Inspection Report 

The Department of Energy’s 

Pandemic Influenza Planning 

DOE/IG-0784 December 2007 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Inspections and Special Inquiries 


THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S 

PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING 

 

TABLE OF 

CONTENTS 

OVERVIEW 

Introduction and Objective 1 

Observations and Conclusions 2 

Background 3 

DETAILS OF FINDINGS

Pandemic Plans 4 

Coordination of Vaccines and Antivirals 6 

Monitoring Team Positions 7 

Attendance Process 7 

Social Distancing Drill 8 

Pandemic Employee Training 8 

RECOMMENDATIONS 9 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS 10 

INSPECTOR COMMENTS 10 

APPENDICES

A. Scope and Methodology 12 

B. Status of Pandemic Influenza Plans 13 

C. Highlights of DOE’s Pandemic Planning 15 

D. Management Comments 16 
Overview 

Page 1 The Department of Energy’s 

 Pandemic Influenza Planning 

INTRODUCTION According to the U. S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

AND OBJECTIVE (CDC), in a worst case scenario, as many as 90 million people in 

the U.S., including 30 percent of its workforce, could become sick 

from a mutated avian influenza (bird flu) H5N1 strain. Proactive 

steps are therefore necessary to protect U.S. Department of Energy 

(DOE) personnel and maintain the Department’s mission-essential 

functions. 

The Government issued mandates to Federal agencies to conduct 

pandemic influenza planning. On November 1, 2005, the President 

announced the “National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza,”

requiring Federal agencies that perform mission-critical functions, 

including DOE, to develop agency pandemic influenza plans. In 

the event of a pandemic, the U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services will lead the public health and medical response 

and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security will lead 

nonmedical domestic support and response actions. 

On March 29, 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Energy signed a 

memorandum, “Development of the Department of Energy 

Pandemic Influenza Plans,” which required all DOE entities, 

including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), 

to develop specific pandemic influenza plans with full 

implementation by May 31, 2006. The memorandum also 

established the DOE Biological Event Monitoring Team 

(Monitoring Team) to coordinate with other Federal agencies and 

develop a plan that would address an avian influenza pandemic. 

On November 8, 2006, the White House Homeland Security 

Council issued a pandemic influenza plan checklist that contained 

additional criteria for agencies to follow. We concluded that the 

Deputy Secretary’s memorandum and the White House checklist 

were mandatory. 

The objective of our inspection was to determine if DOE was 

taking appropriate and timely actions regarding its pandemic 

influenza planning.
______________________________________________________________________

Page 2 Observations and Conclusions 

OBSERVATIONS AND We concluded that while DOE Headquarters and many 

CONCLUSIONS Department sites are making progress in their pandemic influenza 

planning, much remains to be done. Specifically, we found that: 

• Of the 72 organizations required to submit a pandemic plan 

by a June 1, 2007, deadline set by the DOE Continuity 

Program Manager, only 36 (or 50 percent) met the 

requirement. In addition, only one of the four DOE power 

administrations submitted a plan, which is of particular 

concern given their role in ensuring the Nation’s electricity 

infrastructure; 

• As of October 11, 2007, at the conclusion of our field work, 

53 of 80 organizations (or 66 percent) had submitted their 

pandemic plans; the Continuity Program Manager 

explained that the number of organizations required to 

submit plans had increased since the June 1, 2007, 

deadline; 

 

• Coordination with individual State or U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services officials for the release of 

pandemic vaccines and antivirals had not been completed; 

• Of the 11 required Monitoring Team technical advisory 

positions and 1 Medical Officer position, 4 advisory 

positions and the Medical Officer position remained 

unfilled as of October 11, 2007; 

• Although much progress has been made, DOE had not fully 

implemented an overall corporate process for identifying 

and reporting employees who would be unable to perform 

their work during a pandemic; 

• DOE had not conducted a “social distancing” drill (e.g., use 

of teleworking, limited use of mass transit, and restrictions 

on meetings and gatherings) to test its ability to perform 

mission-essential functions while minimizing person-toperson contact; and, 

• Although DOE had initiated a pandemic influenza 

education and information campaign, including a voluntary 

training course, only 550 of approximately 140,000 DOE 

Federal and contractor employees were trained as of 

October 11, 2007. 
______________________________________________________________________

Page 3 Background 

BACKGROUND We announced this inspection on November 7, 2006. We 

suspended our inspection on November 13, 2006, and 

December 14, 2006, at the request of the Department’s Office of 

Health, Safety and Security (HSS), in order to provide DOE time 

to implement numerous aspects of its pandemic influenza 

planning. We started our inspection field work on May 1, 2007. 

The lead office for emergency operations relating to the 

Department’s pandemic influenza planning is NNSA’s Office of 

the Associate Administrator for Emergency Operations. This 

office is also responsible for DOE’s overall Continuity of 

Operations Plan (COOP). The lead office for biomedical aspects 

of pandemic influenza planning is HSS’ Office of Illness and 

Injury Prevention Programs. This office is responsible for 

coordinating with the White House Homeland Security Council 

and providing pandemic influenza education to employees. 

During our entrance conference on May 1, 2007, we learned 

that the Continuity Program Manager had previously chosen 

June 1, 2007, for the deadline for each Department entity to submit 

a pandemic plan to him. Based on this date, we chose June 1, 

2007, as a snapshot in time regarding DOE’s pandemic 

implementation planning. To most accurately reflect the status of 

DOE’s pandemic planning, we requested and were provided 

updated information as of October 11, 2007. 

We determined that DOE has been proactive in several areas 

regarding its pandemic influenza planning. Specifically, HSS, the 

Office of the Associate Administrator for Emergency Operations, 

and the Office of Human Capital Management (Human Capital) 

have taken leadership roles in the Department’s pandemic 

influenza planning. As reflected in this report, the Department has 

taken a number of important steps to address pandemic influenza 

issues. Appendix C includes a summary of these actions. 
Details of Findings 

Page 4 Details of Findings 

PANDEMIC PLANS We found that, of the 72 organizations required to submit 

a pandemic plan by the June 1, 2007, deadline set by the DOE 

Continuity Program Manager, only 36 (or 50 percent) met the 

requirement. In addition, only one of four DOE power 

administrations submitted a plan, which is of particular concern 

given their essential role in the Nation’s electricity infrastructure. 

 Figure 1 represents the pandemic plan statistics as of June 1, 2007. 

Appendix B of this report identifies the status of all program 

office, support office, and site pandemic plans as of June 1, 2007. 

 Figure 11

Status of DOE/NNSA Pandemic Plans by 

Entity as of June 1, 2007

36

6

30

None Draft Final

On October 11, 2007, at the conclusion of our field work, the 

Continuity Program Manager informed us that, based on his 

statistical analysis of the DOE/NNSA organizational components, 

he determined that the number of organizations required to submit 

a pandemic plan had increased [from 72 to 80]. According to the 

Continuity Program Manager’s statistics, 53 of 80 (or 66 percent) 

of the organizations had submitted pandemic plans by that date. 

The Continuity Program Manager said that in December 2006, he 

had informed all entities that they needed a COOP, which would 

include a pandemic plan, by the June 1, 2007, deadline. He said 

that he believed that six months was a sufficient amount of time for 

the entities to complete their plans. The Continuity Program 

Manager asserted that he was unable to require all entities to 

develop a plan because there was no enforceable criterion, such as 

 

1

 The Continuity Program Manager said that he planned to conduct a quality assurance review of each pandemic 

plan prior to his acceptance of the plans as final. As of October 11, 2007, the quality assurance review had not been 

completed. 
Page 5 Details of Findings 

a DOE order. He noted that contractors use DOE orders for 

justification for funding of additional work. He further said that 

during January 2007, NNSA approved justification for a new 

Continuity of Programs Order that would include a requirement for 

pandemic plans. The draft Order is currently under review. We 

substantiated the lack of a DOE directive or Code of Federal 

Regulations provision covering this topic. 

Further, we were also told by some entities that had not submitted a 

pandemic plan that they were waiting for a DOE order. Thus, we 

believe that it is important for there to be an enforceable 

requirement that all DOE entities have a pandemic plan. 

Accordingly, we believe that DOE should expedite the process to 

put such a requirement in place. 

DOE has a mission-critical role to ensure that the Nation’s energy 

infrastructure is operational during emergencies. A critical aspect of 

this is the DOE power administrations. We noted that the Southwest 

Power Administration Headquarters and its field units were the only 

DOE power administration entities that submitted pandemic plans. 

The Bonneville Power Administration, the Southeastern Power 

Administration, and the Western Area Power Administration stated 

that they were still working on their pandemic plans at the time of our 

review. 

During our review of Headquarters offices pandemic influenza 

plans, we observed that none included planning for the 

Headquarters occupational medical clinics at Germantown, 

Maryland, and Washington, D.C. The Chair of the Monitoring 

Team, who is responsible for the medical aspects of DOE pandemic 

planning, advised that the Headquarters medical clinics are a 

necessary aspect of DOE’s pandemic planning. We determined that 

Human Capital is responsible for oversight of the Headquarters 

occupational medical clinic services. 

A responsible Human Capital official advised that during a 

pandemic, Human Capital planned to follow CDC guidelines for 

medical clinics; however, the official agreed that written details 

were necessary and agreed to develop written procedures to cover 

the Headquarters medical clinics. Although we did not review any 

site pandemic plans to determine if the sites included details 

covering how their medical clinics would operate during a 

pandemic, the Monitoring Team Chair stated that she has been 

providing pandemic influenza guidance to the contractor site office 

medical directors. 
Page 6 Details of Findings 

COORDINATION OF We found that coordination with individual State or U.S. 

VACCINES AND Department of Health and Human Services officials for the 

ANTIVIRALS release of pandemic vaccines and antivirals had not been 

completed. The Deputy Secretary’s March 29, 2006, memorandum 

stated that DOE is responsible for protecting the health of its 

employees, which includes the distribution of needed vaccines and 

antiviral agents. Around May 2006, initial vaccine 

recommendations for DOE were developed. The Monitoring Team 

Chair advised that she had instructed the site occupational medical 

directors to develop a vaccine priority list and coordinate an 

agreement with officials from the appropriate State(s) or U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services for the receipt of 

Federal stockpiles of pandemic medicines. She said that the sites 

were working on this task. 

 On October 22, 2007, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS)/U.S. Department of Health and Human Services working 

group developed a set of recommendations that identified priority 

groups for vaccination. HSS is a member of that interagency 

working group. HSS management said that it strongly recommends 

that DOE follow the DHS/U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services working group guidance for prepandemic and pandemic 

vaccine prioritization. HSS management also said that although 

there are no clear directives on how the vaccines will be distributed, 

it anticipates that health departments of each State will receive and 

distribute vaccine according to the DHS/U.S. Department of Health 

and Human Services recommendations. As such, HSS management 

said that it continues to encourage each DOE site medical director 

to enter into a dialogue with his/her respective State health 

departments for the receipt of pandemic vaccine. 

HSS management said that, due to the current lack of vaccine, DOE 

mission-essential personnel will have the highest priority for 

vaccinations. HSS management also said that it plans to make a 

recommendation that DOE program offices and their respective 

sites compile a list of mission-essential personnel according to 

function. This list will be used to determine the number of vaccine 

doses required and the identity of those to be vaccinated. 

HSS management further stated that it has no specific 

recommendation regarding the vaccination of DOE Federal and 

contractor employees not identified as mission-essential employees. 

Until vaccine is available for the public at large, the Monitoring 

Team will recommend that social distancing, hand-washing, and 

public health practices be implemented to ensure the safety and 

health of DOE Federal and contractor employees. 
Page 7 Details of Findings 

MONITORING TEAM We found that, of the 11 required Monitoring Team technical 

 POSITIONS advisory positions and 1 Medical Officer position, 4 advisory 

 positions and the Medical Officer position remained unfilled as of 

October 11, 2007. The Deputy Secretary’s March 29, 2006, 

memorandum stated that DOE shall form a Monitoring Team and 

identified core standing members and their positions. Further, the 

memorandum identified 11 specific technical advisors to be 

appointed by the Monitoring Team standing members. The vacant 

technical advisory positions were for the Offices of Science, 

Intelligence, and Counterintelligence and a contracting 

representative. 

We also determined that the former DOE Headquarters Medical 

Officer separated from DOE in September 2006 and a replacement 

had not been hired. In the interim, the Monitoring Team Chair 

assumed the Medical Officer’s Monitoring Team responsibilities. 

The Monitoring Team Chair advised us that having all of the 

required advisors to the Monitoring Team and a Headquarters DOE 

Medical Officer would enable the process to operate efficiently 

during a pandemic. The Continuity Program Manager also advised 

us that the establishment of individuals as advisors in each role 

would provide cohesiveness to the pandemic influenza plan. 

ATTENDANCE Although much progress has been made, we found that DOE 

PROCESS had not fully implemented an overall corporate process for 

identifying and reporting employees who would be unable to 

perform their work during a pandemic. DOE, therefore, may not be 

able to ensure continuity of its mission-critical functions. The 

White House Homeland Security Council directed several agencies, 

including DOE, to complete a pandemic-related checklist. The 

checklist included the development of an agency process to 

determine the status of its employees during a pandemic health 

crisis for the purpose of monitoring agency workforce levels and for 

reporting to agencies such as DHS and the U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services. In order to implement this checklist 

item, the Monitoring Team determined that DOE needed to collect 

information in the following categories during a pandemic: the 

number of Federal and contractor employees unavailable to work, 

and identification of the employees’ names, organizations, and 

work locations. 

We were told by the Continuity Program Manager that during 

Exercise Pinnacle 07, a May 2007 continuity of operations exercise, 

DOE was unable to account for all Federal and contractor 

employees who were unable to report to work. As a result, the 

Continuity Program Manager tasked Human Capital to develop a 
Page 8 Details of Findings 

corporate process for identifying how many people were unable to 

report to work during an emergency, their identities, and their 

location of employment. As of August 28, 2007, this capability did 

not exist. 

In November 15, 2007, comments on a draft of our report, Human 

Capital stated that it had developed a corporate personnel 

accountability process in December 2005; however, it had not been 

included in the DOE COOP that was being finalized at that time. 

Further, Human Capital stated that full implementation will be 

realized when the next DOE COOP is updated. In addition, Human 

Capital officials stated that a corporate telephonic call-in process, 

which the DOE Continuity Program Manager requested to be 

established, is also being researched and evaluated. 

SOCIAL DISTANCING We found that DOE had not conducted a social distancing drill

DRILL (e.g., use of teleworking, limited use of mass transit, and restrictions 

on meetings and gatherings) to test its ability to perform missionessential functions while minimizing person-to-person contact. The 

Deputy Secretary’s March 29, 2006, memorandum stated that social 

distancing is a key component in DOE’s pandemic influenza 

planning. 

The Monitoring Team Chair said that a social distancing drill, 

including teleworking where possible, is necessary because social 

distancing is a key strategy in DOE’s pandemic planning. The 

Continuity Program Manager also said that a drill that implements 

the elements of social distancing is essential. He further said that 

the related DOE Order currently in draft will require the 

Department to perform drills, including telework drills. 

PANDEMIC EMPLOYEE We found that, although DOE had initiated a pandemic 

TRAINING influenza education and information campaign, including a 

voluntary training course, only 550 of approximately 140,000 DOE 

and contractor employees were trained as of October 11, 2007. 

Pursuant to the Deputy Secretary’s March 29, 2006, memorandum 

and guidance in the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, a 

pandemic plan is based upon education of its employees. 

 Participation in this training could significantly reduce employees’ 

chances of contracting a pandemic virus. The Monitoring Team 

Chair said that her medical training strategy was to first provide 

training to Headquarters personnel, followed by the sites. In an 

August 13, 2007, Department-wide communication, Department 

officials announced that they were offering a new pandemic 
Page 9 Recommendations 

influenza training course at DOE Headquarters during September 

and October 2007. HSS indicated that it also planned to incorporate 

information on pandemic influenza into its next mandatory Federal 

Employee Occupational Safety and Health training. 

On August 23, 2007, in another Department-wide communication, 

management announced that it would be offering a live televideo on 

September 20 and 25, 2007, regarding pandemic training and that 

the training would be recorded on a DVD for future viewing. 

Therefore, pandemic training would be available to all DOE and 

contractor employees. We believe that DOE is making significant 

progress toward full implementation of employee pandemic 

influenza training even though only a small number of employees 

are currently trained, but should work to ensure that training is 

completed by everyone. 

RECOMMENDATIONS We concluded that while DOE Headquarters and many Department 

sites are making progress in their pandemic influenza planning, 

much remains to be done. We recommend that the Associate 

Administrator for Emergency Operations take the following actions: 

1. Expedite the issuance of DOE Order 150.1, “Continuity 

Programs,” which includes a requirement for a pandemic 

plan at all DOE/NNSA facilities and operations and 

mandatory training requirements; 

2. After DOE Order 150.1 is issued, ensure that all entities 

complete a pandemic implementation plan; and, 

3. Coordinate with the Office of the Chief Information Officer 

to ensure that DOE conducts a social distancing drill (e.g., 

use of teleworking, limited use of mass transit, and 

restrictions on meetings and gatherings) to test its ability to 

perform mission-essential functions while minimizing 

person-to-person contact. 

We recommend that the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer 

take the following actions: 

4. Ensure that Headquarters offices and their respective sites 

coordinate an agreement with State or U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services officials regarding the receipt of 

vaccines and antivirals during a pandemic; and, 
Page 10 Management and Inspector Comments 

5. Expedite appointments to all Monitoring Team positions, 

including the Monitoring Team Medical Officer, in order to 

fully implement pandemic planning. 

We recommend that the Director, Office of Human Capital 

Management, take the following actions: 

6. Develop and institutionalize a corporate process for all 

DOE/NNSA facilities, including Headquarters, to identify 

and report employees who would be unable to report to 

work during a pandemic; and, 

7. Develop a written procedure for the operation of 

Headquarters health clinics during a pandemic. 

MANAGEMENT In comments on a draft of this report, management generally 

COMMENTS concurred with our findings and recommendations. We have 

included management’s comments in their entirety at Appendix D. 

The comments from HSS and Human Capital included corrective 

action plans; however, the NNSA comments did not include a 

corrective action plan. 

 Specific to our recommendation that NNSA’s Associate 

Administrator for Emergency Operations coordinate with the Chief 

Information Officer to conduct a DOE social distancing drill, 

NNSA management acknowledged the appropriateness of a social 

distancing drill, but considered such a drill to be problematic to 

implement. NNSA management considered it to be more 

appropriate to elevate the recommendation to the Deputy Secretary 

to ensure Department-wide participation. 

INSPECTOR In general, we found the management comments to be responsive 

COMMENTS to our findings and recommendations, and based on technical 

comments received, we modified the report accordingly. However, 

due to the lack of a corrective action plan from NNSA, as required 

by DOE O 221.3, “Establishment of Management Decisions on 

Office of Inspector General Reports,” a management decision from 

NNSA is required. 

 Regarding NNSA’s comment about conducting a DOE-wide social 

distancing drill, we note that on November 6, 2006, the Deputy 

Secretary of Energy notified all Department elements via a 

memorandum that he had approved the transfer of management of 

DOE’s Continuity of Government Program from HSS to NNSA’s 

Office of Emergency Operations. We also note that the 
Page 11 Inspector Comments 

memorandum stated that all elements were to give the NNSA 

Continuity Operations Program Manager their full cooperation 

because these programs were critical in ensuring DOE’s ability to 

perform its mission-essential functions in the event of a significant 

disruption. Thus, we believe it is clear the Office of Emergency 

Operations has the authority to conduct social distancing drills. 
Appendix A 

Page 12 Scope and Methodology 

SCOPE AND The majority of field work for this review was completed between 

METHODOLOGY May and July 2007. However, several data points were updated as 

of October 11, 2007. Our review included interviews with DOE, 

NNSA, and contractor officials. We also interviewed U.S. Public 

Health Service officials regarding DOE’s service contract covering 

the Headquarters medical clinics. We reviewed pertinent policies, 

procedures, directives, and regulations. 

As part of our review, we evaluated implementation of the 

“Government Performance and Results Act of 1993” in the context 

of activities included in our review. We did not identify any 

performance measure issues regarding DOE’s pandemic influenza 

planning. 

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the “Quality 

Standards for Inspections” issued by the President’s Council on 

Integrity and Efficiency. 
Appendix B 

__

Page 13 Status of Pandemic Influenza Plans as of June 1, 2007 

Status of Pandemic Influenza Plans as of June 1, 2007 

Chart 1 - DOE/NNSA Entities that Submitted Final or Draft Pandemic Influenza Plan 

DOE/NNSA HQ Staff and Support Offices

1. Chief Financial Officer 

2. Economic Impact and Diversity 

3. Environmental Management 

4. Fossil Energy (Draft) 

5. General Counsel 

6. Health, Safety and Security 

7. Hearings and Appeals 

8. Human Capital Management (Draft) 

9. Inspector General 

10. Intelligence and Counterintelligence 

11. Management 

12. Defense Programs (Draft) 

13. Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

14. Emergency Operations (Draft) 

15. Emergency Operations Training Academy 

16. Management & Administration (Draft) 

17. Defense Nuclear Security 

18. Nuclear Energy 

19. Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (Draft) 

20. Science 

DOE/NNSA Field Sites & Organizations

1. Carlsbad Field Office 

2. Consolidated Business Center 

3. Rocky Flats Project Office 

4. West Valley Project Office 

5. Moab Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Site Project 

6. Golden Field Office 

7. National Nuclear Security Administration Service Center 

8. Oak Ridge Office 

9. Office of River Protection 

10. Richland Operations Office 

11. Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office 

12. Southwestern Power Administration: Gore Maintenance Unit 

13. Southwestern Power Administration: Jonesboro Maintenance Unit 

14. Southwestern Power Administration: Operations and Engineering 

15. Southwestern Power Administration: Springfield Maintenance Unit 

16. Southwestern Power Administration: Southwest Headquarters, OK 
Appendix B (continued) 

__

Page 14 Status of Pandemic Influenza Plans as of June 1, 2007 

Chart 2 - DOE/NNSA Entities WITHOUT a Pandemic Influenza Plan 

DOE/NNSA HQ Staff and Support Offices

1. Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs 

2. Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 

3. Energy Information Administration 

4. Information Officer 

5. Legacy Management 

6. Naval Reactors 

7. Infrastructure & Environment 

8. Public Affairs 

9. Policy and International Affairs 

10. Radioactive Waste Management 

DOE/NNSA Field Sites & Organizations

1. Ames Site Office 

2. Argonne Site Office 

3. Berkeley Site Office 

4. Bonneville Power Administration 

5. Brookhaven Site Office 

6. Chicago Office 

7. Fermi Site Office 

8. Idaho Operations Office 

9. Kansas City Site Office 

10. Livermore Site Office 

11. Los Alamos Site Office 

12. Naval Petroleum Reserves in CA 

13. Nevada Site Office 

14. Y-12 Site Office 

15. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

16. Pantex Site Office 

17. Pittsburgh Naval Reactors Office 

18. Princeton Site Office 

19. Sandia Site Office 

20. Savannah River Site 

21. Schenectady Naval Reactors Office 

22. Southeastern Power Administration 

23. Stanford Site Office 

24. Strategic Petroleum Reserve Project Office 

25. Thomas Jefferson Site Office 

26. Western Area Power Administration
Appendix C 

Page 15 Highlights of DOE’s Pandemic Planning 

HIGHLIGHTS OF DOE’S As part of DOE’s interagency responsibilities, HSS represents 

PANDEMIC PLANNING DOE on the Federal Interagency Task Group on Vaccine 

Prioritization. Through participation, HSS was able to ensure the 

DOE security forces were identified as a high priority for receiving 

pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines. HSS developed a website 

with pandemic information and issued a Department-wide 

communication to direct employees to this information. HSS 

initiated educational classes on pandemic influenza starting in 

September 2007. The classes will be available to everyone on 

DVD. HSS also plans to incorporate information on pandemic 

influenza into its next mandatory Federal Employee Occupational 

Safety and Health training. In addition, on September 7, 2007, the 

Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer issued a memorandum 

that stated that HSS developed a pandemic flu awareness website 

and requested all program offices with websites to establish a link 

to the HSS website. 

The Monitoring Team has met on several occasions and has been 

coordinating with the site occupational medical directors on a 

monthly basis regarding DOE-wide pandemic planning and site 

planning with State or U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services officials. The Monitoring Team has also been 

coordinating with Human Capital regarding employee medical 

training and numerous personnel issues that must be addressed in a 

pandemic plan. Human Capital is in the process of reviewing and 

revising DOE policy regarding absenteeism during a pandemic, 

contracts with health care providers, and Employee Assistance 

Programs. Further, during May 2007, under the guidance of the 

Continuity Program Manager, DOE conducted a continuity of 

operations exercise at Germantown, MD, called Exercise Pinnacle 

07. The Continuity Program Manager said that the exercise 

identified the lack of a corporate accountability process for 

reporting who was not at work. 

Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories 

have been contracted by DHS to develop pandemic influenza 

modeling scenarios. Further, the Bonneville Power Administration 

helped the North American Electric Reliability Corporation 

develop pandemic emergency guidelines for electric companies. 
Appendix D 

Page 16 Management Comments 
Appendix D (continued) 

Page 17 Management Comments 
Appendix D (continued) 

Page 18 Management Comments 
Appendix D (continued) 

Page 19 Management Comments 
Appendix D (continued) 

Page 20 Management Comments 
IG Report No. DOE/IG-0784 

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