UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

In re: CHARLES C. WALDO; 

ETHANNE S. WALDO, 

 Debtors. 

---------------------------- 

CHARLES C. WALDO; ETHANNE 

S. WALDO, 

 Appellants, 

v. 

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 

TRUST COMPANY; OCWEN 

LOAN SERVICING, LLC, 

 Appellees. 

No. 21-4050 

(D.C. No. 2:20-CV-00238-DBB) 

(D. Utah) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, EID, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

* Oral argument would not help us, so we have decided the appeal 

based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a)(2)(C); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if 

otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); Tenth Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 27, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 21-4050 Document: 010110689967 Date Filed: 05/27/2022 Page: 1
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This appeal involves property once owned by Charles and Ethanne 

Waldo. The Waldos obtained a mortgage, which was secured by a deed of 

trust. The Waldos eventually defaulted on the loan, triggering foreclosure 

proceedings. But the Waldos filed bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy 

proceedings, the Waldos unsuccessfully tried to prevent a creditor from 

enforcing the debt. Our appeal involves the aftermath of those bankruptcy 

proceedings. 

I. The Waldos challenge the proof of claim involving the mortgage.

In those bankruptcy proceedings, a proof of claim was filed by the 

Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, NA, as Indenture Trustee for 

the IMC Home Equity Loan Owner Trust 1998-7, and Ocwen Loan 

Servicing, LLC. The Waldos objected, but didn’t deny arrearage on the 

mortgage. They instead questioned whether the bank and Ocwen could 

enforce the debt. The bankruptcy court overruled the Waldos’ objection 

and granted summary judgment to the bank and Ocwen.1

The Waldos unsuccessfully moved to reopen and later sought 

reconsideration of the refusal to reopen, arguing that the bank and Ocwen 

1

 The bankruptcy court conducted a hearing and issued a written order. 

We don’t know whether the bankruptcy court provided an oral explanation 

because the bankruptcy court’s docket contains no transcript or audio 

recording of the hearing. We thus lack any explanation from the 

bankruptcy court for its rulings. But the Waldos never properly appealed 

the bankruptcy court’s denial of their objection or grant of summary 

judgment to the bank and Ocwen. 

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had no right to enforce the debt. In making this argument, the Waldos 

again questioned the proof of claim, insisting that the mortgage contract 

was no longer valid, Ocwen no longer serviced the loan, and the bank 

entity (that filed the proof of claim) no longer existed. 

II. The bankruptcy court denies the motions to reopen and 

reconsider. 

To decide the motion to reopen, the bankruptcy court considered how 

long the case had been closed, the possible relief for the Waldos, the 

strength of the fraud allegations, the similarity between the current 

allegations and earlier allegations, the potential for another court to hear 

the issues raised in the motion, the prejudice to Ocwen and the bank, and 

the prejudice to the Waldos if the case were to remain closed. The 

bankruptcy court concluded that these factors weighed against the Waldos, 

so the court denied their motion to reopen. 

The Waldos asked the bankruptcy court to reconsider, but the court 

treated the request as a motion to alter or amend a judgment and denied 

relief.

The district court affirmed, and the Waldos appeal. 

III. Article III Standing 

Before reviewing the bankruptcy court’s rulings, we assess Article 

III standing, which entails a jurisdictional issue. See Lee v. McCardle (In 

re Peeples), 880 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2018). The Waldos deny that 

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the bank has Article III standing in the appeal. But it is the Waldos, not the 

bank, who have invoked federal jurisdiction. So it’s the Waldos who must 

show Article III standing. See Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 

(2016). The Waldos do have Article III standing, and no one contends 

otherwise. 

We need not address whether the bank had Article III standing in the 

bankruptcy court. The bank’s standing in bankruptcy court could bear on 

summary judgment, but the Waldos didn’t properly appeal the summaryjudgment ruling. 

IV. Discretion to Reopen or Reconsider 

The bankruptcy court did not err in declining to reopen the 

proceedings or to reconsider that ruling. 

A. Standard of Review 

Despite the district court’s ruling, we independently review the 

bankruptcy court’s decisions without deferring to the district court’s 

analysis. WD Equip., LLC v. Cowen (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943, 947 

(10th Cir. 2017). In conducting this review, we apply the abuse–of–

discretion standard. See Nelson v. City of Albuquerque, 921 F.3d 925, 929 

(10th Cir. 2019) (motion to alter or amend the judgment); Woods v. Kenan 

(In re Woods), 173 F.3d 770, 778 (10th Cir. 1999) (motion to reopen). The 

bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if the decision is “arbitrary, 

capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Rocky Mountain 

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Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229, 1239 (10th Cir. 

2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. Motion to Reopen 

In seeking reopening, the Waldos presented numerous theories. Most 

stemmed from alleged trickery by the bank and Ocwen in filing the proof 

of claim in bankruptcy court. 

Duration. The Waldos contend that the bankruptcy court focused too 

heavily on how long the case had been closed. The bankruptcy court did 

label the passage of time the “most influential” factor. Suppl. R. at 549. 

And the Waldos correctly say that no time bar prevents the setting aside of 

a judgment for fraud on the court. United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 

1341–42 (10th Cir. 2002). But the passage of time is a proper factor for a 

bankruptcy court to consider when deciding whether to reopen a case. See 

Redmond v. Fifth Third Bank, 624 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2010). The 

bankruptcy court did not treat the passage of time as conclusive; the court 

considered this as just one of several factors. In doing so, the court acted 

within its discretion. See id.

Prejudice. The bankruptcy court also acted within its discretion 

when finding that reopening would prejudice Ocwen and the bank by 

forcing them to relitigate the validity of their proof of claim. In the 

Waldos’ view, Ocwen and the bank shouldn’t have participated in this 

case, so reopening the case would not have prejudiced them. The Waldos’ 

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argument ignores the interest of Ocwen and the bank in defending their 

judgment. Although the Waldos downplay the expected costs for Ocwen 

and the bank, the bankruptcy court could reasonably consider those costs 

prejudicial. 

Consideration of the Waldos’ arguments. The Waldos assert that 

the bankruptcy court ignored their arguments and evidence. We disagree. 

The bankruptcy court denied the Waldos’ motion to reopen and explained 

the decision. The Waldos do not point to anything in the record showing 

that the bankruptcy court ignored any arguments or evidence. 

Standing. The Waldos imply that the bankruptcy court overlooked 

their challenge to Article III standing for Ocwen and the bank. But the 

Waldos’ motion to reopen did not challenge Article III standing of Ocwen 

or the bank. 

Fraud on the court. The motion instead attacked the grant of 

summary judgment based on fraud on the court. In arguing that Ocwen and 

the bank had committed a fraud on the court, the Waldos asserted that 

“there was never the requisite [s]tanding to file a [c]laim.” Suppl. R. at 

539. Rejecting this assertion, the bankruptcy court pointed out that the 

Waldos had already raised nearly identical challenges. This 

characterization fell within the bankruptcy court’s discretion, and the 

Waldos have not shown an abuse of discretion in the denial of their motion 

to reopen. 

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C. Motion to Reconsider 

Nor did the bankruptcy court err when denying the Waldos’ motion to 

reconsider. 

The bankruptcy court could reconsider when the controlling law has 

changed, new evidence becomes available, or correction is needed because 

of a clear error or manifest injustice. Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 

204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). Applying these factors, the 

bankruptcy court concluded that nothing had substantially changed since 

the ruling on the motion to reopen. 

The Waldos argue that the bankruptcy court ignored some of their 

arguments. We disagree. The court said that it had considered all of the 

arguments, and we have no reason to think otherwise. 

Granted, the bankruptcy court did not address the Waldos’ references 

to Article III standing. But even if these references had constituted an 

argument based on a lack of Article III standing, the bankruptcy court 

would have acted within its discretion by declining to consider the 

argument: The Waldos had not presented the argument in their motion to 

reopen, and the bankruptcy court didn’t need to consider arguments that 

could have been presented earlier. See Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 

1708 (2020). 

The Waldos contend that the attorney for Ocwen and the bank 

“should not have been allowed to participate” in the proceedings. 

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Appellant’s Opening Br. at 3a. 2

 For this contention, the Waldos cite 

perceived deficiencies in the attorney’s entry of appearance: 

1. The attorney never filed an entry of appearance for Ocwen or 

its successor. 

2. The attorney’s appearance form identified the bank by its old 

name. 

This argument is invalid under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 

9010(b): “An attorney appearing for a party in a case under the Code shall 

file a notice of appearance with the attorney’s name, office address and 

telephone number, unless the attorney’s appearance is otherwise noted in 

the record.” This rule applies because the record otherwise clarifies that 

the attorney represented both Ocwen and the bank. For example, the 

attorney’s brief for summary judgment identifies the clients as Ocwen and 

the bank under its new name. So any perceived deficiencies in the entry of 

appearance wouldn’t matter.3

 For this contention, the Waldos have not 

shown that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when denying 

reconsideration. 

2

 The attorney did not participate in the proceedings related to the 

motion to reopen, so we understand this argument to address the denial of 

reconsideration. 

3

 We deny the Waldos’ request to strike the entry of appearance filed 

here by counsel for Ocwen and the bank. The entry of appearance complies 

with Tenth Circuit Rule 46.1. 

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D. The Waldos’ Additional Arguments 

The Waldos challenge the bankruptcy court’s award of attorney’s 

fees. The bankruptcy court ordered the fees more than a month after the 

Waldos had filed their notice of appeal. The Waldos did not file a 

supplemental notice of appeal, a step necessary to give us “jurisdiction 

over an attorneys’ fees issue that becomes final subsequent to the initial 

notice of appeal.” EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1250 

(10th Cir. 1999). So we lack jurisdiction to consider the award of 

attorney’s fees. 

The Waldos make several claims that appear to challenge the 

bankruptcy court’s ruling on summary judgment. But that ruling isn’t at 

issue, so we cannot consider the Waldos’ challenge to the grant of 

summary judgment. See Lang v. Lang (In re Lang), 414 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 

(10th Cir. 2005). 

The Waldos allege many problems with the district court’s analysis. 

They argue, for example, that the district court erred by ignoring evidence 

and by taking judicial notice of several documents. We have independently 

reviewed the bankruptcy court’s rulings, disregarding the documents 

noticed by the district court, and we find no abuse of discretion. 

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Affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Robert E. Bacharach 

Circuit Judge 

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