3 55 FBI COUNTERINTELLIGE NCE PROGRAMS

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KANSAS STATfc UNlVuHStTV

BE FO RE TH E

CIV IL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 

SUBCOMMITTEE

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OF TH E

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDIC IARY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIV ES

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

FB I COUN TERINTELLIG ENCE PROGRAMS

NOVEMBER 20, 1974

Serial No. 55

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judic iar y

43-721

U.S . GOVERNM ENT PR INTING OFF ICE

WA SHING TO N : 197 5
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

PET E R W. RO DINO , JR., New Je rs ey , C hair m an

H A R O LD D. DO NO HU E, M as sa ch use tts 

JA C K BR OOKS, Tex as 

RO B ER T W. KAST EN M EI ER , W isc on sin 

DO N ED W ARDS, Cal ifor ni a 

W IL L IA M L. HU NG AT E, M isso ur i 

JO H N CO NY ER S, J r., M ichig an 

JO SH U A E IL B E R G , Pen ns yl van ia 

JE R O M E R. W ALD IE , Cal ifor ni a 

W A LTER FL OW ERS, Al ab am a 

JA M E S R. MA NN , So uth Car ol in a 

PA U L S. SA RB AN ES . M arylan d 

JO H N F. SEIB ERLIN G , Ohio 

GEORGE E. DA NI EL SO N, C al if orn ia 

RO B ER T F. DR IN AN , M as sa ch us et ts 

C H A R LE S B. RA NG EL , New York 

BA RBA RA JO RD AN , Te xa s 

RA Y TH ORNTON, A rk an sa s 

E L IZ A B E T H HO LT ZM AN , New Yo rk 

W AYNE OW EN S, U ta h 

EDW ARD MEZ VINS KY , Io wa

ED WAR D HU TC HIN SO N, Michiga n 

RO BER T Mc CLOR Y, Illino is 

HEN RY P. SM IT H III, New Yo rk 

CH ARL ES W. SAN DMAN, J r., N ew Je rs ey 

TOM RA IL SB AC K, Il linois 

CH ARL ES E. W IG GIN S, C al if or ni a 

DA VI D W. DENNIS , In dia na 

HA M IL TO N FIS H , ,Tr., New York 

W IL EY MA YNE, Iowa 

LA W RE NC E J. HO GA N, M ar yl an d 

M. CA LD W EL L BUTLER , V ir gi ni a 

W IL LIA M S. CO HE N, Maine 

TREN T LO TT , M ississ ippi 

HA RO LD V . FR OE HL TC H, W isco ns in 

CA RLOS J. MO OR HE AD , C al if orn ia 

JO SE PH J. MARA ZITI, New Je rs ey 

DELB ERT L. LA TT A, Ohio

J erom e M. Zeif m a n, G ener al C ounse l

Garner J. Cl in e, A sso cia te G en er al C ou ns el

H erbert F u c h s, C ounse l

W il li am P. Sh a tt uck, C oun se l

H. Ch r is t o ph er Noi.de, C oun se l

Alan A. P ar ke r, C ouns el

Mau ric e A. Barboza, C ounse l

J am es F. F alc o, C ounse l

Danie l L. Co h en, C oun se l

Arth ur P. E nd re s, Jr. , C ounse l

Robe rt J. Tra inor, C ou nse l

F ranklin G. P olk , C ounse l

T ho ma s E. Moo ney, C oun se l

Mic hael W. Blo mmer, C ounse l

Alexander B. Cook, C oun se l

Const antin e J. Gek a s, C ounse l

Alan F. Co ff ey, J r., C ou ns el

K en n eth N. K lee, C ounse l

Civ il R ig h t s an d Co n stit u tio n a l R ig h t s S ubcom m it te e

DON ED WAR DS , Cal ifor ni a, C hair m an

JE R O M E R. W AL DI E, Cal ifor ni a 

PA U L S. SA RB AN ES , M ar yl an d 

RO B ER T F. DR IN AN , M as sa ch use tts 

C H A R LE S B. RA NG EL , New York

CH ARL ES E. WIG GI NS , C al if or ni a 

ROBER T McCLORY, Il linois 

M. CA LD WEL L BUTL ER , V ir gin ia 

TREN T LO TT , M issis sip pi

Alan A. P ar ke r, C oun se l

Ard en B. Sc h ell, A s s is ta n t C ounse l

J an et M. McNair, A s s is ta n t C ounse l

Mic h a el W. Blo mmer , A sso cia te C ou ns el

(I I)
C O N T E N T S

Testimony—

Silberman, Laurence, Deputy Attorney General of the United States, 

accompanied by Clare nce M. Kelley, Directo r, Burea u of Inv estigation, and Henry E. Petersen, Assistan t Attorney General, Criminal

Division __________________________________________________ 4

Statem ent of—

Saxbe, lion. William B., Attorney General________________________ 9

Pete rsen Repor t_______________________________________________ 10

Statem ent of Hon. Clarence M. Kelley, Dire ctor, FB I______________ 44

Supplemental mate ria l_____________________________________________ 44

Background inform atio n_______________________________________ 45

OIL

FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

W ED N E SD A Y , N O V EM B E R 20 , 19 74

H ouse of R ep re se nta ti ves ,

Civ il R ig hts an d C onst it uti onal R ig h ts S ubco m m it te e

of t h e C om m it te e on t h e J ud ic ia ry ,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in Room

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Don Edwards 

[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Pres ent: Representatives Edwards, Waldie, Sarbanes, Drina n, 

Rangel, Wiggins, McClory, and Butler.

Also present: Alan A. Parker, counsel; Arden B. Schell, assistant 

counsel; and Kenneth N. Klee, associate counsel.

Mr. E dwards. The subcommittee will come to order.

This past Monday, November 18, Attorney General William B. 

Saxbe released a report regarding F BI Counterintelligence programs.

We have invited the Attorney General and Mr. Lawrence Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, is here in his place, along with Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen, and the Director of th e 

Fede ral Bureau of Investigation, Clarence M. Kelley, to be with us 

today to discuss this report. The purpose of our discussion today is 

not to elicit specific details concerning specific groups or individuals. 

We must be mindful as we proceed with our responsibility to protect 

individual privacy and not to foster or be the vehicle for the dissemination of potentially harmful or damaging allegations in the course of 

this meeting.

With that caveat in mind, however, I do believe it essential to begin 

the free exchange of information which will enable this subcommittee 

to satisfy itself tha t the practices outlined in the repo rt will be controlled in the future (as my colleague, Mr. Wiggins, has stated) by a 

mechanism based on more than simple good faith.

Let me recount some background in order to set the stage for our 

meeting.

The subcommittee’s attention was first directed to allegations of 

questionable FBI activities when materials surfaced after an FB I office 

was broken into in Media, Pa., in 1971. Following that break-in, a suit 

was brought under the Freedom of In form ation Act by NBC newsman 

Carl Stern. Aft er an 18-month court battle, the FB I recently released 

a number of memoranda which surfaced the so-called “C OIN TEL 

PR O” operations.

The potential for invasions of constitutionally protected rights was 

apparent, and a letter requesting a review of the operations of the FB I 

was signed by Chairman Rodino, and sent to the Comptroller Gen- 

(1)
2

eral of the United States, Elmer B. Staats, on Ju ne 3,1974. Since that 

date numerous meetings have been held between our staff and the staff 

of the Comptroller General, between the staff of the Comptroller General and the F BI , and between the Comptroller General, personally, the 

Attorney General and the Director of the FB I.

Today, nearly 6 months afte r Chairm an Rodino’s original request, 

the GAO, the official congressional auditing agency, has still been 

denied access.

In Jun e 1974, we became aware of the investigation and report of 

the Petersen committee. Chairman Rodino requested the report by 

letter to the Attorney General on June 28, 1974. The following has 

tran spired since tha t da te:

July 10, 1974—The Attorney General advised Chairm an Rodino 

that he and Mr. Kelley had, in executive session, briefed the Senate 

FB I Oversight Committee and offered in that letter to similarity brief 

Mr. Rodino and Mr. Hutchinson.

July 12, 1974—Chairman Rodino asked the Attorney General to 

brief this subcomittee, as the approp riate oversight entity. No response 

was received.

August 14, 1974—Chairman Rodino again asked the Attorney General that this subcommittee be briefed on the Petersen report. No response was received.

Monday, November 11, 1974—Chairman Rodino and Mr. Hutchison 

were briefed by Attorney General Saxbe and Mr. Kelley. Chairman 

Rodino urged that the Petersen report be made public and tha t Mr. 

Wiggins and I be briefed on the entire report. A meeting was ar ­

ranged for this past Saturday. As you know, tha t morning the Saturday Washington Star-News carried the entire story before we met.

I feel tha t I must express my personal reactions to the revelation 

of the briefing last Saturday. They were of utmost concern and dismay. and I called an emergency session of the subcommittee the following Monday, at which meeting today’s he aring was scheduled.

This subcommittee is charged with legislative and oversight juri sdiction over the constitutional rights of American citizens. We take 

this responsibility most seriously. No provision of the Constitution, 

law enacted by Congress, or Presidential executive order—in my 

view—has authorized activities by the FB I such as those described in 

the Petersen report. When I was an FB I agent may years ago. nothing 

in any manual or rule hook authorized such conduct, and if they do 

today, they are without legal license.

Regardless of the unattractiveness or noisy militancy of some pr ivate citizens or organizations, the Constitution does not permit Federal interference with their activities except through the criminal 

justice system, armed with its ancient safeguards. There are no exceptions. No Federal agency, the CIA, the IRS , or the FB I, can be 

at the same time policeman, prosecutor, judge, and jury. That is what 

constitutionally guaranteed due process is all about. It may sometimes be disorderly and unsatisfactory to some, but it is the essence 

of freedom.

I am disturbed by the spirited defense of the F BI's CO INT ELP RO 

program by Mr. Kelley. In his November 18 statement Mr. Kelley 

seems to say that the mere invocation of the catch phrase “national
3

security” justified the CO INT ELPRO program ’s frightening litany 

of Government violations of constitutional rights.

I suggest tha t the philosophy supporting CO INT ELPRO is the 

subversive notion that any public official, the President or a policeman, 

possesses a kind of inherent power to set aside the Constitution whenever he thinks the public interest, or national security warrants it. 

That notion is the postulate of tyranny.

Law enforcers cannot be lawbreakers. Attorney General Saxbe has 

characterized aspects of these activities as “abhorrent in a free society”. I join in tha t statement and commend the Attorney General 

for making this information public. We on th is subcommittee intend 

to assist him in making sure that the full story is told and that serious 

efforts are begun for exercising responsible congressional oversight in 

this area.

In order for this subcommittee to make the prop er kind of determination in the exercise of its legislative oversight responsibilities, 

we must have correct, factual and complete information. Our request 

to the General Accounting Office to proceed with its audit and general 

review was but one step in tha t direction—this hearing is another.

I can assure you th at this subcommittee takes its jurisdiction and its 

responsibilities in this matter most seriously. What we begin here today, we shall vigorously continue in the future.

I wish to than k Mr. Kelley, Mr. Petersen, and Mr. Silberman, representing the Attorney General, for accepting our invitation on such 

short notice.

Mr. Wiggins, do you desire to make an opening statement.

Mr. Wiggins. Yes; I do, Mr. Chairman.

I concur in many of the remarks of my subcommittee chairman.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, tha t what we are here to discuss 

are the counterintelligence and intelligence activities conducted in the 

past by the FB I and the Department of Justice and to insure tha t in 

the future those activities shall in all cases be consistent with the law.

I see no great public benefit in attemp ting to assess responsibility for 

past actions, since there is a clear policy direction from the present 

Attorney General that such conduct shall not reoccur. But we do have 

the responsibility, Mr. Chairman, to monitor by careful oversight the 

activities of the Department to see tha t tha t policy is implemented 

in the future.

I fully expect the cooperation of the Department of Justice and 

the FB I in pursuit of these oversight responsibilities.

Of necessity however, our initial inquiry is going to focus upon the 

operation described as COINT ELPRO. I am concerned, Mr. Chairman tha t a description of those activities may probably prejudice na ­

tional security concerns, may probably tend to defame, degrade, or 

ridicule individuals, and may tend to prejudice constitutional rights 

and statutory rights of privacy of those individuals.

We expect our witnesses to be candid with us and I am concerned 

that t hat candor is properly within the context of a public hearing. We 

are here to discuss high ly sensitive m aterial; namely, the intelligence 

activities of the Department of Justice.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like to 

ask just a few prelim inary questions of all three witnesses.
4

I will di rect the question to you, Mr. Silbe rm an, an d will expect 

response s, if the re is a co ntrary po int of view, by Mr. Kelley and Mr. 

Pe tersen .

In ord er to describe the activ ities ge neral ly known as C O IN TELPR O , Air. Silbe rm an, is there a likelihood th at th e p ers onal repu tatio n 

of an y in dividu al may be defam ed or dis graced ?

TESTIMONY OP LAURENCE H. SILBERMAN, DEPUTY ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY:

CLARENCE M. KELLEY, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF FEDERAL IN ­

VESTIGATION, AND HENRY E. PETERSEN , ASSISTANT ATTORNEY

GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION

Mr. Silberman. Dependin g upon the scope of th e questions, I thi nk 

th er e is v ery much t h at danger, Congres sman W igg ins .

Air. W iggins. I s there the po ssibi lity th at fu ll an d cand id answers 

may jeop ardize the personal se curity o f ind ivi du als?

Air. Silberman. Again, d ep en din g on the scope o f the qu estions, the 

answ er, of course, is yes.

Mr. W iggins. I s there the po ssibi lity th at fu ll an d candid answers 

com passed wi thin the C O IN TELPR O prog ram wi thou t ru nn ing the 

risk whic h y ou h ave ju st describ ed ?

Mr. Silberm an. No t f ull y, no. because when we get into th e question 

of i nd ivid ua l gro ups we have rig ht s o f p riv acy which we are qu ite concerne d abo ut.

Air. W iggins. I s t here a ris k to natio nal security—a nd I might add 

th at th at term in ou r rules is not confined to ex ter nal th re at s to the 

se cu rit y of this natio n—if full and candid ans wers to que stio ns con ­

ce rn in g th e CO IN TELPRO are disclo sed to th is comm ittee .

Mr. Silberman. Ce rta inly with res pect to some po rtion s of wh at 

have been referre d to as the counterintellige nce program s.

Air. AVigginb. In lig ht of those ans wers do eith er Afr. Peterson or Air. 

Ke lle y tak e exception to the rem arks of the D ep uty Atto rney G ene ral.

Air. P etersen. Not a t all.

Air. Kelley. I do not.

Mr. AViggins. In l ight of t hat , Air. Ch air man, the Ch air m ay wish on 

its own motion to move th at th ese h earin gs be closed a nd t hat we pr oceed i n executive session.

Air. E dwabds. Do you so move ?

Air. W iggins. I am first inv iti ng you to do so.

Air. E dwards. Air. AA7aldie.

Mr. W aldie. I wish to spea k in open session to the im plication th at 

a case ha s been mad e th at the rule of the House dema nd ing executive 

sessions w hen m ate ria l is b ein g add uce d th at will t en d to degra de a nd 

defame—I do not believ e t ha t the answers have in fact m ade th at case. 

Arv own belief is th at when a que stio n is asked th at wou ld elic it a 

response th at would fall wi thin those proh ibi tio ns, th at then is the 

tim e to adv anc e the pro posal t h at we go in to executive session.

I must sav ex ecutive sessions do not seem to me to be the way to p ro ­

tec t the privacy of i nd ivi du als and org aniza tio ns. It is the invasion of 

th eir privac y th at was done in an executive manne r th at has even
5

brought about the necessity of these hearings. When the cloak of secrecy surrounds the activities of the agencies that are presently being 

examined by this committee, privacy suffers. I t is not enhanced, and 

it does not seem to me that this legislative branch should in any way 

be a contributor to the aura of secrecy that has been established and 

brought about by w hat appears, on the face, to have been an abuse of 

executive power. I believe the facts warran t an open and candid investigation and examination of those facts. 1 f there is an instance when 

an individual will be injured by any testimony that will be adduced by 

any particular question, that would be the time to assert the application 

of the rule and not during the hypothetical problem posed here that 

might eventually occur.

Mr. E dwards. Mr. McClory.

Mr. McClory. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The preliminary question, directed by my colleague, Mr. Wiggins, 

indicates very positively tha t it would be prop er for our committee to 

close this hearing to the public, and it seems to me that this is the proper 

time for us to take that action.

Clause 27 (f) (2) of rule XI of the rules of the House refers to a 

committee meeting where all or pa rt of the remainder of a hearing 

would involve testimony, evidence or other matters which might endang er the national security, or, to other rules of the House such as 

rule X I, clause 27(m ), where the hearing may tend to defame, degrade 

or incriminate any person. Then the rule is th at we shall take action 

to receive the testimony in this case in executive session.

Now, I feel very jealous of the prerogatives of this committee. I 

don’t want us to have a hearing here which does nothing more than to 

reiterate what we have read in the papers or what we have seen in 

press releases. If we are going to perform a true oversight function, it 

seems to me we havfe to get into the details, personal details, involving 

names and events and other detailed inform ation which is vital for us 

to receive in order to determine to what extent, if to any extent whatsoever, the jurisdiction and authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been excepted.

I am very anxious that we protect the civil rights of all concerned, 

including those that have been subjected to this counterintelligence 

activity, but likewise the individual rights of those who may be named 

in the course of this hearing; and I am confident that we can do a more 

thorough and a more responsible job consistent with our oversight 

functions if we take action under clause 27 to have the meeting closed.

Mr. Wiggins. Would you yield?

Mr. McClory. Yes.

Mr. Wiggins. I would like the members to know what my inten ­

tion is.

I have not yet made the motion to close the hearing into executive 

session, but that would be my inten tion; however, I would like the 

members to know t hat it seems to me that there will certainly come 

a time when open hearings into this subject will be completely proper, 

but we are treading on new ground here. We do not fully understand 

the scope of the testimony which is about to be offered nor the possible sensitive nature of it, and before we barge ahead in public, I 

would think that the bette r part of discretion is tha t we have what 

amounts to a briefing session in advance with these distinguished wit43 -7 21— 71
nesses so as to understand the scope of the ir testimony, the likely 

nature of it. and its possible sensitivity.

It is very difficult to discuss these important preliminary matters 

in an open session, and that is my motive in preparing at least to 

offer a motion to close.

Mr. E dwards. Mr. Sarbanes.

Mr. Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, I would oppose the motion to close 

and I simply want to note tha t the chairman of the full committee, 

Chairman Rodino, wrote on three separate occasions to the Attorney 

General with respect to a report on tnese activities, tha t no answer at 

all was forthcoming to the latter two of those letters, and that on the 

18th of November, namely, on Monday of this week, the Attorney 

General in an open public briefing session to the press promised either 

to give the entire contents or at least a considerable portion of a summarized version thereof of the Petersen report to the press in a public 

session.

The Director has issued, I gather, a public statement as a followup to the statement of the Attorney General’s, and it seems to me 

that at a minimum we should proceed here now in an open fashion 

to consider a briefing with respect to those materials and questions 

pertaining thereto.

The response to the questions addressed by Mr. Wiggins earlier 

obviously indicate tha t in part whether we even begin to involve any 

question of the rules depends on the scope of the questioning and 

there is certainly plenty of material to be reviewed and briefed to 

thi s committee and inquired about, which has already been done in 

an open and public manner by the Department to the press, and it 

seems to me that the committee ought to proceed in open session at 

least until we have explored tha t matter.

Mr. Edwards. We will recess for purposes of the vote until 2:45.

TShort recess.]

Mr. E dwards. The subcommittee will come to order.

Mr. Wiggins.

Mr. Wiggins. Mr. Chairman, we have discussed where the votes 

are. and I have four, the chairman has four, and unfortunately I must 

make a motion. And that means the motion will not prevail; but let 

us go through the motion. Mr. Chairman.

I move t hat these hearings be closed and that the committee adjourn into executive session for the purpose of hearing the testimony 

of the witnesses.

The motion is made pursuant to the rules of the committee and 

the rules of the House.

Mr. Edwards. Those in favor of the motion signify by raising their 

hands.

[Wiggins and McClory raised their hands.]

Mr. Edwards. Those opposed?

[Drinan, Sarbanes. Waldie, and Edwards raised their hands.]

Mr. Edwards. Fou r to four. The motion does not carry.

Air. Silberman. I would be glad to cast a vote if you need someone to break a tie.

Mr. Edwards. You have to go through an election, Mr. Silberman.

Mr. Silberman. Air. Kelley or Air. Petersen, do any of you have 

opening statements?
z

Mr. Silberman. Yes, 1 have a brief statement I would like to make.

Mr. Edwards. Mr. McClory.

Mr. McClory. As I read the rule, it says that the motion is to be 

determined on a rollcall vote and I suggest a rollcall.

Mr. Edwards. The Clerk will call the roll.

Mr. Parker. Mr. Waldie.

Mr. Waldie. No.

Mr. Parker. Mr. Sarbanes.

Mr. Sarbanes No.

Mr. Parker. Mr. Drinan.

Mr. Drinan. No.

Mr. Parker. Mr. Rangel.

[No response.]

Mr. Parker. Mr. Wiggins

Mr. Wiggins. Aye.

Mr. Parker. Mr. McClory.

Mr. McClory. Aye.

Mr. Parker. Mr; Butler.

Mr. Wiggins. Proxy Aye.

Mr. Parker. Mr. Latta.

Mr. Wiggins. Proxy Aye.

Mr. Parker. Mr. Edwards.

Mr. Edwards. No.

Air. Parker. The vote, Mr. Chairman, is four to four. The motion 

fails.

Mr. Edwards. The motion fails.

Mr. Silberman?

Mr. Silberman. Yes, Mr. Chairman. T would just like to make a 

few brief remarks concerning some of the matter you alluded to in 

your opening statement.

The Attorney General has in previous conferences with the chairman of the full committee indicated his desire to arrive at a consensus 

or an understanding with Chairman Rodino as to the most effective 

manner in w’hich this subject, which is discussed here today, as well 

as other subjects, could be discussed with the appropriate committee 

or subcommittee of the House.

We have been faced, Mr. Chairman, with conflicting demands from 

several committees. As you may be aware, the subject which is discussed here today has in some respects been alluded to and explored 

by Congressman Tchord’s committee, which T understand still has 

hearings going on. on this subject. Beyond tha t, Congressman Kastenmeier has written letters to the Attorney General asking for responses 

on a number of materials, a number of questions which we feel fall 

within the province of an FB I oversight committee.

Now, the Senate did in fact set up a special subcommittee of the 

Jud iciary Committee of the Senate, which is an FB I oversight subcommittee, and to which the Attorney General in the spring of last 

year brought all of the matters concerning the counterintelligence 

programs, otherwise referred to as COINT ELP RO.

It is our view, of course, and a number of other people have expressed the view tha t it may be wise to have a joint Senate-House 

committee, but of course, that is a m atter for the House and the Senate to determine. But in any event, I have talked to Chairman Rodino,
even as late as yesterday, concerning the question of whether or not 

he or others would set up one committee whose only function would 

be FB I oversight, because we regard tha t as a terrib ly important 

ma tter and we think this Congress ought to be set up to respond to 

that challenge.

So that has been a matter that has been under discussion for a 

number of months and from my understanding from Chairman 

Rodino yesterday, it is still not finally determined.

Mr. Edwards. Mr. Silberman, back in June the Chairman of the 

full committee assigned this responsibility. Attorney General Saxbe 

has a number of letters so stating. This is a matter for the House of 

Representatives to determine.

Mr. Silberman. Absolutely.

Mr. Edwards. And we have made this determination and we will 

now proceed.

Do you have a statement, any of the three of you gentlemen, on the 

prog ram itself, which is the subject of this hearing.

Mr. Silberman. No, we are here prepared to respond to your questions, Air. Chairman. We didn’t have time to prepare a statement.

Mr. Edwards. I just have one very short question before I yield to 

my colleagues.

Air. Kelley, is this program still in operation to any extent 

whatsoever?

Air. Kelley. The COINT ELPRO program is not in existence at 

this time.

Air. E dwards. Air. Kelley, Air. Petersen, to the best of your knowledge, did the program, when it was in existence, entail any burglaries, 

electronic surveillance, wiretaps, or violence by governmental 

employees?

Air. P etersen. We came across no evidence of that in the examination we conducted, which was an examination of CO INT EL files. But 

I have to be candid. While electronic—first of all there was no evidence of burglary or assault or anything like tha t involved, but with 

respect to electronic surveillance, well, electronic surveillance was not 

part of the program. It may have been that some who were subject 

to counterintelligence activity were under other areas of the Bureau’s 

activities also subject to electronic surveillance. Fo r example, there 

is a suit pending by the Socialist Workers Pa rty which alleges illegal 

electronic surveillance, which the Government is defending. They have 

subsequently amended their complaint to include allegations based 

upon the counterintelligence program. So I don’t want to mislead you. 

So far as I was able to determine, and the Bureau supports this in 

the ir commentarv to us, electronic surveillance as such was not part 

of the COINTE LPR O program.

Air. E dwards. Thank you.

Mr. Wiggins.

Mr. Wiggins. Air. Silberman, thus far, what this committee knows 

about the counterintelligence program it has obtained as a result of 

priv ate briefings from the Attorney General and matters contained in 

the press.

I would like you as pa rt of your testimony to lay the record before 

this committee and, therefore, before the Congress, with respect to the 

inception of the program, how long it was maintained, what its activi-
9

ties were, and the number of individual cases where the program was 

applied. In short, Mr. Silberman, we should have for our record, at 

least, a history of what has occurred.

Mr. Silberman. Mr. Wiggins, I thin k the answers to all of those 

four questions are contained in the document which the Attorney General released on Monday and which I would ask be made p art of this 

record.

Mr. Wiggins. Mr. Chairman, I request tha t the Attorney General’s 

statement with respect to the CO INT EL program be made a part of 

our record at this point.

Mr. Edwards. Without objection it will be entered.

[The prepared statement of Hon. William B. Saxbe follows:]

Statement of Hon. William B. Saxbe, Attorney General ofthe United States

In Janu ary of this year during the course of my initial briefing on current issues 

facing the Department of Justice, I was informed of the existence of an FBI 

“Counterintelligence Program”.

After ascertaining the general thrust of the counterintelligence programs, I 

directed Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen to form a committee charged 

with the responsibility of conducting a complete study and preparing a report for 

me which would document the Bu reau’s activities in each of the separate counterintelligence programs. That study committee consisted of four Criminal Division 

representatives and three representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, selected by Director Kelley.

The Committee’s report to me stated th at there were seven separate programs— 

. five directed at domestic organizations and individuals, and two programs directed 

at foreign intelligence services, foreign organizations and individuals connected 

with them. These programs were implemented at various times during the period 

from 1956 to 1971 when all programs were discontinued. The Committee furthe r 

found tha t 3247 counterintelligence proposals were submitted of which 2370 

were approved. In 527 instances, known results were ascertained.

It is not my intention at this time to detail for you the p articulars of the seven 

programs inasmuch as you have been provided with a copy of the Committee’s 

report which has been edited to delete national security information. That document describes fully the activities involved in each of the programs.

The materials released today disclose that, in a small number of instances, 

some of these programs involved what we consider today to be improper activities. 

I am disturbed about those improper activities. However, I want to stress two 

things: first, most of the activities conducted under these counterintelligence 

programs were legitimate—indeed, the programs were in response to numerous 

public and even Congressional demands for stronger action by the Federal 

Government. Second, to the extent th at there were, nevertheless, isolated excesses, 

we have taken steps to prevent them from ever happening again. In this connction, Director Kelley last December sent a memorandum to FBI personnel 

strongly reaffirming the Bureau policy th at: “FBI employees must not engage 

in any investigative activity which could abride in any way the rights guaranteed 

to a citizen of the United States by the Constitution and under no circumstances 

shall employees of the FBI engage in any conduct which may result in defaming 

the character, reputation, integrity, or dignity of any citizen or organization of 

citizens of the United States.”

Attorney General William B. Saxbe and Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Director Clarence M. Kelley released today the details of certain counterintelligence programs conducted by the FBI from 1956 to 1971 against several domestic 

and foreign-based subversive or disruptive groups, organizations, and individuals.

These efforts, which carried the designation “COINTELPRO,” were targeted 

against the Communist Party U.S.A., the Socialist Workers Party, the New 

Left, White Hate groups, and Black Extremist organizations, as well as certain 

espionage operations and hostile foreign-based intelligence services.

The materials released today significantly expand upon material released in 

December, 1973, by Director Kelley concerning the counterintelligence program
10

co nducte d again st ra dic al an d vi ol en t el em en ts as p a rt of th e COIN TELP RO— 

New L ef t.

F B I C O IN TELI’RO Act ivities

I. INTRODUCTION

In F all , 1973, th e D ep ar tm en t of Ju sti ce disc lose d cert ain do cu m en ts re la ti ng 

to a “c ounte ri nt el ligen ce ” pr og ra m of th e F edera l B ure au of In ves tigat io n 

en ti tl ed "C O IN TELPRO — New L ef t.” Am ong th e do cu m en ts disclosed w as a 

u ir ecti v e in dic ati ng th a t th e FB I had also in sti tu te d six oth er co unt er in te llig en ce 

p ro g ra m s ( ‘‘C O IN T E LPR O '') , to w it : E sp io nag e; W hi te H ate G ro ups; Comm u n is t P a rt y , U .S .A .; Sp ec ial O pera ti ons; Black E x tr em is ts an d th e So cial ist 

W ork ers P a rt y . Bas ed on th es e di sc lo su re s, addit io nal re ques ts ha ve been mad e 

fo r num er ous ot her do cu men ts re la ti ng to th es e F B I COIN TELPR O ac tivi ties . 

T his p ap er is in res po nse to th ose re qu es ts.

Ia Ja n u a ry , 1974 A ttor ne y G en er al W illiam Sa xb e re qu es te d A ss is ta nt A tto rn ey 

G ener al H en ry Pet er se n to form a co m m itt ee to review th es e FB I COIN TELP RO 

acti vit ie s. T he Com mittee w as chai re d by A ss is ta nt A ttorn ey G en er al Pet er se n, 

and co nsi st ed o f fo ur Crim in al Div isio n re pre se nta ti ves an d th re e FB I re pre ­

sen ta ti v es se lected by F B I D irec to r C lare nc e Ke lley.

In Ju ne, 1974 th e var io us COIN TELPR O pro gr am s we re d iscu ss ed a t leng th by 

A ttorn ey G en er al Sa xb e an d F B I D ir ec to r Ke lle y w ith th e F B I O ve rsig ht Su bcom m itte e of th e Sen at e Ju dic ia ry Com mittee . Mo re re ce nt ly, th e COIN TE LP RO 

a cti v it ie s of th e FB I were disc us se d by A ttor ne y G en er al Sax be and D irec to r 

Kelley w ith C ha irm an Ro dino and R an kin g M in or ity Mem be r H ut ch in so n of th e 

H ou se Ju d ic ia ry Co mm ittee.

II . TH E COINTELPRO PROGRAMS

.4. Orig in, scope, an d ob jectives of CO IN TELPRO act iv it ie s

T he te rm "C O IN TELPRO ” is a ge ne ric te rm us ed by th e F B I to de sc ribe s even 

se p a ra te “c ou nt er in te llig en ce ” pro gra m s which th e B ure au im plem en ted at d if ­

fe re n t tim es duri ng th e pe riod fr om 1956 to 1971, wh en all were disc on tin ue d. 

Fiv e o f th es e pr og ra m s we re di re ct ed at do mes tic -bas ed gro up s ami in div id ual s— 

Com m un ist P art y . U.S .A., th e fo re ru nner of all oth er COIN TELPR O S (195 6- 

197 1) ; Soc ia list W or ke rs P art y (19 61-19 70) ; W hi te H ate Gro up s (1964-1 971) ; 

B la ck E xtr em is ts (19 67- 1971) ; an d Ne w L ef t (196 8-19 71 ). Th e do cu men ts 

au th o ri zin g th es e five pro gr am s defin e th eir ob jective as be ing eit her sim ply th e 

d is ru p ti o n o f th e gro up ’s a c ti v it ie s; o r th e d is ru ption, e xp os ur e an d n eutr ali zati on 

th ere of.

T he o th er tw o COIN TELP RO pro gra m s were in th e are a of fo re ig n counte rin te llig en ce — Es pion ag e or Sov ie t-Sat el lite In te llig en ce , whi ch w as in eff ect fr om 

1964 to 19 71 ; an d Sp ec ial O pe ra tion s, which was in effect fr om 1967 to 1971. 

A cc or di ng to B ur ea u do cu men ts, th e ov er al l ob jectives of th es e tw o pr ogra m s 

w er e to en co ur ag e an d st im ula te a vari ety of co un te ri nte llig en ce ef fo rts again st 

host il e fo re ig n inte lli ge nc e so ur ce s, fo re ig n Com m un ist org an iz at io ns an d in div id u als co nn ec ted w ith them .

B. T h e ba ck gr ou nd an d co nte xt o f C O IN TELPRO act iv itie s

A fa ir , accura te and co m pr eh en sive unders ta ndin g of th e var io us COIN TELPR O acti vit ie s under ta ken by th e F B I is po ssible on ly in li ght of th e co nte xt 

an d cl im ate in which th e pr ogra m s were es ta bl ishe d.

As in dic at ed above, COIN TELPRO —C om m un ist P art y, US A w as th e pre dece ss or— and in som e re sp ec ts th e mo del—o f su bs eq ue nt F B I COIN TELP RO 

acti vit ie s. T he Com mun ist P art y , US A pr og ra m gr ew out of th e “R ed Sca re ” 

of th e earl y an d middle 1950's. T his er a of American pol itic al his to ry was ch aracte ri zed by th e gro w th an d de clin e of “M cC art hyis m ;” nu m er ou s an d wellpublici ze d “spy tr ia ls ;” an d, in ge ne ra l, a pre vai ling view in Con gress an d th e 

A m er ic an peop le th a t th e F edera l Gov er nm en t sh ou ld ta k e appro pri ate st ep s 

a g a in st do mes tic su bv ersion . The pe riod w as also ch ara cte ri zed by a w id es pr ea d 

co nce rn th a t su bv er sive elem en ts, sp ea rh ea de d by th e Com m un ist P art y , w er e 

n o t on ly pe rv as ive, but were al so in var yin g de gr ee s ef fe ct iv e in su ch are as as 

sa bota ge and esp iona ge . Moreover, al th ough do m es tica lly ba sed, it was cle ar 

th a t th e op er at io ns an d acti vit ie s of th e Com m un ist P a rt y US A wer e in fa c t 

dir ecte d by fo re ig n co un trie s. In de ed , th e fa c t of fo re ig n (S ovi et ) di re ct io n an d 

co ntr ol of th e Com m un ist P a rt y US A w as reco gn ized by th e Su pr em e C ourt in 

C om m unis t P a rt y USA v. U nited Sta te s, 368 U.S . 871.
11

The original COINTELPRO was, then, conceived as a “counterintelligence” 

effort in the purest sense. Moreover, the overwhelming bulk of the activities 

carried out under the program were legitimate and proper intelligence and investigative practices and techniques. What was new in the COINTELPRO effort 

was primarily the targeting of these activities again st one specified group or category of organizations. Although, as discussed in more detail below, some COINTELPRO activities involved isolated instances of practices tha t can only be 

considered abhorrent in a free society, it is important to understand that these 

improper activities were not the purpose or indeed even the major characteristic 

of the F BI’s COINTELPRO efforts.

COINTELPRO—Socialist Workers Party, undertaken in 1961, appears to have 

been a direct outgrowth of the earlier effort targeted against the activities of 

the Communist P arty, USA. Later COINTELPRO activities were based on the 

Communist Party, USA model, but reflected the changing threats to domestic 

order tha t emerged in the decade of the 1960's.

The next COINTELPRO undertaken was against White Ila te Groups. This 

program, which began in 1964, grew out of the disruptive and harrassing activities of these groups in their attempt to subvert the civil rights movement. The 

activities of these groups were characterized by lynchings, burnings, bombings, 

and the like—a climate of violence and lawlessness which society and its law 

enforcement mechanisms seemed incapable of countering.

The next COINTELPRO undertaken was against Black Extremists in 1967. 

As in the case of the White Hate Groups, the activities of these extremist groups 

were marked by violence, arson and bombings. In addition, the activities of 

many of these extrem ist groups included police shootings and, as is well known, 

the fostering and fomenting of riots and other civil disturbances in cities all 

across the land.

Finally, many of these activities were led by or included individuals who 

publicly proclaimed their association with the political doctrines or leadership 

of hostile countries, including Communist nations.

The last domestic COINTELPRO was instituted in 1968 against the “New 

Left.” The origin and purposes of this effort were best described by FBI Director 

Kelley in a press release on December 7.1973 :

“In the late 1960’s, a hard-core revolutionary movement which came to 

be known as the ‘New Left’ set out, in its own words, to bring the Government to its knees through the use of force and violence.

“What started as New Left movement chanting of Marxist-Leninist slogans in the early years of their ‘revolution’ developed into violent contempt, 

not only for Government and Government officials, but for every responsible 

American citizen.

“During these years, there were over 300 arsons or attempted arsons, 14 

destructive bombings, 9 persons killed, and almost 600 injured on our college 

campuses alone. In the school year 1968-69, damage on college campuses 

exceeded 3 million dollars and in the next year mounted to an excess of 9.5 

million.

“In this atmosphere of lawlessness in the cities mobs overturned vehicles, 

set fires, and damaged public and private property. There were threats to 

sabotage power plants, to disrupt transportation and communications facilities. Intelligence sources informed the FBI of plans tha t were discussed to 

poison public w ater supplies.

“At this time of national crisis, the Government would have been derelict 

in its duty had it not taken measures to protect the fabric of our society. 

The FBI has the responsibility of investigating allegations of criminal 

violations and gathering intelligence regarding threats to the country’s 

security. Because of the violent actions of the leadership of the New Left. 

FBI officials concluded that some additional effort must be made to neutralize and disrupt this revolutionary movement. This effort was called the 

‘Counterintelligence Program—New Left’ or ‘COINTELPRO-New Left.’

“While there is no way to measure the effect of the FB I’s attem pt at 

countersubversion, I believe t ha t it did have some impact on the crisis at 

tha t time.

“Now, in the context of a different era where peace has returned to the 

college campuses and revolutionary forces no longer pose a major threat 

to peace and tranquality of our cities, some may deplore and condemn 

the FBI’s use of a counterintelligence program—even against hostile and 

arrogant forces which openly sought to destroy this nation.
12

“I share the public’s deep concern about the citizen’s rig ht to privacy and 

the preservation of all rights guaranteed und er the Con stitution and Bill 

of R igh ts.”

As ind ica ted in Dire ctor Kelley’s statem ent—and as is apparen t in the case 

of all COIN TELPRO activities—“th ere is no way to measure the effect of the 

FB I’s attempt at countersubversion.” Unfortu nate ly, no empirical data exist 

wi th respec t to the effectiveness of the various COINTELPRO efforts und ertake n in countering the threats perceived to the domestic order. Perha ps the 

na tu re of intelligence work is such th at no such objective measure exists.

C. Au tho rization and implementation of COINTELPRO activities

According to FB I documents, all seven program s implemented under COINTE LP RO were specifically authorized by form er FB I Director J. Edgar Hoover. 

COINTELPRO programs were app arently not reporte d to any of the Attorneys 

General in office during the periods in which they were implemented. Only 

ce rta in aspects of the Bureau’s efforts to penetrate and dis rup t the Communist 

Par ty USA and White Hate Groups—appare ntly conducted under COINTELPRO alth ough not specifically sta ted as such (th e term “COIN TELPRO” was 

used only inside the Bu rea u), were repo rted to at least three Attorneys General 

and key White House staff of two Pre sidents between 1958 and 1969. It must 

he emphasized th at none of the activities so reporte d involved any improper 

conduct. One additional Attorney General during this perio d was briefed on 

the B urea u’s “counterattack” against the Communist Pa rty USA.

Fin ally, Bureau documents disclosed th at the House Appropriations Subcommitte e was briefed on the Burea u’s counterintelligen ce prog rams including the 

ch arac ter of COINTELPRO and examples of specific activities und erta ken 

in connection with this program, as ear ly as 1958. Under the directives establishin g the programs, no counterintellig ence actio n could be initiated by the 

field witho ut specific prior Bureau authorization. Except in a very small number 

of instan ces this policy was strictly adhered to. The gre at ma jority of actions 

were eit he r approved or disapproved at the Assistant Dire ctor level or above, 

while a very small number were acted on at a lower level.

D. Statist ical analysis of COINTELPR O a ctiv ities

As indicated above, the maximum time span of all seven COINTELPRO progra ms covered the period 1956 to 1971. All programs, however, were not in 

effect d uring this entire period.

With respect to the five programs directed at domestic-based orga niza tions 

and individuals, a total of some 3,247 proposals for counterintellig ence activity 

were subm itted by the various FB I field offices for consideratio n from the inception of the programs in 1956 to their termin atio n in 1971—more tha n ha lf 

of them aris ing under the Communist Pa rty USA program. Some 2,370 of these 

prop osals, or approxim ately 73%, were approved and implemented. Of those 

proposals which were approved and implemented, known results were obtained 

in only some 527, or approximate ly 22%.

The individ ual statistics on each of these five program s are as fo llows:

Organization

Approved and

Proposals implemented Known results

Communist party U.S A . ..................................................................................

Socialist Workers Party......................................................................................

White Hate Groups..............................................................................................

New Left,.............................................................................................................

Black Extremis ts............................... .................................................................

Tot al..........................................................................................................

1.85 0 1,3 88 222

72 46 13

404 289 139

381 285 77

540 362 76

3, 247 2,37 0 527

With respect to the two other “COINTELPRO” programs, Special Operations 

and Espionage or Soviet-Satellite Intelligence—both of which rela ted to operation s prima rily targ eted aga inst hostile foreign intelligence services, foreign 

organization s and individuals connected with them —no statistics a re set forth in 

this report. Because of the natur e of these activities, all documents relating to 

“Espionage or Soviet-Satellite Intelligence” are classified Secret, and a very substan tia l pa rt of the documents rela ting to ''Special Operations” are likewise 

classified Secret. Publication of these sta tistic s would be inappropriate in term s 

of th e national security.
13

E. Ana lysis of types of activity conducted under COINTELP RO domestic-based

programs

Reports with respe ct to the five domestic based COINTELPRO programs disclosed a close s imilarity in the types of a ctivities conducted und er each program, 

in general, the activitie s common to all programs may be grouped into approximately a dozen categories. As indicated above, the overw helming bulk of these 

activities were clearly legitim ate and prop er und ertakings, within the scope of 

the FB I’s ongoing responsibilities, and are listed as “COINTELPRO ’ activ ities 

only because they were reported as such. They may be cha racterized as follow s:

(1) Sending anonymous or fictitious materia ls to members or groups.—The 

vast majority of these actions consisted of item s of inform atio n designed to 

create dissention and cause disruption within the various groups. Of the tota l 

number of actions implemented under all five domestic based programs, 

approximately, 40% fell und er this category.

(2) Dissemin ation of public record info rmation to med ia sources.—Actions 

implemented und er thi s categ ory consistetd prim arily of making public source 

material available to friendly media representatives for the purpose of using 

such ma terial in a newspaper, magazine, or radio or telev ision program in order 

to expose the aims and activities of the various groups. This type of activity 

represented approximately 20% of all actions implemented under domestic 

COINTELPRO efforts. It was implemented in some 300 instances in connection 

with the Communist Pa rty USA progra m; in six instances in connection with 

the Socialist Workers P art y ; in 2G instanc es in connection with Black Extrem ists; in 15 instanc es in connection with White Hate Gro ups; and in 25 

instanc es in connection with th e New Left.

(3) Leaking info rma nt based on non-public inform atio n to media sources.—

Most of the actio ns implemented in this categ ory rel ate d to the leaking of investigative material to friendly media sources for the purp ose of exposing the 

nature , aims and membership of the various groups. There were no instances 

of this type of activity in connection with the Socialist Workers Pa rty program, 

and rela tively few in connection with the Communist Pa rty USA and New Left 

programs. Approximately one-seventh of the act ion s implemented under the 

Black Extremists program, and one-sixth of the actions implemented under the 

White Ilat e Groups program fell und er this category.

(4) Advising local, State and Federal authorities of civil and criminal violations by group members.—This act ivity—totally legal—represented app roximately 8% of the total number of actions implemented und er all five domestic 

based programs.

(5) Use of inform ants to disrupt a group's activities.—Most of the actions 

implem ented under this categ ory were for the purpose of using info rmants to 

dis rup t the activities of various groups by sowing dissention and exploiting 

disputes. No sta tistic s are ava ilable as to the num ber of instanc es of this type 

of act ivity in connection with the Communist Pa rty USA program, but it seems 

th at inform ants were used in thi s program to cause disrup tion but not as agents 

provocateurs. This type of activity represen ted less than two percent of the 

activities und ertake n in connection with the fou r oth er domestic based 

COINTELPRO programs.

(6) Inform ing employers, credit bureaus and creditors of members' a ctivities.—

The majority of actio ns implemented under this category consisted of notifying 

credit bureaus, cred itors, employers and prospective employers of members’ 

illegal, immoral, rad ical and Communist Pa rty activitie s in order to affect 

adve rsely their cre dit standing or employment sta tus . No s tat istics are available 

as to the number of instances in which thi s type of activity was used in connection with the Communist Pa rty USA program, alth ough the Bureau has 

reported th at it was used in a number of instances. It was used in only a small 

number of instances in connection with the four oth er domestic based 

COINTELPRO programs, namely in one instance in connection with the Socialist 

Workers Party, seven instanc es in connection with Black Extremists. 15 instances in connection with White Ilat e Groups, and 20 insta nces in connection 

with the New Left, or a total of some 43 instanc es in all domestic based 

COINTELPRO prog rams other tha n the Communist Pa rty USA.

(7) Inform ing or contacting businesses and persons with whom members had

economic dealings of members' aetv iitie s.—The ma jor ity of actio ns implem ented 

und er this categ ory consisted of notifying persons or businesses with whom 

members had economic dealings of the members’ association with the various 

groups involved for the purpose of adversely affecting their economic intere sts.

4 3 -7 2 1— 75------ 3
14

No in st ances of th is type of acti vit y were re port ed in co nn ec tio n w ith th e 

C om m unis t P art y USA pr og ra m . It was im plem en ted in only on e in st an ce in 

co nn ec tion w ith th e So cial ist W or ke rs P a rt y pro gr am , in 62 in st an ce s in co nnec ti on w ith th e Bla ck E xtrem is ts , 14 in st an ce s in co nn ec tio n w ith th e W hi te 

Ila te G ro up s, and ei ght in st an ce s in co nn ec tio n w ith th e Ne w Lef t, or a to ta l of 

so me 85 in st an ce s in a ll d om estic ba se d pr og ra m s.

(8 ) In te rv ie w in g or c on ta ct in g mem be rs .— Thi s ty pe of a cti vit y—a ga in , to ta lly 

le gal— w as im plem en ted in on ly a sm al l nu m ber of in st an ce s fo r th e pu rp os e of 

le tt in g mem be rs kn ow th at th e F B I was aw are of th eir acti vit y an d also in an 

a tt e m p t to de ve lop them as in fo rm an ts . No in st an ce s of th is type of a cti vit y were 

re p o rt ed in co nn ec tio n witli th e Com m un ist P a rt y USA , Soc ia lists W or ke rs P a rt y 

an d B la ck E xtr em is ts pr og ra m s, and in on ly ele ve n in st an ce s in co nn ec tio n w ith 

W hit e Ila te Group s an d in one in st an ce in co nn ec tio n w ith th e New Lef t. It 

sh ould be no ted th a t man y F B I lield offices carr ie d on th is ac ti vit y ro utinel y 

b u t di d no t a tt ri b u te it to a co un te rint el lige nc e fu nc tion but ra th e r to th e ro utine 

in vest ig ati on of in di vid ual s or org an iz at io ns .

(!>) A tt em p ti n g to use relig io us an d ci vi l lead er s and, o rg an isat io ns i n dis ru ptive

a cti vit ie s. — The m ajo ri ty of ac tion s im plem en ted unde r th is ca te go ry invo lved 

fu rn is h in g in fo rm at io n to civ ic an d relig io us le ad er s an d or gan iz at io ns in ord er 

to gain th eir su ppo rt an d to per su ad e them to ex ert pre ss ure on st ate an d loc al 

go ve rn m en ts , em ploy ers an d la ndlo rd s to th e detr im ent of th e va riou s grou ps . No 

in st ances of th is ty pe o f act iv ity w er e re por te d in co nn ec tio n w ith th e Com m un ist 

P a rt y USA pr og ra m . It was us ed in on ly 2 in st an ce s in co nn ec tio n w ith the 

S ocia li st W or ke rs P art y pr og ra m , in 36 in st an ce s in co nn ec tio n w ith Bl ac k 

E x tr em is ts , in 13 in st an ce s in co nn ec tio n w ith W hi te H ate Group s an d in 10 

in st ances in co nn ec tio n w ith th e Ne w Lef t, or a to ta l of some 61 in st an ce s in 

co nn ec tion w ith all do mestic ba se d pr og ra m s.

(1 0) A c ti v it y re la ted to po litica l or ju dic ia l processes.— Thi s ty pe of acti vit y 

re p re se n ts less th an one h alf of one per ce nt of all C O IN TELI’RO ac ti vit ie s— a 

to ta l of on ly 12 in st an ce s in co nn ec tio n w ith all five do mes tic ba sed pr og ra m s.

A ltho ug h sm all in nu mbe r, th es e 12 in st an ce s are am on g th e mos t trou bl in g 

in al l of th e C O IN TELI’RO effo rts . Con sequ en tly , in th e in te re st of fu ll dis ­

clo su re , th ey are de sc rib ed in deta il as fo ll o w s: tipp in g off th e pr es s th a t a 

w ri te -i n ca ndid ate fo r Con gress wou ld be att endin g a gro up’s m ee tin g a t a spe cific 

tim e an d plac e ; l ea ki ng in fo rm at io n to th e pr es s th a t a gr ou p official was a ct iv el y 

ca m paig nin g fo r a pe rson ru nnin g fo r pu blic office; fu rn is hin g th e a rr e st an d 

co nv ic tion re co rd of a mem be r of a grou p wh o w as candid ate fo r a loc al pu blic 

office to a fr ie ndly new sp ap er which pu bl ishe d th e in fo rm ati on; se nd in g an 

an on ym ou s le tt er to a pol itic al candid ate ale rt in g him th a t a gr ou p’s mem be rs 

w er e acti ve in hi s ca m pa ig n and ask in g th a t he no t be a tool of th e gro up; se ndin g an an on ym ou s le tt er to a loc al sch ool boa rd official, purp ort in g to be from 

a co nc er ne d par en t, al ert in g him th a t candid ate s fo r th e sch ool bo ar d w er e mem ­

bers of a gro up: m ai ling an an on ym ou s le tt er to a mem be r of a gr ou p wh o w as 

a m ayora lt y ca ndid ate in ord er to cre at e d is tr u st to w ar d his com ra des; fu rn is h ­

in g ba ck gr ou nd of a grou p wh o w as a ca ndid ate fo r pu blic office, in cl ud in g a rr ests 

an d ques tion ab le m ari ta l st atu s, to ne ws med ia co n ta cts ; fu rn is hin g pu blic 

so ur ce d ata on a gr ou p to a loca l gra nd ju ry chair m an wh o had re qu es te d it in 

co nn ec tion w ith th e gra nd ju ry ’s pr ob e of th e sh oo ting of police by gr ou p mem ­

b e r s ; fu rn is hin g in fo rm at io n co nc er ni ng a rr e sts of an in div id ual to a court th a t 

had ea rl ie r give n th is in di vi dua l a su sp en de d se nt en ce and also fu rn is hin g th is 

sa m e in fo rm at io n to his em pl oy er wh o la te r di sc ha rg ed th e in d iv id u al; mak in g 

an an on ym ou s te le ph on e ca ll to a de fe ns e att orn ey, a ft e r a F ed er al pr os ec ution 

h ad re su lted in a m is tr ia l, ad vis in g him (a ppare ntl y fa ls el y) th a t on e of th e 

d efe n d an ts an d an o th er we ll kn ow n gr ou p in di vid ual wer e F B I in fo rm an ts .

(1 1) E st ab lish in g sh am or ga ni za tion s fo r dis ru pti ve pu rp os es .— Thi s ty pe of 

acti v it y w as ut iliz ed on ly in co nn ec tio n w ith th e W hi te H ate Gro up s pro gr am 

an d w as im plem en ted in on ly five in st an ce s pri m ari ly fo r th e pu rp os e of us in g 

th e org an iz ati ons to send out m ate ri al in te nd ed to d is ru p t var io us su ch grou ps .

(1 2) In fo rm in g fa m il y or ot he rs of ra di ca l or im m or al a cti vit y— The m ajo ri ty 

of acti ons im plem en ted und er th is ca te go ry invo lved th e se nd in g of an on ym ou s 

co m m un ic at io ns to fa m ily mem be rs or gr ou ps to which in div id ual s be long ed 

advis in g th em of im mor al or ra dic al ac ti vit ie s on th e p a rt of var io us in div id ual s. 

T he se ac ti vit ie s re pre se nt a li tt le mor e th an one per ce nt of all CO IN TELI’RO 

acti v it ie s—a to ta l of som e th ir ty in st an ce s in all do mes tic -bas ed pr og ra m s. T his 

ty pe of acti vit y w as re por te d to ha ve been us ed in fr eq uen tl y in co nn ec tio n w ith
15

th e Com m un ist P a rt y US A pro gr am , and w as not us ed in co nn ec tio n with th e 

Soc ia list W or ke rs P a rt y pr og ra m , it w as re port ed to hav e been us ed in tw elv e 

in st an ce s in co nn ec tio n w ith th e Bla ck E x tr em is ts pr ogra m , in tw o in stan ce s in 

co nn ec tio n w ith W hi te H ate Group s, an d in 1G in st ances in co nn ec tio n w ith the 

Ne w Le ft.

In addit io n to th e ab ov e tw elve ca tego rie s, it w as fo un d th a t a sm all nu mbe r 

of m isce lla ne ou s ac tion s, ap pr ox im at el y 20 in st ances in al l th e do mestic -based 

pr og ra m s, w er e im pl em en ted which di d not tit in an y spec ific ca te go ry . Ag ain, 

it is appro pri ate in th e in te re st s of fu ll di sc lo su re th a t th es e acti vit ie s be set 

fo rt h in det ai l. The mos t eg re gi ou s ex am pl es of th es e m isce llan eo us type s of 

acti v it y a re as fo llow s: mak in g arr angem ents fo r lo ca l au th o ri ti es to sto p two 

gr oup mem be rs on a na rc ot ic s p re te x t and by p re arr an g em en t hav in g a police 

ra dio opera to r in dic at e th a t anoth er in div id ual w an te d th em to ca ll her with 

pu rp os e of hav in g th is in di vi dua l com e under su sp icio n as a po lic e in fo rm er ; 

us e of “citizen han d” ra di o, us in g th e sa m e fr eq uen cy be ing us ed by de m onst ra ­

to rs , to pr ov id e dis in fo rm ati on; m ak in g te le ph on e ca lls to pare n ts of mem be rs 

of a gr ou p ad vi si ng th em of th e co nn ec tio n of th e ir so n w ith th e gro up; or 

ad vis in g th e m ot he r of a gr ou p le ad er th a t hi s acti ons wou ld put him in danger; 

fo rg in g of a gr oup’s bu sine ss card fo r in fo rm ant p u rp o ses; re pro du ci ng a grou p 

le ader’s si gnatu re st am p : ob ta in in g ta x re tu rn s of m em be rs of a g ro u p ; re pr odu cing a gr oup 's re cru it in g car d : an d in vest ig ati ng th e lov e life of a gr oup le ad er 

fo r di ss em in at io n to th e pr es s.

F. For eign in te llig en ce acti vit ie s

Tw o pr og ra m s in th e a re a of fo re ign co unt er in te llig en ce — “ Sp ec ial O pe ra tion s" 

an d “E sp io na ge ” or “Sov ie t-Sat el lite In te llig en ce ”— wer e im pl em en te d by th e 

F B I un der “C OIN TELPRO .” The ov er al l ob jective of ea ch w as to en co ur ag e 

an d st im ula te a vari ety of co un te ri nt el lige nce ef fo rts ag ain st hos tile fo re ig n 

inte lli ge nc e se rv ices , an d, in th e ca se of “Sp ec ial O per at io ns, ” also ag ain st fo re ig n 

Com m un ist org an iz at io ns an d in div id ual s co nn ec ted w ith th em .

(1 ) Sp ec ia l op er at ions .— The ti tl e “Sp ec ial O per at io ns” do es not desi gnat e a 

pr og ra m dir ec te d again st a spe cific ta rg et. B ath er, th e ti tl e and th e file on it 

are of a co nt ro l chara cte r, an d th e file conta in s co pies of co rr es po nd en ce of an 

in fo rm at iv e or coor din at in g n atu re re la ti n g to on go ing in te llig en ce oper at io ns 

a n d /o r in ves tigat io ns pri m ari ly ta rg ete d again st hos tile fo re ig n in te llig en ce 

service s, fo re ig n Com m un ist or gan iz at io ns an d in div id ual s co nn ec ted w ith them . 

A ve ry su bst anti al p a rt of th is file is clas sif ied “Sec re t.” A lth ou gh it is no t appro ­

p ri ate to pr ov id e st ati st ic s as to th e p re ci se num be r of a ct io ns im pl em en te d und er 

th is pr og ra m , it ca n ge ner al ly he st ate d to in cl ud e appro xim at el y te n gen er al 

ty pe s of ac tivity, su ch as ope ra tions invo lv in g tr avel of co nf id en tial in fo rm ants 

ab ro ad ; ex te nd ed uti li zati on of co op er at iv e in div id ual s and in fo rm ants ab ro ad : 

an on ym ou s m ai ling s fo r th e pu rp os e of dis ru pti ng acti vit ie s of a su sp ec te d ag en t 

of a fo re ig n in te llig en ce serv ic e; e tc.

(2 ) Esp iona ge or Sovi et -s at el lite in te llig en ce .— T his pro gr am , al th ough official ly de si gn at ed a COIN TELPR O pr og ra m , em ph as ized in te llig en ce gath eri ng 

an d co un te rint el lige nc e ef fo rts al re ady be ing purs ued in co nn ec tion w ith th e 

B ure au's on go ing fo re ig n inte llig en ce re sp on sibi lities . It did no t c u rt a il an y 

acti vit y or in any w ay ch an ge th e sco pe of co unt er in te llig en ce ef fo rts alr eady 

in eff ect an d co nt in uin g to da y. It w as pri m ari ly in te nd ed to in sp ir e in it ia ti v e 

an d to en co ur ag e in ge nui ty in th e B ure au's co nt in uin g counte ri nte llig en ce ef fo rts 

again st ho stile fo re ig n in te llig en ce service s.

In th e in te re st of th e national se cu rity , no st ati st ic s or ex am pl es of th e ty pe s 

of ac tion s im plem en ted under th is pr og ra m may appro pri ate ly be disc losed.

Mr. W iggins. Mr. Petersen, you led a team which investigated this 

program; is that true?

Mr. P etersen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Wiggins. Who were the members of your team ?

Mr. Petersen. First o f all. Mr. Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General, Criminal Division; Mr. Phi lip White, Staff Assistant to me in the Criminal Division: Mr. Michael Abbell, Staff Attorney in the Criminal Division: Mr. Joh n Martin. Staff Attorney in the 

Criminal Division: Inspector Thomas Smith of the Federal Bureau of
16

Inv estigation; Agent James Williamson, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Agent Edmund Pistey of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation.

Mr. Wiggins. I s the report which is known as the Petersen report a 

unanimous report of this committee?

Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir, it is a unanimous report of the committee as 

such. The Bureau as an institution may have differing views.

Mr. Wiggins. With respect to what portions of the report?

Mr. Petersen. 1 am not aware. The report was submitted to Mr. 

Kelley so th at he m ight express those views to the Attorney General. I 

have seen no formal expression of those views.

Mr. Wiggins. M r. K elle y, do you concur in the repo rt of the Pete rse n 

committee ?

Mr. Kelley. There are some matters discussed which we thought 

perhap s needed some adjustment, but overall we concur tha t it is a 

faith ful recording of what appeared in the committee's review.

Mr. Wiggins. Mr. Petersen, did your task force examine all of the 

individu al files or did you simply take random samples?

Mr. P etersen. I think both, but perhaps I would explain the methodology in some more detail.

First of all. for each field office that was engaged in a COIXTED 

program there was a control file maintained in the Bureau headquarters 

The three Bureau agents on the committee examined with whatever 

assistance from other elements in the FB I tha t may have been necessary —I don’t know there was any—all of those and summarized the 

relevant information with respect to each agents activity taken under 

the CO IXTE L program. Those summaries were then assigned to the 

stall', attorneys on the committee; white, hate groups, black extremists, 

Communist Pa rty USA, et cetera.

Based on those summaries the report was prepared.

Xow, in order to assure the validity of those summaries, the attorneys in the Criminal Division and only attorneys in the Criminal Division, took 20 percent sampling of the original files and compared them 

to the summary to ensure accuracy and invariably they were an accurate summ ary of the raw files.

Mr. Wiggins. It is my understanding tha t this activity was commenced some years ago at the direction of Director Hoover, is t hat 

a correct statement ?

Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir, tha t is what the file reflects.

Mr. Wiggins. Can you tell us whether there was at that time statutory authority for the conduct of such programs?

Air. P etersen. I am not, aware of any statutory authority for the 

exercise of this responsibility. Whatever authority exists would have 

been said to be implicit in the discharge of other duties and tha t is a 

very questionable area.

Mr. Wiggins. There is not, as I understand it, a sta tutory prohibition against counterintelligence activities per se, but rath er only 

against specific activities which might fall under that heading. Is th at 

a fa ir statement, Mr. Petersen ?

Mr. Silberman. May I respond to that ?

One of the difficulties in analyzing what is referred to as 

CO IXTE LPRO is tha t there are a number of activities within 

CO IXTE LPRO which fall clearly within the authority of the Bureau
17

under Executive orders and statutes; and, of course, there are some 

activities which the Attorney General has already indicated he believes to be inappropriate.

It seems to me that it might help to a certain extent to distinguish 

between those activities which, for instance, are clearly within the 

authority of any law enforcement agency and those which may exceed 

that authority.

Mr. Edwards. The committee is operating under House rules, under 

the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Waldie.

Mr. Waldie. I ask this to any one of you who m ight provide the 

answer.

I am examining the report itself and on pages 11 and 12 one of the 

tactics was the leaking of information based on nonpublic information 

to friendly media sources, and then you break down the number of 

times this tactic was used.

On page 12 you specify it was used 3G0 instances in connection with 

the Communist P art y program, G instances Social Worker's Party, 2G 

instances black extremists. 15, white hate and 25 new left.

So I presume from the accuracy of those references tha t this is 

ample documentation as to whom the allegations were made, as to the 

identity of the friendly media sources. Is that a correct assumption?

Mr. Silbermax. Congressman Waldie, I thin k you are referring to 

dissemination of public record information to media contacts.

Mr. Waldie. Well, I am in the first instance.

Mr. Silbermax. Yes.

Mr. Waldie. And that was disseminated only to friendly media 

representatives, according to the report, and I presume that it is amply 

documented whom you construed to be ‘‘A frien dly media representative'' tha t is important for me to know, th at you make a designation 

among the media of America as to whom is friendly and by exclusion 

you defined the rest as unfriendly.

Mr. Silbermax. Fir st of all, Mr. Waldie, let me make perfectly 

clear to you.

Mr. Waldie. Please, not that word.

Mr. Silbermax. I beg your pardon.

Mr. Waldie. Please go ahead, I am sorry.

Mr. Silbermax. This is not a present assertion.

Mr. Waldie. I understand that.

Mr. Silbermax. You were saying it as if it were the present tense.

Mr. AY aldie. I understand that. I will make that judgment when 

we have concluded this hearing. Pa rt of my concern is to be satisfied 

that it is not a present intention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I am not at this stage of these proceedings so persuaded.

Xow, to respond to my question, will you provide me with the list 

of the friendly media to whom public inform ation was disseminated?

Mr. Silbermax. I am not sure that is appropriate.

Mr. AAtaldie. That is not really for you to make this determination. 

If you can tell me tha t you will not, then we can take the steps that 

we are permitted to use. Aly question to you is will you provide me 

with tha t information?

Mr. Silbermax. You mean the list of media sources-----

Mr. AAtaldie. The list of friendly-----
18

Mr. Silbermax [continuing]. To whom the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation between 1956-----

Mr. Waldie. That is not what I am asking. Listen carefully to my 

question. Refer to page 11 of the Petersen report, subparagraph 2, 

line. 3, the phrase friendly media representatives; page 11, where you 

are discussing to whom you disseminated public record inform ation; 

and then on page 12, top paragraph, you enumerate specifically the 

instances in great detail in which th at occurred.

I presume, therefore, you have ample information as to the friendly 

media in those instances to whom the information was disseminated.

Mr. Si lbekmax. First of all, the Justice Department does not at this 

stage, at this lime distinguish between friendly and unfriendly media. 

We have no such distinction and we have no such operating instructions nor do we have any such policy.

If your question is the identity of newspapermen-----

Mr. Waldie. T hat is not my question. Listen to my question. I want 

to know in (he 360 instances referred to on page 12, in connection with 

the Communist Party program, in the 6 instances in connection with 

the Socialist Worker’s Party, and you can conclude the rest of that 

par agraph , I want to know in each of those specific instances the media 

to whom the information was released.

Mr. Silbermax. 1 am not sure but that wouldn’t involve the exposure 

of newspapermen in a fashion which might well raise first amendment 

questions.

Mr. Waldte. It raises a great number of first amendment questions 

but thev are adverse to the Government and that is what T want to 

know. The Government has no business determining which of its media 

are friendly.

Mr. Silbekmax. I absolutely agree with you.

Mr. Waldie. Then would you agree with me that you would find no 

objection, I would think, in providing me with the information as to 

why such a policy was adopted at one time, in your Department.

Mr. Silbermax. Well, I wasn't there, this was back in 1956, throug h 

the 1960's, Congressman Waldie. I deplore the concept of distinguishing between friendly and unfriendly media.

Mr. W aldie. Can you just simply tell me-----

Mr. Silbermax. Your question is can we identify those reporters 

to whom the allegations were made?

Mr. Waldie. I didn’t know they were reporters. I want to know 

the media representatives. Will you provide that to me?

Mr. Silbermax. I am not certain. I would like to consult with the 

Atto rney General about that. That may raise some questions that 

this committee would be equally concerned about—such as the identification of newsmen in the process of th eir news gathering activity. 

M e are particularly sensitive in the Justice Department about this 

and have adopted a number of policies which prevent governmental 

power being imposed upon newsmen in such a fashion as to chill their 

first amendment free press rights.

Mr. Waldie. My time is up. I will come back to you.

Mr. E dwards. Mr. McClory.

Mr. McClory. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

F irst of all I want to comment on your earlier statement, Mr. Silberman, particula rly with regard to your suggestion as to where you
19

think the jurisdiction for FB I oversight .ought to be, and I want to 

assert quite affirmatively and with some jealous feelings of the prerogatives of this committee that the oversight jurisdiction belongs 

right here in this subcommittee, and I thin k we have been sidetracked 

or we have been overlooked insofar as recognizing what our prerogatives are.

Mr. Silberman. May I respond just briefly, Congressman McClory, 

to say that the Attorney General received a letter November 14 which 

in turn refers to an earlier letter of October 23 from Congressman 

Kastenmeier, chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts. Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice in which the very nature of his 

inquiry asserts the same jurisdictional “oversight” rights. It is obviously not up to us to make a determination as to which subcommittee 

or committee of the Congress has jurisdiction. All tha t we ask is that 

the chairman make clear which committee has jurisdiction.

Mr. McClory. Well, you are only being subjected to inquiries now 

by one subcommittee of the House J udiciary Committee, I assume.

Mr. Silberman. We only get it one at a time, if that is what you 

mean.

Mr. McClory. Now. I have read the Director’s statement with 

regard to the report which was made public in response to pressures 

which I judge came from the chairman and from this committee with 

regard to these counterintelligence activities. I thin k it would be 

extremely important for us to know of these e arlier days—that we are 

not experiencing now. of course—and who these revolutionary forces 

were, these elements th at were engaged in conspiracies and the potentially deadly agents which we were guarding against. Because while 

I recall highly offensive conduct and large-scale demonstrations right 

here in the Capitol, I am not aware myself of the revolutionary leaders or activities or the threats of killings and maimings which we 

were guarding against; and it is that kind of information which it 

seems to me tha t we should know about if we are going to either 

countenance a continuation of this activity or we are going to direct 

tha t it be discontinued. I assume that would not be the kind of information that you would 

want to identify here in a public, open hearing by using names and 

identifying individuals who were involved in that sort of thing, or 

the names of individuals who were engaged in counterintelligence 

activities to try to protect our citizens, as you say, is tha t correct?

Mr. Silberman. To whom are you addressing tha t question ?

Mr. McClory. To whomever is the spokesman you have on the panel.

Mr. Silberman. I am sorry, Congressman McClory, I thought for a 

moment you were addressing it to Director Kelley.

Let me first address the earlier part of your premise. The Attorney 

General has always expressed a desire to make this report public and 

indeed discussed that with the Senate FB I Oversight subcommittee 

many months ago. It is not so that it is public only because the chairman of this committee wished it to be made public.

Now with respect to the other part of your question, you are absolutely right that the disclosure in an open hearing of certain of the 

instances to which Director Kelley referred to in this statement would 

not serve the interest of either the Congress or the executive branch.
20

Mr. McClory. Some of these activities which we regard as offensive 

and which arc covered in the report or the study are said to have been 

conducted at the request of Members of Congress.

Can you identify the Members of Congress who urged activities tha t 

are being questioned and scrutinized at this time ?

Mr. Silberman. I think you are referring to Director Kelley’s statement, are you not, Congressman McClory, rather than the report?

Mr. McClory. I am not sure.

Mr. P etersen. The report does not say that.

Mr. Silberman. The report does not say that ?

Mr. Me Clory. It is in the press release.

Mr. Silberman. You mean Director Kelley’s press release?

Mr. McClory. Well, are you familiar with tha t and could you 

identify the Members of Congress for us ?

Mr. Silberman. I certainly could not identify them and I would 

have to defer to Director Kelley on that question.

Mr. Kelley. There were in some instances members of the Appropriation s Committee before whom Mr. Hoover testified on F BI appro ­

priations. I cannot identify them at this point.

Mr. McClory. Thank you.

Mr. Silberman. We did know th at much of tha t testimony before 

the Appropriation s Committee was designated “off the record.”

Mr. McClory. I think my time is up.

Mr. E dwards. Mr. Sarbanes.

Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Silberman. I want to make one comment on this jurisdictional 

point which I raised. Mr. Wiggins and I were members of a select 

committee tha t spent well over 1 year studying the jurisdictional 

questions in the House of Representatives. I thin k we probably recognize the complexities connected with it. But I only suggest to you 

that if the House chose to, and its committees chose to, any number 

of subcommittees or committees could assert jurisdiction with respect 

to oversight connected to the F BI, i f it fell within the purview of th eir 

responsibility. The Judiciary Committee is organized not on an agency 

basis or on a departmental basis, but is organized more on a functional 

basis in terms of subject m atter th at comes before the committee. The 

fact tha t two subcommittees of this committee have felt it necessary 

to inquire of the F BI with respect to certain matters may only reflect 

that they are carrying forth their responsibilities that are assigned to 

them. I can understand that the Department and the Bureau seeks 

some arrangement to which they can easily relate and I take it tha t 

you made that remark only as a suggestion of what would be convenient for you. But I just want to make it very clear that the way we 

do our business is for us to arrange and tha t a functional arrangement which may make a lot of sense from our point of view may well 

be the appropriate one even though it may make things somewhat 

inconvenient or repetitious for the Bureau or for the Department.

Mr. Silberman. It was not convenience that I was concerned about, 

Congressman Sarbanes, but a much more important matter. The 

Atto rney General and 1 feel very strongly tha t the Congress should 

exercise appropriate oversight jurisdiction over the Bureau and indeed 

over the Department, but particularly over the Bureau.
21

Much of the matters that the Bureau are engaged in are extraordinarily sensitive, particularly in the counterintelligence field. I don t 

mean counterintelligence in terms of COIN F ELP RO, I mean counterintelligence in its classic sense. Those m atters are in many cases classified at the highest classifications. I only thou ght that both the Congress and the executive branch would share a desire to minimize the 

number of people who would have access to this information so that 

we could do all tha t we could to preserve its integrity and a t the same 

time make certain that the Congress can and does exercise its approp riate oversight functions.

Mr. Sarbanes. We want to preserve the inte grity of the material. 

We also want to maximize the oversight, and I thin k th at is really for 

us to decide how to go about that.

Mr. Silberman. I t is only a suggestion that we have been making.

Mr. Sarbanes. I appreciate tha t.

Mr. Petersen, in this report that Mr. Wiggins has placed into 

the record, upon presentation by Mr. Silberman, headed FB I 

CO INT ELPRO activities dated November 18, 1974, a document 21 

pages in length, I don’t know how to refer to it, I guess the Petersen 

report or the complete report of the group which you headed whose 

members you enumerated earlier in the hearing.

Air. Petersen. Th at is a truncated version of the report of the 

committee.

Air. Sarbanes. Well how truncated is it ?

Air. Petersen. I think our report was about 39 pages. This is about 

21 or something like that.

Air. Sarbanes. In other words, this is about half of the report that 

was submitted by you to whom ?

Air. P etersen. To the Attorney General.

Air. Sarbanes. To the Attorney General.

Well, who prepared this report ?

Air. P etersen. It was prepared by the staff of the A ttorney General.

Air. Sarbanes. Does Air. Silberman know the answer to tha t 

question ?

Air. Silberman. Yes; a number of us worked on that. There were 

certain matters in the Petersen report which concerned national 

security matters. There were also a number of other matters relating 

to the philosophical framework in which this would be examined as 

well as certain other procedural and other matters which have nothing 

to do with the facts of CO INTELPRO. I understand that everything 

tha t was factual about the C OIN TEL programs is in this report.

Air. Sarbanes. Well, let me get this very clear.

Mr. Silberman. All factual matters about the domestic CO INT ELPRO were included with the exception of one matter. One sentence was 

deleted because it was determined tha t it might well expose an informant who would be in personal danger.

Air. Sarbanes. Air. Petersen, when were you charged with making 

this study?

Air. P etersen. I really don’t remember the date. It was earlier done, 

as I recall, by the Attorney General in J anuary of this year.

Air. Sarbanes. When did you submit the 39 page Petersen report to 

the Attorney General?

43 -7 21 — 75 ----- 4
22

Air. P etersen. Approxim ately the third week in May.

Air. S arbanes. Thi rd week of Alay of this year ?

Air. P etersen. Yes, sir.

Air. Sarbanes. Then it is not really accurate then to refer to this 

document as the Petersen report. This is, in effect, an edited and 

rew ritte n summary or modification of the Petersen report prepared 

by the Attorney General’s office; is t hat not correct ?

Air. Petersen. That is correct.

Air. Sarbanes. Well my time is up, I will come back to you, I assume later.

Air. Edwards. Mr. Butler.

Air. Butler. Thank you, Air. Chairman.

I would address my question to, I assume, Air. Petersen, but since 

you are the one, the authority-----

Air. P etersen. We are willing to share, Congressman.

Air. Butler. Thank you.

With reference to Air. Saxbe’s statement of November 18 at the 

news conference, on page 2, “The Committee found th at 3,247 counterintelligence proposals were submitted of which 2,370 were approved”.

To whom were these proposals submitted and by whom ?

Air. P etersen. Those proposals came into the national headquarters 

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and were approved generally 

at the A ssistant Director level and in some instances at the level of the 

Dire ctor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Air. B utler. Well, I am not sure in my own mind what the levels 

of authority are but there is one Director of the Federal Bureau-----

Air. Petersen. Pard on ?

Air. Butler. There is one Director ?

Air. P etersen. Yes, sir.

Air. Butler. How many Assistant Directors ?

Air. Petersen. I don’t know how many Assistant Directors. Basically 

there is an Assistant Director in charge of the General Investigative 

Division and Internal Security Division. Air. Kelley can give you 

more specifics.

Air. Butler. What I am try ing to determine in my own mind is how 

fragmented was the auth ority for approval of these counterintelligence proposals.

Air. P etersen. I don't thin k it was very fragmented at all. I t went 

to the two major operating divisions, the Internal Security Division 

or the General Investigative Division, and thence on up to the Director.

Air. Butler. So is it a reasonable assumption that the Director or two 

Assistant Directors made the ultimate determination in these instances 

as to whether they were approved or not ?

Air. Petersen. That is right.

Air. Butler. Were any policy criteria spread out on the record or in 

the file as to what would be approved and what would not, or was it 

purely----- -

Air. Petersen. It was purely ad hoc. I don't think we came across any 

broad policy statement-----

Air. Butler. Even in directing assistance ?

Mr. P etersen. Tha t is right. I t took its genesis from some of the pure 

intelligence programs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 

stan dards were apparently known to the officials of the Bureau in conjunction with their performance of duties in that regard.
23

Air. Butler. Well, let us go further, then. Of those procedures 

which were approved, either by the Director or the Assistant Director, 

how many were communicated upward? I am referring to the statement of Mr. Kelley on November 18: 1 want to assure you tha t Director 

Hoover did not conceal from superior authorities the fact tha t the FBI 

was engaging in neutralizing disruptive tactics.

Mr. Petersen. We are talking about now approval in the Department of Justice.

Mr. Butler. Yes; the extent to which the Director of the FB I advised the Attorney General of the United States of this.

Air. P etersen. Well, I thin k there may be some differences of viewpoint between me at least and the officials of the Fede ral Bureau of 

Investigation on this score. This initial report prep ared stated th at we 

found no evidence in the Cointel control files to indicate that anv one 

outside of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Department of 

Justic e knew about th is program or its implementation and tha t was 

corroborated by oral advices of officials of the Bureau. Generally, 

within the past week Air. Kelley and his staff have advised that some 

aspects of this program were communicated to a number of Attorneys 

General.

Air. Butler. At this point may I direct some questions to Air. 

Kelley. T am, of course, referring to your statement and I want to 

recognize tha t you were not there then and I was not here then so we 

are perfectly pure in both instances and we can proceed with total 

objectivity. But you did state on November 18 that Director Hoover did not 

conceal and then, for example in a communication concerning revolutionary organizations he sent to the then Attorney General and the 

White House on Alay 8,1956, and so forth on page 8 of your statement. 

Have you checked somewhere a list of the instances whether oral or 

written in which the Director of FB I communicated this upward?

Air. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Air. Butler. Would you feel tha t it would violate any confidence 

to pass tha t information on to this committee ?

Air. Kelley. We referred all of these to the Attorney General by 

written communications. As to the question on confidence I would 

like to defer to Air. Silberman.

Air. Butler. Well, Air. Chairm an, Mr. Silberman.

Air. Silberman. Congressman, that is a troubling question.

Mr. Butler. Ju st a moment. Air. Chairman, I move that we go 

into executive session for the purpose of responding to this question 

at th is moment.

Air. Edwards. Perhaps it would be a good idea first to see if in 

executive session we would get a response.

Air. Butler. All right.

Air. Silberman. I would not be prepared to give in open session 

copies of correspondence from the Bureau to the Attorney General 

which referred to this program or activities unde r this program because, I hasten to add, I have reviewed all of that and no Attorney General was ever given the full scope of these programs. But it is correct 

from the inform ation which the Bureau has provided us in the last 

couple of weeks tha t Attorneys General were aware of certain aspects 

of the program, particularly certain targets. Aly view on that is that we
24

would be prepared to make tha t available to the committee subject, 

however, to excising any references in those reports that would disclose any confidential informants or endanger anybody’s life. One of 

the things we are always concerned about is endangering the life of 

an informa nt within any of these groups and I think you agree it 

would be appropriate to make that editing change.

Mr. Butler. My time is up and I than k the gentleman. I withdraw 

the motion, if it is appropriate.

Mr. E dwards. Mr. Drinan.

Mr. Drinan. In the report, on page 14, there is noted a very shocking and degrading thing tha t the FB I went to various citizens and 

told them about the alleged extremists with whom they had economic 

dealings and it’s also noted in 62 instances so-called black extremists 

were damaged in their economic relationship.

Does the Department of Justice have any intention of informing 

these 62 individuals, without informing others, tha t they in fa ct were 

spied upon, tha t their economic dealings with certain other citizens 

were deteriorated because of the alleged radicalism tha t was communicated to those with whom they h ad commercial relationships ?

Mr. Silberman. Congressman Drinan, we will respond under the 

Freedom of Information Act as we have already done so.

Air. Drinan. These 62 people have never heard of this report. I 

did n’t he ar of it until 2 days ago. These 62 so-called black extremists 

have no way of knowing th at the ir economic life was seriously damaged by the FBI.

Air. Silberman. Well, first of all, let me say to you, Congressman 

Drinan, the Attorney General and I find that conduct-----

Air. Drinan. Would you respond to the question. What are you 

going to do about the 62 black extremists, American citizens of African 

ancestry ?

Air. Silberman. Air. Chairman, could I have permission to respond 

to one question at a time ?

Air. E dwards. I am sure Congressman Drinan will allow you.

Air. Drinan. I want a response.

Air. Silberman. I would just like a chance to finish my answer.

I want to make it very clear to this committee that the Attorney 

General and I deplore this particu lar action, we do not sanction it, 

we believe it to be wholly inappropriate, and we have already made 

the determ ination with respect to certain requests that have been made 

by individuals who do know about this to reply under the Freedom of 

Inform atio n Act to any requests made bv individuals against whom 

conduct was taken of this nature, and which is not within an investigatory file. That is to say, improper active or positive or negative conduct 

which was taken as against these individuals.

Air. Drinan. Well, I repeat my question, which hasn’t been answered, do you have any intention of informing these 62 American citizens who are black, th at they were spied upon and that people with 

whom they had commercial relationships were told about their alleged 

radicalism and presumably these 62 black citizens were hurt?

Mr. Silberman. Well, I would like to take your suggestion, Congressman D rinan, up with the A ttorney General.

Mr. Drinan. When will we have an answer from the Attorney 

General ?
25

Mr. Silberman. As soon as I have a chance to take it up w ith him.

Mr. Drinan. Can we have it in 72 hours? Th at is my request.

Mr. Silberman. Your request is duly noted.

Mr. Drinan. I have another point on page 15, that the h BI stooped 

to have religious leaders go to various landlo rds and tell the landlords about the alleged radicalism once again of 36 black extremists 

and the landlords were informed to the detriment of these various 

groups.

Mr. S ilberman. Which page?

Air. Drinan. Did you inform anybody who the religious leaders 

were who were used in this way ?

Mr. Silberman. Which page are you referring to?

Mr. Drinan. Page 15.

Mr. Silberman. Your question was would we inform you of those 

religious leaders? .

Air. Drinan. Would you tell the 34 black extremists tha t religious 

and civic leaders were used and manipulated by the FB I to go to the 

landlords of these black extremists to presumably have them evicted 

or raise the rents or somehow cause them damage?

Mr. Silberman. You mean identify to the black extremists who the 

religious leaders are?

Mr. Drinan. Yes: they have a right to know. It is the same question 

put in a different way that now you have used American citizens, not 

FB I agents.

Mr. Silberman. I didn’t use anybody, Congressman, and I really 

resent your use of that pronoun.

Mr. Drinan. I am sorry. The FB I before you were associated with 

it. Mr. Silberman, used American citizens to cause damage to 36 black 

Americans, and I am simply saying they have a right to know what 

has transp ired in the ir life.

Mr. S ilberman. We will take t hat m atter under consideration too.

Mr. Drinan. On page 19 there is evidence of, it seems to me, obviously criminal activities on the part of F BI agents, and I cite on page 

19 some of the things tha t were done a t least in 20 instances t hat are 

noted here; tha t FB I agents forged a group's business ca rd : they reproduced a group leader’s signature stam p; and, they obtained tax 

returns of members of a group.

Does the Department of Justice have any intention of seeking out 

the FB I agents who engaged in this criminal conduct and bringing 

disciplinary or criminal action against them ?

Mr. Sii.berman. Excuse me a moment. There is one point tha t you 

mentioned I would like to ask Mr. Petersen about.

There is one qualification with respect to the tax return incident. 

Mr. Petersen informs me tha t tha t tax retu rn may well have come to 

the Department or to the Bureau in the course of a legitimate inquiry, 

a legitimate law enforcement activity.

Wh at was the rest of your question?

Mr. Drinan. Does the FBT. does the Department of Justice have anv 

intention of bringing disciplinary or criminal action against the FBT 

agents who forged a group's business card or who reproduced a group 

leader's signature stamp?
Mr. Silberman. Well, we got a recommendation from Mr. Petersen 

tha t none of the, matters tha t fell within this report should be criminally prosecuted.

Mi-. Drinan. Why?

Mr. Si lberman. I refer that question to Mr. Petersen.

Mr. Drinan. Mv 5 minutes are up.

Mr. Chairman, if it is agreeable, Mr. Petersen can answer why the 

activity, limited only to the activity tha t I have mentioned, on page 

19 are not crimes. Perhaps he could tell us why forging and reproducing sign ature stamps are not crimes.

Mi-. Petersen. First. I want to make it clear. Mr. Drinan. I didn’t 

say those were not crimes. What I did suggest, tha t since this program terminated in 1971, and since the possible violations would 

relate to alleged violations of statutory constitutional rights, which is 

really a very murky area of the law and subject to great change over 

the period of time this program was in existence, and it is far from 

clear now, and third, because this was a program not of corruption, 

it is clear that there was no personal aggrandisement or personal enrichm ent involved on the part of the individual agents, and finally 

because it was a program that was directed by the Director of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, that it would he somewhat incongruous to single out those few instances that are perhaps all under 

the statute of limitation and single out relatively few individuals for 

criminal prosecution for following the orders of their superiors.

My suggestion was tha t the country would be better served, the 

people first of all, the Government, by the institution of safeguards 

to see that this didn’t happen again than by the prosecution of individual agents fo r the conduct here involved.

Mr. Drinan. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Silberman, to answer 

the other part of my question, is any disciplinary action contemplated?

Mr. Silberman. I think the rationale which Mr. Petersen set out 

suggests that if discipline were to be meted out it would have to be 

meted out to one who is no longer alive. But we have the entire matter 

under fur the r review. We do not intend, however, to discipline agents, 

those few agents, involving some instances, for actions which indeed 

the entire Bureau and the D irector were responsible.

Mr. Drinan. I don’t think you want to live by that principle. I 

yield back.

Mr. E dwards. Mr. Pangel.

Mr. P angel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Petersen, I didn’t fully understand your answer because an 

analogy as to whether or not——

Mr. Petersen, Mr. Rangel-----

Mr. P angel. Because somebody has initiated a conspiracy the fact 

that other people are involved and received orders, if tha t was true 

we would not have the Watergate trials going on now.

Mr. P etersen. I am sorry I wasn’t clear. Congressman. But with 

all deference may I suggest if someone initiates a conspiracy I agree 

with you wholeheartedlv. Mv proposition is that, first, that we ought 

to be tryi ng to correct what happened.

Mr. P angel. We should do that in our Government at all levels.

Mr. Petersen. Second, it seems to me to be most inequitable to single
27

out the grade 10 agent on the street level for doing what he was directed 

to do by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Rangel. That is what Mr. Ilakleman is saying.

Mr. Petersen. Well T submit that there is a difference.

Third, I think that the individual actions have to be analyzed.

I want to make one thing clear. This report, so-called Petersen report 

and its 39 pages, is not a prosecutive memorandum. It is not a study of 

a potential conspiracy. It was undertaken to investigate for the Attorney General and Director Kelley, because neither one of them knew 

what went on under that program. It doesn’t purport to be a definitive 

statement with respect to the wisdom or not of criminal prosecution. 

Mr. R angel. Obviously.

Mr. Petersen. It was the suggestion of the committee tha t it might 

be inappropriate to initiate criminal prosecution.

Mr. Rangel. What committee?

Mr. Petersen. The committee that looked at the COINTEL program. It might be in appropriate to initiate criminal prosecution for 

the. reasons t ha t I have just stated. The question first of all has to be 

determined whether there is a violation of the law, the question-----

Mr. Rangel. That is the problem.

Mr. Petersen. It has not been finally determined.

Mr. Silberman. Let me respond at this point.

Mr. Rangel. I had a question I would like to ask Mr. Silberman and 

I am more limited in my time than you arc with yours.

Certainly you are very sensitive to these wrongdoings or inappropriate action being a ttributed to you as a person. Wh at bothers me is 

that we are dealing with a press release tha t was issued by the Attorney 

General. I have no idea the extent of the investigation that might be in 

the so-called Petersen report or what was deleted from this report and 

put into the release which I assume every newspaper person in the 

country has available to them as a part of the public record.

In order for us to have a better unde rstanding of the problems. I 

just hate to believe just because Mr. Hoover died, it is still not the FBI. 

But without any lack of respect to you, I would hate to believe that the 

FB I would not want to share with us the problems that they had 

faced at some time in the ir career, so we have a bette r understanding as 

to what the Congress can do to help. But I am stuck here with a press 

release that is very sensitive to present members of the Bureau and I 

assume the Department, and I would want to know why can’t we have 

at least the so-called Petersen report ?

Mr. Silberman. The Petersen report does not add any facts with respect to these five COIN TEL programs.

Mr. Rangel. Would the Petersen report tell me what criteria were 

used for extremists?

Mr. Silberman. No.

Mr. Rangel. White hate groups-----

Mr. Silberman. No, sir.

Mr. P etersen. No.

Mr. Rangel. Would the Petersen report tell me 20 percent of what 

was available ?

Mr. P etersen. Twenty percent of the raw files of the Bureau to determine that the summaries which are really-----

Mr. Rangel. Of all of the files or just the CO INT EL?
28

Mr. P etersen. CO IN TEL contr ol files, not all of the files of the 

Bur ea u. W e won't be able to do------

Mr. R angel. H ow c an I find ou t when you ta lk a bout kno wn res ults 

only in 22 perce nt, wh at happened to the othe r 78 percen t. Wh ere 

wo uld I go, th at is not in your rep or t eithe r.

Mr. P etersen. W hen we say the kno wn res ult s th at is wh at the file 

reflected. Th e oth ers were either n ot acted on or tu rn ed d own o r no repo rts ma de. Th e latte r, no tin g the Bu reau agents prop en sit y I should 

say to ge t cred it for prog ram activ ities, we feel is a sm all margin of 

er ro r.

Mr. R angel. W hen you say th at it is to d isru pt a nd org ani ze o r th at 

is an ti- American or an tin ationa l sec urity , does th at disrup tio n, could 

it lead to the assassination of the individu al involved, wou ld th at be 

in an y------

Mr. P etersen. No, sir.

Mr. R angel. You are p rotecting yo ur inf ormers an d somebody wou ld 

lea k ou t inform ation as to whom they m ight su spect as th ei r infor me r, 

whe th er th at inf orma tio n is true or not, wou ld no t thes e so-c alled 

vio len t grou ps be prone to destr oy the lives of some of these people.

Mr. P etersen. We came across no thing to suggest t ha t. I especia lly 

asked th at question in connection wi th some o f t he m ore vio len t-pron e 

or ga ni za tio ns and obviou sly the answer was “ no.”

Mr. R angel. W ha t is the Atto rney Ge neral pr ep ared to give us besid es th e pre ss release so we wou ld know wh at the pro blems are with 

th is cond uc t which obviously was dep loyed by all peop le aro un d 

toda y?

Mr. Silberman. I am not sure I kno w wha t it is th at you need, 

Co ngres sm an.

Mr. R angel. I would lik e to know re all y who these organiza tio ns are 

an d some of the names. It is tra gic, I hav e been des cribed as an extrem is t by some peop le, but I do n’t know wh at the F B I lan guage was 

in t he la te 1950’s or the 1960’s. I u nd ersta nd th at some o f th e civil righ ts 

lead ers th at are d ead were sub ject to this type o f i nvest iga tio n. Maybe 

pe rh ap s t he y still are, I don ’t know.

M r. Silberman. The y a re n ot. Th ey are not now.

Mr. R angel. May be some o f them sho uld be. Beca use I may be using 

civ il ri ghts in a ter m which has no thing to do with civ il rig hts . So I 

have to kno w who the peop le are and wh at was being done and I am 

re stricted to this release.

My only que stio n is. is there some rep ort you are pr ep ared to make 

av ailable to th e committee beside the press release?

Mr. Silberman. The chair ma n, as he star ted th is he arin g made it 

ve ry clea r wh at the grou nd rules were. As I un de rstand his pos ition, 

you wer e no t going to go into the n ames of i nd ivi du als o r groups.

Mr. R angel. I am not going into an ything , Mr. Silbe rm an. I asked 

whe th er or no t yo ur agency or the Dep artm en t has any ad ditio na l 

in fo rm at io n you would be pr ep ared to give to this com mittee. I am 

no t as ki ng fo r the nam es verba lly. I assum e th at the re are othe r re ­

po rts th at you sincerely believe wou ld give us a be tte r feel for wh at 

we. are ta lk in g about.

Mr. Silberman. No, I rea lly d on 't th in k there is a ny rep ort we have 

th at wo uld give you any be tte r feel whatsoev er for w hat wen t on other 

th an w ha t you have.
29

Mr. Eangel. You think this release should be sufficient in order to 

guide us?

Mr. Silberman. There is nothing we have, there are no reports th at 

we have, which go into any factual data in excess of what you have.

Mr. Eangel. Obviously the six people on the panel had to know’ 

who was being investigated.

Mr. Silberman. Oh, yes. There are a number of raw files.

Mr. Eangel. I am not asking for these names at an open hearing. 

Would your Department have any objections if this committee was 

able to review the names of the organizations that at some period 

in the history of the FB I they felt it was necessary to destroy ?

Mr. Silberman. Necessary to destroy ?

Mr. Eangel. T hat is your language, disrupt, destroy ?

Mr. Silberman. Well, we may well be able in executive session to 

go into the names of those groups which were targeted. I think this 

committee has a legitimate reason for knowing that.

Mr. Eangel. Thank you. What vehicle would you suggest that 

would not do violence to your rules of confidence and protection.

Mr. Silberman. I think the executive session might be a useful 

vehicle to do that. I firmly believe that this committee should know 

the names of those groups against which this conduct was directed. 

There are, after all, the rights of those members of the group who 

would feel defamed if the group itself were described. So I am quite 

anxious to accommodate you in that respect.

Mr. E angel. But the level of conduct th at we are talking about has 

never reached a point of being above and appropriate. There was no 

criminal conduct that you saw Mr. Petersen, as you conducted your 

prelim inary report on the parts of agents.

Mr. Petersen. Tha t is, w’ell let me put it another way, Congressman. The repo rt adds a number of exhibits, two of which are legal 

memoranda.

One which suggests that there is a little likelihood of criminal 

prosecution and the other frankly a m inority view, would suggest that 

there may be a possibility of criminal prosecution.

Now, the two memoranda were submitted not because the committee 

was trying to carry water on both shoulders but because the committee "was attempting to advise Director Kelley and the Attorney 

General of the nature of the problems involved and we thought we 

ought to point out to him tha t while we as a committee thought that 

criminal prosecution may be inapprop riate we had to concede that 

one, may be able to fashion a potential criminal case.

Mr. Edwards. Time has expired.

Mr. Silberman. Therefore the Attorney General ought to be aware 

of both those points of view.

Mr. Edwards. At least one, nonviolent civil rights organization, 

by the FB I to disrupt organizations demonstrating against, for example, the Vietnam war?

Mr. Petersen. I am not sure of the specific natu re of the demonstrations. I just can’t answer that. It is conceivable tha t some of these 

groups have been demonstrating against some in favor of it, because 

the activities were directed at a broad span from far righ t to far left 

from the Klu Klux Kia n-----
30

Mr. Edwards. Some in the middle, too, thinking of the organization you mentioned at the press conference?

Mr. P etersen. I don't know what middle means but there are va rying degrees.

Mr. E dwards. At least one nonviolent civil rights organization, 

that is correct?

Mr. Silberman. You are absolutely righ t but we don’t know tha t 

in that case whether the direction wasn't so much against tha t group 

but rather directed against another group derivatively.

Mr. P etersen. Or an individual.

Mr. E dwards. Do you have any evidence tha t the FB I was in operation with this program at any political conventions such as the 1968 

Democratic Convention in Chicago?

]\Ir. P etersen. No, sir. We saw no evidence of that.

Mr. Edwards. Mr. Kelley, in your release of November 18 you expressed considerable approval of the program. Do you still feel th at 

way and do you feel that there should be this type of program within 

the FB I?

Air. Kelley. My statement was tha t I felt that the Director and 

the members of the Bureau who participated in the program felt sincerely they were doing something for the betterment of the security 

of the Nation. I found no evidence in the review that I made tha t the 

intent was other than that.

Now, it may well be that critics will say this is not true because some 

things were done which were described as very reprehensible.

It will be up to those officials and authorities who review these 

matters to determine if the incidents described are subject to any 

criminal prosecution. This would involve the question of intent, of 

course.

Mr. Edwards. Can you think of any of the areas described in the 

Petersen repo rt tha t you believe were appropriate for the FB I to 

engage in?

Mr. Kelley. Yes. sir, I can thin k of a number of ap prop riate things 

tha t were done, and it is agreed by the Department and the committee 

that a number of things were done which were appropriate under the 

circumstances.

Mr. Edwards. For example, Mr. Kelley, for example-----

Mr. Kelley. I would refer tha t to Mr. Petersen who made the 

appraisa l.

Mr. P etersen. I think we are talking about some of the areas 

directed at foreign intelligence activities.

Mr. Edwards. I don't believe we will pursue it at this moment, uerhaps at a late r date.

Mr. W iggins.

Mr. W iggins. Mr. Kelley, I want to talk to you about what is going 

on now.

The FB I does now engage in intelligence activities, does it not?

Mr. Kelley. It does.

Mr. Wiggins. Does it engage in counterintelligence activities?

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Mr. W tggins. At the present time?

Mr. Kelley. Yes.
31

Mr. Wiggins. I take it that that activity is conducted by agents in the 

field; is tha t true?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Wiggins. Is there a special un it within the FB I which also conducts such activities, apa rt from your normal field agents?

Mr. Kelley. I don't understand.

Mr. Wiggins. Well, 1 am asking you if you have a group within the 

FB I tha t is solely devoted to the conduct of intelligence activities.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Wiggins. Can you generally, within the limits of propriety, characterize what is regarded as proper intelligence functions of the F BI?

I want to know in general the kinds of activities which the FB I is now 

engaged in.

Mr. K elley. We are engaged in the investigation of matters which 

can be prosecuted as violations of existing statutes.

Mr. Wiggins. Yes; stopping there for a moment, is that activity 

under the jurisdiction of U.S. Attorneys in the field or is it done independently of the U.S. Attorneys ?

Mr. Kelley. They are consulted but final review is with the D epartment here in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Wiggins. Please continue.

Mr. Kelley. And then, of course, we are engaged in gathering general intelligence. This is under the procedure th at has long been binding 

on us that you don’t wait until you are taken over, you do investigate to 

determine what probabilities exist.

Mr. Wiggins. Stop ping there. That type of intelligence activity is unrelated to a known or suspected crime; is th at correct?

Mr. Kelley. It could encompass a crime for which we have no known 

subjects at that point. I think tha t most of our investigations are directed toward prosecution.

Mr. Silberman. May I interject at tha t point, Congressman Wigins ? I have reviewed this and as far as I can determine all of the intelligence activities—counterintelligence is really what we are talking 

about—of the Bureau are predicated on a statutory basis or Executive 

order base which goes back to 1939.

Mr. Wiggins. Mr. Silberman, does the Bureau conduct general background intelligence with respect to certain categories of figures even 

though it may be unrelated to a known offense? Do you monitor, for 

example, activities of those whom I shall generally describe as underworld figures?

Mr. Silberman. Well, I would divert to Henry on that. To the extent 

we are gathering criminal intelligence on underworld figures, it is 

predicated upon a statutory basis and indeed generated for the purpose of prosecution. Now, of course, sometimes the criminal intelligence you get is broader than what you can use in an actual 

prosecution.

Mr. Wiggins. I understand.

Mr. Silberman. The whole premise of the organized crime operation, which has been in existence since the 1950’s, is based on the 

assumption t ha t you marshal the resources of the Justice Department 

and other agencies in order to direct attention ag ainst organized crime 

operations.
32

Mr. Wiggins. Did you wish to expand on that, Mr. Petersen?

Mr. P etersen. I do want to make a clarification that there are intel­ ligence activities conducted, generally speaking, and by th at we mean a gat her ing of factual material with respect to people who have the reputation of being involved in organized crime. T hat is not a willy- nilly choice. Those are people who have established reputations with police agencies for the conduct of illegal activity on a day-to-day basis over a long period of time. Marshaling of that activity is then analyzed to determine what specific violations are involved. That is a re­ sponsibility of not only the Federal Bureau of Investigation but all 

police agencies.

Mr. Wiggins. In addition to those two broad categories, is there a 

third , is there a national defense category ?

Mr. Silberman. There is a counterintelligence effort on the part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and in tha t respect it has some similarities to the intelligence gathering that Henry just referred to in the organized crime area, but it does have a statu tory basis in prosecutable offenses.

Mr. Wiggins. I would like to know. Mr. Kelley, what control you assert over these activities. Are field agents authorized at the present time to initiate any one of these three investigative activities?

Mr. Keeley. Most of the investigations are initiated in the field 

where they are reviewed by supervisory staff and sent to Washington where they are again reviewed by supervisory personnel. If it appears to us that i t has no possibility of success, or that it is something th at we should not be wasting our time on. the investigation will be discon­ tinued. On the other hand, additional information may be necessary 

before any decision can be made.

Mr. Wiggins. At the present time your policy is an afte r the fact 

review ?

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Silberman. In most cases. In other cases, for instance, in the 

counterintelligence activities, my experience is that it is indeed the Washington office of the Bureau, in conjunction with the Criminal Division or the Internal Security Section of the Criminal Division, and with appro priate consultation with myself and the Attorney Gen­ eral. th at oftentimes initiates activities in the counterintelligence field.

Mr. Wiggins. I know my time is up but I would like to pin this down. Can the supervising agents in a field office institute a specific intelli­ gence activity without prior approval from Washington, D.C. ?

Mr. Kelley. No; he cannot, not a general program of intelligencegathering activities.

Mr. Wiggins. Then you oversee the program initiated by the men in 

the field but they implement it without getting your approval of each 

specific act, am 1 correctly describing tha t ?

Mr. Siijjerman. The Bureau is one of the most highly supervised 

organizations in the Government, Congressman Wiggins. In my ex­ perience in various Government agencies I have never seen an organi­ zation which is more tightly controlled from Washington.

Mr. Wiggins. My time has expired.

Mr. Edwards. Mr. Waldie.

Mr. Waldie. Mr. Kelley, I have your statement of November 18 in hand. Do I presume that prior to the writing of this statement you
33

in fact had access to the Petersen report in its entirety, not the abridged 

edited form th at is before our committee ?

Have you seen the entire Petersen report ?

Mr. Kelley. I saw the first draft and subsequent drafts, yes.

Mr. Waldie. In other words, you have seen more than is before our 

committee today ?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Waldie. Now, let me read something from your statement and 

ask if you agree tha t this is so:

Fo r the FB I to have done less und er the circumstanc es would have been an 

abdication of its responsibility to the American people. The stud y which I have 

made convinces me th at the FB I employees involved in these programs acted 

entirely in good faith and within the bounds of wh at was expected of them by 

the President, the Attorney General, the Congress, and the American people.

Do you still believe tha t to be the case ?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Waldie. I have in my hand a memorandum for you from the 

Attorney General, William Saxbe. He says:

I am pleased th at your memorandum of December 5. 1972 to FB I employees 

recognizes these concerns.

And states the Bureau policy to be th a t:

FB I employees must no t engage in any investigative activ ity which could 

abridge in any way the righ ts gua ranteed to a citize n of the U nited Sta tes by the 

Constitution and und er no circu mstances shall employees of the FB I engage in 

any conduct which may res ult in defaming the chara cter, rep utation, integr ity 

or dignity of any citizen or organiza tion of citizens of the United States.

Do you believe that that stated policy was in fact honored in the 

actions of the program tha t we are examining now ?

Mr. Kelley. You are reading from a memorandum tha t I prepare d; 

are you not ?

Mr. Waldie. Yes.

Mr. Kelley. Congressman, T am in a position where T came into the 

FBT as Director after this started. T look at the intent.

Mr. Waldie. T know that.

Mr. Kelley. I don’t thin k under any circumstances th at we should 

engage in this type of activity today and this is clear in instructions I 

have given throughout the Bureau. "We should not do it but if circumstances change to the point tha t some type of lawful activity is approp riate in the future, we are going to go through the line of authority 

that, we spoke of, that is. to the Attorney General.

Mr. Waldie. I f you believe we should not do it today, is that because 

you believe the circumstances t hat would warrant such action do not 

exist today ?

Mr. Kelley. Th at is right.

Mr. W aldie. I f those circumstances once again in your mind occur, 

you would construe the conduct of this program to be proper and 

within the policy guidlines tha t I read to you, developed by you.

Mr. Kelley. Only if we go to the Attorney General and in t urn to a 

further level of review, for example, to the President.

Mr. Waldie. Would you ask authority under any circumstances for 

approval of activity which could abridge rights guaranteed to citizens 

of the United States by the Constitution.

Air. Silberman. It really-----
34

Mr. Waldie. Just a moment, would you permit the Director, let me 

explain why T am interested in the Director’s responses rather than 

yours.

I thi nk I pretty well know where you stand and Mr. Petersen.

Mr. Silberman. And the Attorney General.

Mr. Waldie. I knew where the Department of Justice stood during 

the days this program was in effect. The fact of the matter was the 

program was in existence because I didn’t know where the Director 

stood. I am trying to find out where our present Director stands. I 

think tha t is important. I appreciate your not intruding in the inquiry.

Mr. Silberman. Fa ir enough.

Mr. Waldie. Mr. Kelley, would you respond, are there any circumstances when you would seek approval from the Attorney General for 

the rig ht to abridge the rights and privileges guaranteed American 

citizens under the Constitution ?

Mr. Kelley. Congressman Waldie, this is, of course, a very broad 

concept about when do you abridge the rights.

Mr. W aldie. It is a narrow concept.

Mr. Kelley. I would not under any circumstances contemplate action without going to the Attorney General or to the President. I don’t 

know of the situation which might suggest this. I f i t came up, I would 

have to consider my responsibilities under the circumstances.

Mr. Waldie. I appreciate your candor, Mr. Kelley.

Mr. Silberman, one question to you. You have responded in answer 

to a question asked by Mr. Sarbanes, which was why do we not have 

the full report, and I did not know we did not have it and apparently 

no one knew w’e did not have the full Petersen report. One of the 

standards that you said dictated your determination to provide us an 

abridged report, I attempted to write it down specifically, you said, you 

were concerned about the philosophic framework in which this report 

would be examined-----

Mr. Silberman. No; that isn’t what I meant.

Mr. Waldie. That is what you said.

Mr. Silberman. No; I said there was a discussion of philosophy in 

it, in one of the drafts of the Petersen report. There are various drafts. 

And there was a recommendation against criminal prosecution. There 

were other matters which were not strictly related to the facts of the 

CO IN TE L programs.

I can assure you—I want to make this quite clear—that with one 

exception of one sentence in the report it is a complete and factual 

summary. Th at one sentence was deleted because as I told you earlier, 

it revealed the identity, the Bureau felt, of an informant in the counterintelligence field.

Every other description of what happened is in this report.

Mr. Waldie. Then if tha t be the case, with the deletion of th at one 

name you should have no objection to providing us with the original 

40-page report.

Mr. S ilberman. Your assumption is incorrect.

Mr. Waldie. Well, now, tell me why. T hat assumption would seem 

to follow the nature of today.

Mr. Silberman. Because if we had thought it was appropriate to release the full discussion we would have done so at the time. There are 

a lot of internal working documents in the Justice Department which
35

go to the making of a final report, This is the Attorney General’s 

report.

Mr. AValdie. We are not asking for the work document. I want to 

address just this question to th e Chair, since my time is up. Mr. Chairman, will this committee be insistent upon its right to have in its possession the entire Petersen report, though its consideration be in executive session.

Mr. E dwards. This committee will require, I am sure, all of the in­ formation that is available and, of course, we will handle the matter 

in executive session.

Mr. Silberman. In executive session I have a great deal less reluctance to disclose almost anything.

Air. E dwards. Mr. McClory.

Mr. McClory. Thank you, Air. Chairman. I think the proceeding here today discloses t ha t our failure to resolve the committee session into executive session has greatly hampered and limited our oppor­ tunities to secure information, and I thin k all we have done is to have a rehash of some press releases and public information which, if we are going to expand on this information, we are going to have to do it in 

executive session. I am concerned myself and I feel that the Director asserts a very important position in indicating the protection of the interests of our citizens in taking steps to prevent revolution and to prevent violence tha t might otherwise occur, and I know th at the form er late Director was well intended even though he may no t have always respected the 

individual constitutional righ ts of citizens. I am sure, Mr. Director, t hat you would not support any principle which would deny individual rights on the mere pretext tha t you felt tha t a majority of the people of the Nation would have their position enhanced or protected by the denial of those constitutional rights, 

would you ?

Mr. Kelley. You are correct.

Mr. McClory. In other words, we endeavor to carry out our function of protecting the Nation and preserving the peace while at the same time respecting the individual rights and prerogatives which the Constitution guarantees.

Air. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Air. AIcClory. I read from your statement t ha t superior authorities were always informed as to this type of counterintelligence activity carried on by the F BI and that specific communications were directed to the Attorneys General in 1965,1967 and 1969.1 am also confused by the dates, b ut I gather tha t communications, th at is reports from the FB I rega rding at least some of these counterintelligence activities, were communicated to the late former Attorney General Robert Kennedy, former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, and former 

Attorney General Ramsey Cla rk; is that correct ?

Air. Kelley. Those were the ones, yes.

Air. AIcClory. Now, reference was made somewhere a t least to the 

intense danger because of the bombing of the Capitol. I recall the bombing of the Capitol; they set off a bomb in the men’s room over on the Senate side and did cause some disruption. A ctually has that ever been connected in any way with any revolutionary group tha t you 

know of?
36

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. McClory. It has ?

Mr. Kelley. It has. They have claimed credit for the act themselves.

Mr. McClory. Is that investigation completed ?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Mr. McClory. Tha t investigation is continuing?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. McClory. And do you feel tha t is one reason for justifyin g 

counterintelligence activities against groups tha t purport to be antiestablishment or anti-Government ?

Mr. Kelley. I don’t think just because they are antiestablishment 

or anti-Government, it warrants th e use of any such program.

Mr. McClory. One more question. In the counterintelligence 

activities, have we engaged in any wiretaps without securing authority 

of th e d istrict courts as required by law in nonnational defense cases?

Mr. Silberman. Congressman McClory, that is a subject I do not 

believe we should go into in open session.

Mr. McClory. Is tha t inform ation which may be made available 

to us in the executive session.

Mr. P etersen. I don’t think we understand the question.

Mr. Silberman. You said counterintelligence did you not ?

Mr. McClory. Yes.

Mr. Silberman. I thought you did.

Mr. Petersen. Excuse me.

Mr. Silberman. It is a m atter tha t would be appropriate for this 

House in executive session. It has already been made available to 

the other House in executive session.

Mr. McClory. Thank you very much.

Mr. E dwards. Mr. Sarbanes.

Mr. Sarbanes. Mr. Kelly, this truncated report states, among other 

things, some COTNTELPIiO activities involved isolated instances of 

practices that can only be considered abhorent in a free society.

Do you agree with that, statement ?

Mr. Kelley. I do not.

Mr. McClory. The Attorney General in his press release reiterated 

his November 18 news conference, statement that the materials 

released today disclosed in a small number of instances that some o f 

these programs involve what we consider today to be improper activities. T am disturbed about those improper activities.

Do you agree with that stated position ?

Mr. Kelley. Some of the actions taken under these programs are 

under present review by the Attorney General and the Department 

of Justice. Some of these have been concluded to have been improper, 

and T agree with the Attorney General tha t some were.

Mr. McClory. Do you think they are improper or would you think 

them improper absent a determination by the Attorney General?

Mr. Kelley. I do construe them as improper today, yes.

Mr. McClory. Absent that determination. In other words, it is 

your own perception tha t some of these activities are improper?

Mr. K elley. I make this determination personally.

Mr. McClory. Now, in your statement, and I take it this was a 

statement that you made subsequent to the Attornev General’s press
37

conference of November 18; is that correct your statement of November 

18?

Mr. Kelley. Yes; tha t was simultaneous with his release of the 

information.

Mr. McClory. I see. You said “the study which I have made." Was 

tha t study put into written form ?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Mr. McClory. Your study ?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

Mr. McClory. “Which I made convinces me tha t FB I employees 

involved in these programs acted entirely in good faith and within 

the bounds of what was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General, the Congress and the American people.’'

Is it your position that there was no action taken by the FB I that 

was not carried out within sanctioned bounds as transmitted to the 

FB I by either the President, the Attorney General, the Congress, or 

the American people ? Is tha t your position ?

Mr. Kelley. My position is th at it was considered by the former 

Director and the members of his executive stall’ tha t this was a type 

of activity tha t was sanctioned by those you mentioned, including the 

American people.

Mr. McClory. I am interested in tha t later sanction. I find it an 

interesting one because it is also referred by you at the bottom of 

page 3 of your statement, where you say in carr ying out its counterintelligence programs the FB I received the personal encouragement 

of a myriad of citizens both within and without the Government. 

And I do not understand what is the legal authority that the FB I 

finds for these activities in terms of the encouragement of private 

citizens.

Do you perceive that to be some basis from which the FB I can 

draw authority for engaging in these activities ?

Mr. Kelley. In the context in which I view the situation now, I 

do not thin k it is proper to embark on such programs, and, as I 

said, I will not do so. But in tha t time, and with those troubles, and 

with the strong feelings tha t something should be done by somebody, the then leadership felt it was a manifestation of a need, and 

it was pursued.

Mr. McClory. Well, at such times, and I hope it would not happen, 

if such times were to again descend upon the land, is it your position 

that the FB I in response to those circumstances, comparable to what 

existed at an earlier time, should embark upon these activities, engage in these activities again ?

Mr. Kelley. I don’t know, Congressman. We are talk ing about a 

hypothetical situation.

Mr. McClory. I did not say the Government, I said the FB I?

Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir. We are talking about the Government when 

we talk about the FB I. I would not take any such action independent of the Attorney General or the President. I have even considered 

the possibility of legislation, and I know this would be extremely 

difficult to enact. If actions of the type we are discussing here are 

again needed, I want to be able to carry them out in accordance with 

proper statutes or executive orders; in other words, do it the way 

I am su re you would want it done.
38

Mr. McClory. Mr.-----

Mr. Silrerman. May I add a point?

Mr. McClory. Surely

Mr. Silberman. The crucial point for the Attorney General and 

myself, both of whom exercise supervisory responsibility over the 

FB I, is that we have the ironclad assurance, and with the capacity 

to monitor it. that the Bureau would never engage in such a program 

without coming to us. And in my judgment and I know it’s the Attorney General's judgment, it should not only receive the ratification 

of the President, but also should be taken before the appropria te 

oversight committees of both the House and the Senate. And that is 

an ironclad procedural safeguard which I think is terribly important and I know this House will agree.

Mr. McClory. Obviously tha t is one of the things I think is impera tive to evolve out of these hearings and this discussion. The one 

thing that concerns me in the Director's statement, and I will close 

on this because I see my time is up, is th at we are considering a broad 

range of activities in terms of what was done by FB I agents directed 

against a broad range of groups and, of course, it is asserted tha t 

some of that was proper; I thin k it is conceded that some was improper, and obviously it points out the complexity of the problem, 

since obviously you have to consider, one, the nature of the kind 

of activities in which agents are engaged, some of which may well 

be precluded under any circumstances in a democratic society.

Mr. Silrerman. T think you are absolutely right on tha t point.

Mr. McClory. And, secondly, of course, you may well have to relate 

it with respect to the subjects against whom such activities are engaged, ones against perhaps giving between American citizens and 

agents of a foreign power, something of that. sort.

J\fr. K elley. I thin k you are quite correct. I think you p ut that in 

an analytical framework which makes a grea t deal of sense.

Mr. McClory. Thank you.

Mr. E dwards. Mr. Drinan.

Mr. Drinan. Mr. Kelley, I am more and more distressed at the 

content of your statement of November 18 of this year, as Mr. Sarbanes said, tha t you now infer tha t the Attorney General has statutor y power to allow the FB I to go beyond investigating, beyond 

monitoring, go beyond counterintelligence, and actually take an affirmative action to disrupt the activities of a p articula r organization.

Where is the statutory basis for the executive order base for such 

an affirmation ?

Mr. Kelley. I will admit that it does not come from easily identified sources.

Mr. Drinan. You mean some uneasily identified sources.

Mr. K elley. It is inherent, I think, in the need for the protection of 

the constitution and the righ ts of the citizens which are guaranteed 

bv law.

Mr. Drinan. No activities, sir, to disrupt the activities of American 

citizens bv law enforcement officials can b« imnuted anv inherent activity or inherent power of the Department of Justice. I mean, 

I don’t thin k that we can understand that. We are lawvers. v

'e have to say that you do or do not have the statutory power from the Congress or from the Department of Justice.

Absent some executive order tha t is related, clearly, I frankly
39

don’t see how you can judge, as you have, everything tha t has been 

revealed to us this week. You say sometimes the FB I in the past 

wanted to neutralize the activities of certain groups, then you say 

tha t these activities of the FB I were made to disrupt these plans. 

How can you judge such activity ?

Mr. Kelley. I am not trying to judge them. I am saying that if it 

comes up again we will go to the Attorney General and the President for guidance.

Mr. Drinan. W hat power does the Attorney General have? Let us 

take the case that you go to the Attorney General this week or next 

week, what power does he have from the Congress or the Constitution or anyth ing ? I want Mr. Kelley’s answer.

Mr. Silberman. It seems to me you are asking-----

Mr. Drinan. I am asking him the question. This is very essential. 

I want people in America to trust their government, and their faith 

in government has been eroded and when this came out I had letters 

from constituents and they are in horror what the FB I did and you 

say tha t for the FB I to have done less under these circumstances 

would have been an abdication of its responsibility to the American 

people.

I have a letter received this morning saying how can the FB I 

Director say that when these outrageous things are coming out.

All I say, I want all of us to prevent this in the future and yet 

you are fudging on it and saying I will go to the Attorney General 

and he has t ha t inherent power to give me the power to disrupt the 

activities of a group. Where is that power?

Mr. Kelley. I ask tha t we refer this to Mr. Silberman. I have 

already stated what I thought was this power. I will not pursue a 

course of act ion unless there is an approval given by higher authority 

speaking of there being an approval or disapproval of these past 

activities, 1 have had numerous people tell me they feel that the activities of the FB I in light of the problems of that day were completely 

right, and just. But T do not want to argue about anything that hap ­

pened in the past. We are talking about what may happen in the 

future. If I see a situation where I th ink some extraordinary analysis 

is needed or some extra ordin ary moves are needed to counteract a clear 

and present danger, I am going to present it to the Department of 

Justice.

Mr. Drinan. Well, the (’’ongress clearly has the power to enact a 

statute that would forbid any Federal law enforcement agency from 

ever disrupting an organization’s activities. You have the power to 

arrest if you see a crime. You obviously have the power of gathering 

intelligence, but you must bring this to another branch of Government.

When you say counterintelligence tha t is an euphemism, it is 

almost, i f you will, in the form of official anarc hy: yon are engaging 

in the same activities that these people tend to engage in. All I can 

say, sir, is that if it is, the ('ongress would pass a bill saying tha t the 

FB I and the Department of Justice may not disrupt the citizens or 

groups.

Do you want such a statute. Do you think i t is needed?

Mr. Kelley. In the event such statute is passed we will completely 

abide bv it.

Mr. Drinan. Do you think that such statute is necessary?

Mr. Kelley. No, sir, I do not.
40

Air. Drinan. In other words, that there is no power of the D epartment of Justice now to authorize th at !

Mr. Kelley. Mr. Silberman.

Mr. Silberman. My answer to tha t question is you are using the 

word disruption and I think I am using it in the same wav. We do 

not have power to authorize the Bureau to disrupt domestic groups.

Mr. Dm nan. Therefore, Mr. Kelley is being told in effect don’t come 

to the Attorney General under any circumstances to tr y to get permission to dis rupt activities.

Mr. Silberman. Frank ly, Congressman Drina n, I would rather he 

came to the Attorney General and myself whenever there was a questionable point so we would make it absolutely certain tha t we were 

app lyin g the constitutional law of the United States.

Air. Drinan. I am relieved of this, Mr. Silberman, because Mr. 

Kelley was claiming a power which you concede, as I understand it, 

you don’t possess. Thank you.

Mr. E dwards. Would you not agree, Mr. Silberman, in addition, 

neither Congress nor the Executive has the righ t by Executive order 

or by law to authorize unconstitutional activities such as are described 

in the Petersen report ?

Mr. Silberman. I think it follows as the n ight follows the day, th at 

neither the executive branch nor the Congress can authorize unconstitu tional activities.

Mr. Edwards. Mr. Rangel.

Air. Rangel. Thank you.

I think one of the problems that we have is th at the panel doesn't 

trust the Congress, because it is coming over pretty clear tha t Air. 

Kelley believes tha t these agents are wrong now and it was wrong 

then. I suppose there are reasons why at any level of the executive 

government tha t you have to select your words very carefully.

Alany of the acts described in the release are clearly unconstitutional and illegal.

Air. Petersen says it is a question as to whether there is substantial 

evidence to prosecute.

Air. P etersen. I just want to qualify that. This is not a prosecution report.

Air. Rangel. I understand that.

Air. P etersen. I was talking about the policy-----

Air. Rangel. You have really given me the substance of my next 

question.

If there is some feeling that this committee is operating on a vendetta 

to embarrass the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I could clearly 

unde rstand whv one might say, well, let's see tha t it doesn’t happen 

again and forget the past.

But you have to appreciate that the member^ of this subcommittee 

don't have the slightest idea what the past is. We are not convinced, 

and I just can't think of a better word, but I am not using the word 

coverup in the sense th at it has been used. But Ave are not convinced, 

since Air. Petersen was not instructed to find out whether anyone 

violated the law, but was asked to give a very general report in order 

to see that some of these illegal and immoral acts do not occur in the 

futu re. And I just trust that when we go into executive session, not 

for the purpose of filing indictments, th at we will have a better understanding as to what we are talking about, and it bothers me, as it
41

bothers Father Drinan. there is nothing tha t yon are saying, Director 

Kelley, today tha t doesn’t allow all of us, I think, to believe th at you 

think these acts were wrong in the past. I don't know why it is difficult to say it and why it has to he, hut with all the American flagwaving they did, the best they could with what they had to work with. 

It is frightening if these things occur in this decade tha t you feel that 

you can find any authority to say that this thin g would happen again 

and I think it would make us all feel a lot easier if you show we can 

rephrase the statement and say tha t it was wrong then. We are not 

saying the people were acting with criminal inten t, hut it is wrong 

and there is no constitutional basis for this type of conduct, and I hope 

that when we go into executive session that we can go in with the 

framework that we are not charging anybody with this wrongdoing, 

sitting at this panel, hut you can’t he sensitive at one hand because it 

may appear that as one is charging you with this conduct, and then 

at the same time say but we find nothing wrong with tha t conduct 

when it, too, plays.

Mr. Silberman. Congressman Rangel, the Director of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation is subordinate to the heads of the Department of Justice. The Attorney General and myself and Henry Petersen all regarded this report as listing acts which we believe to have 

been wrong.

Mr. R anger. Well, I don’t know whether th at really comes through 

in Director Kelley's statement, written statement, but it certainly 

comes through in his testimony today.

Mr. Silberman. The crucial point is that Director Kelley has made 

a flat committment tha t nothing will be undertaken without our 

approval.

Mr. Rangel. I can appreciate tha t and I am just saying tha t it is 

just one last hurdle that I think we have to overcome and tha t is I 

sincerely believe, and I am not asking a question, Director Kelley believes it was wrong when it was done. I turn back the balance of my 

time.

Mr. Drinan. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. R angel. I yield.

Mr. Drinan. I would be very happy and I take it the members of 

the panel would, and I think American citizens would, i f Mr. Kelley 

would say tha t he won’t use this power to disrup t activities even if 

the Attorney General gave it to him. [Laughter.]

I thin k tha t is what you want to say from the way I hear you, 

and tha t you haven’t said that, and Mr. Rangel has brought it out 

very well, and tha t all I say is tha t Mr. Silberman has conceded 

that he or the Attorney General has no power to authorize under any circumstances disruptive activities of the FB I, and I really 

feel tha t it follows like the night, the day, th at th e F BI should say that 

even if some Attorney General told us that we could use this power, 

we won’t use it, this power, because the Attorney General doesn't have 

the power to transmit.

Mr. Silberman. The problem is we are using an expression disruptive activities, which I think I understand what you mean, and if I 

do understand it I agree with you. But it is in fact a very general 

phrase and indeed ordinary criminal law enforcement activities 

targeted against organized crime groups do in fact “disrup t” their
42

ac tiv iti es an d we inten d th at. Th e pro blem I th in k you re fe r to are 

such as th e matt ers referre d to in some sections of the re po rt which 

go be yo nd wh at are normal crim ina l inv est iga tiv e m atters an d which 

are ta rg et ed to disru ption in a broa de r sense an d in th at b road sense I 

wo uld ag ree with you 100 percent.

Mr. Dm xa x. T ha nk you very much. I yie ld back the balance of my 

tim e.

Mr. E dwards. We are going to ad jour n in a few minutes bu t Mr. 

McC lory w ould like to question you.

Mr. McClory. I know we are abo ut to ad jour n and I do n ot w ant to 

engage in any fu rther questioning. JTowever, T do wish to make one 

ob servation, a nd that is w hile we hav e addre sse d a lot of questions an d 

in qu iries an d voiced suspicions and doubts J wa nt to ap plau d the A tto rn ey Ge ne ral's initiative, his action, in giving assura nce in public 

sta temen ts a nd supplemented b y the state me nts here today that the m is 

a reco gn ition th at a numb er of th e activ ities were i mp rope r, they will 

be discon tin ue d, they will not be cou ntenan ced in the future. I myself 

feel rea ssured f rom th e appeara nces made h ere to day t hat we ar e go ing 

to b e pr otec ted again st th is ty pe o f offensive, in my opinion, unconstitu tional counteroffensive activ itie s which do im pa ir, do deny individual co ns titutiona l rig hts, an d I wa nt to commend the At torney 

Ge ne ral an d T wa nt to commend the Di rector and the Assis tan t 

A ttor ne ys General for th ei r sta tem ents and th ei r pos itions as 

expressed befor e this committee.

Mr. Silberman. Th an k you, sir.

M r. W aldie. I have rea lly quite a bi t o f confidence in yours a nd Mr. 

Pe te rs en an d the Dep artm en t of Jus tic e ab ility to reflect the needs we 

are discussin g here of protec tin g constitutiona l lib ert ies an d I do no t 

sh ar e t he same confidence in th e D ire cto r, Mr. K ell ey’s abilities or sen sitivi ties , an d I don't say th at in criticism of him . He has not been 

trai ned in th at field. Tie is a policem an. An d t hat field is no t necessarily 

invo lved de eply in those so rt o f r esp onsibilities.

The refo re, I sug ges t th is to you. Th e pa tter n in the pa st has rea lly 

been to situations we are all co nfro nting now, ge neral ly the D ep ar tmen t of Ju stice un de r the At torney s Gener al, pa rtic ul ar ly un der 

wh ich th e abuse too plays, were quite cogniza nt to civil lib ert ies and 

qu ite co gn izan t of the needs of prote cti ng , with an exception or two, 

the abuse occu rred withi n the D ep artm en t because o f the insensitivities 

of th e fo rm er Dire ctor to those prob lems. I do n’t expec t you to acquiesce or dissen t. My only personal view of t he m atter leads me to th at 

con clusion. Wh ere I am fearfu l is th at the stru ctur e th at we seek to 

es tablish to pre vent a re currence o f th is sort of abuse will be de pendent 

up on Mr. Kelley rec ogniz ing the need of com ing to you fo r appro val. 

I do n’t th in k M r. Kelley is ca pable of recogniz ing th at need and a gain 

T do n’t reflect on Mr. Kelley. I th in k a ma chine ry has to be set up t hat 

it is no t Mr. Kelley who initiates th is inq uir y to receive ap prov al fo r 

actio ns th at are questionable. T he mach ine ry has to be set up that the re 

is ov ersigh t of Mr. Kelley so th at he does not un witt ingly un de rta ke 

these so rt of ac tivities . I fou nd abso lutely no confidence in the r esponse 

he gave to questions that he is capab le of recog niz ing the need of going 

to yo u fo r a pp rova l fo r suc h actions.

Mr. Silberman. I t hi nk th at is terrib ly un fa ir, Cong res sman W ald ie.

M r. W aldie. I hope i t is in acc ura te.
43

Mr. Silberman. I t is inaccurate. The Attorney General and I have 

absolute confidence.

Mr. Waldie. It is not intended to be f air or unfair, it is intended to 

be a description of my impression as to his responses to questions asked by this committee and I will review the transc ript and refer it to you to demonstrate why I possess these doubts. It is not intended as any evaluation of Mr. Kelley in terms of this field. Maybe you need that sort of individual to be the Director of FB I. The fact of the matter is he is there and the fact of the matter is we had an individual of th at kind there under which all of these terrible abuses took place, and you 

concur they are terrible. You are interested, as is this committee, in making certain they don’t occur in the future, and I only suggest to you that to depend upon Mr. Kelley to recognize a situation where they might occur and come to you for consent is placing a great deal of responsibility upon Mr. 

Kelley to even recognize the need of such permission.

Mr. Silberman. May I respond to tha t?

Mr. Waldie. Yes.

Mr. Silberman. First. I would like to tell this committee that the Attorney General and I have absolute confidence in Clarence Kelley. He is p ut in a very awkward position here and you all ought to realize it. lie was not there when these acts were engaged in and he has an obvious personal reluctance it seems to me to have to be in a position to condemn his predecessor. That is not Director Kelley talkin g, that is me talking. There is and has been in motion for the months that At­ torney General Saxbe and I have been in the Department a much closer working relationship between the rest of the Department and the Bureau. We don’t any longer refer to them as two separate entities. I have absolute confidence that any matter, indeed any policy initiative of the Bureau, even if it was clearly within its statutory authority but was nonetheless a new policy initiative, would come to the Attorney General and myself. We have absolute confidence in th at.

Mr. Waldie. Well I feel reassured by the strength of your convictions in this regard and apparently you have been exposed to a more indepth knowledge of the Director than have we today been exposed.

Mr. P etersen. 1 would like to add something more. Over the past 

few years, the relationships between the Federal Bureau of Investiga­ tion and the rest of the Department of Justice have, in my estimation, improved 1,000 percent. There is more communication than in the past. There is a spiri t of cooperation which I am fran k to say did not always exist in the past. I don’t mean to say tha t we regard them as perfect any more th an they regard us as pe rfect and we quarrel and quibble and debate on a professional level, which is healthy, and we have no disagreement with you at all. I share your concerns that that improve­ ment, needs to continue. We would like to see a mechanism to insure that it does continue. We have no panacea to offer in this regard. It is always going to be headed by an individual an d there is always going to be, because it is a large organization with wide responsibility, a great 

deal of independence accorded to tha t individual.

Mr. Waldie. I appreciate th at.

Mr. Edwards. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We will adjou rn 

the committee subject to call of the Chair. [Whereupon, at 4 :55 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned subsequent to 

the call of the Chair.]
S upp lem en ta l I nf or mat io n

U.S. Department of J ustice,

Federal Bureau of I nvestigation,

Washington, D.C., November 22,1974- Hon. Don E dwards,

House of Representatives,

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman : During my appearance before your subcommittee on 

November 20th, several references were made to the statement which I released 

to the press on November 18, 1974, regarding the FB I’s counterintelligence program. I am enclosing a copy of this statement along with some background material for your ready reference and for inclusion in the trans cript of the hearing.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley,

Director.

Statement of Hon. Clarence M. Kelley, Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation

Attorney General William B. Saxbe today has released a report regarding FBI 

counterintelligence programs. The report was prepared by a Justice Department 

committee which included FBI representatives tha t was specially appointed early 

this year to study and report on those programs.

Since taking the oath of office as Director on J uly 9, 1973, I also have made a 

detailed study of these same FBI counterintelligence programs.

The first of them—one directed at the Communist Party , USA—was instituted 

in September, 1956. None of the programs was continued beyond April, 1971.

The purpose of these counterintelligence programs was to prevent dangerous, 

and even potentially deadly, acts against individuals, organizations, and institutions—both public and private—across the United States.

They were designed to counter the conspiratorial efforts of revolutionary elements in this country, as well as to neutralize extremists of both the Left and the 

Bigh t who were threatening, and in many instances fomenting, acts of violence.

The study which I have made convinces me that the FBI employees involved in 

these programs acted entirely in good faith and within the bounds of what was 

expected of them by the President, the Attorney General, the Congress, and the 

American people.

Each of these counterintelligence programs bore the approval of the thenDire ctor J. Edgar Hoover.

Proposals for courses of action to be taken under these programs were subject 

to approval in advance, as well as to constant review, by FBI Field Office and 

Headquarters officials.

Throughout the tenure of these programs, efforts admittedly were made to disrup t the anarchistic plans and activities of violence-prone groups whose publicly 

announced goal was to bring America to its knees. For the FBI to have done less 

under the circumstances would have been an abdication of its responsibilities 

to the American people.

Let me remind those who would now criticize the FBI’s actions tha t the 

United States Capitol was bombed; that other explosions rocked public and 

private offices and buildings: tha t rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid 

siege to military, industrial, and educational fac ilities; and that killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence from New England 

to California.

The victims of these acts of violence were human beings—men, women, and 

children who looked to the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to protect 

the ir lives, rights, and property. An Important part of the FB I’s response was 

to devise counterintelligence programs to minimize the threats and the fears 

confronting these citizens.

(44)
45

In carrying out its counterintelliegnce programs, the FBI received the personal encouragement of myriad citizens botli within and without the Government. Many Americans feared for their own safety and for the safety of their 

Government. Others were revolted by the rhetoric of violence and the acts of 

violence that were being preached and practiced across our country by hard-core 

extremists.

I invite your attention to the gravity of the problem as it then existed, as 

well as the need for decisive and effective counteraction by the criminal justice 

and intelligence communities.

I want to assure you that Director Hoover did not conceal from superior 

authorities the fact tha t the FBI was engaging in neutralizing and disruptive 

tactics against revolutionary and violence-prone groups. For example, in a communication concerning a revolutionary organization that he sent to the thenAttorney General and the White House on May 8, 1958, Mr. Hoover furnished 

details of techniques utilized by the FBI to promote disruption of that 

organization.

A second communication calling attention to measures being employed as an 

adjunct to the FB I’s regular investigative operations concerning this same revolutionary organization was sent to the Attorney General-designate and the 

Deputy Attorney General-designate by Mr. Hoover on Jan uary 10, 1961.

Mr. Hoover also sent communications to the then-Attorneys General in 1965, 

1967, and 1969 furnishing them information regarding disruptive actions the 

FBI was employing to neutralize activities of certain Rightist hate groups.

I have previously expressed my feeling tha t the FB I’s counterintelligence 

programs had an impact on the crises of the time and, therefore, tha t they 

helped to bring about a favorable change in this country.

As I said in December, 1973:

“Now, in the context of a different era where peace has returned to the college campuses and revolutionary forces no longer pose a major thre at to 

peace and tranquility of our cities, some may deplore and condemn the FBI’s 

use of a counterintelligence program—even against hostile and arrogant forces 

which openly sought to destroy this nation.

“I share the public’s deep concern about the citizen’s righ t to privacy and 

the preservation of all rights guaranteed under the Constitution and Bill of 

Rights.”

My position remains unchanged.

CO UN TE RI NT EL LIGE NC E PRO GRAM----BA CK GR OU ND M ATE RIA L

I . INTRODUCTION

The FBI’s counterintelligence program was developed in response to needs 

at the time to quickly neutralize organizations and individuals who were advocating and fomenting urban violence and campus disorder. The riots which 

swept America’s urban centers, beginning in 1965, were quickly followed by 

violent disorders which paralyzed college campuses. Both situations led to 

calls for action by alarmed Government leaders and a frightened citizenry.

II. TENOR OF THE TIM ES

An Associated Press survey noted that, during the first nine months of 1967, 

racial violence in 67 cities resulted in 85 deaths, injuries to 3,200 people and 

property damage of over $100,000,000. The February, 1970, issue of “Security 

World” stated that during the period Jan uary 1 to August 31, 1969, losses 

specifically traced to campus disorders amounted to $8,946,972.

In March, 1965, then Senator Robert F. Kennedy predicted more violence 

in the South and North after Congress passed voting rights legislation. Kennedy said. “I don’t care what legislation is passed—we are going to have problems .. . violence.”

A United Press International release on December 5, 1967, quoted Pennsylvania’s Governor Raymond P. Shafer as warning that “urban disa ster” in the 

form of “total urban warfare” is waiting in the wings to strike if the race problem 

is not solved in the Nation’s cities.

attorney General Ramsey Clark reported to President Johnson on January 12, 

1968, according to the “Washington Star,” tha t extremist activity to foment 

“rebellion in urban ghettos” has put a severe strain on the FBI and other Justice
46

Department resources. Clark called this “the most difficult intelligence problem” 

in the Justice Department.

A United Press International release on F ebruary 13, 1968, stated tha t President Johnson expected further turmoil in the cities and “several bad summers” 

before the Nation's urban problems are solved.

III. CAL LS TO ACTION

President Lyndon Johnson said in a television address to the Nation on 

July 24, 1967, in describing events tha t led to sending troops to Detroit during 

that city’s riot, “We will not tolerate lawlessness. We will not endure violence. 

It matter s not by whom it is done, or under what slogan or banner. It will not 

be tolerated.” He called upon “all of our people In all of our cities” to “show 

by word and by deed tha t rioting, looting and public disorder will just not be 

tolerated.”

In a second address to the Nation in just three days, President Johnson 

announced the appointment of a special Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder 

to investigate origins of urban riots. The President said tha t this country had 

“endured a week such tha t no Nation should live through; a time of violence 

and tragedy.” He declared tha t “the looting and arson and plunder and pillage 

which have occurred are not par t of a civil rights protest.” “It is no American 

right,” said the President, to loot or burn or “fire rifles from the rooftops.” Those 

in public responsibility have “an immediate” obligation “to end disorder,” the 

Presiden t told the American people, by using “every means at our command. . .

The President warned public officials tha t “if your response to these tragic 

events is only business-as-usual, you invite not only disaster hut dishonor.” 

Presiden t Johnson declared th at “violence must be stopped—quickly, finally and 

permanently” and he pledged “we will stop it.”

House Speaker John W. McCormick said on July 24, 1967, after conferring 

with President Johnson that the President had told party leaders tha t “public 

orde r is the first business of Government.” The next day, Senator Robert C. 

Byrd advocated “brutal force” to contain urban rioting and said adult looters 

should be “shot on the spot.”

On April 12, 1968, Representative Clarence D. Long of Maryland urged J. 

Edgar Hoover in a letter and in a public statement to infiltrate extremist groups 

to head off future riots and said FBI Agents “could take people like Negro 

militants Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown out of circulation.”

The “St. Louis Globe—Democrat” in a February 14, 1969, editorial entitled, 

“Throw the Book at Campus Rioters,” described campus disorders then sweeping 

the Nation as “a thre at to the entire university educational system. This newspaper called on the Attorney General to “move now to stop these anti-American 

anarchists and communist stooges in their tracks. He should hit them with every 

weapon at his command. The American people are fed up with such bearded, 

anarchist creeps and would applaud a strong drive against them. They have been 

coodled and given license to run roughshod over the rights of the majority of 

college students f ar too long. It is time to hit them hard with everything in the 

book.”

On October 2,1969, Senator Byrd said that “events in the news in the past few 

days concerning activities by militant radical groups should alert us to the new 

trouble tha t is brewing on the Nation’s college campuses and elsewhere.” Senator 

Byrd said tha t “all of us would do well to pay heed now, and law enforcement 

authorities should plan a course of action before the situation gets completely out 

of hand.”

After the August 24, 1970, bombing a t the University of Wisconsin, Madison, 

a group of faculty members called for disciplinary action aaginst students involved in disruption and violence. In a statement delivered to the Chancellor, 867 

faculty members said “the rising tide of intimidation and violence on the campuses in the last few years has made normal educational and scholarly activities 

increasingly difficult. There has been a steady escalation of destructiveness that 

has culminated in an act of homicide. Academic freedom, meaning freedom of 

expression for all ideas and viewpoints, has been steadily eroded until now 

many are questioning whether it exists on the Madison campus.” The faculty 

members said that “the acts of a few must not be allowed to endanger the rights 

and privileges of all members of the academic community.”

“The New York Times” reported on October 11. 1970, on “The Urban Guerrillas—A New Phenomenon in the United States” and noted tha t the Senate
47

Subcommittee on Internal Security recently heard four days of testimony on four 

bills aimed at “crushing the urban guerrillas,” including one “that would make 

it a crime to belong to or aid organizations advocating terrorism, and would 

prohibit the publication of periodicals tha t advocate violence against police 

and the overthrow of the Government.” The President’s Commission on Campus Unrest in detailing “the law enforcement response” noted tha t “it is an undoubted f act tha t on some campuses there 

are men and women who plot, all too often successfully, to burn and bomb, and 

sometimes to maim and kill. The police must attempt to determine whether or 

not such a plot is in progress, and, if it is, they must attem pt to thw art it.”

Finally, Allan C. Brownfeld, a faculty member at the University of Maryland, 

writing in “Christian Economics,” February 11, 1970, on “The New Left and 

the Politics of Confrontation” noted tha t “in many instances, those extremists 

who have fomented disorder have been in violation of state and Federal statutes.” 

But, Mr. Brownfeld noted. “What is often missing is the will to prosecute and 

to bring such individuals before the bar of justice.” Mr. Brownfeld’s article 

was subcaptioned “A Society Which Will Not Defend Itse lf Against Anachists 

Cannot Long Survive.”

IV. APPROPRIATIONS TESTIMONY

On February 10, 19G6, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover testified regarding the 

Ku Klux Kian, saying tha t “the Bureau continues its program of penetrating 

the Kian at all levels and, I may say, has been quite successful in doing so. 

The Bureau’s role in penetrating the Kian has received public attention due to 

the solution of the brutal murders of Viola Luizzo in Alabama, Lieutenant 

Colonel Lemuel A. Penn in Georgia and the three civil rights workers in Mississippi. We have achieved a number of other tangible accomplishments in this 

field, most of which are not publicly known but are most significant.” Discussion 

off I he record followed.

V. PUBLIC SUPPORT OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

Following acknowledgement tha t the FBI had a counterintelligence program, 

syndicated columnist Victor Riesel wrote on June 15, 1973, “no apologias are due 

from those in the highest authority for secretly developing a domestic counterrevolutionary intelligence stratagem in early 1970.” Mr. Riesel detailed the record 

of “dead students,” “university libraries in flames,” and “insensate murdering of 

cops,” and concluded “it would have been wrong not to have attempted to counter 

the sheer off-the-wall terrorism of the 1969-70 bomb seasons. And it would be 

wrong today. No one need apologize for counterrevolutionary action.”

“Our reaction is tha t we are exceedingly glad he ordered it,” wrote the “St. 

Louis Globe—Democrat” in a December 11. 1973. editorial on the counterintelligence program. This newspaper noted that “the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

under the late J. Edgar Hoover conducted a three-year campaign of counterintelligence ‘to expose, disrupt, and neutralize’ the New Left movement . . .” and 

that “many of these New Left groups were doing everything they could to undermine the Government and some of them resorted to bombings, stree t riots, and 

other gangster tactics. Others waged war on police across the Nation and on our 

system of justice. Still others disrupted the Nation's campuses. The Nation can be thankful it has a courageous and strong leader of the FBI to deal with the 

serious threats posed by New Left groups during this period.”

On June 18, 1974. Eugene II. Methvin, Senior Editor, “The Reader's Digest,” 

testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding terrorism and 

noted, “. . . the FBI’s counterintelligence program against the extremist core of 

the New Left was a model of sophisticated, effective counter-terrorist law enforcement action first developed and applied with devastating effect against the 

Ku Klux Kian in the mid-1960’s. In tha t context the strategy won great publicity 

and p raise ; yet now we have the Attorney General condemning it. In the current 

climate of justifiable revulsion over Watergate, we are in danger of crippling law 

enforcement intelligence in a hysteria of reverse McCarthyism in which we close 

our eyes to evidence and some compelling necessities of domestic and international 

security.”

o