Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-515 | October 29, 2019 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Joel M. Schumm

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Dominique Rena Triblet,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

October 29, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-515

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Alicia A. Gooden, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G21-1802-F5-4859

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-515 | October 29, 2019 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary

[1] Dominique Rena Triblet (“Triblet”) appeals her conviction of Carrying a 

Handgun without a License, elevated to a Level 5 felony due to her conviction 

of a felony within the prior fifteen years.

1

 We affirm.

Issues

[2] Triblet presents two issues for review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying 

defense counsel’s request for a continuance for lack of 

preparation because counsel had primarily concentrated 

on another criminal case scheduled for trial on the same 

day; and

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 

instruct the jury on the defense of necessity.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 5, 2018, Triblet received a telephone call from a man she knew 

only as “Whitey.” He asked that Triblet meet him at a residence on Hillside 

Avenue in Indianapolis to discuss “an important matter.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 98.) 

Triblet suspected that Whitey had ordered her brother’s murder, but she agreed 

to meet with him. She and her cousin drove to Whitey’s residence. 

1

Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1(e)(2)(B).
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[4] When Triblet entered the residence, she observed eight males dressed in black, 

and there were “guns everywhere.” Id. at 110. She had a “gut feeling” that she 

was in danger. Id. at 102. Undetected, Triblet took a handgun from the kitchen 

counter, and she then left the residence with Whitey following closely behind 

her.

[5] Triblet called her mother to come and get her. Unwilling to end that call to 

place another, Triblet asked a neighbor to call 9-1-1. The neighbor refused to 

do so and Triblet then approached the home of Brooke Pyles (“Pyles”) and 

asked that she call 9-1-1. Pyles saw Triblet pointing the gun and became 

frightened and headed for the basement. Nevertheless, Pyles called 9-1-1. 

Before the police arrived, Pyles heard shots being fired outside her house.

[6] When police arrived, they took hold of Triblet and attempted to pull back her 

arms. Some scuffling occurred, during which the handgun fell from Triblet’s 

waistband. Triblet was arrested and charged with Carrying a Handgun without 

a License, Pointing a Firearm, Criminal Recklessnes, and Resisting Law 

Enforcement. 

[7] On December 11, 2018, Triblet was brought to trial before a jury. Triblet 

testified and admitted that she had possessed and fired a handgun. According 

to Triblet, she took the gun because she feared for her life and she fired into the 

air to deter Whitey from his pursuit of her. She denied that she had pointed the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-515 | October 29, 2019 Page 4 of 10

gun at Pyles or resisted arrest.2 The trial court instructed the jury on selfdefense but refused Triblet’s proffered instruction on the defense of necessity. 

The jury found Triblet guilty of Carrying a Handgun without a License but 

acquitted her on all other charges.

[8] Triblet waived her right to have a jury determine whether she had committed a 

prior felony within the requisite statutory period for elevation of her offense to a 

Level 5 felony. On February 1, 2019, the trial court found sufficient evidence 

supported the elevation and sentenced Triblet to five years imprisonment, with 

two years suspended to probation. Triblet now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Motion for a Continuance

[9] Triblet’s trial was first scheduled for May 1, 2018, but was rescheduled for 

September 11, 2018, upon the request of Triblet’s initial counsel. On August 

14, 2018, Dana Childress-Jones (“Defense Counsel”) appeared as Triblet’s new 

counsel. At a pretrial conference on September 4, 2018, Defense Counsel 

moved to continue the trial, and trial was reset for October 16, 2018. The State 

moved to continue the October trial setting, and trial was reset for December 

11, 2018.

2 Triblet testified that she had yelled out in pain due to a recently broken leg.
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[10] On December 5, 2018, the State and Defense Counsel appeared for a final 

pretrial conference on Triblet’s case. Defense Counsel advised the trial court 

that plea negotiations were “too far apart,” such that Triblet’s case was likely 

proceeding to trial. (Supp. Tr., Vol. II, pg. 4.) Defense Counsel further advised 

that she was also counsel on another case scheduled for trial on the same day

and she “was starting to decide which one I should really focus on.” Id. at 5. 

At the conclusion of the brief hearing, the trial court acknowledged that 

Defense Counsel had “two ahead of Ms. Triblet as it stands right now [Blow 

and Barnett]” but confirmed Triblet’s trial setting. Id. at 6. Defense Counsel 

expressed her thanks.

[11] Thus, three cases were “stacked” for jury trials on the same day. (Tr. Vol. II, 

pg. 7.) The day before the scheduled trials, the case of defendant Blow was 

continued. As for the Barnett case, he and the State reached a tentative plea 

agreement at approximately 5:00 p.m. Defense Counsel sent e-mail messages 

to the trial court and prosecutor expressing her need for a continuance in

Triblet’s case because she had concentrated on Barnett’s case. Feeling ill, 

Defense Counsel did not continue to check her e-mail in the evening hours.

[12] On the day of trial, Defense Counsel appeared and learned that the prosecutor 

opposed an additional continuance. At a conference outside the presence of the 

jury, Defense Counsel insisted that she was unprepared, and could provide only 

ineffective assistance if forced to proceed immediately with Triblet’s trial. The 

trial court reminded Defense Counsel that she was familiar with the court’s 

practice of “stacking,” with cases “congested off” rarely before “the very last 
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minute.” Id. The trial court listened to the recording of the December 5, 2018

final pretrial conference and clarified that the Triblet trial setting had been 

confirmed. The trial court denied Defense Counsel’s oral motion for a 

continuance but permitted her a one-hour delay to obtain the Triblet file. 

Triblet now argues that the denial of a continuance was an abuse of the trial 

court’s discretion because Defense Counsel was forced to trial despite repeated 

protests that she was unprepared.

Rulings on non-statutory motions for continuance are within the 

trial court’s discretion and will be reversed only for an abuse of 

that discretion and resultant prejudice. Maxey v. State, 730

N.E.2d 158, 160 (Ind. 2000). An abuse occurs only where the 

trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances. Palmer v. State, 704 N.E.2d 124, 127 

(Ind. 1999). “There is a strong presumption that the trial court 

properly exercised its discretion.” Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 

239, 247 (Ind. 2002).

Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018).

[13] We are not unsympathetic to the significant challenges faced by defense 

attorneys assigned to multiple “stacked” cases. In some circumstances, the 

combination of over-scheduling and last-minute moves for congestion could 

render an attorney unable to pursue an able defense. But here, at bottom, the 

request for a continuance was a last-minute oral request made four months into 

client representation and one week after confirmation of the trial setting. And it 

appears that Defense Counsel ably represented her client – who was ultimately 
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acquitted of three charges. We commend her commitment to advocacy even 

when confronted with less than ideal circumstances. 

[14] As for a strategy that might have been implemented with additional 

preparation, Triblet suggests only that Defense Counsel could have presented 

testimony from Triblet’s mother. Triblet’s mother, who was not an eyewitness, 

could have confirmed that Triblet called her when leaving Whitey’s residence. 

Triblet admitted that she possessed a gun without a license. The jury’s task was 

to determine whether the conduct was excused under the law. As such, the 

relevance of Triblet’s mother’s testimony would have been marginal, at best. 

We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion 

for a continuance. 

Defense of Necessity Instruction

[15] A trial court’s decision to give or refuse a jury instruction is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015). We 

consider (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is 

evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether 

the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions. Id. 

The parties do not dispute whether Triblet’s tendered instruction is an accurate 

statement of the law or whether its substance was covered by another 

instruction. As such, our focus is upon whether there was evidence in the 

record to support giving the necessity instruction.
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[16] The common law defense of necessity has been referred to as a “choice of evils” 

defense. Toops v. State, 643 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). The 

following are traditional prerequisites in establishing the defense: 

(1) the act charged as criminal must have been done to prevent a 

significant evil;

(2) there must have been no adequate alternative to the 

commission of the act;

(3) the harm caused by the act must not be disproportionate to 

the harm avoided;

(4) the accused must entertain a good-faith belief that his act was 

necessary to prevent greater harm;

(5) such belief must be objectively reasonable under all the 

circumstances; and

(6) the accused must not have substantially contributed to the 

creation of the emergency.

Id. at 390. A defendant must present at least some evidence on each of these 

elements to warrant the necessity instruction, but “[e]ven if there is only a 

‘scintilla’ of evidence in support of a criminal defendant’s proposed defense 

instruction, it should be left to the province of the jury to determine whether 

that evidence is believable or unbelievable.” Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 378

(citing Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242, 247-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). In 

determining whether the refusal of a proffered instruction warrants reversal, we 
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assess whether the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to give 

the instruction. Id.

[17] Triblet likens her circumstances to those of the defendant in Hernandez, whose 

conviction for carrying a handgun without a license stemmed from a vehicle 

stop. See id. at 375. Hernandez was a reluctant passenger in the vehicle of his 

neighbor, Gray, when that vehicle was stopped. Immediately upon his exit 

from the vehicle, Hernandez notified an officer that he was in possession of a 

gun. Because he had no license for the weapon, Hernandez was arrested, 

charged, and brought to trial for carrying a handgun without a license. 

Hernandez pursued a necessity defense, claiming that Gray was a dangerous 

felon who had insisted that Hernandez take possession of the handgun during 

the traffic stop. Id. Hernandez testified that Gray had commanded him to 

“take the gun or else” and Hernandez understood this as a threat from Gray to 

shoot him. Id. According to Hernandez, he tried to place the gun under a seat, 

but Gray insisted that he put it in his pocket. Id. Our Indiana Supreme Court 

vacated Triblet’s conviction for instructional error and remanded for a new 

trial, concluding that there was “some evidence” that warranted giving the 

defense of necessity instruction tendered by Hernandez. Id. at 376.

[18] In this case, the trial court observed that Triblet had placed herself in the 

circumstances she considered emergent. Also, the trial court found a lack of 

evidence that there was no adequate alternative to Triblet’s possession of the 

gun. We agree with the trial court’s characterization of the evidence. Triblet 

testified that she experienced a “gut feeling” that her life was in danger and she 
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decided to leave. (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 102.) But there is no evidence that Triblet’s 

exit was impeded by conduct such as threatening words, movement, or 

gestures. With no impediment, Triblet’s choices were to walk out or to walk 

out armed. She chose the latter course and grabbed the gun, undetected. This 

does not evince a lack of an adequate alternative. 

[19] And, even if we assume that Triblet faced an emergency inside the residence, 

she retained the handgun as circumstances evolved to safety. Unlike the 

defendant in Hernandez, Triblet did not freely divest herself of the gun at her first 

opportunity. It fell from her waistband during her arrest, without her having 

informed officers of its existence. Even if the jury were convinced that Triblet 

took the gun out of necessity, the jury would likely have found that her 

subsequent placement of the gun in her clothing amounted to carrying a 

handgun without a license. We cannot say that the omission of a defense of 

necessity instruction prejudiced Triblet. 

Conclusion

[20] Triblet has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her 

motion for a continuance or in refusing her instruction on the defense of 

necessity.

[21] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and May, J., concur.