United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 8, 2009 Decided July 10, 2009

No. 08-7127

CANEISHA MILLS, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-01061)

Mara E. Verheyden-Hilliard argued the cause for

appellants. With her on the briefs was Carl Messineo.

Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney

General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Peter J. Nickles, Attorney

General, and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General.

Stacy Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, entered an

appearance.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and GINSBURG and

ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Chief Judge: Four District of Columbia citizens

(appellants) filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin

further implementation of a police checkpoint program in the

District of Columbia. The district court denied the motion for

a preliminary injunction, holding that the appellants failed to

show either irreparable harm or a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits. Because we hold that the appellants’

showing of irreparable harm is sufficient, and conclude that

appellants have shown a substantial likelihood of success, we

reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND

The neighborhood safety zone (NSZ) program was created

by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) in response to

the violence that has plagued the Trinidad neighborhood in

Northeast Washington, D.C. for many years. Before this case

arose, Trinidad had recently been the scene of twenty-five

assaults involving firearms, five of which resulted in deaths, and

six of which involved the use of vehicles. Shortly after a triple

homicide in the Trinidad neighborhood on May 31, 2008, the

MPD designated a portion of the neighborhood an NSZ.

Pursuant to MPD Special Order 08-06, issued June 4, 2008,

MPD implemented the program and erected eleven vehicle

checkpoints over the course of five days at locations around the

perimeter of the NSZ. This first implementation of the

checkpoints took place from June 7 to June 12, 2008. On July

19, 2008, nearly a month after appellants commenced this action

in the district court, the Commander of MPD’s Fifth District, in

response to a series of violent attacks that morning in Trinidad,

requested and was granted approval for another NSZ in the

Trinidad neighborhood. This second implementation of the

NSZ program originally was to run from July 19 to July 24, but
3

was extended until July 29, 2008. 

During the first implementation of the NSZ program,

Special Order 08-06 set forth the parameters of the program.

According to the Special Order, the original primary purpose of

the program was “to provide high police visibility, prevent and

deter crime, safeguard officers and community members, and

create safer District of Columbia neighborhoods.” This Special

Order also governed the police officers’ conduct at the

checkpoints during the first implementation of the NSZ

checkpoint program. According to the Special Order, motorists

were to receive advance notice of checkpoints, which were to be

marked with signs around the borders of the NSZ as well as

“barricades, lights, cones, and/or flares.” Officers were to stop

all vehicles attempting to gain access to the NSZ area. Officers

were not to stop vehicles attempting to leave the NSZ area

without particularized suspicion. Officers also were not to stop

individuals seeking to enter the NSZ area on foot. When

motorists attempting to gain entry into the NSZ area were

stopped at the checkpoint, officers were required to identify

themselves to motorists and inquire whether the motorists had

“legitimate reasons” for entering the NSZ area. Legitimate

reasons for entry fell within one of six defined categories: the

motorist was (1) a resident of the NSZ; (2) employed or on a

commercial delivery in the NSZ; (3) attending school or taking

a child to school or day-care in the NSZ; (4) related to a resident

of the NSZ; (5) elderly, disabled or seeking medical attention;

and/or (6) attempting to attend a verified organized civic,

community, or religious event in the NSZ. If the motorist

provided the officer with a legitimate reason for entry, the

officer was authorized to request additional information

sufficient to verify the motorist’s stated reason for entry into the

NSZ area. Officers denied entry to those motorists who did not

have a legitimate reason for entry, who could not substantiate

their reason for entry, or who refused to provide a legitimate
4

reason for entry. 

Motorists who failed to provide sufficient information were

refused entry into the neighborhood in their vehicles, although

motorists were not charged with a criminal offense if they failed

to provide a legitimate reason for entry. Officers could not

conduct a search of a stopped vehicle unless individualized

suspicion developed during a stop. During the first

implementation of the NSZ program, only one arrest was made

at a Trinidad NSZ checkpoint; the arrest was for driving while

in possession of an open container of alcohol. Forty-eight of

951 vehicles stopped during the June checkpoints were refused

entry. The record does not indicate whether any arrests were

made during the second implementation of the program. See

Mills v. District of Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 58 n.8

(D.D.C. 2008). 

Between the first and second implementation of the NSZ

checkpoints, but after this action commenced, the District

revised its Special Order governing the program. Though the

six “entry-sufficient” categories remained the same, the District,

understandably concerned with running afoul of the Fourth

Amendment, tweaked its approach to implementing the

program. Significantly, the revised Special Order established

that motorists should be asked for identification only if they

claimed to be residents of the NSZ in order to verify their

residency. The revised Special Order also provided that

information given by the motorist need only be “reasonably

sufficient” to verify the motorist’s reasons for entry. The

primary purpose of the NSZ program remained similar despite

the revisions to other areas of the program. The revised Special

Order, however, clarified that “[t]he [revised] primary purpose

of an NSZ is not to make arrests or to detect evidence of

ordinary criminal wrongdoing, but to increase protection from

violent criminal acts, and promote the safety and security of
5

1

William Robinson was also stopped, and was originally a

party to this action. He has since passed away, however, and is no

longer a part of this case. 

persons within the NSZ by discouraging–and thereby

deterring–persons in motor vehicles from entering the NSZ

intending to commit acts of violence.” 

Appellants Caneisha Mills, Linda Leaks, and Sarah Sloan

were among the 48 motorists denied entry at an NSZ checkpoint

during the first implementation of the NSZ checkpoints between

June 7 and June 12, 2008.1 Each appellant was denied entry in

her vehicle on account of her refusal to provide certain

information. Mills refused to provide personal information

regarding her identity and intended activities in the NSZ, Leaks

refused to provide details about her political activity and

intended community organizing, and Sloan refused to provide

information about a political meeting she wished to attend. 

In a press conference held on July 19, 2008, MPD Police

Chief Cathy Lanier stated that she would continue to utilize

NSZs “until a judge orders [her] to stop.” On June 20, 2008, the

appellants filed a class action complaint seeking declaratory,

injunctive, and compensatory relief. The appellants asserted that

the NSZ checkpoints constituted unconstitutional seizures in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied

the appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that

the appellants failed to establish irreparable harm or a likelihood

of success on the merits. This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS 

Appellants argue that the district court erred in denying

their motion for a preliminary injunction against the District’s

imposition of the NSZ Program. To prevail, appellants “must
6

‘demonstrate 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits,

2) that [they] would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is

not granted, 3) that an injunction would not substantially injure

other interested parties, and 4) that the public interest would be

furthered by the injunction.’” Katz v. Georgetown Univ., 246

F.3d 685, 687-88 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting CityFed Fin. Corp.

v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 746 (D.C. Cir.

1995)). A district court must balance the strength of a plaintiff’s

arguments in each of the four elements when deciding whether

to grant a preliminary injunction. “If the arguments for one

factor are particularly strong, an injunction may issue even if the

arguments in other areas are rather weak.” CityFed Fin. Corp.,

58 F.3d at 747. Accordingly, “[a]n injunction may be justified,

for example, where there is a particularly strong likelihood of

success on the merits even if there is a relatively slight showing

of irreparable injury.” Id. (citing Population Inst. v. McPherson,

797 F.2d 1062, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). “We review a district

court decision regarding a preliminary injunction for abuse of

discretion, and any underlying legal conclusions de novo.” Katz,

246 F.3d at 688. We will overturn any of the district court’s

factual findings only upon a finding of clear error. Cobell v.

Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 256 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing City of Las

Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

Appellants’ likelihood of success on the merits is dependent

upon the strength of their constitutional challenge to the

checkpoint program. The Fourth Amendment provides that

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Without

question, a seizure occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a police

checkpoint. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,

450 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556
7

(1976) (“[C]heckpoint stops are ‘seizures’ within the meaning

of the Fourth Amendment.”). The Fourth Amendment,

however, only proscribes those seizures that are unreasonable.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. Therefore, this issue turns on whether

the stops of the appellants in connection with the NSZ program

were unreasonable.

The constitutionality of police checkpoints is not a new

controversy. Indeed, the courts of the District of Columbia have

previously considered a prior roadblock program by this same

police department in the same Trinidad neighborhood. See

Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (1991). There is ample

guidance for our review from the Supreme Court. 

In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court considered

the constitutionality of the suspicionless routine stops of

vehicles at checkpoints on major roads leading away from the

border. The Court held “that stops for brief questioning

routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent

with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by

warrant.” Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566. In the discussion

of the constitutional question, the Court noted that “the need for

[the judgment of a neutral magistrate] is reduced when the

decision to ‘seize’ is not entirely in the hands of the officer in

the field, and deference is to be given to the administrative

decisions of higher ranking officials.” Id. The Court also

discussed the reason for the search, that is, “[i]nterdicting the

flow of illegal entrance from Mexico.” Id. at 552. In the end,

while determining that the checkpoint stops were not

unconstitutional, the Court noted that “[t]he principal protection

of Fourth Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate

limitations on the scope of the stop.” Id. at 566-67. The Court

further explicitly declared that “our holding today is limited to

the type of stops described in this opinion.” Id. at 567.

Obviously, the facts before the Court in a border protection stop
8

are far different than those before this court today. However,

the Supreme Court has offered further guidance.

In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), the Supreme Court

considered the constitutionality of a police stop that, while not

literally at a roadblock or checkpoint, was sufficiently analogous

to generate an analysis that has been instructive in roadblock

cases. In Brown, cruising police officers stopped two

pedestrians, one of whom was the eventual Supreme Court

litigant, in an area with a high incidence of drug traffic.

Although one officer testified that “the situation ‘looked

suspicious and we had never seen that subject in that area

before,’” the officers did not offer any specific suspicion or any

reason to believe the subjects were armed. Id. at 49. The police

demanded that the subjects identify themselves. One refused

and asserted that the officers had no right to stop him. The

officers charged him under a Texas statute which made “it a

criminal act for a person to refuse to give his name and address

to an officer ‘who has lawfully stopped him and requested the

information.’” Id. In determining the constitutionality of the

stop in that case, the Court offered analysis instructive in all

further cases involving a suspicionless stop constituting a

seizure but short of arrest. The Court concluded that

“[c]onsideration of the constitutionality of such seizures

involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served

by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the

public interest, and the severity of the interference with

individual liberty.” Id. at 50-51. Although we doubt that the

checkpoint in this case would have survived constitutional

scrutiny under the Brown analysis, later Supreme Court

pronouncements speaking directly to issues of checkpoint

seizure constitutionality make that result even more clearly

compelled.
9

Most plainly controlling of the case before us is the

Supreme Court decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531

U.S. 32 (2000). In Edmond, the Court considered a checkpoint

program conducted by the City of Indianapolis in an effort to

interdict unlawful drugs. Under the stipulated facts of the case,

officers operating pursuant to directions issued by the chief of

police would for a limited period of time stop all vehicles

without particularized suspicion, look for signs of impairment,

conduct an open view examination of the vehicle from the

outside, and have a narcotics-detection dog walk around the

outside of each stopped vehicle. After observing that “[a] search

or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of

individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,” the Court observed

that “we have recognized only limited circumstances in which

the usual rule does not apply.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. The

Court recognized that it had in the past upheld the

constitutionality of a checkpoint stop for border protection, see

Martinez-Fuerte, supra, and “a sobriety checkpoint aimed at

removing drunk drivers from the road,” id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S.

444). But the Court stressed that “[w]e have never approved a

checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect

evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Edmond, 531 U.S.

at 41. The Court then concluded that “[b]ecause the primary

purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint program is ultimately

indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the

checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 48. It is this

rule which governs the present case, and as the purpose of the

NSZ checkpoint program is not immediately distinguishable

from the general interest in crime control, appellants’ argument

that the seizures were unconstitutional appears headed for

ultimate victory.

The District argues that the primary purpose of the NSZ

program as found by the district court—deterring violent,

vehicle-facilitated crime—does not fit within the
10

unconstitutional category of checkpoint stops for purposes

“ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime

control.” Instead, the District argues, this case is governed by

Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004). In Lidster, police set up

a highway checkpoint and stopped motorists for the purpose of

asking them for information about a hit-and-run accident that

had occurred approximately one week earlier at the same time

and place. One stopped motorist, Lidster, was arrested for

driving under the influence of alcohol. The Illinois Supreme

Court held the stop unconstitutional, believing that Edmond

compelled that result. The United States Supreme Court made

clear that it did not.

The District seizes on language from the Lidster opinion to

argue that that case and not Edmond is controlling. The District

argues that because the Lidster opinion noted that the “general

language” in Edmond should be read “as referring in context to

circumstances similar to the circumstances then before the Court

and not referring to quite different circumstances that the Court

was not then considering,” Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424, the NSZ

checkpoint stop should be upheld, as were the inquiry stops in

Lidster rather than struck down as unconstitutional, as were the

drug interdiction stops in Edmond. We think it apparent from

the face of the checkpoint programs involved that the stop

before us is far more like the stop in Edmond than in Lidster.

The Edmond stop sought to detect and deter crimes

involving narcotics. The NSZ stop seeks to deter violent crimes

involving motor vehicles. This would seem a distinction

without a difference. In each instance the interest of the police

was in general crime control, not directed to any particular

suspicion or a particular crime. In neither case was there reason

for the stop unrelated to the crime control purpose. The reason

for stopping the individuals in each case was the possibility,

without individualized suspicion, that the driver stopped might
11

be the potential perpetrator of an as-yet undetected, perhaps

uncommitted, crime. Both of these sets of facts seem to fit

equally within the rubric of “general interest in crime control.”

Lidster is unlike either one. The police in Lidster were

investigating a crime that they knew to have occurred. They

were not looking for suspects. As the Lidster Court stated,

“information-seeking highway stops are less likely to provoke

anxiety or to prove intrusive,” than the investigative checkpoint

considered in Edmond. Id. at 425. As the Court stressed,

“[f]urther, the law ordinarily permits police to seek the voluntary

cooperation of members of the public in the investigation of a

crime.” Id. The Lidster Court then reiterated the longstanding

proposition that “‘law enforcement officers do not violate the

Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the

street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing

to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the

person is willing to listen.’” Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460

U.S. 491, 497 (1983)). In short, the NSZ stop has nothing in

common with the stop upheld in Lidster and everything in

common with the unconstitutional stop in Edmond.

Refining the argument slightly, the District contends that

the Supreme Court’s category of stops serving “the general

interest in crime control” extends only to seizures actually

looking for evidence of crime as opposed to seizures designed

to deter crime. That argument is unconvincing. Nothing in

Edmond limited “the general interest in crime control” to only

those instances where a law enforcement officer was seeking

evidence of a crime. In Edmond, the Court recognized that a

general rule exists that “a seizure must be accompanied by some

measure of individualized suspicion,” 531 U.S. at 41, and that

“only limited circumstances [exist] in which the usual rule does

not apply,” id. at 37. The Court stressed that the only

suspicionless checkpoints previously upheld were those

checkpoint programs that were “designed primarily to serve
12

purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border

or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety.” Id. at 41. By

automatically proscribing suspicionless checkpoints with a

primary purpose of serving “the general interest in crime

control,” the Court was concerned with placing a “check on the

ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any

conceivable law enforcement purpose.” Id. at 42. The District’s

argument, however, turns this paradigm on its head. Under the

District’s interpretation, individualized suspicion is only

required when a law enforcement officer is searching for

evidence of criminal wrongdoing. Any suspicionless checkpoint

program therefore would be allowed so long as its primary

purpose did not involve actively seeking evidence of criminal

wrongdoing. The individualized suspicion requirement is the

rule under the Fourth Amendment, not the exception.

Accordingly, we cannot read “the general interest in crime

control” so restrictively as to encompass only those checkpoints

in which law enforcement officers were seeking evidence of

criminal wrongdoing. 

Without doubt, the Edmond Court did not intend the

proscription of checkpoints whose primary purpose was

“general interest in crime control” to be limited to those seeking

narcotics, or other evidence. Instead, the Court used the phrase

in what would appear to be its natural and usual sense to include

investigation and deterrence. 

Indeed, when this court has been confronted with

constitutional challenges to police checkpoints, it has

consistently treated the purpose of deterring ordinary criminal

activity like drug crime as indistinguishable from the purpose of

detecting such activity in the context of suspicionless

roadblocks. See United States v. Bowman, 496 F.3d 685 (D.C.

Cir. 2007); United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977 (D.C. Cir.

2001); United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir.
13

1989). In each case the defendant sought to suppress evidence

obtained at MPD roadblocks. Bowman, 496 F.3d at 686-87;

Davis, 270 F.3d at 981; McFayden, 865 F.2d at 1308-09. In

each, the MPD instituted roadblocks for the stated purpose of

regulating vehicle traffic and safety. See Bowman, 496 F.3d at

691; Davis, 270 F.3d at 981; McFayden, 865 F.2d at 1308. And,

in each, this court explained that although traffic regulation was

a permissible primary purpose for suspicionless checkpoints,

deterrence of drug activity and general drug enforcement were

not. See Bowman, 496 F.3d at 692-93; Davis, 270 F.3d at 980;

McFayden, 865 F.2d at 1312-13. As a result, where the district

court had made appropriate findings that traffic regulation, and

not general deterrence, was the primary goal of the stops, this

court affirmed the convictions. See McFayden, 865 F.2d at

1312-13. However, where the record was insufficient to support

a determination of the primary purpose, the court remanded for

further fact-finding. See Bowman, 496 F.3d at 694-95; Davis,

270 F.3d at 981-82. 

In short, appellants’ likelihood of success on the merits is

strong. 

B. Irreparable Injury

We further conclude that appellants have sufficiently

demonstrated irreparable injury, particularly in light of their

strong likelihood of success on the merits. See CityFed Fin.

Corp., 58 F.3d at 747. The harm to the rights of appellants is

apparent. It cannot be gainsaid that citizens have a right to drive

upon the public streets of the District of Columbia or any other

city absent a constitutionally sound reason for limiting their

access. As our discussion of the likelihood of success has

demonstrated, there is no such constitutionally sound bar in the

NSZ checkpoint program. It is apparent that appellants’

constitutional rights are violated. It has long been established
14

that the loss of constitutional freedoms, “for even minimal

periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion)

(citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713

(1971)). Granted, the District is not currently imposing an NSZ

checkpoint, but it has done so more than once, and the police

chief has expressed her intent to continue to use the program

until a judge stops her. 

III. CONCLUSION

In short, we conclude that appellants have established the

requisites for the granting of a preliminary injunction. They

have made a particularly strong showing of the substantial

likelihood of success on the merits and that they would suffer

irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. The district

court did not address the other two elements of the preliminary

injunction test. Accordingly, we reverse the district court and

remand for further proceedings.

So ordered.