1 SYLLABUS This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all por tions of the opinion.

State v. Cornelius C. Cohen (A
- 50 -21) (08 4493 ) Argued January 4, 2023
-- Decided June 22, 2023 PIERRE-LOUIS, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether the odo r of marijuana in a vehicle authorizes a search of the engine compartment and t runk under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. On January 17, 2016, after receiving a “be on the lookout” (BOLO) email based on a tip from a confidential informant (CI) t hat defendant Cornelius Cohen would be traveling to the Carolinas to pick up fire arms and bring them back to New Jersey to sell, State Trooper Charles Travis notice d one of the cars described in the BOLO email traveling northbound on the New Jersey T urnpike. Trooper Travis pulled the vehicle over for traffic violations. When Trooper Travis approached the vehicle, he noti ced multiple air fresheners hanging from the rearview mirror. The t rooper asked defendant and Najah Baker, who was a passenger in the vehicle, fo r their credentials. Trooper Travis testified that he smelled “a strong odor of raw marijuana” in the vehicle during the stop and observed “greenish

- brown vegetation” on the driver’s beard and shirt , which the trooper identified as “shake,” or “the tail

- end of marijuana.” Trooper Travis told a colleague who had followed hi m to the traffic stop that he smelled raw marijuana and was going to remove defen dant and Baker from the car. With defendant and Baker handcuffed and in separate patrol cars, Trooper Travis began a search of the vehicle. He first searched t he passenger compartment, where he recovered from the glove compartment a 9mm spent shell casing. The search of the passenger compartment did not reveal any mariju ana. Trooper Travis did not apply for a search warrant b ased on the information supplied by the CI, but instead proceeded to the fr ont of the vehicle where he opened the vehicle’s hood and searched the engine compartment. There he found a rifle and a revolver. Trooper Travis then moved his search t o the trunk, where he found a duffle bag containing hollow point bullets. No mar ijuana was recovered from the car, defendant, or Baker.2

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized dur ing the car search. The trial court denied the motion, although the judge e xpressed that he was troubled by the “concept of how far [the courts should] tolerat e the subjective testimony of the smell of raw marijuana” when there is “no other evidence to suggest marijuana was ever in the car.” Notwithstanding those concerns, the trial court held that “[t]he odor of raw marijuana emanating from a vehicle with out a detectible pinpoint establishes probable cause to search the entire veh icle, ” citing State v. Kahlon, 172 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 1980)

. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of unlawful possession of a weapon. T he Appellate Division affirmed the court’s ruling a nd reliance on Kahlon to justify extending the search. The Court granted certification. 251 N.J. 14 (2022 ).
HELD: Expanding the search to the engine compartment and trunk went beyond the scope of the automobile exception. Although the tr ooper smelled marijuana in the passenger compartment of the car, his initial searc h yielded no results and provided no justification “to extend the zone of the . . . s earch further than the persons of the occupants or t he interior of the car.” State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 14- 15 (1980). As a result, the seized evidence should be suppressed. 1. Pursuant to the automobile exception to the war rant requirement, when the police have probable cause to believe that a vehicle conta ins contraband or evidence of an offense and the circumstances giving rise to probab le cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous, law enforcement may search the vehicle without first obtaining a warrant. New Jersey courts have recognized that th e smell of marijuana constitutes probable cause that a criminal offense has been com mitted and additional contraband might be present. But a search that is reasonable at its inception ma y nonetheles s violate the Constitution by virtue of its intolerab le intensity and scope. (pp. 12- 13) 2. The Court reviews decisions in which it has end eavored to define the bounds of a legal search under the automobile exception based o n the suspected presence of marijuana. In Patino , a search of the trunk following the discovery of a plastic container full of “green vegetation” and a marijuan a cigarette in a vehicle’s interior exceeded the parameters of the automobile exception

. 83 N.J. at 12-13. The Court noted that the officer’s discovery of only “a sma ll amount of marijuana, consistent with personal use, does not provide [police] with p robable cause to believe that larger amounts of marijuana or other contraband are being transported.” Id. at 13. In State v. Guerra , on the other hand, the officer’s de termination that the apparent intensity of the marijuana odor in a vehicle he had pulled over for a broken taillight could indicate only an amount too large to be conta ined in the bag he saw in the car’s interior

-- combined with the observed presence of a substanti al weight in the trunk , which was “hanging low”

-- justified a search of that space, where the troope r discovered 176.5 pounds of marijuana. 93 N.J. 146, 148-52 (1983). (pp. 13-16)3

3. In Kahlon, which was decided prior to Patino , an officer searched the interior compartment of the defendant’s vehicle and found a partially burned cigarette and a clear plastic bag containing half an ounce of marij uana. 172 N.J. Super. at 336. The officer then entered the backseat where he noticed a “very heavy odor of unburned marijuana.” Id. at 337. Having found no additional marijuana i n the backseat, the officer opened the trunk where he found 30 pounds o f marijuana. Ibid. The Appellate Division held that the officer had probab le cause to search the trunk in light of his “ inability to pinpoint the source of the smell of un burned marijuana ” that seemed to emanate from the rear of the car “ together with the marijuana already found in the car .” Id. at 338. In sum, cases in which New Jersey courts have uphel d searches of

areas beyond the passenger compartment have involv ed facts beyond simply detecting the smell of marijuana from the in terior of the car. (pp. 16- 18 ) 4. Here, after initiating the traffic stop of the car described in the BOLO alert , Trooper Travis reported “a strong odor of raw marij uana” in the vehicle as well as “greenish

- brown vegetation” on the driver’s beard and shirt. At that point, he had a reasonable belief that a criminal offense had been committed and that additional contraband might be present on defendant ’s person and in the passenger compartment. The initial search of defendant, Baker, and the pas senger compartment was therefore valid. After the search of the car’s interior did not reve al marijuana, however, the police expanded the search to separate areas of the vehicle despite no unique facts that indicated raw marijuana was in either the engi ne compartment or trunk. That expansion we nt beyond the scope of the automobile exception, an d any information from the BOLO could not contribute to a probable ca use determination based on the smell of marijuana. Comparing in detail the facts of this case to those of prior cases, the Court finds that the searches of the engine compartment and trunk here were unlawful and that the evidence seized from th em must be suppressed. (pp. 18-23) 5. Th e Court ’s holding does not suggest that areas within the inte rior of a car would require separate probable cause findings to conduct a warrantless search. Nor does it suggest that the warrantless search of a trunk o r engine compartment will always require separate probable cause findings, although a generalized smell of raw marijuana does not justify a search of every compar tment of a car

. Finally, although the search here predated the Cannabis Regulatory, E nforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act, the Court anticipate s that cases involving the automobile exception and probable cause to search a vehicle based solely on the smell of marijuana will likely be few and far betwe en going forward

. (pp. 23- 25) REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, WAINER APTER , and FASCIALE; and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily ass igned) join in JU STICE PIERRE-LOUIS ’s opinion.1 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 50 September Term 20 21

084493
State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. Cornelius C. Cohen, Defendant-Appellant.

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division

. Argued January 4, 2023 Decided June 22, 2023
Raymond L. Hamlin argued the cause for appellant (Hunt, Hamlin & Ridley, attorneys; Raymond L. Hamli n, of counsel and on the briefs). Sarah C. Hunt, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah C. Hunt, of counsel and on the briefs ). Austin J. Howard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Public Defender of New Jersey (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Austin J. Howard, of counsel and on the b rief). Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Ameri can Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation ,2 attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief). Dillon J. McGuire argued the cause for amicus curia e Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jers ey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin , of counsel and on the brief, and Dillon J. McGuire, on the brief).
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS delivered the opinion of the C ourt.
In this case, we consider whether the odor of marij uana in a vehicle authorizes a search of the engine compartment and t runk under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. After receiving a tip from a confidential informant that defendant Cornelius Cohen regularly traveled out of state to acquire firearm s for subsequent sale in New Jersey , the New Jersey State Police issued a “be on the lookout” notice for two vehicles defendant was known to use . After spotting one of the cars on the New Jersey Turnpike , State Trooper Charles Travis followed the vehicle for a few miles before initiat ing a traffic stop for failure to maintain the lane and a suspected toll violation. During the stop, Trooper Travis detected the smell of raw marijuana while speaking with defendant at the window of the vehicle. After searching the passenger compartment and finding no marijuana, the trooper continued his search by opening the hood of the car . He discovered a rifle and a revolver3

nestled in the vehicle’ s engine compartment. Trooper Travis then opened t he trunk and found a bag containing hollow point bulle ts. Despite Trooper Travis’s detection of the odor of marijuana , n o marijuana was found. Defendant moved to suppress the items seized during the warrantless search and the trial court denied his motion. Ther eafter, defendant pled guilty to one count of second-degree unlawful possession o f a weapon and was sentenced to five years ’ imprisonment

. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence, finding no error in the trial court’s admission of the evidence seized from the engine co mpartment and trunk. We granted certification limited to the issue of wh ether officers were authorized to search the car’s engine compartment and trunk based on the odor of marijuana in the vehicle. As detailed below, we reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment and find that the seized evidence should be suppressed

. I.
A. We rely on the testimony from the suppression heari ng for the following factual summary. In January 2016, Detective Joseph Czech of the New Jersey State Police received a tip from a confidential informant (CI) t hat defendant often travel ed4

to the Carolinas to pick up firearms and bring them back to New Jersey to sell. The CI provided officers with defendant’s name and physical description. The CI further provided the license plate numbers to the following two vehicles defendant allegedly used to transport weapons: a g ray Infiniti G35 registered to defendant, and a black Honda Civic registered to Na ja h Baker

. Later that month, the same CI advised Detective Cze ch that defendant and an associate would be traveling to one of the C arolinas on January 15, and planned to return to New Jersey on January 17. In response to that information, Detective Czech entered the license pl ates for both vehicles into various law enforcement databases so that he would be notified if the plates were picked up by a license plate reader or checked by another officer. Detective Czech’s supervisor, Detective Sergeant John Cipot , sent out a “be on the lookout” (BOLO) email to State Police stations on January 14 , asking officers to notify Detective Czech if they spotted either of the cars. On January 17, State Trooper Charles Travis noticed the black Honda Civic described in the BOLO email traveling northbo und on the New Jersey Turnpike. Trooper Travis testified that he followe d the vehicle for about two miles and saw the driver repeatedly fail to maintai n his lane. According to his testimony, as the car passed through a toll plaza, the trooper saw the EZ-Pass indicator display an “unpaid toll” message. Trooper Travis called Detective5

Czech

-- as instructed by the BOLO email

-- and told De tective Czech that he was about to pull the vehicle over for traffic viol ations. When Trooper Travis approached the vehicle, he noti ced multiple air fresheners hanging from the rearview mirror. The t rooper asked defendant and Baker, who was a passenger in the vehicle, for thei r credentials

-- license, registration, and car insurance information. Defendant told the trooper that he and Baker were returning from Washington, D.C., whe re they had been visiting friends for the weekend. Trooper Travis testified that he smelled “a strong odor of raw marijuana” in the vehicle during the stop. Trooper Travis also observed “greenish

- brown vegetation” on the driver’s beard and shirt, which the trooper identified as “shake,” or “the tail

- end of marijuana.” In questioning defendant and Baker, Trooper Travis testified that he asked d efendant whether he smoked cigarettes because Trooper Travis “wanted to make sure it wasn’t tobacco .” Trooper Travis told a colleague who had followed hi m to the traffic stop that he smelled raw marijuana and was going to remo ve defendant and Baker from the car. During a search of defendant’s person, Trooper Travis found a cigar and a keychain with an image of a marijuana l eaf but did not discover any actual marijuana.6

With defendant and Baker handcuffed and in separate patr ol cars, Trooper Travis began a search of the vehicle. He f irst searched the passenger compartment, where he recovered from the glove comp artment a plastic bag containing two shot glasses. One of the shot glass es contained a 9mm spent shell casing. The search of the passenger compartm ent did not reveal any marijuana. Trooper Travis did not apply for a search warrant b ased on the information supplied by the CI, but instead proceed ed to the front of the vehicle where he opened the vehicle’s hood and searched the engine compartment. There he found a black canvas bag nea r the passenger side of the car “along the firewall of the engine

. ” Trooper Travis found a second, smaller bag against the engine’s firewall on the dr iver’s side. The first bag contained a rifle; the second a revolver. Trooper Travis then moved his search to the trunk, where he found a duffle bag containin g hollow point bullets. No marijuana was recovered from the car, defendant, or Baker.
B. On October 17, 2016, a grand jury returned a three- count indictment charging defendant with second-degree unlawful poss ession of a weapon, third-degree possession of a weapon, and fourth-deg ree possession of a prohibited device.7

Defendant filed three pre-trial motions : a motion to suppress the firearms and ammunition seized during the car searc h, a motion to suppress his

on -scene statement to police, and a motion to reveal the identity of the confidential informant. The trial judge held a fou r-day hearing on those motions. Only the motion to suppress the evidence seized from th e car is relevant to this appeal. Much of the suppression hearing focus ed on whether Trooper Travis actually smelled marijuana, and whether the search was based on unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances as requ ired by State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015), given the BOLO that had been issue d three days prior to the stop. Trooper Travis testified that he smelled raw marijuana and explained , based on his experience, that he searched the car hood because marijuana “can fit in the engine compartment

. And what will happen is it will get sucked into . . . the air vents.” Baker testified that when they were stopped, neithe r she nor defendant had consumed marijuana that day or had ma rijuana in their possession. The trial court denie d defendant’s motion to suppress, although the judge expressed that he was troubled by the “concept of how far [the courts should] tolerate the subjective testimony of the smell of r aw marijuana” when
there is “no other evidence to suggest marijuana was ev er in the car. ”8

Notwithstanding those concerns, the trial court, in a written decision, credited Trooper Travis’s testimony and concluded that the search was lawful, so the seized evidence was admissible. Based on the dashcam video of the stop, the trial court found that a second officer corroborated Trooper Tr avis’s smell of marijuana. Citing State v. Kahlon, 172 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 1980), the trial court held that “ [t]he odor of raw marijuana emanating from a vehicl e without a detectible pinpoint establishes probable cause to search the entire vehicle.” Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon and w as sentenced to five years’ imp risonment with 42 months ’ parole ineligibility. Defendant’s sentence was stayed pending appeal.
C. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court i ncorrect ly interpret ed Kahlon to stand for the proposition that the smell of marijuana permits a search of the entire vehicle. In an unpublished opinion , the Appellate Division affirmed the trial co urt’s ruling and reliance on Kahlon to justify extending the search from the passenger compartment to the hood a nd trunk of the car.9 D.

We granted defendant’s petition for certification limited to the issue of whether officers had probable cause to search the v ehicle ’s engine compartment and trunk under the automobile exceptio n to the warrant requirement. 251 N.J. 14 , 14

- 15 (2022). We also granted the applications of the Office of t he Public Defender (OPD), the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) , and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jerse y (ACLU) to participate as amici curiae.
II

. A. Defendant argues that the smell of marijuana did no t provide police with probable cause to search the engine compartment and trunk of his vehicle

. Defendant contends that the trial court and the App ellate Division unfairly broadened the holding of Kahlon

. Defendant distinguishes this case from Kahlon by h ighli ghting the fact that no marijuana was found in the interior of his car and insist s the State did not put forth “any facts supporting t he

su spicion of a drug cache in the trunk or the hood of the automobile. ” Defendant further argues that the “shake” of dried marijuana leaves are, at best, indications that Cohen might have a small amo unt of marijuana for10

personal use which is not enough to justify expandi ng the search to the car’s trunk or engine compartment under State v. Patino , 83 N.J. 1, 13 (1980). Several amici support defendant’s position

. The OPD argues that, in pre-legalization cases, the odor of marijuana provi des probable cause to search only the areas of a vehicle from which the smell seems to emanate and insists this Court’s jurisprudence on the automobile except ion has been faithful to that specificity requirement. The ACLU argues that the seized evidence must be suppressed because the smell of marijuana does not authorize invasive searches beyond the passenger compartment of a vehi cle. The ACDL expresses concern that, under the Appellate Divisio n ’s rule, an officer could falsely claim to smell marijuana to enable a full-s cale automobile search. The ACDL urges this Court to suppress any non-drug evidence seized in a search initiated by smell and prevent any officer with kno wledge of an existing
in vestigation from searching a subject’s car without a warrant

. B. The State urges the Court to affirm the Appellate D ivision and hold that Trooper Travis had probable cause to search the eng ine compartment and trunk

. Comparing th is case to State v. Guerra, 93 N.J. 146 (1983), the S tate argues that Trooper Travis had probable cause to ex pand his search after ruling out all other possible sources of the odor.11 III. A. Our standard of review on a motion to suppress is d eferential, and we

“ uphold the factual fi ndings underlying the trial court’s decision so lon g as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.” State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (quoting S tate v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We defer “ to those findings in recognition of the trial court’s ‘ opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to ha ve the “ feel ” of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. ’ ” Ibid. (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244). This Court ordinarily will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are “so clearly mistaken ‘ that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction. ’” State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244). “A trial court’s legal conclusions, however,

‘ and the consequences that flow from established fac ts ,’ are reviewed de

novo. ” Ahmad, 246 N.J. at 609 (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)).
B. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are pr esumptively unreasonable12

under both constitutions. See State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022). Before conducting a search, the police must obtain a warrant from a neutral judicial officer “unless the search falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Camey, 239 N.J. 282, 298 (2019). “ When no warrant is sought, the State has the burden to demo nstrate that ‘[the search] falls within one of the few well-delineated excepti ons to the warrant requirement.’” State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19-20 (2004) (altera tion in original) (quoting State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 482 (2001)). The State

must show “ by a preponderance of the evidence that there was n o constitutional violation.” Id. at 20 (quoting State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 13 (2003)). The exception to the warrant requirement at issue i n this case is the automobile exception. This Court has held that und er our State C onstitution,

“ when the police have probable cause to believe that [a] vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense and the circum stances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous ,” law enforcement may search the vehicle without first obtaining a warran t. Witt, 223 N.J. at 447. The automobile exception is premised on three ratio nales : (1) a vehicle’s inherent mobility; (2) “t he lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile compared to a home ” ; and (3) “ the recognition that a Fourth Amendment13

intrusion occasioned by a prompt search based on probable cause is not necessarily greater than a prolonged detention of t he vehicle and its occupants while the police secure a warrant. ” Id. at 42 2-23. Our courts have long recognized that the smell of mari juana “constitutes probable cause ‘ that a criminal offense ha[s] been committed and th at additional contraband might be present. ’ ” State v. Walker, 21 3 N.J. 281 , 290 (2013 ) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515- 16 (2003)). That said, “ a search which is reasonable at its inception may [nonetheless] violate the Fourth Amendment by virtu e of its intolerable intensity and scope. ” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968) ; accord Patino, 83
N.J. at 10- 11

. Although both federal and state constitutional law recognize an automobile exception to th e warrant requirement, “ it is well known that our State Constitution ‘ provides greater protection against unreasonable se arches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment. ’” See State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156 , 165

- 66 (2023) (quoting State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 504 (2021), and discussing numerous examples ). This Court has recognized that “[g]reater individual protections exist for automobile searches, too” under our State Constitution. Id. at 166. In prior decisions, t his Court has endeavored to define the bounds of a legal search under the automobile exception based o n the suspected presence14

of marijuana. In Patino , after pulling the defendant’s vehicle over, a state trooper noticed a clear plastic container full of “ green vegetation” on the floor
near the front seat. 83 N.J. at 5. The trooper searched the interior of the vehicle and recovered a marijuana cigarette. Ibid. The trooper continued searching, examining the glove compartment and asht ray, but f ound nothing further. Id. at 5-6. Finally, the trooper searche d the trunk and discovered cocaine. Id. at 6. This Court held that the search of the trunk excee ded the parameters of the automobile exception. Id . at 12- 13 . The Court noted that the officer’s discovery of only “ a small amount of marijuana, consistent with person al use, does not provide [police] with probable cause to be lieve that larger amounts of marijuana or other contraband are being transporte d.” Id. at 13. The Court concluded that the search was unlawful because, und er the automobile exception, not only must an officer have probable c ause to believe that contraband is present in the vehicle, “but the search must be reasonable in scope” and must be “strictly tied to and justified by the circumstance s which rendered its initiation permissible.” Id. at 10- 11 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19)

. The Court noted that a search that is initially reasonable “may become unreasonable because of its intolerable intensity a nd scope.” I bi d. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 18). Accordingly, the Court hel d, officers must “provide15

justification to extend the zone of the exigent sea rch further than the persons of the occupants or the interior of the car .” Id. at 14- 15

. Three years later, the Court held that an officer l awfully extended the scope of a search to the vehicle’s trunk after dete cting the odor of marijuana. Guerra, 93 N.J. at 1 50

. In Guerra, the defendant was pulled over for a broken taillight. Id. at 148- 49. The trooper detected a “strong odor of raw unb urned marijuana emanating from the interior of the car” a nd noticed a small “ suitcase which he concluded could not have been the source of the odor.” Id. at 149. The trooper remarked that the car was “hanging low in the trunk” and expressed his intention to look inside the trunk. Ibid. Upon searching the trunk after obtaining a telephonic search warrant, the trooper discovered 176.5 pounds of marijuana. Id. at 1 49 -50. The motion court found that the search was justified under the automobile exception “becau se the smell of ‘the marijuana, coupled with the vehicle riding low cert ainly constituted probable cause to search the tru nk.’” Id. at 150. The Appellate Division reversed , determining that insufficient grounds existed for t he issuance of a telephonic, as opposed to a written, warrant. Ibid. The primary question in Guerra before this Court wa s whether the officers properly obtained a telephonic warrant pri or to searching the vehicle at police headquarters. Id. at 148. While the Court agreed with the Appellate16

Division that the telephonic warrant was defective, we ultimately held that the search was nonetheless permissible under the automo bile exception. Id. at 151

- 52. The Court found that after making a lawful stop, “[t]he troopers then detected a strong odor of marijuana which, as found by the trial court, could not have emanated fr om the small suitcase in the car’s interior.” Id. at 150. In contrast to the setting of Patino , in which the confirmed presence of a quantity of marijuana consistent with personal use did not j ustify the search of a car trunk, Guerra arose from the offic er’s determination that the apparent intensity of the marijuana odor could indicate only an amount too large to be contained in the bag in the car’s interior

-- combined with the observed presence of a substantial weight in the trunk

-- justif ied a search of that space. Accordingly, the Guerra Court held that the officer had probable cause to search the trunk. Ibid. The Appellate Division has similarly addressed the extent to which the odor of marijuana provides probable cause to extend the scope of a vehicle search beyond the passenger compartment under the a utomobile exception. In Kahlon , which was decided prior to this Court’s decision in Patino , after pulling a motorist over, the officer smelled marijuana and t he defendant admitted to smoking marijuana. 172 N.J. Super. at 336

. The officer searched the interior compartment of the vehicle and found a partially burned cigarette17

and a clear plastic bag containing half an ounce of marijuana. Ibid. The officer then entered the backseat where he noti ced a “very heavy odor of unburned marijuana.” Id. at 337. Having found no additional marijuana i n the backseat, the officer opened the trunk where he con tinued to smell the heavy odor of marijuana and found a cardboard box from wh ich the smell of unburned marijuana emanated. Ibid. The officer opened a bag in the box and found 30 pounds of marijuana inside. Ibid. The trial court suppressed the marijuana found in t he trunk, but the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the search was lawful. Id. at 338. The Appellate Division held that the officer’s

inability to pinpoint the source of the smell of un burned marijuana while in [the rear interior] of the autom obile although it appeared to emanate from the rear of th e vehicle, together with the marijuana already found in the car, reasonably could leave him to conclude, as he did, that the odor came from the car’s trunk and accordingly established probable cause to search th e trunk for such marijuana. [Ibid.]
In State v. Sarto , the Appellate Division upheld the search of a trunk when “the strong odor of unburned marijuana gave police probable cause”
because the odor “could not have emanated from the small plastic bag found in the vinyl bag ” in the passenger compartment. 195 N.J. Super. 565, 57 4-7 5 (App. Div. 1984)

. Officers discovered a knife in plain view during a vehicle18

stop and subsequently arrested the defendant for a weapons violation. Id . at 567 . While retrieving the knife, the officer detected a strong odor of marijuana and found a partially opened clear plastic bag cont aining marijuana. I bid. Citing to Guerra and Kahlon , t he Appellate Division held that the strong odor of unburned marijuana “gave police probable cause t o search the trunk for evidence of contraband.” Id. at 574. Similar to Kahlon, the officers in Sa rto initially found marijuana in the passenger compartm ent prior to extending the search to the trunk, and similar to Guerra, the str ong odor of marijuana that remained after that discovery could not be explaine d by the contents of the passenger compartment of the vehicle

. Ibid. In sum, cases in which our courts have upheld searc hes that extended to the trunk or other areas beyond the passenger compa rtment have involve d facts indicating something more than simply detecting the smell of marijuana from the interior of the car.
IV. Applying those principles and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution to this case, we find that the officer s did not have probable cause

to search the engine compartment or the tr unk and thus exceeded the scope of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement

.19

Upon noticing the black Honda Civic described in the BO LO alert that was issued after the CI’s firearms trafficking tip , Trooper Travis followed defendant’s vehicle for about two miles

. After initiating a traffic stop, Trooper Travis reported detecting “a strong odor of raw marijuana” in the vehicle as well as “greenish

- brown vegetation” on the driver’s beard and shirt . At that point, Trooper Tra vis had a reasonable belief “that a criminal offense ha d been committed and that additional contraband might be p resent” on defendant’s person and in the passenger compartment. See Walke r, 213 N.J. at 290. W e therefore find that the initial search of defendant, Baker, and the passen ger compartment was valid under the automobile exceptio n because the officer had probable cause to initiate that search. After the search of the car’s interior did not reveal marijuana, however, the police indiscriminately expanded the search to separate areas of the vehicle

-- beyond the compartment from which Trooper Travis i nitially detected the smell -- despite no unique facts that indicated raw marijuana was in either the engine compartment or trunk. After searching the passenger compartment, Trooper Travis then searched under the hood of the car, an arguably unlikely locale for storing personal items in a vehicle, inc luding illegal narcotics. Within the engine compartment, the trooper found a bag containing a rifle and a second bag containing a revolver. Trooper Travis next searched the trunk,20

where he discovered a bag containing hollow point b ullets. No marijuana was found anywhere in the car , or on defendant or Baker. We hold that when Trooper Travis expanded his searc h to the engine compartment of the car, he went beyond the scope of the automobile exception. Although he smelled marijuana in the passenger compartment of the car, the trooper’s initial search yielded no results and provided no justification “to extend the zone of the . . . search further than the persons of the occupants or the interior of the car .” See Patino, 83 N.J. at 14

- 15 . Had the smell of raw marijuana emanated from under the hood of the vehicle, that could have justified expand ing the search. Prior cases from this Court and the Appellate Division that upheld searches beyond the interior of the vehicle illustrate that something more than just a general smell of marijuana underpinned the holding in those cases

. Similarly, had Trooper Travis indicated that the smell was of such magnitude as t o necessarily emanate from a large cargo space such as a trunk, the question o f probable cause would have been closer. Here, however, Trooper Travis made no such observation that the marijuana smell was stronger in certain areas of th e car and provided no reasoning for expanding the search to the hood and the trunk

. This holding is consistent with this Court’s and the Appellate Division ’s decades- old precedent. In Patino, although not a case involving the odor o f21

marijuana, this Court invalidated the search of a v ehicle’s trunk after the officer actually found a marijuana cigarette and a plastic container of “green vegetation” in the interior of the vehicle. 83 N.J. at 5, 11-13. In Kahlon , th e Appellate Division upheld the search of the trunk a fter the officer (1) smelled marijuana upon pulling the car over; (2) the defend ant admitted to smoking marijuana; (3) the officer found a plastic bag cont aining half an ounce of marijuana and a marijuana cigarette in the interior compartment; and (4) the officer detected a very strong odor of unburned mar ijuana in the area of the backseat. 172 N.J. Super. at 335 -37. Similarly, in Sarto, officers also found marijuana in the passenger compartment before exten ding the search to the trunk. 195 N.J. Super. at 567- 68 . In those cases, although the extended search was invalidated in one matter and upheld in the oth ers, the facts supporting probable cause to search the trunk were much strong er than the facts in this case, with Trooper Travis only generally smelling “ a strong odor of raw marijuana” in the vehicle’s interior

. A lthough the State equates this case to Guerra , the circumstances of the search in Guerra, as well as the arguments consider ed by the Court, are distinguishable. Unlike this case, in Guerra, the officers obtained a search warrant prior to searching the trunk of the car; th is Court granted certification after the Appellate Division found that warrant to be invalid

. 93 N.J. at 148.22

Moreover, much of the Court’s analysis in Guerra focused on the validity of the telephonic search warrant, and the consequences of finding a warrant invalid

. See id. at 152-53. A lthough the Cou rt invalidated the warrant, we ultimately held that the search of the trunk was ne vertheless permissible based on the automobile exception

. Id. at 150-52. The Court did not conduct a robust analysis of the issue, instead relying prima rily on Kahlon

-- which, as we have explained, is factually distinguishable fro m the present case. See i d. at 150. The Court also cited to Patino for the gen eral proposition that the “extent of [ the ] search of an automobile depends upon the degree o f the probable cause. ” Ibid. Additionally, the facts establishing probable cause in Guerra are distinguishable from the present case as well. I n Guerra, the officers detected an odor of raw marijuana apparently too strong to h ave emanated from the small suitcase in the car. I bid. And evidence indicated that the trunk was hanging low as if carrying significant weight, a fa ct that the trial court found persuasive. See ibid. Here, there is no claim that Trooper Travis conside red whether the odor he smelled could or could not have emanated from the vehicle’s interior. Rather, he testified only to generally detect ing the scent of marijuana in the car ’s interior prior to expanding his search beyond the occupants and the passenger compartment. On that basis, the degree of23

probable cause was insufficient to justify searchin g the engine compartment and the trunk. There is certainly a difference between generally d etecting the smell of a prohibited substance and detecting a sme ll of the substance of such a magnitude as to immediately suggest to officers tha t vast quantities of the substance were present, coupled with observation th at the car’s trunk appeared to be hanging low due to heavy weight. Here, Trooper Travis had no definitive information that defendant possessed marijuana because his initial search did not reveal any illegal contraband. Neither th e smell nor the “shake in defendant’s beard” fulfilled the Patino requirement that an officer have specifi c justification to extend a search under the automobile exception beyond the defendant’s person and the passenger compartment. And any information contain ed in or suggested by the BOLO could not contribute to a probable cause deter mination based on the trooper’s smell of marijuana

. Accordingly, we find that Trooper Travis’s searches of the engine compartment and trunk were u nlawful, and the evidence seized from those illegal searches must therefore b e suppressed. This holding in no way suggests that areas within the interior of the car would require separate probable cause findings in o rder to conduct a warrantless search. We are not dividing up the int erior of vehicles such that an officer would need to establish different or additional probable cause to search24

the front seat as opposed to the back seat, for exa mple. Pursuant to the automobile exception, if an officer has probable ca use to search the interior of the vehicle, that probable cause encompasses the en tirety of the interior. We are also not suggesting that the warrantless sea rch of a trunk or engine compartment will always require separate pro bable cause findings. Instead, we reiterate that a warrantless search of a car “ must be reasonable in scope” and “strictly tied to and justified by the circumstance s which rendered its initiation permissible.” Patino , 83 N.J. at 10

- 11

. However, a generalized smell of raw marijuana does not justify a search of every compartment of an automobile.
We briefly note th e important changes to the Criminal Code regarding marijuana with the Legislature’s passage of the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernizati on Act (CREAMMA) , N.J.S.A. 24:6I -31 to - 56, in 2021

. Through CREAMMA, the Legislature fashioned “a new approach to our marijuana policies” and “leg aliz[ed] a form of marijuana, to be referred to as cannabis.” N.J.S.A. 24:6I -32(a). CREAMMA’s amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10 largely decriminali zed the possession of unregulated marijuana occurring on or after its effective date of February 22, 2021. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4)(b).25

CREAMMA further added a new section in the Criminal Code stating that neither “the odor o f cannabis or burnt cannabis, ” nor the “ possession of marijuana or hashish without evidence of quantity i n excess of any amount that would exceed the amount . . . which may be lawfully possessed, ” “ shall, individually or collectively , constitute reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime” except on school property or at a correction al facility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
10c. Though N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10c has no bearing on our present pr obable cause analysis because the search at issue predated the p assage of CREAMMA , going forward, we anticipate that cases involving t he automobile exception and probable cause to search a vehicle based solely on the smell of marijuana will likely be few and far between.
V. For the foregoing reasons, the motion to suppress should have been granted, so we reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, defendant shall be given the opportunity to withdra w his guilty plea.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, WAINER APTER, and FASCIALE; and JUDGE SABATINO (tem porarily assigned) join in JU STICE PIERRE-LOUIS ’s opinion.