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IN THE COURTOFAPPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON PAULINE LOUISE CONNER, Appellant,

v. EVERHOME MORTGAGE COMPANY, a division ofEVERBANK, and EVERBANK, REGIONAL TRUSTEE SERVICES, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a/k/a MERSCORP, FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, LENDER PROCESSING SERVICES, DOES l-XXX, INCLUSIVE, Respondents. No. 74050-4-1 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: November21, 2016 • i 0- 1;,J

Leach, J. — Pauline Conner challenges the summaryjudgment dismissal 

### of her lawsuitagainstEverhome Mortgage Company (nowEverBank),1 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (MERS), and Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). After Conner defaulted on a loan, EverBank started nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings against her home. Conner then filed a lawsuit asserting various causes of action based on alleged violations of the 

### 1In July 2011, Everhome Mortgage Company merged withEverBankwith the surviving successor being EverBank. Both names are used throughout the briefing and record, but the entities are the same for purposes of this dispute. Forconsistencywith thetrial courtorder, we use "EverBank."No. 74050-4-1 / 2



### deeds of trust act (DTA)2 and Consumer Protection Act (CPA)3. She claims genuine issues of material fact prevent dismissal of these claims. She also challenges certain trial court evidence rulings and the denial of her requestfor a continuance ofthe summaryjudgmenthearing. Because Conner does not dispute that she defaulted on her loan and did not restrain the foreclosure sale, she fails to raise an issue of fact about her waiverofmostofherDTA claims. Becausethe respondents did notowe Conner 

### a duty ofgood faith, the trial court properly dismissed Conner's good faith claim against them. And because Conner does not provide facts to support the causation element of her CPA claim, the trial court properly dismissed the claim. Forthese reasons, we affirm. FACTS 

### In May 2006, Irwin Mortgage Corporation (IMC) loaned Pauline Conner $279,000 evidenced by a promissory note. A deed oftrust (DOT) encumbering Conner's home secured the note. The DOT named MERS as its beneficiary. MERS neverowned orpossessedthe promissory note. IMC endorsed the note in blank and sold it to Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae delivered the note to EverBank to allow EverBank to service it for Fannie Mae. EverBankmaintained continuous physical possession ofthe original note. 2Ch. 61.24RCW. 3Ch. 19.86 RCW.No. 74050-4-1 / 3

Conner defaulted on the loan in May 2009. EverBank notified Conner of her default and an imminent referral to foreclosure. Conner did not cure her default. On August 31, 2009, EverBankreferred the loan forforeclosure. 

### In September 2009, MERS executed an assignment of the DOT, purporting to assign to EverBank all beneficial interestunderthe DOT. On September 18, 2009, Regional Trustee Services sent Conner a notice of default, signed as "Trustee and/or Agent for the Beneficiary." EverBank appointed Regional Trustee as successor trustee, providing it with a notarized affidavit ofpossession indicating that EverBankpossessed the note. On October 20, 2009, Regional Trustee recorded EverBank's appointment of successor trustee appointing Regional Trustee as successor trustee. The same day Regional Trustee also recorded a notice of trustee sale and sent itand a notice offoreclosure to Conner. The notice offoreclosure scheduled a public action of Conner's home for January 22, 2010. Regional Trustee continued the sale to April 16, 2010. Connerdid notattemptto enjoin the sale. Fannie Mae purchased the property at the April 16 trustee's sale. When Conner did not move out, Fannie Mae started
an eviction action, which the court stayed pending the outcome ofthis lawsuit. Conner filed this lawsuit on February 13, 2012, naming EverBank, Regional Trustee, MERS, and Fannie Mae as defendants. On July 9, 2015,No. 74050-4-1 / 4 respondents EverBank, MERS, and Fannie Mae moved for summaryjudgment seeking dismissal of all claims against them. Regional Trustee had entered receivership and was not a party to the summary judgment proceeding. On August 4, 2015, Conner moved for a continuance to allow her to conduct discovery on specific questions related to ownership and possession of her promissory note. The trial court denied Conner's CR 56(f) motion and granted respondents' motion for summary judgment, dismissing all of Conner's claims. Connerappealed. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

### We review an order granting summary judgment de novo.4 Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing all facts and reasonable inferences inthe light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issue of material fact 

### exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.5 We consider the same evidence that the trial court considered on summary 

### judgment.6 But we may affirmthe trial court ruling on any ground supported by the record.7

4Havden v. Mut. ofEnumclaw Ins. Co.. 141 Wn.2d 55, 63-64, 1 P.3d 1167 (2000).5Lvbbertv. GrantCounty, 141 Wn.2d 29, 34, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000). 6Lvbbert. 141 Wn.2d at 34. 7King County v. Seawest Inv. Assocs., 141 Wn. App. 304, 310, 170 P.3d 53 (2007). -4-No. 74050-4-1 / 5

ANALYSIS Declarations ofLee and Kaufman Conner asserts that the trial court should not have considered declarations and related business records about Regional Trustee and EverBank's actions in connection with the foreclosure. We review a trial court's decision to admit or 

### excludeevidence in a summaryjudgmentproceeding de novo.8 First, Conner contends that the declarations of Bradley Lee and Deborah Kaufman did not show that they had sufficient personal knowledge of the facts stated in the declarations. CR 56(e) requires that "[supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competentto testifyto the matters stated therein." Declarations based on review of business records satisfy this personal knowledge requirement ifthe business 

### records are admissible under RCW5.45.020.9 RCW 5.45.020 provides that a business record is admissible when the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if itwas made inthe regularcourse ofbusiness, atornearthe time ofthe act, condition orevent, and if, in the opinion ofthe court, the sources of information, method and time ofpreparation were such as tojustify its admission.

8Folsom v. BurgerKing. 135Wn.2d 658, 663, 958 P.2d 301 (1998). 

### 9DiscoverBankv. Bridges, 154Wn. App. 722, 726, 226 P.3d 191 (2010). -5-No. 74050-4-1 / 6



### Courts interpret "custodian" and "other qualified witness" broadly.10 The record 

### need not be identified bythe one who created it.11 Itmust only be made "in the regularcourse ofbusiness, undercircumstances which the courtfinds rendered it 

### trustworthy."12 The declarations of Lee and Kaufman satisfy the personal knowledge requirement because they meet the requirements of CR 56(e) and RCW5.45.020. We dealt with a similar challenge in Barklev v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.13 Like the affiants in Barklev, Lee and Kaufman satisfied CR 56(e) and RCW 5.45.020 when they declared under penalty of perjury that (1)they were officers of EverBank and Regional Trustee, respectively, (2) they had personal knowledge of their companies' practices of maintaining business records, (3) their personal knowledge was based on examination ofthe records, and (4) the attached records were true and correct copies ofrecords made inthe 

### regularcourse ofbusiness at ornearthe time of the transaction.14 Connercontends thatthe trial court improperly accepted these conclusory declarations ofpersonal knowledge aboutthe records' creation and contents. In


### 10 Statev. Ben-Neth, 34 Wn. App. 600, 603, 663 P.2d 156 (1983). 11 Cantrill v. Am. Mail Line. Ltd., 42 Wn.2d 590, 608, 257 P.2d 179 (1953). 12 Statev. Rutherford. 66 Wn.2d 851, 853, 405 P.2d 719 (1965). 13 190 Wn. App. 58, 66-68, 358 P.3d 1204 (2015), review denied, 184 Wn.2d 1036(2016). 

### 14 See Barklev, 190 Wn. App. at 67; see also Discover Bank, 154 Wn. App. at726. -6-No. 74050-4-1 / 7


### Barklev, we concluded that the trial court could properly consider "conclusory" declarations becausethe moving party had failed to identify any genuine issue of 

### material fact aboutthe affiants' qualifications.15 Here, thetrial court admittedthat the declarations "tended to assert, without much more, that the affiant had 

### personal knowledge, was familiar with the records, and that the records were 

### prepared inthe ordinary course ofbusiness." The trial court still considered the declarations, observing, likethe court in Barklev. that Conner offered nothing to contradict the declarations. Given no reason to doubt their accuracy, the trial 

### court, in its discretion, could properly findthe declarations reliable enough to be considered. 

### Conner objects to Kaufman's reliance on the referral to foreclosure, sent 

### by Lender Processing Services on behalf of EverBank. She contends that Kaufman improperlyconsidered a documentthat contains hearsay and is from a 

### third party. However, Kaufman used the document to show that Regional Trustee believed that it had received a referral to foreclosure from EverBank, 

### which is precisely what the document conveys. Kaufman's reliance on the referral to foreclosure was proper. Conner also claims that Kaufman's declaration is defective because it 

### referred to an affidavit of possession that was not attached to it. "Sworn or
15 Barklev, 190Wn. App. at67-68. -7-No. 74050-4-1 / 8



### certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 

### attached thereto or served therewith."16 "However,evidence may be presented in affidavits by reference to other sworn statements in the record such as 

### depositions and other affidavits."17 Although the affidavit ofpossession was not attached to the Kaufman declaration, the respondents submitted two identical separate copies with the summaryjudgment motion. Conner contends that the trial court could not know whether Kaufman relied on that same document, but 

### Connerbases this argumenton pure speculation. Connerprovides no reason to believe that Kaufman relied on a differentdocumentthan the one provided to the
court. Further, Conner did not ask the trial court to strike Kaufman's declaration 

### for this reason and first raises it in this appeal. Had Conner objected to this alleged deficiency before resolution of the summary judgment motion, 

### respondents could have easily cured it.18 Conner's failure to object earlier waives her right to make this complaint on appeal.19 The trial court properly considered the declarations ofLee and Kaufman.



### 16CR 56(e). 

### 17 Mostromv. Pettibon. 25 Wn. App. 158, 162, 607 P.2d 864 (1980). 18 See Meadows v. Grant's Auto Brokers. Inc.. 71 Wn.2d 874, 881, 431 P.2d 216 (1967). 19 See Meadows. 71 Wn.2d at 881. -8-No. 74050-4-1 / 9

DTA Claims The trial court declined to consider Conner's DTA claims against the 

### respondents, deciding that she had not pleaded them in her complaint.20 The trial courtwas wrong. The allegations involving the DTAappear inConner's first
cause of action for "wrongful foreclosure." She based her wrongful foreclosure

cause of action on claims of violations of chapter 61.24 RCW, Washington's 

### deeds of trust act. The language of the complaint shows that alleged DTA violations provided the sole basis for Conner's wrongful foreclosure claim. For 

### example, "Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are misrepresenting their right to enforce a debt and foreclose in violation of the statutory requirements of 

### Washington RCW 61.24 et seq." Conner also describes particular ways that DTAviolations led to wrongful foreclosure. Because violations ofthe DTAwere essential to Conner's wrongful foreclosure cause ofaction, thetrialcourterred in dismissing those claims on this basis. But we affirm dismissal ofthese claims becausetheywere eitherwaived or lack merit. Conner waived her DTA claims against the respondents. A borrower's 

### failure to enjoin a foreclosure beforethetrustee's sale may result in waiver of her claims underthe statute.21 This waivermay occurifthe party "(1)received notice 

### 20 "Whilethe plaintiffappears to have argued various alleged violations of the Deed ofTrust Act, she never actually pleaded the violations as a cause of action." 21 RCW61.24.040(1)(f)(IX). -9-No. 74050-4-1/10



### of the right to enjoin the sale, (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of a defense to foreclosure prior to the sale, and (3) failed to bring an action to obtain 

### a court order enjoining the sale."22 This court applies waiver "where it is 

### equitable under the circumstances and where it serves the goals of the act."23 Thus, to decide ifwaiver is proper, courts examine whether interested parties 

### had an adequate opportunity to prevent wrongful foreclosure.24 Also, failure to bring an action to enjoin foreclosure does not waive claims asserting "(a) [cjommon law fraud or misrepresentation; (b) [a] violation of Title 19 RCW; (c) [fjailure ofthe trustee to materially comply withthe provisions of this chapter; or 

### (d) [a]violationof RCW61.24.026."25 Here, Connermakes no claimthat she did not receive notice ofherright to 

### enjoin the sale or that she did not know of the foreclosure sale. Nordoes she claim that she attempted to enjoin the sale. Conner had ample opportunity to 

### challengethe sale. All allegedlywrongful actions occurred on or before October 20, 2009. She knew or should have known aboutthem, and the sale did nottake 

### place until April 2010. Thus, waiver is equitable here. We therefore find that

22 Plein v. Lackey, 149Wn.2d 214, 227, 67 P.3d 1061 (2003). 23 Albice v. PremierMortg. Servs. ofWash.. Inc.. 174Wn.2d 560, 570, 276 P.3d 1277(2012). 24 Albice, 174Wn.2dat571. 25 RCW61.24.127(1). -10-No. 74050-4-1 /11

under RCW61.24.127(1), Conner waived all but her CPA claims and her good 

### faith claimagainstthe trustee.26Good Faith Claim The trial court correctly dismissed Conner's good faith claim. Conner claims that Regional Trustee violated its duty of good faith by failing to properly investigate information itrelied upon to initiateforeclosure. Atrustee owes a duty 

### to act in good faith withimpartialityto both lenders and borrowers.27 But the trial court properly dismissed this claim because the trustee, Regional Trustee, was not a party to the summary judgment motion asking for dismissal of this claim and none ofthe respondents owed Connera duty ofgood faith. Conner claims that EverBank is vicariously liable for Regional Trustee's actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The respondeat superior doctrine makes a principal liable for its agent's wrongful acts committed within 

### the scope ofthe agency.28 Generally, "'a trustee is not merely an agent for the lender or the lender's successors. Trustees have obligations to all ofthe parties



### 26 Conner argues that EverBankfraudulently advised herthat making two months of payments would avoid foreclosure and Regional Trustee falsely indicated the number of Conner's delinquent payments. Although common law 

### fraud is one ofthe exceptions to waiver under RCW 61.24.127(1), Conneroffers no authorityto supportherfraud claims. Further, she did not raisethis issue until appeal. Wethereforedeclineto address herarguments aboutthefraud claim. 27 RCW 61.24.010(4); Lyons v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 181 Wn.2d 775, 787, 336P.3d 1142(2014). 

### 28 Black's Law Dictionary 1505 (10th ed. 2014). -11-No. 74050-4-1/12 

### to the deed, including the homeowner.'"29 However, "[wjhere the beneficiary so controls the trustee so as to make the trustee a mere agent ofthe beneficiary, 

### then as principal], the beneficiary may be liable for the actions of its agent."30 Here, Conner asserts that Regional Trustee was a mere agent of EverBank because EverBank controlled the transaction by its authorityto startand stop the 

### foreclosure. Assuming this is true, Conner still did not present any evidence showing that EverBank exercised an improper degree of control over Regional Trustee. Because Conner does not show that EverBank improperly controlled Regional Trustee, her proposition that Regional Trustee acted as EverBank's agentfails. Similarly, Conner's argument that Regional Trustee and EverBank should be held jointly and severally liable under theories of civil conspiracy and joint venture liability also fails. Conner cites no authority applying these theories in deed of trust cases. Further, Conner offers no evidence to justify their application inthis case. To prove civilconspiracy, a plaintiffmust showthateach participant combined to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by 

### unlawful means.31 To establish joint venture liability, a plaintiff must show a
29 Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank. 176 Wn.2d 771, 789, 295 P.3d 1179 (2013) (quoting Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp.. Inc.. 175 Wn.2d 83, 93, 285 P.3d 34 (2012)). 30 Klem, 176Wn.2d at 791 n.12. 31 Newton Ins. Agency & Brokerage, Inc. v. Caledonian Ins. Grp., Inc., 114 Wn. App. 151, 160, 52 P.3d 30 (2002).-12-No. 74050-4-1/13

contract, a common purpose, a community of interest, and equal right to a voice 

### and control.32 Conneroffers no evidencethatEverBankhad a common objective with Regional Trustee, lawful or otherwise. Because the respondents have no liability for Regional Trustee's actions, we decline to consider Conner's claims based on Regional Trustee's violation of its duty as trustee. Because the respondents have no primary or vicarious liability, we affirm dismissal of Conner's good faith claim. CPA Claims Next, we address Conner's CPA claims. The CPA prohibits "[ujnfair 

### methods ofcompetition and unfair ordeceptive acts or practices inthe conductof 

### any trade or commerce."33 To prevail on a CPA claim, the plaintiffmust show (1)

an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) occurring in trade or commerce, (3) a 

### public interest impact, (4) injury to the plaintiff in his or her business or property, 

### and (5) acausal linkbetween the unfairor deceptive act and the injury.34 Conner claims deceptive practices by Regional Trustee, EverBank, and 

### MERS caused her injury. Specifically, Connerbases her CPA claim on MERS's improper assignment of the DOT and on violations of the DTA, including 32 Kniselv v. Burke Concrete Accessories, Inc., 2 Wn. App. 533, 537, 468 

### P.2d 717 (1970) (quoting Carboneau v. Peterson, 1 Wn.2d 347, 374, 95 P.2d 1043(1939)). 33 RCW 19.86.020. 34 Klem. 176Wn.2d at782 (quoting Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 780, 719 P.2d 531 (1986)). -13-No. 74050-4-1 /14 

### EverBank's allegedly improper appointment of Regional Trustee, and various violations of the DTA by Regional Trustee. Because Regional Trustee was not 

### involved in the summaryjudgmentmotion and is not a party to this appeal, we do notconsiderCPA claims based on RegionalTrustee's alleged DTAviolations. 

### As an initial matter, the respondents incorrectly assert that the statute of limitations bars Conner's MERS-based CPA claim. A litigant must commence a 

### CPA action within four years from the date that cause ofaction accrues.35 A CPA claim begins to accrue when, with the exercise of due diligence, the claimant should have discovered the basis for the cause of action.36 The events

on which Conner bases her CPA claim occurred in late 2009 in connection with 

### foreclosure on her property. Conner sued in February 2012, well withinthefouryearperiod for bringing a CPA claim. Because the causation element ofthe CPA claim is dispositive, we focus 

### exclusively onit. Conneridentified herinjuries as the loss of her home and the 

### expenses sheincurred seeking legal helptodetermine ownership ofhernote.37

35 RCW 19.86.120. 

### 36 See Shepard v. Holmes, 185 Wn. App. 730, 739, 345 P.3d 786 (2014); 

### Maverv. Sto Indus., Inc., 123 Wn. App. 443, 462-63, 98 P.3d 116 (2004), rev'd in parton othergrounds. 156Wn.2d 677, 132 P.3d 115 (2006). 3? See Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofWash., 166 Wn.2d 27, 62, 204 P.3d 

### 885(2009) ("Consulting an attorneytodispel uncertainty regarding thenature of an alleged debt isdistinctfrom consulting an attorney to institute a CPA claim. 

### Although the latter is insufficient to show injury to business or property, the former is not." (citation omitted)). -14-No. 74050-4-1/15



### But Conner fails to show that either MERS's DOT assignment or EverBank's appointment ofsuccessortrustee caused these injuries. First, Connordoes not 

### show that EverBank relied on MERS'sassignmentof the DOTfor itsauthorityto foreclose or appoint a successor trustee. Also, she does not dispute that she 

### failed to meet her debt obligations and cure her default despite receiving notice of foreclosure. The record contains no evidence that the alleged deceptive acts of the respondents caused Conner's default or failure to cure. Thus, Conner cannot show that but for alleged deceptive acts, EverBank would not have foreclosed on her home. 

### Nordoes Conner show how the alleged deceptive acts caused Connerto 

### incur legal expenses. Neither the MERS assignment nor the appointment of

successor trustee had any effect on who was the owner or holder of the note. 

### Thus, these acts did not cause Connerto investigate ownership. Connerfailed todemonstrate a genuine issue of material fact thatthe MERS assignmentofthe 

### DOT, EverBank's appointment oftrustee, or any other allegedly improper action by the respondents caused her injury. Because Conner does not raise facts to 

### show a causal linkbetween the alleged deceptive acts and her injury, we do not address whether she has established the otherelements ofher CPA claim. 

### Conner has failed to produce any evidence supporting an essential element ofher CPA claim. We affirm dismissal ofthis claim. -15-No. 74050-4-1 /16
CR 56(f) Continuance The trial court properly denied Conner's request for a continuance under CR 56(f). Before oral argument on the respondents' summaryjudgment motion, Conner requested a continuance to conduct discovery on certain questions. Finding those questions were immaterial to the issues before it, the trial court denied the request. A trial court may deny a CR 56(f) continuance for a number 

### ofreasons: "(1)the requesting party does not offer a good reason forthe delay in obtaining the desired evidence; (2) the requesting party does not state what evidence would be established through the additional discovery; or (3) the 

### desired evidence will not raise a genuine issue of materialfact."38 An appellate court will affirm a trial court's decision to deny a CR 56(f) motion absent a 

### showing of manifestabuseofdiscretion.39 Here, the evidence Conner sought would not have created an issue of fact. Conner asserts material issues of fact exist about EverBank's status as 

### "actual holder" ofthe note with authority to foreclose. Conner moved for a CR 

### 56(f) continuance for the purpose of conducting discovery on this question. 

### Specifically, Connerplanned to request information on the date parties acquired ownership ofthe note and DOT; the amount, form, and source ofconsideration 38 Baechler v. Beaunaux. 167 Wn. App. 128, 132, 272 P.3d 277 (2012) 

### (quoting Turnerv. Kohler, 54 Wn. App. 688, 693, 775 P.2d474 (1989)). 39 Lake Chelan Shores Homeowners Ass'n v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 176Wn. App. 168, 183, 313 P.3d 408 (2013). -16-No. 74050-4-1/17 

### paid for the note and DOT; the date consideration was paid; and the identity of the agents involved. The trial court denied the CR 56(f) motion, concluding that none of Conner's requested discovery was material to the summaryjudgment issues.Conner claims that whether EverBank or Fannie Mae was the owner and 

### holder ofthe note is disputed. But any evidence Conner hoped to obtain about ownership or possession would not have changed the outcome here. First, ownership is not relevant to ability to enforce and is, thus, not material.40 Second, possession is the only salient fact for determining the "actual holder."41 Undisputed evidence shows that EverBank was the holder of the note. Conner 

### does not provide any reason to believe that more discovery would uncover evidence showing otherwise. And if such evidence existed, Conner does not 

### explain why shedid not have sufficienttimeto discoveritearlierinthe litigation. 

### Conner asserts that she needed additional time to conduct discovery because the respondents did not answer her amended complaint until a month before the hearing on summary judgment. But Conner had three years for discovery. The respondents' delay in filing their answer does not excuse Conner'sfailure to conductdiscovery on this issue.


### 40 See Truiillo v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc.. 181 Wn. App. 484, 500, 326 P.3d 768 (2014). rev'd on othergrounds. 183 Wn.2d 820, 355 P.3d 1100(2015). 

### 41 Truiillo. 181 Wn. App. at498. -17-No. 74050-4-1/18



### Conner did not identify any evidence that she might obtain through discovery that would raise a material issue of fact. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Conner's CR 56(f) motion. AttorneyFees Conner requests attorney fees under both RAP 18.1 and the terms ofthe 

### DOT. Because shedoes not prevail on any issue, we deny herrequest. CONCLUSION Because the undisputed facts show that Conner waived her DTA claims, 

### exceptthe good faith claim againstthe trustee, the trial court properly dismissed those claims. Becausethe respondents did notowe Connera duty ofgood faith, 

### the trial court properly dismissed Conner's good faith claim against them. And because Conner does not provide facts to support the causation element ofher CPAclaim, thetrial courtproperlydismissed thatclaim as well. We affirm.

WE CONCUR: 

# ^'^ l^cfe^I.

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