Filed 8/15/22 LaFace v. Ralphs Grocery CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

JILL LAFACE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B309721

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC632679)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Patricia Nieto, Judge. Dismissed.

Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, André E. Jardini, K.L. Myles, 

Greta T. Hutton; Capstone Law, Ryan Y. Wu, Melissa Grant and 

John Stobart; Law Offices of Michael V. Jehdian and Michael V. 

Jehdian for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Morrison & Foerster, Tritia M. Murata, Wendy J. Ray, 

Karen J. Kubin, James R. Sigel for Defendant and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION

Decedent Jill LaFace filed a representative action against 

Ralphs Grocery Company under the Private Attorneys General 

Act (Lab. Code, § 2698, et seq. (PAGA)) seeking civil penalties for 

alleged violations of workplace seating requirements. Following 

a bench trial, the superior court entered judgment in favor of 

Ralphs. We affirmed the judgment. (See LaFace v. Ralphs 

Grocery Co. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 388 (LaFace).) Following the 

trial, the court awarded costs to Ralphs in the amount of 

$193,857.98. LaFace appealed. 

LaFace died while this appeal was pending, before the 

opening brief was filed. LaFace’s counsel has not attempted to 

substitute LaFace’s personal representative or successor in 

interest into the case. Ralphs moved to strike the opening brief 

and requested that we dismiss the appeal because there is no 

appellant. 

We agree, and therefore grant Ralphs’s motion to strike the 

opening brief and dismiss the appeal. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

LaFace worked as a cashier at a store owned by respondent 

Ralphs Grocery Company. She brought a PAGA action against 

Ralphs on behalf of herself and other current and former Ralphs 

cashiers, alleging that Ralphs violated an Industrial Welfare 

Commission wage order that required employers to provide 

suitable seating for cashiers. (LaFace, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 392.) A bench trial was held between November and December 

2019, and the trial court found that Ralphs had not violated the 

wage order. (Ibid.) We affirmed the judgment. Although LaFace 

died before the reply brief was filed, we exercised our discretion 
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to decide the appeal on its merits because it presented a 

continuing issue of public interest. (Id. at p. 392, fn. 1.) 

Meanwhile, in the superior court Ralphs filed a 

memorandum of costs seeking $746,788.80 in costs, not including 

attorney fees. LaFace filed a motion to strike or tax costs. The 

superior court granted LaFace’s motion in part, taxed costs of 

$552,930.82, and awarded costs to Ralphs in the amount of 

$193,857.98. 

LaFace timely appealed in December 2020. LaFace died in 

September 2021. LaFace’s counsel filed an opening brief on 

December 10, 2021. LaFace’s counsel has not sought to 

substitute a personal representative, successor in interest, or any 

other party as the appellant. Ralphs filed a motion to strike the 

opening brief, and in its respondent’s brief asks us to dismiss the 

appeal. LaFace’s counsel opposed the motion to strike, and did 

not file a reply brief. 

DISCUSSION

“A pending action or proceeding does not abate by the death 

of a party if the cause of action survives.” (Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 377.21.) “A cause of action that survives the death of the 

person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to 

the decedent’s successor in interest . . ., and an action may be 

commenced by the decedent’s personal representative or, if none, 

by the decedent’s successor in interest” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 377.30.) Ralphs argues that the opening brief must be stricken 

and the appeal must be dismissed because “no party is pursuing 

it.” 

The attorney-client relationship is “one in which the 

attorney acts as agent for the client, who is the principal.” 

(Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 418.) An 
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attorney may not represent a client without the client’s consent. 

(See, e.g., In the Matter of Shinn (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State 

Bar Ct. Rptr. 96, 104-105.) “As a general rule the authority of an 

attorney to act for his client normally ends with the client’s 

death.” (In re Lanza’s Estate (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 720, 724.) 

Following LaFace’s death, and with no substituted party in her 

place, LaFace’s counsel is acting without LaFace’s consent and 

without a client. 

Moreover, an attorney without a client generally does not 

have standing to appeal a fee award. (See In re Marriage of 

Tushinsky (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 136, 141.) LaFace’s counsel has 

not sought to intervene in the case to assert any interest they 

may have in the cost award. (Lindelli v. Town of San Anselmo

(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1512.)

LaFace’s counsel argues that the appeal should not abate 

upon LaFace’s death because in a PAGA action, the state is the 

real party in interest. (See, e.g., Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 

46 Cal.4th 969, 986 [“An employee plaintiff suing [under PAGA] 

does so as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement 

agencies”].) Ralphs counters that the cost award was imposed 

against LaFace rather than the state, and therefore the state is 

not an aggrieved party and has no standing to appeal. (Code Civ. 

Proc, § 902; In re Marriage of Burwell (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1, 

13 [“To have appellate standing, one must (1) be a party and (2) 

be aggrieved.”].) We agree that the state does not have standing 

because it is not an aggrieved party, and LaFace’s counsel is not 

directly representing the state in this appeal. 

LaFace’s counsel compares this case to Sullivan v. Delta 

Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, which considered whether 

the recovery of damages for pain and suffering was barred when 
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the plaintiff died after judgment while an appeal was pending. 

(See Code Civ. Proc. § 377.34, subd. (a) [“In an action or 

proceeding by a decedent’s personal representative or successor 

in interest on the decedent’s cause of action, the damages 

recoverable . . . do not include damages for pain, suffering, or 

disfigurement.”].) The Supreme Court held that “death after 

judgment does not abate any aspect of personal tort actions, 

including the right to recover damages for pain and suffering.” 

(Id. at p. 305.) However, appellate standing was not at issue in 

that case; the decedent’s successor in interest had been

substituted as the plaintiff. (Sullivan, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 

292.) Sullivan therefore does not control here. 

Because LaFace’s counsel filed the opening brief without 

client consent and is pursuing the appeal without a client, we 

agree the opening brief should be stricken and the appeal should 

be dismissed.1 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(1).)

1 The parties agree that the cost award erroneously includes 

$16,502.72 in paralegal travel costs, which the superior court 

intended to strike as unnecessary to the litigation. Ralphs 

represents in its respondent’s brief that it will not oppose a 

motion brought before the superior court to correct the cost award 

to eliminate this error. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d) 

[“The court may . . . correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or 

orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order 

directed”].) 
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DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J.

WILLHITE, J.