U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

35–362PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

VENEZUELA AT A CROSSROADS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 13, 2019 

Serial No. 116–4 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: Ahttp://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Ranking 

Member 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Republican Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Abrams, Hon. Elliott, U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela, U.S. Department of State ........................................................................................................ 13 

Oudkirk, Sandra, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Energy Resources, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 20 

Olive, Steve, Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Latin America and 

the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development ............................ 25 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 68 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 69 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 70 

ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Amensty International letter submitted by Chairman Engel .............................. 71 

Article from The Wall Street Journal submitted by Representative Smith ....... 78 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD WITH RESPONSES 

Chairman Eliot L. Engel ......................................................................................... 83 

Representative Chris Smith .................................................................................... 85 

Representative David Cicilline ............................................................................... 86 

Representative James Sensenbrenner ................................................................... 89 

Representative Michael Guest ................................................................................ 90 

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VENEZUELA AT A CROSSROADS 

Wednesday, February 13, 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:09 a.m., in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ENGEL [presiding]. The committee will come to order. 

As the situation in Venezuela continues to unfold, it is important 

that the Foreign Affairs Committee hear from policymakers in the 

Trump administration on the latest developments and how the 

United States will continue to engage on this issue. So, I am glad 

to welcome our panel, whom I will introduce prior to their statements. 

And let me also welcome all our members, the public, and the 

press, and we are glad to have our friends from C–SPAN here this 

morning to cover our hearing. 

Before we start, without objection, all members may have 5 days 

to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the 

record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

Chairman ENGEL. Let me start by saying that the humanitarian 

crisis in Venezuela is simply heartbreaking. Ninety percent of Venezuelans are living in poverty, more than 1 in 10 children suffer 

from malnutrition, and nearly 10 percent of the country’s population of 31 million has fled overseas. What makes it even more 

heartbreaking is that this crisis is entirely manmade. Venezuela 

should be one of the wealthiest and most prosperous countries in 

the hemisphere; it once was. But the corruption, incompetence, and 

mismanagement of Nicolas Maduro, and Hugo Chavez before him, 

have driven that country off of the edge of a cliff. The blame lies 

squarely with the crooked officials who have repressed the Venezuelan people for years, doing everything from throwing political 

opponents in jail to rigging elections, to gunning down protesters 

in the street. 

Now some consider it a good sound bite to say that Venezuela 

represents the failure of socialism, but we should be honest that 

Venezuela is not a socialist country. It is a kleptocracy. It is a cruel 

and oppressive regime, pocketing every dollar it can, even if it 

means that the country’s people are literally starving to death. 

Nowhere is Nicolas Maduro’s disregard for his fellow Venezuelans clearer than his decision to block humanitarian aid from 

entering the country last week at the Colombia-Venezuela border. 

This was a disgrace, and we need to keep looking for ways to get 

this assistance to those who need it without provoking a confronta-
2 

tion that could lead to the loss of life. The Venezuelan people deserve better. They deserve the future they choose for themselves 

and their country. 

So, our question is, how do we help them attain that future? How 

do we stand with the people of Venezuela as they seek a peaceful 

democratic transition? 

First, governments around the world, and especially here in our 

neighborhood, need to support the Venezuelan National Assembly 

and Juan Guaido they work toward free and fair elections, elections that must be monitored by credible international observers, 

including the OAS, the Organization of American States. The EULatin America contact group can play a potentially crucial role in 

laying the groundwork for these elections in an area where our own 

administration can provide financial and political support. 

What about U.S. policy more broadly? I will credit the administration. In the last few weeks, we have seen good multilateral engagement to grapple with this crisis. I am glad the White House 

rejects Nicolas Maduro. I think we should reject authoritarians, regardless of the ideology, and that would include despots like Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un. 

But I do worry about the President’s saber rattling, his hints 

that the U.S. military intervention remains an option. I want to 

make clear to our witnesses, and to everyone else watching, U.S. 

military intervention is not an option. Congress decides when, 

where, and how the U.S. military is used around the world, and 

Congress would not support military intervention in Venezuela. 

Venezuela’s neighbors feel the same way. Just last week, Colombia’s Deputy Foreign Minister said that, and I quote him, ‘‘In no 

way would the Colombian government permit or agree with any 

type of military intervention,’’ unquote, in Venezuela. 

With respect to new sanctions on the PDVSA, I appreciate the 

need to squeeze Maduro, but the White House must think through 

the potential repercussions that these sanctions could have on the 

Venezuelan people if Maduro does not leave office in the coming 

weeks. We need to continually evaluate their effectiveness. 

My biggest concern about the administration’s policy is what appears to be missing. What are we going to do about the more than 

3 million Venezuelans who have already left the country? This has 

become Latin America’s biggest migration crisis in recent history, 

and I fear the United States may make things worse. 

For starters, we should be taking in more Venezuelan refugees, 

but our admission numbers are at their lowest in recent history. 

Worse, the immigration policies of the White House have resulted 

in more Venezuelans being deported back to Venezuela, and that 

is like sending people back into a burning building. 

The President could fix that with the stroke of a pen. He could 

grant temporary protected status, or TPS, to Venezuelans living in 

the United States. I hope he does so. And I have also cosponsored 

a bill written by Representative Soto that would take this step. 

There is more we can do legislatively. Mr. McCaul and I have 

spent the last 2 weeks trying to draft a bipartisan resolution on 

this matter. We were about 95 percent of the way there, but hit 

a roadblock, similar to the Senate, on how to deal with questions 
3 

about the use of force in Venezuela. This is a policy difference, and 

it is a debate worth having, including during this hearing. 

We also have pending a few substantive bills introduced by Representatives Mucarsel-Powell, Shalala, and Wasserman Schultz, 

that would help alleviate the humanitarian crisis and dial up pressure on Maduro. I hope we are able to move them forward during 

our next markup. 

For now, I am eager to hear from our witnesses to get a fuller 

picture of the administration’s approach to this volatile situation. 

But, first, let me yield to my friend, our ranking minority member, 

Mr. Michael McCaul of Texas, for an opening comments he may 

have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

When Nicolas Maduro was handpicked by Hugo Chavez in 2013, 

it was clear that he would follow in his socialist dictatorship footsteps. Since that time, Maduro’s policies, rampant corruption, and 

violent crackdowns on peaceful political dissent have turned Venezuela into a failed State. Hyperinflation has skyrocketed, food and 

medicine are scarce, and, according to the United Nations, up to 3 

million have fled the country since 2014. 

Last week, a fuel tanker and two shipping containers were 

placed on a bridge to block the delivery of desperately needed humanitarian aid, as seen on the screen. This act highlights how evil 

the Maduro regime really is. 
Credit: AP: https:f/www.washingtonpost.com/world(2019(02(08/us-says-maduro-is-blocking-aid-starving-people-venezuelan-says-his-people-arent-beggarsl?utm term=.86ae073
5 

The current crisis highlights the horrifying impact of socialism. 

Those who continue to preach or show sympathy do not understand 

its history and the abject suffering it has caused. Let us be clear, 

the suffering of the Venezuelan people at the hands of the Maduro 

regime is not caused only by its ideology. The Maduro regime is full 

of criminals that oversee a mafia State backed by U.S. adversaries 

like, Russia, China, and Iran, and is linked to drug trafficking and 

other illicit activities. 

Today, the people of Venezuela have had enough, and over the 

last month they have started to take back their country that they 

love. Inspired by Juan Guaido, leader of the National Assembly 

and Interim President, millions of protesters have rallied in the 

streets across the country and stood up to the Maduro dictatorship. 

Bolstered by the leadership of the United States, many nations 

around the world, including most Latin American and European 

countries, are standing with them, as the TV monitor shows. 
6 
7 

I commend the President for recognizing Juan Guaido as the legitimate Interim President, for supporting his efforts to call for free 

and fair elections, and for imposing sanctions that hold the regime 

responsible for their criminal actions. 

This week, I will be introducing a resolution. I continue to work 

with the chairman in a bipartisan manner to condemn the criminal 

actions of Nicolas Maduro and countries like Cuba, Russia, China, 

Iran, and Syria for supporting his regime. It also clearly recognizes 

Juan Guaido Interim President and urges the international community to support the humanitarian and economic assistance for 

Venezuela. 

The Venezuelan people need to know that America is on their 

side, but it should also be known that we do not aim to choose their 

next leader. We simply want the conditions that would allow the 

people to choose for themselves. Our role must be a supportive one, 

but one that stands for universal principles of freedom and democracy. And today’s hearing will allow us to discuss how we can play 

that role to the best of our ability. 

In January, I was pleased that the President and Secretary 

Pompeo called on Eliot Abrams to serve as Special Envoy for Venezuela. As a seasoned diplomat who has served in numerous foreign policy and national security positions, I believe that Mr. 

Abrams is the right man for the job. And I look forward to hearing 

his testimony, as well as the testimony of the other experts here 

today. 

I believe this is an issue that both parties can come together on 

and do what is best for the people of Venezuela to support this 

noble cause. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

It is now my pleasure to introduce our witnesses. 

Mr. Elliott Abrams is the U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela at the U.S. Department of State. He is currently on leave 

at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he serves as a senior 

fellow for Middle Eastern studies in Washington, DC. Mr. Abrams 

served as Assistant Secretary of State in the Reagan Administration and as the Senior Director of the National Security Council for 

Near East and North Africa Affairs under the George W. Bush Administration. I love his first name, even though he spells it incorrectly. 

[Laughter.] 

And I look forward to hearing what he has to say today. 

Ms. Sandra Oudkirk is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy Diplomacy. Ms. Oudkirk is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service. From 2017 to 2018, she served as the Acting Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for Threat Finance and Sanctions in the Bureau of Economics and Business Affairs. Her previous overseas assignments include consular assignments in Taipei, at the U.S. Embassy in Dublin, Deputy Principal Officer in Istanbul, and Narcotics Affairs Section Chief in Jamaica. 

Mr. Steve Olive is Acting Assistant Administrator for USAID’s 

Latin America and Caribbean Bureau. Mr. Olive served as the Acting Director of the Foreign Service Center in the Office of Human 

Capital and Talent Management from 2017 to 2018. Previously, he 
8 

served as Deputy Mission Director for Somalia, Deputy Mission Director for Haiti, as well as numerous other roles across nearly two 

decades at USAID. 

We are grateful for your service and your time this morning. 

All witnesses’ testimony will be included in the record of this 

hearing. 

And now, I would like to recognize our witnesses for 5 minutes 

each. We will start with Mr. Abrams. 

STATEMENT OF ELLIOTT ABRAMS, U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR VENEZUELA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Engel, Ranking 

Member McCaul, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on our efforts to restore democracy in Venezuela. 

[Audience members interrupt hearing.] 

Chairman ENGEL. OK. The Chair will remind all persons in the 

audience that any manifestation of approval or disapproval of proceedings is in violation of the rules of the House and its committees. 

Mr. Abrams—— 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you. 

Chairman ENGEL [continuing]. I apologize. Please continue. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Venezuela is at a crossroads. Over the past month, 

we have witnessed a massive outpouring of hope and courage and 

tenacity by the Venezuelan people. We saw it again yesterday, as 

they have taken to the streets to protest that has brought them 

nothing but poverty and misery and repression. 

They have placed their hopes in a young, dynamic, and legitimate leader, Juan Guaido, to lead them through a transition to democracy. And we join the Venezuelan people in this effort. 

Under the Maduro regime, the situation inside Venezuela will 

only get worse. Venezuela has become the most violent country in 

the world. Hyperinflation is spiraling out of control and will reach 

a million percent or more. There is widespread hunger. Communicable diseases that are easily preventable are resurging once 

again. 

[Audience members interrupt hearing.] 

Chairman ENGEL. The Chair will remind all persons in the audience, if we have to clear the hearing of spectators, we will do it. 

[Audience members interrupt hearing.] 

OK. I want to again say the Chair will remind everyone that any 

manifestation of approval or disapproval of proceedings is in violation of the rules of the House and its committees. If this continues, 

we will have to just clear out the hearing room of people who are 

here. It is unfortunate, but, apparently, there are some people who 

only believe they are the only ones who should be heard. The last 

time I looked, we were a democracy and everyone has the right to 

be heard. 

So, please continue, Mr. Abrams. 

Mr. ABRAMS. And oil production has fallen from 3 million barrels 

a day to about a million. It will probably go down to about 500,000 

by the end of the year. 
9 

More than 3.5 million Venezuelans, as you have said, Mr. Chairman and Mr. McCaul, have been forced to flee their country and 

spread throughout the region in search of food and medicine and 

work and protection. 

The light in all this darkness is Venezuela’s National Assembly, 

the last democratic institution in Venezuela. Interim President 

Juan Guaido has provided new hope to those who want to return 

to a free and democratic Venezuela. Through his efforts, we look 

forward to a democratic and multiparty transition, an economic recovery that benefits all, and competitive, free, and fair Presidential 

elections, truly representative of the will of the people. 

We have always recognized that the solution to Venezuela’s political and economic crisis must be led and achieved by the Venezuelan people. The U.S. Government role is to support that effort. 

And as we meet today, Mr. Chairman, the State Department and 

its interagency partners are hard at work responding to Interim 

President Guaido’s call for international humanitarian assistance. 

We invite international partners to join us in helping to fill warehouses and assistance centers with basic supplies the Venezuelan 

people so desperately need. We also continue our implementation 

of over $140 million in existing programming to address the regional humanitarian crisis. 

As you have said, Maduro and his cronies are conspiring to prevent this lifesaving assistance from reaching the Venezuelan people. But, of course, those at the top of the regime are well-fed. They 

impose misery on the Venezuelan people, but they do not share it. 

The United States has effectively levied individual and sectoral 

sanctions on the Maduro regime. We have exponentially increased 

the cost of doing business for the regime in the gold sector, the financial sector, now in the oil sector, the combination of which has 

created enormous pressure on Maduro and his band of thieves. We 

have frozen bank accounts. We have revoked visas of those who 

benefit from their corruption and complicity. 

And this is not a U.S. effort alone. It is now more than 50 democracies in this hemisphere and around the world. The Venezuelan 

desire for freedom has galvanized the global effort on behalf of Interim President Guaido. 

As a result of this growing pressure, there is a storm brewing inside the Maduro regime that will eventually bring it to an end. 

While it is impossible to predict the moment this will happen, we 

believe the current political and economic environment is 

unsustainable and that he will not be able to weather it much 

longer. 

For those remaining supporters of the regime, we have one simple message: your time is up. A new, free, and prosperous Venezuela will rise, and your fellow citizens will remember who stood 

by them in their struggle. 

This includes especially the armed forces who will be needed in 

the future to build a secure Venezuela where law and order defeat 

criminality and violence. Now is the time for the armed forces to 

support the Venezuelan people and reclaim their own legitimacy. 

Over the next weeks and months, we will continue our pressure 

against Maduro and his inner circle. Last week, I announced visa 

restrictions and revocations on members of the illegitimate Con-
10 

stituent Assembly. Today, we can add we have imposed visa restrictions and revoked visas on members of the TSJ, the illegitimate supreme court. 

But we will also provide off-ramps to those who will do what is 

right for the Venezuelan people. We will support Venezuela’s Interim President, the National Assembly, the new government, and 

its aspirations to create a new Venezuela. We will continue pressing for humanitarian assistance delivery with the help of regional 

partners and the international community. 

And we are hopeful and confident that the Venezuelan people 

will succeed in their quest for liberty. And when they do achieve 

this monumental goal, it will show despots and dictators not only 

in our hemisphere, but in the rest of the world that the will of the 

people for freedom will prevail over those who try to suppress it. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me here today, and thank 

you for the continuing interest and support that this committee has 

shown, bipartisan interest, in supporting the struggle for freedom 

in Venezuela. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:] 
11 

VENEZUELA AT A CROSSROADS 

TESTIMONY OF 

ELLIOTT ABRAMS 

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR VENEZUELA 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BEFORE 

THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FEBRUARY 12,2019 

Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and Members of the 

Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on our efforts to restore democracy 

to Venezuela, one of the Administration's top priorities. Venezuela is at a 

crossroads. Over the past month we have witnessed a massive outpouring of hope, 

courage, and tenacity by the Venezuelan people as they have taken to the streets to 

protest a regime that has brought them nothing but poverty, misery, and repression. 

They have placed their hopes in a young, dynamic, and legitimate leader, Juan 

Guaido, to lead them through a transition to democracy. 

We join with the Venezuelan people in this effort. The United States has a 

compelling national interest in stopping the destabilization that Venezuela's 

decline has brought to the region as more than 3 million people have been forced to 

flee in one of the largest migration crises in the world today. 

Under the illegitimate and unrecognized Maduro regime the situation inside 

Venezuela will only get worse. Consider the following: 

• Venezuela has become the most violent country in the world. In large 

part this is due to poverty and desperation, directly caused by the former 

Maduro regime's disastrous mismanagement of the economy and policy 

of social divisiveness. It is also due to Maduro's neighborhood gangsor "colectivos"-who prey on the poor through extortion, kidnapping, 

and murder. 

• Hyperinflation, thanks to Maduro's economic policies, mismanagement, 

and regime corruption, has spiraled out of control. Within the last month 
12 

it grew by 220 percent. In total, by the end of2019, it could reach 10 

million percent. 

• One ofthe most significant consequences ofMaduro's disastrous 

economy is food insecurity. Only 30 percent of the protein required in 

the regular diet of the Venezuelan population is available. Scarcity and 

high prices have reached critical levels for food processors and grocery 

markets. In the meantime, the regime's subsidized food program, known 

as "CLAP," only arrives regularly to known Maduro supporters, a cruel 

source of political manipulation. The rest of the population sees its 

delivery only once a month or less, if at all. 

• Cases of malaria and tuberculosis are rising exponentially. Measles and 

diphtheria, which are preventable through vaccination and had been once 

eliminated in Venezuela, are resurging due to the lack of needed 

medicine and treatment. 

• And the resources that could save Venezuela from its economic crisis 

have been misappropriated. Over the last ten years, Maduro and his 

cronies looted over $11 billion of national wealth. PdVSA, once 

considered the Venezuelan people's crown jewel, has functioned as an 

ATM for Maduro and his inner circle. Refineries are operating at less 

than 25 percent capacity; most ofVenezuela's oil engineers have fled the 

country, and oil production from the country sitting on the world's 

largest proven oil reserves is on track to fall to less than one million 

barrels of oil per day this year. 

As a result of the corruption, violence, and mismanagement by the former 

Maduro dictatorship, more than 3 million Venezuelans- more than 10 percent of 

Venezuela's population - have been forced to flee their country in order to survive. 

They have spread throughout the region in search of food, medicine, work, and 

international protection. Generous neighboring countries have opened their doors 

to these refugees and migrants, but these countries now are finding themselves 

challenged to continue to absorb the daily outpouring of desperate Venezuelans. 

The light in all of this darkness has been Venezuela's National Assemblythe last democratic institution in Venezuela. This courageous group of patriots 

struggles to set Venezuela free, in the face of threats from Maduro and his thugs. 

They have called the Venezuelan people to action, and the people have responded. 

Interim President Juan Guaid6 has provided new hope to those who want to return 
13 

to a free and democratic Venezuela a Venezuela that benefits all Venezuelan 

citizens, not just Maduro and his inner circle. Through his efforts, we look forward 

to a democratic and multi-party effort to lead their transition, an economic 

recovery that benefits all, and competitive, free, and fair presidential elections truly 

representative of the will of the people. 

We have always recognized that the solution to Venezuela's political and 

economic crisis must be led and achieved by the Venezuelan people. The U.S. 

Government is doing everything within its power to support that effort. We do this 

because the restoration of peace, democracy, and prosperity would reunite 

Venezuela with the democratic community of the hemisphere. It would also refute 

the false promise of authoritarianism championed by a small nmnber of 

dysfunctional states, most notably Cuba which has provided direct support for 

Maduro's repressive tactics including the recent deployment of its most feared 

units, the Black Wasps. 

On January 24, Secretary Pompeo announced "The United States is ready to 

provide an initial sum of $20 million in humanitarian assistance to the people of 

Venezuela." As I speak to you today, Mr. Chairn1an, the State Department and its 

interagency partners are hard at work responding to Interim President Guaid6's call 

for international humanitarian assistance with this initial contribution. We invite 

international partners to join us in helping to fill warehouses and assistance centers 

with basic supplies the Venezuelan people so desperately need. We also continue 

our implementation of over $140 million in existing aid and development 

programming to address the regional humanitarian crisis. 

Maduro and his cronies are conspiring to prevent this life-saving assistance 

from reaching the Venezuelan people. A few days ago we learned that one of the 

Maduro regime's inner circle thugs in Tachira State, Freddy Bernal, upon learning 

of our humanitarian assistance plans, immediately cancelled gasoline shipments 

designated for the state in order to paralyze the state government's ability to 

support the entry of humanitarian aid. Others, like Diosdado Cabello, have labeled 

his own people as "traitors," "selfish," and "disgusting" for wanting to receive 

international aid. 

Madura's actions, and those of his enablers, have not and will not go 

unanswered. We have effectively levied individual and sectoral sanctions on the 

former Maduro regime. And they are making a difference. We have exponentially 

increased the cost of doing business for the regime in the gold sector, the financial 

sector, and now the oil sector-the combination of which has created enormous 
14 

pressure on Maduro and his band ofthieves. We have frozen the bank accounts of 

the regime's most notorious gang leaders and revoked their visas and those of their 

irrunediately family members who benefited from their corruption and complicity. 

They and their families are no longer welcome in the United States. We are asking 

other nations who recognize the legitimate Guaido government to do the same and 

revoke visas of regime leaders. 

As a result of this growing pressure, there is a storm brewing inside the inner 

circle; a growing dissatisfaction and distrust that will eventually bring about an end 

to Maduro's reign of terror. While it is impossible to predict the moment this will 

happen, we believe the current political and economic environment is 

unsustainable and that he will not be able to weather it much longer. 

We stand in common purpose with regional partners such as the Lima 

Group, which came together in August 2017 to find a peaceful exit to the crisis in 

Venezuela. The group declared in its first statement its full support and solidarity 

to the democratically elected National Assembly. That statement rang as clear and 

true then as it does now. 

Other international actors, including the Organization of American States 

and the United Nations Security Council, are also instrumental in this pivotal 

moment for Venezuela. They establish the critical international framework and 

consensus necessary for restoring democracy. We recognize global diplomacy is 

required to ensure a peaceful and inclusive transition. 

This is not an effort by the United States alone but an effort by what is now 

near 50 democracies in this hemisphere and around the world. We are witnessing a 

historic shift in our hemisphere toward democratic solidarity. The Venezuelan 

desire for freedom has galvanized a global effort and wide recognition for Interim 

President Guaid6 has poured in, further isolating Maduro. 

And for those remaining supporters of the former Maduro regime, we have 

one simple message: your time is up. A new, free, and prosperous Venezuela is 

rising, and your fellow citizens will remember who stood by them in their struggle. 

This includes especially the armed forces and all security forces, who will be 

needed in the future to build a secure Venezuela where law and order defeat 

criminality and violence. Now is the time for the armed forces to support the 

Venezuelan people, reclaim their own legitimacy, and tum to helping build 

tomorrow's Venezuela. 
15 

Over the next weeks and months, the international community will take full 

advantage of the momentum built over the last few weeks. 

• We will continue our pressure against Madura and his inner circle by a 

variety of means. But we will also provide off-ramps to those who will do 

what is right for the Venezuelan people. 

• We will support Venezuela's interim president, the new government, and its 

aspirations to create a new Venezuela full of hope, promise, and potential 

-and we will work together toward a democratic transition. 

• We were all thrilled to see newly appointed Ambassador to the United States 

Carlos Vecchio in the chamber for the State of the Union Address. He is 

getting set up in Washington as he represents the legitimate government to 

our country and government 

• We will continue pressing our humanitarian assistance delivery with the help 

of our regional partners and the international community. 

• And we will expose and speak out against Madura and his enablers' cruelty 

and violence, recognizing the Venezuelan voices that have witnessed it 

firsthand. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Nicolas Madura and his cronies are reeling 

from the force of Venezuela's own people, who are determined to live in freedom 

and dignity. 

We are hopeful and confident the Venezuelan people will succeed in their 

quest for liberty. And when they do achieve this monumental goal, it will show 

despots and dictators not only in our hemisphere, but in the rest of the world, that 

the democratic will of the people will always outlive and outshine those who try to 

suppress it. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me here today and thank you for the 

continuing interest and support this Committee has shown toward the struggle for 

freedom in Venezuela. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 
16 

[Audience members interrupt hearing.] 

Chairman ENGEL. The Chair will remind all persons in the audience that any manifestations of approval or disapproval of proceedings is in violation of the rules of the House and committees. 

OK. Ms. Oudkirk. 

STATEMENT OF SANDRA OUDKIRK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF ENERGY RESOURCES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. OUDKIRK. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul—— 

Chairman ENGEL. Can you push the microphone a little closer? 

Good. 

Ms. OUDKIRK. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today. 

On January 28th, the United States designated Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., PDVSA, under Executive Order 13850. This action extends to entities that are majority-owned by PDVSA. These new 

sanctions are intended to place pressure on the illegitimate former 

Maduro regime, minimize its receipt of revenue from the United 

States, and safeguard the U.S. financial system. The designation of 

PDVSA will also preserve Venezuela’s national assets for the Venezuelan people. 

The United States is holding accountable those responsible for 

Venezuela’s tragic decline. As Special Representative Abrams 

noted, under the former Maduro regime, Venezuelan oil production 

steadily declined due to mismanagement, corruption, and a lack of 

investment. 

PDVSA has long been associated with allegations of corruption 

and a variety of schemes designed to embezzle billions of dollars for 

the personal gain of corrupt Venezuelan officials and businessmen. 

These sanctions aim to prevent the illegitimate Maduro regime and 

other corrupt actors from further enriching themselves at the expense of the Venezuelan people. 

Concurrent with this action, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 

Control issued general licenses that authorized certain transactions 

and activities with PDVSA to help mitigate unintended consequences on U.S. companies, interests, and allies. These licenses 

provide equal treatment to U.S. refineries that import Venezuelan 

crude oil. Any payments made to PDVSA must, however, be made 

into a blocked interest-bearing account located in the United 

States. These funds will be preserved for the people of Venezuela. 

CITGO, a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of PDVSA, is authorized 

to continue business operations for the next 6 months. However, 

this license does not extend to dealings with PDVSA. The license 

for U.S. companies operating in Venezuela will allow them to continue operations with minimal exceptions. The oil sector is an integral part of the Venezuelan economy and its revival will be essential to the country’s economic recovery. 

We have engaged allies, including those in other regions, such as 

Europe and Asia, who have joint ventures with PDVSA in Venezuela, on the goals and objectives of these sanctions. We are working to avoid disruptions in vulnerable energy sectors in the Carib-
17 

bean and Central America in light of PDVSA’s integrated role in 

those local and regional energy markets. 

The United States continues to work with oil producers and consumers all over the world to ensure access to reliable and affordable energy supplies. We believe disruptions are unlikely since oil 

markets are adequately supplied. And U.S. oil producers are a key 

reason why markets are well supplied. Over the past year, U.S. 

crude oil production increased by nearly 2 million barrels a day 

and exports increased by a million barrels a day. This added to 

market liquidity. U.S. production and exports are poised to continue to grow over the coming months. 

And so, in closing, I would like to note that we are carefully considering ongoing U.S. involvement in, and links with, the Venezuelan energy sector, as we balance our effort to support the restoration of democracy and the eventual rebuilding of Venezuela. 

U.S. sanctions need not be permanent. They are intended to change 

behavior. The path to sanctions relief for PDVSA is through the expeditious transfer of control of the company so that it is no longer 

a tool for the former Maduro regime’s illegitimate uses. 

Thank you for your attention, and I am happy to take any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Oudkirk follows:] 
18 

VENEZUELA AT A CROSSROADS 

TESTIMONY OF 

SANDRA OUDKIRK 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

BUREAU OF ENERGY RESOURCES 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BEFORE 

THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FEBRUARY 12,2019 

Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and Members of the 

Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. As you know, President 

Trump officially recognized President of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan 

Guaido, as the Interim President of Venezuela on January 23. The President also 

issued an Executive Order to make clear that United States sanctions continue to 

target the illegitimate former Madura regime. 

On January 28, the United States detennined that persons operating in 

Venezuela's oil sector may now be subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive 

Order 13850. In addition, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) has been 

designated for operating in this sector. This action extends to entities that are 

majority owned by PDVSA. 

These new sanctions are intended to place pressure on Maduro and his 

cronies, minimize its receipt of revenue from the United States, and safeguard the 

U.S. financial system. The designation ofPDVSA will preserve Venezuela's 

national assets for the Venezuelan people. I also want to underscore that these new 

sanctions do not target the innocent people of Venezuela and will not prohibit 

humanitarian assistance including the provision of medicine and medical devices, 

which are desperately needed after years of economic destruction under Maduro' s 

rule. 

The United States is holding accountable those responsible for Venezuela's 

tragic decline. Under the former Maduro regime, Venezuelan oil production 

steadily declined due to mismanagement, corruption, and lack of investment. 

Analysts estimate that PDVSA production will fall to less than one million barrels 
19 

of oil per day this year, down from nearly three million per day when Maduro 

became president. 

PDVSA has long been associated with allegations of corruption and a 

variety of schemes designed to embezzle billions of dollars for the personal gain of 

corrupt Venezuelan officials and businesspeople. It currently serves as a key 

vehicle through which Maduro and his cronies plunder Venezuela's wealth for 

their own comtpt purposes. These sanctions aim to prevent the illegitimate fonner 

Maduro regime and other corrupt actors from further enriching themselves at the 

expense of the Venezuelan people. 

Concurrent with this action, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control 

(OF A C) has issued General Licenses that authorize certain transactions and 

activities with PDVSA, within specified timeframes, which will help mitigate 

unintended consequences on U.S. companies, interests, and allies. 

For example, CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary ofPDVSA, is authorized 

to continue business operations for the next six months, however, this license does 

not extend to dealings with PDVSA. This license can be extended beyond the 

initial six-month period by Treasury's OF AC, if appropriate. 

These licenses provide equal treatment to U.S. refineries that are importing 

Venezuela crude oil, offering the same 90-day wind down period for purchasing 

and importing petroleum products from PDVSA. Any payments made to PDVSA, 

however, must be made into a blocked, interest-bearing account located in the 

United States. These funds will be preserved for the people of Venezuela. 

Several alternative sources of the same type of heavy sour crude oil that 

Venezuela produces exist, which include sources from Mexico, Ecuador, 

Colombia, Canada, and the Middle East. While there may be a short-term 

adjustment period, we do not assess that this adjustment will have a sustained 

negative impact on the U.S. refineries that import Venezuelan oil. 

The license for U.S. companies operating in Venezuela will allow them to 

continue normal operations there, with minimal exceptions. The oil sector is an 

integral part of the Venezuelan economy and its revival will be essential to the 

country's economic recovery. 

A license has also been issued to allow U.S. persons in Venezuela to 

purchase petroleum products for personal, commercial or humanitarian purposes. 
20 

As part of our mitigation efforts, it will be essential to coordinate action with 

allies as appropriate, by previewing our policy strategy and through high-level 

government engagement, particularly with those in other regions, such as Europe 

and Asia, who have joint ventures with PDVSA in Venezuela. We are also 

working to avoid disruptions in vulnerable energy sectors in the Caribbean and 

Central America, given PDVSA's integrated role in those local and regional 

energy markets. 

The United States continues to work with oil producers and consumers all 

over the world to ensure access to reliable and affordable energy supplies. Over 

the past year, U.S. crude oil production increased by nearly two million barrels per 

day and exports increased by over one million barrels per day, adding to market 

liquidity. Over the next year, U.S. production is forecasted to increase to an alltime high of more than 12 million barrels per day. Disruptions are unlikely since 

oil markets are adequately supplied. 

The United States continues to have grave concerns about the activities of the 

former Madura regime and its affiliates to: perpetuate human rights violations and 

abuses; conduct arbitrary arrests and detentions of pro-democracy protestors; curtail 

press freedom; and harass political opponents. We will continue to use the full suite 

of our diplomatic and economic tools to support Interim President Juan Guaid6, the 

National Assembly, and the Venezuelan people's effmis to restore their democracy. 

U.S. sanctions need not be permanent; they are intended to change behavior. 

The path to sanctions relief for PDVSA is through the expeditious transfer of 

control ofthe company so that it is no longer a tool for the former Madura 

regime's illegitimate uses. We will also carefully consider on-going U.S. 

involvement in and links with the Venezuelan energy sector, as we balance our 

effort to support the restoration of democracy and the eventual re-building of 

Venezuela. 

Thank you for your attention and now I am happy to take any questions that 

you may have. 
21 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Ms. Oudkirk. 

Mr. OLIVE. 

STATEMENT OF STEVE OLIVE, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. OLIVE. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and 

members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to testify 

today on this critical and timely subject. I am grateful for the committee’s longstanding bipartisan support for Latin America and the 

Caribbean, especially Venezuela. 

I am proud of the work that we have done to help Venezuelans 

and the neighboring communities that are hosting them. Administrator Green and I met some of these Venezuelans who had fled 

their homeland when we visited Cucuta, Colombia last July. 

However, we know that humanitarian assistance alone will not 

address the root causes driving people away from Venezuela. Lasting political and economic reforms are the only sustainable solutions to this crisis. This is a pivotal moment in the history of Venezuela. The people are standing up against the dictator; they are 

not alone. As USAID Administrator Mark Green said, and I quote, 

‘‘We proudly stand with the people of Venezuela who are yearning 

for freedom and a true democracy.’’ End quote. 

Venezuelans have endured steady erosion of human rights and 

fundamental freedoms under the corrupt and repressive Maduro 

regime. We have seen widespread shortages of essential food and 

medicine. There have been major outbreaks of diseases like diphtheria, measles, and malaria, which had previously been under control or eliminated. 

On January 23d, the people peacefully took to the streets to protest against Maduro’s regime. The National Assembly, the only legitimate body, has asserted its constitutional authority and put 

power back in where it belongs-in the hands of the Venezuelan people. 

The struggle for democracy in Venezuela is led by the Venezuelan people themselves. I am proud that USAID has a long tradition of standing by Venezuelans who have continued to assert 

their democratic rights. USAID supports local human rights defenders, civil society, independent media, electoral oversight, and 

the democratically elected National Assembly. 

Over the past 5 years, we have provided close to $40 million in 

democracy assistance to these groups, including the planned $15 

million in Fiscal Year 2018 funding, which cleared Congress yesterday. Thank you. 

I salute the bravery of the Venezuelans who have kept up the 

fight for democracy even when their cause seemed nearly impossible. USAID Administrator Mark Green and I have spoken by 

phone with Interim President Guaido d have met with Venezuelan 

ambassadors Vecchio and Borges to coordinate USAID’s humanitarian response and support to the National Assembly, as they restore democracy and prosperity in Venezuela. 

Our most immediate priority will be to get food and medicine to 

those who need it. USAID will always be ready and willing to help 

vulnerable Venezuelans. When Interim President Guaido quested 
22 

urgent humanitarian assistance from the United States, Secretary 

of State Pompeo announced that we are ready to provide initial humanitarian assistance to the people of Venezuela. USAID has 

prepositioned food, nutritional supplements, hygiene kits, and medical supplies in Cucuta. The U.S. is coordinating with Interim 

President Guaido d his team of experts, governments in the region, 

and humanitarian partners on the logistics of deploying aid, to mobilize a response that is efficient and safe. 

Since Fiscal Year 2017, the United States has provided approximately $140 million, including nearly $97 million in humanitarian 

assistance and approximately $43 million in development assistance, to support affected countries’ emergency efforts and build 

their long-term capacity to host the more than 3 million people who 

have fled Venezuela. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the committee, thank you again for this opportunity to testify today. I 

thank you for your continued bipartisan support and look forward 

to engaging with you further as the United States helps the people 

of Venezuela to return to peace, prosperity, and democratic and citizen-responsive governance. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Olive follows:] 
23 

Prepared Testimony of Steve Olive 

Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean 

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 

"Venezuela at a Crossroads" 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Wednesday February 13,2019 

Chairn1an Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and members of the Committee, thank you for the 

invitation to testify today on this critical, timely subject. I am grateful for the Committee's 

long-standing support for Latin America and the Caribbean, especially Venezuela. By forging 

partnerships with civil society, faith-based and non-governmental organizations, the private 

sector, and like-minded governments to build free and prosperous societies, USAID advances 

U.S. national security and economic prosperity, and promotes a path to recipient self-reliance 

and resilience. 

Development Context 

This is a pivotal moment in the history of Venezuela. The people are standing up against a 

dictator. They are not alone. As USAID Administrator Mark Green said, "We proudly stand 

with the people of Venezuela who arc yearning for freedom and a true democracy." 

The Venezuelan people have endured a steady erosion of human rights and fundamental 

freedoms under the Maduro regime. With a handpicked Supreme Court effectively abolishing 

all the powers of the country's democratically elected National Assembly, the creation of an 

illegitimate Constituent Assembly, and a corrupt electoral council that responds to the regime, 

Maduro gave himself almost unlimited powers. This culminated in early, sham, so-called 

elections last year, after which Maduro attempted to steal another six-year tenn. 

These maneuverings, combined with decisions that devastated Venezuela's once-robust 

economy, led to a man-made crisis that has driven more than three million Venezuelans from 

their homeland since 2014. The effects of the regime's mismanagement have hit all sectors of 

society: the International Monetary Fund estimates that inflation exceeded one million percent 
24 

in 2018 and forecasts inflation of I 0 million percent in 20 19; 1 Venezuelans face widespread 

shortages of essential food and medicine. As the health system collapsed, the country saw 

major outbreaks of diseases such as diphtheria, measles, and malaria, which had previously 

been under control or eliminated. Crumbling infrastructure has disrupted basic services, 

including water and sanitation. 

On January 23,2019, the people said, "enough," and peacefully took to the streets to protest 

against Maduro's regime. The only remaining democratic institution in the country-the 

National Assembly- asserted its constitutional authority, took control away from Maduro, and 

put power back where it belongs in the hands of the Venezuelan people. The United States 

quickly recognized National Assembly President Juan Guaid6 as Venezuela's Interim 

President, and President Trump made our support to the Venezuelan people clear: "I will 

continue to use the full weight of United States economic and diplomatic power to press for 

the restoration of Venezuelan democracy." 

Long-Term Programming: USAID Democracy Assistance 

The struggle for democracy in Venezuela is led by the V cnczuelan people themselves. I am 

proud that USAID has a long tradition of standing by those who have continued to assert their 

rights and maintain a democratic voice in the face of dictatorship. 

USAID supports local human rights defenders, civil society, independent media, electoral 

oversight, and the democratically elected National Assembly in Venezuela. Over the past five 

years, we have provided close to $40 million in democracy assistance to these groups, 

including the planned $15 million in Fiscal Year 2018 funding. 

For example, the regime has tried to impede the democratically elected National Assembly 

from pursuing its constitutional responsibilities to represent the will of the Venezuelan people, 

exercise oversight of the Executive branch, and carry out its Legislative agenda. USAID has 

offered technical expertise enabling the National Assembly to continue to serve the 

1 httpsJ/\\Ww.imfurg 

2 
25 

Venezuelan people. Our assistance has been available to all members of democratic parties in 

the National Assembly. 

I salute the bravery of the Venezuelans who have kept up the fight for democracy even when 

their cause seemed nearly impossible. Their efforts are coming to fruition. Moving forward, 

USAID will build on our long-tem1 programs to support interim President Guaid6 and the 

National Assembly as they restore democracy and prosperity in Venezuela. 

Crisis Response: USAID Humanitarian Assistance 

Given the dire conditions within the country, USAID's most immediate priority will be to get 

food and medicine to those who need it. US AID has always been ready and willing to help 

vulnerable Venezuelans. But as Maduro has tried to conceal the consequences of his 

mismanagement and corruption, the three million Venezuelans fleeing their country have told 

a different story. So, too, has Venezuela's Interim President, who has requested urgent 

humanitarian assistance from the United States. In response, Secretary of State Pompeo 

announced on January 24, 2019, that the United States is ready to provide more than $20 

million in initial humanitarian assistance to the people of Venezuela. 

The U.S. is coordinating with Interim President Guaid6 and his team of experts, governments 

in the region, and our humanitarian partners on the logistics of deploying aid, to mobilize a 

response efficiently and safely. We are prepositioning reliefitcms-ineluding food, nutritional 

supplements, hygiene kits, and medical supplies-in Colombia so that they are available to 

reach Venezuelans in need, as soon as is safe and logistically possible. 

The United States is already providing robust support for response efforts throughout the 

region as the growing impacts of Venezuela's crisis spill into neighboring countries. Since 

Fiscal Year 2017, the United States has provided approximately $140 million-including 

nearly $97 million in humanitarian assistance and approximately $43 million in development 

assistance-to support affected countries' emergency efforts and build their long-term capacity 

to host the more than three million people who have fled Venezuela. USAID deployed a 
26 

Disaster Assistance Response Team that is on the ground throughout the region conducting 

assessments, identifying priority needs, and coordinating the U.S. government's response 

efforts. Administrator Green and I met with some of the Venezuelans who fled their homeland 

when we visited Cucuta, Colombia, last July. I am proud of the work we have done to help 

them and the neighboring commtmities hosting them. However, while humanitarian assistance 

will help to alleviate the immediate needs of many Venezuelans, it will not-and cannotaddress the root causes of Venezuela's instability, and it is not a long-term solution. Lasting 

political and economic reforms are the only sustainable solutions to the crisis. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the Committee, thank you again for the 

opportunity to testify today. I thank you for your continued support and look forward to 

engaging with you further as the United States helps the people of Venezuela to return to 

peace and prosperity and sec the open, transparent, citizen-responsive government that they 

deserve. 

4 
27 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Olive. 

Let me start the questioning, and let me ask Mr. Abrams: as I 

said in my opening statement, I am certainly willing to give credit 

where it is due in terms of elements of the administration’s approach to Venezuela. But my biggest concern about the policy is 

what seems to me is clearly missing, and that is an effort to deal 

with the 3 million Venezuelans who have fled the country. The administration has pushed countries in the region to open their 

homes and hearts to Venezuelans, and I certainly support this effort. But how can we call on other countries to admit Venezuelans 

while continuing to close the doors of our own country to these 

same individuals? 

So, my question is, will the Trump administration reassess its 

historically low refugee admission numbers, and will President 

Trump grant temporary protected status, or TPS, to the many Venezuelans here in the United States who should not be forced to return to Maduro’s Venezuela? I would urge you to do so. I would like 

to hear what you have to say about it. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I cannot speak about the broader refugee question. 

It is just not within my own remit. The question of Venezuelans, 

in particular, the doors are not closed, certainly, for those who have 

a reasonable fear of persecution and can apply for political asylum. 

But, on the broader question, I think you are raising an important question, and it is one that I intend to discuss with the Secretary when he completes the current trip to Europe, the question 

of Venezuelans who are in the United States. 

Chairman ENGEL. I hope we can continue to have dialog on it because I think it is really, really important. The situation, as you 

have said, with the refugees should really be paramount or at least 

upfront in terms of things that we are doing and things that we 

could do to help diffuse this crisis. So, I am going to pursue that, 

and I hope that we can get some more answers. 

Let me ask you again, Mr. Abrams, and maybe Ms. Oudkirk can 

also comment: when it comes to the new sanctions on the Venezuelan oil sector, I certainly understand the need to squeeze 

Maduro, but I hope that the White House has thought through the 

potential impact that these sanctions could have on the Venezuelan 

people if Maduro, by some reason, manages to remain in power. So, 

has the administration assessed the humanitarian impact of these 

sanctions on the Venezuelan people if there is not a quick transition? Have you considered the impact on U.S. refineries and their 

employees which process Venezuelan oil? And can you please share 

those assessments with us? 

Mr. ABRAMS. On the humanitarian impact, the money that the 

United States was paying to PDVSA was not going to the Venezuelan people. I mean, if it were, the kind of starvation, the kind 

of reappearance of communicable diseases would not be taking 

place. So, I do not think the sanctions alone are going to have that 

impact. But, in any event, we want to do a very big humanitarian 

surge with the many allies we have in this effort to help the Venezuelan people to make sure that their own situation is not worsened. 

Chairman ENGEL. OK. I hope that we can continue to have further dialog on it. 
28 

Ms. Oudkirk, do you have a comment on that? 

Ms. OUDKIRK. Yes, Mr. Chairman. On your question related to 

the impact on the United States, on refineries, we have been looking at that very closely and we are in very close contact with the 

12 Gulf Coast refineries that imported the majority of Venezuelan 

crude oil that came into the United States. There are a number of 

license applications pending with OFAC that will provide some specific relief, and we at State are working, in concert with our Treasury colleagues, to process those as quickly as possible. And we are 

committed to remaining in contact with U.S. industry as the situation progresses. 

Chairman ENGEL. All right. Thank you very much. 

I would now like to call on Mr. McCaul, our ranking member. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Abrams, I think we really have an historic opportunity to 

transform what has been a socialist dictatorship that has been a 

humanitarian crisis into a democracy supported by freedom and 

the people, and at the same time, I think for the first time in decades, have an influence on Cuba and the Western Hemisphere. As 

I look at the Russians in Venezuela and Iran, the Chinese, that 

worries me about our backyard. 

But I want to ask you this question: how important is it for the 

U.S. Congress to recognize the legitimacy of the Interim President 

Guaido? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Mr. McCaul, I think it would be very important. I 

mean, we have 51 countries, including the United States now, that 

recognize him as the interim legitimate President of Venezuela. I 

think it would be really valuable for the Congress to join that 

crowd. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I will continue to work in that effort with the 

chairman. 

Let me ask you about the military. I think the majority of the 

military supports the people and President Guaido. I think, unfortunately, the ones at the top, there is corruption; there is narcoterrorism, cartels. How do we get the military to move away from 

Maduro to support the people and President Guaido? 

Mr. ABRAMS. This is the toughest question. And our answer thus 

far has been, first, to pressure them, sanctioning many members 

of the upper ranks. Second, to tell them continually that there are 

off-ramps if they decide to side with the people of Venezuela. Thus 

far, obviously, that has not happened except in a few isolated cases. 

But we are hearing a lot of discontent in the military. I mean, 

for one thing, if you are a general and look down at the ranks, you 

know that your own people in the army are starving. And what 

about their brothers and sisters and mothers and fathers? So, we 

think that this opinion is spreading within the military that the 

current situation is untenable. We hope that there will be a decision on the part of many in the military, first, not to support the 

Maduro regime, but, second, not to block desperately needed humanitarian aid. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I was impressed by your optimism about the situation, that eventually that will happen. 

Mr. Olive, on the humanitarian aid issue, we saw the pictures of 

the roads being blocked off by Maduro, not allowing the humani-
29 

tarian assistance from the Lima Group that agreed to send this 

down there. We just met with the President of Colombia, and he 

was talking about this very issue. How can we get that assistance 

into Venezuela to help these desperate people? And have you 

thought about possibly using not just the land borders, but the sea 

as well? 

Mr. OLIVE. Thank you, Ranking Member McCaul. 

We are, indeed, looking for ways of distributing the assistance 

safely and effectively within the country. We are in daily communication with Interim President Guaido and his team on finding 

out those avenues to do so. We are also committed to 

prepositioning goods and supplies in other parts, if that is necessary. We also are looking at scenarios of flying things in, as the 

situation permits. 

But, right now today, the Maduro regime is not allowing access. 

And we do hope that, through the diplomatic efforts we are making 

and the internal efforts by the Interim President Guaido d his team, 

we will change that scenario shortly. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, and I think as the people of Venezuela see 

what their, I would say, illegitimate President is doing and what 

the military is doing to block this humanitarian aid, that they will 

rise up even more so, and hopefully, return this country to a democracy. It could be such a great country with such great natural 

resources. 

And so, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. Mr. Sherman? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Wherever Russia goes, people flee. We have 3 million Syrians who have left their country and nearly the same number of Venezuelans. 

There is talk here of Venezuela being a socialist country. I would 

say that various governments in Scandinavia have adopted policies 

of democratic socialism, and I do not think there is anyone in this 

room that would call the Maduro regime democratic socialist. 

We have got a situation where Russia expects to be repaid. Mr. 

Abrams, what steps are we considering to support an action by the 

Venezuelan people to say, ‘‘OK, we owe you so much minus the $2, 

$3, $10 trillion of harm you did to our country by supporting this 

criminal Maduro; therefore, you only owe us $1 trillion instead of 

$2 trillion.’’? Mr. Abrams, are we discussing with the Russians how 

we can make it plain that in the permanent future of the Venezuelan government that they do not have to pay Russia and that 

they will not suffer any demerits in their credit rating for Western 

agencies and Western banks? 

Mr. ABRAMS. We have begun to have those discussions. Primarily, of course, it would be led by Treasury. But the interim government, the National Assembly, has said that they would repay 

debts. Some of those debts I think were never approved by the National Assembly. Ultimately, it is a decision with most of these that 

they are going to have to make. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But have we put the Russians on notice that we 

would support, and require our banks to support, a decision by the 

Venezuelan government to offset that by trillions of dollars of 

claims against Russia, and that we would prohibit, we might 
30 

choose to prohibit our banks from looking at any credit rating that 

was impaired by failure to repay Russia? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I do not believe that exact message—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. I hope you will. 

In this room we were told that Turkey is a great friend of the 

United States, and therefore, we should turn a blind eye to history 

and not recognize the Armenian genocide. Mr. Abrams, can you 

work inside the administration so that they have an understanding 

that Turkey is not a friend of ours here in our own hemisphere, 

and that, accordingly, the administration would announce that it 

would not object to this committee, once again, as it has in the past 

at the committee level, passing the Armenian genocide resolution? 

Mr. ABRAMS. You are going to get me in trouble here with these 

questions. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That is the job. 

Mr. ABRAMS. That is the idea. 

The role that Turkey is playing in Venezuela is to give all-out 

support to the Maduro regime. There are very few countries that 

are doing that. Turkey has decided to align itself with Russia/Cuba 

in taking that position. And I will certainly take your message back 

to the Department. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are you directly in contact with the Turkish government regarding their policies in Venezuela? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I am not personally. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I hope you would talk to those who are—— 

Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. And make it plain that the administration, if you just go neutral on this, Congress will be the conscience of this country. And we also have Venezuela reportedly owe China $20 billion. I 

know that China’s policy toward Maduro is different than that of 

Russia, but what is China doing now to help the legitimate government of Venezuela? 

Mr. ABRAMS. They are not doing anything to help Mr.—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are they providing any additional funds to 

Maduro? 

Mr. ABRAMS. No. My information is that they will not lend any 

more money because they are worried about getting back what they 

have already lent. And the message that we have passed to them 

is, if you continue to back Maduro and the economy of Venezuela 

descends further, you will never get paid back. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And I would point out that countries repay loans 

because they fear they will not be able to borrow more because of 

the credit ratings that come from basically New York, and that 

there may be times when we need to instruct credit-rating agencies 

and banks not to regard as a demerit a failure to repay a criminal 

loan. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome to our very distinguished witnesses, and it is great to 

see Elliott Abrams who has done a tremendous job for decades. 

Let me just ask, first, on sex tourism, there are about 3 million 

people who have become refugees and an undetermined number 
31 

are IDPs. Many are along the border of Colombia. We know that 

the gangs very often turn these women into sex slaves. So, my 

question is, what are we doing to try to combat that? Venezuela 

has been a Tier 3 country for many, many years, including currently, an egregious violator, and that is even before the latest crisis. 

Second, as was pointed out, Mr. Olive, 300,000 children are at 

risk of death from malnutrition. You underscore the resurgence of 

once eradicated diseases like diphtheria. I am wondering, have vaccinations ceased in Venezuela? I remember in the 1980’s President 

Duarte in El Salvador had days of tranquility. And I have actually 

traveled down when—and Elliott will remember this very well— 

when Duarte and the FMLN had days of tranquility to vaccinate 

the kids because so many were dying from preventable diseases. 

Would days of tranquility be perhaps a way forward to get these 

kids vaccinated? 

Let me also point out that the Foro Penal, the Venezuelan 

human rights group, said, between January 21st and 31st, the 

number of Venezuelan political prisoners jumped from 273 to 966. 

How many of those are being tortured? And why has not the U.N. 

been even more outspoken against this horrific mistreatment of 

these people, including young people, adolescents? 

And finally, The Wall Street Journal reported that the government of Juan Guaido has held debt negotiations here in Washington with China. Are we a part of that? Are we encouraging it? 

Not much time, but if you could answer those questions? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Let me just begin on the trafficking of persons. We 

get no cooperation from the Maduro regime, of course. There are 

efforts—and Mr. Olive can talk about that—on the Colombian side 

of the border to offer not only food and medicine, but some protection as well. 

Mr. OLIVE. Thank you, Congressman. 

And that is absolutely correct. On the border areas, especially in 

Colombia that is, our funding does help with that issue. It is a very 

large issue that we cannot control completely, but our programs do 

address that. 

Mr. SMITH. Can you provide for the record some elaboration on 

that, and how well the TIP office is engaging on this as well? 

Mr. OLIVE. I will defer to State for the TIP offices. But, for our 

programs that we are providing in Colombia, they include identifying vulnerable people who might be vulnerable for trafficking, 

working with youth on the issue, et cetera, as part of the programming. 

Sir, in terms of vaccines, yes, it is true that inside Venezuela 

there are less and less medicines and vaccines available, and therefore, less children and other people being vaccinated. We have seen 

an increase, then, in these diseases, as a result. We are monitoring 

that carefully in Colombia, again, as part of our assistance. The Colombian medical system is very concerned about being overwhelmed and having these diseases to be on the increase in their 

country as well. And so, that is part of our assistance package, and 

eventually, the assistance package that goes into Venezuela will 

also include vaccines. 
32 

Mr. SMITH. Did you want to comment on the debt issue and 

whether or not the Chinese negotiations with the—— 

Mr. ABRAMS. I do not believe there are any negotiations, using 

that terms narrowly. 

Mr. SMITH. OK. Talks? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Discussions, sending of messages, have taken place. 

There have been some reports in the press, also, about additional 

talks that the Chinese have denied. And I have not had a chance 

to find out whether they have actually taken place. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could speak to the use of torture? And is the 

Convention on Torture and the experts at the U.N. treaty body 

looking into this? Anybody know? 

Mr. ABRAMS. There are many reports of use of torture in Venezuela, but they have not permitted the various U.N. Special 

Rapporteurs to come in for quite a while. So, that is one of the 

things we would like to see, for the regime to admit the Special 

Rapporteur on Torture. 

Mr. OLIVE. Congressman, your committee and Congress has provided us with increasing assistance to Venezuela, and it includes 

defending victims of human rights and helping them on these 

issues. 

Mr. SMITH. Again, on the trafficking issue, are there any estimates as to how many women and/or children have been trafficked? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I do not have those. I do not know of the TIP office 

has them. We will find out and come back to you. 

Mr. SMITH. OK. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Chairman ENGEL. We are going to have to end the questioning. 

Thank you, Mr. Smith. Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Democracy is the key for me. And I have got a deep and long history with Venezuela. I do not like the fact that there is no democracy in Saudi Arabia. I do not like the fact that there is no democracy in North Korea. And I speak out about it and, then, some of 

these places, they do not have any elections. I do have confidence 

in the Venezuelan people. 

I was back and have been involved in Venezuela when many 

were not here. I was part of a bipartisan delegation. It was Cass 

Ballenger from North Carolina, Bill Delahunt from Massachusetts, 

and myself who engaged with then-President Hugo Chavez. And I 

saw back then that individuals who were poor, who had never had 

anything from any other government, never any consideration, 

where I was on the ground to see that they, for the first time, were 

getting schools and hospitals, and getting their fair share under— 

and this President, Hugo Chavez, was elected in a free and fair 

election. 

I have seen, because I was there; I witnessed several of these 

elections, when the United States—and this is why the United 

States cannot lead in this matter—I was there several times for 

elections and I watched people line up in a peaceful way and waited for hours to vote, and elected Hugo Chavez. I saw recall elections, and Hugo Chavez allowed the democratic process to continue, 

and he faced those recall elections and won, fair and square. 
33 

So, I, then, saw that there was an attempted coup in Venezuela 

in 2002. And as certain CIA evidence has now been revealed, we, 

the day after the coup, acknowledged the coup government. The 

people of Venezuela went back in the streets and demanded that 

their democratically elected President was restored. 

So, the context and the reason why I say that is it is complicated 

and difficult for us in the United States to take the lead when, in 

fact, the Venezuelan people also know that we acknowledge not a 

democratically elected President, but we try to undermine them. 

So, for me, democracy is important, and that is why I do, and I 

am worried about democracy when it has failed. And I have known 

Nicolas Maduro. We had this group called Grupo de Boston. And 

I have tried my best to try to bring both sides, opposition and at 

that time Chavistas together, and we had people working collectively. 

I must admit, under the Nicolas Maduro, I have seen the situation continue to deteriorate, and people of Venezuela are suffering. 

And I have seen him avoid some democratic elections. I have seen 

the National Assembly get democratically elected. So, there is democracy in Venezuela. That is why I recognize the National Assembly, and the National Assembly speaks, for me, for the people of 

Venezuela, which is why our focus should be on having free and 

fair elections in Venezuela. 

I am concerned about the conversations that the President is 

having with the threat of sending military into Venezuela. What 

our focus should be is to make sure that we are doing all that we 

can, supporting the Lima countries, the OAS, and the others, to 

have a free and fair election conducted, because the Venezuelan 

people believe in democracy. And that is why you see the National 

Assembly now where the opposition is. 

And I am continuing to talk with members of the opposition, 

members of the National Assembly, and members of the military, 

et cetera, about working together, so that we can have a free and 

fair election, so that the voices, not of the United States, but of the 

people of Venezuela is clearly heard. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of our witnesses for being here today. 

It is really sad to see one of the greatest countries of our hemisphere, Venezuela, which was one of the wealthiest countries of 

Latin America. I know that over the years our families had wonderful associations with Venezuelans that is just so reassuring. 

And I believe, too, in the people of Venezuela. 

And that is why I am very grateful that the National Assembly 

has elected President Juan Guaido, and the recognition by 51 countries of his presidency, and this is on behalf of the people of Venezuela. 

Additionally, I am very grateful for the United States Agency for 

International Development, Mr. Olive. People need to know how effective USAID has been around the world, helping persons in relief 

efforts, and, in particular, at this time, $97 million has already 

been provided; another $20 million from the State Department. 
34 

But, of course, it is very clear that the aid has been blocked by the 

Maduro regime. 

And so, what efforts are being made to get around this blockage, 

Mr. Olive? And what can be done to help get more aid to the people 

of Venezuela? 

Mr. OLIVE. Thank you, Congressman, for your question. 

We are on a daily basis with calls with members of the interim 

government of Guaido’s regime, of his presidency talking about 

ways we can get aid into the country. There are many scenarios 

being put forth. We are overturning every stone to see what is possible. There are diplomatic efforts that I am sure the Special Representative can also speak to. But, rest assured, daily we are trying 

to find a way to get this assistance to the people who need it most. 

Mr. WILSON. And we are very fortunate, again, to have 51 countries recognize the Guaido presidency. What efforts are being made 

internationally, not just USAID, to help the people of Venezuela? 

Mr. ABRAMS. There is a very broad effort. You will have heard, 

at the Ottawa meeting about a week ago, Canada announced $53 

million in additional aid. Each day, you find one or another country, mostly in Europe now, announcing another contribution to this 

effort. So, it is an increasingly international effort. 

Mr. WILSON. And to reassure the people of Venezuela, what efforts are being made that it, indeed, gets to the people of Venezuela, as opposed to what has occurred in the past of where there 

has been looting? 

Mr. OLIVE. Thank you, Congressman. 

We share that same concern, that the delivery of assistance must 

be done safely. It must be done efficiently. And those provisions 

need to be in place for us to be effective in delivering assistance 

to the Venezuelan people. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I would just add that I think that is true of all aid, 

including U.N. aid, and we have looked at that, too. That is, the 

regime has used aid—first of all, they have stolen a good deal of 

it, but they have also directed it to their political supporters. And 

we are trying to make sure that any path of aid that goes in is not 

diverted either for corruption or for political purposes. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, it just makes a difference for the people, and 

it is just encouraging to see bipartisan support for this aid. 

Ms. Oudkirk, it has been reported that the Maduro regime is either transferring or selling the assets of the people of Venezuela, 

which is their gold reserves. What is the latest on protecting the 

gold reserves for the people of Venezuela? 

Ms. OUDKIRK. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman, I, unfortunately, do 

not work with gold reserves. I can take that question back, though. 

Mr. WILSON. And additionally, with that, we have sanctions. I 

hope that, as you get back with me, that we identify who the possible purchasers are and who is facilitating this, so that sanctions 

can be in place. 

And then, Mr. Abrams, again, thank you for your service for our 

country. 

We know that there is drug trafficking, significant, out of the regime, the Maduro regime; human trafficking. What is being done? 

And also, terrorists, harboring of Hezbollah, FARC. And what is 
35 

being done to identify this and block efforts that would threaten 

American families? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, it is very difficult when you have a regime 

that is, in fact, very much in favor of doing that. ELN, a guerilla 

group from Colombia, is protected on their side of the border. There 

is a lot of drug trafficking that benefits the top officials of the regime. 

What can we do? Well, one thing we can do is sanction those who 

are involved in this. In some cases, we can prosecute people involved in this, and try to assemble the information. Because the 

day will come when Venezuelans will take back control of their 

own government and their own country and they will be able to 

pursue this. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. We look forward to a bright future for 

Venezuela. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Chairman, for holding this meeting. 

And thank you to the witnesses that are here today. 

Ms. Oudkirk, can you talk to me a little bit about the oil sanctions? I know that, in light of reports that Juan Guaido plans to 

name a new board of directors for CITGO, the process will require 

the U.S. to legally recognize the new board members. Would a new 

board have access to U.S. bank accounts with proceeds from Venezuela’s oil sales that are being blocked by the sanctions? 

Ms. OUDKIRK. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

So, as I noted in my remarks, the key to sanctions relief for 

PDVSA is the transfer of control of that company away from 

Maduro and his cronies and to a democratically elected representative of the Venezuelan people. 

With regards to CITGO, CITGO operations in the United States 

are covered by a general license that Treasury issued on the day 

the sanctions were announced. So, CITGO’s operations here in the 

U.S. are continuing under that license, and that license covers 

them for 6 months from the date of announcement. The ban is on 

remitting payments back to PDVSA as long as it is under the illegitimate control. 

Mr. SIRES. What would a board do named by Guaido? What 

would that do if he names a new board? 

Ms. OUDKIRK. For CITGO? 

Mr. SIRES. Yes. 

Ms. OUDKIRK. I will have to get back to you on the details of 

that. I do not have the answer for you right now. I am sorry. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Abrams, do you? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, we do not want any funds to go to the regime. 

So, that would not be permitted. But I think there are a lot of lawyers in Washington who are making a lot of money trying to figure 

out the answer to your question. 

Mr. SIRES. Well, my daughter is lawyer. Let’s not kill the lawyers. 

[Laughter.] 

Go ahead. 

Well, you know, my thing is, if we are able to get this money in 

U.S. banks, and obviously, under the sanctions, could that money 

be used for humanitarian purposes in Venezuela? 
36 

Mr. ABRAMS. It can. All these funds, all Venezuelan government 

funds are, in our view, rightly available to the legitimate Interim 

President, Mr. Guaido, and the National Assembly. So, they can 

use those funds to purchase additional humanitarian assistance. 

There are a lot of procedures to go through to get them actual 

control of it. And they have made it clear that they want to be extremely careful. They are going to be accused of misusing the 

funds. So, everything has to be totally transparent. But, in principle, yes. 

Mr. SIRES. OK. And I know that Maduro is propped up by the 

Cubans in Venezuela. How many Cubans are really actually in 

Venezuela propping him up? 

Mr. ABRAMS. To give you a round number, it is in the multiple 

thousands. It is not a few hundred. It is several thousand Cuban 

officials, including intelligence people. 

Mr. SIRES. And getting back to the money, I know that he made 

an effort to move a billion dollars into Uruguay in gold. And Uruguay rejected it. Did you read that article? 

Mr. ABRAMS. There are continuing efforts, and some of them, I 

am sorry to say, look as if they have been successful, in which a 

private jet comes in and gold is put on it, and off it goes. And then, 

the gold is sold, and the money goes to people in the regime. 

Mr. SIRES. Now they are opening an account in Russia? That was 

the latest that I read. They moved the money into Russia? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I have seen that information, too. Most Western 

banks, not just American banks, European banks, will not touch 

any of this. So, they need to go look for things like a Russian bank 

that will deal with it. 

Mr. SIRES. But if we prevent the money from going into Venezuela, where are they getting this money to move to Russia? Can 

you speak to that? 

Ms. OUDKIRK. So, I think the point of the sanctions is to do exactly what you just described, to keep the money in these blocked 

interest-bearing accounts in the United States, so that they do not 

flow back to Venezuela and are not, then, you know—— 

Mr. SIRES. Disappear? 

Ms. OUDKIRK [continuing]. Disappeared. However, the sanctions 

were only announced a couple of weeks ago. So, money that had 

gone back before then is available to the illegitimate regime to be 

used for these purposes. So, the point is, from now going forward, 

keeping that money in the blocked accounts, so that it cannot be 

misused. 

Mr. SIRES. OK. Thank you very much. My time is up. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much. Mr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panel 

being here. 

As we know, the Maduro disastrous economy has created a food 

insecurity. Only about 30 percent of the protein requirements are 

being met. There are cases of malaria and TB increasing. In a 

failed State, you see measles, diphtheria; sanitation goes down. So, 

it is a bad situation and it is going to get worse. 

Yet, over the last 10 years, Maduro—and I am going to, in a spirit of bipartisanship, I am going to agree with my colleague, Gregory 

Meeks about Chavez in the beginning. Because there were some 
37 

rapid changes that did benefit the people in the lower tiers of the 

economy. However, that got absconded in his third and fourth 

term, and then, Maduro just lost it. Maduro has taken over $11 billion from the Venezuelan people, 

and it is the most violent country on the planet today. And you 

think of all the things going around as far as murders per capita. 

And then, you look at who is supporting Maduro. It is Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, Bolivia, Turkey, certainly not cheerleaders of democracy or certainly America. 

And then, I look at Cuba, and we have heard numbers over the 

course of the last few years that Maduro has Cuban security 

guards around him because he does not trust the Venezuelans. We 

have heard numbers up to 40,000 Cuban soldiers in Venezuela. Are 

they playing a role of surveillance and intimidation, in your experience, in the information you have, toward the Venezuelan people? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Yes, and toward the Venezuela security forces, Mr. 

Yoho. I think you are exactly right, that they are the security 

guards directly around Maduro. And one of their really important 

roles is to spy on and surveil the security forces, the army, to make 

sure that everybody shows loyalty to Maduro. He does not trust his 

own people. 

Mr. YOHO. You know, I am glad you brought that up, the surveillance. We just heard last week from a very reliable source that 

China, via ZTE, is offering their facial recognition to the Maduro 

government, so that they can control their people like China is 

doing. Russia wants that technology. They are going to do it. Iran 

wants that. And I think we are seeing things played out. 

History is repeating itself with a failed State that creates a vacuum, that vacuum will be filled. And so, we have got a choice. We 

can allow Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, people that are anti-democracies, anti-American, fill that void. The people of Latin America, 

Venezuela in particular, will really suffer. Or we can get behind 

the legitimate Interim President, President Guaido. And with us 

and the 51 nations, as Mr. Wilson talked about, stand behind them 

because that is the right thing to do, and it is the right thing to 

do for the Venezuelan people. 

Something came up in a question. Do the people of Venezuela 

have gun ownership rights or was that taken away by Chavez or 

Maduro? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I do not know the answer to that. 

Mr. YOHO. OK. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I will have to find out. 

Mr. YOHO. But it is interesting that a socialist country that turns 

to a dictatorship does not have the means to protect themselves. 

Yet, the criminal gangs do and the narco-terrorists have those, and 

the military has those. 

Mr. ABRAMS. We do know that the Maduro regime has distributed arms to its gangs. 

Mr. YOHO. They have, and I think that, again, goes to just the 

breakdown of Maduro, because he knows he is not legitimate. And 

if we are going to honor legitimate elections, we know that President Guaido is the one that we need to follow. 

Ms. Oudkirk, you were talking, the question came up about 

CITGO. If the legitimate President gets recognized around the 
38 

world, President Guaido, that money that CITGO is producing, if 

we were to remove the sanctions, or keep the sanctions on, that 

money can go into escrow, cannot it, so that we know it does not 

go to Maduro? And when things get sorted out, it will go back to 

the rightful owners, the Venezuelan people, right? We can do that, 

cannot we? 

Ms. OUDKIRK. Yes, Mr. Congressman. The point of the license, 

the general license that was provided for CITGO operations, was 

to allow CITGO to continue to operate here in the United States, 

and for any funds that would have been remitted back to the 

PDVSA parent in Venezuela, to be held in a blocked interest-bearing account here for the future use of the democratically elected 

representatives of the—— 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. I am out of time. And I appreciate your 

expertise. Thank you. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Abrams, you said that there is a coalition of 51 countries 

joining with us or that we are part of. How many of those countries 

have said that the use of military force is an option and should be 

on the table? How many of those other countries have stated that? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I do not know of any that have Stated it. 

Mr. KEATING. I do not, either, and that is why I asked the question. So, we are the only ones that have Stated that, have their 

leaders say that? 

Mr. ABRAMS. We are the only one probably in a position—— 

Mr. KEATING. Oh, no, that is not what I asked. I mean, the other 

thing is, Ambassador Bolton, just a couple of weeks ago, was seen 

holding a notepad and it captured ‘‘5,000 troops to Colombia’’. And 

the President, last weekend, is again stating that the use of U.S. 

military force is an option. And my concern is, if it were part of 

a coalition, we should be working in concert with that, not standing 

alone having an option like that on the table. 

And I think that, as you look at our actions in that respect, I 

think, indeed, it can backfire on us. I think it plays right into 

Maduro’s rhetoric about the U.S. involvement. And I think it is 

something that will not help the cause of that. 

Has President Guaido, has he ever said anything or uttered anything about the use of U.S. military force as an option? Has he said 

that? 

Mr. ABRAMS. He actually made a comment a few days ago relating to humanitarian—— 

Mr. KEATING. No, I mean military force, I am talking about. 

Mr. ABRAMS [continuing]. Related to getting humanitarian assistance in. But this is not the path, I think you can see, that the U.S. 

Government is pursuing. 

Mr. KEATING. Then, why are we saying it, though? That is my 

question. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Because we always say it in all—— 

Mr. KEATING. You know, Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution 

says the President should be consulting with us. I think we are 

doing so many things that could be helpful. We are working in concert with other countries. All those things are good. But the statement—I mean, I do not think it was a mistake perhaps that that 
39 

notebook phrase from Ambassador Bolton was captured. And why 

would he have that on his notebook? Why would that come out? 

And why would the President be saying this without working in 

concert with the other countries in the coalition or without having, 

first, a sincere dialog with Congress on this matter? Doesn’t that 

make your job more difficult? 

Mr. ABRAMS. It has not because we always take the position that 

all options are on the table. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, perhaps that is not a good option right here. 

I believe strongly that we are hurting our cause and the cause of 

the Venezuelan people. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, in the work that we are doing—and we are 

doing it—on the diplomatic front and on the economic front, on the 

humanitarian front, with lots of other countries, this issue does not 

get in the way. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, I think it plays right into the hands of the 

dictator that is our adversary right now. And I think it really undercuts the ability and our involvement with the Venezuelan people themselves. Because, ultimately, I think we all agree the resolution, if there is going to be any kind of significant, tangible resolution, will come at the hands of the Venezuelan people themselves 

to make that. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I agree. 

Mr. KEATING. Just a quick question then. Before we recognized 

President Guaido, were there actions taken to make sure our embassy personnel were secure before that was uttered? Was there actual policy discussion before that was uttered? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. This is a matter of the utmost significance to 

all of us, to the Secretary. We speak to the charge’ in Caracas literally every day. I talked to him this morning again about the 

question of security. It is on the minds of everybody in the Department and it was then. 

Mr. KEATING. I would suggest, too, as a final comment, that it 

is too late now, but, as we go forward, before the administration 

is talking about the use of military force in this situation, keeping 

that as an option, that they should have sincere discussions with 

this committee and with Congress, and then, make declarations 

like that. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. Ms. Wagner. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this 

hearing. 

And thank you to our witnesses for their time and certainly for 

their service. 

Mr. Abrams, in keeping with the prior questioning, I can say 

that, in the wake of Maduro’s abortive attempt to expel U.S. diplomats, the United States is negotiating with the Venezuelan foreign ministry to establish a U.S. interest office, I have been told. 

Mr. Abrams, can you provide an update on these negotiations? And 

again, what security measures have been taken to keep our diplomats safe? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, on the security measures, I wouldn’t want to 

go into that at an open hearing. But the security question is one, 

again, that is on our minds every day. We are not negotiating an 
40 

intersection. An intersection is used in a case where there is a government and we do not recognize that government. But in Venezuela there is a government we do recognize, which is—— 

Mrs. WAGNER. So, is there a U.S. interest office being stood up, 

or no? 

Mr. ABRAMS. No, there is not. 

Mrs. WAGNER. There is not? All right. 

Mr. ABRAMS. There is not. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I am amazed at the breadth of the international 

coalition now calling for change in Venezuela. Principles of sovereignty and non-interference have in the past limited some Latin 

American countries from speaking out against regional abuses, but 

Latin America is truly stepping up to the plate and taking a strong 

stance against our neighbor. 

Mr. Abrams, what was the tipping point for Latin American 

States that have called for Maduro to step down and how is the 

U.S. working to unify this coalition of hemispheric States to stand 

against human rights abuses in Venezuela? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think the tipping point has really been Maduro 

conduct, the conduct of the government. And when Venezuelans in 

the National Assembly came together behind Interim President 

Guaido, that I think was the moment when—and I agree with you, 

it is really quite—— 

Mrs. WAGNER. Remarkable. 

Mr. ABRAMS [continuing]. Remarkable to see so many countries 

of Latin America, and also in Europe, which is against their usual 

practice, you know—— 

Mrs. WAGNER. Correct. 

Mr. ABRAMS [continuing]. To come forward and recognize him. 

We are in touch with really all of them constantly as we talk 

about now, for example, we had the Lima Group meeting; we had 

the meeting in Ottawa. We have tomorrow a humanitarian assistance meeting hosted by the OAS. So, there is a constant—— 

Mrs. WAGNER. To that point, Mr. Abrams—and I do not mean to 

interrupt—but, as a followup, I know that the Organization of 

American States has also been uncharacteristically critical of 

Maduro and refused to recognize Maduro’s legitimacy last month. 

I understand that Venezuela is seeking to leave the OAS. But how 

can the Organization continue to support free and fair democracy 

in Venezuela? Can the OAS aid the United States and these other 

coalitions in enforcing sanctions on the Maduro regime? 

Mr. ABRAMS. At some point, there may be a credentials fight in 

the OAS because, until there is, the Maduro regime is the recognized government, according to the OAS. And we have the same 

problem in New York at the U.N. as well. But, to the extent that 

the Organization can help, particularly on the humanitarian side, 

they are trying to do so. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I know OAS last month refused to recognize 

Maduro’s legitimacy. So, that is a good development. 

Venezuela has longstanding ties with Hezbollah, an Iranian 

proxy and terrorist organization. Mr. Abrams, to what extent does 

the Maduro regime rely on proceeds from illicit activities supported 

by groups like Hezbollah and drug trafficking networks for its survival? What are we doing to address this? Thank you. 
41 

Mr. ABRAMS. The regime has made a great deal of money, and 

higher-ups in the regime have made a great deal of money, over 

the last decade, in particular, out of things like drug trafficking. It 

is very hard for us to address when the government in place, of 

course, is behind all of this and is profiting from it, and the people 

who ought to be engaged in law enforcement are, in fact, themselves making money from this. 

So, what do we do? We sanction them. We cancel visas in some 

cases. We can try to go after them through criminal prosecutions 

in some cases, and we have. There are some people in jail in the 

United States, Venezuelans, for engagement in drug trafficking, 

people who are connected to the regime. But the real solution to 

this is to get a democratic government in place that will fight drug 

trafficking with us. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank you. 

My time has expired. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much. Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to our witnesses. 

We have all watched in horror as the Maduro regime has destroyed Venezuela’s economy, starved its people, and engaged in 

widespread corruption and repression. We all want a better future 

for the people of Venezuela and want to end this manmade humanitarian crisis. And we all believe that the Venezuelan people have 

the right to pick their own leaders, a right Maduro has denied his 

people by refusing to hold free and fair elections. 

However, we must be very careful, in my opinion. It is not the 

job of the United States to choose leaders in other countries. The 

United States has a long and not-all-together positive history of involvement in Latin America, which I believe you are all familiar 

with. 

And each transition in Venezuela must be truly democratic and 

led by the people of Venezuela. The United States must work with 

the National Assembly and other governments in the region in a 

supporting role. 

And I want to turn to my first series of questions because I am 

concerned by continuing comments from the Trump administration, 

noting that the use of military force is, as the President said, ‘‘an 

option’’. And so, for you, Mr. Abrams, my first question is, we have 

not, of course, the Congress of the United States has not declared 

war on Venezuela. Correct? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Correct. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Is there an existing statutory authorization that 

would allow for a military intervention in Venezuela? Yes or no? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Has Venezuela attacked the United States, its 

territories or possessions, or its Armed Forces? 

Mr. ABRAMS. No. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Has the administration increased troop deployments to countries, including Colombia, neighboring Venezuela at 

any point in the last month? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I do not believe so. 
42 

Mr. CICILLINE. Are there currently any plans to, or discussions 

about, moving additional combat troops to Colombia or any other 

country that neighbors Venezuela? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Is anyone at the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, or any other agency, making plans for U.S. military engagement in Venezuela? 

Mr. ABRAMS. That is a question I cannot answer. I know of no 

such planning, but—— 

Mr. CICILLINE. Well, consistent with the War Powers Act, I have 

introduced legislation that expressly prohibits the administration 

from taking military action in Venezuela without consulting Congress. Will you pledge that the Trump administration will not take 

any military action regarding Venezuela without consulting with 

Congress, in accordance with the War Powers Act? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I do not know that I can answer that question, Mr. 

Cicilline. A series of Presidents, you know, have taken a jaundice 

view, I might say, of the War Powers Act. So, I am really not in 

a position to speak—— 

Mr. CICILLINE. OK. Well, under our Constitution, as you know, 

only Congress can declare war, and we have neither declared war 

nor granted the administration the authority to send the Armed 

Forces into hostilities in Venezuela. In my view, it would be illegal 

under U.S. law, inappropriate, and reckless to attempt a military 

intervention. The United States must show leadership in our hemisphere and we must continue to provide aid to suffering Venezuelans. 

But I want to just build on Mr. Keating’s question, because you 

said, of the 51 countries in this coalition, we are the only one that 

has threatened the use of military force. And in response to a question from Mr. Keating, you said, because we are the only one capable of doing it. Surely, you are not suggesting the other 50 countries do not have the military capability to engage in a military action, if they so elected, do you? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, some do and some do not. 

Mr. CICILLINE. So, some do? We are not the only ones that have 

that ability. 

Mr. ABRAMS. We have not threatened military action in Venezuela. 

Mr. CICILLINE. You said we are not the—— 

Mr. ABRAMS. I mean, all options are on the table. 

Mr. CICILLINE. My question is, we are not the only one that has 

that capability? So, when you said that to Mr. Keating, that was 

not accurate? 

Mr. ABRAMS. We are the only one with the kind of capability, obviously, that—— 

Mr. CICILLINE. OK, but others have military capability and have 

not made the same assertion of that being an option? Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I am actually not sure of the answer to that, of 

what other governments have said. 

Mr. CICILLINE. OK. So, Mr. Abrams, what is particularly concerning to me is that, in light of the fact there is no legal authority 

to express the use of military force as an option, it is unclear to 
43 

me how the President or anyone in the administration can claim 

it is an option on the table, because it is not. And to the extent that 

we are suggesting that it is, we are misleading the international 

community or misleading the people in Venezuela. So, I urge you 

to take back the message to the administration that it is not authorized and not helpful. 

And I would now like to turn to Mr. Olive to talk a little bit 

about the politicization of aid. Is it true that, historically, American 

humanitarian assistance has been offered on the basis of need 

alone? 

Mr. OLIVE. Yes, correct. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And would you say that, in order to provide lifesaving assistance in war zones and dangerous areas, humanitarians need to be able to operate in a neutral and apolitical way? 

Mr. OLIVE. Correct. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And is it true that the United States, through 

USAID, is prepositioning humanitarian aid in the border of Venezuela? 

Mr. OLIVE. Yes, we are. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Do you have any concerns that tying humanitarian assistance to a particular political outcome could have unintended consequences or harm our ability to deliver assistance in 

Venezuela or to other countries? And what steps is the administration taking to ensure that aid does not become a flash-point? 

Mr. OLIVE. Administrator Green has said we will always, as the 

U.S. Government, be ready to help those in need. There are people 

in need in our hemisphere right now as a result of this crisis, and 

we are preparing—we already are supporting them in these border 

areas. We are doing what we can to build the capacity in-country 

to receive and distribute aid securely and efficiently, and be able 

to monitor those distributions, and that is our focus. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Wright. 

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all three of you for being here today. And, Mr. 

Abrams, I am very glad you are here. I agree with our ranking 

member that you are exactly the right person for the job. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you. 

Mr. WRIGHT. I have always believed that it is ill-advised, if not 

self-defeating, to broadcast to ruthless dictators what the United 

States is willing or unwilling to do; that it is a mistake to tell 

someone like Maduro that we are willing to use a manual screwdriver, but never a power drill; and that, in fact, we should not remove any tools from the toolbox. 

My question, Mr. Abrams, is, does the War Powers Act require 

that the President of the United States get permission from Congress to even speak about using military force? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I do not believe so. 

Mr. WRIGHT. I did not think so. And is it not true that military 

action is always an option, unless Presidential action triggers the 

War Powers Act and the Congress says no? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I think that is correct. 

Mr. WRIGHT. That is what I thought. Thank you very much. 
44 

I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. All right. Thank you. Mr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to continue asking questions in the same line as my 

colleagues, Mr. Keating and Cicilline. And I do not want any of this 

to be construed as—you know, I think what the Chavez regime and 

the Maduro regime have done to Venezuela is an absolute disaster 

and the humanitarian crisis that they have created is a disaster, 

and we have to do everything to support the people of Venezuela. 

But our Framers, by their genius and design, created separation of 

powers, keeping the Nation’s purse and sword separate. 

Congress is empowered to declare war, provide for and regulate 

the Armed Forces. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the 

responsibility to direct the Armed Forces as they conduct the hostilities. 

We have been talking a little bit about the War Powers Resolution. It is absolutely very clear it provides the President to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into situations of hostilities or imminent 

hostilities as exercised only pursuant to, one, a declaration of war; 

two, specific statutory authorization, or, three, a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its territories 

or possessions, or its Armed Forces. 

Mr. Abrams, my colleagues have already pressed you a little bit 

on the use of military force in Venezuela. I would like to ask you 

a yes-or-no question. Do you agree with the War Powers Resolution 

which States, quote, ‘‘The President in every possible instance shall 

consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed 

Forces into hostilities or into situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and 

after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces,’’ until they ‘‘are no longer 

engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.’’? 

Yes/no? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I cannot give you a yes-or-no answer to that. I 

mean, this is a long debate, as you know better than I. Presidents, 

including the most recent President, President Obama, have used 

force in cases where there was a big debate about the War Powers 

Act. And Presidents sometimes have said, ‘‘I’m submitting a report, 

but I’m not sure that I’m obliged to do so.’’ I just cannot get into 

that debate today. I am not prepared to do so. 

Mr. BERA. Again, I think the War Powers Act is very clear in 

when the President is authorized to introduce U.S. forces. 

Mr. Olive, I am going to shift to you. As I mentioned prior to the 

hearing, I also do publicly want to acknowledge the men and 

women that serve this country every day from our State Department, our diplomats, our aid and development folks. We are proud 

of them, and I think we cannot acknowledge their work and contribution and patriotism to our country enough. 

Can you give me a quick assessment of how bad the humanitarian crisis in-country is at this juncture and how much worse it 

has gotten over the past few weeks? 

Mr. OLIVE. Thank you, Congressman, and thank you for your 

kind words to my colleagues. I will definitely take that message 

back to them. 
45 

Mr. BERA. Thank you. 

Mr. OLIVE. The situation is deteriorating on a daily basis. The 

reports that we have gotten from inside the country are hospitals 

are drastically reducing their supplies and not able to have surgical 

equipment, vaccines, et cetera, available to even do routine types 

of surgeries, let alone more complicated ones. 

We are very concerned about the power grid. There are numerous power outages throughout the country that, of course, affect 

then, hospitals and clinics, et cetera. 

Food is available, but it is controlled by the regime and used as 

a tool. And that is something that is deteriorating the country as 

well. So, people are having trouble getting food. We are hearing of 

increasing amounts of malnutrition amongst infants in being able 

to get the nutrients that they need at those early stages of life. 

So, yes, our reports are pretty steady that this is declining on a 

daily basis. 

Mr. BERA. Well, thank you. 

In my limited time, Mr. Abrams, given this deterioration and the 

circumstances on the ground, and given the unique situation where 

the Venezuelan military really does have a lot of power in terms 

of which direction things go, have you seen a shift in open sources 

that suggests the military is now moving away from Maduro or 

support for Maduro is changing? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think we have seen some indications of that. It 

is probably a subject better discussed in closed hearing. 

Mr. BERA. Great. Thank you. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. BERA. And I will yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Reschenthaler. 

Mr. RESCHENTHALER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to everybody who came in today to testify. 

Mr. Abrams, as a veteran of the Iraq War, I just want to thank 

you for everything that you did in service of the country. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you. 

Mr. RESCHENTHALER. Thank you. 

Over the past several months, we have witnessed the brave people of Venezuela rise up against the despot and dictator Nicolas 

Maduro. Since Maduro’s rise to power in 2013, Venezuela has been 

plagued with poverty, death, and misery. The regime’s authoritarian role and socialist policies have led to over 3 million Venezuelans fleeing the country, 90 percent of the population living 

below the poverty line, and 300,000 children at risk of starvation. 

It is one of the most violent countries in the world, rampant with 

murder. And hyperinflation is expected to reach 10 million percent 

by the end of 2019. Venezuela is in the midst of an extreme humanitarian crisis that must be addressed immediately. 

Mr. Abrams, how have the socialist economic policies of the 

Maduro regime led to Venezuela’s collapse? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I would say it was a combination of mismanagement, corruption, and policy. For example, what has happened with 

PDVSA? Instead of treating it as a private company, what they 

have done is basically looted it and put all sorts of regime supporters in there. There is no State of law in Venezuela, So that private property, in a sense, really does not exist. If the regime does 
46 

not want you to have private property, they will just take it away 

from you. So, it has been a disastrous downward spiral. 

Mr. RESCHENTHALER. What are the core functions of the Maduro 

relationship with Cuba, Russia, and China? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I think in the case of China and Russia, they 

have gotten a lot of money. That is enormous loans, tens of billions 

of dollars. Cuba is different. Obviously, they do not have any 

money to give. What they give is people, largely intelligence and 

military people, to surround this regime and act as a kind of loyalist corps. As Venezuelans become more and more disillusioned 

with this regime, Maduro surrounds himself with Cubans who he 

trusts more than his own people. 

Mr. RESCHENTHALER. Do you see a situation arising where the 

United States would become involved militarily in Venezuela? And 

if you do see that, how do you foresee that scenario playing out? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I do not see it. I do not see it. And one of the things 

that is sort of notable about the discussion about the use of force 

is that that is not the policy of the United States. The policy is to 

pursue humanitarian, economic, diplomatic paths forward to try to 

support the Venezuelan people’s desire for democracy. When we 

say all options are on the table, that is because all options are always on the table. That is not the preferred route and that is not 

the route we are going down. 

Mr. RESCHENTHALER. Thank you, Mr. Abrams. 

Mr. Olive, what is the best way for the U.S. to support Venezuela’s democratic opposition? Is the United States ready to assist 

the organization with free and fair elections? 

Mr. OLIVE. Thank you, Congressman, for your question. And absolutely. Your body has provided now $15 million in Fiscal 

Year 2018, and a portion of that can go to ensure that an electoral 

process is fair and transparent. And we will work alongside our 

State colleagues on whatever assistance may be needed, but it will 

have to be requested, and, as the Special Representative said, Venezuelan-led. 

Mr. RESCHENTHALER. If we do have a future democratic government in Venezuela, are we ready to engage in assisting the new 

free nation, such as nation-building? 

Mr. OLIVE. We are looking at different scenarios. Again, it has 

got to be Venezuelan-led. They will determine their priorities. They 

are part of our hemisphere. We stand ready to assist. But the most 

important thing is to get the government and the power back in 

the hands of the Venezuelan people. 

Mr. RESCHENTHALER. Thank you, Mr. Olive. 

And I yield back the remainder of my time. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Castro. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairman. 

I have in the past supported sanctions against the Maduro regime because, as Mr. Meeks mentioned, I do believe in many ways 

that Mr. Maduro has oppressed his people. At the same time, I believe that the role of the United States is to promote democracy, 

freedom, and human rights around the world. The role of the 

United States is not to handpick the next leader of Venezuela. 

Mr. Abrams, I have a question for you. My question is whether 

you are aware of any transfers of weapons or defense equipment 
47 

by the U.S. Government to groups in Venezuela opposed to Nicolas 

Maduro since you were appointed Special Representative for Venezuela. 

Mr. ABRAMS. No. 

Mr. CASTRO. And I want to be respectful of you, but also honest. 

The reason that I ask that question, there has been a McClatchy 

news report of such an incident. Are you aware of that news report? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Saw the report, yes. 

Mr. CASTRO. I ask this question because you have a record of 

such actions. In Nicaragua, you were involved in the effort to overtly provide lethal aid to the Contras against the will of Congress. 

You ultimately pled guilty to two counts of withholding information 

from Congress in regard to your testimony during the Iran-Contra 

scandal. So, I ask you the question, can we trust your testimony 

today? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, you can make that decision for yourself, Mr. 

Castro. I can tell you that the answer to your question is no. It is 

a simple and unequivocal no. There has been no such transfer of 

arms. 

Mr. CASTRO. I also want to ask you—I mentioned the promotion 

of democracy and the fact that the Venezuelan people have to pick 

their own leader—what is the administration’s strategy for encouraging elections as soon as possible in Venezuela? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, that is the heart really of administration policy. That is, after the Maduro regime, a short transition to an election, and that is the view of all of the 51 nations that are supporting Mr. Guaido. 

I completely agree with the way you started. It is not for us to 

choose the next President of Venezuela. It is for Venezuelans. We 

can help, as a lot of other countries can help, in facilitating a free 

election, because, as you know, there is a lot of experience, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, 

Freedom House. And equivalents in other countries are really quite 

good at giving assistance. 

Mr. CASTRO. Also, I know that you have spoken about the fact 

or you mentioned that all options are on the table. And in a private 

setting, we had a conversation about that, which I will not get into. 

But I want to reiterate one point and one of the reasons that I disagree with that approach. The reason that I disagree with the 

statement and the approach is because I believe that it gives license to countries like China and Russia to, then, further engage 

with Venezuela and do it in the name of protecting Venezuela sovereignty by drumming up the idea that the United States is going 

to invade the Nation of Venezuela. I strategically think that it was 

a bad statement. 

With that, I yield back. 

[Applause.] 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

The Chair will remind all persons in the audience that any manifestation of approval or disapproval of proceedings is in violation of 

the rules of the House and its committees. 

Mr. BURCHETT. 

Mr. BURCHETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
48 

I guess the good thing, or the bad thing about being a freshman 

is all the good questions already get asked, but I still have a couple 

that have not been asked. 

I think it has been established that Cu ta, the Cu tan regime is 

in line with Maduro. How would you recommend that we could separate that? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I do not think that lectures to the Cu tans are going 

to have much impact. I think, in fact, that is going to happen when 

there is a freely elected democratic government, and Venezuela will 

just send them home. 

Mr. BURCHETT. I agree with you. Thank you. 

Could you all followup just a little bit more detail on the Russian 

influence in Venezuela and what you would recommend that the 

United States would do to limit that influence? We talk a lot about 

sanctions and all that, but, I mean, honestly, that is sort of like my 

momma saying, ‘‘I’m going to tell your dad,’’ and then, dad would 

say, ‘‘I’m going to tell your momma.’’ And then, you know, kids, 

they shriek in horror, but, in reality, they just go off and giggle a 

little bit. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, there have been some conversations with the 

Russians, and I am sure there will be more, but I cannot say they 

have done any good thus far. Again, it is partly a matter of just 

seeing Venezuela move to a freely elected democratic government, 

which can then make independent decisions about the relationships 

it wants to have. 

For example, when sanctions come off, they will not need to turn 

to Russia to say, ‘‘How do we deal with these sanctions?’’, through 

Rosneft or through Russian banks or anything like that. The Russians I think, at this point are not putting any more money into 

Venezuela because they are worried about getting paid back the 

money they have already put in. And once there is a freely elected 

government that can deal, again, with the World Bank and the 

IMF, and a broad international program and support, I think the 

Russian role will diminish very quickly. 

Ms. OUDKIRK. And, Mr. Congressman, if I can add onto that, if 

we look at Russian involvement in the hydrocarbon sector, one of 

the reasons why this administration made a decision to license the 

continuing involvement of U.S. companies—— 

Mr. BURCHETT. Right. Can I ask you a question? I already know 

what hydrocarbons means, but Mr. Pence does not. Could you explain that to him? 

Ms. OUDKIRK. Oil and gas. 

Mr. BURCHETT. OK. Thank you. 

Ms. OUDKIRK. And so, one of the reasons why we licensed the 

continued involvement of U.S. companies in upstream oil production in Venezuela was because the oil and gas sector is the key pillar of the Venezuelan economy, and it will be going forward. And 

keeping the U.S. corporate presence there, with their best practices, with their adherence to all the sorts of practices that we expect here in the United States, is, we believe, one of the best ways 

to ensure that in the future Venezuela is able to return to prosperity and sort of an economy that functions normally. 
49 

Mr. BURCHETT. Where we have seen that they have nationalized 

these industries, we have seen the prices, in fact, spiral upwards, 

is that correct? Not artificially, but legitimately? 

Ms. OUDKIRK. It depends really, but I think what we are focused 

on here, we are looking at an oil sector that is in profound crisis, 

and the general economic crisis in Venezuela exacerbates that. The 

trained staff are voting with their feet. They are going to other 

countries. Key equipment is being stripped of copper wire, so electricity cannot be transmitted. So, it is all knitted together, but we 

do believe that Western involvement in the upstream oil sector will 

leave us positioned to have both the U.S. private sector and the 

U.S. Government assist with eventual economic recovery. And we 

are a counterweight to the Russian and the Chinese investment, 

which is otherwise very prevalent in that industry. 

Mr. BURCHETT. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder of my time. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

Ms. TITUS. Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

President Trump seems averse to international cooperation and 

multilateral agreements. He seems to prefer go-it-alone, shootfrom-the-hip, mano-a-mano type of diplomacy, such as it exists. But 

some of us believe that, if we are going to be successful in helping 

Venezuela survive and recover through political means, not military means, and through humanitarian assistance, we are going to 

need to work with the Lima Group and with OAS. So, I would ask 

you, Mr. Abrams, do not you think that your role on the National 

Security Council in the George W. Bush Administration during the 

2002 Carmona coup in Venezuela hurts your credibility with Latin 

American countries and makes it difficult, if not impossible, for you 

to serve now as a Special Representative of Venezuela, to foster 

these kind of agreements? 

[Applause.] 

Chairman ENGEL. Excuse me. The gentlewoman will suspend. 

Mr. ABRAMS. No. 

Chairman ENGEL. The Chair will remind all persons in the audience that any manifestation of approval or disapproval of the proceedings is in violation of the rules of the House and its committees. So, I please ask the audience to cooperate or else we will have 

to have people removed, which I would not like to do. 

Go ahead and respond. 

Mr. ABRAMS. My answer is no. 

Ms. TITUS. And you do not think that your appointment sends 

the wrong message to our allies in Latin America? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I have been in contact with an awful lot of 

them. I have talked to a lot of people on the phone in the last couple of weeks. I have met with a bunch of foreign ministers in the 

last couple of weeks. These have been very good meetings and we 

are all cooperating because we all want the same thing in Venezuela, which is democracy. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, I hope so, too, but I think your ‘‘no’’ puts you 

in the minority. 

I will go from there to a broader question. What happens if 

Maduro is ousted? Will he, then, go to Russia or to Cuba, or will 
50 

we have a truth commission? Will he be imprisoned? What about 

these corrupt oligarchs we have heard about? What about the 

heads of the military? And what is going to be the U.S.’s position 

at that point? Would some of you comment on that? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I would say, first, these are, for the most part, 

Venezuelan decisions. They are decisions that a new democratic 

government is going to have to make. The decision on where 

Maduro goes is for Maduro. Does he want to go to Cuba or Russia 

or someplace else? 

But, you know, there have been a lot of democratic transitions 

in the world, happily, in the last few decades. Each one is a different case. They have to make these decisions internally about 

how much do they want to do in prosecuting people. Do they want 

to have amnesties? And, you know, the National Assembly has already passed an amnesty bill. These are not our decisions. We are 

not Venezuelans. 

Ms. TITUS. I appreciate that, but we often hear about some subversive activity that encourages one kind of approach or another. 

And I suspect that would be the case again, too. 

Comment about what we do after the fact, once Maduro goes? 

Mr. OLIVE. Yes. From the development standpoint, we are prepared to help the new government in its priorities of rebuilding the 

country. USAID’s assistance is very public. We will use our normal 

mechanisms that we have done in other countries, and we will be 

transparent and happy to share any information that we have, 

when we reach that day where we are having plans and we have 

responded to a request from the government. 

Ms. TITUS. We have heard a lot about the security folks from 

Cuba. What about the teachers and the doctors that came from 

Cuba to Venezuela? Will we be able to work with them after the 

fact? 

Mr. ABRAMS. My guess would be that many of them will be withdrawn. They are sent there, in large part, as a political message 

of solidarity with Maduro. So, after Maduro—again, that is a decision for the Venezuelans to make, not for us. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Ms. Titus. Mr. Pence. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To all the witnesses today, thank you for your time. 

As a Marine, I am proud when America plays a leadership role 

with our allies and partners in support of democratic principles and 

the rights of free people in Venezuela and around the world. As 

Americans, there is no higher calling in our diplomatic endeavors 

than to stand with free people against tyranny. 

I want to focus on how United States leadership has help build 

a coalition of support for the Venezuelan people. Over 40 countries 

have now recognized Juan Guaido as the Interim President of Venezuela, a number that has effectively doubled in recent weeks. I am 

proud that the United States was among the first to stand alongside Interim President Guaido d the Venezuelan people. 

I also believe that it is important to provide support to Venezuela’s neighbors like Colombia, who are generously hosting millions of Venezuelans fleeing the country and the crisis. 
51 

Mr. Olive and Mr. Abrams, Mr. Abrams, you Stated more than 

3 million Venezuelans, more than 10 percent of Venezuela’s population has been forced to flee their country to survive. You also 

mentioned today in your testimony, and I quote, ‘‘Maduro cannot 

weather much longer.’’ My question is, how concerned are you 

about the effects of this on neighboring countries and what are the 

implications of this on the larger region? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I can begin the answer. There is a steady outflow. That 3 million, or it may even be 3.6 million, grows every day. 

And if the regime stays in power throughout this year, it can reach 

5 million. So, we will be hearing a lot more from Brazil and Peru, 

and especially Colombia, about the need for help in dealing with 

continuing massive outflows of Venezuelans. This will stop only if 

there is a democratic turn in Venezuela and a beginning of economic recovery. 

Mr. OLIVE. Congressman Pence, thank you for your question. 

We have been in constant contact, especially with the Colombian 

government, on these issues and it is supportive of them. Administrator Green is meeting with President Duque tomorrow to have 

this very conversation. One part of it will be how can we continue 

to assist Colombians todeal with the amount of Venezuelans migrating into Colombia at this time. We are concerned about it and 

are prepared to go shoulder to shoulder with Colombians. 

Mr. PENCE. Is there any concern that the blockade is going to attract even more people faster with the humanitarian supplies sitting across the border? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think it is a concern, and it is one of the reasons 

why we all want to get the aid in. Venezuelans need it very, very 

badly. 

Mr. OLIVE. When Administrator Green and I were there in July, 

it was clear that they were saying, and we saw it firsthand, that 

90 percent of the Venezuelans that were coming into Colombia to 

get support were going back into Venezuela. So, they were just 

coming in to be able to get the vaccines or health care or food or 

generate some income to be able to go back into the country. And 

we expect that to continue until when we are allowed to bring in 

our humanitarian assistance into the country in a safe and efficient 

manner, in a manner that we can monitor where it goes and make 

sure that it gets to the people who are in need of it most. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you. I just want to say I am proud that President Trump and Secretary Pompeo continue to speak with clarity 

and provide the leadership our values require on the situation in 

Venezuela. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that we can say today that probably all, if not most, of 

the members of this committee are really concerned with the violence in Venezuela, the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela affecting 

thousands of families that has led to an unprecedented migration 

of Venezuelans throughout the region. And, of course, the presence 

of Hezbollah there as well. I, myself, have cosponsored legislation 

to address that particular problem. 
52 

But, Mr. Abrams, many of our allies have expressed concern of 

your appointment to deal with this problem. Some have characterized it as being perhaps like appointing Exxon to lead a discussion 

on the Green New Deal or maybe even appointing MBS to lead a 

discussion on fairness in journalism and accessibility to journalism. 

Do you feel that your past actions in Iran-Contra have permanently impaired your ability to fairly and transparently deal in the 

region, since we all know the outcome of what happened then? Do 

you feel that that is a major problem, baggage that you bring to 

the table? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I do not, and now I have been doing this job for two 

whole weeks. And I can tell you that Members of Congress have 

raised it. No Latin American of any nationality with whom I have 

dealt has raised it. And we have had lots and lots of discussions 

about how we are going to promote democracy in Venezuela. 

I guess I should say, since I have been attacked now three times, 

in my own defense, if you look at the Reagan record of 8 years, 

when we came in, there were military dictatorships all over Latin 

America. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Mr. Abrams, that is not an attack. That is a fact 

of history. 

Mr. ABRAMS. And when we left in country after country after 

country there had been transitions that we supported. Chile is a 

very good example. So, I think it is actually a record of promoting 

democracy, and I think a lot of Latin Americans know the—— 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Respectfully, I differ with you. I think it is a fact 

of history. We should not dig our heads in the sand and make believe that this never happened because it did. And you were at the 

helm of that and you—— 

Mr. ABRAMS. I was at the helm of promoting democracy in Latin 

America. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Well, you may want to characterize it that way, 

but I do not. I think you were involved in the Iran-Contra deal, and 

I think that permanently damages you to be a fair and impartial 

arbiter in a conflict that is leading to a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented levels in Venezuela. 

So, I want to get to my next question, which is, do you believe 

that there could be a peaceful, diplomatic solution to this crisis? 

And if so, has our Nation engaged the Vatican, the United Nation, 

Mexico, and Uruguay in their efforts to resolve this peacefully 

without any bloodshed? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, we have had discussions with the Vatican, 

with the U.N. I spoke to the Secretary General actually yesterday 

morning. Mexico and Uruguay are somewhat different because they 

have a different approach, which is the kind of dialog with Maduro 

that has been tried and failed in past years, tried by the Venezuelans who are pushing for democracy in their own country. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. And the opposition has in some instances asked 

to be armed. Do you feel that that is a viable for protecting themselves or do you feel that arming the opposition will lead to a civil 

war? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think it is a terrible idea. I think that the question of security for the opposition—well, it is not really the opposition. It is now, in our view, the legitimate government of Venezuela 
53 

and the National Assembly. Security for them, security for individuals like Interim President Guaido is a real issue, but the solution 

to it is replacing this government with the interim government, 

and then, allowing the people of Venezuela to choose their government. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Finally, do you feel that there are currently any 

individuals in the armed forces or in government that are applicable to receive Magnitsky Act levels of sanctions and options? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Yes, I think there are. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. And are you willing to share those—— 

Mr. ABRAMS. Not in a public hearing. I think we need to go over 

the names again. But, certainly, some of the people rise to that 

level of human rights violations. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Mr. Chairman, let me just, again, reiterate my 

concern for a potential human crisis emerging in the region, potential civil war, famine, if we do not go the diplomatic way and abandon our old, bad ways of Iran-Contra. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. GUEST. 

Mr. GUEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Abrams, in your written testimony you talk about that Cuba 

has provided direct support for Maduro repressive tactics, including 

the recent deployment of its most feared units, the Black Wasp. 

Can you kind of expand upon this military unit and what they are 

doing in the country of Venezuela? 

Mr. ABRAMS. We have seen Maduro reinforcing his Cuban guard 

corps. Again, it is a lack of confidence in his own people or it is 

a knowledge that his own people want him gone. So, there were 

Cubans. There are Cubans surrounding him. That is the palace 

guard. This special forces unit has now come in. This is in the last 

few weeks. And I think it is really quite striking that he does not 

trust the Venezuelan people or the Venezuelan armed forces. 

Mr. GUEST. And so, the Cubans have sent special forces units 

into Venezuela to prop up this regime? 

Mr. ABRAMS. That is correct. 

Mr. GUEST. And then, since January the 23d, we have seen a 

host of nations join us in our ability to affect change in the Nation 

of Venezuela. Actually, one of the nations that has yet to take a 

position one way or the other—and you touched on it very briefly 

a moment ago—was Mexico. And again, can you kind of talk about 

why they have failed to take a position one way or another on this 

particular important matter? 

Mr. ABRAMS. They are quite isolated in Latin America, you are 

right, when you look at the other larger democracies. I think I 

would say it is just the ideology. It is an old view on the part of 

their President that this is all about American interventionism. 

And when we say, well, it isn’t; you have got 51 countries, including most of the major democracies in Latin America, plus Canada, 

saying this, this isn’t about the United States and Venezuela. We 

have not been able to persuade them, at least to this point. 

Mr. GUEST. And you also talk about in your written testimony 

that Maduro and his cronies are conspiring to prevent lifesaving 

assistance from reaching the people of Venezuela. Can you expand 

on that just briefly as well? 
54 

Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. Well, perhaps Mr. Olive could do so as well. 

But what we are seeing visibly in the blocking of that bridge is a 

policy on the part of the Maduro regime. And Maduro himself has 

said, ‘‘We do not need humanitarian assistance.’’ He is completely 

blind to the suffering of the Venezuelan people. 

Mr. GUEST. And you also talked about in your written testimony 

that they have also canceled gasoline shipments, so that you would 

be unable to transport humanitarian aid. Is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Do you want to comment on that? I have not seen 

that exact report. 

Mr. OLIVE. We have not seen it as a major concern now. If we 

have full access to being able to get things into the country, we will 

overcome that, whatever fuel shortages there may be. 

Mr. GUEST. And so, we currently have, for lack of a better term, 

a dictator who is refusing humanitarian aid and a country of great 

crisis, and has also aligned himself with the Cuban government, to 

the point that there are Cuban special forces currently in Venezuela at this time. Is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAMS. That is correct. 

Mr. GUEST. I would yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. 

Ms. OMAR. 

Ms. OMAR. Thank you, Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here and thank you for your testimoneys. 

Mr. Abrams, in 1991, you pleaded guilty to two counts of withholding information from Congress regarding your involvement in 

the Iran-Contra affair, for which you were later pardoned by President George H.W. Bush. I fail to understand why members of this 

committee or the American people should find any testimony that 

you give today to be truthful. 

Mr. ABRAMS. If I could respond to that—— 

Ms. OMAR. It was not a question. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I—— 

Ms. OMAR. That was not, that was not a question. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I would—— 

Ms. OMAR. I reserve the right to my time. 

Mr. ABRAMS. It is not right—— 

Ms. OMAR. That was not a question. 

Mr. ABRAMS [continuing]. That members of this committee can 

attack a witness who is not permitted—— 

Ms. OMAR. On February 8th—— 

Mr. ABRAMS [continuing]. To reply. 

Ms. OMAR. That was not a question. Thank you for your participation. 

On February 8th, 1982, you testified before the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee about U.S. policy in El Salvador. In that 

hearing, you dismissed as communist propaganda report about the 

massacre of El Mozote in which more than 800 civilians, including 

children as young as 2 years old, were brutally murdered by U.S.- 

trained troops. During that massacre, some of those troops bragged 

about raping a 12-year-old girl before they killed them, girls before 

they killed them. You later said that the U.S. policy in El Salvador 

was a ‘‘fabulous achievement’’. Yes or no, do you still think so? 
55 

Mr. ABRAMS. From the day that President Duarte was elected in 

a free election to this day, El Salvador has been a democracy. That 

is a fabulous achievement. 

Ms. OMAR. Yes or no, do you think that massacre was a ‘‘fabulous achievement’’ that happened under our watch? 

Mr. ABRAMS. That is a ridiculous question, and I—— 

Ms. OMAR. Yes or no? 

Mr. ABRAMS. No. 

Ms. OMAR. I will—— 

Mr. ABRAMS. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. OMAR [continuing]. Take that as a yes. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I am not going to respond to that kind of personal 

attack, which is not a question. 

Ms. OMAR. Yes or no, would you support an armed faction within 

Venezuela that engages in war crimes, crimes against humanity, or 

genocide, if you believed they were serving U.S. interest, as you did 

in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I am not going to respond to that question. I am 

sorry. I do not think this entire line of questioning is meant to be 

real questions. And so, I will not reply. 

Ms. OMAR. Whether under your watch a genocide will take place 

and you will look the other way because American interests were 

being upheld is a fair question, because the American people want 

to know that anytime we engage a country that we think about 

what our actions could be and how we believe our values are being 

furthered. That is my question. Will you make sure that human 

rights are not violated and that we uphold international and 

human rights? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I suppose there is a question in there, and the answer is that the entire thrust of American policy in Venezuela is 

to support the Venezuelan people’s effort to restore democracy to 

their country. That is our policy. 

Ms. OMAR. I do not think anybody disputes that. The question I 

had for you is that, does the interest of the United States include 

protecting human rights and include protecting people against 

genocide? 

Mr. ABRAMS. That is always the position of the United States. 

Ms. OMAR. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Watkins. 

Mr. WATKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My questions are for Mr. Abrams. Sir, it is well known that 

members of Maduro regime have ties to drug trafficking. Now we 

are hearing allegations of ties with terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah and FARC. Can you walk me through the nature of 

those ties and what kind of concern that poses to the U.S. security? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, some of this I guess we should do in a closed 

hearing. But the group that stands out most is the ELN, the Colombian terrorist group that is harbored in Venezuela. They have 

not just escaped into Venezuela. I mean, that is government policy 

on the part of the Maduro regime. They also have, obviously, extremely close ties to Cuba. There is a Hezbollah presence all over 

Latin America, and I believe they are engaged in fundraising in 

Venezuela, and the regime does nothing to prevent that. So, these 
56 

are security concerns that are going to exist as along as this group 

is in power. 

Mr. WATKINS. Thank you. 

Is there concerns about the safety and security of U.S. diplomats 

and contractors, and do you know of any steps being taken to assure that they are safe? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, there are a lot of Americans in Venezuela. 

The number of official Americans is small, but there are a lot of 

American citizens who live there. Unfortunately, we have very limited ability to protect them. We do supply some consular services. 

Every couple of days, we may give out an emergency passport to 

an American. But the staff size is limited and our ability to protect 

people is limited. And so, we rely on the regime, actually, which 

controls the guns to make sure that no harm comes to Americans. 

And we have made it clear that that is their responsibility under 

international law. 

Mr. WATKINS. Thank you, Mr. Abrams. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

Mr. LEVIN. 

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to the witnesses for coming today. 

First, I would like to followup on the chairman’s questions about 

temporary protected status, where we began. Mr. Abrams, do you 

think it is fair to call the humanitarian situation in Venezuela dire, 

given the Venezuelan people’s need for basics like nutritious food 

and medical supplies? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. 

Mr. LEVIN. I understand, as you mentioned to him, that you are 

discussing designating Venezuela for TPS with others in the administration, given that dire situation. While you were Assistant 

Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs a 

generation ago, we might say—— 

Mr. ABRAMS. A generation or two. 

Mr. LEVIN [continuing]. You testified at a hearing before the 

House Judiciary Committee that concerned TPS for Salvadorans. 

At that hearing, you testified, and I quote, ‘‘Some groups argue 

that illegal aliens who are sent back to El Salvador there meet persecution and often death. Obviously, we do not believe these claims, 

or we would not deport these people.’’ End quote. Is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I take your word for it. You know, it has been a 

while. 

Mr. LEVIN. Yes, I understand. That was at a hearing before the 

Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of 

the committee, on a bill numbered H.R. 4477, Temporary Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens., on April 12th, 1984. 

And is it correct that, when you testified at that hearing in 1984, 

death squads controlled by the Salvadoran government, which had 

the backing of the United States, were committing horrific acts of 

violence against the Salvadoran people? I do not have a lot of time. 

Were they or were they not, sir? 

Mr. ABRAMS. The death squads were certainly active, although I 

cannot remember the exact years, but the amount of death squad 
57 

activity came down under President Duarte and under American 

pressure. 

Mr. LEVIN. Well, just to remind you, as The Atlantic pointed out, 

more than 75,000 Salvadorans were killed in the fighting, most of 

them—most of them—victims of the military and its death squads, 

more than 75,000. ‘‘Peasants were shot en masse, often while trying to flee. Students and union leaders had their thumbs tied behind their backs before being shot in the head, their bodies left on 

roadsides as a warning to others.’’ 

I would just ask, sir, you, of all people, to use your offices to try 

to help promote TPS for Venezuelans in need. 

Mr. Olive, let me ask you a question. I am the son of an official 

of USAID. So, I also appreciate the work of you and your colleagues 

there. 

It is my understanding that sanctions on the Venezuelan Stateowned oil company that the Trump administration imposed last 

month are meant to cutoff Maduro’s cashflow and force his exit. 

What I want to know is, what is the administration’s plan if this 

approach does not work? The Wall Street Journal reported last 

month, quote, ‘‘If the standoff endures, the U.S. move could prove 

devastating for Venezuela’s economy which relies on oil exports for 

95 percent of its hard currency income.’’ End quote. Which obviously isn’t a great thing. 

But my question to you is, what does the Trump administration 

plan to do if these new sanctions squeeze the Venezuelan economy, 

but Maduro remains? Have you examined what will happen to the 

Venezuelan people? 

Mr. OLIVE. First, Congressman, thank you for your kind words 

to my colleagues. I will take that back to them. Thank you. 

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. OLIVE. Most of this, I would defer to the State Department. 

But, from a humanitarian assistance point of view, we do see many 

of these resources that were coming into the Maduro regime were 

not getting to the people, and the ones that were were used as a 

tool, such as their CLAP program, et cetera. We do expect the situation to get worse, and that is why we are prepositioning goods 

right now on the border, ready to go into Venezuela. And we are 

prepared to do much more when we have access where we can securely and efficiently monitor its distribution, and that is what we 

are prepared to do. 

For the remainder of your question, I will defer to the State Department. 

Mr. ABRAMS. No, I agree with that. 

Mr. LEVIN. All right. Well, we are very concerned about deepening the crisis that we are trying to prevent. 

Let me, finally, Mr. Chairman, just end by I noted, and I really 

appreciate the bipartisanship here, a number of our friends on the 

other side of the aisle have called Venezuela ‘‘the most violent 

country in the world’’ and ‘‘the most dangerous country in the 

world,’’ things like this. I do not understand that, if you look at Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Mali, Somalia, Yemen, and South Sudan. 

I just hope that we stick to the facts here. The situation is bad 

enough as it is. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 
58 

Mr. SIRES [presiding]. Thank you. 

We now recognize Steve Chabot from Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Olive, what is the State of press freedoms in Venezuela, and 

how are we countering the regime’s propaganda and ensuring that 

Venezuelans are aware of the support that the U.S. and the international community are providing? 

Mr. OLIVE. Thank you, Congressman, for your question. 

We are providing supporting for independent media. We are now 

up to, with the approval of the congressional notification that has 

now expired, and we can now use our 2018 funding. We have spent 

about approximately $40 million, or that are available for—one of 

the areas is independent media. 

The groups that we are working with, Freedom House, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, 

NDI, and others, are working to preserve an independent media 

within the country. 

They are very challenged. They have been threatened, and some 

have been arrested, et cetera. Some of their operations have been 

disruptive. 

Administrator Green, on two occasions, one in Washington in December, one in July in Miami, met with Venezuelan diasporas who 

raised this issue. And he said, we are a lifeline to many of those 

independent journalists and media, and we will do everything we 

can to remain so. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

And my final question would be for Mr. Abrams as well as Ms. 

Oudkirk. What role do energy and oil continue to play in the 

Maduro regime’s ability to maintain the loyalty of countries in the 

region? And, Mr. Abrams, I will begin with you. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think it is very important. I mean, the only real 

asset that they have got is money that comes from oil sales and the 

oil itself. We have seen that most in the Caribbean, where they 

have been involved in an awful lot of activities that have produced 

a political result. And you can see that, actually, in some of the 

OAS votes, where, unfortunately, some democracies in the Caribbean have not joined this group of 51 countries around the world 

in supporting Interim President . 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Oudkirk, would you like to add anything to that? 

Ms. OUDKIRK. Yes, Congressman Chabot. The Petrocaribe program, which is, I think, what you are referring to, has largely 

wound down, with the exception of sort of concessional oil sales or 

oil deliveries to Cuba. 

However, as Special Representative Abrams noted, there are a 

variety of countries in the Caribbean and Central America who 

have a large sort of debt overhang with PDVSA. And this is really 

a problem. The coercive use of energy sales, whether we see it here 

in the Western Hemisphere or farther afield, is a real challenge. 

And I think the key here is that, as the sanctions bite on PDVSA, 

their ability to use, to take the oil proceeds themselves and use 

them directly as money is going to be largely cutoff. 

The United States used to, prior to the sanctions, import about 

40 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports, but we paid about 75 percent 
59 

of oil receipts because so much of the other oil went for debt-foroil swaps with China and Russia. So, cutting off that financial flow 

is really a key focus of the sanctions. And then, separately, really 

working with these vulnerable economies and jurisdictions close to 

Venezuela to figure out a way for them to extricate themselves 

from a dependence3 on PDVSA is a crucial piece of work that we 

have in front of us going forward. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. In the interest of members 

making votes, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. 

We will now recess. Votes have been called. I will urge all the 

members to please come back after the three votes that we have. 

Thank you very much. Just be a little patient. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SIRES. The hearing will come to order. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. There we go. My voice carries, but that is better. 

Let me just start out by saying that, in my view, what we are 

dealing with here is an anti-democratic coup, a slow-motion antidemocratic coup that was carried out by the Maduro regime, a regime that packed its supreme court with loyalists, that tried to 

render null and void a Congress that was elected by the vast majority of the Venezuelan people, that imprisoned and tortured Venezuelan citizens who exercised their human right to protest against 

these outrages, that prevented the opposition from fielding a candidate against the leader of this regime. 

This is not a left or right issue. This is not an issue that should 

divide us on ideological grounds. If any of us in the United States, 

whether we are liberal or conservative, progressive, whatever, experienced that in our country, we would be on the streets screaming about it, just as the vast majority of Venezuelans are doing. 

And because of that, I am a critic of much of the administration’s 

foreign policy, as you guys will not be surprised to hear, but I feel 

like in the case of Venezuela this is a policy that, broadly speaking, 

I can support, and I certainly pray for its success, given what has 

been happening to the Venezuelan people. 

I know a number of the issues have been raised already. But, 

with that foundation, I do want to ask Mr. Abrams a handful of 

questions that relate Venezuela to our overall approach to the 

world. 

I think you know, Mr. Abrams, based on your work over many, 

many years, that the one argument that dictators like Maduro and 

Putin and others throw at us all of the time, when we try to do 

the right thing, as I think we are trying to do here, is that we are 

inconsistent, that we aim our democracy and human rights policies 

at our adversaries, or at our ideological adversaries, not our 

friends. Sometimes that is an unfair charge; sometimes it is more 

fair. But I wonder if, as a general matter, you would agree that we 

need to strive, where possible, for moral consistency. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I do agree. I think it is impossible to achieve in the 

end for any administration because—— 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Try for. 
60 

Mr. ABRAMS [continuing]. We are balancing so many American 

interests. But it is something we are striving for. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Would you, then, agree, as a general matter— 

and I know, I am sensitive to the fact you are here representing 

the administration’s Venezuela policies; you cannot necessarily 

speak for everything else—but, as a general matter, would you 

agree that, if we are going to be condemning a president who is 

trying to attain absolute power for life, contrary to constitutions 

and the democratic process in Venezuela, that we should do so in 

other countries, such as Egypt, when similar situations arise, as a 

general matter? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I really should not respond beyond the question of 

Venezuela. It is really not my remit at the Department and not 

while I am up here. You and I go back a ways, and you know that 

my view is, generally, that the United States should be supporting 

the expansion of democracy all over the world. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you. 

Would you agree that, if we are going to be condemning socialism 

and effects on the people of Venezuela, that we should be condemning even more strongly communism in North Korea, rather 

than talking about how the economy of that country might be 

about to explode in a positive direction? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think the human rights record in North Korea is 

pretty well known, but I really in this hearing cannot go very far 

down that path. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. OK. 

Mr. ABRAMS. It is just not my responsibility. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. And would you agree that, if we are going to 

be asking countries to help the millions of Venezuelans who are 

fleeing their country, to take in refugees for the time period necessary to give them protection, that we, as a country, should also 

maintain our tradition of keeping our doors open to refugees fleeing 

persecution around the world, as a general matter? 

Mr. ABRAMS. As a general matter, yes. And Venezuelans who feel 

that they would be in danger by going home should apply for, and 

are eligible for, asylum here. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you. Again, I would note that the refugee numbers have made it difficult to meet the demand from Venezuelans and from people fleeing repression and war all over the 

world. 

Thank you so much, Mr. Abrams. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

Congressman ROONEY. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to, first, thank Secretary Abrams for coming here 

and speaking so candidly and clearly, and bringing the great depth 

and length of his experience in Central America and South America to bear on our problems that we face together. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you. 

Mr. ROONEY. The question I have is one that apparently was not 

asked earlier. It is about the political transition and Maduro’s 

threatening to hold these early elections, and how big a threat 

would they be to the legitimate National Assembly’s continuing efforts to institutionalize itself? 
61 

Mr. ABRAMS. They would be a threat. I think as we saw last year 

in the May 2018 elections, any elections that Maduro funds are not 

going to be credible elections. There needs to be a free and fair 

Presidential election in Venezuela, but it is not going to happen if 

it is under Maduro’s control. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you. 

Mr. SIRES. I have a question. The continued outflow of Venezuelans outside of Venezuela, how much of a destabilizing factor 

would that have in the region if it continues at the rate that it is 

going now, which is 5,000 a day going into—— 

Mr. ABRAMS. About 5,000 a day net leaving. It will place an even 

larger burden on the countries that are already feeling this, and 

Colombia, of course, most of all. Peru has about 700,000 Venezuelans, I believe. So, the impact on their health system, for example, is very great now, and you are increasing this, potentially, 

by about 60 percent. 

Perhaps Mr. Olive would add a comment? 

Mr. OLIVE. Yes, we are very concerned about that. Administrator 

Green is meeting with President Duque of Colombia tomorrow, and 

that is going to be one of the topics discussed. The Colombians 

have expressed a great interest that their medical systems, schools, 

and social services are being overwhelmed not just in the border 

area, but throughout the country, and are concerned that, if they 

cannot continue to provide those services to their citizens, that it 

will disable or destabilize the country potentially. And that goes for 

Caribbean countries like Trinidad and Tobago as well. 

Mr. SIRES. In a meeting earlier that we had with the President 

Duque, he said that they already have 400 cases of measles that 

they have been able to track. 

At this time, I would like to recognize Congresswoman MucarselPowell from Florida. 

Ms. MUCARSEL-POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

so much for allowing me to participate in this hearing today. 

And, Mr. Elliott Abrams, Sandra Oudkirk, thank you for being 

here today, and thank you, sir, for coming. 

This is an extremely important issue for me personally. I am the 

first South American Representative ever to be elected to Congress. 

So, I bring that perspective to these discussions. I have visited that 

country many times. I have very close friends that have had to flee 

this oppressive narco-regime, which is what we all call it. And I 

have some family members that are still in Venezuela. 

So, it is something that I have been very outspoken about for 

many years, and this has been escalating for the past 15 years. 

And I am glad that we are now finally having these conversations. 

I just hope that this is the beginning of several others that we will 

have, so that we can do everything in our power from the United 

States to help the people of Venezuela. 

So, my first question, one of the things that I have been focusing 

on is humanitarian aid. So, that is why I have been working on 

this humanitarian aid bill. 

And I wanted to ask Mr. Abrams, how much has actually been 

delivered in the humanitarian aid that we have seen, that you 

started with with the first 20 million? Do you have details on how 

much has actually already been delivered? 
62 

Mr. ABRAMS. I am going, if you will permit, turn to Mr. Olive. 

Mr. OLIVE. Of that new 20 million that Secretary Pompeo announced, we have used that money to preposition goods currently 

in Colombia, and we are also looking at other neighboring countries 

and other parts of the Colombia. That is how we have spent it so 

far. 

In terms of getting goods in the country, we have not been able 

to do much. With the money that comes to our Latin American and 

Caribbean bureau, which was $9 million in 2017 and will be $15 

million with 2018 funds, we have built the capacity of civil society 

organizations and tested their ability to distribute humanitarian 

assistance. But it is very small. The security of those partners is 

very much of a concern of ours. So, we have had to keep it more 

low profile at this point. 

And then, the only other assistance that is getting into the country is what Administrator Green and I saw when we were there in 

Cucuta in July, and that is the Venezuelans crossing over the border, getting the medical services or vaccines or food, or things that 

they need in Colombia, and then, going back in. 

But that is all we have been able to do so far. We really need 

Maduro to allow this assistance that we are building up on the border into the country and distributed correctly. 

Ms. MUCARSEL-POWELL. And are we working very closely with 

the United Nations and some of their members in providing this 

aid? 

Mr. OLIVE. Yes, we are in constant conversation with them. At 

the moment, they have some restrictions as well, which I think 

Special Representative Abrams can go into. But we are having 

those discussions and being transparent on what our plans are. 

Ms. MUCARSEL-POWELL. OK. Great. 

I also wanted to ask you, Mr. Abrams, Cuba, as we have discussed before, has clearly been a major contributor to Maduro’s illegitimate regime. And they have been providing support on a number of fronts, including military personnel. I would like to get a little bit more detail on what you can tell us about the Cuban officers 

that are on the ground in Venezuela at this time. And also, why 

have not we sanctioned these people who are helping prop up 

Maduro and his illegitimate regime? 

Mr. ABRAMS. There are thousands of Cuban, let’s call them, security and intelligence people on the ground. They form a kind of palace guard around Maduro. As I noted before, what it suggest is he 

does not trust Venezuelans. He does not trust the Venezuelan military. So, he brings in Cubans to surround him and provide security. They also spy on members of the Venezuelan military. They 

also police the Venezuelan military. So, that is what he uses them 

for, because he sees, I think, his own support among all Venezuelans, including in the military, crumbling. 

Now sanctioning them, you know, many of them are, if you will, 

just security officers in the ranks whose identities we do not even 

know. We have sanctioned high-level people in the Maduro regime. 

We continue to do that, civilian and military. And we will continue 

to do that. We have announced some expansions this week for the 

constituent assembly and the supreme court, the TSJ. 
63 

Ms. MUCARSEL-POWELL. OK. I am running out of time, but I 

have one very important question. One of the discussions that I 

have heard from some colleagues here on the floor is that they are 

concerned that the sanctions that we are imposing to PDVSA are 

going to hurt the Venezuelan people. And I want to make it very 

clear that I am in full support of these sanctions to PDVSA. 

But I wanted to ask, what is the administration’s plan, should 

these sanctions begin to affect and, indeed, exacerbate the humanitarian crisis for the people that are living right now in the country? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Let me just say, this horrendous humanitarian situation in Venezuela that we have all been talking about existed 2 

weeks ago, before there were sanctions on PDVSA. So, they have 

not used those billions of dollars in income to help the Venezuelan 

people to buy food, to buy medicine for them. In that sense, we 

know that this funding stream that we have tried to cutoff does not 

go to the Venezuelan people. 

Mr. OLIVE. And, Congresswoman, that is exactly why, when Interim President Guaido called Administrator Green, even though 

he realized that he may need future assistance on electoral processes, civil society, and independent journalism, et cetera, he said 

the No. 1 need is humanitarian assistance, and he asked that it be 

prepositioned and ready to get in the country. We do not have that 

access yet, but we work daily on trying to get that. 

Ms. MUCARSEL-POWELL. Thank you so much. 

Mr. SIRES. Congresswoman Shalala. 

Ms. MUCARSEL-POWELL. That is why my focus has been the humanitarian aid. 

Thank you, Chairman, for allowing me to participate. 

Ms. SHALALA. Thank you, Chairman, for allowing me to participate as well. 

And I want to add that I absolutely support the other members 

of the south Florida delegation. It is a huge issue for us in south 

Florida. And I hope you hear in our voices bipartisan support for 

most of what you are doing. 

I have a quick question to followup on the humanitarian aid. And 

that is, aid to Colombia, because so many of the Venezuelans have 

gone over the border, and possibly to Brazil, but I think Colombia, 

in particular, is feeling the need for humanitarian aid. 

Mr. OLIVE. Yes, the U.S. Government has provided $140 million 

for neighboring countries and, in particular, Colombia, which $97 

million of that USAID has administered. Administrator Green is 

meeting tomorrow with President Duque of Colombia to talk precisely of recalibrating where we are, what support have we been 

able to provide, what more is needed, and have those kinds of discussions, because those impacts have been severe on neighboring 

countries, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Equador, and Trinidad, Tobago. 

Ms. SHALALA. Thank you very much. 

And, Mr. Abrams, I am going to keep asking you the same question about TPS. And I want to reinforce what my colleagues—for 

those of us, in your testimony you talked about how more than 10 

percent of Venezuela’s population has been forced to flee their 

country. As you know, many of them have come to south Florida, 

to Debbie’s district, to my district, to Mario Diaz-Balart’s district, 
64 

to Debbie Wasserman Schultz’s district. And we are very concerned. 

And I want to reiterate to the administration, we have introduced bipartisan legislation to extend TPS to Venezuelans. I am 

well aware that the administration is trying to take away TPS designations for so many people in my community, and I want to be 

supportive of them, but also to emphasize adding TPS for Venezuelans. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, thank you. This is, obviously, a very important question. It is one I have discussed with Secretary Pompeo, 

and I will take it back and let him know of your views. 

Ms. SHALALA. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SIRES. Congresswoman Spanberger. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you very much. 

Thank you to our witnesses who are here today. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity today for asking questions. 

My colleagues have highlighted our collective and serious concerns about the use of military force, potential use of U.S. military 

force in Venezuela. And even in hearing caution, we have heard 

Admiral Stavridis talk about limited and well-intentioned intervention for humanitarian purposes, saying that a military response 

would ‘‘foment rage in the region and internationally’’. I am in complete agreement that a military solution, particularly on the part 

of the U.S., is not answer. 

But I do have a couple of questions about what we might anticipate from other countries. To your knowledge, are there any other 

countries who are contemplating direct involvement, such as Russia or China? We have seen Russia come to the aid of autocratic 

leaders elsewhere in the world. Do you see any indication that 

Moscow may consider something similar, deployment of advisors or 

military forces to Venezuela? And I will open that up to all of the 

witnesses. 

Mr. ABRAMS. We did see some Russian bombers, if I recall correctly, fly to Venezuela, which was a Russian display of—I do not 

know—support for the regime, I guess you would say. But they 

have not put armed personnel on the ground the way they have in 

some other countries. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. OK. And Russia has been known to at times 

use hybrid warfare and transnational criminal organizations to further some of their objectives and obscure their direct role in doing 

so. Do we have any indication that this may be happening in Venezuela or any concerns that it may happen on the horizon? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, it is always a concern, and they have an investment in this regime literally in financial terms, but, obviously, 

in political terms as well. And they have been defending it. They 

made a very strident appearance in the Security Council, for example, on January 25th, when Secretary Pompeo was there, a lot of 

cold war rhetoric really. But it is a very interesting question as to 

how far they would actually go. And we ask ourselves that question 

all the time. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Any additional? OK. And then, another question on this same line of questioning. To your knowledge, what is 
65 

the role of the colectivos or the armed civilian militias? Are they 

receiving, to your knowledge, any external support, training, or 

weapons? And if so, do you know where that is coming from or how 

the U.S. and our partners in the region might be able to prevent 

such support and use of such support? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I am not aware of foreign support for the colectivos. 

It is clear that they work for the regime, and the regime in some 

cases has armed them. And they are kind of an auxiliary to the 

normal, legitimate, if you will, security forces. But the regime has 

the means, unfortunately, to organize and arm them. I have not 

seen evidence of a relationship between the colectivos and foreign 

powers. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. And for Ms. Oudkirk I have a question about 

the sanctions and potential impact of the sanctions. We are well 

aware of the fact that for many years Venezuela has been able to 

invest heavily and in some cases buy the loyalty of Caribbean 

States through the sale of its crude oil. And some of these 

Petrocaribe States have supported actions of the Organization of 

American States to put diplomatic pressure on Maduro, which has 

now led to him threatening economic retaliation. 

With concerns of the potential for destabilization or humanitarian crises in other parts of Latin America, my question is, do 

you expect any economic reverberations from Venezuela? And what 

is the administration doing to reduce the risk of economic damage 

potentially to these countries, many of whom, like Jamaica, for example, have also borrowed heavily from Venezuela in the past? 

Ms. OUDKIRK. Thank you very much for your question, Congresswoman Spanberger. 

So, one of the things that we did to mitigate ancillary consequences on neighboring jurisdictions was OFAC issued General 

License 11, which gave a 60-day period to wind down U.S. person 

involvement in third-country interactions with PDVSA. So, this 

was designed to sort of smooth out the removal from the transaction chain of U.S. persons, so both individuals and companies. 

And we are looking on a sort of country-by-country, jurisdiction-byjurisdiction basis at the involvement of PDVSA in these various basically small countries and islands, and figuring out what it is that 

needs to be done during that 60-day period to ensure that the focus 

of this sanction’s impact remains on PDVSA, not on these small 

markets. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. OK. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here and for your patience, and the members who attended today’s hearing. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
66 

APPENDIX 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Eliot L. Engel (D-NY), Chairman 

Febmary 13, 2019 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the 

Committee website at h1tps://f(>rcignaffairs.house.gov/): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, Febmary 13,2019 

ll:OOa.m. 

Venezuela at a Crossroads 

The Honorable Elliott Abrams 

U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela 

U.S. Department of State 

Ms. Sandra Oudkirk 

Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of Energy Resources 

U.S. Department of State 

Mr. Steve Olive 

Acting Assistant Administrator 

Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean 

U.S. Agency for Intemational Development 

By Direction of the Chairman 
67 

COMMITTE)]: ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

Day Wed11esday Date February 13, 2019 Room 2172 

Starting Time 11:09 a.m. Ending Time 2:35p.m. 

Recesses ' !l:28 to l;1lj L_to __ ) L_to ___} L_to __ ) L_to __ ) L_to ___) 

Chairman Eliot L Engel 

Rep. Albio Sires 

Check all of the following that apply: 

Open Session 0 Executive (closed) Session D Televised 0 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Venezuela at a Crossroads 

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See attached. 

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Rep. Do1111a Sha/a/a 

Rep. Debbie Mucarsel-Powell 

Electronically Record!:!!jtaped) 0 

Stenographic Record L{J 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? YcsEJ NoD 

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS f'OR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.) 

IFR-E11gel 

JFR-Smith 

QFR-E11gel 

QFR-Smith 

QFR • Cicilli11e 

QFR • Se11senbrmmer 

QFR- Guest 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

~ME ADJOURNED 2:35p.m. ~ t -- Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 
68 

PRJ£SENT 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

r----4- X 

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FULL COMMIITEE HEARING 

MEMBER PRESENT MEMBER 

Eliot L. Engel, NY X Michael T. McCaul, TX 

Brad Shennan, CA X Christopher H. Smith, NJ 

Gregory W. Meeks, NY X Steve Chabot, OH 

Albio Sires, NJ X Joe Wilson, SC 

Gerald E. Connolly, VA X Scott Perry, PA 

Theodore E. Deutch, !:1::._ ·-·- X Ted Yoho, FL 

Karen Bass, CA Adam Kinzinger, lL --··--·---

William Keating, MA X Lee Zeldin, NY 

·-

David Cicilline, Rl James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr., WI 

Ami Bera, CA X Ann Wagner, MO 

Joaquin Castro, TX Brian J. Mast, FL 

Dina Titus, NV X Francis Rooney. FL 

Adriano Espaillat, NY Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA 

Ted Lieu, CA X John Curtis, UT 

Susan Wild, PA Ken Buck, CO 

Dean Phillips, MN X Ron Wright, TX 

l!han Omar, MN X Guy Reschenthaler, PA 

Colin Allred, TX X Tim Burchett, TN 

Andy Levin, Ml X Greg Pence, IN 

Abigail Span berger, VA X Steve Watkins, KS 

Chrissy Houlahan, PA X Michael Guest, MS 

Tom Malinowski, NJ 

David Trone, MD 

Jim Costa, CA 

Juan Vargas, CA 

Vicente Gonzalez, TX 

Debbie Mucarsel-Powell, FL 

Donna Shalala, FL 
69 

AMNESTY J( 

INTERNATIONAL ~ 

Rep. Eliot Engel 

Chair 

Rep. Michael McCaul 

Ranking Member 

Febmary 12, 2019 

House Foreign Affairs Committee House Foreign Affairs Committee 

RE: Amnesty International Statement for "Venezuela at a Crossroads" Hearing 

Dear Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and Members of the Committee: 

On behalf of Amnesty Intemational 1 and our more than two million members and 

supporters in the United States, we hereby submit this statement for the record. 

Amnesty International is an international human rights organization with national and 

regional offices in more than 70 countries, including in the U.S. and in Venezuela. Our 

organization has been monitoring the situation in Venezuela for many years and wishes 

to share its grave concerns with the Committee regarding the mass violations of human 

rights in the country, as well as recommendations to improve the the dire situation and 

alleviate the tremendous human suffering taking place there. 

I. The Venezuelan Government Has Engaged in Brutal Crackdowns on 

Political Dissent. 

The institutional crisis in Venezuela- fueled by deep political polarization and marked 

social deterioration in the country- has had a devastating impact on human rights. In 

2017, Venezuela's highest judicial authority, the Supreme Court of Justice, took on the 

powers of the National Assembly (which was, and continues to be, led by the 

opposition). This led to a wave of protests between April and July 2017 which were 

violently repressed by the government of Nicolas Maduro. Between April and July 

20 I 7, more than 120 people were killed and around 1, 958 injured in conjunction with 

the protests; an additional 5,000 people were detained. 2 

1 Amnesty International was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977. 

2 Amnesty International, "Q&A on the Human Rights Crisis in Venezuela," 7 Feb. 2019, 

https://\V\VW .amnestv. org/cn /documents/ amr5 3/9809/20 19 /en(. 

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAl USA 1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE SE. 5TH FLOOR I WASHINGTON. DC 20003 

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Amnesty International Statep1ent "Venezuela at a Crossroads" 

Page2 

In the wake of these protests and their deadly aftermath, Amnesty International 

published two reports documenting the deteriorating human rights situation in the 

country. The first, Silenced by Force: Politically Motivated Arbitrary Detentions in 

Venezuela, relied on interviews with a panoply of current and former detainees and their 

lawyers to conclude that the government had engaged in the "abusive and arbitrary use 

of criminal law as a mechanism by which to detain and prosecute people who hold 

opinions critical of the Venezuelan government's policies."3 The second, Nights of 

Terror: Attacks and Jllegal Raids on Homes in Venezuela, documented a pattern of 

government security forces engaging in indiscriminate raids of civilian homes, 

frequently demanding to know tbe whereabouts of political dissidents and terrorizing 

individuals into acquiescing to the government's demands4 

Since Amnesty International published these reports, the crackdown on political dissent 

in the country has further deteriorated. Just weeks ago, on January 22 and 23, 2019, 

there were numerous mass protests against the government of Nicolas Maduro, 

particularly in working-class areas where pro-government arn1ed groups (called 

"colectivos") are concentrated. In response to the protests, the Venezuelan state 

responded by deploying armed tactical police, and there have been reports of significant 

human rights violations, which Amnesty International is working to verify. According 

to the Venezuela-based organization Foro Penal, 988 people were arbitrarily detained 

in the last ten days of January 2019, 741 of whom were still held as of February 6, 

2019. On a single day- January 23- there were 770 arbitrary detentions. 5 Several 

Venezuelan civil society organizations have reported that 40 people have died in the 

context of the January 2019 protests.6 

3 Amnesty International, "Silenced by Force: Politically Motivated Arbitrary Detentions in Venezuela," 

2017, available at: https:/lwww.amncstv.~\!J.l\\"ll.l.Qadf!)ocumcntsi AM R5360 1420 17EN( iUS II. PDC 

4 Amnesty International, "Nights of Terror: Attacks and Illegal Raids on Homes in Venezuela," 2017, 

available at: https:i/www.amnesty.on.tfdownload!Documcntsi AM1{5372X520 171oNGLISI !.PDF. 

5 Foro Penal, "Reporte Sohre La Represi6n En Venezuela," Jan. 2019, available at: 

hJ.t.ps:/ /i(.liQJ..lcna l.com/20 19/02i05ireportc,s0bre-la-renrcsion-en-V<:Jlczucla-encro-20 19/. 

6 Vasco Cotovio & Emanuella Grinberg, "At Least 40 Venezuelans Have Been Killed in Recent 

Protests," CNN, 29 Jan. 2019, ht!l's.2\~~'-"-'Y,_\')1.l.L'>)n)!1Jll.2i0 l/29_i;\t11Cric<!;ci_'Sllezycla-protc_ )1;~ 

slsathsiinQ_.,x.htmJ 

AMNESTY !NT£RNAT10NAL USA! 600 PENNSYlVANIA AVENUE SE. 5TH FLOOR! WASHINGTON. DC 20003 

T 202.544.0200 iF 202.546.7142 !WWW.AMNI;:STYUSA.ORG 
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Amnesty Internatiqnal Statement "Venezuela at a Crossroads" 

Page 3 

Particularly disturbing is the widespread arbitrary detention of children: in just a single 

week in January, 77 children under the age of 18 were detained in Venezuela, including 

a 12-year-old girl. 7 Judges are reportedly being pressed to punish children as a means of 

detening anyone in Venezuelan civil society from engaging in protest. 

In addition, the government has routinely violated the right to freedom of expression. 

At least 19 media workers -both Venezuelan and foreign nationals -have been 

arbitrarily detained or expelled from the country. 8 

II. The Government's Failure to Adequately Respond to the Socioeconomic 

Crisis Violates Venezuelans' Human Rights. 

The Venezuelan government's failure to acknowledge the crisis of scarcity, let alone to 

put in place urgent and appropriate responses to guarantee Venezuelans' rights to health 

and food, violates Venezuelans' basic human rights. The lack of access to these basic 

rights has been a central issue in the ongoing political protests in the country as well as 

an impetus for the forced migration of millions of Venezuelans, as documented by 

Amnesty International in its "Emergency Exit" campaign.9 

The skyrocketing rate of inflation - which cunently stands at one million percent and is 

envisioned to increase tenfold by the end of 2019 10 - has left Venezuelans unable to 

afford even basic goods. On top of that, Venezuela is experiencing a severe shortage of 

food products and essential medicines. As a result, Venezuelans are left both starving 

and sick: as of 2018, the country was missing eighty-five percent of essential 

7 Amnesty International, "Tell the Venezuelan Government: Children Must Not Be in Prisons," Feb. 5, 

2019, https:llact.amnestvusa.orglpa!!e!3X052iaction/l '?av~ \V 1902EACPR I &ea~url.icl,~ 176-1056. 

'Amnesty International, "Q&A on the Human Rights Crisis in Venezuela," Feb. 7, 2019, 

https:/ /www.amnesty.org/en/documcntsiamr:,,5 3/9~09/20 19/en.', 

9 Amnesty International, "Venezuela: Unattended Health Rights Crisis Is Forcing Thousands to Flee," 

Mar. 9, 2018, https://www.mnnesty.orgien1latcstinewsi2() I X.'031vcnczuela-unattcnckd-health-rightscri sis-is-to rein g-thousands-to-tleei. 

10 "Venezuela Crisis: How the Political Situation Escalated," BBC NEWS, Jan. 24, 2019, 

https:.i/www.bbc.com/newsiworld-latin-america-36319S77. 

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA 1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE SE. 5TH FLOOR I WASHINGTON, DC 20003 

T 202.544,0200! F 202.546.7142! WWW.AMNESTYUSA ORG 
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Amnesty Jntemational Statement "Venezuela at a Crossroads" 

Page 4 

medicines, 11 and nearly two-thirds of its population had reported involuntary weight 

loss. 12 

The Venezuelan govemment's refusal to act in the face of this severe lack of medicine 

and food violates its citizens' human rights to adequate food and the right to health. The 

right to adequate food requires that food be available, accessible, and acceptable. 13 The 

right to the highest attainable standard of health requires not just timely and appropriate 

health care but also access to the underlying detenninants of health, including safe and 

potable water and adequate sanitation and an adequate supply of safe food and 

nutrition. 14 In failing to acknowledge the crisis of scarcity in the country, let alone take 

appropriate action to urgently secure the rights to food and health for its citizens, the 

Venezuelan govemment is violating these core human rights tenets. The govemment's 

failure to act calls into question its willingness to comply with its obligation to 

guarantee access to these rights for all, without discrimination of any kind. 

In some cases, the grave socioeconomic situation has exacerbated the already 

deleterious violations of political rights in Venezuela, constituting what advocates have 

termed a "double discrimination" against political activists in the country. For example, 

Amnesty Intemationalleamed of the death, just days ago, of a young man named 

Virgilio, who was detained without cause after participating in a political protest. 15 

While in detention, he was presented with rotting food, sometimes filled with worms, 

11 Samantha Raphelson, "Venezuela's Health Care System Ready to Collapse Amidst Economic Crisis," 

NPR NEWS, Feb. I, 2018, hnrs: 1

/www.npr.om'201 X/02/0 I/5X7469305 1

vcDezuclas-health-care-svstemrcady-to-colbpse-nmid-economic-crisis. 

12 Vivian Sequera, "Venezuelans Report Big Weight Losses in 2017 as Hunger Hits," REUTERS, Feb. 21, 

2018, https:/ /www .reuters.com 1

article'us-vcnezucla-foodivenezuelans-rerort-big -weight -I osscs-in-20 I 7-

as-hungcr-hits-idUSKCN I G52ll1\. 

13 Amnesty International, "Human Rights and Human Dignity: A Primer on Economic, Social, and 

Cultural Rights." available at: 

h!!ps://www.amnesty.orgl~lownlomLJ2'2fllillfDJSI30001pol3400 I £Qj4en.pc!L at 42. 

14 !d. at 48. 

15 Vanessa Moreno Losada, "Tras sufrir una hemorragia, muere en Uribanajoven detenido en protestas 

de 2017," EFECTO Cocuvo, Feb. 7, 2019, httr:l/efeetococuyo.cotl)l_;;ucesositra,,;_-sufrir-una-hemornu;i!l:: 

mucre-en-uribana-joven-detenido-en-protestas-dc-20 [7.'. 

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA!600f'ENNSYLVANIAAVENUE SE., 5TH FLOOR! WASHINGTON, DC 20003 

T 202.S44.0200! F 202.546.71421 WWW.AMNESTYUSA.ORG 
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~mnesty International Statement - "Venezuela at a Crossrqads" 

Page 5 

and could not access potable water. He soon developed a fever for which he was denied 

treatment. Though he was eventually evacuated to a hospital in a severely dehydrated 

state, it was too late: Virgilio, just 20 years old, died of a hemorrhage on February 5, 

2019 - a death directly attributable to the combination of his illegitimate detention and 

authorities' refusal to provide him with adequate food, water, and medication while he 

was detained. 

Ill. The United States Government's Response to the Venezuela Crisis Must 

Account for Effects on Venezuelans' Human Rights. 

The United States has taken an active role in responding to the ongoing institutional 

crisis in Venezuela, including the imposition of sanctions and proposed provision of 

humanitarian assistance. Amnesty International takes this opportunity to remind the 

U.S. government of the paramount importance of considering the effect any such 

measures will have on the human rights of Venezuelans. Amnesty International 

provides its views as an impartial organization which docs not take positions in support 

of or opposition to any particular political leader or party. 

Regarding the petroleum sanctions imposed by the United States on January 28, 2019, 

Amnesty International reminds the U.S. government that it must take full account of the 

impact any sanctions will have on the enjoyment of human rights, especially among the 

most vulnerable groups in society. Sanctions should be targeted, with specific 

objectives and a clear timetable, and their effectiveness and humanitarian impact must 

be monitored. 

Regarding any threats of military intervention, a responsible approach to the current 

situation would focus on guaranteeing, without delay, the rights of the Venezuelan 

people, rather than diverting attention towards possible military intervention. The 

international community has an obligation to prevent escalation of the conflict in 

Venezuela. In particular, the U.S. government should work in concert with other 

governments to ameliorate the extreme shortages of food and health care that put the 

lives of millions of Venezuelans at risk. 

Regarding humanitarian assistance, states that can provide assistance should do so 

when necessary, in a manner that comports with human rights, including consulting 

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Amnesty International Statement- "Venezuela at.a Crossroads" 

Page 6 

with civil society and ensuring that resources are distributed without discrimination. 

However, the widespread suffering of people in Venezuela should not be used as a lever 

in political negotiations or as a bargaining tool to exert political pressure on the 

government. Amnesty International opposes all conditions on international assistance 

and cooperation that result or may result in human rights abuses and encourages the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee to carefully examine any conditions on U.S. 

humanitarian assistance to ensure that compliance with them does not lead to rights 

abuses. 

Finally, regarding the exodus of Venezuelan nationals from the country, which 

already numbers over three million individuals and is expected to increase to five 

million by the end of2019, Amnesty International encourages the United States to 

assist Venezuelan nationals seeking international protection, including nationals 

seeking protection within the United States, who now make up the largest group by 

nationality of individuals seeking asylum in the United States. 16 The widespread 

violations of human rights in Venezuela has put the lives, freedom, and safety of those 

fleeing the country at great risk. The United States should extend protections to 

Venezuelan nationals and should ensure that they are not forced to return to a country 

where they would face grave harm. 

III. Amnesty International's Policy Recommendations to Congress and the 

Executive Branch 

Amnesty Intemational believes that the intemational community, including the United 

States, has an obligation to prevent the escalation of the crisis in Venezuela, ensure that 

its actions do not violate international law or perpetrate futher human suffering, and 

support national actors in creating conditions that will ensure the lasting enjoyment of 

human rights in Venezuela. 

To that end, Amnesty International calls on Congress to: 

16 Gisela Salomon, "Venezuelans Find U.S. Asylum Surprisingly Elusive," AP NEWS, 29 Aug. 2018, 

hltps:;/apnews.coml6atll9ac70e554eabX1()};;_290 12ad00b I. 

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA! 600 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUES£, 5TH FLOOR I WASHINGTON, OC 20003 

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Anmesty International Statement- "Ven~zuela at a Crossroads" 

Page 7 

• Denounce the policy of repression in Venezuela, which, in recent years, has 

manifested itself in politically motivated arbitrary detentions, torture and the 

excessive use of force by security forces; 

• Work with relevant executive branch agencies to fulfill the United States' 

obligation to provide humanitarian assistance to address shortages in food and 

essential medicines, symptoms of the debilitating socioeconomic crisis in the 

country. This assistance must be coordinated and without conditions, ensuring 

that it directly reaches those who are suffering as a result of the crisis 

especially groups exhibiting particular vulnerabilities. The United States must 

exercise due diligence to ensure that any assistance provided does not result in 

human rights abuses of any kind; 

• Defend and strengthen support for Venezuelan civil society organizations and 

human rights defenders; 

• Ensure that Venezuelans seeking international protection in the United States 

are granted unrestricted access to territory and protection from return; 

• Assist in the safeguarding of specialized human rights mechanisms including 

the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the UN Office of the 

High Commissioner for Human Rights so that they have access to the country 

to document the human rights situation, produce reports, and engage 

discussions on how to guarantee human rights in Venezuela. 

For more information, please contact Charanya Krishnaswami at +1 202 675 8766 or 

ckrishna@aiusa.org. 

Sincerely, 

Charanya Krishnaswami 

Americas Advocacy Director 

Amnesty International USA 

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA 1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE SE. 5TH FLOOR t WASHINGTON. DC 20003 

T 202.544.0200 IF 202.046.71421WWW.AMNESTYUSA.ORG 
76 

China Talks With Venezuela Oppostuon1o Protect Investments~ WSJ 

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https:Jiwww,wsj.com/articleslchina-holds-talks-with·venezuelan-opposition·on-debl-oll-projects-11549993261 

LATIN AMERICA 

China Talks With Venezuela Opposition to 

Protect Investments 

Chinese diplomats discuss debt, oil projects with Guaid6 camp as pressure mounts against ally Madura 

Representatives of Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaid6, above in Caracas on Feb. 5, have metwlth Chinese diplomats to 

discuss China's loans and oil investments in the country. PHOTO: FEDERICO PARRA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY 

IMAGES 

By Kejal Vyas 

Updated Feb. 12,2019 2=01 p.m. ET 

CARACAS, Venezuela-China has been holding talks with Venezuela's political opposition to 

safeguard its investments in the troubled Latin American nation, hedging its bets as pressure 

builds on Nicolas Madura, the embattled leader for whom Beijing has been a vital ally. 

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77 

211912019 China Talks With Venezuela Opposition to Protect Investments- WSJ 

Chinese diplomats, worried over the future of its oil projects in Venezuela and nearly $20 

billion that Caracas owes Beijing, have held debt negotiations in Washington in recent weeks 

with representatives of Juan Guaid6, the opposition leader heading the U.S.-backed efforts to 

oust Mr. Maduro, according to people familiar with the talks. 

"China recognizes the increasing risk of a regime change and does not want to be on the bad 

side of a new regime," said R. Evan Ellis, an expert on Chinese relations in Latin America at the 

U.S. Army War College. "While they prefer stability, they realize they have to put eggs in the 

other basket." 

Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro has resisted pressure at home and abroad to cede power to Mr. Guaid6. PHOTO: 

MANAURE QUINTERO/REUTERS 

The talks are a sign of the apprehensions building with creditors of Venezuela's leftist 

government. Over nearly two decades, loans-for-oil deals with China and Russia have provided 

vital support for Venezuela. Relations flourished under Mr. Madura's predecessor, the late 

socialist strongman Hugo Chavez, who fortified ties with those countries, Cuba, Iran and even 

India in an effort to combat U.S. power. 

But commercial and financial ties with these countries have been strained since Mr. Madura, 

Mr. Chavez's handpicked successor, took power in2013 and the economy began to shrink, with 

oil production plummeting by more than half after years of rampant graft and mismanagement. 

Sanctions leveled by Washington last month on Venezuela's oil industry have exacerbated Mr. 

Madura's difficulties, cutting offVenezuela's only meaningful source of income and portending 

further declines in oil output. 

China's Foreign Ministry didn't respond to a request for comment about Beijing's contacts with 

the Venezuelan opposition. In recent weeks, the ministry has suggested that discussions are 

taking place and Beijing wants to see its interests respected. 

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78 

2/19/2019 China Talks With Venezuela Opposition to Protect Investments- WSJ 

Asked about rumored talks at a media briefing on Feb. 1, Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng 

Shuang said Beijing "has be.en in close communication with all parties in various ways on 

the situation in Venezuela." 

"No matter how the situation evolves," Mr. Geng said, "China-Venezuela cooperation should 

not be undermined." 

Mr. Guaid6 has publicly extended olive branches to China and Russia. The young National 

Assembly chief, whom lawmakers chose to lead an interim presidency in a direct challenge to 

Mr. Maduro, has argued that political change would be a precursor to economic reforms to 

restore stability. 

Venezuela, which sits atop the world's largest oil reserves, should maintain ties with China, the 

world's biggest oil importer, he said. 

The fall of the Maduro government could work to China's advantage, said Mr. Ellis. "Guaid6 

could help lift [U.S.] sanctions and get oil flowing again. At the end China has everything to gain 

from Guaid6," he said. 

People familiar with the debt-repayment talks said there are significant hurdles. Venezuela has 

borrowed from China more than $50 billion in a series ofloans-for-oil agreements since 2007, 

and according to estimates by China's Commerce Ministry it still owes Beijing around $20 

billion. 

China is unwilling to take a significant loss on its loans, as some of the opposition's economic 

advisers have suggested for lenders, including holders of the country's defaulted bonds, 

according to two of the people familiar with the talks. Both sides have been discussing grace 

periods on repayment plans to give any potential Venezuelan transitional government 

breathing space, they said. 

Opposition lawmakers have also long clamored to make the terms of China's loan deals with 

Venezuela more transparent, which Beijing opposes, according to two of the people familiar 

with the negotiations. 

Like China, Russia has publicly supported Mr. Madura but has shown little willingness to prop 

up the government with fresh funds. Neither ally has granted large loans to Venezuela in recent 

years. Their joint oil ventures in Venezuela have been subject to the corruption and operational 

difficulties felt across the country's oil industry, energy consultants said. 

One director of a company that provides oil-field valves and tubes to Chinese and Russian state 

firms operating in Venezuela said the company had only made one sale in all of 2018. "The 

Chinese, the Russians, !just don't see them putting any money in," the director said. 

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79 

211'9/2019 China Talks With Venezuela Opposition to Protect Investments - WSJ 

Venezuela's Oil Minister Manuel Quevedo, center, in India on Monday, where his ministry said he was seeking buyers for 

Venezuelan oiL PHOTO: ANUSHREE FADNAVIS/REUTERS 

Moscow is open to dialogue with Mr. Guaid6, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov suggested this 

month, saying Russia expected to maintain cooperation with Caracas "regardless of political 

developments in the country." 

Paradise Lost: Venezuela's Path from Riches to Ruin 

JOHN VAN HASSELT/SYGMA/GETTY IMAGES 

The Trump administration's 

sanctions aim to redirect oil 

assets and revenue away from 

Mr. Maduro and into the hands 

of Mr. Guaid6, closing off access 

to Venezuela's biggest cash 

customers. 

Venezuelan officials have been 

seeking new buyers for their 

heavy oil, which until January 

could be refined at specially 

fitted American installations. 

On Sunday, the state-run Saudi 

tanker company, Bahri, said one 

of its vessels had traveled to Venezuela to load crude for one of Caracas's regular customers in 

India. Bahri said the shipment would be completed before the end of a grace period set by U.S. 

sanctions. 

On Monday, Venezuela Oil Minister Manuel Quevedo was in New Delhi, seeking to increase sales 

to India, his ministry said. 

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80 

2r19/2019 China Talks With Venezuela Opposition to Protect Investments - WSJ 

But Indian officials have said privately that they have grown impatient with Venezuela, which 

for several years has delayed repayment of nearly $500 million owed to state oil company 

ONGC Videsh Ltd. 

Venezuela's government has also fallen into arrears with Indian pharmaceutical companies 

that once thrived here, forcing many of them to shift operations out of the country as social and 

economic conditions deteriorated. 

"Private entities in India have little reason to go out of their way to ramp up imports in such a 

chaotic situation," said Smita Purushottam, a former Indian ambassador to Venezuela who 

recently retired from the Foreign Ministry. 

"My view is that the people of Venezuela are fighting for survival," she said. "They have 

suffered for too long and perhaps the only way forward is to start anew, under international 

supervision, to minimize their suffering and rekindle hope." 

-Benoit Faucon in London, Charles Hutzler in Beijing and Ginette Gonzalez in Caracas 

contributed to this article. 

Write to Kejal Vyas at kejal.vyas@wsj.com 

Appeared in the February 13, 2019, print edition as 'China Hedges Bets With Venezuelan 

Opposition.' 

Copyright@2019 Dow Jones & Company. Inc. All Rights Reserved 

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81 

Question: 

Questions for the Record from Chairman Eliot L. Engel 

Venezuela at a Crossroads 

February 13, 2019 

Has the Administration assessed the humanitarian impact ofthe PDVSA sanctions on the 

Venezuelan people if there is not a quick transition? Please provide the Committee with this 

assessment. 

Mr. Abrams did not submit a response in time for printing. 

Mv. Oudkirk did not submit a response in time for printing. 

Question: 

Has the Administration considered the impact of the PDVSA sanctions on U.S. refineries and 

their employees which process Venezuelan oil? Please provide the Committee with this 

assessment. 

Mr. Abrams did not submit a response in timefor printing. 

Ms. Oudkirk did not submit a response in time for printing. 

Question: 

We all hope that there is a peaceful, democratic transition in Venezuela as soon as possible. If 

this is not the case, what is the Trump Administration's Plan B approach to Venezuela? Please 

provide the Committee with Piau B options for Venezuela. 

Mr. Abrams did not submit a response in time for printing. 

Question: 

The Trump Administration has pushed countries in the Americas to open their homes and hearts 

to Venezuelans. I support this effort. But, how can we eall on other countries to admit 

Venezuelans while continuing to close the doors of our own country to these same individuals? 

(a) Will the Trump Administration reassess its historically low refugee 

admission numbers? 
82 

(b) Will President Trump grant Temporary Protected Status to the many 

Venezuelans here in the United States who should not be forced to return 

to Maduro's Venezuela? 

(c) When, if at all, does the Administration plan to make a decision on TPS 

for Venezuelans living in the United States'/ 

Mr. Abrams did not submit a response in timefor printing. 
83 

Question: 

Questions for the Record fmm Representative Chris Smith 

Venezuela at a Crossroads 

February 13,2019 

"We have heard reports that refugees from Venezuela are falling prey to human trafficking by 

guerillas along the border and by highly organized criminal networks who are transporting the 

victims to countries in Europe for exploitation. 

a) What is the Administration doing to work with the Government of Colombia in particular 

to prevent human trafficking during this humanitarian disaster?" 

Mr. Steve Olive: USAID shares your concern about vulnerable Venezuelan women and girls 

who have left their country and are subject to exploitation, trafficking, and gender-based 

violence (GBV). In addition, as local public services are strained by large numbers of 

Venezuelans, there are increased risks of xenophobia. USAID's assistance to Venezuelans across 

the region provides support to host communities to reduce xenophobia and discrimination. 

Through our Transforming Communities to Protect Women and Girls program, US AID 

addresses these vulnerabilities primarily in tlu·ec departments in Colombia that are hosting 

significant numbers of Venezuelans. This program is working with local and national health 

systems to prevent and protect against GBV and combat xenophobia and discrimination. 

Specifically, the program aims to strengthen the healthcare system's ability to plan for migrant 

services, improving information systems, and facilitating focalized service provision for 

approximately 4,000 women. USAID will also work with targeted municipalities to help them 

implement local response plans to combat GBV. 

We will continue these efforts to ensure security for Venezuelans and the communities hosting 

them in neighboring countries. 

Mr. Abrams did not submit a response in timeforprinting. 

Mv. Oudkirk did not submit a response in time for printing. 
84 

Question: 

Questions for the Record from Representative David Cicilline 

Venezuela at a Crossroads 

February 13, 2019 

Has the Administration increased troop deployments to countries, including Colombia, 

neighboring Venezuela at any point in the last month? 

Are there currently any plans to or discussions about moving additional combat troops to 

Colombia or any other country that neighbors Venezuela? 

• Is anyone at the White House, National Security Council, Department of Defense or any 

other agency making plans for U.S. military engagement in Venezuela? 

Will you pledge that the Trump Administration will not take any military action in 

regarding Venezuela without consulting with Congress in accordance with the War 

Powers Act? 

Mr. Abrams did not submit a response in timefiJrprinting. 

Question: 

The Administration ··just like many Members of Congress and members of this Committee- is 

hoping that Nicolas Maduro steps down from power soon. 

What is the Administration's long-tem1 strategy for Venezuela? 

What planning is in place if the situation in the country further deteriorates, possibly even 

toward civil war? 

What is the contingency plan ifMaduro clings to power? 

What kind of preparation is the Administration doing for what happens when and if 

Maduro steps aside? 

What would the United States role be in supporting a democratic transition, rebuilding 

Venezuela, and supporting long-term stability? 

The Administration has attempted to slash budgets for development assistance and 

humanitarian aid·· how do you plan to fund the support needed to rebuild Venezuela? 

Have any lessons from the intervention in Libya been taken into consideration? 

What precautions are being taken to ensure the safety and security of U.S. diplomatic 

personnel in Venezuela? 

Mr. Abrams did not submit a response in timefor printing. 

Question: 

What plans are in place to ensure that humanitarian aid is actually delivered to the Venezuelan 

people? 
85 

Mr. Steve Olive: The U.S. Agency for Intemational Development (USA!D) and the Department 

of State are working through a network of implementing partners to deliver assistance to 

Venezuelans in the region. Millions of people have left Venezuela due to the crisis created by 

Maduro. The United States Government is supporting many of those displaced individuals and 

families, and they receive our assistance every day. 

As of February 13,2019, the United States Govemment has provided more than $97 million in 

humanitarian assistance to the region, along with $43 million in development assistance for the 

Venezuelans who have fled the country and host communities in the region that are impacted by 

the crisis. 

USAID is coordinating with representatives of Interim President Guaid6 on their humanitarian, 

logistics and distribution planning. They have established arrangements for warehousing, as well 

as distribution through civil society organizations, once access allows for cross-border delivery. 

Question: 

Mr. Maduro has already blocked the entry of food and medicine into the country, so how do you 

plan to get aid into the country? 

Mr. Steve Olive: It is deplorable that the Maduro regime, through the security forces and am1ed 

gangs ( colectivos) they control, has not allowed the necessary assistance to reach the V cnczuelan 

people. The U.S. Government is looking at all options to deliver aid to the people of Venezuela. 

We are working with Interim President Guaid6 and responding to his requests for humanitarian 

assistance. We are also working closely with other governments in the region, including the 

administration of President Duque in Colombia in coordinating this effort. 

Question: 

How could it be distributed in a transparent and safe way without becoming a political tool? 

Mr. Steve Olive: The humanitarian assistance that we arc providing to the people of Venezuela 

is about helping people affected by a massive crisis, plain and simple. The United States and our 

international allies are responding to Interim President Guaid6's request for humanitarian 

assistance for the people of Venezuela, who are sutiering from a crisis caused by the illegitimate 

Maduro regime's gross economic mismanagement and corruption. 

We know the lack of food and medicine continues to get worse with each passing day. Our 

efforts are to send supplies that can help those who are suffering. We will always focus first on 

providing the right supplies to match the needs on the ground. 

2 
86 

Question: 

U.S. Air Force planes are now being used to pre-position aid in Colombia. Is the U.S. military 

leading this humanitarian relief effort? Are you concerned about the appearance of militarizing 

aid? 

Mr. Steve Olive: The U.S. military has a long history of supporting U.S. civilian-led 

humanitarian missions and coordinating with interagency partners-including USAID and the 

State Department-to ensure that aid reaches people impacted by life-threatening disasters. 

Recent examples of military air support include the Mexico earthquake (20 17), Caribbean 

hurricane (20 16) and Nepal earthquake (20 15). The use of military aircraft to pre-position aid in 

Colombia is part of a whole of U.S. Government effort to address the humanitarian needs of the 

Venezuelan people. 

Question: 

In your written testimony submitted to the Committee, you noted that more than 3 million 

Venezuelans have had to flee their country. I was glad to see you thank "generous neighboring 

countries" who are welcoming these "desperate Venezuelans." 

Could you tell me how many Venezuelan refugees the United States admitted last year? 

The year before? 

How many Venezuelans applied for asylum in the United States in 2018'1 And how many 

were granted asylum? 

Do you find it at all contradictory that as you thank Venezuela's neighbors for their 

generosity in opening their doors, President Trump wants to build a wall to keep these 

same people out? 

Is the Administration considering granting Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelans 

living in the United States? 

Mr. Abrams did not submit a response in time for printing. 

3 
87 

Question: 

Question for the Record from Representative James Sensenbrenner 

Venezuela at a Crossroads 

February 13, 2019 

Yesterday the Wall Street Journal reported that China was now having conversations with acting 

President Juan Guaido. The report indicated that the Chinese, who for years have supported the 

regime through purchasing Venezuelan oil, are now beginning to hedge their bets on the Maduro 

regime surviving this opposition movement. 

o In your view, does this shift of support away from Maduro change your calculus 

on the chances of the regime surviving? 

If so, what new steps can the U.S. take to increase the likelihood of a new 

democracy being established? 

o How does the loss of Chinese support change Maduro's tactics going forward? 

Will he become more brazen in his methods to repress the opposition? 

Mr. Abrams did not submit a response in time for printing. 
88 

Question: 

Questions for the Record from Representative Michael Guest 

Venezuela at a Crossroads 

February 13,2019 

You discussed the ongoing implications of the crisis for the oil industry both in Venezuela and for 

U.S. companies operating in or partnering with Venezuela. There are concerns that these U.S. oil 

companies could be negatively affected and that some U.S.-based assets are being put at risk by 

the recent sanctions on PDVSA. 

I. Can you explain to what extent U.S. companies were being consulted leading up to the 

decisions to impose sanctions? 

2. Regarding these U.S. oil companies, what are their main concerns, and how much were 

they considered in the decision-making process? 

3. Referring to post-crisis Venezuela, how is the U.S. preparing to help Venezuela regain 

the barrels per day production that it had pre-Maduro? And, what is the impact of that 

resurgence outside Venezuela? 

Ms. Oudkirk did not submit a response in time fbr printing. 

Question: 

Referring to post-crisis Venezuela, how is the U.S. preparing to help Venezuela regain the barrels 

per day production that it had pre-Maduro? And, what is the impact of that resurgence outside 

Venezuela? 

Mr. Abrams did not submit a re;,ponse in time for printing. 
89 

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