1 0 8

- 5 2 6 8

- b k ( L ) ; 0 8

- 5 2 7 4

- b k ( C ON) In re K a lik o w R ea l E sta te 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 Augus t T er m 2 009 4 Docket Nos. 08-5268-bk(L); 08-5 274-bk (CON) 5 Argue d: Oc to be r 29 , 20 09 De ci de d: Ap ril 8, 2 010 6

_____________________________________________________________________________ 7 IN RE : PE TE R S . K AL IK OW

an d K AL IK OW

RE AL ES TA TE CO ., 8 Debtors

. 9

_____________________________________________________________________________ 10 SHELDON H. SOLOW, STEVEN M. CHERNIAK, 11 EVERGENCE CA PITAL ADVISORS, INC., and SHEILA M. GOWAN, 12 CH AP TE R 1 1 T RU ST EE OF DREI ER LLP , e t al., 13 Appellants , 14 - v. - 15 PE TE R S . K

AL IK OW

an d K AL IK OW

RE AL ES TA TE Co ., 16 Appellees

. 17

_____________________________________________________________________________ 18 Before: MINER, RAGGI, and HALL, Circuit Judges. 19 Ap pe al

fro m a ju dgm en t e nt er edonSe pt em be r 30 , 20 08, inth e U ni te d S ta te s D is tr ic t C ou rt 20 for the Southern District of New York (Batts, J.), affirming orders entered on June 21, 2004, and 21 Oc to be r 14 , 20 04, inth e U ni te d S ta te s B an kru pt cy Co ur t f or th e S ou th er n D is tr

ic t o f N ew

Yo rk 22 (Lifland, B.J.) that granted former-debtors appellees’ mot ion to reopen Chapte r 11 proceedings, 23 impose sanctions against appe llants, and award costs a nd fees to appellee s, the District Court ha ving 24 fou ndth at

th e B an kru pt cy

Co ur t ( 1) di d n ot

er r inpr oc ee di ng b y m ot

io n i ns te adof a n a dv er sa ry 25 proceeding; (2) had personal jurisdiction over appellant s who were not initially named in appellees’ 26 motion; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against appellant s. 27 Affirmed in part; vacated in part and re manded with instruc tions. 28 D AV I D M. G O SS ETT , Richard Ben-Veniste, Maye r 29 Brown LLP, Washington, D.C., for AppellantsSheila McGowan, as Chapte r 11 Trustee for Dreier LLP, has been substituted in place of 1 th e o rig in al ap pe lla nt Dr ei er LLP

. Only appellants Solow and Che rniak submitted briefs to this Court. By let ter dated A ugust 2 18, 200 9, S he ila

Mc Go wa n j oi ne d i n all a rgu me nt s r el ev an t t o D re ie r, L LP. 2 1 Sheldon H. Solow and Steven M. Cherniak 2 Joan M. Secofsky, Howard D. Ressler, Diamond 3 McCarthy LLP, New York, NY, for Appellants 4 Ev erge nc e C ap it al Advis or s, In c. , a ndSh eilaM. 5 Go we n, Ch ap te r 11 Tr us te e o f D re ie r LL P 6 R ANDY M. MAS TR O , G ib so n D un n & Cr ut ch er LLP , 7 New York, NY, for Appellees Pet er S. Kalikow and 8 Kalikow Real Estate Co. 9 MINER, Circuit Judge: 10 Appellants, Sheldon Solow (“Solow”), Steven Che rniak (“Cherniak”), Evergence Capital 11 Advisors, Inc. (“Evergence”), the law firm of Dreier LLP, Marc S. Dreier, and Kosta Kovachev 1 12 (collectively , the “Appellants”), appeal from a judgment ente red on Septembe r 30, 2008, in the 2 13 Unit edSt at es Di stric t C ou rt for th e S ou th er n D is tr

ic t o f N ew

Yo rk ( Ba tt s, J.) , a ffi rm in g or de rs 14 entered on June 21, 2004, and October 14, 2004, in the United State s Bankruptcy Court for the 15 So uthe rnDi st ric t o f N ew Yo rk ( Lif la nd , B .J. ). Th e B an kru pt cy Co ur t’ s o rd er

of J un e 2 1, 2 004 , 16 granted (1) the motion of debtors-appellees, Pete r S. Kalikow and Kalikow Real Estate Co. 17 (t oge th er , “Kal

iko w” ), to re op enCh ap te r 11 pr oc ee di ngs , p ur su an t t o 1 1 U. S.C . § 350 (the “35 0 18 Mo ti on ”) ; a nd (2) t he mo ti onof Kal

iko w s ee king

anor de r, p ur su an t t o 1 1 U. S.C . § § 1 05, 524 , 11 41, 19 as against Evergence and against its “controlling persons[] and agents,” including the law firm of 20 Dreier LLP, to enforce the release , discharge, and injunction provisions of Kalikow’s plan of 21 re orga ni za ti on(the “Pl an ”) se t f or thinth e B an kru pt cy

Co ur t’ s C on fir ma ti onOr de r o f Ja nu ary 2 7, 22 1994 (the “Enforcement Motion”). The Ba nkruptcy Court’s order of Octobe r 14, 2004, granted3 1 “costs and expenses, including, without limita tion, attorneys’ fee s and expenses,” incurred up to 2 Se pt em be r 28 , 20 04, inco nn ec ti onwi thth e E nfo rc em en t M ot io n. Th e t ot al

am ou nt of the aw ar d 3 se t f

or thinth e O ct ob er

14, 200 4 o rd er

wa s $3 34, 583 .12

. 4 On appeal, the District Court affirmed the judgment and orde rs of the Bankruptcy Court, 5 holding that: (1) the Bankruptc y Court correct ly found that it had the authority to c onduct the post

6 confirmation proceedings by motion, rathe r than by an adversary proc eeding, because Kalikow 7 so ugh t t o e nfo rc e the pr e- ex is ti ng i nj un ct io n a ndpr ov

is io ns of the Pla n a ndCo nfi rm at io n O rd er , 8 pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a)(2), 1141; (2) the Bankruptc y Court properly found that pe rsonal 9 ju ris di ct

io n e xis te d a s t o S ol ow

an d C he rnia k b ec au se , altho ughth ey we re no t i ni ti ally

na me d i n 10 Kalikow’s motions, they had inte ntionally atte mpted to c onceal their ident ities during the 11 pr oc ee di ngs inth e B an kru pt cy Co ur t; an d ( 3) th e B an kru pt cy Co ur t did no t a bu se it s d is cr et io n i n 12 imposing sanctions against the Appe llants because that court “possessed a mple evidence of 13 da mage s” a nd “c le arly pr ov id edth e b as is for

im po si ng s an ct

io ns ag ai ns t A pp ella nt s b y s pe ci fic ally 14 noting that the not ices posted by

them . . . violated the Confirmation Orde r . . . [and] that the 15 Ap pe lla nt s h adac te d i n b adfaith, wi thno le git im at e p ur po se for

th ei r c on du ct .” 16 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the District Court in all respects 17 except its imposit ion of sanctions upon the Appe llants, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a)(2), 1141, for 18 violating the injunction provisions of the Plan and Confirmation Order. We affirm the judgment of 19 the District Court in all other respects. 20 BA CKGRO UN D 21 I. Ba nkru pt cy Co ur t P ro ce edin gs 22 This appeal arises from Chapter 11 bankruptcy proc eedings commenc ed by Kalikow on 23 August 21, 1991, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the4 1 “Bankruptcy Court”). On Dec ember 21, 1993, Kalikow filed a plan of reorg anization. The Plan 2 vested Kalikow with the property of the e state, free from credit ors’ interests, and discharged 3 Kalik ow

fro m “ an y C laim an d a ny

‘d eb t’

. . . th at

[a ro se ] b ef or e the Ef fe ct ive Da te .” I n p ar ti cula r, 4 “every holder of a discharged Claim” was “precluded from asserting against [Kalikow] . . . any 5 further Claim based on any docum ent, instrument or ac t, omission, transaction or other ac tivity of 6 an y k

in d o r n atur e tha t o cc ur re d p rio r t o the Ef fe ct ive Da te .” 7 Th e B an kru pt cy Co ur t c on fir me d the Pla n p ur su an t t o aCo nfi rm at io n O rd er da te d J an ua ry 8 27, 199 4. T he Co nfi rm at io n O rd er : 9 (1) made “the Plan and its provisions . . . bindi ng upon the Debtors . . . and any 10 ho ld er

of a cl ai m again st

or in te re st inth e D eb to rs .” 11 (2) r el

ie ve d K al iko w o f all “ lia bi lit

y t o a ny ho ld er of a Cl ai m f or an y . . . a ct

ivi ty . . . 12 ar

is in g ou t o f . . . the co nfi rm at io n. ” 13 (3 ) o pe ra te d “a s adi sc ha rge . . . as to ea chho ld er of a Cl ai m, ” re lie vin g the de bt or s 14 “fr om all d eb ts th at ar os e again st

th em pr io r t o o r o n the Ef

fe ct ive Da te .” 15 (4) precluded any creditor holding a “discharged debt . . . from asserting against the 16 De bt or s, . . . an y o th er or fur th er Cl ai m” ba se d u po n a ct

ivi ty “pr io r t o the Ef

fe ct ive 17 Da te .” 18 (5) “restrained and enjoined” all “creditors . . . whose c laims are discharged” from 19 “employing any process or any ac t to collect , recover, or offset such debts,” except 20 as provided in the Plan. 21 The Confirmation Order also preserved credit ors’ claims for liability created by the express 22 terms of any agreeme nt or other docume nt execut ed and delivered by Kalikow in conne ction with 23 implementat

ion of the Plan. 24 As part of the Plan, Kalikow was required t o submit to the Ba nkruptcy Court a 25 representat

ion letter (the “Representat ion Letter”) that

would provide unsecured credit ors assurance 26 th at

Kalik ow ha d m ad e a

ful l d is cl os ur e o f the ir a ss et s. Kalik ow su bm it te d s uc h ale tt er

onFe br ua ry 27 17, 1994. The Representation Lette r reserved to the Plan Adm inistrator an enforcement mechanismThe Plan Administrator Agreeme nt provides that upon a de termination by the Bankruptcy 3 Court, “following notice to all parties in interest, including [Kalikow], and a hea ring, that the Plan Administrator has unreasonably refused or failed to pursue any right or remedy . . . after rec eiving written reque st to do so from the holder of an [unsec ured] [c]laim, the n the [Bankruptcy ] Court may authorize such holder t o pursue such right and remedy on be half of all of the holders of [unsecured] [c ]l ai ms .” 5 1 in the event of a brea ch by Kalikow. It authorize d the Plan’s Administrator, on behalf of creditors, 2 to pursue a post-confirmation claim “as a result of a misrepresentation or breac h of the 3 representat

ions and warranties set

forth [in the Represent ation Letter]” up to t en years from the 4 Plan’s effective date — i.e., until February 17, 2004. This provision of the Represe ntation Lette r 5 was incorporated into se ction 4.6 of the Plan Administrator Agreeme nt, which state d that “[e]xce pt 6 as expressly provided . . . in this Section 4.6 [of the Plan Administrator Agree ment], no person othe r 7 than the Plan Administrat or shall have authority to c ommence a ny legal action or otherw ise pursue 8 any right or remedy with respect t o any misrepresent ation or breach of warranty under the Kalikow 9 Representat

ion Letter.” Should the Plan Administrator dec line to pursue such a claim, se ction 4.6 of 10 the Plan Administrator Agree ment authorize d an unsecured cre ditor to seek the court’s permission 11 to pu rs ue a p os t- co nfi rm at io n c laim as de sc rib edinth e R ep re se nt at io n Le tt er . 3 12 In February 1994, a few weeks after the Confirmation Order had issued, Solow provided 13 Kalik ow

wi tha $ 7 m ill

io n l oa n a nd re ce ive d i n e xc ha nge anop ti onto buy a n i nt er es t i n K al iko w’ s 14 re orga ni ze d b us in es s. Kalik ow re paid th at

lo aninJu ne 199 4 —

mo re th anfiv e y ea rs ea rli er th anit 15 was due. Kalikow then re purchased the purc hase-option from Solow for $2 milli on in 1995. The 16 rapid repayment of the loan and repurchase of the opt ion caused Solow to spec ulate that Kalikow 17 had conceale d a portion of their assets from creditors. Solow neve r produced any evidenc e to 18 support that spec ulation. In 1997, Solow moved in the Bankruptcy Court for the appointm ent of an 19 ex am in er

to inve st iga te Kalik ow ’s re pr es en ta ti on s. By this ti me , the ba nkru pt cy

ca se s w er e c lo se d.Cherniak was the Chief Ope rating Officer of the Solow Development Corporat ion. 4 The Notices a ppearing in the New York Post we re printed as “Legal Notice” and had the 5 following heading: “THI S IS A NOTICE TO ALL UNSECURED CREDITORS UNDER THE 1994 CHAPTER 11 PLAN OF REORGANIZA TION OF DEBTORS PETER S. KALIKOW AND KALIKOW REAL ESTATE CO .” Solow paid more than $70,000 in advertising costs for the placem ent of the Not

ices in The New

York Times and the New York Post. 6 1 The Plan Administrator had bee n discharged on Decem ber 26, 1995. Kalik ow opposed the m otion, 2 argui ng tha t S ol ow la ck edst an di ng t o b rin g it as “apo st -c on fir ma ti onle nd er wh o h as be enpaid in 3 full.” The motion was denied. 4 Approximately seve n years after Solow’s motion w as denied, as the t en-year period for post5 confirmation claims was about to expire, Solow and Cherniak consulted Dreier LLP with respec t to 4 6 the approaching claims dea dline of February 17, 2004. At that time, Marc Dreier (“Dreie r”) of 7 Dr ei er

LLP co nt ac te d E ve rge nc e, a d ef un ct Flo rid a C or po ra ti on , a ndKo va ch ev , E ve rge nc e’ s 8 owner, to front as the c ontact for notice s (the “Notice s”) to apprise unsecured c reditors “under the 9 1994 Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Debtors Peter S. Kalikow and Kalikow Real Estat e Co” 10 of possible claims. The Notices c ontained a list of creditors of the e states, some listed with the 11 am ou nt s o f t he ir c laim s, follo we d b y the st at em en t: “Y oumay h av e a ddit io nal right s o f re co ve ry 12 based on a failure by the de btors to make truthful disclosure. The deadline for your pursuing 13 ad di ti on al

re co ve ry is Fe br ua ry

17, 200 4. All i nt er es te d c re di to rs sh ould co nt ac t the un de rs ign ed .” 14 The Notices bore the name of Evergenc e, and provided phone and fax numbers; however, the se 15 numbers were assoc iated with a t elephone and fax machine on the premises of Dreier LLP. After 16 the publication of the N otices on February 9 and 12, 2004, in The New York Times and the New 17 York Post, a number of listed creditors at tempte d to contac t Evergence, either individually or by 5 18 co un se l. I n r es po ns e t o the No ti ce s, th er e w er e e igh te enle tt er s ( fro m f or me r c re di to rs or

th ei r 19 counsel) faxed to the fax number provided, and there we re sixty-five telephone calls (from fifty-nineIn addition to Evergence and D reier LLP, notice of the Enforcement Mot ion was given to 6 the Office of the Untied St ates Trustee for the Southern District of New York and counsel to the Pla n A dm inis tr at or . According to the E nforcement Motion, the Securities and Exchange Com mission filed a 7 ci vil co mp lain t again st

Ko va ch ev

an d s ev er al

othe r in di

vid uals inNo ve mb er

200 3 fo r alle ge dly ru nnin g a$28 mi lli on“Po nz i s ch em e. ” 7 1 separate numbe rs) made to the number provided. The law firm of Bingham McCutchen prepa red 2 for

it s c lie nt , 10 01 F ifth A

ve nu e O wn er s, In c, an d fa xe d t o the nu mb er pr ov id ed , apr oo f of

cl ai m 3 for submission to the Bankruptcy Court. NFS Services, Inc. also submitt ed a lette r of authority to 4 collect on behalf of its client, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. However, no creditor submitte d a 5 claim to the Ba nkruptcy Court or Plan Administrator, or att empted t o recover from Kalikow 6 directly. 7 In response to the N otices, on April 14, 2004, Kalikow fil ed the 350 Motion seeking an 8 order pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350 to reopen Kalikow’s “substantively consolidate d bankruptcy 9 ca se s. ” O n A pr

il 2 0, 2 004 , K al

iko w f ile d the En for ce me nt

Mo ti on , p ur su an t t o 1 1 U. S.C . § § 1 05, 10 524, 1141, seeking “to enforc[e] the release, discharge, and injunction provisions of the Plan and 11 Confirmation Order.” The Enforcement Motion wa s directed against “Evergence Capital Advisors, 12 Inc., and its directors, officers, controlling persons, and agents, including the law firm of Dreier 13 LLP .” Th e m ot

io n i de nt ifi edEv erge nc e a s ade fun ct Flo rid a c or po ra ti on , d is so lve d o n O ct ob er 4, 6 14 2002. Kosta Kovachev was identified as the president of Evergence. Kalikow alleged in the 7 15 Enforcement Motion that the Not ices had been plac ed in bad faith, had been designed t o appear as 16 if o rd er edby

a c ou rt , h adcr ea te d c on fus io n a mo ng c re di to rs , a ndha d i nj ur edKalik ow ’s re pu ta ti on . 17 The Enforcement Motion sought an order (1) enjoining publication of the Notic es pursuant to the 18 Plan, the Confirmation Order, and 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 114 1; (2) directing Evergence t o cease and 19 de si st

fro m “ en ga gin g inan y f

ur th er su chac ti on s”; (3 ) r eq

ui rin g E ve rge nc e t o p ub lis h c or re ct ive8 1 notice of the sam e size, placem ent, and frequency in the same publicat

ions; and (4) imposing 2 sanctions on Evergence in the amount of Kalikow’s costs a nd attorneys’ fee s related to invest igating 3 and responding to the Notic es. 4 On May 6, 2004, Kalikow deposed Marc S. Dreier at the offices of Dreier LLP to discover 5 any information Dreier might have regarding the Not ices. At tha t time, Dreier de clined to name the 6 clients who had c ontacte d Dreier LLP with regard to the post-confirmation claims, cit ing 7 at to rn ey -c lie nt

pr ivile ge . So me ti me th er ea ft er , the Ba nkru pt cy Co ur t h el d aco nfe re nc e i n c ha mb er s 8 and compelled disclosure. When the deposition resumed on May 28, 2004, Dreier named Solow and 9 Ch er ni ak

as th e f irm ’s cl ie nt s. 10 On June 7, 2004, Dreier LLP filed an objection to the Enforcement Motion on be half of 11 Solow and Cherniak, claiming that Kalikow’s motions had “sought no relief against [the m].” The 12 ob je ct

io n d is pu te d K al

iko w’ s alle ga ti on s o f ba d fa ith, argui ng tha t the No ti ce s h adbe enpl ac edin 13 order to alert credit ors, before the deadline expired, to the possibility of post-confirmation claims 14 based on Kalikow’s misrepresenta tions. The objection also argued tha t the Bankruptc y Court lacked 15 subject mat ter jurisdiction, that the dispute should be heard by a formal adversary proceeding, and 16 that the re was no legal basis for relief. Kalikow filed a reply on June 9, 2004, stating that relief 17 wo ul d b e s ou ght

ag ai ns t D re ie r in di

vid ually , a s w ell a s again st

So lo w a ndCh er ni ak

. 18 At

a h ea rin g onJu ne 10, 200 4, i n the Ba nkru pt cy Co ur t, th e c ou rt

gra nt edKalik ow ’s 19 motions. The Bankruptcy Court found that the Not

ices “implicate[d]” the injunctive provisions of 20 the Plan and Confirmation Order. The court c onsidered, inter alia, (1) the timing of the Appellants’ 21 actions in placing the advert isements nine y ears after Kalikow repaid Solow and repurcha sed the 22 option, and seven yea rs after Solow’s motion to appoint an e xaminer was denied; (2) the choice to 23 publish the Notices in t wo of New York’s most wide ly-read newspapers as a method of contac ting9 1 creditors — whose addre sses and contac t information could have been e asily obtained — whe n 2 mailing the information would have been significantly less e xpensive; (3) the Not ices had “the 3 appearance of legal notice s that are published at the direction of this Court”; and (4) “[t ]he [N]otic es 4 were designed to m islead the public into thinking that they have a right to rea ssert discharged 5 claims.” The court also found that none of the Appellants w as a former unsecured cre ditor of 6 Kalikow. The court conclude d that the Notices had not been placed in good faith and rejec ted the 7 argument that, be cause no credit or had attempt ed to collect a discharged claim, the injunct ion had 8 not been violated. A s to the injunctive re lief requested by Kalikow, the Bankruptcy Court dec lined 9 to grant this request, st ating that bec ause “no creditors took the [respondents’] bait be yond retent ion 10 of c ou ns el

an d i nqui ry

at th ei r e xp en se ,” the re qu es te d i nj un ct ive re lie f w ould “se rve [] no ba si c 11 pu rp os e a t thi s p oi nt inti me .” I ns te ad , the co ur t a wa rd ed“the re co ve ry

of c os ts in cu rre d i n 12 investigating and bringing on this process,” with other forms of relief “more appropriately addressed 13

. . . inothe r n on -ba nkru pt cy pr oc ee di ngs .” 14 On June 21, 2004, the Bankruptcy Court issued a writt en order (the “First Order”) resta ting 15 its oral ruling of June 10, 2004. The First Order imposed sanctions on “Evergence Capital A dvisors, 16 Inc. and its directors, officers, controlling persons, and agents, including the law firm of Dreier 17 LLP ,” a nd “So lo w, . . . Ch er ni ak , . . . D re ie r a nd

. . . Ko va ch ev .” T he co ur t o rd er ed : 18 that the Former Debtors shall provide to the [sa nctioned parties] billing inf ormation 19 (the “Invoices and Rec eipts”) evidencing the c osts and expenses, including without 20 limitation attorney s’ fees and expenses (the “Total Costs and Expe nses”) incurred by 21 the Former Debtors in conne ction with the Enforcement Motion and in otherwise 22 inve st

iga ti ng a nd re sp on di ng t o the No ti ce s thr ough the da te of the He ar in g. 23 The court further ordered that any objec tions to Kalikow’s state ment of expenses be made 24 within five days of Kalikow’s submission, at which point the court would “schedule a he aring to 25 de te rm in e the pr op er am ou nt of [ sa nc ti on s] to be aw ar de d. ”10 1 On June 30, 2004, Kalikow submitted its statem ent of expenses in the amount of 2 $266,172 .63, to which the Appe llants objected, and the Bankruptcy Court sc heduled a hearing to 3 de te rm in e the pr op er am ou nt of s an ct io ns . K al iko w s ub mi tt eda l arge r re qu es t o n J uly 1 6, 2 004 , 4 to talin g $2 99, 046 .98 , whi chre fle ct edco st s i nc ur re d a ft er th e J un e 1 0 h ea rin g a ndup to July 16. 5 On Septembe r 14, 2004, the Appellant s objected t o the expense s and costs submitt ed by 6 Kalikow, arguing that the total am ount was exce ssive, that individual entries were ambiguous or 7 unreasonable, that c osts incurred after June 10 should be exclude d, and that cost s for speaking with 8 Th e N ew

Yo rk Tim es re po rt er s a nd dr af ti ng p ro fe ss io nal gr

ie va nc es we re no t l eg

it im at ely w ithi n 9 those awarde d. Because Solow, Cherniak, and Dreier had not been made pa rties to the c ase prior to 10 the adjudication of the ir liability, the Appellants also objec ted to any award based on the underlying 11 me rit s, su bm it ti ng a de cl ar at io n b y D re ie r, w

ith s ev er al at ta ch me nt s, ex pl ai ni ng the goo d-f ai thba si s 12 of Solow and Cherniak for believing that Kalikow might have misrepresente d their assets in the 13 earlier bankruptcy proce eding and explaining their desire to alert cre ditors to the issue be fore the 14 deadline expired. 15 In a hearing held on September 28, 2004, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that

it did “not 16 fin d the am ou nt s tha t a re re qu es te d [ by Kalik ow ] t o b e u nu su al

giv enall o f the ci rc um st an ce s o f thi s 17 case. . . . The sanction he re I find is appropriate and it is justified by the docume ntation that has 18 been submitte d to the [c ]ourt.” The Bankruptcy Court also st ated that the “proper amount” of costs 19 and expenses would include those incurred through the da te of the Sept ember 28, 2004 hearing 20 because “the request for fees today [] has been c aused by the covert behavior of the [A ppellants] as 21 well as the t endency t o extensively litigate almost all matte rs that surrounded the various Orders and 22 issues that are he re,” including the Appellants’ submissions “devoted to the underlying merits.” The 23 court concluded that the e xpenses and costs w ere “fair, reasonable, and appropriate” and included11 1 co st s “u p t o t od ay .” 2 OnOc to be r 14 , 20 04, th e B an kru pt cy Co ur t i ss ue d awr

it te n o rd er

(the “Se co ndOr de r”) 3 requiring the Appellants to pay $334,583 .12 to Kalikow, but staying payment if the Appellants 4 posted a $300,000 bond with the Bankruptcy Court , pending final judgment on appeal. The 5 Appellants poste d the bond of the requisite amount on Oct ober 26, 2004, and timely appealed to the 6 Unit edSt at es Di stric t C ou rt for th e S ou th er n D is tr

ic t o f N ew

Yo rk. 7 II. The District Court’s De cision 8 Th e F irs t a nd Se co nd Or de rs we re ap pe al edto th e D is tr ic t C ou rt , a ndth e a pp eals we re 9 co ns ol

id at edinth at

co ur t. Inth e D is tr

ic t C ou rt , fo ur

of the Ap pe lla nt s, Ev erge nc e, Ko va ch ev , 10 Dreier LLP, and Marc S. Dreier, argued that the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject -matter jurisdiction 11 to hear allegations of conduct so far afield from the subject of the injunctions. They also argued that 12 the Notice s had not violated any injunct ion; that the sanc tions were legally unwa rranted; that the 13 Bankruptcy Court lacke d personal jurisdiction over non-parties; that the court had erred in we ighing 14 the evidence ; and that the sanctions were excessive. Solow and Cherniak joined the foregoing 15 arguments and submitte d a brief with respect to personal jurisdiction. 16 The District Court reje cted all of the A ppellants’ arguments in an unpublished dec ision dated 17 September 29, 2004, entered as judgment on September 30, 2008, and affirmed the judgment and 18 orders of the Bankruptcy Court. The court held that (1) the Bankruptc y Court had personal 19 ju ris di ct

io n o ve r So lo w a nd Ch er ni ak , who ha d “i nt en ti on ally so ugh t t o k ee p the ir i de nt it ie s s ec re t” ; 20 (2) the Bankruptc y Court did not err in proceeding by mot ion instead of an adversary procee ding 21 be ca us e i t h adbe enas ke d t o e nfo rc e a pr ev io us in ju nc ti onan d n ot

to is su e a ne w i nj un ct

io n; an d ( 3) 22 the Bankruptcy

Court neither comm itted clea r error nor abused its discretion in imposing sanctionsThe District Court also uphe ld the Bankruptcy Court ’s determination tha t it had “core” 8 subject-matt er jurisdiction to decide the motions beca use the Not ices “directly affect ed the inte grity of [Kalikow’s] bankruptcy procee dings” and were “designed to mislead third parties into thinking th ey ha d v ia bl e c laim s, ” t hu s i mp lic at in g the Pla n a ndth e C on fir ma ti onOr de r. T hi s h ol di ng, ho we ve r, i s n ot

ch alle nge d o n a pp eal. 12 1 against the Appe llants and awarding costs and fee s to Kalikow. Solow and Cherniak filed a notice 8 2 of an appeal to this Court on Oc tober 27, 2008. Evergence, Dreier LLP, Marc S. Dreier, and Kosta 3 Ko va ch ev

fil edth ei r n ot

ic e o f a n a pp eal t o thi s C ou rt onOc to be r 28 , 20 08. 4 On appeal, Solow and Cherniak argue (1) that the Bankruptc y Court did not have personal 5 jurisdiction over Solow and Cherniak; (2) that the Bankruptcy Court e rred in proceeding by motion 6 instead of an adversary proce eding; and (3) that the Bankruptcy Court e rred in concluding that the 7 Ap pe lla nt s h advio la te d the in ju nc ti ve pr ov is io ns of the Pla n a ndth er ef or e a bu se d i ts di sc re ti onin 8 imposing sanctions against them. 9 ANALYSIS 10 I. Of the Standard of Review 11 “Adi st ric t c ou rt ’s or de r ina b an kru pt cy ca se is su bj ec t t o p le na ry

re view, me anin g tha t thi s 12 Court undertakes an indepe ndent examinat ion of the factual findings and legal conclusions of the 13 ba nkru pt cy

co ur t. ” Inre Du pl anCo rp ., 2 12 F .3d144 , 15 1 ( 2d Ci r. 2 000). Fin di ngs of f ac t a re 14 reviewed for clear error, and conclusions of law are re viewed de novo. Id. “The Bankruptcy 15 Court’s interpretation of the text of the Plan [and] the Confirmation Order . . . are conclusions of 16 la w r ev ie we d d e n ov o. ” Id

. 17 A bankruptcy c ourt’s award of sanctions will not be se t aside by this Court in the absence of 18 anab us e o f di sc re ti on . Inre Hi ghg at e E quit ie s, Lt d. , 27 9 F. 3d 148 , 15 1 ( 2d Ci r. 2 002); Su ss ma n v . 19 Bank of Israel, 56 F.3 d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 1995). The bankruptcy court “nec essarily abuse[s] its 20 discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous asse ssment13 1 of the ev

id en ce .” I n r e H igh ga te Equi ti es , Lt d. , 27 9 F. 3d at 152

. 2 II. Of Personal Jurisdiction Over Solow and Cherniak 3 Solow and Cherniak argue that although the y had notice of the Enforcement Motion and 4 related procee dings, they were ne ver made proper parties t o the procee dings nor properly served 5 with process. Specifically, Solow and Che rniak argue that Kalikow’s motions were never amended 6 to name the m as respondents and w ere insufficiently descriptive t o alert them that relief was being 7 sought against them. Solow and Cherniak also claim that service of Kalikow’s Enforcement Motion 8 on Dreier, the att orney who represe nted Solow and Cherniak at that time, const ituted inadequat e 9 service as to the m. Both the Bankruptc y Court and the D istrict Court reject ed these a rguments, 10 finding that Solow and Cherniak could not have bee n named in the § 350 motion to reopen and the 11 En for ce me nt

Mo ti onbe ca us e the y p ur po se fully co nc eale d the ir i de nt

it ie s u nt il the ir a tt or ne y, Ma rc 12 S. Dreier, was ordered by the Bankruptcy Court to re veal their names, and that Solow and Cherniak 13 were sufficiently apprised and given notic e of the motions. 14 “Before a federal court may e xercise personal jurisdiction over a [party ], the procedural 15 re quire me nt

of s er vic e . . . m us t b e s at

is fie d. ” D yn eg

y Mid st re am Se rvs . v. Tr am mo ch em , 45 1 F. 3d 16 89, 94 (2d Cir. 20 06) (internal quotat ion marks omitted); see also Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 17 Stringing, Inc., 5 26 U.S. 344 , 350 (1999) (stating that service of process is “fundamental to any 18 procedural imposition on a named de fendant”). These due proc ess requirements a pply in motion 19 pr oc ee di ngs (i .e ., c on te st edpr oc ee di ngs ) u nd er Ba nkru pt cy

Rule 901 4(

b) wi thth e s am e f

or ce as in 20 adversarial proceedings under Bankruptcy Rule 7004. In re Zumbrun, 88 B.R. 250, 252 (B.A.P. 9 th 21 Ci r. 1 988 ). 22 “[I]n a conteste d matter, [as he re,] the notice of hearing is treated as a summons a nd the 23 mo ti onis tr ea te d a s aco mp lain t. ” Inre Pa rke r, 3 92 B .R . 49 0, 4 96 ( Ba nkr. D . Ut ah 200 8)

.14 1 Consistent with due process, Bankruptcy Rule 9014 requires that “reasonable notice” be given to the 2 party against whom re lief is sought. Contrary to Solow and Cherniak’s claim, the mot ion need not 3 sp ec ifi cally

na me th e p ar ti es to th e m at te r. S ee Inre Zu mb ru n, 88 B .R . a t 2 53. Al th ough the failu re 4 to am en d aca pt

io n t o n am e the pa rt

ie s m ay co ns ti tu te a v

io la ti onof F ed er al

Rule of C ivil Pr oc ed ur e 5 10, such error does not per se const itute a deprivation of due proce ss. See Baker v. Latham 6 Sparrowbush Assocs., 72 F.3d 246, 2 54 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that to satisfy due process, notice 7 ne edon ly

be “re as on ab ly

calc ul at ed ” t o a pp ris e the adve rs e p ar ty (i nt er nal quo ta ti onma rks 8 om it te d) ). 9 Here, Kalikow’s motion sought an order against “Evergence . . . and its direc tors, officers, 10 controlling persons, and agents, including the law firm of Dreier LLP.” M oreover the motion 11 specified that its t erms would apply to as-ye t-unidentified parties, noting that “[t] he use of 12 Evergence to plac e the Not ices makes it likely that the individuals behind the N otices do not w ant to 13 be id en ti fie d .

. . . [I]t ap pe ar s tha t c er ta

inpa rt ie s a re us in g E ve rge nc e a s afro nt he re to pu rs ue th ei r 14 im pr op er

en ds .” T hu s, we agre e w

ith the lo we r c ou rt s tha t t

he mo ti onwa s s uff

ic ie nt ly de sc rip ti ve 15 to alert Solow and Cherniak tha t relief was being sought against them . Indeed, after Solow and 16 Ch er ni ak ’s id en ti ti es we re re ve al ed(f ollo wi ng m uc h r es is ta nc e) , K al iko w e xp re ss ly

st at edinit s R ep ly 17 to Dr ei er

LLP ’s ob je ct

io n tha t r el

ie f w as so ugh t again st

So lo w a ndCh er ni ak

. 18 Al te rn at

ive ly , So lo w a nd Ch er ni ak argue th at

th ey we re no t p ro pe rly

se rve d. Th ey , h ow ev er , 19 do not dispute that their counsel, Dreier LLP, was properly served. Although Solow and Cherniak 20 argue that Dreier LLP did not represent them, the rec ord clearly establishes that (1) Solow and 21 Cherniak engaged Dreier LLP to place the Not ices; and (2) Dreie r LLP continued to act as counse l 22 for Solow and Cherniak in connection with the Enforcement Motion. For example, Dreier stated 23 during his deposition that “[w]e cont inue to represent

these client s insofar as these clients ne ed15 1 representat

ion in connection with this matter.” And in the A ppellants’ submitted obje ctions to 2 Kalik ow ’s mo ti on s i n the Ba nkru pt cy Co ur t, Dr ei er

ac kn ow le dge d tha t “ for

pu rp os es of f

ull 3 disclosure to the Court, it should be noted that Dreier LLP was retained by Sheldon H. Solow and 4 Stephen Cherniak — eac h in their individual capacities — in connection wit h some of the facts a nd 5 events upon which the Injunction Motion is based.” Moreover, Dreier LLP filed their papers on 6 behalf of Solow and Cherniak on July 8, 2004, attempted to submit pa pers on their behalf on 7 Se pt em be r 14 , 20 04, an d a pp ea re d a t a he ar in g onth ei r b eh al f onSe pt em be r 28 , 20 04. Indeed, the 8 re co rd es ta bl

is he s tha t D re ie r LL P w as no t o nly S ol ow ’s “t ru st edla wy er ” inthis ca se bu t als o i n 9 other litigation as well. Cf. Luedke v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 159 B.R. 385, 39 5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 10 199 3) (h ol di ng tha t d ef en da nt ’s ac ti

ve pa rt ic ip at io n thr ough i ts co un se l inon e p ro ce edin g im pl ic it ly 11 au th or

iz edco un se l t o a cc ep t s er

vic e o n c lie nt ’s be half i n r el at edpr oc ee di ng) ; Inre Re is ma n, 139 12 B.R. 797, 801 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). Proper service on Dreier LLP, therefore, constitut ed proper 13 service on Solow and Cherniak. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). 14 Thus, because Solow and Che rniak were properly served and given reasonable notice of the 15 relief sought against them, we c onclude that the Bankruptcy Court prope rly exercised personal 16 jurisdiction over them. 17 III. Of the Bankruptcy Court ’s Decision to Proceed by Motion 18 So lo w a nd Ch er ni ak argue th at

be ca us e Kal

iko w’ s E nfo rc em en t M ot

io n s ought

in ju nc ti ve 19 relief, the Bankruptcy Court w as required to conduct the case as an adversary procee ding, rather 20 than a conte sted matt er. Citing to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(7), which re quires 21 th e c om me nc em en t o f a n a dv er sa ry pr oc ee di ng “ to ob ta

inanin ju nc ti onor

othe r e quit ab le re lie f,” 22 Solow and Cherniak argue that Kalikow should have be en required to have c ommenced a n 23 adversary proceeding in response t o the publication of the N otices. Specifically, Solow and16 1 Cherniak claim that Kalikow sought injunct ive relief in the Enforcement Motion beyond the 2 enforcement of those injunctions provided for in the Plan and Confirmation Order. The 3 Bankruptcy Court rejec ted this claim, finding that the Enforcement Motion involved the 4 enforcement of a pre-existing injunction, a conside ration that permit s the resolution of the mot ion 5 as a contest ed matte r rather than through an adversary proc eeding. See In re Texaco Inc., 182 B.R. 6 937 , 94 5 (

Ba nkr. S .D .N .Y . 19 95) ; Inre Wo rld Co rp , In c. , 25 2 B .R . 89 0, 8 95 ( Ba nkr. D . D el . 20 00) 7 (“[A]n adversary proce eding is not necessary w here the relief sought is the enforcement of an order 8 previously obtained.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A) (providing that a court may issue an 9 injunction in connection w ith an order confirming a plan of reorganization “after notice and [a] 10 he ar

in g”) ; c f. F ed . R . B an kr. P. 7 001 (7 ) ( se tt in g fo rth the sc op e a ndre quire me nt s fo r a n a dv er sa ry 11 proceeding). 12 We ho ld th at th e D is tr ic t C ou rt di d n ot er r inco nc lu di ng tha t the En for ce me nt Mo ti ondi d 13 not seek a new

injunction but, rather, “[sought] to enforce an injunction already in place — [one] 14 that was c reated by se ctions 1141 and 524 of the Bankruptcy Code and the express terms of the 15 [Plan] and Confirmation Order.” See In re Texaco, 182 B.R. at 945. That is, we reject the argument 16 of Solow and Cherniak insofar as they claim that Kalikow sought new injunctive relief from the 17 Bankruptcy Court, as the relief sought — including publication of corrective notices — w as meant 18 to correct the alleged violation of the existing injunction. We agree w ith the District

Court that the 19 relief sought by Kalikow — including publication of corrective notice s — was to correc t the 20 pe rc ei

ve d v io la ti onof the in ju nc ti on . Mo re ov er , the re qu es te d r el ie f of th e p ub lic at

io n o f c or re ct

ive 21 notices was not

granted by the D istrict Court, and none of the A ppellants therefore suffered any 22 prejudice. Solow and Cherniak have thus failed to de monstrate that they were prejudiced from the 23 denial of the “formalities and discovery rights accom panying normal civil suits” accorded to17 1 adversary proceedings. Solow and Cherniak appea red at two he arings and made written subm issions 2 before the Bankruptcy Court. We reject their claim that they were deprived of a fair opportunity to 3 present the ir case as a result of the Bankruptcy Court proce eding by motion, as opposed to initiat ion 4 of a n a dv er sa ry

pr oc ee di ng t o e nfo rc e the te rm s o f the Pla n a ndCo nfi rm at io n O rd er . 5 IV. Of the Bankruptcy Court ’s Award of Sanctions 6 So lo w a nd Ch er ni ak argue th at

th e i nj un ct

ive pr ov is io ns ci te d b y the Ba nkru pt cy Co ur t a re 7 unrelated to their conduct and that the injunct ive provisions of the Plan and the Confirmation 8 Order only pertain to holders of pre-confirmation claims discha rged in bankruptcy. As Solow and 9 Cherniak were not holders of pre-confirmation discharged claims, they claim tha t they w ere not 10 personally bound by these injunctive provisions. 11 The Bankruptcy Court impose d sanctions on the A ppellants because it found that they had 12 “violat[ed] the relea se, discharge, and injunction provisions of the Reorganization Plan, the 13 Confirmation Order, and Sections 1141 and 524 of the Bankruptcy Code.” The court also found 14 that the “[t]he notice s were designed to m islead the public into thinking that they have a right to 15 re as se rt

di sc ha rge d c laim s. ” Although we find no clear error with any of the factual findings of the 16 Bankruptcy Court, including its findings regarding the Appellants’ motives behind the publication of 17 th e N ot

ic es , w e c on cl ud e tha t s an ct io ns we re no t p ro pe rly

im po se d i n thi s c as e p ur su an t t o 1 1 18 U.S.C. §§ 524(a)(2), 1141. Our holding, however, should not be read to condone the Appellants’ 19 conduct in this ca se. 20 The effect of a discharge in Chapte r 11 bankruptcy is set forth in § 524 of the Bankruptcy 21 Code. “Generally, a discharge in bankruptcy relieves a debtor from all pre-petition debt , and § 22 524(a) permanent ly enjoins creditor act

ions to collect discha rged debts.” Bessette v. Avco Fin. 23 Servs., Inc., 230 F .3d 439, 444 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Nat’l Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. NGC Settleme nt18 1 Tr us t & As be st os Cl ai ms Mgm t. Co rp . ( Inre Na t’ l G yp su m C o. ), 118 F.3 d 1 056 , 10 62 n .13 (5 thCi r. 2 199 7) ; H ar dy

v. U ni te d S ta te s (

Inre Ha rd y) , 97 F.3 d 1 384 , 13 88– 89 ( 11th C ir. 199 6) ; Inre Ge tz off , 3 180 B.R. 572, 573 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 199 5). When there is a c onfirmation order of a reorganization 4 pl aninba nkru pt cy pu rs ua nt to Ch ap te r 11 , tha t c on fir ma ti onor de r d is ch arge s the de bt or fro m all 5 pr e- co nfi rm at

io n c laim s. 11 U .S. C. § 1 141 (d )( 1) (A ). A c on fir me d p la n b in ds bo th“the de bt or . . . 6 and any creditor,” 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a), which includes entit ies that have “claim[ s] against the debt or 7 th at

ar os e a t the ti me of o r b ef or e the or de r fo r re lie f,” 11 U .S. C. § 1 01( 10) . Si mila rly , § 524 (a )( 2) 8 provides that a discharge “operate s as an injunction against . . . an act[] to collect, rec over or offset 9 an y s uc h d eb t a s ape rs on al lia bi lit y o f t he de bt or , whe th er

or no t dis ch arge of s uc h d eb t i s w ai ve d. ” 10 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2); see also 11 U.S.C. § 727(c)(1) (sta ting that the “trust ee, a creditor, or the 11 Unit edSt at es tr us te e m ay ob je ct to th e gra nt

in g of a dis ch arge ”)

. 12 We agree with Solow and Che rniak that they are not holders of pre-confirmation claims 13 discharged in bankruptcy who w ould normally be bound by the provisions of the Plan, as only a pre14 co nfi rm at

io n c re di to r o r h ol de r o f su cha c laim is bo un d b y the pl ai n l an guage of the in ju nc ti ve 15 pr ov

is io ns of the Pla n. Kalik ow ’s Pla n s pe ci fic ally pr ov id edth at it “bi nd [s ] all h ol de rs of C laim s, ” 16 an d “dis ch arge [s ] the De bt or s fr om an y C laim

. . . th at ar is es be for e the [P la n’ s] Ef

fe ct ive Da te . 17 Lik ew

is e, th e C on fir ma ti onOr de r e lim in at edth e d eb to r’s lia bi lit y a s “t o a ny

ho ld er of a cl ai m” ; 18 discharged the debt ors, “as to each holder of a Claim,” from “debts that arose . . . prior to or on the 19 Ef

fe ct ive Da te ”; p re cl ud ed , “a s t o e ve ry di sc ha rge d d eb t . . ., th e c re di to r tha t h el d s uc h d eb t . . . 20 from asserting against the Debt ors, . . . any other or further Claim” based on pre-confirmation 21 events; and “restrained and e njoined” all “creditors . . . or other entities whose c laims are discharged 22 . . . by the Plan and this order” from acting “to collect . . . such debt s” in the future. 23 Accordingly, the Bankruptc y Court’s authority, pursuant t o §§ 524(a)(2) and 1141, does not19 1 ex te nd to sa nc ti onin g t he Ap pe lla nt s, wh os e b ad -fa ith c on du ct

di d n ot ru n a foul o f the pl ai n 2 la ngu ag e o f t he Co nfi rm at io n O rd er . C f. H ub er

v. M ar in e Mid la ndBa nk , 51 F.3 d 5 , 10 (2 d C ir. 3 1995) (observing that to hold a party in c ontempt, a c ourt must have “ente red a clear and 4 unambiguous order”). 5 Fur th er mo re , So lo w a nd Ch er ni ak ca nn ot be lia bl e f

or a v io la ti onof a n i nj un ct

io n i n the ir 6 alleged capacitie s as accessories t o or agents of a bound party (i.e., a holder of a pre-confirmation 7 discharged claim) in this case . Although injunctions can bind third parties who a ct on a name d 8 party’s behalf, see Regal Knitw ear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S . 9, 14 (1945), here, because the Bankruptc y 9 Court found that none of the bound pa rties — the holders of pre-confirmation discharged claims — 10 took any prohibited act as a result of the Not

ices, Solow and Cherniak may not be sanctioned a s 11 ac ti ng o n b eh al f of cr edit or s. Cf. Le vinv. Tib er Ho ld in g Co rp ., 2 77 F .3d243 , 25 0 ( 2d Ci r. 2 002

) 12 (“ Be for e a

pa rt y c anbe fou nd guilt

y o f aid in g a ndab et ti ng c ivil c on te mp t, th e c ou rt mu st fin d: (1 ) 13 that the party subject to the court ’s mandate com mitted cont empt; and (2) that another part y 14 as si st edth e e nj oi ne d p ar ty .”)

. 15 We reject Kalikow’s argument that §§ 524, 1141, and the Confirmation Order forbid any 16 “attempt t o collect” without regard to the party

“from whom” one attempt s to collect. Cf. Alemit e 17 Mfg. Corp. v . Staff, 42 F. 2d 832, 833 (2d Cir . 1930) (“[I]t is not the act described which the decree 18 may f

or bi d, bu t o nly tha t a ct

wh enth e d ef

en da nt do es it .” ( em ph as is ad de d) ). Al th ough § 524 (a )( 2) 19 broadly states that it “operates a s an injunction against the c ommencem ent or continuat ion of an 20 action, the e mployment of process, or an ac t, to collect , recover or offset any such debt as a personal 21 lia bi lit

y o f t he de bt or ,” 1 1 U. S.C . § 524 (a )( 2) , it ca nn ot be th at § 5 24(a) (2) p ro hi bi ts mi sl edcr edit or s 22 fro m i nqui rin g a bo ut th ei r c laim s ( or

othe rw is e s ub mi tt

in g apr oo f of

cl ai m) to a thi rd pa rt

y w ho (1 ) 23 has no relation to the reorganization proceedings and (2) ha s not sought repayme nt from the formerIn re Nassoko, cited by Kalikow, is inapposite he re. In that case a creditor sold a 9 discharged debt to a third party, who in turn demande d payment from the debtor. 405 B.R. at 518–19. The court rejected the creditor’s argument that selling the loan did not const itute an ac tion to collect, obse rving that such reasoning would allow any cre ditor to “simply collect on a disc harged debt indirectly by

selling it to a third party, aware that the third party intende d to pursue collect ion of the debt. The third party could then plea d ignorance of the discharge, thereby purporting to in sula te all p ar ti es fro m l

ia bi lit y. ” Id . a t 5 22. Inth e c as e b ef or e u s, al th ough f

or me r c re di to rs responded to the Notices by m aking telephone calls and by faxing lette rs in search of information, none of these cre ditors ever filed suit or attempt ed to make a c ollection in violation of the 20 1 de bt or

or init ia te d p ro ce edin gs i n c ou rt onbe half o f the cr edit or s. Cf. Inre Na ss ok o, 405 B. R. 515 2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (involving case whe re the credit or sent the de btor a lette r allegedly intended 3 to in du ce paym en t o f di sc ha rge d d eb t)

. 4 In cases where courts have held tha t § 524(a)(2) bars creditors from any act to collect a 5 discharged debt through various subterfuges, the cre ditors’ schemes at least involved contac t with 6 th e d eb to r t o e xt ra ct paym en t. Se e, e. g., Inre Walke r, 1 80 B .R . 83 4 ( Ba nkr. W .D . La .. 1 995 ) 7 (continued de duction of loan payment s from debtor’s paychec k without affirmative manifestat ion of 8 de bt or ’s as se nt

to su chpaym en ts vio la te d d is ch arge in ju nc ti on ); Inre Co st , 16 1 B .R . 85 6 ( Ba nkr. 9 S.D. Fla. 1993 ) (withholding debtor’s social sec urity benefits to repay prepetition overpay ment 10 vio la te d d is ch arge in ju nc ti on ), va ca te d b y s et tl em en t 1 90 B .R . 69 4 ( S.D . Fl a. 199 4) . H er e, in 11 contrast, no credit or collected from a third party what he w as owed by Kalikow, and no third party 12 th er eb y a cqui re d a n i nt er es t again st , o r d em an de d p ay me nt fro m, Kalik ow , e ithe r d ire ct ly or th ro ugh 13 the Bankruptcy

Court as a result of the A ppellants’ actions. The former cre ditors neither conta cted 14 Kalikow nor initiated judicial proceedings. Their contac t with Evergence in no way “pressured” 15 Kalikow to repay any of the discharged debts. In re Nassoko, 405 B.R. at 525 (internal quotat ion 16 marks omitted); c f. id. (observing that the purpose of section 524(a) (2) “is to give complete e ffect to 17 the discharge . . . . Once a de bt is discharged, the debt or will not be pressured in any way to repay 18 it.” (internal quotation marks and alt ernation omitte d)). Accordingly, the “act s” specified in § 9injunction. 21 1 524(a)(2) take n by holders of pre-confirmation claims discharged in bankruptcy — i.e., te lephone 2 calls and the mailing of letters and proof-of-claim forms to Evergence — are simply too far 3 re mo ve d fr om de bt or Kalik ow an d the Ba nkru pt cy

Co ur t t o fall w

ithi n the re ac h o f 11 U.S .C . § 4 524 (a

)( 2)

. 5 V. Whether 11. U.S.C. § 105(a) is an Independent Ba sis for the Award of Sanctions 6 Kalikow argues in the alternat ive that § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code serves as an 7 independent basis for affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s aw ard of sanctions in this case. We 8 di sagre e. Th e B an kru pt cy Co ur t’ s d is cr et

io n t o a wa rd sa nc ti on s m ay

be ex er ci se d o nly o n the ba si s 9 of the sp ec ifi c a utho rit y i nv ok edby

th at co ur t. Be ca us e a n a

wa rd mi ght

be ba se d o n “a ny

of a 10 number of rules or statutory provisions,” each “governed by differing standards,” this Court has 11 found it “imperative that the court explain its sanct ions order with care, spec ificity, and attent ion to 12 the sources of its powe r.” Sakon v. Andreo, 119 F .3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation 13 marks omitted). The statutory c ontempt pow ers given to a bankruptcy c ourt under § 105(a) 14 complement

the inherent pow ers of a federal court to enforce its own orders. See Int’l Union, 15 UMWA v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994 ) (“The traditional justification for the re lative breadth 16 of the co nt em pt

po we r h as be en

ne ce ss it y . . . . ”) ; s ee al so Go ya

Foo ds , In c. v. W alla ck

Mgm t. Co ., 17 290 F.3 d 6 3, 7 8 ( 1s t C ir. 200 2)

. 18 Section 105(a) of the Ba nkruptcy Code em powers a bankruptcy court with authority to issue 19 “any order, process, or judgment that is ne cessary or appropriate t o carry out the provisions of [the 20 Bankruptcy Code].” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). We have long recognized tha t “[s]ection 105(a) limits the 21 bankruptcy court’s e quitable powers, which ‘must and can only be e xercised within the confines of 22 th e B an kru pt cy

Co de .’” Inre Da

ily Ma rt Co nv enie nc e S to re s, In c. , 35 1 F. 3d 86, 92 ( 2d Ci r. 2 003 )22 1 (quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (198 8)). Section 105 “does not 2 ‘authorize the ba nkruptcy courts t o create subst antive rights that are otherwise unavailable under 3 ap pl

ic ab le la w, or co ns ti tu te a r ov

in g c om mi ss io n t o d o e quit y. ’” I d. (q uo ti ng U ni te d S ta te s v . 4 Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305 , 1308 (5th Cir. 1986 )); accord Be ssette, 230 F.3d at 444 (“Section 105(a) 5 empowers the bankruptcy court t o exercise its equit able powers — whe re necessary or appropriate 6 — t o fa cilit at e the im pl em en ta ti onof o th er Ba nkru pt cy

Co de pr ov

is io ns .” ( in te rn al qu ot at io n m ar ks 7 and alteration omitt ed)). “Thus, § 105 does not itself create a private right of action, but a court may 8 invoke § 105(a) if the equitable remedy utilize d is demonstrably nec essary to prese rve a right 9 el se wh er e p ro vid edinth e C od e . . . . ” Be ss et te , 23 0 F. 3d at 444–4 5 ( in te rn al qu ot at io n m ar ks 10 omitted). The se powers are “in addition to w hatever inherent

contempt powers the c ourt may 11 have” and “must include the a ward of monetary and other forms of relief to the extent such awards 12 ar e n ec es sa ry

an d a pp ro pr

ia te to ca rry

ou t the pro vis io ns of the Ba nkru pt cy Co de an d p ro vid e f

ull 13 remedial relief.” Id. at 445 (internal quotation marks and cit ations omitted) . We therefore must 14 reject Kalikow’s argument that § 105 serves as an indepe ndent basis for awarding sanctions without 15 violation of § 524(a)(2) or another provision of the Bankruptcy Code. 16 We certainly a cknowledge the le gitimate conce rn of the Bankruptcy Court and a ppreciate its 17 attempt

to exercise a c ombination of inherent and statutory authority t o remedy the harm caused by 18 the Appellant s’ reprehensible conduct . We must hold, however, that the equitable power conferred 19 on a bankruptcy court by 11 U.S.C. § 105 “i s the power t o exercise equity in carrying out the 20 provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than to further the purposes of the Code generally, or 21 othe rw

is e t o d o the rig

ht thin g.” Inre Da

iry Ma rt Co nv enie nc e S to re s, In c. , 35 1 F. 3d at 92. Th is 22 limitation “suggests that an exe rcise of section 105 power be t ied to another Bankruptc y Code 23 section and not m erely to a gene ral bankruptcy conce pt or objective.” Id. (quoting 2 Collier on23 1 Bankruptcy ¶ 105.01[1] (15th ed. 2003)). Further, the Supreme Court has c autioned that “[b]ecause 2 of the ir v ery p ot en cy , in he re nt po we rs mu st

be ex er ci se d w

ith r es tr ai nt

an d d is cr et

io n. ” Ch am be rs 3 v. N AS CO , In c. , 50 1 U. S. 3 2, 4 4 ( 199 1) ; s ee al so Sa ko n, 119 F.3 d a t 1 13. 4 VI. Conclusion 5 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment in all respec ts except 6 its imposition of sanctions. See In re Highgate Equities, Ltd., 279 F.3d at 152 (The bankruptcy 7 court excee ds its discretion “if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.”). Ac cordingly, 8 we VACA

TE the judgment of the District Court insofar as it upholds the aw ard of sanctions, and 9 we RE MA ND th e c as e t o the Di st ric t C ou rt wi thin st ru ct

io ns to re ma ndto th e B an kru pt cy Co ur t 10 for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.