A t t h e t r i a l l e v e l , t h e c a s e a l s o i n v o l v e d t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s o f

a t h i r d c h i l d o f

M o t h e r , D. D. K. 1 T h a t ch ild ha d a d iff

e re n t fath e r, a n d issu e s re g a rd ing ter m ina tio n o f p a re n ta l righ ts to D .D .K . ar e no t i n v o lve d in this ap p eal by Fat her. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 4, 200 3 IN RE: D. D. K., D. M. M., an d T. J . M., JR.
Appeal f romthe Juvenile Court for Montgom ery C ounty No. 64-169 L. Raym ond Grim es, Judge

No. M2003- 01016-COA-R 3-P T - F iled Dece m ber 30, 2003

This appea l involve s a petiti on filed by the Depa

rtment of Children’s Ser vices to terminate the pare ntal rig hts of Father to his two minor children. The trial court g rante d the petition and Father appea ls the decision. B eca use we find the petition was improperly g rante d, we va cate and re mand.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Vacat ed and Rem anded

P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., joined.

Adrian R. B ohnenber g er, Clar ksville, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, T. J. M ., Sr.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , At torne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; P. Rob in Di xon, Jr., As sis ta nt At torne y Ge ne ra l, fo r the app e lle e , St a te of

Te nn e sse e , D e pa

rt me nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s.
OP IN ION

At iss ue is the tr ia l cou rt ’s g ra nti ng the pe tit ion to t e rm inate the pa re nta l r ig hts of

F a the r i n reg ard to his t wo (2) minor children, D.M.M., a son born October 7, 1989, and T.J.M., J r., a son born J anuary 6, 1992. 1
On September

4, 1 9 9 8 , t h e Depa

rtment of Children Servic es (“ DCS”) petitioned the Montgome ry County juvenile court for temporary custody of si x -y ear old T.J .M., J r. and his older brother, nine y ear old D.M.M. The petiti on alleg ed that the children’s mother, T.W., was using cra ck
coca ine on a r eg ular ba sis and was not providing adequate ca re to the c hildren. The pe tition identified F ather

by name a nd stated his addre ss was unknown. B y order enter ed the sa me day , the2

juvenile judg e found pr obable c ause that the children w ere depende nt and neg lected and place d them in DCS custody . After

working wi t h M o t h er for a y ear , DCS determined that the c hildren we re “re ady to return home,” and a trial home visit was attempted in Novembe r, 1999. Howe ver, Mother subsequently

tested positive for c ocaine , and on J anuary 4, 2000, the childre n wer e ag ain re moved f r o m th e h o me , p la c e d b r ie f ly in f o s te r c ar e , a n d th e n p la c e d w ith th e ir mate r n a l a

u n t G

. W.

At the time of the re movals, the children w ere living with Mother. Father spent a g reat deal of time at the a

partment, but denie s he wa s living there. He testified he ha d daily visited or chec ked
o n t h e c h i l d r e n d u r i n g t h e tr i a l p e r i o d w h e n t h e c h i l d r e n w e r e r e t u r n e d t o t h e i r m o t h e r ’ s c u s t o d y. He wa s awa

re D CS removed the childre n.

Father testified he went to the DCS off ice two day s after

the re moval. He testified he was not give n any

paper work to fill out and was not told to call or r eturn to the DCS office . He ne ver made a nother attempt to contact DC S about hi s children. He also testified he onc e telephone d the
ma te rn a l aun t w ith wh om the c hil dr e n w e re liv ing . H e te sti fi e d s he tol d h im h e wa s n ot a llo we d to visit t he childre n or come ar o u n d them. He did not make any eff ort to see or

contac t the children beca use he did not wa nt to cause a ny trouble. H e s aw t h e chil dren at a fa milyfuner al but did not vis it w ith the m be c a us e , h e te sti fi e d, he didno t w a nt t o c a us e a ny pr ob le ms. During this time, Father lived in a shed behind his par ents’ house. H is mailing addr ess was his parents’ house , and he r ece ived mail there

. He s t at ed he had told DCS hi s addre ss when the children w ere remove d. The children’ s case worke r testified the children knew wher e Father lived and g ave he r g ener al direc tions to the place

. She also testified she looked for the par ents’ house a nd found it once. She did not testify that she tried to g o in or that she talked, or tried to talk, to Father or his pare nts at that time.

F a the r t e sti fi e d h e wa nte d th e c hil dr e n to liv e wi th h im, bu t it wa s his un de rs ta nd ing he c ou ld not ge t his children bac k beca use he did not have a sui table place for them to live. As of the date of trial, he still did not have suitable housing, but testified he kne w that it would be nec essary to have a suitable plac e to live in order to g et the children. He also testified, howeve r, that a r epre sentative of the De pa rt me nt o f H uma n Se rv ic e s h a d tol d hi m on ly six mo nth s e arl ie r that he wo uldha ve to establish a suitable re sidence and he had then filed applications for gove rnment subs idiz ed housing
a ndwa s o n tw o w a iti ng lis ts. Appar ently , Father ha d been unde r a prior order to pay child support to Mothe r. I n J anuary of 2001, a y ear

afte r the c hildren we re r eturne d to DCS custody , a new support order was e ntere d. The Assistant District Attorney in char g e of c hild support enforc ement in the county testified that
a n o rd e r wa s ent e re d by de fa ult be c a us e F a the r did no t app e ar at the he ari ng . Co ns e qu e ntl y , c hil d
su pp ort w a s se t us in g a p re su mpt ive sa lary of $2 5, 76 1 a c c or din g to the c hil d s up po rt g uid e lin e s. Reg ular pa y ments had bee n made more or less we ek l ysince Julyof 2001 by Father’s e mploy erT hi s t est i m o ny co nt radict ed t he t est i m o ny of t he D C S ca sewo rker and t he al l egat i o ns i n t he p et i t i o n. 2

T he casewo rker cal l ed t hat off i ce i n prep arat i o n fo r t he t erm i nat i o n pro ceed i ng. 3

M ot h er ’ s r i g h t s w er e t er mi n at ed af t er t h i s h ea r i n g by or der da t ed Ju l y 8, 2002. M ot h er ’ s t er mi n at i on i s n ot 4

a t i ssu e in this a p p e a l.

M eanwhil e, on N ov embe r 4, 2002, D CS pr epa r ed a n ew pe r man en cy pl an for t h e ch i l dr en w i t h t h e g oal of 5 ad o p t i o n.
3 pursuant to a wa g e assig nment. The a mount paid was less than the a mount o rd er ed

. Fa t her w as 2 employ ed by

the Cityof Clarksville in it s re cr ea t i o n department. Nothing in the r ecor d indicates how long he had be en so employ ed. He was not aske d if his job wa s full time or part time, as ha d been indicated th rough hea rsay testimonyear lier in the trial, or how much money he ea rned. The Assistant D.A. test i fi ed h is office would have pr ovided DCS information on Father’s pla ce of
e mpl oy me nt i f D CS ha d a sk e d for it. F a the r te sti fi e d he c ou ld re c e ive te le ph on e c a lls a t w or k. DC S
never attempted to contac t him there and ne ver asked the child support office for information about Father. 3

II. DCS filed a petition to terminate the pa renta l rig hts of Mother and F ather on Fe bruary 20, 2002. The pe tition allege d Father ha d abandone d the children by not visit ing and not pay ing support fo r the fo ur

month s im me diate ly

pr e c e din g the pe tit ion . A n a ff ida vit a c c omp a nie d th e pe tit ion in which Ms. Hall, the DCS ca seworke r, t estified reg arding her unsuc cessf ul attempts to locate Mother,
c on c lud ing Mo the r’ s w he re abo uts we re un kn ow n an d co uld no t be as c e rt a ine d. No su c h a ff ida vit reg arding Father acc ompanied the petition. I ndeed, F ather appea red at the hearing on the petition held May 23, 2002, and reque sted appointment of counse l. The hea ring was c ontinued as to Father’s pa re nta l r ig hts a nda n att orn ey was app oin te d f or him

. Th e he ari ng on the pe tit ion to t e rm inate 4 Father’s r i gh t s was held Oc tober 17, 2002. The only order in the rec ord bef

ore us, e ntitled Final Dec ree of Gua

rdianship, that appe ars to g rant termination of Father ’s p arental rig hts was enter ed Marc h 25, 2003, stating it wa s entere d nunc pro tunc , but f ailing to state the date it should have been enter ed. The orde r beg ins with a rec ital that the matter “ came on to be hea rd Oc tober 17, 2002.” 5 The orde r terminate d Father’s pare ntal rig hts on the g round of abandonme nt, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1- 11 3( g )( 1) , b a se d o n h is fa ilu re to vis it, a nd a fi nd ing that suc h termin a tio n is in the be st i nte re sts of the c hildren.

III

. A par ent has a

fundame ntal rig ht to the car e, custody and contr ol of his or her c hild. Stanley
v . I lli no is , 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. C t. 1208, 1212-13 (1972); Nash-Putnam v. Mc Cloud , 921 S.W. 2d17 0, 17 4- 75 (T e nn . 1 99 6) ; In Re Ad op tio n of a F

e ma le Chi ld , 896 S.W .2d 546, 547 (Tenn. 1995); Nale v. Robertson , 871 S.W .2d 674, 678 (Tenn. 1994). This right is a fundame ntal but not
abs olu te ri g ht, a ndthe state ma y int e rf e re wi th p a

re nta l r ig hts if

the re is a c omp e lli ng state int e re st.4

Santosky v . Kramer , 455 U. S. 7 45 , 7 47 , 1 02 S. Ct . 1 38 8, 13 91 (1 98 2) ; Nash-Putnam , 921 S.W .2d at 174-75.
Terminating pare ntal rig hts has the leg al ef fec t of reduc ing the pare nt to the role of a complete stra ng er, “ severing f oreve r all leg al rig hts a nd obligations of the pare nt.” Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-1-113( l )( 1 ). T h e U n i t ed S t at es S u p re m e C o u rt h as re co gn i z ed t h e u n i q u e n at u re o f p ro ce ed i n gs to terminate pa

renta l rights, stating that “[f]ew conseque nces of judicial action ar e so g rave as the
sever ance of natura l family ties.” M.L.B. v. S.L.J. , 519 U.S. 102, 119, 117 S. C t. 555, 565 (1996) (q u o t i n g Santosky, 455 U.S. at 787, 102 S. Ct . at 1412 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting) )

. As a re sult, “[t ]he int e re st o f p are nts in the ir re la tio ns hip wi th the ir c hil dr e n is su ff ic ie ntl y fu nd a me nta l to c ome wi thi n the finite class of liberty interests protec ted by the Four teenth Amendme nt.” Id. The c onstitut ional protec tions of the pare nt-child relationship require c erta in safeg uards be fore the re lationship can be
sever ed. O’Danie l v. Me ssier , 9 05 S.W. 2d18 2, 18 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 5) . T his mos t dr a sti c interfe renc e with a pa

rent’s rights re quires “the opportunity for a n individualiz ed dete rmination that a par ent is either unf

it or will cause substantial harm to his or her child befor e the f

undamental right to the care and custody

of the c hild can be ta

ken aw ay .” In re Swanson , 2 S.W .3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999).
Our leg islature has established those situations in which the state’s interest in the welfa re of a child justifies interfe renc e with a parent’s constitut ional rig hts by setting f orth g rounds on which termination proce eding s can be brought, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g ), and pare ntal rig hts may be terminated only

in those statutorilydefine d circ umstances. In re M .W .A. , 980 S.W .2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). B eca use the de cision to terminate par ental rig hts affects fundamental constitutional rights, courts mu s t apply a hig her standa

rd of pr oof whe n adjudicating termination
case s. Santosky , 455 U. S. at 76 9, 10 2 S. Ct. a t 14 03 ; In re M.W .A. , 9 80 S.W. 2da t 62 2; O’Danie l , 90 5 S. W.2 d a t 18 6. To jus tif y the te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts , th e g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatio n mu st be e sta bli sh e d b y

c le ar andc on vin c ing e vidence. Te nn . Co de . A nn . § 36 -1 -1 13 (c )( 1) ; In re Valentine , 79 S.W .3 d 5 3 9 , 5 46 (Tenn. 2002) . “This heig htened standa rd . . . ser ves to preve nt the
unwar rante d termination or i nterfe renc e with the bi ologic al par ents’ rig hts to their children.” In re M.W .A. , 980 S.W .2d at 622.

The e x istence of

any one statutory

g round will support terminatio no f anin d iv idua l’s pare ntal rig hts. I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d at 473. I n addition, if a c ourt, apply ing the appropriate evide ntiary standard, de termines that one of the g rounds exist s, the court must also find, using the clear a nd convincing evidenc e standa rd, that termination is in the child’s best int ere st. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(c )(2)

. Howeve r, a best interests analy sis is not war rante d unless g rounds have been pr oved.
The sole g round alleg ed as the b as i s for the te rmination of Father’s pa renta l rig hts was abandonme nt, as set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6 -1 -1 1 3 (g)(l), which incor porate s the definition found in Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-1-102( 1)( A) (I ). Unde r that statute, abandonment is the willful failure to visit , to support, or to make re asonable pay ments for s u p p o rt for a period of f

our c on se c uti ve mon ths imm e diate ly pr e c e din g the fi lin g of

the pe tit ion . Wh e n u sin g that g ro un d, DC S is r e qu ir e d b y

statut e to p ro vid e no tic e to the pa re nt o f the c on du c t th a t w ill c on sti tut e aba nd on me nt,5

a s a pr e re qu isi te to t e rm inatio n o n th a t g ro un d. We b e g in our anal y si s o f this c a se wi th tho se re qu ir e me nts

.
I V.

Ev e n a ft e r a

c hil d h a d b e e n v a lid ly

c omm itt e d to thec us tod y of DC S, the Sta te ’s fi rs t priority is to restore the family unit if at all possible. In t he Matter D.D.V. , No. M2001-02282-COA- R3-J V, 2002 WL 225891, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 14, 2002) (n o T en n

. R

. App. 11 application filed). Ad dit ion a lly , f

or a ny c hil d p la c e d in fo ste r c are , D CS mu st p re pa re a pe rm a ne nc y

plan w ith in thirty day s of that place ment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2-403( a)( 1). A permanenc y plan i s a written plan for
a c hil d p la c e d in fo ste r ca

re

. Th e pla n s e ts o ut r e qu ir e me nts fo r the a c hie ve me nt o f a sp e c if ic g oa l, such as reunific ation of the family , adoption, or perma nent foster car e. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-2- 402(8) & -403(a)( 1). Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2-403( a)( 2)(A) mandates that the require ments of the perma nency

plan be state d in specific te rms an d b e re as o nably rela ted to the spec ific g oal. The pe rm a ne nc y

pla ns are to be re vie we d wi thi n a sp e c if ie d ti me a ft e r f

os te r c are pla c e me nt andno le ss often than e very six (6) months there afte r, t o assess compliance with the requirements and pr oject a likely date on whic h the g oal of the pla n will be achie ved. Te nn. Code Ann. § 37-2- 404(b).

P ar en t s ar e u s u al l y i n v o l v ed i n t h e d ev el o p m en t an d re v i ew o f p er m an en cy p l an s

. T h ro u gh that pr oc e ss the pa

re nt i s in fo rm e d o f the ste ps he or sh e mus t tak e to ha ve the c hil d r e turne d a ndto avoid termination of pa

renta l rig hts. I n particula

r, t he legislature has dete rmined that the g round of abandonme nt must be ex plained to the parents. To that end, Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2- 403 provides in p e rt ine nt p art : (a) (2)( A) The perma nency plan for any

child in foster c are shall include a state ment
o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b e t w e e n t h e p ar e n t s , t h e a g e n c y a n d t h e c a s e w o rk e r o f s u c h a g e n c y. Such statements shall include the r esponsibiliti es of eac h party in spe cific terms and shall be re asonably

rela ted to the ac hievement of t he g oal spec ified in subdivision (a) (1). The statem ent sha l l i n clu de the defin itions of "ab andon m ent" . . . contained in § 36-1-102 and the cr iter ia and procedures for te rmi n ation of parental rights. Eac h party shall sign the statement and be g iven a c opy of it. The court must revie w the p roposed plan w ithin si x ty (60) da y s of the foster car e place ment. . . .
(B )(i) The pare nts or leg al g uardia ns of the child shall rec eive notice to appea r at the court re view of the perma nency plan or the pla n of ca

re a nd th e c our t s hal l e xpl ain on t he r e c or d t he law r e lat ing to aba ndonm e nt c ont ain e d in § 36 -1 -1 02 , a nd sha ll
e xpl ain th at

th e c ons e que nc e s o f failur e to v is it orsuppo r t the c hild wil l be te r m ina ti on o f the par e nt s' orgua r dia ns' r igh ts to th e c hild, . . . . I f the pa rents or leg al g uardia ns are not at the hea ring to review the permanenc y plan or plan of car e, the court shall ex plain to the pare nts or g uardia ns at any

subsequent hea

ring reg arding the c hil d h e ld the re a ft e r, that the c on se qu e nc e s o f f a ilu re to v isi t or

su pp ort th e c hil d will be termination of the pa rents’ or g uardia ns’ rig hts to the child, . . . .6

(ii) I f the pare nts or g uardia ns of the child cannot be g iven notice to appe ar at the court revie w of the perma nency plan or plan of car e, or if they ref use or f ail to appea

r at the court re view of the perma nen cy p l an or plan of ca re, or cannot be found to provide notice for the court revie w of the permanenc y plan or plan of car e, any ag ency which holds custody

of the c hild in foster ca

re or in any other type of c are and whic h se e ks to te r m ina te par e nt al o r gua r dia n r igh ts bas e d upon aba ndonm e nt of that c hild und er § 36- 1-102 , shall not be precluded f rom procee din g wi th the te rm ination bas e d upon th e gr ounds of ab ando nm e nt , if the age ncy

demonstrates at the time of t h e t er m i n at i o n p ro ce ed i n g: ( a ) That the c ourt rec ord shows, or the pe titioni ng party prese nts to the court a copy of the pe rmane ncy

plan or plan of car e that shows that the defe ndant par ents or leg al g uardia ns, subsequent to t h e court review in subdivisi on (a) (2)( B) (I ), has sig ned the portion of the permanenc y plan or plan of

car e which de scribes the criteria for e stablishing abandonme nt under § 36-1- 102, or that the c ourt rec ord shows that, at a subsequent hearing r eg arding the child, the court made the statements to the par ents or lega l gua rdians re quired by

subdivision (a) (2)( B) (I ).
( b ) B y an af fidavit, that the child’s pe rmane ncy plan or plan of

car e containing lang uag e which describes the criteria for establishing
aba nd on me nt u nd e r § 36 -1 -1 02 wa s pre se nte d by the a g e nc y

pa rt y to the p ar e n ts o r

g u ar d ia n s a t an y

ti me p r io r

to f il in g th e te rmination petition, or that there w as an attempt at an y t i m e t o prese nt the plan which desc ribes the criteria for establishing abandonment under § 36- 1-102 to the par ents or g uardia ns at any time by the ag ency

party , and that su c h a tte mpt

wa s r e fu se d b y

the pa re nts or g ua rd ia ns

.

( c ) That if the court rec ord does not conta in a sig ned copy of the perma nency

plan or plan of

car e, or if the petition i ng ag ency cannot present evidence of a pe rmane ncy plan or plan of

car e showing evidenc e of suc h notice having been give n or an affida vit showing that the p la n w a s g iv e n o r th a t th e p lan w a s a tt e mp te d to b e g iv e n to the pare nts or g uardia ns by

the ag ency

and wa s ref

used by the par ents or g uardia ns, and, in this circumstance , if th er e is no other court rec ord of t h e e xp la n a ti o n b y

th e c o u r t o f

th e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f

ab a n d o n ment and the right to see k an at t orney at any time, then th e pe ti ti oni ng agency shall f

ile wi th the court

an af fi dav i t i n th e te rm ination procee din g wh ich desc ribes in detail the party's dili gent efforts to bring su ch notice r equired by su bdi vision (a)( 2 )( B )(I) to such par e nt orgua r dia n at

any ti m e pr ior

to filing th e ag e nc y's filing7 of the term ination petition .).
§ 37-2-403 ( emphasis adde d).
Thus, DCS was not authorized to procee d on the g round of a bandonment unless it could show (1) F ather was g iven the re quired notice by a perma nency plan containing the notice and sig ned by F a the r o r t hat Fath e r r e fu se d to sig n s uc h a plan p re se nte d to him , ( 2) in the abs e nc e of tho se documents, some court rec ord showing an explanation by the court of the conse quence s of abandonme nt, or (3) a n aff idavit of di lige nt eff

orts by DCS to provide such notice prior to the f iling of the termination petition. Our revie w of the rec ord befor e us contains none of t h es e a l t er native methods of showing notice.

Th e r e ar e n o p r e

- p e t i t i o n p e r m a n e n c y p l a n s i n t h e r e c o r d

. T h e r e w a s n o t e s t i mon yDC S attempted to pre sent a plan to Father. The recor d does contain Quarterly Prog ress Reports of Children in S t at e Custodyand Judi cial Review Summaries of various dates during the childre n’s place ment in s ta te c us tod y . T he y

are a ll r e la te d to Mo the r’ s o bli g a tio ns un de r a pe rm a ne nc y plan sh e app are ntl y ag ree d to. We have car efully revie wed each of these documents and find no indication F ather was ever included in a ny perma nency planning or judicial revie w. Nothing on the J udici al R ev iew Sum mari e s r e fl e c ts tha t F a the r w a s g ive n th e re qu ir e d n oti c e by the c ou rt

.
I n its order terminating Father ’s parental rig hts, the court spec ifically found that F ather

had appea red twic e in court, “April 12, 2002, whe n he announc ed in open c o u rt t h at h e would hire an attorney and on May

23, 2002, at t he ini tial termination hearing when he announce d that he could not hire a n a tt o r n e y

. ” N o th in g in th is o r d e r in d ic a te s th a t F a th e r w a s n o ti f ie d o f th e d e f

in ition and
c o n s e q u e n c e s o f

ab a n d o n me n t i n o p e n c o u r t o n th e s e o c c a s io n s

. I n a n y e v e n t, th o s e ap p ear ance s o c c u rr e d a f

t e r t h e f i l i n g o f t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e o n t h e g r o u n d o f ab a n d o n m e n t

. C o n s e q u e n t l y, we must consider

whether DCS complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2- 403(a) (2)( B) (ii)( c ).

The re cord c ontains no aff idavit as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2-403(a)( 2)(B )(ii) “ c”. I n addition, the testimonyat the hea ring on the petition by

the ca s ewor

ker, Ms. Ha ll, indicates no aff idavit comply ing w ith subsection ( c ) could ha ve bee n filed.

Court: And, from Septembe r of 1998 to F ebrua ry the 20 , 2002, what ef

forts did y ou th

ma k e to c o n ta c t [ T

. M

. Sr

. ]? Ms. Hall: We alway s sent him letters informing him of Foster Care , Permane ncy

Pla ns , a nythi ng that w a s ta kin g pla c e wi th the De pa

rt me nt. Court: Did any

of those letter s come ba ck to y ou? Ms. Hall: No, sir. Court: Do y ou have a rec ord her e today , y our file?
***** Court: C an y o u l o ok throug h y our file f rom 1998 and tell the Court wha t le tt e r s w e r e f

o r w ar d e d o r

w h a t n o ti c e s w e r e f

o r w ar d e d to [T

. M

. Sr ]?
 T h e su m m a ry sta te s tha t F a the r’s a d d re ss is “L o u ise A v e n u e , C la rk sv ill e , T N .” T h e su m m a ry is c h e c k e d to 6 i ndi cat e t he pare nt s / car egi ver not i f i ed. T he mat er nal aunt ap pear s t o hav e a t t ended t he r evi ew. T he r ecomm ended g oal

w a s “re la tive p la c e m e n t d u e to m o the r’s to ta l no n -co m p lian c e w ith p e rm a n e n c y p la n a n d p e n d ing c rim ina l ch a rg e s.”
8 Ms. Ha ll: Th e on ly on e that c a n be fo un d is on Janu ary 20 02 to [T. M. Sr .]. Th is

is the only

one that can be found. Mr. Hay : Were ther e F oster Care Review B oards se t for these children? M s

. H a l l : Ye a h. Ye s. We ha v e F o s t e r R e v i e w l e t t e r s i n h e r e , b u tt h e y ’ r e a ll g oing to other

people.
** *** Co u r t: G o b a c k

to th e b e g in n in g , M s

. H a ll

. Wh e n d idy o u k n o w [T

. M

. Sr ]? Ms. Hall: J ust acc ording to the rec ords, there is no information on him. He never , there

i s n o p er m an en cyp l an i n t h e f i l e w h er e h e s i gn ed o r a n y t h i n g. Cou rt : Th a t’ s n ot the qu e stion I ’m a sk ing . H e c a n’ t si g n a

Pe rm a ne nc y

Pla n, Ms. H a ll , if h e d o e s n ’ t kn o w ab o u t i t. Wh e n d idy o u
- a ll k n o w ab o u t [ T

. M

. Sr

. ]? Ms. Hall: I learned about [T.M.S r.] two-and- a- half y ear s ag o when I rec eived this case. Court: Ms. Hall, wh y d i d n’t y ou contac t or notify [T.M.S r.] prior to J anuary 10 , th 2002? Ms. Hall: I

have c ontacted [T.M.Sr.] before January 2002.
**** (B rief r ece ss taken) Court: I n revie wing y our file in our short break, . . . .what notice or notices y ou found
s in c e th e c h il d r e n h a v e b e e n inc u s to d y in ‘ 9 8 to [T

. M

. Sr

. ]? Ms. H all: Yes, sir. There was a letter sent out to [T.M. Sr] by a previous case manag er

in 2000 telling him that they was g oing to ha ve a Judicial Review B oard. Court: Where wa s that sent to? Ms. Hall: That wa s sent to 408 L ouise L ane. 6 Court: All rig ht. Wh at els e, what other notice or notices do y ou have in ther e or c o mm u n ic a ti o n s to [T

. M

. Sr

. ]? Ms. Hall: We ha ve, the J anuary the 10th, 2002 informing him that the Depa rtment was considering termination of pate rnal rights. We have one we nt out March 12th, 2002 informing him of a court date.

On re -c ro ss e xami na tio n, Ms. Ha ll h a d th e fo llo wi ng e xch a ng e wi th F a the r’ s c ou ns e l:
Attorney : Did y ou ever try to find o u t where [T.M.S r.] was employ ed, whe re c hil d s up po rt

wa s c omi ng fr om? Ms. Hall: No, sir. Attorney : And so, y ou never tried to contac t him at his j ob? Ms. Hall: No, sir. . . . At torne y : Di d y ou e ve r, did a n inv e sti g a tiv e of fi c e r o r anythi ng fo r D CS
e v e r y try to f in d [T

. M

. Sr

. ]? Ms. Hall: Acc ording to my knowledg e, I ’m unsure right now.W h i l e we c u s t omar i l y l i mi t ou r c on s i der at i on t o t h os e i s s u es r ai s ed by t h e p art i es , T en n

. R. App. P. 13( b) 7 p erm i t s us t o co nsid er o t he r i ssue s i n ord er to p rev en t i nju ry t o t he p ub l i c a nd p rej ud i ce t o t he jud i cial p ro ce ss. T his case i nv ol ves a f

un dam ent al r i gh t prot ect ed by our Co ns t i t ut i on as wel l as s t at ut ory procedur al r equi r ement s for i nt er fer enc e
w ith tha t righ t. T h u s, it falls w ithin the e x c e p tio n in R u le 1 3 (b ).
9 Thus, DCS sent two letters or notices to F ather befor e filing the termination petition. Neither
wa s mad e a n e xhibi t or

app e ars in the re c or d b e fo re us . T he wi tne ss’ s d e sc ri pti on of the do c ume nts does not indicate tha t either include d the notice r equire d by Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 2-403(a )(2) (A).
Consequently , we c onclude that DCS has fa iled to demonstrate a ny o f the statutory circ umstances unde r which it could proc eed to terminate Father’s pa renta l rig hts on the g round of
aba nd on me nt.

This court has previously

held that without proof in the re cord of compliance with the notice provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2-403, a trial court’s f inding of abandonme nt must be set aside. In the Matter of C.L.H. et al , No. M 2000-02799-COA- R3-J V, 2001 WL 605101, *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 5, 20 01 ) ( no Te nn . R. Ap p. 11 app lic a tio n fi le d) . In th a t c a se , th e pa re nts ha d b e e n in c lud e d in the permanenc y plans and both had worked wit h DCS in varying de g ree s. Nonethele ss, because the plans did not include the re quired information and the re cord did not otherwise show that DCS had adequately

explained the conseque nces o f fa i lure to visit or failure to support to the pare nts as require d by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2-403, this c ourt found the trial court had er red in finding that the pare nts had aba ndoned the c hildren.

We do not reac h the question of whe ther DCS was obli g ated to include F ather in its pl anning of the children’ s future thr oug h a permanenc y plan. See In the Matt er of A.J.H. , No. M2002-01568- COA -R 3 -J V, 2 0 0 3 WL

1129817, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar ch 14, 2003) ( no Tenn. R. App. 11
app lic a tio n fi le d)

. We a lso do no t re a c h the iss ue prima ri ly arg ue d in the pa

rt ie s b ri e fs , i.e ., whether DC S us e d r e a so na

ble e ff orts o r w a s r e qu ir e d to us e reas on able e ff orts t o r e un ite F a the r w ith his children unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-166. 7

This court dea ls with no iss ue of g reater importanc e than termination of pare ntal rig hts. There is no more sig nificant a ction by the S tate in the contex t of civil proce eding s. We are deeply awa re of the g ravity

of an y d ec i sion we make in these ca ses, including the conse quence s to the children wh os e status c a nn ot b e fi na lize d. Ho we ve r, we c a nn ot i g no re DC S’ s f a ilu re to c omp ly

wi th the pla in statutory requirem en t s n ecessary

for termination on the only g round it alleg ed. The power and discretion g rante d to DCS i n these situations must be exercised in strict compliance with the leg al
re qu ir e me nts e sta

bli sh e d inre c og nit ion of

a pa re nt’ s f un da me nta l r ig hts

.
Be cause the re cord be fore us does not demonstrate that Fathe r wa s provided with the re quired notice of the definition of abandonme nt and the conseque nces of abandonme nt, and does not include pr oo f o f a ny

c ir c ums ta nc e jus tif

y ing the failu re to p ro vid e no tic e a s se t ou t in thestatut e , w e mus t10

va c a te th e ju d g me n t o f th e tria l c o u r t te r mi n a ti o n F a th e r ’ s p ar e n ta l r ig h ts

. O u r d e c is io n d o es not aff ect c ustody

of the c hildren. That de cision is left to the trial court he rein. In r e V a l en tine , 79 S.W .3d at 550. Costs of this appeal ar e taxed to the appellee , State of Tenn es s ee , De p artment of Chi ldr e n’ s Se rv ic e s.

___________________________________ P A T R I C I A J. C O T T R E LL , J.