SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5595-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

MARVIN EURE, JR., a/k/a

MARVIN EURIE and 

MARVIN EURE,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted January 12, 2021 – Decided March 5, 2021

Before Judges Fisher and Moynihan.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 15-08-1860.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Michele A. Adubato, Designated Counsel,

on the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Lucille M. 

Rosano, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
A-5595-18

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PER CURIAM 

Defendant Marvin Eure, Jr. pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit 

murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-4(a), amended from the indicted charge of murder, and unlawful 

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), was sentenced and did not file a 

direct appeal but instead later filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition that 

was denied. He now argues:

POINT I

THE [PCR] COURT ERRED IN DENYING . . . 

DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] WITHOUT 

AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE 

FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL 

REPRESENTATION FROM PLEA COUNSEL.

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES.

B. FAILURE OF PLEA COUNSEL TO 

CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE 

INVESTIGATION.

C. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE ALIBI 

DEFENSE.

D. FAILURE TO FILE ON APPEAL ON 

BEHALF OF DEFENDANT.

E. FAILURE OF ATTORNEY TO GIVE 

PROPER ADVICE REGARDING 

DEFENDANT'S DECISION TO PLEAD 

GUILTY.
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F. FAILURE OF PCR COURT TO 

CONDUCT AN EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING.

Reviewing the PCR court's factual inferences drawn from the record and its legal 

conclusions de novo because it did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, State v. 

Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016), we reverse and remand for 

an evidentiary hearing.

Defendant's claims that counsel failed to: appeal his conviction; review

discovery with him; "ensure[] that he was fully cognizant of the elements and 

consequences of a guilty plea"; and pressured him to take an involuntary plea,

are bald and belied by the record. During the plea colloquy, defendant had all 

discovery save for a copy of a polygraph he received that day and had reviewed

discovery with counsel. The court and assistant prosecutor also reviewed the 

charges and plea agreement, including the sentence, dismissals and the rights 

defendant was waiving. Defendant confirmed no one pressured or coerced him 

to give up those rights; he did so voluntarily. He also stated no one forced, 

coerced or promised anything, other than what was stated on the record, that 

caused him to plead guilty. Furthermore, defendant has not set forth any 

arguments he would have made if an appeal had been filed.
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A "defendant must allege specific facts and evidence supporting his 

allegations," State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013), and "do more than make 

bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel" to 

establish a prima facie claim, State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. 

Div. 1999). "Defendant may not create a genuine issue of fact, warranting an 

evidentiary hearing, by contradicting his prior statements without explanation." 

Blake, 444 N.J. Super. at 299. Defendant's bald averments, belied by the record, 

do not establish a prima facie claim. And, an evidentiary hearing is not to be 

used to explore PCR claims. See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 157-58 (1997). 

As such, the PCR court properly denied an evidentiary hearing as to those issues.

Defendant did, however, submit certifications from Khalil Sykes and 

Jahson Coles who swore they were with defendant on the evening of the murder, 

which the State alleged to have occurred at approximately 11:28 p.m. The PCR 

court rejected defendant's contention that his trial counsel failed to investigate 

his alibi defense and interview an alibi witness because 

a careful review of the [alibi witnesses'] statements 

shows that . . . defendant would not have had an alibi 

from 11:00 p.m. to 12:50 a.m., the time when the crime 

is alleged to have occurred. As such, Mr. Sykes would 

not have been able to serve as an effective alibi witness. 

In his certification, Mr. Sykes says he went into his 

apartment at 11:00 p.m. leaving [defendant] in the car, 

and that he was not with . . . defendant from 11:15 p.m. 

to 12:50 a.m. The State alleges that the murder 
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occurred approximately at 11:28 p.m. when by the very 

account of his "alibi" witnesses they were not with him. 

According to Jahson Cole's certification, he was with 

. . . defendant until about 10:15 p.m. or 10:30 p.m. 

Therefore, he could not have testified about . . . 

defendant's whereabouts at the time of the murder. As 

such, there is nothing in the record to support that an 

alibi defense would have been successful at the time of 

trial and that based on his alibi he would have secured 

his release.

Coles certified defendant left Coles's home at 10:30 p.m. He swore 

defendant left with Sykes. Though Sykes certified he left Coles's house with 

defendant at 10:00 p.m., went to Wendy's before going to the Essex County jail 

and Delaney Hall to make deposits to commissary accounts, and then stopped at 

Sykes's home, where Sykes left defendant in the car until Sykes "came back out" 

around 11:00 p.m., the PCR court misapprehended that Sykes was not with 

defendant "from 11:15 p.m. to 12:50 a.m." Sykes certified after he re-joined 

defendant at 11:00 p.m., the two made their way to defendant's home, arriving 

at about 11:15 p.m. They did not go inside the house but went further down the 

block; defendant exited the vehicle and "was talking to a few people that he 

knew" while Sykes stayed in the car and "was on [his] phone." Sykes also 

certified they "stayed out there [until] about" 12:50 a.m. when they drove back 

to defendant's home. They sat in the car for ten minutes before defendant went 
A-5595-18

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into his home. Sykes drove home, arriving at 1:20 a.m.1 when he let defendant 

know he had arrived. 

Contrary to the PCR court's finding, the certifications evidence that Sykes 

was with defendant at the time of the alleged murder. Defendant, therefore,

established a prima facie case by presenting specific evidence of ineffective 

assistance of his counsel who he alleges did not interview the witnesses. See

Porter, 216 N.J. at 355. The court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing 

regarding that issue. See R. 3:22-10(b); State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63

(1992). 

The PCR court should not have considered defendant's admissions during 

the plea colloquy in light of his contention that he may not have made those 

admissions if his counsel had investigated the alibi defense. When he gave up 

the right to present witnesses on his behalf, he did so without an investigation 

of the alibi witnesses. Had that investigation been performed, defendant may 

not have waived that right. 

Nevertheless, we do not suggest any factual findings and legal 

conclusions, leaving those to the PCR court to make after hearing from the 

witnesses produced at the evidentiary hearing and then perpending the 

1

 The certification sets forth the time as 1:20 p.m., an obvious typographical 

error considering the timeframe Sykes recounted.
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Strickland-Fritz prongs.2 That includes whether defendant has shown "that (i) 

counsel's assistance was not 'within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases'; and (ii) 'that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have [pleaded] guilty and 

would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129,

139 (2009) (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 

457 (1994)); see also State v. Gideon, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op. at 14-

16). It also includes an assessment of the strength of the State's proofs. See

Gideon, ___, N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 23-24).

Thus the PCR court could again properly consider that: defendant faced 

a minimum prison term of thirty years, all of it parole-ineligible, see N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-3(b)(1), on the murder charge; his criminal record exposed him to a 

possible extended term of life in prison; and he accepted a plea deal calling for 

an aggregate twenty-year prison sentence, subject to the No Early Release Act, 

2

 To establish a PCR claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 

must satisfy the two-pronged test formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 

N.J. 42, 58 (1987), first by "showing that counsel made errors so serious that 

counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth 

Amendment," Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687); then 

by proving he suffered prejudice due to counsel's deficient performance, 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 691-92; see also Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52. Defendant

must show by a "reasonable probability" that the deficient performance affected 

the outcome. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.
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N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, which the sentencing court reduced to eighteen years, 

concurrent to his federal sentence, resulting in what the PCR court said was, in 

effect, a net six-year sentence on these State charges. We do not advocate for 

that repeated analysis; we note only that those circumstances can be validly

considered. We leave it to the PCR court to determine if defendant met both 

Strickland-Fritz prongs.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.