[Cite as Gallick v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2018-Ohio-818.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 : No. 15AP-182 

 (C.P.C. No. 14CV-7188) 

 : No. 15AP-190 

John J. Gallick, (C.P.C. No. 14CV-7189) 

 : No. 15AP-233 

 Appellant-Appellant, (C.P.C. No. 14CV-7185) 

 : No. 15AP-419 

v. (C.P.C. No. 14CV-7193) 

 : No. 15AP-564 

Franklin County Board of Revision et al., (C.P.C. No. 14CV-7190) 

 : No. 15AP-837 

 Appellees-Appellees. (C.P.C. No. 14CV-7187) 

 : No. 16AP-392 (C.P.C. No. 14CV-7186) 

 : No. 16AP-393 (C.P.C. No. 14CV-7194) 

 : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on March 6, 2018 

 

On brief: John J. Gallick, pro se. Argued: John J. Gallick. 

On brief: Rich & Gillis Law Group, Mark H. Gillis, and 

Richelle L. Thoburn, for appellee Board of Education of the 

Columbus City Schools. Argued: Richelle L. Thoburn. 

 

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

KLATT, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, John J. Gallick, appeals judgments of the Franklin County Court 

of Common Pleas that affirmed decisions of the Franklin County Board of Revision ("BOR") 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

2 

and denied Gallick's motions for new trial. For the following reasons, we reverse some 

judgments and dismiss the appeals of other judgments.

{¶ 2} In July 2012, Gallick purchased two adjacent, identical apartment buildings 

located at 1688 and 1704 East Livingston Avenue in Columbus, Ohio (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as "the Livingston properties"). Gallick bought the two buildings in 

a single sale and paid a total of $120,000. Each building contained 15 units, and each unit 

was assigned its own tax parcel number.

{¶ 3} For tax years 2012 and 2013, the Franklin County Auditor ("Auditor") 

appraised the units at the following true values: 

1688 East Livingston Avenue 

Tax Parcel Number True Value 

010-178688-00 (Unit A) $9,300

010-178689-00 (Unit B) $9,300

010-178690-00 (Unit C) $14,000

010-178691-00 (Unit D) $14,400

010-178692-00 (Unit E) $14,400

010-178693-00 (Unit F) $14,400

010-178694-00 (Unit G) $14,400

010-178695-00 (Unit H) $14,400

010-178696-00 (Unit J) $14,400

010-178697-00 (Unit K) $15,800

010-178698-00 (Unit L) $14,000

010-178699-00 (Unit M) $14,000

010-178700-00 (Unit N) $14,000

010-178701-00 (Unit P) $15,800

010-178702-00 (Unit Q) $15,800 

1704 East Livingston Avenue1

Tax Parcel Number True Value 

010-178703-00 (Unit A) $14,000

010-178704-00 (Unit B) $14,400

010-178705-00 (Unit C) $9,300

010-178712-00 (Unit K) $15,800

 

1 The valuations of units D, E, F, G, H, and J of 1704 East Livingston Avenue are not at issue in this appeal. 

Consequently, those units do not appear in this list. 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

3 

010-178713-00 (Unit L) $14,000

010-178714-00 (Unit M) $14,400

010-178715-00 (Unit N) $14,000

010-178716-00 (Unit P) $15,800

010-178717-00 (Unit Q) $15,800 

{¶ 4} On March 22, 2013, Gallick filed multiple complaints with the BOR seeking a 

decrease in the valuation of each unit. Each complaint challenged the valuation of three 

units, resulting in 10 complaints (covering all 30 units). In response to each complaint, 

appellee, the Board of Education of the Columbus City School District ("Board of 

Education"), filed counter-complaints seeking no change in the Auditor's valuations. The 

BOR combined the complaints and counter-complaints, and it held a single hearing on 

them.

{¶ 5} At the April 10, 2014 hearing, Gallick testified and presented documentary 

evidence. Gallick explained that he had purchased the Livingston properties after a realtor 

informed him that the properties were on the market. Without asking the offering price, 

Gallick placed a bid of $120,000 for both buildings. The previous owner accepted the bid, 

and the closing occurred in July 2012. Gallick presented the BOR with copies of the 

conveyance fee statement and deed to prove the occurrence of the sale and the sale price. 

{¶ 6} According to Gallick, the true value of each unit was $4,000, which he arrived 

at by dividing the $120,000 purchase price equally between the two buildings, and then 

dividing $60,000 by 15, the number of units in each building. Gallick, who "own[s] that 

whole block," also testified that $4,000 was "the going price" for apartment units in the 

area. (Tr. at 8, 14.) The Board of Education presented no evidence or argument regarding 

the Livingston properties at the hearing.

{¶ 7} In decisions issued June 13, 2014, the BOR accepted $4,000 as the true value 

of each unit for the 2012 tax year. However, the BOR retained the Auditor's valuation of 

each unit for the 2013 tax year. Gallick appealed the BOR's decisions as to the valuations 

for the 2013 tax year to the trial court pursuant to R.C. 5717.05.

{¶ 8} Although the trial court did not consolidate all the appeals into one case, the 

majority of the appeals proceeded similarly. Gallick and the Board of Education filed 

virtually identical briefs in each appeal. In the appeals involving the units listed above, the 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

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trial court affirmed the decisions of the BOR. In some of the appeals, Gallick moved for a 

new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59. With one exception, the trial court denied those motions.2

{¶ 9} We have eight appeals involving the Livingston properties before this court: 

(1) appeal No. 15AP-233, which involves units A, B, and C of 1688 East Livingston Avenue; 

(2) appeal No. 16AP-392, which involves units D, E, and F of 1688 East Livingston Avenue; 

(3) appeal No. 15AP-837, which involves units G, H, and J of 1688 East Livingston Avenue; 

(4) appeal No. 15AP-182, which involves units K, L, and M of 1688 East Livingston Avenue; 

(5) appeal No. 15AP-190, which involves units N, P, and Q of 1688 East Livingston Avenue; 

(6) appeal No. 15AP-564, which involves units A, B, and C of 1704 East Livingston Avenue; 

(7) appeal No. 15AP-419, which involves units K, L, and M of 1704 East Livingston Avenue; 

and (8) appeal No. 16AP-393, which involves units N, P, and Q of 1704 East Livingston 

Avenue.

{¶ 10} We consolidated the eight appeals. In his appellant's brief, Gallick assigns 

the following errors:

[1.] The Board of Revision and the lower courts erred as a 

matter of law by failing to base their property tax valuations 

upon the recent arm's-length sale prices of Appellant's several 

properties when the arm's-length nature of the sales were not 

rebutted by the BOR or the Appellees, no new appraisal was 

conducted by the auditor, no significant improvements were 

made to the properties, and no other factors existed for the 

Auditor or the BOR to dramatically increase the property 

valuations notwithstanding the recency of the arm's-length 

sales, thus requiring a remand to the Board of Revision and an 

order for the BOR to revert back to the arm's-length sales prices 

for tax valuation purposes. 

[2.] The BOR and the lower courts erred by failing to take into 

account that the valuations by the auditor and decisions 

upholding same by the Board of Revision are not entitled to a 

presumption of validity when monumental increases in 

property valuations for all properties subject to this appeal 

were unsustainable as a matter of fact and law when the auditor 

failed to conduct a formal up-to-date appraisal, failed to 

provide any comparable sales data, and failed to substantiate 

that any significant improvements had been made to the 

several properties, warranting reversal to the BOR and 

 

2 In appeal No. 15AP-190, rather than denying Gallick's motion for a new trial, the trial court deemed the 

motion inactive. 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

5 

Franklin County Auditor and a decrease in property valuations 

commensurate with the original purchase prices. 

[3.] The BOR and the lower courts erred as a matter of fact and 

law by applying the incorrect legal standard to Appellant's 

testimony and evidence presented to the BOR despite it being 

reliable, substantial and probative, by failing to shift the burden 

of proof to the BOR based upon Appellant's testimony, and by 

failing to render an independent judgment to determine the 

taxable value of the subject properties when there was no 

evidence and no new appraisal supporting the auditor's 

valuations. 

[4.] The lower courts abused their discretion by failing to allow 

Appellant's offer of additional evidence or at the very least 

ordering a hearing on the evidence, and a hearing on the merits 

of Appellant's claims. 

[5.] The lower courts erred by denying, failing to conduct merit 

reviews, and failing to hold hearings on Appellant's motion for 

relief from judgment and motions for new trial. 

[6.] The current property taxation scheme violates due process 

because it fails to give meaningful notice to the taxpayer why 

property valuations are increased, fails to provide for reasons 

in decisions rendered by the BOR, and leaves courts on appeal 

to guess at why valuations occurred causing insufficient judicial 

review, leaving the taxpayer and public guessing why and how 

valuations are rendered making it impossible to defend against 

the valuation thus placing an improper burden of proof against 

the taxpayer and an improper presumption that the auditor's 

valuation is correct. 

{¶ 11} Before we begin our review of the merits of Gallick's assignments of error, we 

must determine which of his eight appeals are properly before this court. To do that, we 

must consider whether Gallick filed all of his appeals in a timely manner. 

{¶ 12} "An appeal as of right shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk 

of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4." App.R. 3(A). If an appellant fails to 

meet the timing requirements of App.R. 4, the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear 

the appeal. In re H.F., 120 Ohio St.3d 499, 2008-Ohio-6810, ¶ 17. A court of appeals 

without jurisdiction must dismiss the appeal, since the court does not have the power or 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

6 

authority to review the issues involved. Fougere v. Estate of Fougere, 10th Dist. No. 17AP72, 2017-Ohio-7905, ¶ 10.

{¶ 13} Pursuant to App.R. 4(A)(1), "a party who wishes to appeal from an order that 

is final upon its entry shall file the notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within 30 days of 

that entry." The timing requirement of App.R. 4(A)(1) is subject to App.R. 4(A)(3), which 

provides that, "[i]n a civil case, if the clerk has not completed service of the order within the 

three-day period prescribed in Civ.R. 58(B), the 30-day period[ ] * * * begin[s] to run on 

the date when the clerk actually completes service." Thus, the clerk's failure to complete 

service within three days of a final order's entry tolls the 30-day appeal period until service 

is accomplished. On the other hand, if the clerk timely complies with Civ.R. 58(B), then the 

30-day appeal period begins to run on the date of the final order's entry. 

{¶ 14} App.R. 4(B) sets forth some exceptions to the timing requirements of App.R. 

4(A). Of relevance to this appeal, under App.R. 4(B)(2)(b), if a party files a "timely and 

appropriate" motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59, "then the time for filing a notice of 

appeal from the judgment or final order in question begins to run as to all parties when the 

trial court enters an order resolving" the motion. Importantly, in order for a party to benefit 

from the tolling effect of App.R. 4(B)(2)(b), the motion for a new trial cannot be untimely 

filed or inappropriate under the circumstances. See Besman v. Leventhal, 8th Dist. No. 

104414, 2017-Ohio-464, ¶ 13 (refusing to apply the App.R. 4(B)(2)(b) exception because the 

appellant's motion for a new trial was inapplicable to the type of proceeding pending before 

the trial court); Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Abu-Niaaj, 2d Dist. No. 2011 CA 45, 2012-Ohio2099, ¶ 9 (holding that an untimely motion for a new trial did not extend the 30-day period 

for appealing a final order).

{¶ 15} Here, Gallick seeks to rely on the App.R. 4(B)(2)(b) exception in three cases: 

15AP-233, 15AP-419, and 15AP-837. In each of these cases, the trial court entered a final 

order affirming the BOR's decision. On same day as the entry of each final order, the clerk 

served notice of that order on the parties and noted service on the docket as required by 

Civ.R. 58(B). Thus, under App.R. 4(A), Gallick had 30 days from the date of each final 

order's entry to file his notice of appeal. Gallick, however, failed to file notices of appeal 

within the 30-day period. Instead, in each case, he moved for a new trial. In all three cases, 

Gallick only filed a notice of appeal after the trial court denied him a new trial. To the extent 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

7 

that Gallick seeks to appeal the judgments affirming the BOR's decisions, these notices of 

appeal are only timely if the App.R. 4(B)(2)(b) exception extends the filing deadlines.

{¶ 16} Whether or not Gallick may claim an extension based on App.R. 4(B)(2)(b) 

depends on whether his motions for new trial were appropriate under the circumstances. 

This determination, in turn, requires this court to consider two issues: (1) whether Civ.R. 

59, which governs motions for new trial, applies to appeals initiated under R.C. 5717.05, the 

statutory basis for Gallick's appeals of the BOR's decisions to the trial court, and 

(2) whether Gallick filed his motions after trials had occurred in the trial court. 

{¶ 17} With few exceptions, the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure "prescribe the 

procedure to be followed in all courts of this state in the exercise of civil jurisdiction at law 

or in equity." Civ.R. 1(A). However, "to the extent that [the rules] would by their nature be 

clearly inapplicable," they do not apply to procedure in "special statutory proceedings." 

Civ.R. 1(C)(8). Because Civ.R. 1(C)(8) only exempts the application of a procedural rule if 

it is "clearly inapplicable," the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure apply in special statutory 

proceedings adversary in nature unless a good and sufficient reason exists not to apply to 

the rules. Hambuechen v. 221 Mkt. N., Inc., 143 Ohio St.3d 161, 2015-Ohio-756, ¶ 7; 

Ramsdell v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm., 56 Ohio St.3d 24, 27 (1990).

{¶ 18} An administrative appeal filed pursuant to a statute, such as an appeal 

initiated under R.C. 5717.05, is a special statutory proceeding. Middlebrook v. United 

Collection Bur., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-280, 2017-Ohio-8587, ¶ 8. Thus, Civ.R. 59 applies 

in such appeals unless R.C. 5717.05 renders that rule clearly inapplicable. This court has 

found that Civ.R. 59 is not clearly inapplicable to administrative appeals where the trial 

court reviews de novo questions of law and fact. In re Appeal of Neff, 10th Dist. No. 85AP289 (Mar. 4, 1986); Quick v. Wolfe, 10th Dist. No. 81AP-561 (Aug. 20, 1981). In an R.C. 

5717.05 appeal, a trial court reaches a decision de novo. Black v. Bd. of Revision, 16 Ohio 

St.3d 11, 14 (1985). Consequently, we conclude that Civ.R. 59 applies to the appeals at issue 

here.

{¶ 19} Our conclusion, however, does not end our analysis. Although the 

administrative nature of a case may not preclude a motion for a new trial, such a motion is 

only appropriate in cases where a trial has occurred. Wolf-Sabatino v. Sabatino, 10th Dist. 

No. 12AP-307, 2012-Ohio-6232, ¶ 13 (holding that "a motion for a new trial properly lies 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

8 

only after a trial"). Absent a trial, a motion for a new trial is a nullity. State ex rel. Batten 

v. Reece, 70 Ohio St.2d 246, 248 (1982). 

{¶ 20} A proceeding is a trial for Civ.R. 59 purposes when the indicia of trial 

substantially predominate in the proceeding. First Bank v. Mascrete, Inc., 79 Ohio St.3d 

503, 507 (1997). Those indicia include: (1) whether pleadings initiated the proceeding, (2) 

whether the proceeding took place in court, (3) whether a judge or magistrate was present 

and presided over the proceeding, (4) whether the parties or their counsel were present, (5) 

whether the parties or counsel introduced evidence, (6) whether the parties or counsel 

presented arguments in court, (7) whether a judge or magistrate decided issues of fact, (8) 

whether the issues decided were central or ancillary to the primary dispute between the 

parties, and (9) whether a judgment was rendered on the evidence. Id. 

{¶ 21} After considering the above indicia, courts have found motions for new trials 

appropriate where there has been an in-court hearing succeeded by a judgment ruling on 

the issues argued and evidence heard at the hearing. Fougere, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-72, 

2017-Ohio-7905, at ¶ 15. Here, no such hearings happened. In each of the three cases at 

issue, no proceedings occurred where the parties or counsel presented evidence and 

argument in court to a trial judge or magistrate. Because there were no trials in the three 

cases at issue, Gallick's motions for new trial were inappropriate and their filing did not toll 

the 30-day period for appealing the judgments affirming the BOR's decisions. Gallick, 

therefore, did not timely initiate appeals of the judgments affirming the BOR's decisions in 

appeal Nos. 15AP-233, 15AP-419, and 15AP-837. Thus, we lack jurisdiction over those 

judgments. 

{¶ 22} Next, we must decide whether we may review the judgments in appeal Nos. 

15AP-233, 15AP-419, and 15-837 that denied Gallick new trials. Although Gallick timely 

appealed those judgments, another problem stands in the way of our review. As we 

explained above, a motion for a new trial is a nullity unless it is filed after a trial has 

occurred. Batten, 70 Ohio St.2d at 248. In the absence of a preceding trial, a judgment 

entered on a motion for a new trial is also a nullity and a party cannot appeal from such a 

judgment. See Johnson v. Geico Homesite, Inc., 6th Dist. No. OT-17-003, 2017-Ohio-7273, 

¶ 8 ("[A]n appellate court cannot consider an appeal from a nullity."); Levy v. Ivie, 195 Ohio 

App.3d 251, 2011-Ohio-4055, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.) (holding that a judgment deciding a null 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

9 

motion is also a nullity and cannot be appealed). Here, because no trials occurred in the 

three cases at issue, Gallick's motions for new trial and the judgments deciding those 

motions constituted nullities. Gallick, therefore, cannot appeal those judgments to this 

court. Accordingly, we dismiss appeal Nos. 15AP-233, 15AP-419, and 15AP-837 in their 

entirety.

{¶ 23} Having determined that only appeal Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-564, 

16AP-392, and 16AP-393 are properly before this court, we turn to reviewing Gallick's 

assignments of error. By his first assignment of error, Gallick argues that the trial court 

erred in ignoring the arm's-length sale that occurred five and one-half months prior to the 

tax lien date. Gallick contends that the sale price constitutes the best evidence of the true 

value of each unit, and consequently, the trial court erred in refusing to decrease the 

valuations of each unit based on the $4,000 per unit sale price. We agree.

{¶ 24} In an R.C. 5717.05 appeal, the party appealing the board of revision's decision 

bears the burden of proving its right to a reduction or increase in the board of revision's 

determination of value. CABOT III-OH1M02, LLC v. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist. No. 13AP232, 2013-Ohio-5301, ¶ 26. The trial court must consider the evidence heard by the board 

of revision and any additional evidence admitted by the trial court, and apply its 

independent judgment to determine the taxable value of the subject property. Black, 16 

Ohio St.3d at 14; CABOT III-OH1M02, LLC at ¶ 16. On an appeal of the trial court's 

judgment, an appellate court must decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in its 

valuation determination. Black at paragraph one of the syllabus; CABOT III-OH1M02, LLC

at ¶ 16.

{¶ 25} The Ohio Constitution provides that "[l]and and improvements thereon shall 

be taxed by uniform rule according to value." Ohio Constitution, Article XII, Section 2. 

Consistent with that constitutional mandate, R.C. 5713.01(B) requires county auditors to 

appraise real property "at its true value in money." 

{¶ 26} R.C. 5713.03 governs how the true value of real property is determined. From 

1976 to 2012, R.C. 5713.03 stated that, if any tract, lot, or parcel of real estate "ha[d] been 

the subject of an arm's length sale between a willing seller and willing buyer within a 

reasonable length of time, either before or after the tax lien date, the auditor shall consider 

the sale price of such tract, lot, or parcel to be the true value for taxation purposes." 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

10 

(Emphasis added.) Am.Sub.H.B. No. 920, 136 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3182, 3247. Interpreting 

this provision, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that former R.C. 5713.03 required the sale 

price of a recent, arm's-length transaction to be the true value of the property. Berea City 

School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio4979, ¶ 13, superseded by statute as stated in Terraza 8, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 

Revision, 150 Ohio St.3d 527, 2017-Ohio-4415, ¶ 26. The court later explained that former 

R.C. 5713.03 "reject[ed] * * * appraisal evidence of the value of the property whenever a 

recent, arm's-length sale price has been offered as evidence of value." Cummins Property 

Servs., L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 117 Ohio St.3d 516, 2008-Ohio-1473, ¶ 13, 

superseded by statute as stated in Terraza 8, L.C.C. at ¶ 26.

{¶ 27} In 2012, the General Assembly significantly changed the language of R.C. 

5713.03. In relevant part, the General Assembly replaced "shall" with "may," so the statute 

now reads, "the auditor may consider the sale price * * * to be the true value for taxation 

purposes." (Emphasis added.) 2012 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 487. House Bill 487 went into effect 

on September 10, 2012. Consequently, the amended statute governs all valuations for tax 

year 2013, which are determined as of January 1, 2013.3 Terraza 8, L.L.C. at ¶ 18. Here, 

because Gallick challenges the valuations for tax year 2013, amended R.C. 5713.03 applies 

to these appeals.

{¶ 28} Although amended R.C. 5713.03 overrode the holding of Berea, it did not 

invalidate two rebuttable presumptions applied in valuation cases. Terraza 8, L.L.C. at 

¶ 31-33. First, the presumption that "a submitted sales price 'has met all the requirements 

that characterize true value' " remains. Terraza 8, L.L.C. at ¶ 32, quoting Cincinnati School 

Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 78 Ohio St.3d 325, 327 (1997). Likewise, 

under amended R.C. 5713.03, the presumption that " '[t]he best evidence of the "true value 

of money" of real property is an actual, recent sale of the property in an arm's-length 

transaction' " survives. Id. at ¶ 33, quoting Conalco, Inc. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Revision, 

50 Ohio St.2d 129 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus; accord Mann v. Cuyahoga Cty. 

Bd. of Revision, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2017-Ohio-8820, ¶ 12 ("Under the version of R.C. 

 

3 " '[T]he first day of January of the tax year in question is the crucial valuation date for tax assessment 

purposes.' " HIN, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 481, 2010-Ohio-687, ¶ 16, 

quoting Freshwater v. Belmont Cty. Bd. of Revision, 80 Ohio St.3d 26, 29-30 (1997). 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

11 

5713.03 that applies to tax year 2013, * * * a price from a recent arm's-length sale is not 

conclusive evidence of a property's value but it nevertheless 'constitute[s] the best evidence 

of the property's value.' ").

{¶ 29} To employ these presumptions, a proponent of a sale need not affirmatively 

demonstrate with extrinsic evidence that a sale price reflects the value of the property. 

Terraza 8, L.L.C. at ¶ 32. Instead, the proponent of the sale must only present basic 

documentation of the sale, such as the conveyance fee statement and deed. Id.; Buckeye 

Terminals, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2017-Ohio-7664, ¶ 20 

("The conveyance fee [statement] and deed create a rebuttable presumption that the sale 

met the requirements that characterize true value."). If this initial burden is met, the 

opposing party then has the burden of going forward with rebuttal evidence showing that 

the sale price does not, in fact, reflect the property's true value.4 Terraza 8, L.L.C. at ¶ 32. 

To satisfy its burden, the opposing party may present evidence showing that the sale was 

not at arm's length or not recent to the tax lien date. Huber Heights City Schools Bd. of 

Edn. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2017-Ohio-8819, ¶ 11. Where 

the opposing party fails to demonstrate a reason to disregard the sale price as an indicator 

of value, then the sale price is the best evidence of the property's true value. Lunn v. Lorain 

Cty. Bd. of Revision, 149 Ohio St.3d 137, 2016-Ohio-8075, ¶ 18. 

{¶ 30} Here, Gallick provided the BOR with copies of the conveyance fee statement 

and deed showing the transfer of the Livingston Avenue properties to him. The conveyance 

fee statement is dated July 16, 2012 and reflects a sale price of $120,000 for both Livingston 

properties. With the presentation of this evidence, rebuttable presumptions arose that the 

sale price met all the requirements of true value and constituted the best evidence of the 

true value of the Livingston properties.5 Thus, the Board of Education had the burden to 

 

4 The party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden to present evidence to rebut the 

presumption. Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. at 328. However, the burden of proof remains on the 

party on whom it was originally cast. Id.; accord Dauch v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Revision, 149 Ohio St.3d 691, 

2017-Ohio-1412, ¶ 20 ("The ultimate burden of proof d[oes] not shift."). 

5 Gallick purchased the Livingston properties in a bulk sale, i.e., " 'a sale of numerous real estate parcels at 

an aggregate price as part of a single deal.' " Buckeye Terminals, L.L.C. at ¶ 17, quoting St. Bernard SelfStorage, L.L.C. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 115 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007-Ohio-5249, ¶ 15. Ordinarily, "a 

bulk sale raises the additional question 'whether the proffered allocation of [the] bulk sale price to the 

particular parcel[s] of real property is "proper." ' " Id. at ¶ 18, quoting St. Bernard Self-Storage, L.L.C. at 

¶ 15. In this case, however, the Board of Education has never challenged the propriety of Gallick's allocation 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

12 

present evidence to the contrary. The Board of Education argues that it met its burden by 

eliciting testimony from Gallick that established that the sale of the Livingston properties 

was not recent to the tax lien date of January 1, 2013.

{¶ 31} A sale is recent if it is made within a reasonable length of time of the tax lien 

date. Health Care REIT, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 140 Ohio St.3d 30, 2014-

Ohio-2574, ¶ 22. Consequently, one component of recency is the period of time that has 

elapsed between the sale date and the tax lien date. Id. Temporal proximity, however, is 

not the sole factor affecting recency. Emerson v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Revision, 149 Ohio St.3d 

148, 2017-Ohio-865, ¶ 19; Worthington City School Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 

Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 27, 2009-Ohio-5932, ¶ 32. The determination of whether a sale 

is recent requires consideration of all factors that would, by changing with the passage of 

time, affect the value of the property. Emerson at ¶ 19; Cummins Property Servs., L.L.C., 

117 Ohio St.3d 516, 2008-Ohio-1473, at ¶ 35. General developments in the marketplace, 

along with conditions more specific to the property, are relevant in determining recency. 

Cummins Property Servs., L.L.C. at ¶ 35. With regard to changes in market conditions, the 

speed of the changes is an important consideration. "If the market is changing rapidly, then 

the selling price will not be the best evidence of true value for as long a period of time as 

when the market is not changing or changing very slowly." New Winchester Gardens v. 

Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 80 Ohio St.3d 36, 44 (1997), overruled in part on other 

grounds, Cummins Property Servs., L.L.C. at ¶ 25.

{¶ 32} Here, the Board of Education contends that market conditions between the 

sale date (July 16, 2012) and the tax lien date (January 1, 2013) changed to such a degree 

as to invalidate the sale price as a measure of the Livingston properties' true value. The 

Board of Education points to Gallick's testimony before the BOR as evidence of its 

contention. During the April 10, 2014 BOR hearing, Gallick testified about the sale prices 

of properties located near the subject properties that he purchased in arm's-length 

transactions dating from April 2008 to the hearing date. Gallick stated, "You can see -- 

Actually, the value of the properties went down. I mean, the most -- the newer -- the most 

 

of the sale price. Consequently, the Board of Education has waived any argument concerning the propriety 

of the allocation. Emerson v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Revision, 149 Ohio St.3d 148, 2017-Ohio-865, ¶ 20; RNG 

Properties, Ltd. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 140 Ohio St.3d 455, 2014-Ohio-4036, ¶ 33. 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

13 

recent properties I'm buying, I'm buying cheaper than the ones I bought in '08 and '09." 

(Tr. at 5.) Later in the hearing, Gallick represented, "And I’m telling you right now the value 

of properties have gone down in '11 and '12 and '13 from where they were in '10. * * * The 

market's down. I may contract for properties now that are even lower than 4,000 a unit."

(Tr. at 20.)

{¶ 33} Thus, Gallick testified to a general downward trend in market prices from 

2008 and 2014, and a drop in the market between 2010 and 2011/2012/2013. However, 

for our purposes, the relevant period is between July 16, 2012 and January 1, 2013. Gallick 

did not state that market conditions changed during that specific span of time, much less 

that the market changed so rapidly that a sale that occurred only five and one-half months 

prior to the tax lien date could no longer evince true value. Testimony of a downward trend 

in the market over seven years is not evidence that the market rapidly dropped between 

July 16, 2012 and January 1, 2013. Consequently, Gallick's testimony regarding the 

condition of the marketplace does not rebut the presumptions that the sale price met all the 

requirements of true value and best reflected the true value of the Livingston properties.

{¶ 34} Next, the Board of Education reverses course and eschews its contention that 

the Livingston properties' value dropped. It, instead, argues that rising tenancy levels and 

a "clean up" of the properties raised the value of the properties such that the July 16, 2012 

sale cannot be considered recent to the January 1, 2013 tax lien date. However, again, the 

evidence the Board of Education relies on does not support its argument. 

{¶ 35} At the BOR hearing, the Board of Education's attorney asked Gallick, "And 

how's your occupancy been since your purchase? Did it increase any?" (Tr. at 9.) Gallick 

answered, "It's increased a little." Id. Thus, Gallick testified that the number of tenants at 

the Livingston properties rose between the July 16, 2012 sale and the April 10, 2014 

hearing, and not that the number of tenants rose between the July 16, 2012 sale and the 

January 1, 2013 tax lien date. Moreover, Gallick did not quantify the increase by stating 

how many more tenants he now has. Assuming that an increase in tenancy occurred 

between July 16, 2012 and January 1, 2013, the evidence regarding that increase is too 

meager to prove that the tenancy level affected the value of the properties between the two 

relevant dates. Consequently, evidence regarding the tenancy level does not rebut the 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

14 

presumptions regarding true value that arose when Gallick adduced evidence of the July 

2012 sale. 

{¶ 36} With regard to the physical condition of the Livingston properties, the Board 

of Education's attorney asked Gallick, "Can you tell us a little about what condition [the 

properties] were in and whether any of them needed any improvements or repairs after 

your purchase[?]" (Tr. at 5.) Gallick responded that, "[b]y and large, they just needed 

cleaning up." Id. The attorney then asked, "So none of them required any kind of capital 

or structural updates or improvements?" (Tr. at 6.) Gallick replied, "No." Id. 

{¶ 37} Pursuant to R.C. 5713.03(B), the sale price in an arm's-length transaction 

cannot be the true value of the property if, subsequent to the sale, "[a]n improvement is 

added to the property." With respect to buildings or structures, an "improvement" is "a 

permanent addition, enlargement, or alteration that, had it been constructed at the same 

time as the building or structure, would have been considered a part of the building or 

structure." R.C. 5701.02(D) (setting forth definitions of certain terms used in R.C. Chapter 

57). Consequently, ameliorative measures such as replacing carpet and repainting do not 

constitute improvements that preclude a sale price from reflecting the true value of 

property. Cattell v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Revision, 11th Dist. No. 2009-L-161, 2010-Ohio-4426, 

¶ 28-29.

{¶ 38} Here, nothing in Gallick's testimony or the other evidence explicates exactly 

what Gallick did to "clean up" the Livingston properties. It is clear, however, that Gallick 

did not go so far as to perform the type of improvements contemplated in R.C. 5713.03(B). 

Thus, that provision does not bar the use of the sale price to set the true value of the 

Livingston properties. 

{¶ 39} Nevertheless, even if post-sale enhancements do not qualify as 

improvements, they could conceivably change a property sufficiently to affect the recency 

of a sale. Here, however, the Board of Education fails to direct us to any evidence that 

Gallick performed any "clean up" between July 16, 2012 and January 1, 2013 or, assuming 

a "clean up" occurred, the degree to which the properties were "cleaned up." Without more 

detail regarding the "clean up," the record lacks proof that the "clean up" was so significant 

that it altered the value of the properties. Thus, evidence related to the "clean up" does not 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

15 

rebut the presumptions regarding true value that arose when Gallick presented evidence of 

the July 2012 sale.

{¶ 40} The Board of Education has only ever argued the lack of recency to rebut the 

presumptions at issue. Nevertheless, in appeal Nos. 16AP-392 and 16AP-393, the trial 

court determined that the July 2012 sale did not qualify as an arm's-length transaction. 

We, therefore, must consider whether the record contains evidence of the nature of the 

transaction that negates the presumptions regarding true value.

{¶ 41} Three factors are relevant in deciding whether a transaction occurred at arm's 

length: (1) whether the sale was voluntary, i.e., without compulsion or duress; (2) whether 

the sale took place in an open market; and (3) whether the buyer and seller acted in their 

own self-interest. Olentangy Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 

141 Ohio St.3d 243, 2014-Ohio-4723, ¶ 47; Walters v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Revision, 47 Ohio 

St.3d 23 (1989), syllabus. Here, the trial court concluded that the July 2012 sale was not 

an arm's-length transaction because Gallick neither knew nor asked the seller's listing price 

before Gallick offered to buy the properties for $120,000. We do not see how Gallick's 

failure to find out the list price prior to placing an offer results in the conclusion that that 

the sale was not at arm's length. Gallick's decision to place an offer without knowing the 

asking price is neither evidence of compulsion or duress, nor evidence that Gallick betrayed 

his own self-interest. Gallick testified that the prior owner placed the Livingston properties 

on the market, a realtor informed him that the properties were available for sale, he viewed 

the properties and decided to make an offer of $120,000, and the seller accepted his offer. 

These facts establish that the July 2012 sale was an arm's-length transaction. 

Consequently, evidence regarding the circumstances of the July 2012 sale do not rebut the 

presumptions regarding true value that arose when Gallick presented evidence of the sale.

{¶ 42} Where a rebuttable presumption exists, the party challenging the 

presumption must produce evidence that counterbalances the presumption or leaves the 

case in equipoise. Bd. of Edn. of the Cleveland Mun. School Dist. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 

Revision, 107 Ohio St.3d 250, 2005-Ohio-6434, ¶ 15. Here, the Board of Education failed 

to produce such evidence. Consequently, the presumptions prevail, and thus, the July 2012 

sale price constitutes the best evidence of the true value of the Livingston Avenue 

properties. Because Gallick established $4,000 as the true value of each unit for the 
Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-233, 15AP-419, 15AP-564, 15AP-837, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

16 

purposes of tax year 2013, the trial court erred in affirming the BOR's decisions. 

Accordingly, we sustain Gallick's first assignment of error.

{¶ 43} By the remaining assignments of error, Gallick either advances alternative 

bases for finding error in the affirmance of the BOR's decisions or seeks a hearing before 

the trial court to present evidence regarding the true value of the Livingston properties. 

Given our ruling on Gallick's first assignment of error, his other assignments of error are 

moot, and consequently, we do not rule upon them.

{¶ 44} For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss appeal Nos. 15AP-233, 15AP-419, and 

15AP-837. We sustain the first assignment of error in appeal Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 

15AP-564, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393, which renders moot the second through sixth 

assignments of error. We reverse the judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common 

Pleas in appeal Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-564, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393. We remand 

those five cases to the trial court so that it may certify to the Auditor the true value of $4,000 

per tax parcel for units D, E, F, K, L, M, N, P, and Q of 1688 East Livingston Avenue and 

units A, B, C, N, P, and Q of 1704 East Livingston Avenue for tax year 2013.

Appeal Nos. 15AP-233, 15AP-419, and 15AP-837 dismissed;

appeal Nos. 15AP-182, 15AP-190, 15AP-564, 16AP-392, and 16AP-393 

reversed and remanded with instructions. 

SADLER and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.