ARI Research Note 86-16

P0) PRODUCT DEVELOPMfENT AND UTILIZATION WITHIN THE ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM:

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE NEW BASIC RIFLE MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING PROGRAM

CD

Judy A. Holley, Seward Smith, and Arthur D. Osborne

ARI Fort Benning Field Unit

for

ARI Field Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia

TRAINING RESEARCH LABORATORY D T IC

JUN 0 2 1981

L cm I~§*

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

January 1986

Approved for public release; distributton unlimited,

86 o 2 046

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U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

WM. DARRYL HENDERSON u

EDGAR M. JOHNSON COL, IN

Technical Director Commnandig

.

t '.

other rmary dstrbuton anid will be avalilalble to rOeusors only through DTIC or other rference services such |r

This report ha's been cleared for release to the Defense Technical information Center IDTIC). It hats been given o a the National Technical Information Service (NTIS). The views, opiions, end/or findings contained in this

hreport are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Dopartment of the Army position, piW o. ,d;cision, unless so designated by other official documentation. I

7.
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ARI Research Note 86-16

4. TITLE (and Subtitle) S. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

Product Development and Utilization Within the

Army Training System: Observations and Recommenda- October 80 - October 81

tions from Development and Implementation of the S. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

New Basic Rifle Marksmanship Training Program - -

7. AUTHOR(*) B. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMSER(e)

Judy A. Holley, Seward Smith

and Arthur D. Osborne

S. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK

AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

ARI Field Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia

Post Office Box 2086, 2Q263743A794

Fort Benning, Georgia 31905

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U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral January 1986

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Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600 43

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II. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

..

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aids If necoeoary and Identify by block number)

Basic Rifle Marksmanship

Training Systems

Training Program

Individual Training

20. ABSTRACT'(Cuth an reverse aide It nerseew d Idenflly by block number)

Through the development of a new Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM) Program

Of Instruction (POI) and the provision of technical assistance during its

implementation, personnel at the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) Fiold Unit

at Fort Benning, Georgia (further references to this organization will be "ARIBenning") had the opportunity to be involved with, and observe the organizational change process pertaining to, the utilization of a Research and Development

(R&D) product within the Army training system. While the observations have

(over)

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ARI Research Note 86-16

20. ABSTRACT (continued)

implications for BEN POI sustainment, their broader implications are for

managing change within the Army Training System.

Given a POI with demonstrated effectiveness, an established need for the

POI, a formal requirement for POI use, extensive technical assistance from the

developer, and full cooperation of Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command

(HQ, TRADOC) and its subordinate schools, US Army Infantry School (USAIS) and

Army Training Centers (Forts Benning, GA; Bliss, TX; Dix, NJ; Jackson, SC;

Knox, KY; Leonard Wood, MO; MDlellan, AL; and Sill, OK), problems still

arose. Issues raised by the problems are generic to FAD product development

and utilization within the Army training system, specifically management of

that process at organizaticnal levels of fHadquarters, Major Commands (HQ,

MACOMS, e.g., HQ, TRADOC) and their subordinate organizations (e.g., USAIS).

In this report observations made during BRM POI development and

implementation are integrated with scientific and applied literature to

provide information directly applicable to research development and

utilization within the Army Training System.

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St. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if nece*eery and ldentify by block number)

M0. ABSTRACI (wmtae mrevere . e If noce em a" Identify by block nkbher)

,.,

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BRIEF

.Req

- The purpose of this report is to contribute to the development of

improved R&D management and utilization within the Army Training System at

organizational levels of HQ MACOM's (Headquarters, Major commands, e.g., HQ

TRADOC) and of their subordinate organizations (e.g., USAIS) by providing a

description of the organizational change process observed during the BRN POI

development and implementation, including observed consequences of that

process, and managerial implications.

Procedure:

* observations of the organizational change process currently used for RD

product utilization within the Army training system were made by ARI-Fort

Benning researchers as they developed the new BRM POI and provided extensive

technical assistance during its implementation in the 1st Infantry Training

Brigade at Fort Benning and later at the seven other ATC's.

Current scientific and applied literatures on organizational change were

searched and integrated with researcher observations to produce a description

of the current change proamga W its managerial implications and to develop a

managerial checklist (Appendix A) to guide implementation managemept at hightr

Sornizational Xevel of the Army. -,,4

*" Findings: 4 --

1. Cbservations of the BRM POI development and implementation revealed two

major factors that impair R&D product development and utilization. Both

factors are determined by current organizational structure and processes at

organizational levels of HQ TRADOC and USAIS. The two factors are (a)

decentralized management of the change process (i.e., Instructional Systems

Development [ISDJ Model, which guides research development and utilization

within the Army training system) and (b) decentralized management of the

impleme *.ation phase of that process.

2. Management of the change process is decentralized. Management

responsibility is shared by several organizations rather than being clearly

assigned to one organization. Without adequate safeguards, diffused

management responsibility tends to degrade organizational performance.

3. Problems created by decentralized management are exacerbated by shortages

of personnel and TDY/Travel funds, degrading effectiveness of the change

process, especially the implementation phase.

4I. Decentralization of the change process can result in unnecessary and l

costly duplication of effort among organizations sharing responsibility for

management of the change process. ........

5. Management of the implementation phase per se is decentralized, although

management of each of the four other ISD model phases (analysis, development,

, , Codes

Dist SAv ial

;Ns~ecr QAiY 0 LI )V 

~ I .~* *. . .. .... . ........................................................
design, and control) at USAIS is centralized. Management of each phase is

clearly assigned to a USAIS Directorate, except for the implementation phase.

For the B34 POI, implementation management responsibilities were shared by HQ

TRADOC, USAIS, and the eight ATCs.

6. Decentralized management of the implementation phase is the opposite of

what is recommended in the scientific and applied literatures on

organizational change. During the BRM POI implementation, this resulted in:

(a) duplication of effort among using agencies, (b) under-utilization of

implementation support procedures, (c) suboptimal coordination across affected

Army agencies, and (d) suboptimal use of developer expertise.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

Conclusions and recommendations pertinent to R&D development and

utilization and to BRM POI sustaiment will be given. Those pertaining to R&D

development and utilization will concern (a) the change process (i.e., ISD

model) and (b) the implementation phase of that process.

I. R&D Development and Utilization

A. The Change Process .

1. Management of the change process needs to be centralized to

alleviate, if not entirely eliminate negative consequences of decentralized

management. Centralized management ("cradle to grave," i.e., inception to

obsolence) of an R&D product by one organization would (a) facilitate

integration of the change process phases, (b) help protect organizational

effectiveness, as well as organizational efficiency, (c) eliminate both

unnecessary and costly duplication of effort and burdensome time-consuming

coordination associated with decentralized management, and (d) facilitate the

development of subject matter expertise pertaining to an R&D product (e.g.,

training program) which is vital to successful product development,

implementation, and sustainment.

2. A systems approach to program development can insure that both

organizational effectiveness and organization efficiency are safeguarded.

3. Periodic evaluations of R&D product utilization should continue

as long as the product is used. This prevents undesirable shifts in the use

of the product, which can result in a precisely executed but ineffective

process.

4. An important issue concerning optimal use of developer

expertise was perceived during BRM POI implementation. Because of its

relationship to organizational effectiveness, the US Army needs to confront

and resolve the issue.

B. The Implementation Phase of the Change Process

1. The US Army, as well as other government and private

organizations, needs to give much greater emphasis to the implementation phase

tv

- M . = . w . m - .. . - , l . . . - S . . . . . . . - . .
of the organizational change process. The following factors are central to paccomplishing this.mpa. Increased implementation management from organizational

levels such as HQ MACOMs (e.g., HQ TRADOC) and USAIS. This includes clear

assignment of responsibility for implementation management of an R&D product,

such as a training program, to an appropriate organization within the Army

training system at the level of HQ MACOMs or their subordinate organizations,

such as USAIS.

b. Allocation of sufficient manpower and budgetary resources

for implementation management at the level of HQ MACOMs and their subordinate I.

organizations, such as USAIS.

c. Provision of adequate decision-making and resource

allocation authority to the organization responsible for implementation

management.

d. Utilization of implementation techniques currently

available in scientific and applied literatures. Recently identified

implementation management processes can be used at organizational levels such

as HQ TRADOC and USAIS to provide strong leadership that supports local

commands of using organizations.

2. In addition to implementation of a R&D product (e.g., training

program) at the primary using organizations (e.g., ATCs) the product may need

to be coordinated with and integrated into other officer and NCO programs

(e.g., Officer Basic and Advanced Courses; Noncommissioned Officers School;

Cadre Training Centers (CTCs); and Pre-Command Courses). 

3. Implementation management of an R&D product should include an

assessment of new knowledge and skills required for all affected resident Army

personnel (e.g., trainers, supervisors). Professionally developed, costeffective training should be provided (e.g., "Train the Trainer" programs).

For commanders, inspection targets should be emphasized. Establishment of

minimum qualification standards for trainers should be considered.

4. Because of their expertise pertaining to an R&D product,

developers of each product should be used to contribute implementation and

product use.

5. Formal organizational procedures are needed for insuring that

suggested product modifications are assessed in light of the originating

organizational needs, values, and underlying rationalism.

6. A systematic search for all obsolete materials and information

related to the product needs to be undertaken. Steps should be taken to

modify, revise, or remove the obsolete material from the system.

7. Potential contributions of the research to Army organizations

other than the primary using organizations need to be determined and

actualized through development and implementation of a systematic plan for

disseminating germane information, materials, and training aids.

v

.- 7.. 

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,, .-..... ..., ..... :.,..,. ... .-...--.. '. .,,. .-,,,.... ....: . * ,.- ... . .. .- :. .-. ,, .. ---. ..,.- ..-.. ., .... ,... "..-.
9.

II. BM4 POI Sustainment - Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations relevant to BRH POI sustainment are:

1. Periodic formative evaluations of the BRM POI need to be scheduled

to insure that both organizational effectiveness and organizational efficiency

are being maintained.

2. A formal procedure is needed for insuring that supported program

modifications are assessed in light of the originating organizational needs

and values and in light of the rationale underlying program components.

3. An audiovisual "Train the Trainer" program needs to be developed. For the short-term, the program needs period-by-period self instruction

sessions. For the long-term, a professionally-developed job analysis of the

trainer position is needed. Minimum qualification standards for trainers need

to be set and tests developed by educational experts to insure those

qualifications.

4. An audiovisual program that emphasizes BRM POI rationale and

training inspection priorities is needed for resident commanders in using

agencies.

5. Information about the BRM POI needs to be conveyed to all Active and

Reserve Component Units Army wide, e.g., Forces Command (FORSCOM), and US Army

Europe (USAREUR), to support unit marksmanship training.

6. In addition to implementation within ATCs, this POI needs to be

coordinated with and integrated into other officer and NCO programs.

7. A systematic search for all obsolete materials, training aids, and

information related to the BRM POI needs to be undertaken. Examples of

obsolete materials include training circulars, TEC lessons, field manuals, and

shot diagnosis cards. Steps should be taken to modify, revise, or remove the

obsolete materials from the system.

Utilization of Findings: -

This report potentially contributes to R&D management and product

utilization within the Army training environment. It could be used as a base

for a full assessment by the Army of its structures and processes at higher

organizational levels to determine whether they hinder or facilitate R&D

product development and utilization. Portions relevant to BRM POI sustainment

can be used by the Army to protect their R&D investment and to insure its ongoing contribution to military preparedness.

V.

,. e - .. .. . -. -. ..- .- . .... -. - . - . . . . . - .- . e . ., .- . " . -. . .' . - - .- ... - - . . . . . .+.i
,j

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION ....... ... ............................. .. ... 1

USAIS Organizational Structure and R&D Product

Development and Utilization ......... ...................... 3

Contrast Between Formal Requirement and Implementation

Processes.......... ................. 4

DECENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF THE CHANGE PROCESS (ISD Model) ... ...... 5

Efficiency May Overshadow Effectiveness ........ ................ 5

Managerial Implications......... ...... ...... .. 6

Duplication of Effort Across the Change Process Phases ...... 9 "

DECENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE.. . . . . . . . . 11

Duplication of Effort Among Using Agencies. .. ..... . ....... 11

Development of Training for Resident Range Personnel ......... ... 12

Preparation of Briefings ........ ... ...................... 13

Over-reliance on Traditional Implementation Procedures .......... ... 13

Model Program ........ ..... ............................ 15

Mobile Training Team (MTT) ........ .................... .... 15

Suboptimal Coordination Across Affected Army Agencies .... ......... 16

Reciprocal Relationship Between BRM Training and Unit Training . . . 16

Potential Contribution of Army Training Programs for Trainers

and Their Commanders to R&D Product Utilization and

Sustairinent ........ ..... ............................ 17

Need for Systematic Identification of and Remedial Action for

All Cbsolete Materials and Training Aids .... ............. ... 18

Usefulness of BRM Training Materials and Aids to Rifle Marksmanship

(RM) Training Throughout the Army ..... ................. .... 18

Suboptimal Use of Developer Expertise ..... ................. .... 19

Areas of Developer Expertise.. . . . . . . . . . . .. ........ 19

Vii *%~ ......... ~ *.***.

. . ... . .*.*.*. . . . . . .. . .*. . . .S. . . . . . .
PAGE

Potential Uses of Developer Expertise . ............. 20

Power.. *.. . .. .. .. . *.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .20

Persuasion. .... ............. ...... ... . 20

Ed ucation .. .. .... .. ... . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 21

Facilitation .. ........ . .. .. .. .. .. . .. . . . 21

Developer Hesponibiliy in Product Utilization .. ............ 21

DISCUSSION . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 23

APPENDICES. ... ............ ............. ... 24

*Appendix A, POI Implementation and Sustairuient Checklist. .... ... 24

* Appendix B, Suggestions for Field Implementation of the M16A1 Rifle

Marksmanship Training Program .. ... ............ 29

FIGURES

Figure 1, A Systems Approach to Progrm Development. .. ... ...... 7

GLOSSARY .. ....... ............. ............ 34

Viii
INTRODUCTION !

There are circumstances in the military that require timely and effective

implementation of change. Examples are: system wide restructuring,

curriculum changes, and new, improved equipment incorporation. Development of

these candidates for change appears to be considerably easier than actual

implementation of the change. The reasons for this difficulty are many. The

purpose of this report is to explore the change process, citing a specific

current example, and to offer some insights and recommendations for achieving

implementation goals.

Interest in research utilization within the military services has rapidly

expanded in recent years, paralleling an analogous growth within scientific

and applied literatures (Gartner & Naiman, 1976; Human Interaction Research

Institute and National Mental Health, 1976; Roberts & Frohman, 1978; Zaltman &

Duncan, 1977). Impetus has come from several sources. Two major ones are (a)

pressure at the federal level for a significant increase in the rate of R&D

product use and (b) a desire on the part of military services to translate R&D

investments into improved organizational effectiveness.

Despite the large and developing literature on research utilization, a

need remains for information directly applicable to the Army training

environment. As pointed out by Gray and Gray-Roberts (1980), ". . . the

applied literature is too idiosyncratic and parochial for application to

utilization problems in the Army's unique training environment."

While an advanced model for organizational and individual change oriented

to the Army training unit environment has been developed (Gray & Gray-Roberts,

1980), little information is available regarding organizational change

processes at management levels of HQ MACOMs (e.g., HQ TRADOC) and their

subordinate organizations (e.g., USAIS). The Gray and Gray-Roberts (1980)

model embodies all organizational management at these organizational levels in

the project manager or "change agent" (usually the developer or sponsor of an

innovation) , who is assumed by the model to have "the resources and discretion

to act as an effective change agent." While this bold embodiment in no way

diminishes the usefulness of their model, it leaves the project manager with

the need for more guidance in how to go about providing users with the

educational, persuasive, facilitative, and power processes called for by the

model. Much more importantly, it leaves the Army with two major needs. One is

a need for assessing its own structures and processes at higher organizational

levels to determine whether they function to facilitate or hinder R&D product

development and utilization. The second need is to determine the appropriate

role of higher organizational levels in this organizational change process,

especially in the implementation phase. .-

Observations during BRM POI development and implementation revealed two

major factors that impair optimal R&D product development and utilization

within the Army training system: (a) decentralized management of the entire

change process and (b) decentralization management of the implementation phase

of that process. While these factors may appear to be the same, i .e.,

decentralized management, a distinction between the two is important for a

clear perspective of the current change process in the Army training system.

-=~.- ,, l- ,..,- , ................................................................... ......... - - . . .. . .
Separating the two factors makes the necessary distinction between management

of the entire change process and management of each phase of the change

process. Management of the entire change process can be centralized (i.e.,

management responsibility for all phases of the change process can be given to

one organizational agency) or decentralized (i.e., responsibiliity for

management of the phases can be dispersed among two or more organizational

agencies). The management of each hase of the change process can also be

centralized or decentralized, regardless of whether the management of the

entire process is centralized or decentralized. As will be discussed in the

following sections of this report, in the Army training system, management of

the entire change process is decentralized. Management of each phase of the

training development process is centralized, with the notable exception of the

implementation phase. The management of the implementation phase is

decentralized.

The observed consequences and managerial implications of decentralized

management of the entire change process and of the implementation phase will

be respectively discussed. This will follow a description of the role of

current organizational structure and processes in determining these factors.

2

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*V - T- -- V1. -- 6- i

9.

USAIS Organizational Structure and R&D Product Development and Utilization

Within the United States Army Infantry School (USAIS), research development and utilization is guided by the Instructional Systems Development (ISD)

model, which is an organizational change model with five phases: analysis,

design, development, implementation, and control. There is a match between

USAIS organizational structure and the five phases, with the notable exception

of the implementation phase. The Directorate of Training Development (DTD)

has responsibility for the first three phases while the Directorate of

Evaluation and Standardization (DOES) has responsibility for the final phase.

Responsibility for the implementation phase, at least in the case of the BRM

POI, was shared by HQ TRADOC, USAIS, and ATCs.

Assignment of respective ISD model phases to two directorates and other

agencies decentralizes the management of the change process. This is in

contrast to management within each phase of the change process, which is

centralized as a result of each phase being clearly assigned to a specific

Directorate. The exception is the implementation phase in which management is

decentralized. Not only was the management responsibility for implementation

of the BRM POI shared by HQ TRADOC, USAIS and ATCs, but within USAIS two

divisions of DTD had implementation responsibilities: Systems and Enlisted.

Within TRADOC HQ at least two separate sections were involved: IET personnel

and personnel responsible for the Cadre Training Centers (CTCs).

The BRM POI has indirect effects on major commands (MACOts) other than

TRADOC. These include all Active and Reserve Component Units Army wide.

Coordination with these MACOMs is required if the Army is to have a rifle

marksmanship training system that is integrated across BRM, Advanced Rifle

Marksmanship (ARM), and unit rifle marksmanship. N single person or

organization had responsibility for extending BRM POI implementation to

include even preliminary steps for achieving this integration. Rather, one of r.

the major implications of the problems encountered in BRM POI implementation,

when integration among eight ATCs within only one MACOM was being attempted,

is tbhat very complex problems are likely to arise when changes in Army-wide

rifle marksmanship training are attempted.

f.

3..
Contrast Between Formal Requirement and Implementation Processes

The delivery of the formal requirement for BRM POI implementation at the ATCs

was characterized by a highly centralized organizational structure and

formalized process; however, for the implementation phase per se, a less

centralized structure with minimum formalization emerged. Specifically, after

POI development and testing, the program proponent, USAIS, recommended

adoption to HQ TRADOC, which in turn sent it to Deputy Commander, Operation

and Plans (DCSOPS), Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). Following

HQDA approval, HQ TRADOC issued a formal requirement for implementation at the

ATCs. After issuance of the formal requirement, the decentralized management

described above emerged.

The observed operational change following issuance of the formal requirement for implementation revealed an unexpected organizational management

flexibility within the Army. Bureaucratic organizations are usually considered

to be static entities incapable of change (Aiken, Bacharach, & French, 1980).

The demonstrated capability for flexibility is clearly to the Army's advantage

since optimal organizational structure and processes vary depending on whether

the organization is seeking to develop proposals for change or trying to

implement them (Zaltman, 1973). Current research indicates that a

decentralized organizational structure is needed when proposals for change are

being developed; however, for the implementation phase er se an organization

needs to maintain its highly centralized structure and formalized processes

(Shepard, 1967; Sapolsky, 1967; Carroll, 1967; Zaltman, 1973; Aiken,

Bacharach, & French, 1980). This is the opposite of utat was observed in the

BJR4 POI implementation.

In the following two sections of this report decentralized management of

the change (ISD) process (i.e., all five phases of the ISD model: analysis,

design, development, and control) and decentralized management of the implementation phase will be di Iussed, respectively. Implications for BEN POI

sustainment, R&D management, and product utilization will be included.

4-'

• .

-- d - -k • l • • l l l-
DECENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF THE CHANGE PROCESS (ISD MODEL)

While decentralized management of the change process (i.e., ISD Model)

may, to some extent, be considered efficient from the traditional management

science point of view (i.e., tasks are broken down into small units permitting

specialization), the approach has potentially costly, if not fatal,

consequences, when used for complex managerial processes, such as planned

organizational change. It is well nown that specialization increases the

need for coordination. In their classic discussion of the division of work,

March and Simon (1972) state: "The greater the specialization by subprogram

(process specialization), the greater interdependencies among organizational

subunits. Interdependence does not by itself cause difficulty if the pattern

of interdependence is stable and fixed. . . Difficulties arise only if

program's execution rests on contingencies that cannot be predicted perfectly

in advance. . . the greater the elements of variability and contingency, the

greater is the burden of coordinating activities that are specialized by

process."

Organizational change, by its very nature, is a dynamic rather than

stable process. Despite the best possible planning, all problems cannot be

anticipated. Equally important for the Amy, each POI may require

coordination among a unique set of agencies. As previously pointed out, full

implementation and sustainment of the BiM POI requires coordination among and

within several MACOMs. This coordination is complicated by the widespread

geographic distribution of the involved agencies.

Two major consequences of decentralized management of the change process

are: (a) efficiency may overshadow effectiveness, and (b) duplication of

effort among agencies sharing in the management responsibility.

Efficiency May Overshadow Effectiveness

With distribution of the ISD phases among USAIS irectorates and other

agencies, there is a danger of the question of whether things are being done

right, i.e., organizational efficienc , overshadowing the question of whether

the right thing is being done, i .e., organizational effectiveness. While both

efficiency and effectiveness must be assessed to obtain a meaningful picture

of organizational productivity, effectiveness requires integration of the

phases of planned change so that what is done and how it is done remain

grounded in the original organizational values and needs that gave rise to the

change. If program components become disassociated from their underlying

rationale, efficiency may replace effectiveness.

An observation made by ARI researchers as they developed the new BRM POI

provides an example of the disassociation of a program component and its

underlying rationale. Fbp-up targets were initially designed in the 1950's to

provide transition to field firing at fleeting, indistinct, combat-like

targets once the soldier had fully mastered the fundamentals of shooting.

Ibwever, as a result of a series of cost-cutting measures that gradually

changed the Ary's BRM POI, pop-up targets were used as soldiers were trying ,d

to master the fundamentals of marksmanship accuracy (Smith & Osborne, 1981).

The original purpose and underlying rationale for the use of a program

5

VT
- .-

component had became cut off from the component and, for a period of time,

efficiency overshadowed effectiveness. The pop-up target ranges were being

run correctly, but the right thing was not being done to teach basic

marksmanship. Detailed feedback on bullet strike location, necessary during

initial marksmanship training, was not being provided.

This kind of shift can occur Armywide in a POI as modifications are made

in response to budgetary and time constraints. It can also occur as a result

of honest, but uninformed attempts to improve the PO.

Not all such shifts occur at an Army-wide level, but may occur within a

using agency (e.g., ATC) or for an individual user (e.g., trainer). For

example, the four fundamentals of rifle marksmanship, an important part of the

new BRM POI, could become "an end in themselves." Ekmphasis could be placed on

their memorization rather than on understanding and correct application.

Another example is provided by firing with a protective mask. The weapon has

to be canted (tilted) so that the soldier can see through the sights. This

usually requires a cant of about 45 degrees. Efficiency has replaced

effectiveness if a soldier is taught an exact angle rather than being taught

to use least amount of cant permitting his use of the sights.

Managerial Implications. Recent developments within scientific and

applied literatures provide methods for insuring that both organizational

efficiency and organizational effectiveness are safeguarded during R&D product

development as well as during implementation and sustainment. A systems

approach to program development (see Figure 1) is one such means. This

approach requires systematic evaluation and feedback for each stage that

precedes program evaluation: Step 1 - Values or Needs; Step 2 - Specific

Goals; Step 3 - Program Requirements; Step J - Program Design; and Step 5 -

Program Implementation. Additionally this approach safeguards effectiveness

by making explicit the link between program evaluation and program revision

through a feedback discrimination and communication network that determines,

based on the evaluation, what program changes are needed and where they are

located in the system.

The fact that this approach requires evaluation and feedback for Step 1,

the organizational needs stage, is of particular importance for safeguarding

effectiveness. This requires that a POI as it is written and as it is being

used face the stringent requirements posed by questions such as: Does the

training deal with the problem it is supposed to? Would it work in the real

world? Did the needs analysis and the program developers ask the right

questions in the first place?

Unless a program is monitored during initial implementation as well as

throughout its use, program effectiveness may be subtly shifted and because of

other constraints, replaced by organizational efficiency. 7b prevent this,

two types of evaluation have been developed and are recommended in the

.' scientific literature: summative and formative evaluation.

Summative evaluation, the more common approach to program evaluation,

provides a summary statement about the general effectiveness of a program.

6

I.

................................................................................................................. .-
RIFLE MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING

Step 1

VALUES OR NEEDS

Military Preparedness

A nation of competent

shooters

A corps of civilian and/or

military instructors

Skilled shooters in the

military

PROGRAM REVISIONS SPECIFIC GOALS

Improved Basic Rifle

Make the necessary Marksmanship in the

Army

program changes (Initial entry training level)

FEEDBACK DISCRIMINATION PROGRAM REQUIRE4ENTS

& COMMUNICATION NETWORK Improve skill and

What changes needed? confidence, raise

Where in the system? qualification standards

PROGRAM EVALUATION PROGRAM DESIGN

Quality shooters in Eliminate problems

military? Is Army in fundamentals, in

marksmanship improved? diagnosis & remediation

Skill and confidence and in transition to

better? Problems combat firing

eliminated? Is program

practical & manageable?

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Sbw to train, what

cO mpromises, costs,

hours, use of devices,

etc.

Figure 1. A systems approach to program development.

7

.r 7 r,
The primary goal is to determine whether a program is achieving its intended

purpose, e.g., are soldiers who have completed the BRM POI accurate shooters?

This type of evaluation is performed only after the program has had sufficient

time to correct problems and function smoothly. Used primarily for reporting

purposes, a swUmative evaluation that uses a highly credible design and valid

measures of outcomes constitutes a research study (Mrris and Fitz-Gibbon,

1978).

Formative evaluation, developed for use throughout the entire

implementation process, is a proactive mode of management that provides a

means for systematically checking on both efficiency and effectiveness.

Formative evaluators systematically monitor program activities, periodically

test for progress in achievement, look out for potential problems, and

identify areas where the program needs improvement (Morris & Fitz-Gibbons,

1978). his permits identification of any program components that are

becoming disassociated from their underlying rationale. Additionally,

mechanisms for systematic feedback from users (e.g., trainers and their

commanders) are provided so that questions or reservations about the entire

POI or its components can be frankly expressed, permitting identification and

provision of needed explanations concerning program rationale. 9,

The shift toward inappropriate use of pop-up targets indicates that

formative evaluation in the form of periodic checks should continue throughout

the life of a POI rather than ending after the summative evaluation. Even

though both efficiency and effectiveness are being maintained at the time of

the sUmMative evaluation, which usually occurs after the program has time to

function smoothly, inappropriate shifts in the use of program components can

occur at a later time. At whatever point in the life-cycle of a program, all

proposed changes need to be evaluated in light of (a) the organizational needs

and values that provided impetus for the program and (b) the tmderlying

rationale for the program component under consideration.

8

* - . - ~,p

* * - % * b'5 ~b 4 ~ ~ .. *
Duplication of Effort Across the Change Process Phases

The current decentralized management of the change (ISD) process requires

nuerous persons responsible for management of the respective phases to

acquire extensive knowledge of POI purpose, tasks, conditions, standards, and

underlying rationale. Again using the B1#l POI as a specific example,

extensive knowledge of the POI was necessary for personnel in the Systems

Divison of DTD since they requested anticipated POI deviations, and made

decisions concerning deviation acceptability. Mditionally, at an IET

Conference, November 1980, the Systems Division briefed the new Bil POI,

including a presentation of the validating research and a ccmparison of the

new Bil POI with the then current POI. In March 1981, at a second IET

Conference, the Systems Division presented requested POI deviations and

responded on their acceptability. At the request of two ATCs (Fort Leonard

Wood, MO, and Fort Dix, NJ) the BRM POI project officer in the Systems

Division traveled with ARI-Fort Benning representatives to those ATCs to

discuss the Bil POI and its implementation.

Extensive knowledge of the BiM POI was also needed by personnel within

the Eklisted Division of DTD, USAIS, for two reasons. One, the BRM POI is

part of a new lET POI. Personnel in the Enlisted Division of DTD worked with

TRADOC HQ to organize two IET Conferences. A representative of this division

served on a TRADOC IET term which inspected IET program implementation at the

ATCs during Spring, 1981. All members of this term needed expert knowledge of

the Bil POI. Two, the IET Division of DTD has responsibility for the POIs for

ANCOC, BNCOC, and PNCOC. Full implementation of the BRM POI requires that

these POIs be coordinated with the new Bil POI.

Personnel in DOES, USAIS, will need extensive knowledge of the BRM POI to

effectively carry out their mission of program evaluation and standardization.

Managerial Implications. There are advantages to having numerous

personnel within USAIS and TRADOC HO with in-depth knowledge of a POI or other

R&D product, but the cost-effectiveness of such an approach must be a

considered. In a situation characterized by manpower shortages, heavy

workloads, and high personnel turbulence, the cost is high, although it may

not manifest itself directly or immediately. For example, personnel with

heavy workloads may obtain only enough knowledge to "get by," which may lead

to concurrence with suggested modification that function to impair short-term

or long-term effectiveness of the POI.

A possible solution is found in an approach known as "cradle to grave"

management (Montjoy & Holley, 1980). Used in Air Force base contracting for

large-dollar contracts that require extensive specialized knowledge and

complex administration, one person has responsibility for the contract from

beginning (cradle) to end (grave). With the person who wrote the contract

also administering it, the problem of duplication of learning effort is

*, avoided.

For R&D products of the importance and complexity of the BRM POI "cradle

to grave" responsibility could be tasked to one organizational unit. That

organizational unit would be responsible for managing all phases of the change

9
1. 7 . :* .- L: . U,.' , WVYW , WLUTW , , L U .V . .. * ,,--'- . ,- - * .- - . * V K

process: needs analysis, design, development, implementation, and control.

The control phase would include formative evaluation, but not summative

evaluation. Sunmative evaluation needs to be performed by an agency other

than the developer.

This approach would insure that program evaluation is grounded in the

originating needs and values, providing a safeguard against efficiency

overshadowing effectiveness. Mditionally, it wuld reduce the observed

duplication of effort across phases of the change process. An organizational

unit with this responsibility would need the budgetary and manpower resources

necessary to carry out its mission effectively. While this may appear

expensive, the cost must be evaluated against the cost-effectiveness of the

current procedures.

Duplication of learning would still exist. That is, many Army personnel

would have knowledge of the POI tasks, conditions, standards, and underlying

rationales. But it would be personnel who most need in-depth knowledge of the

P0I in order to carry out their job responsibilities.

,10

10 .'

.......... ,-o
m

DECENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

Management of the BHl POI implementation phase was decentralized.

Following delivery of the formal requirement for BRM POI implementation at the

ATCs, a decentralized organizational structure with few formalized processes

emerged. Decentralized management during implementation and sustainment of a

POI may have costly negative consequences. One possible explanation for this

is found in the increased coordination required by decentralization. In a

situation with manpower shortages and work overloads, there simply may not be

enough time to perform the necessary coordination. In an organization with a

high rate of personnel turbulence, there may not be adequate breadth of

knowledge concerning organizational policies and processes for achieving

coordination nor sufficient understanding of the coordination needs of a given

POI.

Another possible negative consequence of decentralized management of the

implementation phase has been identified by social psychologists. Darley &

Latane (1970) described an undesirable phenomenon known as "diffusion of

responsibility," which is likely to occur in situations where no one person

has the clearly designated responsibility for providing acutely needed help.

Research findings indicate that in such cases personal responsibility for

helping is not likely to be assumed by anyone, and the needed help probably

will not be forthcoming. While these results need additional testing to

establish generalizability to organizational processes, observations made

during B4 POI implementation suggest that decentralization of management and

diffusion of responsibilty produce analogous results. Each division or agency

may assume that other divisions and agencies are taking care of needed

implementation tasks. Each person is likely to do only his assigned tasks

leaving overall implementation management unattended. Further, and equally

detrimental, each person may assume that assigned tasks, policies, and

procedures, as they currently stand, will adequately accomplish R&D product implementation and sustainment when, in fact, they may not be adequate because

of unique characteristics of a given product, wide-spread effects of the

product across Army agencies, and other variables unique to the training

environment at the time. The results can be problems that unnecessarily

delay, impair, or threaten to degrade the demonstrated effectiveness of an R&D

product.

Negative consequences of decentralized management observed during the BRM

POI implementation were (a) duplication of effort among using agencies, (b) over-reliance on traditional implementation procedures, (c) suboptimal

coordination across all affected Army agencies, and (d) suboptimal use of

developer expertise.

Duplication of Effort Among Using Agencies

The wide-spread effects of BM POI implementation together with

decentralized management of the implementation phase resulted in several tasks

being repeated at numerous places throughout the Army. Two selected examples will be discussed: the development of training for resident range personnel

(Infantry Training Brigade and Infantry Training Group/Committee) and the

preparation and delivery of briefings on the BRM POI.

11

. . *.%.* . . . . *% -**

"' ' . '. '.-...'. . . -.-. " .. • "

.". ". ". . . . " .. "" , " " . '. ' . " ." " " " " " " " " .' . " " ." . ,' .
These examples were selected because of their relationship to

standardization and their critical role in BRM POI implementation and

sustainment success. Additionally, they demonstrate ways in which higher

command leadership can significantly facilitate timely, standardized

implementation.

Development of Training for Resident Range Personnel. The BRM POI was

specifically designed to give each IET soldier direct feedback on his

shooting performance, thereby providing opportunity for independent learning.

Even so, range personnel have a critical role in determining IET soldiers'

shooting performance. The BRM POI makes great demands on trainers in terms of

required knowledge, skills, and abilities.

After participating in an earlier (1978) BRM POI, ARI researchers

concluded that the most serious instructional problem was a general lack of

knowledge in marksmanship fundamentals on the part of the committee group and

drill sergeant instructors, who had "came through a similar thin, noninstructional, non-feedback marksmanship program themselves. They had not

seen firsthand the downrange effects of their bullets, and had received

little, if any, instruction in how to teach BRM" (Smith & Osborne, 1981). ARI

researchers concluded that the necessary experiences and knowledge required of

US Army marksmanship program trainers did not exist to permit the new program

to go to the field without resident cadre/committee group training (Osborne,

Schroeder, & Heller 1980).

Four apparent options were avilable to the Army for providing needed training prior to POI use at each ATC:

(1) Assume that any trainer ought to be able to read the BEM POI

materials and then, on his own, identify and develop the necessary

knowledge, skills, and abilities.

(2) Assume any company commander ought to be able to read the B34 POI

materials and then, on his own, develop and supervise a training

program for trainers under his command.

(3) Assume that each ATC will identify all personnel needing training,

identify knowledge, skills, and abilities to be trained, and develop

the necessary training.

(4) Develop a standardized training program to be exported to using

agencies (i .e., ATCs) that is based on a professional job analysis

that utilizes technical assistance of educational and marksmanship

experts as well as available technologies such as videotapes.

Because of the professionalism of individual trainers and their company

commanders, they can be relied on to produce the best possible "Train the

Trainer" program given time and resource constraints. Hbwever, the landmark

study by Gross, Giacquinta, and Bernstein (1971) clearly demonstrated that

leaving individuals or their commanders to identify knowledge, skills, and

abilities required of trainers by a new program and to develop a training

12

:: . - .... .----- *i **' -i. .. .I . . . .
*f -'Z WY W*W 4- r- - K,; W-. V,. ----- ,V -J -.

.-

program that would insure their achievement is not the best implementation

procedure. Specifically they found that this procedure ignores the need of

stimulating and professional leadership fram higher management when '.

subordinates, even professional ones, are learning new behaviors.

Additionally, higher levels of management (e.g., HQ MACON, USAIS) have access

to resources not available to individuals and their commanders, and in some

instances, not available to ATCs. Developed by higher levels of management,

the training program could be based on a professionally developed job

analysis, allowing minimum qualification standards for trainers to be set.

Educational experts could serve as technical assistants in the selection of

training methods (videotape lessons, TEC lessons, films, hands-on experience)

and in the development of tests to challenge the knowledge of trainers in

marksmanship and in teaching marksmanship. POI developers and proponents

could provide input on training content. While each ATC may have the capacity

for producing a "Train the Trainer" program, the questions of standardization

and cost-effectiveness argue for one effort to be exported Army-wide.

Development of such training programs for trainers can begin as soon as the

POI is officially approved by the proponent, facilitating the earliest

possible implementation.

Preparation of Briefings. Briefings on the new BRM POI were given at all

hierarchical levels of the Army's organizational structure, including a TRADOC

General Officers Meeting and IET Conferences. Within the ATCs, briefings were

given to key commanders and personnel in Infantry Training Brigades and

Infantry Training Committees/Groups. Initial briefings can serve critical

educative and persuasive functions. The education is necessary to insure

product standardization and to facilitate timely implementation. Successful

persuasion is especially important when initial attitudes toward a product are

being formed. Negative attitudes will be difficult, if not impossible, to

change. At whatever organizational level they exist, negative attitudes can

function to impair implementation and sustainment. Additionally, for the

BAN POI, much of the information could be more rapidly assimilated if

presented visually (e.g., slides, videotape) as well as verbally. For

example, new silhouette targets, arrangement of firing lanes, and new training

aids could be more rapidly and accurately understood if visually presented.

Given the important role and high frequency of initial briefings,

development of a standardized briefing appears warranted and cost-effective.

* When rapid and accurate understanding of a R&D product would be greatly

facilitated by visual information, development of an audiovisual briefing

appears efficacious.

Over-reliance on Traditional Implementation Procedures

Decentralization of management during the implementation phase placed

primary reliance for implementation on the formal requirement and official

changes in relevant field manuals (FMs) and POIs. This is in keeping with a

traditional view of management held not only by the Army but by many

academicians, organizational consultants, and organizational managers. Until

recently, it was widely assumed that given a formal requirement, subordinate

managers and other workers would implement a change in conformity with higher

management intentions. A formal requirement does have a critical role in

13
determining utilization of an R&D product (Zaltman, 1973; Scott, 1980), but

its limitations also need to be recognized. Although a formal requirement may

constitute a necessary prerequisite for successful initiation of R&D product

utilization, it is not sufficient for adequate implementation. Implicit in

the assumption that subordinate managers and other workers will implement a

change given a formal requirement are two additional assumption-.

The first is that if told what (e.g., tasks, conditions, and standards)

to implement, subordinates will know how to implement. That is, they will

know how to adequately identify and resolve issues involved in managing the

change. Additionally, they will have or be able to achieve in a costeffective, timely fashion any substantive knowledge and skills necessary to

carry out the change.

The second implicit assumption is that any problem in implementing the

change will be essentially one of overcoming organizational members' initial

resistance to change (Gross, Giaquinta, & Berstein, 1971). Given that any

initial resistance is overcone, the change is assumed to proceed relatively

smoothly.

Research evidence has seriously undermined the validity of these

assumptions (Zaltman, 1973; Gross, et. al., 1971). Indications are that

subordinates do not necessarily know how to adequately identify and resolve

issues involved in managing the change. Nor do they necessarily have access

to resources for performing managerial tasks or for obtaining substantive

knowledge required for implementing a given organizational change. Further,

even if subordinates initially have favorable attitudes toward a change,

resistance to change can develop if significant barriers to implementation

occur during the implementation process (Gross, et. al., 1971). Significant

barriers to implementation identified by Gross et. al. (1971) were: (1) lack

of clear understanding of the innovation, (2) teachers' lack of skills and

knowledge to carry out the innovation, (3) unavailability of required

materials and equipment, and (4) organizational arrangements existing prior to

and during the innovation's introduction that were incompatible with the

innovation.

Emphasis within the implementation literature has moved toward tailoring

implementation processes to the training environment and the characteristics

of the specific innovation. There was some evidence of this in the BRM POI

implementation. A Trainer's Guide and a Shooter's Book were specifically

designed to be used with the BRM POI. At the request of two ATCs,

representatives of the developer and the proponent agencies traveled to the

ATCs to facilitate implementation. Prior to implementation, a TRADOC IET

inspection teem visited each ATC for approximately two days.

Two additional opportunities existed to further tailor the implementation

process to the training environment and the characteristics of the BIM POI.

While not utilized, they demonstrate additional implementation procedures

availaole to the Army. Scientific and applied literatures have clearly established the need for assessing the potential contribution of such methods

to utilization of specific R&D products.

14
Model Program. The 1st Infantry Training Brigade, Fort Benning, GA,

initiated the new BRM POI on 7 January 80, which was twelve months prior to

implementation at Fort Leonard Wood and Fort Knox and 21 months prior to

implementation at the other five ATCs. Recognizing the unique opportunity

provided by the early implementation of the BRM POI in the 1st Infantry

Training Brigade, ARI-Benning recommended that a BRM POI Conference be held at

Fort Benning. Unfortunately, the recommendation was not implemented due to

budgetary constraints and reliance on traditional implementation methods.

The value of a model program has been established. Glaser and his

colleagues (1967) demonstrated that if potential users attend a conference

where they can discuss an innovation and see it in operatoin, adoption will be

significantly facilitated. This approach was especially promising because the

ATCs are widely dispersed geographically. Communication decreases markedly

with increasing distance, and with decreased communication comes diminished

understanding, diminished trust, and greater resistance to the thrusts of the

"outside" organization (Roberts and Froham, 1978). Inviting key personnel

from each ATC to a conference at Fort Benning would have encouraged two-way

communication between users and the proponent as well as between the users and

the developer. Additionally, it would have encouraged communication among key

personnel at the ATCs. This would have encouraged shared solutions to common

implementation problems.

A model program also permits the use of visual as well as verbal information related to POI implementation management (e.g., arrangement of firing

lanes, target placement, concurrent training station arrangements) . In

addition, visual information can be given on POI substantive content (e.g.,

effects of wind and gravity on bullet strike, use of long range sight with 25M

silhoutte target). Visual information would permit rapid assimilation at a

critical time for facilitating implementation.

Mobile Training Team (MTT). One other implementation procedure that is

especially promising in the case of widely dispersed using agencies is Mobile

Training Teams (MTT), which would be TDA units responsible for (a) conducting

briefings to introduce a new R&D product to key officers (i.e., Brigade

Commanders and above) as well as to personnel who are the trainers (Company

Commanders and Cadre) at each using organization; (b) providing technical

assistance and advice to each installation on management of implementation and

sustainment; (c) conducting model "Train the Trainer" programs or providing

technical assistance and advice for use of self-instructing "Train the

Trainer" programs; (d) monitoring implementation and sustainment and providing

relevant feedback to the using agency and to higher organizational levels

(e.g., HQ MACOMs, USAIS); (e) informing program proponents of improvements

developed by using agencies; and (f) providing technical assistance and advice

to all Army agencies affected by or involved with the implementation in order

to facilitate Army-wide integration.

The knowledge, skills, and abilities required of members of a Mobile

Training Team (MTT) are extensive. As an example, to qualify as a member of a

MTT for the BRM POI a person would need subject matter expertise in

marksmanship; history of RM training in the US Army; current RM training in

other countries; tasks, conditions, standards, and underlying rationale of the

15

-" ." ,, -''i :- , a ''mm -a-. '" -''" "'' '" h' ' '' ' In W ''-/ ":' J-" " " '- -- ' '''J '";Ji m ''' - ' t : ._., - =-! ', ". '--
POI; validation research design and research findings; M16A1 design and

capability; M16A1 ammunition design and capability; how to teach BRM in the

IET environment; and management of BN4 POI implementation and sustainment.

Management issues include optimal utilization of range personnel,

standardization of record fire scoring procedures (e.g., acceptable abilities,

if any), re-cycling soldiers who do not qualify; reducing the number of

soldiers who miss one or more training sessions; assistance for a soldier who

has missed a session; optimal use of Weaponeer and/or other training aids;

supplemental training to be provided by Infantry Training Brigade; and optimal

use of concurrent training. I.

Equipping MTT members with such knowledge would be costly. Adding this

to the cost of sending the teams to widely dispersed using agencies makes this

a costly procedure (when compared with not sending the teams). But the cost

of not sending them needs to be considered. The extensive knowledge and

skills needed by HTT members are also the knowledge and skills needed by

trainers and their commanders at using agencies. An effective way of getting

it to them must be found if program implementation and sustainment are to

succeed even minimally.

Suboptimal Coordination Across All Affected Army Agencies

Utilization of an R&D product may have consequences and managerial

implications beyond the primary or targeted using agencies. Certainly this is

true of the BFll POI. While the first major impact of the new BEN POI was on

ATCs with an IET mission, its total effects are potentially much more far- v

reaching, including all active and Reserve Component Units and all Army

Service Schools. Proactive, systematic management of these effects would

optimize attainment of maximum returns from R&D investments. One, it would

insure full, coordinated support of product implementation and sustainment

within primary using agencies by other key Army organizations. Two, it would

insure that potential contributions of the research to Army organizations

other than the primary users would be identified and optimized.

Specific effects of the BRM POI beyond the ATCs are the result of:

(1) The reciprocal relationship between BRM training and unit training. 16

(2) The potential contribution of Army training programs for trainers

and their commanders to BRM POI implementation and sustainment.

(3) The need for systematic identification and correction of obsolete

materials and training aids.

(4) The usefulness of BRM training materials and aids to rifle

marksmanship training throughout the Amy.

Reciprocal Relationship Between BRM Training and Unit Training. Unit

training builds on the BRll POI and, in turn, some soldiers who go through unit

training later become IET trainers. Since the BRH POI produces soldiers with

known skills, it provides a standardized base for unit marksmanship training

programs. Information concerning the skill level of soldiers completing IET

" 16

C *, . . . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . .°
must be effectively communicated to commanders of other Army MACOH and RC

units in order for them to adequately assess unit training needs. While

ARI-Fort Benning and DTD, USAIS, are developing a unit marksmanship POI,

commanders will need an overall picture of the content and rationale of the

BEN POI to fully understand and adequately use the unit program.

Because some soldiers who go through unit training later become IET

trainers, coordination between BRM and unit training is needed to insure that

trainers have come through a strong rifle marksmanship program themselves

(Smith & Osborne, 1980). While developing the BR4 POI, ARI-Benning researchers noted the general lack of knowledge and skill in marksmanship on

the part of drill sergeant and committee/group personnel. This was attributed

to ineffective marksmanship programs through which these personnel had come

(Smith, Osborne, Thompson, 1980; Osborne, Schroeder, and Heller, 1980).

Potential Contribution of Army Training Programs for Trainers and Their

Commanders to R&D Product Implementation and Sustainment. Unit training is

not the only Army training program that could support the BRM POI. The

critical role of trainers and their commanders in determining BR4 POI success

suggests that optimal implementation management would address this. Train the

Trainer Programs should be developed and implemented in all officer and NCO

professional development courses (Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, NCOES,

Pre-Command Courses, and possible a local course at each Army Training

Center). This would facilitate selection of targets for command inspection

that are directly related to the primary training mission as was emphasized by

GEN Meyer.

Coordination of the Pre-Command Course POI with newly developed POIs,

such as the BiR4 POI, would significantly facilitate valid inspection target

selection. Additionally, coordination between Pre-Command Courses and the

organizations providing training for trainers would insure that commanders are

taught to inspect the same tasks, conditions, and standards that trainers are

taught to carry out. Priorities for training inspection would be in accord

with priorities for training.

Having identified all relevant training agencies, major questions for

implementation management are: (1) What training should these agencies provide to support the new POI? (2) When should the training be initiated

* for optimal support of initial POI implementation? (3) Hbw can revision of

the commander and trainer POIs be facilitated within this optimal framework?

For example, the pre-command course at Fort Jackson, SC has added a two-hour

unit on training inspection. Because of time limitations and the wide

diversity of commands, this unit is being limited to generic issues. Hbwever,

it could be supplemented with materials for specific POIs. These materials

could include literature (e.g., fact sheets), audiovisuals for selfinstruction, and inspection checklists. In some cases it may be efficacious

to include the development of training materials for commanders and trainers

in the POI developer's contract. Having the POI developer and proponent

involved in the development of the training materials has the advantage of

facilitating emphasis on the correct priorities since they are subject matter

experts on the POI objectives, tasks, standards, and conditions.

17

- .
With effective coordination of all POIs that address BRM POI subjects,

these BRM standards can possibly be identified as major performance objectives

for officer and NCO duty assigments and may possibly be used within Officer

and NCO efficiency reporting system.

Need for Systematic Identification of and Remedial Action in Relation to

All Obsolete Material and Training Aids. bservation of the BiIl POI

implementation revealed the need for coordination across affected Army

agencies to identify all materials (e.g., TEC lessons, training aids, field

manuals) that will become obsolete with the adoption of a new POI or other R&D

product. A systematic search for obsolete materials and their removal or

revision needs to be included in implementation management. Conservations

with range personnel indicated that they experience frustration when obsolete

material is not revised or removed in a timely manner. Comments made to ARI

personnel indicated that range personnel are very knowledgeable about Army

marksmanship documents and that they want to abide by Army doctrine. Hbwever,

when obsolete materials are not revised or removed, range personnel feel

caught in a bind between two or more conflicting sources of doctrine. While

none of the observed frustrations was extreme, each can contribute to turning

initially positive attitudes toward a POI to negative ones. Gross, et. al.

(1971) clearly demonstrated that frustrations of this type can impair program

effectiveness.

Usefulness of BRM Training Materials and Aids to RM Training Throughout

the Army. Many of the BF4 POI training procedures and aids are useful for

advanced rifle marksmanship training, including but not limited to the 25

meter scaled silhouette zeroing target, other scaled silhouette targets, the

Riddle device, the Paige device, and dry fire procedures. Additionally, much

of the POI substantive content is directlyy applicable to advanced

marksmanship training, including but not limited to, information on the

effects of wind and gravity on bullet strike, target detection, firing with

the protective mask, night firing, automatic firing, M16A1 capability, and

maintenance of the M16A1 rifle. Again, proactive, systematic leadership on

the part of higher management levels of the Army is needed for disseminating

these materials, aids, and information throughout the Army.

.

4 'a

5 5%~
buboptimal Use of Developer Expertise

At the risk of having the authors' motives for writing this section

questioned, it is nevertheless included for three compelling reasons:

(1) An important issue concerning optimal use of developer expertise was

perceived during BE4 POI implementation. Because of its importance

to organizational effectiveness, the Army needs to confront and

resolve the issue.

(2) The issue exists whether a RED product is developed "in-house"

(e.g., by personnel in Systems Division, DTD, USAIS) or by a

Department of Defense Laboratory (e.g., ARM) or by a contractor. ,a

(3) Observations made during BIN POI development and implementation are

relevant to the on-going discussion within the research community

concerning the role of researchers in research utilization.

Indications from these observations are that provision of technical

assistance by researchers is not only a legitimate role, but in fact

ought to be a professional responsibility. Participation in 2

research utilization may not be as optional for the researcher as

the discussion has implied.

Areas of Developer ExPertise. Through their work in an area, developers

tend to become experts in that area. Researchers at ARI-Benning and Littonellonics (ARI-Benning contractor) became subject matter experts (SMES) in the

following areas as they developed and validated the BM POI:

(a) rifle marksmanship and marksmanship training

(b) rifle marksmanship ranges, targets, training aids and equipment

(c) BAN POI tasks, conditions, standards, and the rationale underlying

program components

(d) roll of BRHM POI in unit readiness and US Army military preparedness

(e) BRM training management and instruction

(F) M16A1 design, capability, and maintenance

These researchers also became knowledgeable about current rifle

marksmanship training in the US Marines, Australia, Germany, Great Britain,

and Russia.

For the Army, an important issue is how such broad, indepth knowledge can

be optimally used? This expertise is of potential benefit in two obvious

areas: the implementation and sustainment of the BM POI as well as other

areas where decisions are being made related to infantry rifles and

marksmanship training.

19

%.- %" "- --- . " ,% " - " . ," " .. ." . ... ." o * . %a' . "a a
Provision of technical assistance during Implementation of an R&D product

is recognized as a needed, legitimate role for developers. during the BM4 P01

implementation, however, requests and needs for technical assistance far

exceeded manpower, time, and budgetary resources. Researchers at ARI found

themselves in a bind similar to that faced by personnel in the Systems

Division, DTD, USAIS: having completed the validation of the B84 F0I,

researchers needed to move on to the development and validation of other POIs,

specifically in this case, the Advanced Rifle Marksmanship (ARM) and unit

marksmanship POIs. HDwever, their expertise W8s needed for BlM P0I

implementation by the ATCs. The bind was especially difficult since ARM and

unit marksmanship POIs build on the BM POI. Until the EN POI is

successfully implemented, validated ARM and unit training POIs are impaired.

ARI-Fort Benning and Systems Division, DTD, USAIS, provided extensive

technical assistance during B4 POI implementation through responses to phone

inquiries, publication of articles, distribution of technical reports, visits

to two ATCs, and assistance with the Cadre Training Center's P01. Since there

was no systematic plan for integrating their expertise into the implementation

process, it is doubtful that developer expertise was optimally utilized.

Potential Uses for Developer Expertise. The expert knowledge of

developers could make significant contributions to each of the four

implementation processes included in the Gray and toberts-Gray (1980) model

for organizational and individual change: power, persuasion, education, and

facilitation.

(a) Power. While developers have either limited or no formal command

power, they have power that derives from subject matter expertise (French and

Raven, 1960). This power base is very effective in "selling" or persuading

users of the value of a Pal. Persuasion is critical during the early stages

of implementation when initial attitudes about the P01 are being formed. As

already noted, initial impresions may be difficult, if not impossible, to

change. Developers may assist through direct contact with users or by

providing technical assistance for the development of audiovisuals and other

literature to be used in the numerous briefings that occur throughout all

affected agencies. Additionally, developers can provide invaluable assistance

in training mobile training teams (MTTs).

(b) Persuasion. Developers are thoroughly familiar with the

organizational needs which provided impetus for a product, how the product

meets those needs, the rationale for program components, and the research data

that support the program. Questions posed to Systems, DrD, USAIS, and ARIFort Benning during BHM POI implementation at the ATCs indicated that this

kind of information was needed by users to assess the value of the POI. For

example, the position that the new qualification standard is more difficult

was challenged. The lack of a reference point on the zeroing target was

questioned as was the need for re-zeroing the M16A1 rifle when firing with a

bipod. These questions came from dedicated, interested professionals who

wanted evidence that the program had been carefully thought through and

tested.

2

20

; f .;. : '- .. -. *"-.-v.... .. -.. ,..."."" .'.......,".".."":"-
(c) Education. Developers are an excellent source of data for job

analyses of trainer positions. Developers also have a valuable contribution

to make when organizational policies and procedures are being designed to

prevent undesirable gradual shifts in the use of program components, resulting

in the components becoming ends in themselves rather than being a means to an

end, such as the development of accurate shooters.

(d) Facilitation. Gray and Roberts-Gray (1980) point out that contact

between the developer and the user facilitates implementation and sustainment.

The large number of user-developer contacts initiated by users during the BRM

POI implementation indicated that this contact needs to be systematically

arranged. In scientific literature, it is recognized as a key part of

formative evaluation. Another potentially valuable contribution is the

development of a checklist for resident commanders to use in inspecting each

period of the POI.

Developer Responsibility in Product Utilization. Events during the BRH POI

implementation indicated that not only is there a need for developers to be

available to assist during implementation, but they may in fact have a

responsibility for taking a proactive role. In developing and validating the

BRH POI, ARI researchers became aware of the need for several managerial

actions that could significantly contribute to Implementation and sustainment

success. Three examples are clarification of the roles of D-ill Sergeants and

Infantry Taining Group/Committee personnel, intensive training for all range

personnel prior to POI implementation at the ATCs, and the use of Fort Benning

as a model program. Seeing the critical facilitating role of these actions,

ARI researchers actively communicated the need for them to the POI proponent

through letters (see Appendix B), technical reports, verbal suggestions, and

an informal paper. Because of budget and manpower constraints as well as

reliance on traditional implementation procedures, ARI's suggestions were not

utilIzed.

While a systematic procedure for overall implementation and sustainment

management at higher organizational levels would help assure that such needs

are identified and responded to in a timely manner, it may be that researchers

need to use even more effective means of communications with R&D product

proponents and users. One powerful potential is the staff study, a

traditional method within the Army for making recommendations to a commander.

The staff study (FM 101-5) presents in concise form the problem,

assumptions, facts bearing on the problem, discussion, conclusions, and action

recommended. These are supported by documentation in annexes. The commander,

if concurring, can imediately "sign off" on the recommendation, which is the

authorization needed to bring about the recommended action. An obvious

strength of this approach is that the researcher has presented the recommendation in the ry's decision making language and format. The preparation of

staff studies is clearly outside the traditional role of researchers, but researchers need to re-evaluate their role and responsibilities when the

research has been designed to solve an operational problem and when researchers develop expertise and insights that can contribute, not only to

successful utilization of their research, but to total organizational

effectiveness.

21

-I.
Observation of the BEN POI implementation revealed that, in this case at

least, developers became subject matter experts (SMEs) in several areas and

are qualified to make valuable contributions to the Army, not only in POI

implementation and sustainment, but also in other areas. Given this, it is

hard to justify removing developers from a project immediately after the

product development is completed. It is probable that the need for researcher

expertise will be high whenever the research is conducted to solve an

operational problem. sufficient time and funding need to be included either

in the researcher's contract or the developer's job description to permit full

utilization of this expertise.

4 .m

'I

o%

,°.

22

W.

L.
DISCUSSION iJ

Throughout this report information, whether from observations of the BRM

POI change process or from the scientific and applied literatures, has pointed

toward two related conclusions. One is the need for centralized management of

R&D product development and utilization, including in particular the

implementation phase. The second is the critical role of higher

organizational levels in the management of the entire process and of every

phase of the process. The advocated proactive role by higher management need

not diminish the local command authority of using agencies; in fact, it

probably will have the exact opposite result. It will likely strengthen and

support local command. Following issuance of a formal requirement for

implementation, centralized management could be retained by higher

organizational management. However, implementation processes other than power

ones can then be used, specifically educative, persuasive, and facilitative

processes. This is not to say that "power" processes will no longer be needed

or recommended. They may be critical. However, utilization of educative,

persuasive, and facilitative management processes will decrease the

probability that additional power processes will be needed. The point being

made here is that management processes and necessary resources should be made

available to permit strong leadership from higher management throughout the

entire change process, and this, in turn, strengthens local command.

One other issue important to the Army is that of Who should be

responsible for centralized management of R&D product development and

utilization.

In their model of organizational and individual change developed for the

Army unit training environment, Gray and Roberts-Gray (1980) assume that the

developer or the sponsor will function as implementation manager or "change

agent." Their model further assumes that the developer or the sponsor of an

innovation has the resources and discretion to act as an effective change

agent. Cbservations made during the BRM POI implementation revealed that this

assumption may not be justified. Neither the developer, ARI-Fort Benning, nor

the proponent, USAIS, had the funds, manpower, or discretion to engage in the

needed broad-scale implementation processes. DTD, USAIS, has limited

personnel who are responsible for producing numerous P0Is and carrying out

many other actions. Hving produced a POI, personnel experience continuous,

urgent pressure and incentives to move on to producing others. At best

limited funds can be converted to implementation support. Given the widespread effects of the B114 POI across MACOHS and the resulting complex

management requirements, it is doubtful that the developer or proponent will

be given the broad resource allocation and decision making authority necessary

to act as an effective agent.

A possible solution to the problem of assigning responsibility for

management of R&D product development and utilization will be provided to

demonstrate possibilities available to the Army. This particular one provides

a means for working through recognized command structure. As described, it is

an elaborate procedure, but it can be modified to fit a particular FAD product

and the relevant organizational structure.

23

., % ,, _. . . ,- _ ./ , -, .,, , .. .* . . . . , % , , -!, 4 . , . . *. . . . -.. .. , . , .. . . . . . ... , . . ,*' ... ., . * , ..
L7,*

The approach, reported by Rbberts and Frohman (1978) has been modified

for the Army training system. A representative of the proponent (e.g.,

project manager) serves as manager or "change agent" and has the clearly

designated responsibility for overseeing and coordinating the total change

process. The project manager heads a team composed of working-level members

(e.g., BMI Chiefs) from each affected agency (ATCs). The project manager

reports to a coordinating board on which sits one high-ranklng member from

each affected agency (e.g., ATC). Each agency's board representative is

someone with broad resource allocation and decision making authority. The

coordinating board would meet periodically during all phases of the change

process to review progress and revise milestones.

The structure of this approach would need to be varied as a function of

the number of affected MACOHs and the inter-relationships of affected agencies

within MACOMs. In the case of the BR4 POI the project manager would have

worked with a coordinating board for each affected MACOM. More than one team

composed of working-level members might be needed. This procedure centralizes

management. It provides a formal organizational structure and processes for

identification and minimization, if not elimination, of potential barriers to

product development implementation, and sustainment at both higher

organizational levels and within using agencies. It would also facilitate the earliest possible implementation.

'-6

1%.

24
APPENDIX A

r, ~POI IMPLEMENTATION AND SUSTAINMENT CHECKLIST '

9 9

K2

25 -

I-

--.

.9 9.-"- **9.. .
POI IMPLEMENTATION AND SUSTAINMENT CHECKLIST

Objectives:

1. To insure timely, standardized, successful initial implementation.

2. Tb insure full, coordinated support of initial program

implementation and sustainment of that program at primary using agencies.

3. To optimize contributions of the program and its supporting research

to all Army agencies.

Implementation at Primary Using Agencies:

1. Provide adequate initial communication about the new POI.

a. Provide communication that will "sell" the new POI as personnel

are forming initial attitudes about it.

b. Arrange for two-way communication between developers/proponents

and using agencies.

c. Arrange for communication among key personnel at using agencies

to facilitate sharing solutions to common implementation

problems.

d. Utilize available implementation techriques such as model

programs and mobile training teams.

2. Identify and produce needed supplemental materials for commanders,

trainers, and soldiers (e.g., Trainer's Guide, Shooter's Book).

3. Identify implementation management issues and provide suggestions to

appropriate personnel at using agencies:

a. Facilities required; modifications needed in current

facilities.

b. Manpower utilization alternatives (e.g., assign committee group

personnel to a specific range or have them move with the

soldiers from range to range).

c. Materials, training aids, and equipment required.

(1) How and when these can be obtained.

(2) Amounts needed (e.g., number of zeroing targets per 1000

soldiers.

d. Optimal use of training aids (e.g., Weaponeer, Riddle device).

26

i . - i.i i
e. Reducing number of soldiers who miss one or more training

sessions. Assistance for soldiers who do miss sessions.

f. Management for soldiers who are unsuccessful in the program.

g. Scheduling training sessions.

4. Provide training for resident commanders by developing a

standardized briefing to be exported to using agencies. inphasize:

(1) Purpose of POI

(2) Rationale underlying program components

(3) Training inspection priorities

5. Provide a training inspection checklist for each POI session.

6. Provide self-instructing, audiovisual training for resident

trainers. anphasize:

(1) New POI substantive content

(2) How to teach in the specific training environment

7. Insure that trainers and commanders assigned in the future will be

qualified in the new POI.

a. As soon as the new POI has been adopted, identify all Army

agencies that need to be coordinated with the new POI (e.g.,

Pre-Command Course, Drill Sergeant Schools, ANCOC, BNCOC,

PNCOC, unit training).

b. Notify personnel responsible for trainer/commander POIs of the

need for revision.

c. Supply information and other support to get trainer/commander

POIs revised in a timely manner, preferably some time prior to

the initial implementation date for the new POI.

d. Supply appropriate support materials for the trainer/commander

POIs, such as fact sheets and training inspection checklists.

Audiovisuals developed for resident trainers and commanders

could easily be edited for use in trainer/commander training

agencies.

8. Arrange for formative evaluation during implementation and

sustainment. Formative evaluation should:

a. Systematically monitor the program at all using agencies.

27

;................ . . .....-.... . .... ... ...... ... ........... ...... :... , '..- ,..-..........-.......... ]
ST' - p . -". W7

b. Periodically test for progress in achievement (e.g., Are

soldiers shooting more accurately?).

c. Look out for potential problems (e.g., Are required training

aids available? Is efficiency overshadowing effectiveness?

Are program components becoming "an end in themselves?"). .-

d. Identify areas where the program needs improvement (Is some

session or program component not working out as expected?).

9. Identify and appropriately correct (remove, revise, modify) all

obsolete information, materials, and training aids (e.g., TEC

lessons, field manuals, old Paige devices, shot group diagnosis

cards). This action is most effectively accomplished prior to

initial implementation of the POI at using agencies.

10. Arrange for an external audit (summative evaluation) of the program

by DOES after the program has had time to correct problems and

function smoothly.

Utilization in Other Army Agencies:

Identify and disseminate information, materials, and training aids

resulting from development of the new POI to Army agencies other than the

primary users that can benefit from them.

2.

i

il.

,'.-
APPENDIX B

SUGGESTIONS FOR FIELD IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

M16A1 RIFLE MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING PROGRAM

29
PERI-IJ 13 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Field Implementation of the Ml6AI Rifle Marksmanship

Training Program

1. ARI-Benning's role in implementing the new marksmanship program is rapidly

diminishing, but we wish to call attention to some of the details of implementation that might be overlooked.

2. Program Implementation at the Army Training Centers.

a. ARI-Benning suggests that the best way to guarantee rapid and effective

implementation of the new marksmanship program is: 1) to bring relevant personnel from the other eight Army Training Centers (ATC) conducting Initial Entry

Training to Fort Benning to observe the "model" program in operation at the

Infantry Training Brigade, 2) to train them in all features of the new program

and 3) to send them back to their posts with full packets of implementing

information (procedures, training scripts, range modifications, target samples,

ett.). It is our feeling that without proper orientation, under controlled

conditions at Fort Benning, many of the beneficial effects of the new program

could be lost as it is fielded. Each ATC or similar user will make necessary

local decisions to place the program into operation on existing ranges. Our

concern is that USAIS, through indoctrination of cadre members from user

installations, teach the basic concepts of the program to minimize improper

decisions.

b. The advantages of the new program are based, in part, on an instructor

cadre of professionals who understand the concepts of rifle marksmanship and

who are able to transmit them to trainees. To be candid, the necessary experience

and knowledge required of US Army marksmanship instructors does not exist in

sufficient quantity to permit the new program to go to the field without resident cadre training. The new instructor's manual has been designed to fill

the knowledge gap that has developed over the last fifteen or more years. The

instructor's manual c.annot fill the gap by itself. The experience we've had

with committee group personnel suggests that instructors, while motivated,

need considerable attention and practice to attain the skills necessary to

train marksmen.

c. We are aware that very limited training time and resources are available

to produce US Army marksmen, however, adequately prepared instructors are

critical to efficient and effective exp'nditure of these resources. Those

marksmanship personnel brought to and trained at Fort Benning could become

instructors in a "train the trainer" program back at their posts and could save

a great deal of travel by Fort Benning personnel trying to get the new marksmanship program operational.

30

t2.• . A
PERI-IJ 13 June 1980

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Field Implementation of the M16A1 Rifle Marksmanship

Training Program

3. Additional Program Support.

a. Manuals are already being revised to bring them into accord with the

new program but there are clear media implications that should be thought

through. What are the best ways to get material across to the student? Should

films of any program parts be prepared (eg., capability of the weapon,

assembly/disassembly, firing positions)?

b. Another important area is what corrections are needed in current TEC

lessons (and other exportable training materials) and what new material should

be developed to support the new marksmanship program.

c. Care needs to be taken to insure that each training course that deals

with marksmanship or its training is corrected/modified to agree with the new

program.

4. ARI has few resources to aid in carrying out any of this work but would

willingly advise on such matters within our expertise. We would al-o appreciate

the opportunity to review any new or revised products to aid in achieving program consistency and continuity.

SEWARD SMITH, Ph.D.

Research Psychologist

3'

31 "

5'

5-

* S %.
REFERENCES

Aiken, M., Bacharach, S.B., & French, J.L. Organizational structure, work

process, and proposal making in administrative bureaucracies. Academy of

Management Journal, 1980, 23, 631-652.

Carroll, J. A note on department autonomy and innovation in medical schools.

Journal of Business, 1967, 4O, 531-534.

Cetron, M. Technology transfer, where we stand today. In H.F. Davidson, M.

Cetron, and J. Goldbar (Ms.), Technology Transfer. Leiden: Noorhoff

Publishing, 1973.

Darle, J., & Latane, B. Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of

responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 8,

377-383.

French, J. & Raven, B. The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.),

Studies in social power. Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research,

1959.

Gartner, J. & Naiman, C. Overcoming the barriers to technology transfer.

Research Management, 1976, 19, 22-28.

Glaser, E., Coffey, H. Marks, J., & Sarson, I. Utilization of applicable

research and demonstration results. Los Angeles: Hunan Interaction

Research Institute, 1967.

Gray, T. & ioberts-Gray, C. A strategy for coping with change:

organizational innovations: a sociological analysis of planned

educational change. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971.

Gross, N., Giacquinta, J., & Bernstein, M. Implementing organizational

innovations: a sociological analyslis of planned educational change. New

York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971.

Human Interaction Research Institute and National Institute of Mental Health.

Putting Knowledge to Use: A Distillation of the Literature Regarding

Knowledge Transfer and Change. Los Angeles: Human Interaction Research

Institute, 1976.

March, J. & Simon, H. On rationality in organizations. In E.P. Hollander &

R.G. Hunt (Eds.), Classic contributions to social psychology. New York:

Oxford University press, 1972.

Montjoy, R., & Holley, J. A study of base contracting organization (Air Fbrce

contract). Auburn: Office of Public Service and Research, Auburn

University, cbtober, 1980.

Morris, L., & Fitz-Gibbon, C. How to measure program implementation. Beverly

Hills: Sage Publications, 1978.

32 a

U-,

%-.1
- - , *.F * ~ ~ ~T - °

Osborne, A., Schroeder, J., & Heller, F. Training effectiveness analysis for

infantry weapons systems: Evaluation of the basic rifle marksmanship

program of instruction. Research report, ARI, October, 1980.

ROberts, E., & FRohman, A. Strategies for improving research utilization.

Technology Review, March/April, 1973, 33-39.

Sapoisky, H. Organizational structure and innovations. The Journal of

Business, 1967, 40, 497-410.

Scott, T. Tactical training for ground combat forces. Armed Forces and

Society, 1980, 6, 215-231.

Shepard, H. Innovation-resisting and innovation-producing organizations. The

Journal of Business, 1967, 40, 470-477.

Smith, S., & Osborne, A. Toubleshooting rifle marksmanship. Infantry, July-August, 1981, 1-7. '.

Zaltman, G., & Duncan, R. Strategies for planned change. New York: John

Wiley and Sons, 1977.

Zaltman, G., Duncan, R., & Whobek, J. Innovations and organizations. New

York: John Wiley & ASons, 1973.

33

33

, ,.'U _ #" = , . , ,. .. ,IW, ,. -64',.t, ... " • - - - ' " - - . . . . . , ' - . . .. . •.
GLOSSARY

BRM Basic rifle marksmanship

POI Program of instruction

ARI US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

So iences

ARI-Benning US Army Research Institute Field Unit, Fort Benning, GA

R&D Research and development

TRADOC US Army Taining and Doctrine Command

FORSCCM US Army Forces Command

MACOM Major commands of US Army such as TRADOC and FORSCOM

HQ Headquarters

USAIS US Army Infantry School

IET Initial Entry Training

RM Rifle Marksmanship - This includes fundamentals, knowledge,

skill and abilities

URM Unit Rifle Marksmanship

ARM Advanced rifle marksmanship

ATCs US Army Taining Centers which include Forts Benning, GA; Bliss,

TX; Dix, NJ; Gordon, GA; Jackson, SC; Knox, KY; Leonard Wood,

MO; McClellan, AL; and Sill, OK.

MTT Mobile Training Team. A concept introduced in the report.

Modeled after NETT (New Equipment Training Team), these teams

would be TDA units responsible for providing extensive expert . assistance with the implementation and sustainment of an RD

* product.

DTD Directorate of Taining Development, USAIS

ISD Instructional systems Development, the organizational change

model which guides research development and utilization within

USAIS. The model has five phases: analysis, design,

development, implementation, and control.

DEV Directorate of Evaluation, USAIS. While this Directorate is now

the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardication (DOES), at the

time of the BRM POI implementation at the ATCs it was DEV.

34

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DOES Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization. See 13EV.

DA Department of the Army.

CTC Cadre Training Center

V.

35a