IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

GREGORY COOK,

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant,

v.

CYNTHIA GREBE, et al., 

Defendants/Counter-Claimants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 17-0211

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV 2015-002890

The Honorable Daniel G. Martin, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The East Valley Law Firm, Chandler

By Daryl R. Wilson

Counsel for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant

MacQueen & Gottlieb, PLC, Phoenix

By Benjamin L. Gottlieb, Patrick R. MacQueen

Counsel for Defendants/Counter-Claimants/Appellees

FILED 9-11-2018
COOK v. GREBE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, in 

which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Maurice Portley1 joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 The issue we address is whether a party who prevails on quiet 

title claims but loses on other claims or defenses is nonetheless eligible to 

recover attorneys’ fees under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section

12-1103(B). For the following reasons, we conclude that the statute’s 

prevailing-party determination is controlled by whomever prevails on the 

quiet title claims, and that non-quiet title claims are relevant only for 

purposes of deciding whether, in the court’s discretion, attorneys’ fees 

should be awarded and in what amount. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Gregory Cook and Cynthia Grebe are neighboring property 

owners.

2 Cook filed a complaint in superior court alleging he adversely 

possessed Grebe’s property by using and maintaining it for more than 15 

years. Cook also alleged that Grebe’s failure to maintain and secure the 

property created a private nuisance. Grebe filed counterclaims alleging 

quiet title, conversion, unjust enrichment, and trespass. After considering 

competing motions for summary judgment, the superior court granted 

partial summary judgment in favor of Cook on Grebe’s conversion 

counterclaim. 

¶3 Near the end of the jury trial on the remaining claims, the 

superior court struck Grebe’s unjust enrichment claim. The jury found in 

Grebe’s favor on her quiet title counterclaim and Cook’s adverse possession 

claim, and in Cook’s favor on his private nuisance claim and Grebe’s

 

1 The Honorable Maurice Portley, Retired Judge of the Arizona Court 

of Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant 

to Article VI, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution.

2 Grebe’s husband, John Meadows, is also a party to the litigation, but 

the property is titled only in Grebe’s name. For ease of reference, and 

because this opinion centers on the quiet title claims, we refer only to Grebe.
COOK v. GREBE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

3

trespass counterclaim. The court then determined that Grebe was “the 

prevailing party for purposes of the adverse possession and quiet title 

claims” and stated she could file an application for attorneys’ fees. 

¶4 Grebe requested attorneys’ fees in the amount of $82,726.75, 

which Cook opposed, asserting Grebe was not entitled to recover fees for 

claims on which she did not prevail. In its ruling, the court explained that 

Grebe was “deemed the prevailing party in this matter for purposes of

A.R.S. § 12-1103” and entered a fee award of $50,000. This timely appeal 

followed. 

DISCUSSION

¶5 Generally, a court may award attorneys’ fees only when 

authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties. Taylor v. S. Pac. Transp. 

Co., 130 Ariz. 516, 523 (1981) (citation omitted). As provided in A.R.S. 

§ 12-1103(B), a party prevailing in a quiet title action may recover attorneys’ 

fees if, 20 days before bringing the action, he or she tendered five dollars 

with a request that the other party execute a quit claim deed, and the other 

party did not comply. See Lange v. Lotzer, 151 Ariz. 260, 262 (App. 1986)

(“The Arizona Legislature has expressly determined that only a prevailing 

party who follows certain prerequisites may recover attorney’s fees in quiet 

title actions.”). Although § 12-1103(B) only refers to a “plaintiff,” a 

defendant who successfully asserts a quiet title counterclaim may seek 

attorneys’ fees. See Long v. Clark, 226 Ariz. 95-96, ¶¶ 1, 2 (App. 2010) 

(reversing a fee award to defendants in a quiet title action because, although

they successfully defended, they did not file a counterclaim). It is 

undisputed that Cook and Grebe each complied with § 12-1103(B)’s

prerequisites for recovering attorneys’ fees. 

A. Prevailing-Party Determination

¶6 We review the superior court’s determination of who is the 

prevailing party, for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees, for an abuse of 

discretion. Sanborn v. Brooker & Wake Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 178 Ariz. 425, 430 

(App. 1994). We review the interpretation of a statute de novo, and when 

doing so, our goal “is to effectuate the text if it is clear and unambiguous.” 

BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17, 19, ¶ 9 (2018). A 

statute’s words should be read in context to determine their meaning.

Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509, ¶ 7 (2017). We construe related 

statutes together and strive to give effect to each provision involved. Id. 

¶7 Cook argues the superior court erred in finding Grebe was the 

prevailing party because, when considering the totality of the litigation, he
COOK v. GREBE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

4

prevailed on a greater number of claims than she did. He contends the 

litigation was, at best, a draw. But Cook’s position fails to acknowledge the 

legislature’s word choices in describing the circumstances in which a party

may recover attorneys’ fees in litigation involving quiet title disputes. See

A.R.S. § 12-1103(B) (explaining the prerequisites for recovery of attorneys’ 

fees in an “action to quiet title to real property”) (emphasis added). The word 

“action,” by itself, has a broad meaning that may encompass any court

matter or proceeding. See A.R.S. § 1-215(1) (“‘Action’ includes any matter 

or proceeding in a court, civil or criminal.”). However, § 12-1103(B) refers 

to an “action to quiet title to real property,” indicating it is limited to that

specific kind of proceeding. See Action to Quiet Title, Black’s Law Dictionary

(10th ed. 2014) (“[A] proceeding to establish a plaintiff’s title to land by 

compelling the adverse claimant to establish a claim or be forever estopped 

from asserting it.”). 

¶8 Section 12-1101(A) supports this conclusion because it limits 

a quiet title action to parties who wish to assert their interest in a property’s 

title against those with an adverse interest in the title, thereby resolving or 

quieting the competing interests. Therefore, under § 12-1103(B), the 

determination of who is the prevailing party for purposes of awarding 

attorneys’ fees turns on whether a party successfully quieted title, 

regardless of whether claims that do not involve quieting title are included 

in the same lawsuit. See McCleary v. Tripodi, 243 Ariz. 197, 202, ¶ 26 (App. 

2017) (explaining that “[a] party successfully quieting title may recover 

attorney fees if” he or she complies with the requirements of A.R.S. 

§ 12-1103(B)). 

¶9 It is undisputed that the jury found in Grebe’s favor on the

competing quiet title claims. Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse 

its discretion in finding she was the prevailing party with regard to the 

attorneys’ fee provision of § 12-1103(B). Contrary to Cook’s assertion, the

court had no reason to look further than the quiet title and adverse 

possession claims because they are the only claims in this lawsuit that 

involved quieting title to the property. Cook’s private nuisance claim and 

Grebe’s conversion, unjust enrichment, and trespass counterclaims are not 

claims affecting title; they are relevant only in determining whether the

court should award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party, and if so, in what 

amount. See Scottsdale Mem’l Health Sys., Inc. v. Clark, 164 Ariz. 211, 215 

(App. 1990) (explaining that a court may consider the same factors that are 

considered in a contract action under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, as set forth in 

Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 570 (1985), when

determining whether to award attorneys’ fees in a quiet title action under 

§ 12-1103(B)); Chantler v. Wood, 6 Ariz. App. 134, 139 (1967) (noting that 
COOK v. GREBE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

5

§ 12-1103(B) entitled plaintiffs “to reasonable attorney’s fees for the time 

spent on the quiet title feature of the case”).

3

B. Reasonableness of Fee Award

¶10 Cook does not argue the superior court abused its discretion 

in deciding, after making the prevailing party determination, that it would 

award reasonable attorneys’ fees to Grebe. See Scottsdale Mem’l, 164 Ariz. at 

215-16. Instead, Cook contends that Grebe’s fee application failed to 

differentiate between her successful and unsuccessful claims, and therefore,

the application for attorneys’ fees should have been rejected under 

Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, Inc., 138 Ariz. 183 (App. 1983). He also 

argues the court’s approximate 40% reduction in attorneys’ fees was 

arbitrary and unsupportable because he prevailed on most of the claims, 

the fee application did not provide any evidence to support the $50,000 

amount, and “[n]either party argued for a 40% reduction.” 

¶11 We review the reasonableness of a fee award for an abuse of 

discretion. See Kay v. Biggs, 13 Ariz. App. 172, 177 (1970). As in other 

contexts, “an attorney’s affidavit supporting a fee application,” at a 

minimum, “should include ‘the type of legal services provided, the date the 

service was provided, the attorney providing the service . . . and the time 

spent in providing the service.’” Nolan v. Starlight Pines Homeowners Ass’n, 

216 Ariz. 482, 490, ¶ 37 (App. 2007) (quoting China Doll, 138 Ariz. at 188). 

“Once a party establishes its entitlement to fees and meets the minimum 

requirements in its application and affidavit for fees, the burden shifts to 

the party opposing the fee award to demonstrate the impropriety or 

unreasonableness of the requested fees.” Id. at 490-91, ¶ 38. To successfully 

challenge the application for attorneys’ fees, the opposing party must do so 

with specificity. Id. at 491, ¶ 38.

¶12 In the superior court, Grebe’s attorneys’ fees application and 

affidavit met the China Doll requirements, yet in response, Cook made only 

cursory arguments concerning the requested fee amounts without any 

 

3 Both parties cite cases involving awards of attorneys’ fees made 

pursuant to contractual provisions or A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A), arguing they 

prevailed under the tests employed in those contexts (e.g., based on 

“percentage of success” and “totality of the litigation”). But such cases are 

not helpful for determining which party prevailed under A.R.S. 

§ 12-1103(B) because its language, applicable only to “action[s] to quiet 

title,” is much more restrictive than A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A), which authorizes 

fee awards in “any action arising out of a contract.” 
COOK v. GREBE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

6

discussion on which amounts were unreasonable. His broad assertions are 

insufficient to challenge the specifics of Grebe’s fee application. See In re 

Indenture of Tr. Dated Jan. 13, 1964, 235 Ariz. 40, 52-53, ¶ 47 (App. 2014) (“A 

party challenging the amount of fees requested must provide specific 

references to the record and specify which amount or items are excessive.”).

¶13 Cook’s appellate arguments also lack specificity. He does not

point to any evidence suggesting the amount awarded was unreasonable, 

such as specific fee entries in the attorneys’ fee affidavit or citations to trial 

transcripts (which he failed to provide) showing the amount of trial time

spent on each aspect of the case. See A. Miner Contracting, Inc. v. Toho-Tolani 

Cty. Imp. Dist., 233 Ariz. 249, 262, ¶ 43 (App. 2013) (finding the superior 

court did not abuse its discretion in failing to reduce the attorneys’ fee 

award further because the appellant did not “identify with any particularity 

what evidence supports a further reduction in fees beyond the reduction 

already granted by the trial court”); Jones v. Burk, 164 Ariz. 595, 597-98 (App. 

1990) (declining to disturb attorneys’ fees award under A.R.S. § 12-1103(B) 

because both parties “fail[ed] to point to evidence suggesting an abuse of 

discretion”).

¶14 The superior court reduced Grebe’s requested attorneys’ fees 

by about 40%. On this record, Cook has not shown the court abused its 

discretion in failing to further reduce the fees Grebe requested. See China 

Doll, 138 Ariz. at 189 (explaining that when a party has achieved only partial 

success, “it would be unreasonable to award [fees] for all hours expended” 

and agreeing with the statement in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436

(1983), that there is “no precise rule or formula for making these 

determinations”).

¶15 In sum, Cook has pointed to nothing in the record indicating

the superior court erred in determining the prevailing party, deciding 

whether that party should be awarded fees, and assessing the 

reasonableness of the amount of the fee request. Cook has not overcome 

the presumption that the court knew and followed the law. See Maher v. 

Urman, 211 Ariz. 543, 548, ¶ 13 (App. 2005) (quoting State v. Ramirez, 178 

Ariz. 116, 128 (1994)). Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion. 
COOK v. GREBE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

7

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm the superior court’s attorneys’ fee award. As the 

prevailing party on appeal, we award taxable costs to Grebe; we also grant 

Grebe’s request for reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal under 

A.R.S. § 12-1103(B), subject to compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil 

Appellate Procedure 21.