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THE DEPARMENT OF DEFENSE 

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region

June 1, 2019

The estimated cost of this report or study for the 

Department of Defense is approximately $128,000 for 

the 2019 Fiscal Year. This includes $18,000 in expenses 

and $110,000 in DoD labor.

Generated on 2019June01 RefID: 0-1C9F36A
MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

he Indo-Pacific is the Department of Defense’s priority theater. The United 

States is a Pacific nation; we are linked to our Indo-Pacific neighbors 

through unbreakable bonds of shared history, culture, commerce, and 

values. We have an enduring commitment to uphold a free and open IndoPacific in which all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty and able to 

pursue economic growth consistent with accepted international rules, norms, and 

principles of fair competition.

The continuity of our shared strategic vision is uninterrupted despite an increasingly

complex security environment. Inter-state strategic competition, defined by 

geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions, is the primary 

concern for U.S. national security. In particular, the People’s Republic of China, under 

the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, seeks to reorder the region to its 

advantage by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory 

economics to coerce other nations. 

In contrast, the Department of Defense supports choices that promote long-term 

peace and prosperity for all in the Indo-Pacific. We will not accept policies or actions 

that threaten or undermine the rules-based international order – an order that benefits 

all nations. We are committed to defending and enhancing these shared values.

The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy articulate our vision to 

compete, deter, and win in this environment. Achieving this vision requires combining 

a more lethal Joint Force with a more robust constellation of Allies and partners. 

Increased investments in these imperatives will sustain American influence in the 

region to ensure favorable balances of power and safeguard the free and open 

international order.

This 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) affirms the 

enduring U.S. commitment to stability and prosperity in the region through the pursuit 

of preparedness, partnerships, and the promotion of a networked region.

T
 Preparedness – Achieving peace through strength and employing effective 

deterrence requires a Joint Force that is prepared to win any conflict from its 

onset. The Department, alongside our Allies and partners, will ensure our 

combat-credible forces are forward-postured in the region. Furthermore, the 

Joint Force will prioritize investments that ensure lethality against high-end 

adversaries.

 Partnerships – Our unique network of Allies and partners is a force multiplier 

to achieve peace, deterrence, and interoperable warfighting capability. The 

Department is reinforcing its commitment to established Alliances and 

Partnerships, while also expanding and deepening relationships with new 

partners who share our respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and 

the rule of law.

 Promotion of a Networked Region – The Department is strengthening and 

evolving U.S. Alliances and Partnerships into a networked security architecture 

to uphold the international rules-based order. The Department also continues 

to cultivate intra-Asian security relationships capable of deterring aggression, 

maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.

Advancing this Indo-Pacific vision requires an integrated effort that recognizes the 

critical linkages between economics, governance, and security – all fundamental 

components that shape the region’s competitive landscape. The Department of 

Defense, in partnership with other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, 

regional institutions, and regional Allies and partners, will continue to diligently uphold 

a rules-based order that ensures peace and prosperity for all. 

Patrick M. Shanahan

Acting Secretary of Defense
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Contents

1. Introduction........................................................................................................................ 1

1.1. America’s Historic Ties to the Indo-Pacific ............................................................ 2

1.2. Vision and Principles for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific....................................... 3

2. Indo-Pacific Strategic Landscape: Trends and Challenges............................................ 7

2.1. The People’s Republic of China as a Revisionist Power........................................ 7

2.2. Russia as a Revitalized Malign Actor...................................................................... 11

2.3. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a Rogue State.......................... 12

2.4. Prevalence of Transnational Challenges ................................................................ 13

3. U.S. National Interests and Defense Strategy............................................................... 15

3.1. U.S. National Interests............................................................................................. 15

3.2. U.S. National Defense Strategy............................................................................... 16

4. Sustaining U.S. Influence to Achieve Regional Objectives......................................... 17

4.1. Line of Effort 1: Preparedness................................................................................ 17

4.2. Line of Effort 2: Partnerships................................................................................. 21

4.3. Line of Effort 3: Promoting a Networked Region............................................... 44

Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 53

Acronyms .............................................................................................................................. 55
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1

1. Introduction

he Indo-Pacific is the single most consequential region for America’s future. Spanning a vast 

stretch of the globe from the west coast of the United States to the western shores of India, 

the region is home to the world’s most populous state, most populous democracy, and largest 

Muslim-majority state, and includes over half of the earth’s population. Among the 10 largest 

standing armies in the world, 7 reside in the Indo-Pacific; and 6 countries in the region possess nuclear 

weapons. Nine of the world’s 

10 busiest seaports are in the 

region, and 60 percent of global 

maritime trade transits through 

Asia, with roughly one-third of 

global shipping passing through 

the South China Sea alone. 

The United States is a Pacific 

nation and has five Pacific states: Hawaii, California, Washington, Oregon, and Alaska, as well as

Pacific territories on both sides of the International Date Line, including: Guam, American Samoa,

T

“The story of the Indo-Pacific in recent decades is 

the story of what is possible when people take 

ownership of their future...this region has emerged 

as a beautiful constellation of nations, each its own 

bright star, satellites to none.”

- President Donald J. Trump, speech at the APEC CEO Summit, 

November 10, 2017
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Wake Island, and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). American businesses 

have traded in Asia since the 18th century, and today, within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

(APEC), America’s annual two-way trade with the region is $2.3 trillion, with U.S. foreign direct 

investment of $1.3 trillion in the region – more than China’s, Japan’s, and South Korea’s combined. 

The Indo-Pacific contributes two-thirds of global growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and 

accounts for 60 percent of global GDP. This region includes the world’s largest economies – the 

United States, China, and Japan – and six of the world’s fastest growing economies – India, Cambodia, 

Laos, Burma, Nepal, and the Philippines. A quarter of U.S. exports go to the Indo-Pacific, and exports 

to China and India have more than doubled over the past decade. This is made possible by free and 

open trade routes through the air, sea, land, space, and cyber commons that form the current global 

system.

1.1. America’s Historic 

Ties to the Indo-Pacific

The United States is a Pacific nation. Our

ties to the Indo-Pacific are forged by 

history, and our future is inextricably 

linked. We have contributed both blood 

and treasure to sustain the freedoms,

openness, and opportunity of this region.

Our presence secures the vital sea lanes of 

the Indo-Pacific that underpin global 

commerce and prosperity. Our leaders, 

diplomats, military forces, and businesses 

helped frame and strengthen the international system of clear and transparent rules; peaceful 

resolution of disputes; and the rule of law that has been vital to the region’s relative security and 

growing prosperity. 

The past, present, and future of the United States are interwoven with the Indo-Pacific. Our 

engagement in the Indo-Pacific dates back more than two centuries, based on the pursuit of the shared 

prosperity that comes from fair and reciprocal trade, open commerce, and freedom of navigation. In 

1784, within months of signing the Treaty of Paris, the United States sent a trading ship, the 

EMPRESS OF CHINA to inaugurate commercial ties with China. In 1804, President Thomas 

Jefferson sent the explorers – Lewis and Clark – on an expedition to our Pacific Coast, which Jefferson

recognized as the gateway for increased trade and commerce. By 1817, Congress approved the first 

full-time Pacific deployment of a U.S. warship. In the early 19th century, we began our relationship 

with the Kingdom of Thailand and thereafter negotiated to open Japan to global trade in the 1850s.

“Starting in the Indo-Pacific, our priority 

theater, we continue to pursue many belts 

and many roads by keeping our decades-old 

alliances strong and fostering growing 

partnerships.”

- Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan, 

testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

March 14, 2019
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At the close of the 19th century, the United States established an “Open Door” policy towards China,

promoting equal opportunity for trade and commerce in China, and respect for China’s sovereignty.

In the 20th century, the United States expanded its role in the region as we confronted imperialism

and fascism and held the line against communism during the Cold War. The early 1950s marked 

several milestones – the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines 

and the United States in August 1951 and the signing of the Australia, New Zealand, and United States 

Security Treaty in September 1951 – both of which sought to bring stability to the region. In the 

seven decades that followed the Second World War, based on a foundation of the U.S. system of 

alliances and our forward deployed forces, the Indo-Pacific was largely peaceful, and we helped create

the stability necessary for economic prosperity in the United States and the region. 

In pursuit of partnership, not domination, the United States worked with Japan and South Korea after

the Second World War to forge alliances and stimulate an economic boom in both countries. In 

Taiwan, U.S. aid helped create an open, democratic society that allowed the island to blossom into a 

high-tech powerhouse. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States invested in Hong Kong, Singapore, 

and other Southeast Asian economies and supported foundational institutions like the Association for 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the APEC Forum, and the Asian Development Bank, all 

contributing to growth in the region. Simultaneously, the United States established formal diplomatic 

relations with China in 1979, which facilitated economic exchange and extended America’s consistent 

policy approach of a free, open market and equal trading opportunity for merchants of all nationalities 

operating in the region. At the turn of the 21st century, the United States advocated for China’s 

admission into the World Trade Organization, with the belief that economic liberalization would bring 

China into a greater partnership with the United States and the free world.

As history has demonstrated and the future necessitates, the United States will continue to play a key 

role as a force for regional stability in the Indo-Pacific in support of U.S. diplomatic and economic 

aspirations. To do so, the United States must be prepared by sustaining a credible combat-forward 

posture; strengthening alliances and building new partnerships; and promoting an increasingly 

networked region. These actions will enable the United States to preserve a free and open IndoPacific where sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity are safeguarded. 

1.2. Vision and Principles for a 

Free and Open Indo-Pacific

In 2017, President Trump announced our nation’s vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific at the 

APEC Summit in Vietnam, and our commitment to a safe, secure, prosperous, and free region that 

benefits all nations. This vision flows from common principles that underpin the current international 

order, which has benefited all countries in the region – principles we have a shared responsibility to 

uphold: 
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1. Respect for sovereignty and independence of all nations;

2. Peaceful resolution of disputes; 

3. Free, fair, and reciprocal trade based on open investment, transparent agreements, and 

connectivity; and,

4. Adherence to international rules and norms, including those of freedom of navigation and 

overflight. 

Our vision for a free Indo-Pacific is one 

in which all nations, regardless of size, 

are able to exercise their sovereignty free 

from coercion by other countries. At 

the national-level, this means good 

governance and the assurance that 

citizens can enjoy their fundamental 

rights and liberties. Our vision for an 

open Indo-Pacific is one that promotes 

sustainable growth and connectivity in 

the region. This means all nations enjoy access to international waters, airways, and cyber and space 

domains, and are able to pursue peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes. On an 

economic level, this means fair and reciprocal trade, open investment environments, and transparent

agreements between nations.

Our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific recognizes the linkages between economics, governance, 

and security that are part of the competitive landscape throughout the region, and that economic 

security is national security. In order to achieve this vision, we will uphold the rule of law, encourage 

resilience in civil society, and promote transparent governance – all of which expose malign influences 

that threaten economic development everywhere. Our vision aspires to a regional order in which

independent nations can both defend their interests and compete fairly in the international 

marketplace. It is a vision which recognizes that no one nation can or should dominate the IndoPacific.

In recognition of the region’s need for greater investment, including infrastructure investment, the 

United States seeks to invigorate our development and finance institutions to enable us to become 

better, more responsive partners. U.S. Departments and Agencies will work with regional allies and 

partners to provide end-to-end solutions that build tangible products and transfer experience. 

Ultimately, the maintenance of a free and open order sustains regional development because a wellfunctioning and transparent marketplace incentivizes global commercial investments that outpaces 

any state’s unique resources. The United States is not alone in its pursuit of a free and open IndoPacific – many of our allies and partners share these principles and values:

“The U.S. offers strategic partnerships, not 

strategic dependence. Alongside our allies 

and partners, America remains committed 

to maintaining the region’s security, its 

stability, and its economic prosperity.”

- Then-Secretary of Defense James N.

Mattis, speech at the Shangri-La 

Dialogue, June 1, 2018
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“We must ensure that these waters are a public good that bring 

peace and prosperity to all people without discrimination into 

the future.”

- Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, policy speech to the 196th session of the Diet 

January 22, 2018

“Now what is important is to preserve a rules-based 

development in the region. It’s to preserve the necessary 

balances in the region.”

- President of France, Emmanuel Macron, speech during a state visit to Australia 

May 2, 2018

“...rules and norms should be based on the consent of all, not 

on the power of the few.”

- Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue

June 1, 2018

“We want a rules-based system that respects the sovereignty and 

the independence of every single country and a commitment 

then to regional security that is always the precondition for 

prosperity.”

- Prime Minister of Australia, Scott Morrison, address at the APEC CEO Summit 

November 17, 2018

“Collective solutions to shared challenges in the Pacific require 

strong and vibrant regionalism, with institutions that can 

convert political will into action, supported by partners who 

align their efforts with the region’s priorities.”

- Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs for New Zealand, Winston 

Peters, address at Georgetown University

December 15, 2018
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A free and open Indo-Pacific rests on a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and 

accountability. While we unapologetically represent U.S. values and beliefs, we do not seek to impose 

our way of life on others. In order to maintain the regional dynamism that benefits all, each country 

in the region has a shared responsibility to contribute and sustain it – for the regional order will not 

survive on its own. We will uphold our commitments, but we will rely on allies and partners to 

contribute their fair share, including by investing to modernize their defense capabilities. 

Advancing this vision is a whole-of-government priority that draws on the strengths and values of 

American society. As Secretary of State Michael Pompeo has said, “The American people and the 

whole world have a stake in the Indo-Pacific’s peace and prosperity. It’s why the Indo-Pacific must 

be free and open.”

Our whole-of-government commitment was reflected at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in 2018, as 

Secretary of State Pompeo, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, U.S. Agency for International 

Development Administrator Mark Green, and other Cabinet-level officials launched new initiatives to 

expand U.S. public and private investment in Indo-Pacific infrastructure, energy markets, and digital 

economy. We also established new development finance partnerships with Japan, Australia, Canada, 

and the European Union, supported by significant new resources and authorities in the Better 

Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act or the BUILD Act, which President Trump 

signed into law in October 2018. The following month, Vice President Michael Pence announced 

efforts to coordinate with Japan on $10 billion in regional energy investment, establish a U.S.-ASEAN

Smart Cities Partnership, and launch a five-country partnership for electrification in Papua New 

Guinea. The Vice President also announced the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative to help countries 

attract high-quality investment and counter corruption and coercive threats to their sovereignty, by 

strengthening civil society and good governance. Furthermore, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, a 

major bipartisan legislation, was signed into law by President Trump on December 31, 2018. This 

legislation enshrines a generational whole-of-government policy framework that demonstrates U.S. 

commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region and includes initiatives that promote sovereignty, 

rule of law, democracy, economic engagement, and regional security.

As the region grows in population and economic weight, U.S. strategy will adapt to ensure that the 

Indo-Pacific is increasingly a place of peace, stability, and growing prosperity – and not one of 

disorder, conflict, and predatory economics. Embedding these free and open principles will require 

efforts across the spectrum of our agencies and capabilities: diplomatic initiatives, governance capacity 

building, economic cooperation and commercial advocacy, and military cooperation. 
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2. Indo-Pacific Strategic 

Landscape: Trends and Challenges

 

 

2.1. The People’s Republic of China

as a Revisionist Power

China’s economic, political, and military rise is one of the defining elements of the 21st century. 

Today, the Indo-Pacific increasingly is confronted with a more confident and assertive China that is 

willing to accept friction in the pursuit of a more expansive set of political, economic, and security 

interests. 

Perhaps no country has benefited more from the free and open regional and international system than 

China, which has witnessed the rise of hundreds of millions from poverty to growing prosperity and 

security. Yet while the Chinese people aspire to free markets, justice, and the rule of law, the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC), under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), undermines 

the international system from within by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously eroding the values 

and principles of the rules-based order. With more than half of the world’s Muslim population living
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in the Indo-Pacific, the region views the PRC’s systematic mistreatment of Uighurs, Kazakhs, and

other Muslims in Xinjiang – including pervasive discrimination, mass detention, and disappearances 

– with deep concern. China’s violation of international norms also extends abroad. Chinese nationals 

acting in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security were recently indicted for conducting 

global campaigns of cyber theft that targeted intellectual property and confidential business and 

technological information at managed service providers. China has continued to militarize the South 

China Sea by placing anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles on the disputed 

Spratly Islands and employing paramilitary forces in maritime disputes vis-à-vis other claimants. In 

the air, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increased patrols around and near Taiwan using 

bomber, fighter, and surveillance aircraft to signal Taiwan. China additionally employs non-military 

tools coercively, including economic tools, during periods of political tensions with countries that 

China accuses of harming its national interests.

The People’s Republic of China’s Military Modernization 

and Coercive Actions

As China continues its economic and military ascendance, it seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in 

the near-term and, ultimately global preeminence in the long-term. China is investing in a broad range 

of military programs and weapons, including those designed to improve power projection; modernize 

its nuclear forces; and conduct increasingly complex operations in domains such as cyberspace, space, 

and electronic warfare operations. China is also developing a wide array of anti-access/area denial 

(A2/AD) capabilities, which could be used to prevent countries from operating in areas near China’s 

periphery, including the maritime and air domains that are open to use by all countries. 

In 2018, China’s placement of anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles on the 

disputed Spratly Islands violated a 2015 public pledge by the Chairman of the CCP Xi Jinping that 

“China does not intend to pursue militarization” of the Spratly Islands. China’s use of military 

presence in an attempt to exert de facto control over disputed areas is not limited to the South China 

Sea. In the East China Sea, China patrols near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands with maritime 

law enforcement ships and aircraft. These actions endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the 

sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. Such activities are inconsistent with 

the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Simultaneously, China is engaged in a campaign of low-level coercion to assert control of disputed 

spaces in the region, particularly in the maritime domain. China is using a steady progression of small, 

incremental steps in the “gray zone” between peaceful relations and overt hostilities to secure its aims, 

while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict. Such activities can involve the coordination 

of multiple tools, including: political warfare, disinformation, use of A2/AD networks, subversion, 

and economic leverage.

During the last decade, China continued to emphasize capabilities for Taiwan contingencies. China 

has never renounced the use of military force against Taiwan, and continues to develop and deploy 
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9

advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign. PLA modernization is also 

strengthening its ability to operate farther from China’s borders. For example, the PLA is reorganizing 

to improve its capability to conduct complex joint operations, and is also improving its command and 

control, training, personnel, and logistics systems. Key weapon systems deployed or in development,

include: cruise and ballistic missile systems, modern fighter and bomber aircraft, aircraft carriers, 

modern ships and submarines, amphibious assault ships, surface-to-air missile systems, electronic 

warfare systems, direct-ascent, hit-to-kill anti-satellite missiles, and autonomous systems.

China’s Use of Economic Means to Advance Its Strategic Interests

China is using economic inducements 

and penalties, influence operations, and 

implied military threats to persuade 

other states to comply with its agenda. 

Although trade has benefitted both 

China and its trade partners, Chinese use 

of espionage and theft for economic 

advantage, as well as diversion of

acquired technology to the military, 

remains a significant source of 

economic and national security risk to all 

of China’s trading partners.

While investment often brings benefits 

for recipient countries, including the United States, some of China’s investments result in negative 

economic effects or costs to host country sovereignty. Chinese investment and project financing that 

bypasses regular market mechanisms results in lower standards and reduced opportunities for local 

companies and workers, and can result in significant debt accumulation. One-sided and opaque deals 

are inconsistent with the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and are causing concern in the 

region. For example, in 2018, Bangladesh was forced to ban one of China’s major state firms for 

attempted bribery, and in the same year, Maldives’ finance minister stated that China was building 

infrastructure projects in the country at significantly inflated prices compared to what was previously 

agreed. Furthermore, a Chinese state-owned enterprise purchased operational control of Hambantota 

Port for 99 years, taking advantage of Sri Lanka’s need for cash when its government faced daunting 

external debt repayment obligations. 

The United States does not oppose China’s investment activities as long as they respect sovereignty 

and the rule of law, use responsible financing practices, and operate in a transparent and economically

sustainable manner. The United States, however, has serious concerns with China’s potential to 

convert unsustainable debt burdens of recipient countries or sub-national groups into strategic and 

military access, including by taking possession of sovereign assets as collateral. China’s coercive 

behavior is playing out globally, from the Middle East and Africa to Latin America and Europe. 

“Beijing is leveraging its economic 

instrument of power in ways that can 

undermine the autonomy of countries across 

the region...easy money in the short term, 

but these funds come with strings attached: 

unsustainable debt, decreased transparency, 

restrictions on market economies, and the 

potential loss of control of natural 

resources.”

- Admiral Philip S. Davidson, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific 

Command, posture testimony before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, February 12, 2019
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A lack of transparency also clouds China’s activities in the 

polar regions. In 2018, China announced the inclusion of the 

region in One Belt One Road as the “Polar Silk Road” and 

emphasized its self-declared status as a “Near-Arctic State.”

China is also expanding its engagement and capabilities in the 

Antarctic, in particular by working to finalize a fifth research 

station, which will diversify its presence across the continent. 

Risk Reduction: Engaging China

One of the most far-reaching objectives of the 

National Defense Strategy is to set the military 

relationship between the United States and China on 

a long-term path of transparency and non-aggression. 

Pursuit of a constructive, results-oriented relationship 

between our two countries is an important part of 

U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. 

As the scope of China’s military modernization and 

the reach of China’s military activities expands, the 

need for strategic dialogue and safe and professional 

behavior consistent with international law is crucial. 

When China and the PLA operate in a manner 

consistent with international norms and standards, 

the risk of miscalculation and misunderstanding is 

reduced. Recognizing this, our bilateral military 

engagements with China, which include high-level 

visits, policy dialogues, and functional exchanges, are 

centered on building and reinforcing the procedures 

necessary to reduce risk and prevent and manage 

crises. 

Through our military-to-military engagements, the 

Department of Defense will continue to encourage 

China to engage in behaviors that maintain peace and 

stability in the region and that support – rather than 

undermine – the rules-based international order. We 

will not accept policies or actions that threaten to 

undermine this order, which has benefited all 

countries in the region, including China. The United 

States is prepared to support China’s choices to the 

extent that China promotes long-term peace and 

prosperity for all in the Indo-Pacific, and we remain 

open to cooperate where our interests align.

On October 5, 2018, President 

Trump signed into law the Better 

Utilization of Investments Leading 

to Development (BUILD) Act. The 

BUILD Act establishes a new U.S. 

International Development Finance 

Corporation. This legislation 

consolidates, modernizes, and 

reforms the U.S. Government’s 

development finance capabilities. 

Backing from the U.S. Government 

can catalyze significant amounts of 

private capital into emerging 

markets. This model of mobilizing 

private investment is vital as the 

needs of developing countries are 

too great to meet with official 

government resources alone. The 

BUILD Act prioritizes low-income 

and lower middle-income countries, 

where the Development Finance 

Corporation’s services will have the 

greatest impact. It more than 

doubles the U.S. development 

finance capacity from $29 billion to 

$60 billion. The new authorities and 

flexibility provided under the 

BUILD Act will give the United 

States greater agility to offer 

financially sound, transparent 

investment alternatives.

THE BUILD ACT
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2.2. Russia as a Revitalized Malign Actor

Russia’s interest and influence in the region continue to increase through national outreach and 

military modernization – in both its conventional forces and strategic forces. Despite slow economic 

growth due to Western sanctions and decreasing oil prices, Russia continues to modernize its military 

and prioritize strategic capabilities – including its nuclear forces, A2/AD systems, and expanded 

training for long-range aviation – in an attempt to re-establish its presence in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Russia’s operations and engagement throughout this region are consistent with its global influence 

activities, which seek to advance Moscow’s strategic interests while undermining U.S. leadership and 

the rules-based international order. 

Russia’s efforts include using economic, diplomatic, and military means to achieve influence in the 

Indo-Pacific region. Moscow seeks to alleviate some of the effects of sanctions imposed, following 

its aggressive actions in Ukraine, by diplomatically appealing to select states in Asia and seeking 

economic opportunities for energy exports. Russia also seeks to increase defense and trade relations 

through arms sales in the region. 

Russia is re-establishing its military 

presence in the Indo-Pacific by 

regularly flying bomber and 

reconnaissance missions in the Sea of 

Japan and conducting operations as far 

east as Alaska and the west coast of the 

continental United States. Russia has 

also intensified its diplomatic outreach 

in Southeast Asia, seeking to capitalize 

on U.S.-China tensions in order to 

present itself as a neutral “third 

partner.” The Russian Navy has 

increased its operations and reach, with 

the Russian Pacific Fleet deploying ships to support operations in the Middle East and Europe, and 

the Russian Baltic and Black Sea Fleets deploying to the Indo-Pacific. Russian ballistic missile and 

attack submarines remain active in the region, while Russia is also undertaking efforts to modernize 

its conventional forces and nuclear strike capabilities. 

China and Russia collaborate across the diplomatic, economic, and security arenas. China has 

increased investment in Russia's economy and Russia is one of China's top sources for energy imports. 

In the security realm, China purchases advanced equipment such as Su-35 fighter aircraft and the

S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia. The two countries participate in bilateral and 

multilateral military exercises together, including China's 2018 participation for the first time in 

Russia's annual strategic command and staff exercise, VOSTOK (East) 2018. China and Russia 

“For decades, the U.S. led the world in 

hypersonics research – and deliberately chose 

not to weaponize these systems. China and 

Russia have chosen differently. Our nation 

does not seek adversaries, but we will not 

ignore them either. We refuse to be bound by 

geography. Our new, space-based sensor 

layer will give us persistent, timely, global 

awareness.”

- Acting Secretary Shanahan, remarks on the 2019 

Missile Defense Review, January 17, 2019
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12

frequently jointly oppose U.S.-sponsored measures at the United Nations Security Council. Broadly, 

they share a preference for a multipolar world order in which the United States is weaker and less 

influential. Russia has Arctic interests linked to its significant Arctic Ocean coastline and the 

extraction of natural resources. This is witnessed by Russia’s extended continental shelf claim, and an 

uptick in its military posture and investments to develop the region and the Northern Sea shipping 

route, including with Chinese involvement. However, an interest in reserving Arctic resources for 

littoral states may ultimately limit the extent and depth of Sino-Russian cooperation. 

2.3. The Democratic People’s Republic 

of Korea as a Rogue State

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) will remain a security challenge 

for DoD, the global system, our allies and partners, and competitors, until we achieve the final, fully 

verifiable denuclearization as committed to by Chairman Kim Jong Un. Although a pathway to peace 

is open for a diplomatic resolution of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, other weapons of 

mass destruction, missile threats, and the security challenges North Korea presents are real and 

demand continued vigilance. North Korea’s history as a serial proliferator, including conventional 

arms, nuclear technology, ballistic missiles, and chemical agents to countries, such as Iran and Syria,

adds to our security concerns. Furthermore, the DPRK’s continued human rights violations and abuse

against its own people, including violations of individuals’ freedom of expression, remain an issue of 

deep concern to the international community. The United States also continues to support Japan's 

position that North Korea must completely resolve the issue of Japanese abductees, and has raised 

this with North Korean authorities.

North Korea has developed an intercontinental ballistic missile intended to be capable of striking the 

continental United States with a nuclear or conventional payload. In 2017, North Korea conducted a 

series of increasingly complex ballistic missile launches eastward toward the United States. North 

Korea did so by overflying Japan with long-range ballistic missiles. Some tests were done at highly 

lofted trajectories designed to simulate flights at ranges that could reach the United States. 

North Korea poses a conventional threat to U.S. allies, such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and 

Japan. North Korea has long-range artillery arrayed against the ROK – particularly the Greater Seoul 

Metropolitan Area – capable of inflicting catastrophic damage on ROK civilians and large numbers

of U.S. citizens. North Korea has demonstrated willingness to use lethal force to achieve its ends. In

2010, North Korea sank the ROK corvette CHEONAN and killed 46 sailors in an unprovoked attack. 

In 2010, it also shelled the ROK Yeonpyeong Island in the Yellow Sea, killing 2 civilians and 2 military 

personnel and wounding 22 more. 

North Korea continues to circumvent international sanctions and the U.S.-led pressure campaign 

through diplomatic engagement, counter pressure against the sanctions regime, and direct sanctions 
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evasion. Early in 2018, North Korea exceeded its sanctioned limit on refined petroleum imports 

through illicit ship-to-ship transfers. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is working 

with allies and partners to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) by 

disrupting illicit ship-to-ship transfers, often near or in Chinese territorial waters, and in the Yellow 

Sea. North Korea is also engaged in cross-border smuggling operations and cyber-enabled theft to 

generate revenue, while simultaneously circumventing United Nations Security Council prohibitions 

on coal exports. 

The Trump Administration has pursued leader-level diplomacy with North Korea for the first time, 

which has highlighted unique opportunities for a brighter future for North Korea. Until North Korea 

clearly and unambiguously makes the strategic decision to take steps to denuclearize, the United States 

will continue to enforce all applicable domestic and international sanctions, and DoD will remain 

ready to deter, and if necessary, defeat any threats to the United States, the ROK, Japan, or our other 

allies and partners. 

2.4. Prevalence of Transnational 

Challenges

The Indo-Pacific region continues to experience a myriad of security challenges from a range of 

transnational threats, including: terrorism; illicit arms; drug, human, and wildlife trafficking; and piracy, 

as well as dangerous pathogens, weapons proliferation, and natural disasters. Multiple terrorist 

organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), operate in countries throughout the 

region. The heavily-traveled Indo-Pacific sea lanes are targets for pirates seeking to steal goods or 

hold ships and crews for ransom. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing further challenges

regional peace and prosperity. A region already prone to earthquakes and volcanoes as part of the 

Pacific Ring of Fire, the Indo-Pacific region suffers regularly from natural disasters including

monsoons, hurricanes, and floods to earthquakes and volcanic activity, as well as the negative 

consequences of climate change. 

Another issue of concern is weak and illiberal governance in countries. Governments that are not 

responsive to the will of their people are more susceptible to malign external influence. For example, 

democratic backsliding in Cambodia has taken place since 2017, when the ruling party banned 

independent media and dissolved the main opposition party. Additionally, we remain concerned about 

reports that China is seeking to establish bases or a military presence on its coast, a development that 

would challenge regional security and signal a clear shift in Cambodia’s foreign policy orientation. In

Burma, the lack of a robust democracy has set conditions for human rights atrocities committed by 

Burmese security forces in northern Rakhine State since August 2017, and has created regional 

instability, with more than one million Rohingya refugees currently in Bangladesh. 
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The United States is encouraged by positive indicators within South and Southeast Asia that 

democratic institutions are on an upward trajectory and steadily improving transparency, 

responsibility, and democratic values. These indicators include freedom of the press, civilian control 

of the military, and free and fair elections in countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, 

each of which experienced autocratic rule in the past. 

In South Asia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives are also on a positive trajectory. In Sri Lanka, after 25 years 

of conflict, the government has transitioned to a constitutional, multiparty republic with a freelyelected President and Parliament. The political system was challenged with a constitutional dispute in 

late 2018. Ultimately, however, all parties respected the Supreme Court ruling that returned 

democratic processes and norms, and the military remained uninvolved throughout the dispute. The 

Republic of Maldives’ historic election in 2018 – with 90 percent of the eligible population voting –

ushered in the new president, who has outlined an agenda for sweeping reforms to promote free 

media, an independent judiciary, and transparent public financial management.
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3. U.S. National Interests 

and Defense Strategy

3.1. U.S. National Interests

he 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy is based upon the view that peace, security, and prosperity 

depend on strong, sovereign nations that respect their citizens at home and cooperate to 

advance peace abroad. It is grounded in the belief that U.S. leadership in promoting these 

widely held principles is a lasting force for good in the world. As such, DoD is working to support 

enduring U.S. national interests, as articulated in the National Security Strategy:

1. Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life;

2. Promote American prosperity through fair and reciprocal economic relationships to address 

trade imbalances;

3. Preserve peace through strength by rebuilding our military so that it remains preeminent, 

and rely on allies and partners to shoulder a fair share of the burden of responsibility to protect 

against common threats; and,

T
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4. Advance American influence by competing and leading in multilateral organizations so that 

American interests and principles are protected.

While these interests are global in nature, they assume a heightened significance in a region as 

strategically and economically consequential as the Indo-Pacific.

3.2. U.S. National Defense Strategy

The 2018 National Defense Strategy guides the Department of Defense to support the National Security 

Strategy in order to:

1. Defend the homeland;

2. Remain the preeminent military power in the world;

3. Ensure the balances of power in key regions remain in our favor; and

4. Advance an international order that is most conducive to our security and prosperity.

Both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy affirm the Indo-Pacific as critical for 

America's continued stability, security, and prosperity. The United States seeks to help build an IndoPacific where sovereignty and territorial integrity are safeguarded, the promise of freedom is fulfilled,

and prosperity prevails for all. We stand ready to cooperate with all nations to achieve this vision. 

The National Defense Strategy informs how we work with our neighbors in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, 

to address key challenges in the region. The core diagnosis of the National Defense Strategy is that DoD’s 

military advantage vis-à-vis China and Russia is eroding and, if inadequately addressed, it will 

undermine our ability to deter aggression and coercion. A negative shift in the regional balance of 

power could encourage competitors to challenge and subvert the free and open order that supports 

prosperity and security for the United States and its allies and partners. To address this challenge, 

DoD is developing a more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, and is increasing 

collaboration with a robust constellation of allies and partners.

The challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific extend beyond what any single country can address alone. 

The Department seeks to cooperate with like-minded allies and partners to address common 

challenges. The United States acknowledges that allies and partners are a force multiplier for peace 

and interoperability, representing a durable, asymmetric, and unparalleled advantage that no

competitor or rival can match. We seek to provide the structure that allows our respective militaries 

to work together – leveraging our complementary forces, unique perspectives, regional relationships, 

and information capabilities. Taking deliberate steps in these areas will allow us to improve our 

collective ability to compete, deter, and if necessary, fight and win together. 
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4. Sustaining U.S. Influence to 

Achieve Regional Objectives

he National Defense Strategy directs the Department to increase lethality, to strengthen alliances,

and to expand the competitive space. In the context of the Department’s Indo-Pacific 

Strategy, this translates into the pursuit of Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a 

Networked Region.

4.1. Line of Effort 1: Preparedness

The National Defense Strategy directs the Department to employ its resources in ways that enhance the 

lethality, resilience, agility, and readiness of the Joint Force. This resourcing must span near-term 

force employment activities and longer-term investments to modernize and redesign the U.S. military.

The Department is developing innovative capabilities and operating concepts to address specific 

operational problems. This also involves identifying new, asymmetric ways to upgrade and employ 

legacy systems. Experimentation and exercises to test evolving warfighting concepts and capabilities 

help create a virtuous cycle that spurs additional ideas and innovations. Many of these experiments

T
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and exercises are being conducted alongside allies and partners to ensure we can test and improve

interoperability for joint and combined operations. 

The National Defense Strategy implicitly 

acknowledges the most stressing potential

scenarios will occur along our competitors’ 

peripheries. If our competitors decide to 

advance their interests through force, they 

are likely to enjoy a local military advantage 

at the onset of conflict. In a fait accompli

scenario, competitors would seek to employ 

their capabilities quickly to achieve limited 

objectives and forestall a response from the 

United States, and its allies and partners. 

DoD initiatives on force employment, crisis 

response, force and concept development, 

and collaboration with allies and partners 

are aimed to help address this critical challenge. 

The National Defense Strategy directs the Department to posture ready, combat-credible forces 

forward – alongside allies and partners – and, if necessary, to fight and win. This approach 

intentionally presents competitors with a dilemma by ensuring they cannot quickly, cheaply, or easily 

advance their aims through military force. 

Competitors are compelled to advance 

their interests through other, more benign 

means – which are often subject to 

internationally recognized rules or widelyaccepted state practices. 

The Department is undertaking a range of 

efforts to enhance Joint Force 

preparedness for the most pressing 

scenarios. Examples of DoD initiatives 

include:

 Investments in Advanced Training Facilities at the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex to 

present a more a realistic and representative training environment;

 Investments in unit and depot maintenance across Air Force and Naval Aviation to achieve 

an 80 percent fighter readiness goal by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2019; and,

 Investments in advanced missile defense systems interoperable with allied systems in Japan 

and Australia.

“We are adapting to fight against near-peer 

competitors. Our armed forces are learning 

to expect to be contested throughout the 

fight...We are changing our mindset, 

working to regain our advantages, and 

playing to our strengths. Alliances and 

partnerships are at the heart of this 

competitive effort.”

- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security 

Affairs, Randall G. Schriver, speech at the Elliot School 

of International Affairs, February 7, 2019

“The 2018 National Defense Strategy’s

unified framework enables a potent 

combination of teamwork, resources, and 

an unmatched network of allies and 

partners stepping up to shoulder their 

share of the burden for international 

security. The National Defense Strategy

also fosters alignment within the 

Department, the Interagency, industry, 

and Congress.”

- Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan, testimony to the 

House Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2019
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The Department is also modernizing the force to meet the demands of high-end competition.

Illustrative examples of key investments include:

 Acceleration of the development and forward presence of U.S. land forces’ Multi-Domain 

Task Force, utilizing Security Force Assistance Brigades to build partner capacity and 

strengthen multinational teams, and expanding Pacific Pathways to deepen relationships with 

U.S. allies and partners;

 Strategic deterrence enhancements associated with investments in the new Columbia-class 

ballistic missile submarine;

 Purchase of 110 4th- and 5th-generation aircraft which will result in both capability and 

capacity improvements;

 Purchase of approximately 400 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles;

 Purchase of more than 400 Joint Air-Surface Missiles – Extended Range;

 Investments in two Unmanned Surface Vehicles, additional Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles, 

and additional Maritime Strike Tactical Tomahawks;

 Increased capacity in Anti-Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, and Ballistic Missile 

Defense (BMD) by purchasing 10 more destroyers within the FY 2020-2024 Future Years 

Defense Program;

 Investment in resources to support offensive and defensive cyberspace operations; and,

 Efforts to unify, focus, and accelerate the development of space doctrine, capabilities, and 

expertise to outpace future threats, institutionalize advocacy of space priorities, and further 

build space warfighting culture.

Current Posture in the Indo-Pacific

Defense posture is a visible manifestation of U.S. national interests and priorities abroad, and makes 

up the network of U.S. forces and capabilities that are forward-deployed in the region, as well as the 

interconnected bases, infrastructure, installations, and international agreements that support both dayto-day and wartime employment of the force. 

In the region, USINDOPACOM currently has more than 2,000 aircraft; 200 ships and submarines;

and more than 370,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, DoD civilians, and contractors assigned 

within its area of responsibility. The largest concentration of forces in the region are in Japan and the 

ROK. A sizable contingent of forces (more than 5,000 on a day-to-day basis) are also based in the 

U.S. territory of Guam, which serves as a strategic hub supporting crucial operations and logistics for 

all U.S. forces operating in the Indo-Pacific region. Other allies and partners that routinely host U.S. 

forces on a smaller scale include the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom 

through the island of Diego Garcia.
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Future Posture in the Indo-Pacific

To achieve our strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific, we seek to evolve our posture and balance key 

capabilities across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania to have a more dynamic and distributed 

presence and access locations across the region. For example, as announced by Vice President Pence 

on November 16, 2018, the United States seeks to partner with Papua New Guinea and Australia on 

their joint initiative at Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island.

In order to overcome the tyranny of distance, posture that supports and enables inter- and intratheater logistics must be flexible and resilient, and the pre-positioning of equipment is critical. 

Specifically, we are exploring expeditionary capabilities; dynamic basing of maritime and air forces;

special operations forces capable of irregular and unconventional warfare; anti-submarine capabilities;

cyber and space teams equipped for multi-domain operations; and, unique intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities – among other investments. From leveraging existing access in 

the Compact States, to pursuing co-development with our most capable allies and partners, we will 

continue to forward-station leading edge technologies, such as 5th generation fighters in the IndoPacific. 

DoD is also developing new operating 

concepts to increase our lethality, agility, and 

resilience that will be further implemented 

through our evolving posture. For example, 

as part of the Multi-Domain Operations

concept, the U.S. Army will test MultiDomain Task Forces intended to create 

temporary windows of superiority across 

multiple domains, and allow the Joint Force 

to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The 

U.S. Army will test the Multi-Domain Task Forces through the Pacific Pathways program to determine 

the right capability mix and locations. Furthermore, the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations is 

an emerging U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operating concept to provide resilience and support to 

maritime operations inside contested environments. It is intended to deny adversary freedom of 

action; control key maritime terrain; and support Joint Force air and maritime requirements by 

operating from austere locations at a tempo that complicates adversary targeting.

In addition, DoD will continue to ensure a force posture that enables the United States to undertake 

a spectrum of missions including security cooperation, building partner capacity, collaboration on 

transnational threats, and joint and combined training. 

“DoD’s participation in combined 

military exercises has increased by 

seventeen percent in the last two years, 

and our Foreign Military Sales have 

increased by more than sixty-five percent 

in the last three years.”

- Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan, testimony to the 

House Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2019
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4.2. Line of Effort 2: Partnerships

U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific is rooted in our long-standing security alliances – the bedrock on 

which our strategy rests. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, 

providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.

Expanding our interoperability with allies and partners will ensure that our respective defense 

enterprises can work together effectively during day-to-day competition, crisis, and conflict. Through 

focused security cooperation, informationsharing agreements, and regular exercises, we 

are connecting intent, resources, and 

outcomes and building closer relationships 

between our militaries and economies.

Increasing interoperability also involves

ensuring our military hardware and software 

are able to integrate more easily with those of 

our closest allies and partners, offering financing and sales of cutting-edge U.S. defense equipment to 

security partners, and opening up the aperture of U.S. professional military education to more IndoPacific military officers. 

To this end, we have strengthened our alliances 

with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the 

Philippines, and Thailand. These alliances are 

indispensable to peace and security in the region 

and our investments in them will continue to pay 

dividends for the United States and the world, 

far into the future. We have also taken steps to 

expand partnerships with Singapore, Taiwan, 

New Zealand, and Mongolia. Within South 

Asia, we are working to operationalize our Major 

Defense Partnership with India, while pursuing 

emerging partnerships with Sri Lanka, the 

Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nepal. We are also 

continuing to strengthen security relationships

with partners in Southeast Asia, including:

Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and 

sustaining engagements with Brunei, Laos, and 

Cambodia. In the Pacific Islands, we are enhancing our engagement to preserve a free and open IndoPacific, maintain access, and promote our status as a security partner of choice. Efforts to maintain a 

free and open Indo-Pacific have also brought us closer to key allies, including the United Kingdom, 

France, and Canada, each with their own Pacific identities.

“Our network of allies and 

partners is a force multiplier for 

peace and interoperability.”

- 2018 National Defense Strategy

BURDEN SHARING

The National Security Strategy calls on the 

United States to pursue cooperation and

reciprocity together with our allies, 

partners, and aspiring partners.

Cooperation means sharing responsibilities 

and burdens. The United States expects 

our allies and partners to shoulder a fair 

share of the burden of responsibility to 

protect against common threats. When we 

pool resources and share responsibility for 

our common defense, our security burden 

becomes lighter and more cost-effective.
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Modernizing Alliances

JAPAN

The U.S.-Japan Alliance is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, with the United 

States remaining steadfast in its commitment to defend Japan and its administered territories. As the 

security dynamic in the Indo-Pacific evolves, however, it is imperative that the U.S.-Japan Alliance 

adapt to meet the challenges that 

threaten our security and shared 

values. Whether countering 

North Korea’s rogue behavior, or 

long-term strategic competition 

with China and Russia, we must 

pursue concrete objectives that 

preserve the alliance as our 

asymmetric advantage. 

The National Defense Strategy clearly 

articulates that the Department 

will prioritize and strengthen our 

alliances, identifying the U.S.-

Japan Alliance as a critical 

relationship. Japan’s 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines echoes a similar message, reinforcing 

the fundamental fact that the security interests of both the United States and Japan are closely

intertwined. Given the urgency to address new threats, trends, and technologies, we have already seen 

progress in operational 

cooperation, mutual asset 

protection, and bilateral planning.

Maintaining the technological 

advantage the alliance needs to 

fight and win against our 

adversaries is also a top-tier

priority, with the Department 

continuing to streamline Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) to Japan and 

other allies, pursue codevelopment opportunities, and 

deepen cooperation in the cyber 

and space domains.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

The National Security and National Defense Strategies have 

elevated FMS as a tool of first resort in strengthening 

alliances and attracting new partners. Conventional Arms 

Transfer Policy and Security Cooperation reforms have 

focused our ability to improve the efficiency and 

effectiveness of FMS. We have been successful in 

reducing costs, improving processing times, and 

minimizing policy hurdles to make technology more 

available to a larger group of partners.

Acting Secretary 

Shanahan with 

Japanese Minister 

of Defense 

Takeshi Iwaya, at 

the Pentagon, 

January 16, 2019.

Photo by Master Sgt. Angelita 

Lawrence
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23

POSTURE: JAPAN

U.S. forces in Japan are an essential component of our posture in the region. To meet shared threats, 

advance common interests, and fulfill our obligations under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual 

Cooperation and Security – a key enabler for maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region – the 

Department remains steadfast in its commitment to deploy our most capable and advanced forces to 

Japan. The Government of Japan 

contributes financially to the 

stationing of U.S. forces in Japan 

through a Special Measures 

Agreement. This strategic 

contribution directly supports the 

operational readiness of U.S. forces 

in Japan. 

The Department assigns

approximately 54,000 military 

personnel to Japan, in the U.S. 

Navy’s Seventh Fleet, U.S. Marine 

Corps’ III Marine Expeditionary 

Force, 3 Air Force wings, and 

smaller U.S. Army and Special 

Operations units. Some of the more 

advanced capabilities stationed in 

Japan include the F-35, MV and 

CV-22, and the USS RONALD 

REAGAN, our only forward 

deployed aircraft carrier. BMD

assets are also tightly woven into our 

force posture in Japan, including

AEGIS Destroyers, sophisticated 

BMD radar systems, and a 

PATRIOT firing unit to counter the

ballistic missile threat. Enhancing 

operational cooperation between 

the U.S. forces and Japan Self 

Defense Forces (JSDF) is also a 

priority, as outlined in the 2015 

Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense 

Cooperation. Bilateral presence 

operations throughout the IndoPacific region, mutual asset 

GUAM AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF 

THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 

(CNMI)

The Department is modernizing its force posture in 

Guam, in keeping with Guam’s position as the 

westernmost territory of the United States and a strategic 

hub for our joint military presence in the region. We are 

establishing a Marine Air Ground Task Force of 5,000 

U.S. Marines in Guam starting in the first half of the 

2020s as a central feature of the U.S.-Japan realignment 

plan. In Guam, we have some of the most significant 

ammunition and fuel storage capabilities in the IndoPacific. The addition of rotational maritime lift in Guam 

will increase the reach of our combat power in the 

Western Pacific. At Anderson Air Force Base, we have 

established an active Army Missile Defense capability in 

response to increasing threats, and maintain a continuous 

bomber presence and ISR capability. In the CNMI we 

have air, surface, and subsurface training capabilities and 

we are taking steps to ensure we will have ready joint 

forces and opportunities for increased multilateral 

training.

The Government of Japan has already provided more 

than $2 billion of a $3.1 billion commitment for 

construction of facilities for the U.S. Marine Corps 

realignment. The U.S. Government will fund the balance 

of construction, estimated at $8.6 billion, and is working 

toward an outcome that enhances our Indo-Pacific 

posture, bolsters our security commitments in the region, 

and directly benefits Guam.
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protection missions, and bilateral exercises are just a few areas of operational cooperation that U.S. 

forces and the JSDF collaborate on to advance our shared objectives. 

The realignment of U.S. forces in Japan contributes to a regional force posture that is geographically 

distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. We have already made substantial 

progress on this initiative. Examples include the movement of the U.S. Navy’s Carrier Air Wing Five 

to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, the stationing of JSDF units on U.S. Air Force and Army bases, 

and the return of more than 10,000 acres of land in Okinawa to the Government of Japan. Future 

steps include the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility and the return of U.S. Marine 

Corps Air Station Futenma, as well as the consolidation of our remaining bases and the return of 

additional land in Okinawa, Japan. 

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The United States remains steadfast in its 

commitment to the defense of the 

Republic of Korea (ROK). The U.S.-

ROK Alliance is the linchpin of peace and 

prosperity in Northeast Asia, as well as the 

Korean Peninsula. 

The Department is continuing its work 

with the ROK Ministry of National 

Defense to transition wartime operational 

control for Combined Forces Command

(CFC) from a U.S. Commander to a ROK 

Commander. To achieve this, the DoD 

and the ROK Ministry of National Defense are investing in critical military capabilities to ensure our 

combined readiness to meet any threat to the alliance. The United States and the ROK are also 

working to enhance alliance capabilities in the fields of space, cyberspace, and missile defense, along 

with efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction. 

Together, the United States and the ROK are constantly improving our ISR capacity; developing a 

robust, tiered BMD; fielding appropriate command and control assets; acquiring necessary inventories 

of critical munitions; and enhancing the tools to prevent, deter, and respond to cyber attacks. 

The United States and the ROK continue combined training through command post exercises, as well 

as field training exercises to ensure the readiness and combat proficiency of combined forces on the 

Peninsula and in the region. The Department is also working to revitalize the United Nations 

Command, which contributes to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through oversight and 

maintenance of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

“The alliance between South Korean and 

American forces is ironclad – forged in 

blood, shaped over 65 years of combined 

military operations and training, and 

hardened by the crucible of war. Shared 

sacrifice and mutually agreed principles 

underpin our alliance and ensure it 

endures the winds of change.”

- Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, General Robert B. 

Abrams, testimony to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, February 12, 2019
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POSTURE: REPUBLIC OF KOREA 

The U.S-ROK combined force – unique among bilateral U.S. military relationships – is a robust 

deterrent to aggression on the Korean Peninsula. As we sustain readiness for any conflict, the United

States and the ROK also remain committed to the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea 

and enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The Department has three 

unique commands on the 

Korean Peninsula: U.S. Forces 

Korea (USFK), the CFC, and 

the United Nations Command. 

The ROK hosts 28,500 U.S. 

service members and their 

families to units including the 

U.S. Eighth Army and 2nd

Infantry Division, Seventh Air 

Force, U.S. Marine Corps 

Forces Korea, U.S. Special 

Operations Command-Korea, 

and Commander, Naval Forces 

Korea. Advanced capabilities 

stationed in South Korea include two fighter wings of F-16 and A-10 aircraft; a major U.S. Army 

prepositioned stockpile; a combat aviation brigade; a field artillery brigade; advanced ISR units; and a 

headquarters for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The ROK continues to invest more in its defense 

over the past 15 years than it did in decades 

before, spending over 2 percent of its gross 

domestic product on defense and increasing 

foreign military procurements from the United 

States, such as the KF-16 and PATRIOT 

battery upgrades, AH-64E Apaches, the 

F-15K, RQ-4 Global Hawk variants, and the 

F-35A Joint Strike Fighter. Seoul also has 

future procurement plans for the P-8, advanced 

munitions, upgrades to PAC-3 missiles, and 

F-16 fighters – all of which will increase 

interoperability with the United States. 

Significant improvements in U.S. Force posture during 2018 include adding essential munitions, BMD

systems, and pre-positioned wartime stocks. The United States continues to work with the ROK to 

create an interoperable BMD architecture that addresses the ballistic missile threat from North Korea. 

In 2017, the United States deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery to the ROK. 

“The force is sufficiently postured to 

deter aggression and defeat any 

adversary, if necessary. We continue to 

train at echelon to maintain the 

readiness required to translate a strong 

military posture into decisive victory on 

short notice.”

- General Abrams, testimony to the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, February 12, 2019

Acting Secretary of 

Defense Shanahan 

hosts the South 

Korean Minister of 

National Defense 

Jeong Kyeong-doo 

at the Pentagon, 

April 1, 2019.

Photo by Master Sgt. Angelita 

Lawrence
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

26

The United States and the ROK have agreed to a 10th Special Measures Agreement that will enable 

the ROK to help offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. The Special 

Measures Agreement will ensure essential readiness related personnel and activities, including the

contributions of 9,000 South Korean national employees of USFK serving in crucial roles of public 

safety, health care, emergency response, and quality-of-life delivery operations. 

Our joint efforts in military construction and modernization ensures our forces are postured, prepared, 

and properly set for the future. The Land Partnership Plan and the associated Yongsan Relocation 

Plan are bilateral agreements that provide the foundation for streamlining USFK’s footprint while 

returning facilities and valuable land to the ROK Government for future development. In 2018, 

USFK and United Nations Command Headquarters relocated both commands from U.S. Army 

Garrison Yongsan to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, joining U.S. Eighth Army and 

2nd Infantry Division in new state-of-the-art facilities on the largest DoD facility outside of the 

continental United States. By consolidating capability in Pyeongtaek, on facilities built mostly with 

ROK funds, we maximize our ability to uphold U.S. security commitments, return large portions of 

downtown Seoul to the Korean people for economic development, and improve the quality of life for 

our Service members and their families. Since 2003, USFK has returned 49 sites to the ROK while 

simultaneously moving the majority of our forces and families away from the demilitarized zone and 

closer to major air and sea ports. 

AUSTRALIA

U.S. and Australian forces have shared the battlefield in every major conflict since the First World 

War and celebrated their “First Hundred Years of Mateship” in 2018. For more than a century, we 

have conducted joint and coalition operations, training and exercises, intelligence cooperation, and 

capability development. The United States and Australia share a commitment to building on the 

interoperability of our armed forces, collaborating to ensure the security of the Indo-Pacific region

into the future, and seeking innovative ways to adapt to new threats. 

Australia is providing forces in Iraq for the counter-ISIS fight as trainers, force protection, and 

advisors. Australia’s significant commitment to a stable and secure Afghanistan is also helping 

modernize our alliance through its contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-

led Resolute Support Mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces. Australia is also a key contributor to the UNSCR enforcement operations to bring North 

Korea into compliance with its international obligations and serves as a significant partner to the 

Philippines in building counter-terrorism capacity. 

Both the United States and Australia are strengthening security in the Indo-Pacific through more 

deliberate coordination of the policies and priorities underlying regional engagements by promoting 

interoperability to address new threats, increasing focus on the Pacific Islands, and leveraging the U.S.-

Australia force posture initiatives and the unique exercising and training opportunities created in the 

process.
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

27

The Department is also partnering with Australia in cyber, space, and defense science and technology 

domains. Together, we are building upon our long-established defense intelligence partnership 

through the regular exchange of information and assessments – which strengthens our situational

awareness and capability and enhances our ability to operate together in support of regional stability 

and the rules-based international order. The United States and Australia intend to explore new models 

of development, acquisition, and sustainment and continue to transform our defense organizations 

and processes to meet new challenges.

POSTURE: AUSTRALIA

In 2014, the United States and Australia signed the Force Posture Agreement, a 25-year plus agreement 

governing our Force Posture Initiatives and providing our forces more opportunities to work 

bilaterally, and in trilateral and regional activities, in areas including maritime capacity building and 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). 

There are two Force Posture Initiatives in northern Australia: (1) the Enhanced Air Cooperation, 

improving interoperability through longer duration, more sophisticated training; and (2) Marine 

Rotational Forces-Darwin, an annual rotational presence of up to 2,500 U.S. Marines. The Force 

Posture Initiatives promote a combined capability to respond to crises and contingencies, strengthen 

interoperability, and further

engagement with regional 

partners. 

In 2018, the U.S. Marine 

Rotational Forces-Darwin 

completed its seventh 

rotation, training with 

forces from Australia and 

12 other regional countries 

and deploying as part of 

Australia’s Indo-Pacific 

Endeavor – a flotilla that 

conducted security 

cooperation activities in 

Southeast Asia and the 

Pacific Islands. 

In 2019, the Marine 

Rotational Forces-Darwin is expected to grow to 2,500 U.S. Marines. Enhanced Aircraft Cooperation 

will deepen as well in 2019, with a robust set of activities planned, and deployment of new capabilities 

for these engagements.

Australian Defence Force 

members with Charlie 

Company, 5th Royal 

Australian Regiment, fire 

squad automatic weapons 

during Marine Rotational 

Force - Darwin's Exercise 

KOOLENDONG at 

Mount Bundey Training 

Area, Australia, 

August 22, 2018.

Photo by the U.S. Department of Defense 
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28

THE PHILIPPINES

The 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty provides the foundation for our bilateral security 

cooperation, along with the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, and 2014 Enhanced Defense 

Cooperation Agreement

(EDCA). These foundational 

agreements and our longstanding 

history enabled U.S. forces to

support the Philippines during its 

battles against ISIS-aligned 

extremists that captured the city 

of Marawi in 2017. U.S. Special 

Operations Forces advisors 

remain in the country to date and 

provide our continued support to 

the Armed Forces of the 

Philippines.

We have 280 bilateral defense 

activities planned with the Philippines in 2019, and the Philippines hosts the most bilateral exercises 

in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility. This robust annual cooperation ensures our forces 

maintain a sufficient level of interoperability to respond in times of crisis. 

The Department is partnering with the Armed 

Forces of the Philippines in its 15-year 

modernization plan to upgrade its capabilities 

for territorial defense. The main areas of

emphasis are maritime security, ISR, and 

aviation. The United States and the Philippines 

are also partnering on reconstituting counterterrorism forces following the Marawi siege. 

In December 2018, then-Secretary James 

Mattis, with authority delegated by the 

President, returned the Bells of Balangiga to the Philippines. The Bells were seized during the U.S.-

Philippine War in 1901 and are venerated as religious artifacts by the people of the Philippines. In 

returning the Bells of Balangiga to the people of the Philippines, the United States cements the tight 

bond between our two countries and peoples, which is based on respect and shared sacrifice.

In March 2016, the United States and the Philippines began to implement the EDCA to give our 

forces access to key facilities and allow our militaries to work even more closely together. As part of

this implementation, we are supporting the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 

“In returning the Bells of Balangiga to 

our ally and friend - the Philippines - we 

pick up our generation's responsibility 

to deepen the respect between our two 

peoples.”

- Then-Secretary of Defense Mattis, F.E. 

Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, 

November 15, 2018

The United States officially 

returned the Bells of 

Balangiga to the 

Philippines, December 11, 

2018. (Left to right) 

Philippines' Defense 

Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, 

the Executive Secretary of 

the Philippines Salvador 

Medialdea, U.S. Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of 

Defense Joseph H. Felter, 

and U.S. Ambassador to the 

Philippines Sung Kim.

Photo by the U.S. Department of State
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

29

and strengthening mutual defense. There are five EDCA Agreed Locations arrayed throughout the 

archipelago: Antonio Bautista Air Base, Basa Air Base, Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation, Lumbia 

Air Base, and Mactan Benito Ebuen Air Base. The first projects under the agreement were completed 

in 2018 and an additional 12 projects have been approved for implementation for 2019 and 2020. 

These investments provide force posture enhancements, improve our future readiness, and improve 

the operational flexibility of the alliance during contingencies.

In March 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo reaffirmed our commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty, 

providing assurances that, “as the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on 

Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense 

obligations under Article IV of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”

The United States and the Philippines continue to find new ways to meet our shared goals. For 

example, at the invitation of the Government of the Philippines, we concluded a bilateral air exercise 

at Basa Air Base that incorporated fighter aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the U.S. 

Air Force.

THAILAND

The United States and Thailand established relations in 1818 and shortly thereafter, Thailand became 

an ally after signing the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1833. Our deep and longstanding militaryto-military ties with Thailand were formalized in 1954 with the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective 

Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), and in 2003 we reaffirmed our commitment to Thailand by designating 

it a major non-NATO ally. The 2014 

military coup created significant challenges. 

As Thailand continues to take steps toward 

democracy, DoD looks forward to 

strengthening our longstanding defense ties.

Together we are advancing shared goals of 

enhancing regional security; confronting 

public health challenges; countering 

transnational crime; combating trafficking in 

persons, wildlife, and narcotics; and assisting 

refugees and displaced persons. We 

currently hold more than 130 military-tomilitary engagements each year, including 

the Indo-Pacific’s largest military exercise, 

COBRA GOLD. 

As a U.S. ally that is both central to ASEAN and positioned between South Asia and Southeast Asia, 

Thailand plays a key geostrategic role in the Indo-Pacific region. The access provided to Utapao Royal 

Thai Naval Air Station and the associated deep-water port at Sattahip is a critical enabler for U.S. force 

MILITARY EXERCISES IN THE 

INDO-PACIFIC

The United States holds some 90 named military 

exercises in the Indo-Pacific each year, with the 

vast majority of these exercises being conducted 

jointly or combined with our allies and partners. 

These forces and exercises cooperate with 

militaries across the region in a range of activities 

from real time HA/DR to the full spectrum of 

conventional warfare skills to deter our 

adversaries.
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30

projection. Utapao supports logistics activities and HA/DR operations such as support to efforts 

surrounding the 2015 earthquake in Nepal. 

The United States currently enjoys information sharing with Thailand enabled by a General Security 

of Military Information Agreement, communications security via a Communications and Information 

Security Memorandum of Agreement, and logistics sharing via an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing

Agreement. Our future efforts in Thailand will focus on maintaining and enhancing access at 

cooperative security locations, expanding the scope and complexity of our current exercises, and 

supporting the Royal Thai Armed Forces’ modernization efforts, most notably the Royal Thai Army’s 

intent to update its Brigade Combat Team construct centered on the U.S. Stryker vehicle. 

Strengthening Partnerships

As democracies in the Indo-Pacific, Singapore, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Mongolia are reliable, 

capable, and natural partners of the United States. All four countries contribute to U.S. missions 

around the world and are actively taking steps to uphold a free and open international order. The 

strength of these relationships is what we hope to replicate in our new and burgeoning relationships 

in the Indo-Pacific. 

SINGAPORE

Singapore remains a steadfast partner in Southeast Asia with a strong commitment to promote 

regional and global stability. Our long-standing defense relationship is underpinned by the 1990 

Memorandum of Understanding, the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, and the 2015 U.S.-

Singapore Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. In the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, 

the United States designated Singapore a “Major Security Cooperation Partner.” Singapore provides 

access to U.S. Navy ships, as well as U.S. military aircraft, including most recently littoral combat ships 

and P-8 Poseidon aircraft, whose presence has contributed to the security and stability of Southeast 

Asia, and continues to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The Department has long hosted training detachments of fighter aircraft from Singapore to train 

alongside the U.S. Air Force in the United States, which helps to further deepen our security ties and 

boost interoperability. Singapore annually sends approximately 1,000 personnel to training and 

education courses in the United States, representing the largest training presence in the United States 

from any foreign military. 

Singapore was the first and only Asian country to contribute assets and personnel to the Global 

Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and has participated in Operation Gallant Phoenix since May 2017. 

Singapore has commanded Combined Task Force 151 in the Gulf of Aden five times.
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

31

TAIWAN

The United States has a vital interest in upholding the 

rules-based international order, which includes a 

strong, prosperous, and democratic Taiwan. The 

United States is pursuing a strong partnership with 

Taiwan and will faithfully implement the Taiwan 

Relations Act, as part of a broader commitment to the 

security and stability of the Indo-Pacific. Our 

partnership is vital given China's continued pressure 

campaign against Taiwan. Taiwan lost three diplomatic partners in 2018, and some international fora 

continued to deny the participation of representatives from Taiwan. Although China advocates for 

peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force, and continues 

to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign.

The salience of defense engagements has increased as the PLA continues to prepare for contingencies 

in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward 

independence. The PLA is also preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by 

force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s 

behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan, China has increased military 

exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, including circumnavigation flights by the PLA Air Force and naval 

exercises in the East China Sea.

The objective of our defense engagement with Taiwan 

is to ensure that Taiwan remains secure, confident, free 

from coercion, and able to peacefully and productively 

engage the mainland on its own terms. The 

Department is committed to providing Taiwan with 

defense articles and services in such quantity as may be 

necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient 

self-defense capability. DoD is continually engaged in 

evaluating Taiwan’s defense needs to assist Taiwan in 

identifying capabilities that are mobile, survivable, and 

effective in resisting the use of force or other forms of coercion. Since 2008, U.S. Administrations 

have notified Congress of more than $22 billion in FMS for Taiwan.

NEW ZEALAND

Since the Washington Declaration in 2012, the United States and New Zealand continue to deepen 

and broaden their defense relationship. The U.S.-New Zealand defense partnership will remain 

focused on building maritime security presence, capabilities, and awareness; cooperation to develop 

expeditionary defense capabilities; and sharing information to enable security cooperation and to

“America will always believe that 

Taiwan’s embrace of democracy 

shows a better path for all the 

Chinese people.”

- Vice President Pence, remarks at the 

Hudson Institute, October 4, 2018

“A strong and secure Taiwan can 

deter aggression, defend the 

Taiwan people and their hardwon democracy, and engage on 

its own terms with the PRC.”

- Assistant Secretary of Defense for IndoPacific Security Affairs Randall G. Schriver, 

remarks at Stanford University, April 10, 2019
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

32

prepare to respond to a range of contingencies. New Zealand contributes forces to coalition 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, to three United Nations peacekeeping missions, and to UNSCR 

enforcement operations. 

Besides these global contributions, 

New Zealand plays a critical role as a 

regional leader promoting stability, 

building capacity, and responding to 

crises and contingencies in the Pacific 

Islands, such as natural disasters. In 

2018, New Zealand announced the 

“Pacific Reset,” its new whole-ofgovernment policy to engage in the 

Pacific Islands, building capacity and 

resilience in response to a range of 

threats. By collectively stepping up in 

partnership with Pacific Island nations 

and other likeminded allies and 

partners, New Zealand’s Pacific Reset 

directly complements DoD’s efforts in the Indo-Pacific and our efforts to renew engagement in the 

Pacific. The overlap in our respective strategies creates synergies, as we collectively step up to pool 

our resources and respond to the Pacific’s need for greater investment, infrastructure, and capacity 

building efforts that match the region’s highest-priority needs.

MONGOLIA

Since the inception of formal bilateral defense cooperation in 1996, the U.S.-Mongolia defense 

relationship has developed significantly. Mongolia regards the United States as its most important 

“third neighbor” and primary 

security partner. The United States

and Mongolia have a 

comprehensive partnership based 

on common values and shared 

strategic interests in protecting and 

promoting freedom, democracy, 

economic openness, and human 

rights worldwide. Mongolia 

remains regionally and globally 

engaged as a net security exporter 

through the Mongolian Armed 

Forces’ contributions to the United 

Nations peacekeeping operations in 

On December 10, 2018, 

the U.S. Memorial for 

Pukeahu was unveiled 

in the presence of the 

Minister of Defence 

Ron Mark, U.S.

Ambassador to New 

Zealand Scott Brown, 

and Randall G. 

Schriver, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense 

for Indo-Pacific 

Security Affairs.

Photo by the U.S. Department of State

U.N. Peacekeepers 

from Mongolia 

patrol as part of a 

field training 

exercise during 

Exercise SHANTI

DOOT 4 in 

Bangladesh, 

March 6, 2018.

Photo by Lance Cpl. Adam 

Montera
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

33

Africa, and its continued deployment in Afghanistan to support coalition operations. Moreover, 

Mongolia continues to enforce U.N. Security Council sanctions that have been unanimously adopted 

in response to North Korea’s unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The United States 

supports Mongolia's efforts to maintain and further develop a modern, professional, and selfsustaining military capable of serving as a fully integrated coalition and U.N. Peacekeeping partner. 

The United States also assists Mongolia with expanding its capacity to respond to domestic and 

regional disasters and humanitarian crises. The United States and Mongolia share a vision for a free 

and open Indo-Pacific that safeguards sovereignty and freedom from coercion for all countries.

Mongolia’s regional cooperation and support for multilateral institutions contributes to peace, 

stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and serves as a stabilizing influence in the region.

Expanding Partnerships in the Indian Ocean Region

The United States and India share a 

common outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Both

countries recognize the importance of the 

Indo-Pacific to global trade and commerce 

and acknowledge that developments in this 

region will shape the larger trajectory of the 

rules-based international order. India, 

through its “Act East” policy, continues to 

make significant security, economic, and 

development investments to secure the 

vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific 

region. The Indian Ocean Region is at the nexus of global trade and commerce, with nearly half of 

the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two thirds of global oil trade traveling through its sea lanes. 

The region boasts some of the fastest-growing economies on Earth, and is home to a quarter of the 

world’s population. While the region offers unprecedented opportunity, it is also confronting a myriad 

of security challenges, including terrorism, transnational crime, trafficking-in-persons, and illicit drugs. 

To combat these challenges, the United States seeks opportunities to broaden and strengthen 

partnerships with India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nepal to respond to shared regional 

challenges.

INDIA

The United States and India maintain a broad-based strategic partnership, underpinned by shared 

interests, democratic values, and strong people-to-people ties. The U.S.-India strategic partnership 

has strengthened significantly during the past two decades, based on a convergence of strategic 

interests, and the United States and India continue to use their deepening relationship to build new

partnerships within and beyond the Indo-Pacific.

“To advance our vision of a free and open 

Indo-Pacific, we are building new and 

stronger bonds with nations that share 

our values across the region, from India to 

Samoa. Our relationships will flow from a 

spirit of respect built on partnership, not 

domination.”

- Vice President Pence, remarks at the 

Hudson Institute, October 4, 2018
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34

In June 2016, the United States 

designated India a “Major Defense 

Partner,” a status unique to India. 

The designation seeks to elevate the 

U.S. defense partnership with India 

to a level commensurate with that of 

the United States’ closest allies and 

partners. The establishment of the 

U.S.-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue 

in September 2018 also serves as a 

tangible demonstration of our 

commitment to promoting the 

shared principles of a free and open 

Indo-Pacific. 

The United States continues to pursue a range of initiatives with India to enable cooperation, 

strengthen our interoperability, and establish a strong foundation for defense trade, technology 

sharing, industrial collaboration, and broader cooperation on defense innovation. The signing of the 

Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement in 2018 represents a significant development 

in our military-to-military relationship, facilitating greater interoperability and real-time secure 

information-sharing. DoD and the 

Indian Ministry of Defence are 

increasing the scope, complexity, and 

frequency of our military exercises.

Later this year, the United States and 

India will conduct our first tri-service 

exercise, and we continue to 

collaborate on maritime security and 

domain awareness, HA/DR, counterpiracy, counter-terrorism, and other 

transnational issues. 

As our shared interests and security 

cooperation have expanded, U.S.-

India bilateral defense trade and 

technology cooperation have also 

grown, with approximately $16 billion in defense trade since 2008. Through the Defense Technology 

and Trade Initiative, we are increasing cooperation in defense technology, building industry-toindustry ties, and identifying opportunities for the co-development and co-production of defense 

systems for the sustainment and modernization of military forces. 

Then-U.S. Secretary of 

Defense Mattis with 

the Indian Minister of 

Defence Nirmala 

Sitharaman during the 

signing of the 

Communications, 

Compatibility and 

Security Agreement, 

September 6, 2019.

Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class 

Lisa Ferdinando

During MALABAR 2018, 

an Indian Navy oiler 

conducts an underway 

replenishment training 

exercise with a U.S. 

warship, enabled by the 

implementation of the 

U.S.-India Logistics 

Exchange 

Memorandum of 

Agreement.

Photo by Mass Communication 

Specialist 2nd Class William McCann
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35

SRI LANKA

Since 2015, DoD has strengthened its relationship with Sri Lanka and increased military engagements 

significantly, particularly with the Sri Lankan Navy. In 2017, we conducted the first port visit in 30 

years by a U.S. aircraft carrier – the USS NIMITZ Carrier Strike Group – and the first ever bilateral 

Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Exercise. In 2019, we increased cooperation 

on mutual logistics arrangements in support of Indian Ocean security and disaster response. 

THE MALDIVES

Following the recent democratic transition in the Maldives, the United States has begun to explore 

avenues to expand security cooperation, with particular emphasis on providing capacity-building 

opportunities to the Maldives National Defence Forces and Maldivian Coast Guard. Key areas of 

focus include: maritime domain awareness (MDA) – to enable Maldivian forces the ability to monitor 

and patrol its sovereign maritime area and contribute to regional efforts to protect sea lines of 

communication; HA/DR readiness; and counter-terrorism capability. An additional $7 million in FY 

2018 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) will support these efforts.

BANGLADESH

The United States enjoys a strong defense relationship with Bangladesh, an important partner for 

regional stability and security. Security cooperation focuses on key areas such as maritime security 

and domain awareness, counterterrorism, HA/DR, 

peacekeeping, and border 

security. The annual Bilateral 

Defense Dialogue between 

USINDOPACOM and the 

Bangladesh Armed Forces 

Division sets the strategic 

direction of our defense 

relationship. In addition, recent 

increases in FMF, International 

Military Education and Training 

(IMET), and the inclusion of 

Bangladesh in the Maritime 

Security Initiative (MSI)

underscores not only the value the United States places on its defense partnership with Bangladesh, 

but also Dhaka’s contributions towards regional stability in support of upholding a rules-based 

international order in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.

United States and 

Bangladesh naval 

officers pilot a P-8 

during the CARAT 

Exercise in 2018.

Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class 

Tristin Barth
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36

NEPAL

The United States seeks to expand our 

defense relationship with Nepal, focused on 

HA/DR, peacekeeping operations, defense 

professionalization, ground force capacity, 

and counter-terrorism. Our growing 

defense partnership can be seen in the 

establishment of the U.S. Army Pacific-led 

Land Forces Talks in June 2018, our seniormost military dialogue with Nepal. This 

year has already seen several senior-level 

visits to Nepal by the USINDOPACOM 

Commander and Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for South and 

Southeast Asia to further advance our defense relationship. 

Expanding Partnerships in Southeast Asia

Through the implementation of the 

National Defense Strategy in the IndoPacific, the United States is prioritizing 

new relationships with Vietnam, 

Indonesia, and Malaysia – key players in 

ASEAN that remain central in our 

efforts to ensure peace and underwrite 

prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. All three 

countries represent engines of economic 

growth that are strategically located on 

key sea lanes between the Indian and 

Pacific Oceans. While maintaining 

independent foreign policies, Vietnam, 

Indonesia, and Malaysia are aligned with the region’s shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific

and are focused on maintaining peace, stability, and prosperous economic development in the region.

VIETNAM

The Department is building a strategic partnership with Vietnam that is based on common interests 

and principles, including freedom of navigation, respect for a rules-based order in accordance with 

international law, and recognition of national sovereignty. The U.S.-Vietnam defense relationship has 

Commander of the U.S. 

Indo-Pacific Command 

Admiral Phil Davidson 

visits Nepal, 

January 11, 2019.

Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Robin 

Peak

After nearly 50 years of 

service in the U.S. Coast 

Guard, the Hamilton-class 

cutter (WHEC-722) was 

officially transferred to the 

Vietnam Coast Guard 

under the name CSB-8020. 

A transfer ceremony took 

place at Coast Guard Base, 

Honolulu, May 25, 2017.

Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Melissa 

McKenzie
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37

grown dramatically over the past several years, as symbolized by the historic March 2018 visit of a 

U.S. aircraft carrier for the first time since the Vietnam War. 

The Department is working to improve Vietnam’s defense capabilities by providing security assistance, 

including Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, T-6 trainer aircraft, a former U.S. Coast Guard highendurance cutter, and small patrol boats and their associated training and maintenance facilities. The 

U.S. military also engages in numerous annual training exchanges and activities to enhance bilateral 

cooperation and interoperability with the Vietnam People’s Army, Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard. 

Additionally, DoD has provided training and technical assistance to support Vietnam’s 2018 

deployment of a medical unit to the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan, and will continue to 

provide assistance to facilitate future deployments. 

Our increasingly strong defense ties are based on a foundation of close cooperation to address legacy 

of war and humanitarian issues, which predates the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1995. As we

look to celebrate 25 years of diplomatic relations in 2020, DoD remains committed to supporting U.S. 

efforts to clean up dioxin contamination and remove unexploded ordnance, and appreciates Vietnam’s 

continued assistance to account for U.S. personnel missing from the Vietnam War.

INDONESIA

As the world’s second and third 

largest democracies, the United 

States and Indonesia share many 

common strategic interests, and this 

year celebrate 70 years of diplomatic 

relations. The United States 

supports Indonesia’s vision to 

become a “global maritime 

fulcrum” straddling the Indian and 

Pacific Oceans. Indonesia and the 

United States cooperate on defense 

issues under the auspices of the 

U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive 

Partnership, reaffirmed in October 2015. The Strategic Partnership focuses on six areas for advancing 

defense cooperation: maritime security and domain awareness; defense procurement and joint 

research and development; peacekeeping operations and training; professionalization; HA/DR; and 

countering transnational threats such as terrorism and piracy.

The United States and Indonesia conduct an active exercise program that enhances our respective 

capacity and interoperability based on common platforms such as F-16 fighters and Apache attack 

helicopters. Our bilateral defense activities include more than 200 bilateral military engagements a 

year, one Joint Staff sponsored exercise, and several service-level maneuver exercises annually. 

U.S. Air Force members 

escort displaced people off 

a U.S. C-130 Hercules 

aircraft in Balikpapan, 

Indonesia, 

October 9, 2018. 

Thousands were displaced 

after a 7.5 magnitude 

earthquake and tsunami 

struck Indonesia’s 

Sulawesi Island.

Photo by Master Sgt. James May
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38

Indonesia is a major recipient of IMET funds in the Indo-Pacific, which are used to enhance the 

military professionalization of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. Future areas of 

collaboration include developing defense industry partnerships that will expand coordination on 

acquisition, technology transfer, cooperative research, industrial collaboration, and logistics support.

MALAYSIA

Malaysia is a key player in Southeast Asia 

and we will continue to deepen our security 

and defense cooperation. Our ties have 

remained strong for many years, and we are 

working with the Pakatan Harapan 

Government to further strengthen this 

important relationship. Malaysia’s regional 

leadership role, technologically advanced 

industry, sizeable economy, and capable 

military make it an important partner in 

securing peace and prosperity in Southeast 

Asia. Malaysia has demonstrated the 

capacity and resolve to contribute to 

regional security, and we continue to 

support Malaysia’s emerging security 

requirements.

We conduct more than 100 defense 

engagements with Malaysia annually, 

including exercises, subject matter expert 

exchanges, and partner on common 

objectives such as maritime security and 

counter-terrorism. We improve our 

interoperability through combined air, 

maritime, and amphibious training in 

multiple locations across the country. At sea 

we participate in both the CARAT and 

Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training 

(SEACAT) Exercises and are increasing 

cooperation with Malaysia’s maritime law 

enforcement agency, in coordination with 

the U.S. Department of State. Through the 

MSI, we are helping Malaysia improve its 

MDA by providing sensors on existing 

platforms. We are deploying a U.S. 

THE STATE PARTNERSHIP 

PROGRAM IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

The State Partnership Program began in 1993 

with partnerships between the National Guard 

of designated U.S. States and newly 

independent Eastern European countries. 

The State Partnership Program has since 

expanded to other regions, including the 

Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Western 

Europe, and the Indo-Pacific.

By the end of FY 2019, the United States will 

have 79 partnerships with 86 nations, 12 of 

which are in the Indo-Pacific:

 Bangladesh / Oregon (2008)

 Cambodia / Idaho (2009)

 Indonesia / Hawaii (2006)

 Malaysia / Washington (2017)

 Mongolia / Alaska (2003)

 Philippines / Hawaii, Guam (2000)

 Thailand / Washington (2002) 

 Tonga and Fiji / Nevada (2014 & 2018)

 Vietnam / Oregon (2012)

Recently Added:

 Nepal (2019)

 Sri Lanka (2019)
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

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maritime advisor to Malaysia to improve our partnership and coordination on maritime security and 

MDA. Malaysia also actively partners in international counter-terrorism efforts, adding its regional 

perspective to support the global effort to defeat ISIS.

Malaysia has been a critical partner of increasing importance in the region ever since the United States 

elevated the relationship to a Comprehensive Partnership in 2014. Malaysia is a leader on several key 

regional security challenges in Southeast Asia, particularly maritime security and countering violent 

extremism. For example, Malaysia participates in multilateral air and maritime patrols in the Malacca 

Strait with Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand, focused on countering threats to international shipping

in that vital waterway. Malaysia also participates in similar patrols in the Sulu and Celebes Seas with 

Indonesia and the Philippines aimed at countering violent extremists. The Malaysia Maritime 

Enforcement Agency formally committed to host the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement 

Initiative (SEAMLEI) Commanders’ Forum in December 2019. Malaysia plays a leadership role on 

HA/DR, and currently co-chairs the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) 

HA/DR Experts’ Working Group with the United States. 

The Malaysian Armed Forces have demonstrated the professionalism, capacity, and resolve to 

contribute to regional security and international U.N. missions. We will continue to work closely with 

Malaysia to advance these and similar efforts which support a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Sustaining Engagements, Strengthening Foundations

As outlined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia of 1976, Brunei, Laos, and 

Cambodia embrace ASEAN values including, but not limited to, the mutual respect for the 

independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; the right 

of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coercion; 

and the settlement of differences or disputes in a peaceful manner. These principles underscore the 

importance of the sovereignty of all nations, and are in line with the U.S. vision for a free and open 

Indo-Pacific. While the United States maintains measured engagements with Brunei, Laos, and 

Cambodia, we continue to seek opportunities to enhance defense relations as conditions permit. 

BRUNEI

Military-to-military ties have become a mainstay of the U.S.-Brunei bilateral relationship. The 

Bruneian Government has welcomed the growth of military ties with the United States and likeminded nations, including with respect to enhancing MDA. In 2018, in addition to the Brunei Navy's 

participation in the RIM OF THE PACIFIC Exercise and holding our annual bilateral CARAT

Exercise, the Royal Brunei Land Forces and U.S. Army conducted their first bilateral exercise –

PAHLAWAN WARRIOR – in Brunei. This year the United States co-hosted with Brunei a 

multilateral Cooperation Against Transnational Threats workshop. We continue to look for ways to 

expand our military-to-military cooperation, including through increased information sharing.
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40

LAOS

Strategically located in the geographic heart of ASEAN and the Mekong sub-region, Laos presents 

opportunities for deepening security, economic, and diplomatic engagement. China is increasingly 

focused on Laos, and Beijing continues efforts to expand its strategic footprint through large debtfueled investments, especially in infrastructure and energy. However, Laos is wary of overdependence

and is seeking to diversify its partners and 

options. At the same time, Laos is 

experiencing a significant demographic shift 

– with a large majority of its population 

under the age of 35 – which presents a 

unique opportunity to engage a new, 

outward looking generation. The Lao 

military prioritizes Vietnam, Russia, and to 

a lesser degree China as its primary security 

partners. At the same time, the Laotian

military is slowly expanding its international 

engagement portfolio, first to ASEAN and 

to a lesser degree to countries in the region 

such as Japan, Australia, and India. 

The United States supports activities that advance Laos’ integration into ASEAN, such as defense 

modernization, interoperability, English language proficiency, and respect for a rules-based 

international order. In the meantime, we are working to move past war legacy issues related to the 

Vietnam War and aim to conclude Prisoner of War/Missing in Action recovery operations honorably, 

and by 2030 to make Laos substantially risk-free of U.S.-sourced unexploded ordnance.

CAMBODIA

DoD seeks to build a productive military-to-military relationship with the Kingdom of Cambodia that 

protects its sovereignty, promotes military professionalism, and helps it become a responsible and 

capable contributor to regional security. In early 2017, Cambodia suspended all military-to-military 

exercises with the United States. We, however, continue to cooperate in peacekeeping operations, 

humanitarian mine action, medical research, and U.S. Missing in Action personnel accounting. 

Revitalized engagements in the Pacific Islands

We are revitalizing our engagement in the Pacific Islands to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific 

region, maintain access, and promote our status as a security partner of choice. The Pacific Islands 

represent a region distinct from other regions in the Indo-Pacific because of the relatively small size 

of states, unique geography, and challenges to promote economic prosperity. As a Pacific nation itself, 

Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of 

Defense Joseph 

H. Felter with a 

Lao Unexploded 

Ordnance

disposal team at a 

cleanup site in 

southern Laos, 

January 18, 2019.

Photo by the U.S. Department 

of Defense
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

41

the United States views the 

Pacific Islands as critical to 

the U.S. strategy because of 

our shared values, interests,

and commitments, 

including U.S. security 

guarantees to the Freely 

Associated States. Our 

shared interests with the 

Pacific Islands underscore 

four important components 

special to this region. 

First, we share a long history, born from 

commitments and support during the Second 

World War that compels a renewed U.S. 

commitment to stay. Second, we believe 

strongly in respect for a safe, secure, and 

prosperous, free and open Indo-Pacific that 

must preserve small states’ sovereignty. Third, 

we aim to focus on building capacity and 

resilience to address maritime security; Illegal, 

Unreported, and Unregulated fishing; drug 

trafficking; and resilience to address climate 

change and disaster response, as signified by the 

2018 Boe Declaration. Fourth and finally, we 

are committed to continued engagement in the 

region, by reaffirming and renewing 

partnerships. 

Of the Pacific Islands, three have militaries: 

Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tonga. The 

United States works with each to support 

improved capability within partner armed 

forces and, consistent with a partner-centric 

approach, often in support of efforts from allies 

and partners such as Australia and New 

Zealand. 

The United States has a unique relationship with 

the Freely Associated States. The Compacts of 

Free Association are treaty-like agreements 

COAST GUARD PARTNERSHIPS 

WITH THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

The U.S. Coast Guard operations within the Pacific 

Islands have been steady over the past half century. 

The Coast Guard’s presence is permanent and its 

partnerships enduring. The Coast Guard provides 

unique access, influence, and trust due to its routine 

interactions with the Pacific Islands to address 

shared maritime safety, security, and governance 

challenges. 

 The U.S. Coast Guard represents 

USINDOPACOM at the Pacific Quadrilateral 

Defense Coordinating Group, a Pacific 

Consortium (the United States, France, 

Australia, and New Zealand) that supports 

counter-Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 

fishing enforcement through multilateral and 

bilateral operations with 15 Pacific Island 

nations, bringing considerable economic and 

security benefits to the participant nations.

 The U.S. Coast Guard shiprider agreements 

allow 11 Pacific Island nations to exercise 

sovereignty in their exclusive economic zone 

through U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy ship 

deployments.

 The U.S. Coast Guard partners with the U.S. 

Navy on Oceania Maritime Security Initiative 

deployments.

U.S. Coast Guard Cutter 

Mellon was in Fiji from 

January 22-25, 2019, to 

exercise the bilateral 

Shiprider Agreement 

recently signed between 

Fiji and the 

United States. 

Photo by the U.S. Department of Defense
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

42

which provide security and financial support to the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of 

the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. These nations are important and historic U.S. partners 

in the Pacific, with deep ties to the United States.

U.S. security support to the Pacific 

Islands comes in many other forms as 

well. Many Pacific Island countries 

participate in various regional exercises 

and training events, including 

USINDOPACOM’s KOA MOANA 

and PACIFIC PATHWAYS Exercises. 

We have increased the number of ship 

visits and, in turn, shiprider agreements 

that we have exercised. We are 

increasingly supportive of capacity 

building across the Pacific Islands, which 

includes at least $7 million in FMF in 

2018 to support Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tonga. Additionally, the United States is working with 

Palau to improve its MDA to enhance Palau's maritime law enforcement capability.

Engagements with Other Allies

THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND CANADA

Allies such as the United Kingdom, France, and 

Canada play a critical role in maintaining a free and 

open Indo-Pacific. In addition to military 

capability and regional presence, these allies 

contribute vital support to upholding free and 

open principles in the region and globally. 

For example, the United Kingdom has increased 

deployments and operations in the region since 

2017, contributed to the coordinated, 

multinational initiatives to enforce 

UNSCR sanctions on North Korea, and 

performed its first naval operation 

aimed at asserting navigational rights 

and freedoms in the South China Sea in 

2018 with the transit of its frigate 

“The U.S. military is active on a 

daily basis to safeguard freedom of 

navigation and overflight in the 

Indo-Pacific, demonstrating our 

commitment to fly, sail and operate 

wherever international law allows.”

- Assistant Secretary of Defense Randall G. 

Schriver, speech at American Enterprise 

Institute, August 7, 2018

In FY 2018, the Department 

challenged 40 different maritime 

claims of 26 claimants. Many of these 

excessive claims were challenged 

persistently, throughout the year, in 

the course of routine, daily operations. 

Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for IndoPacific Security 

Affairs Randall G. 

Schriver announces 

a new partnership 

between the Nevada 

National Guard and 

Fiji in Suva, 

December 14, 2018.

Photo by the U.S. Department of 

Defense
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

43

HMS SUTHERLAND and 

amphibious transport HMS ALBION,

followed by the transit of its frigate 

HMS ARGYLL in 2019. The United 

Kingdom shares our holistic view of 

the region as the “Indo-Pacific,” as 

well as the importance of 

strengthening alliances and 

partnerships with countries in the 

region. 

The United States and France have 

restarted the Indo-Pacific Security 

Dialogue, and recognized the 

significance of the extended 

UPHOLDING FREEDOM AND ACCESS TO GLOBAL COMMONS

Throughout our history, the United States has asserted a key national interest in preserving the freedom of the 

seas, and has often relied on the U.S. military forces to protect that interest. As President Ronald Reagan said in 

releasing the U.S. Oceans Policy in 1983, “we will not acquiesce in unilateral actions of other states designed to 

restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight.” Today, in places 

like the South China Sea, excessive maritime claims are attempts by coastal States to unlawfully restrict the exercise 

of freedoms afforded to all seafaring nations to operate in waters beyond territorial limits. The United States will 

continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, and encourage our allies and partners to do 

the same. 

Excessive maritime claims inconsistent with international law, if left unchallenged, threaten the international rulesbased order and U.S. interests and those of our regional allies and partners. Freedom of the seas is essential to 

ensuring the global mobility of U.S. forces in the event of a crisis and the worldwide security of civilian shipping 

on a daily basis. DoD, therefore, is committed to ensuring free and open maritime access, including through 

freedom of navigation (FON) assertions (commonly called Freedom of Navigation Operations, or FONOPs), to 

protect the stable economic order and to maintain the ability of U.S. forces to respond, as needed. The FON 

program is carefully designed to challenge coastal states’ excessive maritime claims while respecting their rights 

under international law. 

The FON program protects long-standing principles of freedom of navigation for civilian and military vessels 

through both diplomatic and operational challenges, refusing to acquiesce to excessive maritime claims wherever 

they are made. FONOPs serve to protect the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed 

to all nations under international law. They are not targeted at any particular country, and they have no bearing 

on sovereignty disputes over land features. FONOPs are conducted peacefully and impartially, in accordance 

with international law. Consequently, U.S. forces routinely challenge excessive maritime claims asserted by allies 

and partners, as well as those made by potential adversaries and competitors.

 

 

Arleigh Burke-class 

guided-missile 

destroyer USS 

SPRUANCE and 

Arleigh Burke-class 

guided-missile 

destroyer USS 

PREBLE conduct 

freedom of navigation 

operations in the South 

China Sea.

Photo by the U.S. Department of 

Defense
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

44

deployment of the aircraft carrier FNS CHARLES DE GAULLE to the Indo-Pacific in 2019,

accompanied for portions of its deployment by ships from other NATO countries, Australia, and the 

United States. France additionally supports UNSCR enforcement and shares our emphasis on 

developing a network of strategic partnerships, contributing to the building of a regional security 

architecture, and engaging in multilateral dialogue platforms, in its strategy on France and Security in the 

Indo-Pacific.

Canada is contributing to UNSCR enforcement, to include providing a maritime patrol aircraft during 

summer 2018. A Canadian officer was also appointed the first non-U.S. Deputy Commander of 

United Nations Command in 2018. Canada is also expanding defense cooperation with partners in 

the region such as Vietnam, with future efforts expected to focus on advancements in personnel 

training, U.N. peacekeeping operations, and increased defense industry ties.

4.3. Line of Effort 3: 

Promoting a Networked Region

Shared security in the Indo-Pacific 

continues to rest on U.S. military presence 

and a growing network of alliances and close 

partnerships that promote interoperability 

and coordination. 

As the Indo-Pacific changes, the United 

States is augmenting its bilateral 

relationships with trilateral and multilateral

arrangements, and encouraging intra-Asian 

security relationships for partnerships with 

purpose. As articulated in the National 

Defense Strategy, DoD will strengthen and 

evolve our alliances and partnerships into an 

extended network capable of deterring or 

decisively acting to meet the shared 

challenges of our time. In the Indo-Pacific, 

this includes a networked security 

architecture capable of deterring aggression, 

maintaining stability, and ensuring free

access to common domains. 

In a large and interconnected region, especially one with so many strong, capable, and dedicated 

players, it is prudent to network and link relationships to produce gains for all. As we weave together 

PARTNERSHIPS WITH PURPOSE

An important example of partnerships with 

purpose is the Enforcement Coordination Cell 

(ECC) in Yokosuka, Japan. Commanded by 

USINDOPACOM and executed by U.S. 

Seventh Fleet, the United States is working sideby-side with South Korea, Japan, Australia, 

New Zealand, Canada, France, and the United 

Kingdom at a single headquarters to enforce the 

UNSCR sanctions regime against North Korea 

and the illicit transfer of oil and ship-to-ship 

transfers in the East China Sea and Korea Bay. 

The ECC allows us to work closely with our 

allies and partners to manage, coordinate, and 

de-conflict our efforts and is an important 

facilitator of transparent collaboration between 

our allies and partners at sea and in the air. 
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45

these partnerships with purpose, a networked security architecture – with its shared values, habits of 

cooperation, and compatible and complementary capabilities – will form a strong free and open fabric 

that knits the region together, preserving sovereignty and regional peace and stability for years to 

come. This is a vision the United States has long advanced in the Indo-Pacific, and one we believe

will continue to benefit the region in terms of stability and prosperity.

TRILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS

First, the Department is strongly emphasizing trilateral mechanisms to bring together like-minded 

allies and partners to maximize individual contributions to regional peace and security and link 

together nations that previously worked with us mostly separately. The region is more secure when 

we combine efforts in this way and we will continue to prioritize these important mechanisms.

The ROK, Japan, and the United 

States trilateral partnership is critical 

to peace and security in the IndoPacific region. Our three 

democracies share the common goals 

of upholding a rules-based 

international order; achieving the 

final fully-verified denuclearization of 

North Korea; and strengthening the 

network of like-minded nations in the 

region. Toward these ends, the 

ROK-Japan-United States trilateral 

defense partnership continues 

practical cooperation on UNSCR

enforcement; information sharing; anti-submarine warfare; BMD; mine counter-measure warfare; and 

HA/DR efforts. The United States is committed to further strengthening and growing our trilateral 

defense cooperation to meet future regional and international challenges. 

The United States is also developing its trilateral partnership with Japan and Australia. Together, we 

are cooperating in tangible ways to enhance security across the region and increase our interoperability,

in part, by augmenting our exercises and training; increasing information sharing; and building 

capabilities. For example, we are taking what would otherwise be separate or bilateral capacitybuilding initiatives in Southeast Asia and ensuring that they not only complement one another, but 

are also tailored to assist in building up more comprehensively capable partners. This grouping is also 

effectively improving our interoperability by trilateralizing and multilateralizing key military exercises, 

including COPE NORTH GUAM and SOUTHERN JACKAROO. 

The United States, India, and Japan also enjoy a robust trilateral partnership. The annual naval 

exercise, MALABAR, which began as a U.S.-India exercise, has included Japan as a participating 

Then-U.S. Secretary of 

Defense Mattis meets 

Japan’s Defense 

Minister Takeshi 

Iwaya and the ROK 

Defense Minister 

Jeong Kyeong-doo for 

the U.S.-Japan-South 

Korea trilateral at the 

ASEAN Defense 

Ministers’ Meeting 

Plus, October 19, 2018.

Photo by Lisa Ferdinando
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

46

partner since 2014. The exercise has 

increased our ability to operate 

trilaterally, including via real-time 

information sharing, and has increased 

in complexity over time to incorporate 

surface, amphibious, and air 

components. Underpinning this 

cooperation is the State Departmentled trilateral dialogue which completed 

its 9th iteration in April 2018. This 

dialogue enhances trilateral 

cooperation in the areas of 

connectivity and infrastructure 

development, counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, maritime security and domain awareness, and 

HA/DR. The first-ever trilateral meeting between the leaders of the United States, India, and Japan 

took place in November 2018 at the G20 meeting.

STRENGTHENING REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS THROUGH 

MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT

The United States continues to support ASEAN centrality in the regional security architecture, and 

the U.S. free and open Indo-Pacific strategy seeks to further empower it. The United States and 

ASEAN share common values, and ASEAN is a key partner in promoting the values and policies 

enshrined in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy: 

freedom of the seas; market economics; 

good governance; and respect for an order 

based on clear and transparent rules. As 

ASEAN nations support one another to 

maintain the freedom, sovereignty, and 

territorial integrity of countries within the 

region, this cohesion strengthens 

ASEAN’s voice. The United States

respects ASEAN’s consensus based 

decision-making model, and we believe the 

more ASEAN speaks with one voice, the 

more it is able to maintain a region free 

from coercion. 

A critical part of our engagement is meaningful work with various ASEAN-based institutions. At the 

group’s invitation, the United States joined the East Asia Summit (EAS) – chaired by the rotating head 

of ASEAN – and together we have made it the region’s leading forum for addressing political and 

MALABAR 2018 was 

the 22nd rendition of the 

exercise and the first 

time hosted off the 

coast of Guam.

Photo by the U.S. Department of 

Defense

Commander of U.S. 

Indo-Pacific 

Command Admiral 

Davidson delivers a 

speech on the free 

and open IndoPacific in Singapore, 

March 7, 2019.

Photo by the U.S. Department of 

Defense
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

47

security challenges. Since 

1994, the United States has 

been an active member and 

contributor to the ASEAN 

Regional Forum (ARF), 

utilizing the forum to 

strengthen functional 

multilateral cooperation 

across a range of 

transboundary traditional 

and non-traditional security 

challenges facing the Indo-Pacific. The ARF, 

led by ministers of foreign affairs, is an ideal 

platform for a truly networked region. The 

Department has made significant progress in 

recent years to enhance our defense and security 

relationship with ASEAN. Through these 

efforts, we are continuing to build on the desire 

of ASEAN countries to better share 

information with one another and pursue a

framework to enhance regional MDA.

The Department has enjoyed constructive 

engagement with our ASEAN colleagues in the 

ADMM-Plus and subordinate mechanisms,

such as the Experts’ Working Group, since the 

formal establishment of the ADMM-Plus in

2010. U.S. Secretaries of Defense have attended 

every ADMM-Plus ministerial meeting since 

2010, and we have matched this participation 

with active engagement in the ADMM-Plus 

subordinate mechanisms. 

In working with the ADMM-Plus, we seek to 

complement U.S. efforts in the EAS, the ARF, 

and other ASEAN fora. We use this formal 

multilateral engagement mechanism with 

ASEAN to complement our bilateral and 

trilateral engagements. We have bolstered our

ties further by continuing to host informal U.S.-

ASEAN defense ministers meetings in 

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY, 

STRENGTHENING REGIONAL SECURITY 

NETWORKS, AND ENHANCING SHARED 

UNDERSTANDING

Since its inception in 1995, the Daniel K. Inouye AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) has 

promoted a networked region through its executive 

education programs, and a network of now more than 

12,000 alumni. During in-resident courses each 

involving over 100 fellows from more than 35 countries, 

multinational cohorts have developed action plans such 

as enhancing cross-border law enforcement information 

exchange, mitigating migration emergencies at sea and 

reducing human trafficking.

As part of MSI, the center brought together 

representatives from the maritime focal points and 

information-sharing hubs across ASEAN to develop 

their national and regional information sharing 

mechanisms, share best practices, and outline their 

interagency action plans to enhance maritime shared 

awareness in their nations and the region. 

In 2019, DKI APCSS also co-hosted the Oceania 

National Security Policy workshop with the Pacific 

Islands Secretariat, which focused on the 

implementation of the Boe Declaration, and 

development of national security polices by Oceania 

nations. This event highlighted the importance of 

supporting intra-regional security relationships to share 

best practices and align sub-regional priorities. 

Admiral Davidson, 

Commander of U.S. IndoPacific Command, providing 

opening remarks at the 14th 

ASEAN Defense Ministers’

Meeting Plus Experts’ 

Working Group on HA/DR 

co-hosted by the United States 

and Malaysia at the Daniel K. 

Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for 

Security Studies. 72 

participants from 16 nations 

participated. Photo 

by the U.S. Department of Defense
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

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September 2016, and in June and October 2018 building on the success of our 2014 meeting. 

Thailand is the ASEAN Chair for 2019, and we continue to work with Bangkok to co-organize the 

ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise (AUMX), approved by the Defense Ministers during the ADMM in 

October. The AUMX will take place in September 2019 in Bangkok and international waters in 

Southeast Asia. This type of forward-leaning action by Thailand is a key example of its intent and 

resolve to be a sub-regional leader. We continue to look for other ways and means to support this 

type of effort through the SEAMLEI, previously known as the Gulf of Thailand Initiative on Maritime 

Law Enforcement, which convenes the Coast Guards or maritime law enforcement agencies of 

ASEAN member states to increase maritime law enforcement cooperation and information sharing. 

SEAMLEI builds technical capacity using the latest technology for MDA, while also providing a 

platform for dialogue among decision-making officials. 

In October 2018, the ASEAN 

Defense Ministers agreed to 

conduct the first AUMX, 

which Thailand agreed to 

organize. To fulfill this 

commitment, the United 

States intends to focus on the 

promotion of maritime 

security and safety via shared 

awareness, technical 

cooperation, and sharing of 

knowledge and expertise 

between the United States 

and ASEAN. The United 

States is also examining the 

viability of working with a willing ASEAN member state and ADMM-Plus partners to increase the 

English language training (ELT) capacity for ASEAN military and defense officials. This concept 

proposes joining efforts among ELT stakeholders to support a multinational ELT venue that 

facilitates common learning, cultivates trust and confidence, and helps build a cadre of English 

speaking counterparts across ASEAN defense establishments.

The Department also supports the recent re-establishment of the diplomatic quadrilateral 

consultations – or Quad – between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, which has convened

three times at the Assistant Secretary-level since November 2017. The Quad is an important forum 

to discuss the respective Indo-Pacific visions of the four countries, all grounded in an affirmation of 

ASEAN centrality and building on existing trilateral relationships. Consultations focus on upholding

the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, increasing connectivity consistent with international law and 

standards, and coordinating on counter-terrorism and maritime security efforts. 

ASEAN Defense 

Senior Officials’ 

Meeting-Plus 

Sustainable 

Security, Thailand, 

April 4, 2019.

Photo by the U.S. Department of 

Defense
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49

EMERGING INTRA-ASIAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS

Improving security relations among Indo-Pacific countries is critical to regional integration. The 

Department encourages our allies and partners to develop interconnected security relationships. In 

some cases, and in recognition of the changing security environment, countries are strengthening their 

bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral security relationships on their own, and in others, the Department 

is more directly encouraging new cooperation. As part of these growing ties, countries are signing 

new defense agreements and arrangements; enhancing training, exercises, and operations; and building 

partner capacity, helping stabilize the Indo-Pacific. 

Countries in the region are recognizing the need to formalize closer security ties to safeguard shared 

principles, including the peaceful resolution of disputes, as the region saw with Vietnam and Australia

elevating their relationship to a strategic partnership, and Japan and India significantly expanding their 

defense and security ties. Key countries are also working together more closely on conducting training, 

exercises, and even joint operations. Recent examples include, expanded Japan-Vietnam maritime 

exercises and Indonesia’s proposal to conduct joint operations with Malaysia and the Philippines –

MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVE: YEAR FOUR

DoD’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) – Section 1263 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2016 – was originally established as a five-year authority focused 

on building partners’ maritime capacity. The NDAA for FY 2019 extended the authority through 

December 2025 and expanded the scope of the initiative – now designated the Indo-Pacific MSI – into 

South Asia. MSI authorizes the provision of training, equipment, supplies, and small-scale construction 

to the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh to enhance their 

ability to “sense, share, and contribute” to maritime security and MDA; to create a common Regional 

Maritime Picture; and to empower them to observe and control more effectively their own sovereign 

maritime spaces, both individually and jointly. 

In MSI’s first three years, DoD focused on enhancing information-sharing, interoperability, and 

multinational maritime cooperation. To increase information-sharing, DoD has connected the MSI 

recipient nations’ Maritime Command and Control centers through the installation of secure 

information-sharing networks, and Field Information Support Tool communications systems. MSI 

funding has also been used to field common ISR platforms such as an Aerostat, SABIR ISR sensor 

packages, unmanned aerial systems, and upgrades to High Endurance Cutter (WHEC) vessels to foster 

interoperability among the region’s maritime forces. For example, the Philippines and Vietnam operate 

and maintain their WHECs while conducting MDA missions in the South China Sea and multinational 

training exercises.

With MSI support, the U.S. Navy has increased the scope of the SEACAT Exercise to make it a truly 

regional maritime security exercise in which partners operationalize key skills – such as interdiction –

and communications systems provided through MSI. MSI has also enabled DoD to contract civilian 

vessels for the exercise to simulate real-world interdiction and boarding scenarios more effectively. 

One of MSI’s primary goals in FY 2019 is to enhance interoperability through common platforms. 
Indo - Pacific Strategy Report

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including maritime counter-piracy patrols in the Sulu Sea. Regional capacity-building is increasing as 

well, as seen with Japan’s efforts to improve Philippine maritime forces and India’s steps to deepen

its exchanges with Vietnam. 

These closer relationships are not 

limited to bilateral ones. Last 

year, India hosted Japan and 

Australia for its first ever highlevel trilateral dialogue in New 

Delhi, where they discussed 

maritime security, and other 

security issues. 

Singapore’s Information Fusion 

Centre (IFC) is also an example of 

how countries in the region are 

collaborating to facilitate 

information sharing and enhance 

maritime security. Since its 

inception in 2009, Singapore’s 

IFC has served as a maritime 

information hub for the region, 

contributing actionable 

information to regional and 

global navies and coast guards to 

cue timely operational responses 

to maritime threats such as piracy 

and drug smuggling. The IFC has 

hosted over 100 international 

liaison officers from over 20 

countries. We are also 

encouraged by the region’s efforts 

to establish the “Our Eyes” 

initiative, a platform to improve strategic information sharing between member countries.

Last December, the United States also welcomed the inauguration of India’s maritime IFC, which will 

function as a regional platform for the exchange of information in the maritime domain among partner 

nations. Likewise, Sri Lanka, whose strategic location in the Indian Ocean through which 70 percent 

of maritime traffic passes, has outlined a vision to become a regional hub for logistics and commerce. 

Supporting this vision, the U.S. Navy recently initiated a series of temporary cargo transfer initiatives 

enabling non-lethal re-supply of passing naval vessels in Sri Lanka. These engagements serve as proof 

of principle for a range of initiatives that would benefit regional connectivity and security, including 

support to HA/DR. DoD also fully supports countries pursuing multilateral agreements and 

Rear Adm. Joey Tynch, 

commander, Task 

Force 73, greets 

international liaison 

officers during a tour 

of Singapore's IFC for

the SEACAT Exercise, 

August 30, 2018.

Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class 

Christopher Veloicaza

A Royal Thai Coast 

Guardsman (left), a 

Philippine Navy Sailor 

(center), and a Philippine 

Coast Guardsman practice 

tactical procedures during 

a Visit, Board, Search, and 

Seizure seminar as part of

the SEACAT Exercise in 

Manila, August 28, 2018.

Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Micah 

Blechner
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arrangements to enhance regional security, including the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration of Conduct

to lower tensions in the South China Sea.

The Department is also taking steps to support the law enforcement capacity and riparian domain 

awareness of partner countries in the Mekong region to enhance border security and combat the 

trafficking of drugs, wildlife, arms, and people.

Closer security relations in the region also benefit the United States’ ability to resource and implement 

this strategy. Our National Defense Strategy states that “when we pool resources and share responsibility 

for our common defense, our security burden becomes lighter.” Greater burden-sharing will

strengthen our ability to deter conflict and increase our flexibility in responding to challenges.

GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE (GPOI)

The Indo-Pacific contributes more than one-third of all U.N. peacekeeping personnel, and many 

countries have pledged additional contributions. India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Indonesia are 

consistently among the top 10 U.N. peacekeeping contributing countries. These and other regional 

partners, such as Mongolia, provide critical enabling capabilities to U.N. operations. These 

contributions help promote peace and security while advancing regional cooperation, confidence 

building, and professionalization of security forces.

In partnership with the U.S. Department of State, USINDOPACOM will maintain strong regional 

partnerships through Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which is the U.S. Government’s 

primary tool to build partner capacity to support U.N. peace operations. GPOI’s 12 Indo-Pacific 

partners include Bangladesh, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, 

Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, and Vietnam. Since 2016, GPOI has supported the U.N. Peacekeeping 

Course for African Partners, which brings together Indian and U.S. Army instructors annually to train 

African peacekeepers. Through GPOI, we will support training, exercises, equipment, and training 

facility enhancements with a goal of strengthening partners’ preparation, deployment, and sustainment 

capabilities.
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Conclusion

he United States is a Pacific nation and has a natural and enduring interest in the Indo-Pacific. 

For more than 70 years the United States, along with our like-minded allies and partners, has

helped underwrite a stable security environment that allowed the people, economies, and 

nations in the Indo-Pacific to rise and prosper. Our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific 

encompasses values shared by our allies and partners in the region – one that emphasizes upholding 

a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, transparency, and accountability.

As great power competition returns, we will continue to invest, act, and orient ourselves to ensure that 

the principled international order from which all countries in the region benefit endures. To uphold 

a free and open Indo-Pacific, we will base our outreach and activities in the region on our strong 

alliances and partnerships. We will also enhance our posture and presence while building the 

capabilities of like-minded countries, as we promote a networked and more integrated region, engage 

our burgeoning set of partners, and invest for the future. 

T
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The United States will uphold our commitments and will act to defend our interests and those of our 

allies and partners. At the same time, we maintain our expectation that our allies and partners will

contribute their fair share to security by:

 Resourcing and investing sufficiently for their own defense to ensure deterrence and mitigate 

vulnerabilities; 

 Cooperating in building partner capacity for third party partners in the region;

 Upholding a rules-based international order (i.e., flying, sailing, and operating to uphold 

international laws and norms);

 Providing access needed for contingency response and resiliency;

 Strengthening interoperability, including information sharing, with the United States and other 

like-minded countries in the region; and,

 Promoting and actively participating in region-led initiatives to uphold a free and open IndoPacific.

The United States, along with our like-minded allies and partners, will continue to be engaged in this 

dynamic and rapidly growing region. The Department of Defense, in conjunction with other U.S. 

Government Departments and Agencies, regional institutions, and regional allies and partners, will 

continue to ensure that the rule of law – not coercion and force – dictates the future of the IndoPacific. We will build on our successes to ensure that this region remains peaceful, prosperous, and 

secure for decades to come. 
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ACRONYMS

A2/AD Anti-Access/Area-Denial

ADMM ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN Association for Southeast Asian Nations

AUMX ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

BUILD Act Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act

CARAT Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CNMI Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

CFC Combined Forces Command

DoD U.S. Department of Defense

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

EAS East Asia Summit

ECC Enforcement Coordination Cell

EDCA Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement 

ELT English Language Training

FMF Foreign Military Financing

FMS Foreign Military Sales

FONOP Freedom of Navigation Operations

HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

IFC Information Fusion Centre

IMET International Military Education and Training

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

JSDF Japan Self Defense Forces

MDA Maritime Domain Awareness

MSI Maritime Security Initiative

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PRC People’s Republic of China

ROK Republic of Korea

SEACAT Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training

SEAMLEI Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

USFK United States Forces Korea 

USINDOPACOM

WHEC

United States Indo-Pacific Command

United States Coast Guard High Endurance Cutter
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