J-S15022-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

MICHAEL A. GLOVER 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1044 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 17, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003669-2016 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

MICHAEL A. GLOVER 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1045 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 17, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003670-2016 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

MICHAEL A. GLOVER 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1046 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 17, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003671-2016 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 
J-S15022-24 

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 v. 

MICHAEL A. GLOVER 

 Appellant 

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: No. 1047 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 17, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003672-2016 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

MICHAEL A. GLOVER 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1048 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 17, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003675-2016 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

MICHAEL GLOVER 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1049 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 17, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008021-2016 

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
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MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 1, 2024

Appellant Michael Glover appeals from the order denying his first Post 

Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant raises multiple claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel. We affirm. 

The underlying facts are well known to the parties. See

Commonwealth v. Glover, Nos. 2696 EDA 2018 et al., 2019 WL 6652035, 

at *1-3 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished mem.). Briefly, Appellant was 

charged with multiple offenses at six separate docket numbers after he 

physically assaulted his ex-girlfriend (the victim), damaged her property, and 

violated an order entered pursuant to the Protection from Abuse (PFA) Act.2 

See id. at 2019 WL 6652035, at *1-2. The incidents giving rise to the charges 

occurred on February 1, March 1, March 12, and March 14, 2016. See id. 

Additionally, during the March 12, 2016 incident, Appellant tried to hit the 

victim’s sister with his car while she was standing in the street, and later 

Appellant’s car struck the victim’s car while the victim and her sister were 

inside. See id. at *2. 

A prior panel of this Court summarized the procedural history as follows: 

Following a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the 

following crimes: 

 at CP-51-CR-0003675-2016 (hereinafter “Docket Number 

3675-2016”), robbery, theft by unlawful taking, receiving 

____________________________________________ 

1

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 

2

 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122. 
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stolen property, possessing instruments of crime (“PIC”), 

simple assault, and harassment; 

 at CP-51-CR-0008021-2016 (hereinafter “Docket Number 

8021-2016”), stalking, terroristic threats, and harassment; 

 at CP-51-CR-0003669-2016 (hereinafter “Docket Number 

3669-2016”), stalking, contempt for violation of order or 

agreement, terroristic threats, and harassment; 

 at CP-51-CR-0003670-2016 (hereinafter “Docket Number 

3670-2016”), aggravated assault, stalking, contempt for 

violation of order or agreement, PIC, simple assault, 

recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”), and 

harassment; 

 at CP-51-CR-0003671-2016 (hereinafter “Docket Number 

3671-2016”), aggravated assault, PIC, simple assault, and 

REAP; and, 

 at CP-51-CR-0003672-2016 (hereinafter “Docket Number 

3672-2016”), robbery, stalking, theft by unlawful taking, 

receiving stolen property, contempt for violation of order or 

agreement, terroristic threats, simple assault, and 

harassment.[fn6]

[fn6] 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(iv), 2709.1(a)(1), 3921(a), 

and 3925(a), 23 Pa.C.S. § 6114(a), and 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 

2706(a)(1), 2701(a), and 2709(a)(4), respectively. 

On April 27, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an 

aggregate term of seven to [fourteen] years in prison, followed by 

five years of probation, for his convictions. 

Id. at *2-3 (some citations and some footnotes omitted, some formatting 

altered). 

We add that Derek A. Steenson, Esq., (trial counsel) represented 

Appellant at trial. Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions challenging 

the weight of the evidence and discretionary aspects of his sentence. The trial 

court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions and granted trial counsel 
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leave to withdraw from representing Appellant on August 20, 2018. The 

following day, the trial court appointed David M. Simon, Esq., (appellate 

counsel) to represent Appellant on appeal. 

Appellate counsel filed timely notices of appeal on behalf of Appellant. 

Relevant to this appeal, Appellant argued on direct appeal that the evidence 

was insufficient to sustain his conviction for robbery at Docket Number 3672-

2016. See id. at *3, *8. A prior panel of this Court concluded that Appellant 

had waived this sufficiency challenge because Appellant did not include the 

element he was challenging in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. See id. at 

*8. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and our Supreme 

Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. See id. at *9, 

appeal denied, 234 A.3d 404 (Pa. 2020). The United States Supreme Court 

denied Appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari on October 13, 2020. Glover 

v. Pennsylvania, 141 S.Ct. 597, 208 L.Ed.2d 190 (2020). 

Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on October 8, 2021. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant, who filed two amended 

PCRA petitions on Appellant’s behalf. Therein, Appellant claimed that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss under Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 600 and for failing to advise Appellant about his right to 

testify at trial. Suppl. Am. PCRA Pet., 5/4/22, at 7. Appellant also argued 

that appellate counsel was ineffective because appellate counsel failed to 

challenge the weight of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence on appeal. Id. Lastly, Appellant contended that appellate counsel 
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was ineffective for failing to properly preserve Appellant’s challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence for his robbery conviction at Docket Number 3672-

2016 in the Rule 1925(b) statement. Id. 

The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on January 17, 2023, limited 

to the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise 

Appellant of his right to testify. Trial counsel and Appellant testified at that 

hearing. The PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition on April 17, 2023. 

Appellant filed timely notices of appeal. Both Appellant and the PCRA court 

complied with Rule 1925. 

On appeal, Appellant raises four issues, which we restate as follows: 

1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion 

to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600. 

2. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence. 

3. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the weight of the evidence. 

4. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting Appellant’s robbery conviction in the 1925(b) 

statement. 

Appellant’s Brief at 8.3 

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3

 We note that in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant also argued that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Appellant about his right to testify. 

See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 5/15/23, at 1-2 (unpaginated). Appellant has 

not raised this claim in his appellate brief and acknowledges that he has 

abandoned this issue on appeal. See Appellant’s Brief at 8 n.1; see also 

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 2119(a); Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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Rule 600 

In his first issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file a Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 motion to dismiss. Id. at 20-23. Specifically, 

Appellant contends that he “was incarcerated on March 17, 2016 and was not 

brought to trial until February 9, 2018. Although [Appellant] filed some 

motions for continuance, there were numerous continuances by the 

Commonwealth. There was a delay of over 365 days, thus prejudicing 

Appellant.” Id. at 21. Appellant claims that the Commonwealth did not 

exercise due diligence in bringing this case to trial and “failed to show 

readiness at all stages between preliminary hearing and initial trial date.” Id.

at 22-23. Therefore, Appellant concludes that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600. 

In reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, our standard of review 

is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal 

error. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when 

supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we 

apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions. 

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations omitted and formatting altered). 

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1018 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (finding waiver where the appellant abandoned claim on 

appeal). 
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We presume that a defendant’s counsel was effective. See 

Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1117 (Pa. 2012). Moreover, 

it is well settled that “[c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to 

raise a meritless claim.” Id. at 1118 (citations omitted). 

This Court has explained that 

to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of 

the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process 

that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the 

following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 

(2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her 

action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of 

counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different. 

* * * 

Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis 

and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to 

prove that counsel was ineffective. Moreover, a failure to satisfy 

any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the 

claim of ineffectiveness. 

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44 (citations omitted and formatting altered);

see also Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa. 2014) (stating 

that where a petitioner “fails to meaningfully discuss each of the three 

ineffectiveness prongs, he is not entitled to relief, and we are constrained to 

find such claims waived for lack of development” (citations and quotation 

marks omitted)). 
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Rule 600 provides as follows: “[t]rial in a court case in which a written 

complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from 

the date on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Under 

Rule 600, “periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the 

Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence 

shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must 

commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the 

computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). If the defendant has not been brought 

to trial within the time provided under the Rule, the defendant may file a 

motion to dismiss the charges with prejudice. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1). 

Our Supreme Court has explained: “in assessing any period of delay 

under Rule 600, it is critical to ascertain the cause of such delay. Stated in 

the most general terms, when the Commonwealth causes delay, the Rule 600 

clock continues to tick; when the defendant causes delay, the clock stops.” 

Commonwealth v. Barbour, 189 A.3d 944, 958 (Pa. 2018) (emphasis in 

original) 

When a defendant alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to file 

a Rule 600 motion, the prejudice “is self-evident. A motion to dismiss under 

Rule 600, if meritorious, would have resulted in dismissal of the charges 

against [the defendant].” Commonwealth v. Lynn, 815 A.2d 1053, 1056 

(Pa. Super. 2003). 
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This Court has explained: 

The Rules of Appellate Procedure require that appellants 

adequately develop each issue raised with discussion of pertinent 

facts and pertinent authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119. It is not this 

Court’s responsibility to comb through the record seeking the 

factual underpinnings of an appellant’s claim. Further, this Court 

will not become counsel for an appellant and develop arguments 

on an appellant’s behalf. 

Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2014) (some 

citations omitted). When an appellant fails to present an adequately 

developed argument in an appellate brief, this Court may find that issue 

waived. Id. 

Additionally, this Court has held that where a defendant argues that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a Rule 600 claim but does not 

discuss “the delays in bringing the case to trial or the parties who caused such 

delays[,]” the underlying claim lacks arguable merit. Commonwealth v. 

Prater, 256 A.3d 1274, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted); see also

Fears, 86 A.3d at 804 (stating that where a petitioner “fails to meaningfully 

discuss each of the three ineffectiveness prongs, he is not entitled to relief, 

and we are constrained to find such claims waived for lack of development” 

(citations and quotation marks omitted)). 

Here, the PCRA court concluded that this claim lacked arguable merit 

because although 694 days had passed between Appellant’s arrest and the 

start of the trial, only 175 of the days were attributable to the Commonwealth 
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and the rest were attributable to Appellant. See PCRA Ct. Op., 7/13/23, at 

8-11. 

In his brief, Appellant fails to adequately develop the arguable merit of 

his underlying Rule 600 claim. Specifically, Appellant failed to discuss the 

periods of delay and which party was responsible for each delay. See

Appellant’s Brief at 21. Further, Appellant has not provided any citations to 

the record to support his claim that the Commonwealth had made the majority 

of the continuance requests. Therefore, we conclude that Appellant has failed 

to properly develop this claim for review and is not entitled to relief on this 

claim.4 See Prater, 256 A.3d at 1283. 

Discretionary Aspects of Sentence 

In his second issue, Appellant argues that appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to challenge the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s 

sentence on direct appeal. Appellant’s Brief at 23-24. Specifically, Appellant 

contends that the trial court imposed a sentence that was above the 

aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines and the trial court failed to give 

sufficient weight to mitigating factors, including Appellant’s history of mental 

illness. Id. Therefore, Appellant concludes that his sentence “was harsh and 

unreasonable[]” and “appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on 

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4

 In any event, if Appellant had developed his claim of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness for failing to file a Rule 600 motion, we would affirm on the 

basis of the PCRA court’s opinion. See PCRA Ct. Op., 7/13/23, at 8-11. 
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appeal the denial of the [post-sentence] motion to reconsider the sentence.” 

Id. at 24. 

“[C]laims implicating the discretionary aspects of sentencing raised in 

the context of an ineffectiveness claim are cognizable under the PCRA.” 

Commonwealth v. Sarvey, 199 A.3d 436, 455 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations 

omitted).5 Regarding the arguable merit prong, this Court has explained that 

“if the PCRA court can determine from the record that the sentence was not 

excessive, or that adequate reasons were placed on the record for exceeding 

the sentencing guidelines, then there is no underlying merit to the 

ineffectiveness claim and the claim must fail.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 

942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008). To establish prejudice, the defendant 

must demonstrate that if counsel had presented a challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of the sentence, counsel would have “secured a 

reduction in the sentence.” Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 

1132 (Pa. 2007) 

Here, the PCRA court concluded that this claim lacked arguable merit 

because the sentencing court considered Appellant’s history of mental health 

issues and the aggregate sentence was reasonable. See PCRA Ct. Op., 

7/13/23, at 14-16. 

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5

 Here, Appellant raised his sentencing claim in his post-sentence motions. 

However, appellate counsel did not include this claim in the Rule 1925(b) 

statement for Appellant’s direct appeal. See Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) 

Statement, 10/31/18, at 1-2 (unpaginated). 
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In his brief, Appellant fails to cite any legal authority in support of his 

ineffectiveness claim. Although Appellant refers to mitigating evidence 

presented at the sentencing hearing, Appellant’s brief does not include any 

citations to the record of that proceeding. These failures are grounds for this 

Court to find waiver. See Samuel, 102 A.3d at 1005; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). 

Further, Appellant has not explained why there is a reasonable probability that 

if appellate counsel had challenged the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s 

sentence on appeal, it would have resulted in a reduction of the sentence. 

See Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1132. Because Appellant has failed to develop his 

argument regarding the arguable merit and prejudice prongs of the 

ineffectiveness standard, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.6 See 

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44; see also Fears, 86 A.3d at 804. 

Weight of the Evidence 

In his third issue, Appellant argues that appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to challenge the weight of the evidence on direct appeal. Appellant’s 

Brief at 24-29. Specifically, Appellant contends that the two witnesses’ 

testimony regarding the incidents on March 12 and March 14, 2016 incidents 

had “substantial” differences. Id. at 24-27. Appellant also asserts that the 

victim’s trial testimony about the February 1, 2016 incident “makes no sense” 

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6

 In any event, if Appellant had developed his claim of appellate counsel’s 

ineffectiveness for failing to challenge the discretionary aspects of the 

sentence on appeal, we would affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion. 

See PCRA Ct. Op., 7/13/23, at 14-16. 
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and was inconsistent with her testimony at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 

26. Appellant claims that because the victim was not credible, the evidence 

does not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and his convictions 

shock one’s sense of justice. Id. at 28. Appellant argues that if appellate 

counsel had raised a weight-of-the-evidence claim on direct appeal, this Court 

“would have likely granted relief based upon the facts and circumstances of 

Appellant's case. Therefore, appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance 

by failing to raise the argument that the weight of the evidence did not support 

the verdict rendered for Appellant on his direct appeal.” Id. at 28-29. 

This Court has explained: 

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who 

is free to believe all, none, or some of the evidence and to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses. Resolving contradictory 

testimony and questions of credibility are matters for the finder of 

fact. It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment for 

that of the trier of fact. 

Moreover, appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying the weight challenge 

raised in the lower court; this Court does not review the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence. 

Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see 

the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest 

consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial 

judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable 

reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s 

conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of 

the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest 

of justice. 

Furthermore, in order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to 

the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, 
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vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the 

court. 

Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 311 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations 

omitted and formatting altered). 

In order to establish the prejudice prong for a claim of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel “the petitioner must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would 

have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance.” 

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (per curiam). 

Here, the PCRA court, which also presided as the trial court at 

Appellant’s non-jury trial, concluded that this claim lacked arguable merit. 

See PCRA Ct. Op., 7/13/23, at 16-18. 

In his brief, Appellant presents only a bald assertion of prejudice. 

Appellant has not explained why there is a reasonable probability that if 

appellate counsel had challenged the weight of the evidence on appeal, this 

Court would have granted Appellant a new trial. See Blakeney, 108 A.3d 

750. Appellant also has failed to present any argument as to why appellate 

counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for this omission. See Sandusky, 

203 A.3d at 1043. For these reasons, Appellant has waived this claim for lack 

of development.7 See Fears, 86 A.3d at 804; Samuel, 102 A.3d at 1005. 

____________________________________________ 

7

 In any event, if Appellant had developed his claim of appellate counsel’s 

ineffectiveness for failing to challenge the weight of the evidence on appeal, 

we would affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion. See PCRA Ct. Op., 

7/13/23, at 16-18. 
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Sufficiency of the Evidence 

In his fourth issue, Appellant argues that appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to preserve the challenge to sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting Appellant’s robbery conviction at Docket Number 3672-2016 on 

direct appeal. Appellant’s Brief at 29-30. Specifically, Appellant contends that 

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the element of 

robbery that Appellant used “force, however slight” to take the victim’s phone 

in the Rule 1925(b) statement for Appellant’s direct appeal. Id. at 29. 

Appellant argues that the victim’s testimony that her phone “slipped” out of 

her hand claim was insufficient to establish that Appellant used any force to 

take the victim’s phone. 

Section 3701 of the Crimes Code defines robbery, in relevant part, as 

follows: 

A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, 

he . . . 

* * * 

(iv) inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens another 

with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily 

injury; 

(v) physically takes or removes property from the person of 

another by force however slight; . . . 

18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iv)-(v). 

Here, the PCRA court explained: 

[Appellant] contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 

his robbery conviction because “[the victim] testified that the 

phone ‘slipped’ out of her hand” and “did not testify to any force 
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being used to take the phone.” He likens the instant case to 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 481 A.2d 1352 (Pa. Super. 1984), 

where the defendant was convicted of robbery under section 

3701(a)(1)(v) after removing a pack of cigarettes from the pocket 

of a blind person who was unaware of the removal. Id. at 1353. 

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that the evidence 

was insufficient to support the conviction because the defendant 

removed the property by stealth and not by force. Id. at 1353-

1355. 

Smith, however, is inapposite as [Appellant] was not charged 

with robbery by use of force under section 3701(a)(1)(v); rather, 

he was charged under section 3701(a)(1)(iv), . . . 

* * * 

Here, there is no question that [Appellant] inflicted bodily injury 

during the course of committing a theft. Specifically, the evidence 

established that upon taking [the victim’s] phone, [Appellant] 

immediately punched her in the face with such force that it 

knocked her out of her chair and to the ground. [Appellant] then 

charged at [the victim] and shoved her into a glass shelf, 

shattering it, and causing glass shards to penetrate her eyes. The 

Commonwealth also introduced photographs depicting the bodily 

injuries that she sustained. As such, the evidence unquestionably 

supported [Appellant’s] conviction for robbery. 

* * * 

Thus, even if counsel had properly preserved [Appellant’s] 

underlying sufficiency challenge, it would have afforded him no 

relief. As such, [Appellant’s] ineffectiveness claim fails. 

PCRA Ct. Op., 7/13/23, at 20-22 (footnote and some citations omitted). 

Following our review, we agree with the PCRA court’s conclusions, which 

are supported by the record and free from legal error. See Sandusky, 203 

A.3d at 1043. As noted by the PCRA court, Appellant was convicted of robbery 

under Section 3701(a)(1)(iv) at Docket Number 3672-2016, and that 

subsection does not require proof that the actor took or removed property 
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from the victim by force however slight. Compare 18 Pa.C.S. § 

3701(a)(1)(iv) with § 3701(a)(1)(v). Therefore, Appellant’s sufficiency claim 

has no arguable merit. Because appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for 

failing to raise a meritless claim, Appellant’s claim fails and no relief is due. 

See Sepulveda, 55 A.3d at 1118. 

For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief 

and affirm the PCRA court’s order. 

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judge Colins joins the memorandum. 

 Judge Olson concurs in the result. 

Date: 10/1/2024