[Cite as Hague v. Kosicek, 2019-Ohio-2089.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO 

CARLA R. HAGUE, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 CASE NO. 2018-A-0060

 - vs - : 

MAURI KOSICEK, EXECUTOR OF THE 

ESTATE OF CHARLES G. HAGUE, 

: 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

Civil Appeal from the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2018 CV 

00199. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Gary L. Pasqualone, Curry and Pasqualone, 302 South Broadway, Geneva, Ohio 44041 

(For Plaintiff-Appellant). 

David E. Lowe and Katie E. Christman, Thrasher, Dinsmore & Dolan, LPA, 100 7th 

Avenue, Suite 150, Chardon, Ohio 44024 (For Defendant-Appellee). 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Carla R. Hague, appeals the trial court’s judgment overruling her 

objections to a magistrate’s decision and ruling that she is not entitled to receive further 

spousal support from the Estate of Charles G. Hague. She contests that under the terms 

of the underlying divorce decree, her right to spousal support terminates upon Charles’s 

death. We affirm. 

{¶2} In June 2016, Charles was granted a divorce from appellant on the grounds 
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of incompatibility. Incorporated into the divorce decree is Charles’s and Carla’s 

separation agreement. As to spousal support, the divorce decree states: 

{¶3} ”IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [Charles] shall pay directly to the Wife for 

an indefinite period, the sum of $1,326.80 per month or until the earliest of the death of 

Wife, Wife’s remarriage, or Wife’s cohabitation with an unrelated person as though 

married. 

{¶4} “The said spousal support shall not be modifiable, nor shall the Court retain 

jurisdiction thereof * * *.” 

{¶5} Charles died on January 15, 2018, and a probate action was commenced 

in the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas. On February 5, 2018, appellee, Mauri 

Kosicek, was appointed executor of Charles’s estate. 

{¶6} When appellant did not receive spousal support following Charles’s death, 

she filed a claim against his estate. She argued that Charles’s death does not terminate 

the estate’s obligation to pay monthly support because the divorce decree refers to her 

death, her remarriage, and her cohabitation as support ending events. Appellee rejected 

appellant’s claim against the estate. 

{¶7} Approximately one month later, appellant filed this separate action against 

appellee seeking spousal support from Charles’s estate. Her complaint also seeks an 

order compelling the estate to reserve sufficient funds to continue to pay spousal support 

for the remainder of her life or until she remarries or cohabitates with another person. 

{¶8} After appellee answered the single-claim complaint, the trial court referred 

the case to a magistrate. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate ordered 

both parties to brief the merits. Specifically, the magistrate instructed the parties to 
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address the application of R.C. 3105.18(B) as it pertains to the spousal support order in 

the divorce decree. That statute provides, in pertinent part: 

{¶9} “Any award of spousal support made under this section shall terminate upon 

the death of either party, unless the order containing the award expressly provides 

otherwise.” 

{¶10} Appellant argued that since the order specifically states three contingencies 

upon which spousal support terminates, none of which is Charles’s death, the order 

“expressly” provides that the payments are to continue after his death. Alternatively, she 

asserted that if there is ambiguity regarding their intent, parol evidence must be 

considered. Appellant attached to her brief the affidavit of the attorney who represented 

her in the divorce action averring that Charles and appellant agreed that spousal support 

would survive his death because he was already terminally ill at the time of the divorce. 

{¶11} Appellee maintained that the statute mandates termination of spousal 

support absent express language stating to the contrary. (Appellee further argued that 

there is no express language to the contrary and that parol evidence could not be 

considered.) 

{¶12} The magistrate rejected appellant’s argument that the intent for the spousal 

support to continue after Charles’s death could be implied from the other provisions of the 

support order. The magistrate held that under R.C. 3105.18(B), Charles’s support 

obligation terminated at his death because there is no express language otherwise. In 

addition, the magistrate held that the affidavit of appellant’s divorce attorney could not be 

considered under the parol evidence rule. 

{¶13} Appellant objected to the magistrate’s decision, restating her prior 
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argument. 

{¶14} After hearing oral arguments on the objections, the trial court overruled the 

objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision. The trial court held that parol evidence 

could not be considered because the spousal support order is clear and unambiguous, 

and does not expressly state that spousal support continues after Charles’s death. The 

trial court ordered that the obligation to pay spousal support terminates upon Charles’s 

death. 

{¶15} On appeal, appellant assigns three assignments of error: 

{¶16} “[1.] The trial court erred in its adoption of the magistrate’s decision in 

appellee’s favor ruling that under ORC 3105.18(B) spousal support terminated upon the 

death of [Charles Hague]. 

{¶17} “[2.] The trial court erred in its adoption of the magistrate’s decision in 

appellee’s favor in excluding attorney’s affidavit which sets forth the true intent of the 

parties. 

{¶18} “[3.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of plaintiff-appellant as it lacked 

jurisdiction to rule that spousal support terminated upon [Charles Hague’s] death.” 

{¶19} Under her first assignment, appellant challenges the trial court’s application 

of R.C. 3105.18(B). She asserts that the “expressly provides otherwise” requirement has 

been satisfied because the spousal support order specifically provides for the termination 

of such support upon the payee’s death, remarriage, or cohabitation. 

{¶20} Appellant relies upon Forbis v. Forbis, 6th Dist. Wood Nos. WD-04-056 and 

WD-04-063, 2005-Ohio-5881. In Forbis, the divorce decree addressing termination of 

spousal support is identical to the language in our case; i.e., the Forbis decree states that 
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spousal support terminates upon the earliest of the wife’s death, her remarriage, or her 

cohabitation with a nonrelative male. The Forbis court held: “Since the [trial] court omitted 

[the husband’s] death as a terminating factor, the court clearly expressed its intent for 

spousal support to continue after his death.” Id. at ¶74. 

{¶21} Other courts, however, are in conflict with Forbis. In Woodrome v. 

Woodrome, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2000-05-074, 2001 WL 290067 (Mar. 26, 2001), the 

court began its analysis with the use of the word “expressly” in the statute. The court then 

quoted the following definition: “Expressly means ‘in an express manner; in direct or 

unmistakable terms; explicitly, the opposite of impliedly.’ Black’s Law Dictionary (6 

Ed.Rev.1990).” Id. at *1. 

{¶22} In Woodrome, the divorce decree provides for indefinite spousal support. 

While acknowledging that the language is sufficient to imply that spousal support survives 

the payor’s death, it does not expressly provide for it. Accordingly, the spousal support 

obligation ended at his death. Id. 

{¶23} In Budd v. Munka, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27051, 2014-Ohio-4185, wife was 

ordered to pay spousal support for 120 consecutive months or until husband’s death. On 

direct appeal, wife argued that the trial court erred in not including her death as a 

termination event. In rejecting this argument, the Budd court stated: 

{¶24} “Wife asserts that the trial court’s omission of death of Wife while including 

death of Husband requires the conclusion that the death of Wife would not be a condition 

that would terminate spousal support. However, the trial court’s entry does not expressly

provide that spousal support will not terminate if Wife dies. Said another way, the entry 

does not state that the Wife’s spousal support obligation will continue after her death. 
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While there may [be] an implication that spousal support would not terminate upon Wife’s 

death from the trial court’s language, an implication is not equivalent to an express 

provision. Accordingly, because the entry does not expressly provide that spousal 

support will not terminate upon Wife’s death, pursuant to R.C. 3105.18(B), spousal 

support also terminates upon Wife’s death.” (Emphasis sic). (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 

22. See also Shaw v. Shaw, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA96-05-013, 1996 WL 551423, *3 

(Sept. 30, 1996). 

{¶25} Given the legislature’s use of the word “expressly” in R.C 3105.18(B), Forbis

is unpersuasive; i.e., we reject the holding that the continuation of spousal support after 

the payor’s death can be implied from the other terms of the spousal support award. 

Consistent with Woodrome, Budd, and Shaw, R.C. 31105.18(B) can only be satisfied 

when the terms of the award expressly state that the payment is to extend beyond payor’s 

death. In the absence of express language, the duty to pay spousal support ends when 

the payor dies. 

{¶26} Here, the spousal support award does not expressly provide that Charles’s 

obligation continues after his death. Appellant’s first assignment lacks merit. 

{¶27} Under her next assignment, appellant claims the trial court erred in failing 

to consider her attorney’s affidavit. 

{¶28} “The parol evidence rule states: ‘absent fraud, mistake, or other invalidating 

cause, the parties’ final written integration of their agreement may not be varied, 

contradicted or supplemented by evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, 

or prior written agreements.’ Galmish v. Cicchini, 90 Ohio St.3d 22, 26, 734 N.E.2d 782, 

2000-Ohio-7, quoting 22 Williston Contracts, (4th Ed.1999), 569-570, Section 33:4.” 
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Euclid Asphalt Paving Co., Inc. v. Mount Zion Fellowship Church, 11th Dist. Lake No. 

2004-L-175, 2005-Ohio-7049, ¶ 16. Therefore, when the terms of an agreement are clear 

and unambiguous, parol evidence cannot be considered in construing the terms. Currier 

v. Penn-Ohio Logistics, 187 Ohio App.3d 32, 2010-Ohio-198, 931 N.E.2d 129, ¶ 74 (11th 

Dist.). 

{¶29} On the other hand, “[w]here a term is ambiguous, parol evidence is 

admissible to interpret, but not to contradict, the express language of the contract. Ohio 

Historical Soc. v. Gen. Maintenance & Eng. Co. (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 139, 146, 583 

N.E.2d 340 (citations omitted). ‘[I]f such an ambiguity is alleged, it must arise from the 

language of the contract itself and, therefore, courts will not admit parol evidence to 

construe an ambiguity forced into the contract to strain the apparent meaning of the 

language.’ Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Mitchell-Peterson, Inc. (1989), 63 Ohio Ap.3d 319, 

328, 578 N.E. 2d 851, citing Cincinnati v. Gas Light & Coke Co. (1895), 53 Ohio St. 278, 

286-287, 41 N.E. 239 * * *.” Sherock v. Ohio Municipal League Joint Self-Ins. Pool, 11th 

Dist. Trumbull No. 2003-T-0022, 2004-Ohio-1515, ¶ 16. 

{¶30} Here, the divorce decree lacks ambiguity. By operation of law, spousal 

support terminates upon the death of the payor unless the order expressly states 

otherwise. R.C. 3105.18(B). The trial court did not err in not considering parol evidence. 

The second assignment is also without merit. 

{¶31} Under her final assignment, appellant maintains that by concluding that the 

spousal support obligation ended when Charles died, the trial court amended the support 

award as set forth in the divorce decree. She further maintains that since there was no 

reservation of jurisdiction over spousal support, the trial court exceeded the scope of its 
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jurisdiction. 

{¶32} As stated however, the trial court correctly applied R.C. 3105.18(B) and 

enforced the spousal support provision. It did not amend spousal support or exceed its 

scope. The third assignment is not well taken. 

{¶33} The judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., 

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J., 

concur.