THE USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT.1 

By ALFRED H. BROOKS. 

INTRODUCTION. 

Before the end of the war nearly all active 

American geologists were engaged in work directly or indirectly connected with military 

problems. The many fields of activity opened 

to geologists by the emergency iricluded service 

with troops, administration of war activities, 

national economics, relief work, military education, and, above all, applied geology. The 

success achieved by the American geologist in 

such strongly contrasting duties bears testimony to his broad interests and wide experience and shows that he did his full part in the 

great struggle. This record also shows the 

educational value of geologic training, for it 

has made clear that such training develops the 

mentAl power necessary to success in new fields 

of endeavor. It is also true, as shown by the 

record, that while the geologj,st has the mental 

equipment and experience to render valuable 

service during war in many different capacities, 

yet his most important duties will be to determine the sources of minerals which the military 

situation renders especially necessary. This 

fact is here emphasized because it has been 

assumed by some that the application of geology to war is limited to the work done on the 

battlefield. As a matter of fact, the work in 

economic geology done on this side of tp.e 

Atlantic contributed more to the successful 

termination of the war than that of the geologists in France. The Germans, too, recognized this fact, for a large part of the geologists 

they called into military service were engaged 

in the investigation of mineral resources. Many 

geologists in both France and England were 

engaged in a similar service. 

The following is a partial list of publications 

in which reference is made to the war work of 

American geologists: 

ALDEN, W. C., The country around Camp Albert L. Mills 

(text on back of topographic map), New York: Map 

of Camp Mills quadrangle, U. S. Geol. Survey, 1918. 

ALDEN, W. C., The country around Camp Upton (text on 

back of topographic map), New York: Map of Moriches quadrangle (Camp Upton edition), U.S. Geol. 

Survey, 1918. 

BASTIN, E. S., War-time mineral activities in Washington: 

Econ. Geology, vol. 13, pp. 524--537, 1918. 

BATEMAN, A.M., Military and geologic mapping---a plane 

table: Geol. Soc. America Bull., vol. 30, pp. 405-414, 

1919. 

-- The geologist in war time-the training of artillery · 

officers: Econ. Geology, vol. 12, pp. 628-631, 1917. 

BERKEY, C. P., Engineering geology during and after the 

war (abstract): Geol. Soc. America Bull., vol. 30, p. 81, 

1919. 

BLiss, E. F., Some problems of international readjustments of mineral supplies as indicated in recent foreign literature (abstract): Geol. Soc. America Bull., 

vol. 30, pp. 101-102, 1919. 

BROOKS, A. H., Influence of geography on the conduct of 

the war (abstract): Educational Congress, Dept. Public Instruction of Pennsylvania, 1919, Proc., pp. 

540-547, Harrisburg, 1920. 

-- Military mining in France: Eng. and Min. Jour., 

vol. 109, pp. 606-610, 1920. 

--The application of geology to war (abstract): Eng. 

a.nd Min. Jour., vol. 109, p. 764, 1920; Washington 

Acad. Sci. Jour., vol. 10, pp. 331-333, 1920. 

-. - TheLorraine iron field and the war: Eng. a.nd Min. 

Jour., vol. 109, pp. 1065-1069, 1920. 

BuTTs, CHARLEs, The country in and around Camp Taylor (text on back of topographic map): Map of Camp 

Taylor and vicinity, Ky., U. S. Geol. Survey, 1918. 

CAMPBELL, M. R., The country around Camp Shernlan. · 

(text on back of topographic map): Map of Camp 

Sherman quadrangle, Ohio, U.S. Geol. Survey, 1918. 

CRoss, WHITMAN, Geology in the World War and after: 

Geol. Soc. America Bull., vol. 30, pp. 165-188, 1919. 

DAvis, W. M., Handbook of northern France, Cambridge, 

1918. 

DAy, A. L., Annual report of the Director of the Geophysical Laboratory: Carnegie Inst. Washington Yearbook, 1917, pp. 135-137, 1918. 

DEWOLF, F. W., The outlook for geology and geography: 

School Science and Mathematics, vol. 19, pp. 391-397, 

Chicago, 1919. 

GREGORY, H. E. [editor], Milital'ygeologyand topography, 

New Haven, Conn., 1918. 

-- Geology in the Student Army Training Corps (abstract): Geol. Soc. America Bull. vol. 30, pp. 81-82, 

1919. 

HEWETT, D. F., Manganese ore as a war mineral (abstract): 

Geol. Soc. America Bull. vol. 30, pp. 97-98, 1919. 

t Presented in ab~tract before the Geological Society of America Pee. 31, 1919. 

85 
86 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

JoHNSON, D. W., 'Iopography and strategy in war, New 

York, 1917. 

--- Some recent books on military geography: Geog. 

Review, vol. 9, pp. 60-63, 1920. 

LEE, C. H., Water resources in relation to military operations: Military Engineer, vol. 12, pp. 285-289, 1920. 

LEITH, C. K., Internationalization of mineral resources 

(abstract): Geol. Soc. America Bull., vol. 30, pp. 107-

·108, 1919. 

!;EVERETT, FRANK, The country around Camp Custer 

(text on back of topographic map): Map of Camp Custer quadrangle, Mich., U. S. Geol. Survey, 1918. 

LoUGHLIN, G. F., Rock products and the war (abstract): 

Geol. Soc. America Bull., vol. 30, p. 97, 1919. 

MATTHES, F. E., The country around Camp Mc(Jlellan 

(text on back of topographic map): Map of Anniston 

quadrangle, Ala., Camp McClellan edition, U. S. 

Geol. Survey, 1918. · 

· -- The country around Camp Gordon (text on back 

of topographic map): Map of Camp Gordon and vicinity, Georgia, U. S. Geol. Survey, 1918. 

MERTIE, J. B., jr., Present status of phototopographic 

mapping from the air: Eng. News Record, vol. 82, 

pp. 996-999, 1919. 

MoFFIT, F. H., Methods used in aero-phototopographic 

mapping (review): Eng. Newf! Record, vol. 82, pp. 

1000-1.004, 1919. 

MooRE, R. C., The environment of Camp Funston, with 

a chapter on the western theater of war, by Maj. D. W. 

Johnson: Kansas Geol. Survey Bull. 4, Topeka, 1918. 

PAIGE, SIDNEY, United States Geological Survey as a civic 

institution during war (abstract): G€01. Soc. America 

Bull., vol. 30, pp. 78-79, 1919. 

PoGuE, J. E., Mineral resources in the war and their bearing on preparedness: Sci. Monthly, vol. 4, pp. 120-

124, 1917. 

-- Military geology: Science, vol. 46, pp. 8-10, 1917. 

SALISBURY, R. D., and BARROws, H. ·H., The environment of Camp Grant, Ill.: :illinois Geol. Survey Bull. 

39, 1918. 

SHAW, E. W., Mexican petroleum and the war (abstract): 

Geol. Soc. America Bull., vol. 30, pp. 109-110, 1919. 

SMITH, G. 0., Our mineral reserves, in American problems 

of reconstruction, edited by E. 1\L Friedman, pp. 59-

97, New York, 1918. 

--U.S. Geol. Survey Thirty-eighth Ann. Rept., pp. 

7-9, 1917. 

-- U. S. Geol. Survey Thirty-ninth Ann. Rept., pp. 

7-10, 1918. 

---U.S. Geol. Survey Fortieth Ann. Rept., pp. 7-10, 

1919. 

-- The strategy of Ininerals, New York, 1919. 

---- EconOinic limits of domestic independence in 

minerals (abstract): Geol. Soc. America Bull., vol. 30, 

pp. 98-100, 1919. 

-- Military contributions of civilian engineers, Geol. 

Soc. America Bull., vol. 30, pp. 389-404, 1919. 

SMITH, P. S., The geologist in war times: The United 

· States Geological Survey's war work: Econ. Geology, 

vol. 13, pp. 392-399, 1918. 

SMITH, W. D., War work by the department of geology at 

the University of Oregon (abstract): Geol. Soc. 

America Bull., vol. 30, p. 83, 1919. 

SPURR, J. E., War minerals: Econ. Geology, vol. 13, pp. 

500-511, 1918. 

-- Commercial control of the mineral resources of the 

world (abstract): Geol. Soc. America Bull., vol. 30, 

pp. 108-109, 1919. . 

--The commercial control of the Inineral resources 

of the world; its political significance: Sci. Monthly, 

vol. 6, pp. 73-82, 1919. 

STEPHENSON, I~. \V., and MISER, H. D., Camp Pike and 

the adjacent country (text on back of topographic 

map): Map of Little Rock quadrangle, Ark., Camp 

Pike edition, U. S. Geol. Survey, 1918. 

STONE, R. W., Phosphate rock an economic army (abstract): Geol. Soc. America Bull., vol. 30, p. 104, 1919. 

UMP~EBY, J. B., World view of mineral wealth (abstract): 

Geol. Sec. America Bull., vol. 30, p. 107, 1919. 

VAUGHAN, T. W., Geologic surveys and the eradication of 

malaria: Southern Med. Jour., vol. 11, pp. 569-572, 

Birmingham, Ala., 1918. 

--- Presentation of geologic information for engineer~ 

ing purposes (abstract): Geol. Soc. America Bull., vot 

30, pp. 79-80, 1919. 

WRIGHT, F. E., War-time development of the optical industry: Optical Soc. America Jour., vol. 2-3, pp. 1-7, 

1919. 

Although geologic investigations in areas 

far behind the front must always be of great 

importance during war, yet it is now definitely 

established that the geologist can render an 

essential service at and near the front. The 

fact that a knowledge of geology may prove 

to be the decisive factor in a given military 

operation was made evident only during the 

late war and by no means found general acceptance among military leaders. 

An exposition of the use of geology during the 

war should be prefaced by the statement that 

while the science was definitely recognized in 

several of the armies, it was by no means developed to its full usefulness, not so much because of the failure to organize geologic staffs 

or to give support to geologic investigations, as 

because of the failure to apply the results 

achieved and to seek the advice of the geologist 

on problems that clearly lay within his field. 

Relatively few officers of the high commands 

of the several armies that employed geologists 

had any adequate conception of the application 

of geology to military and engineering problems. So far as geology was thought of at all, 

it was regarded by many as a purely speculative and abstract rather than as a practical and 

concrete science. The geologic officers of all the 

armies had to spend much time and energy in 

combating such ignorance and prejudice. This 

made the service particularly hard, for it was 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 87 

discouraging to see the cheerlul undertaking of 

impossible projects, involving the needless expenditure of time and energy and only too often 

useless sacrifice of lives, which could have been 

avoided by a little elementary knowledge of 

geology. These conditions can best be emphasized by citing a few examples. 

During the great battle of Verdun a bodv of 

troops was ordered to intrench itself on the high 

plateau of the Cc3tes de Meuse. Even a casual 

examination of the geologic map would have 

shown that the plateau was underlain by hard 

limestone with less than a foot of soil. This 

material could not be excavated with the light 

tools furnished or even with proper equipment 

in the time available. As a consequence there 

was a large and needless loss of life. 

In part of the Lorraine sector the front-line 

dugouts were located by the French without 

any consideration of the underground-water conditions. As a consequence a large part of the 

dugouts constructed atgreatlaborwerequickly 

rendered useless by filling with water. We did 

the same thing. I recall an attempt at dugout 

construction at a locality where the responsible 

officer had been warned that he could not excavate to the depth required to obtain shelter. 

The location was in an exposed position, and 

a· number of lives were sacrificed before the 

project was abandoned because of water. 

In the early part of the war, when transportation facilities were crowded to the limit, 

the British brought road metal from England 

in ignorance of the fact that a geologist was 

able to designate readily accessible sources in 

the theater of operations. A responsible officer 

in our own service made a requisition for filter 

sand to be transported across the Atlantic, 

though the geologists of the American Expeditionary Force had already found localities where 

such sand could be procured in France. 

During 1915 the German troops in the St. 

Mihiel sector were giving official recognition to 

the use of the witch-hazel stick in locating 

sources of underground water. The first duty 

of the geologist detailed to this, sector was to 

collect data on the results achieved by this 

implement, so as to shake the confidence of the 

authorities in its efficacy. In our Army many 

large plants, such as hospitals and flying fields, 

were located without any definite knowledge 

of the source of needed water. In the .British 

Army, after the first year, no well drilling was 

permitted without the approval of the geologist 

in charge of water-resource investigations. 

There was no such rule in the American Expeditionary Force, and many wells were drilled 

with no adequate knowledge of the underground-water conditions. In many instances 

it was not until hospitals or other large plants 

actually had a shortage of water that the 

geologist was called into consultation. 

In the early part of the war neither the 

British nor Germans recognized the need of 

geologic knowledge as a preparation for :rp.ilitary mining. The success of the British in 

gaining control of the underground situation 

must in large measure be credited to the refinement of the geologic studies and their interpretations made by Lieut. Col. T. Edgeworth 

David. The attitude of the British is illustrated by a personal experience. Soon after 

reaching France I was sent to the British front 

to investigate military mining. When I was 

presented to Brig. Gen. R. N. Harvey, who 

commanded the British mining troops, and 

stated my mission, he said, without knowing 

my profession: "The first requisite for success 

in military mining is to secure the services of 

experienced geologists. I wish I had known 

that at the start." 2 Although, as will be 

shown, the French Army probably made a 

more general. use of geologic maps than any 

other, yet there was a school of French officers 

who had no conception of the application of 

geology to military affairs. One of these, in a 

confidential and authoritative report on mine 

warfare, says: ''It may be well in complex 

cases [that is, underground conditions] to make 

borings and consult geologists." His attitude 

is also .indicated by this sentence among his 

final ·conclusions: ''The discoveries of experts 

do not count for much. Science has the habit 

of taking back with one hand what she gives 

with the other." 

A large part of the German secret official 

manual of military geology 3 is devoted to an 

attempt to convince army officers of the usefulness of geology in war. During the first 

two years of the war the German technical 

publications contained many articles advocat2 Gen. Harvey has recently repeated the same thought: "From the 

military miner's point of view geological advisers must always be indispensable during war" (King, W. B. R., Ueological work on th ewesternfront: Geog. Jour., vol. 54, p. 217, London, 1919). 

s Kriegsgeologie, herausgegebenim Aultrage des Chefs des Generalstabs 

des Feldherres durch den Chef des Kriegsvermessungwesens am 15 

Januar 1918, Brussels, 1918. · 
88 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

ing the use of geologists in the army and pointing out the various applications of the science 

to war problems. This propaganda was finally 

stopped by the censor under the plea that 

military secrets were being published. It is 

evident; therefore, that Germany, with all her 

use of applied science, had not then recognized 

the military utility of geology. 

The examples above given will serve to illustrate the difficulties with which the military 

geologist had to deal on the western front. 

There were, of course, physical obstacles to 

staffs of the different belligerents will be presented. This will be followed by the principal 

theme of this paper, namely, the application of 

geology to war as developed on the western 

front. In this presentation the attempt ·will 

be to make the subject clear to the reader who 

is not conversant with geologic science. For 

this reason some concepts of geology which are 

well understood by professional geologists will 

be elucidated. 

DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY GEOLOGY. 

observation and record, and, above all, his It is evident that as great military leaders 

investigations were hampered by the fact that must take into account the physical features 

when geologic results were demanded at all, within the theater of operations, they have 

they were demanded at once. Many of the made at least a subconscious use of geologic 

responsible officers of the several belligerents facts. Most of them have not realized, howhad no idea of the necessity of field studies. ever, that in many regions the use of geologic 

A geologic officer might be ordered to make a facts will make it possible to predict accurately 

geologic map overnight, without any prepara- the physical conditions that influence military 

tion, very much as a draftsman .would be or- operations. Military engineers as a class have 

dered to make a tracing. The necessity of giv- also ignored geology, to their disadvantage, 

ing the· geologic office:Fs opportunity to do field though their work brings them into closer conwork and study the terrain was often com- tact with geologic phenomena than that of any 

pletely ignored. other service. 

The American Expeditionary Force, profit- The many references in technical publicaing by the experience of the Allies, organized tions to the application of geology to engineergeologic work from the start. Although many' ing projects 4 must be counted as a recognition 

American officers failed to recognize the utility of the use of the science in military art. Yet 

of geologic knowledge, there were exceptions to direct references to the military value of a 

this rule. The work could not have been car- knowledge of geology are exceedingly scant in 

ried out without the strong support given to it prewar publications. This lack is due in part 

by many of the officers, especially by those of to the fact that only during the present generathe Corps of Engineers. It is worthy of note tion has the science reached a sufficient degree 

that the plan for employing geologists in the of precision to make its conclusions generally 

American Expeditionary Force did not origi- applicable to engineering projects. Engineers 

nate with geologists but with regular (_)fficers as a class, except those in the branch of mining, 

of the Engineer Corps of the United States have not yet taken cognizance of this evolution 

Army. The strongest support of the geologic of geology toward greater accuracy. It can 

work throughout the war came from the same not be expected that military engineers will be 

source. in advance of those in civil life in a recognition 

As a class the persons most difficult to con- of the application of geology. 

vince of the utility of geology Were those who Maj. Gen. Portlock, soldier and geologist, 

in civil life had failed to recognize the applica- was one of the first to recognize that a knowl.-

tion of the science to problems of engineering. edge of geology would be of aid in wa·r. In his 

As a result of my experience I am convinced discussion, published in 1868,S of various apthat the average American civil engineer is plications of the science, he says: "Geology 

sadly lacking in elementary knowledge of geol- is now a true science, being -founded on facts 

ogy as well as in the application of geology to and reduced to the dominion of definite laws, 

his profession. 4 iues, Heinrich, and Watson, T. L., Engineering geology, New York, 

In the following pages the history of the 1914. sorsbie, R. F., Lieut. Col., R. E., Geology for engineers, LondODt 

application of ·geology to war will be briefly 19:~ortlock, J. E., MaJ. Gen. R. E., A rudimentary treatise on geology, 

traced, and the organization of the geologic sth ed., Landon, 1868. 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 89 

and in consequence has become a sure guide 

to the practical man. * * * The soldier 

also may find in geology a most valuable guide 

in tracing his lines both of attack and defense." 

Before the war the only very definite application of geology to military problems was that 

made by the French military geographers. 

The study of military topography is as old as 

the art of war, but it had no very definite scienti:fic basis until the gei~.etic relation between 

land forms and geologic history had been recognized. So long as land forms were regarded as 

unrelated features, without order of arrangement of form, their influence on military operations could not be presented systematically. 

French soldiers have long been leaders in the 

study of military topography, and with the development of physiographic science they were 

quick to see its application in their field. This 

was in part due to their environment, for it has 

long been the duty of French military leaders, 

in the interests of national defense, to study 

the terrain of their own land, which has been 

the battle ground of Europe since the dawn of 

history. Here the broader features of relief are 

clear-cut and of simple pattern. Now here is 

the genetic relation between topography and 

drainage, on the one hand, and stratigraphy 

and structure, on the other, more evident than 

in northern and eastern France. The many 

wars of the past afforded innumerable examples 

of the control of military movements by the 

highlands, scarps, and watercourses, and these 

examples have been noted by generations of 

military geographers. It is therefore not surprising that the French, who have so long 

m~intained a leadership in the art of war, 

should have been the first to recognize the use 

of geology in the field of military topography, 

but it is remarkable that other nations have 

failed to give any attention to this subject. A 

generation before the present war the physiographic features of the Paris Basin and of 

much of the rest of Europe had been described 

and their influence on strategy and tactics set 

forth by French officers. There is a dearth of 

similar treatises by the military geographers of 

other nations. 

It is not pertinent to this paper to discuss the 

development of physiographic science, or to 

search. out its earliest applications to military 

problems. Suffice it to say on ~ne hand that 

the geologic interpretation of some land forms 

is so evident that it was recognized early in the 

evolution of geologic science, and on the other 

that the empirical description of topography 

has dominated most treatises on geography up 

to very recent years. 

In this connection it is perhaps worthy of 

record that the geographer Guyot during the 

Civil War prepared a description of a part of the 

southern Appalachian region for the use of the 

military authorities. 6 He was probably the 

first American geographer to . make use of his 

science in military problems. His description is 

very largely empirical and presents for the most 

part a bewildering mass of detail without orderly arrangement. Here and there are suggestions that Guyot had profited by Lesley's 

great work, "Manual of coal and its topography" (1856), and had some inkling of the 

geologic basis of land forms. 7 Though physiographic science has been developed chiefly by 

American students, yet not until the outbreak 

of the recent war was its military application 

recognized in this country. This is all the more 

remarkable, for, as will· be shown, the French 

have for many years been publishing works on 

this subject. Maj. Johnson's work 8 has directed attention to a field of research which 

should prove of fascinating interest to both the 

American geologist and the professional soldier. 

Of the many French treatises on military 

topography, that of Commandant Marga, published 35 years ago, 9 may be cited as one in 

which the physiographic control of military 

operations is clearly set forth. Furthermore, 

Marga recognized the influence of geology in 

the matter of controlling troop movements by 

its determination of the physical character of 

soil. Of this he says: 10 • 

The character of the soil, which is known by the geology, 

greatly influences the passability of a region, and therefore indicates the difficulties which armies must overcome 

in their marches. In a .granitic country the roads are 

good at all seasons, whereas in a region of argillites they 

are muddy after the rains of autumn or spring and dusty 

s Guyot, Arnold, Notes on the geography of the mountain district of 

western. North Carolina (manuscript), Princeton, N.J., Feb. 22, 1863. 

CopyinlibmryofU. S. Geol. Survey. 

7 Lesley's students gained a clear conception of the need of geologic 

knowledge as a basis of understanding topographic forms. Among the 

military papers of one of them, Maj. T. B. Brooks, I find many references 

to the need of a geologic basis for an understanding of military 

topography. 

s Johnson, D. W., Topogra;phyandstrategyin war, New York, 1917. 

9 Marga, A., Commandant du Genie, Geographie militaire, pt. i: 

Generalites, La France, 2 vols. and atlas, 4th ed., Paris, 1885; pt. 2, 

Pri..ncipaux etats de l'Europe, 3 vols. and atlas, Paris, 1885. 

10 Op. cit., pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 18. 
90 SHOR'I'ER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

in summer. * * * Physical geography, also using the of accuracy the control exercised by the 

science of geology through the data furniE~hed by geologic physiography on the military operations of the 

and topographic maps, determines the types of terrain late war. 

which are unfavorable. It determines the position oflines There are other publications by French 

of defense and the places that should be fortified. officers which treat military geography from 

In his discussion of the military geography the standpoint of the physiographer. The two 

of France, Marga presents briefly the geology above cited clearly indicate that the French 

,_ of the region, and points out its influence on the have been the pioneers in this field and for a 

terrain. The control of military operations. generation have recognized its importance. 

exercised by the Vosges, Ardennes, and other They long ago present~d complete analyses of 

highlands and by the outward-facing scarps of the military physiography of France and 

the Paris Basin, as well as by the watercourses, accurately predicted its control on the camare set forth in detail. In this connection he paigns of the war. Moreover, the interest of 

says: 11 "Between the Triassic plateau of French officers in physiography has been by no 

Langres and Paris there are six concentric means confined entirely to the application of 

ridges which present more or less serious the science to military problems. Several have 

obstacles to invasion." The influence of all made notable contributions to geologyY There 

these physical features on the wars of the past can be no question that interest in and knowland the future are analyzed in considerable edge of geology was more widely disseminated 

detail. This exhaustive treatise indeed covers among French officers than among those of any 

the whole field of geographic influences on war, of the other belligerents. 

including the commercial, political, ethnologic, Though geology has in the past received 

and industrial factors. little recognition in military textbooks, the 

The more purely physiographic phase of the science was by no means ignored in the training 

military geography of France and of many other of officers. At West Point a brief course in 

countries of Europe has been elaborately pre- general geology has long been a part of the cursen ted by 0. Barre, commandant du genie, in riculum but apparently was given for the purhis lectures at the Ecole d'application de pose of general culture, with little or no recog1' artillerie et du genie, FontainebleauP Barre nition of its application to war. French offiis not only a professional soldier but also an cers have also received training in geology, and 

eminent geologist. Though his treatment of its application, especially ~o military top~!?­

military topography is physiographic, yet he raphy, has been recognized·m the French milihas laid greatest emphasis on the tectonic his- tary schools. Less is known of ~h~ Germ~ 

tory and has perhaps presented the geology in officers' training in geology, but 1t 1s certam 

greater detail than his thesis required. His that some of them were at least required to 

principal work on this subject, published 20 attend brief lecture courses in the science. 

years ago, forecasts with a remarkable degree British officers formerly received instruction 

n Idem, p. 155. . 

u Cours de geographie, Croquis geographiques, par le chef de batalllon 

du genie o. Barre, Ecole d:application de l'artillerie et du genie, Fontainebleau, 1897-1900: · 

Section 1, Introduction a l'etude del'Europe centrale, January, 1897, 

pp.1-27. 

Section 2, France, frontiere du nord frontiere du nord-est, August, 

1898, pp. 1-89. 

Section 3, France, systeme des Alpes, frontiere du Jura, frontiere des 

Alpes, November, 1899, pp.1-70. . . . . 

section 4, France, frontiere des Pyrenees, frontleres mantlmes, massif 

centrale, June, 1900, pp. 1-78. 

Section 5, Belgique et Hollande, Suisse, Autriche-Hongrie, June, 1897, 

pp.1-75. 

Section 6, Italie du nord, Allemagne, January, 1898, pp. 1-85. 

Sections 1 and 2 were republished (two pamphlets) under the general 

title "La geographie militaire et les nouvelles methodes geographiques," 

with part of the maps from the atlas, Paris, 1899. The atlas was also 

issued in six sections, covering the same areas as the text, as follows: 

Section 1, January, 1897, 5 plates of maps; section 2, August, 189!l, 7 

plates of maps and sections; section 3, July, 19CO, 5 plates of ma~sand 

sections; section 4, July, 1900, 5 plates of maps and section; sectiOn 5, 

January, 1901, 5 plates of maps and sections; section 6, July, 1898, 5 

plates of maps. 

in geology both at the Chamberly Staff College 

and at the Chatha.,m Engineer School, but these 

courses were abandoned many years ago.14 

Between 1886 and 1898 Lieut. Col. Charles 

Cooper King gave the course in military geology 

at the staff college. He was an artillery officer, 

a man of broad culture, and a geologist of some 

standing. He seems to have been the first 

professional soldier to recognize the wide 

application of geology to military problems. 

1a Noe, G. de la, Lieut. Col. du Genie, and De Margerie, Emmanuel, 

Les formes du terrain, Service geograpbique del' Armee, Paris, 1888. 

Barre, o., Commandant du Genie, L'arcbitecture du sol de Ia France, 

Paris, 1903. 

Berthaut, Gen., Topologie; etude du terrain, Service geographique de 

l'Armee. 

u King, Capt. w. B. R., Geological work on the western front: Geog. 

Jour., vol. 54, p. 218, London, 1919. 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 91 

In his teaching, which included field· work, he 

pointed out the influence of geology on military 

operations. 15 

The above statements indicate that geology 

has not been entirely ignored in military education, though the use of the science does not seem 

to have been widely accepted. Above all, there 

was before the war an almost complete ignorance among military men of the fact that professional geologists could render valuable service during a campaign. This is all the more 

surprising because there are many examples in 

military history where ignorance of geology has 

been a serious handicap. A few exceptions to 

the general neglect of . the use of geology by 

military authorities should be noted. 

When Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798 he 

included in his expeditionary force a commission of scientists, among. whom were two 

geologists. This was part of a pla:ll. for a scienti:fic investigation of a little-known region and 

was in no sense a recognition of the military 

value of geology. At that time, in fact, no 

geologic maps had been made and the students 

of earth science were primarily mineralogists 

and paleontologists. Some of the elaborate 

topographic surveys made by the military 

authorities in different parts of Europe during 

the Napoleonic regime included the collection 

of information about the distribution of minerals and other scientific data.16 The plan of 

having scienti:fic investigations made in connection with military and semimilitary expeditions, originated by Napoleon, has since been 

widely adopted. Much of the first knowledge 

of the western part of the United States was 

gained in this manner. 

In 1898 Dr. George F. Becker went to the 

Philippine Islands to make a reconnaissance of 

the geology and mineral resources of the 

islands. He was attached to the Army and 

was there during the Philippine Insurrection. 

On occasions he was called upon to give 

geologic advice bearing on military subjects. 

Dr. H. H. Hayden accompanied the Younghusband expedition into Tibet as geologist, 

and geologists have been attached to many 

other military ~nd semimilitary expeditions. 

These can not, however, be claimed as indi1;; Obituary notice of Lieut. Col. Charles Cooper King: Geol. Soc. 

London Jour., vol. 54, p. Ixxxvi, 1898. 

tG Berthaut, Col., Les ingenieurs de geographie militaires, 1624-1831, 

vol. 1, pp. 404, 420, 426, 429, 430; vol. 2, pp. 14, 104, 334, 477, 480, Paris, 

Service geographique del' Armee, 1902. 

43595°-21-8 

eating recognition of the military value of 

geology. 

During her war with Russia Japan made a 

geologi<; survey of Chosen, and it is quite possible that some of the results may have been 

put to immediate military use. The evident 

purpose of this survey, however, was to 

determine the resources of Chosen. 

Certain geologic maps and studies of parts 

of Germany and Austria appear to have been 

made in the past by order of the military 

authorities with the desire of obtaining information about water supply. In fact, the use 

of geologists during peace times to determine 

sources of underground water for military 

posts and fortifications has been not uncommon. This must be regarded as a civilian 

rather than a military us~ of geology. 

Except in the field of military topography, 

Col. Cooper King was probably the first professional soldier to recognize the application of 

geology to war, but apparently little attention 

was paid to his pioneer work in this field. The 

subject was entirely ignored until shortly before the outbreak of the World War, when 

Capt. Kranz, of the corps of fortification engineers of the German Army, called attention to 

the use of geology in war .

17 In his article 

Kranz, who was himself a trained geologist, 

briefly sketched the several fields of usefulness 

of military geology .. He pointed out that 

while three or four German engineer officers 

were each year given a few hours a week of instruction in geology at Charlot ten burg Politechnik, this did not meet the situation. He recommended that a few selected officers be trained 

as professional geologists by a three years' 

course, including field work at one of the 

universities. Kranz advocated the recognition 

of military geology as a special profession. 

The work of these specialists, he stated, could 

be supplemented in time of war by calling 

into the military service other geologists from 

civil life. 

Kranz's recommendations, published a year 

before the war, attracted little attention among 

geologists and apparently none at all among 

the military authorities. Therefore, when the 

war came German geologists were mobilized 

with their unit without regard to the possible 

value of their services in their own profession. 

n Kranz, Capt. W. (retired), Militargeologie: Kriegstech. Zeitschr., 

vol. 16, pp. 464-471, Berlin, 1913. 
92 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

This was at a time when scientists of some 

other professions were excused from service 

with troops on the plea that they were more 

valuable in other fields. At once there arose 

a great clamor among German geologists for a 

similar recognition of the utility of their 

science. The German technical journals and 

even the daily press contained many articles 

showing the application of geology in war, and 

Kranz's article, previously almost ignored, was 

cited as presenting the views of a trained 

soldier. Soon controversies arose as to the 

best military use of geology and its limitations. 

This continued until public discussion was 

stopped by the military censor in 1916. 

While this battle in printer's ink was raging 

and at least one German army was using the 

witch-hazel stick, the British . expeditionary 

force had quietly acted in May, 1915, by calling 

into the service Capt. W. B. R. King, of the 

British Geological Survey, to determine underground-water resources.18 Capt. King, .therefore, so far as known, was the first geologist 

to receive a military assignment for work in his 

own profession. During the summer of 1915 

a staff of geologists was organized for a part of 

the German front and appears to have been 

specially charged with the examination of 

water resources. Both the British and the 

German geologic investigations were extended 

during the following year, and gradually more 

or less definite geologic organizations were 

formed, as will be set forth below. 

The first recommendations for the employment of geologists by the American Expeditary Force were made in July, 1917, by Brig. 

Gen. (then Col.) S. A. Cheney, and Col. (then 

Maj.) Ernest Graves, both of the Engineer 

Corps. These officers, after a visit to the 

British front, independently came to the same 

conclusion. Gen. Cheney had been investigating water-supply equipment and Col. Graves 

military mining. This report was approved by 

Brig. Gen. Harry Taylor, chief engineer of the 

American Expeditionary Force, and orders 

were issued to Maj. E. C. Eckel and me, which 

took us to France in August. 

French geologists of military age, like those 

of Germany, were mobilized with their units. 

No geologic staff was organized in the French 

.Army during the war, and but little definite 

1s King, W. B. R., Geological work on the western front: Geog. Jour., 

vo!. 54, pp. 201-221, 1919. 

recognition was given to the military application of the science. There was, however, 

probably a larger use of geologic maps among 

French officers than among those of any other 

Allied army. The geologic map of France 

was completed many years ago, and French 

engineers have long been trained to use it as a 

source of certain kinds of information. Most 

of them are sufficiently versed in geology to 

apply the information contained on the map 

and in the explanatory text, though the text is 

expressed in very technical language. It is 

indeed not uncommon to find French engineers 

who have sufficient knowledge of paleontology 

to make their own stratigraphic determinations. 

The fact that the French were fighting in 

their own land, with whose physical features 

they were thoroughly familiar, made the service of geologists less important to them than 

to their allies. Nearly every French officer had 

at least a subconscious knowledge of the local 

geology in his field-an advantage entirely lacking among the officers of the other armies. In 

spite of this fact the French made certain 

blunders because of their ignorance of the 

geology. 

It has been shown that the French have long 

been the leaders in military physiography, and 

that more of her officers had been trained in ' 

geology than those of any other country. 

It is difficult, therefore, to understand why 

France made no professional use of geologists 

during the war. One reason for it lies in the 

fact that in comparison with other countries 

France has not to any great extent applied 

geology to industrial problems. The ideals of 

her leading geologists have been to advance 

the science rather than to show its practical 

utility. Moreover, the French geologic maps, 

completed many years ago, are not of the same 

standards of detail and accuracy as those of · 

more recent date issued by other countries. 

The lack of refinement in the geologic maps is 

due to the fact that there are but few good base 

maps of French territory. Except for areas 

chiefly along the old German frontier, there 

were at the beginning ·of the war no good 

topographic base maps of France. The standard map (scale 1 :80,000) is hachured, and the 

topography was surveyed before the middle 

of the last century. Therefore, though the 

features of culture are admirably shown, the 

map is of little u8e as a base for detailed 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE ·wESTERN FRONT. 93 

geologic surveys. It should be added that the 

above criticism of lack of detail in some of 

the French geologic work does not apply 

to the investigations in the coal fields. 

As a result of the conditions above set forth 

French engineers and men of affairs have not 

always realized the practical value of detailed 

surveys and exhaustive studies. In general, 

the attitude of the engineer is that the geologist 

has completed his researches many years ago 

and presented final results. If additional 

geologic information or interpretation is needed 

the engineer and not the geologist must be 

called upon. In other words, the average 

engineer knows little of the precision of results 

attained during the recent development of 

geologic science. As the military authorities 

held the same view, it was natural for them to 

turn to the engineer rather than to the geologist, both for more precise information and for 

a practical application of the science. 

In one field of applied geology, namely, 

hydrology, the early leadership of French 

geologists must stand without question. Yet 

in spite of this the French Army drove thousands of wells without consulting a geologist, 

so far as can be learned, and certainly without 

definite recognition of the hydrologists as a 

class. It should be added, however, that many 

of. the engineers of the water-supply service of the French Army were close students 

of geology and hence were entirely competent 

to make their own geologic examinations. I 

also found many French engineer officers 

using the geologic maps in connection with the 

siting of dugouts. 

Though the French Army gave no recognition during the war to the use of professional 

geologists, it by no means entirely ignored the 

application of geology to military problems. 

As already noted, French officers received 

geologic instruction, 19 including a study of the 

terrain in the field, before the war. During 

the war some lectures were given to French 

officers on the application of geology to military engineering.20 

The French were the first to issue a map 

showing the passability of the country as 

19 Lemoine, Paul, Compte-rendu de !'excursion dirigee par M. le 

Genera.l Jourdy aux environs de Rouen les 8 et 9 avril 1906; Soc. amis 

sci. nat. Rouen Bull., 1905, pp. 453-466, 1906. 

Joly, H. D., Conference de geologie: Rev. genie militaire, vol. 34, 

pp. 50-78, Paris; 1907. 20 Charra, Capt., Geologie appliquee aux travaux du genie, Groupe 

des armees du Nord, Co~s du genie, Mar. 29, 1918. 

governed by the physical character of the surface formations. During the summer of 1918 

plans were formulated by the Service geographique for the preparation of ''tank maps," 

which were to take cognizance of the physical 

conditions imposed by the surface materials. 

A number of the prominent French geologists 

were also attached to the Service geographique 

during the war and performed valuable services in preparing descriptions of the physical 

features of the theater of operations, as well 

as in summarizing the mineral resources and 

mining industry of Germany. 

I learn through Dr. A. Renier 21 that Gen. · 

Greindle, chief engineer of the Belgian Army 

and long secretary of the Geological Society 

of Belgium, had a very intimate knowledge of 

the geology of the country where operations 

were carried on and made full use of it. In 

September, 1918, Dr. Van Strachen was appointed geologic adviser to th~ engineering 

commission (conseil de genie) of the Belgian 

Army. 

It appears that geologists were attached to 

the Austrian Army during the war. This 

action probably followed the organization of 

the geologic corps in the German Army. As 

to the Italian or Russian use of geologists 

during the war, no facts are at hand. 

GEOLOGIC STAFF OF BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY 

FORCE. 

In May, 1915, Capt. W. B. R. King was de~ 

tailed as geologist to the engineer in chief, 

British Expeditionary Force, and took over as 

his principal task the determination of water 

resources in the areas occupied by the British 

Army. He was the official adviser on all matters relating to water resources but also had to 

do with other applications of geology to military 

affairs. It- also fell to Capt. King to devise 

the system of surface-water control in the 

plains of Flanders and in northern France, 

which had an important use in both offensive 

and defensive warfare. 

In May, 1916, the first use of geologists for 

mine warfare was made by the British Expe 

ditionary Force,22 .and Lieut. Col. (then Maj.) 

T. Edgeworth David was assigned to this duty, 

first as geologic adviser to the engineers of the 

armies and later at general headquarters, where 

21 Personal letter, Sept. 23, 1919. 

22 King, W. B. R., Geological work on the western front: Geog. Jour., 

vol. 54, pp. 201-202, 1919. 
94 SHORTER .CONTRIBUTIONS TO ,GENERAL GEOLOG;Y, 1920. 

he served on the staff of the inspector of mines. 

Col. David was assisted throughout the war by 

Lieut. Loftus Hills, and at different times by 

other geologists detailed from among the officers 

of the mining troops. Although the British 

geologic staff at no time exceeded five officers, 

this was not so much of a handicap as would 

appear, for there were among the officers of 

the mining troops ("tunneling companies") 

many mining engineers who had been trained 

as geologists and were well qualified to extenq 

the observations and deductions of the headquarters staff. Col. David and Capt. King 

shared the investigations relating to other 

fields of applied geology. Though for much of 

the war these two officers were attached to 

different branches of the chief engineer's staff, 

they worked in perfect harmony, and the geologic investigations were carried on as a unit. 

. Toward the end of the war the obvious mistake 

of having, in theory at least, two independent 

staffs was rectified. The two geologic offices 

were then united under the deputy engineer in 

chief,23 and Lieut. Col. David became chief 

geologist. 

which allowed one for each ~~rps. These were 

to be mmnbers of the staffs of the chief engineers 

of the armies. Provision was also made for 

two geologic officers for work in the line of 

communication. This plan also provided that 

the senior geologic officer at gen~ral headquarters should be designated chief geologist 

and should have technical supervision of all 

geologic work in the American Expeditionary 

Force. This designation carried with it the 

technical control of the geologic investigations 

then being made by an officer of the watersupply section. Meanwhile the geologic work 

done at general headquarters, in part for the 

Engineers and in part for the intelligence section of the General Staff/4 had so greatly increased in amount that authority was finally 

obtained in August, 1918, to increase the 

geologic section to a total of six officers. 

Therefore, in midsummer, 1918, a total of 18 

geologic officers had been authorized, distributed as follows: Six at general headquarters, five with each of the two armies, and 

two in the line of communications (designated 

the service of supplies in the American ExpediGEOLOGIC STAFF OF AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY tionary Force). Though requisition had been 

FORCE. made on Washington by cable in July, 1918, 

for additional geologists, but one arrived before 

The geologic section of the American Expe- the signing of the armistice. For this reason 

ditionary Force was established as a part of and because the armies did not ask for their 

the office of the chief engineer in September, 1917. It then included two officers and was full quota of geologists the complete authorized 

not enlarged until April, 1918, when another geologic staffs were never organized. 

officer was added for temporary duty only. To provide the needed personnel a careful 

The geologic section was first made a part of. search was made in the American. Expedithe division of front-line engineering, which tionary Force for professional .geologists, ~nd 

was under Col. G. A. Youngberg. Col. Young- a number ':ere found engaged m other duties. 

berg's strong support of the geologic work The followmg were ord~~ed to ge~eral hea~­

throughout the war was the decisive factor in quarters as fast as conditiOns pernntted: MaJ. 

gaining for it· what recognition it received. Morris F. Lacroix, then instructor in the Army 

Later the section was transferred to the division Engineer School; Lieut. R. S. Knappen, who 

of engineering intelligence, which was admin- was serving as topographic officer in a railroad 

istered by Col. F. B. Wilby, and he too did regiment; Lieut. H. F. Crooks, who was serving 

much to help the geologic investigations. At as a master engineer in a road regiment; Lieut. 

a still later date the chief geologist reported Wallace Lee, who commanded a munition 

directly to the assistant to the chief engineer train in the Field Artillery; and Lieut. Kirk 

at general headquarters. All the assistants Bryan, who was a private serving as draftsto the chief engineer, including Gens. M. L. man at a corps headquarters. 

Walker, S. A. Cheney, and Charles Kellar, did At the time of the signing of the armistice 

everything in their power to advance the geo- there was a total of nine officers engaged, at 

logic work and to gain recognition for it. least in part, in the geologic work of the 

In July, HH8, plans were approved providing for five geologic officers for each army, 24 The cooperation with the intelligence section of the General Staff was brought about through the influence of Col. K. T. Riggs, Cavalry, 

2s King, W. B. R., op. cit., p. 217. one of the first to recognize the application of geology to war. 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 95 

American Expeditionary Force, five at general 

headquarters, two with the First Army, one 

with the Second Army, and one with the watersupply section.25 

The influence of geology on field fortifications was also developed in the engineer training schools of the American Expeditionary 

Force. This result was due largely to the 

teaching of the late Capt. John D. Irving, who 

was in charge of the oourse on mining and 

dugouts at the Army Engineer School and 

lectured at the corps schools. A few geologic 

lectures were also given at army and corps 

schools by the chief geologist of the American 

Expeditionary Force. 

GEOLOGIC WORK OF GERMAN ARMY. 

The beginning and organization of geologic 

work in the German Army have not yet been 

fully set forth in any publication now available. As already shown, it is certain that at 

the outbreak of war the German Army had 

no geologic staff, nor any definite policy for 

the use of geologists. The Germans have, 

however, so long made use of applied geology 

in connection with engineering works that 

there can be little doubt that they called 

to consultation on engineering 

before the need of geologic asmore purely military field was 

It is also generally be-

' Prof. Albrecht Penck has long been 

an adviser of the German general staff on 

matters relating to geology and geography. 

The evidence obtained from technical journals 

and captured documents makes it possible to 

outline, in brief, the development of the German military geologic organization. 

It appears certain that as late as the spring 

of 1915 practically no use had been made of 

geology in the German Army, and that during 

the following summer the development of 

26 The following is a complete roster of officers connected with the 

geologic work of the American Expeditionary Force during the war: 

Lieut. Col. Allred H. Brooks, chief geologist at ge:p.eral headquarters; 

Maj. E. C. Eckel, at general headquarters for about one month and in the 

water-supply section of the line of communication for about four months; 

Maj. Morris F. La Croix, at general headquarters and with First Army; 

Capt.CharlesH.Lee,atgeneralheadquartersandinlineofcommunication; 

Lieut. R. S. Knappen, at general headquarters and with Second Army; 

Lieut. T. M. Smithers, at general headquarters for three months; Lieut. 

Harold F. Crooks, at general headquarters; Lieut. Kirk Brjran, at general 

headquarters; Lieut. Wallace Lee, at general headquarters, and with 

First Army; Lieut. A. W. Diston, a few weeks at general headquarters; 

Lieut. Sidney Powers, arrived in France on day of armistice. Capt. 

0. E. Meinzer and Lieut. K. C. Heald were on the way to France at the 

time of the armistice. 

military geology in that army began. At this 

time Van W erveke, 26 then director of the 

Alsace-Lorraine Geological Survey, paid a professional visit to the Lorraine front, . with a 

view of determining underground-water resources. The first geologic work by any one 

in the army appears to have been done by 

Prof. Hans Phillipp, of Greifswald. During 

the summer of 1915 Phillipp, then serving as 

a pFivate in the Lorraine sector, made some 

water-supply investigations in the Bois de 

Pretes region of the Moselle Valley. By November of that year 27 the army staff of this 

sector had given definite recognition to these 

investigations, which then occupied four geologists. By February, 1916, this staff had been 

increased to twenty ge'ologists. 

About the time that Phillipp started work, 

Capt. Kranz opened a geologic office at the 

University of Lille.28 In August, 1915, Dr. 

August Leppla, 29 of Berlin, started library and 

laboratory work on the geology of Belgium 

at Brussels. This was followed in 1916 by 

the advent of other geologists at Lille and 

Brussels, and gradually a military geologic 

organization was established. This organization, it appears, was not definitely incorporated 

into the German Army until late in 1917. In 

the later part of 1916, however, there began to 

appear in the German military manuals instructions on the use of geologists. For example, instructions 30 on position warfare issued 

December 15, 1915, include the following 

paragraph: 

In the organization of the ground much labor can be 

saved by appealing to geologists and other competent 

persons to choose favorable positions, principally relating 

to the evacuation of water, the driving of tunnels and 

galleries, the location of wells, and the collection of the 

necessary material. 

This is in strong contrast to the manuals on 

similar subjects issued before and early in the 

war, in which there is no reference to geology. 

The geologists of the German Army were a 

part of the department of military surveys, 

26 Van Werveke, Leopold, Anregung zur planmassigen geologischen 

Untersuchung des besetzten feindlichen Gebiet: Geol. Landesanstalt 

von Elsass-Lothringen Mitt., vol. 10, pp. 241-255, Strassburg, 1916. 

21 Van Werveke, Leopold, Die Ergebnisse der geologischen Forschungen von Elsass-Lothringen in ihre Verwendung zu Kriegswerken: 

Wiss. Gesell. Strassburg Schriften, No. 28, p. 27, Strassburg, 1916. 

28 Information from Prof. Charles Barrois, then detained by the German military authorities at Lille. 

29 Information from Dr. A. Renier, then detained at Brussels. 

so Reglements allemands relatifs: Laguerre de position, p. 7, Paris, 

Grand quartier general des armees des Nord et Nord-est, 1917. 
96 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

controlled by an officer (Chef des Kriegsvermes- side. A signboard on the road read "Geologen Stelle No. 

sungwesens) who was a member of the general 3." There was every appearance of per.manence a.nd 

staff. At the headquarters of each army, or comfort. 

possibly group of armies, in the field there is a Lieut. R. S. Knappen, who visited another 

survey staff officer (Stabsoffizier der Vermes- one of the geologic offices, found it still more 

sungwesens) with the rank of major. Under elaborate. It is worthy of note that these 

.him is a geologist with ·the rank of captain offices were in the St. Mihiel sector and were the 

{Gruppen Leiter), who has charge·of geologic first places from which we chased the Germans. 

investigations and surveys. The geologists are In that sector there are known to have been 

divided into small sections (Geologen Stellen) five of the geologic offices, and they were about 

and distributed according to the needs of the 20 kilometers apart and all connected by 

service.31 These sections were commanded by telephone. 

experienced geologists, some of whom were There is no exact information as to the 

lieutenants, some noncommissioned officers, number of military geologists in the German 

.and some privates. There appears to have Army. At the outbreak of the war, it is said,32 

.been a special class of privates created, known 176 geologists were mobilized with different 

:as Kriegsgeologen. The low rank of the Ger- units for active service. It seems quite likely 

man military geologists is but a reflection of a that before the armistice mDst of these were 

general policy. In general, officers of equiva- assigned to geologic duties. There are known 

lent responsibilities were ranked much lower in to have been about 20 in the St. Mihiel sector. 

the German Army than in the armies of the Prof. Barrois estimates that about 60 geologists 

Allies. The discrepancy is specially noticeable were working under Capt. Karl Regelman, who 

-when comparison is made with the American had headquarters at Lille. In addition to this 

and British armies. In the German technical force about 5 or 6 were stationed at Bru~sels for 

journals there are numerous references to the much of the war, but these were chiefly older 

low rank given to military geologists, and com- men, not directly connected with the military 

plaint is made that in consequence they had not problems. Captured documents and informasu:fficient authority and influence. tion from Prof. Barrois and Dr. have 

In addition to the above-mentioned organi- revealed the names of 34 gec)lOgis 

:zation, which did the field work, there were professionally with the 

:geologic intelligence sections or information should be noted, however, that 

.bureaus (Geologische Arbeitstelle or Geolo- geologists were occupied in · 

gische Beratungstelle), of which there was one mineral resources of Belgium 'northern 

:at Lille, one at Brussels, and one at Metz. France and not working directly on military 

These were manned by the older geologists and problems. It is proba'bly safe to assume that 

did only office work. They furnished the field about 100 geologists of the German Army were 

geologists with summaries of literature, com- investigating military problems on the western. 

piled maps, and made determinations of rocks front. 

and fossils. 

During the period of trench warfare, the 

geologic sections (Geologen Stellen) were provided with comfortable, well-equipped offices, 

located conveniently to the front line. One of 

these offices is described by Maj. Lawrence 

Martin as being 

:a well-built hut in the woods east of the Cotes de Meuse, 

well equipped, having stained-glass centers leaded into the 

-windows, and better drawing tables, shelves, drawers, and 

filing arrangements than in most offices of American gen-

-eral headquarters. There was an illuminated paleontological poem on the wall, and outside a concrete rain gage 

with a 5-inch cast of a fossil (ammonite) em bedded in the 

81 Kriegsgeologie, Brussels, 1918. 

APPLICATION OF GEOLOGY TO WAR. 

OUTLINE. 

Geology :finds its principal application to war 

in forecasting the physical coRditions that will 

be encountered in the execution of certain military projects, such as the construction of-fortifications, the maneuvering of troops, and the 

erection of engineering structures, and in determining the sources of water, road metal, 

and other mineral supplies. The value of geology to the military commander is directly proportionate to the accuracy of the deductions 

32 Steinman, Gustav, Geologie und Kriege: Geol. Rundschau, voL 6, 

pp. 94-95, 1915. 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 97 

made by the geologist. This accuracy will evi- may determine whether or not trenches can be 

dently be controlled by the simplicity or com- made at a certain locality by the use of only 

plexity of the problem presented and by the the standard infantry equipment. Again, acopportunity afforded for detailed observations. curate deductions . as to the kind of alluvial 

The nature of the problem will be inherent to the filling of a valley at a locality within the enemy 

theater of operations; the opportunity for obser- lines may control its passability for infantry, 

vations will depend on the military situation. artillery, or tanks and thus be the decisive fa<>" 

It is evident that if the geology is simple and tor in determining the feasibility of a given 

opportunities are afforded for exhaustive field maneuver. It is evident that the military gestudies, the results will be more accurate than ologist must often come to a decision on probif the geology is complex or the military situa- lems when facts are exceedingly scant. Such · 

tion prevents extensive field observations. a decision may be little more than a" scientific 

For example, the underground-water resources guess" and must then be frankly stated as such. 

available for use in the line of communications Of two men who are familiar with the general 

on both sides of the western front could be de- conditions in the tl;teater of operations a geoltermined with great precision, owing to the ogist will, however, be better qualified to make 

relative simplicity of .the stratigraphy and such a guess than one who is untrained in the 

structure and to the ample opportunities in science. It will be evident that the military 

the rear areas for detailed examinations. On geologist must be one of broad training and 

the other hand, the conclusions reached on the experience and preferably one who has applied 

geology of the areas within the zone of shell his science to engineering problems. 

fire, where observations are always more or less The use of geology on the western front was 

limited, were usually less accurate than those greatly favored by two circumstances: (1) The 

relating to rear areas. Still greater difficulties entire theater of operations was covered by the 

are encountered in times of rapid advance, official geologic maps of the French and Belgian 

when the facts must be gathered under extraor- sur--;eys, and (2) the geology of the region was 

dinary difficulties except in so far as they can relatively simple. Some of these geologic maps 

be obtained from published maps and reports. were old and not up to the present standards, 

The problems of the military geologist are in ·yet all were invaluable to the military geol~ 

general among the simpler problems of geology, ogists of the belligerents on both sides. The 

and deal primarily with (1) the physical char- information presented by these maps was supacter of the surface formations, (2) the depth plemented by numerous publications treating 

to hard rock, (3) the lithology and structure of of the geologic problems arising in the field 

t.he formations to depths of less than 100 feet, of operations. 

except in deep-well drilling, (4) the depth of The formations along the western front. 

the ground-water level, (5) the distribution of between the Vosges Mountains and the English 

water-bearing beds, including their surface out- Channel consist of little-altered sediments 

crops, (6) the geologic control of run-off as ranging in age from late Triassic to Quaternary. 

affecting stream volume, and (7) the distribu- The lithologic units are fairly persistent ovm 

tion of rock suitable for road metal and of broad areas, and the beds are but little disgravel, sand, and materials for concrete. turbed. This simplicity of stratigraphy and 

Though the geologic facts needed would structure favored the definite determination of 

under ordinary conditions be readily determin- the physical conditions that influence military 

able, the zone of fighting is of course unfavor- operations. Closely folded and highly induable for field work, and the investigator must rated Triassic for~ations, together with meta~ 

often perforce be content with very meager ob- morphic Carboniferous rocks and large masses 

servations or even rely entirely on compiled of intrusives, make up the Vosges Mountains. 

data. Although the military situation may The geologic complexity of this range did not 

prevent detailed examinations, the facts and interfere greatly with the solving of the probinterpretations sought for demand a high de- lems presented by warfare, for a detailed 

gree of refinement, such as is usually necessary knowledge of areal and structural geology was 

for engineering projects. For example, a dif- here not absolutely essential. Springs occurference of 1 or 2 feet in the depth to qard rock ring along the numerous zones of fracture 
98 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

afforded an ample supply of pure water, and 

the depth to hard rock could in most places be 

forecast with a fair degree of accuracy. The 

geology on the lines of communication was also 

simple. It is no doubt true that there was a 

larger use of geology on the wes~ern front than 

there would have been if the scene of operations 

had been in a region of greater complexity. 

Though the problems of military geology 

are usually not complex, yet their solution 

demands the attention of highly trained professional geologists who have had extensive 

field experience. It will be shown below that 

in certain fields where the geology is very simple 

the experienced engineer can often make his 

own geologic observations and deductions. 

This procedure, however, as indicated by the 

experience of the war, is safe only where the 

professional geologist has determined the general conditions and the necessity of giving consideration to geologic facts has become well 

established. 

All higher staff officers and military engineers 

should know some geology. It is equally important that the military geologist should 

have some knowledge of engineering. Unless 

the geologist has the capacity and experience to 

make the practical application of his science, 

he will be unable to render the service demanded. To develop full usefulness in war a 

geologist should have some military training, 

especially in military engineering. Kranz's 

suggestion that military geology be recognized 

as a distinct profession is not without merit. 

The basal training should, however, be geologic 

and not military. It can not be too strongly 

emphasized that the view held by some that all 

problems in military geology can be solved by 

those whq have made geology only a side issue 

to another profession is entirely erroneous. 

This is eminently not true, for there is no place 

for amateurs in war, be it in geology or in any 

other subject relating to military science. 

Therefore, in making a choice of geologists 

for problems of war, thorough military training 

must be given due weight, yet it is essential to 

procure men who have had broad professional 

education and above all wide field experience. 

The military geologist must be capable, on one 

hand, of solving the most detailed geologic 

problems and, on the other, of reaching trustworthy conclusions on the basis of only inadequate field observations and on a study of 

literature. In other words, he must be trained 

in both detailed and reconnaissance surveys. 

His success will depend on his ability to grasp 

and coordinate the salient geologic features of 

the theater of operations, and to make the 

practical interpretations of them demanded by 

the military situation. 

In military geology, as in all other branches 

of applied geology, the geologic map is the 

first essential. If none is available, one must 

be prepared. The geologic map once made, 

with the necessary structural sections and 

tables of sequence, can be interpreted for the 

various military uses. A military geologic 

map can not be too detailed, and the ideal to 

be sought is the hi~hest scientific accuracy. 

Lacking such a map or the time to prepare it, 

the geologist must make reconnaissance and 

compile maps. The known facts relating to 

the areal distribution of geologic formations 

must be shown on the map, and even a greatly 

generalized map is better than none at all. 

Should warfare continue to develop on the 

scale and with the scientific refinement witnessed during the last fi:ve years, geologic maps 

will in time be considered almost as essential 

to the offensive and defensive operations as 

topographic maps are now. 

FIELDWOBXS. 

INTRODUCTION. 

Any engineering project involving excavation must take account of the underground 

physical conditions, or, in other words, the 

geology. This is especially true of modem 

fortifications, which require a large amount of 

excavation. The experience of the war has 

shown that protection against modern highpower artillery can not be obtained by surface structures, no matter how strong they 

are built. Adequate defense against artillery 

is possible only by the excavation of deep works 

pr~tected by undisturbed earth or rock. The 

deeper the excavation the greater the influence of the geology. Therefore, there is no 

branch of military art to which the application 

of geology is more definite than in the location 

and construction of fortifications. This is 

true of both permanent and field fortifications. 

Permanent fortifications are built during 

peace times, when there is ample time to explore exhaustively the underground physical 

conditions by test borings and other excavations. The facts thus determined can often 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 99 

be correctly interpreted by an experienced 

engineer who has little geologic knowledge. 

Nevertheless, there are some localities where 

the conditions are so complex as to call for 

greater geologic knowledge than that possessed 

by the average engineer. The experienced 

engineer should recognize such conditions and 

know when to call for professional geologic 

advice. Capt. Kranz 33 has cited an illuminating example in which the engineer recognized 

his own limitations. Some works forming a 

part of a permanent fortification had to be built 

on marshy ground. . The engineer officer in 

charge, not being sure that his own interpretation of the test borings was correct, called a 

geologist into consultation. As a result of 

the geologic examination modifications of the 

project were made, and this, as it proved, prevented an important part of the structure from 

sinking into the mud, as it would have done 

had the original plan been followed. 

Fieldworks consist of trenches, dugouts, and 

subways, used in defense, and mines, which 

may be either defensive or offensive. In siege 

operations approach trenches or saps are also 

used in the offensive. Trenches are surface· 

excavations and range from hastily constructed 

breastworks, giving only partial cover to a man 

lying down, to excavations 6 feet or more deep, 

giving complete protection except against shell 

and trench-mortar fire. Dugouts range from 

cave shelters, excavated usually to a depth of 

not exceeding 30 feet, to shelters constructed at 

or near the surface. Military mines range from 

those not having sufficient cover to give protection against shell fire to those which are 100 

or even 200 feet below the surface. It is evident that even shallow trench excavation is 

more or less affected by geologic conditions, 

such as depth to hard rock and permeability of 

the soil, while for deeper works geology may absolutely control the feasibility of the project. 

Under front-line conditions it is seldom possible 

to use anything but the simplest mechanical 

equipment, and therefore projects that presented no difficulties in peace may be impracticable in war. Moreover, it is of very great 

advantage for the military commander to know 

in advance what physical conditions he will 

meet in executing any given project for field 

fortifications. 

33 Kranz, Capt. W., Militargeologie: Kriegstechn. Zeitscbr., vol. 16, 

p. 468, Berlin, 1913. 

Field fortifications, in contrast with permanent fortification~, are almost always built in a 

hurry and often under shell fire. In general 

such works must be constructed without taking 

time to make underground tests. Yet in many 

localities the underground conditions are clearly 

indicated by the surface formations or can be 

determined by the correct interpretation of a 

geologic map. Scientific warfare demands that 

every possible source of pertinent information 

be drawn upon in advance of an undertaking. 

The engineer charged with the construction of 

field fortifications must make it part of his duty 

to become acquainted with and make use of the 

geologic facts. The desired result· may be in 

part accomplished by training the military 

engineer in the principles of geology that affe~t 

his profession; in part by furnishing him with 

geologic maps and teaching him their use. 

"Although field fortifications are usually built 

in a hurry, the time available and the character 

of the work required vary greatly according to 

the military situation. They may consist of 

only the cover dug hastily by the infantryman 

with his intrenching tools under front-line conditions, or they may involve the deliberate organization of a defensive position, with the use 

of engineer troops and their equipment. Under 

the first condition the application of geology 

will be limited to the use of such facts as can be 

gleaned by a hasty reconnaissance or from the 

geologic map. Such use may prevent the commanding officer from making the blunder, of 

which there were only too many examples during the late war, of choosing defensive positions 

where excavation was impracticable, when not 

forced to do so by the military situation. Furthermore, if the higher commander, who is not 

at the scene of operations, has information at 

hand about the local geologic conditions, either 

from a map or from a military geologist, he will 

not be likely to issue intrenching orders which 

are impossible of execution. 

The deliberate organization of a defensive 

position usually allows more time for planning 

and execution than the rapid intrenchment 

described above. In such projects the army, 

corps, or division commander usually gives 

orders for the defensive position, the site of 

the works being designated only in a general 

way. The details of location are left to the 

engineer officer in charge, who adjusts them so 

as to take advantage of favorable topographic 
100 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

I 

conditions within the zone designated by his geologic knowledge before siting his fieldworks 

orders. In certain regions it is of equal im- is neglecting an important source of informaportance to adjust the fieldworks so as to take·· tion, and this neglect may lead to disaster. It 

advantage of favorable geologic conditions. is equally true, however, that geology is only 

Therefore the engineer should have a geologic one of several factors that influence the choice 

map, and it will save time if he is accompanied of sites for fieldwork~. 

by a geologic officer who can give .him the de- Once the general s1te of fieldworks ~as been 

tailed facts about geologic conditions. Atten- selected, a knowledge of geology agam comes 

tion to the geology is especially important into play in helping to make choice of the " 

if the fieldworks are to include deep dugouts. detailed locations. Often a slight change of 

SITING OF FmLDWORXS. 

There has been some controversy as to 

whether favorable or unfavorable geologic 

conditions can be regarded at all in the siting 

of fieldworks. Some hold that this is a purely 

tactical problem; others that the local geology 

must be the decisive factor. It is evident that 

the military situation may demandsome form 

of- defensive works where the geologic conditions are all adverse, and it is then the duty 

of the engineer to overcome the obstacles as 

best he may. Thus fieldworks ha~e been 

constructed in the water-soaked ground of 

Flanders, and underground shelters have been 

hewn out of the solid granite of the Vosges 

¥ountains. These operations were possible, 

however, only under long-stabilized conditions 

of pos~tion warfare which made it possible to 

overcome the physical obstacles by equipment 

that is usually not available at the front. 

Even in these operations knowledge of the 

geology was invaluable by indicating in advance the conditions that would be met and 

therefore the equipment and time necessary 

for the construction. · . 

In many localities the geologic condition~ 

may practically prohibit the construction of 

fieldworks. In such localities geology rather 

than tactics will be the decisive factor. If the 

bedrock is such that troops can not intrench 

themselves in a given position with the material and time available, field fortifications can 

be constructed only by choosing a more favorable site, and in making this choice the tactical 

commander must be guided by the geology. 

To take another example-that of an underground offensive-military mining, as a rule, 

can be carried on only where it is favored by 

the geology. Obviously a plan for a mine 

attack must give heed to the geology, or it may 

be doomed to failure. Therefore the tactical 

commander who does not avail himself of 

position that will be entirely in accord with their 

tactical Tequirements will yield more favorable 

geologic conditions. Thus, a trench may by a 

slight shift avoid hard rock or danger from 

flooding, and a dugout that would be difficult 

to construct at one place may easily be built 

at another near by. 

The experience of the war has shown that 

although the location of the front line will be 

controlled by the tactical situation, the works 

.of the second and third positions may often be 

so adjusted as to take full advantage of favorable geologic . conditions. Consciously or unconsciously, such adjustments were, made by 

both sides on the western front, notably in the 

Lorraine sector. In many places the adjustment was brought about by elimination, the 

unfavorable localities being successively abandoned after futile attempts to fortify the~. 

Much of this useless work could have been 

avoided by taking cognizance of very simple 

geologic facts. · 

The most essential element in the correct 

siting of fieldworks is a comprehensive knowledge of topogrt;tphy, Here, too, evidently, a 

knowledge of the geology is an important factor. 

Topographic maps can evidently be read much 

more intelligently if the reader has some 

acquaintance with the genesis of land forms and 

hence with their relation to the bedrock structure and lithology as well as to the recent geologic history. This application of geology was 

but little developed during the war, except 

by the French. 

It can not be expected that all future wars 

will be fought in regions of which topographic 

maps are available. In the absence of such 

maps the geologist can perform important serv~ 

ice by determining in advance the topographic 

types that will be found in the field of operations, and he will be able to gain a better conception of the relief than those who are unversed in geologic science. 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 101 

TRENCHES. 

The character of the material in which a 

trench is to be constructed is evidently the first 

consideration, and this can often be accurately 

foretold for any particular locality from the 

geologic map without further field examination. 

Is the material loose or consolidated ~ If loose, 

can it be excavated with intrenching .tools, or 

is the engineer's equipment of larger picks and 

shovels necessary~ If the geology is known, it 

will be possible to estimate closely the rate at 

which trenches can be constructed. For example, heavy clay takes about five times as long 

to excavate as loose soil or sand and gravel. 

Again, if the material is hard rock, trench construction is possible only by blasting. Evidently these considerations will enable the tactical commander to determine in advance the 

feasibility of a project, taking into account the 

man power, equipment, and time available for 

its execution. 

I recall an instance in a training camp showing the need of some knowledge of elementary 

geology by field officers. During a certain maneuver a battalion was ordered to intrench itself 

on a ridge, using the standard infantry equipment. This locality, of which 'there was a good 

geologic map, had been reconnoitered by the 

commanding officer, but he had overlooked the 

fact, which would at once have been evident to 

the merest tyro in geology, that the ridge selected was made up of hard limestone hardly 

covered with a few inches of soil. Intrenching 

in the time and with the equipment specified 

was of course impossibl~, and the maneuver 

failed. In time of war such a blunder might be 

very serious. 

The geologic information needed for planning trench construction demands a knowledge of the depth of soil and subsoil, as well 

as of the weathering of any hard rock that may 

underlie the surface material. The depth of 

weathering will depend on the lithology of the 

rock, the climate, and the topographic location. 

Of these factors the first two will be fairly 

constant for a given formation, but the last 

will vary from place to place. In general, if 

the unconsolidated material extends to a minimum depth of 4 feet, this will satisfy the conditions of ordinary trench construction. The 

average depth of the sea~onal ground frost may 

also in time of emergency have an important 

bearing. 

The lithology and structure of the hard-rock 

formations within 4 feet of the surface must 

also be considered. If the rock is friable or 

fractilred so that it can 

be excavated with hand 

tools, it will be as well 

adapted to rapid trenching as unconsolidated material. 

The permeability of 

the material excavated 

is also an important consideration. (See fig. 7.) 

Trenches dug in impervious material, such as 

clay, require draining or, 

if the topography will not 

permit that, pumping t ~ 

during the wet season. ~ :; 

On the other hand, if the --t 

floor of the trench con- ~ sists of porous material, ~ .... 1i ~ ,Q 8 such as gravel or frac- ~ :~.q 

tured limestone, no sur- ~ £8 g· .., ~ 8"' 

face drainage will be nee- · ~ ~~e l=i' [~$" essary. Drainage is a d'<i ~ ~ ~-

very important consider- i. [i~ 

ation in a region of heavy ~· ~ ii 

rainfall. Because the ~ ~i~ 

physical conditions were g, ¥-~ 

d h e. ft?- ignore many a trenc .... "' 

a ~-~ 

was dug during the war g :: ~ 1:!' c~:~ 

only to become a ditch c:. ~w ~ g-"' during the wet season. In a ~7 

this connection it should a 

d h ~ be emphasize that in t e 

·application of geology to "tt 

the construction of field- ; f~· 

works and esp_ecially of l:i.~·&i 

!1:0"1>" trenches due considera- :~a. 

tion must be given to the · ~We 

quantity and seasonal dis- i [! 

tribution of the rainfall. §J~ O<>~ 

The physical character ~~~ 

of the formation in which ) ~§ 

trenches are constructed ?-j-[ 

not only determines the .. g· 

ease and rapidity of ex- ~-~ 

cavation but also the sta- p.~· 

bility of the slopes and 

hence the need of revetment. Here, again, the 

seasonal climatic variations must be taken into 

account, for a trench wall which will stand with-
102 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

out support during dry weather may quickly begin to slide during heavy rains. The amount of 

revetment will vary in accordance with the 

angle of slope adopted. Firing trenches will 

always have at least a nearly vertical wall 

toward the enemy, and these, except where 

blasted out of solid rock, will require revetment. (See fig. 7.) The strength of the 

revetment necessary will vary with the character of the ground. Communicating trenches, 

which are usually made broad and open, with 

slopes determined by the angle of rest, genermuch of the W oevre lowland of the St. Mihiel 

sector. Here the Oxfordian clay is watersoaked, and excavation of trenches is practically impossible. Another source of water 

that has to be guarded against consists in 

water-bearing strata whose outcrops may be 

loci of seeps or springs. A trench crossing one 

of these outcrops is in danger of being flooded 

with water. If such a location of a trench is 

necessary, provision must be made for evacuating the water. Such conditions existed on 

both slopes of the Moselle Valley and also on 

the eastern scarp of the 

Cotes de Meuse of the 

St. Mihiel sector. (See 

fig. 8.) 

.__ ___ J.._ ___ __,_z ___ ___;3'----------'4Kilometers 

In certain localities 

underground waterbearing strata may be 

cut by trenches and 

lead to flooding. (See 

fig. 7.) Such conditions occurred, for example, in part of the St. 

Mihiel sector in areas 

covered by a formation 

made up of marl and 

clay shales with in--

terbedded limestones. 

The limestones are fractured and in places 

water bearing. In some 

of the Tertiary areas of 

the British front the underground-water conditions were even worse. 

Here loose sands carrying artesian waters were 

in places man tied by 

EXPLANATION 

(Quaternarv). :;.:·:·:'1.::·.,;.::: an !5 an grave s.Usuall.ysaturai:ed excep,t Valleyfillirig ~S d d 1 . 

·' ..... , ········ durmg dryseason.Un-favorablefortrenches 

(Q Limons E--;,z~Silts withsomef'inesands.Usualfy well drained uaternary) ·- ·-·· and veryfavorablefor·trenches 

8 · . ~Hard massive lim.Efst:one overlain atsurtacebysoiland li~~~f6~~ weat_pered zoneyzto.l meterthick. W::![l draine"c;i and. favor-

( Jurass. c) able I ortrenches,Whlch, however, require blastrng.Ltttle 1 or no revetment needed. Water-bearrng zone at base 

( U~~lr ~ales -~~Trench cbnstruction easy.bub,:•.quires ·complete Toa~ci':~)or ~= revetment and provision f'ordrainage · 

Sandstone Es"4Trencfl construction e~sy. Not much revetment 

(Middle Lias) requrred.. Water-bearrng zone at base 

some Clayshaleswithl6fi!T limestone - ::_ ~ r~nc h cons t ru ct' ron easy b ~requr~ · comp lete --.-c:::vc:::un•:m . ....1.-~..J. • ., 

lensesand layers -===:--= Lrmestones arewaterbearrng 

Water-bearing C:==J . . strata ~To be avo1ded 1n fieldwork construction 

Loci .of spri nQs r--.;toutcrops of ~flter-beari nQ' zones: If crossed by trenches 

and seepag~ ~ ample prov1s1on f'ordrain'age m~s't be made 

FIGURE 8.-Diagrammaticcrosssection of Moselle Valley near Pont-3.-Mousson, France. 

ally require but little revetment. Where such 

trenches traverse plastic clay formation, however, revetment is usually necessary to hold 

the ground during the wet season. A knowledge of geologic conditions will make it possible 

to determine in advance the amount of revetment to provide for any given project. 

The position of underground water must 

also be considered in trench construction. If 

the ground-water level is near the surface 

trench construction may be entirely impracticable, and defensive works may have to 

be limited to breastworks with little or no 

excavation. (See fig. 9.) This was true in 

only a thin cover of impervious clay.34 Piercing 

of the clay by excavation would lead to flooding 

of the trenches. It was found that many of the 

fault planes in the Lorraine sector were water 

bearing, and hence on the military geologic 

maps (Pl. XV) issued by the American Expeditionary Force these features were marked 

as a possible source of trouble. An example 

of such a feature is found in a belt of limestone 

which roughly paralleled the front just north of 

Beaumont, in the St. Mihiel sector (Pl. XV). 

This limestone was admirably adapted to 

dugout construction, but the belt was bounded 

u Information from Col. T. Edgeworth David. 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 103 

on the north by a water-bearing fault. To avoid 

flooding, it was therefore necessary to site the 

dugouts so as not to cut the fault plane. 

The application of these principles can be 

illustrated by citing some of the geologic 

features of the Lorraine sector. The Moselle 

Valley is floored in part by gravel, usually 

saturated and unfavorable to trenches and 

also in places subject to inundation by floods. 

The lowest formation exposed in the valley 

walls (fig. 8) consists of the Middle Lias clay 

shales with some thin limest6ne beds. The 

shales weather deeply to a clay that is easily excavated for trenches, which, however, 

require more or less complete revetting and 

provisions for getting rid of surface water. 

Moreover, some of the limestone lenses carry 

enough water to interfere with fieldworks. 

This formation is succeeded by a porous 

sandstone (Middle Lias) from 20 to 40 feet 

thick, whose outcrop is usually marked by a 

small bench on the valley slopes. The top of" 

this sandstone affords a good position for 

defensive works, provided they are not excavated deep enough to cut the bottom of the. 

formation, where there is a strong waterbearing zone. On account of a slight westerly 

dip of all the formations there is less trouble 

with water on the west side than on the east 

side of the Moselle Valley. Above the sandstone is another clay-shale formation (Upper 

Lias or Toarcian), which affords easy trench 

construction but calls for full revetment and 

ample provision for the drainage of surface 

water. The Toarcian is capped by the heavy 

fractured limestone of the Bajocian (Jurassic). 

The outcrop of this limestone is marked by 

bold bluffs and cliffs that mark the margin of 

the Moselle plateau (C6tes de Moselle), and its 

top furnishes an admirable defensive position. 

At its base, the site of the famous minette iron 

ore of Lorraine, there is a strong water-bearing 

zone which must be avoided in fieldworks. 

As a rule the soil and weathered material 

overlying the Bajocian limestone is not deep 

enough for trenches, and in many places they 

must be blasted out of the hard rock but require 

no revetment and are self-draining. Locally 

the Bajocian limestone is capped by deposits of 

loam or silt, the so-called Limon of the French 

geologists. This formation in many places is 

deep enough for trenches, can be quickly excavated, needs little revetment, and is well 

drained and admirably adapted to trench 

construction. Therefore the distribution of 

the Limon was a rather important military 

factor, as it permit- _ 1\) 

ted rapid trench 111 0 

construction with 

only infantry 

equipment in a region which in general was underlain 

by hard limestone 

with only a thin 

covering. 

The section described above covers less than a mile 

in a horizontal di- ~ 

rection. It serves ; 

as a good illustra- "' 

tion o.f the variety ~ of physical condi- ~ ~ tions affecting con- p 

struction that may ~ be found within a ~ 

short distance in a 8 

~ region where there ~ 

are no great differ- ~ 

ences in the charac- .@ ; 

ter of the forma- o ;; 

t 

8' 

tions. 

DUGOUTS. 

"Dugout" is~ 

used as a general i.. 

term to designate .-

any form of shelter ~ 

against rifle or shell ~ i fires, having an ~ 

overhead cover and 

in part or entirely 

underground. Dugouts range from a 

shallow recess .under the parapet of 

a trench (splinter 

proof), affording 

protection only 

against small missiles, to one excavated to sufficient 

depth to withstand 

the shells of the heaviest artillery (fig. 9). If 

the dugout is entirely underground and undisturbed earth and rock are the sole cover, it is 

called a "cave shelter." A dugout consisting of 
104 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

an open excavation subsequently provided with 

a protective roof, the greater part of the structure underground, is called a "cut. and cover 

shelter." A shelter of another type, not properly a dugout, is constructed entirely above 

ground, whose sole protection is the thickness 

of walls and roof; this is called a "surface shelter." Surface shelters are usually built of reinforced concrete, but even the strongest can 

not withstand a direct hit from powerful ar-

·tillery. Moreover, their construction requires 

much time and the use of much heavy material. 

Therefore, surface shelters are in general used 

only where the underground conditions do not 

permit deep excavation. Exceptions to this 

rule are found in exposed machine-gun positions, especially those built in the rear lines, 

where ready egress from shelter is more important than absolute protection. In general, 

however, if time is available, deep cave shelters 

will be built in all defensive positions where the 

underground conditions permit. 

As a well-organized defensive position, including dugouts, is usually established only 

where time and other conditions permit the 

excavation of any material, whe.ther it is loose 

or hard rock, the lithology and structure of the 

material is not so important in the construction 

of cave shelters as in that of trenches. On the 

other hand, the presence of underground water 

usually precludes the use of deep shelters, except where natural drainage is possible. A 

small quantity of seepage water can be controlled by hand pumps, but the use of pumps 

entails a heavy duty on front-line troops, 

which must be avoided if possible. As a 

general rule cave shelters will not be used if 

they require excavation below ground-water 

level or the intersection of water-bearing beds. 

It is evident, therefore, that the position of 

the ground-water table will control the type of 

shelter that may be constructed. If it lies at 

or near the surface only surface shelters are 

possible (:fig. 9); if it is within 10 or 15 feet of 

the surface, cut and cover shelters must be 

used. The depth of cave shelters will depend 

on the size of the artillery against which protection is sought and the character of the 

material affording cover~ For example, the 

amount of undisturbed cover necessary to protect the occupants of a shelter against light 

field artillery (77 millimeters) is 5 feet of compact, undisturbed earth or 2 feet of indurated 

rock such as hard sandstone or granite. Protection against the heaviest artillery used 

during the war ( 420 millimeters) required 48 

feet of compact earth or 24 feet of hard rock. 

Therefore, cave shelters with sufficient cover 

can be built only where the water table is at 

least 30 feet in depth, except that where the 

surface relief permits natural drainage dugouts 

may be excavated below the water table. The 

control of the type of shelter exercised by the 

relation of the water table to the surface of 

the ground is roughly shown in figure 9. Evidently not only the position of the ground-water 

table but also the presence of water-bearing 

strata will determine the feasibility of cave 

shelters. Many of the failures in dugout construction have been due to ignorance of these 

facts. It will be shown below that the distribution of underground water is of even 

greater importance in military mining. 

No problem is of greater difficulty to the 

military geologist than the accurate determination of underground-water conditions. 

Even after the general law controlling the 

·ground-water table in any particular province 

has been determined by field examinations, 

there may be sufficient local variations from 

this law to invalidate its application to a certain 

locality. A few feet of additional overhead 

cover may determine the practicability of a 

project. In the Lorraine sector the problem 

of ground water varied with each formation. 

Impervious formations like the Toarcian and 

Oxfordian clays were free of water once the 

water-soaked surface had been penetrated. 

(See fig. 12.) Fractured limestone, like the 

Bajocian (:fig. 8), is always well drained, except 

at its lower contact with clay shale, where 

there is a strong water-bearing stratum. On 

the other hand, certain formations that are 

made up of interbedded shale and limestone 

and are very common in the Lorraine sector 

were a constant source of trouble because of 

the irregular distribution of their water content. 

In these formations the only safe method of 

procedure was to determine the undergroundwater conditions by bore holes 35 in advance of 

dugout construction. 

It has been shown that the amount of protection against shell fire is dependent on the litholao Made with hand-drilling apparatus. The British made a total of 

28,000 feet of test bore holes during the war to determine underground 

conditions for dugouts and mines. See King, W. B. R., Geological work 

on the western front: Geog. Jour., vol. 54, p. 202, 1919. 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 105 

ogy of the formations and on the fact that earth I loose strata, may be such as to make military 

has only about half the resistance of hard rock. mining impracticable. Mining is feasible only 

Therefore in this phase of the problem also ·when an army is in close contact with the 

geology has a service to render, for the depth of 

loose material over hard rock must be determined. Knowledge of the.lithology and structure of the hard rock is also necessary to determine in advance the ease of excavation and 

the mechanical equipment required. These 

factors also control the amount and character 

of timbering. For example, the fractured Bajocian limestone required heavy timbers, but 

the cave shelters hewn out of the Vosges granite 

stood without support. The chalk formation 

was the most favorable for dugouts, as it could 

usually be mined without blasting and required 

little timber. The clay-shale formations were 

easily excavated but, on account of the plasticity of the weathered zone, needed close tim~ 

bering. 

MINING. 

Military mining during the late war was done 

on a scale which completely dwarfed· all previous operations of this kind. - In no field did the 

military geologist perform a greater service than 

in determining the physical conditions that 

affect underground warfare. A. large measure 

of the success of the British mining is due to the 

detailed geologic work of Col. T. Edgeworth 

David. 

Though the French have long been the acknowledged leaders in military science, they 

appear to have failed to realize fully the application of geology to military mining. Many of 

the French officers were trained in geology, but 

some of their mining operations were more or 

less hampered through failure to inake full use 

of the science by the employment of professional geologists. In spite of this handicap, 

some of the most brilliant mine attacks of the 

war were made by the French, and French 

methods an<i equipment were used by all the 

belligerents. 

enemy 36 and ~ust therefore be carried on under 

the most adverse conditions, such as shell fire, 

infantry attack, and difficulties of transportation. As a general rule all materiel such as mine 

timbers and machinery must be transported to 

the scene of operations on men's backs, so that 

usually only the simplest form of mechanical 

equipment for pumping, ventilating, and excavating is available. Adverse physical conditions that would prove little ori no obstacle to 

mining in civil practice may therefore be absolutely prohibitive in war. 

The principal geologic facts influencing mine 

warfare can be grouped as follows: (1) Distribution, thickness, and structure of formations; 

(2) physical character of formations; (3) underground water. 

The country rock of the area to be mined may 

consist of only a single formation, with little or· 

no variat,ion in composition below the weathered 

surface zone. More commonly, especially in 

deep mines, variations in the country rock will 

be found. · In such places the sequence and 

thickness of the different rock strata should be 

accurately determined. A.ny variation in the 

thickness of individual beds within the zone of 

operations should also be noted. 

If the· sequence includes beds of different 

composition some of the strata will be more 

favorable to mining than others. For ex- · 

ample, a bed of soft clay shale may be in .. 

eluded between strata of hard sandstone, and 

the shale can be easily excavated with pick 

and shovel, but the sandstone will require 

blasting. (See fig. 11, p. 107.) A.t the siege 

of Sebastopol the Allies by accident encoun- . 

tered. a shale bed underground which permitted rapid advance of gallery construction, 

whereas before they had been driving in hard 

limestone and the advance had been very 

slow. Military writers who have ~escribed the 

mining operations of this siege have commented 

on the ''good luck'' of the Allies in finding this 

bed of shale. They h~ve entirely overlooked 

the fact that the very simple geology of the region made it possible to determine accurately in 

advance the position of this stratum favorable 

to mining. It is evident also that if a particuMining is more or less controlled by all factors 

that affect military operations; such as relative 

strength and morale of the opposing forces, 

distance of objective, means of transportation, 

and availability of material. In mining, however, the underground conditions are of first 

importance and in the interest of success must 

be determined before any project is undertaken. 

In many positions the geologic conditions such 

d h b dr k b - k' 36 This is, of course, not true of defensive mines prepared in rear posias groun water, toug e oc , or ro en or . tions. 
106 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

lar bed is selected as the site of a mine gallery 

there must be a reasonable degree of certainty 

that it will maintain a thickness great enough 

for the gallery throughout the distance it is to 

be followed. On a part of the British front 

mining was limited to a bed of clay occurring 

between two water-bearing strata. (See fig. 13, 

p. 109.) This formation, though several hundred feet thick in Belgium, thinned out to the 

south in France. When underground operations were necessary near the southern margin 

of the deposit it became a matter of the greatest consequence to determine in advance the 

thickness of the clay. 

In general mining will be impracticable in all 

areas where the country rock is igneous (granite, diorite, basalt, etc.), for such rocks can not 

be excavated with the mechanical equipment 

available. It may happen, moreover, that even 

in a region made up essentially of sedimentary 

beds igneous rocks in the form of dikes or larger 

better drainage of galleries. It is evident that 

the attitude of the beds-the structure-must 

be determined in advance of mining operations. 

Horizontal beds are in many localities broken 

by displacemen:ts or faults, and these may be 

a serious if not insurmountable obstacle to 

driving a gallery. (See fig. 11.) So far as possible the presence or absence of faults should be 

determined in advance of mining. If one is 

reached in the gallery an examination of the 

plane of the fault will often reveal the direction of the throw and may make it possible to 

"pick up" the same bed beyond the dislocation. In the example illustrated in figure 11 

the fault brings the bed so near the surface that 

there is not sufficient head cover for mining. 

The physical character of the formations penetrated by the mine workings will control the 

speed of excavation and the type and quantity 

of timbering and will indicate the mechanical 

equipment required. The underground transmission of the sound of 

~~~~ excavation, an impor-

~=-=="'==:-=~~~~ tant consideration in 

mine warfare, varies 

with the character of 

the strata. 

The physical character of the rocks to be FIGURE 10.-Diagram showing an igneous dike that prevents the advance of an attack gallery driven in 

soft sediments. mined will depend both 

masses crosscut the country rock. A mine gallery that abuts against such a dike, unless the 

dike is narrow, will usually have to be abandoned. (See fig. 10.) It is important, therefore, to know in advance whether dikes occur 

in the region to be mined, and this can usually 

be determined from a knowledge of the general 

geology. If dikes are likely to be encountered, 

as detailed an examination of the area to be 

mined must be made as the military situation 

permits. The outcrops of dikes can frequently 

be recognized in photographs taken from aircraft. 

Most successful military mining has been 

done where the galleries follow individual 

strata. This is possible where the rocks have 

been little disturbed and are therefore practically horizontal. If the rocks are badly crumpled the operations of mining are usually impracticable. On the other hand, low dips of 

beds may be of advantage in providing for 

on their original mineral composition or lithology and on the amount 

of alteration they have undergone. A sandstone, originally deposited as a sand, may be 

only slightly cemented and be very friable and 

easily excavated. .Again it may be highly indurated or altered to a hard quartzite and thus 

be very difficult to mine. If a hard sandstone 

has been subject to earth stresses it may be so 

fractured and sheared as to be readily broken 

in mine excavation. What has been said of 

sandstone is. also in general true _of limestone 

and other rocks. The ease of excavation will 

depend, therefore, not only on the degree of 

hardness and toughness of the strata but also 

on the presence or absence of bedding planes, 

fractures, joints, cleavages, and schistosity. 

In the following classification the most common geologic formations are grouped in accol'dance with their relative ease of excavation under 

such conditions as are usually imp0sed by military mining. This classification is not intended 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 107 

to be complete but will serve to indicate the 

kind of information needed in mine warfare. 

1. Excavated with little or no picking; examples, gravel, 

sand, and silt. 

2. Easily excavated with pick and shovel; examples, 

clay, shale, soft sandstone, and chalk. 

3. Difficult to break with pick; examples, siliceous 

chalk, hardpan, sandstone, and schist. 

4. Broken only by blasting and hand drilling but not 

so hard as to make excavation impracticable; examples, 

limestone, medium hard sandstone, slate. 

5. Excavated rapidly only by machine drilling; example, 

granite, diorite, quartzite. 

The first three of these groups afford favorable 

conditions for military excavation, the fourth 

group is decidedly unfavorable, and the fifth is 

ordinarily prohibitive. Mine warfare has, however, been carried on even in the hardest rocks. 

In 1916 the French and Germans did extensive 

mining near the north end of the Vosges Mountains, not far from St. Die, in quartzite, highly 

indurated sandstone, and 

conglomerates. Both 

sides used air drills supplied from power stations 

located near the front 

line. This was possible 

because the topographic 

conditions were exceptionally favorable. The 

deep-cut valleys and 

the above grouping of the rock formations according to relative ease of excavation also serves 

as a rough indication of the relative distance at 

which the no)se of excavation can be heard. 

The charges of mines and camouflets 87 are 

carefully gaged to bring about the desired radius 

of destruction and no more. If the mines are 

undercharged their purpose is not acccomplished; if they are overcharged the consequent 

shattering, or even cratering, of the ground will 

necessarily hamper further mining progress .. 

The determination of the charge is based on the 

composition of the explosives, the depth of the 

mine chamber, and the physical character of the 

formation. The last factor involves the use of 

geology. 

Even the color of the excavated material, determined by its lithology, should be known in 

advt;mce, so that provision can be made for the 

camouflagi~g of the surfac~. dumps. This is 

heavytimbergavealmost FIGURE 11.-Dia.gra:mm.atic cross section showing a fault that prevents the advance ·or an attack gallery 

driven in beds of soft shale lying between beds of hard sandstone. complete shelter from observation, and hence there was but little artil-:- 1 necessary because the success of a mine attack 

lery fire on either side. 'l'he noise of the opera- is largely dependent upon its secrecy, and a contiona was so great, however, that both armies spicuous dump of rock, such as white chalk, is 

had fairly definite information about t~e opera- a sure indication to. the enemy of the position 

tions of their opponents .. In general, the plan of the shaft or entry. 

was ill conceived and led to no decisive results. The amount of fracturing that the rocks have 

One· of the first principles of underground undergone not only has an important effect on 

warfare is that operations should be carried on the ease of excavatim{ but also determines to a 

with as little sound as possible, so as not tore- large extent the amount and kind of timber reveal the position of the mines to the enemy. It quired. If, for example, the formation is a 

is evident that the audibi1ity of mine opera- plastic or semiplastic clay, complete timbering 

tions will depend on the hardness and toughness or casing will be necessary. In contrast to this, 

of the rock as well as on the mechanical means a solid limestone or chalk will stand with very 

used in excavation. Sound is transmitted little timber. Some of the most difficult 

more rapidly by solid formations than by those ground is that formed by highly fractured hard 

that are incoherent, and mining of hard rocks rocks, such as limestones, which require the use 

will be heard at far greater distance than that of of heavy timber. This fractured condition 

soft material like clay or sand. The records may be caused in areas of active mine warfare 

show that the use of the pick ·can be heard more 31 A camouflet is a small mine whose charge is so gaged that its effect than twice as far in chalk as in clay. In general does not reach the sl.lrface. 
108 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

by the discharge of explosives in defense and 

attack. 

Water is the most serious obstacle with which 

the military miner has to deal. If there is any 

chance of countermining, the attack will be 

made at as great a depth as possible, for it is a 

decided advantage to have the adversary above. 

Very frequently the depth of operation is determined by the water conditions; hence these 

must, so far as possible, be determined in adyance, and in many places this is the most difficult problem of the geologic engineer. When, 

however, the general features of the underground water have once been established for a 

geologic province, it will only be necessary to 

determine the local features of the geology that 

Tamped day 

face formation was a loose sand underlain by 

clay. Here the upper bed was heavily charged 

with water and presented serious difficulties to 

the sinking of shafts. (See fig. 13.) In the 

W oevre district of Lorraine the surface formation is clay, which during the rainy season is 

heavily charged with water to a depth of 1 or 2 

meters. This also interferes seriously with the 

sinking of shafts. (See fig. 12.) Conditions of 

this kind are usually determinable by surface 

observation and by a consideration of the seasonal distribution of rainfall, or if not test borings will have to be made. 

The ground-water level usually has a greater 

effect on military mining than the surface 

water. In general, military mines must be 

kept above the ground-water level. 

Exceptions, however, are found 

:::;:-~-s--~~~~ vt.Lr~~~JI:~::c:.~~~~~=:t~:.g~~nd where natural drainage to the sur-

=- ~ ~ ;:~~~~-~~~~~~-~-(- ~ f::i~~~ be operated.. :h::eta~:rt~:~~~ In any particular ~:~ province the depth of the groundwater table usually varies between ~ordi~ '~impervious clay shale= certain fairly definite limits. Infor-

- ~~ ~&round mation about it can be obtained by 

'\'1::..:: studying the distribution of springs 

and seeps and the sequence of strata, 

or by direct observation in wells or 

shafts or in drill holes sunk for the 

purpose. In many places the 

ground-water level has a sufficient 

seasonal fluctuation to affect underFIGURE 12.-Section in Woevre lowlands, Lorraine, showing underground conditions ground warfare. One of the most 

and entrance to cave shelter. valuable services performed by Col. 

may cause variations from the normal conditions. 

There are three sources of ground water to be 

considered in military mining-(1) the surface 

water that· may penetrate to a considerable 

depth in quantities large enough to interfere 

with mining (see fig. 12); (2) the ground-water 

level, which occurs at varying depths in accordance with geologic and topographic conditions; 

(3) water-bearing'stratain which the water may 

or may not be artesian. 

Surface waters do not usually occur in sufficient quantity to interfere seriously with military mining. In regions of excessive precipitation, especially during the rainy season, they 

may hamper the sinking of shafts. In some 

parts of the B~~ish fronts, for. example, the surDavid wa~ the accurate determination on the 

British front of the ground-water level at 

different seasons of the year. By his advice 

the British mines were located above the high 

ground-water level of the spring, while the 

Germans, who attempted to drive at a lower 

level, were :flooded out of their workings. 

If a water-bearing stratum is penetrated, the 

mine will be flooded and entirely lost. Information about buried water strata can often be 

obtained from existing well records; in the 

absence of these it must be inferred from the 

general geology and topography of the region 

under investigation. 

The underground conditions on a part of the 

British front are illustrated in the accompanying diagrammatic section (fig. 13), which shows I ,.,. .. ,• 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 109 

a bed of impervious clay overlain by quicksand 

and underlain by chalk carrying artesian water. 

To nteet these conditions shafts were sunk 

through the quicksand by the use of tubing, 

and the mine galleries were driven in the clay. 

If these galleries broke into the sand above, 

they would be flooded by surface waters. If, 

on the other hand, they were placed too low in 

the clay the artesian water of the chalk would 

break through and flood the mine works from 

below. A gallery properly placed in this 

section evidently had a strong tactical position, 

for it could not be countermined at a lower 

level. This presents an excellent example of 

the necessity of close adjusting of the mine 

works to the geologic conditions. 

Though the factors governing military mining are very largely geologic, yet their interpretation in terms of excavation, equipment, etc., 

3. The information gained about the depth 

of the ground water or of water-bearing strata 

by the use of geology will determine in advance 

the type of cave shelter which can be constructed and whether mining is practicable. 

4. By the use of goologic facts it will be possible to forecast the kind and quantity of 

mat6riel necessary to execute any project of 

fortification. This will include the tools and 

other mechanical equipment, such as ventilators, boring machines, and pumps, revetting 

material for trenches, and timbers for dugouts 

and mines. 

5. A knowledge of the geology will make it 

possible to learn in advance the character of 

the material to be excavated, and this is one 

of the factors determining the time needed to 

complete the project. 

are problems of the mining engineer. Therefore, the geologic engineer will be called 

upon for the geologic facts and 

deductions, and the mining engineer will apply these data in 

formulating the plans of underground 

The ~eologist 

operation. 

not o~y must 

~~~ 

Attack gallery . = lmperviou~ clay, determme the facts m regard _________ ._. _ __ __ _ -=: dry ground 

must 

to hisownsideofthefrontbut 

also forecast, so far as 

~~~~ 

=:J.--.--~-~'~, - ' _ ', ~~~· .' ,: Fractured chalk, 

Possible the conditions which :.&-J;t_:.:L~- ··-:~)s:--=-~Z, -· '· '.!,\;-, · ~~~·artesian water; ' . . - tl· . ~·==r--" ....-r---',....,.--L---r-'-- ..,- --,---,-:- wet ground the enemy will meet if he countermines. Evidently mine FIGURE 13.-Diagram showing location of mine gallery in dry ground between two water- bearing formations. 

warfare calls for the most detailed geologic information. It is to the great 

credit of the British geologic staff that they procured this information in spite of the fact that 

all the investigations had to be carried on under front-line conditions. The surface observations were supplemented by a large number 

of test borings. 

GEOLOGIC JU.PS .AKD REPORTS. 

The geologic information needed as a guide 

to the location and construction of fieldworks was furnished by all the armies of the 

western front in the form of maps, sections, 

and reports, and to sol,Ile extent by personal 

inference. In the earlier stages of the work 

sll11KARY. the maps were chiefly adaptati()ns of the 

The use of geologic facts in the siting and existing French and Belgian geologic maps. 

construction of fieldworks can be summarized -Later more detailed geologic surveys were 

as follows: made and the results were shown on color 

1. Geology will make it possible to take maps printed for general distribution. The 

advantage, so far as the tactical situation per- standard scale of the British military geologic 

mits, of the most favorable physical conditions. maps was 1 : 10,000, and they were printed on 

2. A knowledge of the geology will, to a large the new Ordnance Survey base without the 

extent, prevent the undertaking of projects contours.ss These geologic maps are prethat are impossible on account of the physical 

conditions underground. 

as The maps examined covered areas in the plains of Flanders, where 

there is little relief. It is possible that others were issued in which the 

reliefls shown by contours. 
110 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

sen ted as being a "General classification of 

ground according to its suitability for dugouts, 

etc." The information shown by colors is 

supplemented by overprinted descriptions. 

The locations of all ·bore holes are indicated, 

thus giving a measure of the reliability of the 

information about any particular locality. 

For the mining work of the British Army 

geologic maps on a still larger scale were 

prepared, but these appear to have been 

issued only in manuscript form. The British 

also printed geologic cross sections with brief 

explanatory texts conveying information of the 

same kind as that shown on the maps. 

These graphic data: were supplemented by 

the British geologists by brief reports in which 

the geologic sequence was described ana its 

relations to the construction of fieldworks set 

forth. These reports were usually iss~ed in 

mimeographed form and were illustrated by 

geologic sections. The British geologists, unlike those of the American Army, were frequently called into consultation on the ground, 

and thus gave much help orally of which 

there is no record. 

The first military geologic maps prepared by 

the American Expeditionary Force were col-

·ored by hand on bases without relief arid on 

:a scale of 1 : 80,000. When the work of issuing 

;geologic maps of the entire front was undertaken these were printed on a scale of 1:50,000, 

·with a contoured base. They were termed 

engineering geologic maps and the classification 

was lithologic. In the legend the lithologic 

units were described with reference to the 

construction of fieldworks. Seeps and springs 

were indicated by red lines. A part of the 

Montsec map, originally printed in colors with 

contoured base, is here reproduced (Pl. XV). 

The German Army issued some geologic engineering maps on the French hachured base of 

the 1:80,000 scale, but their standard map was 

on a scale of 1:25,000, on a contoured base, with 

the geology indicated in great detail. The map 

explanations were practical rather than scientific and presented in full detail the features of 

each geologic formation that could be of military value. It is probable that not very many 

of these detailed maps were printed during the 

war, for less than half a dozen were captured. 

In addition to these maps the Germans 

printed many reports dealing with the relation 

between geology and field fortifications. In 

these reports .an evident attempt was made to 

avoid all geologic nomenclature that would not 

be comprehensible to the layman. Some, indeed, were clearly intended for the use of men 

having little or no technical education. In 

spite of this attempt the German map legends 

and reports are in general so elaborate and comprehensive as to tend to defeat their own purpose. 

All the belligerents followed the practice of 

issuing preliminary geologic maps and reports 

before more complete information was available. These would be corrected in later editions. Thus a geologic map might run through 

several editions within a few months. The 

exigencies of military operations may evidently 

demand some information before the field ex .. 

aminations have been completed. This situation is a difficult one for the average geologist 

to meet, for his inclination is to wait until he 

has all his facts before coming to a decision. It 

is hard for a geologist from civil life, to grasp 

the important fact that some information is 

better than none at all. 

The geologic engineering mapa of the Ameri• 

can Expeditionary Force differed from most of 

those issued by the other armies in the fact that 

they were extended far within the enemy lines. 

It was held that information about the physical 

conditions in enemy territory was of value even 

if only approximately correct. These maps 

could of course not have been prepared had the 

French official maps (1 :80,000) not been available. In drawing the boundaries on a scale 

larger than the original some use was made of 

aero-photographs. The base of the heavy cliffforming Bajocian limestone could, for example, 

be rather accurately delineated from the photographs. The same results could probably have 

been attained without the photographs if a better contoured base had been available. Another feature that favored the drawing of this 

contact for part of the Moselle Valley was the 

fact that the vineyards of this area, which were 

outlined on the base map, are all on the Bajocian limestone. Spring lines were also a useful 

guide in determining some of the contacts. 

The geologic section of the American Expeditionary Force prepared a number of reports 

dealing with the geologic control of field fortifications, military mining, mining troops, and 

related subjects. These reports are listed 

below. All except one were issued only in 
f 

U. 8. G EOLOGICAT, SURVEY 

Silt, 

-

clay, and mud 

Usuallf, saturated, except during dry season (A~I to August), and sqbject; to flooding. Unfavorable for trenches and ~ts. 

These deposits range in thickness from~io 2 meters m small valley~! to 2'to 8 meters in large 

valleys such as that Of Meuse River. 

__ .-::::;_· --- Principal lines of dislocation. Water is likely to occur along these lines, due to the zones of fracture. 

PROFESSIONAL PAPER 128 PLATE XV 

__ 1_ 

Scale 50,00~ 3 4 Kilometers ~ 0 1 2 

Loose material 

~ on slopes {talus) Made up of clay at surface and angular lime- stone debris below. Usually well drained; favorable for trenches and, where thick enough, for dugouts. In many places water occurs along tile bottom of these deposits. 

Locus ---·---- of springs and seepages These should be avoided as far as ~ible in the location of field works, especially of dug- outs. Fieldwork& should be placed above the lines of springs. 

DESCRIPTION OF FORMATIONS 

/:/'// ////// 

/ ////:;:/// /~ ////// 

/ / / / / / tlltt< 

Clay at surface; clay shales with some thin limestone layers below Surface zone usually saturated for a depth of 1 to 2 meters except in very dry weather. Deep trenches usually impossible, and even shallow trenches likely to be tilled with water. Defensive works will be principally parapets 

revettec;l on both sides. Cave-slielter con- struction usually impracticable unless means are provided for sinl<ing through satura~ 

zone into the dry ground underneath. Cut and cover shelters most practicable form of shelter. In certain loo8lities the terrain pel'!llits sufficient drainage for cut and cover Shelters. 

Surface fonnation ~ usually clay 1 to 2 

meters in depth. Below this fonnation is soft clay shale or soft limestone 

Seepages are likely to be found in limestone. In general favorable for trenches and locally favorable for cave shelters. In man)' ~aces underground water prevents cave-shelter construction. The presence or absence of underground water should always be determined in advance of dugout construc- tion by test shafts or· bore holes. 

MILITAll.Y GEOLOGIC MAP OF MONTSEC, FRANCE, AND VICINITY. 

Surface fonnation 

-

consistin_g of weath· 

ered zone ~to 1 meter. th1ck madeuR 

of clay with limestone fragments and 

broken rock. Below is compact limestone formation 

Usually well drained, and trenches require little revettin~. Very favorable for cave shelters but requ~res hard-rock excavation. A few beds of clay are found in the limestone, and at these places water is likely to occur. Where a limestone fonnation·rests on·clay, as near Apremont, a line of sprin~ or seepages ·is 

usually found. Such localities should be 

avoided, or the tleldworks placed above tbe line of sprinp or seepages. 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 111 

manuscript form and. hence had no wide circulation. Reports were prepared covering the 

front between the Swiss frontier and_ Meuse 

River and including a description of the military engineering features and their relation 

to the geology. A special report on underground water and its relation to fieldworks 

was also prepared for the use of the engineers. 

Detailed reports were also made on the geology 

and topography of the enemy positions in the 

Lorraine sector and their relation to and 

control of the enemy fortifications. These 

reports were prepared for the use of the intelligence section of the General Staff. 

Geologic engineering maps prepared by geologic section, 

American Expeditionary Force. 

Quadrangle. Scale. 

Commercy ........ 1:80,000 

Montsec ......... 1:50,000 

Cheminot ........ 1:50,000 

St. MihieL. ___ .. 1:50,000 

Etain. . . . . . . . . . . . 1: 50, 000 

Luneville. __ . ___ .. 1:50,000 

Amelecourt ... _ . . 1: 50, 000 

Schirmeck .... __ .. 1:50,000 

Chateau Thierry. . 1: 50, 000 

Notes. 

Hand colored; not printed. 

Printed. 

Do. 

Do. 

Do. 

Hand colored; not printed. 

Do. 

Not completed. 

Do. 

Reports prepared by geologic section, American Expeditionary 

Force, relating to field fortifications, etc. 

Mining troops of British Expeditionary Force. 

Notes on British mining practice. 

Notes on British mining schools. 

Engineer re~onnaissance on French front from Belfort to 

St. Mihiel. 

Geology and topography as affecting military engineering, 

Nomeny-St. Mihielsector. 

Mine-rescue apparatus. 

Notes on cover for shelters. 

Underground water and its relation to :fieldworks. 

(Printed ip. Engineer Field Notes, No. 27, A. E. F.) 

Notes on shelters for infantry. 

Geology and topography as affecting military engineering 

of German position, St. Mihiel and Pont-a-Mousson 

sector. 

The German defenses of the Lorraine front. 

MANEUVERING. 

The influence of swamps and marshes on 

strategy and tactics is of course well established. On many occasions skillful leaders 

have defeated an opponent by taking advantage of impassable ground. Present tactics and 

modern equipment in artillery and tanks have 

led to a revision of the old classification of 

passable and impassable ground for troop 

maneuvers. This revision has been necessary 

because of the colossal scale of modern operations, involving not only tremendous .concentrations of men but also enormous unit weight 

of mobile equipment, such as artillery and 

tanks. A land surface that would have been 

no obstacle to maneuvers in fonner wars, with 

their relatively small numbers of troops and 

light equipment, might prove almost impassable for the great bodies of men and the heavy 

equipment demanded by present tactics. There 

were, of course, plenty of exceptions to the new 

requirements during the late war, for much 

fighting was done in swampy lowland and even 

among rugged snow-clad ranges, where the 

great concentration of infantry in attack and 

the use of heavy equipment was impossible. 

The decisive battles of the war, however, were 

fought in areas where the passability of the 

ground was an important element. The question whether a certain hill slope is made up of 

slippery clay or of hard ground may be the 

decisive factor in a tactical movement. Again, 

the success of an operation may hinge on the 

quick traverse of a certain valley bottom. If 

the valley floor is silt or clay, it will be soft and 

muddy during the wet season and difficult to 

traverse; if it is sand and gravel it will be hard 

and dry and easy . of passage by troops and 

equipment. Again, the suGcessful fording of a 

stream may depend on the physical character of 

the stream bottom. A knowledge of the geology of the region will make it possible to forecast the physical conditions of the surface, and 

this will often be of immense service in formulating plans for tactical movements. . 

The feasibility of a maneuver depends, as 

shown above, on the physical condition of the 

soil, as well as on the topography. 89 Complete 

understanding of the topography of the scene 

of operations is clearly of first importance to 

the tactician. It has been emphasized in many 

publications, 40 notably by the French, that a 

thorough knowledge of military topography 

can best be obtained by understanding its relations to the bedrock geology and to the recent 

geologic history of the region. This subject 

relates to the training of officers and, though 

important, need not be further discussed here. 

The influence of topography on tactical move39 There are other conditions, such as distribution of forests, character 

of roads and railroads, that influence tactical movements, but these need 

not be considered here. · 

40 This subject is admirably presented in "Military geology and to--

pography," edited by H. E. Gregory, pp. 162-252, New Haven, 1918. 
112 SHORTEU CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

ments has, however, been emphasized to the 

exclusion of almost any consideration of the 

effect of soil conditions. An escarpment may 

afford an admirable defensive position, but a 

lowland underlain by clay may during a wet 

season be even a still greater obstacle to an 

attack. Ground that could be readily traversed 

by a light skirmish line might, after being 

crossed by repeated waves of mfantry, be so 

churned up as to become practically impassable 

for rapid forward movement. Even if passable 

by infantry it might be impassable for artillery 

and tanks. 

Another aspect of the problem is the effect of 

modern artillery fire, with its penetration in uncousolidated material to a depth of nearly 50 

Shell crater 

Shell crater in clay overlying sand containing artesian water; filled with water from below 

Shell crater 

===--====-..=:::::: ---~ A--- -==-- - ===: ~~-Dry~~ 

~£il!!N@,@f·1\;fii,i-iMW("r:>~·: .. :·~-t·t;J..;!":,:!\;~;~t Shell crater in clay overlying dry sand; 

surface water drains into gro~:~nd. 

FIGuRE 14.-Diagrams showing influence of geologic conditions on the 

presence of water in shell craters. 

feet. A barrage may so churn up the ground 

as to make it a serious obstacle to rapid infantry 

attacks and impassable to heavy equipment. 

It is evident that the shell craters will be much 

larger in unconsolidated material than in hard 

rock, and which kind of ground will be reached 

by the shell fire can be determined in advance 

by the use of geology. Moreover, underground 

conditions may lead to the shell craters being 

filled with water from below and thus add still 

greater obstacles to advance. (See fig. 14.) 

The location of outcrops of hard, brittle rock 

within the enemy lines, especially in their fieldworks, may also be of some local importance. 

Artillery fire that hit such outcrops was more 

·effective because of the splintering of the rocks. 

Whether ground will be hard or soft at any 

particular time depends principally on the 

physical character of the soil and subsoil and 

on the amount of precipitation. Therefore the 

determination of the· physical conditions of 

the surface as a guide to planning troop maneuvers involves the use of data on geologic conditions and rainfall. .A knowledge of the areal 

geology is of first importance, and hence a geologic map is indispensable. 

The lithology of the formations immediately 

underlying the surface must be known, as well 

as their products of weathering including soil 

and subsoil. An essential element to the problem is the depth to hard rock, for obviously if 

bedrock occurs near the surface, with only a 

thin cover of soil, the ground will be dry and 

hard at all seasons. On the other hand, if there 

is a heavy cover of soil and subsoil that have 

certain physical properties .the ground will become soft and water soaked during the wet 

season. If the surficial material is pervious, 

as, for example, in a sandy soil, the rain water 

will soak deep into the ground and the surface 

will remain dry and hard, but where there is 

an impervious surficial deposit, such as clay, 

it will hold the water and form soft, muddy 

ground. Other geologic factors, such as depth 

of ground-water table and degree of saturation 

of soil and subsoil at the time of rainfall, also 

affect the problem. 

The dip of the strata determines in a large 

measure the areal distribution of the formations 

and this of course holds true of the soils derived 

from them .. u In areas of horizontal strata there 

will evidently be less variation in type of soil 

from place to place than in regions of close 

folding. 

In the practical application of these prin-: 

ciples no great refinement will be necessary. 

Having a geologic map of an area with which 

he is familiar and data on precipitation, an 

experienced geologist will be able to forecast 

the soil conditions of any formation with a 

sufficient degree of accuracy for use in maneuvers. 

The whole problem is closely tied to the 

quantity and seasonal distribution of rainfall. 

A certain formation ·may afford hard ·footing 

and hence be easily passable during the dry 

season, only to become soft and practically 

41 In glaciated regions other factors are evidently involved, which will 

not be discussed here. 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 113 

impassable during wet weather. Therefore 

monthly data on precipitation are absolutely 

essential, and information about evaporation 

is desirable. In northern latitudes the seasonal distribution of ground frost may have 

a bearing on the passability of the terrane at 

times. 

The permanent ground frost of polar and 

subpolar regions introduces another element. 

In these regions the soil and subsoil thaw only 

to a depth of 1 foot to 3 feet during the short 

summer. This condition produces a swampy 

character in the ground even on hill slopes, and 

as a result much of the country is almost 

impassable for modern armies. 

An area in which the character of the soil 

and the precipitation are such as to form 

muddy ground during the wet season may be 

artifici~ly drained. Locally the plain of 

Flanders has been so drained as to give relatively hard ground, but the great plain of 

western Russia, with similar natural physical 

conditions but not drained, is wet and muddy. 

In arid and semiarid regions the considerations above set forth are. of less importance, 

for the terrane, except for talus slopes, is likely 

to be firm at all seasons. AB the greatest concentrations of the population of the world are 

in the humid regions, however, these are likely 

to continue to be the scenes of important 

wars. Therefore the use of geologic maps 

in forecasting the physical conditions of the 

•surface of the ground deserves attention by 

tactical leaders. This military use of geology 

need not be overemphasized, for evidently 

in many regions it will have little practical 

application. Moreover, its important effect 

in military maneuvers will be confined chiefly 

to the wet season of the year. 

Though geologic maps may be only occasionally of service to the tactician, yet he can 

not afford to ignore any source of iuformation 

about the physical character of the terrane in 

the scene of his operations. Advance knowledge that the soil conditions in this or that 

part of the battlefield will slow down an 

infantry attack or make the advance of artillery 

or tanks impossible may give a decisive advantage in a given movement. Some instances 

from the late war, showing the influence of 

geology on troop maneuvers, can be cited. 

In the Lorraine sector of northeastern 

France strongly contrasting physical conditions were found between the areas underlain 

by hard limestones (Jurassic) and sandstones 

(Triassic) and those underlain by clays and 

marls (Liassic and Jurassic). The· former 

afford hard footing at all times; the latter 

during the wet season were in many places 

impassable for heavy equipment. such as 

artillery and tanks or even for quick movements of large "Qodies of infantry. The wet 

country may be provided with hard roads, but 

in time of advance the enemy will destroy the 

roads in whole or in part, so that they are 

likely to be impassable. Moreover, a general 

attack is made over a broad front, and the 

advance of heavy artillery or tanks must be 

possible without counting on the use of roads. 

The Germans had planned their withdrawal 

from the St. Mihiel salient in October, when the 

water-soaked clays of the W oevre lowland 

(Pl. XV) are in their worst state so far as the 

movement of troops is concerned. (See fig. 

12.) Captured documents showed that they 

had formulated very elaborate plans for the 

demolition of roads and bridges. Fortunately, 

our attack. was made in September, both before 

the physical conditions were at their·worst and 

before the plans for demolition could be accomplished. Had the attack been deferred until 

October and the roads been destroyed as 

planned, a part of the new positions would have 

been almost impregnable to attack until after 

the rainy season. Evidently the Germans had 

taken into account the pltysical conditions of 

the surface formation and its seasonal. variations. 

The physical character of river bottoms and 

banks may also be an important factor.in carrying out any particular movement. A shallow 

watercourse bottomed by mud or silt will be 

impassable for large bodies of infantry, not to 

mention artillery and tanks. The presence of 

a bedrock reef on such a stream, affording a 

hard bottom, will provide a feasible crossing. 

For example, the streams traversing the 

W oevre lowlands, underlain by the Oxfordian 

clay shales, had muddy bottoms that could not 

be crossed by artillery, tanks, or large bodies of 

infantry. In places, however, as shown by the 

geologic maps (Pl. XV), the streams traversed 

limestone reefs where crossings could be made. 

Geologic information of this . kind was used in 

the planning of the St. ¥iJllel attack, principally in choosing routes for tanks.· Again, the 
114 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

gravel-filled valleys of the streams whose 

sources are in the hard rocks of the Vosges 

Mountains afford dry, firm footing, but the 

Meuse and its tributaries, traversing areas of 

soft limestones and shales, are bottomed with 

silt and mud and are very difficult to traverse 

during th~ wet season. The ground underlain 

by the Cretaceous chalk usually remained hard 

during all seasons. Many of the Tertiary formations became water soaked during the wet 

season and furnished a difficult terrain for troop 

movements. Much the larger part of the success in the use of tanks during the war was attained in the chalk areas, but attempts to take 

tanks across areas underlain by clay formations, such as the Oxfordian, in the St. Mihiel 

salient, failed. 

The study of the physical conditions affecting troop movements must sometimes take account of the effect of barrage fire. In the Tertiary formations of the British front there were 

places where an artesian water-bearing sand 

was capped by impervious clay. As a result of 

a heavy barrage the ground was pitted with innumerable shell craters filled with water from 

the underlying strata.42 Advance over such 

ground was exceedingly difficult for infantry. 

The designation of the areas where these conditions existed, so that they might not be 

chosen as scenes of attack, was one of the duties 

of the British geologists. On the other hand, 

where an impervious clay overlay a dry sand 

the effect of shell fire was to drain the surface. 

Such t-ypes of terrain might be of local importance in affording a series of dry shell craters 

to organize as defensive positions. 

The use of geologic maps· to forecast the 

physical conditions of the surface was of slow 

development during the war. In this field the 

French did the pioneer work. A map of a part 

of the Reims sector, making a classification of 

surface deposits according to degree of passability, was issued by the Fifth French Army in 

July, 1917. It is called a soil map and is on a 

hachured base on a SGale of 1:80,000. The 

physical character· of the surface outcrop of 

each formation in its relation to infantry and 

artillery movements is described for both the 

wet and dry seasons. This appears to have 

been the first and probably was the best of this 

type of geologic mnps. The French also issued 

"general information_ maps," on some of which 

42 Information from Col. T. Edgeworth David. 

the soil was outlined and classified in a crude 

way according to passability. Toward the end 

of the war the Service geographique started on 

a project to make a series of maps for the use 

of tanks, but none of these were issued. 

As has been shown, the British geologists 

were consulted on questions relating to physical conditions of the surface, especially in regard to the effect of barrage fire. They also 

prepared some maps, giving a broad classification of their entire front with reference to the 

use of tanks. 

No special maps giving a classification of soils 

as affecting the maneuvering of troops were 

issued by the American Expeditionary Force. 

Information of this kind was, however, given 

on some of the geologic engineering maps. In 

these the explanations included a description of 

the surface conditions of each formation for 

both the wet and dry season. An example of 

this type of map, the original of which was in 

colors, is given in Plate XVL 

It also fell to the geologists of the American 

Expeditionary Force to collect and make available information about river crossings. This 

had largely to do with the fluctuations of stream 

volume but also took into account the character of the river bottom. The description of the 

topography and geo]ogy of the enemy's lines, 

prepared by the geologists of the American 

Expeditionary Force, included mention of the 

areas in which hard or soft footing would be 

found on the uplands and slopes as well as i:rt 

the valley bottoms. Just before the armisti~e 

the Tank Corps of the American Expeditionary 

Force developed a plan to make use of a geologist in the se]ection of area suitable to the maneuvering of tanks. By that time experience 

had shown that a proper use of tanks is possible 

only if heed is given to the physical conditions 

of the soil. 

It appe~ that in the German Army the use 

of geology in forecasting the conditions to be 

encountered in an advance was only a late 

development. Not much space is devoted to 

this application of the science in the German 

secret manual of war geology published in January, 1918. Through the courtesy of Dr. A. 

Renier I saw at Brussels a German map giving 

information of this type, issued in June, 1918. 

This was called a military geologic map and is 

published on a scale of 1:50,000. The legend 

is of the same general type as those of the 
U. B. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PROFESSIONAL PAPER 128 PLATE XVI 

1 Scale so,ooo 

1~==EL~~==~o=============1E============32C===========~3Kilornerers 

· Silt, mud, sand, 

~ and gravel, with some clay 

'The valleys of the Meurthe and parts of the Sanon (Parroy to Mouzy) and the Vezouse up to Blamont, as well as those of the small streams w1thin the sandstone area, i 

!p'e chiefly floored with sand and gravel. In the other 

valleys tlie floor is chiefly silt and mud. The thickness 

of these deposits ranges from less than 1 meter in small 

valleys to 2 or 3 meters along Sanon and V ezouse rivers. 

They are usually saturated, except during the dry season (June to September); in part subject to flood and un- favorable to trenches and dugouts. I 

The silt and mud floored valleys usually afford soft footing, even during the dry season. They are for the most part 

impassable during the wet season (October to May), 

except when frozen. The gravel and sand floored ·valleys· are better drained and are passable except during floods. 

Floods are likely to occur in any month but are most , frequent and highest between November and April. , 

r~}.~f~j~~f~!rt ·High gravel and ~~d ·d·~;;~iis ;;ith some clay. (~to 20 meters thick) _ Well drained near surface but contain much water at' oottom. Trench construction easy but requires com-\ 

plete revetment. Cave shelters possible where deposits ! are thick enough but require heavy timbering to 1

• 

maintain roof. . I 

The surface is usually firm, even during wet weather, ~ 

DESCRIPTION OF FORMATIONS. 

Clay 1 to 3 meters thick resting on limy shale 

Th~~~j~~~i~:~~f~t~f :if:iJ!~~~defo~~t~~i=!~l slopes, where it may exceed the thickness given above 

by accumulation of slide material. During the wet season the surface zone is more or less saturated, and 

the ground is muddy to a depth of 1 meter or more. Ground water usually within 3 or 4 meters of surface, 

exce_pt at crests of slopes, where it is deeper. The formatlOn also contains some thin beds of limestone, usually water bearing. The presence or absence of underground water should always be determined in advance of cave- shelter construction by test shafts or bore holes. 1 

Trench construction easy but requires complete revetment and ample provision for surface drainage. Trenches 

located on clay slopes are liable to be destroyed by slides 

and need strong revetment. Cave shelters can be built 

only where the. terrain permits drainage tunnels. ' 

The surface of this format10n is usually soft and except . where well drained on crests and slopes is likely to be muddy during the wet season (October to March); except when frozen, slopes are slippery during the wet season. , 

///(i:/~ 

'//~-// % /1- % 

Clay with weathered limestone Yz to 1¥.! meters; \ 

compact limestone below, with some shale beds . Surface_ usually well drained, but some water may occur along shale beds. · Trenches difficult to excavate but require little revetment. Formation is favorable to cave Shelters but reguires · hard-rock excavation and where rock is fractured heavy timbering. 

Surface of ground usually firm, but during wet weather 

(October to April) some mud found on limestone. Lime- stone forms steep cliffs where capping bills. 

Sandy clay soil 

-

with weathered sandstone 1 · 1 to 3 meters; medium-hard sandstone 

containing some clay below · UsJially well drained; trench construction in weathered! zone easy but requires heavy revetment on account of 

swelling. Cave shelters in sandstone require heavy rock 

work; some seepage water, and drainage tunnels usually 

S~~his formation usually well drained and firm. 

"'"6"-"" 

'"""'~ "' " Sandstone and conglomerate, in most pfaces \ 

weathered to a depth of onlyY.!meter or less ' 

Rock below soil very bard and requires blasting for trench' 

construction. Cave-shelter construction requires use of 

power drills and blasting. In most places not much 

seepage water. Surfacegroundfirmandinplacesbardthroughouttheyear. 

. Locus of ---~-- springs and seepages 

These should be avoided as far as possible in. the location 

of fieldworks, especially of dugouts. Fieldworks should, 

be placed a~ve th~. of springs. . 

8 

Line of dislocation (fault) 

\Vater is likely to occur along these lines, due to the zones! 

of fracture. · . 

~ . Quarry (in part abandoned).: 

x Sand andgravel pit· 

MILITARY GEOLOGIC MAP OF CIREY, FRANCE, AND VICINITY. 114-1 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 115 

French and American maps already described. 

Its purpose is evidently to guide the tactical 

commander in planning a forward movement. 

While intended primarily to describe the surface formations, it also contains geologic information bearing on :fieldworks. The areas of 

natural and possibly artificial inundation are 

indicated. Like all the other German military 

geologic publications, the map is confusing because of the attempt to show too great a variety of facts on a single base. Dr. Renier told 

me that a number of other maps of this type 

had been prepared, but this is the only one 

captured, so far as I know. In one respect it 

was different from all other German geologic 

maps that I have seen, inasmuch as it covered 

areas held by the Allies and was therefore in 

part based on compiled data. 

The sources of information needed for 

geologic maneuvering maps will be field o bservations within an army's own lines and 

compiled data on areas occupied by the enemy. 

Geologic and soil maps will be the best sources 

of information. The facts furnished by these 

maps must be interpreted in terms of firmness 

and stability of. soil at different seasons of the 

year. A proper interpretation will be possible 

only if the geologist has a personal familiarity 

with the region, and he should also know by 

observation the effect on the soil of a given 

type of the passage of large bodies of troops 

and heavy equipment. He should also know 

the unjt weight of the heaviest equipment 

which is used. 

River and stream crossings should be marked 

on the same maps, with a statement of whether 

bottom is hard or soft and the seasonal fluctuations in depth. Maps of this type should 

be made on a contoured base and on a scale 

not larger than 1: 50,000.~3 It is very desirable 

that the same maps also show distribution of 

forests, 44 which is important to maneuvers. 

WATER RESOURCES. 

The supplying of a huge modern army with 

water is one of the largest tasks that falls to 

the military engineer. It is difficult enough to 

develop the water supply needed in rear areas 

and under stationary conditions of trench war43 The standard geologic maps of the U.s. Geological Survey (scales 

1:62,500 and 1: 125,000) are well adapted for this purpose if a proper explanatory text is prepared to accompany them. 

44 Forests could be shown, as on the French maps, by a black pattern; 

the geologic information being indicated by overprints in transparent 

colors. 

fare, but the task becomes far more complex 

and serious in time of advance and mobile 

warfare. During the recent war both the 

British and the French estimate of minimum 

water requirement when troops were massed 

for advance was about 150,000 gallons a day 

for every 20 square miles of territory occupied. 

The water supply provided for civil consumption in most regions is not sufficient for 

military needs. Therefore, it is usually not 

only necessary to make available to the armies 

the water already developed but also to seek 

new sources of supply. The determination of 

possible sources of water in any particular 

region is largely a geologic problem. Nevertheless, during the early part of the war none 

of the opposing armies appear to have made 

any use of professional geologists in this field. 

Part of the German forces were then using the 

witch-hazel stick to find water, and the well 

drilling done by the British was~ largely haphazard and without heed to the geologic facts. 45 

The British were the first to recognize the error 

of such happy-go-lucky methods. By the 

time the United States entered the war the use 

of geologists in determining the sources of 

water was well established in both the British 

and German armies. The French watersupply service was also making much use of 

geology in selecting locations for wells but 

failed to recognize the economy and efficiency 

of calling on professional geologists to solve 

geologic problems, rather than having the 

work done by water-supply engineers, many of 

whom were at best only partly trained in 

geology and all of whom must perforce give 

the greater part of their attention to questions 

of development and mechanical equipment. 

In view of the experience gained by the 

blunders of our allies there is less excuse for our 

not having made full use of geologic science in 

its application to water resources. Though reforms were instituted during the war in these 

matters, yet in the aggregate many wells were 

drilled by the American Expeditionary Force 

without any knowledge of the underground 

water conditions. It is rather surprising to 

find experienced engineers who in their own 

field will not start a project without the most 

careful investigations and planning, yet who 

will cheerfully begin drilling for water while 

«5 King, w. B. R., Geological work on the western front: creog. Jour., 

vol. 54, p. 219, 1919. 
116 SHORTER CONTRlBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

utterly ignorant of its underground occurrence. 

The explanation of this anomaly lies largely in 

the fact that engineers have not kept pace with 

modem advance in applied geology sufficiently 

to realize that the location of water-bearing 

strata is almost an exact science. Fortunately 

the hit or miss method did less harm in this field 

than it might elsewhere, because underground 

water-bearing strata are rather widely distributed on the western front. Therefore a policy 

that would have been disastrous in many 

other fields in general led here only to a waste 

of time and. energy. 

A determination of the sources of underground wate-r demands a knowledge of the areal, 

stratigraphic, and structural geology. The 

French official maps formed admirable guides 

in this field, and in some places an interpretation of these maps and their accompanying 

explanatory text sufficed to determine the 

positions of water-bearing strata. More commonly, however, some local surveys and supplementary investigations were necessary. Most 

of the well drilling done in the American zone 

was in the line of communication. At the 

front we depended largely on water supplies 

already developed by the French military authorities, and during the advance we made 

much use of sterilized surface water. 

It fell to the geologists in large measure to 

report on the resources of the surface waters. 

Where good stream measurements were available 46 or where the conditions permitted field 

examinations the questions of surface water 

aupply were passed on by engineers. Even in 

this field they were not always entirely successful, because many engineers who are expert 

in water-supply construction failed to realiz~ 

the necessity of a careful scrutiny of the seasonal variations of rainfall and more especially 

of the control of run-off by the geology as well 

as by precipitation. As a result some attempts 

were made to utilize surface water without adequate knowledge of the quantity of water available during the dry season. When it came to 

estimating stream volumes within the enemy's 

lines the task proved to be beyond the engineers 

and fell to the geologists of the American Expeditionary Force. With this went the determination of the location of springs, depth to 

underground water, and similar facts, which, 

46 There bas been no systematic gaging of streams in northern and 

northeastern France. 

of course, requires a knowledge of structure 

and stratigraphy. 

In the British Expeditionary Force the 

geologist, Capt. W. B. R. King, acted as 

adviser to the chief efiooineer on all matters 

relating to water resources. No well drilling 

was permitted without his sanction, and he 

supervised the collection of all data relating 

to water resources. His duties were distinct 

from those of the water-supply officers, who 

took his results and interpreted them from the 

standpoint of the engineer. The line was therefore clearly drawn between water resources, 

belonging to the field of the geologist, and water 

supply, belonging to that of the engineers. 

The lack of surface water in part of the area 

lying in front of the British lines necessitated 

the drilling of wells during the advance. One 

of the most valuable services rendered by Capt. 

King consisted in selecting sites for these wells 

within the battle area and forecasting the depth 

to water. In commenting on Capt. King's 

paper, 47 Brig. Gen. Liddell says: 

In this connection it would give you some idea of the 

problem with which the geologists had to deal when I 

instance the advance of the Third Army. * * * We 

had to cross practically a desert area * * * in which 

there was practically no surface water. We got across 

this desert area largely owing to our accurate geological 

knowledge of the ground. * * * To take 300,000 men 

and 100,000 horses across an area like that is a feat which 

I think has seldom been equaled. Of course, we depended 

largely upon borings. During the advance and in the face 

of the enemy we made 13 bores 250 to 300 feet in depth; 

in some cases the boring plants were in line with the field 

guns, and the crews unfortunately in this case were 

knocked out by shell fire. The bores were most successful, 

and as a result the Army was well supplied with water. 

This statement well illustrates the necessity 

of having an exhaustive knowledge of the geology of the theater of operations. Had it not 

been for Capt. King's professional attainments 

and knowledge of the terrain, which enabled 

him to predict the underground water conditions, this advance would not have been made 

in the time allotted to it. It brings further proof 

of the necessity of having the geologic investigations in the hands of experienced professional 

geologists. To rely on amateurs in such an 

emergency would have been the height of 

folly. 

In the French Army both the water-resource 

and water-supply work was done by the 

tt King, W. B. R., op. cit., p. 215. 
U. S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PROFESSIONAL PAPER 128 PLATE XVII 

Alluvium 

1 Kimmeridien 

A.staf'tes 

30·50m. 

Oxf"ordien 

orWoevre 

I/0-160m. 

Bsiocien 

or Liverdun · . Oolitl/6 tnt: 50·70m. 

Llas superieur 

or TOBrcien 90·130 m. 

Lias moyen or Liasien 60-100 m. 

Lias inf"erleur or S/nemurien 40m. 

.lnfrallsss/c . 

30-50 m. Limestone~ herd 

80-100 m. LimestoneJ hard; blocky 

-1::::!:="==±1------- ------------------------Locus or spr/nes 

25-40 m. Marls, .sandy_; thin lenses reddish limestone 

80·115 m. Marlandclayshafes. 

75 -100m. Hqrfs snd clay shs/e.; thin beets of" limestone 

r2(;5;;5~l-f_;_-;,;_ ~ ~~~;~ ~t--;;-;_~~~~;;, ~~~ ~:; ;;; = ~L f%;:S '{; :/pn;,;;j;'::U~'ftfs J weak end ver,able i(1 flow 

----s&iean"d ciiiys ----------------

GENERALIZED SECTION OF COMMERCY QUADRANGLE, FRANCE, SHOWING SEQUENCE OF GEOLOGIC 

FORMATIONS AND OCCURRENCE OF WATER. 

116-1 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 117 

same men. Though it was very evident that 

greater use of geology would have been beneficial to the French service, yet it must be 

remembered that many of the French e:r;tgineers 

had a complete knowledge ·of the underground 

water resources of the country. Indeed, 

some of them were highly competent geologists. 

Nevertheless, the service would have been 

benefited if professional geologists had been 

employed to determine the water resources 

and the engineers had been free to devote their 

time to the engineering problems. 

In the American Expeditionary Force the 

distinction between the work of the geologist 

and that of the engineer was recognized but 

not very sharply defined.· Some of the engineers engaged in water-supply developmen.t 

gave small heed to geology, and insufficient 

control was exercised to compel the determination of underground conditions in advance 

of well drilling. As a consequence during the 

dry season there was an unnecessary shortage 

of water at a number of hospitals, aviation 

fields, and other military establishments. On 

the other hand, some of the geologists were 

detailed to water-supply work that clearly 

belonged to· the domain of the engineers. 

These matters were being rectified at the end 

of the war,· when a definite system of responsibility for the different fields was being established. 

The function of the military geologists of the 

German Army in the matter of water resources 

seems to have been similar to that of the British 

geologists. They acted as .advisers in all 

matters relating to water resources but were 

not responsible for the engineering problems 

of water development. It appears that they 

performed some of the duties of sanitation, 

which in all the other armies were left to the 

medical corps. 

Many of the geologic data and conclusions 

relating to water resources must necessarily 

relate to special localities where water developments are under consideration. In the American Expeditionary Force reports of this character were made concise and, so far as possible, 

shorn of all geologic terminology and speculation. The aim was to put into the hands of the 

engineer a statement of conclusions, with a 

brief summary of the facts upon which the 

conclusions were based. In addition, some 

reports and sections were prepared for the use 

. 43595°-21-10 

of those versed in geology. (See Pl. XVII.) 

The purpose of such a report was to present 

the geologic facts bearing on the water resources of a particular region, to serve as a 

guide to those making local examinations. It 

would have be.en well to have had these reports prepared before the war, as a part of the 

military preparation. Though there is a vast 

literature dealing with the underground w~ters 

of France, it consists for the most part of 

detailed descriptions of special localities, and 

but few attempts have been made to summfirize 

the facts bearing on larger regions, as has been 

done for many parts of the United States.· 

Exceptions to this are the publications· of 

Dr. Ed. Imbeaux, of Nancy, ingenieur en chef 

des ponts et chaussees, which give much information about the underground waters of France 

and especially of Lorraine. 48 Information about 

the run-off of streams of northern and northeastern France is exceedingly scant, as there has 

been no systematic gaging of the watercourses. 

Data of this kind were collected from various 

sources, and in the absence of exact measurements estimates were made on the basis of 

precipitation and knowledge of the geologic 

conditions. 

The American Expeditionary Force printed 

some maps showing the facts relating to distribution of water as determined by geology. On 

these maps were indicated the locations of 

springs, the areas of possible shallow dug wells, 

and the areas of deeper underground w&ters and · 

also the available information about stream 

volumes. (See fig. 15.) They proved. ~o be 

of great service to the water-supply engineers, 

but unfortunately the force available for their 

preparation was not large enough to permit 

covering the entire front with these maps. To 

be complete they should have shown also the 

depth of the principal underground water horizon by subterrf\nean contours. This would 

have greatly enhanced the value of the maps 

but could not be done for lack of sufficient field 

force to make the necessary local examinations. 

It also fell to the geologists to compile reports 

on the water resources within the enemy lines. 

These reports were printed as small pamphlets, 

each accompanied by a map (fig. 16) graphically summarizing the information contained 

48 Imbeaux, Ed., and others, Annuaire statistique et descriptif de la 

distribution d'eau de la France, 2d ed., Paris, 1009. Imbeaux, Ed., 

Les eaux potables et leur rOle hygienique dans 1e · Departement de 

Meurthe et Moselle, Paris, 1897. 
.. 0 1 2 3 4 XILOMETERS. 

EXPLANATION 

Water-bearing iiver 

'~ deposits 1-10 meters deep.' (More or less water &lso oceurs at moderate 

depths below bottoms of smaller valleys) 

_a1 ' 

Principal areas of undel'Jrround water at depth ol 30-225 meters. ThiS water occurs along irregularly distributed fissures in limestone 

and at baSe of fractured limestone on strata of clay shale. Water unc\er varying hydro-. static pressure 

River disCharges (approximate) 

average and 

minimum flow 

in cubic meters per second 

Loci of springs 

"Loci ol strong springs. 

0 

Deep wells: 

(approximate or minfmum 

depth in meters ) 

e Deep drill holes 

cased through arte- sian water horizons 

in hard sandstone. 

Depth in meters to water horiZon 

FIGURE 15.-Map showing water resources of Mamey, France, and vicinity. 

I. \ \ \ t • I. I It • Jl o I •' I ,.;, 

, 0 I 2 3 KII.OMtTER& 

.A Spring 

0 Dugwell 

EXPLANATION 

-.r- Stream believed to carry water throughout the year 

... -.... Stream believed to be dry in summer 

Note.-'nle data on springs and wells are incomplete. Then are ehallow wells in nearly all towns and at many farm houses 

APPROXIMATE STREAM VOLUMES 

• Gaging stations 

{ 

Av .. 036 .sec. m3 =Average run-off iri cubic meters per second 

L. • 01() " " = Low-water run-off in cubic meters per second 

Fltl. .310 " " • Flood-water run-off in cubic me~ra per second 

Note.-.001 cubic meter per second is equal to 22,800 galloliS of water per day. Strejllll volumes baaed in part on incomplete data. Therefore use 50 per cent factor of safety lor minimum run-off 

FIGURE 16.-Map of Pettoncourt, France, and vicinity, showing developed water supply. 

......,. 

1-' 

00 

00 

~ 0 

~ ~ 

c 

0 

21 

i-3 

~ 

§ 

0 

~ 00 

i-3 

0 

~ 

~ 

~ G':l 

trJ 

~ 0 

0 

~ 

j 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 119 

in the text. They included a brief nontechnical 

statement of the physiography and geology so 

far as it affected the water resources.· The 

character of the developed sources of water 

was briefly described, and information on 

stream volumes was tabulated. In the description of the watercourses information was given 

not only as to their volume but a1so as to their 

depth and other features that affected stream 

crossings. 

A glossary of English water-supply terms, 

with their German and French equivalents, 

was also included in these publications. In the 

back of each pamphlet was an alphabetic list 

of the towns with a full statement of the developed water supply. All this iriformation was 

summarized on the map, on which all wells, 

springs, and reservoirs were indicated by appropriate symbols. These reports, prepared in 

the office of the chief engineer, of which the 

geologic section formed a part, were issued and 

distributed by the intelligence section (G 2) of 

the General Staff. A list is given below. 

General water-supply reports and maps prepared by geologic 

section, American Expeditionary Force. 

[*Indicates printed reports.] 

Notes on water supply, Nomeny-Pont-a-Mousson-St. 

Mihiel sector. 

Notes on underground water supply, St. Die-St. Mihiel 

sector. 

Note on deep water-bearing horizons in southeastern part 

of Commercy quadrangle. 

Hydrogeologic map of French front from Commercy to 

Thann, scale 1:320,000. 

· Water-supply map of Nancy, scale 1:80,000. 

Water-supply map of Commercy, scale 1:80,000. 

*Water supply of Commercy quadrangle, with map, scale 

1:80,000. 

*Water supply of Metz S. W. quadrangle, with map, scale 

1:50,000. 

*Water supply of Metz S. E. quadrangle, with map, scale 

1:50,000. 

*Water supply of Metz N. W. quadrangle, with map, scale 

1:50,000. 

*Water supply of Metz N. E. quadrangle, with map, scale 

1:50,000. 

*Water supply of Verdun N. E. quadrangle, with map, 

scale 1:50,000. 

*Water supply of Verdun N. W. quadrangle, with map, 

scale 1:50,000. 

*Water supply of Mezieres S. W. quadmngle, with map, 

scale 1:50,000. 

Water supply of Mezieres S. E. quadrangle, with map, 

scale 1: 50,000. 

*Water supply of Luneville N. E. quadrangle, with map, 

scale, 1:50,000. 

*Water supply of Sarrebourg S. W. quadrangle, with map, 

scale 1: 50,000. 

Water supply of Sarrebourg N. W. quadrangle, with map, 

scale 1: 50,000. 

*Water supply of and geological notes on the Rhine Valley. 

The above-listed reports were modeled on 

those issued by the British geologists, each of 

which contained an alphabetic list of towns 

with a statement on their developed water supply and were accompanied by a map on which 

the same information was graphically summarized. For use in the studies of underground 

water of northwestern France a summary of the 

geology relating to this subject was compiled for 

the use of the British Expeditionary Force by 

the Geological Survey of the United Kingdom. 

This summary relieved the geologist at the 

front from much examination of literature, 

which could be done better in the libraries at 

London. 

One of the tasks of the British geologic staff 

was to prepare maps showing the territory 

occupied by the enemy divided into regions 

according to type of water supply. The map 

explanation indicates the sources of water in 

each region and the type of mechanical equipment needed to develop it. These maps 

served both for general strategic purposes and 

to guide the engineer in making choice of the 

proper water-supply equipment to provide f<!>r 

an advance. 

The kind of information furnished by these 

maps is indicated by the following extract from 

an explanatory text: 

AREA I. 

Horses.-Plenty of surface water. Water in --

Canal bad during flax-soaking operations. Shallow wells 

a few feet deep will give horse water anywhere. on low 

ground. 

Drinking water.-Scarce to very scarce. Will have to 

depend on sterilizing lorries or alum sedimentation, or 

chlorination. Boring is not used for "Thanet sand." 

Water is saline. 

Equipment needed.-Surface pumps only. Sterilizing 

lorries. Alum installation. 

AREA IV. 

Clay overlying "Thanet sand " on old rocks. Springs 

in valleys at junction of old rocks. Borings could get 

some water from "Thanet sand." 

A fair number of running streams for horse watering. 

Equipment needed.-8urface pumps for springs. Tube 

well pumps, not air lifts. Ashford steamers. 

AREA XV. 

Oolitic limestones overlying clays with some sands. 

Some springs in valleys from limestone, but on the whole 

area is dry. Borings could get water from sand. 

Equipment needed.-8uriace pumps an'd tube well 

pumps; air lifts. 
120 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

Another type of British water-supply map be learned, the German geologic staff was the 

of the region held by the enemy was one on official source of an~·information about water 

which the relative abundance of water in the resources, and the engineers were charged with 

several regions is indicated, as well. as its the developments. 

purity. Using as a unit 150,000 gallons a The experience of the war has clearly shown 

day for each 20 square miles, the colors on the that matters relating to the provision of water 

map show whether water is ''abundant, for field armies are of two kinds-(1) the determedium, or scarce," also whether it is ''good, mination of water resources, which includes the 

fair, or bad." These maps were prepared for collection of data in field and office and relates 

strategical and tactical purposes. chiefly to geology; (2} the furnishing of water 

The regional reports 49 of the French General supply, which pertains to the development of 

Staff include brief statements on water supply water and is solely a matter of engineering. An 

and some short but very admirable summaries effective organization will clearly differentiate 

of the geologic and physiographic features, between the two fields. The geologist will 

, prepared by Dr. Emmanuel de Martonne and make the necessary field examinations and coinother geologists. The several French armies pilations of data, so as to obtain full informaalso issued maps· showing the distribution of tion as to the sources of water. The results of 

sources of water developed for military use the geologist's investigation will be furnished in 

within their own lines. Outside of these there terse summaries to.the engineer. It will be his 

seem to have been no maps or other publi- duty, with these data before him, to determine 

cations relating· to water resources issued by the location and plan of water-supply stations 

the French Army. The engineers of the and the type of mechanical equipment. He 

Service d'eau had, however, in their files many will also direct the execution of the project. 

data relating to the hydrology of the army This division of duties and responsibilities besectors. tween the military geologist and the engineer 

The Germans issued very elaborate · maps was the plan followed by both the British and 

showing the water resources of the areas German armies. 

within their own lines. All their geologic In time of war provision for water must be 

military maps contained some reference to made (1) to supply camps, cantonments, hoBunderground water. In addition, special maps pitals, railways, shops, etc., in rear and mobiliwere issued on scales of 1:25,000 and 1: 50,000 zation areas, (2) to supply the mobile armies in 

which contained a great variety of informa- the theater of operations. The task of providtion on water resources and water supply. On ing water for the rear areas will be the simpler 

these maps the distribution of loci of springs of the two, because usually the information 

and areas of deep and shallow waters were available about the water resources of the rear 

indicated by colors. In addition the quantity areas is better and if information is lacking 

and quality of the water supply of each town local surveys, such as can not be made at the 

was shown by symbols, and all the military front, are possible. On the -other hand, the 

supply systems, including reservoirs, pipe largest local d~mands and therefore the largest 

ljnes, and pumping stations, were indicated. water-supply units will be in the rear areas 

This information was so complete that the where there are the greatest permanent concencapture of one of these maps made it possible trations of personnel as well as of war industries 

to select important targets for artillery fire. and means of transportation. In the areas of 

None of tb,ese maps contained any information mobilization and supply there will be time, 

about quantities of surface waters. No cap- which is often lacking at the front, to develop 

tured documents revealed evidence that the underground water, if it is present, by drilling. 

Germans prepared maps showing water re- Similar conditions prevail along the line of 

sources of the areas within the Allied lines. communication, but the development of water 

In addition to maps the Germans issued some supply becomes more difficult as the front is 

reports dealing with underground waters and approached. 

their methods of development. So far as could One of the first steps to be taken in time of 

war or when war is threatened is to call into the 

""Notice descriptive et statistique, Ministere de la Guerra, Commis-1 • ffi · b f 1 · t t d 

;;ion du service geographique de l'Armee. serVIce a su Cient num er o geo og1s s o e-
USE OF GEOLOGY ON 'I:HE WESTERN FRONT. 121 

termine the water resources in the mobilization 

and rear areas, for these resources must be 

determined before sites are selected for camps, 

hospitals, depots, etc. Much of this work can 

be done in times of peace, but supplementary 

local examinations and surveys will always be 

necessary. 

Knowledge of the water resources of the 

theater of operations will also be based on information collected during times of peace, but 

supplementary investigations will always be 

necessary, including compilations, as well as 

field examinations, in so far as the military 

situation permits. This task should receive 

immediate attention at time of war or when 

war is threatened. . 

The first important task will be the preparation of maps and reports showing the general 

distribution of water resources in the· entire 

theater of operations ·and including a general 

classification of the area in accordance with 

sources, quantity, and quality of water. The 

purpose of such maps and reports will be strategic, for water supply is one of the important 

factors to be considered in the general plan of 

a campaign. These maps and reports will contain also a statement of the equipment needed 

to develop the water supply in different parts 

of the theater of operations. This statement 

will be prepared by the water-supply officers 

from the information furnished by the geologist. Its purpose is to serve as a guide in providing the mechanical equipment needed to 

develop a water supply. 

Detailed water-supply maps accompanied by 

brief descriptive texts are necessary for the use 

of armies in the field. These maps and reports 

will present every detail of developed and potential sources of water, including springs, 

wells, reservoirs, tanks, cisterns, ·stream volumes, lakes, ponds, and available underground 

water. Information showing the quantities of 

water available is of the utmost importance, 

and the quality of the water must also be reported. Seasonal variations of stream flow 

must likewise be considered. The preparation 

of such maps and reports is a proper function of 

the geologic corps, which will, however, cooperate with the water-supply and sanitary officers. 

The water-resource maps and reports must 

be ready before troop movements are begun. 

As new and more detailed information will be 

collected during an advance, the reports on 

water resources will receive constant revision 

which will involve new additions and supplements. A necessary extension of this work will 

include the collection and coordination of information about the water resources of areas 

within t~e enemy lines. The collection of this 

information will form a part of the peace-time 

preparation, but no matter how exhaustively 

it may be done in advance, the information will 

always require revision in time of war. The 

determination, as far as may be, of the water 

resources within the enemy lines also lies essentially within the field of the geologist. It can 

not be too strongly emphasized that though 

the development of a water supply is a function 

of the water-supply engineer, the available 

water resources can best be determined by the 

geologist. 

TRANSPORTATION. 

Geologic facts and their interpretation clearly 

deserve recognition in problems of road, railroad, canal, reservoir, and wharf construction. 50 

The application of geology in this field relates·tQ 

depth and physical character of bedrock, stability of slopes, and character of river crossings, 

as well as to sources of road metal and railroad 

ballast. In this, as in other branches of geology applied to engineering, profound knowledge 

of the science is not always needed, and in many 

problems the experienced engineer will himself 

be able to determine the necessary facts correctly and make accurate deductions. If properly trained, he will also know when the problem 

is beyond his experience, so that he should seek 

the assistance of the professional geologist. So 

far as I know, little use was made of geologists 

on engineering problems relating to transportation on the western front. The Germans, however, have so long recognized the need of advance 

geologic knowledge in building railroa~, canrus, 

etc., that it is not likely that they ignored this 

need in time of war. Much space is given to 

this subject in the German manual of military 

geology. The average American railroad engineer, however, has not yet learned the use of 

geology in his own field. 

In the British and American armies geologists were called upon for information on the 

50 Some applications of geology to engineering are presented in the following publications: 

MacDonald, D. F., Some engineering problems of the Panama Canal 

in their relation to geology and topography: Bur. :Mines Bull. 86, 1915. 

Atwood, w. w., Relation of landslides and glacial deposits to reservoir sites in the San Juan Mountains, Colo.: U.s. Geol. Survey Bull. 

685,1918. 
122 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

distribution of road metal; the French appear 

to have relied on their engineers for this service. As the French engineers were operating 

in their own country, they had far more local 

knowledge than their allies had. No general 

reports on the road metals of France have been 

issued, and under war conditions it was not 

always possible for the British and American 

officers to find the individuals who had the 

local information. 

Special road and quarry services were organized in the American Expeditionary Force, and 

these did not call upon the geologist for much 

information. Time and effort would undoubtedly have been saved had more use been 

made of geologic facts in this field. However, 

when advances were planned it was found 

that the geologists were the best sources of 

· information about the distribution of road 

metal and railroad ballast within the enemy 

lines. This information was in part embodied 

in the geologic engineering maps which have 

been described and in part presented on special 

maps. ·The special maps showed the surface 

distribution of· all hard rocks that might be 

used for road metal and also the gravel deposits. The location of all quarries and gravel 

pits was also shown. Eight maps showing the 

distribution of road metal were prepared by 

the geologists of the American Expeditionary 

Force. 

Military preparation should include the 

preparation of general small-scale maps on 

which the distribution of all rocks that may be 

used for road ballast is indicated, with a 

classification of their relative value for this 

purpose. All quarries and gravel pits should 

be shown on such maps, with an indication by 

symbol of their relative importance. Large, 

well-equipped quarries should be distinguished 

from those whose product is used only locally. 

Special large-scale maps showing road metal 

should be issued for important areas in the 

theater of operations. These would be prepared after the plan of campaign had been 

determined. 

CONSTRUCTION. 

What has been said about the application 

of geology to the building of roads, railways, 

and canals applies equally to other forms of 

engineering construction. In this field the 

determination of the character of foundation 

and stability of slopes, as well as sources of 

raw materials, involves some use of geologic 

facts. Here again many of the problems are 

so simple as not to require the advice of a 

professional geologist. Yet there is always 

danger that the engineer who is ignorant of 

geology will make blunders that could easily 

have been avoided. Such errors are even 

more costly in war than in peace. All engineering works constructed during war are 

built in a hurry, and often the advice of the 

geologist can save time by forecasting the 

physical conditions. 

The only service to construction rendered 

by the geologists of the American Expeditionary Force was in locating sources of aggregate 

for making concrete. . There was during the 

war a hurried call for the building of a plant 

near the front to make reinforced-concrete 

blocks (shell bursters) used for dugout protection. (See fig. 9.) The geologic problem 

was very simple, for it was evident that the 

gravels from the hard rocks of the Vosges 

Mountains were the only possible source of -

suitable material. Knowledge of the bedrock 

geology and of the physiographic history, together with limitations on locations placed by 

the military situation, narrowed the choice of 

location to a small area. A brief field examination settled the problem and showed 

that the situation permitted only two possible 

locations, and the transportation conditions 

practically limited the selection to one, and in 

two days the matter was settled. This was a 

very good example of the value in an emergency 

of definite geologic information about the field 

of operations. 

The British geologists performed valuable 

service in bringing definite proof that the concrete of the German ''pill boxes'' (surface 

shelters) WftB being made of gravels from the 

Rhine. It was established by the British 

Foreign Office that t~gravel was being brought 

to Belgium by canals through Holland. A 

protest to the Dutch Government, with this 

proof as to source of material, ended this 

military traffic through a neutral country. 

MINERAL RESOURCES. 

War investigation of mineral resources will 

fall into three classes-(1) that in the home 

country to meet military needs; (2) that in 

the theater of operations for use of the army 

in the field; (3) that in the country of the 
USE OF GEOLOGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 123 

enemy as a guide in broad strategy or in minor western front. It is most likely that the 

attacks. The first of these is plainly a civil French engineers made use of geologic maps 

function and needs no further mention here. in choosing sites. It is known also that in the 

Investigations of mineral resources within the British service no important locations were 

theater of operations, such as investigations made without a report by a geologist, at least 

of road metal, concrete material, and water, on the water supply. In the American Expehave already been referred to and included all ditionary Force the practice of calling on 

those of this type performed by the Allies. In geologists for information before the estabsome regions military geologists would be called lishment of hospitals, aviation fields, etc., was 

upon to investigate mineral fuels in the not very general, and as a consequence some 

theater of operations for use of the field armies. needless blunders were made. 

The Germans made elaborate investigation of It fell to the geologists of the British and 

the mineral resources of the occupied territory. German armies to help determine the areas of 

They paid special attention to deposits of possible artificial inundation. This phase of 

phosphate, coal, and iron, doing a large warfare formed an important part of defensive 

amount of drilling and open-cut work. There and offensive operations at certain localities in 

were probably as many geologists engaged in northwestern France and Belgium. Both 

these investigations as were employed on American and British geologists ·were called to 

military problems. This was not specifically locate sources of filter sand. 

war work, however, for its purpose was to In the German military geologic manual 

obtain commercial information that could not considerable attention is devoted to the inbe acquired during peace. It was, no doubt, fluence of geology on earth telegraphy and 

the intention of the German Government to listening-in devices, for it was found that cerevaluate the resources of the conquered terri- tain underground conditions favored the transtory as a guide in delineating its proposed mission of electric currents. The determining 

expanded frontier after it had won the war. factor appears to be the distribution of waterThe mineral reserves of the enemy and their bearing strata, and the best transmission was 

distribution are evidently important factors obtained where such a bed was included bein military strategy. Some work on this tween two impervious formations. These conproblem was done by the geologists of the elusions regarding geologic influences on earth 

American Expeditionary Eorce, and a large electric transmission seem to have been overnumber of French geologists were employed looked by the German Signal Corps. A manduring the war on a similar mission. Under uaP1 dealing. with this subject published as 

ordinary war conditions work of this kind late as the end of 1917 makes no mention of the 

would not fall to geologists of the field armies, use of geology in this field. In reference to 

as it can better be performed at the rear, where this subject it says: "The range of the power 

access to good libraries is to be had. A more buzzer depends on the· nature of the ground 

purely tactical problem in which the geologists between the stations. * * * Power-buzzer 

of the American Expeditionary Force gave communications must not therefore be selected 

some help is ·the designation of important from the map, but their suitability must be 

localities of the enemy mineral industry for ascertained by experiment." This statement 

bombing raids or even shelling. ·is all the more remarkable because when it was 

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATIONS. 

There are many other fields in which geologic knowledge can be of service during war. 

The location of camps, cantonments, hospitals, 

aviation fields, and munition and engineer 

dump~ milst evidently take into account 

drainage and character of soil and subsoil, as 

well as water supply. The geologic facts 

relating to these subjects are usually simple 

but were often ignored by the armies of the 

printed many German military geologic maps 

had already been issued, and on all of these the 

relative conductivity of each formation was 

noted in the explanation. It indicates that 

~he work of the German military geologist was 

by no means completely coordinated with that 

of other branches of the service. It brings 

additional proof that the application of geology 

~~ Manual of position warfare for all armies, part 9, The Signal Service 

and its employment, paragraph 15, Berlin, issued by the Chief of the 

General Staff of the Field Army. Dec. 15. 1917. 
124 SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS TO GENERAL GEOLOGY, 1920. 

to military problems developed only during 

this war was so new a field that its full usefulness had by no means been reached when 

hostilities ceased. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

The many applications of geology to war 

have been set forth above. It has been 

shown that nearly all the great powers recognized the usefulness of the science before the 

end of the war by organizing geologic staffs. 

Furthermore, many instances have been cited 

from the experience of the war where the direct 

military value of geologic knowledge was 

proved beyond question. Modern scientific 

warfare evidently compels an army to seek 

every possible advantage .by making full use 

of all sources of information about the physical 

conditions within the theater of operations. 

Of two opposing armies the one having the 

better knowledge of the terrain will have an 

advantage and at times a decisive advantage. 

A complete knowledge of the terrain is, however, possible only by the use of geology. 

All this brings proof that geologic knowledge . 

must be considered a part of the preparation 

for war. Geologic preparation for war may be 

classed under three headings: 

1. The general principles of geology and 

their application to war must be made a part 

of military education. 

2. Peace-time preparation should include the 

collection and coordination of geologic data · 

relating to all possible theaters of operations. 

3. A staff of geologic engineer reserve officers 

should be organized. This should be made up 

of experienced professional geologists who 

should receive the special peace-time training 

necessary to develop them to their full usefulness when called into active service.