IMPROVISED 

THREATS

Warfighter Support 

Maintained, but 

Clearer 

Responsibilities and 

Improved Information 

Sharing Needed

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2018

GAO-18-509

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-509, a report to 

congressional committees

July 2018

IMPROVISED THREATS

Warfighter Support Maintained, but Clearer

Responsibilities and Improved Information Sharing

Needed

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) established the Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Organization in 2006 to lead and coordinate the department’s 

counter-improvised explosive device (IED) efforts. In response to a 

congressional mandate, DOD renamed this entity the Joint Improvised-Threat 

Defeat Organization (JIDO) and placed it under the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA) in 2016. Since that point, JIDO has transferred personnel and 

pay systems, funding, and staff functions to DTRA, and identified additional, 

longer-term transition activities that will take several years to complete, such as 

workforce colocation. Plans for these transition activities reflect all nine key 

practices GAO identified for implementing mergers and organizational 

transformations, such as setting goals and timelines. JIDO also identified 

efficiencies achieved through the transition in areas such as research and

training.

JIDO maintained warfighter support during its transition under DTRA. Officials 

from across DOD stated that they were satisfied with JIDO’s level of support 

during the transition and that JIDO continued to provide a range of warfighter 

support such as personnel and rapidly fielded materiel.

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization Developed Capabilities 

However, GAO identified two challenges to JIDO’s efficiency and effectiveness:

• Unclear responsibilities. DOD has not clarified which categories of threats 

JIDO is responsible for countering and what authorities JIDO has for 

countering them. According to DTRA and JIDO officials, clarifying these 

issues would help JIDO plan, program, and coordinate its responsibilities.

• Incomplete information sharing. JIDO lacks processes to ensure it 

routinely obtains permission to share research project information and 

submits it to DOD’s designated information sharing repository, as required. 

As a result, information on less than one-third of JIDO’s research projects is 

included, according to DOD. This limits the ability of other research 

organizations to leverage JIDO’s expertise and increases the risk of

View GAO-18-509. For more information, redundant or fragmented research.

contact Jason Bair at (202) 512-6881 or 

bairj@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

IEDs are one of the most lethal 

weapons available to terrorists and 

enemy combatants. DOD reported that 

between January 2007 and February 

2018, approximately 9,000 IED 

incidents were targeted against U.S. 

and allied military forces in Iraq and 

Afghanistan resulting in about 23,000 

casualties. 

The House Armed Services Committee 

included a provision in a committee 

report for GAO to assess JIDO’s 

transition under DTRA. This report: (1) 

assesses the status of JIDO’s 

transition under DTRA; (2) describes

how, if at all, the transition has affected 

JIDO’s warfighter support; and (3) 

identifies what, if any, challenges could 

affect JIDO’s continued efficiency and 

effectiveness. GAO examined DOD 

documentation including directives and

plans, and met with DOD officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four recommendations 

including that DOD clarify the 

categories of threats JIDO is 

responsible for countering and JIDO’s 

corresponding authorities, as well as 

establish processes for obtaining 

permission to share research project

information and submitting it to DOD’s 

information sharing repository. DOD 

concurred with all of the 

recommendations and cited actions it 

plans to take to address them. 
Page i GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

Letter 1

Background 3

JIDO Completed Initial Transition Activities, Developed LongerTerm Transition Plans That Reflect Key Practices, and 

Identified Efficiencies 7

JIDO Maintained Warfighter Support during the Transition 11

Unclear Responsibilities and Incomplete Information Sharing 

Challenge JIDO’s Continued Efficiency and Effectiveness 15

Conclusions 19

Recommendations for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 23

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 28

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 30

Tables

Table 1: Key Practices for Mergers and Organizational 

Transformations Reflected in Joint Improvised-Threat 

Defeat Organization (JIDO) Transition Plans 10

Table 2: Actual or Anticipated Efficiencies from the Joint 

Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Transition, 

According to the Department of Defense 11

Table 3: Warfighter Support the Combatant Commands Reported 

Receiving from the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat 

Organization (JIDO) Before and During the Transition 12

Table 4: Department of Defense (DOD) Organizations Contacted 

by GAO 26

Figures

Figure 1: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) 

Timeline of Significant Events 5

Figure 2: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) 

Enacted Funding Levels 6

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

Figure 3: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) 

Staffing Levels 7

Figure 4: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 

Organizational Structure as of May 2018 8

Figure 5: Examples of Materiel Capabilities the Joint ImprovisedThreat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Undertook during the 

Transition 13

Figure 6: Number of Unique Users Utilizing Joint ImprovisedThreat Defeat Organization’s (JIDO’s) Voltron 

Improvised-threat Intelligence-related Capability 14

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense 

DTIC Defense Technical Information Center 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

IED Improvised Explosive Device 

JIDA Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency

JIDO Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization 

JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page 1 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

July 24, 2018

Congressional Committees

As we previously reported, improvised explosive devices (IED) are one of 

the most accessible and lethal weapons available to terrorists and enemy 

combatants and have been used extensively against U.S. and allied 

military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 Between January 2007 and 

February 2018, approximately 9,000 IED incidents were targeted against 

U.S. and allied military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan resulting in about 

23,000 casualties, according to the Department of Defense (DOD).2 To 

address this persistent and evolving threat, DOD established the Joint 

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to lead and 

coordinate the department’s counter-IED efforts.

In 2015, DOD established JIEDDO as an independent combat support 

agency to preserve its counter-IED capabilities and support counterterrorism, counter-insurgency, and other related operational areas. 

However, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 

directed DOD to transition the organization under the authority, direction, 

and control of an existing military department or defense agency.3 In 

2016, DOD renamed this entity the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat 

Organization (JIDO) and placed it under the authority, direction, and 

control of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).4

 1

GAO, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices: Improved Planning Could Enhance 

Federal Coordination Efforts, GAO-16-581SU (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2016). DOD 

defines an improvised explosive device as a weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an 

unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or 

incendiary chemicals designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny mobility, or 

distract.

2

In this report, annual dates are calendar years unless otherwise specified.

3

Pub. L. No. 114-92 (2015).

4

In this report, unless the distinction is relevant, we refer to the Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA), 

and the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) as JIDO. 

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

House Report 115-200, accompanying a bill for the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, included a provision for us to 

assess JIDO’s transition under DTRA.5 This report:

(1) assesses the status of JIDO’s transition under DTRA, whether 

transition plans reflect key practices on mergers and organizational 

transformations, and what, if any, efficiencies have been identified;

(2) describes how, if at all, the transition has affected JIDO’s warfighter 

support, and what types of warfighter support JIDO provided during 

the transition; and

(3) identifies what, if any, challenges could affect JIDO’s continued 

efficiency and effectiveness.

To assess the status of JIDO’s transition under DTRA, we analyzed JIDO 

transition planning documents and met with DTRA and JIDO officials to 

discuss the status of the transition and identify achieved efficiencies.6 We 

compared JIDO transition plans to key practices we identified in prior 

work on mergers and organizational transformations to determine if the 

key practices were reflected.7 GAO’s prior work found that implementing 

large-scale organizational change requires the concentrated efforts of 

both leadership and employees, and that it can take several years to 

complete. Therefore, we included both initial and longer-term transition 

activities within the scope of our review.

To describe how, if at all, the transition affected JIDO’s warfighter 

support, and what types of warfighter support JIDO provided during the 

transition, we reviewed relevant DOD plans and strategies and obtained 

the perspectives of combatant command and military service planning, 

operations, intelligence, training, and logistics officials. We also 

 5

H.R. Rep. No. 115-200 (2017). 

6

For the purposes of this report, we define “efficiencies” as maintaining federal 

government services or outcomes using fewer resources (such as time and money), or 

improving or increasing the quality or quantity of services or outcomes while maintaining 

(or reducing) resources. See GAO, Streamlining Government: Key Practices from Select 

Efficiency Initiatives Should Be Shared Governmentwide, GAO-11-908 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 30, 2011).

7

GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). GAO 

convened a forum in September 2002 to identify useful practices and lessons learned 

from major private and public sector mergers, acquisitions, and organizational 

transformations. This was done to help federal agencies implement successful 

transformations of their cultures.
Page 3 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

administered a questionnaire and analyzed responses from the 6 

geographic combatant commands and Special Operations Command.8

To identify any challenges affecting JIDO’s continued efficiency and 

effectiveness, we analyzed DOD doctrine and guidance on JIDO’s 

mission and authorities, and met with DTRA, JIDO, Joint Staff, military 

service, and combatant command officials. We then compared 

information on potential challenges we identified to relevant joint doctrine 

and DOD directives and instructions to determine their relevance. More 

detailed information on our objectives, scope, and methodology can be 

found in appendix I of this report.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to July 2018 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD created the Army IED Task Force in 2003—which DOD elevated 

into the Joint IED Defeat Task Force in 2005—in response to the 

increased IED threat to U.S. forces operating in Iraq. The 

accomplishments of the Army task force led to a recommendation that a 

larger organization be created. In 2006, JIEDDO was established to 

provide timelier, integrated counter-IED solutions and was placed under 

the authority, direction, and control of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.9

JIEDDO’s mission was to focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all DOD 

actions to defeat IEDs.

In September 2013, as a result of the drawdown of operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued guidance directing 

 8

DOD operates 6 geographic combatant commands to manage the department’s military 

operations: Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, Northern

Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command.

9

DOD Directive 2000.19E, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO) (Feb. 14, 2006) (Rescinded 2016). 

Background

JIDO’s Counter-IED Roles 

and Responsibilities
Page 4 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

JIEDDO to continue its counter-IED mission and maintain essential 

capabilities commensurate with the reduction of supported U.S. military 

forces. Two months later, in November 2013, the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense directed JIEDDO to develop a concept of operations plan to 

articulate its enduring mission. In March 2015, after considering a range 

of options, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated JIEDDO a 

combat support agency focused on counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, and other related operational areas, including counter-IED. In 

April 2015, JIEDDO’s name was changed to JIDA to reflect this expanded 

mission.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 directed 

DOD to provide a plan and timeline for the full and complete transition of 

the activities, functions, and resources of JIDA to an office under the 

authority, direction, and control of an existing military department or 

defense agency.10 In February 2016 DOD renamed JIDA to JIDO and 

placed it under the authority of the Director, DTRA, effective October 1, 

2016. In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act, in 

August 2016, the department submitted a plan to Congress for 

transitioning JIDO under DTRA.11 Figure 1 shows significant events in 

JIDO’s organizational history.

 10Pub. L. No. 114-92 (2015).

11DOD, Report to Congress Plan for Full and Complete Transition of the Joint ImprovisedThreat Defeat Agency Under the Authority, Direction, and Control of the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (August 2016).
Page 5 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

Figure 1: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Timeline of Significant Events

a

Estimate as of May 2018, according to DTRA officials.

Congress has appropriated overseas contingency operations funds for 

JIDO operations.12 JIDO can use these funds across multiple 

appropriations accounts to investigate, develop, and provide counterimprovised threat equipment, supplies, services, training, facilities, and 

personnel. Figure 2 shows JIDO’s enacted funding levels for fiscal years 

2013 to 2018.

 12Since fiscal year 2010, DOD has requested, and Congress has authorized and 

appropriated, separate amounts for both operation and maintenance base requirements

and operation and maintenance overseas contingency operation requirements as part of 

the annual budget cycle. DOD defines “contingency operations” as small, medium, or 

large-scale military operations, including peacekeeping operations, major humanitarian 

assisted efforts, noncombatant evacuation operations, and international disaster relief 

efforts. Base requirements are those costs that would be incurred whether or not a 

contingency operation took place. Operation and maintenance base requirements 

encompass continuing annual costs of DOD’s routine operations, including operating 

support for installations, training and education, civilian personnel, maintenance, 

contracted services, and defense health.

JIDO Funding and Staffing
Page 6 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

Figure 2: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Enacted Funding 

Levels

When JIDO was established in 2006, it was led by a retired four-star 

general, and each subsequent director has been a three-star general. 

Figure 3 shows JIDO’s staffing levels including for military, civilian, and 

contractor personnel for fiscal years 2013 to 2018.
Page 7 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

Figure 3: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Staffing Levels

JIDO completed initial transition activities in key areas such as 

organizational alignment, personnel and pay systems, and mission 

funding, according to DOD documents and officials. Consistent with our 

prior work on mergers and organizational transformations, DTRA and 

JIDO Completed 

Initial Transition 

Activities, Developed 

Longer-Term 

Transition Plans That 

Reflect Key Practices, 

and Identified 

Efficiencies

JIDO Completed Initial 

Transition Activities and 

Developed Longer-Term 

Transition Plans
Page 8 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

JIDO officials stated that it will take several years to fully transition JIDO 

under DTRA.13 Completed transition activities include:

• Organizational alignment: As shown in figure 4, DTRA aligned JIDO 

as a directorate-level organization.

Figure 4: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Organizational Structure as of May 2018

Note: This figure excludes some offices such as General Counsel and Inspector General.

• Personnel and pay: JIDO transitioned 263 civilian and 110 military 

authorized positions to DTRA. JIDO also transferred personnel pay 

systems from the Army to DTRA to ensure its workforce was paid 

without disruption.

• Funds: DTRA coordinated the transfer of previously appropriated 

JIDO funds from Army to DTRA accounts to ensure mission 

continuity.

• Budget request: Prior to its transition under DTRA, JIDO relied 

exclusively on overseas contingency operations funding and did not 

receive base funding through DOD’s annual budgeting process. 

Following the transition, DTRA requested funds through DOD’s base 

budget to cover a portion of JIDO’s enduring and predictable functions 

(e.g., information technology support, personnel salaries, and 

infrastructure costs).

 13 GAO-03-669.
Page 9 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

• Staff integration: JIDO integrated several of its support functions into 

existing and complementary DTRA functions, including legal, financial 

management, human resources, equal opportunity and diversity, 

inspector general, and security.

In November 2017, DTRA released a plan that assigned responsibilities 

and milestones for the remaining longer-term transition activities such as 

consolidating information technology and acquisition management 

functions, and workforce colocation.14 DTRA officials noted the 

importance of pursuing military construction options to co-locate JIDO 

and DTRA personnel at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to enhance mission 

effectiveness and collaborative planning, increase force protection, and 

reduce leased space costs. Further, DTRA continues to evaluate the size 

and composition of JIDO’s workforce, including its leadership, military, 

civilian, and contractor positions, according to DTRA officials.

JIDO transition plans reflect key practices we identified for implementing 

mergers and organizational transformations.15 Our prior work indicates 

that the likelihood of an efficient and effective transition is increased by 

following these key practices. According to our analysis, JIDO transition 

plans and supporting documentation include language reflecting all nine 

key practices, as shown in table 1.

 14Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization 

(JIDO) Integration Plan (Nov. 15, 2017).

15GAO-03-669.

Transition Plans Reflect 

Key Practices for Mergers 

and Organizational 

Transformations
Page 10 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

Table 1: Key Practices for Mergers and Organizational Transformations Reflected in Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat 

Organization (JIDO) Transition Plans

Key practices Reflected in transition plans? Examples from transition plans 

Ensure top leadership drives the 

transformation

Yes Transition overseen by the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (DTRA) Executive Director and 

the JIDO Vice Director

Establish a coherent mission and 

integrated strategic goals to guide the 

transformation

Yes Transition planning focused on seeking efficiencies 

without adversely affecting DTRA and JIDO 

missions

Focus on a key set of principles and 

priorities at the outset of the 

transformation

Yes Improve focus on combat support mission, and 

leverage and expand collaboration with interagency 

and international partners

Set implementation goals and a timeline to 

build momentum and show progress from 

day one

Yes Discrete implementation goals with associated 

timelines set, such as the transfer of employee 

benefits to DTRA by August 2016

Dedicate an implementation team to 

manage the transformation 

Yes A senior steering group and 8 working groups in 

functional areas such as human resources, 

operations, and comptroller, were established to 

manage the transition

Use the performance management 

system to define responsibility and assure 

accountability for change

Yes DTRA leadership has transition-related 

responsibilities included in annual performance 

expectations

Establish a communication strategy to 

create shared expectations and report

progress

Yes Communication plan developed that describes how 

and when employees and stakeholders will be kept 

informed of transition activities and assigns 

responsibility for delivering these communications

Involve employees to obtain their ideas 

and gain their ownership

Yes Quarterly meetings held to keep employees 

informed of transition activities and to solicit their 

input

Build a world-class organization Yes Longer-term planning processes, such as acquisition 

and human resource functions, will integrate best 

practices

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. | GAO-18-509

Several efficiencies resulted or are anticipated from JIDO’s transition 

under DTRA, according to DOD documentation and officials. These 

efficiencies are summarized thematically in table 2.

DOD Identified Transition 

Efficiencies
Page 11 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

Table 2: Actual or Anticipated Efficiencies from the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Transition, According 

to the Department of Defense

Functional area Efficiency example

Research • Sharing testing facilities and expertise in key areas such as modeling and simulation, tunnel 

capabilities, and sensor development to increase collaboration and reduce testing costs

Training and Exercises • Eliminated redundant explosive ordnance disposal training

• Collaborating on exercise planning 

Planning • Eliminated independent strategic planning activities

• JIDO incorporated into Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) regional planning working 

groups

• JIDO included in DTRA governance bodies

• Integrated continuity of operations planning and exercising 

Information Technology • Consolidated cybersecurity services, computer networks, and software license agreements

Acquisition, Finance, and 

Logistics

• Consolidated contracting, financial management and reporting, and property accountability 

functions

Personnel • Integrated manpower, personnel, and performance management systems

• Consolidated staff functions to include general counsel, legislative and public affairs, inspector 

general, and equal employment opportunity

• Reducing DTRA overhead and management costs that is expected to result in a civilian staff 

reduction of 74 (by fiscal year 2020)

Infrastructure and Property • Assessing future infrastructure consolidation opportunities

• Transferred JIDO’s property to DTRA’s accountable property system of record

International Engagement • Coordinated and, in some instances, combined international information exchanges 

Source: GAO analysis of DTRA information. | GAO-18-509

According to officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, each of 

the military services, geographic combatant commands, and Special 

Operations Command, JIDO maintained its warfighter support during its 

transition under DTRA. For example, the geographic combatant 

commands and Special Operations Command—the primary recipients of 

JIDO’s warfighter support—stated in response to our questionnaire that 

JIDO’s support to their command was not negatively affected by the 

transition. Further, in their questionnaire responses, all of the commands 

indicated they were either fully or mostly satisfied with JIDO’s level of 

support during the transition period. In interviews with officials from 

Central Command and Special Operations Command, officials reiterated 

this point noting that JIDO provided a consistent level of support to 

multiple directorates within their commands during the transition period. In 

addition, they noted that without JIDO intelligence-related, personnel, and 

training support, among others, their commands’ capability to support the 

warfighter may have been negatively affected. Table 3 identifies the types 

of warfighter support that the geographic combatant commands and 

JIDO Maintained 

Warfighter Support 

during the Transition
Page 12 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

Special Operations Command reported receiving from JIDO before and 

during the transition.

Table 3: Warfighter Support the Combatant Commands Reported Receiving from the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat 

Organization (JIDO) Before and During the Transition

Combatant command

Type of warfighter support

Rapidly fielded 

materiel 

capabilities

Intelligencerelated

Tactics, 

techniques, and 

procedures Personnel Training Othera

Africa

Command -     -

Central Command      

European Command -     

Northern Command   -   -

Pacific

Command -     

Southern Command      

Special Operations 

Command   -   

Source: GAO analysis of combatant command responses to GAO questionnaire. | GAO-18-509

Note: A check mark () indicates that the combatant command reported that JIDO provided that type 

of warfighter support within the combatant command’s area of responsibility. A dash (-) indicates that 

the combatant command reported that JIDO did not provide that type of warfighter support within the 

combatant command’s areas of responsibility.

a

Examples cited by the combatant commands include: analysis of lessons learned, analysis of 

workflow processes, subject matter expertise, support for counter-improvised threat initiatives, and 

website capability data integration.

Based on our observations of a JIDO capabilities demonstration, 

interviews with combatant command officials, and questionnaire results, 

we found that JIDO provided the following types of warfighter support 

during the transition:

• Rapidly fielded materiel capabilities: JIDO continued to research, 

develop, and rapidly field materiel solutions to support U.S. and allied 

forces. JIDO’s materiel support concentrated on defeating IEDs and 

small unmanned aircraft systems. Figure 5 shows examples of 

materiel capabilities JIDO researched during the transition.
Page 13 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

Figure 5: Examples of Materiel Capabilities the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat 

Organization (JIDO) Undertook during the Transition

• Intelligence-related: JIDO provided analytical tools and products to 

support global military operations. For example, JIDO maintained an 

information technology capability called Voltron that allows U.S. forces 

to analyze and apply improvised-threat information. This platform is 

being increasingly used by organizations across DOD and the federal 

government. As figure 6 shows, DTRA reported the number of unique 

Voltron users grew nearly tenfold from 2013 to 2017.
Page 14 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

Figure 6: Number of Unique Users Utilizing Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat 

Organization’s (JIDO’s) Voltron Improvised-threat Intelligence-related Capability

Note: Voltron is an information technology capability that allows U.S. forces to analyze and apply 

improvised-threat information.

• Tactics, techniques, and procedures: JIDO assisted combatant 

commands and allies by providing a variety of tactics, techniques, and 

procedures to counter improvised threats. According to combatant 

command officials, JIDO conducted threat assessments and provided 

exercise support, participated in subject matter expert exchanges with 

allied nations, and developed security work plans. For example, Africa 

Command reported that JIDO personnel conducted a vehicle-borne 

IED threat assessment of a city and a small unmanned aircraft 

systems threat assessment of a U.S. installation in Africa.

• Personnel: JIDO assigned personnel to each of the geographic 

combatant commands and Special Operations Command to support 

counter-IED planning, training, intelligence, and operations activities. 

For example, Central Command reported that JIDO has over 180 

personnel primarily located in forward operating positions to provide a 

range of warfighter support, such as analyzing counter-threat 

networks. Central Command and Special Operations Command 

officials noted that embedded JIDO personnel continue to play a 

critical role in supporting command and forward operating warfighter 

functions.
Page 15 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

• Training: JIDO continued to provide counter-improvised threat 

training during the transition. For example, JIDO participated in 

combatant command-sponsored operational- and tactical-level 

exercises, curriculum development, and partner nation train and equip 

missions.

• Other: According to combatant command questionnaire responses, 

JIDO also provided warfighter support outside of the categories 

previously identified. For example, Pacific Command and Special 

Operations Command reported that JIDO provided funding, subject 

matter expertise, and lessons learned for counter-small unmanned 

aircraft system initiatives.

We identified two challenges that could affect JIDO’s continued efficiency 

and effectiveness. First, JIDO’s improvised threat responsibilities—

specifically, the categories of improvised threats that JIDO is responsible 

for countering and JIDO’s authorities for countering them—are unclear. 

Second, information on most of JIDO’s research projects is not available 

through the department’s designated information sharing repository.

JIDO’s responsibilities for countering improvised threats are unclear, 

which has the potential for limiting JIDO’s continued efficiency and 

effectiveness. According to DOD joint doctrine, the Secretary of Defense 

should provide direction to combat support agency directors (such as the 

DTRA Director) to include clearly defined and achievable national 

strategic objectives and timely strategic direction.16 From 2006 to 2016, 

JIDO’s responsibilities for countering IEDs were articulated in a DOD 

directive.17 As part of JIDO’s transition under DTRA in 2016, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense cancelled this directive and indicated that JIDO 

should continue its mission under the authorities of DTRA.18 However, as 

 16Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Mar. 25, 2013) 

(incorporating change 1, July 12, 2017).

17DOD Directive 2000.19E (Rescinded 2016). 

18Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Organizational Realignment of the Joint 

Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (Nov. 2, 2016).

Unclear 

Responsibilities and 

Incomplete 

Information Sharing 

Challenge JIDO’s 

Continued Efficiency 

and Effectiveness

JIDO’s Responsibilities 

Are Unclear
Page 16 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

of May 2018, DTRA’s DOD directive (DOD Directive 5105.62) has not 

been updated to include JIDO. DTRA officials said that they expect the 

next update to DTRA’s DOD directive to include JIDO and its 

responsibilities and anticipate it being issued in the fall of 2018. Due to 

the cancelling of JIDO’s former directive and a lack of clarity in DTRA’s 

forthcoming draft directive, JIDO’s responsibilities are unclear to officials 

from across DOD. For example, officials from the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military services, and some combatant 

commands stated that they are unclear what categories of threats JIDO is 

responsible for countering and what authorities JIDO has for countering 

improvised threats, as described below.

• The categories of threats that JIDO is responsible for countering 

are unclear. DOD has not clearly defined what constitutes an 

improvised threat. In 2015, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

expanded JIDO’s mission from solely countering IEDs to countering 

improvised threats at large. However, the term “improvised threat”

does not appear in DOD’s authoritative dictionary of military and 

associated terms.19 Further, in discussions and in responses to our 

questionnaire, officials from across the department provided different 

interpretations of what constitutes an improvised threat, from any 

commercial-off-the-shelf technology that has been modified to have 

desired battlefield effects to any improvised device that has an 

explosive component. To address this issue, DTRA developed the 

following improvised threat definition in its draft directive that is 

awaiting DOD approval:

Improvised Threat – Threat tactics, techniques, procedures, and devices 

designed, fielded, or employed in any modality of conflict that adversely 

affects U.S. Joint Force protection or maneuverability. The emphasis is on 

non-state actors, but not on those exclusively as determined by the 

combatant commanders.

Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency. | GAO-18-509

JIDO and DTRA officials explained that this definition gives them the 

flexibility they believe is necessary to address emerging improvised 

threats. In contrast, officials from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military services told us that the 

definition in the DTRA draft directive is too broad for understanding 

what categories of threats JIDO is responsible for countering. For 

 19DOD, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (June 2018).
Page 17 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

example, under this definition, space, cyber, and radiological threats 

could be included. DOD’s improvised-threat definition could be 

interpreted to include all improvised, conventional, and strategic 

threats. DOD officials noted that JIDO’s prior directive, which was 

rescinded in 2016, included a precise definition of an IED. These 

officials cautioned that if the improvised threat definition remains 

vague, it increases the risk that JIDO will be tasked with addressing 

too many categories of threats, which will spread JIDO’s funding and 

staffing resources thin, diminish JIDO’s counter-IED expertise, and 

potentially fragment departmental counter-improvised threat efforts.

• JIDO’s authorities for countering improvised threats are unclear.

Officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, 

the military services, and some combatant commands said they are 

unclear about JIDO’s authorities for countering improvised threats. 

According to DOD officials, JIDO’s prior directive clearly articulated 

JIDO’s authorities to coordinate departmental counter-IED efforts in 

key areas such as research and rapid fielding. In particular, the prior 

directive stated that JIDO “shall focus (lead, advocate, and 

coordinate) all DOD efforts to defeat IEDs.”20 In contrast, DTRA’s draft 

directive does not specify JIDO’s authorities for leading, advocating, 

and coordinating departmental counter-improvised threat efforts in key 

areas such as research and rapid fielding. Until the department 

clarifies JIDO’s improvised threat authorities, it remains unclear what, 

if any, authorities JIDO has with respect to leading, advocating, and 

coordinating the department’s response to counter-improvised threats.

DTRA and JIDO officials stated that clarifying the categories of 

improvised threats that JIDO is responsible for countering, as well as 

JIDO’s authorities for countering them, would be beneficial. However, 

DTRA and JIDO officials cautioned against being overly prescriptive in 

bounding the categories of improvised threats and corresponding 

authorities because doing so could hinder JIDO’s flexibility to address 

future urgent, unanticipated threats. Rather, these officials suggested 

clarifying broad categories of improvised threats that JIDO would be 

responsible for addressing, such as improvised threats involving 

explosives and their related delivery systems. Clarifying both the 

categories of threats JIDO is responsible for and JIDO’s authorities would 

help JIDO more efficiently and effectively plan, program, and coordinate 

its assigned improvised threat responsibilities, according to the same 

 20DOD Directive 2000.19E (Rescinded 2016). 
Page 18 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

officials. In addition, clarifying JIDO’s improvised threat responsibilities 

could inform departmental decisions about JIDO’s organizational 

structure—including the size and composition of its leadership, 

permanent, and contractor workforce, and funding levels.

JIDO does not routinely provide information on its research projects to the 

department’s designated information sharing repository. Research project 

information includes thousands of technical, operational, capability and 

limitation, and vendor test reports that JIDO developed on behalf of DOD. 

DOD Instruction 3200.12 requires defense organizations such as JIDO to 

document and send information on their research projects to the Defense 

Technical Information Center (DTIC).21 DTIC manages the department’s 

primary repository for preserving and sharing research information across 

the department.22 In response to concerns regarding the availability of 

information on JIDO research, the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics oversaw an effort to 

determine the extent to which JIDO had submitted information on its 

research projects to DTIC.23 In 2017, this effort concluded and found that 

JIDO had submitted less than one third of the required documents on its 

research projects to DTIC.

Sharing information on JIDO research involves two separate processes: 

(1) obtaining the permission of other DOD organizations associated with a 

research project and (2) submitting information at the conclusion of 

research. DOD reporting and interviews with DOD officials identified two 

separate challenges that affected JIDO’s ability to routinely share 

information on its research projects:

• Obtaining permission at the onset of research. The Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

was unable to submit research project information to DTIC in 

 21DOD Instruction 3200.12, DoD Scientific and Technical Information Program (STIP) 

(Aug. 22, 2013) (incorporating change 1, Oct. 10, 2017).

22DTIC’s information sharing repository contains approximately 4.1 million records. 

Information from DTIC’s repository was downloaded more than 45.5 million times in fiscal 

year 2017.

23DOD’s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics organization was restructured on Feb. 1, 

2018, into two organizations: Acquisition and Sustainment, and Research and 

Engineering, each with an under secretary, per the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328).

JIDO Does Not Routinely 

Share Research Project 

Information
Page 19 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

coordination with JIDO because, while required to, JIDO had not 

obtained permission from DOD organizations associated with the 

research projects to release the information. According to DOD 

officials, such permission typically is obtained at the onset of a 

research project from the organizations associated with the project. 

However, JIDO had not obtained permission for most of the projects.

• Submitting information at the conclusion of research. According 

to DOD officials, JIDO focused almost exclusively on addressing 

urgent warfighter needs, and did not develop a process to ensure its 

research project information—such as technical, operational, and test 

reports—was submitted to DTIC after projects ended.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and military service 

officials noted the importance of ensuring that JIDO’s research project 

information is readily available so that, for example, other research 

organizations can leverage JIDO’s experience and expertise before 

funding and conducting similar or related research. In May 2018, DTRA 

officials told us that in response to information we presented, they began 

coordinating with DTIC to discuss information sharing. Further, the 

officials stated they were receptive to developing processes, including 

obtaining permission from DOD organizations associated with the 

research projects, and to submit information on JIDO research projects to 

DTIC. Establishing such processes to ensure information on JIDO’s 

research projects is included in DTIC’s repository would help reduce the 

likelihood of fragmented and unintentionally duplicative counterimprovised threat research projects.

Enemy combatants and terrorists continue to use improvised weapons, 

particularly IEDs, against U.S. military forces. DOD’s ability to counter 

improvised threats depends on organizations such as JIDO to develop 

and implement training, tactics, equipment, and other capabilities that 

address urgent warfighter needs, such as countering weaponized small 

unmanned aircraft systems. JIDO has completed initial transition activities 

to DTRA, such as transferring personnel and pay, and officials stated they 

expect to achieve long-term efficiencies. Further, JIDO’s warfighter 

support was maintained during the organization’s transition under DTRA. 

However, JIDO faces some challenges that, if unresolved, could diminish 

its continued efficiency and effectiveness. Specifically, if the department 

does not clarify the categories of threats JIDO is responsible for 

countering and JIDO’s authorities for countering those threats, JIDO’s 

ability to plan, program, prioritize, and coordinate an effective and timely 

response could be hindered. Further, clarifying JIDO’s improvised threat 

Conclusions
Page 20 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

responsibilities could inform departmental decisions about JIDO’s 

organizational structure—including the size and composition of its 

leadership, permanent, and contractor workforce, and funding levels. 

Lastly, JIDO’s counter-IED experience and expertise is recognized by 

officials from across DOD; however, JIDO does not routinely submit 

information on its research projects to DTIC, as required. Not submitting 

information to DOD’s designated information sharing repository increases 

the risk of other DOD entities unknowingly expending funds on 

researching improvised threats that JIDO has already researched. This 

may result in fragmented or duplicative efforts because outcomes of 

relevant research undertaken by JIDO were not considered. Addressing 

these challenges will help sustain JIDO’s progress in efficiently and 

effectively countering improvised threats.

We are making the following four recommendations to the Secretary of 

Defense:

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment clarifies the categories of 

threats within JIDO’s counter-improvised threat mission. 

(Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment clarifies JIDO’s authorities for 

countering improvised threats, including the degree to which JIDO is to 

focus (lead, advocate, and coordinate) departmental efforts in key areas 

such as research and rapid fielding. (Recommendation 2)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure the DTRA Director establishes a 

process to routinely obtain permission to release applicable information 

from organizations connected to JIDO research projects so that JIDO can 

send the information to DTIC. (Recommendation 3)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure the DTRA Director establishes a 

process to submit information on JIDO’s research projects to DTIC. 

(Recommendation 4)

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 21 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats 

DOD reviewed a draft of this report and concurred with all of our 

recommendations. DOD also cited actions it plans to take to address 

them. We believe that if DOD completes the actions it outlines in its 

response, this will address the intent of our recommendations. DOD’s 

written comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition and Sustainment; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps; and the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency. In addition, the report is available at no charge on our website at 

http://www.gao.gov

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-6881 or at bairj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix III.

Jason Bair

Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 22 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Shelby

Chairman

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairwoman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 23 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

In this report we (1) assess the status of the Joint Improvised-Threat 

Defeat Organization’s (JIDO) transition under the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (DTRA), whether transition plans reflect key practices 

on mergers and organizational transformations, and what, if any, 

efficiencies have been identified; (2) describe how, if at all, the transition 

has affected JIDO’s warfighter support, and what types of warfighter 

support JIDO provided during the transition; and (3) identify what, if any, 

challenges could affect JIDO’s continued efficiency and effectiveness.

To assess the status of JIDO’s transition under DTRA, whether transition 

plans reflect key practices on mergers and organizational 

transformations, and what if any, efficiencies have been identified, we 

analyzed DTRA and JIDO documentation describing completed JIDO 

transition activities in areas such as organizational structure, staffing, 

funding, authorities, and planning. We compared JIDO’s transition plans 

to key practices for mergers and organizational transformations that we 

identified in prior work to determine whether these key practices were 

reflected.1 To conduct this comparison, two analysts independently 

assessed JIDO transition plans to determine whether the key practices 

were reflected by indicating “yes” or “no,” and documented examples of 

yes cases. For the purposes of this review, by “reflect” we mean that the 

general intent of a key practice was identified. Further, a “yes”

assessment meant that elements of the key practice were reflected, and a 

“no” assessment meant that no part of the key practice was reflected. The 

two analysts’ independent assessments were similar; therefore, a third 

analyst was not required to mediate resolution. In addition, we assessed 

evidence from relevant documentation—such as JIDO transition plans—

that detailed JIDO and DTRA activities and functions to determine if 

efficiency gains had been identified and achieved. Finally, we interviewed 

officials from the Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy; 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and Intelligence; each of the 

military services; Joint Staff; DTRA; and JIDO to discuss JIDO’s transition 

plans, status, efficiency gains, and related challenges.

 1

For the purposes of this report, JIDO transition plans refers primarily to the following 

three documents: (1) DOD’s Report to Congress Plan for Full and Complete Transition of 

the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Under the Authority, Direction, and Control of 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (August 2016), (2) Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat 

Organization Concept of Operations (June 2016), and (3) Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA) Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Integration Plan 

(November 2017). GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 

Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 

2003).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 24 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

To describe how, if at all, the transition has affected JIDO’s warfighter 

support, we reviewed relevant DOD plans and strategies such as JIDO’s 

concept of operations to determine the scale and scope of JIDO’s 

operational support responsibilities.2 We held discussions with officials 

from the Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy; 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and Intelligence; each of the 

military services; Joint Staff; Central Command and Special Operations 

Command; DTRA; and JIDO to discuss JIDO’s warfighter support during 

the transition period. We also administered a questionnaire through the 

Joint Staff to each of the 6 geographic combatant commands and Special 

Operations Command—the primary recipients of JIDO’s warfighter 

support—to determine how, if at all, warfighter support was affected by 

the transition and the types of support the combatant commands received 

from JIDO, among other things. As part of the questionnaire’s 

development, Joint Staff officials familiar with JIDO’s mission reviewed 

the draft questionnaire for substantive issues, and a GAO questionnaire 

specialist reviewed the questionnaire for technical issues. We modified 

the questionnaire based on the feedback received from these reviewers, 

as appropriate. To administer the questionnaire, we sent a copy of the 

questionnaire to the Joint Staff on February 6, 2018, which the Joint Staff 

transmitted to the 6 geographic commands and Special Operations 

Command. We closed the questionnaire on March 5, 2018. The Joint 

Staff provided the questionnaire responses by email. To ensure the 

independence of the responses, prior to submitting the questionnaire, we 

discussed with the Joint Staff the planned process for disseminating the 

questionnaire and receiving the responses. The Joint Staff agreed not to 

change the formatting or content of the commands’ responses. We 

compared relevant questionnaire responses from Central Command and 

Special Operations Command—the two primary recipients of JIDO 

warfighter support—to information obtained from interviews with these 

commands to ensure consistency. Further, the commands included 

individual contact information in their responses to allow us to follow up if 

necessary and confirm the validity of the commands’ responses. Finally, 

we provided a statement of facts to the department, which included our 

analysis of the commands’ responses to our questionnaire. No 

inaccuracies were identified. We had a response rate of 100 percent. 

Data from the questionnaires were entered manually by a GAO analyst in 

Microsoft Excel. A quantitative data analysis was conducted by a GAO 

analyst using Microsoft Excel, and a second GAO analyst independently 

 2

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization Concept of Operations (June 2016).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 25 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

verified the accuracy of the analyses. The questionnaire contained 

questions covering the transition period, as well as time periods before 

the transition, to more fully understand the effects of JIDO’s transition on 

the combatant commands. After analyzing the questionnaire results, we 

discussed our overarching observations with DTRA and JIDO officials to 

better understand their relevance and significance.

To identify what, if at any, challenges could affect JIDO’s continued 

efficiency and effectiveness, we analyzed relevant joint doctrine, 

directives, guidance, and planning documents that involved JIDO’s 

mission and authorities. We also spoke with officials from the Offices of 

the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy; Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics; and Intelligence; Joint Staff; each of the military services; the 

Defense Technical Information Center; DTRA; JIDO; and Central 

Command and Special Operations Command to obtain their perspectives 

on potential challenges. We then compared information on potential 

challenges to relevant joint doctrine and DOD directives and an 

instruction to determine their relevance.

To address our three reporting objectives, we worked with officials from 

the DOD organizations listed in table 4. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 26 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

Table 4: Department of Defense (DOD) Organizations Contacted by GAO

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict

Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office

Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Humanitarian Mine Action Office

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1)

Strategic Plans and Policies Directorate (J5)

Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J8)

U.S. Army

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Training (G3/5/7)

Adaptive Counter Improvised Explosive Device and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Solutions (G38)

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology

Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment

Unexploded Ordnance Center of Excellence

U.S. Navy

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems (N9)

Navy, Joint, and Urgent Needs (N9IJ)

Surface Warfare (N96)

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition

U.S. Marine Corps

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

U.S. Air Force

Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection (A4)

Directorate of Civil Engineers 

Headquarters Air Force Electronic Warfare Division (A5RE)

U.S. Africa Command

Operations and Cyber Directorate (J3)

U.S. Central Command

Intelligence Directorate (CCJ2)

Operations Directorate (CCJ3)

Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate (CCJ5)

Force Development Directorate (CCJ7)

Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (CCJ8)
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 27 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

U.S. European Command

Operations Directorate (J3)

U.S. Northern Command

Operations Directorate (J3)

U.S. Pacific Command

Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Operations Directorate (J3)

U.S. Southern Command

Operations Directorate (J3)

U.S. Special Operations Command

Intelligence Directorate (J2)

Operations Directorate (J3)

Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5)

Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate (J8)

Defense Technical Information Center

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Mission Integration Office

Acquisition, Finance, and Logistics Directorate

Human Resources Directorate

Intelligence and Plans Directorate

Information Integration and Technology Services Directorate 

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization

Mission Integration Division (Intelligence) (J2) 

Operations Directorate (J3)

Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate (J5)

Information, Technology, Communications Directorate (J6)

Training, Support, Plex Directorate (J7)

Requirements Acquisition Directorate (J8)

Operations and Research Directorate (J9)

Source: GAO | GAO-18-509.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 28 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 29 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgments

Page 30 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats 

Jason Bair, (202) 512-6881 or bairj@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact above, Marc Schwartz (Assistant Director), 

David Adams (Analyst in Charge), Vincent Buquicchio, Clarice Ransom,

Michael Silver, Sarah Veale, and Melissa Wohlgemuth made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(102267)
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