Filed 4/29/16 Wagner v. Broderick CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

TRACY WAGNER ,
Plaintiff and Respondent
,

v.

AARON BROD ERICK ,
Defendant and Appellant

. B 260375
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YD054842 )

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. John A.
Slawson , Judge. Affirmed

. Tritt & Tritt and James F. Tritt for Def endant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Robert Brode and Robert E. Brode for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________2

Aaron Broderick appeals from the superior court’s grant of a domestic violence restraining order sought by Trac y Wagner, Broderick’s ex

- wife. Because there was substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that Broderick disturbed the peace of Wagner, which constitutes an act of “abuse” under the Domestic Violence Protection Act,
we affirm the order.
FACTS AND PROCEEDING BELOW Tracy Wagne r and Aaron Broderick were married on April 27, 2006. Their

son, Jayd en, was born i n July 2007. They separated on October 20, 2008.
On October 23 , 2008, Wagner filed a petition for dissoluti on of marriage requesting joint legal custody and primary p hysical custody of their son , and visitation for
Broderick

. On May 5, 2011, a fter years of litigation, the court entered a stipulated judgment of dissolution which includ ed provisions for custody and visitation

. On October 3, 2014, Wagner filed an ex par te request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO), which was temporarily granted pending a hearing on October 23, 20 14.
On October 20, 2014, Broderick filed his response to the re quest for DVRO. On October 23, 2014, the court held a hearing on the request for DVRO. Wagner was represented by an attorney and Broderick represented himself. 1 At the hearing, Wagner testified that on 10 to 12 occasions, Broderick appeared to be photographing and/or videotaping her with his cell phone. Wagner expla ined that she was an assistant coach of Jayden’s soccer team, which met to practice on a weekly basis. Broderick would arrive at practice and place his cellular phone camera 10 inches away from Wagner’s face for a “couple of minutes,” app earing to videota pe her. At the hearing, Broderick questioned Wagner, asking her if she had told anyone about his alleged videotaping. She responded affirmatively, noting that she had told her attorney and “other people that have noticed it.” Broderick then asked if Wa gner recalled

1 The October 23, 2014 hearing took place throughout the day with multiple recesses due to other matters on the court’s calendar. At the end of the day, the court continued the hearing to the next day, October 24, 2014, to discuss the details of the DVRO. On that date, Broderi ck was represented by counsel.3

the names of the pe ople she told. She answered, “S ure.” Before she was a ble to provide the names, the court interjected, asking Brode rick why it was relevant. Broderick explained that “ [ i ] f she’s in fear of her safety, and it’s something t hat makes her uncomfortable, you would think that she would notify someone immediately.” The

court then asked, “D o the specific names matter then?” Broderick responded, “I f she mentioned it to the grocery clerk, then it shows that it wasn’t important, bu t if she mentioned it to people that were there that may have witnessed it, I can see that’s relevant.” The court noted that Broderick made a good point, but continued
, “I don’t find that relevant. She says she’s notified other people about it or discuss ed it with them.” The court then asked Wagner how many people she estimated notifying. Wagner replied that she had told four or five people, and the court directed Broderick to move on to another topic. Wagner then recounted the events of October 1, 201 4. She took Jayden to a dental appointment for his annual cleaning . Wagner knew that it was possible that Broderick would attend the dental appointment because she had given him notice of it via their Family Wizard calendar. Wagner explained that, being fearful of Broderick, she called ahead to the dentist’s office and asked the staff if they cou ld “set [the] chairs apart
from each other in case [Bro derick] were to show up.” The staff at the dentist office
accommodated h er request and set the chairs a pa rt. Upon arriving at the appointment,
how ever, Broderick moved his chair a few inches away from Wagner’s chair and appeared to be videotaping her

. After the appointment ended, Wagner attempted to say goodbye to Broderick and remain in the office with Jay den to allow Broderick time to leave first “so that [she] wouldn’t be alone with him in the parking lot.” Broderick, however, waited in the parking lot for Wagner and Jayden. Wagner stated that Broderick had parked his car in the spot directly next to he r car. Broderick placed his head out the window and yelled at Wagner when she walked by his car, which scared her

. He also appeared to be photographing or videotaping her with his camera through his car window.4

Later that after noon, Broderick arrived at Jayden’s soccer practice and, when it ended, sat in his car and appeared to be videotap ing Wag ner for several minutes through his car window. As Wagner was leaving practic e, Broderick exited his car
and approached her in an intimidating manner, forcing h er to back up into her car mirror. At that moment, Wagner saw a nother parent and called out to the parent, and Broderick

“ turn[ed] around with the phone and [went] back to his car, [sat] in the car and, again, [sat] there with the phone, holding it in the video [mode], with

. . . a smirk on his face.”
That evening, Wagner took Jayden to “f amily fun night ” at his school. When they arrived, Broderick was in his car, l eaving the event. Upon seeing Wagner and Jayden,
Broderick returned to the event and walk ed into the school behind Wagner and Jayden. Wagner told Broderick that he was making her uncomfortable. Wagner’s counsel stated that Wagner’s boyfriend, a police officer, was available as a witness to testify that he observed Broderick videotaping Wagne r on “numerous occasions,” but “because of time constraints,” counsel would not call him. Broderick, for his part, denied ever taping Wagner and stated that there were “no photos, no videos, zero.” The court noted that “it’s pretty clear to me [that Wa gner] is not making this up,

as far as her feelings, but feel ings aren’t enough. There need s to be affirmative acts by the other side that fall within [the DVPA ].” A fter hearing further testimony, the court granted the restraining order for a three

- year period , stating that it found Wagner to be credible, and Broderick’s constant videotaping, or appearance of videotaping, was “disturbing mother’s peace,” which constituted domestic violence under the DVPA

. The court noted that the DVRO needed to be crafte d narrowly so it would not implicate custody of Jayden or Broderick’s ability to spend time with his son. The court directed the parties to draft a proposed DVRO, and ordered the parties to return the following day
to finalize it

. On October 24, 2014, when the court reconvened Broderick was represented by
counsel

. Counsel asked the court whether Broderick had an opportunity to testify and make “any arguments.” The court explained that Broderick testified and cross

- examined5

Wagner, and the case had a “ very large record” and was “a very bitter case, very difficult case,” and the hearing on the DVRO had a “very thorough transcript.” The court further noted that “the overwhelming majority of the decision was a c redibility call . . . The

court found any re asonable person in mother’s position would have come to the same
conclusion” that having a video camera “within 10 inches of her face” on multiple
occasions satisfied the standard for a DVRO. Ultimately, the court ordered Broderick to

sta y 15 feet away fr om Wagner and not give the appearance that he is videotaping or photographing Wagner at any time.
Brode rick timely appealed the DVRO.
DISCUSSION We review a trial court’s granting of a protective order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) for abuse of discretion

. ( Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2 014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1143. ) In reviewing the evidence, we apply the substantia l
evidence standard of review , and we defer to the trial court on issues of credibility. ( Lenk v. Total

- Western, Inc. (2 001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968. ) On appeal, Broderick argues that the court er red by granting the DVRO solely based on Wagner’s subjective perception of abuse. We disagree. Family C ode s ection 6320 , subdivision (a) provides that a court may issue an
order under the DVPA en joining a party from “ disturbi ng the peace” of another party

. Although the DVPA does not provide a definition for “disturbing the peace,” several
Court of A ppeal opinions have held that “disturbing the peace” under section 6320
includes conduct that “ destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party. ” ( Burquet v. Brumbaugh
, supra , 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146 ; In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2 009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497. ) Here, Wagner testified that Broderick placed his cellular ph on e within 10 inches of her face, appearing to videotape or photograph her , for
minutes at a time on a weekly basis for two months at soccer practice s and at Jayden’s dentist appointment

. The court found that Broderick’s behavior disturbed Wagner’s

peace , or destroyed her mental or emotional calm
, and similarly would do so to a6

reaso nable person in Wagner’s position. In so finding, the court did not abuse its
discretion. Broderick attempts to distinguish Burquet by arguing that, in Burquet , an

ex

- boyfrie nd, unable to accept that his romantic relationship was over, engaged in

“ an unrelenting course of conduct, with sexual overtones.” But nothing in the DVPA

or the case law requires the abuse at issue to be sexual in nature , and we reject such a requiremen t. Broderick also argues on appeal that the trial court erred by ruling that he could not elicit the names of the individuals that Wagner told about his conduct, contending
that this information could have undermine d Wagner’s credibility. We disagree.
Broderick never argued to th e court that he intended to call the unnamed
individuals as witnesses or that their identities would undermine Wagner’s credibility. Rather, when questioned by the court as to why the names of the people Wagner told

were r el evant, Broderick responded, “I f she mentioned it to the grocery clerk, then it shows that it wasn’t important, but if she mentioned it to people that were t here that

may have witnessed it, I can see that’s relevant.” The mere recitation of their names by Wagner, however, would have had little, if any, probative value regarding her credibility. Thus, the ruling was not error. Finally, Broderick contends that the trial court erred by not allowing him to “argue
his case” and “tell his story” before issuing its decision. We disagree. Both parties were sworn in at the beginning of the hearing. Alt hough the court did not require Broderick to separately testify and argue, it allowed him to “tell his story” and argue through his
narrative presentation

. Indee d, he testified that he never videotaped or photographed Wagner and argued that Wagner was not credi ble

. Further, Broderick has not shown prejudice: H e points to no additional evidence or argument that he would have made if permitted more time for his de fense

. The court weighed the evidence and determined that Wagner’s testimony was
credible and Broderick’s was not , and that Broderick’s actions warranted a DVRO. This credibility call and determination were suppor ted by substantial evidence.7 DISPOSITIO N The trial court’s DVRO is affirmed. Parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

CHANEY , J.

LUI, J.