Filed 5/20/24

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

TERESA DOSKOCZ et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

ALS LIEN SERVICES et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 A166299

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. MSC17–01486) 

Plaintiff Teresa Doskocz originally filed a class action in federal court

against defendant ALS Lien Services (ALS) alleging violations of the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; FDCPA) and

California’s unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; UCL)

related to ALS’s collection of unpaid assessments on behalf of homeowner 

associations (HOAs).

After the parties stipulated that the federal case would be dismissed

and refiled in state court, Doskocz was granted leave to amend her complaint

to add allegations that law firm SwedelsonGottlieb and individuals Sandra 

Gottlieb and David Swedelson (collectively, SG defendants) were alter egos of 

ALS. The state court also granted Doskocz’s motion to bifurcate trial and 

proceed first on her equitable UCL cause of action. At the conclusion of the 

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this 

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts II.C., D., E., 

and F. of the Discussion.
2

bench trial, the court found that ALS had violated the FDCPA and entered 

judgment in favor of Doskocz on her UCL cause of action. It also found the 

SG defendants jointly and severally liable for restitution and class counsel

fees as alter egos of ALS.

ALS now seeks reversal of the judgment by arguing that the trial court 

(1) erred in adopting a ruling by the federal judge in the original action,

(2) erred in ruling that ALS violated the FDCPA, and (3) abused its discretion 

in granting Doskocz’s motion to bifurcate. The SG defendants also challenge 

the judgment, arguing that the trial court (1) lacked substantial evidence on 

its alter ego findings, (2) abused its discretion in granting Doskocz leave to 

amend her complaint, and (3) abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees

to class counsel.

We disagree and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. ALS Collection from Doskocz

Doskocz owns a townhouse in Danville, California that is part of 

Danville Green Homeowners Association, Inc. (Danville Green). Danville

Green hired ALS to collect unpaid HOA assessments from Doskocz. At the 

time of trial, ALS was working with approximately 100 HOAs throughout the 

state.

ALS uses the nonjudicial foreclosure process to collect assessments and 

other charges. In November 2013, ALS sent Doskocz its standardized “prelien letter,” which stated that Doskocz was delinquent in the payment of 

assessments and owed Danville Green $1,239.08. It also stated that Doskocz 

could request a payment plan for the debt. The next month, ALS recorded a 

delinquent assessment lien against Doskocz’s townhouse.
3

Doskocz agreed to a payment plan. The plan included a waiver of Civil 

Code section 5655, subdivision (a) (section 5655(a)),1 which requires 

payments “first be applied to the assessments owed, and, only after the 

assessments owed are paid in full shall the payments be applied to the fees 

and costs of collection, attorney’s fees, late charges, or interest.” ALS’s 

standard payment plan includes this waiver, and its standard collection 

contract terms require HOAs to agree to payment plans with this waiver. 

During Doskocz’s payment plan period, ALS applied only a portion of her

payment towards unpaid assessments, applying the rest to ALS’s collection 

fees and costs.

Doskocz made five of the six payments in the plan, but was unable to 

make the final payment. Doskocz requested a second payment plan. ALS 

responded that her total balance was $1,074.90, but proposed a plan for three 

monthly payments totaling $2,033.19. Instead of accepting this proposal, 

Doskocz sent in two monthly payments of $537.45, intended to satisfy the 

total balance.

The next month, in October 2014, ALS sent Doskocz its standardized 

pre-notice of default letter (pre-NOD letter). The letter stated that Doskocz 

owed $830.73, and that if payment was not received, ALS “will record a 

Notice of Default.” ALS eventually closed the collection account and billed 

Danville Green for $425 in collection fees and costs, which Danville Green 

paid.

1 Section 5655(a) is a provision of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest 

Development Act (Civ. Code, § 4000 et seq.; Davis-Stirling Act). The DavisStirling Act “set[s] forth comprehensive rules, restrictions, and procedures for 

imposing, paying, collecting, and enforcing regular and special [homeowner] 

assessments.” (Huntingon Continental Townhouse Assn., Inc. v. Miner (2014) 

230 Cal.App.4th 590, 599.)
4

B. Filing in Federal Court

Doskocz filed a class action in federal court against ALS in 2015, 

alleging its collection practices violate the FDCPA and thus constitute

unlawful business practices under the UCL. ALS moved for summary 

judgment on various grounds, including that it had complied with the 

FDCPA because Doskocz waived section 5655(a). The federal court rejected 

that argument, concluding the waiver was void as a matter of public policy. 

Several months after that ruling, the parties stipulated that the federal case 

would be dismissed and refiled in state court, but subject to the federal 

judge’s summary judgment ruling.

C. Refiling in State Court

Doskocz filed her state court complaint in 2017, and the court granted 

her motion for class certification in 2018. Then, in 2020, the court granted 

Doskocz’s request for leave to file a first amended complaint to add alter ego 

allegations against the SG defendants. ALS moved for summary judgment

shortly thereafter, renewing its argument that Doskocz had waived 

section 5655(a). The court declined to reconsider the federal judge’s ruling

and denied the motion.

D. Bench Trial

In 2022, the court granted Doskocz’s motion to bifurcate and proceed 

first by bench trial on her equitable UCL cause of action. At trial, Doskocz 

presented two underlying violations of the FDCPA to support her UCL cause 

of action: (1) ALS’s application of homeowner payments contrary to 

section 5655(a); and (2) ALS’s pre-lien and pre-NOD letters as improper 

threats of foreclosure contrary to Civil Code2 section 5720, which limits 

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
5

collection of delinquent assessments through foreclosure until the amount 

owed is at least $1,800 or more than 12 months delinquent.

E. Judgment

In its statement of decision, the court concluded that ALS had violated 

the FDCPA in both respects and found the SG defendants were alter egos of 

ALS. After the court entered its statement of decision, Doskocz elected not to 

proceed with the scheduled jury trial on her FDCPA cause of action and that 

cause of action was dismissed.

Judgment was entered in favor of Doskocz on her UCL cause of action.

ALS and the SG defendants were jointly and severally liable for $156,753 in 

restitution to the class (calculated as fees and costs charged by ALS after 

homeowner account balances would have been zero if their payments had 

been applied to unpaid assessments instead of other charges). The judgment 

also included injunctive relief against ALS related to application of 

homeowner payments, recalculation of class member accounts, 

communication with homeowners, and charging of late fees and interest.

ALS and the SG defendants each filed timely notices of appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

ALS raises three issues on appeal. First, it argues that the trial court 

erred in adopting the federal judge’s ruling that the section 5655(a) waiver

was void as a matter of public policy. Second, it argues that the court erred 

in ruling that ALS violated the FDCPA through its pre-lien and pre-NOD 

letters. Third, ALS argues that the court abused its discretion in granting 

Doskocz’s motion to bifurcate and proceed first with a bench trial on her UCL 

cause of action.

The SG defendants also raise three issues on appeal. First, they argue

that the trial court lacked substantial evidence on its alter ego findings. 
6

Second, they argue that the court abused its discretion in granting Doskocz 

leave to amend her state court complaint. Third, the SG defendants argue 

that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to class 

counsel.

We address, and reject, each argument in turn.

A. No Error on Section 5655 Waiver Rulings

1. Additional Background

When ALS moved for summary judgment in the federal action, it

argued that it had complied with the FDCPA because Doskocz had waived 

her rights under section 5655(a) to prioritize application of her payments to 

unpaid assessments first, before ALS’s collection fees and costs. Doskocz 

opposed the motion, arguing that the waiver was void as a matter of public 

policy under section 3513.3

The federal court recognized that “[t]he California Supreme Court does 

not appear to have addressed this issue, and neither party has identified a 

case directly on point.” Citing DeBerard Properties, Ltd. v. Lim (1999) 

20 Cal.4th 659, it explained that section 3513 bars the waiver of a statutory 

right when the “ ‘ “public benefit [of the statute] is one of the primary 

purposes.” ’ ” (DeBerard, at p. 669.)

The federal court determined that the “public purpose and benefit 

inherent in the Davis-Stirling Act and section 5655(a)” had been established,

and there “can be no serious doubt that the Legislature adopted the Act for 

the primary purpose of protecting homeowner rights—a quintessential public 

benefit.” It pointed to legislative history material that the provision now 

3 Section 3513 provides: “Any one may waive the advantage of a law 

intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason 

cannot be contravened by a private agreement.”
7

found in section 5655(a) “ ‘goes to the heart of home owner rights, touching 

upon the key issue of when, if ever, a homeowners’ association should have 

the right to force the sale of a member’s home when the home owner falls 

behind on paying overdue assessments or dues.’ ”

The federal court thus concluded that section 5655(a) “serves the 

important public purpose of protecting homeowner equity and rights by 

ensuring that a delinquent assessment, which is the original debt that opens 

the door to collection costs and ultimately foreclosure, is paid down as a first 

priority. This allocation clearly serves the legislative goal of preventing 

foreclosure over small delinquencies, and operates to cut off a cascade of late 

fees and collection costs likely to lead to defaults and foreclosures. To allow a 

waiver of this provision by contract would flout the very purpose of the 

section and the Davis-Stirling Act generally, and so the contract clause must 

be voided as against public policy.” The parties’ subsequent stipulation for 

dismissal of the federal case and refiling in state court provided that the “new 

state court action will be subject to this Court’s Order Re Summary 

Judgment.” 

When ALS moved for summary judgment in the state court action, it

renewed its argument that Doskocz’s claims failed as a matter of law because 

she had waived section 5655(a). The state court rejected this argument and 

denied the motion. It explained: “ALS’[s] motion for summary judgment is 

either a motion for reconsideration or a motion for summary judgment on an 

issue already decided against the moving party. . . . ALS has made no 

showing of new facts or law and it appears that the majority of ALS’[s]

waiver argument is identical to the argument it made in federal court.” The 

state court declined to reconsider ALS’s waiver argument. It found that the 
8

federal court ruling “stands and thus, the waiver of Civil Code section 5655(a) 

is invalid.” 

2. Analysis

ALS appears to challenge the section 5655(a) waiver ruling in two 

respects, arguing that (1) the federal judge was “wrong” in finding the waiver 

void as a matter of public policy, and (2) the state court erred in “adopting”

the federal court’s ruling. 

As for the federal judge’s interpretation of section 5655, our review is 

de novo. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527.) “ ‘ “The 

fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court should ascertain 

the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” ’ ” 

(Pacific Fertility Cases (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 568, 575.) “ ‘[W]e first examine 

the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and 

construing them in context.’ ” (Id. at p. 576.) “ ‘If the words in the statute do 

not, by themselves, provide a reliable indicator of legislative intent,’ ” we look 

“ ‘ “ ‘to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be 

achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, 

contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of 

which the statute is a part.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) If the meaning is still unclear, we 

follow the “ ‘ “more reasonable result.” ’ ” (Ibid., italics added by Pacific 

Fertility Cases.) 

Section 3513 bars waiver of a statutory right when the “ ‘public 

benefit’ ” of a statute is “ ‘one of its primary purposes.’ ” (Azteca Construction, 

Inc. v. ADR Consulting, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166.) Such

prohibitions on waiver can be express or implied. (Compare § 1751 [“Any 

waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this title is contrary to public policy 

and shall be unenforceable and void.”] with Armendariz v. Foundation Health 
9

Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 100 [concluding waiver of rights

under Fair Employment and Housing Act contrary to public policy based on

broad goal of statutory scheme to protect employees from discrimination and 

harassment].)

ALS contends that section 5655 cannot be interpreted to contain an

implied prohibition on waiver because it was adopted for a “narrow, very 

private interest.” We disagree. In 1996, the concept of prioritizing 

application of payments to unpaid assessments was codified in section 1367, 

requiring that “any payments toward such a debt shall first be applied to the 

principal owed, and only after the principal owed is paid in full shall such 

payments be applied to interest or collection expenses.” (Stats. 1996, 

ch. 1101, § 4, capitalization omitted.) In 2002, section 1367.1 was added to 

the statutory scheme to clarify and expand pre-lien notice requirements. 

(Stats. 2002, ch. 1111, § 8.) Section 1367.1, subdivision (b) included a similar 

sentence with broader language regarding the priority of applying payments 

to assessments owed before “fees and costs of collection, attorney’s fees, late 

charges, or interest.” Ten years later, sections 1367 and 1367.1 were 

repealed and that sentence from section 1367.1, subdivision (b) was recodified

in section 5655(a). (Stats. 2012, ch. 180, § 2.) In every formulation, the 

requirement has been mandatory—it affords no discretion to HOAs to decline 

prioritization. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State 

Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1143 [recognizing “presumption that 

the word ‘shall’ in a statute is ordinarily deemed mandatory”].)

But as the purpose of the requirement is not evident from the statutory 

text alone, we find the legislative history from both sections 1367 and 1367.1 
10

instructive.4 The materials from section 1367 show that the Legislature 

viewed this prioritization requirement as an important public benefit. Under 

existing law, HOAs had the power to impose interest, charges, and costs

related to the collection of unpaid assessments, all of which created a lien

enforceable by nonjudicial foreclosure. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor 

Analyses, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1317 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended Sept. 6, 1995, p. 3.) The author of the bill explained that the 

current law “invites overreaching by collection firms,” applying payments to 

collection costs rather than the principal balance and creating a “treadmill 

wherein the collection costs continue to accrue despite the good faith efforts of 

the homeowner to cure any back debts.” (Assem. Mem. Jackie Speier author 

of Assem. Bill No. 1317 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.), letter to Gov. Wilson,

Sept. 10, 1996, pp. 2–3.) 

The prioritization requirement was thus intended to protect 

homeowners from abuses by collection firms and “insensitive and overzealous 

associations who adopt unnecessarily adversarial tactics in collecting past 

due assessments.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1317

(1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 21, 1995, p. 7.) Concern about these 

abuses outweighed arguments in opposition that the statute would interfere 

with private agreements between homeowners and HOAs. (Sen. Housing &

Land Use Com., com. on Assem. Bill No. 1317 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended June 13, 1995, p. 3.) These materials also make clear that the 

4 We grant Doskocz’s unopposed request to take judicial notice of three 

legislative analyses of the bill enacting section 1367.1 that were presented to 

the federal court on summary judgment. We deny Doskocz’s opposed 

supplemental request to take judicial notice of the timing of text included in 

that bill as not necessary or helpful to our analysis. (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.252; Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 

18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6.)
11

Legislature considered these protections applicable to a significant

percentage of its populace: at the time, approximately five million 

homeowners lived in the state’s 30,000 common interest developments. 

(Assem. Mem. Jackie Speier author of Assem. Bill No. 1317 (1995–1996 Reg. 

Sess.), letter to Gov. Wilson, supra, at p. 1; Assem. Mem. Dan Hauser, letter 

to Gov. Wilson, Sept. 10, 1996.) 

The legislative history from section 1367.1 is consistent with this 

purpose, explaining that the statute was “primarily designed” to address the 

same concerns regarding the nonjudicial foreclosure process for delinquent 

payments. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Bill No. 2289 (2001–2002 

Reg. Sess.) as amended June 19, 2002, p. 5; see also Diamond v. Superior 

Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1190 [finding intent regarding public 

purpose of section 1367.1 in legislative history].) Contrary to ALS’s 

suggestion, the lack of explicit references to the prioritization requirement in 

these materials does not suggest some other private or narrow purpose. Nor 

is it particularly surprising, given that the requirement was similar to the 

one already in section 1367.

ALS’s remaining arguments do not alter our view. First, ALS suggests

that section 5665 limits a homeowner’s rights under 5655. Section 5665 

requires an HOA to provide any “standards” it has for payment plans to an 

owner requesting such a plan. (Id., subd. (a).) This provision was originally 

added as part of section 1367.1, subdivision (c)(2). (Stats. 2002, ch. 1111, § 8.) 

Given the prioritization requirement in section 1367.1, subdivision (b), we 

adopt a construction that “ ‘ “best serves to harmonize the statute 

internally.” ’ ” (Pacific Fertility Cases, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 576.) We

thus interpret section 5665 to contemplate optional HOA standards for 
12

payment plans, but not to allow standards that contravene the prioritization 

requirement in the preceding section 5655(a). 

 Second, ALS argues that section 5655 does not confer a public benefit 

because without waiver of the prioritization requirement, there is “evidence” 

that HOAs are less likely to agree to payment plans. ALS does not offer or 

explain this “evidence.” We find the argument dubious, as HOAs would still 

be incentivized to enter into payment plans to recover the principal balance of 

assessments owed, resolve collection accounts as quickly as possible, and 

avoid foreclosure processes. 

 Finally, at oral argument on appeal, counsel for ALS argued the 

company acted merely as an agent of the HOA and therefore is not, itself, 

subject to the provisions of the Davis-Stirling Act; rather, only the HOA is, 

and therefore any liability under the Act lies only against the HOA. While 

ALS’s appellate briefing made passing reference to its agency status, ALS 

never made any argument in its briefing that, as an agent of the HOA, the 

provisions of the Act did not apply to its actions, let alone provide authority 

supporting such an argument. It therefore forfeited the argument. (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [requiring briefs to state each point under 

a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point and to provide 

argument and, if possible, supporting authority]; Jones v. Superior Court

(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they 

are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider 

the issues waived.”].)

 In sum, we conclude the federal court did not err in ruling that the 

waiver was void as against public policy.5

5 Given our de novo review of this issue and the parties’ stipulation that 

the state action was “subject to” the federal court’s ruling, we need not 
13

B. No Error on FDCPA Rulings

1. Additional Background

When ALS moved for summary judgment in this state court action, it 

argued that Doskocz’s claims failed as a matter of law because ALS’s pre-lien 

letter did not improperly threaten foreclosure. The court rejected the 

argument. It first quoted a boldface, capitalized statement in the letter: 

“IMPORTANT NOTICE: IF YOUR SEPARATE INTEREST IS PLACED IN 

FORECLOSURE BECAUSE YOU ARE BEHIND IN YOUR ASSESSMENTS, 

IT MAY BE SOLD WITHOUT COURT ACTION.” (Boldface omitted.) The 

court then referenced the next portion of the letter, which stated: “If the 

foreclosure process begins, you are legally obligated to pay all fees and costs 

associated with that process. Should you fail to pay all delinquent 

assessments, late charges, costs of collection, including all lien and 

foreclosure process costs and fees, attorneys’ fees and interest, you may lose 

your property.” The court concluded that this letter, reviewed under the least 

sophisticated consumer standard, threatened foreclosure and thus violated 

the FDCPA. 

In its statement of decision after trial, the court reached the same 

conclusion about not only the pre-lien letter but also the pre-NOD letter. On 

the pre-lien letter, the court explained that the boldface, capitalized language 

was required by law.6 The language below that statement, however, was not 

required by law and “[t]he least sophisticated debtor would reasonably 

understand the unbolded language as threatening a foreclosure sale.” On the 

address ALS’s procedural argument that the state court erred in “adopting” 

the ruling and declining to reconsider it.

6 Section 5660, subdivision (a) requires that the boldface, capitalized 

statement set forth above be included in the notice sent to an owner prior to 

recording a lien to collect a debt from delinquent assessments.
14

pre-NOD letter, the court quoted the following statement: “If payment is not 

received within ten (10) days, then Association Lien Services will record a 

Notice of Default. Copies of the Notice of Default will be provided to your 

mortgage company and to anyone else having a legal interest in your 

property and entitled to notice under the Civil Code. Please note that if 

Association Lien Services is required to record the Notice of Default, you will 

also be responsible for paying an additional fee of approximately $995.00 for 

preparing and serving the Notice of Default, acquiring a Trustee’s Sale 

Guarantee along with any applicable recording, mail and related costs.” 

The court explained that recording a notice of default is “a necessary 

step in perfecting the right to hold a foreclosure sale” and that section 5720’s 

prohibition on collection through foreclosure of delinquent assessments that 

are less than $1,800 or more than 12 months old “means not only a 

foreclosure sale but also the commencement and perfection of the foreclosure 

process leading up to a sale, including recording a Notice of Default.” The 

court then concluded that the “least sophisticated debtor would reasonably 

understand recording a Notice of Default, notifying mortgage lenders, and 

obtaining a Trustee’s Sale Guarantee as indicating an intention to conduct a 

foreclosure sale.” 

2. Analysis

The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from engaging in certain 

practices to collect or attempt to collect a debt, including threatening to take 

action that cannot be legally taken and threatening to effect dispossession of 

property where there is no present right to possession of the property. 

(15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(5), 1692f(6)(A).) “[A] threat need not be express: it can 

be implied.” (Gonzalez v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC (9th Cir. 2011) 

660 F.3d 1055, 1064.) To determine whether conduct violates the FDCPA, 
15

courts employ the “ ‘least sophisticated debtor’ ” standard. (Gonzalez, at 

p. 1061, fn. 2 [discussing adoption by Ninth Circuit and majority of other 

courts].) This standard “ ‘preserv[es] a quotient of reasonableness and 

presum[es] a basic level of understanding and willingness to read with care,’ ” 

but is “ ‘designed to protect consumers of below average sophistication or 

intelligence,’ or those who are ‘uninformed or naive,’ particularly when those 

individuals are targeted by debt collectors.” (Id. at p. 1062.) 

Here, Doskocz claimed that ALS’s pre-lien and pre-NOD letters 

violated these provisions of the FDCPA because the letters threatened 

foreclosure when foreclosure was not permitted under section 5720.

Section 5720, subdivision (b) provides that an HOA “may not collect” a 

delinquent assessment less than $1,800 or more than 12 months old “through 

judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure,” but may “attempt to collect or secure that 

debt” through a civil action in small claims court, recording a lien that the 

HOA may not foreclose upon until the delinquent assessment reaches $1,800 

or more than 12 months, or “[a]ny other manner provided by law, except for 

judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure.” When ALS sent its pre-lien and pre-NOD 

letters, Doskocz’s delinquent assessment had not met this $1,800 or 12-

month threshold. 

We have some doubt as to whether ALS’s pre-lien letter can reasonably 

be characterized as threatening foreclosure before the delinquent assessment 

reached this statutory threshold. Nor do we need to make this 

determination. As counsel for Doskocz acknowledged at oral argument, if we 

conclude ALS’s pre-NOD letter can properly be so characterized, that suffices 
16

to uphold the judgment.7 Our review is de novo. (Gonzalez v. Arrow 

Financial Services, LLC, supra, 660 F.3d at p. 1060.)

ALS argues that the least sophisticated debtor would not read the preNOD letter as a threat of foreclosure because it only tells the homeowner that 

a notice of default will be recorded if payment is not received. ALS contends

that this does not violate section 5720 because the term “foreclosure” in that 

provision means only a foreclosure sale, not steps in the foreclosure process

(e.g., recording a notice of default) leading up to the sale.

Such a constrained reading of section 5720 is not supported by its plain 

language or legislative history. Section 5720, subdivision (b) imposes 

constraints on an HOA that “seeks to collect” or “attempt[s] to collect or 

secure [a] debt” below the $1,800 or 12-month threshold. Recording a notice 

of default starts the foreclosure process: it is the initial step, followed by a 

notice of sale and then sale. (§ 2924, subd. (a)(1).) The phrasing “seeks to 

collect” or “attempt[s] to collect” suggests an intent to cover these steps to 

commence and perfect the foreclosure process, not just the final step of a 

completed sale. 

The legislative history of section 5720 supports this interpretation. The 

provision was originally added to the statutory scheme in section 1367.4, 

subdivision (b) and then reorganized and recodified as section 5720, 

subdivision (b). (Stats. 2005, ch. 452, § 4; Stats. 2012, ch. 180, § 2.) The 

Legislative Counsel’s Digest stated that section 1367.4 “would revise and 

7 The judgment enjoins ALS from (1) engaging in communications 

“indicating that any step in the non-judicial foreclosure process may be 

initiated or pursued, including that a Notice of Default may be recorded” and 

(2) recording any notice of default before the $1,800 or more than 12 months 

old threshold is met. ALS is also required to rescind notices of default or 

trustee’s sale where the threshold had not been met. 
17

recast the procedures for collecting delinquent assessments for certain debts.” 

(Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 137 (Stats. 2005 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) 

Summary Dig.) Interpreting the term “foreclosure” from section 5720 to 

include the procedural step for initiating foreclosure is consistent with this 

legislative goal. We thus agree with the trial court that the least 

sophisticated debtor would reasonably understand this language in ALS’s 

pre-NOD letter as threatening foreclosure in violation of section 5720. 

 In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that 

ALS’s pre-NOD letter violated the FDCPA. 

C. No Abuse of Discretion on Motion to Bifurcate 

1. Additional Background

 Doskocz moved to bifurcate trial and proceed first on her equitable 

UCL cause of action. ALS opposed the motion on the ground that the UCL 

cause of action (for unlawful business practices) was predicated on violations 

of the FDCPA. ALS argued that it was entitled to a jury trial to determine 

its liability under the FDCPA, including whether the waiver of homeowner 

rights under section 5655(a) was a “bona fide error” under the FDCPA.8 

 The court granted the motion. In so doing, it explicitly declined to rule 

on the parties’ dispute regarding what issues under the FDCPA cause of 

action required a jury trial. The trial court stated it need not decide that now 

because even “assuming these are issues for the jury the Court would still 

decide to hear the UCL claim first.” In its statement of decision after trial, 

the court concluded that the bona fide error defense did not apply to 

8 Title 15 United States Code section 1692k(c) provides: “A debt 

collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if 

the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation 

was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the 

maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”
18

Doskocz’s UCL cause of action and even if it did, “ALS did not act 

unintentionally, based on a bona fide error, and maintain procedures 

reasonably adapted to avoid the violation in using waivers of § 5655(a) in 

payment plans.” 

2. Analysis 

 We review a trial court’s decision to bifurcate for abuse of discretion. 

(Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146, 163.) While courts retain broad

discretion on the sequencing of trial, this discretion is not unlimited. (Ibid.) 

“ ‘The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being 

applied’ . . . . ‘Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable 

principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an 

“abuse” of discretion.’ ” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State 

University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 393.) ALS bears the burden to show 

the trial court abused its discretion here. (Property California SCJLW One 

Corp. v. Leamy (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1163.) 

 To satisfy this burden, ALS repeats its argument that the motion to 

bifurcate “completely ignored the fact that in order to establish a claim under 

the UCL, [Doskocz] would need to establish a violation of the FDCPA as the 

predicate statute for finding a violation of the UCL” and that ALS was 

entitled to a jury trial on the issue of liability under the FDCPA. ALS 

contends that the trial court’s ruling is “inherently contradictory” because it 

acknowledged that issues of liability under the FDCPA would be 

encompassed in the UCL cause of action but “assumed, rightly or wrongly,” 

that ALS had some right to a jury trial on the FDCPA cause of action. 

 We begin with the principle that the right to a jury trial in civil cases is 

generally limited to legal causes of action, not equitable ones. (Hoopes v. 

Dolan, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 155.) “Over the more than 80-year 
19

history of the UCL, scores of decisions of both this court and the Courts of 

Appeal have uniformly recognized that the cause of action established by this 

statute is equitable in nature.” (Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. 

Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 279, 301.) The California Supreme Court has 

made clear that “there is no right to a jury trial in a cause of action under the 

UCL.” (Id. at p. 327.) Courts have declined to depart from this rule where a 

defendant raises the argument ALS makes here: that the predicate law for 

establishing a UCL cause of action for unlawful business practices entitles it 

to a jury trial. 

In Hodge v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 278 (Hodge), for 

example, employees asserted a UCL cause of action premised on violations of 

the Labor Code regarding overtime wages. (Hodge, at p. 282.) The employer 

contended it was entitled to a jury trial because the cause of action was 

predicated on a legal question regarding a breach of contract and its 

affirmative defense required adjudication of legal claims. (Id. at pp. 283–

284.) Hodge reasoned that “[a]lthough the unlawful prong of the UCL 

borrows from other laws, it is not a substitute for those laws.” (Hodge, at 

p. 284.) The UCL makes this explicit: “Unless otherwise expressly provided, 

the remedies or penalties provided by this chapter are cumulative to each 

other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this 

state.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17205.)

Moreover, “ ‘the overarching legislative concern’ ” in enacting the UCL 

was “ ‘to provide a streamlined procedure for the prevention of ongoing or 

threatened acts of unfair competition’ ” and “[c]onsistent with this objective, 

the UCL provides only for equitable remedies. . . . Damages are not 

available.” (Hodge, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 284.) Accordingly, the UCL 

“is not simply a legislative conversion of a legal right into an equitable one” 
20

but a different and separate equitable cause of action. (Hodge, at p. 284.) 

Hodge thus concluded that the presence of legal issues did not “transform” 

the employees’ equitable UCL cause of action into one of law. (Hodge, at 

p. 285.) 

The same reasoning applies here: the fact that the UCL cause of action 

required determination of ALS’s liability under the FDCPA did not transform 

Doskocz’s equitable UCL cause of action into a legal one.9 Indeed, “[s]uits 

under [the UCL] are often combined with causes of action that entitle the 

plaintiff to a jury trial (e.g., fraud, breach of contract)” and issues decided 

first “in a UCL bench trial (which may include determination of predicate 

claims such as fraud, etc.) may make a jury trial unnecessary.” (Weil & 

Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 

2023) ¶ 14:230.1, citing Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc.

(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 988, 995, 1005 [court addressed six legal claims in 

ruling on equitable UCL cause of action].) We thus conclude that ALS has 

not met its burden to show the trial court abused its discretion in granting 

Doskocz’s motion to bifurcate.

D. Substantial Evidence on Alter Ego Findings

1. Additional Background

In its statement of decision after trial, the court concluded that the SG 

defendants were alter egos of ALS. Quoting Associated Vendors, Inc. v. 

Oakland Meat Co. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 825, 837 (Associated Vendors), the 

court described the two-part test for applying the alter ego doctrine: 

“ ‘(1) that there be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 

personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, and 

9 Given this conclusion, we need not address the parties’ arguments on 

the merits of any bona fide error defense.
21

(2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an 

inequitable result will follow.’ ” 

On the first part of the test, the trial court found there was such a 

unity of interest and ownership. Swedelson and Gottlieb are husband and 

wife, and have always been the sole shareholders and directors of ALS. 

Gottlieb is the chief executive officer and president of ALS. Swedelson and 

Gottlieb started their assessment collection business, Association Lien 

Services, in 1987. Swedelson and Gottlieb are also the sole general partners 

of their law firm, which is a general partnership between them. The law firm 

was formed in 1987, the same year as Association Lien Services.

From 1987 to 2005, Swedelson and Gottlieb operated both businesses 

as a single entity. In 2005, Swedelson and Gottlieb incorporated Association 

Lien Services (as “ALS Lien Services” because the original name was not 

available) based on personal tax advantages. Upon incorporation, the law 

firm entered into a sublease with ALS to continue to operate out of the suite 

immediately adjacent to the law firm office, as well as a management 

agreement to continue the shared administrative services, access, and use of

facilities from the law firm that ALS had before. 

ALS and the law firm shared common personnel, and law firm 

employees routinely provided services (like letter reviews) to ALS. As of 

December 2013, ALS was in default on payments under the sublease and 

management agreement. Gottlieb agreed to forego her ALS salary, and the 

law firm, in violation of ALS’s rights under the sublease, subleased portions 

of ALS’s space to other subtenants. The court found Swedelson and Gottlieb 

had used ALS to procure legal work for the law firm. ALS’s standard 

collection contract terms provided for use of the law firm’s legal services. 
22

ALS advertised the law firm’s legal services on its website and in other 

marketing materials.

On the second part of the test, the court found that failure to apply the 

alter ego doctrine would lead to an inequitable result. When ALS was 

incorporated in 2005, Swedelson and Gottlieb contributed $28,000 total in 

capital. They also obtained an insurance policy with a $1 million limit and a 

$250,000 class action sublimit. 

The court found that Swedelson and Gottlieb “failed to provide ALS 

with sufficient unencumbered capital and/or insurance to cover its reasonably 

foreseeable liabilities” related to “unfair debt collection litigation.” It found 

they were aware of these risks at the time of incorporation because they had 

previously defended Association Lien Services in another FDCPA class action

in which they had charged $1,076,227.14 for legal fees. ALS educational 

materials showed Swedelson and Gottlieb were “sophisticated” in their 

knowledge of FDCPA liability. Between 2012 and 2020, ALS was sued at 

least 12 times for debt collection activities. 

As described above, ALS was in default on payments under the 

sublease and management agreement by the end of 2013. When ALS was 

collecting Doskocz’s account in 2013 and 2014, it had no significant 

unencumbered capital. ALS’s default on its payments under the sublease 

and management agreement continued to grow. 

ALS had around $100,000 in total income from 2015 to 2021, but had 

$825,000 in delinquencies. During that period, ALS paid the law firm 

approximately $1.4 million in rent, management fees, legal services, and 

compensation to Gottlieb. This included $300,000 in attorney fees billed as 

outside counsel in this litigation (beyond fees paid to insurance defense 

counsel after exhaustion of the insurance policy). The court found that this
23

$300,000 in payments had a “significant adverse financial impact on ALS,” 

and that Swedelson understood bankruptcy would stay the litigation and stop 

“financial drains,” but neither Swedelson nor Gottlieb ever considered it. The 

court also found it was reasonable to infer that Swedelson and Gottlieb 

“tolerated” ALS’s defaults because, given its public identification with the law 

firm, ALS’s bankruptcy or “financial failure” would be damaging to the law 

firm. 

By the time of trial, ALS had been insolvent for several years and was 

unable to pay a class judgment. ALS’s approximate net worth was negative 

$1.1 million. The court found that the SG defendants’ (1) failure to 

“adequately capitalize ALS to respond to reasonably expected unfair debt 

collection class action litigation,” (2) continuation of ALS’s business since 

2013 without “adequate capital or insurance to respond to a Judgment in this 

case,” and (3) diversion of ALS funds to themselves was “in bad faith and 

intentional, for the wrongful and intentional purposes of circumventing the 

requirements of the FDCPA and Davis-Stirling Act and of avoiding ALS’s 

liability to the Class in this case.” 

The trial court noted that the SG defendants had presented testimony 

from an “expert on alter ego,” including opinions regarding the observance of 

corporate formalities and the separateness of entities. The trial court 

concluded, however, that the expert had “testified about his opinion based on 

incomplete facts provided to him. As a result that opinion was not helpful to 

the Court. Also the legal conclusion reached by him, even [if] it was on 

complete facts, invades the discretion of the court under the law.”
24

2. Analysis

The SG defendants challenge the trial court’s findings on both parts of 

alter ego test. At oral argument on appeal, the SG defendants conceded that 

the proper standard of review is whether there is “substantial evidence 

contained in the record to uphold the findings of the trial court.” (Associated 

Vendors, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at p. 835.)

Associated Vendors identifies various factors to consider in the alter ego 

test, including identical equitable ownership, use of the same office and 

employees, use of a corporation to procure services or serve as an

“instrumentality” or a “conduit” for the business of another entity, and failure 

to maintain an arm’s-length relationship. (Associated Vendors, supra, 

210 Cal.App.2d at pp. 838–840.) 

There was ample evidence to support the court’s finding on unity of 

ownership and interest under these factors. Swedelson and Gottlieb were the 

sole shareholders, officers, and directors of ALS, as well as the sole general 

partners of SwedelsonGottlieb. ALS used the administrative services and 

facilities of the law firm office. ALS and the law firm shared common 

personnel, and law firm employees performed work for ALS. The agreements 

with HOAs and marketing by ALS show it was used as an instrumentality or 

a conduit for law firm business. And the law firm’s failure to act on ALS’s 

defaults and its improper sublease of the ALS space show they did not 

maintain an arm’s-length relationship.

The SG defendants cite evidence and expert testimony regarding 

certain corporate formalities to suggest otherwise, including the sublease 

agreement and separateness of various accounts and policies. But these 

formalities do not overcome the substantial evidence on the other factors, 

particularly given that the law firm subsequently violated this sublease
25

agreement. (See Associated Vendors, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at p. 840 

[consideration of presence or absence of various factors “within the province 

of the trial court” and any conflict is for trier of fact to resolve].) The SG 

defendants also suggest that Gottlieb’s forfeiture of her ALS salary weighed

against any unity of ownership or interest, citing Sonora Diamond Corp. v. 

Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 529. That case is entirely inapposite, 

as it analyzed only the second part of the alter ego test and concluded that a 

parent company’s advance of funds to a subsidiary does not alone prove 

injustice. (Id. at p. 539.) Even accepting the analogy between an advance 

and salary forfeiture, Sonora Diamond says nothing about how it factors into 

unity of ownership or interest.

Turning to the second part of the test, the SG defendants contend that 

the trial court “made no finding of any injustice.” In so doing, the SG 

defendants appear to suggest there was no evidence of actual fraud or

fraudulent intent necessary for such a finding. But the alter ego doctrine 

“does not depend on the presence of actual fraud.” (Associated Vendors, 

supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at p. 838.) Instead, “it is designed to prevent what 

would be fraud or injustice, if accomplished. Accordingly, bad faith in one 

form or another is an underlying consideration and will be found in some 

form or another in those cases wherein the trial court was justified in 

disregarding the corporate entity.” (Ibid.) Here, the trial court concluded 

that the SG defendants acted intentionally and “in bad faith” by failing to 

adequately capitalize ALS, continuing ALS’s business without adequate 

capital or insurance, and diverting ALS funds to themselves. 

Failure to adequately capitalize, absence of corporate assets, and 

undercapitalization are all factors that can be considered in applying the 

alter ego doctrine. (Associated Vendors, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at p. 839.) 
26

When ALS was incorporated, Swedelson and Gottlieb contributed only 

$28,000 in capital, and obtained an insurance policy with a $1 million limit 

and a $250,000 class action sublimit despite having previously defended 

Association Lien Services in a FDCPA class action and charging over a 

million dollars for legal services. Swedelson and Gottlieb proceeded with 

ALS’s business despite the risks reasonably foreseeable after this litigation. 

Over the next several years, they continued ALS’s business despite growing

delinquencies and additional lawsuits. Then they charged ALS legal fees as 

outside counsel in this action. The SG defendants argue that those fees

should not be considered because they reflect legal services rendered. But 

that misses the point. Swedelson and Gottlieb never considered options for 

ALS that would have mitigated or at least suspended these costs (e.g.,

bankruptcy), instead charging $300,000 in fees above and beyond those paid 

to insurance defense counsel. The evidence on each of these points supported

the court’s finding that failure to apply the alter ego doctrine would lead to 

an inequitable result here. 

We conclude that the trial court’s alter ego findings were supported by 

substantial evidence.

E. No Abuse of Discretion on Leave to Amend Complaint

1. Additional Background

In 2020, the court granted Doskocz’s request for leave to file a first 

amended complaint to add alter ego allegations against the SG defendants. 

Neither the motion nor the court’s ruling are included in the record here. 

ALS subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate to vacate the order. 

This court denied the petition based on failure to demonstrate with reference 

to facts that ALS would suffer irreparable harm absent review by 

extraordinary writ. 
27

In 2021, the SG defendants filed a demurrer to the first amended 

complaint, arguing that the claims against them were barred by the 

stipulation between Doskocz and ALS in the original federal action. The 

stipulation read, in relevant part: “In the state court complaint, Plaintiff 

may, consistent with this Stipulation, delete claims from the Complaint in 

this action, but may not add any new claims. Plaintiff waives any right to 

amend causes of action in the state court action under California law, except 

as allowed by the Superior Court in ruling on any Demurrer or other motion 

filed by Defendant.” The SG defendants argued that the first amended 

complaint improperly alleged “new claims” against them based upon alter ego 

theories of liability.

While the same argument had been made by ALS in opposition to the 

motion for leave to amend, the trial court concluded collateral estoppel did 

not apply because the SG defendants were not parties at that time. Citing 

Hennessey’s Tavern, Inc. v. American Air Filter Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 

1351, however, the court explained that “alter ego allegations provide a 

theory of recovery, but not a new cause of action.” It thus found that adding 

the SG defendants “did not violate the stipulation as no new claims were 

added.” The court overruled the demurrer. 

2. Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1) provides that a 

trial court “may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be 

proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.” We review the court’s ruling 

on Doskocz’s motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion. (Branick 

v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.)

We conclude that the SG defendants have forfeited their challenge to 

this ruling because they did not provide it in the appellate record. (Cal. Rules 
28

of Court, rule 8.124(b)(1)(B) [appendix must include items “necessary for 

proper consideration of issues”]; Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish & Game 

Com. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1051, fn. 9 [“if the record is inadequate for 

meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court 

should be affirmed”].) 

Even if not forfeited, we see no basis to conclude that the court abused 

its discretion in granting the motion. The SG defendants renew their 

argument that the amendment added “new claims” in violation of the

stipulation from the federal action. But alter ego allegations do not create a 

new claim or cause of action, they are instead a “procedural device” used to 

hold the alter ego liable. (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 419 

[explaining alter ego liability is “not a substantive claim”]; Hennessey’s 

Tavern, Inc. v. American Air Filter Co., supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1359

[same].)

To the extent the SG defendants challenge the trial court’s ruling on

demurrer, our review is de novo but reaches the same result. (San 

Bernardino County v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 679, 683.) On 

demurrer, the SG defendants repeated the argument (previously made by 

ALS in opposing the motion to amend) that the new alter ego allegations 

were barred by the stipulation. But the SG defendants show no basis to

enforce that agreement between Doskocz and ALS. Third parties may have 

such a basis where (1) the third party benefits from the agreement, (2) the 

provision of such a benefit was the “motivating purpose” of the contracting 

parties, and (3) permitting enforcement “is consistent with the objectives of 

the contract and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.” 

(Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830.) Here, the SG 

defendants assert—without any supporting facts or law—that they were 
29

intended third party beneficiaries of the stipulation because Doskocz “used 

the language therein” to add them into the state action. This unsupported 

assertion does not persuade us that the requirements for third party 

enforcement are satisfied here. Even if it did, we agree with the trial court 

that the amendment did not run afoul of the stipulation because, as

explained above, the alter ego allegations did not add any “new claims.”

In short, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

granting Doskocz’s motion to amend the complaint and did not err in 

overruling the SG defendants’ demurrer.

F. No Abuse of Discretion on Attorney Fees Award

1. Additional Background

After the statement of decision was issued, class counsel moved for 

attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 on the grounds 

that the litigation had conferred a substantial benefit on the public and a 

large class of Californians. They requested a total $1,173,816 award: 

$939,053 in fees with a 1.25 multiplier that included time spent by lead 

counsel and attorneys from both Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP (Cotchett) 

and Housing and Economic Rights Advocates (HERA). The motion included 

declarations from lead counsel, Cotchett, and HERA describing work 

performed in the action. Declarations from lead counsel and HERA also 

included time records. ALS and the SG defendants opposed the motion. 

Among other things, the SG defendants argued that the requested fee award

was not reasonable or properly apportioned to them. 

The court granted class counsel’s motion and awarded $1,173,816 in 

fees. It found that the litigation “conferred a significant benefit on a 

substantial number of people, including the Class Members in this case and 

the General Public” and the subject matter “implicated the public interest 
30

because it vindicated and enforced important assessment collection 

provisions of the Davis-Stirling Act,” including sections 5655(a) and 5720. 

The court found that the hours spent by class counsel were “reasonable, 

taking into account the history, duration, and context of this litigation, 

including the issues presented, motions practice, Defendants’ opposition, and 

the extent of litigation.” It exercised its discretion to apply the 1.25 

multiplier upon considering the factors from Serrano v. Priest (1977) 

20 Cal.3d 25, including “novelty and difficulty of the questions and skill 

displayed by Class Counsel in presenting them, and the contingent nature of 

the fee award.” 

2. Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 provides that a court may award 

attorney fees to the prevailing party “in any action which has resulted in the 

enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a 

significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred 

on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and 

financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public 

entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award 

appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be

paid out of the recovery, if any.”

Here, the SG defendants challenge the trial court’s finding on the first 

prong of this provision: that the action conferred a significant benefit on the 

general public or a large class of persons. We review this finding for abuse of 

discretion. (See Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1213 

[determination to award fees under Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 reviewed for 

abuse of discretion where appeal turns on factual findings or exercise of 

discretion rather than questions of law].)
31

We find no such abuse of discretion here. The SG defendants focus on 

the minimal financial gain from dividing the restitution award of $156,783 

over 6,000 class members, but ignore the other benefits achieved by the 

action. (See City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System

(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 688, 700 [explaining that considerations beyond 

prevailing party financial benefit may be relevant].) The judgment included 

not only restitution, but injunctive relief prohibiting ALS from certain

practices and requiring it to recalculate balances on all open accounts. More

importantly, the action conferred a significant public benefit because, as 

detailed above, it vindicated important homeowner rights under

sections 5655(a) and 5720. 

Nor are we persuaded by the SG defendants’ arguments challenging

the amount of attorney fees awarded here. (Robles v. Employment 

Development Dept. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 191, 199 [amount of fees awarded 

under Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 reviewed for abuse of discretion].) First, the 

SG defendants argue that Cotchett and HERA did not provide “detailed 

billing” in support of their request. “ ‘California courts do not require 

detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on

declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s 

own view of the number of hours reasonably spent.’ ” (Syers Properties III, 

Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698.) Here, Cotchett and HERA 

provided declarations describing the type of work performed by their 

attorneys and the hours spent on such work. HERA also attached time 

entries with a general description of the category of work performed. This 

was sufficient for the court to determine that the hours requested by class 

counsel were reasonable.
32

Second, the SG defendants argue that the amount was unreasonable 

because multiple attorneys attended hearings and depositions in this action. 

We agree with the general principle that a trial court can exercise its 

discretion to limit an award of fees for “ ‘unjustified duplication of work’ ” 

across different counsel or law firms. (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 

182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) But the SG defendants do not detail how any 

particular time incurred by class counsel was unjustified. On the contrary, 

lead counsel, Cotchett, and HERA all provided declarations stating they had 

reduced or removed entries for duplicative efforts and written off at least 496

hours spent in this litigation.

Third, the SG defendants argue that there was no basis for the hourly 

rates claimed by class counsel or the 1.25 multiplier applied here. “In 

determining hourly rates, the court must look to the ‘prevailing market rates 

in the relevant community’ ” and “should also consider the experience, skill, 

and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, 

LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) “ ‘Affidavits of the 

plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the 

community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting 

a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing 

market rate.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, lead counsel, Cotchett, and HERA provided 

declarations detailing their hourly rates and stating that such rates were at 

or below market rates for attorneys with comparable experience and skill. 

Lead counsel also provided examples of his hourly rates determined in

previous fee awards. Moreover, a trial court “may rely on its own knowledge 

and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate.” 

(Ibid.; see also PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096

[“ ‘The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the 
33

trial court has its own expertise.’ ”].) The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding class counsel’s requested rates to be reasonable. As for 

the multiplier, courts have the discretion to apply such a multiplier based on 

a variety of factors, including novelty and difficulty of the questions 

presented in the action. (Serrano v. Priest, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the 1.25 multiplier

requested here based on novel and difficult legal issues in this litigation, 

including whether waiver of section 5655 was void as against public policy.

Finally, the SG defendants argue that the attorney fees should have 

been apportioned, with ALS being solely responsible for fees incurred before

the alter ego allegations were added to the first amended complaint in 2020. 

“[T]rial courts have discretion not only in setting the amount of an award of 

attorney fees, but in allocating the award among various defendants based on 

their relative culpability.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 

178 Cal.App.4th 44, 97–98.) Here, however, the SG defendants were 

determined to be the alter egos of ALS and thus held liable for its obligations. 

(Leek v. Cooper, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 419.) Accordingly, there was no 

distinction between the liability of the defendant entities here, and work 

performed to pursue and prove ALS’s liability was common to the SG 

defendants.

In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding $1,173,816 in fees to class counsel against ALS and the SG 

defendants jointly and severally.
34

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Doskocz is entitled to her costs on appeal. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

CASTRO, J.*

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

BANKE, J.

A166299

Doskocz v. ALS Lien Services

* Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
35

Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior court

Trial Judge: Hon. Barry Baskin

Counsel: 

Soltman, Levitt, Flaherty & Wattles LLP, Steven B. Soltman and Steven S. 

Nimoy for Defendant and Appellant ALS Lien Services.

Murchison & Cumming, LLP, Dan L. Longo and Matthew E. Voss 

for Defendants and Appellants SwedelsonGottlieb, David Swedelson, and 

Sandra Gottlieb.

Housing and Economic Rights Advocates, Arthur D. Levy, Gina di Giusto and 

Daniel F. Alper; and Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Justin T. Berger for 

Plaintiffs and Respondents.