Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-569 | December 11, 2020 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Benjamin Loheide

Law Office of Benjamin Loheide

Columbus, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Sierra A. Murray

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ivan Cornel Augustin 

Hendrickson, Jr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 11, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-569

Appeal from the

Bartholomew Circuit Court

The Honorable

Kelly S. Benjamin, Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

03C01-1902-F5-1080

03C01-1905-F2-2924

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-569 | December 11, 2020 Page 2 of 17

[1] After Ivan Cornel Augustin Hendrickson, Jr. (“Hendrickson”) entered an open 

plea agreement with the State, the trial court sentenced Hendrickson to twentytwo years for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine1 and six years, all 

suspended to probation, for Level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle after 

forfeiture of license for life,

2 which was to run consecutively to the sentence for 

dealing methamphetamine, yielding an aggregate sentence of twenty-eight years

with twenty-two years executed. Hendrickson raises two issues on appeal, 

which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not identifying

mitigating factors in its sentencing order; and 

II. Whether Hendrickson’s sentence is inappropriate.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On December 10, 2018, a confidential informant (“CI”) contacted Detective 

Adam DeBoth (“Detective DeBoth”) of the Bartholomew County Sheriff’s 

Office and said that he or she could get methamphetamine from Hendrickson. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 23. Detective DeBoth gave the CI $300 and equipped 

the CI with surveillance and electronic monitoring equipment. Id. Detective 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a(1), (e)(1).

2

See Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17(a)(1).
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DeBoth accompanied the CI to the location designated for the drug deal. Id. 

Hendrickson had already arrived. Id. The CI gave Hendrickson the $300, and 

Hendrickson gave the CI more than ten grams of methamphetamine. Id.; Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 25. 

[4] On December 19, 2018, Detective DeBoth was again contacted by a CI. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 23. The CI indicated that he or she could buy half an 

ounce of methamphetamine from Hendrickson. Id. Two other detectives met 

the CI, and they gave the CI $350 and equipped the CI with surveillance and 

electronic monitoring equipment. Id. Detective DeBoth accompanied the CI to 

the designated location for the drug deal. Id. Hendrickson was already present. 

Id. The CI gave Hendrickson the $350, and Hendrickson gave the CI 13.40 

grams of methamphetamine. Id. 

[5] On January 31, 2019, Officer Brandon Decker (“Officer Decker”) of the 

Columbus Police Department received information that Hendrickson entered a 

black sport-utility vehicle with a while female near a particular gas station. Id. 

at 19. The female was believed to be Breanna Meier (“Meier”), Hendrickson’s 

girlfriend, who had an active warrant for her arrest. Id. Officer Decker knew 

that Hendrickson was an habitual traffic violator and had forfeited his driving 

privileges for life. Id. Officer Decker immediately proceeded to the area in a 

fully marked police vehicle. Id. He identified a black sport-utility vehicle and 

observed that it was traveling seventy-five miles per hour in a seventy-miles-perhour zone and that the license plate light was not illuminated, so Officer Decker 

initiated a traffic stop. Id. Officer Decker approached the driver’s side of the 
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vehicle and identified Hendrickson as the driver. Id. He ordered Hendrickson 

to turn off the engine and exit the vehicle. Id. Hendrickson turned off the 

engine as instructed, but he then began to reach between the driver’s seat and 

the center console. Id. Officer Decker reached into the vehicle and secured 

Hendrickson’s wrists. Id. Hendrickson then complied with Officer Decker’s 

order to exit the vehicle. Id. Officer Decker discovered that the vehicle was 

uninsured. Id. Hendrickson later explained that Meier had asked him to drive, 

so she could put on her makeup while they drove. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2

at 48. 

[6] On February 26, 2019, the State charged Hendrickson with operating a motor 

vehicle after forfeiture of license for life, a Level 5 felony, under cause 03C01-

1902-F5-1080 (“Cause 1080”). Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 17. On May 21, 2019, 

the State charged Hendrickson with two counts of dealing methamphetamine,

each as a Level 2 felony, under cause 03C01-1905-F2-2924 (“Cause 2924”). Id. 

at 21-22. Hendrickson also faced charges in other cases at that time. On 

October 3, 2018, the State had charged Hendrickson with operating a motor 

vehicle after forfeiture of license for life, a Level 5 felony, under cause 03C01-

1810-F5-5503 (“Cause 5503”). Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 11. On March 8, 2019, 

the State charged Hendrickson with dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 4 felony; 

conspiracy to commit dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 4 felony; conspiracy to

commit trafficking with an inmate, a Level 5 felony; and possession of a 

narcotic drug, a Level 6 felony, all under cause 03C01-1903-F4-1331 (“Cause 
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1331”). Id. at 24-27. On April 2, 2019, the State added an habitual offender 

allegation under both Cause 1331 and Cause 5503. Id. at 12, 30. 

[7] On January 16, 2020, Hendrickson pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, 

which addressed all four cause numbers. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 28-31; Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 5. Hendrickson admitted to one count of dealing in methamphetamine 

as a Level 2 felony under Cause 2924 and operating a motor vehicle after 

forfeiture of license for life as a Level 5 felony under Cause 1080. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. 2 at 28; Tr. Vol. 2 at 5. In exchange, the charges under Cause 5503 

and Cause 1331 were dismissed, as well as the remaining charge for dealing 

methamphetamine under Cause 2924. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 28; Tr. Vol. 2 at 

35-36.

[8] On January 16, 2020, the trial court held a guilty-plea hearing and took the 

matter under advisement. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 26-27. On February 20, 

2020, the trial court conducted a hearing in which it accepted Hendrickson’s 

plea and heard testimony regarding Hendrickson’s sentence. Tr. Vol. 2 at 4-31, 

36. Hendrickson testified about his past, which included a troubled childhood. 

Id. at 9. Hendrickson’s alcohol and drug use began when he was young. Id. 

He explained that the loss of several close family members between 2012 and 

2014 increased his dependence on alcohol and drugs. Id. at 9-10. He 

eventually began selling drugs in order to support his habit. Id. at 10. He 

admitted to having an extensive criminal record. Id. at 9. Hendrickson 

expressed remorse at the hearing. Id. at 12. Hendrickson also testified about 

helpful programs he participated in while incarcerated at the Bartholomew 
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County Jail and expressed his desire to enter a rehabilitation program for his 

addictions. Id. at 11-12. 

[9] Hendrickson admitted he had acquired fifty-six grams of methamphetamine. 

Id. at 15. Hendrickson also admitted that at least some of his past crimes were 

unrelated to his use of illegal substances and that he had never successfully 

completed probation. Id. at 9, 15. Lieutenant Toby Combest (“Lieutenant 

Combest”) of the Columbus Police Department testified that Hendrickson was 

“a little above” a mid-level drug dealer. Id. at 24, 29. Lieutenant Combest also 

testified that Hendrickson, at one point, made $3,000 a day dealing drugs. Id. 

at 29-30. 

[10] At the hearing, the trial court identified five aggravating factors: Hendrickson’s 

criminal history; his failure to successfully complete probation; his unsuccessful 

rehabilitation efforts; a jail-rule violation; and a pending case in Johnson 

County for aiding, inducing, or causing dealing in methamphetamine. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 32-33. The trial court noted that Hendrickson’s 

criminal history included four felony convictions and eight misdemeanor 

convictions. Tr. Vol. 2 at 36. The trial court also stated that Hendrickson’s 

“plea of guilty that he entered is a mitigating factor,” but recognized “the 

pragmatic fact of that [plea]” and stated that “the other charges that were 

dismissed is a great benefit.” Id. at 39. The trial court also discussed several 

other circumstances, including Hendrickson’s difficult childhood, his substance 

abuse, and his cooperation with the presentence investigation report, but it did 

not find that these were mitigating factors. Id. at 38-39. 
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[11] The trial court issued a written sentencing order the same day as the sentencing 

hearing. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 32-35. The order reiterated the same five 

aggravating factors identified at the sentencing hearing. Id. The written 

sentencing order, however, stated that “[t]he Court finds no mitigating 

circumstances.” Id. at 32. In Cause 2924, the trial court sentenced 

Hendrickson to a sentence of twenty-two years for Level 2 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine, with no time suspended. Tr. Vol. 2 at 39; Appellant’s App. 

Vol. 2 at 33. In Cause 1080, the trial court sentenced Hendrickson to six years

for Level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of license for life, to 

run consecutively to the sentence for dealing methamphetamine but with all six 

years suspended to probation. Tr. Vol. 2 at 39; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 33. The 

trial court ordered Hendrickson to serve all executed time in the Indiana 

Department of Correction. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 33; Tr. Vol. 2 at 39. 

Hendrickson now appeals. We will provide additional facts as necessary. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Discretion

[12] Hendrickson claims the trial court abused its discretion in failing to identify 

mitigating factors in its written sentencing order.3 Hendrickson correctly 

3 Hendrickson actually claims the trial court committed error instead of contending the trial court abused its 

discretion. However, because the finding of mitigating factors is a matter of trial court discretion, we will 

analyze Hendrick’s argument under the abuse-of-discretion standard. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 

490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). 
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observes that during the sentencing hearing the trial court discussed potential 

mitigating factors but did not cite those factors in its written sentencing order.

[13] Sentencing is left to the discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court 

reviews its decisions only for an abuse of that discretion. Singh v. State, 40 

N.E.3d 981, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion 

occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the trial court. Id. The finding of mitigating 

circumstances falls within the trial court’s discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). The trial 

court is not obligated to find a circumstance to be mitigating merely because it 

is advanced by the defendant. Id. at 493.

[14] An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor 

requires the defendant to show the mitigating factor is both significant and 

clearly supported by the evidence. Id. Further, if the trial court does not find 

the existence of a mitigating factor, it is not obligated to explain why it has 

found that the factor does not exist. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion only 

if “the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits 

reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, 

or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.” Baumholser v. State, 62 

N.E.3d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490), 

trans. denied. 
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[15] Here, Hendrickson accurately notes that during the sentencing hearing, the trial 

court discussed purported mitigating factors. For instance, the trial court 

described Hendrickson’s guilty plea as a “mitigating factor,” but the trial court 

also stated that Hendrickson’s plea was a “pragmatic” decision and that 

Hendrickson received a “great benefit” from the plea agreement because several 

other charges were dismissed. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 39. The trial court also discussed 

several other potential mitigating circumstances, including Hendrickson’s 

difficult childhood, his substance abuse, and his cooperation with the 

presentence investigation. Id. at 38-39. Hendrickson is correct that the trial 

court did not mention these purported mitigating factors in its written 

sentencing order. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 32-35. Hendrickson thus contends 

there is an “ambiguity” between the trial court’s statements at the sentencing 

hearing and its written sentencing order, and this ambiguity “makes it difficult, 

if not impossible, to know with certainty what the [trial] court’s reasons for its 

sentence and to have any meaningful review over that decision.” Appellant’s Br.

at 15-16. Hendrickson thus asks us to remand this matter to allow the trial 

court to clarify its sentencing order or to conduct a new sentencing hearing. 

[16] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not reciting in its sentencing order 

the purported mitigating factors it discussed during the sentencing hearing. 

Although the trial court discussed Hendrickson’s guilty plea, difficult 

childhood, substance abuse, and cooperation with the presentence investigation

at the sentencing hearing, it did not actually find that those factors were 

mitigating. Tr. Vol. 2 at 38-39. Thus, the trial court’s statements at the 
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sentencing hearing show that it considered these factors but rejected them as 

mitigating factors. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (holding that trial court 

considered and rejected a potential mitigator when the factor was discussed by 

the trial court but omitted from the sentencing statement). A sentencing court 

is not obligated to find a circumstance to be mitigating merely because it is 

advanced as such by the defendant, nor is it required to explain why it chose 

not to make a finding of mitigation. Felder v. State, 870 N.E.2d 554, 558 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2007).

[17] Moreover, we disagree with Hendrickson’s claim that “the written sentencing 

order does not appear to match the stated sentencing rationale.” Appellant’s Br.

at 15-16. The trial court’s statements at the sentencing hearing show that it

considered factors that Hendrickson contended were mitigating, but it did not 

actually state that those factors were mitigating factors. The trial court’s 

statements at the sentencing hearing and its written sentencing order were not 

inconsistent. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to recite 

in in its sentencing order the purported mitigating factors it discussed during the 

sentencing hearing, and we therefore decline Hendrickson’s request to remand 

this matter to the trial court for clarification or a new sentencing hearing. 

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[18] Hendrickson claims that his sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of 

his offenses and his character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may 

revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find 

the sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of the offense and the 
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character of the offender. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. The nature of offense 

compares the defendant’s actions with the required showing to sustain a 

conviction under the charged offense, Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 

(Ind. 2008), while the character of the offender permits for a broader 

consideration of the defendant’s character. Anderson v. State, 989 N.E.2d 823, 

827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Whether a sentence is inappropriate 

turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, 

the damage done to others, and other factors that come to light in a given case. 

Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224.

[19] We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court but 

also any other factors appearing in the record. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 

856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We defer to the trial court’s decision, and our goal is 

to determine whether the appellant’s sentence is inappropriate, not whether

some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 

864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by 

compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such 

as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s 

character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good 

character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). When we 

review a sentence, we seek to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived 

correct result. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225.
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Nature of Offense

[20] Hendrickson argues that his twenty-eight-year aggregate sentence is 

inappropriate because he suggests there was nothing particularly egregious 

about the facts and circumstances of his crimes. When considering the nature 

of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point in our analysis. 

Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494; Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2011). As a Level 2 felony, Hendrickson’s conviction for dealing 

methamphetamine carried an advisory sentence of seventeen and one-half years 

with a range of ten to thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. Thus, his twentytwo-year sentence was four and one-half years greater than the advisory 

sentence but eight years less than the maximum sentence. See id. As a Level 5 

felony, Hendrickson’s conviction for operating a motor vehicle after a lifetime 

forfeiture carried an advisory sentence of three years, with a range of one to six 

years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). Therefore, Hendrickson received the 

maximum sentence for this conviction, although the trial court suspended all of

that sentence to probation. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 39. 

[21] The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the 

commission of the offense. Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 

The nature of the offense refers to a defendant’s actions in comparison with the 

elements of the offense. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. When determining 

whether a sentence that exceeds the advisory sentence is inappropriate, “we 

consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as 

committed by the defendant that ‘makes it different from the typical offense 
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accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.’” Moyer v. 

State, 83 N.E.3d 136, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Holloway, 950 N.E.2d 

at 807), trans. denied. 

[22] In claiming there was nothing egregious about his offenses, Hendrickson first 

argues that even counting the dealing methamphetamine charge that was 

dismissed, he sold only $650 worth of methamphetamine, and the weight of the 

methamphetamine in each sale only slightly exceeded the ten-gram threshold to 

qualify as Level 2 felony. “When analyzing Hendrickson’s offense along the 

spectrum of the others in this category, his cannot rate as one of the more 

notable or severe.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. As to his conviction for operating a 

motor vehicle after a lifetime forfeiture, Hendrickson argues there was nothing 

egregious or remarkable about his offense because he was driving the vehicle at 

“[Meier’s] request so she could put on her makeup.” Id. at 13 (citing Appellant’s 

Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 48). 

[23] We reject Hendrickson’s arguments that the nature of his offenses makes his 

twenty-eight-year aggregate sentence inappropriate. As to his dealing 

methamphetamine conviction, Hendrickson possessed and sold large amounts 

of methamphetamine. He admitted to acquiring fifty-six grams of 

methamphetamine and sold nearly twenty-four grams of the drug in just two 

transactions. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 23; Tr. Vol. 2 at 15. This conduct exceeds 

the elements of the offense, so his twenty-two-year sentence is not 

inappropriate. See Zavala v. State, 138 N.E.3d 291, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)

(citing Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224 (“The nature of the offense analyzes the 
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defendant’s action in comparison with the elements of the offense.”)), trans. 

denied. Neither does the nature of Hendrickson’s conviction for operating a 

vehicle after forfeiture of his license for life make his six-year suspended 

sentence inappropriate. Hendrickson drove a vehicle without a driver’s license, 

without insurance, and with a license plate light that was not illuminated. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 19-20. Although Hendrickson eventually followed the 

officer’s commands after being pulled over, he initially failed to do so and had 

to be restrained. Id. at 19. Moreover, we reject Hendrickson’s effort to 

minimize the severity of the offense by stating that he was driving the vehicle 

only because Meier had asked him to drive, so she could put on her makeup. If 

anything, this explanation makes his offense more egregious because he drove 

the vehicle for Meier’s convenience to perform a non-essential task, not because 

an emergency had arisen that made it necessary for him to drive the vehicle. 

[24] Thus, considering the nature of Hendrickson’s offense for dealing 

methamphetamine, his twenty-two-year sentence is not inappropriate. While 

Hendrickson’s sentence exceeded the advisory sentence of Level 2 felonies by 

four and one-half years, his sentence was a full eight years less than the 

maximum sentence he could have received. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. 

Likewise, considering the nature of Hendrickson’s offense for Level 5 felony 

operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of license for life, his six-year sentence 

was not inappropriate. While Hendrickson did receive the maximum sentence, 

see Indiana Code section 35-50-2-6(b), the trial court fully suspended that 

sentence. Moreover, we find Hendrickson’s cavalier reason for driving – to let 
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Meier put on her makeup – magnifies, not minimizes, the severity of his 

offense. Thus, Hendrickson has failed to present compelling evidence 

portraying the nature of his offenses in a positive light. See Stephenson, 29 

N.E.3d at 122. Accordingly, Hendrickson has failed to show that his twentyeight-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of his 

offenses.

Character of Offender

[25] Hendrickson makes several arguments for why his sentence is inappropriate 

considering his character. He says his childhood was troubled. Tr. Vol. 2 at 9. 

His father was abusive and provided alcohol and illegal drugs to Hendrickson 

when Hendrickson was young. Id. His mother was incarcerated for six years 

during his childhood. Id. Later, as an adult, Hendrickson became addicted to 

alcohol and drugs, and his addiction worsened as he tried to cope with the loss 

of several family members. Id. at 9-10. He eventually began selling drugs to 

support his drug use. Id. at 10. As evidence of his good character, Hendrickson 

points to participation in programs while incarcerated at the Bartholomew 

County Jail and his desire to enter a rehabilitation program for his addiction. 

Id. at 11-12. Finally, he draws our attention to his expression of remorse at the 

sentencing hearing. Id. 

[26] Hendrickson has an extensive criminal history. He has twelve convictions in 

addition to the offenses in this case, including convictions for resisting law 

enforcement, public intoxication, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, battery 

resulting in bodily injury, and interference with reporting of a crime. Appellant’s 
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Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 41-46. Four of those convictions were felonies, and eight of 

those convictions were for misdemeanors. Id.; Tr. Vol. 2 at 14-15. Numerous 

other charges were dismissed pursuant to plea agreements and, at the time of 

sentencing, Hendrickson had a pending charge in Johnson County for aiding, 

inducing, or causing dealing methamphetamine. Id. at 14. Though many of 

these crimes relate to drug activity, not all are related to Hendrickson’s use of 

illegal substances, such as his convictions for operating a vehicle while an 

habitual traffic offender, battery, battery resulting in bodily injury, and 

interference with reporting of a crime. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 45-46. 

Moreover, Hendrickson was not a small-time drug dealer but was instead a 

major player in the drug trade -- “higher than a mid-level dealer,” as one 

witness testified -- and made a significant amount of money, $3,000 dollars a 

day at some point. Tr. Vol. 2 at 29-30.

[27] Hendrickson’s crimes demonstrate a pattern of committing the same or similar 

offenses many times. He has multiple convictions for illegal consumption, 

resisting law enforcement, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and battery. 

Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 42-46. Repeatedly engaging in the same illegal 

behavior reflects poorly on Hendrickson’s character. See Norris v. State, 113 

N.E.3d 1245, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Smith v. State, 889 N.E.2d 

261, 263 (Ind. 2008)) (“‘The significance of a defendant’s prior criminal history 

will vary ‘based on the gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they 

relate to the current offense.’”); Heyen v. State, 936 N.E.2d 294, 305 (Ind. Ct. 
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App. 2010) (finding the fact that the defendant “continue[d] to commit the 

same crimes again and again” reflected poorly on his character), trans. denied. 

[28] Moreover, Hendrickson failed to reform his behavior despite numerous 

opportunities to do so. Hendrickson has been placed on probation five times, 

but he has never successfully completed probation. Tr. Vol. 2 at 15. Instead, he 

chose to disregard the law by committing new crimes. Appellant’s Conf. App. 

Vol. 2 at 42-46. Hendrickson’s failure to reform his behavior demonstrates that 

his sentence should not be revised. See Sainvil v. State, 51 N.E.3d 337, 344 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2016) (holding that a defendant is not entitled to have his sentence 

revised when a trial court has “shown him leniency multiple times, with 

unsuccessful results”), trans. denied. Thus, Hendrickson has failed to present 

evidence portraying his character in a positive light such as evidence of 

substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character. See 

Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. Accordingly, Hendrickson’s twenty-eight-year 

aggregate sentence is not inappropriate considering his character.

[29] Affirmed. 

Bradford, C.J., and May, J., concur.