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IRAN ON NOTICE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 16, 2017

Serial No. 115–5

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Katherine Bauer, Blumenstein-Katz Family Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ................................................................................. 4

Mr. David Albright, founder and president, Institute for Science and International Security .................................................................................................. 21

Mr. Scott Modell, managing director, The Rapidan Group .................................. 30

Andrew Exum, Ph.D., contributing editor, The Atlantic ...................................... 37

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Katherine Bauer: Prepared statement ........................................................... 6

Mr. David Albright: Prepared statement ............................................................... 23

Mr. Scott Modell: Prepared statement ................................................................... 32

Andrew Exum, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 40

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 80

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 81

The Honorable David Cicilline, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Rhode Island: Material submitted for the record .......................................... 83

(1)

IRAN ON NOTICE 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. This morning 

we consider options available to the new administration as it contends with an emboldened Iran. 

As one witness will tell the committee, we should start with this 

premise: Iran ‘‘gets no special pass’’ on its dangerous and provocative acts. Unfortunately—despite its promises to the committee—

that is not how the previous administration handled Tehran. Terrorist and missile activities that should have been designated were 

not designated. In a country where beatings and torture and executions are the norm, just one individual has been sanctioned for 

human rights abuses after negotiations began, just one. After that 

deal was inked, the former Secretary of State traveled the world 

enthusiastically touting that Iran was open for business. 

Indeed, the administration went out of its way not to offend 

Tehran. In December, when this committee pressed the extension 

of the Iran Sanctions Act, the President took the very unusual step 

of letting this legislation become law without his signature. 

So it is not surprising that Tehran believes it is in a ‘‘post-sanctions environment.’’ But as long as Iran is firing missiles, fueling 

terror, and shouting ‘‘Death to America,’’ nothing can be normal. 

Sanctions can be imposed even while adhering to and strictly enforcing the nuclear agreement—as flawed as it is. Remember, even 

under the previous administration’s reading, the administration 

has the ability to press back on Iran’s support for terrorism, for 

human rights abuses, and for missile development. ‘‘None of these 

sanctions were relieved under the [agreement],’’ in the words of the 

former administration. 

So Iran’s continuing intercontinental ballistic missile program—

whose only purpose is to carry a nuclear warhead—must be front 

and center. This month’s designations are a good start. But more 

can be done to find and target the banks and companies that are 

supplying this dangerous program aimed at us. It also means more 

extraditions, more prosecutions, and indictments of sanctions violators. This proactive approach also means stepping up our defenses 

and those of our regional partners. 

2

Second, the administration shouldn’t be shy about tackling Iran’s 

terror arm and that is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This 

is the group fueling the Assad regime in Syria and this is the group 

responsible for the death of hundreds of American troops. Since the 

Guard has been labeled Iran’s ‘‘most powerful economic actor’’ by 

the U.S. Treasury Department, there are plenty of options here 

available. Indeed, there are hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary 

Guard Corps affiliates that are yet to be sanctioned—what one observer calls a ‘‘Revolutionary Guard’s Gap.’’ These are the front 

companies that are funding the missiles that have on the side of 

them, ‘‘Israel must be wiped off the face of the earth.’’

These terror outfits need to be sanctioned, and the new administration should look at ways in which companies closely linked to 

the Revolutionary Guard Corps—but not fully owned by them—

could be sanctioned. The threat of secondary sanctions against 

those around the world dealing with these IRGC units which even 

tried to carry out a terrorist attack here in Washington, DC, to kill 

the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington. Looking at this must 

be a priority, and it has to be real, and it wasn’t under the previous 

administration. 

Around the region, the administration can attack Iran’s proxy 

Hezbollah thanks to a new law advanced by this committee. We 

can focus on increased interdiction of Iranian arms shipments to 

the revolutionary Houthis in Yemen, on clearer rules of engagement, and better defense cooperation with our partners on the 

front lines of the Iranian threat. 

The nuclear agreement does not leave us defenseless against 

Tehran’s threatening behavior. Careful coordination with allies is 

a must, and all along we should be clear that the choice is with 

Iran to end its threatening, destabilizing behavior. 

I am going to introduce our panel this morning, and then I am 

going to go to Mr. Eliot Engel of New York who is the ranking 

member of this committee. 

On our panel we have Ms. Katherine Bauer. She is the 

Blumenstein-Katz Family Fellow at The Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy and previously she served in a series of positions 

at the Treasury Department. 

We have Mr. David Albright. He is the founder and president of 

the Institute for Science and International Security. Mr. Albright 

is a trained physicist and former weapons inspector. 

We have Mr. Scott Modell, managing director at the Rapidan 

Group and previously served for 13 years in the Central Intelligence Agency. 

And we have Dr. Andrew Exum, contributing editor at the Atlantic and previously Dr. Exum served as Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Middle East Policy. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full prepared statements are 

going to be made part of the record and you will be asked to summarize if you could. The members here are going to have 5 calendar days to submit any statements or additional questions, any 

extraneous material they might want to put into the record. 

So we would start with Ms. Bauer, but before we do that allow 

me to have the ranking member of the committee Eliot Engel open 

with his opening comments. 

3

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me also thank our witnesses and welcome all of you 

to the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

At this point we all know Iran’s record of provocative actions, 

from ballistic missile tests to transferring weapons to terrorist organizations and other bad actors that seek to destabilize the region. Technically speaking, all this bad behavior doesn’t violate the 

nuclear deal. However, those actions are inconsistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 which governs the implementation 

of the agreement. Responsible governments around the world have 

an obligation to respond. 

The Trump administration imposed new sanctions against several entities involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program and support for terrorism. And just to make sure we are all being fair, I 

will mention that these designations matched exactly the Obama 

administration’s response over the last several years since negotiations began. 

The difference between the Trump administration’s response and 

the Obama administration’s response was a two-word phrase, ‘‘on 

notice.’’ Then National Security Advisor Mike Flynn said as a result of Iran’s provocative actions the United States is putting Iran 

‘‘on notice.’’ So what does it mean exactly to put Iran ‘‘on notice’’? 

How will the administration respond if Iran tests the President 

again? Does the administration have a plan? 

In a follow-up briefing to the ‘‘on notice’’ warning a reporter 

asked what that meant. The response was, ‘‘We are considering 

what options there are and how we want to communicate and enforce our concerns.’’ That is not really a plan. I hope that the administration will make it clear what their plan is on Iran because 

surely Iran will continue its provocative behavior. 

We cannot afford a half-baked or reckless foreign policy. Rash decisions concerning America’s role in the world could have serious 

consequences for American personnel and interests. American and 

Iranian forces are operating in close proximity in Iraq. Who knows 

what could happen if the administration doesn’t have a cohesive 

policy? Additionally, if this turns out to be an empty threat, then 

this administration will not have done its job. We have to really 

confront the Iranian threat and let them know that we are serious 

about it, that we mean business. 

I don’t trust the Iranian Government. I didn’t vote for the Iranian deal. But the Iranian deal is now in place and I think we have 

to ensure that Iran lives up to every bit of its responsibility under 

that deal. Let me just say this. I look forward to our hearing from 

our witnesses about what a responsible course of action would be. 

Iran and the terrible regime in Tehran is not going away and I 

think that if the United States doesn’t stand up to it, it will only 

get worse. I believe with all my heart that everything must be done 

to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon. However, looking 

the other way and just tough rhetoric doesn’t really cut the mustard. We have got to make sure that Iran understands that there 

are severe consequences if they continue their ways. And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses as to what they think our response should be. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

4

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Engel. We now go 

to our witnesses. 

Ms. Bauer. 

STATEMENT OF MS. KATHERINE BAUER, BLUMENSTEIN-KATZ 

FAMILY FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR 

EAST POLICY 

Ms. BAUER. Good morning. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member 

Engel and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today to discuss the future of U.S. policy 

toward Iran. My testimony will focus on the role of sanctions and 

restraining Iran’s malign influence in the region and disrupting its 

global terrorism, money laundering, and procurement networks. It 

will draw on analysis done in conjunction with my colleagues Patrick Clawson and Matthew Levitt at the Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy as part of a new study that we released earlier 

this week. I will summarize key points here. 

There is no doubt today that sanctions played a pivotal role in 

bringing Iran to the table to negotiate constraints on its nuclear 

program. Over roughly a decade, the U.S. and its allies imposed 

powerful multilateral sanctions on Iran that isolated Tehran from 

the international financial system and crippled its economy. 

Following implementation of the Iran nuclear deal in January 

2016 and suspension of nuclear related sanctions, the pace of sanctions against Iran under remaining authorities slowed. Despite assurances the United States would vigorously press against Iranian 

activities outside of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the 

Obama administration did so only sporadically. Thus, in many 

ways Washington ceded the narrative to Tehran which successfully 

convinced many in the private and public sectors that in the wake 

of implementation of the nuclear agreement they operate in a post 

sanctions environment. 

But the deal was never intended to give Iran a free pass on its 

nonnuclear malevolent actions. Iran made no commitment to cease 

nonnuclear malign activity and has not in fact halted it. In the 

words of Abbas Araqchi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister and one of 

Iran’s chief negotiators of the deal, ‘‘During the nuclear negotiations we clearly said that questions of security, defense, ballistic 

missiles and our regional policies were not negotiable and not 

linked to the nuclear talks.’’

Sanctions remain a viable and powerful tool to confront Iran over 

its nonnuclear illicit conduct. In our study we suggest a multipronged approach that includes taking back the narrative, emphasizing the sanctions that remain, and vigorously enforcing them. 

Such enhanced sanctions will work best, however, if they are proportional and accompanied by diplomatic, military, and intelligence 

measures in a coordinated campaign against Iran’s destabilizing 

activities. 

Sanctions are a tool in such a strategy, but not a strategy unto 

themselves. There is a place for unilateral sanctions such as the action taken by the Trump administration late last month against 

Iranian procurement and terrorist support networks. These actions 

were likely prepared under the Obama administration, and as Congressman Engel noted they demonstrate a bipartisan consensus on 

5

targeting Iran’s malign activities. They are also effective because 

banks around the world look to the U.S. and to the OFAC list and 

they can be very disruptive. As well, they lay the groundwork for 

other countries to follow suit. 

However, sanctions are most effective when adopted by an international coalition. Foreign partners have long been skeptical of 

U.S. unilateral sanctions when they are viewed as being capricious. 

Thus, focusing on Iranian conduct that violates international 

norms will be most likely to draw multilateral support and compliance. In this manner, sanctions can also demonstrate to Iran the 

benefits of accommodating itself to the international order. 

Consider the benefits that Iran has gleaned from the nuclear 

deal. Oil sales and other exports are up and inflation has stabilized. Iranian officials claim that hundreds of small banks have 

already reestablished correspondent relationships with Iran. But 

Iran will not be able to attract the foreign investment it desperately needs while global banks continue to view it as a financial 

pariah, and there is no reason to believe that Iran has ceased the 

illicit financial conduct or sanctions evasion conduct that underpinned the U.S. FinCEN 311 finding of Iran as a jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern or earned Iran its place on the 

Financial Action Task Force blacklist. 

Previously, private sector engagement on the risks of doing business with Iran proved incredibly effective as a tool to restrict Iran’s 

operating environment. Given this history, the U.S. Government 

should resume such sanctions diplomacy and engagements with 

private and public sector actors around the world to highlight evidence that Iran continues to pose a threat to the global financial 

system. Rather than reassuring banks that doing business with 

Iran will help enshrine the nuclear deal, U.S. Government officials 

at every level should emphasize that Iran bears the onus of demonstrating its adherence to the same requirements imposed on 

every other country by reining in illicit financial activity and conforming with international norms. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bauer follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Feel free, Mr. Albright, please. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and 

other members of this committee for holding this hearing today and 

inviting me to testify. I applaud your committee’s efforts to understand and chart a way forward on Iran policy. 

I would like to limit my comments to the Iran nuclear deal which 

I would like to see maintained, but the deal must be better enforced and implemented, its nuclear conditions more strictly interpreted, its verification improved, and its short and long term deficiencies fixed. I have listed in my testimony several steps to fix the 

weaknesses in the deal and will discuss some of them here. 

But first, I would like to talk a little bit about some of the specific problems in the deal’s implementation. As the chairman mentioned, Iran continues to test nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. We 

can argue whether this is inconsistent with or in violation of U.N. 

Security Council Resolution 2231, however, the fact of the matter 

is that a nuclear warhead without a reliable delivery system is not 

a militarily useful weapon. So progress on ballistic missiles today 

and tomorrow represents progress toward Iran building a nuclear 

weapons arsenal in the future. 

The workings of the deal have been far too secret. Moreover, the 

IAEA continues to under report the actual situation on the ground. 

Many of the Joint Commission decisions are questionable and I 

have given several examples in my testimony. Also, so far Iran has 

resisted IAEA inspections of military sites and the risk is growing 

that Iran is creating no-go zones for inspectors inside Iran. Moreover, during the JCPOA negotiations and extending for some time 

afterwards, the Obama administration interfered in U.S. law enforcement efforts. It blocked or did not process the extradition requests and lure memos aimed at Iranians and their agents alleged 

of violating U.S. trade control and sanction laws. 

I would like to briefly discuss some specific steps to ensure stricter enforcement in strengthening the JCPOA in the short term, and 

I give many in my testimony. There is a need to achieve greater 

transparency in IAEA access. The U.S. and its allies should press 

IAEA to include greater details in its quarterly reports to the 

Board of Governors. Parallel agreements to the JCPOA should be 

publicly released. More importantly, it is critical to ensure that 

Iran provides guaranteed, timely IAEA access to Iranian military 

facilities. 

It is also a priority to prevent Iran from developing an indigenous enriched uranium fuel capability. If they do so this would lay 

the basis for an expanded industrial scale centrifuge program that 

would be very difficult to stop. Toward that goal, further exemptions to the 300 kilogram enriched uranium cap should be deferred 

indefinitely. There are also numerous loopholes to the JCPOA that 

need to be fixed. I will mention two here. 

The Oman loophole for heavy water should be plugged. To that 

end all shipments of Iranian heavy water from Oman or other overseas storage locations should be subject to approval by the ProcureVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:04 Mar 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\021617\24242 SHIRL
22

ment Working Group. It is also important to ensure that Iran is 

abiding by restrictions on centrifuge R&D under the JCPOA. There 

are examples where they are pushing the envelope and the 

pushback needs to happen. 

It is also critical that Iran create and implement a strategic 

trade control system that meets international standards. As part of 

creating a strategic trade control regime in Iran, the United States 

should also interpret the JCPOA as stating that Iran will commit 

not to conduct illicit commodity trafficking for government controlled or owned military, missile, nuclear, or other industries and 

programs. 

As we await that there needs to be more effective enforcement 

of trading bans and sanctions. The administration should commit 

to more aggressively investigate, indict, and extradite those involved in outfitting Iran’s nuclear missile or conventional weapons 

programs in defiance of U.S. laws and sanctions. The administration and its allies should step up efforts with allies to detect, interdict, or otherwise thwart Iran’s illicit procurement efforts that violate national and international laws. 

At the same time, the United States and its allies should take 

steps to better detect and block Iranian cooperation with North 

Korea on ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and conventional arms. 

They should also devote more intelligence resources determining if 

North Korea and Iran are cooperating on nuclear programs or 

transferring nuclear or nuclear related technology, equipment, or 

materials. 

Beyond the short term problems, the Iran deal has fundamental 

long term deficiencies that need to be addressed. Which problems 

to focus on and how to remedy them should be part of an Iran policy review by the Trump administration and Congress. Two priorities are extending the nuclear limitations in the deal and limiting 

Iran’s ballistic missiles. One suggestion covering the former is to 

maintain a 12-month breakout requirement forever. 

Since I have run out of time let me end there. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Modell. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT MODELL, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

THE RAPIDAN GROUP 

Mr. MODELL. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members 

of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to come 

back and discuss what I would call the next generation of Iran 

pushback. I have testified here before and I think I am in the consensus to say that the last 8 years has been overly passive. 

And I have pushed forward—thinking ideas that there are ways, 

the tools we have and ways in which we can push back against 

what we often call the Iranian Action Network that have been 

overlooked and ignored as a result of an overly accommodating policy over the last 8 years. A lot of the recommendations I have in 

here are on the basis of things that I have already seen that we 

have that just need to be dusted off and sharpened, tools we have 

we have used in the past, ways in which we can improve on what 

already exists. 

But going back to the overarching theme of putting Iran ‘‘on notice,’’ I think that former National Security Adviser Flynn did the 

right thing. I think there needs to be follow-up in that regard, follow-up on what the new rules of engagement are, follow-up in 

terms of making very clear to the Iranians that escalation, we have 

a very clear intent of reestablishing escalation dominance, of 

changing the nature of the dynamics between the U.S. and Iranians and the Gulf in other places and Yemen as well. 

But I also don’t think that we have done nearly enough to point 

out the fact that while the original hostage crisis was in 1979, 

there is another hostage crisis. The Iranian regime continues to 

take Iranian-Americans and Canadian-Americans and other hyphenated Iranians hostage. It has become the systematic policy for 

the IRGC and for those businesses, particularly foreign businesses 

that are looking to get back into Iran, I think that needs to be part 

of, I guess, an overhaul of our media offensive and making clear 

about the dangers and risks not only to reputation, but literal risks 

of doing business in Iran. 

So I think Iran needs to be put on notice on various other dimensions. The other thing I would say is know your customer and do 

due diligence. My understanding from foreign businesses, large 

multinationals that are going into Iran, is that those requirements 

are actually rather easy to satisfy. I think this committee might 

consider ways of enhancing those, making those stricter, raising 

the bar for companies that are looking to get back in. 

The IRGC has done a very good job of cloaking itself, you know, 

two or three degrees removed from the core so that businesses, you 

know, can avoid that type of risk. But I think that they are 

ensconced in ways that ordinary businesses don’t know and they 

are not being held liable to actually verify. 

Corruption, I think, is the one thing that gets at the heart of all 

the Iranians. To the extent that you are going to move Iranians, 

channel that anger and get them to do more inside and outside of 

Iran to stand up and protest, I really think that we need to do a 

much better job of systematically pointing out how deep corruption 

is. And I think that there are certain ways of doing that not only 

31

by overhauling what I said, the Voice of America and Radio Free 

Europe, and actually returning to the day when those were tools 

that were part of U.S.-Iran policy, but also on U.S. Government 

Web sites I think that there needs to be putting businesses on notice as well. 

I also think partners, proxies, and allies of the Iranian Government as well need to be put on notice and there are a lot of ways 

in which we can do that, and Chairman Royce mentioned some of 

those in some of the war zones in which we are all familiar. I look 

forward to expanding on some of these ideas, most of which I have 

mentioned in my testimony. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Modell follows:]

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STATEMENT OF ANDREW EXUM, PH.D., CONTRIBUTING 

EDITOR, THE ATLANTIC 

Mr. EXUM. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you 

so much for the opportunity to speak to the committee today. I 

have been asked to present testimony on Iran and I will do so in 

my capacity as the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Middle East Policy during the Obama administration. I left the 

Department of Defense last month and my testimony today was 

cleared by the Department to ensure what I tell you remains at the 

appropriate level of classification and is as boring as possible for 

the rest of you listening in, but I will do my best to talk about 

things within the constraints I have been given. 

The United States has three vital interests in the Middle East: 

The security of the State of Israel, countering terrorism and the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and freedom of navigation and commerce in and around the Arabian Peninsula which 

all of you know is the home to vast hydrocarbon reserves. Iran can 

and does pose a threat to all of those interests and it does so in 

three ways: Its nuclear program, its buildup of conventional arms, 

and what we call its asymmetric activities that support the proxies 

such as Hezbollah or some of the Shia militias in Iraq. 

During the Obama administration we countered Iran through 

what we called our four Ps: Our posture, our plans, our partners, 

and our preparedness. With respect to posture, we have about 

35,000 troops in and around the Persian Gulf alone. We have major 

airbases in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. We have a major naval 

base in Bahrain. And these bases and the troops operating out of 

them allow us to ensure freedom of navigation in and around the 

Arabian Peninsula, combat terror groups—for many of these forces 

are in the skies above Iraq and Syria right now—and deter conventional Iranian aggression against our Gulf partners. 

We maintain a robust suite of plans to respond to regional contingencies. In my capacity at the Pentagon I reviewed these plans. 

They are real, they are resourced, and our forces are ready to execute them. Over the past three decades, meanwhile, we have invested in our regional partnerships, specifically building partnership capacity in our Gulf partners. 

We have a long way to go, but one of the areas where we have 

made the most progress, ballistic missile defense, helps us counter 

Iran’s build-up of conventional weapons. We also engaged in unprecedented levels of defense and intelligence cooperation with 

Israel while making available some of our most advanced U.S.-

made weapons to Gulf partners. 

Finally, we have our preparedness, and we chose this word because we needed the fourth P for people like me to remember. But 

what this really stands for, the many dozens of bilateral, unilateral, multilateral exercises we conduct on an annual basis to help 

us prepare for regional contingencies. 

So how are we doing? I will be blunt in my assessment and then 

offer some words of advice for this new administration as well as 

some words of caution for this committee. Specifically, I will argue 

that this administration’s strategic flirtation with Russia is incompatible with what I assess to be its desire to pressure and counter 

Iran. 

38

First, the Department of Defense did not play a role in negotiating the nuclear deal with Iran, but the deal very much helped 

the U.S. military. Despite all the sturm and drang here in Washington and elsewhere in the summer of 2015, most strategic planners I have spoken with both here and in the region see the deal 

as offering real, positive opportunities both for the United States 

and for Iran. 

As you know, the Pentagon was always in charge of providing 

the enforcement mechanism for U.S. policy. If Iran cheats we will 

know about it, and the Pentagon is prepared to act accordingly. 

From our perspective then the nuclear deal was a pretty good deal 

because it constrained Iran while placing no such constraints on 

us. 

Iran also has some opportunities of course, and it appears to be 

largely squandering them. Some optimists in the Obama administration had hoped the nuclear negotiations would be a way to bring 

Iran in from the cold, so to speak, and encourage Iran to play a 

more helpful role regionally. The view of these optimists was not 

universally shared within the administration. 

Many of us argued within the administration and to our allies 

that the reason we needed to sign a deal with Iran was not because 

Iran is a benign actor but because they are a malign actor and thus 

needed to be prevented from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Iran’s actions since signing the nuclear deal have vindicated the pessimists. 

Iran continues a robust build-up of conventional weapons, including what we military folks call anti-access, area denial weapons 

like anti-ship cruise missiles and air defense systems, and while I 

don’t think our own military commanders are losing sleep over 

these weapons just yet, I know our regional partners are. 

And here is my first word of caution. These weapons systems for 

the most part are not indigenous to the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

These are Russian weapons, sold by Russia to Iran with the aim 

of constraining U.S. freedom of maneuver in strategically important waterways and airways. Any serious effort to counter the 

build-up of these Iranian capabilities has to take Russia into account. 

Iran is also continuing what I would call its asymmetric activities. Its support to Shia and allied militia in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, 

and Yemen continues. The presence of anti-ship cruise missiles in 

Yemen is especially concerning since it threatens a key commercial 

waterway, the Bab al-Mandeb. 

And let me be blunt again regarding the administration’s overtures to Russia. In Syria it will be exceptionally difficult and likely 

impossible to reach any accommodation with Russia and the regime in Damascus that does not end up strengthening Iran and its 

proxies, including Hezbollah. So before the administration goes 

down that path they should recognize that in the short term at 

least they are going to embolden some of the very people they have 

pledged to counter in the region. And they will embolden Iran and 

these groups to the detriment of Israel’s security. 

In Iraq, meanwhile, the Islamic State is on a clear path to defeat. 

But the long term threat to Iraq’s sovereignty is both Kurdish separatism and the Shia militia, many of them supported by Iran, that 

exist only loosely affiliated with the Iraqi state. In addition, Iraq’s 

39

long term stability will be dependent on the United States being 

able to keep a small contingent of trainers and special operators in 

the country, which is why the President’s dismissive comments 

about the Iraqi Government, his comments about how we should 

have taken Iraq’s oil, and his ban on Iraqis coming to the United 

States have been so strategically misguided. 

This all plays into a narrative of an Iran that very much views 

Iraq as a zero-sum game with the United States. It has spent millions of dollars to convince Iraqis that we have the types of malign 

activities toward Iraq that the President seems to in fact have but 

which few other share. If the United States wants to push back on 

that it needs to do so in the President’s words and with robust diplomacy. 

I would also caution this administration from trying to push back 

against Iran and its proxies in Iraq right now. We have a Sunni 

terrorist enemy to defeat in Iraq and our 5,000 soldiers in Iraq 

need to focus on them not on war with Iran’s proxies. I fought in 

Iraq, and as any of you who fought there remember, Iran can make 

our life pretty miserable. So we don’t need that fight right now and 

we should sequence how we push back on them. 

Finally, a few words on Yemen. We have talked about Islamic 

fundamentalism, but I am somewhat of a freedom of navigation 

fundamentalist. The United States should be prepared to robustly 

counter any threats to key waterways, and I am not going to lose 

any sleep if a couple of Houthis die because they made an error of 

firing an anti-ship cruise missile into the Bab al-Mandeb. 

I should note though that the vast, vast majority of commercial 

traffic—1,400 vessels, 80 million tons on a monthly basis—that 

flows through the Bab al-Mandeb is not American. It comes from 

the European Union, India, China, Korea; these are the countries 

that have the most at stake in any actions which threatens shipping, and before the administration escalates a war in Yemen it 

should start with some multilateral diplomacy telling Iran, in essence, to knock it off, lest their own commercial interests be at 

stake. 

In conclusion, in Secretary Mattis we have a Secretary of Defense who keenly understands the threat posed by Iran. And in 

Secretary Tillerson and Gary Cohn we have, respectively, a Secretary of State and a director of the Economic Council who understand the centrality of market access to hydrocarbon resources in 

the Gulf to the global economy. 

So there is some cause for optimism that this administration will 

eventually put together a coherent strategy to counter Iran’s malign activities in a way that serves U.S. interests. But the contradictions in the administration’s strategic initiatives thus far, not 

to mention the alarming and unprecedented dysfunction within the 

national security decision making process, leave plenty of room for 

worry as well. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to go over. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Exum follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Exum. Thank you to the 

panel. One of the questions that I was going to direct at Mr. 

Albright concerned a portion of your testimony where you said that 

the previous administration interfered in U.S. law enforcement efforts when it came to them blocking the efforts to arrest and convict Iranians and their agents engaged in breaking U.S. export and 

sanctions laws. 

One of the focuses I have is sort of reversing that policy, especially with respect to the IRGC, but what measures can we take 

to send the signal that extraditing and arresting and convicting 

those that are involved in breaking our laws has to be a priority? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, first thing, I think some of these memos and 

extradition requests should be revisited. I mean they still exist, 

some cases may still be active. I mean these are not public cases. 

The other, and I must say one of the impacts that I heard very 

clearly was that this in a sense interfering in what the investigators were doing in our enforcement agencies was discouraging, and 

these are hard cases to launch and they hesitate to do more. 

So I think the administration should send a very strong signal 

that it fully supports these investigations and prosecutions of these 

Iranian and Iranian agents. 

Chairman ROYCE. So that would have to be through State and 

so it was the State Department——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That is right. 

Chairman ROYCE [continuing]. That put the kibosh on it. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, that is where they tended to die. 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. So that is where they tended to die, but I think 

it has to be done at the White House level. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. And to get these cases moving again, because I 

think my understanding is Iran hasn’t stopped its illicit activities 

and it is very important to counter them. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, another way to counter it, and I will go 

to Ms. Bauer’s comment here, but I bet there would be a tremendous ripple effect from sanctioning just one or two European companies for transactions with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 

Corps. They are the main economic player in Iran. 

And I think you had a line in your testimony where you said that 

the application of U.S. secondary sanctions for dealing with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps remains a significant risk for companies looking to reengage with Iran and that this application of 

secondary sanctions has never been done. 

So another question is why not and what would the impact be 

if our response now to their missile tests and maybe to General 

Soleimani’s trip 2 days ago to Moscow is such a robust action? And 

let’s push that button there. 

Ms. BAUER. Thank you, Chairman. Indeed, the remaining sanctions on the IRGC and the fact that they include secondary sanctions risks remains a great deterrent to businesses looking to reengage with Iran. And in fact that is one reason I think why you 

haven’t seen action against a European country in particular is 

that they do not want to lose access to the U.S. financial system, 

and so they are able to look at the OFAC list and ensure that they 

49

don’t do business with anyone on that list or anyone who holds a 

50 percent or an aggregated 50 percent share of a business they 

are working with. 

So they are able to do some due diligence. Where they are not 

confident with the due diligence it appears that they are not engaging. But there are things that could be done to make it harder and 

to isolate the IRGC further, for example, designating additional 

IRGC affiliates to make it clear to those companies going in. 

Chairman ROYCE. So maybe those with less than a 50 percent 

ownership share but you could expand that out, or you are saying 

there is affiliates out there that we haven’t captured yet? 

Ms. BAUER. There are affiliates who haven’t been listed. Even 

those that are not listed by operation of law, companies are restricted or could be sanctioned for doing business. 

Chairman ROYCE. Why don’t we do this on that answer. Why 

don’t I just ask the panel if you have ideas on that, if you could 

give me some specifics, and I could just get to this Soleimani question which I wanted to ask, because it was a surprise to me, you 

know, to see him travel again to Moscow. This is the third time he 

has done it, and as a matter of fact he is there right now. And I 

would just ask the panel for any creative solutions for effectively 

pushing back on his continued travel. 

And the thing I find most objectionable here is that he has been, 

you know, fingered as the fellow behind the death of many Americans, the one who plotted the Russian-Iranian tag team slaughter 

that went on in Syria in the middle of the Iranian negotiations. I 

mean there have been so much that this guy, as head of the Qud 

Forces—which is in charge of assassinations outside the country—

has been responsible for, attacks across Europe and so forth where 

they take out anybody perceived to be an enemy of the regime. 

I mean this is a really bloodthirsty guy. And it seems to me that 

the reason he is headed to Moscow for these meetings has got to 

be the ballistic missile systems or other weapons systems that he 

intends to introduce into the theater. So ideas on how to react to 

that? Maybe Mr. Modell, do you have a——

Mr. MODELL. One of the things that I have thought and again 

what I hear from Iranians all the time is why is the U.S. Government not doing more to come up with a large matrix of all IRGC 

officials that we know of, businesses that we know that are linked, 

and publicize it constantly and to show their links to corruption? 

I mean this isn’t necessarily going to directly address the Soleimani 

issue, but I think it is going to significantly weaken the IRGC. 

So when you are talking about publicizing the——

Chairman ROYCE. Well, I think this cuts into another point you 

made in your testimony here about the need to make some changes 

of the broadcasting into Iran so that yes, it is objective but we do 

touch on issues that is important there. We now have a single head 

of the agency who has the ability to direct information. 

And so as information spills out about corruption or whatever 

that access to that information on social media and on a platform 

of radio and television should be available so that people know exactly what has happened here with respect to the IRGC taking all 

of these assets usually through nationalization and transferring 

them to the ownership of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

50

I need to go to Mr. Engel. My time has expired. Thank you very 

much, panel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Exum, let me ask you 

this. In your testimony you pointed out one way in which Russia 

and Iran collaborate to destabilize the Middle East. You mentioned 

that Russia provides Iran with anti-access, area denial weapons 

like anti-ship cruise missiles and air defense systems. Obviously 

this is very disconcerting to us and our allies because their goal is 

using these weapons to inhibit freedom of movement in strategic 

waterways and airways. 

There have been Russian media reports that Iran and Russia are in discussions over $10 billion in weapons. How would you suggest 

the Trump administration respond to this? 

Mr. EXUM. Well, I think one of the things that the Trump administration can do and then here with respect to sanctions that defer 

to the sanctions experts, because I am sure that there are aspects 

outside of the military lane that you can use. I think with respect 

to diplomacy, I will just focus on diplomacy and the military steps 

that I think he can take with respect to diplomacy by constraining 

the access to waterways. 

And look, these are, we don’t need the oil and gas that is coming 

out the Persian Gulf as much as the global markets need them and 

as much as we need them for the stability of the global economy. 

So it is not just the United States or the Trump administration 

that has a stake in this, that has a stake in freedom of navigation 

and freedom of commerce in and around the Arabian Peninsula. I 

would think that you would start with a large multilateral effort 

to pressure Iran on the deployment of these weapons systems and 

on Russia on the sales of these weapons systems. 

From a military perspective we are already doing quite a lot. 

Again I don’t think that the commander of NAVCENT would argue 

that his freedom of movement is in any way constrained right now, 

but it is clear that we need to do two things. We need to increase 

the degree to which we have ballistic and air missile, or integrated 

air and missile defense systems, within the Middle East. That includes both sales to partners and increasing partner capacity, but 

it also means that our partners in the region need to get more serious about their own maritime capabilities. Historically, maritime 

capability of the Navy has been the third of three services within 

most of our Gulf militaries. They need to get serious about their 

own efforts to be able to keep the waterways in and around the 

Arabian Peninsula secure. 

And I would defer again, like I said, to my Treasury colleagues 

or my colleagues from the Washington Institute with respect to 

what more we can do in terms of sanctioning those Russian businesses or those Iranians that are purchasing these types of weapons systems, Mr. Ranking Member. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Anybody else have comments on that? 

Mr. MODELL. Mr. Ranking Member, the only thing I would say 

is that it is a very asymmetric process that Iran is involved in and 

that includes commercial acquisition of the conventional military 

stuff. Building on what Dr. Exum is saying, I think we have not 

done enough to work with our allies in the region, particularly in 

the GCC which is often the site of enabling Iran to do these things, 

51

to front companies based in their own Emirates, for instance, to develop the capabilities to work asymmetrically in a defensive capacity. And I don’t think we are systematically oriented in that sense. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Albright, let me ask you this. You have criticized the IAEA 

for lack of transparency in reporting and I quote you, this is what 

you said: ‘‘The IAEA reporting continues to lack critical technical 

details that implementation of the agreement. Its lack of information in the IAEA reports combined with the secrecy surrounding 

the decision making of the Joint Commission is a serious shortcoming on the implementation of the JCPOA and erodes support 

for this important deal.’’

Let me ask you this, what information is missing from IAEA reporting and what information do you need to be made public? What 

specific recommendations do you have for the Trump administration and Congress to encourage more transparency so that experts 

like you can better evaluate the implementation? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, in my testimony I gave there is a footnote 

and I apologize for making a footnote. But essentially the IAEA is 

not reporting on almost any of the technical details that it used to 

report on—levels of enriched uranium, controversies with Iran. I 

mean Iran is pushing limits of the JCPOA. The IAEA may or may 

not be pushing back but it could report on the status of that. So 

I would say that they are providing very little information. 

On heavy water we hear a lot, well, they are over, you know, the 

cap of 130 tons by 100 kilograms, they leave out 70 tons was sent 

off to Oman in a kind of a clever trick that in essence allowed Iran 

to be 70 tons over the cap on heavy water, if you judge that cap 

by the heavy water Iran owns and controls. 

So I think that there is a lack of information inhibiting analysis, 

and the lack of information is providing a false narrative about 

where things are at and we need a lot more information. Now I will 

say under pressure, some from Congress, some from us, some from 

the media, the Joint Commission did decide in December to start 

releasing its major decisions publicly. I mean I don’t think they 

wanted to do that but I think that they felt the absolute need to 

do it. And so I think pressure does work in this case and I think 

the Trump administration should push for much more openness. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Thank 

you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We go to Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like 

to thank you and the ranking member for again providing us the 

information and a focus on a very significant element to our nation’s security, and so thank you both. And I would identify myself 

certainly with your opening statement. 

I am however, and this panel has not changed my, I don’t know 

if it is observation or my analysis that frankly our policy toward 

Iran and the mullah regime in Iran has been detached from reality 

in that it is basically wishful thinking of the worst sort. Let me just 

mention about Russia and how they have armed the mullah regime, this horrible dictatorship, with weapons to shoot planes out 

of the air and take care of that type of military threat. 

52

Quite frankly, we are not going to invade Iran. I don’t see it even 

if they have a bomb we are not going to invade Iran. Those weapons are aimed at preventing some sort of, or countering a military 

threat to that regime which now has a positive relationship with 

Moscow. That if we are going to get rid of the mullah regime it 

won’t be U.S. military personnel with U.S. weapons going in and 

doing that job. 

If we are going to get rid, and unfortunately all the talk about 

that and all the details about every little increment in which the 

Iranian mullah regime now is closer to getting a bomb has taken 

us away from the real solution, the only solution which is make 

sure that we deal with the people of Iran who hate the mullahs. 

And you are taking focus away from that by talking about weapons 

systems and this. 

We need to make, while we left the Baluch who would be in 

charge of the Strait of Hormuz I might add if we would support 

their fight against the mullah regime. The Kurds, there are more 

Kurds in Iran than there are in Iraq. The Azeris, we have Azerbaijan right next door that is willing to help. But all of this time, 

and even the Persian element were as ready to overthrow the 

mullahs several years ago in this Green Revolution and we let 

them go without any, even verbal, support for their effort. 

Now getting rid of the mullah regime by helping the people of 

Iran is the answer. You have Persians, the MEK, I know as everybody criticizes them because they have a checkered past, well, they 

also, they have been willing to help us get rid of the mullah regime 

and they have been struggling for a more democratic government 

along with the other Persians who are there. Ninety percent of the 

Persians don’t like it. And like you said as you would expect from 

a journalist to focus in on the corruption and the repression that 

is going on. Well, if we focus on that that is how we would mobilize 

the only real power we have to get rid of them which is the Iranian 

people themselves. 

And one last note about this idea about all this focus on how 

much heavy water they have and et cetera, et cetera. We gave 

them $150 billion with this nonsensical treaty that we signed with 

them, $150 billion were made at their disposal. How much do you 

think it would cost them to buy a nuclear weapon from Pakistan? 

It wouldn’t cost, I bet it wouldn’t even cost $1 billion. I bet they 

could get it for in the tens of millions, if not $100 million. The fact 

is that regime with its hands on a military capability of nuclear 

weapons, that is the threat. It is the regime, it is not the weapon 

itself. 

So I think we should quit focusing America’s attention on things 

that will not change the situation and make us any safer. And 

again talking about how much heavy water they have and how are 

they going to be able to stop them from building their own bomb, 

if they want to bomb now they can afford to buy it. And the answer 

is the mullahs have got to go. The mullah regime has to leave and 

how we get rid of it is not through American military operations, 

but instead reaching out to the people of Iran and helping them 

win their freedom. 

53

And that is, if anybody in the panel would like to spend their 

time refuting that, please go right ahead. How about my journalist 

friend, go right ahead. 

Mr. EXUM. Well, sir, first off, thank you for that. I will be blunt. 

First off, you know, if it were to come to those types of activities, 

and then I well know your biography, I know your experience, you 

would know that the Department of Defense, this is not within our 

wheelhouse so to speak. You know, any outreach toward separatist 

movements is usually done either clandestinely or overtly through 

diplomatic channels. And there have, you know, certainly been examples where we have done that. 

I think with respect to, I will focus on one thing which is the 

note about the dollars that Iran has. First off, you know, Iran always has the cash on hand if they wanted to, you know, purchase 

a nuclear weapon. I think—and I hate to do this, I am putting on 

my Ph.D. hat now—there is a lot of academic literature and a lot 

of analysis that would suggest that that is not a really likely thing. 

So if you were the Pakistanis and you sell a nuclear weapon to 

somebody, first off, you lose all of the control that you would have 

on that nuclear weapon and you would get all of the blowback if 

it is used. So I think that threat, although it is real and it is something that we carefully monitor, it is something that contains a lot 

of risk for anybody that would sell that. 

The second thing I would say is that when it comes to money and 

what the Iranians are doing in terms of the asymmetric activities, 

in terms of these nefarious activities, a lot of these things are really cheap and they didn’t need the money to keep doing this stuff. 

What they are doing in Yemen, what they are doing in Syria and 

Iraq, it is not that expensive to begin with. 

And as we have established, if the Quds Force wants to get a 

piece of the budget they are going to get a piece of the budget. They 

are going to get their way and thus far they have gotten their way 

with respect to I guess what we would call the Islamic regime’s discretionary spending. But, and I don’t think that the amount of 

money that was freed up, which is a little less when you look at 

actually the liquid assets, has had much of an effect on what 

Qasem Soleimani and his lieutenants are doing in Iraq and Syria. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, makes 

some interesting points and the chairman was quite indulgent with 

him on time. I hope that inspires a whole new approach. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, certainly with respect to Mr. Brad Sherman it does, so thank you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Because I do want to deal with some of the points 

he raises. But before I do that in some minds the picture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this regime, is the smiling face of its foreign 

minister Javad Zarif—dapper, debonair—in Geneva. The real face 

of this regime, the real picture of this regime is Alan Kurdi, that 

3-year-old boy on the beach in Turkey in the Mediterranean, one 

of 400,000 Syrians who died as a result of the Islamic Republic’s 

support for the butcher in Damascus. 

I for one don’t think that we can excuse Russian arms sales to 

Iran on the theory that we are going to achieve regime change any 

time soon. We have watched the Arab Spring. We have seen which 

54

regimes survive and which don’t. Those regimes that have 50,000 

thugs willing to machine gun their own citizens survive. Those 

whose army is unwilling to do that and are confronted by their own 

people don’t. And we have had other panels so I want to ask this 

panel, I have been assured by other panels that there are tens of 

thousands of Quds Force soldiers willing to machine gun other Iranians if that is what it takes to keep this regime in force. 

The gentleman from California says that the weapons that Russia is selling they are only defensive, it wouldn’t affect us. But of 

course the S300s are the anti-aircraft weapons that make it much 

more difficult for Israel or even the United States to take out this 

nuclear program if that becomes necessary, and the fact that all options are on the table is the only thing that keeps Iran from not 

cheating more on the JCPOA and one of the only things that got 

them to sign it. 

But I want to focus on the gentleman from California’s idea of 

buying a nuclear weapon. He mentions Pakistan, but Pakistan 

might well listen to their friends in Saudi Arabia. If they have a 

bomb for sale maybe they would sell it there. They are a Middle 

Eastern country, or nearly one, and would be directly affected. 

I want to focus a little bit about our friends in North Korea. The 

death of Kim Jong Nam illustrates that we should never have 

taken North Korea off of the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. 

North Korea provided the kit that was used to create a nuclear 

bomb-making facility that was destroyed by Israel, located in Syria, 

destroyed by Israel last decade. Do any of our panelists have any 

idea how much money North Korea got in return, not for a nuclear 

weapon but just a kit to build one, technology? I am seeing four 

shaking heads. 

But I would point out that North Korea is in need of cash. Iran 

has some already loaded on pallets wrapped in cellophane. And I 

know that Iran would want the indigenous capacity. I know that 

they would want more than one weapon. But will any of you comment on why has Iran not purchased a weapon from North Korea? 

Knowing now that North Korea has a few more weapons than they 

need to defend themselves from us, they could afford to part with 

one. Mr. Albright. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes, I think there is worry. I mean, and a nuclear 

weapon can be transferred in different ways. It doesn’t have to be 

a fully commissioned, workable——

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes, it could be just the fissile, they could sell the 

fissile material, they could sell the weapon, they could sell——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That is right. And I think there is a lot of worry. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. The two separately. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes, and I think there is a lot of worry and I 

think it needs to be looked at, just what is the level of cooperation? 

I mean I don’t know of any credible evidence right now saying that 

Iran and North Korea are cooperating on nuclear weapons related 

or nuclear weapons issues, but there is a lot of cooperation on missiles. They have common enemies. And I think it needs to be 

looked at much more——

Mr. SHERMAN. Do any of you have an opinion on whether the 

Syria-North Korea transaction of last decade would have inevitably 

55

involved Iranian observers, advisers, or cash? Anyone have an 

opinion on that? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. There has been statements or some evidence that 

Iran would have had some involvement in it. I was never able to 

confirm direct involvement. But given the closeness of Iran and 

Syria, fortunately that reactor doesn’t exist anymore and there 

could certainly, cooperation could——

Mr. SHERMAN. I am going to try to sneak in one more question 

which is indulgent of the chairman, but on the comment that we 

need to prevent U.S. banks from financing any aircraft sales to 

Iran because that creates an incentive for U.S. banks to come here 

and lobby us in favor of Iran to make sure they get repaid. The press reports are of discussions of a $10 billion military 

hardware deal between Russia and Iran including tanks, artillery, 

and aircraft. The JCPOA says Iran can’t buy those kinds of weapons without the approval of a secret, five-member committee that 

operates in secret but we have a seat on that and can veto such 

sales. Is there any possibility that the United States would approve 

or fail to veto, any transfer of weapons from Russia to Iran? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I don’t think so. If I can say the problem is that 

the ban ends after 5 years or earlier if the IAEA issues its broader 

conclusion on the additional protocols. So really, this duration issue 

transcends nuclear to conventional and ballistic missile and it is 

something the Trump administration is going to have to factor in 

strongly into its policy review on Iran of how do we deal with these 

exemptions that in essence take place in not that distant future. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I will give one more comment and then I 

will yield back. No, I will yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Let’s do this. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I will yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Let’s get back to 5 minutes and let’s start with 

Steve Chabot on that from Ohio. Thanks. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you for your indulgence. As we all know, ultimately the President became aware because most of us didn’t like 

or agree with the Iran deal and ended up taking action on his own. 

And some would argue that the previous administration, the 

Obama administration, had so much invested in the deal that they 

overlooked provocative actions, overlooked, arguably, a whole series 

of flagrant violations of the deal itself, and Iran pretty much got 

away with murder, I think, literally in some cases, but figuratively 

also. 

I would just like to go down the line and see, what do you think 

of what a lot of people think about this, the fact that the administration did overlook far too much, some of those things which you 

have already commented on here today, because this was one of 

their great accomplishments, something some people thought 

couldn’t be done. 

So I will start with you, Ms. Bauer. 

Ms. BAUER. In terms of potential violations on the margins of the 

JCPOA, I think it is important to consider proportional responses. 

In my testimony there is a section where I look at the use of proportional responses to what the previous administration may have 

called ‘‘deviations’’ in terms of compliance with the deal, but what 

this administration might be more inclined to call ‘‘violations.’’

56

And so I think it is important to have options available short of 

abrogating the deal. Those could be things like not approving decisions that come in front of the Joint Commission or suspending licensing, not the licenses themselves perhaps, but suspending licensing under the agreement until such issues are resolved. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Albright. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think my criticisms are fairly well known. I 

thought that conditions should have been stronger in many cases. 

I mean I did not support the deal despite a lobbying effort on the 

part of the administration. And I had supported publicly the JPA, 

but I thought there were several cases, conditions that just weren’t 

strong enough where I could support them. I didn’t come out 

against it. 

I have since, with implementation, become more critical of that. 

I think too many concessions were made, many more noes should 

have been given rather than yeses, and I think it has made this 

situation more difficult to deal with. And one of the challenges of 

the Trump administration is going to be to reverse this, and I think 

it is going to be challenging. 

And I think the things I put in my testimony, the short term 

things, are the things to do today. I mean obviously you can’t get 

them all, but there are a lot of opportunities to start changing the 

nature of the implementation that can start today and the U.S. has 

the power to do it. But I do think it is going to be tough. 

And then there is this issue of, there are these problems, I mentioned one, and Congressman Rohrabacher in a sense is alluding 

to them, that the duration is a real problem in this agreement. I 

mean I wish 10 years was a long period of time in the Middle East, 

but it is not. And in some sense the major limitations of the deal 

start to unwind quicker than it took to negotiate this deal, if you 

go back to the start point as 2003. 

And so you have a real problem of how does now the administration deal with these conditions that are going to unwind in the future with conventional weapons, ballistic missiles——

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Let me cut you off there because some 

of us are being held to 5 minutes. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay, I apologize. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Modell. 

Mr. MODELL. No, to a couple of things to Mr. Rohrabacher’s 

point, I think that the deal is actually a large setback to those in 

and outside of Iran who were eager to see us to actually do things 

that would lead to momentum for channeling resistance against the 

regime. 

And I think, you know, everything from 2009 when the Green 

Movement started happening and there was a moratorium on dealing with members of the Green Movement and actually aiding people as they were trying to channel resentment and figure out how 

to take disparate clusters of resistance and form an actual resistance movement for the first time in 35 years at the time, it was 

a tremendous failing and it was all in the interest of ill-conceived 

rapprochement in the nuclear deal. 

I won’t comment on the nuclear deal in particular, but the one 

thing I think it is important to consider is that the deal itself—in 

a sense from an intel perspective or a law enforcement perspecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:04 Mar 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\021617\24242 SHIRL
57

tive—was a real setback, because now everyone is so eager to preserve the deal that we are putting the brakes on and we are cautiously walking around the idea of law enforcement. The 

verification of this still is critical. And I think to the extent that 

the CIA and the intelligence community were actually on the right 

path of developing better ways of working with law enforcement—

detecting, disrupting, and dismantling counter proliferation networks—there has been a setback to that degree. And I think now 

we have an uphill climb in terms of verification and counter proliferation. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. 

Can Dr. Exum respond? I leave it up to you. 

Mr. EXUM. Mr. Chairman, with permission, could I briefly respond? 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. EXUM. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. First off, Congressman, I believe we overestimated the degree to which the diplomatic channel we established between Secretary Kerry and Zarif 

who could bear fruit outside of the nuclear negotiations. I think we 

thought it could, bottom line is it didn’t. They didn’t want to talk 

about anything except for the nuclear deal. 

Second, in terms of pushing back against other things Iran was 

doing, there were lots of reasons having nothing to do with the nuclear deal why we didn’t. In Syria, the President as you all know 

took several options off the table in terms of what we could do in 

Syria. In Iraq we had a fight against the Islamic State to prosecute 

that we didn’t want to endanger by pushing back against Iran too 

soon. And then third, in Yemen, I don’t think the administration 

wanted to get drawn any deeper into Yemen. It is actually in 

Yemen and specifically with respect to the threat to freedom of 

navigation where I think we could have been more aggressive and 

think that would have made sense. 

Chairman ROYCE. We now go to Mr. Greg Meeks of New York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me just say, first 

of all, I appreciate the opportunity to be able to examine our policy 

toward Iran. I think that this will be our seventh full committee 

hearing on Iran in the past year, and I appreciate the opportunity 

to understand the threat that Iran poses to the Middle East and 

I know that we will have further questions. 

However, I must also say with the ongoing new administration 

and President Trump’s bizarre policies toward Mr. Putin and Russia, as you have said, Mr. Chairman that Russia has demonstrated 

that the hope of cooperation cannot survive the cold calculation of 

his narrow interests, I would hope that and I know that we are 

going to have some hearing on Russia in a couple of weeks or so, 

but I hope that we have more focus on Russia and its involvement 

because it seems to be threatening our very democracy. 

It has come out clearly about the Russian involvement in our 

elections for the President of the United States here in America, 

and Russia’s involvement in France and in Germany and those 

elections there. It seems to me that there is a great threat of what 

Russia is doing around the world. 

And being a committee that has gotten together and, you know, 

I see the Senate is starting to move on that side in a bipartisan 

58

way to start talking about where Russia is and what Russia is 

doing, whether it is in Iran or other places around the world, and 

what the connections are between Russia and our current administration, because it seems as though every day there are more ties 

to Russia’s intelligence services that are being discovered at the 

highest level of our national security apparatus. 

So I would think that this committee, and one of the things that 

I do like about this committee is that we work in a bipartisan way. 

That we would be the committee, since it does not seem that anybody on the House side, and I do see some senators on the other 

side of the aisle starting to talk about doing something, but I would 

hope that—and I don’t hear any committee or anything being done 

on the House side. I know that when we had Benghazi, et cetera, 

there was other committees that stood up and did certain things 

at their end for investigation. 

I would hope then that the Foreign Affairs Committee in a bipartisan way would step up and say, ‘‘there is a threat to our democracy,’’ and we hold many hearings. In fact we could lead Congress 

in coming together to say that we are going to look into what is 

happening in Russia and Russia’s narrow interest in how they are 

affecting us here in the United States of America. 

And look at what the President’s positions have been and the 

people that are affiliated with him, because just recently, just even 

yesterday it comes out that even during the campaign there has 

been many individuals from the Trump campaign that had some 

contact with Russia. And clearly when we had General Flynn, who 

had to leave because of his connections with Russia. 

So I think that it provides a unique opportunity for us to have 

some continuous hearings on Russia, its relationship and contact 

with the United States, what it is doing, what it is not doing, its 

connections with the current administration. That conversation is 

very important to every American whether you are Democrat, 

whether you are Republican, whether you are Independent, it is 

something that I think is going to the heart. 

And as the camera of history rolls it will be looking back on what 

did we do in the United States Congress? What did we do at the 

time that our own democracy was threatened by outside entity? 

Did we fully investigate and go into it as an independent body, a 

separate branch of government to make sure that we have done everything to protect ourselves? 

So, you know, it is good that we and we could even talk 

about——

Chairman ROYCE. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. MEEKS. We could even talk about, and I am not going to get 

a minute left, but I know we only get five. 

Chairman ROYCE. I understand. 

Mr. MEEKS. We could even talk about, you know, Russia, you 

know, and I think we have had some of these conversations about 

Russia and its involvement with reference to Iran, of clearly, you 

know, we have heard questions here today talking about Russia 

providing ballistic missiles to Iran. We have talked and heard 

about that had Russia, had discussions over $10 billion in military 

hardware. So that is, you know, a problem to us even as you talk 

about dealing with Iran. 

59

And then when you figure out, you know, Russia and the consequences of the U.S. and Russian cooperation which has, you 

know, this administration has expressed openness to U.S. cooperation with Russia in Syria and how does that affect us in Iran and 

can you do an agreement with Russia? What is this deal with Russia and this administration? 

We have got to get to the bottom of this, and I think there is 

nothing more important for us as members of the legislative branch 

and the Foreign Affairs Committee for us to focus on where, what, 

when, and how Russia is involved with this administration. I yield 

back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, thank you, and I thank the gentleman 

for yielding. Even before this week’s events I have been discussing 

with Ranking Member Engel a hearing focused on the way in 

which Russia works to undermine Western democracies including 

the United States, including France and Germany, and including 

efforts to undermine NATO. As the intelligence reports from January noted, they did that here. They will do it again in the upcoming 

European elections in France and Germany. 

So it is appropriate that we hear from experts on the appropriate 

steps to be taken in response and this will continue the critical 

oversight role that our committee has played on U.S.-Russia policy. 

I will remind the members that we have had hearings specifically 

on Russia and its aggressive acts in the past and, after all, this is 

the committee that led the way to impose sanctions on Russia. We 

did that after its invasion of Ukraine. And this is the committee 

that has been sounding the alarm about Russia’s weaponization of 

information if you go through the hearings that we have had on 

RT, and I would expect that to be the first hearing we hold after 

next week’s recess, as I have shared with Mr. Engel. 

So I appreciate the gentleman’s observations and we now go to 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Chairman Royce and 

Ranking Member Engel, for continuing to focus on the real and serious threat of Iran. As recent events have indicated and as you 

both have pointed out, Iran’s provocative actions have not subsided 

in this post nuclear deal world and in fact, in many aspects, its illicit activity seems to have been on the rise. Iran remains a direct 

threat to our national security, to our friend and ally the democratic Jewish 

State of Israel, and to the stability of the entire Middle East. 

Often lost in the discussion of the JCPOA or Iran’s ballistic missile test is how closely this all mirrors North Korea’s nuclear and 

ballistic missile programs. Our Middle East Subcommittee has convened several hearings on this topic in the last few weeks. North 

Korea and Iran have been suspected of having some level of nuclear cooperation; at the very least, Iran learned from the North 

Korea playbook on how to win concessions from the West and still 

get its nuclear weapons. 

For certain these two rogue regimes have a long history of collaboration on ballistic missile development. Iran’s latest test was 

apparently a ballistic missile of North Korean origin. This is a very 

dangerous alliance, we must not continue to view Iran and North 

Korea as two separate tracks. We have the Iran, North Korea, and 

60

Syria Nonproliferation Act, INKSNA, which now could be a valuable tool to prevent proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical, 

or ballistic missile material to these regimes. Unfortunately, the 

previous administration was severely deficient in its reporting requirements under INKSNA. A GAO report found that the administration was years behind in its reporting, years behind, which had 

the unfortunate consequence of delaying sanctions on proliferation 

activities by Iran. By doing so, the previous administration effectively blocked key sanctions against Iran while the nuclear negotiations were ongoing, much to our detriment. 

In order to be effective we must fully and vigorously enforce 

sanctions and we must look at ways of expanding them if we are 

to curb Iran’s dangerous actions. This includes, Mr. Chairman and 

Mr. Ranking Member, rigorous enforcement of the JCPOA and it 

includes reimposing some sanctions lifted by the JCPOA that fell 

under more than just nonproliferation sanctions. That is why I will 

introduce my Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act which will modify the existing law and give us 

greater flexibility to hold these regimes and those individuals and 

entities accountable for the proliferation of their illicit activity. So 

I ask the panel kindly, could you tell us a little bit more about the 

Iran-North Korea nexus and what that proliferation network looks 

like, especially as it relates to their ballistic missile collaboration? 

And finally, Mr. Albright, you discussed Iran repeatedly taking 

advantage of loopholes and going over the threshold on heavy 

water and low enriched uranium. For what purpose would Iran 

need to enrich more than the alloted 300 kilogram cap on low enriched uranium or 130 metric tons of heavy water? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. It is very hard to penetrate the Iran-North Korean cooperation. I think it is better left to closed hearings to really 

get into that. I mean one thing that can be said though, and it is 

a little bit of an answer to an earlier question, is I think it is very 

important for the United States to sanction companies in Europe 

and in China that are linked to providing goods to Iran and North 

Korea. 

And I bring up the European side of this mainly because it is 

very hard for the European countries now to do that. Their sanctions or listing of companies can be challenged quite easily because 

of the nature of their system, and I think it is important that the 

U.S. sanction European and Chinese companies. 

Now in terms of taking advantage of the loopholes, and I listed 

several, now why would it need to enrich more? I mean I don’t 

think it does. I think it just wants to push the envelope, create 

precedence. It wants to undermine the limitations of the JCPOA 

that were, at least from the U.S. point of view, intended to be pretty robust on that limit. They want to be able to justify why they 

would need a large gas centrifuge program, and one of the ways 

they are going to try to do it is by developing an indigenous fuel 

fabrication capability that uses low enriched uranium which of 

course has to be tested, you have to go above the limit to make 

more enriched uranium for the test fuel. 

And by doing that when the international community would 

want to stop enrichment, the justification for the enrichment would 

61

be deeply embedded in a civil nuclear argumentation whether that 

is the original or the ultimate intention or not. 

So I think again it is for Iran——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir, I am sorry, I was long-winded and ran out of time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Thank you, again. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the 

chairman’s recitation of groundbreaking work done by this committee on Russia and I agree with him. I guess the concern on this 

side of the aisle that could easily be reassured is moving forward. 

Minority wrote——

Chairman ROYCE. If the gentleman would yield. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Only if he suspends my time. If you suspend my 

time I am happy to yield, because you only give me 5 minutes. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Connolly, go ahead with whatever points 

you want to make. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. Three months ago, the minority wrote 

a letter to Eliot Engel, the ranking member, asking him to deliver 

it to the chairman asking for an immediate hearing even before the 

inauguration on this Russia connection. We have, to my knowledge, 

not received the reply. 

Earlier this week, Mr. Cicilline and all of the Democrats signed 

a letter asking that General Flynn be brought before this committee so this committee can examine the foreign policy implications of what just happened. And I certainly look forward to an answer on that request. So I associate myself with remarks of Mr. 

Meeks that moving forward that is what we are concerned about. 

And I continue to hear gratuitous slaps at the previous administration on the subject of Iran because the agreement wasn’t all encompassing. Dr. Exum, are bilateral agreements between us and 

another country, are they typically all encompassing? Is that the 

record? 

Mr. EXUM. No, they are not. And in this case we again, this one 

particularly——

Mr. CONNOLLY. So when we sign nuclear, well, going back to the 

very first nuclear test ban treaty during the Kennedy administration with the then Soviet Union, you mean those agreements did 

not address human rights violations or Jewish immigration or 

Gulags or misbehavior in other parts of the world that were causing us great grief? 

Mr. EXUM. Not only that, Congressman, I seem to recall that we 

still faced significant conventional overmatch in the continent of 

Europe. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So, well, certainly the JCPOA has failed though, 

Dr. Exum, isn’t that right? I mean every single metric set by the 

JCPOA has been violated by Iran or they have cheated, and we 

have caught them at it, right? 

Mr. EXUM. Well, I think with respect to the JCPOA I think that 

there is room to push back against Iran in a more robust way, but 

we ought to do so with caution. 

62

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Exum, is there a single metric they have not 

reached? 

Mr. EXUM. I am not, I would defer to the Energy Department 

and to the Department of——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Enrichment of uranium—they reached the goal. 

The Iraq production facility, plutonium reactor—they filled it with 

cement. Shipping enriched material out of the country—they did it. 

You know, inspections—they have done it. I mean by all accounts 

they have pretty much met the metrics. Now we have to monitor 

it, and I agree with my friends on the other side of the aisle. In 

fact, I have introduced legislation that would create a Helsinki-like 

commission to do just that so it is hopefully removed from politics 

and partisanship. 

But compliance obviously remains an issue, but you can’t argue 

that the JCPOA has been a failure. And that is why after hearing 

all of the predictions for a year or more of how it would fail and 

they would cheat and by the way it would accelerate them as a nuclear power, surely you would agree that is not what happened. 

They are not closer to nuclear development today than before the 

JCPOA, are they? 

Mr. EXUM. No, that is exactly right. Now Mr. Albright may have 

more to add, but as far as I——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I only have 1 minute and 24, and I have a feeling 

the chairman is going to be strict about it, so let me talk about the 

Russian connection. How about we talk about the new President. 

Mr. EXUM. Sure. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I listened with interest to your testimony. 

In some ways this Russia connection makes it harder, not easier, 

for us to try to deter or address Iranian behavior, does it not? 

Mr. EXUM. Well, I believe it absolutely does. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Please explicate. 

Mr. EXUM. Well, especially with respect to Syria, I think we have 

seen many disturbing, and on the one hand the coalition in Syria 

they are not as, the opposing coalition in Syria they are not as stable as our own counter-Daesh coalition is, so there are some fissures between the Russians and the Iranians, for example, or between Hezbollah and the Russians. 

But I am growing increasingly alarmed by the degree to which 

their coalition activities in Syria have brought Russia and Iran 

closer together. We have certainly seen just images on social media 

of Russian Spetznosts on the ground in Syria with Hezbollah 

patches on in a way that alarms us in the same way that U.S. special operators on the ground in northeast Syria working with Kurdish groups alarms the Turks. 

And I think quite frankly we have reason to believe that Russia’s 

introduction and escalation in Syria in the fall of 2015 made it 

more difficult, not easier, to push back against what Iran was 

doing in Syria and elsewhere in the region, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Joe Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you 

and Ranking Member Eliot Engel for your bipartisan approach to 

the issues that we are facing concerning Iran. I am grateful that 

63

we had a bipartisan success in adding language to the National Defense Authorization Act to require an analysis of Iranian missile 

testing. 

The Trump administration took a good first step in designating 

Iranian missile proliferation networks in response to the recent 

tests. More needs to be done. And for Ms. Bauer, what are your 

recommendations for near and short term actions to address Iran’s 

ballistic missile system? 

Ms. BAUER. Thank you. I think there are a lot of options to use 

the existing authority. It is like the authority that was invoked in 

last month’s action to continue to identify procurement networks. 

What is especially impactful can be targeting those previously nonpublic affiliations between commercial fronts and Iranian actors, 

because these front companies need to operate, they need to appear 

to be legitimate in order to procure dual use goods. They need to 

hold bank accounts, and exposing this publicly can be incredibly 

disruptive. 

Mr. WILSON [presiding]. And I appreciate that. And of course 

what they are doing violates U.N. resolutions too, so it really is insulting in light of the Iranian nuclear deal that everything seems 

to continue. In fact, Mr. Albright, apologists for the dangerous nuclear deal claim, ‘‘If Iran cheats, we will know it.’’ I agree with Mr. 

Rohrabacher earlier who said this is wishful thinking which puts 

American families at risk of attack. What is your assessment? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. In the short term, with the program rolled back 

quite a bit the chance of detecting cheating is pretty good, but in 

the longer term I would say it is not. And that is why it is critical 

to, in a sense, really deal with this issue of access by the IAEA. 

Iran will have greater incentives to cheat in the future if it now 

can limit the ability of the IAEA to access. 

And in the longer term, I mean I don’t think this deal can be 

verified after a certain number of rollbacks in the conditions. If you 

are talking 10, 15 years from now, I think it will be extremely difficult to verify this arrangement if Iran builds up its nuclear program as it stated it is going to build up. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, to me it is such wishful thinking, the notification, the number of days we have to provide, the fact that there are 

no Americans serving on the inspection teams. This is beyond wishful thinking. It is putting the American families at risk. 

Mr. Modell, Obama administration officials repeatedly incorrectly 

testified that the dangerous nuclear agreement would in no way 

impact our pressing Iran on human rights and sanctioning those 

responsible for the brutal treatment of the Iranian people. However, there have been no designations for human rights abuses 

since the nuclear deal was implemented despite continued calls 

from Congress to do so. What specific steps can the new administration take to press Iran on human rights? 

Mr. MODELL. First of all, in terms of the first thing is listing individuals for human rights abuses. The second thing though, and 

I have spent a great amount of time here on human rights abuses 

and terrorism and the other violations of the Iranian regime, but 

on human rights in particular is to use the media tools that we are 

funding that we are spending millions of dollars on every year to 

64

highlight those things and to make it an integral part of U.S. policy 

pressuring the regime from the outside. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate so much Mr. Rohrabacher pointing 

out that the prior administration, we had such an opportunity with 

the Green Revolution. I had many friends in South Carolina, of all 

things, Iranian-Americans who had such hopes for regime change 

to give opportunity to the extraordinary people of the culture of 

Persia, to be under a theocracy that is so debilitating and so 

threatening to all the neighbors. And with two sons who served in 

Iraq, I know firsthand where the IEDs came from, and anyone who 

has faced that understands. 

And this really follows too, something never to be forgotten and 

that was the bombing of the Beirut Marine barracks. Hundreds, 

283, I believe, Americans murdered and it was by the Iranian regime, the largest explosive device since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

It should not be forgotten. 

I now yield to Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I thank the chairman. First, Mr. Modell, I want to 

thank you for bringing up the issue of Iran’s abduction of IranianAmericans and dual nationals. 

I would also like to take this opportunity to note that March 9th 

will mark the 10th anniversary that my constituent Bob Levinson 

went missing off of Kish Island. And as I have said at every hearing that we have had about Iran, that has to continue to be Issue 

1 in every discussion that we have with the Iranians. There is a 

new administration here, and I urge this administration just as I 

urged the last administration to make this a very important priority. And I appreciate you raising the issue. 

Mr. Albright, you criticized the IAEA for a lack of transparency. 

I am very concerned about that as well. My understanding is that 

the new administration hasn’t reached out to the IAEA yet to discuss its monitoring of Iran. Clearly that is a problem. They need 

to hear from our representatives to the IAEA. There needs to be 

an exhaustive discussion with the coordinator for Iran nuclear implementation, whom I understand still holds that position. The administration should do that, but I also, Mr. Chairman, would urge 

this committee in order to tackle the issue of transparency to request that our representatives to the IAEA and the coordinator 

come to testify here in front of us to address specifically the transparency issues that Mr. Albright has raised. They are very serious. 

They will impact not just this deal in this year, but as Mr. Albright 

rightly points out, as the deal carries on for the remainder of its 

term. So Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will consider that. 

And finally, Dr. Exum, I want to just spend my remaining couple 

of minutes talking to you about the ‘‘strategic flirtation,’’ I think is 

how you referred to it, that this administration has engaged in 

with Russia. Before getting specifically to Russia and Iran that flirtation also takes place as there is a Russian spy ship off of our 

coast and as there is a mock attack on a U.S. destroyer in the 

Black Sea and at a time when Russia has now deployed a cruise 

missile, and then focus with that as background focus on Iran for 

a minute. 

How do we engage in the ways that this administration has 

seemed intent on doing with Russia while Iran has thousands of 

65

fighters and proxies like Hezbollah fighting alongside the Russians 

in Iran and as this committee and this Congress look at additional 

sanctions outside of the nuclear area, Iran’s support for terrorism, 

for example, how do we do that in an effective way when we are 

simultaneously engaged in this new relationship with Russia that 

weakens our ability to do what we need to? 

Mr. EXUM. Well, thank you, Congressman. I will be blunt. I don’t 

think you can do it. I think that—and I am unfortunately the veteran of many weeks spent across a negotiating table with Russians 

in Geneva over the last year trying to find some way forward on 

the conflict in Syria. We conducted these negotiations as Russia 

was enabling the destruction of East Aleppo and the slaughter of 

thousands of Syrian civilians. We did so in an effort to determine 

whether or not Russia might be some sort of partner in Syria, 

whether they could use their leverage over the regime, over Iran, 

over Hezbollah, to broker some sort of peace in Syria. 

And at the conclusion of that quite bluntly, Congressman, I don’t 

think that Russia necessarily has the influence over the Syrian regime to be able to broker any type of peace. And I think that frankly Russia and the Iranians have more common cause than they do 

any strategic disagreements. 

So for me again, Congressman, I just don’t see the administration’s outreach toward Russia, I just don’t see how they can do that 

without strengthening the Iranian hand in Syria, without strengthening the Iranian hand regionally, without strengthening the hand 

of groups like Hezbollah which pose a clear threat to the state of 

Israel, and without emboldening groups like Hezbollah and these 

Iranian-backed PMF that potentially pose a threat to U.S. forces in 

Iraq in addition to the Iraqi state. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Chairman, just before I yield back I would note for the 

record the reason that it is so important to engage immediately in 

a bipartisan investigation into the relationship between the White 

House and Russia is not just because of leaks, which seems to be 

the President’s biggest concern, but because of the policy implications that stretch not just to U.S., Russia, and our discussions with 

our NATO allies, but all the way to Iran and the threats against 

the United States and our allies in the region that Russia may be 

contributing to. And with that I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Mr. Deutch. We now yield to the 

judge, Congressman Ted Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. I thank the chairman. I am going to talk about Iran 

which is I think the basis of this hearing. Maybe we will have a 

hearing on Russia at some point. 

I think we gave away the farm, the mineral rights, when we 

made the Iranian deal. I couldn’t disagree with you more, Dr. 

Exum, about the Iranian deal. It was a bad deal for the United 

States. We gave them $150 billion that they should not have gotten. I believe that money did not go to build schools and hospitals 

in Iran, it went to the IRGC which runs 80 percent of the economy, 

and the IRGC funds terrorist operations throughout the world, 

namely with their proxy group Hezbollah. 

So I want to talk about Iran not Russia, and Iran and their status in the world today. One of you mentioned rules of engagement, 

66

hopefully we will change the rules of engagement with Iran. I hope 

that we do and we don’t find ourselves in another situation like in 

the last administration on January the 10th or 12th of 2016 when 

two of our river command boats surrendered to the Iranians, surrendered. 

So much for the American phrase, ‘‘Don’t give up the ship. We 

gave up two ships to the Iranians, and Secretary Kerry almost 

apologized. We still haven’t gotten the facts of that situation. 

Maybe we will change the rules of engagement where we don’t 

allow Iranians to capture our ships without a fight over in that 

part of the world. 

But I want to talk about the IRGC. Do you think that the IRGC 

has planned and executed terrorist attacks throughout the world 

including against Americans, Mr. Modell? 

Mr. MODELL. Thank you for the questions, Congressman. I don’t 

that there is any doubt whatsoever that the IRGC, particularly the 

Quds Force, has planned terrorist activities against the U.S. and 

U.S forces, U.S. persons, and its allies around the world. I think 

between 2012 and 2015, there were at least 30 such activities that 

were in some way traced back to the IRGC. So I don’t think that 

there is any doubt about that whatsoever. 

Mr. POE. Does the IRGC have training camps in Iran that train 

other people from other parts of the world in terrorist activities? 

Mr. MODELL. I think the publicly available information would 

point you to Iranian sponsored and run training camps in southern 

Lebanon. Are there training camps in Iran? I think that is probably 

meant for discussion in a more private setting. 

Mr. POE. Well, how about in South America? How about South 

America, can you answer that question? 

Mr. MODELL. South America, beyond the rumors of Iranian training camps in Margarita Island and certain parts of Venezuela I 

have not heard of anything. I have heard of Iranian outreach in 

various nefarious ways to certain groups in Latin America, but the 

links between for instance the Vice President of Venezuela and 

Iran have been long discussed and long, there has been a lot of 

speculation about links therein to terrorism and destabilizing activity——

Mr. POE. How about the Iranian sponsor of Hezbollah in Syria 

and Lebanon? 

Mr. MODELL. I don’t think there is any doubt about that. 

Mr. POE. That it happens. I mean they sponsor the terrorist 

group Hezbollah. 

Mr. MODELL. Not only do they sponsor the terrorist group 

Hezbollah, but I can tell you when Syria began in full force and 

Iran really started to take a leading role, Hezbollah actually put 

up some resistance and said we are not sure that we really want 

to become embroiled in this, and the Iranians strong-armed them 

and said yeah, you are going to do that. So it is not a matter of 

Iran supporting or sponsoring them, it is about them controlling 

them to a large extent. 

Mr. POE. Do you think that the IRGC based on their activities 

worldwide and their sponsorship of terrorism should be back on the 

list or on the list as a sponsor of terrorism, that the Treasury DeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:04 Mar 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\021617\24242 SHIRL
67

partment should designate them as a terrorist organization? Just 

want your opinion. 

Mr. MODELL. In my opinion, I don’t think so. I don’t think so. I 

think that there are certain parts of the IRGC that should be and 

the Quds Force. I don’t think that the original purpose of the designations for foreign terrorist organizations were meant for entire 

militaries, and that is essentially what the IRGC is. I think it is 

overreach and I think, actually I don’t think it will have much of 

an impact. 

Mr. POE. I am not asking for a foreign terrorist organization designation, I am asking if you think that the Treasury Department 

under their power should designate it as a terrorist organization. 

It is a different designation. 

Mr. MODELL. Treasury designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization makes sense just given the depth of IRGC involvement in 

all facets of Iranian terrorism, so yes, in that regard it is. It would 

be sensible, yes. 

Mr. POE. I am out of time, I yield back. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you 

for calling this hearing. Now more than ever the United States 

must show the world that we are serious about holding Iran to account and enforcing the JCPOA as well as examining Iran’s destabilizing activities around the world. But it is impossible to talk 

about Iran and not talk about Russia, particularly when you consider Russia’s blocking of sanctions against Iran at the U.N., and 

Russia’s support of Iranian activities in Syria. 

But I fear that we are at a disadvantage when we have a President who seems unable and unwilling to stand up to Vladimir 

Putin, Iran’s biggest supporter and patron. As the body in the 

House responsible for our foreign policy it is incumbent upon us to 

examine the very real consequences of President Trump’s pivot toward Russia and what that means for our national security, our relationships with allies, and the function of our own Government. 

Mr. Chairman, it has been 8 months since we had a full committee hearing on Russia. I believe we are long overdue, and we 

must have witnesses from the administration appear before us and 

give a full and honest accounting of what their plans are for dealing with this unprecedented Russian aggression and meddling in 

the United States. 

Moreover, as the body tasked with oversight of our foreign diplomacy apparatus, we absolutely must require General Michael 

Flynn to appear before this committee and answer truthfully about 

what his relationship and contacts were with Russian officials before and during his tenure as national security adviser. The issue 

impacts the United States’ relationship with our friends and foes 

around the world. If we cannot be an honest broker in our dealings 

with Russia we lose credibility everywhere. 

And that is why 19 of my colleagues on this committee and I sent 

you a letter asking that we have Michael Flynn testify before this 

committee as soon as possible. I ask unanimous consent that a copy 

of this letter be entered into the record. 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. 

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Mr. CICILLINE. This request is made in the context of the following facts: Unprecedented Russian interference in our elections 

directed by Vladimir Putin to help elect Donald Trump as concluded by 17 intelligence agencies; a sophisticated plan of hacking, 

fake news, and a sophisticated use of propaganda; repeated contacts between the Trump campaign and Russians during the course 

of the campaign. Three members of President Trump’s inner circle—Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and now Michael Flynn—have 

had to leave the inner circle because of their ties to Russian officials. Secret conversations between the national security adviser 

and the Russian Ambassador, then Michael Flynn lied to the American people, lied to the Vice President of the United States, and denied those conversations, those conversations happening right on 

the day that sanctions were imposed for interfering with the American Presidential elections. 

At the same time, Sally Yates, the acting attorney general, 

brought that information to the attention of the White House counsel and she concluded that he was a compromised individual who 

could be blackmailed by the Russians. What did they do? Shortly 

thereafter Sally Yates is fired, Michael Flynn stays in place for 17 

days with full access to classified information continuing all of his 

responsibilities as a national security adviser. 

This is in the context of a President who is bellicose and fighting 

with all of our allies—Mexico, Australia as two most recent examples—but has showered praise on the brutal dictator Vladimir 

Putin. He maligns our intelligence professionals, compares them to 

Nazi Germany, and at the same time we learn that Michael Flynn 

has appeared at a celebration of RT, the single most powerful Russian propaganda machine, and the President has refused to answer 

questions about his investments or financial dealings in Russia or 

to produce his tax returns. 

Then we learn his son at a real estate conference in 2008 said, 

and I quote, ‘‘Russians make up a pretty disproportionate cross section of a lot of our assets.’’ And then he went on to say, ‘‘We see 

a lot of money pouring in from Russia.’’

Mr. Chairman, I don’t know what else we need to see to fulfill 

our responsibilities to get to the bottom of this, because we can’t 

have a real conversation about foreign policy or the implications of 

our relationships with Russia, with Iran, with the rest of the world 

until we get to the bottom of this. 

And so while I am anxious to have a conversation about Iran and 

anxious to have a conversation about the JCPOA, I am imploring 

this committee, Republicans and Democrats, to put your country 

before party to bring these issues before this committee so we can 

get to the bottom of this. The American people expect nothing less, 

and I urge all the members of this committee to join those who 

have already asked for these hearings, because the American people are watching this and they cannot believe that there hasn’t 

been a bipartisan effort in the House of Representatives to get to 

what has been unprecedented interference in our democratic institutions, that the sanctity of our democracy, our ability to defend 

our very way of life is at stake. 

And so I don’t have a question for this panel. I thank you for 

your testimony, but I think this gets to the heart of our ability to 

69

continue to be a beacon to the world, a place of democracy, of self 

government, where foreign governments have no role in helping to 

pick our leaders or interfering with policies that we implement in 

America. And I thank you and I yield back my remaining 2 seconds. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Scott Perry of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk about the 

issue at hand, but I, as you know, simply can’t just let the statements of the past remain on their own without correcting the 

record. 

And as long as credibility has been brought up especially by the 

other side of the aisle, for my whole life, for literally my entire life, 

I have watched many of my friends on the other side of the aisle 

or that side of the aisle sidle up to and speak glowingly of horrible 

dictators like Fidel Castro and——

Chairman ROYCE. Will the gentleman yield for a minute? Just in 

the interest of comity maybe let me make this point. Mr. Engel and 

I have already indicated that the first hearing we are going to do 

is on this issue after the recess when we come back. So for the 

members here what I would just urge is that we have a panel of 

experts before us and if we can stay focused on the issue at hand 

I think that will allow us, especially with the time and effort and 

expertise that these four individuals have put into studying this 

problem, allow us to come to some solutions which this committee 

can then push. 

In the meantime, we can prepare for the upcoming hearing in 2 

weeks and we are to deal with the issue, an issue which we have 

long dealt with on this committee, but I would just urge that from 

members on both sides of the aisle so that we can get back on topic 

on something that is quite a challenge. And then in 2 weeks we 

will continue with the good work of this committee and hopefully 

in a bipartisan way. And with that I will yield back to General 

Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence and I will bring this back home as quickly as I can. I would 

just point to at least most recently discounting all of my life in 

watching what I saw. Most recently, regarding Iran and Russia, 

the Obama administration failed to follow the law and sanction 

Russia for the sale of the S300 missile system and various other 

weapons system, aircraft, armored vehicles, et cetera—nary a word. 

Not a word. Russia invades Crimea—nothing. Nothing from that 

side. The full outrage and concern is what it is, and I would say 

this as an old soldier. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. PERRY. I will not yield. I just want to say this is complementary fashion, in complementary fashion, and it doesn’t apply to everybody. It doesn’t apply to everybody. But in complementary fashion, welcome to the war. With that Dr. Exum, thank you for your 

service to the country. 

I would also like to refer to the remarks of the gentleman from 

California, Mr. Rohrabacher, while we discuss the margin, the marginal errors of the agreement or of Iran’s actions, the small infractions, whether it is low enriched uranium, heavy water stockpiling, 

ballistic missile activities, the purchase of conventional weapons, et 

70

cetera, I don’t think there is any doubt in the room or around the 

world that in some fashion 10 or 15 years from now Iran is going 

to be a nuclear armed with delivery capability nation. That is who 

they are going to be. That is what they are going to be and we are 

going to deal with that somehow. 

And I would also say in agreement with Mr. Rohrabacher, we are 

not going to go to war with Iran. That is not going to happen. I 

think the deal is horrible, I always have. It is what it is and we 

have got to find a way to move forward. 

I just want to follow up with you, Mr. Modell, with where Mr. 

Poe is headed because I was headed there already. What are the 

ramifications of listing the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization 

with specific ties to how Treasury treats their transactions and the 

permutations of the IRGC and those transactions with other countries, other entities? What are the ramifications if that were to 

happen? You said you didn’t think there would be any, it would be 

marginal. Can you elaborate on that? 

Mr. MODELL. Let me elaborate on that. The part that I think 

would be not marginal at all would be as it would serve as a significant deterrent to foreign businesses who were looking to get 

into Iran. So the extent that we can declare them as a foreign terrorist organization by Treasury or by having the State Department 

continue to add the individuals to the lists that exist, Magnitsky 

List type of sanctions where we are pointing out corruption and we 

are actually saying the IRGC’s massive commercial enterprise, 

buyer beware. 

So to a large extent the recovery of Iran’s economy, the ability 

of foreign businesses to go in there and actually conduct transactions would be impacted. So perhaps I misspoke, but I think 

there would be a significant impact economically when you think 

about the extent to which the IRGC has control over significant 

sectors of the Iranian economy and to the extent to which such a 

declaration would probably cause a lot more heartburn among companies that are looking to get in. 

Companies that I speak to right now in a private sector capacity—large oil companies, Europeans, multinationals who are looking—the one thing that they ask is say, hey, you guys are based 

in Washington, DC. We have done a lot of due diligence, we think 

there is a way we can make a lot of money in Iran, however, there 

is still this black cloud of sanctions, we don’t know where the U.S. 

is going to go. It is a significant deterrent even when the lawyers 

have signed off on it and even when people in leading European 

companies are ready to go back in. 

So those types of things give people real pause. So I would stand 

corrected and say it would have a significant impact. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. I would remind all members that 

House Rule 17 and committee decorum requires us to confine our 

remarks to the issues under discussion and to avoid discussion of 

personality. 

And we now go to Dina Titus of Nevada. Thank you. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Exum, in your testimony you talk about the four Ps strategy 

that you followed when you were at the Defense Department under 

71

the Obama administration—posture, plans, partners, and preparedness. Well, it seems to me under this administration our posture 

has become negative and hostile, our plans are nonexistent, our 

partners have all been alienated, and our preparedness is just a 

state of uncertainty. 

We have also heard President Trump when the Iranians circle 

our beautiful destroyers with their little boats and they make gestures at our people they shouldn’t be allowed to make, they will be 

shot out of the water. We heard this confirmed by one of the members of this committee earlier who was calling for virtual combat 

on the Gulf coast. We also heard President Trump tell the leadership of Harley Davidson that nothing is off the table when responding to questions about Iran. 

Would you just address how this new approach, all this saber 

rattling is affecting not only our relationship with Iran, but with 

the other neighbors and potential partners in that part of the 

world? 

Mr. EXUM. Thank you, Congresswoman, for allowing me to address this question. It is a good one. I think for me what worries 

me most about this current administration, and as I said in my 

opening statement, I think there are individuals in this administration, Secretary Mattis for example, who come to this administration 

with deep knowledge of the threat that is posed by Iran as well as 

the threat to our own troops and our other various equities within 

the Middle East, and so I have certain faith in certain individuals 

in this administration. 

The two things that worry me, Congresswoman, are first off sequencing. Strategy is often about prioritization and sequencing. 

And I see some individuals within this administration really eager 

to pick a fight with Iran. And I think we need to be very careful 

about how and when we do that if we elect to do that. 

Right now we still have a lot of hard fighting in Iraq, for example. We have cleared, with our Iraqi partners, to be clear, have 

cleared eastern part of Mosul. To clear western Mosul is going to 

take several, many more months. The Middle Euphrates River Valley still has a significant presence of the Islamic State, and we 

need to remain focused on that at hand. And I sense within this 

administration that there are some voices who are so eager to confront Iran that they may not have thought through how exactly 

they sequence it or what prioritization they are putting into place. 

The second thing, and this is really I think the big concern is just 

the uncertainty within this administration. I don’t think that I will 

surprise anybody here on either side of the aisle by saying that the 

upheavals we have seen within this administration over the past 

few weeks have been unprecedented both in terms of personnel, to 

include the dismissal of the national security adviser, to also include some of the ways in which we have alienated some of our key 

partners such as—I mean I thought it would take some great effort 

to offend Australia, but we managed to accomplish it in the first 

2 weeks of this administration. 

And they are a key partner. They followed us in Vietnam, they 

are active with us off the coast of the Arabian Peninsula in terms 

of maritime patrols. We depend on these partners to not only defeat Daesh but also to push back against the threat, the very real 

72

threat that my colleagues on this table as well the members of this 

committee have highlighted in terms of Iran’s asymmetric activities. 

You know, when we interdict weapons shipments off of the coast 

of Yemen, for example, it is often not U.S. forces who do this. It 

is often our partner forces that do this. We need those partners, 

and right now there is a great deal of uncertainty, I think, among 

many of them in terms of the strategic direction of this administration in terms of who can speak for this administration, and it is 

worrying to me both as a former official, but also quite frankly just 

as an American citizen testifying before this committee today, 

ma’am. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. 

Yes, Mr. Albright. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I would like to add I am not part of the administration in any way, but I don’t, and there may be some voices trying to pick a fight with Iran, but I don’t think they are trying to 

pick a fight with Iran. I think they are, even with this idea of putting Iran on notice, I mean they, Flynn made clear that they want 

to have a policy review. They don’t have people in place and they 

need to do a lot of recruitment, but I think, overall I think they 

are moving ahead rather deliberately. But Iran does things and 

they have to respond. 

Ms. TITUS. Do you think we can have it both ways? We can be 

cozy with Russia and tough on Iran at the same time? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. On the Russian issue, Iran is——

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go now to Mr. Thomas Garrett 

of Virginia. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Garrett, let’s get that microphone closer 

and make sure you have the red button on. 

Mr. GARRETT. Do I get my 10 seconds back? Just kidding. Anybody studying the region with any sort of objectivity understands 

that the IRGC is the fulcrum of power in Iran. The 2009 uprising 

failed, I believe, in large part due to what Mr. Sherman, my colleague from California, referenced as a willingness of individuals to 

level firearms at their fellow citizens. And it wasn’t obviously just 

the IRGC, but subsidiary elements such as the Quds Force thereof. 

And so if we are attempting to ensure better outcomes in Iran, I 

think we should focus our efforts on the IRGC. I am not sure if it 

was Mr. Rohrabacher or Mr. Perry who initially commented on, 

and actually I think it was Mr. Poe who originally commented on 

potentially extending the Treasury Department’s OFAC controls to 

implement actions wherein they would treat the IRGC as a sponsor 

of terror, but I can’t think of a good reason not to do this except 

that as I understand it the JCPOA instructed a lot of the restrictions, a lot of the sanctions that have been placed on the IRGC, to 

be lifted, which seems to me to be counter to American policy in 

any number of arenas. 

Number one, the previous administration’s failure to act in 2015 

after the Russians waited 5 years to complete the sale of S300 missiles to Iran created a circumstance wherein if you understand the 

73

capabilities of the S300 platform, any generation 4 aircraft carrier 

based aircraft really can’t take off in the Persian Gulf safely. That 

is just the reality. And so we have no Gen-5 assets, F-35 comments 

withheld, in that capable range. 

And truly I read where we have ‘‘a robust suite of plans that are 

real, resourced, and our forces are ready to execute them,’’ and I 

wonder if we do, particularly in a world where if we had executed 

a strike with simply F-22s and B-2s, we have about what, 10 operational platforms of the latter. 

So if we wanted to act we couldn’t, we know the fulcrum of power 

in Iran is the IRGC, and we are hamstrung by a JCPOA that 

doesn’t let us attack the fulcrum of power metaphorically, not literally, the IRGC. And it is hard for me to fathom having worn a 

uniform and knowing Ranger Exum—I use that because it is more 

impressive than Doctor—and Mr. Perry, fought alongside and 

served alongside some of the 500 American service members who 

we estimate were killed by IEDs manufactured by the IRGC and 

their subsidiaries, which goes beyond the 283 Americans who died 

in Beirut. And I could keep going, Lebanon, the Khobar Towers, a 

plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador here on this soil. 

So if we want a better outcome in Iran I would submit that we 

need to function in a way that we could penalize the IRGC which 

will then destabilize the regime because the guns are what keep 

the mullahs in power. Having said that I would ask, and I don’t 

have a ton of time left, if anybody can tell me if when we do things 

like send 400 million unmarked euros at a time when it would correlate to the release of foreign held dual citizens—whether it was 

ransom or not, the optics are bad, right—if that doesn’t encourage 

the same sort of bad behavior? And I would point to similar activities undertaken not just in the Sudan and North Korea subsequent 

and precedent to that but also in Iran. Here are your foreign nationals back, we have our 400 million, we now have some more people. 

So I guess, you know, we have what, U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents to the tune of ten, eight plus two, I think, held 

in Iran now, and for us to negotiate in good faith I would argue 

is a betrayal of these folks, of my oath to defend the Constitution 

and the citizens of the nation that it rules over and how can we 

do that? 

I mean why not just cut off all activities in any nonmilitary way 

that we can with the fulcrum of power in Iran and refuse to do 

business with those who do business with these folks and let them 

choose between economic activities with the United States or with 

Iran? I think I know which way they would make those choices. 

So I guess this is a really convoluted compound question, but 

doesn’t the JCPOA really hamstring us from attacking metaphorically, not literally, the axis of power, the fulcrum of power in Iran, 

the IRGC, by virtue of the elements therein, and therefore doesn’t 

it actually serve to perpetuate the existence of the regime? 

Mr. Modell. Sorry, you just got picked at random. 

Mr. MODELL. No, Congressman Garrett, I couldn’t agree more. I 

think that if you are going to actually do the things that Congressman Rohrabacher was talking about and some of things that I 

74

mentioned in my testimony—that is weakening the IRGC—you 

have to focus on that. 

And I think the existence of this regime depends on the existence 

of the IRGC. They are at the center of everything. For them to control 25 to 50 percent of the economy and not to be held accountable 

or for businesses not to be held to a higher standard before doing 

business over there, and I think quite frankly the hurdles are way 

too low, you are actually contributing to the perpetuation of a regime that is fundamentally against us in every way. 

Mr. GARRETT. Right. And Mr. Chairman, I know I am over a bit. 

Did we not with the JCPOA seek to essentially see hopefully regime change through a more moderate regime before the Iranians 

hit that nuclear threshold? That is really the goal, right? Give us 

time and if there is a change in the power, but if we don’t hit that 

fulcrum of power there will be no regime change. Mr. Albright? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. Well, that was some of the talking points. I 

am not sure the negotiators necessarily believe that, but in a sense 

they were asking to kick the can down the road and they did. 

And on your question on the IRGC I think the impact on the 

JCPOA is do we lose the Europeans or not. I mean that is really, 

and so I think the issue for the administration is they are going 

to have to get out there and manage the relationship with the Europeans so if they do decide to move forward on listing the IRGC 

under the executive order as a terrorist organization that they 

don’t lose the Europeans, because certainly it is their business that 

will be affected. 

But I think it can be done, but it certainly, the administration 

has to get out there and talk to them. The Europeans have made 

it clear that this upsets them, but I think that it can be managed. 

Ms. BAUER. Excuse me, if you would indulge me for just a moment. I think that you are right that sanctions diplomacy is very 

important. 

Chairman ROYCE. I am afraid time is expired, but we are going 

to let you put that in writing. 

Ms. BAUER. Okay. 

Chairman ROYCE. Let’s see, Brad Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me just start 

by thanking the witnesses for your testimony here today and your 

service to our country and your work across time on this particularly important issue. 

Ms. Bauer, I want to emphasize what you talked about in your 

testimony. I think the three points you made are worth repeating. 

One, the necessity of taking back the narrative, the need to emphasize the sanctions that are still in place and to enforce those sanctions rigorously, vigorously to the greatest extent possible. 

You said in your testimony that sanctions are most effective 

when they are adopted by international community, the international coalition. My question, and I leave this question with the 

whole panel, what are the challenges to maintaining, if not 

strengthening, international support for sanctions and the opportunities to bring increasing bite to the sanctions in place and potential sanctions against Iran’s activities not just around ballistic missiles but human rights and their activity in conventional weapons 

throughout the region? 

75

Ms. BAUER. Thank you. I think that one of the challenges to increasing the bite of sanctions and to rebuilding this multilateral coalition that we had before is that it does largely come down to the 

Europeans and the view in Europe that an important part of their 

dialogue with Iran is the commercial dialogue. But they are divided 

on this point and they in fact do maintain sanctions on the IRGC 

in Europe under their human rights authorities and they maintain 

sanctions on Hezbollah’s military wing. So they are divided on this 

issue. 

I think what is important going forward from the U.S. perspective in more vigorously enforcing the sanctions we have is that we 

continue to do those based on conduct, because that will be, continuing to emphasize the ways in which Iran violates international 

norms will be something that will be helpful in rebuilding a multilateral coalition. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Albright, you said with the last question 

that there is a question, do we lose the Europeans? What steps 

would increase that likelihood, what steps should we be taking to 

make sure that we don’t lose the Europeans in enforcing sanctions? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes, I think it, and this would reflect just visits 

in Europe. I mean this when they will say, and maybe it is just 

the optics of it, the additional signal, but they will say that this 

would end business between European companies and Iran. I understand what Ms. Bauer said and I would actually defer to her, 

but what I clearly heard was that there is something going on here 

that this other designation would cause companies to pull back. 

And maybe it is not true. Maybe that will be part of the management is that they should be more careful in the first place based 

on having these sanctions in the IRGC. But I do think that the administration has to get out there and start discussing these things 

with them and not just hope for the best. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I will continue down the panel. Mr. Modell, you 

are nodding. 

Mr. MODELL. No, I would just second that. I would say that we 

talk to companies all the time that, you know, have signed MOUs 

and they are on the verge of actually making the leap into Iran and 

there still is a real fundamental lack of clarity on their part as to 

what they can and cannot do. Treasury does a great job of laying 

out some of the dos and don’ts, and there is U.S. Government Web 

sites where you can go and see what you can and can’t do in the 

sanctions. 

But really quite frankly it is cumbersome and it is a lot to get 

through. There is no nice easy dos and don’ts list for companies. 

I think there has to be a media offensive that reminds companies 

of the dangers of doing it. And quite frankly, a lot of companies 

have gone in there and tripped and fallen and have reputational 

risk. 

There should be some sort of a list, consumer report, some U.S. 

Government sponsored Web site that actually details bad experiences that companies have had in going in there so that other companies can reach out and say wait a minute, maybe we ought to 

think about that sounding board, consumer reports if you will. But 

a lot of companies have experiences that we should exhibiting. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Dr. Exum, I don’t want to leave you out. 

76

Mr. EXUM. Well, sanctions is not my specialty and I plead ignorance. I defer to the expertise of the other panelists. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, thank you. I have just a little bit of time 

left, but I think, and I had raised these concerns when the JCPOA 

was announced the need to make sure that Iran cannot get any 

closer to a nuclear weapon during the time frame of the JCPOA or 

any time thereafter and indeed make it clear that U.S. policy is 

Iran will never have a nuclear weapon. And with that I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the gentleman, and we go to Mr. Ted 

Lieu of California. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. Let me first thank Chairman Royce and 

Ranking Member Engel for agreeing to have the next hearing be 

on Russia. I think we all appreciate that. And thank you to the 

panelists for being here, for your expertise and thank you, Dr. 

Exum, for your military service. 

As you know, Iran is involved in Syria, as is Russia, and there 

are two news agencies, CNN and Reuters, reporting that the Pentagon is considering sending U.S. conventional ground forces to 

Syria. That would significantly alter our military footprint and operations in Syria. I think it is a very, very bad idea. 

The Trump administration has not laid out a plan for what they 

would do there. They have not set out objectives they would want 

them to achieve. The Trump administration has not explained who 

they would support in Syria nor how long they would be there. I 

would like to ask each of you, do any of you think it would be a 

good idea to send our women and men of our military in harm’s 

way into Syria? And let me start with Dr. Exum. 

Mr. EXUM. So, Congressman, you are asking all the right questions. If I could be so honest, I think that we would like to know 

a lot more about what these soldiers would be doing. I think we 

would want to know who they would be. I don’t think, I mean you 

followed this conflict closely. You know that our overall strategy 

against the Islamic State has been by, with, and through local 

partners. So we have had forces on the ground in Iraq and Syria 

to the degree that they would enable local partners. 

The strategic dilemma that this administration faces specifically 

as it wants to go on Raqqa is whether or not you can push on 

Raqqa without arming and training the YPG. Doing so would put 

at risk our relationship with a NATO ally in Turkey, and I think 

that is what this administration is wrestling with. We made the decision when we constructed the strategy to counter the Islamic 

State which had buy-in from not only the civilians in the Pentagon 

but also all the uniforms as well that working by, with, and 

through local partners would make more sense, first off, because 

many of us are Iraq veterans and we know that the Iraq war cost 

roughly almost 5,000 U.S. lives. 

I think during my tenure at the Department of Defense the way 

in which we waged the conflict cost five, the loss of five U.S. servicemen. It is also less expensive in terms of monetarily. But more 

important than that strategically the logic is it is more sustainable 

on the ground. Yes, it is messier. Yes, it takes more time. But if 

local groups have a buy-in to the fight they have a buy-in to the 

victory and that is something that didn’t happen after we defeated 

the insurgency in Iraq in 2007-2008. 

77

To get back to your question, deviating from by, with, and 

through could potentially, you know, I would caution the administration from deploying the 82nd Airborne on the ground in northeastern Syria. I believe that would be a mistake. I believe it would 

be costly not just in terms of money but in terms of lives. If by contrast you are talking about limited conventional forces to help you 

breach the outer defenses of Raqqa in a way that might mean that 

you don’t have to arm the YPG to the extent that would really inflame the relationship with Turkey, if that is what they are talking 

about that is something different. 

So Congressman, I think you are asking all the right questions. 

If I am in the position of the Pentagon right now, I am really 

weighing those options and trying to think about, you know, which 

forces you are really talking about. So it all depends on kind of the 

forces that they are talking about. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. So the other panelists, you don’t have to 

answer unless you think it is a good idea to send a lot of ground 

troops into Syria. Do any of you think it is a good idea? 

Mr. EXUM. No. 

Mr. LIEU. All right. So I have limited time. I wanted to talk 

about Yemen, Doctor, as you have mentioned Yemen. As you know, 

Iran is involved there. 

Mr. EXUM. That is right. 

Mr. LIEU. I don’t have any problem with freedom of navigation. 

What I have a problem with is the United States, we are refueling 

a Saudi-led coalition of aircraft that drop bombs in Yemen and we 

don’t have any idea where they drop them. That has been told to 

us. I have gone to briefings, and we don’t know. 

And it turns out that there has been multiple airstrikes on civilians. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented over 70 unlawful airstrikes on wedding parties, on a Doctors Without Borders hospital, on schools; children, women, civilians are being slaughtered. These look like war crimes, and U.S. 

military should not be aiding and abetting war crimes. And what 

I want to know, Dr. Exum, is sort of your view on that issue. 

Mr. EXUM. So Congressman, you put your finger on why I think 

the last administration was reluctant to get deeper involved in the 

conflict in Yemen. I think in some ways the last administration, to 

put it crudely, tried to be half pregnant. There is a strategic argument to be made for if you are going to get involved in the conflict 

then help the Saudis and the Emirates and their coalition win and 

help them win in a way that is compliant with the laws of armed 

conflict and that allows you to have some influence over the way 

they are involved, or you completely step away and you say that 

we can’t be involved with this conflict. 

I think we tried to find a middle ground and I think that is 

where that led to some of the confusion and some of the problems. 

I will say however that we do have adversaries in Yemen, al-Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula, for example, the Islamic State in Yemen 

where it might make sense to partner with some of our forces on 

the ground, or some of our partners, the Emirates, for example, 

who are kind of a cut above the other Gulf forces in terms of their 

competence, and there it might make sense to partner with them. 

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Against threats to freedom of navigation that is something like 

I said, I think it is a U.S. interest. I also think it is a huge interest 

for the Europeans, for India, for South Korea, for anybody pushing 

shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb, and so there should be a concerted diplomatic effort to pressure the Iranians with respect to the 

presence of some anti-ship cruise missiles in Yemen, and if necessary there should also be a kinetic response, because that is a 

point where that has always been a key U.S. interest for 50 years 

in terms of freedom of navigation and commerce around the Arabian Peninsula, and I think you would want to take a hard stand 

there. 

But I take your points regarding the broader conflict and I think 

it is one, it was a key topic of debate within the Obama administration, sir. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, thank you. Thank you. We want to 

thank again our panel. We appreciate the time of our witnesses 

today and especially, you know, this focus of what we do in the 

light of Iran’s continued ballistic missile program and its continued 

transfer of missiles to Hezbollah and the other activities in the region that are threatening to the countries in the region. And as Ms. 

Bauer observed we should start, I think, with the premise that on 

these violations Iran gets no special pass. 

And we look forward to continuing to work with each of you in 

terms of the challenges ahead, so thank you, and with that we 

stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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