J-S14011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

JOSE M. DE LEON GONZALEZ

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 932 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Suppression Order Entered June 30, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-56-CR-0000087-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: AUGUST 7, 2023

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the Somerset County 

Court of Common Pleas’ order granting Jose De Leon Gonzalez’s motion to 

suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless search of the truck he 

was driving following a traffic stop. After careful review, we affirm on the basis 

of the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court.

The Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint charging Gonzalez with 

intent to deliver and possession of a controlled substance after 770 bricks of 

heroin/fentanyl were found in the vehicle he was driving during a traffic stop. 

Gonzalez filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking to suppress evidence 

recovered from the warrantless search. 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On June 28, 2022, the trial court held a suppression hearing. The court 

heard testimony from Pennsylvania State Trooper Glenn Adams who 

conducted the traffic stop. Following the hearing, the court granted the 

suppression motion.1 The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal, certifying 

that the court’s suppression order would substantially handicap the 

prosecution of its case pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). The Commonwealth also 

complied with the trial court’s directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement 

of errors complained of on appeal. 

In response, the trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. In its 

opinion, the trial court summarized the relevant facts leading to the court’s 

decision to grant the suppression motion as follows: 

On January 5, 2021, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Pennsylvania 

State Trooper Glenn Adams conducted a traffic stop of [Gonzalez] 

for traveling in the passing lane on I-76 west, in violation of the 

Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. Trooper Adams eventually conducted 

a search of Gonzalez's van which revealed 770 bricks of 

heroin/fentanyl. The majority of the interactions between Trooper 

Adams and Gonzalez during the stop were captured on a motor 

vehicle recording ("MVR") from either a dashboard or passenger 

window camera viewpoint.

...

Once Gonzalez pulled off to the shoulder of the interstate, Trooper 

Adams approached the van and asked Gonzalez for his 

identification, registration, and proof of insurance. Gonzalez 

handed an identification card from the Dominican Republic to 

Trooper Adams, while the insurance and registration was under a 

third person. Trooper Adams then asked [Gonzalez] to "[p]lease 

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1 The trial court entered the order on June 28, 2022. However, the order was 

not docketed as filed until June 30, 2022. 
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come on with me and bring your jacket. I'm going to get you a 

warning, OK? We will just conduct this stop [at] my vehicle. It's 

safer for me, OK? I'll tell you why I stopped you. Come on back." 

Gonzalez exited the van, Trooper Adams patted him down and told 

Gonzalez "You can stay by my passenger side window, OK?" Once 

Trooper Adams entered his patrol car, he began to ask Gonzalez 

questions. Gonzalez was standing outside of the patrol car, looking 

inside through the passenger window. Trooper Adams testified, "it 

was slightly raining. It was cold." 

Trooper Adams asked a series of questions while he 

simultaneously investigated the validity of the identification and 

registration by using his computer. Trooper Adams asked "[i]s 

that [van] yours? ... What's his name? ... Where are you coming

from?" Gonzalez answered these questions in English, but usually 

after stating "ah?" as to prompt Trooper Adams to repeat his 

question. It is not clear whether the noise of the interstate, a 

language barrier, or a combination of both, caused this response 

from Gonzalez. Trooper Adams then asked "Where are you going? 

... A donde? ... Where do you live? ... Donde vive?" The Spanish 

version of the questions appeared to assist Gonzalez's 

comprehension because he answered quicker. Gonzalez answered 

"I have the address right now... Me? ... Reading, [Pennsylvania]."

A few minutes later Trooper Adams asked "How long are you going 

to be in, hmm, in Pittsburgh ... how long?" Gonzalez, with a 

confused look on his face, did not respond. Trooper Adams 

rephrased, “Cuanto tiempo en Pittsburgh?" Again, the Spanish 

version of the question got a quick response from Gonzalez, "Me? 

... I'm going to pick [up] and come back." 

Trying to figure out the van owner's full name and as his questions 

got more intricate, Trooper Adams began to use his cell phone as 

an English to Spanish translator. Trooper Adams asked through 

his cell phone translator "How long have you known him?" The cell 

phone articulated Trooper Adams' questions in Spanish. As 

Gonzalez began to formulate his response in English, Trooper 

Adams asked him to speak "en Espanol" to the phone, so it would 

be translated back into English. Each time questions were 

translated into Spanish for Gonzalez, he answered without 

hesitation. Trooper Adams used his cell phone as a translation 

service for approximately three minutes before reverting back to 

English. When asked at the suppression hearing about the 
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translation service, Trooper Adams explained that he "felt like we 

both understood what each other were saying more when we were 

speaking in English" and that the cell phone translation "muddied 

the waters a little bit." 

After reminding Gonzalez that he was only giving him a warning, 

Trooper Adams asked if there was anything illegal in the van, to 

which Gonzalez responded "I'm sorry?" Trooper Adams clarified 

by asking if there were any "drogas", Spanish for drugs, in the

van. Gonzalez responded "No, nothing. You can check it." 

Acknowledging at the suppression hearing that there was a "small 

language barrier", Trooper Adams attempted to obtain written 

consent. Trooper Adams handed Gonzalez a Spanish consent to 

search form because "I wanted Mr. De Leon Gonzalez to know 

clearly what I was asking and what his options were" and Trooper 

Adams "presume[d] that [Spanish] is his first language [and] that 

he would be better able to understand." Trooper Adams did not 

identify what the form was when he handed the form over to 

Gonzalez. When asked at the suppression hearing why he did not 

identify the form to Gonzalez, Trooper Adams stated "I think I was 

a little bit thrown off when he said -- when he started saying: ‘You 

can check it.’ And maybe I -- it slipped my mind."

A translator named Mr. Alejanro Pinzon read the Spanish consent 

form into the record at the suppression hearing. Part of the 

Spanish consent form translated into English stated "[a]rticles 

that will be looked for or confiscated, if found" to which Trooper 

Adams handwrote in the words "All contents any contraband" in 

English. The form also stated "I understand I have the right to 

refuse or deny this petition ... police may not be able to do this 

search without authorization." While handing the Spanish consent 

form to Gonzalez, Trooper Adams stated "You review it and then 

sign it after your read it". After Trooper Adams watched Gonzalez's 

"eyes track across the paper", Gonzalez responded "OK", and 

handed it back. Gonzalez did not sign the Spanish consent form 

prior to handing it back. Trooper Adams replied "I'm going to have 

you sign it in a second, OK?" 

Between the time of requesting Gonzalez's signature and receiving 

it, Trooper Adams was communicating with his back-up through 

his computer, waiting for the back-up to arrive to safely conduct

the search, and finishing documents related to the traffic stop. 

When Trooper Adams handed the Spanish consent form back to 

Gonzalez, he testified that he stated "[w]ith everything on the 
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form in mind, if you consent, can you sign the prescribed lines?", 

however, the statement according to the MVR was "[w]ith all that 

in mind, can you sign top and print in bottom, please". After this 

statement, Gonzalez complied and signed the form.

It is not clear when, if at all, Gonzalez was given back his 

identification, registration, and insurance documents. In addition, 

the MVR was played at the suppression hearing but only until 

Gonzalez signed the Spanish consent form and nothing further. 

Gonzalez completed his signature at approximately the 21:25 

minute mark of the MVR.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/22, at 1-5 (citations omitted). The trial court 

explained that it granted Gonzalez’s motion to suppress because it found the 

Commonwealth was unable to meet its burden with respect to proving the 

validity of the roadside consent. See id. at 11; see also Suppression Order, 

6/30/22. Further, the court put its reasons for suppression on the record as 

follows: 

Consent still remains a dangerous area. And when you have a big 

fish on the line or if you think you have a big fish on the line, you 

better know that you have your consent locked up.

Now, let's walk through the steps of what happened here.

The stop was good. The stop was good. I can see with my own 

eyes that the defendant was driving in the left lane for some 

period of time. Nothing drives me more crazy than being in a left 

lane on the Turnpike and then have somebody going 55 with the 

right lane open. The stop was good.

I think that the continued discussion with the defendant along the 

roadside developing information that was supported by 

reasonable suspicion was good. It was fine.

But what the Trooper developed along the road that evening was 

the reasonable suspicion to have a dog called to the scene, who 

would have alerted for sure, and then probable cause would have 
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been secured by a search warrant or a search warrant would have 

been issued as a result of the issue of the probable cause.

The Commonwealth has the burden of establishing that the 

consent was knowing, voluntary, freely given, and I don't believe 

in this instance, this instance, handing the document to the 

defendant and saying " Sign here" was good enough. 

Now, I'm going to change the facts a little bit. Had Trooper Adams 

said: This is a consent form. If you sign it, it will give me the right 

to search your vehicle and all of its contents. You understand that 

you are not obligated to sign this.

Those extra words would have secured the consent, but there's 

too much left to doubt in terms of the Commonwealth's burden 

here for the Court to find that this consent meets the legal 

standard required of our constitution.

I say out loud that I have no objection to aggressive drug 

interdiction along our highways. If nothing else, an awful lot of 

drugs were taken off the street that night and they don't have to 

be returned. But if you want to go the next step and secure 

prosecutions and convictions, you have to be more careful.

N.T., 6/28/22, at 65-67. 

On appeal, the Commonwealth argues the suppression court erred in 

concluding Gonzalez’s consent was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 

When this Court reviews a Commonwealth appeal from an order 

granting suppression, as we are tasked to do here, we may only consider the 

evidence produced at the suppression hearing and then, only that evidence 

which comes from the defendant’s witnesses, along with the Commonwealth’s 

evidence which remains uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 

25, 29 (Pa. 2021). We must determine, in the first instance, whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and if they 
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are, we are bound to those findings. See id. We must always keep in mind 

that the suppression court, as fact-finder, has the exclusive ability to pass on 

the credibility of witnesses. See Commonwealth v. Fudge, 213 A.3d 321, 

326 (Pa. Super. 2019). Therefore, we will not disturb a suppression court’s 

credibility determinations absent a clear and manifest error. See id. at 326-

327. 

We must also determine whether the legal conclusions the suppression 

court drew from its factual findings are correct. See Barr, 266 A.3d at 39. 

Unlike the deference we give to the suppression court’s factual findings, we 

have de novo review over the suppression court’s legal conclusions. See 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 2010). 

It is well-settled that a search conducted without a warrant is 

unreasonable and unconstitutional unless an established 

exception to the warrant requirement applies. One such exception 

is consent[.]

To establish a valid consensual search, the Commonwealth must 

first prove that the consent was given during a legal police 

interaction. Next, the Commonwealth must prove the consent was 

given voluntarily. To be considered valid, the consent must be the 

product of an essentially free and unrestrained choice — not the 

result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will 

overbourne — under the totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266 A.3d 1117, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2021) 

(en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the legality 

of the police interaction is not disputed. Accordingly, we direct our analysis to 

the second part of the test only - whether the consent was valid. 
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To determine whether a consent is valid when provided close in time to 

a traffic stop, courts consider the following factors:

1) the presence or absence of police excesses; 2) whether there 

was physical contact; 3) whether police directed the citizen's 

movements; 4) police demeanor and manner of expression; 5) 

the location of the interdiction; 6) the content of the questions 

and statements; 7) the existence and character of the initial 

investigative detention, including its degree of coerciveness; 8) 

“the degree to which the transition between the traffic 

stop/investigative detention and the subsequent encounter can be 

viewed as seamless, ... thus suggesting to a citizen that his 

movements may remain subject to police restraint,”; 9) the 

“presence of an express admonition to the effect that the citizensubject is free to depart is a potent, objective factor;” and 10) 

whether the citizen has been informed that he is not required to 

consent to the search.

Id. (citation omitted). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court we conclude 

the Commonwealth is due no relief. Following our review of the totality of the 

circumstances, we can find no error in the trial court’s analysis and conclusion 

that Gonzalez’s consent was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial 

court opinion properly addresses the suppression claim, and we adopt it as 

our own. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/22, at 6-7 (thoroughly addressing 

the 10 factors for assessing consent, and finding that factors 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, and 

10 weighed against a finding that Gonzalez consented to the search); see 

also id. at 7-11 (thoroughly addressing the similarities between this case and 

Carmenates, and highlighting that: neither Gonzalez nor Trooper Adams 

used the word “search;” Trooper Adams did not ask Gonzalez if he could read 
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or understand the Spanish language consent form; Trooper Adams did not 

explain what the Spanish language consent form was when he handed it to 

Gonzalez, and Trooper Adams did not offer a reason for this failure; Trooper 

Adams never informed Gonzalez that he could refuse to sign the Spanish 

language consent form, and in fact directed Gonzalez to sign it.). Accordingly, 

the trial court properly suppressed the evidence seized pursuant to the search.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/7/2023