United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-2563 

MARISOL QUEZADA-CARABALLO, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, 

Attorney General of the United States, 

Respondent. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER 

OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Lynch and Kayatta, Circuit Judges. 

Randy Olen on brief for petitioner. 

Enitan O. Otunla, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Benjamin 

C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and John W. 

Blakeley, Assistant Director, on brief for respondent. 

October 31, 2016 
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Marisol Quezada-Caraballo, a 

native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, petitions for review 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") decision affirming an 

Immigration Judge's ("IJ") denial of her application for a goodfaith-marriage waiver of the joint-filing requirement for a 

Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence ("Form I-751 waiver"). 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B). We deny the petition. 

I. 

As she admitted to the IJ, Quezada-Caraballo made a 

series of misrepresentations to advance her Form I-751 waiver 

application. During two interviews with United States Citizenship 

and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), she claimed that her exhusband, Jose Garay, lived with her in Rhode Island when, in fact, 

she and Garay had separated before she moved from Puerto Rico to 

the continental United States, and he had never lived with her in 

Rhode Island. Quezada-Caraballo also admitted that she had 

submitted fabricated documents, including a Verizon bill 

purportedly issued to her and Garay, and other mail apparently 

sent to Garay at their joint residence in Rhode Island. She had 

done so in order to make it appear as if Garay lived with her in 

Rhode Island. And she admitted to submitting several misleading 

affidavits, including one from Garay. 

The IJ denied Quezada-Caraballo's application for review 

of USCIS's denial of her Form I-751 waiver application and granted 
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Quezada-Caraballo voluntary departure. After taking into account 

the record evidence, including testimony by Quezada-Caraballo and 

two others who spoke on her behalf at the hearing, the IJ found 

that Quezada-Caraballo's numerous misrepresentations to USCIS 

undermined the credibility of her testimony. 

The BIA affirmed. It found that the IJ was warranted in 

drawing a "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, 

false in everything) inference from Quezada-Caraballo's 

misrepresentations. And it agreed with the IJ that, in light of 

Quezada-Caraballo's misrepresentations, the record evidence as a 

whole was insufficient to meet her burden to establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that she had entered into a goodfaith marriage. 

II. 

Under the substantial evidence standard, we must uphold 

the BIA's decision unless Quezada-Caraballo can show that "the 

evidence not only supports [reversal], but compels it." INS v. 

Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992). Quezada-Caraballo 

contends that the record as a whole establishes that her marriage 

to Garay was in good faith; that the IJ and BIA erroneously focused 

solely on her admitted misrepresentations and failed to consider 

the countervailing evidence; and that the BIA's approval of the 

IJ's falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus inference was unreasonable 

under the circumstances of her case. 
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We disagree. This court has already held that "the REAL 

ID Act [gives an] IJ discretion to draw [a] 'falsus in uno, falsus 

in omnibus'" inference. Wen Feng Liu v. Holder, 714 F.3d 56, 61 

(1st Cir. 2013). The relationship between the falsehoods and the 

undermined claim here is stronger than it was in Wen Feng Liu. 

Quezada-Caraballo's misrepresentations about the duration and 

scope of her cohabitation with Garay were directly material to her 

claim that she had married him in good faith. Further, QuezadaCaraballo was not dishonest about just one thing -- she made and 

relied on repeated misrepresentations. Consequently, the IJ was 

permitted to discredit Quezada-Caraballo's testimony. 

The BIA, like the IJ, considered the entire record. It 

agreed with the IJ that, in light of Quezada-Caraballo's 

misrepresentations, the record was insufficient to meet the burden 

of proof needed to establish a good-faith marriage. That 

conclusion is well supported by our precedent. This case is not 

like Cho v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 2005), in which 

we granted a petition for review and remanded to the BIA because 

the petitioner had submitted a jointly held health insurance 

policy, tax returns, bank accounts, automobile financing 

agreements, a credit card, and health and telephone records to 

corroborate her good-faith-marriage claim. Quezada-Caraballo's 

evidentiary showing, including the testimony of Garay's ex-wife 

and son, falls far short of that. See Valdez v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 
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407, 411–13 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding that petitioner's general 

testimony as to validity of his marriage and his submission of tax 

returns that provided little evidence of commingled assets were 

insufficient to demonstrate good-faith marriage). 

Nothing Quezada-Caraballo argues on appeal compels us to 

reverse the BIA's reasonable decision. 

III. 

The petition is denied.