COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Felton and Senior Judge Willis 

REGINA JENKINS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0428-03-1 PER CURIAM 

 SEPTEMBER 2, 2003 

CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

 Randolph T. West, Judge 

 (Stephen A. Hudgins, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 (Kim Van Horn Gutterman, Assistant City 

Attorney, on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 Regina Jenkins (mother) appeals the February 7, 2003 order 

of the trial court terminating her residual parental rights with 

respect to her daughter, Lexus Emma Jenkins. The trial court 

determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that mother, 

without good cause, failed to provide or substantially plan for 

the child's future for a period of six months after her 

placement in foster care as required by Code § 16.1-283(C)(1); 

that mother, without good cause, has been unwilling or unable to 

substantially remedy the conditions which led to the child's 

foster care placement within a reasonable period of time in 

accordance with Code § 16.1-283(C)(2); and that, under Code 
§ 16.1-283(E)(i), mother's residual parental rights to a sibling 

have previously been terminated. The trial court concluded that 

termination of mother's residual parental rights served the 

child's best interests and ordered that Newport News Department 

of Social Services (NNDSS) had authority to place the child for 

adoption. 

 Mother argues that the evidence does not support the trial 

court's finding that termination served the child's best 

interests. Specifically, she argues that NNDSS did not present 

sufficient evidence to prove that she failed to substantially 

remedy the causes which led to the child's placement in foster 

care, that she failed to plan for the child's future, and that 

termination served Lexus's best interests because of the prior 

termination of mother's rights to a sibling. Upon reviewing the 

record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of 

the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

Background

 On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to NNDSS, the prevailing 

party below. See McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 391 

S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990). So viewed, the evidence proved that on 

January 28, 2002, mother gave birth to Lexus while incarcerated 

pending a grand larceny charge. At the time of her 

incarceration in December 2001, mother was eight months 

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pregnant. For the first eight months of her pregnancy, mother 

continued to feed her twenty-year drug addiction with cocaine 

and alcohol. Mother's drug use stopped only after this most 

recent arrest and imprisonment. 

 Mother arranged for Lexus to live with Tracy Evans, a 

family friend, while mother remained in jail. On February 9, 

2002, mother posted bond and obtained her release. The 

following day, mother attended a doctor's appointment with Evans 

and Lexus concerning Lexus's medical condition. The examining 

physician concluded that Lexus suffered from acid reflux and 

proscribed appropriate medication. Days after the appointment, 

mother went to NNDSS seeking help with Lexus's medication. 

 Sally Richie, an intake worker in the NNDSS Emergency 

Medication Program, met with mother to discuss her situation. 

Mother informed Richie of her recent release from prison. 

Mother explained that after her release, she took Lexus and 

moved into her sister's apartment but that they were being 

evicted. Mother told Richie that she did not have a job and 

that she had other children in foster care. Richie alerted 

Child Protective Services (CPS) to the situation. 

 Kim Taylor, a CPS employee, learned through her 

investigation that mother had five other children in government 

custody and that her rights to three of the children were 

terminated in 1999. Taylor knew that Lexus suffered from 

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certain medical conditions and that NNDSS provided mother with 

money to check on Lexus' medical care. 

 Taylor tried to locate mother and Lexus. The search 

started with Tracy Evans, the family friend who cared for Lexus 

during mother's incarceration. Evans did not know mother's 

current whereabouts. After a four-day search, Taylor located 

the child at the home of mother's sister and took Lexus into 

custody. Taylor placed Lexus with foster parents on February 

21, 2002. At the time of her placement, Lexus suffered from 

severe diaper rash and was later diagnosed with pneumonia in 

both lungs. 

 In April 2002, mother was convicted on the grand larceny 

charge and received a suspended sentence based on successful 

completion of the Youth Challenge Program for Women. Mother 

entered the program in October. She is expected to complete the 

program sometime in 2004. Mother has not seen Lexus since her 

conviction and incarceration and cannot visit Lexus at the NNDSS 

offices. 

 On May 31, 2002, George Flood, the NNDSS social worker 

assigned to handle Lexus's case, filed a petition for 

termination of residual parental rights in the Newport News 

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (JDR court). The 

petition asked that the court grant NNDSS legal custody of 

Lexus. On November 26, 2002, the JDR court entered an order 

terminating mother's residual parental rights in Lexus pursuant 

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to Code § 16.1-283(E)(i). Mother appealed the order to the 

circuit court. On February 7, 2003, the circuit court heard 

from all three social workers involved in the case as well as 

from mother and concluded that termination of mother's residual 

parental rights served Lexus' best interests. 

Analysis

 Mother contends that the trial court erroneously terminated 

her residual parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283. She 

claims that the evidence did not support the conclusion that 

termination of her rights served her child's best interests. 

 When considering termination of a parent's residual rights 

to a child, "the paramount consideration of a trial court is the 

child's best interests." Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human 

Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). On 

review, "[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed 

all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and 

made its determination based on the child's best interests." 

Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 

(1990). "The trial court's judgment, when based on evidence 

heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it." Logan, 13 Va. App. at 

128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. 

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Code § 16.1-283(E)(i) 

 The pertinent part of Code § 16.1-283(E) provides that 

[t]he residual parental rights of a parent 

or parents of a child who is in the custody 

of a local board or licensed child-placing 

agency may be terminated by the court if the 

court finds, based upon clear and convincing 

evidence, that it is in the best interests 

of the child and that (i) the residual 

parental rights of the parent regarding a 

sibling of the child have previously been 

involuntarily terminated . . . . 

 At trial, the evidence proved that the JDR court 

involuntarily terminated mother's rights to three of her 

children on August 30, 1999. 

 NNDSS removed Lexus from her mother and placed her with a 

foster family on February 21, 2002, less than a month after her 

birth. Flood testified that her foster parents are attentive 

and anxious for the opportunity to adopt her. He stated that 

Lexus is thriving in her new environment and receiving all 

necessary medical care. 

 The record supports the decision of the trial court to 

terminate mother's parental rights to Lexus under Code 

§ 16.1-283(E)(i). NNDSS presented evidence of the previous 

termination proceedings. The trial court concluded that 

termination of mother's residual parental rights served Lexus's 

best interests. Given mother's history and current 

circumstances, coupled with the bright prospects for Lexus's 

future, that decision is not plainly wrong or without evidence 

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to support it and will not be disturbed on appeal. See Logan, 

13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. 

Code § 16.1-283(C) 

 Mother claims that the trial court erred in determining 

that it was in Lexus's best interests to terminate mother's 

residual parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C) because 

mother failed to plan for the child's future and failed to 

substantially remedy the causes which led to the child's 

placement in foster care. She argues that NNDSS did not offer 

any services to mother and did not present evidence that mother 

failed to remedy the conditions that required Lexus's placement 

in foster care. 

 Given our determination that the trial court did not err in 

terminating mother's parental rights pursuant to Code 

§ 16.1-283(E)(i), we need not address this issue. 

 Accordingly, we summarily affirm the trial court's decision 

to terminate mother's residual parental rights. 

Affirmed. 

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