DOMESTIC TRENDS TO THE YEAR 2015: 

FORECASTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 

Demography 

The Economy 

Resources 

Education 

Society 

Technology 

Military Science 

Geopolitics and Threat 

A Report Prepared under an Interagency Agreement 

by the Federal Research Division, 

Library of Congress 

July 199 1 

Project Manager: David L. Osborne 

Authors: Boris Bohun-Chudyniv 

L y Burnham 

Glenn Curtis 

Amy Knight 

Da vid Mc Cla ve 

David L. Osborne 

Andrea M. Savada 

Eric D. Solsten 

Federal Research Division 

Library of Congress 

Washington, D. C. 20540-4840 

Tel: (202) 707-3900 

Fax: (202) 707-3920 

E-Mail: frds@loc.go v 

Homepage: http://lc web. loc.go v/rr/frd/ 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

The study you are about to read is the product of many analysts' research and study. 

Those analysts are identified as authors of the respective papers constituting the work. This project 

concerns the prediction of future United States domestic trends to the year 2015. It has offered everyone 

an opportunity to think creatively and project into the future. While this is a difficult task, it is 

nevertheless exciting and challenging. We have all learned and profited from the experience. 

A product of this magnitude cannot be accomplished without the assistance of many other 

talented people who are not identified elsewhere. The Federal Research Division of the Library of 

Congress has many such talented people and the editor would like to take this opportunity to thank them 

for their many hours of hard work and assistence. First, to David Cabitto, our graphics artist, for his 

skill in compiling the many excellent charts and graphs. The graphics add much to the clarity of the 

text. Next, to Marilyn Majeska and her staff, for reading the manuscript and making valuable 

suggestions. Her skilled eye and careful reading are greatly appreciated for making the text more lucid 

and precise. We gratefully acknowledge the people who helped with the inevitable complexities of 

automation, Steven Cranton and Sara Arason. Our work was saved on more than one occasion through 

their efforts. 

Louis R. Mortimer, Chief of the Federal Research Division, is to be thanked for his 

encouragement and support in this project. His optimism maintained many of our spirits when they 

might have sunk under the weight of deadlines. 

Finally, to those people who have assisted in other, no less important ways, many thanks. This 

work could never have been accomplished in a timely fashion without their help. 

David L. Osborne, Editor 

July 1991 
CONTENTS 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

INTRODUCTION 

DEMOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES IN 2015 

Ly Burnham 

KEY JUDGMENTS: DEMOGRAPHY 

INTRODUCTION 

POPULATION TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS 

VITAL STATISTICS 

Births 

Deaths 

Immigration and Outmigration 

Age Distribution 

Ethnic Composition 

REGIONAL POPULATION TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS 

Regional 

States 

Cities 

HISPANIC POPULATION 

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 

Implications for the Army 

SOURCES 

THE ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES IN 2015 

Glenn Curtis 

KEY JUDGMENTS: THE ECONOMY 

INTRODUCTION 

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 

MANAGEMENT AND THE WORK FORCE 

ENTERPRISE STRUCTURE 

FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT CONDITIONS 

THE UNITED STATES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 

THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ECONOMIES 

UNRESOLVED ISSUES 

CONCLUSION 

SOURCES 

THE UNITED STATES RESOURCE PICTURE IN 2015 

David McClave 

KEY JUDGMENTS: RESOURCES 

INTRODUCTION 

FOOD AND WATER 

ENERGY 

Oil 

Natural Gas 

Coal 

Uranium 

Oil Shale 

Renewable Energy Resources 

NONFUEL MINERALS 

STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS 

iii 
Chromium 

Titanium 

Platinum Group Metals (PGM) 

Cobalt 

Manganese 

RESOURCES FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 

ELECTRONIC METALS 

NONCONVENTIONAL RESOURCES: "The Global Commons" 

SUMMARY OF PROJECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 

SOURCES 

4. AMERICAN EDUCATION IN 2015 

Andrea M. Savada 

KEY JUDGMENTS: EDUCATION 

OVERVIEW 

THE SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 

Choice 

Decentralization 

Curriculum 

National Tests 

Achievement Levels 

National Teacher Certification 

Multiculturalism 

Tracking 

New Technologies 

NON-ACADEMIC SERVICES 

Health and Social Services 

Kindergarten and Pre-School Programs 

OTHER INNOVATIONS 

Expanded School DayIYear-round School 

ApprenticeshiplIntern/Service Programs 

CONCLUSION 

APPENDIX A: Education: The Japanese Approach 

APPENDIX B: General Educational Development Certificates 

SOURCES 

5. AMERICAN SOCIETY IN 2015 

Eric D. Solsten 

KEY JUDGMENTS: SOCIETY 

INTRODUCTION 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE 

Family 

Generational Differences 

Class/Race/Gender 

Class 

Race 

Gender 

SOCIAL WELFARE 

Pensions 

Health Care 

Values 

Religion 

Lifestyles 

POLITICS 

Generations at Odds 

Regional and Interest Politics 

CONCLUSION 
SOURCES 

6. TECHNOLOGY 

Boris Bohun-Chudyniv 

KEY JUDGMENTS: TECHNOLOGY 

INTRODUCTION 

Definition 

Reinventing the Camel 

GENESIS OF TECHNOLOGY (THE SCI-TECH ENGINE) 

LIMITS TO TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 

TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 

ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 

TRENDS IN TECHNOLOGY (METATREND--THE LARGE PICTURE) 

TRENDS AND COMBINATIONS 

GENERAL TRENDS 

PROBLEMS CAUSED BY ACCELERATING PROGRESS 

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES FOR THE MILITARY 

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING FROM ADVANCES IN THE 

PHYSICAL SCIENCES 

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING FROM ADVANCES IN 

INFORMATION PROCESSING 

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING FROM ADVANCES IN LIFE 

SCIENCES 

SOME POSSIBLE PROJECTIONS FOR 2015-2020 FOR SAMPLE TECHNOLOGIES 

SOURCES 

7. UNITED STATES MILITARY SCIENCE IN 2015 

Amy Knight 

KEY JUDGMENTS 

STATE OF THE ART TODAY 

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 

The Operational Continuum 

Joint and Combined Operations 

AirLand Battle and AirLand Battle-Future 

Nuclear War Doctrine 

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN 2015 

Potential Impact of Arms Control 

NUCLEAR WAR IN 2015 

CONVENTIONAL WAR IN 2015 

High-Intensity Conflict 

Mid-Intensity Conflict 

Low-Intensity Conflict 

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY 

Conventional Warfare 

The Nuclear Arena 

Space 

TRAINING AND COMMAND 

Manpower and Force Structure 

Command and Control 

TRENDS AND FINDINGS 

SOURCES 

8. GEOPOLITICS AND THREAT IN 2015 

David L. Osborne 

KEY JUDGMENTS 

INTRODUCTION 
IDENTIFICATION OF TRENDS IN WORLD GEOPOLITICS 

THE UNITED STATES AND STRATEGIC THINKING 

CONCLUSION 

SOURCES 

CONCLUSION 

List of Figures 

List of Tables 
INTRODUCTION 

It is abundantly clear to most researchers that the United States and the developed world are well 

into a period of transition that is generating a great deal of turbulence, both domestically and globally. 

Technology is transforming virtually every aspect of world society and effecting changes in developmental 

trends. While it is impossible to predict the future with any certainty, it is altogether appropriate for the 

U.S. Army to be concerned with future studies and forecasting. 

Twenty-five years ago the United States was coming to grips with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 

The population was predominantly white and the principal minority group was black, constituting 

approximately 10 percent of the total. The percentages of the Asian and Hispanic populations were far 

lower. The American economy towered over all others in the world. The dollar denominated all 

international trade, domestic oil production met most of the nation's needs, and American schools were 

seeing the results of the science and mathematics curriculum instituted as a result of the launching of 

Sputnik in 1957. Although the debate about the involvement in Vietnam was becoming increasingly 

strident, there was no "Vietnam syndrome" because no one would know the outcome of the conflict for 

nine more years and much more time would pass before Americans would formulate any general opinion 

about it. In fact, in 1966 the United States was well into the federal effort aimed at creating the "Great 

Society." Many of the nation's citizens believed America could have both guns and butter: the greatest 

military machine and the greatest social reform effort the world had ever seen. 

During this time the international system was well defined and predicated on the bi-polar 

confrontation between the two power blocs that had emerged from World War 11: NATO and the 

Warsaw Pact. The superpowers focused on Europe and, although the Cuban crisis of 1963 briefly had 

raised the threat ~f~escalation, the two forces, in the main, contested each other in remote areas of the 

world through their client-states or proxies. 

In 1966 the concept of "personal computing" was unknown because automation technology meant 

the mainframe computer and "dumb" terminals. "Smart" bombs and laser-guided weapons were still in 

the idea stage, and planners would only forecast their use in the inevitable conflict with the USSR. 

In 1966 the futurists had their visions, but many visions remain just that. In 1991 Americans are 

not commuting to work with jet packs strapped to their backs. People still drive automobiles, much to 

the detriment of the environment. Cities have not been encapsulated under domes, and electricity 

generated in nuclear power plants is not free of charge. The great social reform experiment has been reevaluated and many Americans have mixed feelings about the Vietnam experience. The Cold War may 

have ended, not through superpower warfare, but because of the seeming collapse of communism from 

its own "inner contradictions." Yet the world still does not live in peace and harmony. What happened? 

Palmistry artists notwithstanding, no one can predict the future. Humans are limited to analyzing events 

and identifying trends so that thcy can be prepared for the future and not be too surprised at what takes 

place. 

The task in this project has been to identify United States domestic trends for the next 25-year 

period, up to the year 2015, in the following areas: demography, the economy, resources, education, 
b 

society, technology, military science and geopolitics and threat. Scenarios have been constructed with 

potential variations for future developments in these areas. Analysts have identified those factors, the 

"change drivers," that will accelerate or retard the development of these trends, and have offered a range 

of possibilities to assist U.S. Army planners in future decision-making. 

How has this been accomplished? Many excellent methodologies exist for predicting future 

trends. When a ballistic missile is fired, its future course can be determined with great precision by using 

calculations. This predictive ability guides the aiming procedure of a mortar crew for the first shot. The 

spotter provides guidance for future actions, that is, correction for wind, equipment-based idiosyncracies, 

etc., without casting any doubt whatsoever on the validity of the basic theoretical predictive formula. 

The long-term future of the physical world may be equally predictable. Assuming the Big Bang 

is, in fact, a valid model of the universe, and reliable measurements have been made of the amount of 

matter in space so one knows whether it will collapse or expand forever, one can calculate with precision 

just when the universe will "recycle" with contraction because of gravitational attraction of the galaxies 

and calculate the time of the next Big Bang, or when the universe will reach a certain degree of coldexpanded "entropy death." Future measurements will either confirm one of these outcomes, or possibly 

suggest that the predictive model is wrong, with implications that a better predictive model may be 

possible if new measurements are taken. 

The verifiability of the predictive model in the physical world has been so successful that 

researchers have naturally sought equally reliable methodologies for the prediction of social developments. 

Some have even become so pleased with results obtained so far that they have provided "objective 

methods" for the projection of future developments. Examples of such methods are Rand's Delphi 

technique, forecasting by analogy with physical and/or biological processes, and extrapolation of trends. 

There have been some attempts to construct quantified structural mathematical models (as described by 

J. P. Martino, for instance). These methods are frequently of considerable use, particularly when 

forecasting technological developments in a narrow area. 

The fact remains, however, that the kind of sure prediction available for measurement of events 

in the physical sciences is not available for the social sciences, regardless of the sophistication of the 

statistical techniques used. The underlying basic processes in physics involve known, unambiguous, 

precisely described analytical formulas (like the gravitational equation that describes both the path of a 

projectile and the attraction of galaxies), while social scientists have no unambiguous testable mechanism. 

They must rely on correlations between events. In this case, trend extrapolation is a valid technique, as 

long as forecasters remember that the reasons behind a trend may be murky and that therefore the trend 

may cease for reasons that are not, in principle, unpredictable, but which have not yet been identified. 

Unless they recognize this fact, forecasters may easily misinterpret the degree of validity the trend 

projection allows. Of course, everyone wants to predict events with maximum validity, but caution must 

be exercised so as not to fall prey to mechanical procedures that sound scientific but do not, in fact, 

increase the validity of predictions. 

The approach to the issue of methodology used here, given the breadth of the task (forecasting 
essentially the whole social and technological set of changing conditions in the United States within the 

environment of global change) and the 25-year time frame, given the broad range of outlooks and 

orientations of the analysts, has been to embrace what psychologists call "construct validity." This 

approach involves specifying the explicit process assumptions for each argument as far as possible and 

allowing independent judgments to be made separately on all the arguments presented. Some of the 

arguments will necessarily be stronger than others, as dictated by available data and each writer's 

integrative vision. This approach also provides the sponsor with a clear understanding of each analyst's 

point of view and allows more accurate assessments to be made by the reader than would be possible if 

some mechanical "homogenization" technique were applied. 

From the beginning of this project the researchers have believed these subject areas to be a loop 

of dependencies. The subjects interact with and depend on each other in ways that are, at once, clear 

yet obscure. What the United States is as a society depends greatly on what it comprises: the myriad 

of demographic facts that, when combined, tell us who we will be. This picture, in turn, will determine 

many trends in economic development. For example, an aging population provides a smaller manpower 

pool, hence the economy will either focus on fewer labor-intensive industries or increase the use of 

robots. An aging population also means that productivity will have to increase in order to satisfy the 

aging population's wants and needs. The demands of the economy in turn, will drive the natural resource 

base and requirements. If, for example, the United States is manufacturing products requiring rare earth 

minerals and raw materials unavailable domestically, there must be reliable foreign sources of supply. 

This fact means that the economy must be able to compete effectively in global markets, and, at the same 

time, the United States must be able to ensure that a regional power or powers will not choke off that 

supply. 

Competing in a global economy will require a work force that is highly educated and trained in 

science and mathematics, has well-developed cognitive skills, takes individual initiative and is goaloriented yet can work in groups to solve everyday workplace problems. The education system capable 

of producing graduates having these skills will demand a commitment from society. The values of that 

society, as exhibited through its social structure and relationships, will determine whether the education 

system will receive the attention it needs. If the product of education is equipped to compete globally, 

then society's economic surplus will increase and the wealth that accrues will enable the society's needs 

to be met. If society's children are well educated and competitive, then they will be able to create the 

technologies of tomorrow, use resources more efficiently and to the maximum benefit, and society's 

living standard will continue to improve. The military services are, in a sense, the ultimate 

consumer. The U.S. Army receives the product of education, the product of technological research and 

development, and the product of the economic riches of society. If these products are of high quality and 

in sufficient quantity, then the military services can provide for the society's security and meet any 

geopolitical crisis that may emerge. 

By way of overview it shall be explained briefly how analysis has proceeded. Figures from the 

United States Bureau of the Census have been used. High and low projections for population growth in 
2015 have been forecasted from these data, scenarios for futuie growth in racial groups, the distribution 

of age cohorts, potential regional population shifts, and possible immigration patterns have been mapped. 

The impact of infant mortality and disease on population trends have also been projected. 

Analysis will show the effects of increasing globalization on the American economy and how this 

will affect the relationship of the manufacturing and service sectors. Global resource reserves and 

projected U.S. needs based on likely future technological developments will be studied. From these 

figures the steps needed to be taken to ensure adequate supplies of critical resources will be identified. 

The education system will be investigated to determine current deficiencies and the trends 

emerging as potential solutions to problems widely acknowledged by educators and the public alike will 

be identified. Analysts will project possible scenarios for the likely success of education reforms. 

American society will have a higher percentage of elderly people in 2015 than now. As a result, 

the available manpower pool for the military will be reduced and generational conflicts over pensions and 

benefits for retirees might possibly occur. The role women will play in the labor force and the military 

will be projected. Americans will continue to be idealistic and express strong religious beliefs and 

affiliations. While the United States will not be isolationist, it will not be the "world's policeman": U.S. 

forces will intervene if vital interests are at risk, but will do so as part of a coalition of forces. 

The concept of technological development and the limits to technological change will be 

discussed. Americans will be in the forefront of technological creativity and innovation, but it is not 

certain that United States industry will lead in the manufacture of technological products. 

The development of military science in light of changes in strategic thinking and the evolving 

system of international relationships will be forecast. Current U.S. security requirements and potential 

threats based on likely developments in the world system will be projected. The end of the Cold War 

does not mean "the end of history" but rather a different form of competition between rivals: economic 

domination. It remains to be seen whether economic power alone can define superpower status. 

The United States will be challenged in many ways in the coming 25 years and the challenges will 

be met. Citizens of the United States have the creative talents and problem-solving skills to meet the tests 

that most certainly will emerge. It is to these forthcoming issues that this study now turns. 
KEY JUDGMENTS 

DEMOGRAPHY 

- Based on the 1990 Census figures, the population of the United States in 2015 will reach 303.4 

million. 

- The nation will become more ethnically diverse, with 37.8 percent of the total population 

identifying itself as a member of a minority group. By 2015 Hispanic-Americans will be the largest 

minority (44.4 million), followed by Black-Americans (41.9 million) and Asian-Americans (13.3 million). 

- Legal immigration will average 550,000 to 600,000 per year. The southern border of the 

United States will continue to be semi-permeable: economic conditions in Central and Latin America are 

not expected to improve markedly to stem the tide of migrants northward. 

- Most of the national population growth will be attributed to ethnic minorities. In the 18-25 

age cohort, the percentage of ethnic minorities will increase from 32.9 to 44.5. Recruitment tactics must 

improve to attract and retain minorities and specialized instruction will need to be intensified. 

- By 2015 the median age of the population will be 37.6, up from the current 33. The ratio of 

those under age 18 will decline, while the ratio of those over age 65 will rise. Life expectancy at birth 

will be 81.5 years for women and 74.6 years for men. 

- The 18-25 army recruitment cohort, currently 12 percent of the total population, will drop to 

10.7 percent in 2015. 

- The average army soldier will be over the age of 30, married with children or a single parent. 

This soldier will be the oldest in combat since the Civil War. The Army will be required to provide 

more social services because of the increasing number of women and single parents in active and reserve 

status. 

-- The trend toward urbanization will continue. More than half of the nation's total population 

resides in 39 large metropolitan areas. Two-thirds of the Hispanic population will be centered in 25 large 

metropolitan areas. 

- The number of married-with-children households will continue to fall, and the number of 

single-parent households will rise, with the overwhelming majority of them headed by women. 

- The effects of AIDS will persist through 2015, with between 1,500 and 2,000 HIV-positive 

babies to be born every year in the next 25 years. While a preventive vaccine is likely to be discovered 

in the forecast period, a cure for those already stricken is uncertain. 
DEMOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES IN 2015 

INTRODUCTION 

The population of the United States totalled 249,632,692 on April 1, according to the 1990 

Census, and is expected to reach 303.4 million by July 1, 2015 (see Fig. 1). These figures are from the 

Bureau of the Census and are not completely reliable. On April 18, 1991 the Bureau announced an 

undercount of six million people in the 1990 census. This number is still being debated and undoubtedly 

will be subject to change in the future. Because these figures arrived as this study was in its final stages, 

the figures used herein are based on previously announced totals. It is imperative, therefore, that the 

reader understand that revised figures by the Census Bureau will skew various projected numbers 

accordingly. However, the trends identified through the analysis presented here are valid. 

The population is multinational; this characteristic of the population will be more pronounced in 

2015, when ethnic minorities will account for 37.8 percent of the total. Hispanics will be the dominant 

minority group. The country will be largely urban and more densely populated in the South and West 

than in the North and Midwest. The population in general is aging, pushing the median age in 2015 to 

37.6 from the present 33. 

Progress of medical science in the treatment of disease has contributed to the continuing increase 

in life expectancy from the present 72.1 for men and 78.9 for women to a projected 74.6 for men and 

81.5 for women in 2015. Women will outnumber men by a ratio of 104 to 100. 

The number of married-with-children households in the United States fell from 80.5 percent of 

the total in 1980 to 77.1 percent in 1988, while the number of single-parent households rose from 19.6 

percent to 22.9 percent. Of the 7.3 million single parents in 1988,6.3 million were women, 15.2 percent 

more than in 1980. 

Single-parent households will continue to rise through the year 2015, but at a slower rate. 

Because the fear of AIDS has caused many people to reduce the number of their sexual partners, there 

has been a noticeable change in the divorce and marriage rates. After a steady rise in the 1970s, divorce 

rates have begun to decline. Marriage rates have declined since 1950, but the number of marriages has 

been constant. It is expected that the divorce rate will decline further and the number of marriages will 

increase. 

The U.S. population projections in this study are based on Series 15, one of 30 series tabulated 

by the Bureau of the Census in its population projections for the period 1988-2080. Series 15, using a 

high fertility rate, reflects the birth surge of 1989 (see below). Illustrating the difficulty of accurately 

projecting population, Series 14, disseminated as the official projected population, was based on a 

medium fertility rate. By 1991, the number of children under five years of age in this series was at least 

1.5 million fewer than the actual number in the cohort. Hispanic projections are based on Series 17, one 

of 30 projections for the Hispanic population from 1983 to 2080. This series took into account a high 

rate of immigration. 

Po~ulation Trends and Proiections 

The U.S. population grew at an annual average rate of less than 1.0 percent during the last two 

census years, 1980 and 1990. This rate would have been even lower had it not been for the birth surge 

of 1989 and the legalization of a large group of originally illegal aliens. The average annual population 

growth rate was 1.9 percent during the decade 1950-60; then it sharply dropped in the following two 

decades to 1.3 percent (1960-70) and 1.1 percent (1970-80). 

Through the analysis of projected Bureau of the Census figures, the U.S. population will reach 

303.4 million by July 1, 2015, based on the following projections: (a) the birth surge of 1989 will slowly 

decline from about 16 per thousand to 14.4 in 2015; (b) the death rate will remain near the current level 

of 8.7 per thousand until the year 2000, then rise to 9.0 per thousand by the year 2015; (c) net 

immigration will begin at 600,000 per year in 1991 then diminish to 500,000 after 1998; and (d) the 

assumption that no unforeseen events will occur that often skew demographic projections, such as natural 

calamities, fatal epidemics, or a large influx of illegal immigrants and refugees. A change in one or more 

of these factors could shift the projected population from a high of 320.5 million to a low of 265.1 

million in 2015 (see Table 1). 

Table 1. U.S. Population, Actual and Projected, 

Selected Years, 1980-2015' 

(in millions) 

' Includes military and federal employees overseas. 

Census data; date of census is April 1. 

Date of projection is July 1. 

Population 

Low Population 

Medium Population 

High Population 

n.a. -- not applicable. 

Actual2 Projected3 

1980 

227.8 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

2005 

n.a. 

262.4 

282.3 

291.7 

1990 

249.6 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

2015 

n.a. 

265.1 

303.4 

320.5 
VITAL STATISTICS 

Births 

At the height of the Baby Boom in the early 1960s, annual births peaked at nearly 4.3 million, 

fell to 3.1 million in the 1970s, then slowly rose again and surged in 1989 with over 4 million births. 

The increase in the number of births recorded in the late 1980's was partially attributed to the rise in 

teenage pregnancies, which had been in decline for the 25 years before 1986. About half-a-million 

teenage girls became single mothers in 1988; this number would have even higher had there not been 

416,000 abortions and more than 120,000 miscarriages or stillbirths. Also contributing to the high 

number of births were the recent immigrants, especially Asians and Hispanics, who have a much higher 

fertility rate than white Americans. The high 1989 birth rate is not expected to be a continuing long-term 

rise. (see Fig. 2) 

Deaths 

In 1988, a total of 2,167,999 deaths were recorded in the United States, 44,676 more than in 

1987. This increase was attributed to the continued growth in the size of the population, an upward 

proportion of older people, and an influenza outbreak in 1988. Infant mortality was still high in 1990, 

with 9.1 per 1,000 births, down from 9.7 deaths in 1989. Each year nearly 40,000 infants die before 

reaching their first birthday; 10,000 of them could probably be saved through the early application of 

commonly known preventive measures. Nineteen large cities were identified as having an infant mortality 

rate higher than the national average for the five-year period from 1984 through 1988. The rates ranged 

from 21.1 per thousand in Washington, D.C. to 10.54 per thousand in Los Angeles. Many smaller cities 

with a population of 100,000 to 250,000 and many rural counties in Mississippi have an equally high rate 

of infant mortality. 

The death rate is not expected to decrease sharply in the next 25 years unless extraordinary 

progress in medical science cuts the number of deaths caused by the current leading diseases of the United 

States. Among these are coronary heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, Alzheimers, and AIDS. Deaths 

attributed to these diseases accounted for 87 percent of those recorded in 1988. Even with forecasted 

improvements in medical care (including a vaccine and/or an affordable cure) and changed individual 

behavior, the death toll of AIDS is expected to be cut by a mere 10 percent over 10 years; it rose over 

23 percent between 1987 and 1988. According to preliminary data, AIDS was the 11th leading cause 

of death in 1989. In 1988, AIDS ranked 15th. It is expected that AIDS will be among the top 10 leading 

causes of death in coming decades. According to the Center for Disease Control the current number of 

Americans suffering from virulent AIDS is about 172,000, and specialists there estimate approximately 

another million have been identified as HIV-positive. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) 

estimated that more than 3 million people in the Western Hemisphere will be infected with the AIDS 
virus by the mid-1990s. In Haiti, one in ten pregnant women is infected with this virus. A new study 

published in the Journal of the American Medical Association indicates that in the United States about 

80,000 women of child-bearing age may be HIV-positive. This figure means that between 1,500 to 2,000 

babies could be born HIV-positive each year. The areas with the highest rates of infected women in the 

study were New York with 5.8 per thousand, the District of Columbia with 5.5, New Jersey with 4.9, 

and Florida with 4.5. 

Some progress has been made in coping with this disease. Medical research has made rapid 

progress in identifying the virus and its replication apparatus. It is probable that a cure andlor a vaccine 

will be found in the forecast period. Other venereal diseases have shown a higher rate of incidence. 

Since 1986, syphilis cases nationally have almost doubled, with the largest increases occurring in lowincome areas of major cities. National health experts have blamed much of the severe syphilis outbreak 

in urban centers on growing use of crack cocaine and prostitution. A dramatic drop in infection rates 

has recently been noted in a few states where an aggressive AIDS-prevention program has been enacted 

(for example, Colorado), leading some public health officials to conclude that the AIDS and syphilis 

efforts complement each other. 

Teenage sexual activity rose sharply in the 1960s and 1970s. It declined slightly in the early 

1980s, but increased again in the mid- and late 1980s despite the dissemination of much information about 

the ever present danger of HIV infection. According to the National Survey of Family Growth, 53 percent 

of all 15-to 19-year-old females were sexually active in 1988, up from 47 percent in 1982. More than 

20 percent of all AIDS victims are in their twenties. Given the incubation period between initial HIV 

infection and the virulent onset of recognizable AIDS symptoms, most probably became infected as 

teenagers. In San Francisco alone, 10,000 AIDS victims were recorded on 14 February, 1991 and 

10,058 at the end of the month, an increase of 58 in a scant 14 days. It is estimated that about 20,000 

to 25,000 San Franciscans are HIV-positive. Studies indicate that up to 20 percent of the city's 

homosexual men between the ages of 16 to 24 are probably infected, an obvious danger sign of yet 

another wave of AIDS. In the Washington, D.C. area, the AIDS infection rate is also very high, 

averaging approximately 3.5 new AIDS cases per day. More than 3,000 have died since 1982, and 

39,100 are believed to be HIV-positive. Other cities reporting higher numbers of AIDS cases are New 

York City (31,635), Los Angeles (11,409), Houston (5,086), Miami (4,633), Newark, New Jersey 

(4,571), Chicago (4,236), Philadelphia (3,597), and Atlanta (3526), all major metropolitan areas. The 

disease has a high incidence among intravenous drug users and their sexual partners, and children. 
UNITED STATES POPULATION GROWTH 

RATE PER THOUSAND 

1980 I 

2000 I 

201 0 I 

2020 

YEARS 

Total Population Total Population 282.3 million Total Population 303.4 million 

250.9 million (1 2.5% increase) (7.5% increase) 

Fig. 2 
Immi~ration and Outmimation 

Net immigration accounted for 40 percent of the population growth in the late 1800s but ebbed 

during the years of the great depression. In the past decade, the rate of net immigration accounted for 

30 percent of the population growth because the United States represents widely publicized opportunities 

for freedom, jobs, and education to peoples around the world. This rate will likely increase as long as 

poverty and political instability in the countries of Central and South America and the Third World 

persevere. Most immigrants of the past two decades have been Asian and Hispanic rather than European, 

unlike earlier periods. More than 2.5 million illegal aliens were granted amnesty under the 1986 

Immigration Reform and Control Act. A major change in the new U.S. Immigration Act of 1990, which 

becomes effective in October 1991, will tilt the balance more toward European applicants and away from 

Asians. The new bill emphasizes the admission of foreigners having professions and skills deemed 

necessary by the United States. It replaces the 1965 Hart-Cellar Act, which granted quotas on the basis 

of kinship with U.S. citizens or ties to its residents, rather than on country-of-origin. The 1990 bill 

emphasizing skills raises legal immigration from the current level of about 500,000 per year to 700,000 

per year for the first three years, then to 675,000 thereafter. The number of visas granted on the basis 

of desired job skills will be almost three times the current 54,000, up to 140,000; family-sponsored visas 

will increase by a smaller margin, from the current 435,000 a year to 465,000 for the first three years 

and to 480,000 thereafter. 

The number of emigrants from the United States has been around 100,000 a year. Most of these 

people returned to their original countries or sought other places with an equally desirable political 

climate or environment. It is projected that the emigrants will number between 100,000 to 160,000 a 

year. 

Ape Distribution 

Over the next two decades, the massive Baby Boom cohorts will all be over age 45, and the large 

number of babies born in the late 80s and early 90s will be below 30. This situation will effect a shift 

in the median age from 33.0 in 1990 to 37.6 in 2015. The dependency ratio, which indicates how many 

children and elderly people there will be for every 100 persons of working-age (18-65), reflects the 

change in the age structure (see Table 2). Large numbers of aging or youthful populations affect 

dependency relations within that population. The ratio of those under 18 is expected to continue to 

decline through the year 2015 and the ratio of those over 65 is expected to rise. It is projected that the 

ratio of dependents to the working-age population will be lower during the next 25 years than in earlier 

decades, going from 76.7 per hundred in 1960 to 61.8 in 2015. The dependency of the youthful 

population (17 years old and under) is expected to continue to decline from 62.8 per hundred in 1960 to 

39.6 per hundred in 2015. Conversely, the elderly (over 66 years old) dependency ratio will continue 

to rise, from 13.9 per hundred in 1960 to 22.3 per hundred in 2015. 
Table 2. Dependency Ratio, Selected Years, 1960-2015 

The 18-to-25-year-old group--an important segment to colleges, the military, and employers-- 

estimated to number 32.4 million in 2015, would be smaller if it were not for the unexpectedly high 

number of births of 1989. On the high projection, this group will reach over 34.0; on the low projection, 

less than 27.0 (see Table 3). The personal behavior of this group should be of interest to future military 

recruiters. Recent surveys show that college students' use of illicit drugs is at its lowest level in a 

decade, although marijuana, hallucinogens, and cocaine are still to be found on campuses. The 

University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research in a recent 1990 survey indicates that only 

Year 

1960 

1970 

1980 

1990 

2005 

2015 

Table 3. Recruitment-Age Population (18-25) 

by Type of Projection, 2005 and 2015 

(in thousands) 

*Age 18 to 65 years. 

15 percent of the students admitted having used an illegal drug in the past month, down from 38 percent 

of 1980. Seventy-five percent reported monthly alcohol consumption, also down from 80 percent of 

1980. Accurate projections of future drug and alcohol use are mere guesses. If, as some social scientists 

believe, the United States is in the early stages of another temperance movement (two previous such 

temperance eras have been recorded, each lasting roughly 30 years), then alcohol and drug use could 

Age 66 and Over 

13.9 

14.7 

15.9 

18.7 

19.2 

22.3 

Dependents per 100 

Workers* 

76.7 

73.2 

60.3 

59.8 

59.0 

61.8 

Type of Projection 

Low 

Medium 

High 

Age 17 and Under 

62.8 

58.5 

44.4 

41.1 

39.8 

39.5 

2005 

29,756 

30,720 

31,884 

2015 

26,973 

32,408 

34,043 
decline even further in the forecast period. If illicit drug use does change significantly, then the 

American public may come to grips with this issue in another manner (see "Society"). 

Both age groups, those under 18 years old and those aged 18 to 65, are expected to decrease only 

slightly in 25 years, from 25.7 percent of the total population in 1990 to 24.5 percent in 2015 for the 

group under 18; and 62.6 percent of 1990 to 61.8 percent for the group aged 18 to 65. The number of 

the older, 66 years old or more, will increase from 11.7 percent in 1990 to 13.7 percent in 2015 because 

of the impact of the Baby Boom years (see Table 4). In 1990 there were almost 157 million people of 

working-age in the United States; they paid Social Security taxes for 29.4 million elderly, a ratio of 5.4 

workers to 1 retiree. This ratio will decline in 25 years to 4.5 workers per retiree. In addition to 

increased pensions for retirees, Social Security will have to absorb rising medical costs. Retirement age 

will likely be extended to 70 in order to maintain system solvency. As life expectancy pushes close to 

80 for men and over 80 for women, this is not an unrealistic projection. 

Table 4. Population Distribution by Age Cohort, 

1990,2005, and 2015 

TOTAL 250,862 100.0 282,333 100.0 

'In thousands 

Cohort 

Date of population is July 1. 

Number* 

21,399 

I 

Population distribution by age cohorts and by sex is shown in Table 5 and Figure 3. 

14 

Number* % Number* % 
Fig. 3 

15 
Table 5. Population Distribution by Age Cohort and Sex, 

1990,2005, and 2015 

(in thousands) 

cohort I I I 

Ethnic Com~osition 

TOTAL 

The Bureau of the Census does not give a separate breakdown for Hispanics; for statistical 

purposes Hispanics are forced to choose between white, black, or other on census forms. Therefore the 

current number for whites combines people of European background with Hispanics; the number for 

blacks includes people of African background and Hispanics; and the number for Others includes people 

of mixed-races and Hispanics, plus those who have not identified themselves as white, black, Hispanic, 

Asian, American Indian or Aleuts. For this study, an effort was made to separate Hispanics from the 

Male I Female I Male Male Female 

late of popu-ation is July 1. 

122,474 

Female 

128,388 138,303 144,030 148,884 154,560 
whites, blacks, and others figures. All numbers pertaining to ethnics reflect this reconstruction. 

Table 6. Composition of Population by Ethnic Group, 

1990,2005,2015 

Table 6 shows the expected future changes in the ethnic composition of the U.S population 

resulting from the last two decades of heavy immigration: legal, illegal, refugee. These changes will 

require many program alterations in American institutions, such as education, labor, health and welfare, 

and the military. The majority of immigrants, seeking a haven and the golden opportunity of the United 

States (especially Hispanic and Asjan illegal immigrants) are poor and often illiterate in their own 

language. On the positive side, immigrants frequently help accelerate the pace of American growth and 

development; on the negative side, they just as often arouse ethnic conflict and racial tensions. 

Periodically, certain groups of Americans set out to curtail the influx of immigrants, but the 

acknowledged need for more people, coupled with the well known commitment of America to be the land 

of the free and a haven for the distressed, prevents serious legislative curbs. The latest Immigration Act 

(1990) reflects this commitment. The government presently contemplates admitting entry to all, 

regardless of their health status, even those with serious contagious diseases, including AIDS. This policy 

is contrary to the old laws which prohibited entry of those considered to have less serious diseases, such 

as leprosy and tuberculosis. 

Most of the future population growth in the United States will come from Asians, Hispanics and 

others. The two ethnic groups that have the largest number of kin-related people now in this country are 

Asians and Hispanics. Their fertility rates are generally higher than those of whites and their death rates 

are lower than those of blacks and whites. 

2015 

TOTAL 

Number* 

190,702 

41,943 

44,450 

13,284 

2,436 

10,629 

303,444 7 

*In thousands 

Date of population is July 1. 

250,862 

% 

62.8 

13.8 

14.7 

4.4 

0.8 

3.5 

100.0 282,333 100.0 100.0 
In 2015, whites, excluding white-Hispanics, will repkent 62.8 percent of the total population, 

down from 71.8 percent in 1990, while minorities will grow to 37.2 percent, up from 28.2 percent in 

1990 (see Fig. 4). 

Whites (exclusive of Hispanics) will add 7.2 million through the year 2005 and another 3.3 

million by 2015. Most of the next decade's addition will be via immigrants rather than from any natural 

growth. 

Blacks, excluding census-identified black Hispanics, are projected to increase to 36.6 million in 

2005 and 41.9 million by 2015, representing 12.9 and 13.8 percent, respectively. Their increase would 

be more substantial if it were not for their high death rate. A recent study by the District of Columbia 

Public Health Department indicated that the national black mortality rate was 4.5 times the white rate. 

Even of the preventable diseases, such as tuberculosis, hypertensive heart disease, and pneumonia, blacks 

were more likely to die earlier than whites. The mortality rate for black infants was registered at 17.6 

per thousand in 1990, more than twice the rate of 8.5 for white infants. Homicide was the leading cause 

of death among black 15-to 44-year olds. In the 25-to 44-age group, blacks were 2.5 times more likely 

to die than whites. Rising AIDS and homicide rates have cut the average life expectancy of black males 

to 64.9 years in 1988 from 65.2 in 1987, compared to 72.3 years for white males. 

Hispanics will double their numbers in 25 years and become a larger minority than Blacks (see 

Fig. 5). They totalled 22.4 million according to the 1990 Census and will be 44.5 million in 2015. 

Their rapid increase is attributed both to high rates of immigration and fertility. They represent the 

largest group of illegal immigrants of the last two decades, fleeing poverty and political instability in their 

countries. With the relatively easy access across an almost uncontrollable frontier, their flow into the 

United States has been largely unimpeded. The amnesty several years ago legalized approximately two 

million; there are thousands more unaccounted for. Without legal resident status, they are ineligible for 

many federal welfare programs. Many of them are teens who work for substandard wages and are forced 

to live with friends and relatives in crowded quarters. Because they work in order to be able to send 

money back to their countries to help their families, these teens have not been able to readily further their 

education. 

Asians make up the next largest minority group. They have increased tremendously in the last 

decade: over 95 percent. Asians had a higher fertility rate and lower death rate than whites. The death 

rate among Asian adults in 1988 was about half that of white adults. Immigration accounted for most 

of the growth registered in the last decade because the United States admitted more than a million 

refugees from Southeast Asia. The number of Asians will continue to increase, but at a much lower rate 

because immigration has dropped. If the economies of many Asian countries prosper as expected, fewer 

Asians will attempt to migrate to the United States. Nevertheless, a number from less economically 

fortunate areas are expected to come before the year 2000, especially those having relatives in the United 

States. Approximately 500,000 Hong Kong residents, and some from Taiwan, are expected to emigrate 

to the United States, especially when Hong Kong reverts to China in 1997. By 2015, Asians will number 

about 13 million, representing 4.4 percent of the total population, up from the 2.9 percent in 1990. 
Fig. 4 
FIG. 5 
American Indians, including Aleuts, increased about 38 percent during the last two censuses to 

almost 2 million. This growth is attributed to the increased tendency of people with some Indian ancestry 

to designate themselves as Indian for the 1990 Census, but as white or some other ethnic group in earlier 

tallies. Their natural growth rate has been low and is expected to remain at the same level for the next 

25 years. With no further identity changes, they will number about 2.5 million in 2015. 

The number in "Others" grew over 45 percent between 1980 and 1990, from 6.8 to 9.5 million, 

in part because of the inability to identify the individual's true category. These persons include those 

who, for personal reasons, did not find it possible to indicate the appropriate Bureau of the Census 

racelethnic designation (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, American Indian, or Aleut). Millions fell into 

this category. 

The Bureau of the Census is in the process of adjusting these data for "Others" and it will attempt 

to elicit more accurate information on the origin of respondants. These individuals will be assigned an 

ethniclrace designation deemed appropriate based on other information gleaned from the census forms. 

Until the number of "Others" is revised and its existing base of data is reflected more precisely, the 

population of "Others" is projected to be about 10.6 million in 2015. 

Individuals of mixed race are included in the "Others" category. Interracial marriages have 

increase considerably, from 310,000 in 1970 to 956,000 in 1988. These marriages are expected to 

continue to rise as prejudice against interracial marriage diminishes. The children of these unions will 

have the choice of self-identification when they reach the age of 18. Until that time, they will be 

classified under the racelethnic category of their fathers or single mothers. The number of ethnic groups 

identified will be affected significantly by changes made by these young mixed-race adults in future 

censuses. The Bureau of the Census is currently developing additional ethnic designations for the census 

of 2000. 

High and low projections of ethnic groups are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Composition of Population by Ethnic Group 

and Type of Projection, 2005 and 2015 

(in thousands) 

White 

Black 

Asian 

Indian 

I Other 

The number of Hispanic males 18-to 25-years-old will reach 2.5 million in 2005 up from 1.7 

million in 1990, an increase of 41.4 percent, the fastest growth of all ethnic groups. For the same 

period, blacks and Others, which include Asians and American Indians, will follow with a growth rate 

of 12.3 percent and 20.8 percent, respectively. At the same time, the number of white males will decline 

by one million (see Table 8). 

Low Projection 

July 1. 

High Projection 

2005 

185,680 

3 1,749 

24,938 

8,062 

2,060 

9,874 

262,363 

2005 

191,172 

38,015 

36,327 

1 1,726 

2,354 

12,116 

291,710 

2015 

183,573 

32,3 14 

28,530 

8,546 

2,100 

10,009 

265,072 

2015 

194,847 

45,526 

47,948 

16,416 

2,589 

13,168 

320,494 
Table 8. Selected Age Cohorh by Ethnic 

Group and Sex, 1990,2005, and 2015 

(in thousands) 

11 White 1 10,215 1 10,052 1 

Ethnic 

Group 

11 Black 1 2,026 1 2,091 1 

Hispanic 1 1,740 1 1,605 

1) Other 1 1,283 1 1,207 1 

Age 18-25 

11 TOTAL 1 15,264 1 14,955 

Age 26-45 

Male Female Male 

Black 1 2,276 1 2,305 1 

Female 

2005 

Hispanic 2,461 2,287 

Other 1,550 1,507 

15,538 15,182 

White 

Date of population is July 1. 

9,251 

2015 

9,083 

22,219 

5,573 

6,117 

3,841 

37,750 

White 

Black 

Hispanic 

Other 

TOTAL 

9,211 

2,542 

3,085 

1,565 

16,403 

9,037 

2,569 

2,887 

1,s 12 

16,005 

22,295 

5,084 

6,789 

3,704 

37,872 
Re~ional Population Trends and Proiections 

Regional 

The last two censuses identified the West as having the fastest growth rate in the country at 23.4 

percent, followed by the Southeast, 14.8 percent, and Southwest, 11.2 percent. The West, next to the 

Southwest, was one of the two least populated regions in 1990, but it will be one of the two most 

populous in 2015. Its inhabitants represented only 19.2 percent of the total, but will increase to 21.9 

percent. By contrast, the Midwest, most populous in 1990 with 22.9 percent of the total population, will 

decline to 19.1 percent (see Fig. 6). 

In addition to the large immigration of Asians and Hispanics who seem to prefer to settle in these 

warmer regions, other factors contributing to their growth are the migration of people from economically 

troubled industries in the Northeastern and Midwestern states. In addition, two-thirds of all retirees 

moved to these warmer areas, boosting local economies, since retirees often contribute more than they 

demand. Older migrants use fewer public services, and the taxes generated by the contribution of their 

retirement incomes substantially offset any public costs. Their spending has a great impact on the 

economy of a community. Many states are vying for out-of-state retirees. This growing competition may 

change the size, direction, and composition of the migration pattern of the elderly in the next 25 years. 

Table 9. Regional Population Distribution 

by Army Recruitment Division, 1990,2005, and 2015 
a POPULATION SIZE 

BY U. S. ARMY RECRUITMENT DIVISION* 

1990 = 2015 

(in percentage) 

* U.S. Army Recruitment Brigade Headquarters. 

FORT SAM HOUSTON, TX-7 f 

'4 * U.S. Army Recruitment Divisions are shown without states divided between divisions. 

ms PUERTO RlCO 

Fig. 6 
The population growth in the Southern and Western regions isexpected to continue through the year 2015 

but at a lower rate. It is estimated that in 2015 the West will have an additional 18.5 million people 

reaching, 66.6 million; the Southeast will add 16.4 million to its 50.7 million; and the Southwest will 

increase to 47.9 million, or 10.5 million more (see Table 9). 

States 

Between the two census years 1980-90, the state that topped all gains was Nevada, with a 50.1 

percent increase, followed by Alaska with 36.9 percent, Arizona with 34.8 percent, and Florida with 32.7 

percent. California, as expected, remained the most populous state in the nation, followed by New York, 

Texas, and Florida. Large influxes of Asian and Hispanic immigrants and of people from the East Coast 

and the recession-stricken industrial Midwest accounted for most of the population growth in California, 

Texas, and Florida. California's Hispanic population grew nearly 70 percent in the last decade, while 

Asians increased 127 percent. The 7.7 million Hispanics, representing 25.8 percent of California's 

population in 1990 or 34.4 percent of the nation's Hispanics, outnumbered the total population of all but 

eight states. Their growth is attributed to immigrants from countries below the southern border of the 

United States and to the high reproductive rate of the population already in the state. California also had 

the largest group of Asians in the country, with a total of over 2.8 million as of 1990, representing 39.1 

percent of all Asians. New York had 2.2 million Hispanics and 0.7 million Asians, or 12.3 percent and 

3.9 percent respectively of New York's total population. Texas was second to California in Hispanic 

population, with over 4.3 million, which also reflects the impact of immigration from countries below 

the southern border. Asians in Texas numbered 0.3 million. Florida tallied 1.6 million Hispanics and 

0.2 million Asians among its population. Five areas that lost some population in the 1990 Census were 

Montana, North Dakota, Iowa, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia 

is contesting the 1990 Census count. The Bureau of the Census has admitted that it had missed up to 

58,000 residents. Because of shifts occurring in the United States in manufacturing and industrial 

development these trends are likely to continue (see "Economy"). 

In 25 years, California will still have the country's largest population. New York will fall from 

second (its ranking after the 1990 Census) to fourth behind Texas and Florida by 2025. Eleven states 

in the middle portions of the country are expected to lose some population. By contrast, the District of 

Columbia will regain some (see Table 10). 
Table 10. Regional Population by Army Recruitment 

Division and State, 1990, 2005, and 2015 

Division and 

State 

Northeast 

Total Northeast 1 57.222 1 7.1 1 61.302 1 4.3 1 63,922 

Delaware 

District of Columbia 

Maine 

Maryland 

Massachusetts 

New Hampshire 

New Jersey 

New York 

Pennsylvania 

Rhode Island 

Vermont 

Southeast 

1990 

3,785 

Number* 

Connecticut I 3,305 I 9.4 4.6 

2015 

Number* 

2005 

% change 

3,617 - - - 

675 

610 

1,245 

4,830 

6,050 

1,130 

7,770 

18,082 

11,945 

1,010 

570 

Alabama 

Florida 

Georgia 

Number* 

790 

646 

1,361 

5,732 

6,526 

1,424 

8,853 

18,892 

11,730 

1,106 

625 

-- 

17.0 

5.9 

9.3 

18.7 

7.9 

24.4 

13.9 

4.5 

-1.8 

9.5 

9.6 

Kentucky 

North Carolina 

South Carolina 

Tennessee 

% Change 

Virginia 

Total Southeast 1 50,663 1 20.6 1 61,111 1 9.7 1 67,059 

10.1 

6.3 

5.4 

9.7 

5 .O 

11.7 

7.0 

3.1 

-0.9 

6.2 

5.6 

- ---- 

4,075 

13,145 

6,555 

3,700 

6,690 

3,525 

4,915 

West Virginia 

Midwest 

870 

687 

1,435 

6,290 

6,850 

1,590 

9,475 

19,485 

11,620 

1,175 

660 

4,530 

17,567 

8,500 

- 

11.1 

33.6 

29.7 

I I 1 I I 

6,255 

0.0 

19.6 

17.7 

11.2 

I I I I 

1,803 

6.5 

12.7 

14.5 

19.1 

Illinois 

4,824 

19,800 

9,730 

3,700 

8,000 

4,150 

5,464 

-2.9 

Indiana 

7,450 

I I I I 

11,490 

Iowa 

-0.4 

10.6 

8.9 

6.6 

1,750 

I I I 

5,575 

3,685 

8,850 

4,520 

5,825 

9.2 

-3.4 1,690 

0.0 

2,788 

8,135 

-0.3 

11,490 

5,558 -0.2 5,545 

-8.5 

-0.1 11,480 

2,550 I -4.3 I 2,440 
Division and 

State 

Michigan 

Minnesota 

Missouri 

Nebraska 

Noah Dakota 

Ohio 

South Dakota 

Wisconsin 

Total Midwest 

2015 

Number+ 

9,300 

4,850 

5,710 

1,560 

610 

10,885 

755 

4,875 

58,010 

Southwest 

1990 

Arkansas 

Colorado 

Kansas 

Louisiana 

Mississippi 

New Mexico 

Oklahoma 

Texas 

Wyoming 

Total Southwest 

Number* 

9,345 

4,405 

5,155 

1,588 

641 

10,908 

700 

4,920 

57,515 

2005 

% change 

-0.2 

7.8 

8.0 

-1.1 

-3.3 

-0.1 

4.0 

-0.4 

0.8 

Number* 

9,325 

4,747 

5,567 

1,570 

620 

10,900 

728 

4,900 

57,955 

% Change 

-0.3 

2.2 

2.6 

-0.6 

-1.6 

-0.1 

3.7 

-0.5 

0.1 

2,370 

3,330 

2,490 

4,240 

2,595 

1,535 

3,167 

17,180 

455 

37,362 

West 

6.3 

9.5 

3.9 

3.1 

8.1 

17.7 

6.4 

14.2 

1.1 

10.5 

Alaska 

Arizona 

California 

Hawaii 

Idaho 

Montana 

Nevada 

Oregon 

Utah 

Washington 

2,745 

4,300 

2,715 

4,510 

3,150 

2,365 

3,625 

24,m 

450 

47,860 

9.0 

18.0 

5.0 

3.2 

12.3 

30.9 

7.6 

22.4 

-2.2 

15.9 

2,583 

3,928 

2,614 

4,374 

2,914 

2,010 

3,407 

21,025 

445 

43,300 

565 

3,725 

30,090 

1,130 

1,017 

805 

1,230 

2,870 

1,743 

4,925 

14.8 

16.1 

14.7 

20.6 

5.8 

1.6 

14.8 

6.7 

11.8 

8.6 

830 

5,775 

42,700 

1,750 

1,155 

813 

1,860 

3,330 

2,330 

6,050 

28.0 

33.6 

23.7 

28.4 

7.4 

-0.6 

31.7 

8.8 

19.6 

13.1 

723 

4,975 

37,225 

1,45 1 

1,092 

800 

1,620 

3,122 

2,085 

5,572 
Division and 

State 

Number* % change Number* I I I I I 

Total West 

*in thousands; date of population is July 1. 11 

48,100 22.0 58,665 13.5 66,593 

UNITED STATES 

Cities 

I I I 

The 1990 Census shows that for the first time, more than half of the country's population lives 

in standard metropolitan areas (S.M.A.). Most of the national population growth in the last decade 

occurred in these areas (see Table 11). Smaller cities also gained population and new small cities 

mushroomed throughout the country. While large and small cities proliferated, rural towns became 

relatively deserted. Young rural people left their towns for better opportunities in the cities. Losses in 

rural population were highest in the Midwest. This trend is likely to continue in the forecast period. 

Further depopulation of the central sections of the United States are expected with the continuing decline 

in agricultural employment (see "Economy"). 

The fastest growing metropolises were in Florida and in the Southwest: Orlando recorded a 53.3 

percent increase over 1980; Naples grew by 77 percent; Fort Pierce, 66 percent; and Fort Myers, 63 

percent. The growth in these S.M.As is attributed primarily to retirees. Fast growing S.M.As in other 

states include Las Vegas, Nevada with a 60 percent increase; Austin, Texas with 46 percent; and Las 

Cruces, New Mexico with 41 percent. The New York metropolitan area was among the slower growing 

areas, with only a 3.1 percent gain over the decade; nevertheless it remained the country's largest with 

18.1 million, up over half a million from 1980. Los Angeles followed with over 14.5 million, or an 

increase of 26.4 percent over 1980. If New York and Los Angeles continue to grow at their present 

rates, the population of metropolitan Los Angeles will outnumber that of New York by the year 2005. 

Five S.M.As -- Cleveland, Detroit, Pittsburgh, New Orleans, and Buffalo -- have suffered population 

losses during the same period. As metropolitan areas grow in population and annex additional territories, 

the affected central cities lose some of their population. City residents with sufficient income flee to the 

more attractive suburban areas where crime and drug use are low and housing is more affordable. The 

result is a diminishing population and tax base for the losing central cities. In the last 15 years several 

cities have also lost jobs to the burgeoning nearby suburbs. According to a recent report by the National 

League of Cities, incomes of people in the largest central cities are lower than those of the suburbanites 

by 41 percent. Central cities had 43 percent of the nation's poor in 1989 as compared with the 37 

percent in 1979. 

The overall data indicate a dramatic shift of population from Northeast and Midwest to 

the South and West. The data also show that people tend to move to areas with concentrations of at least 

250,862 12.5 282,333 7.5 303,444 I 
one million people where jobs are more readily available. The Los Angeles S.M.A. and the Boston 

S.M.A. top the list of 25 areas expected to generate new jobs through the year 2000. Table 12 shows 

how the ranking of these 25 cities changed in four years (1982-86). As the structure of the economy 

changes, these trends will continue through the forecast period. 
Table 11. Metropolitan Areas Having Population 

of One Million or More in 1990, Compared with 1980 

Metropolitan Area 

New York 

Los Angeles 

Chicago 

San Francisco 

Philadelphia 

Detroit 

Boston 

Washington 

-- - - 

1980* 

17,539,532 

1 1,497,549 

7,937,290 

5,367,900 

5,680,509 

4,752,764 

3,971,792 

3,250,921 

Dallas 

Houston 

Miami 

Atlanta 

Cleveland 

Seattle 

San Diego 

Pittsburgh 

1990* 

18,087,251 

14,531,529 

8,065,633 

6,253,311 

5,899,345 

4,665,236 

4,171,643 

3,923,574 

Minneapolis 

St. Louis 

Baltimore 

% 

Change 

3.1 

26.4 

1.6 

16.5 

3.9 

-1 .8 

5.0 

20.7 

2,930,568 

3,099,942 

2,643,766 

2,138,136 

2,834,062 

2,093,285 

1,861,846 

2,137,133 

2,376,968 

2.199.497 

Phoenix 

Tampa 

Denver 

Cincinnati 

3,885.41 5 

3,7 1 1,043 

3,192,582 

2,833,511 

2,759,823 

2,559,164 

2,498,016 

- 

Milwaukee 

Kansas City 

Sacramento 

Portland, Oregon 

32.6 

19.7 

20.8 

32.5 

-2.6 

22.3 

34.2 

2,464,124 

2,444,099 

2,382,172 

1,509,175 

1,613,600 

1,618,461 

1,660,257 

Norfolk 

Columbus 

15.3 

2.8 

8.3 

1,570,152 

1,433,464 

1,099,814 

1,297,977 

2,122,101 

2,067,959 

1,848,319 

1,744,124 

1,160,311 

1,243,827 

40.6 

28.2 

14.2 

5.1 

1,607.1 83 

1,566,280 

1,481,102 

1,477,895 

2.4 

9.3 

34.7 

13.9 

1,396,107 

1,377,419 

20.3 

10.7 
Metropolitan Area I 1980* I 1990* 

N~W orleans 1,256,668 1,238.81 6 -1.4 11 I I I 

San Antonio 

Indianapolis 

I 

Buffalo, New York 1,242,826 1,189,288 -4.3 11 I 

Charlotte, N.C. I 97 1,447 1 1,162,093 1 19.6 11 

1,072,125 

1,166,675 

Providence, R.I. 

1,302,099 

1,249,822 7.1 

'Census year; date of census is April 1. 

Hartford, Conn. 

Orlando, Florida 

Salt Lake City 

Rochester, New York 

1,013,508 

699,904 

91 0,222 

97 1,320 

1,086,837 

1,072,748 

1,072,227 

1,002.41 0 

7.1 

63.3 

17.8 

3.2 
Table 12. Ranking of Cities Having dreatest Employment 

Opportunities, 1982 and 1986 

CITY 

Houston 

Anaheim-Santa Ana 

Los Angeles-Long Beach 

San Jose 

Dallas 

Denver 

Phoenix 

1982 

1 

2 

3 

4 

Washington, D.C. 

San Diego 

Boston-Lawrence-Salem 

1988 

7 

3 

1 

4 

6 

6 

7 

Atlanta 

Tampa-St. Petersburg 

Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood 

Minneapolis-St. Paul 

9 

16 

6 

8 

9 

10 

San Francisco 

Austin 

Miami-Hialeah 

6 

11 

2 

11 

12 

13 

14 

Orlando 

Oakland, California 

Nassau-Suffolk, N.Y. 

Seattle 

West Palm Beach-Boca Raton 

10 

12 

21 

17 

15 

16 

17 

San Antonio 

Baltimore 

Tucson 

15 

--- 

22 

18 

19 

20 

2 1 

22 

Chicago 

Philadelphia 

New York 

Detroit 

20 

23 

19 

24 

26 

23 

24 

25 

--- 

--- 

--- 

.-. ' " denotes ranked below 26 

--- 

--- 

--- 

--- 

8 

13 

14 

18 
HISPANIC POPULATION 

Within the next two decades, Hispanic-Americans will be the largest minority group in the United 

States. They made up 9.0 percent of the U.S. population in 1990, up from 6.4 percent in 1980, a growth 

attributable to both rapid immigration and high fertility. At this rate, they should reach over 44.4 million 

in 2015 or 14.6 percent of the total population. In the event of worsening conditions, i.e., political 

turmoil or deteriorating economic conditions in the countries below the southern border, there will be 

larger influxes of immigrants. The number of Hispanics could reach 48 million. On the other hand, if 

conditions improve (i.e., there is political stability and prosperity) large numbers of Hispanics in the 

United States would possibly return to their former countries. Thus the number of remaining Hispanics 

could be as low as 28.5 million in 2015 (see Table 13). 

Table 13. Hispanic Population by Type 

of Projection, 2005 and 2015 

(in thousands) 

The Hispanic population is younger, poorer, less educated and from larger families than other 

ethnic groups. Their median age in 1990 was 25.6 and will be 27.5 in 2005 and 29.0 in 2015. As shown 

in Table 14, Hispanics aged 18 to 45 will represent 44.0 percent of the total Hispanic population in 2005 

and 42.4 percent in 2015 (medium projection.) In 1989, Hispanics aged 18 to 25 dropped out of high 

schools at a rate of 62.8 percent. Of this age group, 16.1 percent enrolled in college, 56 percent of them 

in two-year colleges. Enrollment in graduate school fell by 15.2 percent between 1986 and 1988. Table 

15 reflects the Hispanic population distribution and by age cohorts and by sex for the years 2005 and 

2015. 

Type of 

Projection 

Low 

Medium 

High 

bate of population is July 1. 

2005 

24,938 

34,792 

36,327 

2015 

28,530 

44,450 

47,948 
Table 14. Distribution of Hispanic Population 

by Selected Age Cohorts and Type of Projection, 2005 and 2015 

The largest concentration of Hispanics will be found in the West, with an estimated 42.1 percent 

Type of Projection 

and Age Cohort 

of total Hispanic population in 2005 and 43.2 in 2015. The Southwest will have over 25 percent of the 

Hispanics, and the Northeast about 16 percent (see Table 16). Metropolitan areas containing large 

Hispanic populations are shown in Table 17. Hispanic population distribution by selected age cohoas 

2005 

Low 

and by Army Recruitment Division is shown in Table 18 and Figure 7. 

2015 

Number* % Number* 

12.3 

28.7 

% 

Age 18-25 

Age 26-45 

13.4 

29.3 

3,347 

7,308 

Medium 

3,495 

8,202 

13.4 

29.0 

5,972 

12,906 

13.6 

30.4 

Age 18-25 

Age 26-45 

High 

4,748 

10,576 

13.4 

27.3 

*In thousands 

Date of population is July 1. 

6,409 

13,086 

13.3 

29.2 

Age 18-25 

Age 26-45 

4,835 

10,595 
Table 15. Distribution of Hispanic Population 

by Age Cohort and Sex, 2005 and 2015 

(in thousands) 

Table 16. Hispanic Population by Army 

Recruitment Division, 2005 and 2015 

Age 

Cohort 

0-4 

5-17 

18-25 

26-45 

46-65 

66-79 

80 + 

TOTAL 

2015 

*In thousands 

Date of population is July 1. 

Male 

2,110 

5,053 

3,085 

6,789 

4,392 

9 87 

255 

2005 

Date of population is July 1. 

17,717 

Division 

Northeast 

Southeast 

Midwest 

Southwest 

West 

TOTAL 

Female 

2,018 

4,832 

2,887 

6,117 

4,186 

1,246 

493 

Male 

1,745 

4,272 

2,461 

5,594 

2,839 

643 

163 

Female 

1,669 

4,084 

2,287 

4,982 

2,896 

842 

3 15 I 

17,075 

2005 

22,671 

2015 

Number* 

5,740 

3,270 

2,296 

8,838 

14,648 

34,792 

2 1,779 

Number* 

7,023 

4,178 

2,709 

11,335 

19,205 

44,450 

% 

16.5 

9.4 

6.6 

25.4 

42.1 

100.0 

% 

15.8 

9.4 

6.1 

25.5 

43.2 

100.0 
Table 17. Metropolitan Areas -Having Over 

40,000 Hispanic Population, 1988 

(in thousands) 

11 Metropolitan Area Population I % 

II ( Metro Area I 11 Boston-Lawrence-Salem-Lowell-Brockton 103.6 2.8 I I 11 Chicago-Gary-Lake County 81 1.1 9.9 

11 Dallas-Fort Worth 400.2 I 10.7 

Cleveland-Akron-Lorain 

H Denver-Boulder 200.4 10.5 

I Detroit-Ann Arbor 87.1 1.9 

I I 

44.9 

Hartford-New Britain-Middletown-Bristol 52.8 4.7 1 

1.6 

I Houston-Galveston-Brazoria 667.5 18.5 

11 LOS Angeles-Anaheim-Riverside 4,072.7 29.3 I Miami-Fort Lauderdale 858.5 28.0 I I Milwaukee-Racine 45.6 2.9 I 11 New Orleans 53.6 4.0 

11 New York-Northern New JerseyLong Island 2,499.2 13.8 I 

11 Orlando 40.7 4.1 I 11 Philadelphia-Wilmington-Trenton I 176.6 1 3.0 

11 Phoenix 305.3 14.8 I 11 sactarnento 159.2 11.4 

11 Salt Lake City-Ogden 55.8 5.2 

1) San Antonio 

11 San Diego 425.7 17.9 I 

11 San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose 

11 Seattle-Tacoma 54.5 2.3 

11 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater 1 16.4 5.7 

11 Washington, D.C. 
* US. Army Recruitment Brigade Headquarters. HE",,"/,",?? 7 

* US. Army Recruitment Divisions are shown without states divided between divisions. -4 

Fig. 7 
Table 18. Hispanic Population by Selected Age 

Cohort, Sex, and Army Recruitment Division, 2005 and 2015 

(in thousands) 

Division and I 2005 I 2015 

Age Cohort 

Northeast 

- ~- I 

Male 

Age 18-25 

Age 26-45 

Female Male 

Southeast 

Female 

406 

923 

Midwest 

West 

272 

575 

Southwest 

377 

822 

290 

63 8 

Age 18-25 

Age 26-45 

176 

373 

Age 18-25 

Age 26-45 

Hispanics in the United States vary greatly in their education, economic status, and ability to cope 

in American society and culture. Because so many are first-generation immigrants, they tend to cling 

to their native culture. It is believed that only 26 percent of them are fluent in English and that 47 

percent struggle to cope with the language. More than 2 million adults speak only Spanish. Nearly three 

in four continue to speak Spanish at home; few families in California and New Mexico have completely 

adopted English. Those born in the United States are fluent in English and thereby earn as much as 

736 

1,560 

Age 18-25 

Age 26-45 

Age 18-25 

Age 26-45 

487 

1,073 

23 1 

526 

162 

369 

456 

966 

215 

468 

626 

1,421 

>ate of population is July 1. 

1,036 

2,355 

151 

329 

188 

414 

581 

1,266 

963 

2,097 

787 

1,731 

1,333 

2,933 

1,247 

2,643 
people of European descent. This trend follows historical of immigration. It is expected that 

a greater degree of assimilation will occur with succeeding generations. 

Cuban-Americans, estimated to number 1.0 million in 1990, or 4.6 percent of the total Hispanic 

population, are concentrated in Florida. Some of them have settled in the New York Metropolitan Area. 

In 1987 the Cubans were reported to have a median family income of nearly $27,000, the highest of all 

Hispanics. 

Mexican-Americans, estimated to number 13.496 million, made up 60.4 percent of the 1990 

Hispanic population. In the 1980 census, 74 percent were native born. The median age of MexicanAmericans is 24 years, compared to 33 for all U.S. residents. They tend to marry young and have 

children at early ages. Mexican-American women have experienced less marital instability than other 

Hispanic women, except for Cubans. As a result, the proportion of Mexican-American children living 

in two-parent households is higher than other Hispanic groups. But like all ethnic groups in the U.S., 

the number of Mexican-American single-parent households is rising. 

Mexican-Americans are concentrated in California and in other parts the Southwest, the majority 

in urban areas. The Los Angeles area has about 2 million Hispanics of Mexican origin; more than 70 

percent of them are under age 35. There are many well developed Mexican communities in the 

Southwest that newcomers can blend in with easily, causing great difficulties for the too few federal 

authorities whose job it is to apprehend illegal or undocumented immigrants from south of the border. 

Because the newcomers do not have to relinquish their language or cultural ties, their rate of assimilation 

and acculturation to American ways is slow. 

In 1988 the median Mexican-American family income was $21,025, about two-thirds of the 

national median family income of $32,191. More than 19 percent of Mexican-American families were 

headed by women and half of these live in poverty. According to the 1989 Bureau of Census data, about 

25 percent of all Mexican-American families lived below the official poverty line. Except for Puerto 

Ricans, this poverty rate exceeds that of all Hispanic groups. 

Puerto Ricans, the majority living in New York and New Jersey, totalled over 2.7 million in 

1990, or 12.2 percent of the total Hispanic population. Their family income was $14,600 in 1987. 

Forty-three percent of Puerto Rican families were headed by women in 1987; two-thirds of them lived 

below the poverty line. It is estimated that one-third of the people who identify themselves as Puerto 

Ricans live not in Puerto Rico but in the United States. 

Other Hispanics, numbering 5.1 million in the 1990 Census, are from the Caribbean, Central and 

South America. It is believed that 300,000 Hispanic immigrants have come from the Dominican Republic 

and over 500,000 from El Salvador. 

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 

The demographic data presented above indicate that by the year 2015, the United States will have 

a sizable aging population, a smaller work force, more retirees for far fewer workers, a working group 
whose working age will have to be extended to 70, a good many households headed by single parents, 

a declining number of white Americans, an increasing size of minority populations that will make up 37.8 

percent of the total population, and a need for more social services. 

Im~lications for the Armv 

In 2015, the population of the United States will be aging and highly urbanized, and will comprise 

a sizeable ethnic minority. 

Unless the draft is reinstated forcing thousands of 18-25-year-olds into the Army (see "Society"), 

the average Army soldier will be over the age of 30, married with children or a single parent. This will 

be the oldest in combat since the Civil War. 

There will be a rise in single-parent households, the majority of which will be headed by women. 

If women continue to increase their proportion of the military population (active duty and reserve) then 

the presence of these single mothers in the military will require the Army to provide more social services 

to alleviate the burden of care for children while parents are away on duty. 

Hispanics will be the largest minority group, with an expected total of 44.4 million; followed by 

blacks with 41.9 million; and Asians with 13.3 million. Hispanics will be concentrated in the West and 

Southwest; Asians, in the West and Northeast; and blacks, in the Southeast and Northeast. 

Immigration has been one of the key factors to the nation's population growth and that trend will 

continue up to the year 2000. Most future immigrants will continue to be Asian and Hispanic. Asians 

who immigrate will do so mainly because of relatives in the United States; others will go to other 

prosperous Asian countries close to home, or to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Hispanics will 

continue to cross over the U.S. southern borders as long as abject poverty and political instability prevail 

in their countries. The Immigration Act of 1990 allows skilled Europeans to immigrate to the United 

States but their numbers have been small and will, in all likelihood, remain small. Those who are 

economically despondent will queue to cross over the borders of more affluent European countries, close 

to home. 

The United States is expected to have 303.4 million people in 2015. Given a level of prosperity 

that is much higher than the Third World, continued high immigration into the United States is projected. 

This situation, coupled with high birth and low death rates, could bring the U.S. population to a larger 

number of 320.5 million; the number of Hispanics in this case would be about 48 million. On the other 

hand, if improving conditions -- political stability and prosperity -- prevail elsewhere, the U.S. 

immigration rate would become less significant. And with lower birth and higher death rates, the total 

population could be as low as 265.1 million; in this scenario, the number of Hispanics would grow only 

to 28.5 million. 

Most of the national population growth will be attributed to ethnic minorities. Growing sizes of 

ethnic groups will put increasing pressure on many basic institutions, including the Army. A greater 

challenge will be posed to the old beliefs in inclusion, acculturation, and nondiscrimination. Of particular 
interest to the army will be young people, ages 18 to 25. In this cohort, whites will represent 55.5 

percent of total in 2015, a decline from 67.1 percent in 1990. By contrast, the minorities will grow from 

32.9 percent in 1990 to 44.5 percent in 2015. 

To attract ethnic minorities, especially the increasing number of Hispanics (the potential number 

of white recruits will decline), the Army will have to improve its recruitment tactics; providing potential 

Hispanic recruits with special training, including the English language, will be one of these tactical plans. 

The Army will aIso have to institute new programs to encourage and accelerate the process of acceptance, 

fostering greater cooperation among diverse ethnic groups. 

The effects of the AIDS epidemic will persist through the forecast period. Because about 80,000 

women of child-bearing age may prove to be HIV-positive, between 1,500 to 2,000 babies born each year 

could be HIV-positive. By 2015, many Army recruits will be found HIV-positive. 

In sum, what will the U.S. Army see as its manpower pool in 2015? The number of potential 

Hispanic and Asian recruits will be much higher than at present, with percentages of white and black 

youth decreasing and remaining roughly the same, respectively. Many more will come from single-parent 

households and originate in the south and west of the United States. 
SOURCES 

1. America in the 21st Centurv: A Demographic Overview. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference 

Bureau, 1989. 

2. American Demomaphics. New York: American Demographics, 1988-90. 

3. Bell, Daniel. "The World and the United States in 2013," Daedalus, 116, No. 3, Summer 1987. 

4. Blonston, Gary. "The Changing Face of America," Detroit Free Press, July 20, 1986. 

5. Bouvier, Leon F., and Cary B.Davis. The Future Racial Comuosition of the United States. 

Washington, D.C. : Population Reference Bureau, 1982. 

6. Bulatao, Rodolfo A. World Population Proiections 1989-1990. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 

Press for the World Bank, 1990. 

7. Cetron, Marvin, and Owen Davies. American Renaissance. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 

8. Clark, Robert Louis, and Joseph J. Spengler. The Economics of Individual and Po~ulation Aging. 

New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 

9. Dinnerstein, Leonard, and David M. Reimers. Ethnic Americans: A Historv of Immigration and 

Assimilation. New York: Harper & Row, 1988. 

10. Elder, Terry. Alaska 2000: Population. Labor Force. and Employment in the Year 2000. Juneau: 

Alaska Department of Labor, 1989. 

11. Eric Digest. Demogravhic Trends of the Mexican-American Pouulation: Imvlications for Schools. 

Charleston, West Virginia: Appalachia Educational Laboratory, September 1990. 

12. Fosler, R. Scott, et al. Demographic Change and the American Future. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Press, 

1990. 

13. Futures: the Journal of Forecasting. Planning and Policv. London: Butterworth-HeinemannLtd, 1990. 

14. Gerber, Jerry, Janet Wolff, Walter Klores, and Gene Brown. Lifetrends: The Future of Babv 

Boomers and Other Aging Americans. New York: Macmillan, 1989. 

15. Larnm, Richard D. Me~atraumas: America at the Year 2000. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985. 

16. Lamrn, Richard D. and Gary Imhoff. The Immigration Time Bomb. New York: Truman Talley 

Books, E. P. Dutton, 1985. 

17. Libby, Lawrence W. and Rodney L. Clouser. The Impacts of Pouulation and Global Economic 

Patterns on Natural Resources: A Look to the 21st Centurv. Gainesville: Food and Resource Economics 
Department, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, university of Florida, January 1989. 

18. Mazarracin, Isidro Lucas. Hispanic Education and Culture in a North American Metropolitan Area: 

Chicago. Madrid: Oficina de Educacion Iberoamericana, 1982. 

19. Monterro, Darrel. Japanese Americans: Changing - Patterns of Ethnic Affiliation over Three 

Generations. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980. 

20. Padilla, Felix M. Latino Ethnic Consciousness: The Case of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans 

in Chicago. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1985. 

21. Reid, John. "Immigration and the Future U.S. Black Population," Population Today, 14, No.2, 

February 1986. 

22. Russell, Cheryl. 100 Predictions for the Babv Boom: The next 50 Years. New York: Plenum Press, 

1987. 

23. Sanoff, Alvin F. " 10 Forces Reshaping America," U.S. News and World Report, March 19, 1984. 

24. Thompson, Roger. "Baby Boom's Mid-Life Crises," Editorial Research Reports, 1, No. 1, January 

8, 1988. 

25. United States. Congress, 100th, 1st Session. Joint Economic Committee. Internal Migration: 

Population Changes in the United States. Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1987. 

26. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census. 1990 Census press releases to state 

governors by county, and city, and by race and Hispanic origin. 

27. . Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. The Hispanic Po~ulation of the United 

States. March 1989, (Series P-20, No. 444.) Washington, D. C.: March 1989. 

28. . Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Projections of the Hispanic Population: 

1983 to 2080. Washington, D.C.: November 1986. 

29. . Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Proiections of the Po~ulation of States, 

by Age, Sex, and Race: 1988 to 2010. (Series P-25, No. 1017.) October 1988. 

30. . Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Proiections of the Population of States, 

bv Age. Sex. and Race: 1989 to 2010. (Series P-25, No. 1053.) January 1990. 

3 1. . Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Proiections of the Population of the 

United States. bv Age, Sex. and Race: 1983 to 2080. (Series P-25, No. 952.) May 1984. 

32. . Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Proiections of the Population of the 

United States. bv Age. Sex. and Race: 1988 to 2080. (Series P-25, No. 1018.) January 1989. 

33. . Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United 
States. Washington, D.C.: 1990. 

34. . Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. U.S. Population Estimates, by Age, 

Sex. Race. and His~anic Origin: 1989. (Series P-25, No. 1057.) March 1990. 

35. . Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. United States Population Estimates 

and Com~onents of Change: 1970 to 1986. Washington, D.C.: 

36. United States Department of Health and Human Services. Monthlv Vital Statistical Re~ort, 0701. 39, 

No. 7, Supplement.) November 28, 1990. 

37. United Way of America, Strategic Planning Division. What Lies Ahead: Looking. Toward the '90s. 

Alexandria, Virginia: 1987. 

38. Waldinger, Roger. "US Immigration Policy in the 1980~~" Ethnic and Racial Studies. London] 10, 

No. 3, July 1987. 

39. Wattenberg, Ben J. "The Birth Dearth: Dangers Ahead?," U.S. News and World Report, June 22, 

1987. 

40. . The First Universal Nation. New York: Free Press, 1991. 
KEY JUDGMENTS 

THE ECONOMY 

- The decade of the 1990s will be one of rigorous examination and future development will 

depend on how the economy adapts to the globalized economy, the degree of relaxation in traditional 

U.S. laissez-faire policy toward commerce, and the ability of the economy to maintain productivity (with 

concommitant productivity of the labor pool). 

- Changes affecting the U.S. economy will continue to occur at accelerated speed because, 

barring cataclysmic setback, economic conditions are closely linked with technological advancement. 

- A major factor in economic success will be the feasibility of continuous expansion of the world 

economy to the benefit of all, and the internal political feasibility of exposing U.S. enterprises and labor 

to the increasingly transnational system. 

- Continued automation of the goods producing sector is foreseen. A major factor will be the 

ability of producers to capture and hold fragmented and specialized markets. If there is hesitation then 

producers may be pushed toward basic products and away from high tech, ceding the latter to foreign 

competitors. 

- Quantity of labor, certain to decrease, will be secondary to quality of labor, much less certain. 

Further automation will expand job markets for workers with high technical training and for those with 

basic unspecialized skills; the ratio to be determined by demands posed by new technology. Workers in 

the middle levels may well be less in demand. 

- The military economy will be adjusting to a smaller force structure and will be increasingly 

dependent on high-tech weaponry. The adjustment period will include co-production with at least some 

now exclusively civilian producers and away from isolated production of highly specialized items. Budget 

considerations and perception of the threat will drive the military sector. 
THE ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES IN 2015 

INTRODUCTION 

The condition of the U.S. economy in the next 25 years will be determined by a number of 

variables and trends, some intrinsic to the field of economics and some external. Factors such as 

investment policy and economic globalization are joined by the condition of the U.S. education system 

and demographic trends, for example, in forming a complex balance of possible outcomes. Likewise, 

the trends that will have impact during that period are now at various stages of development, and some 

in fact are not visible at all at the present time. One can predict securely, however, that one trend will 

continue: changes affecting the U.S. economy will continue to occur at accelerated speed because, barring 

a cataclysmic setback, economic conditions are closely linked with technological advancement. 

Within that context, the goal of this paper is to identify and describe the prospective general 

impact of a small number of key issues, then to estimate the prospective impact on U.S. Army policy of 

the economic conditions created. The key issues are the relative proportion of the economy occupied by 

service and manufacturing sectors, and growth rates of each; changes in U.S. management practice and 

the availability and quality of the U.S. work force; enterprise structure and location patterns; the U.S. 

role in the global economic system; changes in economic planning and investment philosophy; and the 

relationship between the defense and civilian sectors of the economy. Future scenarios and the driver 

factors for them will be discussed. In such an assessment, the variety of scenarios matches the formidable 

breadth of creditable opinions, theories, and measurement techniques in current economic thought. 

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 

The economy is conventionally divided into manufacturing and service sectors. The former 

includes plant production of tangible products, mining, and construction. The latter yields a wide variety 

of activities, such as sales, communications, equipment servicing, finance, transportation, information 

supply, food services, and education--some of which directly or indirectly facilitate the transfer of goods 

(such as sales) and some of which are essentially separate from the process of goods exchange (such as 

education). 

The 1980s was a decade of drastic retrenchment and reshaping in U.S. manufacturing, although 

the overall economy grew by all measurements. Enterprises such as U.S. Steel and the Caterpillar heavy 

equipment company, bastions of U.S. conventional manufacturing, slashed their operations but greatly 

increased per capita productivity. The large construction firms that built giant malls and plants through 
the 1980s began to shrink in proportion to the smaller scale of new projects. 

Trend predictions in the manufacturing sector for the 1990s vary. According to one scenario, 

the United States will react to foreign manufacturing competition with a reinvigorated industrial output, 

signaling the end of the post-industrial era. [82] This renaissance would stem from a vast and assumedly 

judicious investment (one estimate says $55 billion by 2000) in plant automation. Automating factories 

could preserve manufacturing's 20 percent (1987) contribution to the GNP and weaken the advantage of 

low-wage foreign competitors by making U.S. industry less labor-dependent. Another key ingredient of 

this scenario is industry's willingness to retool existing plants to accommodate changing demand in a 

world market increasingly geared to such accommodation. 

Other forecasters see unaddressed flaws such as short-sighted planning and investment, neglect 

of personnel retraining, and inappropriate application of technology that could cause the U.S. 

manufacturing system to decline in the next decade, especially in comparison with Asian and European 

competitors. In this scenario, lack of flexibility will continue to block broad retooling in the next decade, 

just as markets for steel, machine tools, and electronics, among other products, were lost to overseas 

producers in the 1980s. [72] 

A major criticism of U.S. industrial policy bears on future scenarios in the manufacturing sector: 

U.S. industrial R&D policy has supported new-product breakthrough development at the expense of 

maintaining the production processes that come later. The low-profit stage of pursuing and perfecting 

existing products, necessary to develop a long-term market, is thus sacrificed for the short-term profits 

associated with breakthroughs. Such a focus often leaves ready-made product markets to foreign 

competitors. An example was the video-recorder, developed in the United States but abandoned because 

early machines had limited applicability and the eventual commercial success of the product required 

years more of design adjustment. 

The M.I.T. Commission on Industrial Productivity, formed in 1988, identified changes necessary 

to alleviate such competitive disadvantages. Streamlined management teams and worker input would 

promote flexibility and responsiveness to markets; simultaneous improvement of product quality and 

marketing would maintain markets beyond the short term; and more direct connection with market signals 

would improve industry responsiveness to fast-changing demand. [lq Amid any new emphasis on 

maintaining commercial markets, ideally the United States would retain its breakthrough design capacity, 

an activity in which it still leads the world in many fields. 

Because many other analyses have identified similar needs, the degree to which they are filled 

is an important determinant of future U.S. market shares in the manufacturing industries where ground 

was lost in the 1980s. Already in 1990, basic industries such as construction materials and textiles had 

regained substantial shares of international markets by improving production efficiency, tightening quality 

control, and paring overhead--but optimism was curbed by the yet undetermined role of a lower exchange 

value of the dollar in the demand for U.S. goods abroad. Although the reversal occurred mainly in noncritical industries, in 1990 the United States recorded its first trade surplus in semiconductors in several 

years. 
For the forecast period, several consumption factors kill likely determine the emphasis of U.S. 

manufacturing: disposable income, longer service life in durable goods, and long-term societal attitudes 

toward consumption of such goods. (The supply-side theorists, on the other hand, stress that consumption 

is fueled by availability of goods, which if true would at least partly negate the foregoing influences.) 

Disposable income could be reduced for a large part of the U.S. population if health care costs continue 

to consume a greater portion of income--a scenario predicted by many unless a new health care system 

is devised. Production cost reduction has already shrunk wages in many goods-production industries, 

putting a potential long-term squeeze on blue-collar purchasing power. 

In one scenario, the high-consumption 1980s will be followed by a decade of conservatism 

(encouraged by slow economic growth) and saving. The baby-boom generation, already well-supplied 

with durable goods, would support that trend by emphasizing savings over consumption spending. That 

might mean redistribution of resources away from non-durable manufacturing and some types of services 

into long-term investment. 

On the other hand, given continued high consumer demand, the emphasis of consumer 

production should continue changing from mass-produced to individualized goods (e.g. minivans and offroad vehicles rather than standard family cars), fragmenting the market and requiring more 

compartmentalization of production operations. [9] Flat or decreased demand for durable goods (both 

often-predicted scenarios) would likely narrow the U.S. field to the most flexible and innovative 

producers after 2000, with foreign suppliers increasing their market shares. 

In general, a scenario of U.S. industrial technology continuing to move abroad in the next decade 

would mean the United States making fewer high-value products and, as a result, less domestic circulation 

of economic wealth. The capital equipment industry, for example, should thrive past 2000 because of 

the large amount of outdated machines that U.S. industry will have to replace in the next decade. But 

segments of that industry such as machine tool manufacture are already dominated by Japan, and in 1985 

U.S. machine firms were already buying 25 percent of their steel abroad. [72] 

Standards such as growth in per capita manufacturing productivity and growth in percentage of 

GNP put into capital investment support the prediction that the sector can "turn the corner" by shedding 

inefficient operations, adopting new product lines in a timely fashion, and fine-tuning and refitting 

existing systems. In the context of the domestic economy, such strategy could preserve the manufacturing 

share of the GNP well beyond 2000. But this scenario may be based on an artificial environment: given 

the virtually universal prediction that no national economy will preserve even present levels of policymaking autonomy in the next 25 years, evaluation of the manufacturing sector without reference to trends 

and policies in Japan, Western Europe, or emerging Asian industrial states ignores a complex of key 

determinants. It also ignores the speed with which those competitors seize new markets if they perceive 

slack in them. An example with likely impact beyond 2000 is biotechnology--a field pioneered by the 

United States but, following a U.S. funding reduction in the late 1980s, now receiving substantial longterm Japanese commitment. [63] In the year 2000, the frequency and magnitude of shifts that have 

occurred in such key pioneer industries in the preceding decade will show the wisdom of the "fine- 
tuning," gradual approach to reform of U.S. manufacturing. 

Forecasts see as much as 90 percent of the U.S. work force in the service sector in 2000, up 

from 40 percent in 1964. [72] Figure 1 shows the trend in relative employment between services and 

manufacturing. Even given a scenario of resurgence in the manufacturing sector in the next 25 years, 

process automation may well reduce job slots in that sector at a faster rate than overall operations can 

expand, meaning a net job shift away from manufacturing. Slumps and advances in the services have 

been consistently more moderate than those in manufacturing--if that well-established trend continues, 

future service dominance of theeconomy would tend to moderate overall economic swings, perhaps 

making the U.S. economy more recession-proof. 

The Bureau of Labor Statistics foresees particular growth in financial, health, and recreation 

services in the 1990s. [75l According to the Department of Labor, fourteen of the thirty fastest growing 

occupations during that decade will be health-related. For an economy moving strongly toward services, 

productivity growth is much more problematic than for an economy more recently industrialized, where 

services provide a smaller portion of employment and the recent introduction of modern production 

equipment yields rapid statistical jumps in productivity. [4] After the year 2000, U.S. service 

productivity growth will be an important determinant of economic health, both domestic and international. 

Because that growth has been virtually flat in recent decades, one post-2000 scenario is a U.S. economy 

dominated by service enterprises that contribute minimal growth, cancel whatever gains might be made 

in the manufacturing sector, and ultimately halt growth in the national standard of living. Such a scenario 

presumes that intrinsic elements of inefficiency will remain in major service sectors; it is based partly on 

the fact that average labor cost in services is 67 percent of the average in manufacturing, meaning that 

services are less likely to improve productivity by replacing people with machines. [4] Low productivity 

is found, for example, in conventional health care, where the process of product delivery may bear little 

relation to the purely economic part of the service transaction. Care of the elderly, an undoubtedly 

growing part of health services in the next 25 years, has many aspects of such inefficiency. 

A second, more positive scenario sees streamlining and technology improving productivity 

(efficiency) in services without lowering product quality. For health care, automated self-service for 

routine medical testing is a possible device to streamline the conventional office visit. Computerized 

classrooms, direct sales, and computerized supermarket checkouts are existing examples of the trend that 

can be expected to multiply in the next 25 years. [4] 
Fig. 1 
A third scenario finds services occupying a stable pdrtion of the economy after the year 2000, 

meaning that the influence of growth rates in that sector would also stabilize (albeit at a high level). 

Service productivity may also increase when faced with international competition, the same stimulant that 

some scenarios see reviving U.S. manufacturing. Financial and communications services, for example, 

increasingly will be forced to improve to meet world competition. There is seemingly room for 

improvement: service productivity in Germany is now much higher than that in the United States. [82] 

Exposure to domestic competition may have the same result in some services; transportation and 

education are services traditionally shielded from market competition, but potentially streamlined by 

deregulation (transportation) or privatization (education). 

An argument has been made that many of the largest service areas have self-limiting 

characteristics that will cause a labor shift back into manufacturing. Only a certain number of restaurant 

meals can be eaten, for example, and cost may limit expansion of the health industry. A tight post-2000 

labor market could shrink the service labor pool, forcing greater capital investment and from that higher 

productivity. [82] 

Another aspect of the prospective relationship of manufacturing and services is the likelihood 

of increased integration between the two sectors. In the future, traditional manufacturing operations will 

become more dependent on rapid access to information about design and marketing, effective 

communications networks, and training for personnel operating sophisticated equipment. The Bureau of 

Labor Statistics expects communications equipment to be the fastest growing type of durable equipment 

purchase by producers in the 1990s [75J; the services rendered by the operators of communications 

networks will bond manufacturing to that part of the service economy for the foreseeable future. 

How will new balances between and within the manufacturing and service sectors influence Army 

policy between the years 2000 and 2015? The scenario of a manufacturing sector continuing to lose 

markets to overseas competitors and contributing a shrinking share to the U.S. GNP would restrict 

defense purchasing options and likely shrink the contribution of U.S.-based R&D and manufacturing to 

defense projects. This scenario would include loss of defense-vital production facilities in electronics, 

machine tools, and semiconductors (as well as other technologies developed between now and 2015) to 

Asian or European competitors, meaning new dependence on suppliers beyond direct U.S. control. On 

the other hand, shrinkage of the manufacturing contribution to GNP would not by itself imply damage 

to the industrial base of the military. Especially given a scenario of improved productivity and continued 

expansion in the service sector, a drop from the current 20 percent share of manufacturing could be 

perfectly acceptable if it also meant that manufacturing had improved qualitatively. This would require 

more accurate and rapid assessment of market changes, flexible retooling to meet them, and greater 

commitment to programs of R&D and continuous process improvement. A manufacturing sector that has 

accomplished those objectives by 2000 would have retained substantial parts of the defense-vital industries 

or overseen their distribution abroad from a position of strength rather than weakness. It would be 

technologically ready for new production assignments, either civilian or military. The scenario of natural 

re-expansion of U.S. manufacturing through 2015 might enhance that capability, depending on whether 
consumer products or heavier industries were the chief areas bf expansion. 

For the military economy to take full advantage of this stronger manufacturing sector, however, 

substantial adjustment would have to limit the present de facto separation of military and civilian 

manufacturing. The dynamics of that relationship will be discussed in more detail in a later section. 

The impact of service sector trends on the military is less dramatic and direct. If productivity 

growth in that sector remains flat or negative in the next 25 years, however, U.S. economic power, hence 

international prestige, will diminish because of the continued influence of services on overall economic 

health. Conversely, if technological advancement affects enough major service industries in a major way, 

service productivity might begin to grow by 2 percent annually, providing an economic boost that would 

enhance the U.S. position after the year 2000. The outcome between those alternatives (likely to fall 

somewhere in the middle) will influence the flexibility of military funding and, conceivably, the 

geopolitical climate in which the military operates. The increased involvement of services such as 

communications, training, and information in U.S. manufacturing means that the productivity and 

technical proficiency of such services also has impact on the military. The degree of this impact will be 

determined by the degree to which military and civilian industry converge in the next 25 years. If the 

military economy remains essentially separate, changes in the civilian service sector will have less impact 

because functions such as software development and engineering and operation of computers and 

telecommunications equipment will be insulated from trends in the civilian economy. The advantage of 

such insulation may decrease if the civilian economy yields improved service techniques that might have 

to be re-invented at greater expense, or even foregone, on the military side. If substantial crossover 

occurs between the years 2000 and 2015, however, the efficiency level of those services in the overall 

economy can carry over into military applications. 

MANAGEMENT AND THE WORK FORCE 

For a number of reasons, the conventional hierarchical management pyramid has been modified 

in many U.S. enterprises in recent decades. Figure 2 depicts how the pyramid is being modified. The 

middle management level of the pyramid is disappearing in two directions: part of it is simply becoming 

unemployed, another part is moving from purely bureaucratic functions to hands-on, "value-added" 

positions that emphasize direct decision making and operational control over personnel supervision. [68] 

The pyramid is being flattened partly to provide faster information flow to and from the top, to and from 

customers and staff. Reducing the number of organizational levels promotes teamwork, speeds product 

development, and allows flexible, rapid response to market changes. It also reflects the rising postindustrial concept that ideas themselves are products with economic value. The new structures often 

require supervisory and non-supervisory personnel, trained to function in diverse capacities, to cross the 

lines of conventional job descriptions. [la 
EMERGING MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 

/ \ MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 

I 1 MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 

Fig. 2 
In the next 25 years management positions are likelysto undergo more qualitative changes. [79] 

Managers increasingly will be expected to be competent in a variety of skills, especially aware of market 

trends and new technologies, able to exert leadership and gather information outside the context of a 

rigidly defined hierarchy, and ready to share decision making with labor. As more information flows 

through automated channels than through human management structures, computer literacy becomes a 

prime requisite for managers. Also, a higher portion of management is likely to be women in the next 

25 years--both because of overall workforce demographics and because of the breakdown of the maledominated management pyramid. This will be especially true in the service and information industries. 

The rapidity of the last change will be determined by both economic factors (will it be possible for the 

average family to live on one income?) and social attitudes (will a traditionalist backlash pull some 

women back out of the work force?) [7] 

Part of the basis of the management-restructuring scenario is increased input by labor into 

management decision making. An alternative scenario finds labor and management striving for greater 

cooperation and flexible organization in the name of improved competitiveness, but resorting to traditional 

adversarial labor-management relations when short-term profit-maximizing management refuses to take 

the risk of a new corporate structure. [55] While the traditional structure is resistant to change, foreign 

competition and the necessity that management gain all possible information input are drivers whose 

strength is likely to increase by the year 2000, leading to the triumph of the "we're all in this together" 

attitude. 

The breakdown of conventional structures also applies to the work force. In the manufacturing 

sector, the use of automated equipment will be maximized in the next 25 years because in the long term 

it increases productivity, a key indicator of economic health. The main question here is the rate at which 

this process will proceed in the next 25 years. Between 1973 and 1988, the amount of labor man-hours 

required to produce a given volume of goods decreased by 150 percent. Because major manufacturing 

industries such as steel still held large amounts of conventional equipment in 1990, [72] the rate of 

replacement is likely to increase over the next 10 to 25 years. In this process, many job categories will 

simply disappear in the forecast period and leave a large group of workers unprepared for alternative 

employment in their newly high-tech industries. Many of those relatively high-paying manufacturing jobs 

will be replaced in the economy by lower-paying service jobs. According to one frequent prediction, 

both sewice and manufacturing job categories will divide dramatically into tedious, low-paying positions 

with little prospect for advancement and technical jobs requiring a relatively high degree of education or 

training. Jobs in the service sector show a more steady two-track, or bimodal, trend. A dramatic 

example of removal of a middle layer between those extremes is the "paper-shuffling" occupations 

(clerical, processing, and manipulation), which now are an estimated 16 percent of the work force. Given 

the scenario of rapid automation, this occupation will be largely replaced by information technology by 

the year 2000. [9] 

Another scenario, however, severely downplays the bimodal outlook and foresees more gradual 

evolution in the structure of the labor force, mainly because of the huge initial cost of replacing labor- 
intensive production with sophisticated, capital-intensive methods. This scenario would have robots 

performing only the most repetitive and hazardous tasks and thus replacing only a small fraction of the 

labor force by the year 2000, thus cushioning the social and economic shock of sudden conversion. [55] 

Given a scenario of rapid introduction of technology such as information networks and robots 

into U.S. enterprises, the "shakedown" period in management and personnel structure might be ending 

by 2000. That would not mean the end of technological improvement in enterprises, but the slowing of 

human displacement by machines. In that case, the period through 2015 would be one of consolidation 

and fine-tuning for the human element of the U.S. production system. Given the scenario of 

technological transformation slowed by a shortage of investment funds (the rapid-automation scenarios 

most often omit the very high cost of the technological revolution that is to save U.S. productivity), 

prolonged economic downturn, or a lack of qualified technicians, the displacement process and its 

attendant insecurity and social disruption (see "Society") would be more gradual and extend into the 21st 

century. 

Substantial shifts can also be expected in the quality and quantity of available labor in the next 

25 years. The Bureau of Labor Statistics forecasts that by the year 2000, managerial, professional, and 

technical occupations will be the fastest-increasing employment categories. [79] But the proportion of 

such positions to the overall labor force will be determined by another driver: the extent to which "smart" 

machines eliminate the need for "smart" operators. Very likely that replacement will accelerate between 

2000 and 2015, but its rate will be determined by the pace of technological innovation and onsite 

replacement of equipment. Meanwhile, people qualified in more than one of the premium categories (e.g. 

business and computers) will be in especially great demand. 

Labor availability for the in-demand categories will be determined by several factors. 

Demographic factors will likely limit growth in quantity of U.S. laborers to around 1 percent in the next 

ten years, compared with 1.8 percent in the 1980s. (The same gross population factor will also limit 

demand in that period, another serious impact on the economy.) By 2015, however, the large number 

of women of childbearing age in the current population will cause a new jump in the number of young 

workers, who will also be consumers (see Fig. 3). [lq Within the gross number, however, other factors 

drive the participation rate of women, young workers, and older cohorts. The female labor force is likely 

to grow more slowly after dramatic growth in the 1980s, and a social backlash in favor of earlier 

motherhood and women in the home (see "Society") could slow the trend even more after the year 2000. 

If more older workers of the period (highly motivated baby-boomers still) elect to delay retirement, they 

could contribute stability and adaptability to the top levels of the work force. The number of trained 

young workers available in the next 25 years is problematic, however. Until about 2010, their age cohort 

is smaller than the one that supported economic growth by swelling the labor force in the 1980s. [31] 

But if the expense of college drives more prospective workers to shorter, skill-oriented training programs 

or directly to work, the participation rate of young people in the labor force would increase. [55J 

An influential external driver here is the effectiveness of the U.S. education system in keeping 

pace with skill requirements in business, health services, information service, and finance. Conventional 

industrial on-the-job-training methods will have lost applicability before the year 2000. The expense of 

training new workers in basic skills in-house would decrease enterprise profits, slow productivity growth, 

and pressure enterprises toward more rapid automation to recoup lost productivity. But in fact, if 

increasing numbers of entry-level workers lack needed skills, precisely such a scenario might result. 

After a period of adjustment in such activity (ending around the year 2000, given rapid and relatively 

even automation in the intervening decade), enterprises may have streamlined in-house training to fill gaps 

left by the U.S. education system with minimal drag on productivity. 

A wild-card variable in labor-force quality and quantity is the rate and source of immigration. 

The U.S. Department of labor projects that in the next two decades immigrants will provide 22 percent 

of U.S. labor growth, doubling the 11 percent contribution of the 1970s, when the baby boom augmented 

the domestic labor force. Because the next increase in domestic labor supply is not expected until nearly 

2015, immigrant labor will be an important resource through the forecast period. As they have in recent 

decades, a large majority of legal aliens will likely gravitate to urban employment centers. In the forecast 

period, immigrants with entry-level skills will increasingly compensate for the relative scarcity of nativeborn workers in the 16-to-19 age group. But the labor force is augmented quite differently by Hispanic 

immigrants in the Southwest, for example, than it is by Asian immigrants in urban areas. Especially in 

the bimodal scenario, untrained worker groups would contribute less per capita to the economy than 

trained (or highly trainable) workers. In the 1980s, over one-third of U.S. immigrants had some college 

education. Dramatically increased, geopolitically-driven immigration from Eastern Europe or some part 

of Asia would serve to maintain that figure, which most analysts feel has been beneficial to the economy. 

[31] On the other hand, continued or increased Hispanic immigration from Central and South America 

might swell an untrained group to a size that would be a drag on the economy after the year 2000. 

The increased emphasis on flexibility (a seemingly unidirectional trend) will affect both enterprise 

structure and the nature of the labor force. As many as ten job changes are forecast for the career of the 

average worker beginning a career in 1990. There is the possibility of creating a large, nomadic, 

"disposable" under-class of multipurpose workers in service industries specializing in short-term, 

customized work. Many of those workers may be trapped at entry level by their inability to remain in 

an organization long enough to develop marketable skills. Meanwhile, the skilled part of the work force 

will also change jobs and retrain more frequently, but more often as a voluntary step in career 

advancement. The rate of economic diversification and fragmentation will determine the rate at which 

such disruptions occur, but increasingly education will be the key to obtaining job security, mobility, and 

higher wages. [55] 

How might these management and work-force scenarios influence Army policy? If average 

recruit age continues to increase, a larger percentage of the force will have prior exposure to the 

prevalent management structure of their time, which may be more antithetical than previously to military 

command hierarchy. An increase in the proportion of reserve forces would have the same effect. TO 
the extent that the understanding of authority is shaped by images such as the conventional corporate 

structure, future recruits will come equipped with a less homogeneous picture of how an organization 

identifies and achieves objectives. On the other hand, new enterprise structures may have provided them 

with self-confidence and initiative lacking in personnel emerging from a more conventional organization. 

Work-force demographic changes will also have impact. By the year 2000 shortages of young 

workers will increase employment competition from the private sector for trained or trainable personnel, 

especially given a scenario where major parts of the service economy have moved into high-tech phases 

in the next decade. On the other hand, the bimodal scenario would mean larger numbers of available 

personnel whose skills match positions being abolished in the new economic structure and older workers 

unable to retrain after their traditional jobs have disappeared. On the average, such a pool of available 

manpower might be older and less educated, which might influence its attitude toward military service 

and its trainability. 

ENTERPRISE STRUCTURE 

As already indicated, a major trend in the next 25 years will be fragmentation and diversification 

of production centers in both manufacturing and service sectors. Even large firms will be subdivided into 

multiple establishments forming production networks, rather than transforming raw materials into a 

finished product (in the case of manufacturing). Although the structure of such networks will vary 

widely, the general rationale for organizing enterprises in subunits is to achieve maximum use of energy 

and materials. [9] 

In the 1990s, greatest growth is likely to occur in the number of small and large enterprises, with 

those of medium size growing less rapidly, just as they did in the 1980s--given reasonably even economic 

conditions during that period. Family firms (defined as those that have remained under control of one 

family for two or more generations) produced 60 percent of the U.S. GNP in 1989, and, barring a 

prolonged economic downturn in the next decade, the profitability and proliferation of such enterprises 

are expected to increase past 2000. This trend coincides with the economy's overall move toward closer 

contact with customers and more customization of service and goods, and with a tendency in society 

toward conventional family values and regaining control of financial levers, after a decade of takeovers 

and mergers created the perception of concentration of wealth in large, impersonal corporations. The 

small firm also provides challenging employment for white collar workers released in the management 

cutbacks of the large corporations. [23] 

Evolution from larger units to smaller is not necessarily permanent, however. The 1990s will 

likely see great experimentation with enterprise size and especially configuration, corresponding to the 

introduction of entirely new product lines and production processes. For example, manufacturing 

operations may be merged with engineering and marketing operations, yielding a unified system of 

physical process with development on one end and the creation of economic value on the other. [33;59] 
After adjustments in the 1990s, by the year 2000 individual industries may have established a pattern, 

dictated by some of the drivers already discussed: the need for rapid exploitation of new markets and new 

technologies, which would limit enterprise size and complexity but put a premium on flexibility; and, on 

the other hand, the need for large-scale investment in new capital equipment, which would favor a larger 

corporate structure. If regulations remain lenient, mergers and takeovers might also continue to diversify 

large parent corporations and make their production networks more complex. 

Continuing mergers would mean that the predominance of large and small enterprises would 

continue because it is predominantly medium-sized companies that are consumed in mergers. Also, 

medium-sized companies (with, for example, $100 million in annual sales) typically show the least 

productivity because their volume requires a substantial labor force but profits are not enough to afford 

full-scale automation. In the next 25 years, such firms will feel increasing pressure to increase capital 

investment at the expense of labor; those unable to do so will disappear or merge with others. [4] 

The geographical siting of economic enterprises will also shift in the next 25 years. 

Manufacturing already demands much less proximity to natural resources and conventional transport (such 

as that provided by rivers and ports), and the day of material-intensive manufacturing is not likely to 

return. As a rule, services have always located near their customers. Given continued technical 

advancement in manufacturing and services, availability of skilled labor and communications networks 

will continue to be prime factors in enterprise location. This would mean continued concentration of 

high-wage employment around the metropolitan areas of both coasts, as well as certain parts of Texas 

and the Southwest and isolated points such as the industrial research centers of Michigan and Minnesota. 

[9] But in the next 25 years some regions will undergo boom-and-bust cycles. The frequency of that 

phenomenon will be driven by the intensity of foreign competition and the pace of changes in product 

lines in individual industries. Even the powerful Silicon Valley complex of high-tech industries now sees 

some enterprises threatened by Japanese competition that is expected to intensify before 2000. [15] By 

the year 2000 economic revival is possible in the Midwestern Rust Belt because of the affinity of hightech industries for university research bases and the trend for individual states to make economic deals 

directly with foreign enterprises. 

The fragmentation of the U.S. economy into smaller dispersed units could have various effects 

on the long-term health of the economy, and thus on resources available for military programs. Barring 

a long-term economic slowdown that would dry up the specialized markets they serve, the new small 

businesses can contribute a healthy entrepreneurial spirit ready to foresake conventional production 

processes and managerial methodology. Their inherently "lean" structure would also help improve 

productivity in the manufacturing sector and enhance their contribution as subcontractors for military 

projects. 

On the other hand, the dynamism of the small companies depends on a continuous investment 

flow, an increasing percentage of which will likely come from foreign sources over the next decade. The 

impact of foreign investment on the U.S. economy will be discussed more fully in a separate section, but 

the degree to which the economic structure remains fragmented in the year 2000 will be an important 
factor in that variable: large numbers of smaller U.S. companies with leading edge technology could be 

under foreign control in 2000, potentially limiting their availability to military R&D. This is especially 

important assuming continuation of the present trend for major military contractors to disperse 

subcontracts widely among smaller firms. 

Changes in the geographical distribution of U.S. enterprise centers will influence the 

demographics of military recruitment. To the extent that the mobile, young portion of the labor force 

relocates in the bicoastal economic concentration, attitudes brought from other regions will be 

homogenized in ensuing recruitment pools. In the Sun Belt, economic immigration will have the same 

effect on indigenous cultural patterns of the South and Southwest. 

FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT CONDITIONS 

Together with a slow rate of productivity growth, the unfavorable U.S. balance of payments, 

budget deficit (close to $200 billion in 1990), and current investment patterns are most often cited in 

negative scenarios as evidence of long-term economic deterioration. Figure 4 projects GNP growth 

through the forecast period. There is a substantial consensus that the significant U.S. economic growth 

of the 1980s resulted mainly from consistently high foreign capital investment in the U.S. ($329 billion 

in direct investment in 1988) [65J, stimulated by the declining value of the dollar and the image of the 

U.S. economy as a secure investment. Since the mid-1980s, the U.S. has invested less in foreign 

economies than they have invested here; this borrowing imbalance, intensified by interest payments, 

becomes part of an already large U.S. trade deficit ($128 billion in 1988). Also, a substantial part of 

U.S. foreign investment has gone to developing countries where the return potential is small; in the 

1990s, substantial U.S. investment may go to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, also economically 

risky ventures (especially compared with the return potential for foreign investors in the United States). 

Many also agree that long-term U.S. planning cannot count on such a foreign-investment trend 

continuing, and that a continued budget deficit (which has been at least $150 billion for the last five 

years) will have long-term impact on domestic U.S. capital investment resources, barring a combination 

of higher taxes and federal program cuts having a drastic effect on the deficit. Wild-card items such as 

the S&L bailout are also de facto budget busters that have rather regularly disrupted recent budget 

forecasts and should be expected to continue. 

Historically, long-term projections of a balanced budget have seldom come true because in the 

intervening period new or expanded government programs usually swallow more of the budget than was 

forecast. [26] Despite the prospect of a fiscally conservative national administration keeping programs 

such as food stamps and veterans' benefits at zero real growth through the 1990s, no federal surplus is 

likely to have supplemented available private investment funds by the year 2000--too many politically 

popular programs will exist. The ineffectiveness of the Gramm-Rudman procedures in paring budget 

deficits in the late 1980s supports that view. 
Fig. 4 
Warnings about over-reliance on foreign capital are especially ominous when combined with 

another frequent criticism of U. S . economic priorities: that the U. S . stock-exchange-driven system 

encourages too much spending on consumption and short-term profit, too little savings and investment. 

In 1989 the U.S. savings rate was 14.9 percent of its GDP, compared with 25.8 percent for Japan. By 

contrast, consumer credit terms in the United States are much more lenient than in Japan and some 

consumption interest is tax deductible--diverting potential U.S. savings and raising interest rates for 

capital investment loans. 

According to the interdisciplinary private Council on Competitiveness, in 1989 the United States 

was investing about half the percentage of GDP that Japan was investing in plant and equipment, and 

Japan's absolute investment total exceeded that of the United States that year as well, in spite of the much 

smaller size of its economy. [51] The disparity reflects a faster Japanese growth rate, rather than a lack 

of growth in U.S. investment; the "moderate projection" of the Bureau of Labor Statistics through 2000 

calls for accelerated growth in the rate of U.S. investment in capital equipment, especially in 

communications and computer equipment, after an economic slowdown in the early 1990s. [79] 

A result of the increased capital accumulation in that scenario is increased labor productivity, 

another statistical area where the United States has lagged in recent years, but where future projections 

vary considerably. Japan and Germany had virtually overtaken the United States in per capita 

productivity by 1990, having steadily closed the gap in the late 1980s. As in other indicators, a U.S. lag 

is not absolute but relative to performance of chief competitors; per capita productivity for U.S. workers 

rose $13,000 between 1972 and 1987. [51] Crucial factors behind future productivity scenarios are labor 

distribution between low-productivity services and high-productivity manufacturing, absolute amount of 

available labor, and the pace at which capital investment lifts productivity by improving equipment. 

Progress in reducing the U.S. budget deficit will also play a role, both economically and psychologically. 

By the year 2000 interaction of those factors will likely show whether the optimistic productivity scenario 

(2 percent annual growth for the 1990s) or the pessimistic scenario (a continuation of the 1980s 

slowdown, to 1 percent or less annually) carries into the next century. In the latter case, output would 

not raise living standards or maintain government spending programs. Adjusted for inflation, average 

real hourly wages for U.S. workers have already been shrinking since 1973. [87J 

Given no progress on the deficit, in the year 2000, the United States might still show prosperity 

in its productivity indicator, but the cost likely would be increased foreign debt and foreign-initiated 

foreign ownership of U.S. production facilities, andlor a U.S. industrial infrastructure unprepared by 

long-term investment for world competition between the years 2000 and 2015. Among non-economic 

drivers of the budget outcome are political feasibility of raising either income or consumption taxes, 

geopolitical feasibility of sustaining military spending cuts past 2000, and political feasibility of limiting 

the growth of entitlement programs in the U.S. budget. 

A positive scenario combines adjustment of U.S. taxation policy to encourage domestic capital 

investment with sustained shrinkage of budget deficits--between 1993 and 2003, for example. The former 

change would likely cause a short-term, transitional economic slowdown, but if made in the next five 
years would likely provide a solid production and R&D infrktructure for expansion after 2000. This 

position of relative strength would reduce dependence on foreign investment, placing more U.S. capital 

in strategic knowledge-based industries such as semiconductors, electronics, advanced materials, 

computers, aerospace, telecommunications, and financial services--areas where long-term investment will 

spill over technology to other industries past the year 2000. [77;84] 

At some point before 2000, incentives for foreign investment in the United States are likely to 

weaken; barring world economic crisis, drivers of this scenario are increased attractiveness of the 

European Economic Community (EEC) or Asian economies as investment ventures, long-term currency 

valuation shifts, or politically-driven economic policy changes by major investors such as Japan and the 

United Kingdom. If that happens before U.S. investment policy has shifted, a major economic crisis 

might result, especially given the likelihood that U.S manufacturing will then be committed to a major 

retooling process. Given that scenario, the period 2000-2015 would likely be a recovery period marked 

by forced rechanneling of domestic funds into targeted industries and services--a drastic weaning from 

foreign borrowing and the present policies that encourage low savings and investment. 

In terms of impact on the military, continued growth in foreign investment in the United States 

through the year 2000 would mean a shrinkage in the enterprise pool available for military contracts--not 

because foreign ownership per se is a disqualifier, but because the cumulative security risk grows with 

the percentage of foreign capital. The short-term slowdown impact of rearranging domestic investment 

incentives would likely be cushioned in the specialized military sector, and beyond 2000 (positing a 

rearrangement sometime in the mid-1990s) such adjustment would ensure broader availability of military 

technology from the U.S. economy. A recovery from the budget deficit will almost surely involve severe 

military budget cuts in the 1990s and a continuation of reorganization and prioritizing past 2000 (although 

the outcome of Operation Desert Storm uncovered substantial remaining enthusiasm for expanded military 

spending). The existing trend of withdrawal from military production by U.S. enterprises would 

accelerate if funding shrank. Given relatively smooth conversion to a consistently smaller military portion 

of GNP (to as little as 3.6 percent after a peak of 6.5 percent in the mid-1980s), by the beginning of the 

forecast period the Army will have had several years of adjustment to operating with fewer resources. 

In that scenario, by the year 2000 austerity would likely force procurement of "off-the-shelf' products, 

which will be discussed in a later section. 

THE UNITED STATES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 

Accelerated international economic integration in the next few decades is a scenario accepted in 

one form or another by virtually all forecasters. The dramatic 1992 removal of economic frontiers within 

the EEC is perhaps the most immediate example of smoothing the passage of goods and services among 

nation-states. But the 1990s will likely bring equally dramatic changes in other parts of the world: 

addition of Mexico to the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement is under serious discussion, [49] and that 
grouping could lead to complete economic unification of the Western Hemisphere, or, farther in the 

future, a Pacific Rim grouping including Asian industrial powers. [7] Newly industrialized countries 

(NIC's) have revised the world economic flow by taking over basic mass-production operations. This 

means that even after EEC unification, a number of major economic players (Japan, South Korea or a 

reunified Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Brazil) will remain dispersed geographically and economically, 

likely contributing an increasing variety of products to the world economy. Growth rates in the Asian 

NIC's will likely remain substantially higher than those in the EEC well past the year 2000. [70] 

Given continued development of international information transfer, in the next 25 years national 

economies will be interconnected and mutually dependent to an unprecedented degree, whatever their 

location or formal alignment. In that scenario, geography ceases to be a controlling economic variable 

because the conjunction of computers and telecommunications systems provides instant information 

access. Industrial processes, much less dependent than previously on material availability, can be located 

where labor supply and retail markets are most favorable. [14] 

Among the implications of such a scenario is the internationalization of capital: movement of 

money among national economies less influenced by individual government policy than by the interactions 

of the international money market and its operatives. This means that traditional control of a national 

currency may not be available to nations, including the United States, as a lever of international power. 

Markets will no longer have fixed locations; they will be rather communications networks with access 

points all over the world. An example is the spot oil market, formerly located in Rotterdam but now 

functioning as a computer-linked network of brokers all over the world. Such internationalization leads 

to a certain lack of national or international legal control over economic activities (such as establishment 

of oil prices), which has deep significance for the economies of nation-states. [14] 

Under these circumstances, enterprises formerly located exclusively in one country will continue 

to spread their operations (and their investments) to other countries, forming joint ventures or other 

multinational arrangements because of the following advantages: such arrangements offer a share of 

foreign markets, they divide the cost of research and production, and they give access to top-level foreign 

technology. An example is the proposed joint venture of Boeing with the French Aerospatiale and 

German Deutsche Aerospace firms to develop a new supersonic transport plane in the 1990s--an 

arrangment that may mean transfer of sensitive U.S. technology. On another level, the Singer Company 

of Connecticut now buys sewing machine motors from Brazil and machine shells from a separate U.S. 

supplier, while devoting all its domestic production facilities to aerospace. Under this arrangement, its 

share of the world sewing machine market increased in the 1980s. [50] Already in 1991, over half the 

goods manufactured in the United States contained at least one component made abroad, and half of U.S. 

trade deals occurred between U.S. companies and their foreign branches or parent companies. [3q 

Driven by the unprecedented freedom to choose, the configurations of foreign and domestic 

enterprise elements are likely to continue multiplying through the year 2000, in both U.S. and foreign 

firms--in inverse proportion to national barriers placed on technology exchange and trade. This context 

poses new aspects to the longlasting U.S. dilemma captured in the political buzzword "competitiveness." 
In recent decades, significant parts of industries such as electronics, computers, steel, and machine tools, 

many defense-vital, have lost markets to foreign competitors, moved operations overseas, or been 

purchased by foreign enterprises. The graphs in Figure 5 show these trends in selected industries over 

the last decade. In 1991 the private Council on Competitiveness found that, although the United States 

retained its world position in 61 "technologies rated crucial to economic prowess," its loss of position 

in 33 others was cause for alarm and development of new government strategies to bolster crucial 

industries. [87J 

A major question, already touched in this paper, is whether such reports signal actual decline 

in U.S. economic power, or whether they are the natural outcome of unprecedented diversification and 

technological change in the world economy. The disparity of answers to this question is conditioned by 

differences in philosophical approaches to national and international economics, and by the importance 

given to the advances of competitors who have approached international competition differently than the 

United States. For the US., the 1990s are likely to be a period of intense strategy discussions and 

adjustment. By 2000 a modified approach to international competition and globalization will likely 

emerge and prevail through the early decades of the 21st century, but the nature of that approach is not 

yet clear. 

In spite of significant domestic political backlash against Japanese investment and trade practices 

in the 1980s, the U.S. approach to the "competitiveness crisis" (which threatens to become a major 

political issue) has been to support free trade, discourage protectionism wherever possible, and, in the 

name of eventual free world trade, minimize the importance of the aggressive trade strategies of 

competitors. An example is the plan for a North American free-trade pact including Canada and Mexico, 

widely opposed by U.S. labor and farm groups who demand protection of U.S. jobs from cheap Mexican 

labor. Advocates of the plan foresee expansion into new markets for all three economies as a first step 

toward total economic integration of the Western Hemisphere. Such a plan is a model of the multilateral 

benefit viewpoint that sees globalization as requiring that at least part of U.S. economic policy now focus 

on building world prosperity, which will inevitably reverberate in additional revenues for all those 

participating. In that process, some short-term sacrifice of U.S. jobs will likely be necessary, but that 

is seen as a natural component of the free-market system. 

Anti-protectionist, free-trade political forces seem ready to dominate the national U.S. scene at 

least until 1996. Meanwhile, in the late 1980s three separate national-level competitiveness councils were 

formed, each evaluating economic evidence from a different standpoint. One of them, the private 

Competitiveness Council, has called for substantial increases in government direction of key industries. 

For the competitiveness situation beyond the year 2000, this proliferation of advisory groups may merely 

represent the deep institutional and philosophical divisions that block consensus on a problem whose 

dimensions have not been assessed yet; or they may show an emerging national perception that 

competitiveness is ultimately a top-level national security issue. The relative influence of such advisory 

panels in the philosophical shakedown period of the 1990s should indicate where U.S. competitiveness 

policy will be in 2000 and beyond. 
Fig. 5 

67 
Meanwhile, in The Work of Nations economist ~obert Reich extends the multilateral benefit 

scenario, predicting the end of national economies and the irrelevance of factors such as national 

investment sources and destinations, location of production facilities, and national trade balances. In this 

scenario, the health of the U.S. economy, for example, no longer depends on that of the U.S. 

corporation. In making the conventional debate over economic competitiveness irrelevant, however, this 

view assumes (unrealistically?) a concurrent withering of other forms of geopolitical competition that 

might interfere with cosmopolitian harmony. 

Present U.S. economic policy also encourages free domestic enterprise, in opposition to various 

proposals for government or quasi-government direction of industrial policy. The rationale of the present 

policy is that, even though aggregate performance of a critical industry may lag, parts of that industry 

likely are performing well; government interference or control will discourage initiative and competitive 

enthusiasm in those parts. [84] Unlike Reich's view, this policy depends on the continued vitality of 

conventional national economic units acting independently. Government's role is as an umpire, to 

maintain optimal conditions for entrepreneurial innovation. 

Critics of a domestic free-enterprise approach point to the Japanese and European examples of 

cooperation between state agencies and private enterprise, as streamlining investment targeting and 

promoting consistency in long-term commitment to technological processes. Savings rates, R&D, and 

human resources development are said to be among the beneficiaries of such a policy. According to this 

view, before the year 2000 competition with countries thus equipped will become increasingly difficult 

for totally independent U.S. companies in the most desirable markets. [51;16] 

If the United States should reach 2000 in an obviously deteriorating international position because 

of continued low productivity, high budget deficits, an outmoded infrastructure, or some combination of 

those elements, two patterns of action may emerge. As already mentioned, protectionism will be pushed 

(by organized labor and other influential factions) as a weapon against aggressive trade practices by 

foreigners. Pressure will be especially strong if a limited world market tends toward the zero-sum model 

(unchanging amounts of available goods divided in varying portions among world economies) instead of 

the scenario of multilateral benefit from an ever-expanding world economy. The "deflationary" scenario 

would mean abandonment of productivity growth as a goal, reduced capital investment, and emphasis on 

preserving traditional industries and jobs. On a world scale, it would also re-emphasize national economic 

units, as nations ended cooperative policies to secure their share of limited markets. 

Targeted economic policy, which has been proposed for the United States in many variations of 

private and governmental control mechanisms, would establish a consensual regulation system that would 

move the U.S. economy toward a partnership among government, business, and labor that was closer to 

that in Japan and Germany and reshape the conventional adversarial relationship of those three institutions 

that now permits only limited "watchdog" government regulation. [41] 

The latter policy runs counter to cultural values of individualism and competitive spirit strongly 

ingrained in U.S. society and prevailing political opinion against government interference in the economy. 

Barring a major political shift, there is little prospect that policy targeting will be applied broadly before 
2015. If a major shift away from current laissez-faire policy -(domestic andlor international) is required 

in the year 2000, public perception of the U.S. position and the threat of international competition (will 

Japan still be an easily identifiable villain, or will competition be distributed more subtly among the EEC 

and several Asian countries?) will be an important driver of policy choice between the years 2000 and 

2015. 

The impact on the Army of various scenarios of future world economic cooperation and rivalry 

is discussed in "Geopolitics." An influential aspect of a new U.S. position in the "global economy" is 

the increased mobility of defense-vital enterprises among two or more countries, when the sale or 

relocation of R&D or production facilities elsewhere becomes economically attractive. The threat to 

military procurement of the resulting redistribution may depend on the degree of concentration of such 

activities among foreign enterprises because concentration reduces supply alternatives. To meet this 

threat, the "4150 rule" has been used in evaluating purchase of national-security-vital enterprises or 

facilities by foreign buyers: if over half such an industry would thus come under control of four or fewer 

foreign enterprises, a purchase may be blocked under this formula. Control of such moves, however, 

is problematic given the complex of regulations and policies that now govern commercial transactions 

with foreign enterprises. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) was founded in 

1988 to determine the national security ramifications of certain industries coming under foreign control. 

Because the definition of "national security" has been vague, this organization has not had administrative 

"teeth." [36] This factor combines with poor domestic investment and tax incentives and inappropriate 

technology export laws to drive some defense-critical enterprises abroad. A result of that combination 

of circumstances was seen in the Persian Gulf War, where the U.S. military was totally dependent on 

French and Japanese firms for certain vital spare parts. [14] Continuation of domestic and external 

laissez-faire policy well into the 1990s, given continued aggressive economic policy by international 

competitors, would seem to promise more such incidents. 

Under even the most positive scenario, the defense industry will likely face purchase of critical 

materials and equipment from non-U.S. sources between 2000 and 2015, for two reasons: a strong 

commitment to a wide variety of advanced technology in military hardware, whatever the force size; and 

the momentum of economic globalization, which will continue to move critical producers of at least some 

of that advanced technology irretrievably beyond U.S. control, no matter how strong the domestic 

economy. 

A U.S. protectionist policy after the year 2000 would likely constrict the range of military 

procurement, especially given the likelihood of increased U.S. reliance on technology to offset manpower 

loss in the 1990s. A response to this would be increased government sponsorship of targeted R&D 

programs andlor production facilities, incorporating civilian industry and academic research centers into 

mixed defense enterprises whose political justification would be impending crisis in national security. 

Such a crisis might be very real if a re-emphasis on self-sufficiency brought higher cost, lower 

production, and delayed deployment of defense systems-dangers inherent in shrinking the production 

base. [36] 
An alternative scenario would be comprehensive analysis during the 1990s of presently disparate 

elements of tax law, procurement rules, R&D policy, and technology transfer policy in the context of the 

present and future global market. By the year 2000 such an analysis might begin producing an up-todate, focused national policy that would insulate military procurement from the most insecure elements 

of foreign supply and stabilize its R&D base. The former might be done by ensuring that foreign 

suppliers are as widely dispersed and competitive as possible, the latter by supplementing private 

investment in the high-risk stages of cutting-edge technology development. [36] But the most likely shortterm driver of such a development is a military emergency in which, unlike the Persian War experience, 

foreign supply of equipment is not forthcoming. 

Perhaps the most likely scenario is a part-way U.S. commitment to targeted investment in R&D, 

capital equipment, and training programs, on a "special need" basis, by 2000. Using the precedent of 

the space program, such an approach could be politically feasible because it would not visibly foresake 

the free market philosophy. It would likely seek to bolster U.S. competitiveness in defense-vital 

industries such as semiconductors, electronics, and machine tools. Using a narrow definition of national 

security, this approach might be a "fix" that would support U.S. military suppliers past the year 2000. 

But it might well fail to address broader issues such as low savings and high consumption rates, which 

ultimately shrink the amount of investment funds (public or private) available for either targeted or 

general use. And the implicit protectionism of such targeted support may increase military procurement 

prices in the same way that automobile import quotas increase car prices. 

THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ECONOMIES 

A frequent near-term prediction is that in the 1990s the military will reduce its personnel and 

extend its reliance on advanced technologies such as semiconductors, advanced communications and 

software. But, given the acknowledged prospect of a shrinking military budget, the economics of 

procurement of such technologies, as well as weapons systems and other equipment, will receive close 

attention in the 1990s; by 2000 a process of drastic revision may be well underway. 

By 1991 defense production was virtually disconnected from the civilian economy. Although 

military projects have an impressive record of spinoff contributions to civilian technology (such as 

satellite communications), little technology now flows out of the labs of military contractors into the 

civilian sector, and military production is increasingly incompatible with technologies and production 

methods in analogous civilian operations. [13] Although the military share of federal R&D spending 

remains steady at 67 percent, the part of that devoted to basic research, the area most likely to have 

civilian application, has dropped from 6 percent to 2 percent [20], and at the same time industry-funded 

R&D has decreased (see Fig. 6). Instead of spinning off advanced technology, military production is now 

a net recipient of technology. [45J 

Military specifications have become very precise and unique, performance requirements tend to 
override cost and durability factors, and the bureaucracy of paperwork and regulations surrounding 

military procurement has become overwhelming. Congressional oversight limits sector overlap in the 

name of military cost control, and the military insists on the right to transfer technology to contractors' 

competitors if national security requires it. For all these reasons, the U.S. producers of military 

equipment have been pared to a unique group of companies equipped to deal with such requirements. 

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 68 percent of firms providing military 

goods in 1982 were no longer doing so in 1987, despite significant increases in the defense budget during 

that period. [13] Most firms that have both civilian and military production operations have carefully 

separated the two. 

Many have proposed breaking down the barrier between military and civilian production in some 

way in order to allow the military to take advantage of dual-use and cost-saving technology and the many 

R&D areas in which civilian production moved ahead in the 1980s, and also to allow civilian industry 

to profit more from the 67 percent of federal research funds going to the military. The urgency of 

reorganization is reinforced by numerous examples of production inefficiency, cost overruns, and lack 

of backup production capacity in the military as well as by a perceived lag in civilian R&D compared to 

foreign competitors. 

Among suggested innovations in the military economy are adopting the design-to-cost approach 

of the civilian sector, in which product performance is maximized only to the point the market will bear 

its cost instead of driving up cost dramatically by insisting on the absolute maximum performance; 

continuing competition among contractors throughout production of an item, forcing them to compete for 

annual sales shares rather than incurring uncontrollable production cost increases; changing specifications 

to minimize component specialization and allow use of off-the-shelf commercial parts that have already 

been market-tested for both performance and cost; and finding uses for production capacity idled after 

completion of specialized military projects. 

Substantial institutional drivers would resist such reforms, in spite of the foreseeable likelihood 

of spiraling procurement costs. First, restructuring the relationship of civilian and military industry 

would require a federal coordinating body with a long-term mandate and close connections with industry-- 

a bureaucratic entity sure to be attacked on the same grounds as was a comprehensive national investment 

policy, as government interference in the free market. Second, forced diversification and competition 

for defense contracts would be opposed by the powerful companies remaining as defense suppliers, who 

are already lobbying hard to retain contracts in a budget crunch. [67l And third, there is now an 

ingrained assumption in government and the military, codified in a mountain of defense regulations and 

directives, that unique military specifications are the norm rather than the exception in guiding defense 

production. [37l In even the most positive scenario, to dissolve such institutional obstacles would 

require an integration strategy lasting through the 1990s. This fact means that the effect of any such 

strategy begun in the next few years would be first seen in the defense systems initiated between the years 

2000 and 2015. 
Fig. 6 
In the 1990s, the cost driver may well overcome institutional obstacles if the design, 

development, and manufacture of weapons systems is as cost-inefficient as most critics claim. Another 

potential driver is a shift toward standing U.S. forces with lighter equipment, emphasizing 

communications and light vehicles. That development would broaden procurement potential of off-theshelf equipment, but it would also require greater civilian capability to shift to production of weapons 

systems in the event of a major conflict--something the civilian economy cannot do at present. [45] 

Were a substantial degree of civilian and military industrial reintegration to be achieved by 2000, 

a more flexible approach to procurement would be possible after 2000. Instead of the current "pipeline," 

leading straight from R&D to the fielding of a specific system, emphasis could fall on evolution of 

existing systems as required by geopolitical and budgetary conditions. Such emphasis would be possible 

because the methodology of the defense economy would resemble more closely civilian enterprises in 

design approaches, procurement practices, and cost sensitivity--making the military market a reasonable 

area of expansion for civilian enterprise and giving the military a wide range of ready, cost-effective 

alternatives. Reintegration would be especially useful given a scenario of proliferating small enterprises 

capable of producing customized high-tech items. Such a constructive relationship likely would be less 

possible, however, if reintegration were achieved because government agencies pressured parts of the 

civilian sector to adapt to the unique requirements of military production. [37l 

UNRESOLVED ISSUES 

The U.S. economic situation will be influenced by a number of factors, internal and external to 

it, whose resolution are unknown and unknowable at this time. Among them are the degree of constraint 

to be exercised by environmental legislation on production, and the impact of environmental change on 

U.S. production centers; the role of independent economic policy making by economic organizations at 

the state level; the capability of the U.S. government to make major changes in current attitudes to 

economic planning, if necessary; future U.S . public attitudes toward the "competitiveness issue, " 

consumption, and women in the workplace; geopolitical conditions requiring varying degrees of economic 

support for the military; and the degree of U.S. cultural adaptation to globalization. 

In 1990 U.S. statutes such as the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act contained provisions for 

more stringent controls on industrial pollution, requiring installation of expensive purification equipment 

in plants. The Clean Air Act targeted small polluters such as gas stations and dry cleaners for the first 

time in 1990. In the 1990s, public concern about acid rain and the increasing likelihood of global 

warming will likely increase, in opposition to the accepted societal value of unimpeded economic growth. 

Beyond that, however, the actual long-term effects of those phenomena and other types of persistent 

environmental degradation may be felt much more sharply after the year 2000--especially if for some 

reason strong international measures are not taken in the interim. In that scenario, before 2015 U.S. 

coastal population and economic centers and agricultural patterns might feel major climatic impact, and 
pollution might become a divisive issue among bordering countries such as Canada and the United States 

and the U.S. and Mexico. The timeliness and appropriateness of environmental measures in the 1990s 

will determine the severity of such disturbances in the forecast period and beyond. 

Given strict enforcement (not the norm before 1990 but seemingly more likely through 2000), 

U.S. industry would invest billions of dollars to meet requirements, diverting funds from major 

infrastructure improvement. The other side of the environment question is that valuable new technology 

and processes, some perhaps with military application, result from the drive for clean air and water. The 

extent of the positive and negative sides of the environmental factor will depend on the perceived margin 

available in the economy for upping environmental standards, in combination with public attitudes. In 

a prolonged downturn, both government enforcement and technological innovation would presumably 

slow. An aspect of the environmental question especially important to the U.S. economy is the 

technology of waste material disposal. In the age of independence from material requirements for 

manufacturing, this largely unresolved problem is one of the two remaining obstacles (the other being 

dependence on conventional fuels). New solutions in waste disposal would remove a major constraint 

on industrial location and streamline production processes, while the lack of such solutions would detract 

from the overall technological upgrading expected in the next 25 years. 

In spite of a consistent U.S. position against government participation and interference in private 

enterprise, many states have formed partnerships with the private sector and begun to solve locally many 

of the national problems listed above. For example, the Ben Franklin Partnership of Pennsylvania, run 

by the legislature and representatives from labor, education, and business, uses state and private funds 

to stimulate development and marketing of technology. And the Corporation for Indiana's International 

Future, under a similarly diverse administration, identifies and promotes state industries with foreign 

export potential--one of several state organizations now making direct export deals with foreign countries. 

Now operating on a relatively small scale, such agencies may have significant impact on the national 

economy in the next 25 years, and their success could stimulate revision of national policy. [44] 

A related question is whether the U.S. government is fundamentally able to run a comprehensive 

national "industrial policy." Several observers have noted that an industrial policy already exists in the 

hodgepodge of regulations, taxes, and subsidies enforced by various agencies. The tobacco industry, for 

example, is simultaneously taxed, restricted, and subsidized. Given the diversity and traditional 

independence of U.S. business enterprise, even targeted policy-making control may be infeasible. In spite 

of frequent calls for government activism in the "competitiveness crisis," a workable organizational form 

of such activism remains problematic. 

Another imponderable are changes in U.S. political and societal attitudes on economic issues: 

what importance will the public assign to international competitiveness in the election of 2000? How will 

that evaluation affect support for the aforementioned increase in government control of private enterprise? 

Will there be a full-scale social backlash against the idea of working mothers and the consumption 

patterns of the 1980s, and will it be followed in the next decade by an opposite reaction? The public 

attitude to competitiveness will depend partly on actual economic conditions in 2000 (Will the standard 
of living have dropped appreciably by then?), partly on the arcane process of issue identification by 

politicians. Then, if competitiveness becomes a major issue, will the public accept quick-fix solutions 

(such as trade barriers) or demand fundamental changes in education and industrial infrastructure? 

Public attitudes toward certain social issues will affect the work force and the orientation of U.S. 

manufacturing. Although women made a major contribution to work force expansion in the 1980s for 

both economic and sociological reasons, re-emphasis of family values might cause many to re-evaluate 

career decisions in the next 25 years, with possible serious impact on management and the skilled labor 

force. 

In another area, the shape of consumer production in many categories will likely be altered by 

a combination of increased environmental consciousness and a related backlash against previous 

consumption levels--but the impact of both those factors has wavered in recent times. Judging by trends 

in the last 15 years, the period 2000-2015 will likely see at least one major swing in public attitudes on 

women's and environmental issues and on consumption levels, but the starting and end points of such a 

swing are unknown. 

Geopolitical issues and conditions will continue to influence strongly U.S. economic policy. A 

major factor here will be the degree of U.S. energy dependence on the Middle East (see "Resource 

Picture"). Whatever political alignments exist there between 2000 and 2015, continued dependence on 

imported fuel would be a major economic weakness in that period and could lead to additional expensive 

conflicts in the region. 

Another unanswered question in this area is the geopolitical fallout of the new international 

economic blocs that will likely form in the 1990s among industrialized nations. Even if those blocs 

provide economic growth for all their members, substantial parts of the traditional Third World, and even 

perhaps parts of Eastern Europe, will likely remain outside direct range of such benefits. Supporting 

them economically, or even combatting armed uprisings by them, would reduce substantially the health 

of any new world economy. And a scenario of intermittent failure or conflict within the new economic 

blocs would worsen the prospects of dealing with the "have-not" nations. 

Finally, reaping the benefits of globalizing the U.S. economy across a broad spectrum will 

likely require substantial cultural accommodation and some compromise of the U.S. values of economic 

independence and entrepreneurial freedom. Items such as learning foreign languages and adopting foreign 

customs will become much more important. Ultimately the U.S. education system will determine how 

those values change, but change is needed in the generation now making economic policy as well. 

Understanding of competing national approaches to economics, if not compromise with them in U.S. 

policy making, will be necessary for the United States to be a full partner in the globalized economy. 

An especially constructive starting point would be Japan, toward which U.S. attitudes of fear and hostility 

have been formed without complete understanding of that alien culture. But the culture shock of no 

longer being able to "go it alone," absorbed only slowly to this point, may linger past the year 2000. 
CONCLUSION 

Whatever trends emerge and whatever drivers prove most influential, in the year 2000 the U.S. 

economy will have undergone a decade of intensive, often painful readjustment. Most parts of the 

economy, including the military, will share in that process. Both the goods-producing and service sectors 

will have substantially more automation in 2000, but the nature of the automation process in the forecast 

period will depend on several variables: whether a point of minimum human participation has been 

reached, where further automation is not cost effective; how much investment capital has been available 

in the 1990s for retooling; new government approaches to investment that might speed (or deter) the 

retooling process in the forecast period; the number of skilled positions required in new automated 

workplaces, compared with the supply of skilled labor after 2000; and the influences of foreign 

competition: the stimulus to match foreign advancements and the impact of losing goods-producing jobs 

overseas. 

Structural changes will continue in the work force, management, enterprise configuration, and 

the balance between services and goods-producing enterprises. In the work force, these changes will be 

influenced by demographic factors such as age-cohort distribution, quantitative and qualitative changes 

in the female work force, and immigration patterns; stimuli and disincentives for higher education; 

changing lifestyles for older workers; availability of business- or government-supported apprenticeship 

programs; and the relative distribution of jobs over a period of time between skilled and unskilled 

positions. In management, important change drivers will be the speed at which automated information 

systems make traditional mid-level positions redundant and physically disperse enterprises; degree of 

resistance to concepts such as flexible labor-management teams and multiple-skill management; the fate 

of the small, independent entrepreneurlmanager after 2000; and the cumulative impact of repeated 

instances of white-collar displacement in economic downturns before and after 2000. 

In the balance of goods-production and services, important factors are the speed and resource 

availability of capital equipment replacement, which will help determine the sector's contribution to GNP 

in the forecast period; political decisions on protecting some industries from international competition and 

subsidizing R&D and capital investment in security-vital industries; the impact of free-trade agreements 

on job losses in manufacturing to foreign competitors, and the degree to which U.S. goods producers go 

multinational; new social and consumption patterns (e.g. greater consciousness of environmental impacts 

of consumption, greater use of public transportation) that redistribute demand between and within sectors; 

and the degree to which services such as information supply are integrated into a new, complex version 

of conventional goods-producing activity, making the distinction between the sectors irrelevant. 

The movement of enterprise configuration away from conventional central locations toward the 

multiple locations of consumers is likely to be influenced in degree and speed rather than direction in the 

forecast period. Drivers are the speed at which goods producers are weaned from dependance on 

conventional fuel and waste disposal requirements; further dispersal of population centers, especially in 

the West and Sun Belt; possible environmental or resource constraints on conventional transport means; 
and consumer choices between standardization and customization. 

The adjustment of the 1990s is likely to have been especially problematic in determination of the 

U.S. role in the global economy. That adjustment should include major policy choices that would then 

play out through the forecast period. If policy makers continue to assume that the U.S. economy is 

fundamentally strong and that sharing trade and industry on an equal basis with foreign competitors will 

ultimately benefit all participants in an expanded world economy, policy may not have changed greatly 

by 2000. If it has not, scenarios for the forecast period would range from benign integration of the U.S. 

economy (including parts now labeled vital for national security) into an expanding world market divided 

into several major trading blocs, to exclusion of U.S. products from a world market unable to sustain the 

growth of its least competitive participants. The latter scenario would mean extended U.S. dependance 

on foreign suppliers for high-level (including military) products. 

If, however, the issue of U.S. competitiveness gains political resonance in the 1990s adjustment 

period (whether or not actual U.S. economic competitiveness deteriorates), U.S. policy may abandon the 

optimistic view of free world trade by adopting trade barriers, restricting technology transfer and 

involvement of foreign firms in U.S. R&D and production operations, and/or targeting government 

support to critical industries. Selection drivers will be the nature and source of domestic political 

pressure, trade and investment practices by foreign competitors, and the degree to which U.S. economic 

indicators have rebounded by the beginning of the forecast period. Infrastructure changes (revamped 

educational/training programs, stronger investment incentives, permanent government/business steering 

committees) may also result. 

The relation of the military and civilian economies will also have been rigorously tested by the 

year 2000. If the present separation of the two stands, military procurement will likely be much more 

expensive and military equipment more specialized. Drivers of this scenario are a long-term geopolitical 

situation allowing drastic reduction in volume and applicability of military equipment, combined with 

continued institutional resistance to reintegration of civilian and military production. On the other hand, 

reintegration would be triggered by procurement cost increases continuing through 2000, combined with 

geopolitical uncertainties continuing to require readiness and flexibility by U.S. forces--both factors strong 

enough to overwhelm institutional resistance. Even given the immediate onset of reintegration, however, 

results would only be visible starting in 2000, meaning that the forecast period would be a shakedown 

time for the new system. 

Another major driver in this issue is U.S. budget commitments to the military. This in turn will 

continue to be influenced by public perceptions of threat and performance (the fall of the Berlin Wall 

reduced threat perception; Operation Desert Storm improved performance perception, hence willingness 

to spend) and by management of whatever national deficit exists in the forecast period. 
SOURCES 

Books 

1. Bezold, Clement, Rick J. Carlson, and Jonathon C. Peck. The Future of Work and Wealth. Dover, 

Massachusetts: Auburn House, 1986. 

2. Center for Strategic & International Studies and Potomac Foundation. Defense Economics for the 

1990s: Resources. Strategies. and OPtions. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International 

Studies, 1989. 

3. Drucker, Peter. The New Realities. New York: Harper & Row, 1989. 

4. Johnston, William B., and Arnold H. Packer. Workforce 2000. Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1987. 

5. Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Vintage, 1989. 

6. Kuttner, Robert. The End of Laissez-Faire: National Pumose and the Global Economy After the Cold 

War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991. 

7. Naisbitt, John, and Patricia Aburdene. Megatrends 2000. New York: Avon, 1990. 

8. Reich, Robert. The Work of Nations. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991. 

9. United States Congress. Office of Technical Assessment. Technologv and the American Economic 

Transition: Choices for the Future. Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1988. 

Articles 

10. Archordoguy, Marie. "Mastering the Market: Japanese Government Targeting of the Computer 

Industry," International Organization, Summer 1988, 509-43. 

11. Armitage, Kenneth, and Dixon A. Tranum. "Industrial Production: 1989 Developments and Historical 

Revision," Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1990, 187-204. 

12. Auerbach, Stuart. "U.S. Relied on Foreign-Made Parts for Weapons," WashinNon Post, March 25, 

1991, Al, A17. 

13. Auster, Bruce B. "A Healthy Military-Industrial Complex," U.S. News and World Reuort, February 

12, 1990, 42-43. 

14. Bell, Daniel. "The World and the United States in 2013," Daedalus, Summer 1987, 1-31. 

15. Belsie, Laurent. "Foreign Competition Clouds Silicon Valley's Future," Christian Science Monitor, 

March 13, 1991, 10-11. 

16. Berger, Suzanne, et al. "Toward a New Industrial America," Scientific American, June 1989, 39-47. 

17. Boonekamp, Clemens. "Industrial Policies of Industrial Countries," Finance & Develo~ment, March 

78 
18. Brody, Michael. "The l99Os," Fortune, February 2, 1987, 2-3. 

19. Brooks, Harvey, and Lewis Branscomb. "Productivity," Technologv Review, August-September 

1989, 27-40. 

20. Brooks, Harvey, and Lewis Branscomb. "Rethinking the Military's Role in the Economy," 

Technolorn Review, August-September 1989, 55-62. 

21. Burgess, John. "Council Warns of Technological Slide," Washington Post, March 21, 1991, B11, 

B 14. 

22. Calingaert, Michael. "Longer-Term Perspectives on 'Europe 1992,"' Business in the Contemporarv 

World, Winter 1990, 74-84. 

23. Calonius, Erik. "Blood and Money," Newsweek Special Issue, Spring 1991, 82-84. 

24. Cartwright, Joseph V. "Potential Defense Work Force Dislocations and U.S. Defense Budget Cuts: 

An Illustration," Washington, D.C.: Office of Economic Adjustment, Department of Defense, 1990. 

25. Castro, Janice. "The Simple Life," Time, April 8, 1991, 58-63. 

26. Cole, Rosanne, Brian P. O'Connor, and Nancy H. Teeters. "Long-Term Economic Forecast 1988 

to 2000," Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1989. 

27. Connaughton, John E. and Ronald A. Madsen. "The Changing Regional Structure of the U.S. 

Economy," Growth and Change, Summer 1990, 48-60. 

28. Cox, William. "The Baby Bust and the Economy of the 1990s," CRS Review, September-October 

1990, 28-29. 

29. Crocker, C. Brandon. "The Myth of Japanese Industrial Policy," Freeman Ideas on Libertv, April 

4, 1988, 136-139. 

30. Defense Budget Project. "Major Weapon System Terminations: Fiscal Years 1991-1993," 

Washington, D.C.: 1991. 

31. DeVita, Carol J. "America in the 21st Century: Human Resource Development," Washington, D.C.: 

Population Reference Bureau, 1989. 

32. Dreyfuss, Joel. "Getting High Tech Back on Track," Fortune, January 1, 1990, 74-77. 

33. Drucker, Peter. "The Emerging Theory of Manufacturing," Haward Business Review, May-June 

1990, 94-102. 

34. Ferguson, Charles H. "America's High-Tech Decline," Foreign Policv, Spring 1989, 123-144. 
35. Forbis, John, and William Adams. "Corporate Victims of the Eighties," Across the Board, December 

1990, 15-17. 

36. Francis, David R. "Advice to Execs: 'Think Globally,"' Christian Science Monitor, April 11, 1991, 

9. 

37. Gansler, Jacques. "Integrating Civilian and Military Industry," 1

Fall 

1988, 68-73. 

38. Gonenc, Rauf. "From Subsidies to Structural Adjustment," The OECD Observer, October-November 

1990, 8-12. 

39. Halberstarn, David. "Reflections on Japan Inc," Business Month, February 1989, 45-48. 

40. Heaton, George Jr. "Commercial Technology Development: A New Paradigm of Public-Private 

Cooperation," Business in the Contem~orarv World, Autumn 1989, 87-96. 

41. Heenan, David A. "Congress Rethinks America's Competitiveness," Business Horizons, May-June 

1989, 11-16. 

42. Henderson, Hazel. "The Future and the Restructuring of Knowledge," Proceedings, University of 

Wisconsin Extension, Jean C. Evans Seminar, 1989. 

43. Henderson, Yolanda K. "Defense Cutbacks and the New England Economy," New England 

Economic Review, July-August 1990, 3-24. 

44. Horrigan, Brian R. "Overview of the Trend Scenario," in WEFA Group, U.S. Long-Term Economic 

Outlook, 1, (3d quarter 1990), 2.1-2.19. 

45. Institute for Defense Analysis. "The Future of Military R&D: Towards a Flexible Acquisition 

Strategy, " Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1990. 

46. Jackson, Don C. "Technology Hemorrhage in An Open Society," Business in the Contempora~ 

World, Autumn 1989, 99-109. 

47. Katseli, Louka T. "The Political Economy of European Integration: From Euro-Sclerosis to EuroCorporatism," The International Spectator, July-December 1989, 186-195. 

48. Kearns, Kevin L. "Who Will Build America's Nuclear Arms?" Washinrrton Post, January 13, 1991, 

C1-C2. 

49. Kinsley, Michael. "Holy Guacamole!" The New Republic, April 1, 1991, 6. 

50. Kirkland, Richard I., Jr. "We're All in This Together," Fortune, February 2, 1987, 34-37. 

51. Kondracke, Morton. "See No Evil, Hear No Evil," Business Month, November 1990, 40-42. 
52. Kutscher, Ronald E. "An Overview of the Year 2000," ~ccu~ational Outlook Ouarterlv, Spring 1988, 

2-9. 

53. Kuttner, Robert. "Atlas Unburdened: America's Economic Interests in a New World Era," The 

American Prospect, Spring 1990, 90-103. 

54. Kuttner, Robert. "Japan vs. Europe: Tough Customers," The International Economy, NovemberDecember 1988, 72-77. 

55. Levitan, Sat A. "Beyond 'Trendy' Forecasts," Futurist, November-December 1987, 28-32. 

56. Lewin, Rebecca, and Ricardo Sookdeo. "Now Capital Means Brains, Not Just Bucks," Fortune, 

January 14, 1991, 31-54. 

57. Liebeler, Susan W., and Michael S. Knoll. "The Perils of Managed Trade," Policv Analvsis, August 

29, 1990, 1-18. 

58. Lynn, Leonard H. "Research and Development in Japan," Current History, April 1988, 165-168. 

59. Main, Jeremy. "Manufacturing the Right Way," Fortune, May 21, 1990, 54-56. 

60. Majumdar, Badiul A. "Industrial Policy in Action: The Case of the Electronics Industry in Japan," 

Columbia Journal of World Business, Fall 1988, 25-34. 

61. Manufacturers' Alliance for Productivity and Innovation. "Why U.S. Manufacturers Are at a 

Competitive Disadvantage," Washington D.C. : 1990. 

62. May, Todd Jr. "The Longest Expansion Ever, " Fortune, July 16, 1990, 52-58. 

63. McComas, Maggie. "Seven Wary Views from the Top," Fortune, February 2, 1987, 58-63. 

64. McIntyre, Richard. "Economic Rhetoric and Industrial Decline," Journal of Economic Issues, June 

1989, 483-491. 

65. Merrick, Thomas W. "America in the 21st Century: A Global Perspective," Washington, D.C.: 

Population Reference Bureau, 1989. 

66. Moran, Theodore H. "The Globalization of America's Defense Industries," International Securitv, 

Summer 1990, 57-99; and 

C. Tait Ratcliffe. "The Intricacies of 'Japanomics,"' S~eaking: of Japan, June 1990, 12-16. 

67. Morrison, David C. "Defense Contractors Trying to Hold On," National Journal, April 14, 1990, 

885-889. 

68. Nulty, Peter. "How Managers Will Manage," Fortune, February 2, 1987, 26-28. 

69. Rauch, Jonathon. "Stateside Strategizing, " National ~ournal, May 27, 1989, 1294-1297. 
70. Rosenstein, Allen, and Phillip Burgess. "U.S. competitiveness in Global Markets," The Bureaucrat, 

Fall 1989, 20-29. 

71. Ryan, Henry Butterfield. "Waging Peace Abroad: Economic Policy," Government Executive, June 

1990, 18, 23-26. 

72. Saporito, Bill. "The Smokestacks Won't Tumble," Fortune, February 2, 1987, 43-45. 

73. Sauerwein, Brigitte. "Western Conversion: Coping with Disarmament Shock," International Defense 

Review, August 1990, 848-849. 

74. Saunders, Norman C. "Defense Spending in the 1990s--The Effect of Deeper Cuts," Monthly Labor 

Review, October 1990, 3-15. 

75. - . "Economic Projections to the Year 2000," Monthlv Labor Review, September 1987, 10-18. 

76. Scheuerman, William E. "Joint Ventures in the U.S. Steel Industry," American Journal of Economics 

and Sociology, October 1990, 413-429. 

77. Scott, Bruce R. "Competitiveness: Self-Help for a Worsening Problem," Harvard Business Review, 

July-August 1989, 115-121. 

78. Seifert, Laurence C., and Alfred D. Zeisler. "A National Manufacturing Policy: An Industrial 

Perspective on Promoting Sustained Improvement in U.S. Global Competitiveness," Technological 

Forecasting and Social Change, Issues Paper Mo. 2, 1989. 

79. Silvestri, George, and John Lukasiewicz. "Projections of Occupational Employment, 1988-2000," 

Monthlv Labor Review, November 1989, 42-65. 

80. Tassey, Gregory. "Structural Changes and Competitiveness: The U.S. Semiconductor Industry," 

Technological Forecasting: and Social Change, March 1990, 85-93. 

81. Taylor, Alex III. "What the Sober Spenders Will Buy," Fortune, February 2, 1987, 21-27. 

82. Thurow, Lester C. "The End of the Post-Industrial Era," Business in the Contemporarv World, 

Winter 1990, 21-26. 

83. Truell, Peter. "U.S., Canada and Mexico to Negotiate A North American Free-Trade Pact," Wall 

Street Journal, February 6, 1991, A8. 

84. United States Department of Defense. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions. "Bolstering 

Defense Industrial Competitiveness: Report to the Secretary of Defense," Washington, DC: Department 

of Defense, 1988. 

85. "Back to Business," Business Tokvo, July 1990, 40-41. 

86. "The Simple Life," Time, April 8, 1991, 58-63. 

82 
87. "The U.S., Europe and Japan: Global Economy in ran sit ion?" Great Decisions, 1990, 17-26. 
KEY JUDGMENTS 

UNITED STATES RESOURCES 

- The United States is in a position of strength in terms of food, water, medicine and associatedindustry resources (for example, timber and fertilizer). There are adequate or friendly foreign supplies 

available. 

- The United States is in a position of weakness in terms of energy resources, particularly oil. 

The forecast is for continuing reliance on fossil fuels for energy and dependence on imports for supplies. 

Fusion energy will not be operational before the year 2040. Safeguarding the next century's de facto 

strategic petroleum reserve, the Persian Gulf, is likely to require a U.S. military presence. 

- The United States will face persistent dependence on foreign supplies for many strategic and 

critical materials, often concentrated in politically and socially unstable areas (the southern "High Africa" 

region and the Soviet Union). The United States will continue to stockpile these minerals and materials 

as insurance against supply cut-offs. 

- The traditional patterns of resource exploitation, acquisition, and use will cause increasing 

concern for environmental consequences and changes will occur because of public awareness. These 

changes will foster new technologies and developments. 

- The United States Army will be engaged in environmental missions and conservation activities 

at home and abroad in the future. 
THE UNITED STATES RESOURCE PICTURE IN 2015 

INTRODUCTION 

No country has a greater vested interest in domestic and global availability, production and 

distribution of resources than the United States. With about 5 percent of the world's population and 7 

percent of its land area, the United States consumes about 25 percent of the world's energy and finished 

products, and 13 percent of its raw nonfuel mineral production. Casual indifference to changes in the 

location, availability, production and distribution of vital resources puts U.S. welfare and security at 

considerable risk. Viewed in terms of domestic and world resource production and consumption, trends 

in some critical categories, mineral fuels and some metallic minerals, for example, have been unfavorable 

for years and a cause for serious concern. 

Although it is still a country more generously endowed with natural wealth than most, the United 

States since the end of World War II has embarked upon a path of development that has been 

transforming it into an increasingly raw materials deficit country. By the 1970's the United States was 

consistently consuming more minerals than it produced. In 1988 the trade deficit in nonfuel minerals and 

metals amounted to $22.3 billion, about 19 percent of the total trade deficit. Adding in charges for 

energy imports, in 1988 the bill for imported resources alone was $64.1 billion or 54 percent of the total 

trade deficit. Meanwhile, the United States has drawn down its own geologic capital by depleting reserves 

of some critical and strategic materials. 

Equally disconcerting from a security standpoint has been a trend driving some crucial industries 

(steel or, lately, semiconductor industries) for which U.S. raw material stocks are adequate to move a 

portion of production abroad or abandon the United States altogether. Iron ore reserves in the United 

States are adequate for hundreds of years of supply. Yet U.S. industry finds it increasingly difficult to 

produce steel at a competitive price, and manufacturing thus depends more and more upon Asian 

countries or Brazil for the enormous quantities of steel needed to build aircraft, automobiles, and other 

consumer durables. 

Three of the most critical materials of an industrial society and its armed forces are: steel, 

aluminum, and refined petroleum; these materials will remain critical throughout the forecast period. In 

1950 the United States produced 47 percent of the world's steel, 44 percent of the world's aluminum, 

and 52 percent of the world's refined petroleum [lq. In 1990, the shares had declined to 10 percent, 

21 percent and 15 percent, respectively. If current trends continue, by 2015, the United States will 

account for just 4 percent, 9 percent, and 7 percent of these commodities so essential to U.S. economic 

prosperity and defense (see Fig. 1). 

National and international security implications of import reliance for critical resources are farreaching and profound. The recent war in the Persian Gulf illustrated U.S. resolve to sacrifice national 

treasure and American lives to protect one of the key sources of U.S. and Western prosperity. Petroleum 

and petroleumderived products are indispensable to sustaining and enhancing the quality of life and 
economic vitality of the United States and the developed world. In the forecast period, the assessment 

is that these products will continue to be the energy mainstay of the United States and the major Federal 

consumer, the U.S. Armed Forces. 

Unfortunately, most estimates of domestic supply project significant declines in U.S. crude oil 

production, with concomitant reliance on foreign, primarily OPEC, oil stocks. Import reliance for natural 

gas is slated to double from 10 percent in 1989 to 20 percent in 2015. Between 1990 and 2015, coal will 

be the only exporting sector of the nation's import-dependent energy industry. As an intense user of 

transportation and hardware, the U.S. Army will continue to consume significant quantities of foreign 

oil, gas, and metals. Jet fuel consumption for defense purposes will continue to account for the bulk of 

petroleum consumption in the defense sector. 

This study will examine the present and future of United States resource production, consumption 

and availability, emphasizing trends and their impact on the U.S. Army. The terrain has been covered 

before. The Club of Rome's The Limits to Growth and the U.S. government's Global 2000 are perhaps 

the two best known reports on resources of the United States and the world. The bulk of the information, 

however, came from more recent publications written by experts from both the private and public sectors. 

The timing of the study could hardly be more fortuitous. This work began as hostilities in the 

Persian Gulf unfolded. In the midst of our research, the Department of Energy released the long-awaited 

National Energy Strategy. Because these two events have consequences for the future of U.S. resource 

production and consumption, they shall be discussed in subsequent sections. Resources are treated in 

categories such as food and water, mineral fuels, nonfuel minerals, within which are found strategic and 

critical materials. This study will also discuss briefly resources of the global commons: materials of the 

seas and atmosphere, the ozone layer, and space in near-earth orbit for satellites, for example. 

Briefly, the resource outlook for the United States is either partly cloudy or partly sunny, 

depending upon one's perspective. In contrast to the points of view of many authorlfuturists in the field 

of resource research and analysis, there is neither an impending apocalypse nor El Dorado. The U.S. 

future with respect to resources is somewhere in between, more like California. The thesis is that the 

Golden State in particular and the United States in general are moving into a transition period marked 

by the challenge of shifting from a society of abundance and conspicuous consumption, which is 

increasingly unaffordable, to a society not necessarily of scarcity, but rather of moderation, perhaps 

toward the end of the forecast period even of national thrift. 

The armed forces, accounting for fully 80 percent of the government's energy consumption, will 

not remain insulated from the primary features of this transition period. 

Finally, this study considers some probable resource requirements of emerging technologies and 

alternative resources and the prospects that major changes will take place in the next 25 years to 

ameliorate some of the most challenging resource-related problems: acid rain, hazardous waste, and 

pollution; import dependence; a legacy of scarcity; and so forth. 
Fig. 1 
FOOD AND WATER 

With the exception of 1988, the year of a major drought, for the past 50 years the United States 

has produced much more food than it consumed in a given year. The assessment is that this beneficial 

trend will continue, barring any unforeseen catastrophe, such as northward migration of the country's 

breadbasket caused by persistent droughts from changes in the world's climate, that is, global warming, 

which is possible, but unlikely to occur by 2015. The on-going debate over global warming will have 

been settled one way or another long before 2015. 

Overall more judicious use and conservation of adequate water resources is expected. In the 

west, however, costly major water redistribution projects (e.g., plan to pipe fresh water from Alaska to 

California) or the construction of large desalinization facilities are likely. Water management and 

conservation will be a key factor in sustaining the country's position as the world's principal farmer and 

grocer. It should maintain this position by virtue of U.S. agriculture's ability to produce more crops on 

reduced acreage, a trend that will continue. 

With respect to key minerals, namely sulfur, potash and phosphate rock, supporting the world's 

largest and most productive agroindustry, the country is well-positioned to satisfy its needs from its own 

ample stocks in the case of sulfur and phosphate rock, or from a friendly foreign supplier, for example, 

Canada for potash, out to the year 2015. 

As a result of these developments, the men and women of the U.S. armed forces in the year 2015 

will be as well, or even better clothed and fed than those who have served before them. 

ENERGY 

Plentiful and inexpensive sources of energy have played a key role in making the United States 

the 20th century's economic and military powerhouse. For the first half of the century, the country 

developed while producing more energy than it consumed. In 1950 the United States produced almost 

34 quadrillion Btu of energy, while consuming 33 quads.' Since 1958, however, the United States has 

had to rely on foreign sources to satisfy its energy requirements in full. In 1989, it consumed 81 quads, 

or approximately 15 more quads than it produced. Twenty percent of U.S. energy in 1989 originated 

in foreign countries: natural gas in Canada and, most important, crude oil in various countries, primarily 

Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Mexico, Canada, and Venezuela. 

Without the desire or wherewithal to substitute other energy sources or to export commodities 

of equivalent value, the United States has gradually consumed its way into a position of vulnerability and 

'A "quad" (1 quadrillion British thermal units) is a standard unit used in comparing large amounts 

of energy. One quad is roughly equivalent to 1 year's worth of oil used at the rate of 500,000 barrels 

a day. 
potential economic and national insecurity. The projection-is that the trend drivers, high foreign oil 

imports and failure to identify, produce and sell equivalent value export commodities, will proceed apace. 

With the exception of nuclear energy, which came on stream in 1957, for the past century the 

United States has relied on the burning of fossil fuels to satisfy most of its energy needs (85 percent in 

1990). Throughout the century, coal, oil and gas have vied with each other as the predominant fuel in 

domestic production: coal in 1949-51 and again in 1982 and 1984-89; in the interim first crude oil and 

then natural gas dominated. In terms of consumption, however, oil has been the predominant energy 

source since 1950. Unfortunately, in the forecast period, the U.S. economy will become even more 

dependent upon fossil fuels than it was in 1990, with attendant negative economic and environmental 

consequences. Some portion of two of the three primary fossil fuels will have to be imported, much of 

it from politically and economically unstable areas. 

Because oil is and will remain in the forecast period the primary source of energy for the United 

States and the U.S. Army, it is appropriate that the study of individual mineral fuels begins here. 

Although used since ancient times, oil as an industry began in 1859 when the first commercial 

well was drilled in western Pennsylvania. Over the years Americans have tended to view inexpensive 

and plentiful oil and its most important derivative, gasoline, as a kind of birthright. (In 1990 bottled 

water in some supermarkets was more expensive than gasoline.) Regrettably, each succeeding generation 

of consumers has been passing on to the next a greatly shrunken reservoir of domestic oil. Crude oil 

reserves stood at 44 billion barrels in 1970; 26.5 billion in 1990. While it is always difficult to predict 

reserves with any precision, if trends continue by 2015 U.S. proved reserves of crude oil may be down 

to about 14 billion barrels, the equivalent of about two years of national consumption. 

In 1990 about 42 percent of the oil consumed in the United States was imported, 24 

percent of which came from OPEC countries. By 2015, the United States is likely to be importing 

between 55 to 70 percent of its petroleum demand. Much of the imported oil will come from Middle 

Eastern countries, whose share of world reserves in the period is projected to increase substantially, as 

production and new discoveries slip elsewhere. Production in the Soviet Union, in 1990 the world's 

largest producer of crude oil, peaked in 1988 and has started what many analysts believe will be a long 

and steady decline. In February 1991, Pravda reported that the Soviet Union will become a net importer 

of oil as early as 1993 if trends continue. For the United States, the energy picture, in contrast to the 

food outlook, is distressing primarily because oil is and will remain the lifeblood of our highly mobile, 

automobile-based economy, society and culture. In 1990 about 35 percent of the world's registered 

vehicles were in operation on U.S. roads, most of which are asphalt, another petroleumderived product. 

Much of the American way of life is dependent on the future availability and low price of a single 

commodity: oil and critical by-products. Petroleum feedstocks for the petrochemical industry, whose 

importance for defense purposes will increase as advanced materials and composites develop, are 
projected to rise by 67 percent over the next 25 years. 

TABLE 1 

ESTIMATED PROVED RESERVES OF OIL (1970 and 1989) 

11 (billion bbl.) 11 Rank I Rank 

11 3. 1 Iran 

1. 

2. 

11 4. 1 USSR 1 55.0 1 92.2 

11 5. 1 U.S. 14.0 191.9 

Saudi Arabia 

Kuwait 

11 8. I Indonesia 1 18.0 1 54.1 

138.0 

68.0 

6. 

7. 

11 9. 1 Venezuela 1 14.0 1 26.5 

169.9 

100.0 

Iraq 

Abu Dhabi 

Saudi Arabia 1 1- 

1 

Abu Dhabi 1 4- 

27.5 

18.0 

Kuwait 1 5. 

58.5 

58.0 

10. 

m Venezuela 

Mexico 1 8. 

Mexico 

U.S. 1 9. 

I 

China I 8.0 10. 

11 Middle East Proved Oil Reserves (1989 percentage of world total): 58. [2] 

23.5 

The strategic nature of oil was first highlighted in 1975 when the Strategic Petroleum Reserve 

(SPR) was created and filling of cavernous salt domes in the southwest began. Before President Bush 

authorized the release of stocks from the SPR in 1991, there were about 580 million barrels in the 

reserve; it is projected to increase to 750 million barrels by 2000 and ultimately hold up to 1 billion 

barrels (at current consumption rates, a scant two-month supply). In DOE'S words, the SPR is a means 

"to effectively address shortrun oil market disruptions." [la 

Since it stopped relying on horsepower early in the 20th century, the U.S. Army has mostly used 

fossil fuels to power its land and air vehicles, warm its barracks, and generate electricity for its facilities. 

Until 1950, when the United States began to consume more oil than it produced, use of this fuel had 

marginal implications for national security. Despite intermittent murmuring on behalf of Texas 

independence, fuel supplies to the civilian and military sectors were safe and secure. 

In the period under analysis, the U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Army will continue to rely for 
the most part on forms of transportation powered by petroleumderived products. The expectation is that 

the primary elements of future ground force weaponry, for example, tanks, armored personnel carriers, 

helicopters, and self-propelled artillery mounts, will probably be larger, heavier, faster, and more lethal 

than their predecessors, consuming greater inputs of fuel, ammunition and spare parts. 

The analysis of resources is inseparable from the assessment of the future geopolitical situation. 

The Middle East will continue to be one of the world's most volatile and unpredictable regions, a region 

in which substantial U.S. military forces are likely to be based and engaged in hostilities periodically. 

Eventually the conservative autocratic regimes of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates 

will be replaced with new leadership, who may or may not be compatible with American national 

interests and values. 

In 1961 and 1991 British and American and allied forces were committed to the Persian Gulf to 

rescue Kuwait, in the first instance threatened by its neighbor Iraq and thirty years later invaded, occupied 

and ravaged by that country. Since 1950 there have been four major wars and numerous international 

crises in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, a region destined to function as the world's de facto 

strategic petroleum reserve. As the world's foremost economic and military power into the next century, 

the United States inevitably will be engaged in safeguarding the production and distribution of Middle 

East oil. 

President Jimmy Carter characterized the energy crises of the 1970's as the "moral equivalent of 

war" and, despite the ridicule and scorn this statement engendered, he and his administration acted 

accordingly: the Department of Energy was set up in 1977; minimum fuel and electric effkiency 

requirements were mandated; and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve began to be filled. 

In 1990 the energy crisis (in the form of Iraq's actual and threatened hostile takeover of two 

countries with the largest proved reserves of oil) was transformed from the moral equivalent of war into 

the real thing. Thousands of lives were sacrificed and billions of dollars and dinars were spent, first by 

Iraq seizing and then by the United States liberating Kuwait and protecting Saudi Arabia. Coincidentally, 

in 1991 during the Persian Gulf war the Department of Energy released the National Energy Strategy, 

designed to ensure an adequate supply of energy to meet United States future needs to the year 2015 and 

beyond. Initial analysis of the strategy indicates an emphasis on market forces and incentives, expansion 

of nuclear capacity, and modest increases in alternate fuels and renewable energy sources. In terms of 

potential, it fails to recognize and exploit fully two of the most readily available sources of energy: 

conservation and recycling or secondary use of resources. 

In the forecast period, the assessment is that no segment of U.S. society will be able to consume 

energy at current rates without jeopardizing the country's economic and environmental health. Instead 

it is expected that the Federal 'gavernrnent and the armed forces in particular will be called upon to 

undergo an environmental and ecological conversion in attitudes toward resource use and re-use. 

Natural Gas 
Even though the United States became a net importer-of natural gas in 1958, the outlook for this 

fossil fuel is much brighter than for oil. In the forecast period, the United States will increase domestic 

production of natural gas, but not at a pace to keep up with projected consumption. Net imports are 

projected to double from 1.3 trillion cubic feet in 1990 (7 percent of consumption) to about 3 trillion 

cubic feet in 2015 (14 percent). 

In the forecast period, most of U.S. imported gas will continue to come from Canada, a reliable 

source. Over the next 20 years, the price of natural gas is projected to rise to a point where imports from 

Mexico are expected to come on stream. 

In terms of national security and compared to oil, natural gas is not considered a critical or 

strategic material. The U.S. armed forces are not major users of natural gas. It satisfied just 6.6 percent 

of defense energy requirements in 1990, down from 7.6 percent in 1980. 

Coal is the one fossil fuel of which the United States has an ample supply, taking into account 

every production/consumption scenario. In contrast to both oil and natural gas, in the forecast period 

domestic coal production will continue to outstrip consumption. Coal exports will increase significantly, 

although not nearly rapidly enough to compensate for mounting imports of oil and natural gas. 

While still a cause for concern, the negative environmental consequences of coal mining and 

production and its consumption as a fuel in electricity generation are expected to be mitigated by 

production breakthroughs (clean coal technology) in the forecast period. 

Overall, coal's share in primary energy consumption of fuels is projected to increase from 22 

percent in 1990 to about 28 percent in 2015. 

Uranium 

As a basic material for commercial nuclear power and plutonium for nuclear weapons, uranium 

is a doubly strategic material. Since 1982, the United States has been a net importer of uranium. In 

1988, the United States continued to lead the world in the production of uranium, but imported ore 

accounted for 96 percent of total U.S. production. Although the United States has adequate domestic 

supplies of uranium to satisfy its requirements for both purposes in the forecast period, price advantages, 

as in the case of iron ore mining and processing, have led the industry to buy mined uranium abroad, 

primarily from Canada. 

In the forecast period, the share of nuclear power for total electric generation is projected to 

decline from 20 percent in 1990 to about 14 percent in 2015. No new nuclear power plants have been 

ordered since the Three Mile Island accident derailed the program in 1978. Replacing older plants would 

require substantial inputs of generating capacity in the 2000-2020 timeframe, which appears unlikely 

owing to perceived safety and environmental impacts. The service lives of existing plants may be 
extended, which should slow the rate of decline. If operating experience with fission plants abroad (for 

example, France and Spain) continues to be satisfactory, public concern over safety and the environment 

can be satisfied by safer plant design, and the waste disposal problem is solved, the United States may 

once again turn to nuclear fission as a power source. Nuclear power plants will have to be cost-effective, 

however, to be acceptable to industry. 

Energy from nuclear fusion, cold or otherwise, so promising just a few months ago, according 

to the National Energy Strategy is now not expected to be commercially available until 2040. 

Oil Shale 

Depending upon the price and availability of the primary fossil fuels examined above and 

technology developments, oil extracted from extensive shale deposits in the United States may come into 

production and use in the forecast period. This should be viewed as a wild card at best, but one that 

would substantially reduce import dependency and redirect trend drivers in the United States' favor. 

Renewable Enerm Sources 

The major sources of renewable energy are hydropower, solar thermal, geothermal, ocean 

thermal, photovoltaics, wind, and biofuels. Biofuels include such categories as energy from trash and 

organic waste, sewer gas, wood, methanol and ethanol. 

In 1990 renewables accounted for about 7 percent of total energy consumed in the United States. 

By 2015 they are expected to increase to approximately 9 percent of total energy consumption. This 

figure could be considerably higher if incineration of municipal waste is selected as the optimal solution 

to the problem of shrinking landfill space and garbage disposal, or if states follow California's lead and 

legislate conversion of a portion of the fleet to methanol or ethanol fuels. 

Various regions of the United States will accelerate the development of such energy sources, and 

California in particular will break new ground in the widespread application of solar thermal, geothermal, 

biofuel, wind and possibly ocean thermal sources of energy. Wholesale application of such power 

sources in other parts of the country will be constrained by both the forces of inertia and nature. 

In concluding the analysis of the mineral fuels section, it is expected that in the forecast period 

the United States and its armed forces will continue to rely on fossil fuels to satisfy a diminishing, but 

still voracious appetite for energy. In 2015 power for land and air vehicles, for vessels, and for 

residential and commercial heat and air conditioning will come from traditional sources roughly in the 

following proportions: 
Figure 2. U.S. Energy Sources in 2015 (projected). [IS] 

OIL 

36 

Energy crises of the 1970's and the recession in the early 1980's so battered the mining and 

metals industry that articles appeared announcing the "death of mining" in the United States. The rebound 

in the second half of the 1980's proved once again that death reports can be greatly exaggerated. 

Nevertheless, compared to its former dominance in mining and production of key minerals throughout 

the first half of the century, the U.S. metals industry has lost much of its luster. With one or two minor 

exceptions, molybdenum and magnesium for example, the industry's competitiveness has slipped in the 

global marketplace, and import reliance has climbed for many critical minerals and materials. As 

additional critical materials move up the import reliance scale and join the ranks of columbium, chromium 

and platinum, it is expected that this trend will continue in the forecast period. 

There are more than one hundred commodities in the nonfuel minerals category. United States 

prospects vary considerably by subcategory. Overall the future does not look as bright as for food and 

water, nor as distressing as the prospects for mineral fuels. In a sense, the U.S. nonfuel commodities 

hopper is either half empty or half full. 

Prospects are best for the group of nonmetallic minerals because estimated U.S. primary 

production into the next century is projected to equal or exceed forecast primary demand for more than 

half the commodities listed. Some of these minerals are boron, sulfur, and chlorine. The opposite trend 

is forecast for the group of metals and mineral-forming elements. If estimates are on target, U.S. 

primary production will equal demand for just 20 percent of the commodities listed and fall far short for 

such essential defense-related metals as aluminum, cadmium, gallium, gold, silver, nickel, tungsten, and 

vanadium. Thus, as one of the most metals-intensive sectors of the economy, the U.S. defense and 

associated high-technology industries will be confronted with a half empty or three quarters empty nonfuel 

commodities hopper. 

The 1990 Statistical Abstract of the United States contains a table that lists 58 nonfuel minerals. 

Following a familiar pattern, for 42 of these commodities the United States consumes more than it 

produces. Despite the trend toward declining material intensity of use for most commodities in the 

United States, as recently as 1981 each American that year used more than 18,000 pounds of nonfuel 

COAL 

27 

NAT 

GAS 

22 

NUCLEAR/ 

OTHER 15 
minerals. In 1991, owing to the war in the Persian Gulf, per capita indices for the armed forces will 

surely be much higher. 

Although import reliance may vary considerably from year to year or be withheld to avoid 

disclosure, the trend for some key minerals is disquieting. For fourteen commodities, for example, 

import reliance ranges between 90-100 percent. These are arsenic, bauxite (from which aluminum is 

made), cesium, columbium, graphite, gem stones, manganese, mica, rubidium, strontium, thallium, 

diamond (industrial), asbestos, and fluorspar. In the next part of this study the future criticality and 

availability of some of these minerals and other key materials on the list of strategic materials will be 

considered (see Fig. 3). 

STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS 

Prompted to respond to a war or national emergency, the United States has prudently established 

fuel and nonfuel mineral stockpiles to ensure adequate supplies in time of crisis. The Strategic Petroleum 

Reserve was created in response to a crisis in the supply of oil. Similarly, the United States by law 

maintains a stockpile of strategic and critical materials that are 1) not found or produced in the United 

States in sufficient quantity, and 2) required to supply military, industrial and essential civilian needs in 

a national defense emergency. As of January 1990 there were 94 commodities in the National Defense 

Stockpile (NDS), which was transferred in 1988 from the General Services Administration to the 

Department of Defense. 
U.S. Net Import Reliance for Minerals and Metals as a 

Percentage of Apparent Consumption in 1990 

I Arsenic 

I Cesium bollucite) 

Columbium (niobium)" 

Graphite* 

Manganese* 

I Strontium 

I Thallium* 

I Fluorspar 

Chromium* 

I Tin* I Tungsten* 

I Stone (dimension) 

Cadmium* 

- . . 

Major Sources (1 986-89) 

France, Sweden, Chile, Mexico 

Canada 

Brazil, Canada, Germany 

Mexico, China, Brazil 

RSA, Gabon, France 

India, Belgium, France, Brazil 

Canada 

Mexico, Germany, Spain 

Belgium, U.K., Germany, France 

Jamaica, Australia, Guinea 

Belgium, Israel, India, RSA 

Ireland, U.K., RSA, Zaire 

Canada, RSA 

Mexico, RSA, Spain, China 

RSA, USSR, U.K. 

Thailand, Germany, Brazil 

Zaire, Zambia, Canada, Norway 

Canada, Norway, Australia 

RSA, Turkey, Zimbabwe 

Brazil, China, Malaysia 

China, Bolivia, Germany, Peru 

Italy, Spain, Canada, Taiwan 

China, India, Mexico, Morocco 

Canada, Israel, USSR, Germany 

China, RSA, Mexico, Hong Kong 

Canada, Australia, Mexico, Germany 

RSA-Republic of South Africa. Asterisk indicates material with major military applications. 

Data on some materials such as germanium and zircon are not disclosed. 

Fig. 3 
TABLE 2. 

COMMODITIES IN THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE STOCKPILE 

ALUMINUM 

BAUXITE 

ANTIMONY 

ASBESTOS 

BERYLLIUM 

BISMUTH 

CADMIUM 

CASTOR OIL 

CHROMITE 

COBALT 

COLUMBIUM 

COPPER 

CORDAGE 

DIAMOND 

FEATHERS AND DOWN 

FLUOROSPAR 

GRAPHITE 

IODINE 

JEWEL BEARINGS 

LEAD 

MANGANESE 

MERCURY 

MICA 

MOLYBDENUM 

NICKEL 

OPIUM 

PLATINUM GROUP 

PYRETHRUM 

QUARTZ CRYSTALS 

QUINIDINE 

QUININE 

RUBBER 

RUTILE 

SAPPHIRE/RUBY 

SILICON CARBIDE 

SILVER 

TALC 

TANTALUM 

THORIUM NITRATE 

TIN 

TITANIUM SPONGE 

TUNGSTEN 

VANADIUM 

VEGETABLE TANNIN 

ZINC 

Note: As of 1/1/90 there were 94 commodities in the SDS. 

Only 45 are listed because the remaining items are forms 

of these commodities. For example, there are seven items 

listed under chromite and chromium and nine under 

manganese. [14] 

Aside from steel, aluminum and lead, there are at least 30 metals of critical importance to the 

U.S. military and the army. After all, weapons and materiel are largely manufactured of metal. In 

varying degrees these include metals from six major categories: base metals; steel industry metals; light 

metals; precious metals; platinum group metals; and electronic metals. 

In the next part of this study prospects for production, consumption and availability of these 

metals to the year 2015 are studied. Especially critical materials will be treated individually; in some 

cases materials will be examined as a group. 

Three of the most important minerals for national defense and associated high-technology industry 

are and should remain chromium, titanium, and cobalt. 
Chromium 

The United States Army War College (USAWC) has devised an index to assess the relative 

vulnerability of the United States with respect to strategic materials. Heading it and most lists of strategic 

materials is chromium, with the highest USAWC Vulnerability Index rating (34). The United States 

stockpiles and will continue to stockpile substantial reserves of chromium for compelling reasons: since 

1960, with the exception of a small amount in 1976, no chromite has been produced in the US.; U.S. 

foreign dependence ranges between 70 and 90 percent and imports come from four suppliers, the 

Republic of South Africa and Zimbabwe, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Chromium has five major military 

uses (ammunition, armor plate, gun barrels, jet engines and stainless steel); and there are no fully 

satisfactory substitutes for most military applications of chromium. 

The assessment is that since much of the world supply of chromite is concentrated in unstable or, 

until recently, traditionally hostile host countries, South Africa and the Soviet Union, stockpiling of this 

ferroalloy will continue to be a national priority in the forecast period. 

The primary mineral sources for titanium are rutile and ilmenite. Sponge metal is made from 

rutile and both elements are included in the NDS. 

In contrast to many minerals, titanium use in the U.S. economy and military is expected to grow 

at a relatively high rate in the forecast period. In the form of titanium dioxide, it will continue to be used 

as pigment for coatings, paints, ceramics, and fiberglass. Because of titanium's high strength to weight 

ratio, as a metal it will remain an important construction component in aerospace manufacturing and 

marine equipment. Consumption may increase substantially if a national commitment is undertaken to 

develop hypersonic air transport, expand the fleet of strategic bombers, or deploy one or more U.S. space 

stations. 

Most of the world's rutile, which is 95 percent titanium dioxide, is produced in four countries: 

the Republic of South Africa, Australia, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone. Titanium slag is imported by the 

United States from Canada. 

On the USAWC's index, titanium was assigned a value of 20, ranking in the middle of eleven 

minerals. The major supplier countries were listed as Canada and Australia, which mitigates the level 

of vulnerability, as these countries are deemed friendly reliable suppliers. The assessment is that these 

two countries will remain important allies in the forecast period. 

Platinum Grou~ Metals (Po 

Six metals make up the platinum group: platinum, palladium, rhodium, ruthenium, iridium, and 

osmium. Most of the world's supply of PGM comes from just two countries: South Africa and the Soviet 
Union. In the forecast period, political uncertainty and poter&l revolutionary forces in those countries 

could cause disruptions in the supply of these and other critical materials concentrated there. After 

chromium, PGM with a score of 32 were second on the USAWC's vulnerability list. 

PGM consumption could greatly exceed projections if, for example, Eastern Europe and the 

Soviet Union switch to unleaded gasoline (platinum for catalytic converters) or if the experimental 

technology of fuel cells is developed by 2015. 

Because of their importance in electrical, electronic, and chemical processing applications, two 

PGM, rhodium and ruthenium were among four materials on the Secretary of Defense's list of 

recommended additions to the NDS in 1989. 

Cobalt 

Cobalt, another stockpiled material, has broad application in high-technology industries such as 

telecommunications and aerospace, as well as significant military uses for jet engines and superalloys. 

For its primary cobalt consumption, the United States is 100 percent dependent on foreign sources, 

deriving about equal shares from one politically stable and reliable source, Canada, and two 

comparatively unstable sources, Zaire and Zambia. 

Stocks of cobalt have been increased in response to political turmoil in southern Africa. In 

general, centrally planned economies and southern Africa produce about 75 percent of the world's supply 

of four critical minerals: chromium; platinum group; cobalt; and manganese. In fact South Africa has 

been called the "nonfuel minerals Saudi Arabia" (see Fig. 4). In the forecast period, the assessment is 

that other strategic material stocks may need to be augmented as instability and turmoil continue to buffet 

these areas. Assuming stability in Brazil, that country should continue to be an important source of 

critical materials (columbium, mica, and manganese, for example) to U.S. defense and high technology 

industries. 

Manranese 

The United States was 100 percent dependent on foreign sources for its apparent consumption of 

750,000 short tons in 1990. Five countries were the major suppliers of ore: Gabon, Brazil, Australia, 

Republic of South Africa, and France. There are no effective substitutes for manganese in its primary 

applications: steel production, dry cell batteries, plant fertilizers, and animal feed. 

RESOURCES FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 

Under no plausible scenario will U.S. society or its armed forces in the forecast period dispense 

altogether with such traditionally critical resources as rubber, steel, lead, or aluminum. It is probable, 
however, that in the next 25 years, in relative terms, these resources will decline in importance compared 

to resources required as basic building blocks in emerging technologies, specifically composites and 

advanced materials. 

For example, as they have for centuries, it is expected that metals will be a primary agent of 

lethality in some 21st century weapons. And yet it is also envisioned that in the forecast period a 

situation in which non-metallic lethal, or even non-lethal, agents will be used to neutralize an enemy. 

These may be anesthetic or particle-beam "phaser" weapons. 

Here again the U.S. outlook is cloudy. On the one hand, with its petrochemical industry, the 

United States has a powerful and well developed base to remain on the cutting edge of innovations in the 

field of polymers of almost any kind: ceramic, metallic or organic polymers. On the other hand, as an 

intense user of energy and petroleum feedstocks, the industry will accelerate the tempo of increasing 

dependence on foreign energy suppliers. 

It is likely that high-techology hardware of the future will carry a higher percentage of material 

of the rare earth metals (thorium, yttrium, cerium) group. Fortunately, the United States in 1990 was 

a leading producer and processor of rare earths and was a major exporter and consumer of rare earth 

products. In relative terms, the U.S. position is stronger in this group in the forecast period. 
WORLD PRODUCTION FOR 

FOUR CROUIGAL MINERALS 1883 

CHROMIUM COBALT 

MANGANESE PLATINUM GROUP 

CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES AND SOUTHERN 

AFRICA PRODUCE ABOUT 75% OF THE WORLD'S 

SUPPLY OF FOUR CRITICAL MINERALS 
ELECTRONIC METALS 

When it comes to warfare, resources often determine not only where an army will fight (e.g., 

oil in the Persian Gulf), but also how it will fight (germanium in night vision devices and infrared target 

acquisition). If the Gulf War is any indication of warfare to come, and it is believed to be, in terms of 

future applications, the electronic group of metals, among which are silicon, cadmium, gallium, 

germanium, and tantalum, will largely determine how effectively the future U.S. Army wages war. 

TABLE 3. 

METALS IN ELECTRONIC APPLICATIONS [7] 

Copper* 

Cobalt* 

Columbium (Niobium) * 

Platinum Group 

Metals* 

Gold and Silver* 

Silicon* 

Cadmium and Mercury* 

Gallium 

Germanium* 

Selenium 

Tellurium 

Tantalum* 

Indium 

Electrical wiring 

Magnetic data-storage devices 

Superconducting computers and 

transmission lines (potential) 

Electrical contacts, multilayer 

capacitors, production crucibles 

Electroplating, wiring, capacitors 

Semiconductors and photovoltaic cells 

Batteries 

Gallium-arsenide electro-optical devices 

solar energy conversion devices 

Infrared and fiber optics, infrared 

light transmission windows 

Photoreceptors in electrophotographic 

copiers 

Infrared sensing materials (mercury 

cadmium-tellurium compounds) 

Capacitors 

Solder, solar cells, optical coatings 

*indicates commodity in the Strategic Defense Stockpile 

Consequently, the production, consumption, and availability of these minerals will be of keen 

interest to the United States and its armed forces. High-technology and defense industries will rely on 

these metals to make "smart" weapons "brilliant." In the next generation of computers, missiles, and 

helicopters, semiconductors, superconductors, and wafers manufactured of these materials will largely 

shape success or failure on the battlefield. 

In this group, five of nine metals are in the NDS. These are silicon, cadmium, germanium, 

tantalum, and indium. Most estimates indicate that the U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Army will invest 

a greater proportion of budgetary outlays and boost their share of consumption of these metals as 

components in a myriad of electronics devices. 
As one of the most abundant minerals in the earth's crust, silicon is not expected to pose a 

problem in terms of supply. In 1990 the U.S. relied on friendly reliable foreign sources for 30 percent 

of its apparent consumption. Gallium arsenide and germanium are acceptable substitutes for silicon in 

semiconductor and infrared applications. It should be noted that the reverse is not true, namely silicon 

is not an acceptable substitute for gallium arsenide-base integrated circuits in many defense-related 

applications. Although there is currently an oversupply of gallium in the world and it is not a stockpiled 

commodity, it may join the stockpile in the forecast period as applications increase. 

The other four stockpiled metals in this group are cadmium, germanium, tantalum, and indium. 

As computer and electronics technology forge ahead in such fields as artificial intelligence, these metals 

will constitute a larger share in defense-essential components, and their proportion in the stockpile should 

increase accordingly. 

On the subject of the National Defense Stockpile, in the forecast period, there will be some 

significant changes in both the size and composition of the NDS. Some stockpiled resources are based 

on World War I1 and Korean War requirements: talc, down and feathers, for example. The statutory 

requirement is to strive for the accumulation of a supply adequate to fight a three-year war. Modernizing 

the NDS may mean introducing a greater degree of flexibility in terms of duration, lengthening the 

requirements for some, while shortening them for others. 

Overall, throughout the forecast period the NDS is expected to continue to be an essential means 

of forestalling disruptions in the supply of key minerals and materials. 

NONCONVENTIONAL RESOURCES: "Global Commons" 

The U.S. Armed Forces and Army will operate less and less in an insulated or isolated 

environment, both in terms of their role within U.S. society and internationally. That is to say, as the 

quality of key common resources deteriorates, specifically air and water quality or the ozone layer, more 

attention will be focused on the armed forces' impact on their surroundings, the environmental health of 

land and water resources near its bases or production facilities. But the armed forces may not only be 

part of the problem, they might also become part of the solution. This might involve both technical and 

human resources. In particular, defense assets, satellites or submersibles, might be used to identify 

environmental or energy-related problems (e.g., acid rain deposition, ozone depletion, build-up of 

greenhouse gases, undersea energy or mineral resources) and help to resolve or exploit them. It is 

possible that the U.S. military will become involved in such international issues as the allocation of space 

in near-earth orbit; leasing, rental or donation of military space technology for global environmental or 

energy projects. 

It is likely that the armed forces will become more involved in waste management to a much 

greater extent than in the past. Budgeteers have tended to think of nuclear weapons' costs as relatively 

short-term expenses. In the process the problems and expense of safe storage and disposal of radioactive 
waste were marginalized. In the forecast period the united States is likely to face staggering costs 

associated not only with the design and manufacture of new weapons, but also with the after effects of 

disposing of radioactive waste from weapons long retired from the arsenal. 

In terms of resource conservation and recycling, it is expected that U.S. government and the 

armed forces of the future will no longer have license to consume resources in the vast quantities they 

have in the past. Government and defense expenditures for and consumption of energy and metals will 

be examined more closely. These developments will affect the individual soldier's training and service. 

In the forecast period, it is possible that the missions of the armed forces or a national service cadre will 

include performing environmental protection or resource management and conservation work on land or 

at sea. Then in addition to the BLUE and RED teams, there will be GREEN teams. In fact, it would 

not be surprising to see the U.S. Army before the year 2000 devoting as much time and effort to 

recycling and conservation of resources as it does in 1991 to physical fitness. 

Should some critical land-based resources become scarce in the forecast period, the United States, 

alone or more likely as part of an international consortium, might spearhead an effort to exploit the 

enormous mineral riches of the seas, in particular mining nodules on the ocean floor. But exploration 

and exploitation would be conducted and managed with an unprecedented degree of responsibility and 

foresight, perhaps with U.S. Navy expertise and equipment. 

As it enters the 21st century, and as other individual countries' roles diminish, the United States 

will likely assume greater responsibility not just for the physical security of large areas of the planet, but 

for the health of the global environment as well. This responsibility will be at least commensurate with 

the impact its economy, industry, and military has on the planet's common resources. 

SUMMARY OF PROJECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 

Research and analysis of resource trends to 2015 leads to the conclusion that production, 

consumption, and availability of resources will continue to define to a great extent the position of the 

United States and its armed forces in the world. Fortunately, the outlook for such critical commodities 

as food, water and medicine and associated industries is relatively favorable. Nationally, there is no 

expectation of population-based developments bearing excessive pressure on these resources. Regionally, 

parts of the sunbelt may have to devise creative and expensive solutions to ensure adequate supplies of 

water and electricity in the forecast period. 

The fuels picture is not nearly so reassuring. Trend drivers point to growing dependence on 

foreign suppliers for the U.S. fuel of choice: oil. New domestic finds for replenishment are not in the 

ofing. Stability of the Middle East, the region with the largest proven reserves, is also unlikely to 

solidify in the forecast period. Hence U.S. forces will likely be deployed there on a regular, if not 

permanent basis, to prevent OECD supply disruptions and protect what will become in the coming 

decades the world's de facto strategic petroleum reserve. 
Two recent and unexpected developments in the fuels area loom ominous. Should the countries 

of the now disbanded Warsaw Pact, with a population, area, and potential market larger than North 

America, be successful in their modernization efforts, the world's fuel and energy complex, and the 

global environment, will be subjected to enormous additional stress. Added to the pressures generated 

by similar efforts in the developing countries, this may trigger fierce competition among nations for 

access to a rapidly depleting oil supply. 

A wild card in this scenario would be a situation in which a reformed, democratic Soviet Union 

or Russia, with the West's assistance, finds and exploits huge new petroleum deposits, thus reducing the 

importance of Middle Eastern oil reserves for the global economy. The surplus, probably from Siberia, 

would then be exported to the West and United States in return for high-technology imports. 

Less likely is rapid progress toward alternate fuels or futuristic non-conventional power packs for 

transportation (hydrogen-powered vehicles, for example). Just a handful of corporations or corporate 

nations own and control most of the petroleum/automotive mega-industry. Revolutionary efforts on their 

part are not anticipated any time soon to reduce the developed world's dependence on oil and gasoline 

and the internal combustion engine. 

The army is not immune to this dependency. Far from it. It would be a pleasant surprise to 

learn that fuel consumption was a major consideration in the design and development of the next 

generation tank or helicopter. 

As a short-term national solution, stockpiling of petroleum will continue or even increase. 

Although leadership in this area is sorely needed, no forceful initiatives are expected to emerge from the 

White House or Congress equal to the challenge of reducing import dependency. Instead, communities 

at the state and local level will perforce expand conservation and recycling to cut costs for fuel and power 

and waste disposal. Federal agencies will then follow suit. 

As a result of declining ore grades and aging U.S. production facilities, import dependency for 

many nonfuel minerals will proceed apace. Because many critical materials and minerals originate in 

potentially unstable countries, namely the "High Africaw2 countries and the Soviet Union, the National 

Defense Stockpile and attendant legislation will continue to play a key role in guarding against disruptions 

that might emerge there. Less likely and less desirable would be troop deployments in southern Africa 

in support of friendly regimes and suppliers of critical resources. 

Again, a substantial potential reserve of critical materials exists and can be exploited if recycling 

and ingenuity is applied to the metal-working and scrap metal industries. American products by design 

are often excessively entrophic, that is, they meld too many intermixed virgin commodities to make 

recycling practical or economical. In the forecast period, it may become more profitable to recover 

minerals from discarded materials rather than produce them from scratch. 

The countries of "High Africa" are the mineral-rich southern African nations of Gabon, Zaire, 

Tanzania, Angola, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, the Republic of South Africa, and 

Mozambique. These countries contain over 40 major mineral districts. 
Finally, traditional solutions are expected to be employed to resolve U.S. resource-associated 

problems in the forecast period: stockpiling of fuel and critical minerals; substitution of one mineral for 

another (silcon in optic fibers for copper cable); technological breakthroughs on the margins to extend 

gas mileage or replace one fuel with another; and when all else fails the planning and execution of 

operations such as DESERT STORM. 

Unlikely but plausible is another approach, a Jules Verne scenario, in which truly revolutionary 

developments emerge to mitigate the impact of the major trends identified here with respect to resource 

problems. In this situation, by 2015 not only should American weapons be "smarter." American houses, 

cars and comrnerical buildings may only remotely resemble the dumb objects of today. Instead, an 

Edison-in-the-making will find a way to transform them into environmentally benign, thrifty consumers 

of energy. Some houses and buildings may actually export power to their neighbors. 

With computers and electronics, the new infrastructure of the United States, when it is built, will 

interact with those it serves. The roadbeds may be giant solar collectors that impart power to vehicles 

running on or above the surface of the highway. Roads with a surplus of sunshine might transmit 

electricity to roads in shaded regions. Ways might be found to harness and store for later use the power 

of atmospheric electrical charges. And the oceans covering most of the globe ultimately promise to yield 

a wealth of minerals, energy and fresh water. 

At the end of all the research and analysis there is one certainty. After studying more than 100 

different minerals and resources, a single resource can be identified as the most critical, most strategic 

material for the United States and the U.S. Army in the coming decades. More precious than gold, 

keener than a diamond, with no known substitute, the human brain, roughly three pounds of bundled 

fibers per issue, holds within it most if not all the answers to the questions this study has raised. Happily 

for the United States, no shortages of this resource are anticipated in the forecast period. In 2015 the 

U.S. will have about 900 million pounds of grey matter in circulation. Just how resourcefully and 

creatively the nation will use this critical material is the subject of the next study. 
SOURCES 

1. Bell, Daniel. "The World and the United States in 2013," Daedalus, 116, No. 3, Summer 1987, 1-31. 

2. Glasser, Martin (ed.). Global Resources: Challenges of Interdependence. New York: Praeger 

Publishers, 1983. 

3. International Petroleum Encyclopedia. Tulsa, Oklahoma: Pennwell, 1971, 1987, and 1990. 

4. Leontief, Wassily, et al. The Future of Nonfuel Minerals in the U.S. and World Economy: In~utOutDut Projections 1980-2030. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983. 

5. Malenbaum, Wilfred. "World Resources for the Year 2000," Annals of the American Academy of 

Political and Social Science, 408, July 1973, 30-45. 

6. Mikesell, Raymond. Nonfuel Minerals: Foreim Dependence and National Security. Ann Arbor: 

University of Michigan Press, 1987. 

7. National Academy of Sciences. National Research Council. Competitiveness of the U.S. Minerals 

and Metals in dust^. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1990. 

8. Pirages, Dennis. Global Technovolitics: The International Politics of Technolow and Resources. Palo 

Alto: BrooksICole, 1989. 

9. Simon, Julian, and Herman Kahn (eds.). The Resourceful Earth: A Response to Global 2000. New 

York: Basil Blackwell, 1984. 

10. Sutphin, David M., and Norman J. Page. International Strategic Minerals Invento~ Summarv Report: 

Platinum Group Metals. (United States Geological Survey Circular 930-E.) Denver, Colorado: United 

States Geological Survey, Books and Open-File Reports Section, 1986. 

11. Szuprowicz, Bohdan 0. How to Avoid Strategic Materials Shortages. New York: John Wiley and 

Sons, 1981. 

12. United States Congress. 97th, 2d Session. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials. National Defense Stockpile. (Hearings 

on H.R. 2603, H.R. 2784, H.R. 2912, and H.R. 3364; June 2 and 4, 1981 .) Washington, D.C.: GPO, 

1981. 

13. . Congress. lOlst, 1st Session. Office of Technology Assessment. Technolow and the American 

Economic Transition: Choices for the Future. (OTA-TET-283.) Washington, D.C. : GPO, May 1988. 

14. . Congress. lOlst, 2d Session. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. 

(Hearing on "The Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress on National Defense Stockpile 

Requirements," April 26, 1989.) Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1989. 
15. . Council on Environmental Quality. The Global 2000 Report to the President of the U.S., 

Entering; the 21st Centurv. Vols 1-3. New York: Pergamon Press, 1980. 

16. . Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 

1990. (1 10th ed.) Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990. 

17. - .Department of Energy. National Enerw Stratew Executive Summary. (1st ed.) Washington, 

D.C.: February 1991. 

18. . Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Annual Enernv Outlook 1990 with 

Pro-iections to 2010. (DOEEIA-0383, 90.) Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1990. 

19. . Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Annual Enerw Review 1989. 

(DOElEIA-0384, 89.) Washington, D.C.: 1990. 

20. - .Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Annual Outlook for U.S. Coal 

1990. @OE/EIA-0333, 90.) Washington, D.C.: 1990. 

21. - .Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Annual Outlook of Oil and Gas 

1990. (DOEIEIA-05 17, 90.) Washington, D.C. : 1990. 

22. . Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. U.S. Crude Oil. Natural Gas 

and Natural Gas Liauids Reserve. (DOEEIA-0216, 89.) Washington, D.C.: 1990. 

23. . Department of the Interior. Bureau of Mines. An Appraisal of Minerals Availability for 34 

Commodities. (Bulletin 682.) Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1987. 

24. . Department of the Interior. Bureau of Mines. The Domestic Supplv of Critical Materials. 

Washington, D.C., 1983. 

25. . Department of the Interior. Bureau of Mines. Mineral Trends and Forecasts. Washington, 

D.C., 1979. 

26. . Department of the Interior. Bureau of Mines. Minerals Information Office. Mineral 

Commodity Summaries. 1991. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991. 
KEY JUDGMENTS 

AMERICAN EDUCATION 

- Substantial reform of the education system is required to remain competitive. Reports of 

graduating functional illiterates and stagnating achievement levels have delivered a grim message to the 

public. 

- Public education will become a reflection of the increasing ethnic minority population. These 

minorities are traditionally considered at-risk: at greater risk of failing to achieve, of dropping out, of 

not being productive members of the labor force. 

- Demands on public education will continue to change, reflecting changes in American family 

structure. Social services, such as health care, family planning, day care, and drug counseling, once the 

domain of families, will increasingly become a part of the educational environment. 

- The federal government will contribute enthusiasm and vocal support, but the financial base 

will continue to rest with state and local governments. 

- Reforms in education are influenced by demographics, multiculturalism, contending 

bureaucracies, and new technologies. Reform proposals will include choice, decentralization of schools, 

national curriculum, national standards and tests, and performance-based assessments. Domestic political 

pressures, contending interest groups, and public opinion will challenge the reforms. 

- Corporate investment and apprenticeship programs will be seen in isolated areas. The cost 

of major reform will be too significant for the business world to bear. 

- Major changes in public education will not occur until the American public believes its future 

to be seriously threatened. Until that time, the hard political decisions will not be made. 

- The Army will not have a manpower pool equipped to be better cognitive thinkers and 

problem-solvers, hence more intensive training procedures will need to be implemented. 
AMERICAN EDUCATION IN 2015 

OVERVIEW 

"Education has consequences for the quality and equality of political and economic life that extend 

far beyond the individual student or the student's family." [I] 

Malaise has settled into the education system of the United States. United States students measure 

poorly in international comparisons of educational achievement. One of the consequences is that the 

United States has lost its competitiveness in the international economic arena. Changes in education are 

initiated in fits and starts, are incremental and slow, and by 2015, the necessary overhaul of the system 

will likely remain incomplete. It will take longer to see results. Reforms are challenged by domestic 

political pressures, contending interest groups, public opinion, and legal considerations. 

One of the problems facing education reform is the size of the education bureaucracy. In fact, 

various bureaucracies-state and national legislatures, governors, school boards, chief state school 

officers, higher educational institutions, teachers' unions, and foundations, influence education reforms 

either by advocating and promoting (some of) them, andlor impeding the changes. As state and local 

shares of school budgets have increased over the last few decades, so too have the number of state and 

local regulations. Federal regulations also have proliferated--most relating to increased federal grant 

programs. 

Demographic factors are a driver of change in education policy and programs. As minority 

populations increase to approximately two-thirds of public school enrollment by 2015, the politics of race 

versus multiculturalism will also become an issue in the debate over systemic reforms. According to its 

advocates, multicultural education (multiculturalism, which its critics distinguish from cultural pluralism) 

seeks to enrich students' knowledge of history and an appreciation of American diversity, with an 

understanding that we are one nation with a common set of political and moral values. The current focus 

of the multicultural debate challenges the Eurocentric focus of education (centered on the United States 

and the West, in terms of the social history of America), and seeks to incorporate Afrocentricism, a 

"particularistic" approach. As American society becomes more diverse, a more "pluralistic" approach 

will need to be considered. 

According to Pallas, Natriello, and McDill, the single most important factor in the school-age 

population of the future is the expected increase in both the number and proportion of traditionally 

disadvantaged young people. They identify five key indicators associated with educationally 

disadvantaged youth which correlate with poor performance in school: minority raciallethnic group 

identity, living in a poverty household, living in a single-parent family, having a poorly educated mother 

(usually the head of the household), and having a non-English language background. 

Children from disadvantaged backgrounds leave formal schooling with fewer cognitive skills and 
lower levels of cultural literacy than their more prosperous counterparts. Noncollege youth have been 

consistently overlooked and undertrained. Some of these youth enter military service, which can provide 

job training, experience, and time to mature. 

Although a uniform and accurate counting system for student dropouts does not exist, the fact 

remains that disadvantaged students are at a greater risk of dropping out. Minority students are more 

likely to be behind their modal grade (and subsequently drop out) than white students. In many large 

cities, where public education is dominated by minority populations, disadvantaged youth account for a 

large proportion of the dropout rate. Students in certain parts of the country are also at a greater risk 

of dropping out. The most common reason for dropping out is poor academic performance. 

Education reform in the late 1980s was directed at: designing education for the 21st century, 

organizing a system of lifelong learning, enriching and diversifying elementary and secondary education, 

improving and diversifying higher education, improving the quality of teachers, adapting to 

internationalization and the information age, and conducting a review of educational administration and 

finance. Education reforms address different concerns in rural areas. Many rural districts are 

disadvantaged because they have fewer resources--as a result of lower tax bases and a greater difficulty 

in recruiting and retraining teachers. Rural schools often lack a large enough student base to support 

diverse program offerings--including a limited ability to provide vocational programs. Where 

instructional staff is lacking, technology will fill in the gaps. Rural schoolchildren will also be expected 

to adhere to a national curriculum, take national examinations, and meet national standards. 

Multiculturalism will not be an issue. 

New technologies will render many careers obsolete by 2015. Our high schools turn out 

semiliterate young adults ill-equipped to deal with the technological world, frustrating the needs of the 

work force for better-prepared employees. The continuing shift from manufacturing to service industries 

will result in many jobs demanding high levels of technical knowledge and skill, and most will require 

welldeveloped social skills. The jobs that employ the greatest number of people will not require more 

than a high school education, and often less. Three types of skills traditionally not required of lowerlevel jobs are becoming more critical: a higher level of cognition and problem-solving; flexibility-- 

knowing how to perform a variety of tasks; and teamwork--including the capacity to resolve conflicts. 

Business and military leaders complain that they must spend millions of dollars on remedial education 

and training programs in such basic skills as reading, writing, spelling, and computations. In the future, 

the question of a course of study may be tied to a minimum outcome level, not a fixed number of years, 

and high school graduates will need more than good performance records on standardized tests. 

Most students realize few benefits from working hard while in school since the labor market in 

the United States, unlike other industrialized countries, does not reward effort and achievement in high 

school. mis may have some effect on the decline in test scores since students have little incentive to 

do well.) High school graduates in Canada, Japan, and Europe compete for attractive jobs on the basis 

of knowledge and skills gained in high school. Achievement tests are closely tied to the curriculum. 

Performance on these tests is the primary determinant of university admission, and to a particular field 
of study. Job applications at all levels require information about examination grades. These national 

examinations are yardsticks by which achievement is measured in terms relative to everyone else's in the 

nation. Mathematics and science achievement are regarded as especially important. In Germany, high 

school grades are the major determinant of who gets the most preferred apprenticeships. 

Parents in the United States hold their children and schools to a lower standard than do Japanese, 

Taiwanese, and European parents. Students in the United States spend less time receiving instruction, 

studying, and doing homework, and more time watching television, than do students in other 

industrialized nations. 

The distinction between national and federal will continue. The move towards a national 

curriculum, national performance standards and assessments, national achievements, and national teacher 

certification will be distinguished from federal intervention. The major responsibility of the federal 

government will be in legislative and judicial matters and as a cheerleader and bully pulpit in influencing 

the conduct of education. National goals (a federal mandate) will continue to be established in order to 

keep the United States from falling further behind in the international arena. The federal government will 

target pilot programs, initiatives, and assistance for handicapped, disadvantaged, and at-risk youth. State 

and local funding will continue to predominate in operations (program). 

David T. Kearns, CEO of Xerox (and Deputy Secretary of Education designate), has called for 

the complete restructuring of public education in the United States. Kearns believes that since education 

interests have failed to improve the school system, it is up to the business community, which understands 

competition and market discipline, to set the new agenda. 

Kearns advocates improving schools by hiring better teachers and paying them more, 

strengthening the curriculum, improving tests and measures, and expecting more of students. It is 

imperative that school districts confront the realities of the twenty-first century--and rid themselves of 

nineteenth-century organizational bureaucracies--by emulating successful companies that are decentralized, 

relying on the know-how and professionalism of workers close to the problem, being flexible, and 

spending heavily on employee education, training, and investment in research. 

As a result of The National Commission on Excellence in Education report, A Nation at Risk: 

The Im~erative for Educational Reform (1983), there have been some modest advances on the education 

front. The minimum requirements for graduation from high school have been raised in almost all states. 

The states that lengthened the school day have witnessed an increase in test scores--a questionable 

criterion of success when 25 percent of high school graduates remain functionally illiterate. Mathematics 

and science curricula have received more attention and have enrolled more students. These reforms raise 

new areas of concern--for example, how do additional requirements serve the needs of disadvantaged 

students? 

Over the last few decades, federal spending on education has declined (taking into account 

inflation), while state and local expenditures have increased. The primary provider of education revenues 

is local government. Improvements in the education system cost money: a longer school daylyear, 

increased graduation requirements, significantly reduced class size (a primary influence on achievement), 
a better evaluation system, more staff development, and technological assistance. 

Spending more money, however, is not enough; the public education system must be overhauled. 

In particular, the federal government must be in the vanguard of funding and developing national 

assessments that are performance-based. In fiscal 1990, only a small proportion of the education budget 

(approximately $100 million of about $24 billion) was spent on promoting accountability for school 

performance. Currently, the federal government does not make its support contingent on performance or 

state and local innovations; choice aims to make schools accountable. 

THE SCHOOL OF THE FLPIZTRE 

Choice 

In the late 1980s, the issue of school choice came into focus. Supported by the presidency and 

Department of Education, choice involves legal, political, economic, and educational issues. Choice is 

a market-oriented reform--parents and students can choose which educational "market" they want to 

attend--that relies on school-based management (decentralization) to hold schools accountable for their 

own performance. School choice issues include: public or private schools, vouchers or tuition tax 

credits, interdistrict and intradistrict choice, magnet schools, post-secondary options, second-chance 

programs, and home schooling. 

Choice advocates say that market control will reduce the constraining education bureaucracy 

(already cited as a burden to improved performance), make the relationship between schools and 

democratic authorities much less prone to excessive regulation and inadequate accountability, and result 

in closer and more cooperative relationships among schools, students, and parents. All these 

developments will promote (and hopefully raise) student achievement. A school either improves or goes 

out of business. As a method of improving public education--via competition for students and the 

empowerment of parents by involving them more in their children's education--choice has received 

political and popular support, academic and media approval. 

Public school choice is an issue for state legislatures, and by 1990, was on the legislative agenda 

of half the states. Advocates say that public school choice does not require large-scale federal 

appropriations. According to Lorraine McDonnell, however, magnet schools are 10 to 12 percent more 

expensive to run than traditional schools; some specialty schools are even more costly to operate. And, 

funding for transportation may be required at the state level. 

Choice advocates view public school choice as an equalizer--a means to foster racial integration-- 

though critics fear resegregation. Disadvantaged minorities generally do not transfer from inner city to 

suburban schools. Some choice plans have judicial restrictions--choice is not an option where it tends 

to segregate and discriminate against populations. 

Advocates also argue that different children perform better in different learning environments--and 
that one should be able to choose that which best meet one's needs. Often, however, choice does not 

involve specific educational programs or achievement records, but rather services--whether a school offers 

day care or a strong athletic program. Choice is also more likely to be exercised in heavily populated 

areas with greater access to public transportation. 

Choice advocates Kearns and Doyle propose that all public school districts with more than 2,500 

students reorganize into voluntary year-round magnet systems that would offer open enrollment around 

academic or vocational specialties. Year-round schools will allow for maximum coordination between 

work and school, and strengthen the ties between the business and education communities. Participating 

schools will have incentives, entrepreneurship, unit-level accountability, and consumer responsiveness 

reminiscent of the private sector, but with universal access, minimum outcome standards, performance 

tracking, and the fiscal arrangements of a lightly regulated public sector enterprise. The state would 

prescribe minimum standards and ensure that all students are placed. 

Former Department of Education Assistant Secretary for Research and Improvement, Chester 

Finn, has said that under the system of choice, the distinction between "public" and "private" will blur. 

Voucher plans, under which states allow the use of tax revenues to pay for education in public, private, 

and parochial schools will facilitiate this "blurring". This will be a contentious political issue with regard 

to the constitutionality of the separation of church and state. It is also unlikely that lower income families 

will be able to afford private schools even with vouchers. 

Critics are also concerned about the quality of information and whether adequate information 

about programs, personnel, and performance would be forthcoming so that parents could make informed 

choices about schools (well-educated and middle and upper class parents are more likely to make better 

choices than the economically disadvantaged). Critics also fear that some education markets might 

support too few competitors to realize market advantages. Further, schools might not select economically 

disadvantaged students--they cost more to educate and financial resources are not necessarily equal. 

If choice is not exercised to a significant degree in states where it is an option, it is unlikely that 

choice will continue to be pursued at the federal level. By 2015, choice advocacy will be limited by a 

(likely) lack of the exercise of choice and its added costs. If, however, a significant level of choice is 

exercised, and, as a result, achievement levels raised and better societal integration evidenced as a 

byproduct of that option, it is likely that choice will become a nationally legislated norm. Better school 

accountability and performance as a byproduct of choice, resulting in a more functionally literate and 

"smarter" student body, will have a positive impact. Success in raising achievement levels as a result 

of public school choice may likely influence the adoption of choice plans that apply to private schools. 

Decentralization may be a lasting result of reform efforts even if choice does not succeed. 

Decentralization 

In the 1960s, the education system was centralized--run top-down from school superintendents, 

to principals, to teachers. In the 1990s, education reformers advocated decentralization. 
Decentralization and deregulation, that is, school-based management, is both an integral part of public 

school choice plans and a separate reform issue. 

Kearns envisions central school district offices as service centers, not command posts, and school 

principals as the most important and most vital link in the "education chain of cause and effect." The 

central administration receives funds--to be spent by the principal and staff. The principal is the CEO. 

Under this scheme, schools recruit, retain, and remove staff. Schools are also responsible for resource 

allocation, scheduling, and instructional organization. By disbanding the mid-level offices between the 

central school district office and the school itself where functions are often duplicated, decentralization 

puts resources back into the schools where staff decisions, not a system-wide formula, directs spending. 

Teachers and principals would decide on the amount of overhead (services offered by central offices but 

purchased on an as-needed basis by the schools)--in areas such as textbook acquisition, library services, 

and counseling. Along with eliminating bureaucratic intermediaries, decentralization envisions 

introducing modern management concepts, thereby promoting accountability and, in turn, improvement. 

Decentralization will proliferate by the turn of the century. 

If, as intended, decentralization succeeds either as a cost-saving measure andlor impetus for 

improvement, (some parts of) the educational bureaucracy will be streamlined and school-based 

management will become institutionalized. If savings are inconsequential and educational achievement 

fails to improve, centralization will resume. 

Curriculum 

The back-to-the-basics movement will be altered. The label applied to the "3Rs" approach is too 

limiting. A national curriculum framework with regional variations, driven by more rigid mathematics 

and science requirements (and more courses in these subjects), and the need to instill higher-order 

thinking skills (in order to raise international competitiveness), will lead to more rigid, mandated high 

school graduation requirements, and will be instituted by 2015. (Japan and most European nations have 

national curricula, See Appendix A.) Many states already have legislated stricter academic requirements 

(particularly in mathematics and science) for high school graduation, resulting in changes in curriculum 

guidelines. Lack of improvement in international achievement comparisons will accelerate the move 

towards a national curriculum. 

The extent of curriculum specificity (which can be detailed by outcomes--not weekly guidelines) 

and the quality and variety of curriculum materials are also parts of curriculum reform. Other curriculum 

changes will address access to information, thinking clearly, communicating effectively, understanding 

the environment, man and society, the rights and responsibilities of people in a global society, and 

personal competence. 

Interdisciplinary courses, to include computers and other information technologies, will become an 

integral part of secondary education. 

The curriculum reform debate also drives other issues--the role of national examinations (and the 
need to first devise adequate assessments and standards),-the quality and effectiveness of teacher 

preparation, pressure for cultural literacy (multiculturalism), and school restructuring (school-based 

management and choice). Testing and accountability, according to Linda M. McNeil, produce a "de facto 

national curriculum that is driven by supposedly scientific and neutral objectives conducive to 

computerized scoring--a curriculum that is not subject to political scrutiny. "[38] Cultural literacy debates 

are largely academic. School restructuring implies that if current school structures inhibit or distort 

curriculum, curriculum can be improved by reshaping the structures. 

Kearns and Doyle suggest that a core curriculum, at least through age 16 (grade lo), but 

preferably until age 18 (grade 12), be adopted, and that promotion to a higher grade not be granted 

without certification of performance. Certification can be handled through examination, in the same way 

students take advanced placement examinations in high school to gain college credit. Kearns and Doyle 

also advocate the "flexible term equivalentM--performance organized around accomplishment of the 

curriculum, not units of time. This would also result in a move away from machine scorable tests (the 

SAT and ACT), which are advantageous to the middle class and disadvantageous (that is discriminatory) 

to at-risk and minority students. These tests also neglect the oral and written form. 

A national curriculum core, even one with regional variations, will present advantaged and 

disadvantaged students with the same framework. Such a curriculum and its byproducts (for example, 

teachers and students held to common sets of expectations, improved teacher training and materials 

development) made available to all groups on an equal basis, without requiring localities to make vast 

investments of money and time, might help to minimize the gaps between the various education 

constituencies and promote educational equity. (However, objections to these measures are the same as 

those used to point out the discriminatory nature of national tests.) The previous trend towards basic 

skills education, as the best way to pursue educational equity, has helped to narrow the achievement gap 

between black and low income children (versus white and higher income youth), but has produced 

students lacking a rich knowledge base and higher-order skills. 

National Tests 

National tests--standards, that is performance-based assessments--are critical to education reform. 

Driven by the national curriculum framework and stricter high school graduation requirements, they will 

be developed gradually, and may be in place by 2015. Unless these tests are developed as performancebased assessments, in tandem with systemic educational reform, they will neither measure for 

accountability, nor have teachers do anything but "teach for the test." Consequently, a movement to 

change the nature of assessments--that is, to measure higher-order skills, has developed. These tests will 

not be today's computerized multiple choice questions, which stress lower-level skills heavily dependent 

on memorization, teaching to the test, and discriminate against minority populations. 

National assessments should be consistent with the reorientation of learning skills and 

accountability goals, measure competency, be based on proficiency, have welldesigned remedial 
programs (to assist those in reaching national standards), and be capable of monitoring instruction and 

learning with the periodic testing of general achievement and specific skills. They should measure not 

only qualitative standards in mathematics, science, and English language skills, but also proficiency in 

problem-solving, reasoning, and creativity. Those who believe that a well-conceived national test can 

be an important lever for upgrading what is taught and learned in school see the lack of such a test in the 

United States as a source of frustration. If minority students do poorly on this national test, however, 

there may be considerable political pressure to drop it as well. 

The President's Advisory Committee on Education is considering the appropriateness and 

feasibility of a national test administered to all students at two or three grade levels. (Most industrialized 

countries have a national curriculum and national examinations that are given to almost all students at 

some time). One version of the test would have it normed to international standards--poor performance 

of U.S. students vis-a-vis their international counterparts would trigger greater public interest in education 

reforms. Another proposal would base test content on explicated syllabi and make the test an important 

influence in students' lives by making results available to college admissions officers, or future 

employers. Increased motivation and better behavior may be a byproduct, if the sharing of results makes 

students more serious about their studies. Alternatively it could lead to even more damaging 

discrimination against minority students, stigmatizing them, and shutting them out of college or the 

workplace. 

If national examinations are tied into an accountability system, they might also provide a means 

for evaluating the effectiveness of particular schools--and for rewarding them. This would motivate 

teachers and administrators to find the best ways to teach the national curriculum. It might also support 

the choice argument--schools that perform well on the tests will perform well in the "market." National 

tests must show achievement gaps and push the federal government to provide additional resources to the 

schools most needing help to reach national standards. However, the decline in national test scores may 

also lead to a diminishing focus on those who perform well. Some critics cite the establishment 

of a national test as leading to the imposition of a national curriculum without discussion. This may 

increase lobbying against both standards and curriculum and delay reform efforts. Others point out that 

although a national curriculum core is reasonable and appropriate, standardized tests measure stability, 

not variability (achievement levels of large groups of students for whom there are common expectations), 

and discriminate against special needs populations. 

Changes in the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), which provides periodic 

assessments of students in a number of subjects, using national samples of students from three agelgrade 

levels, have influenced the trend towards developing a national curriculum. These data are the only 

consistent national achievement measurement in the United States. Until 1990, NAEP reported national 

grades only. In 1991, for the first time, the NAEP will report findings on a state-by-state basis on an 

eighth grade mathematics assessment. State participation is voluntary, however. This experiment, 

permitted by a new federal law, will probably expand in 1992, when fourth and eighth grade mathematics 

will be assessed--again, in as many states as wish to participate. Assessment results could increase 
pressure on state policymakers to bring state curricula in line with NAEP frameworks. NAEP 

comparisons reflect performance of a much more representative sample of state's students than do SAT 

and ACT scores, which measure college bound students, are administered late in secondary school, and 

are insensitive to the school curriculum. 

Achievement Levels 

The level of U.S. students in achievement tests of international comparison (the United States is 

low relative to other industrialized nations) may show some improvement by 2015. Achievement levels 

have shown little gain in the past decade, and at the current rate of achievement, the United States has 

much to do in order to catch up. Again, a fundamental overhaul of the education system is needed prior 

to realizing positive results and large gains in achievement scores. 

John H. Bishop, of the Department of Personnel and Human Resource Studies, New York State 

School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, posits that the large and historically 

unprecedented test score decline between 1967 and 1980 negatively affected the quality of the work force 

and the GNP. This decline was across the board--for whites and minorities, public and private schools. 

Declines were greater for higher-level skills (inference and problem solving) than for the basic skills 

(arithmetic computation). There was no visible decline in the first few years of elementary school, 

although the advantage of being better prepared for first grade than were earlier generations lasted only 

through the third grade. Since a decline affects a work force over a period of some 50 years, these 

shortfalls are enduring. 

Bishop points out that recent efforts to improve the quality and rigor of the curriculum have led 

to rising test scores. However, the general intellectual achievement level (GIA) of high school seniors 

has remained substantially below the level that would have been reached if the rate of gain of academic 

achievement of the 1940s through the early 1960s had continued, rather than reversed beginning in 1967. 

Bishop sees a parallel decline in academic achievement in the applicants to graduate and professional 

schools between 1966 and 1980, as well as a similar recent rebound in test scores. Bishop notes that even 

if current efforts to improve education succeed, the earlier period of low test scores will continue to 

depress productivity well into the 21st century because of the growth of the labor quality shortfall. He 

suggests that the only way to prevent these forecasts from coming to fruition is to change the relationship 

between the GIA at age 17 and the GIA as an adult. This will be done by luring massive numbers of 

adults back into school, expanding educational offerings on television, and/or inducing employers to 

provide general education to long-term employees. 

National Teacher Certification 

National teacher certification will come about more slowly than the movement towards a national 

curriculum framework and national assessments. A natural offshoot of these developments, teacher 
certification (licensing) should test both for basic skills competency and area expertise. 

A national curriculum framework would help to structure a common knowledge base for teachers. 

However, a vast investment in professional teacher development is needed if the benefits of a national 

curriculum are to be realized. The necessity of bringing pre-service education in line with the curriculum 

requires great changes in the curricula of teacher-training institutions and licensing requirements. 

Licensing examinations and inservice programs probably will be based on improving understanding of 

and ability to teach national curriculum content. 

The acknowledged teacher shortages in specific subject areas, however, will mitigate requirements 

where area expertise overrides the need for certification. "Alternate certification," a practice that relies 

on a person's demonstrated knowledge, skill, character, and willingness to impart some of that knowledge 

to children, allows adults to attain provisional status in the education profession. It is likely that 

"alternate certification" will increase and co-exist with demands for national teacher certification 

standards, enlarging the pool of prospective teachers, particularly where there are shortages, (both for 

specific disciplines and in certain geographic areas), as well as equal opportunity considerations. Some 

reform proponents even advocate that in some subject areas instruction not be limited to teachers and that 

professionals be used instead. 

Teaching ability can be learned--by apprenticeship to a master teacher. Kearns and Doyle 

advocate eliminating the degree in education and substituting it with a bachelors degree in a subject 

matter, followed by a fifth year internship in a school building, supervised by a master teacher. 

Kearns and Doyle believe new licensing standards should be flexible and diverse, based in large 

part on performance standards, and measured by knowledge of subject matter (although knowledge of 

subject does not guarantee an effective teacher). They also believe licensing is a state responsibility. 

Teachers' unions and demographic changes will impede national certification on the basis of equal 

opportunity and human resource issues. Some schools andlor states may move towards intern and master 

teacher certification programs. Certification is a contentious issue with teachers' unions. Merit pay 

issues will continue to be both contentious and an issue of fiscal concern. 

As computers and new technologies transform the classroom, and computers are combined with 

team-teaching and collaborative learning, teachers' jobs will change. Teachers will still have a critical 

role in providing effective learning situations but will need increased training and institutional support 

to successfully teach with technology. 

Teacher retention will be based on job performance. According to the concept of school-based 

management, principals will be responsible for firing ineffective teachers. How, and under whose 

responsibility they will or will not be retrained is another issue, not addressed here. 

Multiculturalism 

Multiculturalism versus the politics of race, a controversial political issue, will be influenced by 

the changing demographic picture. Although multiculturalism pits the traditionally Eurocentric approach 
to history and society against the Afro-American ("particularlistic") experience, demographics will also 

have an impact on this issue. By 2015, Hispanics will represent a greater proportion of the population 

than will blacks. If Hispanics are able to wield political clout (similar to what the blacks exert at 

present), then the multicultural question becomes even more complicated in terms of incorporating the 

Hispanic experience, which itself is diverse (see "Demography"). At what point does the cultural 

diversity of "we are all one nation" ("pluralistic experience") transcend the politics of race? The question 

of enforcing and supporting educational equity and equal opportunity will be challenged by the political 

climate that emphasizes excellence and elitism. Further, multiculturalism is primarily an issue in large 

urbadsuburban school districts that constitute the overwhelming majority of school enrollment--it is not 

an issue in other communities. 

Tracking, grouping by performance rather than "race mix," will be abandoned in the near term 

since it is claimed to be discriminatory and disadvantageous to at-risk youth and does not fare much better 

with other parts of the population. After the absence of tracking proves ineffective in improving 

educational achievement, tracking advocates will lobby for reinstatement, citing it promotes educational 

achievement and tracking will be resumed. 

New Technoloeies 

The traditional classroom environment will change as the array of education delivery systems 

expands. Classrooms run by proprietary schools will remain, but developments in telecommunications 

will provide educators with new options. Electronic links between distant locations, that is, "distance 

learningM--the live delivery of instruction from one distant site to another via satellite with audio andlor 

video interaction between students and teachers--will proliferate, as will the use of computers, satellites, 

fiber optics, interactive television and videodiscs, cable television, electronic bulletin boards, and 

electronic mail. Closed circuit and cable tele-courses will become commonplace, and videodiscs and 

videotaped "telelessons" will enhance, supplement, and, in some cases replace textbooks and written 

materials. Students will access, via laser disk or telephone, a central learning center equipped with highspeed computers that can communicate in any learning resource center worldwide. Computers in the 

classroom can be used as tutors, or for simulation and gaming. The more familiar uses of computers can 

provide practical applications for instruction. Tutorial applications can promote higher order thinking 

skills. Training will become problematic. 

Schools will need to adopt these new technologies in order to offer more extensive and intensive 

curricula. Steps must be taken to ensure the effective use of new technologies and learning theories. 

This mix of technologies must also be taken into account in planning both curriculum and facilities. 

State-mandated curriculum changes (and eventually a national curriculum framework) and more 
rigid high school graduation requirements will drive distance learning. New technologies will enable 

schools to meet curriculum requirements, offer courses where there are teacher shortages, and similarly 

provide inservice training that might otherwise be unavailable. Telecommunications networking is 

particularly attractive for small and rural schools. 

The proliferation of these rapid technological changes will likely be inhibited by lack of funding. 

Large increases in federal funding will be needed if the United States moves to a national 

telecommunications infrastructure for distance learning. Although new technologies have made 

systems increasingly affordable, cost factors will influence the acquisition and spread of the new 

educational environment. Long-term payoffs are often sacrificed because short-term outlays cannot be 

made. Costs are influenced by instructional design, system scope, existing infrastructure, partnership and 

cost-sharing arrangements, system engineering requirements, financial arrangements (such as to lease or 

to buy), programming, and training. Annual subscription costs, upgrades and updates must also be 

considered. Many states cite lack of funding as inhibiting improved and increased use of technology in 

their schools. 

The federal government and state regulatory agencies will need to adopt new, flexible, and 

effective policies that address the use of technology for education. Currently, federal and state 

telecommunications policies limit the number and kind of telecommunications services available for 

distance education. 

The Star Schools Act sought to establish multistate, organizationally diverse partnerships to write 

and deliver both core and enrichment curriculum and to provide opportunities for disadvantaged students 

to receive remote instruction. The program, passed by the 100th Congress in 1988, funded four 

multistate, publictprivate partnerships for distance education and set as its goal " . . . address[ing] two 

critical needs in the rebuilding of our educational system to meet domestic and international challenges. 

The Nation's students must have access to basic and advanced courses in mathematics, science, and 

foreign languages, and these courses must be of the highest quality." 

NON-ACADEMIC SERVICES 

Health and Social Services 

The role of the school has changed over time. "Even in particularly effective schools, family 

background is the best predictor of student achievement. "[39] The breakup of the two-parent family, the 

growing culture of drugs and violence in our schools and society, and the increasing number of children 

having children, has led to an extension of the school's role. Schools now deliver a variety of services 

outside the traditional educational environment such as child care and parenting education, nutrition and 

health care, and substance abuse treatment. 

The role of public education in these non-traditional areas is problematic, both in terms of funding 
and as a matter of appropriateness. For the children of minorities and disadvantaged populations who 

are at risk, these services are essential. These programs may detract from instructional time and may 

effect extension of the school day and the evolution of the school as family substitute (particularly in 

urban and inner city schools). Lack of these services will cause larger societal problems (and more costly 

measures) later on. 

Preprimary, social service "education" programs, viewed as beneficial "preventive" measures, 

began as federal initiatives. Funding has now become both a federal and state responsibility. Preprimary 

education directed at disadvantaged segments of the population seeks to prepare these children for 

elementary school instruction. Chapter 1 programs such as Head Start, that target preschool children, 

have been supplemented by the Even Start initiative. Even Start combines basic education for parents 

(those in adult literacy programs) with school readiness training for children ages one through seven who 

may be educationally at risk. Even Start seeks to boost the academic performance of disadvantaged 

children by identifying the medical, nutritional, and other social problems that might inhibit a child's 

success in school and in the long run reduce crime and save taxpayer money. The goal is to provide longterm payoffs by giving disadvantaged youths a better chance to become productive citizens. The price 

paid for not funding such programs will be higher in the future, when disadvantaged youth become 

nonproductive members of the work force. 

Kindergarten and Pre-school Proaams 

Statistics show that the percentage of three- and four-year olds attending preschool increased from 

about 14 percent in 1967 to 38 percent in 1987, and, as a consequence of increased enrollment, the 

preparation for formal schooling--"readinessw--also has improved. 

Most preschool programs are private and attended by predominantly middle class, nonminority 

populations. The acknowledged disparity in educational performance between those attending preschool 

(an advantage) and those without preschool experience (a disadvantage) will pressure many public school 

systems to provide prekindergarten programs for all children. The number of public schools offering 

preschool education programs will expand, but fiscal restraint will limit growth. Prekindergarten 

programs with "educational" curricula will increase. 

Although most kindergarten programs already have high enrollment rates, kindergarten may 

become mandatory in the next century. The kindergarten program will become more "academic." 

OTHER INNOVATIONS 

Ex~anded School DapIYear-round School 

The length of the school day and the school year in the United States, a holdover from the 
nineteenth century, is shorter than that of the industrialized countries of the Pacific Rim that outperform 

the United States in international comparisons. There are obstacles, however, to extending the school 

day and the school year: money, teachers' unions, businesses desiring cheap labor over summer 

holidays, and other special interest lobbies, such as the recreation industry. 

An expanded school day and extended school year will become a contentious issue although it 

was recommended by The National Commission on Excellence. The need for a longer school year may 

be mitigated by a redirection and refocus of the curriculum and greater flexibility by all concerned 

parties. An expanded school daylterm may be combined with various programs. Those who wish for 

an extension of the academic school year may choose to do so. Greater flexibility in the school 

calendar is another reform option. Some students (most say the more academically oriented) will choose 

a longer school year. An extended or flexible school calendar that includes various scheduling options, 

however, will not show positive results, that is, achievement gains, unless educational goals are revised, 

since time on task is not the only issue. 

Apprenticeship and intern programs, to include federal, state, local, national construction corps, 

and community service--will continue to exist as options (not necessarily integrated into the educational 

setting), but funding levels will not expand and changes--vis-a-vis European models--will not be adopted. 

If the business community sees eff~cacy in apprenticeship and lobbies prodigiously, programs will become 

even more widespread. 

These programs are possible components of a flexible education. The incorporation of an internship 

or national service into the high school curriculum would produce more well-adjusted, functionally literate 

members of society. Such measures will probably not be adopted. There may, however, be some 

regional experiments with these types of programs--most likely as business partnerships. 

Pressure for business and industry to become more involved in education will increase. As a 

result, schools will be better connected to workplaces and have more links with the business community. 

Mentorships must become more widespread. 

It has been suggested that the United States adopt an apprenticeship system, such as that in 

Germany, as a means of developing a national skill-building partnership between public schools and 

business. High schools in the United States typically lack an elaborate job placement system, and the 

majority of vocational students end up in jobs that have little or nothing to do with training received in 

high school. 

A national apprenticeship system would be aimed at expanding the supply of skilled workers, 

narrowing the earnings gap between college and non-college youth, establishing new incentives to remain 

in high school AND to do well, and offering disadvantaged youths a realistic alternative to a life of early 

parenthood, drugs, and violence. In the tenth grade, students would choose between apprenticeship or 

an academic track. In the eleventh grade, students would combine on-the-job training with school. In 
the twelfth grade, students would be in their third year of apprenticeship, with 75 percent of the time 

spent on the job and the remainder of the time spent in high school or a community college. At the end 

of the twelfth grade, students would take a comprehensive test to ensure their jobs as well as to measure 

educational proficiency. 

CONCLUSION 

Demographics--the primary change driver--will influence both the trends in education and the 

reforms (see fig. 1). The increase in the number and proportion of disadvantaged youth, who 

traditionally belong to minority populations, will be the most important factor in the school-age 

population. Public education in the 21st century may largely serve minority and disadvantaged 

populations. The United States is committed to the fundamental concept of providing public education, 

but the system itself may polarize. Those who can afford the option will send their children to private 

schools. 

Education reforms move slowly. Although targeted at improving the process of education, some 

reforms face the resistance of education bureaucracies, others meet funding obstacles. Some changes will 

take a long time to measure in terms of results; other reforms lack adequate devices of measurement. 

By 2015, the educational achievement level of U.S. youth will likely show little or no gain over present 

levels, and preparedness for the work force (and military) will still remain wanting. Since the decline 

in achievement levels cuts across society and affects a work force over a period of some 50 years, this 

shortfall is enduring, and as previously noted will depress productivity well into the 21st century. As the 

issue of educational equity comes to the fore, education may become more of a societal leveler. 

Disadvantaged and at-risk youth may increase their achievement levels (gradually and marginally), higher 

achievers may not make great gains, and those in the middle may remain predominantly average. 

The present education system--initially based on reading, writing, and arithmetic (not 

mathematics), organized independently into units of instruction, was devised when the United States was 

an agricultural nation, and has since changed to meet the needs of the Industrial Age. The future 

education system, however, must be revised to meet the needs of the Technological Age--one of global 

interaction and interdependence--in banking, industry, production, resource allocation, communication, 

and information processing. 

Future education programs must be dynamic and reflect the nature of change in the environment. 

Students must be taught to acquire knowledge and skills in critical thinking, reasoning, language, 

mathematics and science; to organize thoughts and solve problems systematically; and to write and 

communicate effectively. They must be versed in good citizenship and community service, understand 

their physical environment, the individual and society, and possess the attitudes and norms of behavior-- 

social interaction skills--that allow a person to function effectively on a job. And, while the U.S. 

business community has adapted to meet the needs of the changing international environment, the 8:00 
am to 3:00 pm school day, and the 180-day school year has remained the same. The need for a longer 

school day and school year is becoming more apparent. 
Fig. 1 
White males traditionally have higher educational levels and higher salaries than other segments 

of the population and have been the most employable. In the late 1980s, white male workers constituted 

almost half of the work force; by the year 2000, they will account for only 15 percent of new job 

entrants. The growth of the black and Hispanic labor force will far outpace the growth of the white labor 

force. By the year 2015, more workers will be women, blacks, and Hispanics; white males will be in 

the minority. The same pattern will be evident in school enrollments. 

Table 1. Age 17 Cohort by Sex, 

1990,2005,2015 

(in thousands) 

11 Ethnic I 1990 I 2005 I 2015 11 

Group 

White 

Black 

Hispanic 

TOTAL 1 1,717 1 1,628 1 2,042 1 1,931 1 2,047 1 1,933 

Male 

I I I I I I 

1,121 

Other I 149 201 I 137 I 

Although the manpower requirements for the army will decrease and the number of potential 

applicants will increase, the military may not have a more functionally literate pool to choose from. The 

proportion of at-risk youth, in relation to the rest of the population, will pose a growing threat to the 

effectiveness of the education system. Reforms will have to move at a quicker pace in order to improve 

the product of American education. As Soviet gains in scientific achievement, specifically Sputnik, 

challenged the U.S. education system in the 1950s and galvanized the country into action, the loss of 

competitiveness in the international economic arena (particularly to Japan and Europe) may spur U.S. 

education into the 21st century. Economic conditions, however, may make the military a more attractive 

option, and the military may not be faced with recruiting from a less than attractive pool of applicants. 

Female 

253 

194 

193 257 I 247 I 

1 

Male 

1,061 

I I I 

Female Male 

244 

186 

Female I 

1,217 

310 

3 14 

1,148 

290 

300 

1,089 1,024 

329 

372 

307 

355 
APPENDIX A 

EDUCATION: THE JAPANESE APPROACH 

In Japan, schooling emphasizes diligence, self-criticism, and well-organized study habits. The 

belief is ingrained that hard work and perseverance yield success in life. Much of official school life is 

devoted directly or indirectly to teaching correct attitudes and moral values and to developing character, 

with the aim of creating a citizenry that is both literate and attuned to the basic values of culture and 

society. Starting pay for school teachers is higher than any other public servants in Japan, and higher or 

equal to that of engineers. The Japanese believe that compulsory schooling must provide 

equal educational treatment of students; that all children have the ability to learn the material; that effort, 

perseverance, and self-discipline, not academic ability, determine academic success; and that wellorganized study habits and good behavior can be taught. A nationally designed curriculum exposes 

students to balanced, basic education. There is also a relatively equal distribution of financial resources 

among schools. 

The education system is characterized by high enrollment and retention rates throughout. School 

is compulsory and free to virtually all children from grade one through nine. Upper secondary school, 

from grades ten through twelve, though not compulsory, attracts about 94 percent of those who completed 

lower secondary school. About one-third of all Japanese upper secondary school graduates advance to 

post secondary education--to full four-year universities, two-year junior colleges, or to other institutions. 

The rigors of the entrance examinations and the cramming sessions preparing students for them are well 

documented. 

The most common type of upper-secondary schools have a full-time, general program that offers 

academic courses for students preparing for higher education and also technical and vocational courses 

for students expecting to find employment after graduation. More than 70 percent of upper-secondary 

school students enrolled in the general academic program in the late 1980s. 

Japanese children attend school five full weekdays and one-half day on Saturdays. The school year 

has a legal minimum of 210 days, but most local school boards add about 30 more days for school 

festivals, athletic meets, and ceremonies with nonacademic educational objectives. The number of days 

devoted to instruction is about 195 per year. 
APPENDIX B 

GENERAL EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CERTIFICATES 

The number of people who earn General Educational Development (G.E.D.--high school 

equivalency) certificates dropped 25 percent in the 1980s. In 1980, approximately 816,000 people took 

at least one part of the five-part examination; approximately 500,200 earned diplomas. In 1989, 

approximately 682,700 people took some part of the examination; 376,880 earned diplomas. Of those 

who took all portions of the test, 70 percent passed the examination in 1980, compared to 68 percent in 

1989. The percentage of 17- to 18-year-olds taking the G.E.D. from 1977 to 1987 increased 

as the test became better known and more widely accepted as an alternative to a high school diploma. 

In 1981, 711,000 people took the G.E.D. and 72 percent passed; slightly less than one-third of the test 

takers were 19 years old or younger. Many of those who passed the G.E.D., however, had only a sixth 

grade reading level. 

By the 1980s, the biggest drop in the number of G.E.D. examinees was among adults ages 18 

to 24. In 1980, 519,000 people of this age group took the G.E.D.; in 1989, only 380,000 people took 

the test. Some educators speculated that the addition of an essay section to the G.E.D. in 1988 made the 

test more difficult and may have scared off potential test takers. Educators also believe that many young 

adults are unfamiliar with the exam and might be more interested in landing jobs and earning money 

quickly--as entry-level jobs can be gotten without high school or equivalency diplomas--than in 

educational achievement. There has also been speculation that the G.E.D.'s credibility may have 

inadvertently been damaged by the military. Since 1970, the services have been working to reduce their 

attrition rates and they have given higher priority to recruiting people who have graduated from high 

school. Statistics show that high school graduates are more likely to remain in the armed forces than 

recruits with G.E.D. diplomas. 

G.E.D. candidates mirror demographic trends. An increasing number of test takers were 

Hispanic--6.8 percent in 1980, but 11.2 percent by 1989. The number of test takers who are black has 

declined over the last decade--from 17 percent in 1980 to 14.2 percent in 1989. 
SOURCES 

1. Aaron, Henry J. (ed.). Setting National Priorities: Policv for the Nineties. Washington: Brookings 

Institution, 1990. 

2. Bailey, Thomas. "The Changing Occupational Structure," NCEE Brief, No. 7, January 7, 1990. 

3. Balch, Pamela M. "Matching School Curricula to Future Employment Trends: Just Whose 

Responsibility Is It?" Education, 109, No. 3, 340-42. 

4. Barker, Bruce 0. "Planning, Using the New Technology in Classrooms," NASSP Bulletin, 74, No. 

529, November 1990, 3 1-37. 

5. Bianchi, Suzanne M. "America's Children: Mixed Prospects," Po~ulation Bulletin, 45, No. 1, June 

1990, 3-42. 

6. Bishop, John H. "Is the Test Score Decline Responsible for the Productivity Growth Decline?" 

American Economic Review, 79, No. 1, March 1989, 187-97. 

7- - ."Why the Apathy in American High Schools?" Educational Researcher, 18, No. 1, January- February 1989, 6-10. 

8. Cetron, Marvin J., and Owen Davies. American Renaissance: Our Life at the Turn of the 21st 

Century. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 

9. Cetron, Marvin J., and Margaret Evans Gayle. "Educational Renaissance: 43 Trends for U.S. 

Schools," Futurist, 24, No. 5, September-October 1990, 33-40. 

10. Cole, Richard T. Taking Stock: A Review of the Im~act of the Governor's Commission on the 

Future of Higher Education. Lansing, Michigan: Office of the Governor, 1988. 

11. Collison, Michelle N-K. "25% Decline in Numbers of GED Diplomas Stirs Fears over Future Adult 

Enrollment," Chronicle of Higher Education, 36, No. 46, August 1, 1990, A25, A27. 

12. Dellatre, Edwin J. Education and the Public Trust: The Im~erative for Common Purposes. 

Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988. 

13. Elmore, Richard F., and Associates. Restructuring: Schools: The Next Generation of Educational 

Reform. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990. 

14. Fass, Paula S. Outside In: Minorities and the Transformation of American Education. New York: 

Oxford University Press, 1989. 

15. Finn, Chester E., Jr. "The Biggest Reform of All, " Phi Delta Ka~pan, 7 1, No. 8, April 1990, 584- 

92. 

16. . "Decentralize, Deregulate, Empower: Seven Proposals to Bring Education into the 20th 

Century, " Polic~ Review, No. 37, Summer 1986, 58-61. 
17. . "A Nation Still at Risk," Commentary, 86, No. 5, May 1989, 17-23. 

18. Frady, Marshall, The ABC Closeup News Staff, and Joan S. Dunphy. To Save Our Schools. To 

Save Our Children: The A~~roaching - Crisis in America's Public Schools. Far Hills, New Jersey: New 

Horizon Press, 1985. 

19. Gamoran, Adam, and Robert D. Mare. "Secondary School Tracking and Educational Inequality: 

Compensation, Reinforcement, or Neutrality?" American Journal of Sociolom, 94, No. 5, March 1989, 

1146-83. 

20. Gerald, Debra E., and William J. Hussar. Proiections of Education Statistics to 2001: An Update. 

Washington: National Center for Education Statistics, 1990. 

21. Glines, Don. "Can Schools of Today Survive Very Far into the 21st Century?" NASSP Bulletin, 73, 

No. 514, February 1989, 49-56. 

22. Griffith, Jeanne E., Mary J. Frase, and John H. Ralph. "American Education: The Challenge of 

Change," Population Bulletin, 44, No. 4, December 1989, 3-38. 

23. Haas, John D. "Educational Futures: Six Scenarios," Futures Research Ouarterlv, 2, No. 2, 

Summer 1986, 15-30. 

24. Hamilton, Stephen F. Apprenticeship for Adulthood: Preparing Youth for the Future. New York: 

Free Press, 1990. 

25. Hunkins, Francis P. "The Future--Its Implications for the High School," High School Journal, 67, 

No. 2, December 1983-January 1984, 104-10. 

26. Kagan, Sharon L. "Early Care and Education: Tackling'the Tough Issues," Phi Delta Ka~pan, 70, 

No. 6, February 1989, 433-39. 

27. . Excellence in Earlv Childhood Education: Defining Characteristics and Next-Decade 

Strategies. (Policy Perspectives Series.) Washington: Department of Education, Offke of Educational 

Research and Improvement, Information Services, July 1990. 

28. Kearns, David T., and Denis P. Doyle. Winning the Brain Race: A Bold Plan to Make Our Schools 

Com~etitive. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1988. 

29. Knapp, Michael S., and Brenda J. Turnbull. Studv of Academic Instruction for Disadvantaged 

Students. Better Schooling; for the Children of Povertv: Alternatives to Conventional Wisdom, 1. 

Washington: Department of Education, Office of Planning, Budget, and Evaluation, January 1990. 

30. Koretz, Daniel M. Educational Achievement: Explanations and Im~lications of Recent Trends. 

Washington: Congressional Budget Office, 1987. 

3 1. . Trends in Educational Achievement. Washington: 

Congressional Budget Office, 1986. 
32. Landers, Robert K. "Conflict over Multicultural Education, Editorial Research Revorts, 1, NO. 44, 

November 30, 1990, 682-95. 

33. LeGrande, Linda. "Economic Benefits of Education." (Library of Congress, Congressional Research 

Service, 88-753 E.) Washington: December 13, 1988. 

34. Lieberman, Myron. Privatization and Educational Choice. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 

35. . Public School Choice: Current Issues/Future Prosvects. Lancaster, Pennsylvania: 

Technomic, 1990. 

36. McCormick, Theresa E. "Multiculturalism: Some Principles and Issues," Theory into Practice, 23, 

No. 2, Spring 1984, 93-97. 

37. McDonnell, Lorraine M. "Restructuring American Schools: The Promise and the Pitfalls," NCEE 

Wf, No. 6, November 1989. 

38. McNeil, John. "Curriculum Politics: Local, State, and Federal," NASSP Bulletin, 72, No. 509, 

September 1988, 60-62, 64-69. 

39. McNeil, Linda M. "Reclaiming a Voice: American Curriculum Scholars and the Politics of What 

Is Taught in Schools," Phi Delta Kappan, 71, No. 7, March 1990, 517-18. 

40. "Making Common Cause: Integrating Academic and Vocational Studies," Curriculum Revort, 18, 

No. 1, September 1988, 1-8. 

41. National Center for Education Statistics. The Condition of Education. 1: Elementary and Secondarv 

Education. Washington: Department of Education, 1990. 

42. National Governors' Association. The Governors' 1991 Revort on Education. Results in Education: 

1990. Washington: 1990. 

43. Ornstein, Allan C. "Emerging Curriculum Trends: An Agenda for the Future," NASSP Bulletin, 

73, No. 514, February 1989, 37-48. 

44. Pallas, Aaron M., Gary Natriello, and Edward L. McDill. "The Changing Nature of the 

Disadvantaged Population: Current Dimensions and Future Trends," Educational Researcher, 18, No. 

5, June-July 1989, 16-21. 

45. Paulu, Nancy. Improving Schools and Empowering Parents: Choice in American Education. (Report 

based on White House Workshop on Choice in Education, Department of Education, Offke of 

Educational Research and Improvement, October 1989.) Washington: GPO, 1989. 

46. Poole, Heather. State Education Policies: In Accountabilitv/Assessment. Teaching. and Literacv. 

Washington: International Reading Association, 1990. 

47. Quality Education for Minorities Project. Education That Works: An Action Plan for the Education 
of Minorities. Report Summary. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, January 1990. 

48. Rassell, M. Edith, and Lawrence Mishel. "Is America Investing Too Little in Its Schools?" 

Princi~al, 70, No. 1, September 1990, 30-33. 

49. "Reclaiming a Voice: American Curriculum Scholars and the Politics of What Is Taught in 

Schools," Phi Delta Kappan, 71, No. 7, March 1990. 

50. Schlechty, Philip C. Schools for the Twentv-First Centurv: Leadership Imperatives for Educational 

Reform. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990. 

51. Smith, Marshall S., Jennifer O'Day, and David K. Cohen. "National Curriculum American Style," 

American Educator, 14, No. 4, Winter 1990, 10-17, 40-47. 

52. Stedman, James B., and Wayne Clifton Riddle. "The 'Educational Excellence Act of 1989': The 

Administration's Education Proposal." (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 89-513 

EPW.) Washington: August 21, 1989. 

53. Stedman, James B., Laura Hersh Salganik, and Carin A. Celebuski. "Dropping Out: The 

Educational Vulnerability of At-Risk Youth. " (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 88- 

417 EPW.) Washington: May 24, 1988. 

54. Stedman, James B., Paul M. Irwin, Bob Lyke, and Wayne Clifton Riddle. "National Education 

Goals: Where are We Now?" (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 90-169 EPW.) 

Washington: March 26, 1990. 

55. Tavel, David (4.). Modern Educational Controversies. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of 

America, 1984. 

56. Tesconi, Charles A. "Multicultural Education: A Valued But Problematic Ideal," Theory into 

Practice, 23, No. 2, Spring 1984, 87-92. 

57. The Unfinished Agenda: A New Vision for Child Develo~ment and Education. New York: 

Committee for Economic Development, 199 1. 

58. United States. Congress. 99th, 1st Session. House of Representatives. Committee on Education 

and Labor. Subcommittee on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education. The Even Start Act-- 

H.R. 2535. (Hearing.) Washington: GPO, 1986. 

59. . Congress. lOlst, 1st Session. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Education and 

Health. The Education Deficit. (Staff Report Summarizing Hearings on "Competitiveness and the Quality 

of the American Work Force. ") Washington: GPO, 1988. 

60. . Congress. lOlst, 1st Session. Office of Technology Assessment. Power On! New Tools for 

Teachinn and Learning. Washington: GPO, September 1988. 

61. . Congress. lOlst, 2d Session. Office of Technology Assessment. Linking for Learnin?: A 

133 
New Course for Education. Washington: GPO, November 1989. 

62. . Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and 

Personnel). Population Remesentation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1989. Washington: 

Department of Defense, July 1990. 

63. . Department of Education. Choosing Better Schools: The Five Regional Meetings on Choice 

in Education. Washington: December 1990. 

64- - .General Accounting Office. Education Reform: Initial Effects in Four School Districts. 

Washington: September 1989. 

65. Walters, Jonathan. "The Most Radical Ideal in Education: Let the Schools Run It," Governing, 

3, No. 4, January 1991, 37-41. 

66. Wayson, William W. Up from Excellence: The Impact of the Excellence Movement on Schools. 

Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1988. 

Additional Sources Consulted: 

Bartel, Ann P., Frank R. Lichtenberg, and Roger J. Vaughn. "Technological Change, Trade, and 

the Need for Educated Employees: Implications for Economic Policy," NCEE Brief, No. 5, November 

1989. 

Barth, Roland S. Im~roving Schools from Within: Teachers. Parents, and Princiuals Can Make the 

Difference. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990. 

Boshwer, Jack E. Educating America: Lessons Learned in the Nation's Corporations. New York: 

Wiley, 1989. 

Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development. Turning Points. Pre~arin~ American Youth for the 

21st Century. The Report of the Task Force on Education of Young Adolescents. New York: Carnegie 

Corporation, 1989. 

Dede, Christopher. "The Likely Evolution of Computer Use in Schools." Educational Leadership, 

41, no. 1, September 1983, 22-4. 

. "Probable Evolution of Artificial-Intelligence-Based Educational Devices," Technological 

Forecasting and Social Change, 32, 115-33. 

"Education: Choices and Challenges. " State Government News, 32, No. 8, August 1989. 

Jean C. Evans Seminar: Extension Education in the 21st Centurv. Proceedings, September 27-29, 

1989. Chula Vista Resort. Wisconsin Dells, Wisconsin. 

Feichtner, Sheila H. School-to-Work Transition for At-Risk Youth. ERIC Clearinghouse on 

Adult, Career, and Vocational Education. Center on Education and Training for Employment. 
Information Series No. 339. Columbus Ohio: Ohio State university Press, 1989. 

Giordano, Peter. "High School Dropouts: Bibliography-in-Brief, 1986-1988." (Library of 

Congress, Congressional Research Service, 88-580 L.) Washington, D.C.: August 1988. 

Hirsch, E. D., Jr. Cultural Literacv: What Everv American Needs to Know. Boston, Houghton 

Mifflin, 1987. 

Lerman, Robert I., and Hillard Pouncy. "Why America Should Develop a Youth Apprenticeship 

System," Policv Re~ort, No. 5, March 1990, 1-14. 

Lyke, Bob. "High School Dropouts: Current Federal Programs." (Library of Congress, 

Congressional Research Service, 90-144 EPW). Washington, D.C. : March 14, 1990. 

Matthews, Christine M. "Underrepresented Minorities and Women in Science, Mathematics, and 

Engineering: Problems and Issues for the 1990s." (Library of Congress, Congressional Research 

Service, 91-26 SPR). Washington, D.C. : September 5, 1990. 

Means, Barbara, and Michael S. Knapp (eds.) Teaching. Advanced Skills to Educationallv 

Disadvantaged Students. Final Report. Data Analysis Support Center (DASC) Task 4. Prepared for the 

United States Department of Education. Office of Planning, Budget and Evaluation by Policy Studies 

Associates and SRI International. Washington, D.C.: March 1991. 

Redd, Kenneth, and Wayne Riddle. "Comparative Education: Statistics on Education in the 

United States and Selected Foreign Nations." (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 88- 

764 EPW.) Washington, D.C. : November 14, 1988. 

Reich, Robert B. Education and the Next Economv. Professional and Organizational 

DevelopmentIResearch Division. Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1988. 

Resnick, Lauren B. Education and Learning to Think. Committee on Mathematics, Science, and 

Technology Education. Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. National 

Research Council. Washington, D. C. : National Academy Press, 1987. 

Stedman, James B. "The Educational Attainment of Select Groups of 'At-Risk' Children and 

Youth." (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 87-290 EPW.) Washington, D.C.: 

April 1, 1987. 

Tindall, Lloyd W. Retaining - At-Risk Students: The Role of Career and Vocational Education. 

ERIC Clearinghouse on Adult, Career, and Vocational Education. The Center on Education and Training 

for Employment. Information Series No. 335. Columbus Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1988. 

United States. Congress. lolst, 1st Session. House of Representatives. Committee on 

Education and Labor. Proposed Legislation--"Educational Excellence Act of 1989. " (Message from the 

President of the United States.) Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989. 

United States. Department of Labor. Employment and Training Administration. Bureau of 
Apprenticeship and Training. The National Amenticeship Program. Washington, D.C.: 1987. 

Vaughn, Roger K., and Sue E. Berryman. "Employer-Sponsored Training: Current Status, 

Future Possibilities," NCEE Brief, No. 4, November 1989. 

Wells, Amy, and Wendy Schwartz. "The Disadvantaged: Paths to Success," NCEE Brief, No. 

3, April 1989. 
KEY JUDGMENTS 

AMERICAN SOCIETY IN 2015 

- Two powerful trends will profoundly affect American society in coming decades: the 

ever-increasing interconnectedness of the world economy and the steady aging of the U.S. population. 

Economic globalization will challenge U.S. businesses on numerous fronts. The aging population will 

make great demands on U.S. resources, both material and human, through increased needs for pensions 

and medical care. 

- Increasing globalization of the economy will mean that business activity will no longer 

necessarily benefit the U.S. workforce. Corporations may be headquartered in the United States, but 

their manufacturing activity will be undertaken elsewhere. A decline in the overall standard of living is 

likely. 

- Declining living standards will not be limited to manufacturing jobs, but will reach 

white-collar workers as well: the increasing use of computers may create "electronic sweatshops." The 

need for higher productivity and profitability will lead to further compression of the middle management 

positions, indicating fewer employment opportunities for mid-level professionals, hence a lack up upward 

mobility. A two-tiered American workforce will gradually appear: one, relatively small, propsering in 

the new harsh global economy; the other, perhaps three-quarters of workers, able to find only low-paid 

and insecure employment. The buoyant optimism characterizing American society since its inception, 

could be extinguished and create social tensions without precedent. 

- The traditional nuclear family will make up only one-fourth of American households. 

The increase in single-parent families, headed by a woman and having serious economic concerns, is a 

persistent trend. Many of these families will be found in the military and additional family services will 

need to be provided. 

- The increasing number of retirees and the shrinking labor force (a concommitant 

decline in the fertility rate and dramatic increase in longevity) will intensify economic (tax) pressure on 

workers. Also important is the fact that the vast majority of retirees will be white and a higher 

percentage of workers supporting retirees will be nonwhite. Racial and ethnic conflicts could develop. 

- The U.S. Army will have a smaller pool of potential recruits, but may reap the 

benefits of uncertain economic fortunes: in a harsh economic climate and stable long-term employment 

more unlikely, the Army may have the top-quality pool for recruits. This, coupled with the need for 

fewer recruits (assuming the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union has ended), could ensure that the 

Army will have a substantial pool of high-quality applicants from which to choose. 
AMERICAN SOCIETY IN 2015 

INTRODUCTION 

This paper begins with several assumptions: the assumption that there will be no disruptive 

world war or gigantic natural catastrophe in the next decade or two; that the Cold War will come to an 

end in the 1990s and that there will be no nuclear war between the superpowers, whether intentional or 

accidental; and that no crazed Third World dictator or terrorist group will detonate a nuclear device or 

unleash germ warfare within the boundaries of the United States. The latter action, not impossible in 

coming decades, could kill millions of Americans and make whole regions of the country uninhabitable. 

The assumption is, then, that the world of the new century will develop peacefully out of the 

world of today, and that the only warfare experienced by the major industrialized countries will be 

commercial in nature. Western Europe will unite to become a powerful commercial bloc, the Pacific Rim 

will be even stronger economically, and the United States will have its hands full competing in an ever 

more interconnected global economy. 

In this view, the great over-arching change driver in the coming decades will be the challenges 

this new global economy presents to the United States. Americans' lives will be altered by their 

country's attempts, sometimes successful, sometimes not, to hold its own in a much harsher economic 

climate. The country's future commercial dominance is no longer assured, and the lazy business practices 

and casual government trade policies so prevalent in the past will no longer be sufficient. The 1970s and 

1980s were hard decades for the American economy, and in numerous areas, technical and commercial, 

the United States no longer came in first place in the global economic race. No trends indicate that the 

next decades will be any less challenging. 

The trade wars of coming decades will demand much from the United States. However, the 

military role the United States began to play during World War TI and maintained up until the virtual 

collapse of the communist system within the Soviet Union is likely to be no longer necessary, at least on 

such a broad scale. This fact will allow the United States to direct its energies to meet the challenges 

posed by the global economy, challenges that will force the country to adapt itself to new economic 

conditions if it wishes to retain its geopolitical dominance and ensure its citizens a high standard of living. 

In the view of many analysts, the situation is stark. A nightmare scenario is that the United 

States will fail to meet the challenge, and, like so many great powers of the past, will enter a period of 

decline, coming over time to resemble Third World countries that sell raw materials and foodstuffs and 

import finished goods. On the other hand, some futurists of the "gee whiz" variety predict that this 

country will, in the course of the next few decades, transform itself into a post-industrial, high-tech 

society in which an educated population performs satisfying and well-paid work and leads a life of selffulfillment and ease. This forecast is not likely to come to pass, given the recent economic trends 

mentioned above, unless the United States undergoes a dramatic transformation in the next few decades. 

Unfortunately, another scenario is more likely: the United States will remain a manufacturing country, 
but only for certain products, and much of this production will be managed by firms with foreign 

ownership. Some American firms will remain leaders in their specialties, but their focus will be global, 

rather than domestic. Production will occur where it is most advantageous, and the "Americaness" of 

these firms will be only a souvenir of their past history and the location of their headquarters. 

The America of this scenario will differ from the America of the past in that the country's 

traditional belief that all citizens have a good chance for economic betterment will no longer conform to 

reality. The society emerging from this dark scenario will be an Onvellian vision of a prosperous 

minority and an impoverished majority. 

The new society's elite minority will have the skills needed to thrive in the global 

information/service economy. The members of this elite will have work that is pleasant, stimulating, and 

well paid. They will apply their ideas and talents wherever they bring the most advantage; because of 

telecommunications, international boundaries will not exist for them. Their companies will scour the 

earth for business opportunities, and production will be located where conditions are most favorable. 

Profits will accrue to the skilled minority. Their offspring will have access to fine schooling that will 

permit them to follow their parents' careers. 

The poor majority, however, will not be able to meet global challenges, will not be able to 

compete with the low wages paid in the Third World, and will not possess the highly specialized 

analytical skills that would make them valuable to the new global economy. The majority will have to 

be content with dead-end occupations and work as menial physical laborers, low-grade service personnel, 

industrial assembly workers, and routine operators in "electronic sweatshops. " 

Analysts fear that these workers, perhaps as much as 80 percent of the work force, will have 

access only to a mediocre school system, ill-equipped to train them in skills that would make them 

competitive in the global economy. Forced to take low wages because their talents can be bought cheaply 

abroad or are readily available domestically, the majority of the work force will have a declining standard 

of living. The high wages enjoyed by ordinary wage-earners during the first three or four decades after 

World War II will be only a dim memory for this new underclass. [40] 

If existing economic trends continue, this bleak scenario of America's future could become 

reality. The 1980s saw, for example, a decline in the living standards of many ordinary working 

Americans, many of whom are living no better than they did in 1970. In the 1980s, the United States 

became the world's greatest debtor nation and endured an unbroken string of trade deficits. The 

country's national debt tripled, its prison population doubled, and its technical and business dominance 

in many areas was lost. Many Americans came to feel that their country had somehow lost its way, and 

they wondered whether their social and governing institutions were adequate. 

Given these unfavorable trends, some observers have concluded that American society is 

reaching a crisis point, that the 1990s will be the decade in which the country must change significantly 

if its ordinary wage-earners are to retain their privileged place in the world. The challenges posed by 

the new global economy could be the change drivers that would transform this country in the coming 

decades. These challenges might cause American society to become more efficient and solve its problems 
n the most effective way possible. Waste of resources, human and natural, could be reduced to a 

minimum as the United States seeks a secure future. A further result could be that social problems will 

be examined with new eyes, new solutions developed, and new methods devised to implement these 

solutions. 

Many of these new solutions will be unpopular for they will break with established ways of 

thought. Their implementation will require public support, however. Securing this support will require 

much dissemination of relevant information about the workings of a complex society, much discussion 

and argument, and trust in the decisions of an informed public. The serious challenges posed by the new 

global economy will perhaps heighten the overall social consciousness and permit bold and creative 

decisions to be made. 

There is almost universal agreement that the United States of the early 1990s is confronted with 

many serious social problems. Increased incidence of crime, growing health care needs and costs, 

deficiencies in the education system, budget deficits, a decaying infrastructure, an aging population, 

entrenched urban and rural poverty are the most obvious problems. There is not yet, however, much 

agreement about how to deal with them, and this lack of consensus is in itself a serious problem. 

However, the country's tradition of practical optimism makes it possible that solutions will emerge. 

One social trend is certain for the America of the next century. That great bulge of population 

growth, the Baby Boomers, the 76 million Americans born between 1946 and 1964, is aging. Its oldest 

members will become 55 in 2001 and 65 in 2011. Its youngest member can be expected to die at an 

advanced age about the year 2068. The aging of the baby boom will have profound effects on virtually 

all aspects of American society. It will ,be a change driver of unforeseeable dimensions. 

Americans over 65 will take an ever-increasing share of the federal budget. In 1940 this group 

received 2 percent of federal expenditures; in 1970 20 percent; in 1989 27 percent; and in 2001 an 

estimated 30 percent. By 2015 their share will be approaching 33 percent. They will receive government 

funds for their pensions and their health care, and, when they are no longer able to care for themselves, 

for there nursing home care. As they become an ever greater segment of the population, the expense of 

their maintenance will increase almost exponentially, for there will be an even larger number of "old-old" 

people over the age of 80, already the fastest growing group in America. 

By 2015 there will be more than eleven million of the old-old, an age cohort that requires much 

personal care. The prevalence of the old-olds will alter the overall social needs of the elderly. In 1985, 

90 percent of the elderly could care for themselves; by the year 2000 only 80 percent will be able to do 

so. Specialists estimate that one 100-bed nursing care facility will have to be built every day during the 

1990s to meet the growing needs of the elderly. 

Many other needs of the aging population will cause similar shifts in the expenditure of time 

and resources: human, material, and financial. The "graying" of the population will affect all segments 

of society: how it lives, its way of doing business, its politics, its allotment of housing, its way of 

spending leisure time, and its values. 

These two overarching trends, the growth of a competitive world economy and the aging of 
America, will affect the military establishment in numerous bays. The aging population will also take 

an ever greater share of the country's wealth, in addition to no longer being a source of production itself. 

In short, fewer resources will be available for military purposes. If the assumption that the Cold War 

will wane is correct, then there may be a lessened need for as large a military establishment. Even so, 

the scramble for resources to maintain a smaller, but professional and high-tech military will be intense 

and potentially polarizing in the crisis situation facing the United States in coming decades. 

While a military force of some sort will always be essential, military power alone will not be 

a key factor in determining a country's strength in an era of strong commercial rivalries. Countries with 

strong economies will be independent; countries with ailing economies will fare poorly in coming 

decades. The Soviet Union is a military giant, yet it cannot feed its people. The military power of the 

United States cannot stop the decay of the old industrial zones of the northeastern parts of the country 

or cure the social blight of the inner cities. In the face of pressing domestic needs that if not addressed 

threaten this country's health, the military will have difficulty obtaining its desired share of national 

resources. 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE 

Familv 

In the first decades of the new century, the traditional nuclear family of husband, wife, and their 

natural offspring will be the exception rather than the norm. This fact is already the case at the beginning 

of the 1990s, when the "traditional" family makes up only one-fourth of households. The frequency of 

divorce, later marriages and remarriages, relaxed attitudes about extramarital sexual relations, a 

disinclination to marry on the part of many, women's entry into the work place, and the large numbers 

of elderly with deceased spouses are reasons for the declining prevalence of the traditional family. 

Because there seems to be little reason to believe that any of these social trends will diminish, the 

traditional nuclear family will probably retain its minority status in coming years. 

A very disquieting social trend almost certain to continue into the future is the upsurge of 

illegitimacy and single-parent families that took place in the 1970s and 1980s (see Fig. 1). During these 

decades, the U.S. rate of illegitimacy became the highest in the industrial world and yielded a new social 

subgroup of largely fatherless families. This social subgroup showed an unusually short generational 

span. Most of these mothers were teenagers when they first gave birth; they became grandmothers in 

their mid-thirties and great-grandmothers by the age of fifty. 

It is likely that the prevalence of illegitimacy will continue to be socially significant in the next 

century. There is little reason to assume a transformation of popular attitudes about sexual morality. 

American society is now so secular that religious strictures relating to sex have little credence, especially 

for sexually active youth. The economic conditions that make obtaining properly paid employment so 

difficult for many minorities are likely to continue, with the result that many minority males will not be 
able to earn enough to support a family. The establishment of an extensive program of effective sex 

education for America's youth, coupled with a wide dispensing of contraceptives, could reverse the 

prevalence of illegitimacy. The provision of better paying jobs for minorities could reduce the number 

of single-parent families. Given the challenging economic conditions of the next decades, and the 

controversial nature of these social programs, such measures will be difficult to effect. 

The American family is not in danger of extinction. It will continue to be the core unit of 

society in the next century, but trends indicate that it will exist in a variety of forms. Communal 

arrangements, homosexual marriages, transgenerational unions, as well as and other types of families will 

be common. Specialists believe, however, that three family types will be dominant in the early years of 

the next century. [49] 

Closest to the traditional family unit will be first marriages, usually entered into after the couple 

has lived together for a time. Cohabitation, relatively rare in mainstream America as late as the 1960s, 

will likely come to be acceptable and unremarkable by most people in the next decades. Figures illustrate 

an already substantial change in attitudes. In 1964 only 11 percent of couples had lived together before 

marriage; two decades later, the figure was 44 percent. Employment trends also make for differences. 

Unlike what was true in most marriages in the first decades after World War 11, both spouses will be 

employed, and perhaps a quarter of these marriages will be childless. Only better-off families will have 

the economic means for mothers to remain at home and care for the children full-time. 

A second type of family, the single-parent family, will be a result of separation, divorce, or 

illegitimate births. Families of this type will usually be headed by a woman, have serious economic 

worries, and occur with the highest rate of frequency among blacks. 

Most people who divorce eventually remarry and their new unions will create "blended" 

families, the third most common family type. These families will consist of offspring from earlier 

marriages and whole sets of step-relations. One specialist has estimated that over 60 percent of the 

children born in the late 1980s will, at some time in their childhood, live in such families. "Blended" 

families are not especially stable and will yield more divorces and remarriages and even larger "blended" 

families, the size or form of which depend on each family member's position in a large and complex 

system of kinships. A divorced woman, for example, is not likely to regard her former spouse as a 

family member, but her children will if they see their father on a regular basis. Furthermore, they will 

regard his relatives as part of their extended family. In effect, they will have another family apart from 

their mother. A family of this type is very different from the traditional nuclear family, with its two 

parents and four grandparents. Children may emerge from it insecure and emotionally distant, or they 

may thrive on the stimulation provided by the wide variety of relatives with whom they come into 

contact. 
MARITAL STATUS OF TEEN MOTHERS* 

AT FIRST BIRTH 1960 TO 1988 I I I 1 

PERCENT 

M~RR~ED ............... . ........... . .A,. SINGLE AT CONCEPTION ................................. MARRIED AT BIRTH 

SINGLE 

1 * BIRTHS TO TEEN MOTHERS AGE 15-19. 

Fig. 1 
Some observers of the American family see a rebirth of the extended family through the closer 

involvement of older people, not just grandparents or blood relatives, in the lives of families. The large 

numbers of older, yet healthy and energetic, persons in the society could assist the small nuclear family. 

The presence of caring older people could alleviate the need for child care centers, for example. The 

existence of laws in all states that protect grandparents' rights to see their grandchildren indicates the 

increasing importance of older people in the raising of children. Another such indication is the increasing 

use of older people as volunteers in schools. In a society of scarce resources, older people will have 

more to do in the next century. 

These family trends pose difficulties for the military. The trend toward a multiplicity of family 

types will make the provision of family services difficult to plan. The prevalence of single-parent families 

will be seen in military families as well and could make the quick deployment of such parents almost 

impossible if there is no extensive support system of child-care facilities. A soldier concerned about the 

welfare of his or her children will not be totally effective. The lack of family stability in soldiers' lives 

will also affect job performance. A further worry is that the offspring of fluid families will be 

maladjusted and bring their personal problems with them into the military when they become soldiers. 

Soldiers from single-parent families may have suffered deprivations in their childhood and may 

be rather troubled individuals. A special difficulty for the military is that many of the young people from 

families of this kind will not have had a strong authority figure in their lives. For some the military, with 

its set hierarchy, will be a welcome refuge, offering security for the first time in their lives; others will 

find discipline intolerable. 

The emerging trends in the American family are so new that their social results are still 

uncertain. The military establishment will cope with them as best it can. The old army that consisted 

to a large degree of young unmarried male conscripts is long gone. It could perhaps be resurrected 

through a reintroduction of the draft and gradually reducing the number of military families. Resource 

shortages may preclude the many and expensive benefits now offered to military families and destabilizing 

family trends may make the military's present policy of relying on a large professional force consisting 

of married soldiers of both sexes an impossibility in the next century. 

Generational differences 

In the America of the next century, older people will outnumber the young. The median age 

of Americans will rise, going to 37.6 in 2015, compared to 25 in 1965 and 30 in 1980. Some 

calculations indicate that there are presently 28 million Americans over the age of 65; by 2020 there may 

be 60 million. The number of very old, that is, over the age of 85, will increase sharply. At the present 

time about 9 percent of those over 65 are 85 or more; around the year 2015 this figure will increase to 

about 17 percent. 

The maturing Baby Boomers will be, for the most part, fairly well set by the next century. 

Their housing will be paid for. Pensions will have been arranged for the first wave of retirements. 
Many of these older Baby Boomers will be in excellent health-and quite active for the first decade or two 

of their retirement. 

The huge numbers of Baby Boomers will mean that the basic mood of the country will be 

different, for, as always in their life, the Baby Boomers will be the defining center of American society. 

When they were young, Baby Boomers were the raison d'etre of suburbia, the lifestyle that emerged after 

World War II. In the 1960s and early 1970s the fust Baby Boomers reached the independence of early 

adulthood and by their way of living established the youth culture. Some of them were active protesters 

against America's involvement in Vietnam. Many others were, at least for a time, members of the 

counterculture. In the 1980s, some of the younger Baby Boomers became yuppies and colored an entire 

decade by their material success and buying habits. 

The maturing Baby Boomers will cause the 1990s to be a more placid decade than the preceding 

ones. Most Baby Boomers will have established themselves, for better or worse. Their large numbers 

will cause ever more businesses to abandon the diminishing youth market and attempt to meet the needs 

of a rapidly maturing population. The maturing of this great age cohort should cause American society 

to become more reflective and stable, as a middle-aged generation becomes dominant. 

In the first years of the 21st century, the first Baby Boomers will begin to retire. Their material 

concerns are likely to have been largely taken care of, and the older Baby Boomers may, in the opinion 

of some specialists, return to the political and ethical concerns of their youth. Raised in the largely 

carefree 1950s and 1960s by their doting parents, and allowed to be independent-minded, older Baby 

Boomers are often idealistic. Making their way in the increasingly difficult 1970s and 1980s forced them 

to worry about earning a living and raising their children. The 1990s are expected to be a difficult 

decade economically for the United States, but many older Baby Boomers, because of when they were 

born, will have decent employment and housing by the time this decade began. 

According to this proposed scenario, these older Baby Boomers will examine their society and 

their lives, look for ethical coherence, and perhaps bring to American society a new surge of highmindedness. Largely free of material worries for themselves, just as they were in their youth when the 

American economy seemed to promise an ever-increasing standard of living for all, these matured Baby 

Boomers may seek again to reform American society. [42] 

This scenario may prove unfounded. Older people often become conservative with age and, 

with diminishing vitality, more pessimistic and guarded about what is possible or desirable in society. 

Matured Baby Boomers may seek only to ensure their own well-being. Faced with the obviously 

worsening problems of how to care for an aging America and meet pension and health care obligations, 

this generation could become an obstructive force in American society, avoiding the sacrifices and 

preventing the fundamental reforms needed to equip the United States to deal with the very serious 

pension burdens that will become critical in the second and third decades of the new century. The 

following figures show the potential size of this burden. In 1987 each Social Security retiree was 

supported by a 10.1 percent payroll tax on 4.8 workers; in 2027 one estimate sets these figures at 17 

percent and 2.3 respectively. Cost trends of this nature may not bring out the best in people. 
Younger Americans are likely to have a lower standard of living than their parents. Their 

housing will be less good and their career prospects less bright than those of the older generation. It will 

be on their shoulders, however, that the older generation will rest. The growing costs of pensions, the 

older generation's need for medical and nursing care, and the nation's worsening dependency ratio may 

fuel resentments in young workers. It is not at all certain that they will be willing to work quietly to 

support their elders. 

Class 

To a remarkable extent, American society has been freer of resentments stemming from class 

differences than many other societies. There have always been economic classes in the United States, 

but to degree greater than elsewhere, there has been movement between classes. Such movement has 

come about partly through a generally increasing standard of living that, in effect, improved everyone's 

social position and partly through the ability of individuals to climb the social ladder through their own 

abilities and industry. Except for the glaring anomaly of slavery, this country has never had a feudal 

system with its tradition of subservience. Hence, most Americans think their society offers them fair 

chances for betterment. 

Some analysts question if this perception of social opportunity will hold in the next century. 

The coming information/service economy will be one in which advancement generally goes to those with 

highly specialized and expensive training. A further problem is perhaps even more serious. Some 

forecasts fear this new economy will require fewer skilled people than in the past, for automation will 

do many tasks formerly managed by skilled workers. In addition, some analysts predict that computers 

and instant communications will move information up and down a company's chain of command: the 

result will be elimination of many middle management tasks, with a consequent loss of jobs and potential 

advancement for lower management. Firms are thus likely to consist of small numbers of highly trained 

and capable managers with large numbers of workers performing routine and unskilled tasks. 

After World War I1 many unskilled, but unionized, American workers were able to secure wellpaying blue-collar jobs in a large manufacturing sector. This sector is rapidly declining in importance 

as a source of jobs. In the late 1980s, it supplied about 20 percent of jobs; by 2015, it will supply only 

an estimated 10 percent. Also in decline is the American labor movement and the well-paying jobs it 

helped guarantee. In contrast, many of the new jobs created within the service sector are badly paid, 

often only slightly above the minimum wage. [8] 

In addition to lower wages, workers will have less security. The new global informationlservice 

economy will be less stable than the one Americans are used to, and employees will no longer be able 

to count on long-term permanent employment. Workers will often be required to switch jobs, firms, and 

geographical location to remain employed. Such shifting will hurt earnings and exact a psychological toll, 
particularly on those employees who do not have a career, but are merely earning a living. Because most 

wives will be working, geographical mobility for displaced workers will also have an impact on 

marriages. 

This scenario's forecast of reduced opportunities for occupational advancement and a scarcity 

of jobs paying enough to secure at least opportunities for the offspring of ordinary wageearners means 

a reduction of social mobility in American society. A result with potentially wide-ranging consequences 

could be an increasingly rigid social system in which the elite would become more self-recruiting and 

advancement from the ranks of ordinary workers more difficult. 

A reduction of social mobility would soon undermine the long-cherished American belief that 

everyone has a chance for economic and social betterment and deprive the social system of the legitimacy 

that it has enjoyed even in the eyes of most poor Americans. A loss of legitimacy often means social 

unrest. Even during the Depression of the 1930s, the United States saw little revolutionary social 

turbulence compared to many other countries, for most citizens accepted the basic social order. Social 

unrest could become common in the new century if ordinary Americans felt that they had not been given 

fair economic and social opportunities. 

Because it would offer young people from all social backgrounds chances for decent 

employment and social advancement, the military would likely benefit, at least in the short run, from a 

more closed American society. As other options became less readily available, young people would view 

the military as offering a career of steady employment, no longer common in the private sector, and 

perhaps as a means of obtaining valuable training and education. The military's emphasis on ability and 

accomplishment and its egalitarian traditions, combined with lifetime employment, would make it 

attractive to many. Hence, the military would have a large pool of applicants to chose from. In addition, 

because its general living conditions would contrast favorably with those of the private sector, the military 

would also likely have good morale and high retention rates. 

Race 

The United States has made amazing advances in race relations in the decades after World War II. 

Although the country has not reached complete racial harmony by the beginning of the 1990s, the gains 

of previous decades in lessening racial prejudice and discrimination are grounds for assuming that 

substantial progress in this area will continue. Blacks, for example, made impressive gains in education, 

employment, and wage levels. Although, there are good reasons for dissatisfaction about many aspects 

of the social conditions that many blacks still have to endure, a sizeable portion of Black America belongs 

to the middle class. 

Other minority groups have shown similar or even greater progress. For the most part, AsianAmericans have done very well. Their children have become proverbial "curve-busters" in California 

universities. The first wave of Cuban-Americans, those who fled Cuba in the early 1960s, have also 

prospered greatly in their new country. But like Black Americans, not all of these minorities enjoy high 
living standards. Some Asians, the Hmong and Khmers for example, are having difficulty adapting to 

American society. Non-Cuban Hispanics also frequently meet with economic and social difficulties. 

Minority groups are thus not monolithic, and there are no overall trends by which to chart their 

social progress. They differ greatly both within themselves and in relation to other minority groups, and 

their path into the future will vary. For example, they are growing at different rates. Black America 

has a higher birth rate than white America, but it is being overtaken by Hispanics, who sometime early 

in the next century are projected to become the largest ethnic group in America. Asian-Americans, for 

their part, have a higher birthrate than whites or blacks, but lower than Hispanics. 

Poorer blacks and Hispanics do have some features in common. In the coming decades it is 

virtually certain that these two groups will reside to a great extent in the centers of metropolitan areas. 

In 1990 they were already in the majority in a number of large American cities and in the first decade 

of the new century, these two minorities will constitute a majority in just over half the country's 100 

largest cities. 

In the next century, most of America's new jobs will be located in the far-flung suburbs, far 

from the inner city. This trend will mean that many poor blacks and Hispanics will be hurt not only by 

their lack of education, but also by their distance from where jobs exist. For these reasons, then, the 

poor members of these two groups will continue to make up the ranks of much of the poor, having badly 

paid dead-end jobs, or little or no work at all. These two groups will form the most visible parts of the 

American underclass. The white members of this underclass will be much more dispersed, living mainly 

in scattered suburbs and in rural areas. 

It is impossible to know with certainty what race relations will be like in the early decades of 

the next century. There are reasons both for optimism and pessimism. The economic strains resulting 

from the rigors of the global economy will be grounds for worry. There will be disagreements about the 

allotment of scarce financial resources. If there is not enough growth in the economy to carry all groups 

upward, then claims on the funds available for direct government intervention to help disadvantaged 

groups could be very keen and call forth racial resentments, already festering or dormant. 

Grounds for optimism are the great material and social gains achieved by many members of 

minority groups in recent decades and their successful integration into mainstream American society. The 

lessening of racism in social institutions, most notably the successful attempts of the American military 

to ease racial tensions and create equality, is one of the most encouraging signs that the United States can 

become a peaceful, multiracial society. Young people, too, seem to be less prejudiced than their parents, 

a fact noticed by many specialists when young people of different races mix freely together. Interracial 

dating, still troubling to many people, is accepted by such youngsters as an ordinary everyday occurrence. 

In addition, modern media, such as television and the movies, allow America's many different ethnic 

groups the opportunity to become familiar with one another and hence reduce racial hostility. [30] 

A final reason for hope is that the United States is committed by law to the equal treatment of 

all ethnic groups. If not always realized in practice, equal treatment is a widely supported principle and 

unlikely to be revoked in the foreseeable future. All ethnic groups have organizations manned by skilled 
lawyers ready to represent and defend their rights in courts of law. On occasion the courts must deal 

with absurd or wrong-headed cases of alleged discrimination, but their obligation to do so protects the 

rights of all groups. Mutual affection may not result from these cases, but toleration and perhaps even 

respect do. There is no reason to believe that equality under the law will not be the case in the America 

of the next century. 

The military will be much affected by the race relations within society as a whole. If they are 

good, the military will have a easier time ensuring that relations within its organization are smooth. Bad 

relations will make the military's task more difficult. In the past, however, the U.S. military has been 

a path-breaker in reducing racial discrimination, and there is no reason to assume that this tradition will 

not continue. If race relations in the United States became very bad, something that is not expected, then 

the military would be affected as well, perhaps to such an extent that it could not perform its tasks 

effectively. 

The military is likely to be only marginally affected by the social problems of minorities. A 

smaller military will need fewer personnel, and screening procedures should allow the military to select 

only those likely to serve satisfactorily. Despite the smaller numbers of young people available in coming 

decades, the military will need fewer to fill its reduced size. The social conditions sketched out in the 

previous section would, if they come to pass, make military service attractive to youths from all social 

groups. 

Gender 

There are good reasons to be optimistic about women's place in the America of the future. The 

gains made by the women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s seem to be permanent. Although some 

segments of American society would like to see women return to being uniquely housewives and mothers, 

or, if they work, remain in the "pink ghetto" occupations of teacher, nurse, and secretary, most 

Americans have come to terms with women's rights. It is difficult to imagine any political movement 

that would seek to undo the social trends that have brought women greater equality in recent decades. 

In addition, economic trends have made employment outside the home a necessity for most women, 

married or not. 

The gains of the women's movement in the last 25 years have been great, so much so that 

American society has experienced a virtual revolution in these years. As Table 1 shows [13], the number 

of women receiving college degrees and advanced degrees has increased almost exponentially since 1970, 

and women have entered the professions at an amazing rate. 
TABLE 1 

University Degrees Earned by Women in the United States 

(in percentages) 

11 Accounting 1 10 141 160 

Business 

Armed with college degrees, women have entered the professions at an unprecedented rate. 

Women's entry into the business world has been especially marked: in 1970 women represented only 1 

percent of business travellers; by 1990, they represented 30 percent. Their share is expected to increase 

even more in the 21st century. 

Women still hold relatively few top management positions. This situation will change in the 

coming quarter century as many of those who entered business in the last two decades acquire experience 

and reach the age at which people usually assume the highest positions. If for no other reason, the sheer 

number of women professionals will crack the so-called "glass ceiling" that up to now has limited a 

woman's rise to the upper levels of management. 

Women will also excel in the running of small firms. Small businesses are a very important 

segment of the American economy, and they will grow more important in the future. At present, 

businesses with less than 100 employees employ some 80 percent of the work force. In the coming 

decades, smaller contracting firms will replace many of America's larger businesses. Women are already 

well represented in this area, having set up about one-third of small businesses on their own in the 1980s. 

In the United States, women are still grossly under-represented on a percentage basis in politics 

at the national level. At the local and state level, however, women are winning an ever increasing 

number of elective offices, by some counts registering a 300 percent gain in recent years. It is only a 

matter of time until women come to hold many seats in congress, head government agencies, take a 

greater share of cabinet posts, and even are serious contenders for the presidency. 

In some respects, however, women have done poorly and can be expected to do worse in the 

Law 

Medicine 

Computer Science 

Agriculture 

Architecture 

Engineering 

12 

15 

24 

7 

21 

1 

37 

28 

30 

29 

28 

9 

53 

48 

48 

35 

35 

25 
future. Poverty has become ever more "feminized," mainly because women have increasingly become 

the heads of single-parent households. This situation is most true among Black Americans, where the 

number of unwed teenaged mothers among the poor has reached catastrophic proportions. The frequency 

of divorce has meant that many middle-class white women have also become impoverished. 

Women's presence in the work place and the increase in the number of single-parent families 

will make the provision of childcare a key social issue in the 1990s. Not only will the civilian sector 

have to confront this issue, but the military will as well. Table 2 [29] illustrates how pressing this need 

has become. 

TABLE 2 

Number of Children with Mothers in the Workforce, 

Selected Years. 1970-1988 

Also certain to plague American society in the decades to come will be the many problems 

connected with the increasing number of unwed teenaged mothers. Possible remedies will cause much 

social discord and consume significant resources. Failure to assist the children and mothers involved will 

require even greater expenditures down the road into the next century. 

The American military has been much affected by the revolution in women's role in society. 

It has made bold attempts to come to terms with this role, but so far with mixed results. In the first 

decades of the new century, the many women admitted to the service academies will be eligible to fill 

many of the military's top positions. This they will likely do, with only occasional friction, for the 

women promoted to these positions will be individuals who adapted well to the demands and 

circumstances of military life. Many other women will not have dealt so well with these conditions, and 

will have left the military earlier, probably at a rate higher than their male counterparts. 

Arranging provisions to deal with military families will cause much trouble and perhaps require 

a reconsideration of policies now in effect. The lower pay of enlisted personnel, coupled with a less 

serious commitment to their careers, will cause many enlisted women with children to have a troubled 

Year 

1970 

1975 

1980 

Under Age 6 

28.5 

36.1 

43 .O 

6-13 Years of Age 

n.a. 

40.6 

55.7 
and only short-term service career. Given the possibility fo; a more peaceful world order in the next 

century, fewer U.S. service personnel are likely to be stationed abroad, but instead be deployed overseas 

for only brief campaigns. This situation will reduce stress on female soldiers with children, but not 

eliminate them. Family difficulties that showed up during "Desert Storm" indicate that new policies will 

have to be worked out if the military continues to allow women a service role nearly identical to that of 

men. 

SOCIAL WELFARE 

The United States has many serious and worsening social problems. There is little argument 

about this fact, but much disagreement about how to deal with these problems. A key assumption of this 

paper is that the rigors of a highly competitive global economy will force the country to devise new ways 

to draw maximum advantage from its most important resource, its citizens. An unhealthy population, 

badly trained and poorly motivated, can only be a drag on the country's competitiveness. Hence, the 

press of economic necessity will be the change driver that pushes American society to deal boldly and 

creatively with long-standing social ills and render its work force as productive as that of its chief rivals 

abroad. Remedies now seen as controversial and experimental will be adopted to deal with social 

problems that traditional methods failed to cure. The devising of new means to deal with drug abuse will 

be an example of the trend toward a objective and rational solution of social problems. 

Some specialists contend that radical means will adopted within a decade or so to deal with the 

consumption of drugs that are now illegal. At the present time, drug abuse is devastating segments of 

American society. The war against drug abuse and trafficking has led to a doubling of the country's 

prison population in the 1980s; according to some estimates, the number is scheduled to double again in 

the 1990s. This increase has meant that the United States has, in relative terms, the largest prison 

population in the world. 

The recently mounted War on Drugs has had little positive effect. Specialists note that the 

prevalence of drug abuse depends largely on social factors, not on law enforcement. The costs of 

maintaining an enormous prison population, most often young men in their late teens and early twenties, 

will come to appear too expensive and ineffective to be continued. The now radical approach of 

legalizing many drugs now illicit and spending money on sound education about the dangers of drugs and 

on rehabilitation of addicts, will, in the view of some specialists, come to be seen over the course of the 

next few years as the most efficient way of dealing with the drug problem. These specialists contend that 

this solution will be accepted because traditional methods failed, and consumed too much in the way of 

human and material resources. If these specialists are correct, in the next century drug addiction will 

come to be treated much as alcoholism is today, and most American's will view the War on Drugs much 

as they now judge the 1920s' experiment with Prohibition. 

Rapidly growing pension and health care costs, already a serious public issue, will be even more 

burdensome in the next century. The aging of American society gives this issue an actuality that 
increases daily. Finding fair and efficient means for dealing with it will mean making choices that will 

shape American society for years to come. Because choices made imply options closed off, the 

management of the issue has become a significant change driver for American society. 

Pensions 

Baby Boomers will begin to retire early in the new century. The so-called dependency ratio, 

the ratio of workers to non-workers, will gradually worsen. A diminishing work force will have to pay 

for an increasing number of retirees. In the 1980s, worry about the long-term health of the Social 

Security system led to reform; for example, the long-standing retirement age of 65 was increased to 67, 

beginning early in the next century. In the future, retirement age will probably be moved back even 

more, to 70 perhaps. The change is a logical one, for improved health among the nation's population 

means that old age starts later now than it did in the past. A male who retired in 1940 at age 65, for 

example, could expect to live for 7 years after his retirement, compared to 10 years in 1970 and 15 years 

in 1990. 

Early retirement will become less common in the next century, for studies show that retirement 

at age 60 can cost a pension fund two times more than one begun at 67. Part-time work by the elderly 

will become more common. Use of older people on a part-time basis has already proved very 

economical. Part-time workers, for example, have been found to produce more on an hourly basis than 

full-time workers. 

The military will also be touched by these trends. As military pensions (or "retirement pay") 

come to consume an ever larger share of the nation's resources, their generous provisions will probably 

be cut back and retirement after 20 years of service may no longer be allowed. Today's healthier 

population means that 40- and 50-year olds are generally quite fit, able to sustain themselves even in hard 

conditions. This fact will be reflected in how long career personnel serve. If a completely professional 

military becomes too expensive, it may be replaced by a model common in Europe. This model has a 

small professional cadre that serves through age 50, and then retires on a pension or shifts to employment 

elsewhere; a larger highly trained group that serves long-term enlistments, but leaves the service without 

pensions; and many draftees who serve a year or two, then enter an active or inactive reserve. No 

European nation has been able to afford a military retirement system like that of the United States, and 

this country, no longer incomparably wealthy as it was in the first decade or two after World War II, may 

be obliged to follow Europe's method of managing military pensions. 

Pensions will present another problem: pension portability, that is, how to maintain an already 

existing pension plan with a new employer. The informationlservice economy will mean that employees 

will often change jobs, making pension portability of crucial importance. Federal employees have long 

been able to take their pensions with them if they stay within the federal work force and reforms in the 

1980s have broadened their options regarding pension portability. Retired military personnel can also 

attach their military career to time spent in government service for pension purposes. This right lessens 
the financial burden of allowing soldiers to retire with a after twenty years of military service. 

Eventually, military pensions also could be made applicable to the private sector. For many workers in 

the private sector, however, solutions are only gradually being worked out. 

Pension plans will become even more important for wage-earners in the future because declining 

average incomes have meant that fewer Americans are able to prepare for their old age through personal 

savings. But ways will have to be found to pay for these pensions. The Social Security payroll tax is 

already a serious burden for ordinary wage-earners. Plans to reduce or increase this tax can have 

political effects so vast and unforeseeable, that politicians from the president down fear for their careers 

when they have to deal with the issue. Choices will have to be made, however, and these choices will 

have to be both effective and enjoy the support of the electorate. If the choices are not seen as fair, 

ordinary people will not support them. If choices are not wise, retirement costs could become so great 

that they will damage the economy. Young workers could refuse to pay them, and businesses will not 

be able both to meet them and remain competitive internationally. 

Health Care 

An aging population will need more care. Medical care, in turn, is becoming increasingly 

expensive; many specialists in medical care see the present American system nearing the crisis stage. 

Costs rose so much during the 1980s that only wealthy Americans need not worry about the devastating 

effects of catastrophic illnesses that can quickly wipe out a lifetime of careful saving. At the beginning 

of the 1990s, only about 10 percent of Americans were basically satisfied with their system of health 

care; 60 percent thought that it needed fundamental changes, and 29 percent believed it needed to be 

completely rebuilt. It is not only ordinary Americans who are threatened by high costs; many leading 

corporations contend they can no longer pay for their employees' health care and remain competitive in 

the global economy. Many poorer Americans, those outside the economic mainstream, have no access 

to medical insurance at all and must rely on Medicaid, a program said by some specialists to be headed 

for bankruptcy in a few years. Medicare, established for older Americans, appears on a sounder footing, 

but in coming decades will consume ever more of the federal budget. 

Devising means to provide adequate medical care to all Americans while controlling costs will 

be one of the most important political issues of the coming decade. The debate will have an ethical 

component as well, for the country will probably have to weigh rationing medical care, not only to the 

elderly, but to the population at large. Choices will be made about the costs, both ethical and material, 

of allocating great resources for so-called "heroic" measures to extend the lives of the terminally ill and 

aged. Should money formerly spent on such measures instead go for a universal system of extensive 

prenatal care, for example? 

The problems of rising costs, inadequate care for many, an increasingly aged society ever more 

in need of medical care, and the increasing specialization of medicine brought about by scientific advances 

have led some observers to foresee a more comprehensive system that will make medical care available 
for all. Given America's individualistic traditions, and th; lobbying power of the health insurance 

industry, this system will not necessarily resemble European national health plans, but is more likely to 

be set up by individual states and combine universal guarantees of health care with the resources of 

existing private health plans. 

The social and financial costs connected with large numbers of people without sufficient medical 

care will be the change driver for this development. It will be seen that overall medical costs can be 

reduced by an increased emphasis on preventive care. An extensive pre- and postnatal program for all 

mothers will mean lower social expenditures of a corrective nature in the long run. A greater knowledge 

of what constitutes health, rather than a concentration on illnesses, will make for a healthier population. 

Many companies will reward employees who have health-enhancing habits; such an approach will also 

benefit American society. Health care for the elderly will, to some extent, be rationed. The overall 

needs of society will outweigh those of the old, whose medical care in the last few months of their life 

can consume medical resources that would otherwise benefit many younger persons. 

Specialists foresee a smaller number of hospitals and an increased number of clinics offering 

ambulatory care. The first of these small facilities appeared only in the 1970s. By 1990 there were 

many thousands of them, and their numbers will grow in the future. These clinics have the advantage 

of easy accessibility for the public and are relatively inexpensive to operate because they are not equipped 

with very expensive and specialized high-tech equipment. Medical technology of this kind will be located 

in large regional hospitals that can treat illnesses beyond the capacity of clinics. Most of these hospitals 

will be owned and operated by a few large national firms. Independent, locally owned institutions will 

largely be a thing of the past. Specialists also predict that in the next century most American doctors will 

be salaried personnel, working for the few large health-care organizations. 

Many observers see trends and social phenomena that point toward an increasingly tolerant and 

pluralistic society in the America of the next century. However morally abhorrent or distasteful some 

behavior may be to most people, if no definite moral or physical harm can be proven, there seems to be 

an increasing likelihood that it will be permitted. To a degree unparalleled in world history, laws are 

now in place protecting behavior that in the recent past would have been quickly repressed or hidden 

behind the veil of hypocrisy. 

Even the political influence of the Moral Majority movement in the first half of the 1980s, could 

not prevent the rise of tolerance. Many Baby Boomers adopted the economic laissez-faire politics of the 

Reagan administration, but these same conservative Baby Boomers also applied this live-and-let-live 

philosophy to the private lives of others. Early in the second half of the 1980s the Moral Majority 

withdrew from the political arena and disbanded itself. 

The revolution in telecommunications taking place, the last few decades has affected values. 

Only the most secluded American can escape being confronted at every turn by different ways of living 
and different attitudes about values. Americans outside of even the smallest town soon learn that anyone 

they may meet may hold opinions about morality, politics, and aesthetics that are very different from their 

own. This fact means that polite tolerance soon becomes a necessity if people are going to deal with each 

other on a day-today basis. This co-existence with others of radically different mindsets gradually brings 

about the ability to appreciate a multiplicity of views. It also brings with it the realization that when there 

are radically different views about the solution of common problems, creative methods must be devised 

to find mutually satisfactory solutions. The constant and increasing exposure of Americans to differing 

belief systems, is causing more time to be spent on learning conflict-resolution techniques, even at the 

grade-school level. To a greater degree than now, Americans of the next century will be skilled at 

dealing with a wide range of values. Provinciality may well become a thing of the past.[l8] 

The increasingly complex and interconnected society of the next century is likely to engender 

a new concern for the welfare of all citizens. It may become clearer than ever before that the misfortunes 

of individuals or particular groups hinder the progress of society as a whole. A feeling of shared destiny 

may become the hallmark of American society. Environmental concerns will contribute to this. The 

damage done to the environment in earlier, less informed times, will be obvious, and the common efforts 

and sacrifices needed to repair it and to prevent additional harm to our common natural world, will serve 

to heighten concern for the welfare of society as a whole. 

If it does prove to be the case that the age of superpower rivalry is past, then the United States 

is not likely to need as large a military establishment in the future as it has in the past. The existence of 

a smaller professional armed force is not assured, however, for economic conditions may make such a 

force too expensive. For this reason it may be necessary to reinstitute a draft system. A universal draft, 

possibly registering women as well as men, would not be seen as fair, however, for given the large size 

of age cohorts in this country, most young people would not be inducted into military service. For these 

reasons, it might prove useful to establish a new form of national service, one with both military and 

civilian components. Young people could be called up for two years and allowed to decide where they 

would serve. Social work, rehabilitation of the environment, or service in a small armed forces could 

be among the options. Given the fact that most youths would not be soldiers, physical and mental 

requirements could be set at such a level that virtually all young people, males and females, even the 

disabled and mildly retarded, would be involved. The term of service could be inexpensive, would 

provide the country with a directed work force to deal with problems of all varieties, would mix young 

people of all classes and races, help inculcate common values, and would tap the wells of idealism 

typically a characteristic of youth. [35l 

American society has always been markedly religious. There is no reason to believe that 

religion will not remain vitally important to many Americans in the next century, but is likely to differ 

from today in that many smaller churches will have appeared, and some "faiths," like the New Age 
movement, only loosely defined as religions, may be widespread. During the 1980s, the older established 

churches lost members. In order to retain their membership, they frequently relaxed their stands on 

religious doctrine or social issues, or they gave way to more radical groups within their membership. 

Part of the established churches' greater liberality was a reflection of a more tolerant mainstream 

America. The tensions that shifting values can call forth within church organizations was especially 

noticeable within the Roman Catholic church. Since the hierarchy remained quite conservative during 

the long papacy of John Paul I1 and did moderate its doctrinal positions, many of the lower clergy paid 

only lip service to their church's stands. In private they counselled their flock to follow their own 

conscience. 

In recent years mainstream religions have been the source of much opposition to the use of U.S. 

armed forces abroad. This trend is likely to increase in the future, as mainstream religions become more 

dominated by people born after World War I1 and who therefore have never experienced a long and 

difficult, but popularly supported, military intervention abroad. The continued presence of this opposition 

movement in the churches is likely to be less important in the future because wars are likely to be short, 

or involve few troops, or if these conditions are not possible, will not be waged unless wide public 

support is certain. 

Fundamentalist religions will continue to play a role in society, perhaps much as they do today, 

but this role will continue be a secondary one, highly visible, but not dominant. The political influence 

fundamentalism enjoyed in the early 1980s through the Moral Majority movement is unlikely to be 

repeated in a increasingly tolerant America. Legal initiatives sponsored by fundamentalists are likely to 

be occasionally successful on a local or state level but be struck down by higher courts if they abridge 

the rights of others. The traditionally fervent patriotism of fundamentalism may well be tempered by the 

increasing complexity and interconnectedness of the world. 

America is still overwhelmingly Christian, but not to the degree it was formerly. In addition 

to the long-established Jewish population, most of whose forebears arrived in this country before World 

War I, there has been a more recent influx of Muslims, although many Americans of Arabic extraction 

are Christian. In the last few decades many immigrants have come from India and Asia and an estimated 

one million Buddhists now live in the United States. This multiplicity of old and established religions will 

also likely lessen the influence of fundamentalism in the future. 

America has a long history of do-it-yourself religions, and this tradition will continue unabated 

into the new century. People will fashion religions of their choosing. As before, there will be religions 

that preach "feel good" messages and garner large, if not solid, followings. Some of the new faiths will 

not be Christian, but assemble a worldview out of anything handy. In the 1980s, the "New Age" religion 

(or is it a life style?) attracted a good deal of attention. With little mental or moral strain, but with some 

financial sacrifice, this faith offers its followers advice, contentment, physical health, and even spiritual, 

or spiritualistic, excitement. This particular sect and others like it may fade away before the new century 

arrives, but similar "faiths" or "modes" will likely replace it. 
Americans will live somewhat differently in the next century, although changes will be of 

degree, rather than kind. The trend away from the classic nuclear family is likely to continue (the results 

of this trend have been sketched out in an earlier section). The most striking changes in how Americans 

live, and perhaps the most painful, will be connected with changes in the ways they earn their living. 

The trend toward the new interconnected real-time global informationlservice economy will 

force fms to adapt to changing business conditions. The new conditions will mean constantly evolving 

job requirements and a highly flexible work force. Workers will change jobs often. An increasing 

number of workers will be hired via short- or long-term contracts. Once contracts are completed, 

workers will have to secure new ones to earn their livelihood. Companies will become smaller. The 

enormous factories that have dominated the manufacturing sector since the early Industrial Revolution 

will give way to many smaller firms located in industrial parks. Workplaces of this nature are easily 

opened and just as quickly shut down, making for much employment insecurity. 

These trends will affect where people live. The old urban centers will continue to lose 

population, while a network of small population clusters will spring up beyond the suburbs built in the 

post-war era. Commuting will more often than not be between these new rurallsuburban centers, rather 

than involve a long trek into the core city. The distinction between rural and urban will lose much of 

its importance and be replaced by this mix of urban, suburban, and satellite areas. 

As much of the work of the new century will be done on computers that can easily be connected 

to one another and to a corporate headquarters, more Americans will probably be working at home. The 

expected increase in the number of self-employed and contract employees will also favor this trend and 

likewise permit more part-time work, more flexible schedules, and make job-sharing more common. The 

trek of large numbers of employees to and from their workplace at the sound of a whistle will be an 

anachronism. 

An unfortunate consequence of this ever-widening and thinning web of habitation will be the 

continued decay of the old urban centers and the isolation of minority groups living in them, trends 

already well established today. Innovative social policies might alleviate the problems of inner cities, but 

their implementation may be difficult in the harsher economic conditions of the next century. 

This study assumes that the trend toward an increasingly tolerant America will continue. As 

a result of trend, minority groups will have a greater feeling of self-worth and increasingly come to 

celebrate their heritages. Their numbers, the economic success of a good part of their members, and 

their greater self-confidence may mean that in regions where they predominate, their cultures will 

flourish. Examples of this today are the highly successful Asian-American communities of California. 

As the time approaches when whites become one minority among many (estimated by some to 

occur around the middle of the next century), the country may come to consist of regions where one or 

several minorities predominate, each with its unique flavor. The United States could become, in effect, 

the United Peoples of America. A potential disruptive aspect of this trend is that it could increase 
regionalization and might make framing nation-wide policiessmore difficult than it is today. 

Retirees are another social group that may come to impose their character upon certain regions 

of the country. Large numbers of the able-bodied retired may also come to dominate in more areas than 

at present; currently only Florida and Arizona have socially significant numbers of retirees. These older 

people, relatively affluent, will change the areas in which they live by the way they spend their time and 

money and by their social and political concerns. 

A number of major American corporations are already preparing for the large market of older 

people who will want to live in retirement communities. This trend will continue, even though retirement 

specialists have found that most retirees remain in the towns in which they spent their working lives. A 

new development in this housing market, however, will be the construction of centers for older 

Americans who can no longer completely manage their own care. Until their mid-seventies, most older 

people are self-sufficient; thereafter, they become ever more dependent on the care of others. Some large 

corporations are already planning to meet the needs of this population group. 

Many older people will be well-provided with housing, however, even having more than they 

need. Many will sell their large homes, acquired when they were raising their families, for something 

smaller. Many will remain where they are and perhaps divide their homes into several smaller 

households. Younger people will likely find housing costs often beyond their means, so a sharing of a 

house with some older people, perhaps their parents, is seen by specialists as likely to become more 

common in the future. An Australian housing variant, the so-called "granny shack," that is, a smaller 

dwelling next to the family house to which older people might move after their grown children start their 

own families, is also seen as a likely trend in the future. 

Retirees will often be "house-rich" and "cash-poor." A likely response to this situation will be 

so-called reversed mortgages, by which older people pledge their house to a financial organization, to be 

ceded upon death, in exchange for ready capital. Variants of the device are being worked out already 

and will become common in the next century. 

POLITICS 

If the Cold War does come to an end in the early 1990s and, as a result, the United States is 

not involved in any serious large-scale conflicts, then American politics in the next decades will likely 

center on domestic issues. The portion of the budget going to defense will decline, with funds instead 

going for domestic purposes. It is likely, however, that the most important domestic political issue will 

be, in essence, international: namely, what political measures will be undertaken to ensure that the United 

States is competitive in the global economy. In short, the great change driver in American politics in the 

coming decades will be how this country deals with the trend towards an interconnected world market. 

Choices will be made about how much government intervention in economic affairs is permissible and 

advisable, how to ameliorate social ills that consume material and human resources, how to train and 

educate Americans to prosper in the new economy, how to improve the country's infrastructure, and how 
to best manage the aging of America, to name only one of this country's most pressing future concerns. 

If, for reasons outlined above, the United States becomes a more tolerant country, then racial 

or ethnic tensions will be less a generation hence than they are today. On the other hand, economic 

trends are likely to strengthen tensions stemming from economic or class differences. Public disorders 

growing out of these tensions could be an ever-present danger if many Americans feel they have not had 

fair economic opportunities. In that case, resources would have to be allotted to deal with these potential 

outbreaks of violence and, as in many other countries, the military may have to concern itself with 

domestic threats as well as external ones. 

Political parties will continue to play key roles in politics but they are likely to be less important 

than they are today and function to a greater degree than today as frameworks in which individual 

politicians pursue their own objectives. Party discipline has always been weak in American politics. 

Because the United States has shunned the principle of proportional representation, making it extremely 

difficult for small parties to achieve a political foothold, American parties are to some degree coalitions, 

often with members who are ideologically opposed to one another. This lack of coherence in political 

parties will increase as problems become increasingly serious. Innovative members of both parties will 

respond creatively to these problems, often forming coalitions with members of opposing parties to 

achieve results. Coalition formation is likely to become an even stronger trend in the future as traditional 

America gradually fades away, to be replaced by something new. 

The coalition built by Roosevelt may largely disappear in the coming decades. The south is 

already no longer solidly Democratic, the unions and their membership, will be fragmented and 

diminished, and minority voters are more likely to approve policies that match their individual place in 

the economy or society than to vote in a racial bloc. Republicans will also have few certain voting 

blocks. If the south will no longer be controlled by the Democratic Party, it will not be tied completely 

to the GOP either. The midwest farm vote will have vanished with the passing of the small farm, and 

agribusiness, while rich, will not control many votes. The millions of white collar and new collar 

workers, that is workers in lower level service jobs, will be a fickle group, largely unpredictable in their 

voting habits. Also unpredictable will be the many new entrepreneurs that will emerge in the new 

informationlservice society. Global in outlook out of necessity and pro-business because of their 

occupations, they will be liberal or at least tolerant in their social attitudes. A relatively peaceful world 

and a reconfigured Soviet Union will make anti-communism seem quaint to them. Older Americans will, 

of course, be a sizeable group in society. They will have the highest percentage of voters and a number 

of strong concerns, notably pensions and health care, but their attitudes on many issues are likely to vary 

just as much as they do in other age groups. 

Given the economic rigors of the coming decades, some political analysts believe that in the 

future, American parties, or at least segments of them, will adopt more pragmatic positions on social and 

economic issues. The leftlright clashes of earlier decades will seem less relevant in the new century, and 

the overriding importance of a smoothly functioning economy may submerge other issues, or cause them 

to be handled differently. For example, affirmative action may be gradually displaced by a policy of 
creating opportunities for everyone. The need for almost everyone to be continuously retrained will mean 

the establishment of education programs that will address the needs of all citizens, not just disadvantaged 

groups and the young. The fact that nearly all Americans will feel the cool winds of the new global 

economy, that all wage-earners, skilled and unskilled alike, will know economic insecurity may make 

many former concerns seem parochial and allow new feelings of solidarity across the nation as a whole. 

1391 

Generations at odds 

Given the continuance of existing trends, it is possible that disputes between generations about 

how the country's resources should be allocated will be at the forefront of domestic politics in the first 

decades of the next century. The prime concerns of older Americans will be their pensions and their 

health and nursing care. Younger Americans will be concerned about the economy, their standard of 

living, their prospects for the future, and the education of themselves and their children. 

The largest lobbying group in the United States in 1991 is the American Association of Retired 

Persons. One of its publications, Modern Maturitv, has a larger readership than either Reader's Digest 

or TV Guide. Older people are organized, are the most likely to vote (see Fig. 2), and have more people 

their own age in Congress than any other group. Although older people have good reasons for their 

demands and entitlements, it is possible thattyounger people will come to believe that the old take too 

much of the country's finite resources. The ever-worsening U.S. dependency ratio will make meeting 

the elderly's demands increasingly difficult for the working population. 

Disputes between the generations could come to have a racial or ethnic component. For the 

coming decades at least, most of older America will be white. It could eventually be the case that an 

older White America, while willing to pay taxes for the benefit of its own children, will not be willing 

to apply resources for the education of increasing numbers of Hispanic, Asian, and black children. 
Fig. 2 
Re~ional and Interest Politics 

It is reasonable to assume that politics on a subnational level will come to be more important in 

the next century. The complexity of the tasks that political bodies will confront might be more 

manageable if town, state, and regional governments, rather than the national government, deal with 

them. For this reason, new governing mechanisms are likely to be developed, or, at the very least, 

existing governing bodies will be improved, to deal with public issues in the coming decades. 

In its effort to develop a more efficient and dynamic society, the American people will devise new 

bodies to govern the vast metropolitan areas that already cut across municipal, county, and state 

boundaries. Greater Los Angeles has an economy that in size exceeds that of many nations. The 

Baltimore-Washington area will be ever more closely interconnected in the next century. Greater New 

York will extend ever further outward from Manhattan. The vast urbanized region extending from 

Boston to Washington (BosWash) already contains one-sixth of the nation's population on 2.1 percent of 

its land, and by 2015 will contain an even larger share of this country's people, packed ever more densely 

together. A counter trend to this increasing concentration in certain areas, generally along the nation's 

coasts, will be an emptying out of other regions, most notably the rural areas of the midwest where many 

small towns are already in the process of disappearing. 

Creating new mechanisms to govern these collections of human beings will take much political 

energy. Entrenched politicians will not want to cede power to larger, overarching entities. Inner-city 

politicians will not be eager to share power with suburban leaders, who, in turn, will not want to saddle 

their districts with the expensive problems of the core city. Governing entities will be developed to deal 

with the problems and goals of the larger regions. Business, social, and environmental concerns of these 

regions will be managed by new regional governing bodies that will have the power to overrule traditional 

political bodies. [15] 

How far this political reformation will extend is uncertain. The division of the United States into 

fifty states is no longer particularity efficient. Getting extremely diverse states to agree on common 

policies is frequently impossible. Arizona has little in common with New Hampshire, other than both 

are parts of the United States. States are frequently divided against themselves. Flat eastern Colorado 

has very different concerns than mountainous western Colorado. Northern Virginia is part of BosWash, 

unlike the state's tobacco-growing counties. 

Forced by the international economy to manage its resources better, the United States will 

experiment with alternative ways of governing itself. Perhaps some kind of Regional Congress will be 

devised, one that has only advisory powers but is able to lobby foreign firms for investments. This 

Regional Congress could be the site where regional parties, that is, parties bound together by common 

concerns and shared values and attitudes, would be active. 

This possibility is not as farfetched as it might first appear. For example, one student of this 

country, the journalist Joel Garreau, divides the United States into nine nations (see Fig. 3). He includes 

in this construction large parts of Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean. He sees North America as 
consisting of New England and its extension into Canada; ~uebec; the Foundry, often frequently referred 

to as the Rust Bowl; the Breadbasket (central Canada, much of the midwest, and northern Texas); Dixie 

(including the eastern third of Texas and northern Florida); the Islands (southern Florida and the 

Caribbean islands); Mexamerica (western Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, southern California, and much 

of Mexico); the Empty Quarter (mountain states and the Rockies in Canada); and Ecotopia (northern 

California, Oregon, Washington, western Canada, and southern coast of Alaska). However crude 

Garreau's design, it conforms much more closely to social and economic realities than does the current 

political delineation of North America. 

Some regions will be more successful than others in the new century. Silicon Valley, the 

Minneapolis-Saint Paul area, and greater Washington are likely to fare better than the urban centers of 

the Rust Belt. It is conceivable that successful areas, having much in common, might join together to 

lobby governing bodies for their purposes. With great financial resources and the best brains money can 

buy at their disposal, a so-called High-TechIService Association would have much success in forwarding 

its interests. These areas, well connected to the global economy, could have very different domestic and 

foreign agendas than areas not prospering in the next century. 

Will prosperous regions be willing to help poorer regions? Will there be there be a national 

agency that steers "seed money" to areas in distress? In the Brave New World of the coming century, 

will there be a feeling that all Americans are in the same boat, or will a philosophy of Social Darwinism 

determine public policy? These are issues that will set public debate in the next century. 

Television transformed American politics in just a few decades. The 1948 presidential campaign 

is said to have been the last in which television played no part. The computer information network 

already in existence is certain to expand in the next 25 years and create what could be called a 

microelectronic society in which large segments of the population will be "in touch" electronically with 

the larger world. For example, interest groups of all stripes will carefully monitor government and 

business decisions affecting them via large data banks earmarked to their specifications. Apprised of a 

happening that affected it, an interest group will inform its members and take appropriate action. This 

ability of immediate response to even the slightest of events, will, in effect, give America a "hair trigger" 

democracy. [q 

Interest groups, by their very nature, agitate for their narrow advantage, often at the cost of the 

common good. The increased strength of well-positioned groups in the new century might be countered, 

according to a suggestion of Robert Dahl of Yale University, by a randomly selected number of citizens, 

perhaps a thousand adults from all walks of life, who would in effect be an "amateur congress" that 

would debate issues. By means of computer information networks, this group could be furnished with 

data needed for decisions on contentious issues, and study, reflect, and finally decide in an electronic 

town meeting. Final judgements could be passed on to the appropriate level of government, local, state, 

and national. If this citizens' congress did its work well, its findings might have considerable weight. 

181 
Fig. 3 
CONCLUSION 

The past 25 years have seen numerous events that have changed how people live. Oil-price 

shocks, Japanese economic ascendancy, the mass distribution of home computers and video, Germany's 

unification, the moonlanding, the women's movement, the invention of the compact disc and fax machine, 

the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, live television broadcasts around the globe via satellite, the Third 

World's "defeat" of the superpowers in Vietnam and Afghanistan are only a few of the developments of 

this period that have altered the world in which we live. There is no reason to expect that the next 25 

years will not witness equally striking events. 

The challenge posed to the United States by the ever more interconnected global economy will 

cause great wrenching changes in the next decades. The world of 2015 will be a very different world 

from today's, as will the role the United States will play in it. The largely bi-polar world that existed for 

a few decades after World War 11 will have given way to a multi-polar world with a variety of complex 

political, economic, and strategic relationships. American society, largely impervious to developments 

outside its borders during much of the post-war period, will be increasingly tied to the rest of the world, 

and the lives of people in small towns in the Midwest or Appalachia will be affected by business choices 

made in Europe or Asia. 

The growing interconnectedness of the world will be the great change driver in the next 

decades. Its effects will alter American society decisively, not always in welcome ways. Ordinary 

Americans may have to accept a lower standard of living as other countries take more of the world's 

wealth. The rigors of the global economy will mean the extinction of some segments of the U.S. 

economy, while other branches will be successful and grow in strength. Parts of the United States will 

prosper, while some regions will be devastated unless far-sighted industrial policies are in place. 

Efforts to improve U.S. competitiveness will mean a substantial channeling of resources to 

education and probably expanding its scope to cover not only the formative years but a person's whole 

working life. Maintaining the nation's physical infrastructure will require more attention if the country 

is to compete successfully. In addition, an aging population will take ever more of the nation's wealth, 

perhaps at a catastrophic rate after 2015. Unless the U.S. economy improves significantly and provides 

employment for everyone, or bold and effective social measures are devised, this country's already large 

underclass may well grow further and consume much resources via inadequate welfare and penal systems. 

Environmental concerns will also require much of the country's resources and, in addition, will lead to 

a greater regulation of how people live and work. 

Dealing successfully with these trends will require policy choices of broad impact. These 

choices could exacerbate existing social tensions and engender a society of hostile and mutually 

destructive groups. The unresolved struggles between narrow interests, whether regional, class, minority, 

or generational, could come to dominate political life, as could the politics of resentment if, as is likely, 

the economy worsens and no overarching positive solution to the country's problems is found. 
The nation's military establishment will be affected in the difficult years during which the 

United States seeks to come to terms with the highly competitive global economy. It will probably have 

to accept a smaller share of the country's resources than it has in the past. The likely waning of the Cold 

War should make this feasible; a smaller military could still guarantee the country's security in a world 

where armed conflict was likely to be waged on a limited scale. The military is likely to be only slightly 

affected by social tensions that may appear in a era of declining living standards and painful economic 

choices. In recent decades, moreover, the U.S. military has shown that it can create within itself a 

society marked by equality and one that is, to a greater degree than is the case in the society at large, free 

of racial and political unrest. In addition, the economic uncertainty experienced by the country at large 

will make a military career attractive to talented youth from all social groups. 
SOURCES 

1. Aaron, Henry J. (ed.). Setting National Priorities: Policy for the Nineties. Washington, D.C.: 

Brookings Institution, 1990. 

2. Anderson, Annelise, and Dennis L. Bark. Thinking; about America: The United States in the 1990s. 

Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1988. 

3. Bell, Daniel. "The World and the United States in 2013," Daedalus, 116, No. 3, Summer 1987, 1-31. 

4. Bezold, Clement, Rick J. Carlson, and Jonathan C. Peck (eds.). The Future of Work and Health. 

Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn House, 1986. 

5. Binkin, Martin. Manning the American Militarv: Demographics and National Security. Teaneck, 

New Jersey: Negative Population Growth, 1990. 

6. Cetron, Marvin and Owen Davies. American Renaissance: Our Life at the Turn of the 21st Centurv. 

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 

7. Cottingham, Phoebe H., and David T. Ellwood (eds.). Welfare Policy for the 1990s. Cambridge: 

Harvard University Press, 1989. 

8. Dahl, Robert A. Democracv and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. 

9. Denton, James S. (4.). Welfare Reform: Consensus or Conflict? Lanham, Maryland: University Press 

of America, 1988. 

10. De Vita, Carol J., and William P. O'Hare. America in the 21st Centurv: Social and Economic 

Support Systems. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1990. 

11. Drucker, Peter F. The New Realities: In Government and Politics: In Economics and Business: In 

Society and World View. New York: Harper and Row, 1989. 

12. Dychtwald, Ken. Age Wave: The Challenges and Opportunities of an Aging America. Los Angela: 

Jeremy P. Tarcher, 1989. 

13. Feather, Frank. G-Forces: The 35 Global Forces Restructurin~ Our Future. New York: Morrow, 

1989. 

14. Fishrnan, Robert. "America's New City: Megalopolis Unbound," Wilson Ouarterlv, 14, No. 1, 

Winter 1990, 24-45. 

15. Fosler, R. Scott, et al. Demogra~hic Change and the American Future. Pittsburg: University of 

Pittsburg Press, 1990. 

16. Garreau, Joel. The Nine Nations of North America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981. 
17. Gerber, Jerry, et al. Lifetrends: The Future of Baby ~oomers and Other Aging Activities. New York: 

Macmillan, 1989. 

18. Gergen, Kenneth J. The Saturated Self. New York: Basic Books, 1991. 

19. Halberstam, David. The Next Centu~. New York: Morrow, 1991. 

20. Harris, Richard A., and Sidney M. Milkis (eds.). Remaking American Politics. Boulder, Colorado: 

Westview Press, 1989. 

21. Hodgkinson, Harold L. The Same Client: The Demogra~hics of Education and Service Delivery 

Systems. Washington, D.C. : Institute for Educational Leadership, 1989. 

22. - . Southern California: The Region and Its Educational Svstem. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 

Educational Leadership, 1989. 

23. Holzman, David. "Seeking Cures for an Ailing System," Insight, 7, No. 7, April 8, 1991, 50-53. 

24. Howe, Neil. "America in the Year 2007," American Spectator, December, 1987, 27-34. 

25. Katsura, Harold M., Raymond J. Struyk, and Sandra J. Newman. Housing for the Elderlv in 2010: 

Proiections and Policv OPtions. Washington, D.C. : Urban Institute Press, 1989. 

26. Kurtz, Paul (ed.). Building a World Communitv: Humanism in the 21st Centurv. Buffalo: Prometheus 

Books, 1989. 

27. Lam, Richard D. Megatraumas: America at the Year 2000. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985. 

28. Lasch, Christopher. The True and Onlv Heaven: Progress and Its Critics. New York: W.W. Norton, 

1991. 

29. Levitan, Sar A., and Elizabeth A. Conway (eds.). Families in Flux: New Approaches to Meeting 

Workforce Challenges for Child. Elder. and Health Care in the 1990s. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of 

National Affairs, 1990. 

30. Louv, Richard. Childhood's Future. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990. 

31. Meyer, Jack A., and Marion Ein Lewin (eds.). Charting the Future of Health Care: Policy. Politics, 

and Public Health. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1987. 

32. Miller, George (ed.). Giving Children a Chance: The Case for More Effective National Policies. 

Washington, D.C. : Center for National Policy Press, 1989. 

33. Mills, D. Quinn. Not Like Our Parents: How the Babv Boom Generation Is Changing America. New 

York: Morrow, 1987. 

34. Morrison, Peter A., et al. Families in the Armv: look in^ Ahead. Santa Monica: RAND, 1989. 
35. Moskos, Charles C. A Call to Civic Service: National service for Country and Community. New 

York: Free Press, 1988. 

36. Naisbitt, John, and Patricia Aburdene. Megatrends 2000: Ten New Directions for the 1990's. New 

York: Avon Books, 1990. 

37. O'Hare, William P., and Carol J. De Vita. America in the 21st Centu~: Governance and Politics. 

Washington, D.C. : Population Reference Bureau, 1990. 

38. O'Neill, Michael. The Third America: The Emergence of the Non~rofit Sector in the United States. 

San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989. 

39. Osborne, David. Laboratories of Democracv. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1990. 

40. Reich, Robert B. The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Centu~ Capitalism. New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 1991. 

41. Robinson, Donald L. Government for the Third American Centurv. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 

Press, 1989. 

42. Russell, Cheryl. 100 Predictions for the Babv Boom: The Next 50 Years. New York: Plenum Press, 

1987. 

43. Schlesinger, Arthur M. The Cvcles of American Historv. Franklin Center, Pennsylvania. Franklin 

Library, 1986. 

44. Schulz, James H. The Economics of Aging. Dover, Massachusetts. Auburn House, 1988. 

45. Strauss, William, and Neil Howe. Generations: The Historv of America's Future. 1584 to 2069. New 

York: Morrow, 1991. 

46. Teeling-Smith, George (4.). Health Economics: Prospects for the Future. London: Croom Helm, 

1987. 

47. Villoldo, Alberto, and Ken Dychtwald. Millennium: Glimpses into the 21st Century. Los Angeles: 

Jeremy P. Tarcher, 1981. 

48. Weir, Margaret, AM Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol (4s.). The Politics of Social Policv in the 

United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. 

49. Zinn, Maxine Baca, and D. Stanley Eitzen. Diversitv in Families. New York: Harper and Row, 

1990. 
KEY JUDGMENTS 

TECHNOLOGY 

- When technology is considered, it is not enough to focus on generations of hardware 

platforms (for example, tanks, airplanes). To understand the state-of-the-art and project future potential 

of technological developments, it is necessary to view technology in the context of four related concepts: 

hardware, process, system, and environment. 

- Identification of key areas of current and potential future progress cannot be made by 

short lists of general categories. It must be done by pinpointing the very specific areas (which are very 

many) where progress is actually occurring. The Nasa Thesaurus (NASA SP-7064), containing many 

thousands of listings, can be adapted as a general guide, and areas of progress correlated to those listings 

with new items added as necessary using the same generation rules as NASA. 

- The search for potentially useful (or critical) new developments should be pursued in 

two directions--from general scientific developments worldwide, and from the point of view of which 

components of Army equipment currently in use or in development can be improved (for example, better 

sensors, better interfaces, better effectors, etc.). 

- Technology comes from science, is developed and financed by industry, proliferates 

through mass production, and feeds back to science in financing the search for continuing improvements, 

and in providing science with better tools for research. 

- We are currently in a period where some developments in science and technology are 

undergoing astoundingly rapid change with no immediate limits, while other developments are "bumping 

up" against limitations of physical reality. 

- The military plays a key role in supporting developments in science and technology. 

Efficiency can be added by knowledgeable selection of areas to support, with de-emphasis of some 

popular areas in which the industry at large is already heavily involved and is doing a sufficient job. 

Increased emphasis could be focused on "orphan technologies" that are not currently popular but which 

could yield significant return for a small investment, research areas that are too expensive for individual 

companies, and areas of basic research that require not much more than support funds for individual 

researchers. 

- The military can play a highly significant role in developing education and training 

technology for itself and for the United States. 

- Technology intelligently used is the single most important consideration for a 

functional Army of the future. 
TECHNOLOGY 

INTRODUCTION 

Definition 

The term "technology" comprises a rough hierarchy of four related concepts: 

1. technology as hardware, e.g. a tank; 

2. technology as process, e.g. the process for manufacture of optical fiber; 

3. technology as system, e.g. transportation system; 

4. technology as environment - the technological milieu of operations - the general 

availability of a particular caliber of munitions, for instance, or a weapon, such as the Kalashnikov rifle; 

the availability of electrical power networks to recharge batteries; the availability of cheap and reliable 

Japanese microchips for use in advanced weapons systems in Desert Storm, etc. The American officer 

in Grenada who used his AT&T credit card to call for air support when the regular military channels 

were not available used his technological environment to good advantage. 

Awareness of the four aspects of technology above is necessary to understanding any technology 

application. No rigid boundaries between the concepts are necessary, and the way the term "technology" 

is used is then clear from the context. Confusion arises only when the categories are mixed without 

awareness of descriptive level and when an attempt is made (usually unconscious) to limit the term 

"technology" to a narrower sense, excluding the other aspects. 

Reinventinp the Camel 

A camel, some wag has suggested, is a horse put together by a committee. For some reason-- 

probably involving the perceived need to focus research funds--the public is being inundated by 

committee-produced lists of "technologies" claiming to provide comprehensive coverage of developments 

relevant to particular constituencies. These include a list of 15 items issued by the United States 

Department of Commerce (Emerging; Technolo~ies: A Survey of Technical and Economic W~ortunities, 

Spring 1990): 

advanced materials, advanced semiconductor devices, superconductors, flexible computer 

integrated manufacturing, artificial intelligence, high-performance computing, advanced 

semiconductor devices, optoelectronics, digital imaging, sensor technology, highdensity data 

storage, biotechnology, midical devices and diagnostics, 

and a list of 22 items issued by the United States Department of Defense (Critical Techno1og;ies Plan, 15 

March 1990): 
composite materials, semiconductor materials and microelectronic circuits, superconductors, 

machine intelligence and robotics, softrware producibility, photonics, parallel computer 

architectures, data fusion, signal procesing, passive sensors, sensitive radars, simulation and 

modeling, computational fluid dynamics, biotechnology materials and processes, air-breathing 

propulsion, high energy density materials, hypemelocity projectiles, pulsed power, signature 

control, weapon system environment. 

The Army has its own list of 13 "Key Emerging Technologies" (Armv Technoloev Base Master 

- Plan, 2d ed., November 1990): 

advanced propulsion, advanced signal processing and computing, artificial intelligence, 

biotechnology, low obsemables, micro-electronicslphotonicslacoustics, neuroscience, power 

generation/storagelconditioning, protectionllethality, robotics, space technology, advanced 

materialslmaterials processing, 

and, to cap it all, The White House's distinguished National Critical Technologies Panel of 13 luminaries 

(that leaves just 987 points of light elsewhere in the nation) has just issued an annotated list of 22 

"National Critical Technologies" (Revort of the National Critical Technoloeies Panel, March 1991): 

MATERIALS - materials synthesis and processing, electronic and photonic materials, ceramics, 

composites, high-performance metals and alloys, 

MANUFACTURING - flexible computer integrated manufacturing, intelligent processing 

equipment, macro- and nanofabrication, systems management technologies, 

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS - software, microelectronics and optoelectronics, 

high-performance computing and networking, high-definition imaging and displays, sensors and 

signal processing, data storage and peripherals, computer simulation and modeling, 

BIOTECHNOLOGY AND LIFE SCIENCES - applied molecular biology, medical technology, 

AERONAUTICS AND SURFACE TRANSPORTATION - aeronautics, surface transportation 

technologies, 

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT - energy technologies, pollution minimization, remediation, 

and waste management. 
pF TECHNOLOGIES 

MATERlALS 

- Materials synthesis and 

procwiog 

- Bl&c & phobic materials 

- Ceramics 

- Composites 

- High-perfma melab & 

MANUFACIURINO 

- Flenile wmputerintelgated 

manufacblring 

- Intelligent praxssing eqpt 

- Mi- and llanofabrication 

- System mgmt technologies 

INFORMATION & 

COMMUNICATIONS 

- Soh 

- MicrOel&ca & 

opb- 

- High-performance wmputing & 

nehvorldne - High-defmitica imaging & 

&plays 

- Swsors & sigd praxssing 

- Data storage and peripherals 

- Computer simam & 

modeliog 

II - Applied mol& biology 

- Medical technology 

AWONAUTICS & SURFACE 

TRANSPORTATION 

- Aemulica 

- Surface tio on 

technologies 

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT 

- Energy technolopies 

- Pollution minimization, 

remediation & waste mgmt 

TA 

ARMY KEY EMER( 

COMMERCE 

EMERGING 

TECHNOLOGIES 

- Advanced mate& 

- Advanced semiconductor 

deviced 

- Supemmductors 

- Flexible computerintepted 

manufachlring 

- Attif~cial intelligence 

- High-perfmce wmpuhg 

- Advanced semiconductor 

&vim 

- Optoel&cs 

- Digid imaging 

- seasor technology 

- Highhity data storage 

- Biotechnology 

- Medical devices & diagncatics 

- Airbreathing propulsion 

LE 1 

NG TECHNOLOGIES 

DEFENSE 

CRITICAL 

TECHNOLOGIES 

- Cornpasite materials 

- Semiconductor nrate& and 

deviced 

- Super~~llducton 

- Machine intelligence and 

roborica 

- Soh producibiity 

- Semiconductor materials and 

micmelectmnic circuits 

- Phobic3 

- Me1 computer BIG- 

- Data fusion 

- Signal processing 

- Waswe sensms 

- Sive mhc. 

- Machine intelligence and 

robotic3 

- Simvtation & modeling 

- Computatid fluid aynamica 

- Biotechnology materials & 

PI- 

- Hi-eae%y-density matter 

- Hypervelocity projectiles 

-Pulsedpawer 

- Signah contml 

- Weapon system etlvimnment 

ARMY KEY 

EMERGING 

TECHNOLOGIES 

- Advanced materialslmaterial 

p-'mp 

- Microelectronicalph&csl 

Iacoustia 

- Advanced signal processing & 

computing 

- Biotechnology 

- Advanced pmpulsion 

- Paver genecation. storage & 

conditioning 

- Di energy 

- FYomiosflaty 

- Lmv observables 

- Space technology 
The lists are quite different. Despite the fact that two-lists contain very similar or even identical 

categories, the other categories in the lists make it clear that they in fact include different subcategories. 

The Army list has the category "advanced materialslmaterials processing," while The White House 

compilation includes "materials synthesis and processing," and the Department of Commerce has 

"advanced materials," @OD has "composite materials"). Sound similar? The White House list has 

separate categories for "ceramics," "composites," and for "high-performance metals and alloys," all of 

which, along with "advanced materials," are subcategories under "materials." The Department of 

Commerce has separate categories for "advanced materials" and "superconductors," (also a separate 

category in the DOD list). The Department of Defense has a joint category for "semiconductor materials 

and microelectronic circuits" that compounds the confusion. 

The list makers are quite aware of each other's lists, and even try to provide category equivalence 

comparisons ("Table 2" in The White House list, for example). This Table, with the "Army Key 

Emerging Technologies" added, is shown as Fig. 1. The Army provides the most exhaustive "crosswalk" 

between its list and the DOD list (see Fig. 2), quite correctly matching its own "advanced 

materialslmaterial processing" category with the following categories on the DOD list: "composite 

materials, " "semiconductor materials and microelectronic circuits, " "superconductors, " "photonics, " 

"passive sensors," "biotechnology materials and processes," "air-breathing propulsion," high-energy 

density materials," "hypervelocity projectiles," "pulsed power," and "signature control." Note the 

inclusion of biological materials as "advanced. " (And why not?) 

What is one to do with all of these "technologies?" One answer is to treat them as separate 

technologies. Some researchers have gone so far as simply to add the lists together and characterize each 

category as a separate "technology," listing its sourcelagent, potential use, milestones, and risklfeasibility 

factors. Aside from the questionable validity of assigning a single feasibility factor to advances in 

"microelectronicslphotonicslacoustics,' which is, in fact, not a single technology but a mixed category 

of many different technologies, the additive mixing of lists clearly introduces enormous redundancy and 

destroys all categorization. 

Some large areas are omitted from each list. Only the Army had the political courage to include 

"space technology," for example. The White House Panel specifically and intentionally excludes manned 

space exploration, implying that it "does not enhance national security and economic competitiveness," 

a very questionable judgement in itself. Paradoxically, the panel equivocates that 

space exploration will continue to stimulate a broad range of advances in both aerospace 

and non-aerospace industries, contributing to our ability to compete in the hightechnology global marketplace. [lo] 

The Panel states that "there are other national goals not addressed in this report." Why not? 

Which areas of technological advancement (besides manned spaceflight) will not enhance national security 

and competitiveness? It omits fusion energy as too long-term, and "signature control" as "important but 

restricted." Oddly enough, though, in the description of the "materials" section, the very first desired 
category includes "more 'stealthy' aircraft structures," an item that could certainly be termed "signature 

control." In the "Ceramics" section, it focuses on "militarylaerospace" designs and specifically mentions 

the Space Shuttle tiles. Nothing is really omitted in the sense of one not being able to place a particular 

development in a category (unless one mentions the specifically exluded words "signature control" or 

"nuclear fusionw--they can be added under other categories). 

Any one of the lists will suffice for a category breakdown (some lists better than others) if the 

category designations are considered just that--category designations in a comprehensive, all-encompassing 

scheme, into which one may insert critical advanced developments as they are identified now or in the 

future. In that sense, the real Key Emerging Technologies would be items like "advances in optical 

masking techniques below .5 micron line separation," not "microcircuit design," or "microelectronics," 

and certainly not "microelectronicslphotonicslacoustics.' The latter is quite acceptable as a general 

category, as long as the actual "emerging technology" items are specifically identified. This "specific 

identification" process should be the ongoing task of a competent group of research analysts within the 

Army in order to see where the advances lie. 

Of course, a better general category scheme may well be possible for the next edition, designed 

as a categorization scheme rather than as a scheme designating whole large areas as "critical" while 

omitting decent categories for significant developments in areas that are not properly covered. 

How should the categorization proceed? In two directions: equipment based and science-based. Any 

specific developments relevant to equipment described in the Army Technological Base Master Plan that 

would significantly improve the functionality, deployability, etc. of that equipment should be so 

identified. At that point developments in the technological environment or scientific research that suggest 

new equipment, new applications, new missions, or new developments in the potential "weapons 

environment" should also be identified. The list of "key technologies" should be quite large and 

constantly monitored for new developments, with items added and dropped constantly as the technological 

environment progresses. 
Fig. 1 
Technology is generated from science and resources. Science provides the knowledge that a 

particular development may be possible, whereupon someone who needs that development for enrichment 

or defense invests in the engineering needed to produce a technological product. The vindication of the 

scientific research through a successful product then leads to further investment in the science in the hope 

of producing more knowledge that can be used in the same way. Alternatively, the need for a particular 

product (e.g. AIDS vaccine), impels the application of resources to science in the hope of finding a 

knowledge framework from which the product can be developed by use of more resources. The term 

"resources" includes manpower (trained, staff and management), site, materials, training, etc., most of 

which can usually (though not always) be purchased through proper funding. The silent third partner in 

the enterprise (in addition to science and resources) is, of course, luck, since there are rarely any absolute 

guarantees that a particular effort will pay off. 

Science is also funded for "pure knowledge" - the propensity of human beings to want to know 

about the nature of things - but the scientist, for all his (or her) protestations of purity, 

often drags out the carrot of "technological fallout" possibilities deriving from pure research as the reason 

for further funding. And not without cause, since in the final account there is no technological progress 

without prior progress in science, and one never knows when a mother lode of technological implications 

will be struck by an unsuspecting "pure" researcher. 

Whatever one's view of the importance of pure science may be, the successful sales of developed 

products (to civilians or to governments) have been a critical driver - "force multiplier" for science and 

therefore, in turn, for technology as well, particularly for development of unforeseen technologies. 

Another "force multiplier" for science has been the improvement of existing instruments and the 

development of new ones. It is here that technology provides direct feedback to science by providing 

sensors which can see further, magnify more, detect smaller and smaller energy fields, etc., and 

"effector" devices that produce higher speeds, higher pressures, higher energies, etc., which then allow 

the scientist to understand more and more of the physical (including the biological) universe. Some of 

that knowledge inevitably winds up suggesting more technological possibilities, so the "force multiplier" 

again feeds back to technology, which explains the current explosive growth in both science and 

technology. 

Unfortunately, this rapid rate of technological progress is not necessarily permanent because it 

presupposes two conditions that currently exist but may not (and probably will not) exist indefinitely to 

the same extent. The first condition is that scientists must be aware that there is something they don't 

know but are potentially capable of finding out. The second condition is that the technology necessary 

for them to "try and find out" must be feasible. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, for instance, 

Newtonian physics reigned supreme, and it was quite a reasonable assumption that most further progress 

in physics would involve calculation of the same set of constants to more and more decimal places. 

Relativity and quantum mechanics changed all that, electronics arrived on the scene to provide 
instrumentation, and the exciting state of "uncertainty" in science, with new knowledge arriving daily, 

was the result. This condition prevails now. By the year 2015 the same state should still prevail because 

the available technology (superconductive supercollider, for instance, plus many many other existing and 

potential tools) will not by any means have been exhausted for research. We cannot say with any degree 

of confidence, however, that progress will continue at the same rate in the year 2090. 

It is critical to note here that progress does not proceed at the same rate for different technologies 

even in this time of unprecedented acceleration. There are mature technologies and rapidly changing 

technologies, and from the point of view of military procurement (mil. spec. doctrine, in particular) these 

require different approaches. In the civilian sector technological change has often been maintained 

(though not always accelerated) by means of "planned obsolescence" and gradual introduction of features 

into a series of product "generations." Annual changes in the automobile are an obvious example. Cars 

that would last a long time would delay introduction of new technology into the marketplace (although 

sometimes features are withheld intentionally so as to have something new for the next year's model). 

This practice, however, can become extremely wasteful in a mature technology. Razor blades, for 

instance, can be made to last much longer, but then there would be a much smaller market for razor blade 

manufacturers. The implications for military procurement are that in a mature technology the mil. spec. 

approach must stress durability to attain quality and savings over time, while in a rapidly changing 

technology one may be better off selecting low cost and flexibilityladaptability as more primary (given 

sufficient operational quality) so that one is not stuck with expensive obsolete items that never wear out. 

"Black box" replacement of technology components is a good approach here. 

The third "force multiplier" for science and for technology (both separately and together - 

therefore with fourfold effect) has been and continues to be the increasing development and increasing 

general availability of more and more powerful computers. 

In science computers play two separate functions. First, they allow more and more precise and 

rapid calculation of experimental results. Second, they are used to carry out "modeling" experiments, 

in which computations replace actual physical equipment. Both allow experiments to be carried out that 

would be otherwise impractical, or even impossible. 

In technology, they enable tools and equipment (including scientific instruments - another "force 

multiplier") to be faster, more powerful, and, finally, more "intelligent" and enable production plants for 

the instruments and equipment to be themselves more efficient and more powerful, with robotic 

components. Product design is now routinely done with computer (CAD) tools, which are not only faster 

in calculations and routine tasks, but make it possible to design products (complex microchips, for 

instance) that it would be highly impractical to do without CAD tools. The development of computers 

is also currently in an explosive phase, likely to carry way beyond 2015. 

Military technology has not only benefited greatly from this burgeoning explosion of science and 

technology but also has spearheaded the cutting edge of technology--supersonic flight, the atom bomb, 

space travel, computing at NSA, etc.--although it must be pointed out that the science was rarely 

INITIATED by the military. As Martin van Creveld points out: 
None of the most important devices that have transformed war--from the airplane through 

the tank, the jet engine, radar, the helicopter, the atom bomb, and so on all the way to 

the electronic computer--owes its origins to a doctrinal requirement laid down by people 

in uniform. (Technolorn and War, 1989) 

In the recent technological tourde-force, Operation Desert Storm, in which a major war was 

fought with essentially zero casualties, except for the unfortunate impact of one scud missile (the effect 

of which can be reasonabIy labeled collateral damage) and effects of friendly fire (the latter having 

potential technological fixes for 2015), the casualties were of an order of magnitude that could reasonably 

be expected during a peacetime exercise (for the time and the number of men involved) because of 

intelligent application of superior technology and, one should admit, a little bit of luck. The United 

States population is very sensitive to casualties. The death of even one individual is considered tragic, 

and we have at times even sacrificed major foreign policy interests in the cause of recovering the remains 

of our kia's. Now that Desert Storm has shown that technology can provide a dramatic reduction in 

casualties (which was not at all as clear before Desert Storm), political support for casualty-reducing 

measures should not be hard to get and may even be mandated by the public. The argument that "we 

already have enough" can be countered by the fact that the next enemy will not be as vulnerable to 

surprise elimination of their air assets because of their very knowledge of our capabilities, and that we 

must forge ahead in electronic warfare to maintain the edge, as well as in electronic (IFF) measures to 

reduce friendly-fire casualties, which, of course are the most tragic. 

LIMITS TO TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 

Like everything else, technology has definite limits on its development, some of which are pretty 

formidable. It can be said with reasonable confidence that the efficiency of energy utilization, say, of 

gasoline in an internal combustion engine, can never exceed 100 percent (laws of physics say that it can 

never even attain loo%), so that the amount of improvement will likely reach a limit reasonably soon, 

beyond which it does not pay much to chisel away at that limit (nor can the weight of the car be reduced 

below "zero pounds" to compensate). This fact, of course, does not mean that more efficient engine 

designs are not a top priority, given the massive scale of their use, the pollution concomitant to 

inefficiency, and the exhaustion of non-renewable petroleum. In the area of funding, the resources 

allocated to science in the United States right after the first Soviet Earth satellite Sputnik I was launched 

grew for a while at an annual rate which would lead expenditures on science to exceed the gross national 

product in about 15 years - another unfortunate absurdity. Chemical processes such as those occurring 

in rocket fuels and explosives cannot yield much more energy than they do now. The speed of light is 

likewise a physical limit that now impacts a good number of technologies. Physics tells us that it cannot 

be exceeded. 

One must be careful with theoretical limits, however. For instance, about three decades ago it 
could easily be proven that the computer sitting on your desk right now (or on your lap, for that matter) 

is completely impossible. If vacuum tubes or even the newly invented transistors could be developed so 

that only one in a thousand would fail per year, a rate that seemed rather optimistic, a computer 

containing 365,000 tubes (or transistors) would be absolutely sure to fail and require repair every day 

(never mind the miniaturization that would be required to put such a beast on your desk). When we 

remember that now a single microchip frequently contains several million transistors, that chip alone 

should fail at least once an hour, and 60 of those chips should fail like clockwork once a minute. An 

impeccable argument in theory, but its consequences are fortunately averted by the absolutely incredible 

reliability of our microminiaturized devices. This is not to say that another limit of this kind cannot 

eventually bar further progress, but we are nowhere near it now in computer development. 

A current example of a technology bumping up against the speed of light is the increase in 

computer processing (or "clock") speed. Every computer has a timing mechanism which ensures that 

things happen together in a certain order. Essentially, an electric pulse is sent to all the parts of the 

computer, ordering some to be turned on and some to be turned off at exactly the right time for the 

processing to continue. The early Apple computer was clocked at about one Megahertz, which means 

that a pulse was sent out once every millionth of second. At the speed of light this pulse travels about 

300 meters before the next pulse is issued (actually, in a wire, electrical pulses travel a little slower), so 

that all the functional parts of the computer that need to be synchronized are "clocked" at about the same 

time, relatively speaking. The early IBM PC was clocked at 4.77 MHz, which is about five times faster, 

and the current PC's run at over 33 MHz,,which is over thirty times faster. The rate of increase in this 

speed of the central processing unit was, therefore, about doubled every two years. If "progress" were 

to continue at the same rate, in 2015 each pulse would travel only about a centimeter.during one cycle, 

and,, therefore, to trigger all parts of a computer "simultaneously," the whole computer would have to 

be MUCH smaller than a centimeter. In 2030, the computer would have to be so small as to be invisible! 

Rather tough on keyboard design! This is not to say that other technologies (optical computers, for 

instance) and other computer architectures (for example, parallel processing), may not extend the effective 

processing rate to much higher limits. Parallel processing, which divides the computing task into subtasks 

handled simultaneously by semi-independent microchip computers connected together in arrays with 

successive array layers handling the results of the preceding array of component microcomputers, is 

clearly the wave of the future in overcoming the speed limitation of architectures based on a single central 

processing unit. Most major computer companies are, in fact, working on such designs, and some of 

them are already in use. 

Other limits to technological development are the availability of trained personnel for all phases - 

scientists, engineers, and equipment operators/specialists, and, of course, funding, with competing 

priorities for painfully limited resources. 

"The inventory that matters most walks home every day after work," says Paul Saffo, a research 

fellow of the Institute for the Future in Menlo Park, California. In his "Looking Ahead" column for the 

April 10, 1991 edition of The Los Angeles Times, Saffo raises the issue of the feared "professional gap" 
in the United States: the declining number of Americans completing advanced degrees in technical areas 

that could cripple U.S. high-tech competitiveness. This "gap", he points out, failed to materialize in the 

1980s, despite the fact that the proportion of foreigners earning graduate degrees in the United States (for 

example, in computer science) jumped from 32 to 45 percent in the 1977-87 period. No real shortage 

developed because many of these graduates elected to stay and work in the United States where they had 

better opportunities to work "on the cutting edge of their profession." 

Nevertheless, the generation of scientists and engineers that entered the work force in the 1950s 

and 1960s will be retiring within the next decade, causing overall retirement rates to increase by 15 

percent. This condition, combined with the declining graduate school enrollments in the sciences and 

engineering and increased demand for scientists and engineers could, in fact, result in a serious shortage 

of skilled professional personnel needed to maintain our high-tech edge. This situation could cause even 

our own companies to move abroad in order to remain competitive. 

"Headhunters" from abroad (for example Japan and Taiwan) are already trying to lure technical 

personnel from the United States, particularly nationals of the country involved. Because the salaries they 

offer are quite competitive, the question why there is no greater exodus must be adressed. 

One possible answer is that the research climate in the United States favors the creative individual 

rather than the docile team player (as in Japan), so that our best bet is to continue to foster a research 

environment in which the brilliant "mavericks" from all over the world will continue to settle in the 

United States regardless of salaries they could earn in their native countries. The salaries do matter, of 

course, particularly for retention of the more "routine" elements of the scientific work force. Mavericks 

alone cannot get the entire job done. They need support staff. 

Despite what appeared to be great initial promise, educational technology has not really 

progressed as expected. Exceptions to this are military-sponsored efforts such as flight trainers, etc., but 

in the environment at large, educational technology is still largely limited to "computers imitating paper" 

and "talking-head" analog video presentations. One reason behind this is the cost of software 

development, which, unlike the case of personal-computer writing-tool and business software, has not 

been amortized by a mass market, and there is, in fact, no widespread realization that the resources 

required to develop educational software are as great as for any other software. Nevertheless, the 

potential remains. There is now equipment available for communication to a vast audience (personal 

computers, broadcast and cable channels, etc.), although the proper presentation methods for interactive 

training have not really progressed. The timetable for such progress is, unfortunately, impossible to 

estimate because no breakthroughs are visible in the near-term. Educators will continue to bemoan 

television while doing nothing to improve programming. It's not their fault, however, as they never 

really had access to resources even minimally adequate to the task (witness the millions of dollars it takes 

to develop a single commercial program for personal computers). 

Education deficiencies place limits on technological progress by limiting the number of future 

scientists and engineers produced in this country (if the economic climate is favorable, we may still attract 

scientists from abroad), limiting the capabilities of the work force (already so limited), and limiting the 
sophistication of the voting public in determining productive policies. Unfortunately, the voting public, 

unlike the scientific elite, cannot be improved by immigration except in the very long term. The military, 

with specific training requirements, may well be the ones to find the most efficient path to educational 

software and systems development. Among the obvious guidelines for progress is the use of 

communications media employing the strengths of that media, rather than imitation of former patterns 

(much as the early motion pictures imitated the stage). Unfortunately such progress cannot be forced, 

and we shall have to wait for ingenious educational use of our powerful new media. 

With regard to resource limitations on the funding of science and technology, despite the 

somewhat faddish nature of favored support areas because of public hyper-enthusiasm when potential 

applications are announced and quick boredom if ultimate results are not instantly available, the "system" 

of government-industry-academic research and development has worked relatively well. This is why we 

are still ahead of the world in many of the basic scientific developments, particularly in areas where there 

is a national consensus on need and where established areas of research are accepted as essential. The 

downside, which is hard to avoid, is the necessity for basic-area researchers to devote a great deal of their 

time scrambling for annual funding. A research funding cycle of at least two years would be a great 

improvement. 

The role of military sponsorship in basic research has been critical in many areas of science and 

technology, despite misperceptions on the part of a small proportion of the public that it's all going 

towards lethality (in fact most such research has been of general benefit and produced vast improvements 

in communications, space and environmental research). Some in the military may object in the other 

direction, that perhaps resources should be more focused on lethality issues. A rational middle position 

here should be a clear focus on the needs of the military as a system, with continual monitoring of which 

system components need improvement and/or can be improved through newly available technology. The 

use of components available in the general environment whenever possible, rather than mil. spec. 

everything to narrow and often limited or unrealistically high specifications could also cut costs if the 

planning is carefully done. The somewhat random and chaotic focus of the general research environment 

could be offset by the military focusing on "orphan technologies," areas of potential improvement that 

are not being pursued because of absence of public focus. Other areas that are identified as heavily 

researched by industry for its own needs could be de-emphasized by military research planners, even if 

there may be "glamor" in a particular research area. 

The question of support of the industrial base by the military looms large, particularly in a period 

that begins with an apparently inevitable serious downsizing of the military establishment. Support for 

advanced research only, per se, is not necessarily sufficient. Someone actually has to manufacture the 

equipment in a timely fashion, particularly if the need arises for rapid mobilization. Experience has 

shown that in our system there really should be more than one source of procurement, otherwise there 

is no objective way to control either product cost or quality. If production lines are shut down and teams 

disbanded, we may face the same problems that emerged after the accident that destroyed the Challenger 

space shuttle. The absence of unmanned launch vehicles such as the Saturn to launch satellites critical 
to national security became painfully obvious, and there w& no way to revive Saturrn--even its plans 

were apparently lost. On the other hand, we cannot afford to keep everyone funded. The delicate 

balance that seems to obtain between contract awards to Lockheed and Boeing surely represents one 

sensible approach. 

What happens when an entire industry moves abroad, which happened to much of the U.S. steel 

industry, our consumer electronics industry, and tool-anddie making, and there is no one to support on 

the domestic scene without serious price inflation and counterproductive protectionism? 

Because some industries are more efficient abroad it will be necessary to procure more of our 

military materiel abroad as well, making certain that several independent sources are cultivated, and that 

the major support goes to our political allies rather than our avowed enemies. This is not necessarily a 

bad thing because it is wasteful to duplicate production of items that can be made cheaper elsewhere. 

Such procurement frees up resources for other areas. As production facilities move abroad, however, 

some critical capacities are lost and difficult to regain. With the loss of heavy industry, for example, the 

production tool industry is moving abroad as well. If we do not support domestic capacity, perhaps 

supporting efforts to "leapfrog" plant automation practices that already have moved abroad by developing 

even more advanced systems, the tradition and art of large tool production, in which we formerly 

excelled, may be lost entirely. The future cost of this will be dear should the political conditions require 

the shift in emphasis to our own domestic heavy industry. There are no easy answers here, but selective 

support of high-tech industrial tool design and production by the military should help maintain some of 

this capability. The same applies to other areas of industry that we may be losing--"seed efforts" to 

maintain the skills are definitely in the long-term national interest. 

The United States is currently in a strong position in areas such as chemistry, non-metallic 

materials, biotechnology (agricultural technology), computer hardware design, computer software, 

optoelectronics, telecommunications, energy source technology, and in the aircraft and defence industries 

producing military hardware, as well as in space technologies. These industries are likely to remain 

strong in the forecast period. Some effort to maintain our strength in these areas is logical for our 

military purchases. 

One cannot overestimate the future importance of software. The software failure leading to the 

successful penetration by the Scud missile that caused the major losses in Desert Storm may well be a 

harbinger of things to come: as the military systems become more and more automated, the hardware 

becomes cheaper and more ubiquitous, the software will inevitably remain the weak link in the next 25 

years. There is no avoiding it, because it is software that makes computers useful, and if any area is to 

be singled out in the need to maintain excellence, it is software. The present U.S. lead in software seems 

insurmountable because of the healthy domestic consumer industry as well as massive high-tech 

procurement by the federal government. We must be careful to support future developments in automated 

software design technology in order to maintain the lead. Automation of software production itself is 

inevitable in the long-term future, with significant developments possible during the forecast period. 

With regard to our space program, history will, on the one hand, praise our landing on the Moon 
in eggshell-thin spacecraft as a supreme triumph of human organization and teamwork as well as a 

miraculous technological feat, while condemning us for placing the effot in the context of a sporting 

contest with the Russians, with no future plan beyond the sporting event itself, rather than develping a 

serious continuing scientific effort. Would that we had worked truly for the future of mankind and 

established a working scientific and industrial colony on the Moon, with working settlements in space and 

perhaps even a Mars mission. None of this would have competed in any significant way with efforts to 

"improve things on Earth." Instead we have wasted precious lives and resources on politically naive 

no-win debacles of all sorts. The United States (or some other nation) will get back to serious exploration 

and development off-plant, but probably not within the time frame addressed by this report. 

Not all research needs funding. Einstein's development of the theory of relativity could not really 

have been aided by any significant additional funding beyond, perhaps, some personal support. 

Theoretical mathematicians (especially before the "computer age") did much significant research using 

paper-and pencil alone. Some personal support grants in this kind of non-fund-intensive research may 

pay off handsomely, however, just because of the high costlbenefit ratio to the supporting organization, 

and because such support provides benefits to the general scientific infrastructure, which benefits all in 

the long run. On the other hand, some research is so costly that only combinations of governments can 

undertake it--the Mars manned mission comes to mind. 

Foreign investment in U.S. research may be a mixed blessing, but in current economic 

circumstances, and with globalization of the utility of research results, it is unavoidable. If basic research 

that would otherwise have to be funded by the government is funded instead by the Japanese, other 

research money that our government (including the military) can put to good use is freed up. It is no 

longer feasible to keep basic research secret for any significant length of time, and denial of such 

knowledge to the enemy unfortunately denies it to our open-source research environment as well. This 

is not to say that specific military developments should not be kept to ourselves as long as possible (e.g. 

keeping the most advanced EW and ECM and C3 electronics out of the aircraft we sell to our allies until 

our own are upgraded to the next higher level) in order to maintain the edge. 

Gross dollars devoted to technology as a whole are, of course, significant in maintaining progress, 

but they must be intelligently focused. The cost factor of technology generation upgrades to the military 

has been projected as a significant barrier. With present costs of sophisticated aircraft running well over 

a billion dollars, it has been said that in the future the armed services will be able to afford only a single 

super-high-tech aircraft! In addition, it takes about 15 years to bring a new generation of technology (in 

the sense of a generation of heavy equipment) to useful application. However, it must be remembered 

that it takes as much money to make a single memory chip of the kind described above (in terms of the 

cost of a plant to produce one, never mind R&D costs) as it does to make a B1 bomber, and yet a 256k 

DRAM chip can be bought retail for a buck and a half. Therefore, the military has a choice of either 

putting all its money into succeeding generations of increasingly expensive single-purpose platforms, or 

designing hardware in a modifiable modular fashion to incorporate future improved technology as such 

technology is developed, preferably in conjunction with developments in the open-market mass environ- 
ments. The B-52 bomber has already been used in this fashidn, which is why it still survives, while the 

B-1 could not yet even be used in Desert Storm. When costs of technology are cited as a barrier, the 

question must be asked what technology, when, and to what end. Replacement of black boxes with better 

black boxes in platforms designed for modular upgrade may well be the way to go. 

The 2,000-lb GBU-24 laser-guided bombs used in Desert Storm are a case in point. They were 

conventional 2,000-lb "dumb bombs" fitted with TRW's Paveway kit at a total cost (bomb included) of 

$20,000 each. This, according to the New York Times. is a dramatic reduction in price from 1988, when 

the Paveway kit alone cost $40,000. Compare the $20,000 figure with the $1.3 million each cost of the 

equally successful Tomahawk missile used by the U.S. Navy in the same campaign. It's clear that unless 

the Tomahawk's extended range and unmanned delivery are critical to a mission, there is more "bang for 

the buck," literally speaking, in the Paveway conversion. Plans for a smarter reusable Tomahawk are, 

of course, under way. 

In the future, this modification of conventional munitions to smart munitions is likely to continue 

and, possibly, to spread as well to "smart micromunitions," the rocket-propelled grenade being the first 

likely modification. Smart shotgun shells may well follow. Video cameras-on-a-chip, which already exist 

in the lab (cigarette-lighter-sized cameras delivering broadcast-quality video are being mounted on helmets 

of quarterbacks in the new WLAF World League American Football), may be followed by much smaller 

active devices that could allow the marine of the future to fire his weapon at 45 degrees elevation in the 

general direction of the enemy, and then select by video which ammo storage box, command-and-control 

node, gasoline tank, or, for that matter, which unfortunate enemy grunt he will hit. The obverse side 

of this picture is that the same weapons will become readily available to the enemy terrorist. 

TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 

A good example of a growing technology, exemplifying progress in the computer field, is the 

increase in the amount of random access memory (and consequent reduction in price per byte of memory) 

in personal computers, which is likely to continue through 2015, even if it does so at a slower rate than 

the present 400 percent increase every two years. When Apple first arrived on the scene, 16 kilobit 

(16,000 bit) DRAM chips were the vogue, and four years later when the IBM PC arrived, 64 kilobit 

chips were the rage. To make 8-bit "bytes," a "bank" of 9 chips is used (one chip for "parity checking" 

error diagnosis), so that with 4 banks of chips on the basic PC "motherboard," 16k chips yield a total 

storage of 64 kilobytes of memory, enough to store 32 pages of text (2,000 bytes per page). Now, 

twelve years later, the "state-of-art" installed chips have a capacity of 4 megabits each (4,000,000 bits), 

with a total 4-bank capacity of 16 megabytes of memory on the motherboard (enough to store 8,000 pages 

of text). More memory can, of course, be added by plugging in additional "memory boards." The next 

generation of chips (to be delivered in 1991 and user-marketed in 1992) contain 16 megabits each, with 

@-megabit chips experimentally produced. The Japanese are already confident enough in the feasibility 

of 256-megabit chips to invest a significant amount of money in the planning of plants to produce them. 
According to "Solid State Technology" (December 1990), Hitachi is constructing an R&D wafer 

processing facility in Ohme near Tokyo to be used for 256 Mb DRAMS. 

The prediction of feasibility of chips with 1 Gigabit capacity (albeit somewhat physically larger 

in size than current chips) can be made with some reasonable confidence for the time frame considered 

by this report. A 4-bank motherboard memory with gigabit chips, by the way, would yield 4 gigabytes 

of memory, capable of storing 2 million pages of text. This is in the direct operational memory only! 

Such a computer will cost about the same as today (around $2,000) or else the industry will not be able 

to sell millions of them and make a profit. Peripherals like laser disks can, at present, store about a 

gigabyte per disk (500 megabytedisks being the most popular), which can store 500,000 pages of text. 

Disk media now under study (NTT's new optochemical hole-burning method, for instance) can potentially 

yield 1000 times that, about 500,000,000 pages of ASCII text per disk. 

If this sounds like a large number, it is. The Library of Congress, in 1989, contained 19,000,000 

books in its collection (plus over 70,000,000 other items) with an average of 385 pages each, so for 

books alone in ASCII text format, 14.63 trillion bytes of storage would be needed (according to Felix 

Krayeski of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress), i.e., about 15,000 currenttype laser disks or 15 of the possible future disks. A manageable number, but if you expect to have the 

Library of Congress in your collection in 2015, think again, because the problem of scanning even the 

current 20 million books page-by-page without damaging them (even by "intelligent robots" of the future) 

is a formidable task indeed. In graphic raster data (300 by 300 dots per inch) about 7,000 of the future 

disks would be needed, by the way. At any rate future (2015) published material (in principle) will 

become readily accessible to everyone with a telephone and a computer. This will include maps, art 

work, sound recordings, etc. 

The brief consideration above of the issue of computer memory development is but a tiny sample 

of current progress in science and technology as a whole. A vast cornucopia inundating us with daily 

news of significant discoveries in physics, electronics, astrophysics (which is, strangely enough, critical 

to particle physics and the basic nature of matter), biology, biotechnology, cybernetics, medicine, etc., 

etc. (note the absence of social sciences), and new technological marvels are becoming everyday gadgets. 

Some of these are immediately useable by the military and incorporated in record time, such as the use 

of Japanese display panels in military aircraft, and the use of cheap geopositioning equipment, massproduced for the boating public, by troops in Desert Storm. 

A comprehensive view of the total picture of this progress in all areas is very necessary for 

military planners, but is unfortunately clearly beyond the scope of the present report. 

ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 

Precise assessment of the rate of technological change, especially if that rate is to be used as a 

gauge of current or future progress during a rapid development phase, is not as subject to simple 

mechanical calculation as it might first appear, even in the case of the memory chips above, where the 
rate seems a straightforward affair. Microchip technology development depends, for instance, on 

development of the physics and chemistry of resists (photosensitive substances that allow patterns to be 

etched on the chips), imaging technologies in a multitude of bands from infrared through soft x-rays (each 

of these technologies is, in fact, a complex combination of many others), substrate development 

(encompassing a whole raft of materials technologies, including growth and processing of large crystals 

and their "doping" with exact amounts of impurities at precise microlocations), technologies for 

deposition of thin films of a variety of exotic substances, etc. When one begins to gauge the progress 

of devices in which the chips are only a small component, the problem looms even larger. The 

paradoxical result is that such assessments can be carried out, but the more precise they are, the more 

limited their usefulness for long-range prediction because change in any of the component technologies, 

either in a breakthrough or an unexpected bottleneck, can affect the whole process. For investment of 

near-term resources these assessments are, of course, invaluable. 

On the other hand, one can get a useful "feel" of the current rate of change by considering the 

differences in parameters of devices in current use as compared to laboratory devices and rational 

projections of demonstrated capabilities of materials. Paul Zane Pilzer (Unlimited wealth, Crown Publishers, 1990) calls this the "technology gap." The thousand-fold increase in the memory storage 

of compact disk material, mentioned above, being developed by NTT (Nippon Telephone and Telegraph, 

reported in "Solid State Technology," December 1990) is accompanied by a recording rate that is 

"...roughly 100 million times faster than existing storage materials. The contents of a full newspaper 

page can be stored with the material in 0.006 sec." Multiplying the capacity increase by the rate 

increase, we get a "technology gap" of one hundred billion. Even if the actual devices that may be 

developed from this technology (and, as pointed out earlier, there is no absolute guarantee of success in 

any particular enterprise) are " 100 times worse," that still leaves a potential improvement factor of about 

a billion or so. 

Taking another example from the February 1991 issue of "Lightwave," the fiber-optics industry 

news magazine: 

Researchers at AT&T's Bell Laboratories said they have successfully boosted the speed 

and capacity of fiber-optic communications systems. The researchers reduced an intricate 

system of colliding-pulse mode-locked (CPM) lasers and fibers spread over a four-footby-six-foot laboratory table to an indium-phosphide chip measuring two square 

millimeters. The researchers then said they used the device to transmit 350 billion light 

pulses a second, each shorter than a trillionth of a second, through 24 kilometers of 

optical fiber. The fastest commercial fiber systems, by contrast, currently generate 2.5 

billion light pulses. 

Although AT&T said it doesn't expect to market a product containing the new 

device until the end of the decade, analysts said the Bell fiber system, together with 

advances in high-capacity fiber cable, could speed development of systems that can 

deliver studio-quality digital television signals to the home or office over telephone lines. 
The area of the table is about 15,500 square millimeters, 350 divided by 2.5 is 140, and, 

neglecting the change in thickness of the equipment, we get an "improvement factor" of over 1,000,000. 

Note that these two examples are even more impressive when one considers that they are singlestage improvements, not improvements over several iterations of developmental stages. Granted, these 

are extremes, but they were found at random over a very limited period of research time, and similar 

factors of over a thousand are quite routine in a wide variety of burgeoning technologies. Some emerging 

technologies, such as those involving recombinant DNA, or the development of artificial photosynthesis, 

are too new to have even such simple "improvement factors" assigned, yet their future impact may be 

gauged as highly significant, even revolutionary. 

One important reality to note here is that the faster a technology progresses, the faster it will 

"bump up" against significant physical limits, to underline the realization that we are living in a period 

that can be called a tsunami of technological transformation. 

TRENDS IN TECHNOLOGY (METATREND-THE LARGE PICTURE) 

The development of technological applications has followed a repeated cycle, a metatrend, if you 

will, in which technology is first introduced, permitting a task to be accomplished in a better way, or in 

a way that could not have been done. This introduction, however, is often, if not always, accompanied 

by unavoidable loss of flexibility and convenience, frequently tying up personnel resources and presenting 

new difficulties. As the situation progresses, solutions to parts of the new problems in turn present 

problems of their own with regard to limitations in flexibility and convenience. Ultimately the technology 

settles down to a situation where maximum flexibility with maximum power prevails. 

In military history (or prehistory, rather) the invention of the litter (the first vehicle, perhaps) 

permitted much more in the way of logistic supplies to be carried by a war party, but it tied up personnel, 

and much energy had to be spent to simply hold up the load, the supplies had to be guarded, and the 

direction of travel had to be determined by a "litter supervisor" (the first sergeant?). Addition of the 

wheel removed the need for human bearers to hold up the load, but limited travel to more unobstructed 

terrain. Addition of the ox (the first engine?) further removed the need for human motive power, making 

for a pretty nifty system, but too slow and vulnerable for a fighting vehicle. The horsedrawn chariot 

(the first military attack vehicle) was the next logical development, but it was still limited by terrain 

requirements and, more critically, subject to unwieldy "command and control," needing one man to drive 

and another to fight. The final development in the sequence miniaturized the vehicle and simplified the 

command-and-control to produce a truly efficient weapons system. The vehicle was shrunk to the 

dimensions of a saddle, and the cavalryman reigned supreme for centuries as the efficient standard 

military technology of an advanced society. 

The power-to-weight ratio for the all-terrain vehicle was hard to beat, and the command-and-control was 

fully and flexibly integrated with the offensive and defensive weapons subsystems (sword and shield, etc). 

The most sophisticated element was, of course, the computer and actuator subsystem of the weapons 
platform (the cavalryman, of course), which still remains stat&of-art, not likely to be replaced within the 

time scope of the present study. 

In the history of computer development, a similar process has taken place, with the centralizedversusdistributed systems argument. The first trend was towards large expensive systems, because they 

were the only path to high computing power. Access to them was provided by operators servicing lines 

of users carrying packs of Hollerith "computer punch cards," only to see, all too often, a "system down" 

sign pasted on a closed upper door panel. After the packs were accepted, the users then lined up again 

to receive their packs back, plus a printout that all too often said "program failed" in embarrassingly large 

letters, visible to all the others in the line. Later the "system down" sign began to appear on what is now 

known as "dumb terminals," and the input of programs to the computer began to be limited as much by 

saturation of the telecommunications channels as by the mainframe computing power. 

The next development might well have been the increasing power of the "dumb terminal," still 

basically attached to and inseparable from a mainframe, with the outcome being a highly centralized 

"smart system," epitomized by IBM's SNA (systems network architecture) with a rigid hierarchical 

arrangement of information processing. What happened instead was that some hobbyists, working in 

garages, developed a small all-purpose machine for other hobbyists, among which the Apple was the first 

large-scale commercial success, fueling a furious development of both system memory (chips), peripheral 

memory (disk drives, etc.), and other peripherals that, with volume sales, became cheap as well as 

powerful after the IBM PC anointed the personal computer as a full-fledged business system. Software 

costing millions of dollars to develop could then be sold in millions of copies rather than hundreds (or 

even dozens), with consequent impact on both price and quality. 

The power of the PC now not only exceeds that of former mainframes, but includes sophisticated 

local storage that would have been impossible if the PC had not become a commercial commodity. 

Flexibility and power have been given to the user, finally, by the development of communications 

interface hardware and software, both among PC's and with mainframes (initially resisted by mainframetypes), so the user calls the shots, and, incidentally, creates a huge security headache. Information 

control of the type that could have been imposed by the authorities if the "smart terminal" rather than the 

PC path had been followed is now impossible. The user has the power of the mainframe at his fingertips 

and will have it even more so in 2015, the time frame projected by the Japanese (N'IT) for a complete 

user-to-user fiber-optic communications network, also likely to be attained by that time in the United 

States. The process of going over completely to fiber in the telecommunications system has to take about 

that much time, of course, because of the enormity and cost of the physical task, but the course of it is 

one of the most predictable aspects of technology at the present time. Parallel-architecture computers 

should also come into their own in this time frame, the greatest difficulty in their implementation being 

software development (else they could flourish even sooner). 

The most significant element here, however, remains the fact that computer/communications 

technology has basically passed over the hump of inflexibility, unwieldiness and inconvenience, by way 

of empowering that same "cavalryman" above to call the shots flexibly within a comprehensive integrated 
command-and-control network. 

The functionality of the integrated ALB battlefield was held in some doubt until Desert Storm 

even by a brilliant analyst like Martin Van Creveld, who speculated that with current-level battlefield 

integration, the low-tech side may at times have the advantage because the battlefield can become 

"frozen" for the high-tech side, with no force component able to move unless another moves first. In 

fact, as Desert Storm has shown, if sufficient tactical flexibility devolved to the individual platform (tank, 

aircraft), the individual platforms in the integrated battlefield could function brilliantly, selecting alternate 

targets and targets of opportunity, using the central command network for coordination purposes, while 

being guided by it for the larger tactical objective, and being provided by it with information needed for 

survival as well as for effective delivery of munitions to target. 

TRENDS AND COMBINATIONS 

Some of the principal trends in technology are cited below. Many of them act as change drivers 

on each other. Thus electronic miniaturization goes hand in hand with increase in processing speed, and 

the requirement for processing speed mandates miniaturization, because of the basic limits of the rate at 

which a signal can travel in a wire, as explained earlier. This "bumping up" against the speed of light 

itself as a barrier in turn mandates development of parallel processing architecture, where one gains total 

speed by having several microprocessors handle different parts of the task at the same time, which again 

requires changes in the way software is written so that separable parts of a task can be segregated and 

sent to different microprocessors. In the quest for better, faster, more reliable, more secure, etc. 

ANYTHING, new materials and processes come under examination, with the result that there exists a 

potential for radical change in materials science. The development of thin film technology permits new 

developments, such as diamond film coatings of tools, and it is not unlikely that growth of larger crystal 

structures will become possible in the future, given the current rate of progress. These same diamond 

films are an excellent substrate for computer microchips, allowing faster and more radiation-resistant 

components to be fabricated. Other materials of potential significance abound, such as the recently 

reported silicon insulator materials for CMOS technology developed by IBM ("Byte," February 1991). 

The number of such technological areas of potential significant progress is so large and changing so constantly that it defies enumeration, and the only rational way to keep up with it is through adoption of largescale continuous monitoring projects conducted by knowledgeable science generalists in consultation with 

specialists in the many industries involved. 

In addition to the physical sciences, which we have emphasized, the recent development of genetic 

engineering holds such radical change potential for biology that reliable prediction for the 2015 time 

frame is quite impossible, except to note that the Human Genome project, mapping the total of significant 

genetic information comprising the human being, is slated to be completed well before then, and current 

biotechnology has already proven that it can perform as expected, in a safe way (not according to Jeremy 

Rifkin), with dramatic results. Organisms have already been patented as products, including ones as 
complex as a mouse. And "killer genes" within some cells-that lead to their shortened life span, in 

conjunction with many many other ongoing and future relevant studies, may well provide a clue to the 

puzzle of human aging. This breakthrough could be followed by the discovery of powerful agents for the 

prevention or even reversal of aging, a contingency that could turn out to be the greatest disaster of all 

time, or the greatest change agent for humanity. 

Suggestive lists of some issues and developments follow, which are, of necessity, far too short 

for comprehensive guidance. 

GENERAL TRENDS 

INCREASES IN: 

speed 

power 

efficiency 

durability 

planned obsolescence 

miniaturization 

complexity 

automation 

modularity 

INCREASED REQUIREMENTS FOR: 

systems organization 

systems centralization 

distributed systems 

management of finite resources 

conservation 

recycling 

extension of knowledge of natural processes 

physical sciences 

biological sciences 

extension of knowledge of humanity 

psychology 

sociology/anthropology 

history/archaeology 

extension of knowledge of the environment 

Earth - surface, subsurface, sea, undersea, atmosphere 

near-Earth 
Moon-Mars-Venus 

Solar system 

Universe 

PROBLEMS CAUSED BY ACCELERATING PROGRESS 

adaptation to accelerating rates of change 

rapid obsolescence of older systems 

long lead times for developmentldeployment of large new systems 

mix of generations of weapons systems 

increased cost of new weapons platformslsystems 

upgrading of older technology with new electronics & weapons 

globalization of science, technology, industry, communications 

short-range focus in development 

changes in industry research funding patterns 

"shooting star" fads in science 

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES FOR THE MILITARY 

1. Smart weaponslmunitions 

A. power availabilityldelivery 

active payload 

efficiency 

B. control processes 

fuzing 

guidance 

collateral damage control 

damage assessment feedback 

C. platforms 

delivery 

guidance 

coordination 

2. Military vehicles - manned and unmanned, mission-related 

A. land 

B. sea 

C. undersea 

D. amphibious 

E. aircraft 
F. spacecraft 

3. Intelligence-related technology 

A. surveillance - local, midrange, remote 

B . target pool identification 

C. damage verification 

D. HUMINT 

E. countermeasures 

4. C3 

A. centralized vs distributed command 

B. secure and robust communications 

encryptionldecryption 

signal hiding 

IFF 

5. Logistics 

A. potential for hardware and software in 

planning 

procurement 

distribution 

repair and replacement control 

6. The individual as "superwarrior" 

A. "amplification" of the individual 

the individual as command/control center 

the individual as a plug-compatible module 

7. Potential from biotechnology and medical technology 

A. possible developments in genetic control 

as weapons - designer gases, designer pests 

as protection 

as soldier selectionldesign means 

B. public health issues 

8. Environmental controls (weather predictionlcontrol) 

9. "Wild Cards" 

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING FROM ADVANCES IN THE PHYSICAL 

SCIENCES 

General considerations: 

useful to start with a large list 
useful to mix development levels (a particular chip and a potential product using that chip should 

both be regarded as separate developments) 

A. Energy use and development 

photoelectric cell 

energy co-generation 

artificial photosynthesis 

food production 

fuels - hydrogen, methane 

MHD 

fuel cells 

high-energydensity batteries 

liquid hydrogen 

synfuels 

windmills 

tidal power 

bioelectric power 

bioluminescence 

extraterrestrial 

orbital microwave station 

wide-spectrum conversion of solar energy 

nuclear 

fission 

direct conversion (beta emission) 

fusion 

space-based nuclear plants 

B . Transportation 

superefficient internal combustion 

petroleum fuels 

liquid 

gaseous 

hydrogen 

methane 

maglev trains 

superconductingdrive vehicles 

superconductive intelligent highways 

cellular-radio-control traffic routing 

automated intracity traffic flow 
supersonic/hypersonic transport 

aircraftlvehicle intelligent diagnostics 

on-board real-time 

aircraft intelligent traffic control 

automated routing 

moon mission vehicles 

Mars mission vehicles 

advanced space propulsion systems 

photon sails 

proton rockets 

nuclear 

advanced hybrid vehicles 

landlair 

ground effect (air cushion) 

C . Communications 

rational allocation and utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum - spread spectrum, satelliterouted, laser 

digitalization of all transmissions 

fiber-optic communications 

fiber subscriber loop 

integrated service 

interactive systems 

information service access 

ultrahighdefinition videolmultimedia 

passive transponder tracking 

military IFF 

personnel tracking 

vehicle tracking 

universal portable cellular two-way communication 

computer card money - no paper 

decentralized education services 

computer display art forms 

D. Materials 

new lightweight strong materials for 

aircraft/spacecraft/vehicles 

new construction materials 

laminates, etc 

carbon fiber 
new plastics 

new glass materials 

controlled opacity 

controlled color 

crystalline coatings 

diamond 

new materials for computer technology 

thin films 

new crystals 

organics 

new organic materials 

food 

medicine 

structures 

E. Other 

novel weapons concepts 

weather control via space-based energy plants 

pinpoint all-planet surveillance and targeting with intelligent systems controlling the 

process 

other.. . 

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING FROM ADVANCES IN INFORMATION 

PROCESSING 

A. Computers 

hand-held supercomputers (3000 times more powerful) 

extra-large superchips 

REAL automated software engineering 

REAL artificial intelligence 

parallel architecture hardware 

parallel architecture software 

superhighdensity displays 

projection displays 

heads-up displays 

large wall-proj ections 

instant access to all written literature 

automated studies 

The "Son of Army 2 1" study -- 
--ARMY 45 (2015-2045) may be done by an intelligent computer program 

voice recognition interfaces 

standardized plug-compatible heads-up display systems 

three-dimensional displays 

at last a really decent universal computer language 

at last a true universal Application Program Interface 

B. Automation 

automation of production 

superflexible factories manufacturing to individual order 

automation of all 

vehicles 

instruments 

appliances 

weapons 

automated recycling utilities 

based on current sewer systems 

other 

service robots 

special purpose 

household chore machines 

guard robots 

roving military mission robotslweapons 

general purpose robots (read Isaac Asimov) 

micromachines 

microsurgical robots in arteries 

microspy mobile intelligence gathering devices 

microweapons - miniature killing machines 

fabrication "teams" of micromachines 

space-based production facilities 

planned development of the Moon for research, industry and habitat 

C. Data collection, transmission, analysis 

integrated heads-up displays for 

remote vehicle control 

integrated military mission modules built around the operator and plug-compatible in a 

variety of platforms and configurations 

fractal image compression for 

video 

terrain-following systems 
target recognition 

D. Artificial intelligence 

functional neural networks 

multi-field "expert knowledge" systems 

Very Massively Parallel architectures with 

self-learning software 

machines designing intelligent machines 

machines designing the human physical environment 

machines designing a rational social environment (according to whom? or is it "according to 

what") 

medical diagnosis system accessible through the universal communication system (outgrowth of 

the present phone system) 

job-location and need-resource matching systems 

E. Research and automation interaction 

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING FROM ADVANCES IN LIFE SCIENCES 

A. Public health issues 

AIDS, famines and other health disasters vs overpopulation due to truly effective medicine and 

abundant food supplies 

ethics of biotechnological manipulation of human genetics 

B. Biotechnology 

completion of the Human Genome project with resulting 

life extension 

temporary 

indefinite 

organ regeneration 

designer drugs for physical ailments 

"friendly" chemical warfare agents 

"designer gases" to make the subject happy, placid and essentially immobile for 

a day or two without ill effects 

countermeasure drugs for same 

much more efficient food production 

design of superintelligent, supercapable humans (maybe supersensible too.. .NAAH) 

breeding of "designer servants, " "designer soldiers, " "designer generals" 

design of brand new currently unimaginable species 

design of truly intelligent species based on the total planet "supergenome" rather than 
simply the limited human genome 

SOME POSSIBLE PROJECTIONS FOR 2015-2020 FOR SAMPLE TECHNOLOGIES 

Incremental change ~rojected: 

Electrochemical storage batteries 

Tires 

Road construction materials and methods 

Building construction methods and materials 

Railroad equipment and trackage 

Airport design/construction 

Internal combustion engines 

Home appliance basic processes 

Electrical power networks 

Chemical explosives, propellants 

Generational Change ~roiected: 

Electromagnetic spectrum allocation for communications 

Radio broadcasting - alldigital format 

TV broadcasting - alldigital very-high-definition format 

Civilian aircraft and air traffic control systems 

Telephone communications networks - all wideband fiber-optic 

Mainframe computers 

Automobiles - computerized control/diagnostics, safety 

Industrial plant automation 

Space travel 

Information access (to existing published info) 

Radical change ~roiected: 

Personal computers 

Data storage/access media 

Personal communications equipment, including video 

Information access (to newly published info) 

Home appliance control - intelligent controls built-in 

Automobile accessories - extensive automation, nav aids 

Surveillance/reconnaissance technology 

Precisiondelivered munitions, including smart micromunitions 

Visualization/display technologies 
Unknown change ~roiected (incremental to radical): 

Medicine 

Human performance enhancement - physical, mental 

Agriculture 

Animal husbandry 

New organism designlproduction 

Nuclear fusion 

Room-temperature superconductivity 

Optical computers 

Holographic storagelretrieval 

Micromachine technology 

Social sciences 

With regard to the need for planning, according to Martin van Creveld: 

The long lead times of up to 15 years that often characterize the most modern 

technologies in particular means that most wars have to be fought with the hardware at 

hand. However, those very same lead times also signify that planning has to commence 

years in advance and involve educated guesses concerning the nature and effect of devices 

which, as yet, exist only on the drawing boards, or simply as semi-articulated ideas in 

the minds of inventors. The conflicting demands of readiness and of preparation, of 

present and the future, make this task extremely difficult. No wonder it has spawned an 

entire new industry, commonly known as technological forecasting, that has much in 

common with the ancient hocus-pocus. (emphasis added) 
SOURCES 

1. Brown, Malcom W. "Invention That Shaped the Gulf War: The Laser-Guided Bomb," New York 

Times, February 26, 1991. 

2. Creveld, Martin van. Technology and War. New York: Free Press, 1989. 

3. Krayeski, Felix P., Jr. "LC's Collection Size in Bytes," Library of Congress. Memorandum, 

November 30, 1989. 

4. Pilzer, Paul Zane. Unlimited Wealth. New York: Crown Publishers, 1990. 

5. "Speedier Fiber," Lightwave, February 1991, Frontlines column. 

6. United States Department of Commerce. Emerging Technologies: A Survev of Technical and 

Economic Opportunities. Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1990. 

7. - .Department of Defense. Critical Technologies Plan. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990. 

8. - .Department of Defense. Department of the Army. Armv Technologv Base Master Plan. (2d 

ed.) Washington, D.C. : SARD-ZT, 1990. 

9. Uslaner, Selma. "International Report," Solid State Technologv, December 1990, 8. 

10. White House, The. The National Critical Technologies Panel. Re~ort of the National Critical 

Technolo~ies Panel. Washington, D.C. : GPO, 199 1. 

(A note on sources. News of technological developments are so ubiquitous as to appear in 

literally thousands of sources. Indeed, the news distribution process has itself become a part of the 

"technology environment." Suggested readings to remain informed depend on individual interest, but in 

addition to major daily newspapers (for example, New York Times, Washington and periodicals 

like Aviation Week, one excellent source is the weekly publication Science News. Industry magazines 

and newspapers such as Infoworld, Lightwave, and Solid State Technology should be considered 

information standards .) 
KEY JUDGMENTS 

UNITED STATES MILITARY SCIENCE 

- By the year 2015 the United States will still play a large role in ensuring the stability 

of the international balance. The United States will have jey strategic interests in the Persian Gulf, 

Europe, the Pacific, and Latin America. 

- The Soviet Union will occupy a position of prime importance in U.S. strategic 

planning even if that country is weakened by internal political problems and economic crises. 

- The arms race will have been scaled down and the development of weapons necessary 

for maintaining deterrence against the Soviet Union will probably take place at a slower pace. The 

United States will continue to rely on a modernized mix of nuclear systems that hold critical Soviet assets 

at risk. 

- The threat of nuclear weapons proliferation to smaller, developing countries will be 

a greater problem than the Soviet threat. Space-based surveillance will be used to monitor arms control 

and anti-proliferation agreements with increased effectiveness. 

- By the year 2015 the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons will have more 

than doubled. Nuclear war will increasingly be viewed as an unacceptable alternative for achieving 

military and political aims. The primary focus of nuclear weapons will be on the proliferation problem 

rather than superpower confrontation. 

- In the event of high-intensity conflict, large quantities of weapons systems, with 

unprecedented range and lethality, specifically, non-nuclear strategic capability (NNSC) would be fielded 

by combatants. Projection of air power would be especially vital since the United States will have a 

much smaller military force designed to respond to medium- and low-intensity conflicts. The closing of 

overseas bases and demobilization of U.S.-based forces will have affected force structure, making it more 

difficult to project power on a global scale. 

- Conventional battle will most likely be obsolete, replaced by low-intensity conflict 

(LIC). This type of third-world conflict will require the understanding of cultural, historical, economic, 

and social roots of turmoil as well as the political/military. The Army would be well served by an 

enhanced Foreign Area Officer Program, wherein the warrior-scholar would be of great value to the 

nation. 

- By the year 2015 the advanced technology of the U.S. military will provide the 

maximum warfighting potential from less manpower. A smaller, home-based, highly professional army 

will be the order of the day. 
UNITED STATES MILITARY SCIENCE TO 2015 

STATE OF THE ART TODAY 

The Strategic Environment 

As a global power, the United States has global interests. Defining those interests in a highly 

uncertain, constantly changing strategic environment is both a political and a military task. Most military 

thinkers agree that the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union do not mean that the threat to 

American interests around the world is any less. Although the Soviets are clearly looking inward and 

focusing their attention more on longstanding internal problems than on military competition with the 

West, the ultimate direction of Soviet change is not yet clear. Furthermore, as the war with Iraq serves 

to remind the U.S. military, new security challenges are arising in other areas of the world. Since World 

War 11, the developing world has experienced on average at least 25 internal and international conflicts 

each year. [I] Many developing nations are gaining increasingly formidable and sophisticated weapons, 

including nuclear and chemical weapons. And terrorism and insurgency are on the rise everywhere. 

The goal of U.S. national security policy today is to preserve the United States as a free and 

independent nation, a goal that is furthered by interrelated political, economic, and defense strategies. 

The foundation of U.S. defense strategy is deterrence, based on nuclear and conventional forces, as well 

as on international alliances and power projection capabilities. Although the first priority of U.S. defense 

strategy continues to be that of deterring nuclear attack, the U.S. has commitments and interests around 

the globe that require U.S. military forces. Conventional capabilities are seen as essential to deter and 

contain local conflicts that might threaten the interests of the U.S. and its allies. 

The Operational Continuum 

At present the Joint Chiefs of Staff takes a view of military science that extends beyond 

straightforward battle doctrine and encompasses broader strategic concepts. One of these concepts is the 

so-called "operational continuum," which basically describes the various levels of interaction between 

nation-states. The first level of interaction is peacetime competition between nations. This includes 

trade, technological and military competition, and efforts to extend military influence beyond borders. 

These activities have been termed "operations short of conflict." 

The next level of the continuum is conflict that falls short of war. This could arise out of 

insurrection or instability within one country that creates broader instabilities in the region. Conflict 

might mean that the military makes a show of force in another country and even carries out raids or 

surgical strikes, such as the United States did against Libya, Grenada or Panama. The third level of the 

continuum is all-out war, either limited and regional or global. 
Joint and Combined Operations , 

Joint operations is a fundamental tenet of current U.S. military doctrine. It refers to the basic 

chain of command, which begins with the President of the United States, goes through the Secretary of 

Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then to the Theater Commander-in-Chief 

(CINC). The CINC is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing his designated mission 

and operates under the strategic direction of the JCS. This is a so-called unified command. The 

individual services are responsible for providing their contingents to the CINC. In addition to joint 

operations, the U.S. military also prepares for combined operations with land, air, and naval forces of 

allied governments. Doctrines, procedures, and principles have been developed to enhance inter-allied 

coordination. The recent war with Iraq exemplifies the concept of combined operations. 

AirLand Battle and AirLand Battle-Future 

The AirLand Battle Doctrine describes the Army's approach to generating and applying combat 

power at the operational and tactical levels. [9] The concept of AirLand Battle is based on the threedimensional nature of modern warfare and the view that all ground actions above the level of minor 

engagements are greatly affected by the supporting air operations of one or both combatants. AirLand 

Battle Doctrine recognizes that modern warfare is likely to be fluid and nonlinear, so it takes an enlarged 

view of the battlefield and emphasizes unified air, ground, and sea operations throughout the theater. 

AirLand Battle-Future (ALB-F) or AirLand Operations, which will become doctrine within two 

,,years, is a refined version of the AirLand Battle concept. Basically, it assumes a smaller army with 

improved technology that will enable the U.S. military to find the enemy at greater depth than ever 

before. Such precise location of enemy formations will allow the U.S. miltary to accept gaps between 

its units and to maneuver a reduced number of forces. Technology also will facilitate precision deep 

strikes against the enemy such as those achieved by the laser-guided bombs of Operation Desert Storm. 

ALB-FIALO places more focus on enemy forces as the objective than airland battle doctrine. ALBFIALO is likely to remain army doctrine into the early years of the 21st century, but numerous outside 

factors could change this doctrine before the year 2015. 

Nuclear War Doctrine 

United States strategy towards nuclear war has evolved around several key concepts during the 

past 25 years. Because the devastating effects of nuclear war have been generally acknowledged, these 

concepts are based on deterrence and escalation control, while scenarios for nuclear war that have been 

posited have tended to focus on Soviet objectives and intentions. NATO allies, for example, have long 
debated the question of what form of "flexible response" would be most effective in meeting a Soviet 

conventional threat. And increasing efforts were begun in the 1980s to develop nuclear weapons that 

would permit a limited response to Soviet aggression rather than an all-out nuclear attack. 

Recognizing that nuclear weapons are too terrible to be used, U.S. military thinkers have 

discussed nuclear warfighting strategy largely in terms of how the United States and NATO would 

respond to Soviet aggression. At the same time, however, because maintaining a nuclear balance has 

long been seen as the key to deterrence, the United States and its allies have devoted tremendous 

expenditures to building up a nuclear arsenal. They have shared a belief that a modernized mix of 

nuclear systems is essential to holding critical Soviet assets at risk. Recent developments have caused 

U.S. military scientists to reassess this strategy. The dismantling of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, 

the moves within the Soviet Union to introduce democratic reform, and the willingness of Soviet officials 

to engage in concrete arms control agreements have given rise to an increased emphasis on arms control 

and a general recognition that the nuclear debate is becoming increasingly irrelevant to global realities. 

Dicussions about the nuclear threat now center just as much on nuclear proliferation as they do on the 

Soviet nuclear arsenal, making nuclear arms control an even more important U.S. strategic aim. 

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES - 2015 

As a superpower, the United States will continue to have strong globalinterests in the year 2015. 

Communications and transportation technologies will shrink the world at a rapid pace, a process that 

could transform the world into a global community. Collective security arrangements and politicoeconomic alliances will unite individual states into larger bodies. Strategic decision-making will take 

place in the context of multinational bodies like the United Nations. Greater security cooperation among 

states will be furthered by environmental and economic concerns, which extend well beyond national 

borders. Issues such as global warming, overpopulation, and the depletion of the ozone layer will create 

a basis for new global agreements that will set a pattern of increasing interdependence and mutual 

cooperation among nation states. Such interaction will have a direct impact on security matters. 

The United States will continue to play a large role in ensuring the stability of the international 

balance. The United States will have important strategic interests around the world, especially in the 

following areas: 

1) Persian Gulf - By 2015 the United States could be more self-sufficient in terms of energy requirements, 

but this is doubtful. It is more likely that the nation will still depend heavily on the Middle East for oil 

and will continue to deem this an area of key strategic interest. The political complexion of the Middle 

East will have changed considerably from what it is now. Islamic fundamentalism will be the driving 

force in the region, replacing traditional forms of rule by oil sheiks. This fact will create widespread 

instability and pose new challenges for the United States in protecting its interests in the area. In general, 

we will support friendly states and act to prevent hostile powers from acts of aggression in the region and 

from gaining control of oil supplies and communications. 
2) Europe - The United States will continue to have a close security and economic relationship with the 

countries of Europe, although it is likely that NATO will be more a political than a military alliance by 

2015. As in the past, the United States will consider part of its national security concerns to preserve 

a peaceful and economically stable European community. Though our forces will be reduced, we will 

maintain our commitment to European security. This will be seen as necessary despite the Soviet 

withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the other indications that it is modifying its traditional security 

priorities. According to one source: "Although internal weakness and political disarray contributed to 

the need to retreat from cold war confrontation with the West they [the Soviets] also may serve to 

paralyze security reform." [4] In other words, it cannot be assumed that by 2015 the Soviet Union will 

no longer pose a threat to Europe. 

3) The Pacific area will grow in importance for United States security interests, although our interests 

will be less focused on the traditional threat. Worries about Communist insurgency will recede in the 

face of new challenges. Japan will remain the dominant economic power, although it is unlikely to 

change its security policy, which is non-interventionist and pacifistic. China, on the other hand, will be 

a nuclear power to reckon with. Many experts expect China to exercise far more power and influence 

in the early 21st century than it has in the past. Despite China's growing importance, Marxism-Leninism 

will probably have little appeal for third-world states of the Pacific area, such as the Philippines. And 

the Soviet Union may be so involved with its own internal problems that it will not be making substantial 

attempts to influence political events there. Nonetheless, violence and armed conflict will become 

increasingly prevalent as population and poverty swell, thus creating a security concern for the United 

States. 

4) Latin America - The American hemisphere will take on new strategic importance for the United States 

towards 2015. Overpopulation, environmental, and economic problems will cause increasing societal 

disruption in Latin America. Therefore we can expect greater political instability and violence. The U.S. 

military will view such instability as a threat to its own strategic security and will therefore maintain a 

readiness to intervene militarily when such a threat warrants intervention. 

5) As in the past the Soviet Union will continue to occupy a place of prime importance in U.S. strategic 

planning, even if the Soviet Union is considerably weakened by the dissolution of its unified state or 

burdened with economic and ethnic problems. Maintaining stable nuclear deterrence in relation to the 

Soviet Union will still be an aim of U.S. policy, although it will not be in the forefront of U.S. strategic 

concerns. Given the state of the Soviet economy in 1991 and the extent of its internal political problems, 

it is unlikely that the USSR will be able to maintain the pace of technological advancement in either 

nuclear or conventional weapons that it has maintained in the past. Therefore the arms race will likely 

be scaled down and the development of weapons necessary for maintaining deterrence against the Soviet 

Union will probably take place at a slower pace. 

Although the United States will continue to rely on a modernized mix of nuclear systems that hold 

critical Soviet assets at risk, the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons in other, smaller 

nations will be perceived as just as great a problem as the Soviet threat. Indeed, according to most 
scenarios, proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons throughout the world will continue well into 

the 21st century. [27l Tensions, therefore, will be high, and armed conflict, as a means for nations to 

protect their economic infrastructures, will be an ever-present threat. 

It is, of course, impossible to predict where and against whom the United States will have to 

focus its military strength in 2015. Colin Gray says that the future of international security politics is 

likely to be very much like its past. Alliance ties may alter and technology will shift, but strategic 

geography will remain a critical subject with persistent implications for U.S. defense planning. [ll] An 

important principle that Gray postulates for this period is to "retain the flexibilty to adjust to change." 

Another probable security concern for the United States will be the growing incidence of low-intensity 

conflict in all areas of the world. (See discussion below.) 

As Gray points out, the classic threats to the United States are receding, but this does not mean 

a more secure world for the future. More than likely what the United States will face as a security 

concern in 2015 are serious political upheavals in East-Central Europe, including the Soviet Union. For 

this reason it will be in the interests of the United States to maintain some sort of military presence in 

Europe, perhaps as a counterweight to a united and economically strong Germany. It is quite possible 

that the United States will continue to lose economic influence in Europe, particularly with the expanding 

role of the European Economic Community (EEC). Nonetheless the United States will still be a 

superpower and, as such, will be called upon to confront any threats to the balance of power in Eurasia. 

As Gray notes: "By virtue of its economic size, the scale of its military forces, its global mobility and 

the cover of its nuclear deterrent, the United States will remain in a class by itself as a power for order 

and stability. " [ll] 

One alternative scenario to the one which postulates that the United States will be a superpower 

with global interests in 2015 is one which places the United States in an isolationist stance. [27l 

According to this scenario the United States remains a prosperous postindustrial state, but other nations 

have achieved new international economic status and increased power and prestige in their regions. This 

changed status has had an adverse affect on U.S. international political influence and caused U.S. forces 

to be dispelled from all overseas bases. The United States has, as a result, turned inward and become 

more isolationist, concerned with social welfare, environmental and other internal issues. In this 

scenario, U.S. reliance on nuclear deterrence is much greater than it was at the turn of the century. 

Potential Im~act of Arms Control 

The arms control process will continue to be centered on the Soviet Union. Although events of 

the past few years have given the United States some cause for optimism about bi-lateral agreements with 

the Soviet Union, the arms control process will be lengthy. Given the extent of its economic problems, 

the Soviet Union has a high incentive to further the arms control process, and to work for cuts in both 

nuclear and conventional forces. Yet the highly turbulent political environment in the Soviet Union might 

in the long run work against arms control. Arms control efforts will also be directed at the problem of 
nuclear proliferation. Negotiations will be a highly politicd process, most likely linked to forms of 

economic aid as a means of leverage. 

NUCLEAR WAR IN 2015 

Most experts agree that the trend toward less emphasis on nuclear weapons in strategic planning 

for possible wars between the global superpowers will continue. Nuclear war will increasingly be viewed 

as an unacceptable alternative for achieving military and political aims. The risk of arousing politically 

damaging opposition at home, together with the problem of limited economic resources, will put more 

and more restraints on nuclear force planning. Although the United States will continue to build nuclear 

weapons, nuclear weapons could become so discredited domestically that the United States will have great 

difficulties persuading its adversaries that it will employ these weapons. However, the American public 

would likely demand retaliatory use of nuclear weapons if U.S. forces were subjected to nuclear or 

chemical/biological attack. 

One analyst has observed that "with respect to nuclear weapons, United States thinking since 

World War I1 has gone from fascination with things nuclear to appreciation of the limitations of such 

weapons." [25l Smith and others argue that there will continue to be a general desire among the nuclear 

powers to avoid destroying the world. Nonetheless, nuclear weapons will be still be very much around 

in 2015, and any war fought between the superpowers will be fought in the nuclear environment. As a 

result, if one side is on the verge of military collapse in a conventional war, the nuclear reality will be 

at the very least reckoned with. Smith asks: "Would the Soviets choose to lose a war of conventional 

forces rather than initiate the use of nuclear weapons themselves?" and goes on to observe: "Few would 

argue that the Soviets would never think such thoughts; clearly nuclear weapons will continue to be a 

factor in any war between major powers." 

Ironically, this future scenario that advances with the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons 

might be made more likely as a result of technological advances in conventional warfare. One source 

suggests that a future form of high-technology, fourth generation warfare might carry in it seeds of 

nuclear destruction. Its effectiveness could rapidly eliminate the ability of a nuclear-armed opponent to 

wage war conventionally: "Destruction or disruption of vital industrial capacities, political infrastructure 

and social fabric, coupled with sudden shifts in balance of power and concomitant emotions, could easily 

lead to escalation to nuclear weapons." [14] 

In general, experts foresee a continued reliance on deterrence as the basis for U.S. nuclear policy. 

Arms reduction agreements such as START will result in balanced and reduced offensive forces, but the 

mission of deterrence will endure and the triad concept will remain fundamental to this strategy. 

Some insist that the United States will also continue to need modern theater nuclear weapons as a 

deterrent aspect of the NATO strategy of flexible response. On the other hand, one study concludes that 

"flexible response will be a mere anachronism if Europeans prohibit the modernization of theater nuclear 

forces or if such forces are reduced to zero through negotiations -- or if we find that our theater nuclear 
weapons are targeted at a democratic Eastern Europe." [8] 

Technology of course will also shift the course of nuclear planning by the year 2015. Indeed, 

some argue that the continued development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) takes the defense 

against nuclear weapons from the U.S. military and places it in the hands of technology. One analyst 

observes that by 2015 nuclear warfare will already be totally in the realm of space: "If nuclear weapons 

continue to exist it seems appropriate that their venue be deep space rather than our small, blue planet." 

[19] Whether or not this scenario is realistic, one thing seems clear. Space-based surveillance systems 

will be so advanced technologically by 2015 that arms control agreements with other major powers will 

be monitored with 100 per cent effectiveness. Therefore arms control will continue to be a key element 

of U.S. strategic policy in the nuclear realm. 

The main focus of nuclear weapons in the future will be centered on the problem of nuclear 

proliferation rather than on super-power confrontation. By 2015 the number of nations possessing nuclear 

weapons will have more than doubled. As Defense Secretary Cheney has observed: "Advanced 

technology can make third-class powers into first-class threats. " [3] The possibility that regional conflicts 

will become nuclear ones will be one of the greatest threats facing U.S. security planners in 2015. This 

situation will not only keep the nuclear question very much alive; it also could reduce United States 

willingness to deploy forces around the globe because of the danger that these forces would be attacked 

by a hostile regional power. Here too, however, U.S. space surveillance capabilities will at the very least 

enable military planners to pinpoint the danger spots with total accuracy and eliminate all elements of 

surprise. 

CONVENTIONAL WAR IN 2015 

Hiph Intensitv Conflict 

This type of conventional warfare is global in scope and objective, e 

ntailing the use of all domestic resources over a long period of time and most likely being a major world 

war with all the superpowers involved. This is the level of conflict that is directly below nuclear war on 

the scale of intensity and could escalate into nuclear war. High intensity conflict is likely to be highly 

destructive and extend across a wide space of air, land, and sea. Combatants in this type of war would 

field large quantities of high quality weapons systems, with unprecedented range and lethality. Power 

projection capabilities of the air force would be especially vital in such a war, since the ability to reach 

all over the globe from just a few bases would likely be achieved by 2015. Complementary Air Force 

and naval operations would play a prominent role. Wide-ranging surveillance and communications 

technology would increase the range and scope of the battle. Chemical and biological weapons are likely 

to be encountered. 

High intensity conflict requires the projection of conventional forces to parts of the globe where 

there are no pre-positioned forces or supplies. The power projection capability will be especially 
important in 2015 because the United States will have a much smaller military, designed to respond to 

medium- and low-intensity conflicts. The loss of overseas bases and the demobilization of U.S.-based 

forces will have affected the force structure, making it more difficult to project power on a global scale. 

Thus, for example, United States forces in Europe will have shrunk dramatically. Sea transport will be 

the primary means of large-scale deployment, with satellite surveillance and space-based defense of sea 

lanes playing a crucial role, particularly in cases of conflict of long duration. In a future high-intensity 

war, it will be essential for the United States to have ASAT capability in order to execute deep and 

accurate strikes into enemy territory with precision non-nuclear weapons. 

In high-intensity conflict U.S. forces must have sufficient firepower to deter or contain or even 

end the conflict in the early stages, before nuclear weapons are used. Firepower will be furnished by 

carrier-based support aircraft, strategic bombers, cruise missiles, and from long-range, land-based 

missiles. The force must have the ability to sustain combat and destroy enemy forces for a prolonged 

period. In order to be prepared for high-intensity conflict the United States must have a large inventory 

of air-, land- and sea-launched smart weapons because even by the year 2015 the defense industry will 

not be able to produce these technologically sophisticated weapons on short notice. 

U.S. military scientists forsee the likely form of defense in a high-intensity conflict, such as that 

which might occur in Europe, to be that embodied in the concepts of AirLand Battle-Future. [17;8] In 

other words, the conflict will take place in a highly fluid battlefield, with an undiscernible front line, and 

operations will be non-linear. The depth and width of the battlefield will expand as new systems, such 

as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), are developed. The ATACMS will give corps 

commanders the ability to strike enemy formations over 100 kilometers away. Another system is the 

Joint Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance System (JSTARS). It is important to note, however, 

that these systems may fall victim to cuts in defense spending as a result of the perceived lower threat 

from the Soviet Union. 

Mid-Intensitv Conflict 

This is another concept on the operational continuum of likely scenarios for the future. A midintensity conflict is a conventional war confined to one area of the globe and involves a regional power, 

rather than a superpower. The prototypical mid-intensity conflict has long been assumed to be that which 

would occur in Southwest Asia, and the recent war with Iraq has provided a concrete example. This midintensity conflict presented a considerable challenge for the United States because Iraq had hightechnology weapons systems and in order to respond to threats posed by these systems the United States 

had to mobilize its assets over great distances. Iraq was the world's sixth largest army, with more than 

1,000 tanks. Moreover, there was the added complication of having to gain support for the attack on Iraq 

from the other superpowers. 

As a mid-intensity conflict, Operation Desert Storm served also as an example of the AirLand 

Battle doctrine in practice. Just as with the high-intensity conflict envisaged by military planners, the war 
with Iraq required the United States and its allies to project power over a long distance and to employ 

its forces in a joint operations and combined arms mode. Laser-guided bombs enabled the allied forces 

to accurately strike the enemy at great distances. Most military planners see the success of the war 

against Iraq as proof of the efficacy of the AirLand Battle doctrine and thus as a justification for 

proceeding to the next stage--Airland Battle Future, which is fundamentally a refinement of the ALB. 

ALBF places a premium on mobility, agility, flexibility, and rapid movement. It posits a battlefield 

where there are fewer troops in more open formations, a less structured battlefield, where forces will rely 

even more than today on smart weapons that penetrate deep into the enemy's rear. 

ALBF is more in keeping with the U.S. military's probable future mission of projecting land 

power to distant theaters as part of joint and combined forces. This projection of land power is the type 

of mission that will be required for mid-intensity conflicts, which some experts say will be the 

predominant form of conflict in the decades to come. The mission of U.S. forces in MIC has been 

described as "to engage and defeat traditional armies, navies and airforces of nations that choose to 

assault U.S. interests throughout the developing world." [8] It is a mission that will involve close 

interservice coordination, just as occurred in Operation Desert Storm because U.S. forces will be 

operating far from home and will also most likely be outnumbered. This situation does not mean, 

however, that the United States can be expected to intervene in mid-intensity wars whenever its interests 

are threatened. It is quite possible that by the year 2015 there will be so many constraints on the U.S. 

defense budget that it will have to be highly selective about global military commitments. 

Low-Intensitv Conflict 

Although it is generally agreed that mid-intensity conflicts are more likely to occur in the future 

than high-intensity conflicts, some military thinkers, such as Martin van Creveld and Rod Paschall, 

predict that the next century will not see any type of conventional warfare. They argue that such 

conventional forms of battle will have become obsolete, along with nuclear war, and that the predominant 

form of conflict will be so-called low-intensity conflict (LIC). Military theorists define LIC in somewhat 

different ways, but it is generally accepted as conflict at the lowest level of the operational continuum. 

According to Rod Paschall, low intensity conflict is armed conflict for political purposes short of combat 

between regularly organized forces. [20] Although LIC typically does not involve regular armies on both 

sides, it could involve a conventional army on one side and guerilla forces on the other. The term first 

appeared in the 1980s and has been used to describe several previous U.S. engagements, including those 

that occurred in Lebanon, Grenada, Iran, Panama, El Salvador, the Philippines, and Libya. Van Creveld 

also classifies the war in Vietnam as an LIC. [21] LICs tend to erupt in less developed parts of the world 

and they are often very bloody and protracted. Some experts define LIC in broader terms, as involving 

six areas: peacetime contingency operations, peacekeeping operations, combating terrorism, 

counternarcotics operations, counterinsurgency, and insurgency. 

LIC usually involves special operations forces, those military or naval elements that are trained 
and equipped to conduct or support insurgency, sabotage, p~ychological operations, counter-terrorism, 

and commando-type operations. They also perform rescue, reconnaissance, and intelligence-gathering 

functions. Although part of the armed forces, they are not designed for regular combat. These forces 

played a crucial role in the war with Iraq, although of course, this was a mid-intensity conflict rather than 

an LIC. Operating deep within the country, they disrupted internal communications and located scud 

missile lauchers so that they could be destroyed by allied forces. Special forces will become even more 

important in the future, playing a role in military operations of all levels of intensity. 

Paschall predicts a substantial increase in special operations forces in the early part of the next 

century, as well as unprecedented levels of performance as a result of technological advances and better 

training. On balance, he observes, technological trends are favoring the terrorist, the special operations 

unit, and the insurgent as the 21st century approaches. First of all, trends in the world's industries will 

make them more vulnerable to sabotage and terrorism. We can expect to see larger nuclear power plants, 

telecommunications centers, and manufacturing facilities for pesticides and toxic chemicals. Airplanes 

will most likely increase considerably in terms of passenger capacity. Secondly, the greater effectiveness 

of new items that a human can carry or wear -- shoulder-fired weapons, rations, communications 

equipment and terrorist devices -- and the fact that manned war machines are becoming prohibitively 

expensive to produce favors the terrorist or insurgent. Paschall portrays a future world where men who 

stand on the ground with weapons in their hands defeat mechanized armies. [20] 

Paschall and others see an end to the essentially bi-polar geopolitical world by 2015, a 

development which should reduce super-power tension. War will still occur, but it will take place 

primarily in the Third World and will most likely be low-intensity conflict. Insurgent movements--often 

based on urban underground movements--will be the prime instigators of LICs, but they may draw in the 

super-powers. The potential for United States involvement will escalate correspondingly as diverse 

forces--religion, nationalism, hunger, population growth, scarce resources--erode the ability of ThirdWorld states to govern. Also, Third-World-sponsored terrorist attacks against westerners will increase, 

and, according to another source, counter-narcotics operations will become increasingly important. [I] 

Before Operation Desert Storm, van Creveld went much further, arguing that conventional 

warfare is on its way out because modern weapons are becoming so dependent on complex technology 

for maintanence and logistic support and so big, expensive, and unmanueverable that contempory war 

is becoming a less viable alternative. Conventional wars depend on stable governments and their armies, 

but it will be increasingly difficult for states to retain a monopoly on violence, largely because of the 

growth of terrorism and insurgency, which threatens directly the viability of the state. As van Creveld 

describes it, states will gradually and spasmodically lose their monopoly on armed violence and will be 

confronted with widespread outbreaks of unrest and violent upheavals, similar to those that occurred in 

Europe during the Reformation. Distinctions between war and crime, soldiers and civilians will no longer 

exist. The first to be affected will be states in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America, but larger 

entities like the Soviet Union, China and India will also be affected by this process. 

Van Creveld describes a world where by 2015, battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings, 
and massacres, and military bases will be replaced by hideouts and dumps. "The spread of sporadic, 

small-scale war," he claims, "will cause regular armed forces themselves to change form, shrink in size, 

and wither away.. .much of the day-today burden of defending society against the threat of low intensity 

conflict will be transferred to the booming security business." [21] Surveillance technology will not 

necessarily be able to suppress subversion and LIC. Van Creveld argues that information-recording and 

transmitting equipment used to bolster a regime can be equally handy in subverting it and that devices 

declared tamper-proof by their manufacturers will still be tampered with. Subversion, therefore, will 

become a major problem for both Western and Third World governments. 

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY 

Conventional Warfare 

Technological developments will have a tremendous impact on military science in the future, even 

if investment in defense technology is curtailed because of budgetary constraints. New technology will 

not necessarily change the nature of war, but in many significant ways it will change the battlefield on 

which war will be waged. There will be several areas where machines will replace personnel on the 

battlefield by the year 2015. Thus, for example, there will be unmanned "tel-operated" vehicles, 

remotely controlled at a safer location, that carry surveillance sensors or weapons into areas too 

dangerous for humans. Robotic machines, which are stronger and faster than humans and do not tire or 

require food or water, will replace human crew. members to perform such tasks as loading ammunition 

in howitzers and tanks. By 2015 robotic machines could well play such military roles as reconnaissance, 

urban warfare, anti-armor attack, minefield sweeping, warning and monitoring logistics, sentry duty and 

explosive-ordnance disposal. [28] Given the fact the the United States and several other Western 

governments are now actively pursuing research in this area, we might expect extensive military 

application of robotics in the future. 

As part of a trend towards greater automation of warfare, the microprocessor will deploy smart 

weapons on a more comprehensive scale. Computers will continue to replace human intervention and 

there will be more automated, long-distance decisions. The battlefield of the future will be fully 

computerized. Advances in computer architecture and machine intelligence will have reached the point 

where weapons will have the ability to analyze their environment and current battle situation, search likely 

target areas, detect and analyze targets, make attack decisions, select and dispense munitions and report 

results. 

The U.S. military is at present on the verge of a revolution in conventional combat capability and 

soon will have long-range strike systems that can kill hard mobile targets, with delivery systems that are 

either air- or surface-launched and either launch-and-leave or man-in-the-loop. The combination of high 

survivability and the massing of lethal firepower will make such weapons dominant in most battle 
situations. As one source points out, "The fusing of adviinced sensors with brilliant weapons and 

battlefield management systems will bring a technological revolution on the battlefields of the next 

century." [a] One question that arises is whether, as some predict, these new technologies will restore 

supremacy to the defensive and mark the end of the tank's importance or whether these technologies will 

place a premium on rapid, stealthy action, and offensive operations. Most experts agree, however, that 

conventional warfare will be increasingly global in scope because of the technological sophistication and 

range of future weapons. 

The Nuclear Arena 

SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative, could put the defense against nuclear weapons completely 

in the hands of technology. Military experts are still arguing about whether SDI is feasible and costeffective, and the final word may not come for some time. Some say that it is unthinkable for the United 

States to deploy such a system because it would be totally automatic, vulnerable to counter-measures and 

have to perform completely flawlessly, which might be a problem since its elements might be on-orbit 

for years before use. One computer expert claims, "Computer simulation of global nuclear war will 

never be accurate enough for us to design a shield against nuclear weapons because we simply do not 

know enough about what might happen in such a conflict." [23] But others, including Defense Secretary 

Cheney, disagree. Cheney is optimistic about the future of SDI, noting that systems under development, 

such as Brilliant Pebble (a missile interceptor deployed in a low space orbit) could make a missile attack 

on the United States too difficult for any enemy to risk in the future [3]. 

Although military applications of space have traditionally focused on strategic intelligence 

gathering and nuclear deterrence, there is a growing trend towards providing space support for 

conventional military operations. With the decline of the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union, we might 

expect this trend to continue in the 21st century. Space support will serve as a means of providing a 

rapid, reliable warning of regional conflagration, along with a rapid response. Space will most likely be 

the "high ground of conventional combat," providing rapid communications and being base independent. 

Supercomputers aboard satellites, which are less vulnerable to communications interference, will enable 

the U.S. military to have self-reliant reconnaissance satellites that can choose their own targets in that 

case where ground-based systems are knocked out in a war. Artificial intelligence techniques will permit 

automatic identification of objects in satellite photos--as a result of the development of high-speed, 

integrated circuitry, which will enable spy satellites to carry on-board computers that perform the bulk 

of image-processing before the data is beamed to the ground. Computerized surveillance will continue 

to diminish the possibility of surprise attack. For navigation, U.S. naval forces will have a global 
navigation system of unprecedented accuracy. In the early 21st century, a wide range of communications 

satellite communications will be supporting conventional forces. 

One issue that will become important to U.S. military science is that of extending the battlefield 

itself into space. Space offers the perspective to locate and track potential enemy targets and to support 

their engagement. Basically there are three types of space-related fire support that might be developed 

in the future: surface-to-space weapon systems (ground-based lasers or ground-launched antisatellite 

missiles); space-to-space weapons systems (killer satellites); and space-to-surface weapons systems (spacebased laser or orbiting missile/projectile launch platform). [lo] It clearly is not beyond the realm of 

technological possibility, but military planners have thus far shown little enthusiasm for using space 

systems for purposes beyond defense and surveillance and reconnaissance. A key consideration here is 

of course the vast cost of developing the technology for space warfare. The deployment and use of 

weapon systems in space is a very sensitive issue because of the time, resources, and effort required. 

Thus extending the battlefield into space will depend heavily on economic factors. 

TRAINING AND COMMAND 

Man~ower and Force Structure 

By the year 2015 the advanced technology of the U.S. military will provide the maximum 

warfighting potential from less manpower. A smaller, home-based, highly professional army will be the 

order of the day. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney has stressed that force levels envisioned by him and 

other planners for the Pentagon's long-range strategy represent "an absolute rock-bottom minimum. " [3] 

Pressures to reduce the size of U.S. forces will continue well into the next decades. Force levels could 

be down by one third to one half by the year 2015. This condition means that recruitment will be geared 

to attracting young men and women with the high qualities necessary to perform efficiently and to grasp 

the new military technologies. Reducing the force levels should give the U.S. military the opportunity 

to be selective and to offer an attractive career package to prospective recruits. Given the changing ethnic 

composition of the U.S. population, the pool from which recruits will be taken will be composed of a 

much higher proportion of blacks and Hispanics than is the case currently. Women will continue to 

increase proportionately as a component of the armed forces. 

Assuming that U.S. military science will continue to adhere to the doctrine of AirLand Battle 

Future in 2015, the army will have three types of forces: 1) forwarddeployed and contingency forces 

2) strategic reserve forces and 3) mobilization forces. The latter is the force required to win a major 

world conflict and consists of units that exist only in force planning documents. In accordance with the 

ALBF doctrine, these forces would be supplemented by allied troops. It is unlikely that in the future the 

United States will have a contingency force large enough to sustain more than one deployed contingency 

corps. This means that the reserve forces must be prepared to reinforce larger contingency operations. 
Most experts agree that the force readiness requirement will not be fulfilled by the active forces. It does 

not follow, however, that the reserve forces should be structured to fight and win in all types of intensity 

combat, including special operations. The reserve capabilities in the future should be focused on those 

areas where the United States has a comparative advantage, such as fire support intelligence/electronic 

warfare, and command and control. 

Because the United States will not be able to maintain large, specialized forces for every 

geographical area and type of combat, the army of 2015, according to one recent study, must be versatile, 

deployable, and lethal to fulfill its strategic roles. [15J Versatility includes "the right mix of active, 

reserve, heavy, light, and special operations forces, sustainment stocks and, above all, high quality in all 

aspects of the force." [15] Because of U.S. interests around the world and its coalition-based strategy, 

U.S. units will be required to deploy often with little warning time. The army of the future must be 

lethal in order to defeat the enemy as quickly as possible. This will require, above all, an army trained 

for combat readiness, which means that the army must support and maintain tough, realistic training 

programs. 

Command and Control 

Judging from current trends, it might be expected that the pattern of command and control that 

was established by the Goldwater-Nichols act, which gives the commanders in the field much greater 

authority and stresses cooperation among the services, will continue. This trend will be promoted by 

technological developments and by force structures--the leaner, better equipped military force of the 

future will lend itself to a more stream-lined command and control system and better interservice 

coordination. And the logistics of command and control on the battlefield will be much more 

technologically sophisticated. Conversely, the growing range and accuracy of many weapons systems will 

continue to bring sea, air, and land battles closer together, raising the requirements for coordination of 

the services and the integration of command and control. 

The projected increase in reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquistion capabilities will raise 

the demands on command, control, and communications considerably, regardless of the level of intensity 

of the conflict. The battlefield of the future will be much more complex. Commanders and their staffs 

will have to be much better prepared to handle vastly increased quantities of data and information. If, 

as some analysts predict, future battlefields will be characterized by separate units fighting smaller, 

independent battles, this will impose even greater demands on the command and control systems. [I81 

There might also be a greater tension between the centralization that will characterize command and 

control at the higher levels and the decentralization that will exist in future battlefields. Another problem 

that might arise is that, despite immense progress in creating multiple forms of communication and in 

improving resistance to jamming and hardening command sites, the C3 system will continue to be 

vulnerable. Dependence on communication satellites will increase that vulnerability. Also, the problem 

of communications among allies on future battlefields will continue to create difficulties, particularly as 
technologies become more diverse and numerous. In short, command and control on the battlefield of 

the future, where complex communications channels must be integrated and coordinated, will present 

continued challenges. 

TRENDS AND FINDINGS 

Military science by the year 2015 will be heavily influenced by the geopolitical, technological, 

economic, and social changes that will have taken place. If present trends continue, the United States 

will not become isolationist. On the contrary, the increasing globalization of problems and issues will 

draw the United States into an array of interregional and international alignments created for dealing with 

environmental, economic, and military challenges. Competition of course will continue, particularly in 

technological, economic and defense spheres. But there will be a growing perception in the United States 

and the Western world of the need for widespread cooperation on a wide range of issues. 

Military science will be closely coordinated with other geopolitical concerns. Defense experts 

will no longer be thinking primarily in terms of military superiority and military victory, but also in terms 

of political, environmental, and economic consequences of military operations. The legacy of the war 

with Iraq, which has resulted in unforetold environmental, political, and societal consequences, could well 

mark the beginning of an era where military decisions are circumscribed by non-military concerns more 

than ever before. Domestic pressures, such as budgetary constraints and environmental considerations, 

will press the U.S. military further in this direction. 

United States military policy will still rest on a power projection mission, and superiority in 

technological advances will ensure that the United States remains a superpower. But the old bi-polar 

concepts will have long been discarded, and technology will also have altered the balance of power and 

the nature of the perceived threat. Smaller countries, particularly those with unstable governments and 

nuclear or chemical weapons, will pose growing challenges. Even the third-rate powers will have 

weapons of unlimited reach and lethality. Terrorism and insurgency will give rise to more involvement 

by the U.S. military in LICs. Military science will no longer be preoccupied with scenarios for nuclear 

or high-intensity, global warfare, but rather with regional, less intense conflicts. 

Arms control will continue to have a crucial impact on U.S. military science and defense 

policymaking. Despite setbacks that have recently occurred in negotiations between the Soviet Union and 

the United States, in the longer term we will probably see substantial cuts in the nuclear arsenals of both 

superpowers. Hard choices will have to be made by both the United States and the Soviet Union in 

deciding what weapons systems will have priority because both will be making decisions under the 

pressure of budgetary constraints. More attention will be devoted to preventing smaller governments 

from acquiring nuclear weapons. As one expert observed "it is highly likely that the major powers will 

cooperate more and more to damp down dangers they see in regions of the world where their interests 

may be threatened." [25J By 2015 nuclear proliferation could be seen as the foremost threat facing the 

world, in which case arms-control agreements will be the key to protecting the political and economic 
interests of the United States. It is also possible, however, that conflict will be taking place outside the 

arena of governments and will have shifted to the low-intensity variety. This prospect will give major 

powers even more cause to pool their resources and influence in the interests of regional and global 

security. 
SOURCES 

1. "The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach--Global Power," A White Paper, June 1990. 

2. Bell, Daniel, "The World and the United States in 2013. " 

3. Cheney, Dick, "Defending Defense, Ornni, March 1991 . 

4. Covington, Stephen R., "NATO and Soviet Security Reform," The Washimton Ouarterlv, Winter 

1991, pp. 1-12. 

5. Deitchman, Seymour J., Military Power and the Advance of Technology. General Purpose Military 

Forces for the 1980s and Bevond, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983. 

6. Dewey, Col. Edward J., " A Blueprint for a Lean, Mean Army 21," Armv, June 1990, pp. 31-38. 

7. Eshel, Tarnir, "Bringing Battlefield C31 Down to Earth," Military Technolom, May 1989, pp. 1720. 

8. Conventional Combat Priorities: An Amroach for the New Strategic Era. The Final Report of the 

CSIS Conventional Combat 2002 Project, CSIS, Washington, D.C, May, 1990. 

9. FM 100-5 Operations., Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, May 1986. (Revised as "Airland Battle 

Future. ") 

10. Gerhardt, Igor D., "Space and the AirLand Battle," Armv. June 1990, pp. 43-48. 

11. Colin Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast: WarmerIStill Cloudy," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 

Naval Review, May 1990, p. 43 

12. Harnrnond, Lt. Col. John C, "CEWI: Vision for the Future?" Military Review, June 1990, pp. 58-68. 

13. Kelso, Admiral Frank B., "The Navy: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, U. S .Naval Institute 

Proceedings, February, 1991, pp. 56-58. 

14. Lind, William, et. al., ed., "The Changing face of War into the Fourth Generation," UQg 

Review, October 1989, pp. 3-11. 

15. Metz, Lt. Col. Thomas F., "Force Structure for the 1990s and Beyond," U.S. Army War College, 

April 1990. 

16. The Militarv Frontier, Time-Life Books, Alexandria, VA, 1988. 

17. Militarv Review, February 1991 (issue devoted to AirLand Battle Future). 

18. Moss, Kenneth B., ed., Technolom and the Future Strategic Environment, Washington D.C: Wilson 

Center Press, 1990. 
19. 09Connell, Robert, Of Arms and Men: A Historv of w&. Weapons and Aggression, New York, 

Oxofrd University Press, 1989. 

20. Paschall, Rod, LIC 2010. Special Operations & Unconventional Warfare in the Next Centurv, 

Washington, D.C, Brassey's, 1990. 

21. van Creveld, Martin, The Transformation of War, New York, Free Press, 1990. 

22. Sabin, Philip A.G., "Shadow or Substance? Perceptions and Symbolism in Nuclear Force Planning," 

Adelphi Papers 222, Summer 1987. 

23. Shultz, James B., "SDI National Test Bid Simulates Attack Response," Armed Forces Journal, Nov. 

1989, p. 59. 

24. Smith, Major Gen. Perry M., "Developing A Long-Term National Strategy," Airpower Journal, 

Summer 1989, Vol. III No. 2, pp. 4-15. 

25. Smith, W.Y ., "Principles of U.S. Grand Strategy: Past and Future," The Washington Ouarterl~, Vol. 

14, no. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 67-78. 

26. Strange, Major Robert A., "Bright Promise or Broken Dream," Militarv Review, October 1989, pp. 

13-21. 

27. Taylor, Charles W., Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic Planning, Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, 1988. 

28. Turbe, Gerard and Hewish, Mark, "Europe and US Pursue Battlefield Robotics," International 

Defense Review, Vol. 24, no. 1, 1991, pp. 40-46. 

29. Vuono, General Carl E., "The United States Army Is a Strategic Force," Armed Forces Journal 

International, February, 1989, pp. 60-64. 
KEY JUDGMENTS 

GEOPOLITICS AND THREAT 

- The post-World War I1 bi-polar world is fast disappearing. The conditions that 

obtained at the end of 1945, exaggerating the pre-eminence of two powers, have virtually disappeared 

with the end of Cold War bloc confrontation. 

- Europe will no longer be the center of political interest between the nuclear powers. 

Former "client" states, most of which are located in the developing world, are well-armed and equipped, 

and may pose security threats to the developed world. These potential regional hegemons will feel free 

to pursue their own goals. Recognizing that ideology, religion, and territory still play significant roles 

in relations between countries, the world is entering upon a very unsettled time. The world's hierarchy 

of nations will be challenged. 

- The relationship between a nation's military power and its economy is being reevaluated. Whether it will be possible to be an economic power without translating that into 

militarylpolitical muscle will be a question of debate for coming decades. 

- The massive use of nuclear-based military force is becoming obsolete. Nuclear 

weapons have served to stabilize the boundaries in Europe. The entrenchment of interest in preserving 

postwar prosperity can balance the deterrent effect of World War I1 memories. 

- The concepts of geography and territory are taking on new, nontraditional meanings. 

Geographical features are no longer an impediment to an attacking opponent because of modern weapons 

delivery systems. Transnational or global issues are emerging that know no state boundaries: global 

pollution and environmental degradation (nuclear accidents and oil spills) transcend national borders. 

- The interdependence of world economies and markets is intensifying and leading to 

further decentralization. This 

greater interdependence is bringing closer coordination between nation-states. The information 

technology revolution is enhancing and enlarging the role of individuals in world and national affairs. 

Remote villages can view the world scene. 

- There is a definite shift to the Pacific Rim and away from Europe. The Asian-Pacific 

Rim is America's largest export market. The security threat to the United States is not present in Europe. 

The potential for security concerns in the Pacific Rim area is high: the Korean peninsula is not stable, 

China will modernize its military, Japan is vulnerable to changes in the international trading economy, 

and Indonesia is not socially or politically stable. 

- Two powerful trends are demography and technology, each driving the other. The 

developed world, the "North," is graying: its population is getting older and its fertility rate is dropping. 

The developing world, the "South," is young and growing very fast. Great pressure is being exerted on 
the North through intense migration: into the United States from Central and South America and into 

Europe from North Africa and the Middle East. This pressure is altering the cultures and creating stress 

in the North. 

- In the year 2015 the United States will go to war to protect its economic interests and 

to assist its friends. It will need to have highly mobile armed forces, well-equipped with high-technology 

weaponry. Forces will need to have theater-specific capabilities and be able to respond quickly to 

perceived threats to American interests. Those threats will be primarily economic in nature: threats to 

markets and natural resources. 
GEOPOLITICS AND THREAT IN 2015 

The course of politics is the product of two sets of forces, impelling and guiding. The 

impetus is from the past, in the history imbedded in a people's character and tradition. 

The present guides the movement by economic wants and geographical opportunities. 

Statesmen and diplomatists succeed and fail pretty much as they recognize the irresistible 

power of these forces. 

--Sir Halford Mackinder, 1890 

The fog of peace appears to have taken over from the fog of war. 

--John Roper, 

"Shaping Strategy without the Threat," 

1990, [25J 

We live in a time when geopolitics is being shaped by geoeconomics. 

--Richard Solomon, 

Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs, 1990 [12] 

INTRODUCTION 

Geopolitics is the study of the geography of relations between the wielders of power. Power 

refers to the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states. The limiting condition of 

relations between states is war: the primary reason for going to war has been to command more 

territory. The greatest threat is not the clash of ideologies but the collision of forces over some piece of 

land. Mackinder's comment sums up the history of international relations: the recurring struggle for 

wealth (read: economic surplus) and power is among actors who are confronted by the dilemma of the 

uneven distribution of natural riches. How a state reacts to this circumstance is determined by its unique 

historical development. When economic surplus was based on agricultural output and technological 

development was slow or nonexistent, the amount of economic surplus was fixed to the amount of land 

which could be tilled and the number of laborers who worked it. Historically, the course to higher 

surplus and greater power has been war: one actor took from his neighbor the riches (read: land and 

laborers) needed to increase economic surplus, thereby enhancing his power and authority in the world 

system. In this scheme, geography is the central fact of world politics. The geographer emphasizes the 

defense that geography offers against the ambitions of rivals. [23] Even with the advent of industrial 

economies and rapid technological development, geopoliticians still analyze international relations in terms 

of territoriality. 

But geopolitics is only one way of analyzing the relations between peoples and nation-states. 
Many now believe that a new era has dawned in which the use of military force has been reduced in 

efficacy and that peaceful evolution has replaced military conflict in adjusting relations between states. 

These analysts maintain that domestic economic and welfare goals have triumphed over the traditional 

power and security objectives of nation-states. They see a world that has become so interdependent 

because of technological advances in information processing and international trade that the nation-state 

system, dominant since the Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, has become 

obsolete. 

Another group holds that the nation-state system is still strong and long-lasting and that national 

security and power remain primary state objectives. They recognize, however, that the theory enunciated 

by Mackinder in 1904 in "The Geographical Pivot of History," no longer has its original potency because 

of the development of modem weapons of mass destruction. Since 1945 the political significance of the 

geographical configuration of continents and oceans is no longer relevant because it has become possible 

to project terrific firepower over great distances without conquering strategic land or dominating 

strategically located seas and oceans. [28] 

The objective of this study is to determine potential threats to the security of the United States 

and to project the various circumstances under which the United States will go to war in the year 2015. 

This will be done through the identification and analysis of trends in world politics and the international 

system and by pinpointing those factors that will effect changes in those trends, the so-called "change 

drivers." Finally, the study focuses on the implications of these trends for the United States Army in 

order to assist the military in meeting whatever threat may present itself to the nation. 

IDENTIFICATION OF TRENDS 

This study identifies four trends continuing into the next century: 

1. The post-World War I1 bi-polar world is fast disappearing. 

2. The massive use of nuclear-based military force is becoming 

obsolete. 

3. The concepts of geography and territory are taking on new, nontraditional 

meanings. 

4. The interdependence of world economies and markets is intensifying and 

leading to further decentralization. 

The analysis of these trends and the factors which may intensify or alter their development (the "change 

drivers") will lead to a projection of future scenarios for possible geopolitical developments. 

1. The post-World War 11 bi-polar world is fast disappearing. 

Americans became aware of geopolitics in December 1941. The historical isolationist pattern of 

American policy, namely, to stay home and tend to business and let the Old World have its squabbles, 

even after World War I, ended with the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Americans understood with immediate 
clarity that the oceans could no longer protect them from events occurring in other areas of the world. 

The writings of Sir Halford Mackinder were known only to professional geographers before 1941, but 

he became a household name as American involvement in the war continued. 

Mackinder's "Heartland" theory and Karl Haushofer's geographical determinism, which formed 

the theoretical underpinning to Hitler's march to the east, ultimately became the foundation for American 

postwar policy for a bi-polar world: containment of the USSR. When this policy was enunciated in 1947 

the worst was yet to come: the Communist Revolution in China. The Mackinder nightmare came to life 

as the Eurasian land mass was united for the first time in modern history under the same ideological flag. 

The greatest land power on the globe commanded the greatest natural fortress on earth. 

The American reaction to this development was "containment": confront the Russians at any 

point where they might gain influence. This has been the central policy of the United States for the last 

forty-four years. This policy has been successful and has provided the framework for the development 

of a strong worldwide free market economy. The essential contribution by the United States to the 

interdependent world economic picture has been the creation and enforcement of rules protecting private 

property rights. Property rights are a set of economic and social relations among industries defining the 

position of each industry with respect to utilization of scarce resources. [31] The nation-state is the only 

actor capable of establishing stable property rights. 

Each power formed its own bloc, and the world was effectively divided into two ideological 

camps. The Cold War ensued. Given the changes in the relationship between the two powers in the past 

year, it is clear that the bi-polarity of the international system is in flux. The Warsaw Pact has been 

dissolved, and the economic crisis in the Soviet Union has caused that nation to discontinue its support 

for its allies and client-states and withdraw from "foreign adventures" to concentrate on its own domestic 

ills. 

Robert Gilpin defines the international system as the aggregate of diverse entities united by 

regulated interaction according to a form of control (for example, imperial/hegemonic, bi-polar, and 

balance-of-power). [lo] Despite the anarchic nature of the system (there is no formal global 

government), there is a high degree of order among states because the system exercises an element of 

control over behavior: it rests on the distribution of power among political coalitions -- it determines who 

governs and whose interests are to be promoted. Throughout history the periods of relative peace and 

stability are those in which the prestige hierarchy has been clearly understood and unchallenged. The 

post-1945 era is such a period: the two powers have rarely challenged each other directly to the point of 

full-scale war. Nuclear weapons have essentially rendered such war obsolete: to date neither side has 

been able to figure out how to use them without global annihilation. 

The disappearance of the bi-polar world presages two developments. One, as a consequence of 

the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the reunification of Germany, Europe will no longer the center of 

political interest between the nuclear powers. Many analysts have written about the end of the Cold War 

or have speculated about the "end of history." Because the nuclear powers are no longer consistently at 

odds and are cooperating in international arenas, their "client states," promoted and armed by both sides, 
have been left with significant amounts of weaponry and are free to pursue their own regional hegemonic 

goals. Recognizing that ideology, religion, and territory still play significant roles in the relations 

between countries, analysts believe the world is entering upon a very unsettled time. The hierarchy will 

be challenged by these would-be regional hegemons. 

The second development growing out of the disappearance of the bipolar world is a reevaluation 

of the relationship between a nation's economy and its military power. The Soviet Union is perceived 

to be a onedimensional superpower (its superpower status is based primarily on its possession of a 

nuclear arsenal without the economic strength to support itself). Some analysts believe it is possible to 

be a world power on the basis of economic power alone. Germany and Japan are held as two examples 

of this phenomenon. Both nations play major roles in the economies of other Western countries and soon 

will do the same in the former East Bloc. While it is widely recognized that both countries could become 

military powers if they chose to do so and much of the prestige they garner is based on that 

understanding, it must be recognized that economic power can play the role it does because the economic 

and political order was created and defended militarily by the United States. 

The changing world economy is producing regional powers. In the East Asian region, widely 

recognized as one of the fastest growing economic areas, the combined GNP of Japan, China, South 

Korea, and Taiwan will be greater than that of the United States in 2015. China's GNP will exceed that 

of the USSR in the same period. The European Economic Community (EEC), scheduled for market 

unification in 1992, will have a combined GNP double that of the USSR by 2015. India's GNP will 

equal France's, and Brazil's will equal that of the United Kingdom (see Fig. 1). 

To date, China has put off military modernization, but it will undertake such a program within 

the forecast period. The emerging regional powers (South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, India, Brazil, Eqypt) 

will have formidable stacks of weapons and possible advanced syterns. The economic development of 

these newly industrialized nations will tend to diffuse power more widely. 

The United States continues to wield great economic clout through international structures it 

created in the post-World War I1 period, but its own fiscal difficulties have caused many at home and 

abroad to question the longevity of that economic force. Some analysts believe that America's hegemony 

will be limited to no more than the decade of the 1990s. As a result of the end of the Cold War, the 

indefinite continuation of the post-World War I1 alignment that exaggerated the hegemony of the United 

States and the Soviet Union, each within its own sphere, is improbable. The further development of 

alternative power bases leading to the appearance of a multi-polar world is the likely trend. 
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS 

(BILLIONS OF 1986 DOLLARS) 

F.R.G. 

U.K. 

INDIA 

S. KOREA 

TURKEY 

EGYPT 

ARGENTINA 

TAl WAN 

Fig. 1 
CHANGE DRIVER: a) If the current trend toward decentrdization of power in the Soviet Union does 

not continue and the CPSU and KGB remain entrenched in power, then the primary strategic interest of 

the United States-led Western alliance will continue to be focused there. Despite its domestic economic 

and political turmoil, the Soviet Union will continue to be in competition with the United States in the 

future both because of the size of its past investments in military technology and because of its position 

at the leading edge of military technology. But with authority continuing to be centralized in the Party 

and bureaucracy (nomenklatura), development of the economically driven multi-polar world would be 

retarded: nuclear hegemony of the two rival blocs would remain primary. A Cold War scenario would 

resume in which arms control and nuclear sufficiency would remain pillars of strategy. The Soviets could 

produce alternative patterns, however. These could include a reduction in military expenditures in favor 

of capital investment reducing the threat to U.S. security, or there could be merely a restraint of growth 

in military expenditures, in which case research and development would continue and production could 

be instituted at a later date (see Fig. 2). [9] 

b) If the Soviet Union reconfigures into a confederation of nine republics (with Estonia, Latvia, 

Lithuania, the Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia becoming independent) and the command-and-administer 

style economy is eliminated in favor of a modified free market system, then a multi-polar global system 

will accelerate multi-polar development. 

c) If some nations of Eastern Europe are unable to make the transition from command economies 

to market systems and popular unrest and fears of anarchy mount, then dictatorships will be re-installed 

that will be potentially hostile to American and Western interests. This scenario would be the so-called 

"Peronist" alternative: a market-adaptable economy with strongly centralized authority. While 

nationalistic and opposed to old-style Soviet hegemony, philosophically they would be non-aligned. 

2. The massive use of nuclear-based military force is becoming obsolete. 

Conventional wisdom has it that nuclear weapons have become unusable: such weapons are for 

mass suicide. Martin van Creveld has said that the United States and the Soviet Union have, in effect, 

been "debellicized." [8] It is widely recognized that political advancement from the possession of 

nuclear weaponry has been null: being the sole possessor of nuclear power did not enable the United 

States to keep Eastern Europe out of the Soviet sphere of control, nor did it enable the United States to 

prevent the Communist Revolution in China. China still does not have Taiwan despite its nuclear 

capability. Nor has its entry into the nuclear club enabled India to have its way in Sri Lanka, where civil 

strife continues. 

Nuclear weapons have served to stabilize the borders in Europe, the primary area of superpower 

interest. Conflicts between the two powers since 1962 have occurred exclusively at the periphery of 

superpower interests (i.e., outside Europe). The credibility of deterrence in Europe had to do with the 

network of economic and political interests, cultural and institutional ties, and past commitments that 

existed between each superpower and its group of European allies. The prospective levels of casualties 
and property damage from conventional warfare alone was &I enormously powerful deterrent. "If the 

deterrent effect of World War 11 memories has faded slightly, the entrenchment of interest in preserving 

postwar prosperity can balance it. " [27,p. 1871 

But the statement "everyone knows that nuclear weapons cannot be used" does not make it a fact: 

"everyone" may not know it! There are other nations seeking the status and prestige that nuclear weapons 

confer, and they may not refrain from using them. Other members of the "nuclear club", not necessarily 

self-acknowledged members, such as Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and perhaps North 

Korea, have serious border disputes with their neighbors on what may be considered "fault lines" of 

conflict. One cannot assume that nuclear weaponry will not be used in the future. 

If, however, one assumes that the use of massive force is not as powerful an option, the question 

arises about the type of force that would be used in its place. Martin van Creveld believes that 

conventional warfare will cede its position to low-intensity conflict (LIC). LIC is defined as having the 

following characteristics: it unfolds in lessdeveloped areas (LICs in the developed world are called 

"terrorism", or "police actions"); the participants are normally guerillas, rarely regular army combat 

soldiers; it relies little on high-tech weaponry (although this may change in the future). [8] The kinds 

of conflicts the world sees in Lebanon, Cyprus, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, El Salvador, and the 

Philippines are typical of LICs. 

While we believe that LIC is very likely the more typical confrontation in the future, we do not 

rule out the use of massive forces in conventional theaters of operation. If a would-be regional hegemon, 

a charismatic leader, with large army and wealth of weaponry, comes upon the world scene not having 

learned from Saddam Hussein's mistakes and confronts a major power under the terms of conventional 

engagement, force will be used on a large scale. 
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT: US, USSR, AND CHINA 

Fig. 2 
CHANGE DRIVER: a) The potential for massive use -of force will increase if ballistic missile 

capability proliferates to many more nation-states (reports of upwards of 25 to 30 such states have been 

published) and these states themselves have the technology to produce or acquire nuclear or 

chemical/biological warheads. Many of these states have border disputes or powerful ideological drives 

and hatreds to endanger international stability. Emerging regional powers (South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, 

India, Brazil, and Egypt) have formidable stocks of weapons -- possibly advanced systems. They will 

not need superpower suppliers or approval to use them. 

b) If a transnational governing body with authority to monitor and verify weapons destruction 

emerges and/or the sales of arms to Third World and developing countries ceases, then the potential for 

massive use of force further diminishes. If a modified and expanded COCOM is created with verification 

and enforcement provisions and member states abide by its rules and limits, then less-developed states 

will not easily acquire the technology of weapons of mass destruction. If the concept of verification 

becomes widely accepted (presently occurring in arms control talks between the superpowers), then there 

will be procedures to ensure that the technologies and weapons themselves are not produced. Arms 

control agreements between the nuclear powers will reduce current stockpiles, and signatures created for 

nonnuclear strategic capability (NNSC) weaponry to prevent nuclear retaliation "accidents" will reduce 

the likelihood that massive force will be used to settle disputes. 

3. The concepts of geography and territory are taking on new, nontraditional meanings. 

Two concepts are at work in this trend. First, in geopolitical terms, the territorial boundaries of 

states no longer have traditional significance because of the development of weapons delivery systems: 

geographical features are no impediment to an attacking opponent. Therefore, the concept of security 

for a nation-state has changed dramatically. Second, transnational or global issues are emerging that 

know no state boundaries. 

Many geopoliticians accept the fact that geography and geopolitical considerations are, if not 

irrelevant, at least unalterably changed by the developments in strategic nuclear technologies: the concept 

of geopolitical space has been modified. Whereas Pearl Harbor ended American "glorious isolation," 

the ICBMs of the 1950's added greater insecurity. When SLBMs were developed, the vertical parameters 

disappeared beneath the surface of the oceans as well: no nation-state could be isolated from global 

involvement anywhere. "The entirety of national territories is an open window." [33, p.1441 

Another aspect of this concept of the changing understanding of what territory and geography 

mean is the emergence of transnational issues. Most people of the developed world have come to realize 

that there are events and issues that respect no national borders: air pollution from Ohio brings acid rain 

to Canada, emissions from power plants in Czechoslovakia and Poland are destroying the trees of the 

Black Forest in Germany, the AIDS epidemic has spread all across the world in less than a decade, the 

breakdown of the ozone layer, caused by global pollution, 

with potentially devastating environmental ramifications, will affect all life on the planet, and many other 
issues. The government of the Soviet Union eventually admitted the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl after 

irrefutable radiation readings in Sweden were made public. The struggle of the United States government 

to come to grips with the international drug trade illustrates the difficulty one government has in 

managing or controlling an issue that spans national borders. These issues transcend the limits of a single 

government's control: many domestic problems have an international component. 

James Rosenau, author of a remarkable study of change in international relations entitled 

Turbulence in World Politics, has theorized that one of the most fundamental changes in the relations 

between nation-states is at the microlevel: the heightened competence of individuals. [2q This improved 

analytic power has come about through the telecommunications revolution: even remote villages in the 

underdeveloped world can receive television transmissions and see what is occurring on the other side 

of the globe. Individuals have increasingly come to understand that certain issues do not remain confined 

within the borders of a single nation-state. 

Along with this development one sees individuals, coalescing in subgroups, moving away from 

larger governmental institutions. Because of increasing frustration at the inability of larger units to solve 

problems, individuals are forming into groups to make their collective voice heard. These groups can 

take the form of a "movement" (a loosely knit aggregate of like-minded individuals and organizations 

seeking to influence one or more aspects of human affairs), e.g. the "women's movement", the "ecology 

movement", or a "leaderless public" (the convergence of actions or orientations of large numbers of 

people with the absence of authority), e.g. polling groups, rioters. The public no longer believes that 

national governments can solve problems. The perceived lack of credibility on the part of larger 

organized units to solve dilemmas is leading to decentralization. "Decentralizing tendencies lead to the 

proliferation of boundary-spanning relationships, thereby undermining hierarchy and intensifying the 

volatility of global authority structures. " [26,p. 1871 

CHANGE DRIVERS: a) The ability of subgroups to effect change in state policies will be an important 

factor in whether transnational issues come to dominate the international agenda. If the "interdependence" 

analysis proves correct, then the multi-centric world will aid the break down of the hegemonic 

international system currently dominated by the United States. The effective sovereignty of nation-states 

will be undermined because, as Rosenau has said, more and more interactions in world politics are 

unfolding without the direct involvement of nations or states. Symptoms of national loss of sovereignty 

are technological breakthroughs that circumvent national authority (Fax machines, PCs, 

telecommunications, "smart" terminals); authority crises that arise as individuals improve their analytical 

capabilities; consensus breakdowns that occur as subgroups emerge to voice their own agenda. 

b) Some analysts have asserted that the "superpower" category is gone: if the rivalry is removed 

the category vanishes. The category of "great power" was associated with invulnerability. "Superpower" 

came into being with nuclear weaponry when it was no longer possible to be invulnerable. William Pfaff 

has written that superpower is not great power writ large, but a different category of power characterized 

by a nuclear arsenal by which each superpower rendered the other vulnerable. [24] If national boundaries 
can be defended against ICBMs and SLBMs as they were & the pre-missile era, then the concept of 

invulnerability will have its traditional significance. Nation-state borders will have more meaning again 

with the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or some variation thereof. If offensive 

missile systems undergo significant reduction and verification measures are improved in the destruction 

of existing stockpiles, then nation-states having ICBM and SLBM capabilities may opt for defensive 

missile systems. 

4. The interdependence of world economies and markets is intensifying and leading to further 

decentralization. 

The post-World War I1 era of American hegemony has been termed the triumph of liberalism 

because the United States has provided the public goods necessary for the functioning of efficient world 

markets. [lo] Adam Smith had argued that real wealth came from trade steming from the exchange of 

goods, not territorial possession. In the 20th century, the United States has continued the enforcement 

of international rules protecting property rights that the United Kingdom created in the 19th century. 

As a result of financial institutions me World Bank, The International Monetary Fund) and trade 

agreements (GATT) that came into being after 1945, the world has seen unprecedented growth and 

economic development. The links between the world's economies become closer all the time: the nations 

of Western Europe are on the threshold of uniting their markets in 1992; the North American continent 

may become one trade zone that may eventually embrace the entire western hemisphere; the Japanese 

"Co-Prosperity Sphere" of the 1930's is seemingly a reality in the 1990's. 

The greater interdependence of world economies and the emergence of transnational issues is 

bringing closer coordination between nation-states. At the same time decentralization is occurring. The 

need to deal with worldwide environmental pollution, currency crises, and terrorism impel greater 

cooperation between systems even as global television and communications networks, the information 

revolution, bring about decentralized "loci of action" enhancing the influence of subsystems and enlarging 

the role of citizens. 

Individuals become frustrated when they witness the inability of central authority to confront 

issues and solve problems. Global communications media transmit images of authority being challenged 

elsewhere. Legitimacy and authority crises develop as locals grant legitimacy to leaders based on 

performance rather than on the grounds of historical respect for the office held. Authority is so 

decentralized that no system or cluster of systems has control over outcomes: individual citizens negotiate 

with terrorists for the release of hostages; gangs of criminals and terrorist. deal with heads of state as coequals. In the name of competitiveness, corporations are being internationalized to an even greater 

extent. United States companies abandon their national identities and say they are global, no longer 

dependent on the American economy. Trade is propelled by the lure of markets, not the flag. A 

recession at home, they say, does not impact operations abroad as it once did. There is a decoupling of 

the corporation from the country. [26] 
CHANGE DRIVERS: a) A pronounced isolationist trend could produce a drive to close a nation-state's 

borders to outside "influences." One such case is Iran where, after the revolution, the Iranian 

Revolutionary Guards, drawing on Shiite fundamentalism, closed the country to prevent Western influence 

from "contaminating" the population. Such a religiously or ideologically based attempt at autarky could 

retard movement toward interdependence, although it is unlikely that a large number of countries would 

pursue such a course. 

If, however, economic nationalism, always near the surface, should appear in several major 

economies or trading blocs (e.g. the EEC or Korea), then it would have significant impact on world 

interdependence. Moves to stifle importation of "luxury" goods or products that compete directly with 

favored domestic industries would be warning signals for such a condition. There could be attempts on 

the part of some states to "go it alone," especially if "outsiders" impose pressure on cultural patterns. 

Economic nationalism is possible, but it is outside the realm of the probable. 

b) Developments in high technology, for example, the fiber-optic network, will accelerate 

interdependence through the spread of education programs, agricultural assistance, or worldwide weather 

forecasting. If ecological degradation of the planet continues, a likely prospect, then there will be a 

global attempt to deal with the disposal of waste products. Such a development would foster cooperation 

between nation-states. 

These four trends are predicted to continue into the first decades of the 21st century. However, 

a careful examination will yield possible alternative developments. First, neither the United States nor 

the Soviet Union will be able to dominate the international system indefinitely, given post-1992 EEC 

market unification and the growing economic power of the Pacific Rim countries. Although the Cold 

War as defined by East-West bloc confrontation is over, the differences between the Soviet Union and 

the United States-led Western alliance will continue to drive many world issues: in the Persian Gulf 

region, in relations with the Islamic nations (because of the Soviets' own potentially restive Moslem 

population) and oil supply (the USSR may be a petroleum importer in the very near term), and in the 

Pacific, where the Soviets have made it clear they intend to be an "Asian power." (Consider President 

Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech 1986.) The desire of the Soviet Union to be a force in world politics 

has not diminished, and with its nuclear arsenal it cannot be disregarded as a major actor. The Soviet 

Union, even with the most positive of possible outcomes (i.e., a full-fledged democratic, decentralized 

confederation of states) will have interests different from those of the United States. While the 

introduction of market-economy reforms into the Soviet system is seen as a desirable goal, a less autarkic 

USSR challenging the United States in the world markets and competing for scarce resources could be 

destabilizing. 

In the longer run (2005-2015)' unless the Soviets can significantly relieve their economic 

difficulties and move toward a new period of substantial economic growth, they will gradually become 

less conspicuous in U.S. policy and strategy. Widely different developments are possible for the Soviet 

Union -- ranging from major reductions in Soviet active forces to free resources for economic revival, 

to persistent economic stagnation that constrains military modernization, to successful economic reform 
that positions the Soviets to compete effectively with the united States in the military-technical revolution. 

191 

John Roper's comment about the fog of peace is particularly appropriate when considering the 

disintegration of the bi-polar world of post-1945. In fact, the Cold War was relatively clear: the 

certainties were numerous. As John Mearsheimer has suggested, the move from bi-polarity to multipolarity is not guaranteed to enhance stability. During the Cold War, bi-polarity led to global caution, 

and regional conflicts were inhibited because of the risk of horizontal escalation. The diminution of bipolarity may lead to a proliferation of local conflicts and local threats. [22] 

It is important not to confuse the end of the Cold War with the elimination of warfare and the 

emergence of universal peace. Some regional wars have been short because of the inability to resupply 

weapons. If there is a proliferation of major supply centers that could change; there could be protracted, 

large-scale regional wars supplied by neither superpower. Brazil, Israel, South Korea, China, and India 

all produce weapons for other nations and could supply regional combatants or conflicts in which they 

themselves are involved. There were numerous serious armed conflicts during the Cold War period, 

and if anything, such types of conflicts promise to be more serious and more numerous with the absence 

of two controlling power blocs. 

The multi-polar world is a turbulent one. By definition there will be more actors and interests 

to be served. There will be a questioning of the legitimacy of the existing power hierarchy. Because the 

possession of nuclear weapons enchances prestige and gives rank in the system, more countries will seek 

to develop them. It is for this reason that the major powers may very well decide to develop defensive 

missile systems to guard against a nuclear attack by a regional hegemon. Analysts believe that a system 

like SDI could be effective against a small nuclear force while not sufficient to deter a large nuclear 

arsenal. 

What do these scenarios imply for the U.S. Army? First, to date, the evolution of various forms 

of global economic cooperation and interrelationships has not yielded the geopolitically secure 

relationships that would preclude substantial military force readiness in the name of national security. 

Long-term economic interdependency might encourage geopolitical evolution, but clearly the two 

processes move at very different speeds. The advent of new multinational economic blocs and the 

consolidation of others such as the EEC could have two effects. Driven partly by the degree of overall 

expansion and prosperity in world markets, these blocs may be the basis of geopolitical stability and a 

source of financial aid to the increasingly restless "have-not" South. The latter eventuality might forestall 

geopolitical conflict with members of the "have-not" group, generated by exacerbated economic 

disparities. Or economic rivalry for limited markets may degenerate into new geopolitical hostility among 

the "haves," negating the unifying effects of international communications networks and trade agreements. 

Obviously the first choice promises substantially greater national security for the United States than the 

second, however directly the United States might be involved in such economic/geopolitical blocs. A 

potential economic bloc with particular resonance for United States geopolitical planning would combine 

Japanese manufacturing and financial power with raw materials from the Soviet Union and perhaps China. 
North-South issues could come to dominate the international agenda. The emergence of global 

ecological problems and limits to growth go far beyond individual states. There will need to be a 

universal commitment to a modern and better life for all inhabitants of the planet because the limits-togrowth approach may lead to bitter fights over scarce resources and to the carving up of the World 

Ocean. There is no guarantee that selfish concerns will be subordinated to the larger good. On the 

contrary, modem science and technology may intensify conflicts over resources. 

Power centers will emerge with cultural and diplomatic traditions far different from the oncedominant West, and this fact may presage a return to conflicts of the premodern era. The European 

powers have attempted to bring the fruits of the "Enlightenment" to the "uncivilized" world for three 

centuries, believing it to be their "burden." "The notion of a unified humanity does not exist; it is the 

creation of a West trying to impose its values on a set of diverse cultures." [lo, p.2251 Political 

fragmentation will increase on the globe because humans are deeply divided by race, religion and wealth. 

Nationalism, with its roots in 17th century Europe, is a predominant faith of modern man, and it has 

unleashed powerful destructive forces. 

The scenarios outlined here have other implications for the army. There is no certainty that the 

massive use of force will disappear. Merely because the nuclear weapons are deemed unusable by 

"rational" people andlor a defensive missile system is developed by those who have the technological 

capability and resources to build it, other types of massive force may replace nuclear weaponry, to wit: 

the nonnuclear strategic capability (NNSC). The application of NNSC to LICs is increasingly important. 

For strategic purposes such application is a significant development: it results in a war-widening option 

short of nuclear escalation. 

It has been suggested by some analysts that U.S. and Soviet military competition is likely to focus 

increasingly on nonnuclear weapons. New types of explosive charges have been developed that can 

make these weapons as effective as small nuclear blasts against most military targets without many of the 

consequences associated with the use of nuclear weapons: precision-guided munitions, fuel-air explosives. 

This type of weapons technology need not remain limited to Soviet and U.S. forces only. 

The widespread development of advanced technologies in the commercial sector for nondefense 

purposes has occurred. Many newly industrialized countries (NICs) are acquiring their own R&D 

capabilities. In addition, co-production schemes enable partners to acquire advanced technological 

processes. The United States cannot dominate military situations by exclusive ownership of an advanced 

technology. It is possible for countries to expand this nonmilitary technology into military applications. 

Although Operation Desert Storm was perhaps an anomaly in terms of the massing of 

conventional arms, there is no assurance that similar events will not recur. Ongoing developments in 

technology may lead political figures to believe that massive use of force is possible without nuclear 

escalation. 

While the concepts of geography and territory have acquired nontraditional values (because the 

industrial and technological basis of economic surplus obviates the need to seize a neighbor's territory 

and development of ICBMs and SLBMs has, in effect, opened the borders of all nations), the emergence 
of transnational issues relating to ideology, religion, and ethnic origin makes territory a fundamental issue 

between nation-states . Peoples all over the globe are in a whirl of change, and they are increasingly looking to their 

group identities: physical characteristics, name and language, history and origin, religion, and 

nationality. These identities frequently cross state boundaries, particularly if they are deemed the residue 

of the colonial era. Most of the boundaries were not based on where peoples actually lived, but were 

artificially drawn by the colonial powers for geopolitical purposes. These boundaries have generated the 

most conflicts. Examples of these issues and their link to territorial conflict include: the Arab world, 

where the historical concept of the "Arab Nation" has been used to justify the attempts by different 

leaders to unify the area; historical ties and ethnic unity were fundamental to the struggle of North 

Vietnam to conquer the South (the Korean peninsula is another case); the Shiite Imams and Mullahs in 

Iran have expressed the desire to unify the Moslem world. There are numerous other examples. 

However, many of these conflicts are arising in places where nation-states have been "united" 

for centuries: Western Europe and North America. The weakening of the fabric of consent (the result 

of Rosenau's microlevel "increased cathectic capabilities of individuals" and the movement toward 

"subgroupism" leading to the questioning of legitimacy and authority) that had kept sub-national groups 

passive or submissive has unleashed long pent-up frustrations for linguistic, regional, political autonomy 

or a reassertion of cultural distinctiveness. The Scots and Welsh, residents of Ulster, Bretons, Corsicans, 

Flemish and Walloons, Basques, Catalans, and Quebequois are examples of this phenomenon. Many of 

these peoples are separated from their larger group by state boundaries; hence we see movements for 

independence within long-established nation-states. Centrifugal and centripetal forces are at work. 

People everywhere are turning away from entire systems--the state, society, community--to 

smaller collectivities. It has been said that the nation-state is too small for the big problems of life and 

too big for the small problems of life. Whole systems are too complex for their needs and wants, and 

they seek to regain control by turning to subsystems. They hope to get in a place they feel they belong 

and where they are grouped with their own kind for physical and emotional safety. That group 

becomes "the nation." The nation is defined as the largest community that, when the chips are down, 

effectively commands men's loyalty. [la The downside to this phenomenon is that the maintenance of 

basic consensus required for effective and democratic public action becomes more difficult if society 

divides into distinct and separate ethnic and cultural blocs. The capacity to mobilize the whole, or very 

nearly the whole, of society for a national cause (e.g., war) will become problematic or impossible if 

cultural diversity produces more cross-purposes and political deadlocks. [21] 

Religion is one of the most powerful sources of community in the world today. A major subtrends is the unsecularization of the world in the late 20th century. Religion is not going to fade from 

the scene. It is a Western conceit that religion is an irrational, premodern phenomenon; religion, 

however, is becoming a powerful force in the United States, Western and Eastern Europe, and the Soviet 

Union. Protestant evangelism is on the rise in traditional Roman Catholic Latin America (the recent 

election of an Evangelical Protestant to the Peruvian presidency bears witness to the power of the 
movement). Religion serves as a dominant unifying force for many groups and is a transnational issue 

of significance. It need not be a divisive force. "We must discern the theological and political conditions 

under which religion can serve the cause of nonviolent conflict resolution." [32, p.271 

The growing interdependence of the world's economies does not necessarily guarantee peace. 

Economic welfare is said to replace national security as the principal object of societies: economic 

cooperation has displaced traditional conflict over territory, balance of power, the rational use of 

resources. We are said to be in an era of international cooperation. Some realist analysts, notably 

Kenneth Waltz, have argued that interdependence and global power are being confused. Transactions 

in and of themselves do not have any political significance. What counts is the ability of a state to adjust 

to change or to use its economic position for political leverage. However, nations are apprehensive 

about the loss of autonomy and access to foreign markets, and, as a result, economic nationalism is a 

potentially disruptive force in the interdependent global economy. Some have seen the rising tension 

between the contrary pulls of the global economy and the national polities as a structural problem. 

Capital can flow easily; people cannot. No national government today controls its own capital flows to 

take advantage of differential interest rates, cheaper labor, and better investment opportunities. But 

people cannot move as readily nor are many countries prepared to take them. As jobs slip away, the 

government must move to protect either capital or people. A large economy may be able to manage these 

transitions but many cannot, and fragmentation because of economic dificulties, multiplied by ethnic 

clashes, increases the chances for LICs. [3] 

While recent decades have seen the growing interdependence of national economies--and this trend 

is predicted to continue--there will need to be a focus on those economies that have not participated in 

the exchange. William McNeill has written, 

Resistance to immiseration has become far more vigorous in recent decades because new 

forms of communication have penetrated even remote villages. Subsistence farmers, who 

in a previous generation encountered outsiders only rarely and as strangers, find a new 

world opening before them when radio and TV programs begin to flood into the village 

square or their homes.. .Pushed by intensifying land shortages at home and pulled by the 

charm of urban comforts as revealed by the new communications, peasant populations 

are ready, as never before, to claim the rights of full citizenship and equality of 

circumstances. [21, p. 1871 

These developments demand new strategies from the United States. 
THE UNITED STATES AND STRATEGIC THINKING 

"Because it is rooted in geopolitical soil, the character of a country's national security policy tends 

to show great continuity over time, though there can be cyclical patterns of change. " [14, 151 The United 

States will go to war in 2015 for the same reasons it has always gone to war: threats to its commercial 

interests and trading power combined with its strong "moralist" bent. 

Geopolitics relates international political power to the geographical setting. It embraces human 

and cultural factors as well as the statistics of territory, economic assets, and distances between political 

enemies. "The cultural thoughtways of a nation are the product of geography." [14] To understand 

American geopolitical thinking requires an understanding of American history and its geographical 

perspective. 

United States geography lends an insular perspective on international politics. The founding of 

the nation came about through the desire to escape "Old World" entanglements. The dread of entangling 

alliances was a natural development of that founding. The nation succeeded in pursuing that strategy until 

World War I when the balance-of-power system in Europe broke down over the inability to contain a 

unified Germany. The exclusively European character of the system was destroyed by the need for 

American assistance: the United States replaced the United Kingdom as the necessary balancer. 

At the conclusion of that war, the United States promptly returned to its historical isolationist 

position. Why? There are five broad characteristics of "the American Way": 

1. The United States, an insular power developed in isolation from the quarrels of balance-ofpower Europe, harbors the belief that peace is the normal and universally desired condition of mankind. 

War is abnormal and preparation for war is abnormal. 

2. Americans have optimism about progress in human affairs which is easily translated into 

oscillations of mood between hope (based on illusion) and disenchantment (attending disillusion) when 

confronted with the intractibility of international competition and conflict. Traditionally Americans have 

solved problems, not lived with them and redefined them as conditions. 

3. Americans are prone to personalize international relations. Problems are deemed to be 

solvable through person-to-person meetings. 

4. Persons of goodwill can always reach agreement if they try hard enough. Americans view 

compromise as the essence of negotiations. 

5. Order and stability are values to be promoted and defended internationally. [14] 

The American tradition is one of moralism and making virtue out of the bequest of geographic 

distance from the amoral squabbles of the Old World. Americans are conditioned geopolitically to think 

and feel in a distinctively American way: the frontier tradition, an experience and expectation of success 

in national endeavors, an abundance of resources for defense, a dominant political philosophy of liberal 

idealism, and a sense of separateness -- moral and geostrategic -- from evil doings of the Old World. 

Since 1945 that position has not been tenable: the United States emerged from that war as the 

pre-eminent power and facing the rebuilding of its allies and containment of the perceived threat to its 
security: the Soviet Union. The rebuilding and expansioi of world markets and the creation of an 

environment for the guarantee of property rights has brought about a high level of prosperity for itself 

and its friends and allies. It is not possible for the United States to return to an isolationist position 

because its economy is too dependent upon virtually all the other world economies. 

There is presently a revival of the isolationist vs. interventionist debate. This debate will intensify 

in the forecast period. In the 1930s and 1940s, this debate focused on keeping the United States apart 

from matters not directly threatening its tangible interests. Isolationism is the traditional American 

geopolitical position. The conversion of the isolationists to interventionists was a consequence of war 

and anticommunism. The neoconservatives of today play the part that in the past was played by the 

liberal internationalists - the United States crusade for global democracy (a la Wilson). However, if the 

results of the Persian Gulf war are not positive, the isolationists would seem better poised to dominate 

the debate than at any time since Pearl Harbor. 

"Isolationism" is an imprecise term. The United States will not be autarkic. Such a position is 

inconceivable given the reality of American prosperity. However, given the basic optimism of 

Americans, the lessening of tensions could lead to a feeling of euphoria and desire to "come home and 

solve America's problems." An accommodation of sorts will occur. The reality of the multi-polar world 

and the recognition that other nations must be responsible for sharing the security burden will increase 

the likelihood that the United States will not pursue a "go it alone" policy and be the global policeman. 

The American electorate will not support such a position indefinitely. The United States will be active 

in international security affairs, because its interests are international in scope. However, as a new 

generation of leaders not having experienced World War I1 assumes power, there will be a very real 

likelihood of a reinterpretation of America's role in international affairs. Each generation's experience 

colors its Weltanschauung. 

What kind of world will the United States be facing in 2015? Several basic structural changes 

are taking place. There is a definite shift to the Pacific Rim and away from Europe. The Asian-Pacific 

Rim is America's largest export market -- $21 billion larger than Europe in 1989. While the EEC will 

be a major trading bloc and a primary partner both politically and economically, there will not be a 

security threat to the United States in Europe. The question is what will the EEC become as a political 

entity? It has no independent taxing authority, and all decisions must be executed by the national 

governments. To what extent will the existence of a single market and common value-added tax, 

common tariffs, labor and security norms and currency force parallel fiscal and economic policies and 

a practical unification of national policy? For the foreseeable future there are doubts this will occur: it 

will likely be a powerful association and will be described like the German principalities in the early 19th 

century: "impregnable in defense and incapable of aggression." [24] 

The potential for security concerns in the Pacific Rim area, on the other hand, is high. North 

Korea is on the verge of becoming another Iraq: the nuclear threat is great. Secretary of Defense 

Richard Cheney has said that North Korea is the only place in the world where he fears an unprovoked 

nuclear attack on U.S. forces. The Republic of Korea is not particularly stable to politically, and is 
acquiring advanced weapons technology. 

The Republic of Korea trades (through third parties) with China to the tune of $3 billion per 

annum, five times the amount of trade China has with North Korea. Seoul has also developed economic 

and comrnerical ties with the Soviet Union. The November 6, 1990 edition of The Wall Street Journal 

reported direct telephone links between Moscow and Seoul, with 5,000 calls per month. The Republic 

of Korea also has guaranteed the Soviet Union $2.3 billion in loans. 

A line of "economic force" stretches from Japan to Australia, but will that economic power also 

become political power? Is political power possible without military power? The refusal of Japan to 

become actively involved in Operation Desert Storm has raised questions about the "commitment" of the 

Japanese to the Western Alliance. Yet, Japan has been quite willing to use economic muscle on the 

political issue of the Northern Territories dispute with the Soviet Union. 

Japan has an aging population: over 20% of the population is over the age of 65. The aging 

phenomenon will not change in the forecast period. It is unlikely that Japan will risk its homogeneity 

and allow any immigration which could alter its demographic trend. Can an "aged" population develop 

into a military threat? With the passing of the World-War-11 generation from the scene, will the new 

generation of Japanese leaders be hesitant to develop the nation's military potential? What kinds of 

threats would Japanese leaders consider sufficient to develop a capability beyond its defense forces? 

Japan is vulnerable to changes in the international trading economy and trade discrimination or 

a trade war. Currently lacking the ambition for a global role, Japan is probably disqualified for it by its 

historic isolation. Resentments in Asia from World War I1 and current trading practices, which many 

Pacific Rim nations consider discriminatory, are obstacles to a world political role commensurate with 

its economic strength. But, the relative military weakness of Japan and the countries of Europe is 

reversible: all have been military powers in the past. Increasing Japanese rearmament is within the realm 

of the possible. 

As noted above, China will eventually undergo military modernization. China is an enormous 

country in both territory and population, leading many to question whether a country of that size can be 

governed because of regional disparity (the coastal delta with the overwhelming majority of the population 

is contrasted with the arid center). 

Other countries of the region pose similar questions. Indonesia, for example, is politically 

unstable. Because of the enormous volume of trade conducted with this region, the United States has 

vital strategic interests in the political events in the Pacific Rim. It is conceivable that any or all of these 

countries could eventually be perceived as a security threat. How reliable an ally is Japan? When a 

peace treaty ending World War I1 eventually is signed between Japan and the Soviet Union, how closely 

will the two nations interact? How trustworthy is the Republic of Korea? Indonesia is the world's largest 

Moslem nation. What if a fundamentalist revolution occurs there comparable to that in Iran? What role 

would the United States play in a war between two of its allies? Would it need to remain neutral? Would 

it be able to remain neutral? Must the United States consider all these nations potential security threats? 

In the forecast period, the United States will be reduced as the focus of power for several reasons: 
1) the reduction in great power confrontation (the end of the Cold War) will mean that the United States 

will no longer necessarily be seen as the "decisive leader"; 2) the rise of Japan as an economic power, 

particularly in high technology, means that much of the focus of technology will shift there; 3) social 

problems at home (drugs, crime, aging of the infrastructure, a general perception of a declining quality 

of life) will require attention to be diverted to the domestic agenda; and 4) the low investment rate and 

productivity of the American economy will mean that it cannot be the driving engine of the world market. 

Make no mistake, it will still be vitally important, but not the engine. There will be many engines. [5J 

Other geopolitical factors to be considered are demographic change and the tension between 

global economic interaction and national politics. The aging of the developed world is a fact: 

populations there are not reproducing themselves. The developing world presents the opposite picture: 

it is growing at an astonishing rate. Mexico is a clear case: 40 percent of its population is between the 

ages of 14 and 25. It is typical of the "South". The aggregate population growth rates will probably 

result in per capita GNP that stagnates or declines in Mexico, Argentina, and Egypt. High unemployment 

(over 40 percent has been suggested) may pose risks to political and social stability in these countries and 

adjacent regions. Tensions, instability, and in some cases conflict may arise as a result. The intensive 

immigration to more developed states from Latin America and Asia to North America, and the Middle 

East and Africa to Europe has been occurring at a steady rate. Social and political tension in Europe can 

be seen today and will intensify in the forecast period. Immigration has caused a marked change in the 

social texture and cultural patterns of the United States. This massive immigration~will influence future 

cohesion and the political capacities of Western industrial nations. [24] 

While the economies of the world are becoming increasingly interdependent and economic 

transactions span the globe on a twenty-four-hour basis, each nation-state has its own national priorities 

and constituencies. There is a global capital shortage, and the U.S. economy has lost its attraction for 

capital -- more money has been going out than coming in and this trend could be long-term. Japan's 

economy is growing faster than that of the United States and the European Community is a capital 

sponge: the unification into a single market has kept money home for investment. The leverage imposed 

by the United States on Japan in the past (the threat of closing U.S. markets or removing the security 

umbrella rings hollow today) is no more. The likelihood of tension between global economic activity and 

national politics is real. It is likely that the United States will aggressively pursue its economic goals and 

no longer subordinate them to its security interests. It will require much patience and perserverence on 

the part of free-traders to maintain the world markets and defuse tensions. The emergence of European, 

East Asian, and North American trading blocs may foster regional security perspectives--a world with 

three roughly equal economic powers may have no country willing to take the responsibility for collective 

security. 

It is unlikely that there will be a systems change in international organization. The reasons for 

the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century have not changed substantially. In spite of the persuasive 

arguments put forth by the "interdependence" analysts, there are flaws in their arguments. The rules for 

the open international economic system precede, rather than follow, technological change: the 
telecommunications revolution has fostered interdependence of the world's economies, but the markets 

have been able to develop within a broader institutional structure delineated by the power and policies 

of the state. Ultimately, the survival of states is enhanced by the growing significance of juridical 

sovereignty: the fact that they are recognized as sovereign by other states in the international system. 

Evidence for this can be seen in the drive by nation-states to protect the sovereignty of a state invaded 

by a neighbor (Kuwait) but not "interfere in the internal affairs" of another state during a popular uprising 

(civil war in Iraq). 

CONCLUSION 

In the year 2015 the world will be multi-polar with different blocs of powers vying for resources 

and economic supremacy. The United States will still be powerful, but will not be driving the world's 

economic engine. The United States will work in concert with other trading blocs: Europe, East Asia, 

and the Western Hemisphere. There will be nation-states in other regions that will be more powerful than 

their neighbors and the conflicts that arise will require concerted, coalition action by other nation-states. 

Threats to security will come in the form of regional conflicts between smaller states and groups 

within states vying for power. The "misery index" of the "South" will need to be reduced or the 

developed world will face serious terrorist threats and regional wars. The fissure between rich and poor 

nations will be a test for the developed world. Few people see poverty as the will of God. The global 

telecommunications network has revealed that poverty is the result of human decisions. Overcoming the 

poverty gap will be the most powerful political force of the age. [lo] As we noted above, as tribal and 

national groups attempt to unite with their own kind, they will lunge for tribal turf and national 

sovereignty. The power of charismatic leaders--Caesars--will be a warning signal of potential difficulty. 

Political conflicts will arise from religious differences, racial or tribal collisions, language conflicts, or 

historical antagonisms. These could develop into "we" and "they" confrontations on a global scale. 

These groups will need to rediscover and reassert pride in their past as a measure of self-esteem. If the 

United States can assist them in that effort, then potentially lethal conflicts can be averted. 

The United States will need to have highly mobile armed forces, well-equipped with hightechnology weaponry and highly skilled personnel to operate it. The forces will need to have theaterspecific capabilities and be able to respond quickly to perceived threats to American interests. Those 

interests will be primarily economic in nature: threats to markets and natural resources. 
SOURCES 

1. Aho, C. Michael and Bruce Stokes. "The Year the World Economy Turned," Foreign Affairs, 70, 

NO. 1, 1991, 160-178. 

2. Ball, Desmond. "Modern Technology and Geopolitics." Pages 171-99 in Ciro E. Zoppo and Charles 

Zorgbibe (eds.), On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 

1985, 171-199. 

3. Bell, Daniel. "As We Go into the Nineties," Dissent, Spring 1990, 171-76. 

4. - . The Coming of Post-Industrial Societv: A Venture in Social Forecasting. New York: 

Basic Books, 1976. 

5- - . "The World and the United States in 2013," Daedalus, 116, No. 3, 1987, 1-31. 

6. Brenner, Michael. "New Terms of Engagement," SAIS Review, 11, No. 1, 1991, 11-26. 

7. Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan, 1977. 

8. Creveld, Martin van. The Transformation of War. New York: Free Press, 1991. 

9. Future Security Environment Working Group. "Sources of Change in the Future Security 

Environment. " (Research Paper.) Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1988. 

10. Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 

11. Glassner, Martin Ira and Harm J. DeBlij. Svstematic Political Geographv. (3d ed.) New York: 

John Wiley and Sons, 1980. 

12. Gordon, Bernard K. "The Asian-Pacific Rim: Success at a Price," Foreim Affairs, 70, No. 1, 

1991, 142-59. 

13. Gray, Colin S. The Geopolitics of Super Power. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1988. 

14. - . The Gemolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland. Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution. 

New York: Crane, Russak, 1977. 

15. Hatfield, Mark O., and Matthew F. McHugh. "After Containment: A New Foreign Policy for the 

1990's," SAIS Review, 11, No. 1, 1991, 1-10. 

16. Isaacs, Harold R. Power and Identity: Tribalism and World Politics. (Headline Series, no. 246), 

New York: Foreign Policy Association, October 1979. 

17. Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, 70, No. 1, 1991, 24-33. 

18. McKitrick, Myra Struck. "Nonnuclear Strategic Capability: Technology, Strategy, and the ArmsControl Process." Pages 25-35 in Kenneth B. Moss (ed.), Technolorn and the Future Strategic 
Environment. Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center Press, 1990. 

19. McNeill, William H. "Peasants, Politics, and Television," Washington Post, December 3, 1990, 

C1-C2. 

20. . The Pursuit of Power. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. 

21. . "Winds of Change." Pages 163-203 in Sea-Changes: American Foreign Policv in a World 

Transformed. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990. 

22. Mearsheimer, John. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International 

Securitv, 15, No. 1, 1990, 5-56. 

23. O'Sullivan, Patrick. Geopolitics. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 

24. Pfaff, William. "Redefining World Power," Foreign Affairs, 70, No. 1, 1991, 34-48. 

25. Roper, John. "Shaping Strategy Without the Threat," Adelphi Papers, No. 257, 1990, 76-83. 

26. Rosenau, Jayes. Turbulence in World Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 

27. Russett, Bruce M. "The Real Decline in Nuclear Hegemony." Pages 177-193 in Ernst-Otto 

Czempiel, and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges. Lexington, 

Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1989. 

28. Sloan, G.R. Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy 1890-1987. New York: St. Martin's 

Press, 1988. 

29. Smith, W.Y. "Principles of United States Grand Strategy: Past and Future," Washington 

Quarterly, Spring 1991, 67-78. 

30. Steinbruner, John D. "Revolution in Foreign Policy." Pages 65-109 in Setting National Priorities. 

Washington, D .C. : Brookings Institution, 1990. 

31. Thornson, Janice E., and Stephen D. Krasner. "Global Transactions and the Consolidation of 

Sovereignty." Pages 195-219 in Emst-Otto Czempiel, and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and 

Theoretical Challenges. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1989. 

32. Weigel, George. "Religion and Peace: An Argument Complexified, " Washington Ouarterly, 

April 1991, 27-41. 

33. Zoppo, Ciro. "The Geopolitics of Nuclear Deterrence." Pages 141-69 in Ciro E. Zoppo, and 

Charles Zorgbibe (eds.), On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: 

Martinus Nijhoff, 1985. 
CONCLUSION 

Two powerful forces-demography and technology--are driving the trends identified in this study. 

These two forces affect all aspects of the domestic scene and have international impact as well. 

Technological developments have transformed the industrial order and brought about the post-industrial 

society, the microelectronic revolution, the information age--whatever one may choose to call this era. 

These developments have generated domestic and global turbulence fed by broad changes in the size and 

structure of populations, the distribution of natural resources, particularly those relating to the generation 

of energy, and the results of technology in all fields. 

In the domestic arena, the population trends indicate that the United States is an aging society. 

While acknowledging that demographic projections are not always reliable (human reproductive behavior 

is especially volatile), the trends have been very powerful: there is unprecedented decline in fertility rates 

and an accompanying explosion in longevity. Projections suggest that the fertility rate of the United 

States will fall gradually to about 1.65 by the year 2015 (a number that is considerably below the 2.2 

figure considered replacement level), while in the same period, life expectancy will rise to almost 85 

years. Barring a major shift in individual behavior, that trend is very likely to remain unchanged. 

What do these demographic trends portend for the United States in 2015? Health care costs will 

take increasingly large portions of federal, state, and local budgets because older people require more 

attention. Total health-care spending is currently about 11 percent of GNP and is projected to be 17 

percent by 2015. A higher number of workers will retire from the labor force than enter it; fewer 

workers will be producing for more retirees. A pattern of generational and ethnic conflicts could emerge 

from this condition. The issues: will increased burdens be borne by workers or retirees benefits be 

reduced, and will the majority of taxpayers--who will be nonwhite--continue to support non-Hispanic 

white retirees? 

Because the work force will have fewer members yet increasing demands (to compete 

internationally in order to maintain prosperity, to support retirees, to build for their own and their 

families' futures), efficiency will be the driver of the economy. In a shrinking manufacturing sector, 

more robots will perform those tasks requiring intensive labor. The service sector will expand, both 

because of the transition to a post-industrial economy where the service sector is naturally larger and to 

meet the increasing services required by the aging population. 

Because fewer new workers will be entering the labor market, the United States will need to 

ensure that every member of society is productive. Society will not be able to afford any "forgotten 

members." Educational excellence will also be driven by the need to remain competitive in the 

international arena. Parents and educators alike must expect better quality and demand higher 

achievement of each child exiting the education system. 

The U.S. Army will have a smaller manpower pool from which to select its members. Weaponry 

will become increasingly complicated and "smart" because of technological advances, and operators will 
need to be better qualified. Even with advances in modulk assembly, the army will need to rely on 

personnel who are highly skilled, cognitive-capable problem-solvers. One certainty is that individual 

initiative and creativity will be ever more critical to success. 

Technology and resources will also be driven by the aging population: there will be incentives 

for "wonder drugs" and bioengineering breakthroughs. The U.S. Army will be forced to rely on 

increasingly complex sensor technology because more functions will be performed by fewer personnel. 

Regionally, the changes in population will bring pressure to bear on natural resource availability 

and distribution. Water, for example, may determine how much population and agriculture the West and 

Southwest can support. 

The demographic trend indicates that the ethnic composition of the United States is changing. 

Americans of European descent are not replacing themselves in sufficient numbers to maintain the 

historical majority in the population. Hispanic-, Asian-, and Black-Americans are increasing at a faster 

rate than non-Hispanic-white Americans. Maintaining basic consensus necessary for effective public 

action becomes more difficult when a society divides into distinct and separate ethnic and cultural blocs. 

The fundamental question arising from this trend is whether the dominant feature of American society 

will continue to be "pluralistic." Will immigrants assimilate to the point where they have a strong sense 

of "American-ness" or will they cling to ethnic and racial categories ranging from "Asian-American," 

"African-American, " "Hispanic-American, " to "Salvadoran-American, " "Vietnamese-American," , 

"Nigerian-American," ad infinitum at the expense of being "American?" The answer depends on whether 

the immigrant populations refuse or are not allowed to assimilate to the national norm. These are public 

policy decisions. The results of those decisions will influence the nature of the Army in 2015. No 

serious problem is foreseen because the Army is one institution that has been more successful than others 

in dealing with ethnic diversity. 

Internationally the "graying of the North" is driving trends as well. Like the United States, the 

population of the developed world, "the North," is growing at a slower pace. Many nations of Europe 

have fertility rates lower than that of the United States, and the projection is that the trend will persist. 

At the same time, the "South," the developing or Third World, is young and rapidly reproducing itself. 

Global projections predict a population of seven billion by 2010; 84.1 percent of that population will 

reside in less developed countries by 2025. These are sobering statistics with important geopolitical 

ramifications. 

First, given the aging of the "North," some analysts suggest that the central challenge to the 

survival of democracy, freedom, and capitalism is demographic decline: there will be fewer free 

Westerners around to protect and promote these values. If the current movement toward multiparty 

democracy in Africa and Latin America does not succeed, the "North" will risk being outnumbered. 

Second, the intensive migration from the "South" to the "North" will exacerbate social and 

cultural tensions, creating conflicts. The nature of such conflict is usually expressed in terms of the 

"pushlpull" model: the economic deprivation, unemployment, and high fertility (push) of developing 

countries work in tandem with the possibility for family reunification, higher wages, and the demand for 
employment (pull) in industrialized countries. Another factor on the "push" side of the model that has 

recently become prominent is environmental degradation. The Haitian "boat people" fled poverty caused, 

among other things, by soil erosion and deforestation. The environmental consequences of resource 

destruction brought about by population growth and industrialization is a worldwide phenomenon. In the 

forecast period, economic, political, and ecological pressures may trigger significant waves of refugees 

to the developed world. 

The influx of immigrants will aggravate differences between peoples, causing social tensions. 

Natives will fear a change in the political and social complexion of the country, a "minoritization" or 

cultural pollution. The potential for conflicts will increase. 

Third, in periods of turbulence, people tend to grasp "eternal" values such as ethnic unity 

(tribalism), social cohesion, religious beliefs and practices, and national sameness to maintain their sense 

of identity. The possible struggles arising from clashes between value systems may be a prominent 

feature of the next century. 

The "South" will not be forever young, however. With development comes the eventual 

possibility that changes in individual behavior will occur and the demographic trend will be altered. This 

trend alteration is not foreseen in the forecast period. 

The second structural force driving domestic trends is technology. This force drives the 

demographic parameter through medical developments in family planning and life extension. More 

women have entered the work force and professions once the exclusive domain of males. This trend will 

continue because the declining fertility rate will dictate that the United States will need the talents of every 

member of society. Technological advances in medicine may permit older people to retain their 

capabilities and be economically productive longer. Bioethical questions will accompany birth control, 

abortion, and family planning developments and will continue to be divisive social issues. 

Technological developments bring to light new fabrication procedures and new materials requiring 

raw ingredients that the United States has in very limited supply or not at all. Reliable suppliers will be 

mandatory for U.S. security. This trend will be likely to intensify. How and from which sources the 

United States meets its needs for resources, particularly mineral fuels, will be a major challenge. 

Technology is of fundamental importance to the economy because it is driving global 

interdependence through telecommunications and data transfer: financial and business transactions are 

conducted on a 24-hour basis. Global interdependence, however, may lead to attempts by national 

governments to impose more controls on domestic populations. Shrinking economic, social, and political 

distances have transnationalized global affairs and increased vulnerability of domestic economies to 

external influences. National governments, for example, will intervene in the internal flow of goods and 

services in order to cope with internationalization of market and banking systems. Technology will shape 

the work place in increasing ways, from information processing and computer-aided design to robotics. 

Electronics manufacturing will replace steel as the principal measure of an economy's industrial output 

because it will be the essential component in much that is produced. Operation "Desert Storm" 

demonstrated that the manufacture of electronic components is already a strategic resource. 
Technology is an important driver of education reform and will be the principal factor in the 

development of distance learning that links remote "learning centers." The use of technology in 

education will go beyond the imitation of television into interactive learning. The army will need to take 

more responsibility for the remedial education of recruits. It will be forced into making even greater 

strides in the development of education technology and its application. 

Technology transfer to other nations has been and will continue to be a national security concern. 

Because of the increasing frequency of co-production schemes and movement of scientific research 

worldwide, this concern will only intensify. The spread of advanced technology to Third World countries 

will increase the danger of more deadly conflicts in areas remote to the United States. The Army will 

need to rely on specialized operations units that will be readily deployable and have theater-specific 

capabilities. 

In consideration of any global view of the future, it is important to take stock of any change in 

the basics of the human condition, the philosophical underpinnings (teleology, ontology, and 

epistemology--questions specifically raised by the sponsor). Has there been or is there likely to be any 

change in our basic relation to the universe? 

The short answer is simply no. Despite the incredible progress in science and technology during 

the past few centuries, and particularly the past few decades, the basic human condition remains the same. 

The individual, his knowledge of the universe being mediated by his limited senses, is born and dies, 

relying on faith to provide value to his own life and that of the universe. Whether there is an aim, 

purpose, and direction to life is still a judgement to be made by every individual. Social progress in the 

sense of people being able to live together in harmony has not changed throughout recorded history; there 

have always been oases of sanity, harmony, and riches surrounded by incredible misery and senseless 

cruelty. The 20th century has seen the likes of Hitler, Stalin, Idi Amin, and Saddam Hussein, and one 

can argue that the amount of human carnage has not decreased, nor even its percentage, despite our 

"enlightenment. " In terms of human rational faculties, despite their "extension" by infrared vision 

systems, telescopes, microscopes, and readouts from physical instruments, the basic sources of knowledge 

remain as they have been since Socrates. Although humans have been quite adept at using deductive 

knowledge, even incorporating that process in "intelligent computers" as servants and mind amplifiers, 

humans know no more of the sources of creativity and of inductive reasoning than they did during the 

time of the ancient Greek civilization. 

There is, however, more grist for the mill, and there is some reason to hope for some long-range 

qualitative changes in the understanding of ourselves and the universe. While epistemology remains 

unchanged, its subject, knowledge, has not only grown by leaps and bounds undreamed by our ancestors, 

but has also given us tools for its organization and its rapid further expansion in computers and scientific 

research enterprises. The tools have grown to the point where they reach beyond the planet, allowing 

humans to orbit the Earth and land on the Moon, and to send probes beyond the solar system itself. 

Personal powers, as far as ontology is concerned, have also been extended beyond the ancients' 

dreams. Humans routinely zoom around highways far beyond what organismic powers would allow, and 
possess the ability to fly at supersonic speeds, to speak i&tantly to almost anyone on the planet by 

telephone, and to access an incredible wealth of human knowledge. 

With regard to teleology, where are we going, and is there purpose to it? What purpose is there 

in the birth of a baby? It is clear from the fact that we are undergoing rapid change that humanity is still, 

in fact, in its infancy, and that this is a time of hope, with the promise of future development of a sane 

society of incredibly powerful and wise individuals. The time scope for fulfillment of this potential 

promise is, alas, way beyond the year 2015. 
LIST OF FIGURES 

Demo~ra~hv of the United States in 2015: 

Fig. 1. United States Population 

Fig. 2. United States Population Growth 

Fig. 3. Population Distribution by Age Cohorts and 

by Sex: 1990 and 2015 

Fig. 4. Ethnic Composition of the United States 

(in percentages) 

Fig. 5. Minorities in the United States 

Fig. 6. Population Size by U.S . Army Recruitment 

Division* 1990-2015 (in percentages) 

Fig. 7. Male Hispanics of Recruitment Age (18-25) 

by U.S. Army Recruitment Division* 

2005-2015 (population in thousands) 

The Economv of the United States in 2015: 

Fig. 1. Employment by Sector in the U.S. Economy, 

1900-2000 

Fig. 2. The Emerging Management Structure 

Fig. 3. Projected Growth Rate of Working Age 

Population 

Fig. 4. U.S. Real GNP Growth 

Fig. 5. The U.S. and Foreign Competition in 

Selected Industries 

Fig. 6. Industry-Funded Research and Development 

Trends for the U.S. and Chief Competitors 

The United States Resource Picture in 2015: 

Fig. 1. U.S. and Rest-of-World Production of Steel, 

Aluminum Metal, and Petroleum, 1975, 1990 

and 2015 (est.) 

Fig. 2. U.S. Energy Sources in 2015 (Projected). 

Based on Department of Energy's Annual 

Enerm Outlook 1990 

Fig. 3. U.S. Net Import Reliance for Minerals and 

Metals as a Percentage of Apparent 

Consumption in 1990 

Fig. 4. World Production for Four Critical 

Minerals, 1983 

American Education in 2015: 

Fig. 1. Population of 18-to-25-Year-01ds by Ethnic 

Groups (in thousands) 
American Societv in 2015: 

Fig. 1. Marital Status of Teen Mothers* at First 

Birth 1960 to 1988 

Fig. 2. Voter Turnout Rates by Age Cohort: 

1964 to 1988 

Fig. 3. The Nine Nations of North America 

Fig. 1. Technologies Crosswalk 

Geo~olitics of the United States in 2015: 

Fig. 1. Gross National Products (Billions 1986 Dollars) 

Fig. 2. Gross National Product: U.S., U.S.S.R., China 

LIST OF TABLES 

Derno~rauh~ of the United States in 2015 

Table 1. United States Population 

Table 2. Dependency Ratio: 1960-2015 

Table 3. Selected Age Group (18-25) by Type of Projection: 

2005-2015 

Table 4. Population Distribution by Age Cohorts: 1990-2015 

Table 5. Population Distribution by Age Cohorts 

and by Sex: 1990-2015 

Table 6. Ethnic Composition of the United States: 1990-2015 

Table 7. Ethnic Composition by Type of Projection: 

2005-20 15 

Table 8. Selected Age Cohorts by Ethnic Groups:1990-2015 

Table 9. Regional Population Distribution by Army 

Recruitment Division: 1990-20 15 

Table 10. Regional Population by Army Recruitment 

Division and by State: 1990-2015 

Table 1 1. Metropolitan Areas with One Million Population 

or More: 1980-1990 

Table 12. List of Cities with Jobs by the Year 2000 

Table 13. Hispanic Population by Type of Projection: 

2005-20 15 

Table 14. Hispanic Population Distribution by Selected 

Age Cohorts and Type of Projection:2005-2015 

Table 15. Hispanic Population Distribution by Age Cohorts 
and by Sex:2005-2015 

Table 16. Hispanic Population by Army Recruitment Division: 

2005-2015 

Table 17. Metropolitan Areas Having Over 40,000 Hispanic 

Population, 1988 

Table 18. Hispanic Population by Selected Age Cohorts and 

by Army Recruitment Division: 2005-2015 

United States Resource Picture in 2015: 

Table 1. Estimated Proved Reserves of Oil for Top 

Ten Countries, 1970 and 1989 

Table 2. Commodities in the National Defense 

Stockpile in 1990 

Table 3. Metals in Electronics Applications 

American Education in 2015: 

Table 1. Age 17 Cohort by Sex, 1990, 2005,2015 

American Societv in 2015: 

Table 1. University Degrees Earned by Women in 

the United States 

Table 2. Number of Children with Mothers in 

the Workforce 

Table 1. Army Key Emerging Technologies