es t ne ed ed to sa tis fy the ‘ int en t 13 to in jure ’ el em en t.” 14 { 47} The m a

j or i t y a l so d i sa gr e e s t ha tP l a i nt i f f f a i l e d, a s am a t t e r

o f l a w , t o sat i sf

y 15 the absence of j ustification requirem ent. D efendant s ’ argum ent that they we re 16 j ust if ie d inte rm ina tin g P la int if f sim ply be ca use the A gr ee m en t gave the m dis cr et ion39

1 to ter m in at e is un av ai li ng . The p rimary cas e ci te d b y

Defen da nt s, Ca rre on , 2 0 1 1 WL 2 9686 895, is f

ac tua lly dis tin ct

. I n Ca rre on , the co urt det er m ine d that the re w er e tr ia

ble 3 issues of fact under breac h of contract that precluded s ubm issio n of p rim a fa cie tort 4 to a jury. Id

. at

*13

. I n th e pr es en t case, a s I ha ve e m pha siz ed thr ough out

thi s 5 Opinion, as the case wa s tried, P laintiff was left with no existing breach of c ontract 6 cl ai m or co nt ract -rel at ed c l a i m. M o reo ve r, Ca rre on did not c ondu ct the ba lanc ing 7 r e qu i r e db y Sc hm itz to de te rm in e whe th er t he re was su ffi ci en t jus ti fic at io n. See 8 Sc hm itz , 199 0- N MS C- 002, ¶ 46. 9 { 48} A cc or din g to Sc hm itz , “ if ade fe ndant offer s a pur pose oth er

than th e 10 m oti va tio n to ha rm the pla int if f as j ust if ic at ionf or his a ct ion s, that j ust if

ic at ionm ust 11 be ba lanc ed

to de te rm ine if

it outw ei ghs the ba d m oti ve of the d efen da nt in 12 attem pting to cause injury .” Id

. ; see Restatem ent (Sec ond) of Torts § 870, cmt. c . I n 13 ba lanc ing the j ust if

ic at ionof fe re d by D ef en da nts , af

ac t- fi nde r is re qui re d to w ei gh 14 “ [t ] he na tur e an d se ri ousn es s of the harm

to th e plain tif

f;

. . . [ t] he f

ai rn es s or 15 unf ai rn es s of the m eans u se d by

th e de fe ndant[ s] ; . . . [ the d] ef en da nt[ s’ ] m oti ve or 16 m oti ve s; and .

. . [ t] he va lue to [the ] de fe ndant[ s] or to soc ie ty

in ge ne ra l of

the 1 7 i n t e r e s t s adva nc ed

by the de fen da nt [s ’] co nduc t.” U J I 1 3

- 1 6 3 1 A NM RA

. I mp o rt a n t l y, 18 the Sc hm itz

Court rej ected a high er burden adopted by som e j urisdictio ns that 19 “ co nduc t [ m

ust be ] don e w ith out anybeneficial e nd[.] ” Sc hm itz , 199 0- N MS C- 002, 20 ¶¶ 45- 46 ( em

pha sis a dde d)

. D ef

en da nts ha ve not

a tta ck ed the suf ficie nc y of40

1 Plaintiff’ s evidence of lack of justification proved in the ey es of the j ury . F urther, as 2 a m atter of la w, m er el y articulating a m otivatio n to term inate the Agre em ent based 3 on P la int if

f’ s c ontra ct

br ea ch , w ith out

w ei ghi ng D ef

en da nts ’ a ll eg ed

ba d m oti ve s, 4 doe s no t and c annot al one dis pr ove the j ust if ic at ione le m en t. Mo re ove r, giv enthat the 5 ap pe ll at e co ur ts do no t re weig h t he ev id en ce wh en co ns id eri ng jus ti fic at i o n, see 6 Be avers II

, 1995-NMC A- 070, ¶ 19, and given that th e j ury wa s adequately

instructed 7 as to the ba lanc ing te st, the m aj or ity de cl ine s to hol d tha t Pl ai nti ff fa ile d to sa tis fy the 8 ab se nc e o f jus ti fic at io n re qu ire m en t. 9 { 49} A lso unavail in g is D ef en da nts ’ a rg um en t tha t pr im a fa ci e tort, a lth ough 10 ty pic al ly a rt ic ula te d a s havin g f

our e le m en ts , s ee U JI 13- 1631 N MR A , m ust be 11 dis m iss ed

if P la int if f fa ils to m ee t a

f if th e le m en t— of

fe ri ng u nique f

ac tua l a l le ga tio ns 12 tha t do not

giv e ri se to oth er

tor t or c ontra ct cl ai m s. In su ppor t of the ir c ont en tio n, 13 D ef en da nts cite to He alths ource , 200 5- N MC A -0 97, ¶ 36. A lth ough He alths ource 14 doe s sta te tha t i n pr im a fa ci e tort the f ac tua l a lle ga tio ns m

ust be uni que , the m aj or ity 15 doe s no t a gr ee that this state m en t i n He alths ource im pose s an a ddi tio na l pr im a fa ci e 16 to rt e le m en t. In st ead , He alths ource wa s elaborating on a rule found in m any Ne w 17 Me xic o c as es a ddr es sin g pr im a fa ci e tort—tha t “ a pr im a fa ci e tort cla im m ay not be 18 used a s a m eans of avoiding the m ore stringent requirem ents of other torts.” Id

. ¶ 35; 19 see Stock , 199 8- N MC A -0 81, ¶ 38 ( “ Pr im a fa ci e tort sh oul d no t be use d to e va de 20 stringent requirem ents of other est ab l i s h ed doctrines of law. ” (a lteration, internal41

1 quot at ionm ar

ks, a nd c itatio n om itt ed )) ; se e als o R ibb le , 200 3- N MCA-093 , ¶ 11 2 (s am e) ; H

age bak , 200 3- N MC A -0 07, ¶ ¶ 24, 27, 29 ( sam e)

. A lth oughple ad ing 3 ide nti ca l f

ac ts m ay ind ic at e tha t a cla im is im pr ope rl y dup lic at ive , a s in He alths ource , 4 2005 -N MC A -0 97, ¶ 36, thi s Court has al so “ be en w ill ing to re co gni ze a pr im a fa ci e 5 tort cl ai m , e ve n th oughthe c ondu ct in que sti on b or e a re se m

blanc e to anothe r ca

use 6 of action.” H

age bak , 200 3- N MC A -0 07, ¶ 27. 7 { 50} In the present case, althoug h Pl ai ntiff’ s prim a fa cie tort claim bore a 8 re se m blanc e to h is o ther cla im s inthat vi rt ua lly a ll of the c la im s inhis c om

pla int 9 w er e ba se d on the sa m e se t of fa ct s, Pl ai nti ff ’ s pr im a fa ci e tort c la im , a s it tur ne d ou t, 10 was no t u se d t o e va de st rin g e n t r e q ui rem en ts of o th er es tabl is he d d oc tri ne s o f la w. 11 A ga in, a s I ha ve str es se d th ro ugho ut this O pin ion ’ s dis cu ssi on of the iss ue s, giv enthe 12 way in which the case wa s tried, ther e w as no other claim available to Plaintiff 13 be sid es pr im a fa ci e tort un de r w hic h to pur sue da m ag es r es ul ti ng fro m the 14 term inati ont ha tw a s m a l i c i ou s a nd e xe c ut e d w i t h t he i nt e nt

t o harm . A s e xp r e ss ed 15 earl ie r, a lth oughI a m

not c onvi nc ed

that P la int if

f, a s a m at te r of law , w as ne ce ssari ly 16 pr ev en te d f

ro m a sse rt ing in co ntr act th at De fe ndants a ct ed in ba d f ai th d es pit e 17 D ef en da nts ’ a cknow le dge d le ga l r igh t t o te rm ina te P la int if f unde r the c ontra ct , the 18 pa rt ie s’ appr oa chle ft pr im a fa ci e tort a s the onl y c la im that w as sus ce pti ble to 1 9 s ub mi s s i o n t o t h e ju ry.42

1 3. De fend ants’ P olicy-Orient ed A pproach 2 { 51} Finally , Def

endants argue that affirm ing th e j udgm ent would m ean that parties 3 who pro p er l y perform

their contracts fa ce gre ater e xpos ure than those who breach 4 them . D efendants predict that “ [i] f the j udgm ent

. . . is affirm ed and becom es a part 5 of the law of thi s [s] ta te , the ce rt ai nty an d pre dic ta bil ity of co ntr ac ts w ill be se ri ousl y 6 underm ined.” A ccording to Defe ndants, this is because “ [n] o one entering a contract 7 w ill know w he the r som e j ur y w ill la te r de ci de tha t the y do not th in k t he bar ga in 8 str uc k w as f ai r or the y do n ot f ee l a party e nf or ce d it s contra ct

ua l rig hts w ith the r igh t 9 fram e o f m in d.” 10 { 52} D ef

en da nts a rg ue that w iththe j udgm en t st an din g, da m ag es c anbe 11 sig nif ic an tly gr ea ter than th ose f

or br ea chof

the A gr ee m en t’ s te rm ina tio n- at -w ill 12 provisi on that lim its com pensatory dam ages for bre ach of the A greem ent to three 13 m onths o f co m

m iss ion s. Furthe r, ind ivi dua ls, suc h as Carr oll an d A lli n, w ho w er e not 14 parties to the Agre em ent can be subje ct, a s t h ey we re her e, to a m illion dollar 15 jud gm en t. Defe nd an ts ass ert th at“ cau ti ou s i nd iv id u a l s w i l l n eed to hi re t he ir o wn 16 ind ep en de nt c ouns el to advis e the m of th e con se que nc es of

dis ch ar gin g th ei r j ob 17 responsib ili t i es even when they scrupulou sly

com ply with all re levant contractual 18 requirem ents.” D efendants point out that, ironically, beca use contract dam ages are 19 ex pr es sly

li m ite d, the da nge r of be ing fo und lia ble fo r tort da m ag es w oul d onl y appl y16 The m aj ority also notes that althoug h Am icus’ argum ents m ostlyoverlapped 11 17 w it h De fe ndants ’ a rg um en ts, A m ic us d id m ak e ad dit ion al pol ic y -b as ed a rg um en ts 18 tha t a cc ep tin g P la int if f’ s in te rp re ta tio n of

pr im a fa ci e tort w oul d hi nde r busi ne ss i n 19 N ewMe xic o be ca

use it w oul d pr oduc e a “ ch ill ing effe ct ,” “ cr ea te ava cuum of 20 gui da nc e, ” inc re as e the c ost of bus iness in N ewMe xic o, dis co ur ag e ec onom ic 21 inv estm en t, and

inc re as e lit iga tio n. H ow ev er , A m ic us p ro vid es no s uppo rt f or it s 22 ar gum en ts. T he m aj or ity the re fo re de cl ine s to c onsi de r the m er its of the a rg um en ts. 23 See IT

T E duc. Servs. Inc. , 199 8- N MC A -0 78 , ¶ 10 ( sta tin g th at thi s C ourt w ill not 24 co ns id er p ro po si ti on s t ha t ar e u ns up po rte d b y cit at io n t o a ut ho rit y ). 43 1 if a c ontra ct

w er e w hol ly

c om pli ed w ith

. D ef

en da nts the n a sse rt

that “ tortif

y ing ” 2 c o n tr a c t s i n t h i s w a y i s n o tr e c o g n i z e db y o u r c o u rt s a n di s b a dl a w a n db a dp o l i c y. 3 { 53} T he m aj or ity re

j ec ts D ef en da nts ’ pol ic y -b as ed ar gum en t tha t af fi rm an ce of

the 4 j udgm ent would (1) m ean that parties w ho properly perform their contracts fa ce 5 gr ea te r ex posure than th ose w ho b re ac h th em , a nd ( 2) ne ga tiv el y im pa ct the c er ta inty 6 and predictability of contracts in N ew Mexico. The m aj ority does not agree t hat 11 7 upho lding this prim a facie tort verdict, under the peculiar circ um stances in this case, 8 ge ne ra lly

und er m ine s “ the c er

ta inty a nd p re dic ta

bil ity ” o f co ntr ac ts. Be ca use our 9 hold ing is s haped by

the p ar t i cu lar cir cum stances here, as has been explained 10 thr ough out

thi s O pin ion , ali m ite d a ppl ic at ionof

pr im a fa ci e tort ca nnot

be sa id t o 11 ge ne ra lly

thr ea te n N ewMe xic o bu sin es se s o r the ir de pe nde nc e on f

re ed om of 12 co ntr ac t gi ve n th e ab se nc e at the part ie s’ ins ist en ce of

c ontra ct c la im s, c om

bin ed w ith 13 D ef en da nts ’ c le ar ly

e gr eg iou s to rt iou s c ondu ct und er the gui se of a le git im at e 14 busin ess interest in term inating an agent’ s contract. It is our sanguin e expectation that 15 busin ess activities do no t rise to the egregious level of pretextual, ruse-filled conduct44

1 s u c h a s t h a tp r o v e d h e r e . T h e p r o o f r e qu i r e d f o r as u c c e s s f

u l p r i maf a c i e t o rtc l a i m, 2 co upl ed

w iththe r equir em en t that pr im a fa ci e tort no t be use d to e va de str ing en t 3 re qui re m en ts o f oth er

e sta bli she d do ctri ne s of la w , c onf ine s pr im a fa ci e tort t o a 4 na rro w sp ace. 5 THE PUNITI VE DAMAGES I SSUE 6 { 54} T he appe llate c ourts re vie w de novo the co nst itu tio na lity of pun iti ve da m ag es , 7 m ak ing a n in de pe nde nt a sse ssm en t of the r ec or d inor de r to d et erm in e w he the r the 8 ju ry ’s awardof p un it iv e d am ag es is co m pa rat iv el y

reas on ab le

. Ak

en , 9 2002 -N MS C- 021, ¶

¶ 17- 19. 10 { 55} D ef

en da nts a rg ue tw o re as ons w hy the pun iti ve da m ag es a w ar d vi ola te d th e 11 Due P rocess Clause of the F ourteenth Am en dm ent. T he first is that, under sever al 12 U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt c as es , pr oc ed ur al sa fe guard s w er e re qui re d bu t no t 13 im plem ented. T he cases, in the order cited and discussed b y De fendants, ar e P ac ifi c 14 Li fe I nsuranc e Co

. v . H

asl ip , 49 9 U.S. 1 (19 91 ), Sta te F arm M utu al A uto m obi le 15 In sur anc e Co

. v . Ca m pbe ll , 538 U

. S. 40 8 ( 2003 ), a nd TX O Produ ction Corp . v . 16 A lli anc e R es ourc es Co rp . , 509 U

. S. 443 (1 993)

. T he se co nd is tha t the a w ar d do es not 17 co m port w ith B

M W of No rth A m er ic a, I

nc . v . G ore , 517 U. S. 559, 574 (199 6). 18 { 56} The proce dural safeguards argum ent consist s of the H asl ip requirem ent that 19 pr oc ed

ur al sa fe guard s m

ust be pr ovi de d fo r due pr oc es s pur pose s, 499 U

. S. a t 20 -2 2, 20 23 n

. 11, c om

bin ed w iththe ru lin g in Ca m

pbe ll , 538 U

. S. a t 41 7, that “ de fe ndants45

1 subj ec te d to puni tiv e da m ag es in ci vil c as es ha ve not be ena cc or de d th e pr ote ct ion s 2 ap p l i c ab l e i n ac r i mi n a l p r o c e e d i n g [ , ]” e v e n t h o u g h p u n i t i v e d a ma g e s s e rv e t h e s a me 3 pur pose s a s c ri m ina l p en al ti es. D ef en da nts lay

out the c onc er

ns e xpr es se d in 4 Ca m pbe ll as to the w ide dis cr et ion ty pic al ly le ft in j ur

y ins tr uc tio ns in ch oo sin g 5 am ount s an d tha t “ the pr es en ta tio n of e vid en ce of

ade fe ndant’ s ne t w orth c re at es the 6 pot en tia l tha t j ur ie s w ill use the ir ve rd ic ts t o e xpr es s b iase s a ga ins t bi g bu sin es se s, 7 particularly

those without s trong local presences.” Id

. (i nte rn al quot at ion m ar

ks and 8 ci ta tio n om itt ed ). A nd, f urthe r, a s TXO P rodu ct

s state s, “ em

pha sis on the w ea lthof 9 the w ro ngdo er

inc re as ed

the r isk that th e award m ay

ha ve be eninf

lue nc ed by 10 pr ejud ic e ag ai nst

larg e co rp or at ion s, ar isk that i s of

spe ci al c onc er

n w he n th e 11 de fe ndant i s anon re sid en t. ” 509 U

. S. a t 46 4. 12 { 57} D e f

e n d a n t s c o n t e n d t h a t t h e j u ry i n s t r u c t i o n s d i dn o ta d e qu a t e l y p r o t e c tt h e m. 13 T he y a rg ue that a

c om bin at ionof fa ct or s le d to the j ur y ’ s r es ult ing pr ej udi ce : ( 1) the 14 court did no t give a proffer ed instructio n that provided further clarification in regard 15 to p uni tiv e da m ag es ins of ar a s it r equir ed the j ur y to “ co nsi de r the pu ni shm en t and 16 deterre nt effec t associated with an aw ard of com pensatory dam ages”; (2) the district 17 co urt a llo w ed

e vid en ce of

the Co m pa nie s’ w ea lthto go t o th e j ur y ; an d (3 ) in c los ing 18 ar gum en t, P la int if

f’ s c ouns el , “ w el l aw ar e tha t c or por at e w ea lthw oul d po iso n th e 19 j ur y , ” em pha siz ed the c oll ec tiv e ne t w orth o f the Co m pa nie s and u rg ed

the j ur y to 20 puni sh F ar

m er s, aw ea lth y , o ut-of

-s ta te c or por at ion

. D ef

en da nts f ind sup port i n46

1 Ca m pbe ll , 538 U

. S. at 427, w hic h st at es that “ [t ] he w ea lthof ade fe ndant c an not 2 jus ti fy an ot he rwis e u nc on st it ut io na l p un it iv e d am ag es award .” 3 { 58} The sec ond b asis for D efendants’ attack on the puni tive dam ages aw ard ar ises 4 fr om gui de post s se t ou t i n bo th G ore a nd Ca m pbe ll

. T he se gui de posts are (1 ) the 5 degree of r eprehensibilityof the defendant ’ s conduct, (2) the ratio between 6 com pensatory and puni tive dam ages, and ( 3) a com parison of the pun itive dam ages 7 wit h c riminal or c iv il pe na lt ie s t ha t c a n b e i mpo se d fo r si m il ar co nd uc t. G ore , 517 8 U

. S

. a t5 75

- 84

. The G ore gu idepo sts a re to be c onsi de re d w ith in the c ont ex t of 9 “ [e] lem entary

notio ns of fairness enshrined in

. . . constitu tional jurisprudence .

. . that 10 a pe rs on r ec ei ve f

ai r not ic e not

onl y of the c ondu ct

that w ill sub

ject him to 11 puni shm ent, but also of the severity of the penalty

that a [s] tate m ay

im pose.” Id

. at 12 574. 13 { 59} D ef

en da nts a lso li st f

ive f ac tor s f or e va lua tin g r ep re he nsi bil ity , ta ke n f ro m 14 Ca m pbe ll , 538 U

. S. at 419, al l of wh ic h De fe ndants co nte nd we igha ga ins t punit ive 15 da m ag es , a nd D ef

en da nts c om

bin e w ithe ac h f

ac tor w hy it w as not m et

. 16 1. Whe the r “ the harm c au se d w as phy sic al a s op pose d to 17 econom ic[. ] ” [ Ca m pbe ll , 538 U

. S. a t 41 9. Pl ai nti ff ] pr es en te d no 1 8 e v i d e n c e t h a th e s u f f e r e dp h ys i c a l h a rm. 19 2. Whether “ the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a 20 reckless disregard of the hea lth or safety of others[. ] ” Id

. 21 [P la int iff ’ s] A gr ee m en t w as te rm ina te d, in ac co rd an ce w ithit s 22 te rm s, be ca use he br ea ch ed

it

. T his doe s no t i m

pli ca te hea lthor 23 safety

issues for [Plaintiff] or any bodyelse.47

1 3

. Whe t h er “ t h e ta rg et o f th e co n du cth ad fi n an ci al v u l n er ab i l i t y[.]” 2 Id

. Again, [Plaintiff] , a sophis ticated and experienced insurance 3 ag en t, p res en te d no ev id en ce tha t he was un iq ue ly vul ne rab le . To 4 the contrary , he established th at he ear ned sign ificant incom e as 5 a Farm er s a ge nt and [ Pl ai nti ff ’ s] ow n e xpe rt

te sti fi ed that 40 6 percent of his busin es s was w ith com panies other than Farm ers 7 an d th er ef or e not im pa ct ed by his te rm ina tio n. 8 4. Whether “ the conduct in volv ed repeate d act i o n s or w as an 9 isolated i ncident[.] ” [Id

. ] T he te rm ina tio n of

[ Pl ai nti ff

’ s] 10 Agre em ent was a one-tim e occurr ence, and [Plaintiff’ s] evidence 1 1 w a s l i m i t e d t o h i s p a rt i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n d t h e r e f or e the 12 lawfu l bu t a lle ge dly tor tio us c ondu ct

he re is inc ap ab le of 13 re pe tit ion

. 1 4 5

. Wh e t h e r “ t h e h a rm wa s t h e r e s u l t o f i n t e n t i o n a l mal i c e , t r i c k e ry, 15 or deceit, or m ere accident.” Id

. [P la int if f] ne ve r ar gue d th at

the 16 te rm ina tio n of his A gr ee m en t i nvol ve d tr ic ke ry or de ce it. A nd, 17

. . . [Pl ai ntiff] failed to prove that [D efendants] bore any m alice 1 8 t o wa rd [P l ai n t i ff ]. 19 { 60} De fendants em phasize Ca m

pbe ll ’ s st at em en t tha t “ [t ] he e xis te nc e of an y one 20 of the se f ac tor s w ei ghi ng i n f

av or of apla int if

f m ay not be suf fi ci en t t o su sta in a 21 pu ni ti ve da m ag es award ; and th e ab se nc e o f al l o f th em ren de rs an y

award su sp ect .” 22 Id

. And further , that there is a presum ption that com

pensatory dam ag es m ak e a 2 3 p l ai n t i ff

wh o l e, “ s o p u n i t i v e d amag es s h o u l do n l y b e a wa r d e d i f t h e d ef en d an t ’s 24 cu lpa bil ity , a ft er

ha vin g pa id c om

pe nsa t o r y d am a g e s , i s s o r e pr eh en sib le a s to w ar rant 25 the im

posit ion of further sanctions to achieve pun ishm ent or deterr ence. ” Id

. 26 { 61} D ef

en da nts a lso a rg ue , in pa rt ic ular, that the r at io o f 2. 5 ti m es the $1 m ill ion 27 co m pe nsato ry da m ag es award is un co ns ti tu ti on al ly exce ssi ve , c iti ng Ca m pbe ll ’ s view 28 tha t “ [w ] he n com

pe nsa tor y da m ag es ar e subs tanti al , the n ale sse r ratio , pe rh ap s on ly48

1 equa l t o c om

pe nsa tor y da m ag es , c an reac h th e out er m ost li m it of the due pr oc es s 2 guarantee. ” Id

. a t 42 5. D ef

en da nts furthe r ar gue tha t the dis tr ic t cour t’ s havin g up he ld 3 the award, in part, on the basis th at seven of Plainti ff’ s em ploy ees lo st their jobs when 4 the A gr ee m en t wa s ter

m ina te d, w as co ntr ar

y to the e xpr es s ho ldi ng i n P hil ip M orr is 5 USA v. Will ia ms , 549 U

. S. 346, 353 -5 4 ( 2007 ), that the a w ar d vi ola te d du e pr oc es s 6 in pun ishin g the defendant for harm to a non-party . A nd Defe ndants argue that there 7 exist no crim inal or civil penalties with which to c om pare the puni tive dam ages aw ard 8 g i v e n t h a tD e f

e n d a n t s ’ l e g a l t e rmi n a t i o no f t h e A g r e e me n ta c c o r d i n g t o i t s t e rms 9 vio la te d no law and w as not pun ish ab le a t a ll, a nd th e di st ric t c ourt e rr ed in fa ili ng 10 to consid er this fac tor. 11 { 62} A lth ough th e part ic ular fa ct s of thi s c as e an d th e lit iga tio n de ci sio ns m ad e 12 ag ai n gi ve us p au se , in lig ht o f our hol din g th at

pr im a fa ci e to rt was ap propr ia te in 13 thi s c as e, the m aj or ity doe s no t a gr ee that the jury in st ruct ion s r eg ar din g pu nit ive 14 da m ag es vio la te d D ef en da nts ’ due pr oc es s r igh ts e ith er by f ai lin g to provide 15 procedural safe guards or because the puniti ve dam ages aw ard ran afoul of the G ore 16 guid eposts o r Ca m

pbe ll factors. First, as noted byPlaintiff, our Suprem e Court has 1 7 ap p r o v e do f

ap u n i t i v e d a mag e s ju ry i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t e x p l a i n s t h a t ( 1 ) t h e ju ry “ ‘may’ 18 aw ar d puni tiv e da m ag es [, ] ” (2 ) “ tha t the pur pose of pun iti ve da m ag es is to p uni sh and 19 de te r w ro ngf

ul c ondu ct [, ] ” (3 ) “ tha t the j ur y sho uld a ct tow ar d th e en ds of re as on and 20 j ustice,” and (4) “ that puni tive dam ages m ust r elate to actual dam ages and the injury49

1 sustain ed.” Ak

en , 200 2- N MS C- 021, ¶ 13. T he ins tr uc tio n gi ve n inthi s c as e fu lly 2 co m pli ed w ith A ke n and, additionally , m irrored N ewMexico’ s Un i fo rm Jury 3 I n s tru ct io n re ga rd in g p un it iv e d am ag es . See U JI 13

- 18 27 N M RA

. T he j urywa s 4 ad equa te ly

ins tr uc te d th at it m ayaw ard punitiv e dam ages if it found that the conduct 5 of Defendants wa s m alicious. The j ury wa s also inst ructed as to the nature of the j ury 6 ins tr u c t i o n

— i

. e . , t h a tt h e p u r

p o s e o f p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s i s t o p u n i s h a n dd e te r— an d 7 that any aw ard m

ust be based on r eason and j ustice. Finally , the j ury wa s instructed 8 tha t any aw ar d m

ust be r ea sona

bly r el at ed to the inj ur

y a nd o the r aw ar de d dam ag es . 9 T hus, the j ur

y ins tr uc tio n pr ovi de d a dequ at e sa fe guard s and d id n ot v iol at e 10 D efend an ts ’ due pr oc es s r igh ts. A lth oughpr es en ta tio n of ade fe ndant’ s w orth m ay 11 be pr obl em at ic a nd r es ult in a larg e p unitiv e da m ag es a w ar d, D ef en da nts ha ve not 12 shown th at

thi s j ur y im pr ope rl y a ct ed on an y pr ej udi ce ag ai nst D ef en da nts be ca

use 13 th ey are o r are ass oc ia te d wi th a bi g b us in es s. 14 { 63} Second, the jury ’ s award com plies with the Gore guid eposts. Although there 15 ar e no c ri m ina l or

c ivi l pe na lti es that c anbe im pose d f or D ef en da nts ’ co nduc t, the 16 first two f

act o rs ar e ap plicable and weigh heavily in favor of Pla intiff. I n this case, 17 Pl ai nti ff

pre sente d e vid en ce of

r ep re he nsi ble c ondu ct

r eg ar din g th e m al ic iou s and 18 int en tio na l tre atm en t of a nd ha rm to him

. T he m aj or ity re j ec ts D ef en da nts ’ a rg um en t 19 that the Ca m

pbe ll factor s r e ga

r di ng r e pr e he ns i bi l i ty

we igh against a punitiv e dam ages 20 aw ar d. D ef

en dants ’ int entio na l and m al ic iou s be ha vio r tow ar d P la int if f ri ght fu lly50

1 ex pose d D ef

en da nts to lia

bil ity

. I n li ght

of D ef en da nts ’ a ct ion s and th e da m ag e to 2 Pl ai nti ff

a nd g ive n ou r af

fi rm an ce of

sub m itt ing the und er ly ing pr im a fa ci e tort c la im 3 to the j ur

y , the m aj or ity

hol ds tha t the e vid en ce in thi s c as e supp orts a 2. 5:1 r at io 4 be twee n t he pu ni ti ve da m ag es award an d t he co m pe ns at or y award

. 5 CON CLU SION 6 { 64} T he j udgm en t and p ost -tri al or de rs e nte re d inthe dis tr ic t c ourt are a ff irm ed

. 7 { 65} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 9 JO N A TH A N B. S U TI N , Ju dg e 10 I CONCUR: 11 M IC HA EL D . BU ST A M A N TE , Ju dg e (s pe ci all y c on cu rr in g) 12 J. M IL ES HA N IS EE , Ju dg e (d iss en ti ng )51

1 BUS TAM AN TE, Judge (sp ecially concurr ing). 2 { 66} I spe ci al ly

c onc ur in Judg e Su tin ’ s O pin iona ff irm ing th e j udgm en t. I w ri te 3 se pa rat el y

be ca use I se e no r ea son to s ec ond- gue ss the part ie s’ li tig at ionstr at eg y 4 be low

. I n m

y vie w , pr im a fa ci e tort w as inv oke d an d lit iga te d inthi s c as e j ust a s our 5 Su pr em e Co urt e nvi sio ne d in Sc hm itz . I als o wr ite to respond to the diss ent’ s concern 6 tha t al low ing pr im a fa ci e tort to ope rate in thi s co nte xt is a thr ea t to fr eed omof 7 co ntr ac t. 8 { 67} Pr im a fa ci e tort w as not a ne w co nc ep t w he n our S upr em e Co urt a dopt ed

it in 9 Sc hm itz , 199 0- N MS C- 002, ¶ ¶ 36- 39. It s r oot s are f

ound in the sc hol ar ly

w ri tin gs and 10 opi nio ns o f Jus tic e O liv er W en de ll H olm es , Jr

. I n an e arl y a rt ic le a nd a

se ri es of 11 le ctur es la te r ga th ered in to hi s b oo k, Th e Co m m on L aw , Holm es o rganized tort law 12 into th e three categories re cognized tod ay : liabilitywithout fault, negligence based 13 on an ob

jecti ve st an da rd of care , an d in te nt io na l t or t. Ol iv er Wend el l Ho lm es , Jr., Th e 14 Th eo ryof To rts , 7 Am

. L. Rev

. 65 2 (18 72 -1 87 3) ; O.W . Hol m es , Th e Co m m on L aw , 15 104-17 (M. How e ed. 1963 ). Holm es’ early wr iting on intent ional torts was m arked 16 by an attem

pt to ground liability on a p olicy -based, objectively determ ined standard 17 ak in to hi s g en eral th eo ry of n eg li ge nc e. Se e ge ne ral ly Ken ne th J

. Va n d e v el de , A 18 H ist ory of P rim a F ac ie To rt: Th e O rig ins of a G en eral T he oryof In te nti onal

T ort , 19 19 Hof st ra L. Rev . 44 7, 4 71 -7 6 (1 99 0) ; Ken ne th J. Van de ve ld e, Th e Mo de r n Pri ma 20 F ac ie T ort D oc tri ne , 79 Ky . L.J. 51 9, 5 21 -2 5 (1 99 0/ 19 91 ).52

1 { 68} Thirtee n y ears after the publ ication of Th e Co m m on L aw , H olm es r ev isi te d th e 2 to pi c o f in te nt io na l t or ts . Oli ve r W en de ll Hol m es , Jr., P riv ile ge, M ali ce, and I nte nt , 3 8 H ar v. L

. Re v. 1 ( 1894 ). P er

ha ps i nf lue nc ed by

the w ri tin gs o f Fr ed er ic k P oll oc k, 4 H olm es too k an e nti re ly ne w appr oa chto the the or y of int en tio na l to rts

. See 5 Vandevelde, sup ra , a t 522-25 . G one was the disj ointed d iscussio n of l on g- r ecognized 6 ca use s of a ct ion

. F oc usi ng o n in

j ur y to ec onom ic int er es ts c au se d by the tr ad e uni on 7 m ovem ent and by

busin ess com

petitors, H olm es instead posit ed the “ com m on-place” 8 ge ne ra l pr opos iti on tha t “ the int en tio na l i nf lic tio n of te m por al da m ag e or

the doi ng 9 of a n a ct m an if es tly li ke ly to inf lic t su chda m age and in fl ic tin g it , is ac tio nable if 10 do ne wit ho ut jus t ca us e.” Ho l mes, supra , a t 3. Jus tif ic at ionw oul d m ost

of te n be in 11 th e fo rm

of a cla im

of p riv il eg e. Id

. at

9. Cl ai m s of p ri vil eg e w oul d r equir e care fu l 12 re vie w of

the part ic ular circu m stanc es of e ac h c as e, but

in the f ina l ana ly sis w oul d 13 be determ ined a s a m atter of policy with courts consciou sly we ighin g the advantages 14 to the comm

unityin allowing recovery ve rs u s allowing the dam age to be suffer ed 15 w ithno r em edy

. Id

. I n w ei ghi ng c la im s of pr ivi le ge , H olm es a sse rt ed that c ourts 16 shou ld c onsi de r the na tur e of the de fe ndant’ s a ct s—i nc lud ing the m oti ve —pl us the 17 na tur e of

the c onse que nc es a nd the c los en es s of the bon d be twee n m oti ve a nd 18 co ns eq ue nc es . Id

. a t 13

. 19 { 69} A s P ro fe sso r V an de ve lde not es , the a rt ic le m ar ke d ashi ft

in H olm es ’ thi nki ng. 20 He em

braced a general theory

of intention al tort. A s Holm es m ade clear, his object15 Holm es wa s not writing in a vacuum . T he tho u g h t that infliction o f inj ury 12 16 w ith out

jus tifi ca tio n w as a ct ion ab le w as a rt ic ula te d in D ex te r v . Co le , 6 W is. 319 17 (1 858) a nd R ic ke r v . F re em an , 50 N

. H

. 420 ( 1870 ), tho ugh ne ith er c as e inv olv ed

the 18 ty pe of int en tio na l t ort H olm es w as ad dr es sin g. T he fi rs t art ic ula tio n of the pr inc ipl e 19 in a se tti ng f itt ing H olm es ’ the or

y w as W alk er v . Cr oni n , 107 Mass. 5 5 5 (1 871). 20 W alker invol ved a claim

arising from

a labor disput e t h at the defendants indu ced 21 plaintiff’ s em

ploy ees to leave their j ob. T he Massachusetts Suprem e Judicial Court 22 re ve rs ed the tri al c ourt’ s di sm iss al a nd r em an de d f or tr ia l no tin g th at

“ [t ] he 2 3 int en t i o n a l c au s i n g o f s u c h l o s s t o a n o t h e r , w i t h o u t j u s t i f i ab l e c au s e , a n d w ith the 24 m alicious pu rpose to inflict it, is of itself a w rong.” Id

. a t 56 2. 53 1 in the article wa s “ to m ake a little c leare r the m ethod to be followed in dec iding [such 2 ca se s]

. ” H olm es , sup ra , a t 14. A nd, H olm es “ decided that m otive, includi ng m alice, 3 co uld be c onsi de re d by

the co ur t i n de te rm ini ng w he the r int en tio na lly inj ur iou s 4 co nd uc t was wit ho ut jus ti fic at ion , i. e. , whe the r it w as a ct ion able .” Van de ve ld e, supra , 5 at 523 ( em pha sis om itt ed ). T hus, in one fe ll sw oop, H olm es pr opos ed a neww ay of 6 an al y zi ng l ia

bil ity f or int en tio na l a ct s. 12 7 { 70} It is lik el y tha t H olm es saw his ide a as a tr ue ge ne ra l the or

y of int en tio na l t orts; 8 an an al yti cal ap pr oa ch whi ch co ul d s up po rt e xi st in g i nt en ti on al to rts as we ll as s uppl y 9 a m eans o f de al ing w ithnov el f ac tua l c ir cu m stances . O n th e Ma ssa chuse tts be nc h, 10 he r e l i e d on hi s t he or y to di ss en t i n t wo l ab orrel at io ns cas es . See V egelahn v. 11 Guntner , 44 N

. E

. 107 7, 107 9- 82 ( Ma ss. 189 6) ( H olm es , J. , dis se nti ng) ; Plant v. 12 W oods , 57 N .E

. 1011 , 1015-16 (Mass. 1900) (H olm es, C .J. , dissenting). In ea ch case, 13 Holm es argued th at t he injunctions entered agains t the unio ns were im proper given 14 the soc ia l a dvanta ge s to be pot en tia lly ga ined f ro m the ir non vio le nt a ct s. I n M

oran19 I t is in m y vie w unf

ortun at e tha t this quot e pr ovi de d th e co m m on n am e fo r 13 20 the tor

t. H olm es ha d no t us ed

the te rm be fo re . P er

ha ps it wa s the re sul t of

his f ee lin g 21 tha t hi s a

ppr oa chha d be enf

ull y a cc ep te d. I f so, his hub ri s w as m isp la ce d. 54 1 v. D unph

y , 59 N .E . 125 (Mass. 1901 ), a ca se involv ing a claim that the defendant had 2 ind uc ed the pl ai nti ff

’ s e m plo y ee to le av e, H olm es a na ly ze d th e ca se usi ng o nly the 3 the or y he ha d e xpounde d inhis a rt ic le s. I n a ddi tio n, he as se rt ed that the c ourt’ s pr ior 4 c a s e s

— f

r o m W alker thr ough P lan t

—all agree d with and supp orted his a n al ytical 5 ap p ro ac h , i n cl u d i n g t h e i d ea t h at “ m o t i v es m ay d et erm i n e t h e q u es t i o n o f l i ab i l i t y[.]” 6 M oran , 59 N

. E

. a t 12 6. 7 { 71} A ik

en s v . W isc onsi n , 195 U

. S. 194 (1 904) , is the m ost en dur ing ex pr es sio n by 8 Holm es of his t h eory . “ It has been considered that, prim a fa cie, the intentio nal 9 inf lic tio n of te m por al da m ag es is a ca

use of ac tio n, w hic h, a s am at te r of sub stanti ve 10 law , w ha te ve r m ay be the fo rm of ple ad ing , r equir es aj ust if ic at ionif the de fe ndant 11 is to escape.” Id

. at 204

. A ik

en s inv olv ed

ac onst itu tio na l c ha lle nge to a sta te statut e 13 12 m ak ing it

unl aw fu l t o “ co m

bin e . . . f

or the pur pose of w ill fu lly or m al iciou sly 13 inj ur ing a nothe r in h is repu tati on, tr ad e, bus ine ss, or pr of es sio n, by

a ny m eans 14 whatever [. ] ” Id

. a t 20 1 ( om iss ionin or igi na l) ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c itatio n 15 om itted). H olm es decided the statute w as constitu tional, in part, by observing “ that 16 su ch a co m

bi na ti on , fol lo wedby dam ag e, wou ld be act io na bl e ev en at c omm on law.” 17 Id

. a t 20 4. He su pport ed

that a sse rt ionw itha n ana ly sis gr ound ed e nti re ly on h is 18 ge ne ral th eo ry .19 I t i s po ssi ble that N ewY ork ha s no w a ba nd oned the r equir em en t tha t the 14 20 fact s as se rte d n ot fit wit hi n an y ot he r no m in at e to rt. Se e B d. of E duc

. of F arm ing dal e 21 Union Free Sch. D ist. v. Farm ingd ale Classro om Te achers Ass’n , 343 N

. E

. 2d 2 78, 22 284-85 (N .Y . 1975). 55 1 { 72} If

H olm es ’ a m

bit ionf or his ge ne ra l the or

y w as that i t wou ld sup plant the 2 es ta bli she d in te nti ona l t orts, it w as not to be

. T he c as es pr om

pti ng the dis cu ssi ons by 3 H olm es a nd o the rs inv olv ed pr im ar ily inj ur ie s to eco nom ic int er es ts c au se d by tr ad e 4 uni ons or

bus ine ss c om

pe tit or s. H olm es ’ fo rm

ula tio n of a

ge ne ra l i nte nti ona l t ort di d 5 no t fi nd ap pl ic at io n m

uc h b ey on d th atreal m

ev en in Mas sa ch us et ts

. Tuttle v. Buck, 6 119 N

. W

. 946 , 948 ( Mi nn. 190 9) ( hol din g th at se tti ng u p abus ine ss not fo r the sa ke 7 of profit but for the sole purpose of driving another out of busin ess was a ctionable); 8 see V an de ve lde , su

pra , a t 484-95 for a general discussion . N ewYork, for a tim e, 9 se em edto acce pt Hol m es ’ f o r mu l a a n d app ly it as he m ig ht ha ve . A dv anc e M usi c 10 Co rp. v . A m . T

obac co Co

. , 70 N

. E

. 2d 401, 403 (N

. Y

. 194 6) ( ex pli ci tly a gr ee ing w ith 11 H olm es ’ f

orm ula tio n in A ik

en s an dh o l d i n g t h at an as s er t i o nt h at t h e d ef en d an t ’s 12 m isrepresentation as to the pop ularity of cer tain song s wa s m ade with intent to injure 1 3 t h e p l ai n t i ff

s t at ed a c a u s e o f a ct i o n fo r “a p ri m a f ac i e t o rt ”) . B u tNe w Yo rk ’s 14 de fi nit ionof

the tort ha s devol ve d in to a spe ci fi c tort so qua lif

ie d, he m m ed , a nd 15 li m it ed as to m ak e it a le ga l n o n - s e q u i tu r. See M orr iso n v . Na t’ l B road

. Co

. , 266 16 N. Y. S. 2d 40 6, 408-09 ( App. Div. 1965 ) (holdin g that ly ing to a c ontestant in a rigged 17 qui z show , thu s harm ing his a ca de m ic re put at ion an d pros pe ct s, did not fi t wi thi n th e 18 de fin it io n o f pr im a fac ie to rt) , re v’ d on oth er gro unds by19 N. Y. 2d 45 3 (1967). 1456

1 { 73} Missour i ’ s adoptio n of the Restatem ent version of Holm es’ form ulation helped 2 to rev iv e h is vi si on , th ou gh no t as a ge n e r a l t h e o r y o f in te nt io na l t or t. Porter , 611 3 S. W

. 2d a t 27 2. T he Re sta te m en t f orm ula tio n e ch oe s H olm es . I t st at es : 4 O ne w ho i nte nti ona lly c au se s in j ur y to an oth er is subj ec t to lia bil ity to 5 th e other

f or that i nj ur

y , if his c ondu ct

is ge ne ra lly

c ulp ab le a nd n ot 6 j ustifiable und er the c ircum stances. T his liabil ity m ay be im

posed 7 althoug h the actor’ s conduct d oes not com e w ithin a traditio nal category 8 o f

t o rtl i ab i l i t y. 9 Re sta te m en t ( Se co nd) of Tort s § 870. T he c om m en ts t o th e se ct iona sse rt that the 10 se ct ion“ pur

ports t o supply [a ] uni fy ing pr inc ipl e” fo r int en tio na l t orts and “ to e xpl ai n 11 th e b as is forth e d ev el op m en t o f th e m or e rec en tl y crea te d i nt en ti on al to rts .” 12 Restatem ent (Sec ond) of Torts § 870 cm t. a. The sam e com

m ent indicates, however , 13 tha t the m or e im

portant w ork of

the se ct ionis to “ se rv e as agui de f or de te rm ini ng 14 when liability

shoul d be im

posed fo r h ar m

that wa s intentio nally

inflicted, e ven 15 tho ugh the c ondu ct

doe s no t c om e w ith in t he r eq ui re m en ts o f one of the w el l 16 established and nam ed intentio nal torts.” Id

. T his la tte r co m

m en t reflec ts the 17 pr ef er en ce co urts ha ve shown f or dis cr et e, spe ci fi ca lly

de sc ri be d to rt s. I t a lso r ef le ct s 18 the c om

m onpl ac e tha t the fi el d of c om pe nsa ble w ro ngs ha s no t be en

—no r shou ld i t 19 be —cl os ed

. 20 { 74} If H olm es’ general theory is now lim ited to c onsid ering unnam ed intentio nal 21 w ro ngs, his m ost

la sti ng con tr ibu tio n to the law in this a re a is h is d isc uss ionof how 22 to consid er a defendant’ s claim of privilege and justification in the face of aggravated57

1 co nduc t. A nd, in ana ge w he n th e co urts univ er sa lly r ec ogni ze the nor

m at ive 2 func tio ns o f th e la w o f torts, H olm es ’ c onsi de ratio n of the c ha ra ct er

of the m eans 3 us edan d t he su bjec t i v e mo t i v es of t he de fen da nt lo om s es pe ci al ly larg e. Se e, e . g. , 4 S a i z v . B e l e n Sc h. D ist

. , 199 2- N MS C- 018, ¶ 26, 113 N

. M. 387 , 827 P

. 2d 1 02. T he 5 law c an

a nd s houl d c onsi de r the harm don e, the m eans by w hic h it w as done , a nd the 6 state of m i n d t h at m otivated th e act in deciding whether, as a m atter of policy , an 7 inj ur y sho uld go unr em ed ie d—wha te ve r the c ont ex t i n w hic h th e ac ts o cc ur re d. 8 { 75} T he S upr em e Co urt w as a w ar e of thi s hi sto ry

w he n it de ci de d Sc hm itz

. I ts 9 dis cu ssi on at pa ra gr ap hs thir ty -f our thr ough fi fty -tw o m ak e cl ear tha t i t un de rs too d 10 the roots, approach, and utilit y of the tort it wa s adoptin g. It c o n s ciouslyadopted 11 Holm es’ analy sis—as ex p re s sed in the Restatem ent—as the m ethod NewMexico 12 co urts w oul d us e to dec ide w he n re dr es s is r equir ed f or inj ur y c au se d by

ins uf fi ci en tly 1 3 ju s t i f i e d , mal i c i o u s , i n t e n t i o n a l c o n du c ti n t e n d e dt o c au s e i n ju ry. 14 { 76} T h e u n i f

o rm j u ry i n s t r

u c t i o n s g u i d i n g j u r i e s f

a i t h f u l l y r e f l e c t t h e S up r e me 15 Co urt’ s a dopt ionof

the Re sta te m en t. T he y

pla ce ahi gh bu rd enof pr oof on the 1 6 pla i n t i f

f t o p r o v e i n t e n t i o n a l a c t s b y t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t e n d e d t o c au s e h a rm to t he 17 plaintiff. UJI 13-163 1. The defendant can plead j ustification but the p l ea i s s u bje ct 18 to a ba lanc ing pr oc es s to “ de te rm ine if it outw ei ghs an y m oti ve of

[ the ] de fe ndant t o 19 inj ur e [the ] pla int if

f. ” U JI 13- 1631 A

. T he f

ac tor s to w ei gh i nc lud e (1 ) the na tur e an d 20 gr av ity

of the harm inf lic te d, ( 2) the f

ai rn es s of the m eans u se d by the de fe ndant, ( 3)1 8 A p e r s u a s i v e c a s e t h a t t h i s l i m i t e r i s n o t n e c e s s a ry h a s b e e n m a de by 15 19 Pro fes so r Van de ve ld e. Van de ve ld e, supr a , a t 53 9- 40. E ve n N ewY ork m ay ha ve 2 0 ab an d o n ed t h i s re qu i re m en t . Bu ti ti s n o tm y p l ac e t o qu es t i o n t h e S up re m e C o u rt ’s 21 choice. 58 1 the de fe ndant’ s m oti ve s, a nd ( 4) the va lue to the de fe ndant or soc ie ty in ge ne ra l of the 2 in te res ts ad va nc ed by th e d efen da nt ’s con du ct

. Id

. T he w ei ghi ng p ro ce ss a llo w s th e 3 parties to argue the policies for and again st allowing recovery in a given factual 4 co nte xt r athe r than inava cuum . O bvi ous ly, m al ic iou s in te nt c anw ork to vit ia te 5 s o c i a l u t i l i t y. 6 { 77} U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a tt h e t o rtw a s i n t e n d e dt o o p e r a t e i n t e r s t i t i a l l y, t h e S up r e me 7 Co urt c au tio usl y

li m ite d it s a

ppl ic at ionto ins tanc es w he re th e facts do n ot f it 8 crystal li zed to rts , th atis , wher e n o o th er i nt en ti on al to rt pr ov id es a rem ed y . Sc hm itz , 9 1990 -N MS C- 002, ¶

48. T his li m ite r ha s be en the sour ce of som e unc er

ta inty , a nd 15 10 un de rli es m

uc h o f J u d g e Su ti n’s co nc ern s. In m y vi ew, Sc hm itz

pr ovi de s ar ea dy 11 an sw er

f or thi s c as e. F urthe r, giv en how tho ro ughl y the ca se w as lit iga te d, thi s is not 12 the appr opr ia te c as e to a ddr es s th e co nc er ns Judge S uti n r ai se s. 13 { 78} Under Sc hm itz , prim a facie tort can be pleaded and litigated in the alternative. 14 Bu t, w he n it

c om es to subm itt ing the c as e to t he jury, if the “ pla int if

f’ s pr oof is 15 sus ce pti ble to subm iss ionund er one of the a cc ep te d cat egor ie s of tor t, the a ct ion 16 shou ld be subm itted to th e j ury o n t h at cause and no t under prim a fa cie tort. ” Id

. A 17 theory or cause of action is “ susceptib le to subm issio n” to a j ury onlyif it has escaped59

1 di sm is sa l b y

su m m ary jud gm en t, d ire ct ed ve rd ic t, o r Ru le 1-0 12 (B)( 6) NMRA. 2 Sc hm itz , 199 0- N MS C- 002, ¶ 48. 3 { 79} H e r e , a l l of P l a i nt i f f ’ s c aus e s of a c t i on othe r t han pr i m a f a c i e t or t we re 4 dism issed by summ ary j udgm ent on D efendants’ m otion s. The dism issed t h eo ri es 5 we re not “ susceptib le to subm issio n” to the j ury . O nce the sum m ary j udgm ents wer e 6 gran te d, the dis m iss ed ca use s w er e not av ai la

ble to Pl ai nti ff as a m at te r of law. 7 Sc hm itz

can no t b e rea d t o re qu ire m or e o f li ti ga nt s o r tr ia l co ur ts

. 8 { 80} T his is not

acas e in w hic h apla int if f tr ie d to e va de oth er

pot en tia l c au se s of 9 ac tio n. P la int if

f ple ad ed a ll co nc ei vable c au se s and p ro cee de d to los e the m to 10 dism issal at De fe ndants’ urging. O ne cause of a ction is th e subjec t of m uch 11 dis cu ssi on and m er its r es pons e. Jud ge Su ti n th eo ri ze s th at P la int if f shou ld h av e 12 pursued his contract claim s m ore assiduo usly by arguing that his ter m in at i o n wa s 13 w ro ngf

ul and pre te xtu al an d thus con tr ar y to the im

pose d c ove na nt o f good

f ai th and 14 fa ir de al ing

. Judg e Su tin re lie s on ca se s sucha s Keste nbau m , 198 8- N MS C- 092. T he 15 em plo ym en t t er

m ina tio n c as es w er e of no hel p to Pl ai nti ff

. T he pr im ar

y f ac tua l i ssu e 16 in those c as es w as w he the r the re ha d be en a br ea ch of the e m plo y ee ’ s c ontra ct

by the 17 em plo y er ; m or e spe ci fi cal ly , w he the r the pla int if f w as f ir ed f or a ct ua l go od c au se 18 unde r the ir

c ontra ct

. Br ea chby

the e m plo y er is the c ont ex t i n w hic h th e ide a of 19 pr et ex t aro se in Keste nbau m and the other wr ongful term ination cases. He re , there 20 wa s undeni ably

a brea ch of the agency

contract—by

Plaintiff. Plaintiff’ s agency60

1 placed busin ess with another com pany , a term inable breach. Once t h at fac t wa s 2 found, summ ary j udgm ent on the breach of contract claim in favor of D efendants wa s 3 ine vit ab le

. U sin g th e co ve na nt o f good f ai th and f ai r de al ing to ch al le nge af ind ing 4 of br ea chin thi s c ont ex t r uns the r isk

of m or phi ng i t i nto ator

t- lik e ad j unc t t o 5 co ntr ac t l aw . P er

ha ps i t w oul d be agoo d id ea to start cr y sta lli zi ng suc h ator

t, but it s 6 pot en tia l i m

pa ct is m uc h br oa de r than the re la tiv el y na rr ow sc ope of pr im a fa ci e tort. 7 Thi s ca se cert ai nl y

do es no t ca ll forth e effo rt o r ev en th e d is cu ss io n. 8 { 81} T he re is nothin g to be ga ine d and m uc h to be los t i n Ju dge S uti n’ s se co nd9 guessin g approach. T here is no hint in the rec ord or argum ent by De fendants that 10 Pl ai nti ff

“ thr ewthe f

igh t” in an y

of his m oti on p ra ct ic e. T he re is no reas on fo r thi s 11 Co urt— or

the dis tr ic t co ur t— to e nga ge in tha t i nqui ry . H owis it to b e done in an y 12 event? Ar e courts to questio n m otive? (“ Did y ou m ean to lose that m otion counsel? ”). 13 A re the y

to sugg es t l it ig at ionta ct ic s and arg um en ts t o c ouns el ? If so, sho uld

both 14 co unse l be e xa m ine d and “ co unse le d, ” or onl y the pla int if f’ s att or ne y ? T o e nga ge in 15 se co nd- gue ssi ng a t the appe llate le ve l i s e ve n m or e pr obl em at ic

. A ll w e can do is 16 wonder at what was done and w hy . I f the is sue wa s preserved belo w, there is n o need 17 to w onde r in a

va cuum be ca use the a rg um en ts h av e be enm ade an d we can a sse ss 18 them on the record. If the subject of our sec ond-gu essing was not preserved or even 19 ar gue d—a s is the c as e here— ou r m usi ngs ar e pe rf

or ce of no ava il. Abse nt a 20 m isc ar

ri ag e of j ust ic e, we wil l not

dis tur b aj ur y ve rd ic t. T he re is ce rt ai nly no61

1 m iscarria ge here. This ca se involv es ag gravated fac ts and serious h arm that 2 D ef en da nts do n ot d isp ut e. W e are le ft to m usi ng a bout howc ouns el sho uld

ha ve 3 be ensm ar

te r an d w orke d hard er , a ll to n o di sc er nib le e nd. 4 { 82} Insum , the c as e w as vig or ousl y li tig at ed

. T he re is no ne ed or r ea son to r ev isi t 5 howit w as li tig at ed

. Su

bj ec t to De fe ndants ’ fa ile d m oti on to dism iss pr im a fa ci e tort, 6 al l pa rt ie s ag re ed at the en d tha t onl y pr im a fa ci e tort w as le ft to be sub m itt ed

to the 7 jury. The jury ha s s po ke n. 8 THE DISS ENT 9 { 83} I disagree w ith the dis s en t ’s assertion that the factual cir cum stances here are 10 ex em pt f ro m the pur vie w of pr im a fa ci e tort si m ply be ca use the y a ro se in the c ont ex t 11 of a contrac tual relationship betwee n the parties. The dis sent argues for a categorical 12 ex em pti on f ro m tor t l ia bil ity , r eg ar dle ss o f be ha vio r an d m oti ve . T he ca se s c ite d by 13 the dis se nt d o no t su ppor t su cha n e xe m

pti on and i ts i pse dix it pol ic y a rg um en t 14 ig no res th e le ss on an d p oi nt of Ho lm es ’ wor k o n wh ic h i t p ur po rts to rel y . 15 { 84} First, the cases the dissent relies on sim p l y d o n o t suppo rt a c ategorical 16 ex em pt io n. G uest v. A lls tat e In sur anc e Co

. did hol d that an at tor ne y c oul d no t c la im 17 fu tur e, une ar

ne d f ee s a s an it em

of da m ag e fr om a fo rm er c lie nt. 201 0- N MS C- 047, 18 ¶ 25, 149 N

. M. 74, 244 P

. 3d 3 42; see D iss en t inf ra ¶ 100. T he ba sis f

or r uli ng—the 19 ne ed to pr ote ct the at tor

ne y /c lie nt re la tio nshi p—s ay s nothi ng abo ut the pr opr ie ty of15 I t i s not ab le , tho ugh not re le va nt h er e, that no one in G uest saw a ny dif fi cu lty 16 16 in al low ing the pla int if fs ’ co ntr ac t cla im s and the pr im a fa ci e tort c la im s to both go 1 7 t o t h e ju ry.

18 It should be noted, however , that e ven the free u s e o f l an d had its lim its at

17 19 com m on law. It w as subject to challenge a s a nuisance. A nd the case of Fletc her v. 20 R ylands , 3 H

. & C. 774 , 159 E ng. Re p. 737 (1 865) —the ba sis fo r str ic t l ia bil ity f or 2 1 h az ar d o u s ac t i v i t i es

— i n v o l v ed a w at erre s er v o i r w h i ch fa i l ed , f l o o d i n g a n ei g h b o r’s 22 m ine. 62 1 im m uni zi ng an e nti re f

ie ld of hu m ana ct ivi ty

f ro m sc ru tin y f or w ro ngdo ing

. A nd

16 2 A ndre ws v . Sta lli ngs , 1995 -N MCA -015, 119 N .M. 478, 892 P.2d 611 , is a run-of-the3 m il l ca se in whi ch th e d efam at io n c la i m w as th e ap pr op ria te to rt t o p ur su e. See 4 D iss en t inf

ra ¶ 10 1. 5 { 85} Se co n d, the dissent m isconst rues Holm es’ theory in his article P ri v i l e

ge , 6 M ali ce, and

I nte nt

. H olm es ’ e ff

ort i n th e ar

tic le wa s to po si t a

ge ne ra l the or

y of 7 int en tio na l t ort us ef

ul a s a m et hod fo r an al y zi ng c la im s f or inj ur y c au se d by 8 intentio nal acts. He did no t posit any specific outcom es in cases. He d id not e that 9 som e pol ic ie s—s uc h as the fr ee use of land— w er e so i ngr ai ne d inthe law a nd s oc ie ty 10 tha t the y

w er e lik el y

to pr ovi de j ust if

ic at ionno m at te r w ha t m oti ve a n a ct or ha d f or 11 use of land. Bu t Ho lm es did not say tha t eve n such use s shoul d be f or ev er f re e fr om 17 12 scrutiny

or liability . T he dissent ig nores its ow n quot e fr om Holm es’ article “ When 13 the que sti on of pol ic y is fa ce d[ , ] it

. . . c an not be a nsw er ed

by ge ne ra lit ie s, but

m ust 1 4 be d e t e rm i n e d b y t h e p a rt i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r o f t h e c a s e . . . p l a i n l y t h e w o rt h of the19 Defen da nt s’ po si ti on is Nix on ia n: “ If t he pre si de nt do es it , it ’s leg al .” 18 63 1 re sul t, or

the ga in f ro m a llo w ing the a ct

to be don e, ha s to be c om pa re d w iththe los s 2 whi ch it in fli ct s.” Ho lm es , supra , a t 3. 3 { 86} D ef

en d a n t s a n d t h e d i s s e n t r e f u s e t o e n g a g e t h e “ p a rt i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r of the 4 ca se ” or

to co nduc t a

c om pa ri son of

ga in and l oss in lig ht of m oti ve . T he fa ct s in this 5 ca se a re e gr eg iou s. A ft er ave ry suc ce ssf ul e le ve n- y ear care er

a s a “ ste llar ag en t” f

or 6 D ef en da nts , P la int if

f w as sum m ar ily te rm ina te d a ft er

one m ist ak e w hic h w as qui ck ly 7 re m ed ie d. T he m oti ve f or the te rm ina tio n c oul d r an g e f r o m p e tty b ur e a uc ratic r ev en ge 8 to unm iti ga te d gr ee d. A s a re sul t of his te rm ina tio n, P la int if

f los t a ll inc om e fr om

the 9 busi ne ss. H is c lie nts an d com m iss ion s we re dis tr ibu te d to the pe rs ons w ho c ar ri ed out 10 the term ination . A nd all of this o ccurre d while Plaintiff’ s wife wa s away for an 11 ex te nde d ti m e w ithase ri ous kidne y dis ea se . I n e ff

ec t, the j ur

y f ound that the 12 ind ivi dua ls who effect ed the f ir ing a ct ed

li ke c or por at e hy en as a nd j ac ka ls 13 cannibalizing th eir ow n. I see no reason to say that Plaintiff should “ have expected 14 as m uc h” w he n he sig ne d hi s a ge nc y a gr ee m en t. 15 { 87} Ther e is n o qu es tio n D ef en da nts int en de d th e fi ri ng and the harm . A s to 1 6 j us t i f i c a t i o n , D e f

e n d a n t s ’ o n l y r e s p o n s e i s “ b e c au s e w e c a n . ” B u t , a s t h e c o u rt i n 18 17 P lan t not ed , that “pr opos iti on i s am er e trui sm .” 57 N

. E

. a t 10 14. I m m uni ty f or 18 int en tio na l, harm fu l c ondu ct r equir es a n inquir

y int o m oti ve . A s H olm es not ed in his64

1 ar tic le , “ It is en tir el y co nc ei vable that m oti ve , in som e j ur isd ic tio ns, sho uld be he ld 2 to affe ctall , or n earl y

all , cla im s o f pr iv il eg e.” Ho lm es , supra , at 9. T he j ur y f ound 3 D ef en da nts ’ m oti ve to be m al ic iou s, an d the ir c ondu ct ine xc usa ble

. D ef en da nts f ai l 4 to a ppr ec ia te that the tor

t and v er dic t addre ss tha t c ondu ct a nd m oti ve . T he 5 te rm in at io n i ts el f wor ks pri m ari ly to p ro vi de a m eas ur e o f da m ag es . 6 { 88} D ef

en da nts ’ a rg um en t tha t this ve rd ic t wi ll unde rm ine “ fr ee dom of c ontra ct ” 7 m a y be a ddr e ss e d by t he f ourt h f a c t or un de r U JI 13

- 16 31 A : “ T he va lue to [the] 8 d ef en d an to r t o s o ci et y i n g en er al o f t h e i n t er es t s ad v an ce db y t h e d ef en d an t ’s 9 co nduc t. ” Bu t D ef

en da nts do not

—c an not —e xpl ai n how al low ing pe tty bur ea uc ratic 10 re ve nge or

gr ee d to m oti va te a nd c ontro l the ir r el at io ns hi p with th ei r ag en ts i s 11 ne ce ssary

to its bus ine ss m ode l or

it s suc ce ss. D ef

en da nts do n ot— cannot

—e xpl ai n 12 howshi el din g th e eg re gio us c ondu ct pr es en t he re is im

portant to the m

or w ha t va lue 13 it co ntr ibu te s to soc ie ty in ge ne ra l. D ef

en da nts do not

—c an not —e xpl ai n ho w 14 im m uni zi ng h y en a- lik e be ha vio r is n ec es sary to de fe nd f

re ed om of c ontra ct

. 15 D ef en da nts do n ot atte m

pt t o e xpl ai n be ca

use a ny a rg um en ts m ad e w oul d be spe ci ous 16 on the ir

f ac e. I n th is c ont ex t, D ef

en da nts ’ a sse rt ionof

“ fr ee dom

of c ontra ct ” is n ot 17 j ust a c lic he ; i t i s ashi bbol eth. 18 { 89} Mor e ge ne ra lly , D ef en da nts ’ as se rt ion of fr ee dom of co ntr ac t fa ils to t ak e int o 19 ac co unt

oth er de ve lop m en ts in the law tha t ar e ai m ed at am el ior at ing the pot en tia l f or 20 the law of

c ontra ct to de vol ve int o th e law of the j ungl e. I nte rn al to the w or ld of19 O ne w onde rs howa n ins ur er w oul d fare in an ac tio n by one of it s in sur ed s 19 20 al le gi ng th e type o f cal lo us an d c ru el be ha vi orvi si te d o n P la in ti ff h ere. 65 1 co nt ract , th e la w im

po se s t he im

pl ie d co ve na nt of

go od fai th an d fa ir d eal in gs . Cont’l 2 Potash, Inc. v. Fre eport-McM aron , I nc. , 199 3- N MS C- 039, ¶

64, 115 N

. M. 690 , 858 3 P. 2d 6 6. T he c ove na nt m ak es sub j ec tiv e m oti ve and “ ri ght c ondu ct ” pa rt

of the 4 conversation when assessing breac hes of co n t ra ct. This lawhas not destroy ed 5 free dom

of contract, thoug h it probably hum anizes it. P rim a fa ce tort can do th e sam e. 6 { 90} In th e in su ran ce fiel d, th e co ur ts ha ve crea te d th e to rt o f ba d fa it h. See U JI s13- 7 1701 to -1 705 N MR

A

. T he obl iga tio ns i m

pose d onins ur er s by

c om m on l awba d f

ai th 8 co nc ep ts are m

uc h br oa de r than an ythi ng tha t m igh t be im pose d by pr im a fa ci e tort. 19 9 T he tor ts o f ec onom ic dur es s and inte rf er en ce s wi th c ontra ct

ua l r el at ion s have the ir 10 ow n po te nti al to int er fe re w ithf re ed om of c ontra ct

. Bu t the y

w er e re co gni ze d in 11 res po ns e to in ap pr op ria te be ha vi orin t h e eco no m ic real m . Se e Te rre l v

. D uk e Ci ty 12 Lu m be r C

o. , 197 4-NMC A- 041, ¶ 9 7, 86 N. M. 405, 524 P. 2d 10 21 (recognizing tort 13 of eco no m ic du res s) , aff’d in part an d re v’d in p art on o the r gr ound

s by197 5- 14 N MS C- 041, 88 N

. M. 299 , 540 P

. 2d 2 29; se e als o W olf v . P erry , 195 9- N MS C- 044, 15 ¶ 15, 65 N .M. 457 , 3 3 9 P. 2d 67 9 (rec ogni zing tortiou s interfere nce w ith contract). 16 The y ha ve no t d es tro y edfree do m of c on tra ctan d n ei th er wi ll th is ve rd ic t.

17 18 M IC HA EL D . BU ST A M A N TE , Ju dg e66

1 HAN ISEE, Judge (d issenting). 2 { 91} Today ’ s m aj ority inje cts the specte r

o f p r i m a fac ie tort liability

into comm ercia l 3 rel at io ns hi ps go ve rn ed fir st by co nt ract s an d, whe n n eces sa ry , do ct rin al co nt ract law. 4 Inuph oldin g th e jur

y ’ s ve rd ic t, the m aj or ity

auth or s do w npl ay

the r equir em en ts o f 5 ex ist ing a nd d ir ec tly

a ppl ic ab le c au se s of

a ct ion —no t on ly

in co ntr ac t bu t a lso in tort. 6 T he e nd r es ult

is th at D ef en da nts ’ r igh t t o e nf

or ce a nd t er

m ina te a n in dis put ab ly 7 br ea ch ed co ntr ac t tha t nei the r viol at es publ ic pol ic y nor is a con tr ac t of a dhe sio n is 8 ne ga te d. 9 { 92} Co nf

usi ngl y , Judg e Su tin ag re es tha t the re “ ar e sol id re as ons fo r req uir ing 10 Pl ai nti ff

to ha ve ple ad ed an d pu rsue d c ontra ct c la im s ba se d onathe or y that hi s 11 te rm ina tio n w as w ro ngf ul, pr et ex tua l, a nd carr ie d ou t w iththe m al ic iou s in te nt t o 12 ha rm an d wi th ou t s uf

fic ie nt jus ti fic at io n.” Op. supra ¶ 37. He also ag re es t hat 13 “ Plain t i ff co uld have pleaded and p ersuasively argued that his term ination wa s 14 unl aw fu l [ as a ] br ea chof c ontra ct a nd/ or br ea chof the im

pli ed co ve na nt of

goo d f ai th 15 an d fa ir d eal in g[ .] ” Op. supra ¶ 3 8

. A n d J u d g e B u s t a ma n t e a l l o w s t h a to u r S up r e me 16 Co urt “ ca

uti ousl y li m ite d [ pr im a fa ci e tort’ s] appl ic at ionto ins tanc es w he re the f ac ts 17 do no t fit cry st al li zed to rts [.]” Sp. Co n. supra ¶ 77. W hy , then, does the jury ’ s verdict 18 stand w he n it

se em s w e ag re e tha t it is hornb ook law that pr im a fa ci e tort m ay not be 1 9 u s ed t o “ e v a d e s t ri n g en tre qu i re m en t s o f o t h eres t ab l i s h ed d o ct ri n es o f l aw [? ]” 20 Sc hm itz , 1990 -N MS C- 002, ¶ 63; see also Sto ck , 1998 -N MCA -081, ¶ 38 (hold ing th at67

1 p ri m a f ac i e t o rt m ay n o ts er v e t o “ es ca p e p o s s i b l e r es t ri ct i o n s ” t o an o t h ert o rt ’s 2 applicability ). 3 { 93} Judg e Su tin sugg es ts tha t the re as on is “ the part ic ular m an ne r in w hic h t his 4 cas e was tri ed ,” Op. supra ¶ 3, a nd “ the pe cu liar ci rc um stanc es in this c as e[

. ] ” O p. 5 supra ¶ 53 . W

hile true that “ there w as no other claim available to Plaintiff besides 6 pr im a faci e to rt un de r whi ch to pu rs ue da m ag es ” fro m Defen da nt s, Op

. supra ¶ 50, 7 such was the cir cum stance onl y because, by the tim e of trial, De fendants had defeated 8 Pl ai nti ff

’ s num er ous dir ec tly ap pli ca ble ca use s of a ct ion

. S o th e onl y

r ea son thi s c as e 9 wa s tried at all is bec ause the district court denied Defe ndants’ m otion for sum m ary 10 j udgm en t onP la int if

f’ s pr im a fa ci e tort c la im

. H en ce , the le ad opi nio n’ s j ust if

ic at ion 11 fo r the oc curr en ce of a tr ia l onw ha t w as le ft of adis em bow el ed c om pla int —l oudl y 12 “ so un di ng in co nt ract an d t or t[,]” Op. supra ¶ 9— be gs the que sti on of whe the r the 13 dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in de ny ing the la st of an oth er w ise suc ce ssf

ul s er ie s of

dis posi tiv e 14 m ot io ns fil edby D efen da nt s. 15 { 94} T he oc curr en ce of suc h an a ty

pic al tr ia l, how ev er , is no r ea son to a ff irm it s 16 outcom e and in any

event is hardly

the fault of D efendants. To the contrary , P laintiff 17 wa s “ the m aster of [ his] com plaint,” Self v. United P arcel Serv. , 199 8- N MS C- 046, 18 ¶ 17, 126 N

. M. 396 , 970 P

. 2d 5 82 ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and ci ta tio n om itt ed ), a nd 19 likewise possessed so le control over whether to appeal the district court’ s dism issal 20 of his contrac t- and tort-based claim s. Ye t Plaintiff chose not to plead the claim s that68

1 J u d g e S u t i n s u g g es t s h e “co u l d h av e p l ea d ed an dp er s u as i v el y ar g u ed [, ]” Op. supra 2 ¶ 38, an d di d no t ap pe al fr om the dis tr ic t co urt’ s su m m ar y j udgm en t i n D ef

en da nts ’ 3 favor on the pr ed ic at e cl ai m s he did choo se to p le ad

. T o up hol d D ef en da nts ’ li ab ili ty 4 under a legal doctrine of such lim ited applicabilit y rin g s h o llow, particularly given 5 Judg e Su tin ’ s a ddi tio na l o bs erv ationthat the “ ex pr es s langua ge of the A gr ee m en t” 6 w oul d no t have ne ce ssaril y “ pr ohi bit ed

c ontra ct -r el at ed

c la im s ba se d onpr et ex t or 7 ru se if they had been carefull y and clearly purs ued .” Op. supra ¶ 37 ( em pha sis 8 ad de d)

. Y et by som e kin d of j udi ci al al ch em y , the m aj or ity

tod ay tur ns D ef en da nts ’ 9 ri ght to te rm ina te the A gr ee m en t i nto li ab ili ty f or it s e xe rc ise of

that r igh t, a nd 10 Plaintiff’ s litigatio n failures (and his own b reac h of t he Agre em ent) into a dam ages 11 bo na nz a p ai d fo r by Defen da nt s. 12 { 95} E ve n le ss ava ili ngl y , Jud ge Bu stam an te appe ar s to se ek a n in de pe nde nt, stand1 3 al one sta n d a r df

o r ap p l i c a t i o n o f

p r i m af a c i e t o rt : “ e g r e g i o u s c o n du c t [

. ] ” S p . C o n. 14 supra ¶ 88

. H e w oul d de cl ar e co rp or at e be ha vio rs r an gin g f ro m “ pe tty bur ea uc ratic 15 rev en ge to un m it ig at edgre ed [,]” Sp. Co n. supra ¶ 86, to be da m ag es -e lig ibl e, az one 16 of li ab ili ty int o w hic h D ef

en da nts ’ “ hy en a-like ” an d “ j ac ka ls c an nib al iz ing the ir 17 own [,]” beh av io rs fal l. Sp . Con

. supra ¶¶8 6 , 8 8

. Un d erJ u d g e B u s t aman t e’s 1 8 ap p ro ac h , d i s t ri ct co u rt s ar e t o u n d er t ak e a fr ee -r an g i n g as s es s m en t o f a d ef en d an t ’s 19 conduct in deciding if a prim a facie tort claim is to be sub m itted to a jury , e ven when 20 “ crystal li z[ed ,] ” Sp . Con

. supra ¶ 80, but elem ent-rich ca uses of action fail on legal69

1 gr ound s. Fu tur e pla int if fs m igh t w onde r w hy

the y sho uld bothe r to p le ad

on- poi nt b ut 2 pr oof -o ne ro us ca

use s of ac tio n. Whic h is ex ac tly w hy the appl ic at ionof pr im a fa ci e 3 to rt i n New M ex ic o was ti gh tl y cu rta il edfro m

th e g et -g o, an d h as so rem ai ne d. See 4 Stock , 199 8- NMCA- 081, ¶ 39 ( “ [T ] he [ pla int if

f’ s] c la im

of pr im a fa ci e tort i s 5 dupl i c a t i ve of he r othe r c l a i m s. B ut t o t he e xt e nt t ha t i t i s no t , w e ho ld that 6 ap pli ca tio n of

that do ctri ne . . . w oul d be an impr ope r m eans o f ev ad ing pr oof of 7 essential, and appropriate, elem ents of those oth er c laim s.”)

. 8 { 96} U lti m at el y , the m aj or ity a u th o r s an d

I f un d am e n t a l ly

dis ag re e ab out

pr im a fa ci e 9 tort’ s pl ac e in N ewMe xic o law . T he tor t w as not c re at ed , nor

were it s e le m en ts 10 designed , to ser

ve as an infill upon which a plaintiff c an ere ct a r em edy when 11 otherwise applicable torts or contract law do not afford redre ss. Q uite the opp osite: 12 that a plaintiff i s precluded from recovering under a diffe rent cause of a ction is often 13 its el f suf

fi ci en t t o de m onstrate the ina ppl ic ab ili ty

of pr im a fa ci e tort. T his c onc lus ion 14 flows from a p roper hi storical understandi ng of t he tort and the genesis of Sc hm itz ’s 15 “ ev as io n” req ui rem en t. See 199 0- N MS C- 002, ¶ 63; se e als o Ja m es P. Bie g, Pri ma 16 F ac ie T ort Co m es to Ne w M

ex ic o: A Sum m aryof P rim a Fac ie To rt L aw , 21 N.M. L. 17 Re v. 327 , 371 ( 1991) (e xpr es sin g c au tio n th at “ pr im a fa ci e tort ha s th e pot en tia l of 1 8 el i m i n a t i n g t h e i m

p o rt an tp o l i c i e s a n dp r o t e c t i o n s e m b o d i e di n t h e e l e m e n t s of 19 tr ad iti ona l t orts, m an y of w hic h have be ende velo pe d ov er c en tur ie s, a nd r ep la ci ng 20 th em wit h a ne bu lo us , all -en co m pa ss in g, an d fo rm le ss cau se of a ct io n” ).70

1 { 97} While Judg e Bustam ant e r i ghtly connects the origins of m

uch of the fram ew ork 2 o f e x i s t i n g t o rt l aw t o t h e w o rko f J u s t i ce Ho l m es , h i s p er s p ec t i v e r eg ar d i n g p ri ma 3 fa ci e tort i s in co m

ple te

. I nde ed , H olm es reject ed af orm al ist r eg im e of

tor t l ia bil ity 4 an d se t out a m or e ge ne ra l the or y f or de ci din g c as es w he re apla int if f al le ge s th at

he 5 ha s be eninj ur ed

by the de fe ndant. 6 Ac tions o f to rt are brought for tem poral dam age. The law r ecognizes 7 te m

por al da m ag e as a n e vil w hic h it s obj ec t is to pr ev en t or to re dr es s, 8 so f

ar a s is c onsi ste nt w ithparam ount co nsi de ratio ns to b e m en tio ne d. 9 W he n i t i s s h o w n t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s a c t h a s h a d t e m

p o r a l d a m a g e to 10 the pla i nt i f

f f or i t s c on se qu e nc e , t he n e xt que st i oni s w he t he r

t ha t 11 consequence was one w hi ch the defendant m ight h ave fore seen. I f 12 co m

m on exp er ie nc e has shown that som e suc h c onse que nc e w as li ke ly 13 to follow the act un der th e circum stances known to the actor, he is taken 14 to ha ve act edwit h n ot ic e, an d i s h el d l iabl e[.] 15 Hol m es , P riv ile

ge, M ali ce, and I nte nt , supra a t 1 (c ite d in Sc hm itz , 199 0- N MS C- 002, 1 6 ¶ 36)

. T o H o l m e s , t h e o n l y qu e s t i o n i n d e t e rm i n i n g w h e t h e r t o e x e m p tad e f e n d a nt 17 fr om li ab ili ty f or da m ag es to the pla int if

f ca use d by the de fe ndant’ s m al ic iou s a ct s is 18 w he the r the de fe ndant’ s a ct ion s, how ev er m al ic iou s, m ay

be j ust if

ie d or 19 “ pr ivi le ge [d ]

. ” H olm es , sup ra , a t 9. A nd w he the r a de fe ndant’ s a ct s are pr ivi le ge d is 20 ult im at el y

aque sti on o f “ pol ic y ; and the a dvanta ge s to the c om m uni ty, o n the one 21 side and the oth er, are the o n l y m atters re ally entitled to be weighed.” Id

. Under 22 Holm es’ theory , the questio n of whether the defendant is privileged to inflict a harm 23 “ can n o t be answer ed by generalities, but m

ust be determ ined by

the particular 24 ch arac te r of

th e cas e, ev en if e v e ry

bo dy agre es what th e an swe r sh ou ld be

. . . .71

1 [P ] la inl y the w orth of the re sul t, or the ga in f ro m a llo w ing the a ct

to be don e, ha s to 2 be com pared w ith the los s which it inflicts.” Id

. a t 3. 3 { 98} Bu t “ [i ] t se em s in ev ita ble that a tor t c onc ei ve d onthe pr inc ipl e of pr im a fa ci e 4 liab i l i t y f

o r i n t e n t i o n a l i n f

l i c t i o n o f h a rm w o u l d c o m e t o e n c r o a c h up o n b odi es of 5 law , li ke c ontra ct , w hic h have m or e lim ite d prin ci ple s of l ia bil ity

. ” Mark

P

. G er ge n, 6 To rti ous In te rfe re nc e: Ho w I t I s E ngul fin g C om m er ci al L aw

, W hyT his I s N ot 7 E nti re lyB ad, and

A P rude nti al R es

pons e , 38 A riz. L. Rev. 1175 , 121 8 (1996). H ence 8 the im port of Sc hm itz ’ s us e of the phr as e “ es ta

bli she d doctrin es of

law . ” 1990

- 9 N MS C- 002, ¶

63 ( em pha sis a dde d)

. T he e le m en ts o f a cl ai m m erel y e xpr es s th e 1 0 r e qu i r e men t s o f

t h e u n d e r l yi n g d o c t r i n e o f s ub s t a n t i v e l a w t h a tp r o v i d e s ar e med y. 11 It f oll ow s, the n, that P la int if f’ s in ab ili ty

to ple ad or pr ev ai l on a cl ai m fo r br ea chof 12 co ntr ac t ( or

tor tio us i nte rf

er en ce w iththe A gr ee m en t i nto w hic h the pa rt ie s e nte re d) 13 m ay it se lf be ar ea son to que sti on w he the r a cl ai m f or pri m a fa ci e tort sh oul d be 14 subm itt ed

to the j ur y . I n othe r w or ds, the f

ac t tha t a pla int if

f cannot obt ai n r el ie f fo r 15 injuries c aused by

the defendant in an action for breach of contract is evidence that 16 the de fe ndant w as j ust if ie d or pr ivi le ge d to c au se the pla int if f’ s in j ur ie s. G er ge n, 17 supra , a t 12 21 ( not ing that i f a cl ai m “ [f al ls] de ep ly

in th e sh ad owof

a nothe r body 18 of law ,” consideration shou ld be given to determ ining whether dism issal is necessary 19 in ord er t o “ pr es erv e th e p rio rit y of t ha t o th er b od y

of l aw”).72

1 { 99} Even H olm es evolved to lim it his pre fe rred gener alized approach to tort 2 l i ability

by use of the term

“ disin terested m alevolence,” Am . B ank & Tr. Co. v

. 3 F ed eral B ank , 256 U

. S. 350 , 358 ( 1921 ), pe nne d to m ar k th e lia bil ity dis tin ct ion 4 b e t w e e n a c t i o n s o f

r i g h tt h a tc au s e h a rm a n d a c t i o n s u n d e rt a k e n s o l e l y t o c au s e h a rm. 5 T h a t n o t i o n i s e v i d e nt i n A ik en s it se lf , w he n H olm es a ddr es se d th e uni que state of 6 m ind that exists when harm is inflicted “ for the sake of the har m as an end in itself, 7 and not m erely

as a m eans to som e further end legitim ately desired.” A ik

en s , 195 U. S. 8 at 203 ; se e als o M

arc el la v. A RP

F ilm s, I nc . , 778 F

. 2d 1 12, 119 ( 2d C ir

. 198 5) 9 (“ [W ] hen there are other m otives, such as profit, self- interest, or busin ess advantage, 10 the re is no r ec ove ry

und er the doc tr ine of

pr im a fa ci e tort.”) . Her e, r eg ar din g 11 D ef en da nts ’ te rm in at io n of the A gr ee m en t w ithP la int if f, the tr ia l r ec or d a m

ply 12 supp orts busi ness, profit, and associative m otive s far bey ond d isinterested 13 m alevolence. 14 { 100} Th e h i s t o r i c l i mi t a t i o n o f p r i ma f a c i e t o rt ’s ap p l i c a t i o n , i n t e n d e db y Sc hm itz , 15 fi nds supp ort i n ou r ca se law . I n G uest , 2 0 1 0

- N M S C

- 0 4 7 , ¶ ¶ 4 7

- 5 6 , o u r

S up r e me 1 6 C o u rt h e l d o n p ub l i c p o l i c y g r o u n d s t h a t a c l i e n t i s n o t l i ab l e t o h i s l a w y e r fo r los t 17 fu tur e earni ng s whe n th e cl ie nt t er m ina te s th e at tor

ne y -c lie nt r el at ion shi p. T he 18 at tor ne y -p la int if

f in G uest co nte nde d th at ev en if lost f utu re e ar nin gs w er e not 19 av ai la ble in a br ea chof

c ontra ct a ct ion , the y w er e none the le ss ava ila ble in an a ct ion 20 ba se d o n p rima facie to rt. Id

. ¶ 57. O ur S upr em e Co urt dis ag re ed , hol din g tha t “ the se73

1 claim s ar o s e out of the sam e circ um stances as [the attorney -plaintiff’ s] contract 2 claim —her em ploy m ent relationship with [ the d e f e nd ant ]

— [ so the ] r e a so ni ng a pplies 3 regardless of the theory of liability .” Id

. This statem ent supp orts m y view that if a 4 pla int if f cannot pr ev ai l onbr ea chof

c ontra ct or the c ove na nt o f good

f ai th and fa ir 5 de al ing f

or agoo d r ea son, the n th e pla int if f shou ld n ot b e al low ed

to pr ev ai l ona 6 p r i maf a c i e t o rtc l a i m f

o r t h e s a me r e a s o n

— e v e n w h e n t h e f o rma l e l e me n t s o f

ap r i ma 7 fa ci e tort c la im

a re f ound by aj ur y to ha ve be enpr ove n. 8 { 101} T his Co urt uphe ld the dis m iss al of apr im a fa ci e tort c la im

f or sim ilar re as ons 9 in Andrews , 1995 -N MCA -015. In that case, we upheld the district court’ s dism issal 10 of the pla int if

fs ’ int en tio na l inf

lic tio n of em oti ona l dis tr es s c la im , r ea soni ng tha t the 11 cl ai m w as an “ at te m

pt[ ]

. . . to m ak e an en d- run ar ound the obst ac le s p os ed by 12 defam ation law’ s harm to reputation elem ent and its cons titutio nal aspects.” Id

. ¶ 48 1 3 ( i n t e rn a l qu o t a t i o n ma rk s a n d c i t a t i o n o mi t t e d )

. Wi t h r e s p e c t t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s ’ p r i ma 14 fa ci e to rt cla im , w e an al y ze d Sc hm itz ’ s “ ev as ion ” ru le f ro m asim ilar standpo int : 15 “ [whe the r pla int if

fs ’ ] pr im a fa ci e tort i s be ing a sse rt ed m er el y to ci rc um

ve nt the 16 established d efenses to defam ation.” Id

. ¶ 64 . In othe r w or ds, w e loo ke d a t the 17 nor m at ive va lue of d efa m at ion( an d it s de fe nse s) a s the m eans of re dress for harm 18 ca use d by w ri tte n st at em en ts. A nd w e co nc lu de d th at it outw ei ghe d th e ne ed

to 19 provide the pl aintiffs with a secondary avenue by which liability m ight b e established 20 pr em is edup on th e h arm cau se d b y

th e d efen da nt s’ act s. Id

. ¶ 67.74

1 { 102} H olm es und er sto od this iss ue a s a que sti on of pr ivi le ge : w he n th e be ne fi ts t o 2 soc ie ty of r equir ing apla int if

f to p ro ce ed (and l ose ) unde r ane sta bli she d th eo ry

of 3 la w ou twei gh th e be ne fit s of al lo win g t he pl ai nt iff to reco ve r fo r pr im a fac ie to rt, we 4 ar e in e sse nc e re co gni zi ng tha t the de fe ndant has a pr ivi le ge to ha rm the pla int if

f. T he 5 ex amp l e H o l m es u s e d i s “t h e r i g h tt o m ak e c h an g es up o n o r i n a man ’s l an d [. ]” 6 Hol m es , supra a t 4. E ve n i f a m an m ak es c ha nge s to his ow n land w ithm al ic iou s 7 int en t t o harm

his ne ighbor , H olm es r ea sone d th at the ne ed

to co m pe nsa te the 8 n ei g h b o r a n dp u n i s h t h e d ef en d an t fo r hi s m al i ce wo u l d b e o u t we i g h ed b y s o ci et y’ s 9 in te res t in en co ur ag in g lan do wne rs to in ve st in an d d ev el op th ei r pr op ert y . Id . “ W ere 10 it oth er

w ise , a nd w er e the doc tr ine c ar ri ed out to its log ic al c onc lus ion , a n e xpe nsi ve 11 wa re ho us e m i gh tb e p ul l e d do w n ont he f i nd i ng o f aj ur y t ha ti tw a s m aintained 12 m aliciously , and thu s a large am ount of labor m ight b e w asted and lost.” Id

. 13 { 103} T he str ai ght fo rw ar d qu es tio n he re is w he the r ane xis tin g and a ppl ic ab le 14 doc tr ine of

law r equir es us t o de ci de thi s c as e in Defend an ts’ f av or , de spi te the ir 15 concession o n appeal that they acted w ith an intent to (and did indeed) harm Plaintiff. 16 A s Ju dge S uti n po int s ou t, Defendan ts’ a rg um en t onthi s is sue boi ls d ow n to a 17 str ai ght fo rw ar d c ont en tio n th at the j ur y ’ s ver dic t, if al low ed

to stand, w oul d f

at al ly 18 unde rm ine the m ax im of c ontra ct law that “publ ic po licy e nc our ag es f

re ed om 19 be tw ee n compe tent pa rt ie s of the r igh t t o c ontra ct , a nd r equir es the e nf or ce m en t of 20 co nt ract s, un le ss th ey cle arl y co nt rav en e so m e p os it iv e la w or ru le of p ub li c m or al s.”75

1 G en eral E le c. Cr edit Co rp. v . T ide nbe rg , 1 9 6 7

- N M S C

- 1 2 6 , ¶ 1 4 , 7 8 N

. M

. 5 9 , 4 28 2 P. 2d 33 . Judge Sutin dism isses this argum ent out of h an d , co n cluding that 3 D ef en da nts ’ a rg um en t pa int s an “ ide al [i ze d] ” pic tur e of aw or ld i n w hic h th er e is 4 “ [n o ] w a y

f o r ap a rt y t o o b t a i n r e l i e f

i n f o r - c au s e t e rm i n a t i o n s t h a ta r e t e c h n i c al ly 5 au th or iz edbu t neve rth el es s p ret ex tu al [.]” Op. supra ¶ 41. A nd the c onc ur

ri ng o pin ion 6 se em s t o p refe r th atfree do m of c on tra ct be va gu el y

“ hu m an iz e[d .] ” Sp . Con

. supra 7 ¶ 89. B ut this is j ust a prefer ence that applicable lawincorporate con siderations th at 8 it doe s no t. S houl d w e al lowapla int if f to o bta in d am ag es f

or ha rm cau se d by

the 9 ex er ci se of

an ex pr es s te rm

in a co ntr ac t w he n th at

c ontra ct doe s no t vi ola te a ny 10 publ ic policy

and is not one of adhesion ? In upho lding the j ury verdict in this case, 11 the m aj ority

authors do n o t an swer

this difficult (and to my

m ind, insurm ount able) 12 que sti on. 13 { 104} T he pub lic pol ic y f av or ing the f

re ed om of pr iva te parti es to s et

the te rm s of 14 their com

m ercia l relationship s shou ld not be discarded if a defendant’ s conduct, even 15 if both legal and exp re s s l y c o n tem plated by the contract, is by

j udicial m easure 16 suf fi ci en tly outra ge ous. T he w or

n ph ra se “ fr ee dom

of c ontra ct ” m ay

be cl ic hé , but 17 that does no t m ean w e should ignore its appli cation in this case. Bad blood and failed 1 8 b u s i n e s s v e n tu r e s o f

t e n k e e p c l o s e c o mp a n y. C o u rt s s h o u l d n o t s i t i n e qu i t y o n c l a i ms 19 ar isi ng f

ro m c om m er ci al r el at ion shi ps tha t w oul dn’ t e xis t bu t f or w ri tte n c ontra ct s. 20 Whe re the te rm s of

ac ontra ct

a re c le ar —a s he re —w e en fo rc e the m a s w ri tte n. T he76

1 pa rt ie s w oul d have ex pe ct ed a s m uc h w he n th ey

e nte re d th e A gr ee m en t. I w oul d 2 rever se t he d i str i c tc ourt ’ s de ni a l o f D e f e nd a nt s’ p os t

- t r i a l m ot i onf or ad i r e c t ed 3 ve rd ic t onP la int if

f’ s pr im a fa ci e tort c la im

. I the re fo re r es pe ct fu lly dis se nt.

4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 5 J. M IL ES HA N IS EE , Ju dg e