U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

34–924 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

S. HRG. 114–811 

REVIEWING THE CIVIL NUCLEAR 

AGREEMENT IN SOUTH KOREA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 1, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.govinfo.gov 

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

LESTER MUNSON, Staff Director

JODI B. HERMAN, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Bob Corker, U.S. Senator From Tennessee .................................................. 1 

Hon. Ben Cardin, U.S. Senator From Maryland ................................................... 3 

Hon. Thomas M. Countryman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International 

Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC .. 4 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 5 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses of Assistant Secretary Thomas M. Countryman to Questions 

Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio .................................................................... 18 

(III)

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(1) 

REVIEWING THE CIVIL NUCLEAR 

AGREEMENT IN SOUTH KOREA 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 1, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:48 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker, Risch, Flake, Perdue, Isakson, Barrasso, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, and 

Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. Today, and I am going to have a slightly longer 

opening statement. I apologize. There are technical facts that I 

would like to be out there. I want to thank everybody for being 

here. 

Today we are here to review our second civil nuclear cooperation 

agreement this year, the fourth in the Asia-Pacific region in the 

past 2 years. While we focus in on the agreement before us with 

South Korea, I would remind my colleagues that in the past 2 

years we have also entered into agreements with Taiwan, Vietnam, 

and China. In reviewing this agreement, we must weigh the impacts of its contents on our global nuclear proliferation objective 

against the political and economic benefits of these arrangements. 

Each of the previously mentioned agreements has very different 

approaches to addressing the key nuclear proliferation concern— 

should the United States support the continued spread of fuel cycle 

technologies, namely enrichment and reprocessing capabilities? I do 

hope we will really think about the details of this today. 

South Korea is one of our closest allies in the Asia-Pacific region, 

and our strong tradition of nuclear cooperation and collaboration 

remains an important element of our partnership. This is an issue 

that I have had the opportunity to discuss, and many of you have 

with President Park, both in Seoul and here in Washington. It is 

also important that we consider how this agreement could potentially impact U.S. strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific, particularly the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula. 

The agreement before us represents a continuation of the relationship that originally began in 1974 with the agreement between 

the United States and the Republic of Korea Concerning Peaceful 

Uses of Nuclear Energy. This agreement has already been extended 

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once by Congress to accommodate a failure to agree on new terms 

and will now expire on March 19, 2016. 

Since that first agreement was reached in 1974, the dynamics on 

the Korean Peninsula have changed. In 1975, South Korea joined 

the NPT. In 1985, North Korea joined the NPT. In 1986, U.S. intelligence became aware of an undeclared plutonium production reactor and reprocessing plant, and subsequently announced its intent 

to withdraw from the NPT in 2003. In 1992, the South and the 

North agreed to a joint declaration in which both parties agreed 

not to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment capabilities. Since that time, North Korea has demonstrated a growing 

nuclear weapons capability, including both plutonium and uranium 

enrichment capacities. 

Given this unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula, I 

believe it is imperative that we closely examine the agreement before us, specifically how it addresses the issue of pyroprocessing. 

This agreement allows South Korea to operate the advanced spent 

fuel conditioning process facility, which is the first step in 

pyroprocessing. And it further provides the ability to enrich uranium up to 20 percent, though South Korea currently has no enrichment capability. 

Today I hope we will learn why this administration chose to include these capabilities in the agreement, and how they match up 

with our bilateral, regional, and global nonproliferation objectives. 

Perhaps our witness could also address how the approval of these 

technologies to South Korea, and, most recently, the acceptance of 

enrichment by Iran, will impact our ability to negotiate agreements 

with other partners, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, that would 

restrict E&R capabilities. 

I do understand the civil nuclear cooperation between the United 

States and South Korea has brought many economic benefits, including the sale of United States nuclear reactors, the transfer of 

United States reactor technology, and participation in South Korea’s export of nuclear technologies, which has generated substantial income for the United States nuclear industry and grown thousands of jobs in the United States. And I know we will hear about 

these attributes from our witness. That said, and I have said this 

before, I am concerned that the current administration has taken 

an economics/industry first, national security second, approach to 

entering into these 123 agreements. 

In closing, the United States must lead with high standards that 

prevent the proliferation of technologies if we are to have a credible 

and effective nuclear proliferation policy. I have concerns that elements of this agreement miss that mark. 

I want to thank Tom Countryman for joining us today to review 

the components of this agreement, and look forward to working 

with him and his colleagues on this and future 123 agreements. 

And I just want to say that Tom is someone we all respect, and 

I know he is working for the administration, and I know he is 

going to give good testimony on their behalf. But I have to say we 

continue to let the camel nose under the tent, and I think that we 

are sending very mixed signals about what our commitment really 

is to nuclear proliferation by the type of agreements that we are 

entering into. 

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So with that, Senator Cardin, I look forward to your comments. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BEN CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

bringing us forward on this hearing, and, Secretary Countryman, 

it is nice to have you here again before our committee. 

As has been pointed out, we have had a long relationship with 

the Republic of Korea on nuclear issues that dates back 50 years. 

The negotiation of this 123 agreement extension or new agreement 

has taken longer than we, I think, originally anticipated with a 2- 

year extension that was approved, and then now a 20-year agreement. Normally these are 30-year agreements, so obviously there 

were some tough negotiations that took place during this period of 

time. 

But I think we should underscore the very close relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea in our interest 

to complete a 123 agreement. First and foremost, it is about the 

safety of the use of nuclear power. It is also about the economic advantages. The principal suppliers are going to be United States 

companies, and we are now working in partnership with the Republic of Korea and the United Arab Emirates, which is showing 

that we are gaining economic strength globally as a result of these 

123 agreements. So I think for all those reasons, it is important 

that we move forward on a 123 agreement with Korea. 

This is certainly a broader relationship we have here. This is a 

country that we literally sacrificed on the battlefield in order to say 

it is a country that shares our values. It is a country that we work 

very closely with on the challenges we have on the Korean Peninsula with North Korea. So this is a country where we have a deep 

and enduring relationship. 

And, Mr. Chairman, let me say that tens of thousands of Korean 

Americans who live in my State of Maryland have helped foster 

that close relationship between our two countries. So there are a 

lot of reasons to move forward here. 

Also, I must say I am a supporter of nuclear power. I think nuclear power is critically important for our national security issues 

and for environmental issues. And here, this is another example of 

a responsible, predictable agreement that allows for the safe use of 

nuclear power by an ally in France. So for all those reasons, I think 

the 123 agreement is one that we should support. 

My own reading of this agreement is that it is a fair compromise 

that was struck to resolve the issue that you raised, which is that 

the United States and the Republic of Korea will continue to study 

the potential of power processing, which is a new type of technology 

for reprocessing spent nuclear fuels. Until the United States and 

Republic of Korea’s joint study of this technology is completed, no 

decision will be reached about whether the Republic of Korea can 

move forward with this technology. And even after the study is finished, the ultimate authority for approving the reprocessing activities will rest with the Secretary of Energy. 

This agreement will allow us to continue to deepen our cooperation with the Republic of Korea, which is particularly important as 

we work together on the region’s energy future, climate change, 

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and on a closer United States-Korea alliance. This agreement reflects the partnership and the enduring bonds between our two nations, and I urge us to support this agreement. 

Obviously there is a process for review. I have introduced legislation to support it, and I hope Congress will continue to show our 

support for the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cardin. We will now turn to 

our witness. Joining us to provide testimony today is the Honorable 

Thomas M. Countryman. He currently serves as the Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation. In 

this capacity, Mr. Countryman leads the Bureau at the head of the 

U.S. effort to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, their related materials, and their delivery systems. 

I want to thank you for being here to share your thoughts and 

viewpoints. I know you understand we would love to hear your 

verbal points in five minutes, so if you have any other materials, 

without objection, they will be entered into the record. 

And with that, we would like to recognize you and thank you for 

your service to our country. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS M. COUNTRYMAN, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND 

NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and 

Ranking Member Cardin, I value your kind words to me, and I 

value just as much your tough questions. I have submitted a witness statement, but orally today I would say that it is a pleasure 

to testify on the President’s submission of an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and the Republic 

of Korea. 

The ROK is a key ally in East Asia, as you have noted, and this 

agreement is an example of the increasing strength of our bilateral 

relationship. It will enhance the strategic partnership between the 

United States and South Korea across the spectrum of political, 

economic, energy, science, and technology issues. It is in the best 

interests of the United States to continue our nuclear cooperation 

with South Korea. 

I thank this committee as well as your colleagues in the House 

Foreign Affairs Committee for your leadership and support in extending the prior 123 agreement for a period of 2 years until 2016. 

This extension gave us the extra time and space we needed to work 

with our partners to achieve a balanced text that satisfies the 

needs of both countries. 

As usual, we have briefed members and staff extensively on this 

agreement, but I will recount a few high points. As with all our 123 

agreements, this agreement is first and foremost an asset to advance U.S. nonproliferation policy. It contains all of the nonproliferation guarantees required by the Atomic Energy Act. It includes conditions related to IAEA safeguards, peaceful use assurance, physical protection assurance, and U.S. consent rights on 

storage, retransfer, enrichment, and reprocessing of the U.S. obligated nuclear material. 

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It allows for the continuation and the expansion of our robust 

and mutually beneficial trade relationship. It establishes a new 

standing high-level bilateral commission for our two governments 

to work together to advance nuclear cooperation. The Commission’s 

working groups will focus on spent fuel management, assured fuel 

supply, nuclear security—I am a little stunned, sir. 

This agreement establishes U.S. consent rights on any future 

possible enrichment or reprocessing of U.S.-obligated nuclear material, but it also contains a set of pathways toward a possible U.S. 

Government decision in the future on whether to grant consent to 

the ROK to enrich or reprocess U.S.-obligated nuclear material. 

The ROK is one of the strongest partners of the United States, 

has consistently displayed a commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. It is a leader in the four multilateral export control regimes 

in the Global Nuclear Security Summit process, and, of course, a 

strong ally in addressing the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear 

and missile programs. 

In short, this agreement is one of the most sophisticated and dynamic, peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements we have ever negotiated. When it enters into force, it will provide a strong foundation 

for our shared peaceful nuclear cooperation and our non-proliferation objectives for years to come. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Countryman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS M. COUNTRYMAN

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, good afternoon. It is a pleasure to testify 

before the committee today regarding the President’s submission of an Agreement 

for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation between the United States and the Republic of 

Korea. As you know, the ROK is a key ally of the United States in East Asia, and 

this Agreement is an example of the increasing strength of our bilateral relationship. The Agreement will enhance the strategic relationship between the United 

States and the ROK across the spectrum of political, economic, energy, science, and 

technology issues. The United States and the ROK have had a strong partnership 

in the field of peaceful nuclear cooperation for more than half a century, and the 

United States is pleased that the ROK has become one of the world’s leading 

nations in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The terms of the new 

U.S.–ROK 123 Agreement strongly reaffirm the two governments’ shared commitment to nonproliferation as the cornerstone of our nuclear cooperation relationship. 

The ROK has a strong track record on and has consistently reiterated its commitment to nonproliferation. It has been an extremely active partner with the United 

States across a wide breadth of bilateral and multilateral activities designed to 

ensure the implementation of the highest standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation worldwide. I would like to explain why the administration believes it 

is in the best interests of the United States to continue our nuclear cooperation with 

the ROK. 

DESCRIPTION OF AGREEMENT

I would like to begin by thanking this committee as well as our colleagues in the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee for your leadership and support in extending the 

prior 123 Agreement with the ROK for a period of 2 years until 2016. The authority 

to extend the agreement that you provided gave us the extra time we needed to 

work together with our ROK partners to achieve a balanced text that satisfies the 

needs of both governments. 

As with all our 123 agreements, this Agreement is first and foremost an asset 

that advances U.S. nonproliferation policy objectives. The President’s transmittal of 

the Agreement, and the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement that accompanied it, include a detailed description of the contents of the Agreement so I will 

not repeat that here, but the Agreement contains all the U.S. nonproliferation guaranties required by the Atomic Energy Act and common to 123 agreements, including 

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ful uses assurances, physical protection assurances, and U.S. consent rights on storage, retransfer, enrichment, and reprocessing of U.S.-obligated nuclear material. It 

also has an initial duration of 20 years with one automatic 5-year extension. 

A unique feature of the Agreement is the establishment of a new standing, HighLevel Bilateral Commission for our two governments to work together to advance 

mutual nuclear cooperation objectives. The Commission will be led on our side by 

the Deputy Secretary of Energy and on the ROK side by a Vice Minister of Foreign 

Affairs. As described in the text of the Agreement, the Commission will consist of 

four working groups, one on spent fuel management, one on assuring a stable fuel 

supply globally, a third on nuclear security, and finally a working group to address 

the promotion of exports and export control cooperation. This new Commission will 

allow for more regular interaction between our two governments on the state of 

nuclear energy in both countries. We expect these interactions to both deepen our 

bilateral nuclear cooperation relationship politically and to make further progress 

in tackling some of our shared challenges facing the future of the civil nuclear 

energy industry. 

As you know, the United States and the ROK agreed to commence a 10-year Joint 

Fuel Cycle Study in 2011 to explore strategies to address shared challenges. The 

Study is exploring the technical and economic feasibility and the nonproliferation 

acceptability of pyroprocessing and of other spent fuel management options. U.S. 

and ROK technical experts are working together to advance technical cooperation 

on the storage, transportation, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, and we expect the 

results of the Joint Study to inform the work of the High Level Bilateral Commission going forward. In addition to the cooperation to occur under the High Level 

Bilateral Commission and in the Joint Fuel Cycle Study, the Agreement also identifies other areas for future research and development collaboration, including nuclear 

safety, safeguards, radioactive waste management, and the development, construction, and operation of reactors. 

As highlighted earlier, the Agreement clearly establishes U.S. consent rights on 

any future possible enrichment or reprocessing of U.S. obligated nuclear material. 

That said, it also contains a set of pathways toward possible U.S. Government decisions in the future on whether to grant advance consent to the ROK to enrich or 

reprocess U.S. obligated nuclear material. Through the High Level Bilateral Commission, U.S. and ROK officials will evaluate the technical feasibility, economic viability, safeguardability, and nonproliferation acceptability of potential reprocessing 

techniques and enrichment options. Any advance consent would require satisfactory 

outcomes from those studies and subsequent written agreement between the parties. 

The Secretary of Energy would have the final authority to decide whether or not 

granting advance consent would significantly increase the risk of proliferation. 

ROK AS A NONPROLIFERATION PARTNER

The ROK is one of the United States strongest partners on and has consistently 

displayed its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. It is a member of the four 

multilateral nonproliferation regimes—the Missile Technology Control Regime, 

Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, and Nuclear Suppliers Group. The ROK 

served as the Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2003–2004, and is scheduled 

to do so again in 2016–017. The ROK also recently completed its term as Chair of 

the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The ROK became 

a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 

23, 1975, and has in force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and Additional 

Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

The ROK has also demonstrated its commitment to nuclear security and addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism, including through hosting the 2012 Nuclear 

Security Summit and providing useful contributions to the development of a highdensity low enriched uranium fuel. It has also been an active and positive contributor to the summit process since its inception, as well as through its support for 

the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and Global Partnership Against 

the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The ROK has ratified 

key nuclear conventions, including the International Convention for the Suppression 

of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical 

Protection of Nuclear Material. The ROK has been an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) since 2009, having hosted regional and global 

meetings and two operational exercises. It has also conducted outreach to states 

that have not yet endorsed PSI. The ROK has been a consistent advocate of nonproliferation in the IAEA Board of Governors, including support for strengthening 

safeguards in a variety of contexts. 

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The ROK Foreign Minister has offered to chair the IAEA’s 2016 Nuclear Security 

Conference. The ROK has also been a strong and close partner in addressing the 

threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear and 

missile programs, including at the IAEA where it has joined the United States in 

addressing the DPRK’s growing nuclear threat and holding the DPRK to its denuclearization commitments and obligations, and advocating for a continued strong 

role for the IAEA in the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the 

Korean Peninsula. 

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BENEFITS

In addition to the many nonproliferation benefits of continuing our nuclear cooperation with the ROK, the agreement allows for the continuation and expansion 

of our robust and mutually beneficial trade relationship. For example, the United 

States provides fuel supply services to the ROK, and the ROK supplies the United 

States with significant reactor components such as pressure vessels. Due to this 

trade relationship, the 2009 contract between the ROK and the United Arab Emirates to build four reactors has already brought hundreds of new jobs and approximately $2 billion in additional revenue to U.S. nuclear suppliers, and the Agreement 

would allow this type of cooperation to continue and flourish in the future. 

The ROK nuclear program owes much to the United States but has now emerged 

as a world leader in nuclear energy, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear security. 

The U.S.–ROK partnership in nuclear energy is emblematic of our broader partnership and a great asset in our own efforts in these areas. 

CONCLUSION

In sum, we believe the nonproliferation and economic benefits of this agreement 

demonstrate that continuing nuclear cooperation with the ROK is in the best interests of the United States. The Agreement is one of the most sophisticated and 

dynamic peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements we have ever negotiated, which 

speaks to the state-of-the-art nature of the ROK’s peaceful nuclear program and the 

many characteristics that our two nuclear programs share in common. Once it 

enters into force, this Agreement will be a significant achievement for both our governments and provide a strong foundation for our shared peaceful nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation objectives for decades to come. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you. 

Senator CARDIN [presiding]. Thank you very much for your testimony. Senator Perdue, I am prepared to yield if you have questions 

that you would like to ask. 

Senator PERDUE. I just have one very quickly, but I appreciate 

that. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here again. I am very 

concerned about what we have just done with Iran. I know that the 

ranking member is as well. We are moving forward. Now we have 

this negotiation with a great ally, and I appreciate your efforts 

there. 

I would just like to pursue the need for South Korea’s desire to 

enrich. I mean, it is just that simple. I know we have got this study 

group. We are going to be looking at this, and I applaud that, but 

I am very concerned. Let me put that in perspective for the record. 

As we looked at this in the Iran negotiation or conversation, 

there are about 190 NPT countries today, nine of which—well, not 

all of these are in the NPT. There are five countries in NPT that 

today have a nuclear weapon. There are four—North Korea, Israel, 

Pakistan, and India—that are non-NPT, but do have weapons. 

There are five countries, and now six including Iran, that have civil 

nuclear programs and are allowed to enrichment under NPT: Germany, Holland, Japan, Brazil, and Argentina. And then there are 

18 countries, of which South Korea is a member, that have civil 

programs that are not allowed to enrichment. 

So the question is: Under what circumstances does it make sense 

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ample of Iran, to start enrichment? The supply chain I know was 

mentioned by the Iranians and so forth, which I find to be fairly 

hollow. It seems to me that this is a first step, and this barrier for 

decades has been very effective in preventing uncontrolled proliferation. 

So could you give us your comments for the record on that? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes, several points. First, when you talk about 

states allowed or not allowed to enrich, it is not under the NPT. 

The Non-Proliferation Treaty does not grant or deny states the 

right to—the so-called right to enrich. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. I misspoke. Thank you. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. But under U.S. agreements, there are a limited number of states who developed independently of U.S. technology a capability to enrichment and/or reprocess. And the recognition of that indigenous capability is contained in a number of 

our 123 agreements. The Iran agreement, of course, does not provide a right to enrichment, and, most importantly, it is not a 123 

agreement. It does not allow for civil nuclear cooperation between 

the United States and Iran. 

Overall, what I would say about enrichment specifically is that 

the market works. There is a surplus of enrichment capacity in the 

world for those states who wish to develop nuclear power. They can 

purchase the fuel they need on the global market. That is what 

was always economically ludicrous about Iran’s claim that it needed to develop this capacity. In the case of the Republic of Korea, 

we have agreed that this is a topic we will discuss in the future. 

I think it is premature to talk about an ROK desire to enrichment, but it is accurate to talk about an ROK desire to keep that 

option open. And that is what we have agreed to do in this case. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. 

Ranking Member. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me—I want to follow up on this a bit because it is unusual, rare, that we give advanced permission to reprocess in a civil nuclear agreement that has only been granted to 

countries that have already had that technology, as I understand 

it, such as India, Japan, and Western Europe. So why are we considering it here for the first time in this region? Knowing the Korean Peninsula’s sensitivity, why are we including it in this agreement or the options in this agreement? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. The very shortest answer is because the ROK 

asked to keep that question open for a future decision based on a 

variety of issues that we will study together that include technical, 

economic, of course nonproliferation policy, security issues, and feasibility. And so, we have agreed that the consent decision will not 

be granted in this agreement. This is not advanced consent, but a 

consent decision on U.S.-obligated material will be made at a later 

time. 

Senator CARDIN. Now, the next question I am going to ask you, 

I am a little bit suspect to ask you this question. But in the 1992 

Joint Declaration in which North and South Korea agreed that 

they would not possess nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities—knowing the activity in North Korea, it is hard for 

me to ask you this question. But does the development of 

pyroprocessing violate the 1992 Joint Declaration? 

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Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Our current agreement for joint research with 

the Republic of Korea on certain aspects of pyroprocessing does not 

violate that agreement. It is technical research at this point. The 

technology and the knowledge that we have shared with the ROK 

is strictly limited by a bilateral agreement. So where we are now 

is not in any way in violation of the Joint Declaration. 

Senator CARDIN. But could it—if it goes to its logical conclusion 

that the Republic of Korea is seeking, could it violate the 1992 

Joint Declaration? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. First, I am not aware. The ROK has not said 

that they are seeking to build a commercial-scale pyroprocessing 

plant in the ROK. At that point, we would have some hard decisions to make. But building pyroprocessing with huge economic 

costs involved as compared to what are today far lower costs for 

spent fuel storage by other methods, that is not the only logical 

outcome of this discussion. 

Senator CARDIN. So, could you share with this committee the 

challenges you had in completing this 123? We needed a 2-year extension. It is a 20-year agreement where we normally look today 

at a 30-year agreement. Can you share with us the thought as to 

why it took longer than, or, at least initially, anticipated, and why 

you are entering into a 20-year agreement where normally it would 

have been a longer agreement? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Again, the short answer for why it took a long 

time, the Republic of Korea, our South Korean friends, are good allies and tough negotiators, and we spent a lot of time going over 

each sentence in here. They have concerns, perhaps greater on 

their side than on our side, about how it is perceived politically 

back in their capital. 

And so, we took the extra time to ensure that this technical 

agreement where we are in agreement on just about everything 

does not become a political football in either capital. And I think 

we succeeded well in that. 

The 20-year agreement with an automatic 5-year extension was 

at the suggestion of the Republic of Korea, and as we previously 

discussed with this committee, there is a preference here to have 

an upper limit of 30 years for 123 agreements. So we had no objection to a 20+5 arrangement. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, you are right about that. I think we do 

want a limit on the 123s. It was just strange that they would not 

want a longer agreement. Is there an advantage to the Republic of 

Korea making this be able to kick out after 20 years? What is their 

thinking there? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Well, I think, and here it is better to ask 

them. But what I would say is they point to the rapid pace of technological change, and it is possible that there will be significant developments in nuclear technology in the next 20 years. At the same 

time, I think this same agreement will serve us well for 20, 25 

years or longer because it has the flexibility to accommodate those 

kinds of changes in technology, specifically through creation of this 

high-level bilateral commission. 

Senator CARDIN. Last question, if I might, getting back to the 

first point, and what the chairman I am sure is going to be talking 

about, the enrichment on the Korean Peninsula in the Republic of 

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Korea. Under this agreement, South Korea is permitted to undertake the first stage of pyroprocessing, which is, again, a new type 

of technology. What do you see is the ultimate objective of Korea 

under this agreement as it relates to either reprocessing or enrichment? I understand they want to reserve their rights, et cetera, et 

cetera. Where should we anticipate we are likely to be? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Well, that is speculative, so I will give only a 

very general answer. I think the intention of the Republic of Korea 

is, number one, to improve their energy independence through the 

use of nuclear power for electricity; second, to be as competitive in 

the international market for reactor technology as they are in a 

number of other high-tech fields; and third, to make economically 

rational decisions about the best way to achieve those goals. 

We do not have a prejudgment from either side about the economic viability of enrichment or reprocessing, particularly when, as 

I said, the world enrichment market is in surplus right now. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. But I think that is how I would describe their 

goals. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. I think you have a tough 

job, and we thank you for the way you deal with each of us, even 

though sometimes we disagree with the outcome. 

I would just add we have an outstanding working relationship. 

I would add to—if I were answering the question that, look, we 

have all spent time with President Park. She is a tough negotiator. 

She is a very focused person. I understand all that. My sense is, 

though, it also has to do with the fact that we have agreed to let 

Japan do the same thing. And I am sorry, there is just a syndrome 

that comes with that. 

There are issues obviously between South Korea and Japan. We 

are, you know, allowing China to do the same thing. And, in essence, I fear that our policy—you know, the old gold standard is 

basically thrown by the wayside—and it is now, you know, because 

others have it, we want it. And I hope you will not deny that that 

was part of the desire, if you will, on behalf of South Korea to be 

able to do this. It is as if they are being treated less well, if you 

will, if we did not allow them to do this. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes, sir; a couple of points. First, as I mentioned, in this negotiation or in any similar negotiation, I think 

both teams come to the table with a consciousness of how they will 

explain the final agreement to legislators and to the public back 

home, and it will be perceived regardless of the explanation. And 

so, I would say that in the case of the Republic of Korea, we had 

a consciousness that there is a possibility of that kind of political 

comparison to Japan being made when it is reviewed back home. 

But I can say it was not in any way an explicit part of the negotiation. It was not a demand pressed by the Republic of Korea in 

this case. Rather, we both agreed that we had to find something 

that demonstrated how strong our bilateral nuclear cooperation is, 

and I think we have done that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, on that same line of discussion, then you 

would agree with me as we continue to throw the gold standard by 

the wayside, as we continue to allow people to reprocess and enrich, as we continue to go down this path, go down this path, go 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

11 

down this path, that that consciousness will continue to be an issue 

with others that we talk about or negotiate with because they also 

will be saying, well, my friend in the region has this capability, so, 

therefore, I must, too, or the people back home will view that I am 

a weak negotiator. So we are going to continue with this syndrome, 

are we not? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I cannot quite agree. First, I can agree that 

I have never liked the word ‘‘gold standard.’’ I understand it was 

coined by a colleague of mine in the State Department, but I think 

it is an inaccurate description of our policy. And especially when 

I recall what the gold standard did to the world economy in the 

1920s, I think it is a bad metaphor to use. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, for people viewing this particular hearing, 

let me just say there is no relevance whatsoever to the two gold 

standards. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. So go ahead. Okay. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, sir. As we discussed in depth at 

a hearing in January of last year, our policy is not to insist on a 

one-size-fits-all standard for every country. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. So, just, look, we have got to—just if you 

would, as we continue—forget the gold standard. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Okay. 

The CHAIRMAN. As we continue—we have—obviously the gold 

standard is not operational anymore, although we might want to 

do some things to attempt to change that, especially with all that 

is occurring in this regard. But is it fair to say that as we continue 

to allow other countries the ability to enrich and reprocess, that as 

that expands out, and it is expanding out geometrically under this 

administration—geometrically, even with state sponsors of terror, 

Iran as we continue to do that, is it not true that when you sit 

down and negotiate with people, the consciousness is going to be 

that they are going to look weak if we allow a state sponsor of terror to enrich while they are a good actor, if we allow the Republic 

of Korea to move down this path when we have stated that the peninsula will not have that kind of activity. 

Again, nothing against President Park or South Korea, but this 

continues to feed the same problem as we move around the world, 

does it not? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Senator, I am never happy to disagree with 

you, but I do have to contest the premise of the question. 

The CHAIRMAN. You are a good soldier. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Well, it is what I believe, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Under this administration, the enrichment 

and reprocessing technology has not spread. There are no countries 

enriching and reprocessing today that were not doing it 8 years 

ago. And the one country that advanced in recent years in its enrichment capability, Iran, which expanded dramatically its enrichment capability since 2000 is now constrained. 

So far from being a geometrical spread of such technologies, 

under this administration there has been a constriction of those capabilities. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just walk down a series of questioning, 

and, I mean, I just look at the most recent agreements we have enFOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

12 

tered into. In every case, we have expanded those countries’ abilities in the 123 agreements we have come to. I am sorry, that is at 

the start opposition to what you just said. This agreement does the 

same thing. 

Let me just walk you down a list of questioning, and my temperature is rising slightly—I feel like, you know, and I am sorry. 

The agreements we have entered into on the 123 side, I am sorry, 

are not consistent with what you just said. They are not consistent. 

This agreement is not consistent with what you just said, and I am 

disappointed that you would cause people to think that that is the 

case. 

So let me just walk down a line of questioning. Is it the United 

States policy that South Korea should not pursue or develop reprocessing capabilities? Is that our policy? I want to make sure we 

communicate that real clearly today to the President of South 

Korea. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. That is a policy decision that should be taken 

later, taken into account a number of issues that we have agreed 

to study together. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I want to bypass some of the—I want to 

come back to that question. What we are really doing is we are 

putting the next person that you have punted this decision to in 

a very awkward position because what you are doing is you are 

leaving them with a bread trail toward reprocessing. You are allowing them to invest—you are causing them by your affirmation of 

this agreement to invest a lot of money in that direction. 

So the next executive, the next person in your position, is going 

to be in the bad position of feeling like we have dealt in bad faith. 

We have been dealing in bad faith with South Korea if we do not 

allow them to continue down that path. That is what you all have 

set up in this process. You know that is what we have set up in 

this process, and that is why you said that someone else down the 

road will have to make that decision. 

Why is that the United States—why did the United States agree 

to cooperate with South Korea on pyroprocessing, research, and 

projects? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Because our option was to cooperate with 

them or to have them do it alone, and we think it is smarter to 

have insight and cooperation on what they are doing and to be able 

to reach common conclusions about the physical, technical, and economic viability of pyroprocessing. 

The CHAIRMAN. This agreement will allow South Korea to operate the advanced spent fuel conditioning process facility, which is 

the first step in pyroprocessing. Is this, as I said earlier, not setting 

the expectation that the United States will ultimately agree to allowing the use of this technology with U.S.-obligated material? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. It may create that expectation for some, but 

we could not have been more clear in all the negotiations and in 

all statements surrounding this agreement that a future decision 

is not prejudged. 

The CHAIRMAN. So you do not think President Park right now believes that we have given a wink and a nod by granting that down 

the road they are going to be able to take further steps. And, again, 

you are looking at somebody who has a lot of faith in you. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

13 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I do not know what President Park believes, 

but I do not believe—I do not see a basis for her to conclude that 

this is a wink and a nod rather than what it actually is, black on 

white. This is—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that she believes this is taking 

her down the path and the country to a place where it is going to 

be very difficult for the next administration to deny the next steps 

that she and her country would like to take, again, our friends? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. If she believes that, she has been badly 

briefed about what we have said. 

The CHAIRMAN. Under today’s circumstances, would the United 

States negotiate an agreement with any country that provided advanced programmatic consent to the pyroprocessing spent fuel 

should the technology be found viable? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I am sorry, one more time, please? 

The CHAIRMAN. Under today’s circumstances, would the United 

States negotiate an agreement with any country that provided advanced programmatic consent to pyroprocessed spent fuel should 

the technology be found viable? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. That is an interesting question. The technology has not yet been proven viable. It may be technically viable, 

but economically and in terms of safeguards and security is a different question. Let me take that question. I mean, we negotiated 

with the ROK as one of our closest partners and as the country 

most interested in pursuing this technology. It is what scientists 

and engineers do is they go down interesting pathways. 

How to apply that to another country, I would have to think 

about, but it is not an issue that has come up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Why did the administration agree to language allowing for the enrichment of uranium up to 20 percent when South 

Korea currently has no enrichment capability? Why did we do that? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Again, we did not agree. We agreed that this 

is an issue that if the ROK makes a decision in the future that it 

wishes to pursue enrichment using U.S-obligated material, we will 

make a decision on that in the future. 

The CHAIRMAN. And, Tom, I am going to close out. I know Chris 

Murphy is here and wants to ask some questions. I am sure Jim 

Risch maybe. I do not think you can look at me with a straight face 

in this hearing and say that the way this agreement is written, the 

words, would not give some indication to people in South Korea 

that we have begun the green light toward additional activities. I 

do not think you could say that to me. If I am a legislator, if I am 

a constituent, and I read the agreement that we have before us, I 

just do not think you can tell me that it does not give some indication that down the road there will be additional doors opened. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I have been around capitals long enough to 

know that there are people who will read it in a number of different ways. But I agree 100 percent with what Senator Cardin 

said that this is a reasonable compromise on an issue in which we 

entered into the negotiations with differing positions, and I think 

our statements have been clear enough. 

Yes, some people will take encouragement about a decision that 

will be taken many years from now by officials different from the 

ones who are now in these jobs. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

14 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. But there is no promise. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and I will just say again, I will hang with 

my comment that the fact is that this administration continues to 

open doors to enrichment, toward reprocessing, continues to make 

it more and more difficult for others who really look at nonproliferation as an important issue. 

As you continue to let the camel nose under the tent, as you continue to let countries expand their reprocessing and enrichment capabilities, it makes it even more difficult, as was the case in this 

particular agreement, it makes even more difficult for us to really 

focus on nonproliferation in the ways that we set out in the very 

beginning. So that is a fact. 

That is why there were differences here. And that is why we find 

ourselves in a situation where I stand by before that these agreements that have been negotiated under this administration have 

done more to open the door toward these types of activities than 

I ever would have anticipated based on the kind of declarations 

that this President and others have made about nonproliferation. 

And I think it shows that we are not committed, that, in essence, 

national security is secondary to the economic benefits that come 

to some. 

So with that, Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for missing the substance of this, but I have been following the 

issue, and I thank you for the work you have done. I think I share 

some of the sentiments that Senator Cardin has expressed regarding what is a hard-fought and hard-won compromise, but a compromise first, second, and third. 

I guess you may have covered this a little bit in your opening remarks, but this is in general is a much more complicated relationship between the United States and South Korea than it has been 

the past. We have less influence on North Korea via the Chinese, 

less of a conduit into understanding and trying to influence their 

actions at the borders, obviously increased military tensions. We 

have a new trade agreement that many in the United States are 

unhappy with. There are complicated enforcement mechanisms in 

it. 

You know, I know you do not, you know, have the portfolio of 

overseeing the totality of the relationship, the commission set up 

within this certainly recognizes the context of the broader relationship and how this fits in. Can you just talk about sort of how this 

agreement sits within the broader bilateral relationship and its importance in terms of continuing to move our very important economic partnership developed after the trade agreement and the security partnership outside of nuclear cooperation? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes, sir. Maybe the best way I can do that is 

to speak explicitly to our nuclear bilateral relationship because I 

think it parallels the developments that you have spoken about. 

When we signed the first 123 agreement with the ROK in 1974, it 

was a reflection of a one-way street; that is, the United States was 

selling nuclear technology and equipment to the Republic of Korea 

so that they could start building electric power generation. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

15 

Today it is absolutely a reciprocal, mutually beneficial agreement. It is not a one-way street. It is definitely a two-way exchange 

of the best technology, of the best capabilities of competitive in the 

global marketplace for other countries that may want to buy nuclear power. And the negotiation and the terms of this agreement 

reflect that this is a partnership of equals, at least in this domain. 

And I think you can extrapolate that also in a number of ways 

to what we are doing together on the economic and the security 

and the diplomatic side as well. I hope that is useful to you. 

Senator MURPHY. I think we can speak in Connecticut to the importance of the energy relationship that extends well beyond nuclear power. Korea is the top buyer of fuel cell technology in the 

world from United States companies. Much of it comes from one 

company in Connecticut that has created hundreds of jobs based on 

a very close relationship between the United States fuel cell industry and the Korean fuel cell industry. It is mutually beneficial in 

that industry as it in the nuclear industry as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions? With that, we 

thank you. I am sure we are going to be following up with other 

questions. And as a matter of fact, subject to Senator Cardin’s approval, the record will remain open until close of business tomorrow. I know as usual you will promptly respond to those questions. 

Senator Markey apparently is rushing in. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. A great friend of nuclear proliferation, so I am 

sure that—— 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. He will cherish this agreement that 

has been put in place. With that, Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Okay. Thank you, and, Mr. Countryman, it is 

so good to see you again. I thank you for holding this hearing, and 

I apologize to you, Mr. Chairman, it is a very important hearing. 

There is a very real and dangerous risk inherent in international 

transfer of nuclear technologies. We last addressed our shared concern on these risks in May during the hearing on the China 123 

agreement. 

As I said then, we should not leave doors open for our partners 

to use U.S. technology to process spent nuclear fuel in ways that 

produce materials that can be used as the building blocks for nuclear weapons. 

Our agreements with partners need to preserve a meaningful 

U.S. role in such decisions. We have issues that, of course, are of 

concern even in this agreement because it leaves the door open to 

process something called pyroprocessing, which South Korea may 

begin doing as early as 2021 after completion of a study of its viability and proliferation risk. 

In 1996, I led a bipartisan group in the House opposed to 

pyroprocessing in the United States because it would not have been 

cost-effective, would have increased proliferation risk, giving a bad 

example to other countries. At the time, I called pyroprocessing bad 

for American efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. We 

were successful back then. It is just a very expensive way— 

pyroprocessing—of burning money, American taxpayer money. It 

was an absolutely crazy idea. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

16 

And so, we cannot allow these weapons usable materials, to be 

separated from spent nuclear fuel. It is very dangerous. Unfortunately, what we are potentially creating here is an open door to increased production of weapons usable material even by trusted 

partners, which can have unintended consequences, especially in 

regions prone to instability. 

East Asia’s regional politics are beset by rivalries over territorial 

claims and national aspirations, and aggravated by lingering antagonism from World War II. It is all still there. Compounding concerns raised by the China agreement is Japan’s intent to begin 

spent fuel reprocessing itself. Next spring it is expected to lead to 

a substantial increase in its already large quantity of weaponsgrade plutonium. 

Secretary Countryman, if Japan goes forward with its plans and 

the region believes that we are on track to help South Korea begin 

pyroprocessing starting in the 2020s, I just think that it is highly 

likely that China ultimately could help us maybe in playing a role 

if we could get together about its decisions on reprocessing, or else 

what we are going to have is just an ever-escalating upward spiral 

of interest in this issue that ultimately is going to create a real 

tragedy for us. 

So what I say to you, Mr. Secretary, when you are visiting these 

countries, when you are talking to these people in these countries, 

you have to deliver a message. This is dangerous stuff we are playing with. This is dangerous stuff that ultimately could come back 

in 15 or 20 years and create even more dangerous situations than 

Iran is today. Could you talk to us about that and what you would 

say would be a good message for these countries from the United 

States as a Cassandra-like mourning? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes, sir. Two comments on earlier statements 

by you, and then a direct answer. First, I do not agree that we 

have opened the door to pyroprocessing. We have just had this discussion. We have agreed to postpone a decision on that until the 

joint fuel cycle study is completed. The second comment is that the 

points you raised in 1996 and again today about high expense and 

vulnerability of fissile material are relevant today, and will be absolutely central among the criteria that we discuss in 2021 and 

afterwards. 

Third, in terms of the message for partners in East Asia or anywhere else is that decisions about E&R technologies, enrichment 

and reprocessing technologies, must be transparent, must be economically logical, and must be defensible on the basis of both the 

physical security and the safeguarding of such fissile material. 

And, yes, we do deliver that message in great detail in East Asia 

and elsewhere. 

Senator MARKEY. Okay. Well, I know that a group of 13 nonproliferation experts sent Secretary Moniz a letter earlier this 

month saying that continuation of United States spent fuel recycling work through the MOX fuel program, the Mixed Oxide Program, ‘‘helps plutonium recycling advocates in Japan, China, South 

Korea, and other states maintain the illusion that plutonium separation and recycling are activities that are responsible nonweapon 

state activities,’’ that they can engage in. Have you seen that letter, 

Mr. Secretary? 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

17 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes. 

Senator MARKEY. Are there opportunities from your perspective 

to ask all of our East Asian partners to defer commercial plutonium-based fuel activities? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I think that letter makes a number of valid 

points, and, yes, I look forward to discussing the concepts in that 

letter with partners in East Asia and beyond. 

Senator MARKEY. Honestly, I do believe this is a door-opening 

historic moment that is very troubling to me. I think that the message that you send, in my opinion, is a very strong one to them 

that we are at the threshold of yet another potential arms race. We 

are still dealing with selling civilian nuclear power plants to Iran. 

We attacked Iraq because of civilian nuclear programs, again, that 

were dangerous. North Korea has a civilian nuclear facility that— 

you know, that had one guise, but it was turned into something 

else. 

So while you say it did not open—does not open the door to 

pyroprocessing because the decision was postponed, I do not think 

that we should for a minute think that the door is locked, you 

know. I do not think it is locked at all. I think we have to make 

sure it is locked. I think that is our responsibility as the global 

leader in nuclear nonproliferation, and I urge you very strongly to 

send that message when you are meeting with these countries 

around the world. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you so much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I, you know, understand sometimes 

media outlets are not always accurate. In fact, that happens many, 

many times, and I understand how administrations and others, you 

know, spin the media. I just want to read from the—my staff just 

handed me the Korea Herald. I have no idea whether it is a respectable media outlet or not. My sense is it may be. ‘‘Korea Gains 

More Nuclear Leeway.’’ This is a sub headline. ‘‘Revised Pact 

Opens Door to Seoul’s Rights of Low Enrichment and Reprocessing.’’ 

And I do not think there is anybody—I am sorry, Mr. Countryman—that does not believe that that is exactly what we have done, 

including all the negotiators on the South Korean side. So, look, I 

am disappointed. I voted for an agreement when I first came here 

that I should not have, and that was the India agreement. 

You know, this has been going on. This is not a partisan issue, 

you know. It happened at the end of the Bush administration. It 

has been hugely expanded upon by the Obama administration. I 

know for private companies there is a lot of money at stake here. 

I got that. A lot of these private companies, as we have learned in 

previous hearings and even in this particular case. 

I think the technology that South Korea plans to use is actually 

technology that ultimately through a subsidiary and then a holding 

company is owned by Japan, which is pretty fascinating. But in 

any event, you know, we see private interest, in my opinion, trumping national security interests on a constant basis, and it is disappointing. 

So I think we are probably going to have a meeting of this committee to see if there are steps we can take to try to stop that from 

happening. We thank you for your service. I do not know if you are 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

18 

going to be testifying before us. Are there any other agreements 

that include reprocessing and enrichment that you plan to bring 

before us between now and the end of the year? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. No, sir. But if I could make two very quick 

comments. One is I appreciate, and I take very much to heart your 

statement that this not a partisan issue. I think there has been 

consistent strong support from administrations and Congresses of 

every political stripe for nonproliferation objectives. And I value 

that very much. And I have taken very careful note of all the comments and questions you have asked, and we will do our damndest 

to answer those in consultation with you and your staff as you 

have time. 

I do have to say on economic interests, at no point were economic 

interests primary in this negotiation. At no point did I get instructions from my leadership or from the White House to make this an 

economically good agreement for the United States or for U.S. companies. The only exception is that we agreed to an ROK request 

that one of the working groups of the bilateral commission specifically deal with commercial cooperation and issues such as export 

licensing from the U.S. side. 

I say this because I simply cannot agree in all the time I spent 

negotiating this that economic interests were at any point primary 

to non-proliferation interests. 

The CHAIRMAN. Actually in fairness, I would say in this particular agreement that the primary issue was the fact that all of 

their neighbors are able to do it. So I would agree with you. I 

would say that in many of our agreements I do think that commercial interest has driven it, and it is interesting. I support strongly 

the nuclear industry. I mean, I am a strong supporter of nuclear 

power. We have got 103 or four plants in our country today. I wish 

we had more. 

I think it is not appropriate in the name of commercialization for 

countries to be enabled, if you will, to have the full fuel cycle and 

be able to proliferate nuclear weapons. I just do not. But in this 

case, I agree. I think it was more of the fact that Japan has it, others have it in the region. And the fact that we continue to lower 

our guard, we let our enemies have it—Iran. And I just think over 

time the pressures continue to mount for us to lower our standard 

so that ‘‘we are treating our friends at least as well as our enemies.’’ 

So with that, again, thank you for your service. 

The record will remain open until close of business tomorrow. I 

know you will answer promptly. 

And we look forward to seeing you again hopefully not on this 

type of subject. Thank you. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS M. COUNTRYMAN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. Recently, the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) announced 

its intention to complete a deal with AREVA to build a plant capable of chemically 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

19 

separating 8 tons of plutonium—enough to fashion more than 1,500 inefficient nuclear weapons. CNNC also announced its desire to have this plant up and running 

by 2020 so that they could stockpile material for a large breeder that might come 

on line by 2040. This could result in China having a stockpile of plutonium capable 

of fueling 20,000 or more nuclear weapons. 

♦ What unique nuclear security challenges might these activities as distinct from 

having a nuclear power system that does not recycle plutonium pose for those 

trying to promote nuclear security? 

♦ To promote nuclear security, would it not be better if China chose not to proceed 

or to delay this effort? 

Answer. As China is a nuclear weapon state under the definition of the treaty on 

the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it already possesses large quantities of 

indigenously produced highly enriched uranium and plutonium for its military programs. If China were to purchase and operate a commercial reprocessing facility, 

China would be responsible for maintaining it in accordance with its obligations 

under the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 

Material upon its entry into force. Both China and the United States have ratified 

the amendment and its entry into force is likely to occur soon. 

In order for U.S. obligated material to be reprocessed at such a facility, the United 

States and China will also have to agree on a set of arrangements and procedures 

mandating the physical security and safeguards procedures to be in place at the 

facility. The United States and China also have recently agreed to launch a bilateral 

nuclear security dialogue to improve and make more transparent our respective 

nuclear security practices and to facilitate exchange of best practices. 

Question. Has the U.S. Government ever proposed an informal commercial plutonium recycling activity time out with Japan, South Korea, and China? Might it consider promoting such a time out in the lead up to the next nuclear security summit 

to be held next march in Washington? 

Answer. The United States has consistently sought to discourage the spread of 

enrichment and reprocessing technologies worldwide. We have made this position 

clear to our partners in East Asia.? 

Question. Since the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 

with Iran on July 14, 2015, have any countries with a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States indicated a desire to alter their current approach 

toward enrichment or reprocessing? 

Answer. The Department has responded under a separate coversheet. 

Question. Since July 14, 2015, has the United Arab Emirates raised any concerns 

regarding potential implications of the JCPOA for the 2009 U.S–UAE nuclear cooperation agreement with Secretary Kerry or any other State Department official? 

If so, what concerns have been raised and when and how were they transmitted to 

the Department? Please provide a classified response if necessary. 

Answer. The Department has responded under a separate coversheet. 

Question. Does the JCPOA qualify as a ‘‘peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement’’ 

with ‘‘any other nonnuclear weapon State in the Middle East’’ under the ‘‘Equal 

Terms and Condition for Cooperation’’ clause of the 2009 U.S.–UAE nuclear cooperation agreement? 

Answer. No. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is not an agreement for 

peaceful nuclear cooperation (a ‘‘123 agreement’’) in accordance with the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954 or within the meaning of the Agreed Minute in the U.S.–UAE 

nuclear cooperation agreement—123 agreements allow U.S. suppliers to export 

nuclear reactors and fuel to our partners. The JCPOA does not contemplate such 

U.S. exports. Rather, the JCPOA is a discrete set of measures to verifiably ensure 

that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. It has no bearing on the terms of our 

existing 123 agreements. 

Question. Has the UAE requested that the United States provide the details of 

cooperation with Iran as outlined in the ‘‘Equal Terms and Condition for Cooperation’’ clause of the 2009 U.S.–UAE nuclear cooperation agreement? 

Answer. The United States has provided in-depth information to the United Arab 

Emirates on the details of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but 

those briefings were in context of our close and regular diplomatic engagement on 

Iran, not in the context of the U.S.–UAE 123 Agreement. 

FOREI-MBP-19 with DISTILLER

20 

Question. Has the UAE requested that discussions begin regarding the possible 

amendment of the 2009 U.S.–UAE nuclear cooperation agreement as allowed under 

the ‘‘Equal Terms and Condition for Cooperation?’’ 

Answer. The Department has responded under a separate coversheet. 

Æ 

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