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iii

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v

Strategic Studies Institute

and 

U.S. Army War College Press

THE RELEVANCE OF THE EUROPEAN 

UNION AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION FOR THE UNITED STATES 

IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Dr. Joel R. Hillison

September 2018

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vi

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ISBN 1-58487-792-8
vii

FOREWORD

As this monograph goes to press, the United 

States is waging a trade war against its closest allies 

in North America, Asia, and Europe. In Europe, there 

is an emerging consensus that European states can no 

longer count on the United States to provide leadership and security. In the United States, there is a greater 

focus on reciprocity in relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European 

Union (EU) and even skepticism over the continued 

relevance of those two organizations. In the midst of 

this turbulent time, Dr. Joel R. Hillison’s analysis provides a necessary corrective to the pessimistic outlook 

on U.S. and European relations. By objectively analyzing the evolution of NATO and the EU and exploring 

the interdependence between them and the United 

States, he is able to place current relations in context 

and provide practical recommendations for improving 

that relationship.

This monograph begins by reviewing U.S. interests 

in Europe. Arguably, those interests have not changed 

since the end of World War II. What has changed, however, is the U.S. approach to furthering those interests. 

For the duration of the Cold War and in the immediate aftermath, NATO and the EU, in its various forms, 

played an essential role in pursuing U.S. interests and 

protecting the interests of U.S. allies. The prosperity 

and security of the United States and Europe were 

seen as interconnected even as the functions, membership, and capabilities of NATO and the EU changed 

over time.

The future of the transatlantic relationship rests on 

the grand strategy or strategic vision the United States 

decides to pursue going forward. Over its history, 
the United States has pursued different grand strategies based on domestic factors and the challenges and 

opportunities presented. Competing visions of U.S. 

grand strategy going forward thus have a direct impact 

on the relevance of NATO and the EU. Ultimately, the 

grand strategy of the United States will determine the 

nature of U.S. relations with the EU and NATO and 

perhaps even determine their continued existence.

The U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies 

Institute is pleased to offer this study as a contribution 

to the current debate about the relevance of the EU and 

NATO to the United States.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute and

U.S. Army War College Press

viii
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JOEL R. HILLISON is a professor of national security 

studies in the Department of Distance Education at the 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) in Carlisle, PA. He 

is also an adjunct professor at Gettysburg College in 

Gettysburg, PA. He joined the USAWC faculty in 2007 

and his last operational assignment was as the comptroller and deputy comptroller for the Multinational 

Forces Iraq from 2004 to 2005. From 1997 to 2000, he 

spent 3 years as the budget officer for the Combined 

Joint Planning Staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied 

Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. He retired 

as a colonel after 30 years of service in the U.S. Army 

and 2 years of service in the Illinois National Guard. 

Dr. Hillison holds an M.A. in economics from the University of Oklahoma, an M.A. in strategic studies from 

the USAWC, and a Ph.D. in international relations 

from Temple University.

xi

SUMMARY

Both European and U.S. foreign policy since World 

War II have been built upon a strong, transatlantic 

relationship. The European Union (EU) and North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have provided 

solid institutional bases for this relationship. Yet, contemporary challenges could disrupt this structure 

and call into question the very viability of the EU and 

NATO. In addition, the “America First” foreign policy 

approach views relations with other countries, and 

by extension organizations like NATO and the EU, 

as a zero-sum game, where equitable burden sharing 

seems to be more important than political solidarity 

and mutual gains from cooperation. These trends portend significant challenges to U.S. relations with both 

NATO and the EU. Overcoming these challenges will 

require continued cooperation and trust between the 

United States and its allies and partners.

Both the EU and NATO provide the United States 

with a comparative advantage in promoting freedom, 

prosperity, and security globally, and in the European 

region. Not only do these organizations contribute to 

the U.S. interest of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, 

but they also provide the United States with diplomatic, economic, and military multipliers that give 

the United States significant influence in addressing 

threats and challenges from states such as Russia and 

China, as well as nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda.

NATO began as a conventional military alliance to 

balance against the threat of the Soviet Union. Over 

time, the Alliance has evolved into a security community that shares common values and interests and is 

committed not only to common defense, but also to 

cooperative security and crisis management. NATO 
xii

also retains significant military capabilities and geostrategic value in promoting common interests within 

and external to the region. The Alliance has always 

emphasized collective action and burden sharing 

among allied members. This is where the current U.S. 

approach to foreign policy is causing tension. Not only 

has the United States chosen to go against the consensus 

views of its allies in addressing key challenges, it has 

also suggested that the U.S. commitment to common 

defense might be contingent upon allies living up to 

their burden-sharing commitments.

So too has the EU evolved from its humble beginnings in the European Coal and Steel Community 

(ECSC), established in 1951, to a customs union and 

common market in 1957 with the European Economic 

Community (EEC). After the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, 

the EU became an imperfect, yet resilient economic and 

political union with the ultimate goal of an ever-closer 

union among member states. That ambitious goal has 

come under increasing pressure from the economic 

crisis, increased migration, and Brexit. Like NATO, the 

EU has strengthened the ability of European member 

states to resist outside aggression. It has also led members to eschew conflict in resolving their internal disputes. As a robust and prosperous union, the EU has 

also become an important economic partner of the 

United States. In addition to being the largest trading 

and investment partner of the United States, the EU 

shares the U.S. commitment to the international rule of 

law, free markets, and promoting democratic values.

The America First approach to U.S. foreign policy 

takes a zero-sum attitude to foreign policy, which 

seems to undermine the solidarity and cooperation 

that have made NATO and the EU so important to 

pursuing both U.S. and European interests. Instead of 
xiii

focusing on the benefits of collective action, the United 

States has placed a greater emphasis on specific reciprocity with both NATO allies and the EU as a trading 

bloc.

In order to continue to promote the mutual interests of the United States and its EU and NATO allies 

and partners, the United States should: 

• Hedge against unfavorable global trends by 

deepening, not reducing its cooperation with 

both NATO and the EU;

• Continue to pressure the allies to increase their 

capabilities, but take a more nuanced view of 

burden sharing; and,

• Promote greater trade and investment between 

the United States and the EU and increased 

NATO-EU cooperation.

While there are many directions U.S. grand strategy can ultimately take, the EU and NATO will remain 

relevant to the United States for the foreseeable future.

1

THE RELEVANCE OF THE EUROPEAN 

UNION AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION FOR THE UNITED STATES IN 

THE 21ST CENTURY

INTRODUCTION

Everything depends upon the alliances with other states, 

and upon their military resources.1

—Antoine-Henri Jomini

The international system appears to be at a critical 

juncture. Dramatic changes in the external strategic 

environment have disrupted long accepted notions of 

the U.S. role in the world and its approach to pursing 

its national interests. U.S. power has been in a gradual, relative decline since the end of World War II. 

Emerging powers increasingly challenge the United 

States and the established international order it helped 

construct. At the same time, Europe is facing significant external threats from migration, terrorism, Russian aggression, and internal turmoil, as exemplified 

by Brexit. Brexit, perhaps more than any other event, 

has signaled a challenge to European aspirations for an 

ever-closer union among European states. Both European and U.S. foreign policy since the Truman administration have been built upon four main pillars: a 

rules-based international order, strong alliances, multilateral cooperation, and the spread of democracy.2

 The 

European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have provided a solid foundation 

for these four pillars. Yet, contemporary challenges 

could disrupt this structure and call into question the 
2

very viability of the EU and NATO. In addition, the 

“America First” foreign policy approach seems to view 

relations with other countries, and by extension organizations like NATO and the EU, as a zero-sum game, 

where equitable burden sharing seems to be more 

important than political solidarity and mutual gains 

from cooperation. These trends portend significant 

changes to U.S. relations with both NATO and the EU.

With the U.S. administration signaling a new 

approach to foreign policy, it is time to reassess the 

importance of NATO and the EU in the context of the 

current and projected geostrategic environment. This 

monograph seeks to inform that discussion. It begins 

by reviewing U.S. interests in a democratic and economically prosperous Europe; this has been an enduring aim since the end of World War II. It also examines 

the role, function, and capabilities of both NATO 

and the EU and how they have adapted over time to 

changes in the global environment. Finally, this project assesses the implications of competing visions of 

grand strategy on the relevance of NATO and the EU. 

Ultimately, the grand strategy of the United States will 

determine the nature of U.S. relations with the EU and 

NATO and perhaps even determine their continued 

existence. The monograph ends with some recommendations on how NATO and the EU can be used to 

pursue U.S. national interests in the future. The salient 

conclusion is that no matter what grand strategy the 

United States adopts, as long as NATO remains intact 

and the EU holds together, both will remain relevant: 

NATO as a security provider and the EU either as a 

partner, or as a competitor.
3

U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE

The relevance of NATO and the EU are directly 

related to how they support or hinder the achievement of U.S. national interests. National interests drive

policy and strategy formulation and exist independently from threats in the contemporary strategic environment. While this may seem obvious, a 

high-level panel of national security experts noted 

that these terms are often conflated. “Many debates 

fail to recognize the distinction between interests and 

threats, since a vivid threat is often needed to remind 

one of an interest that would otherwise go unnoticed 

or unattended.”3 At the most basic level, U.S. national 

interests, sometimes referred to as core interests, are 

espoused in the founding documents of the nation. 

These core interests are enduring in nature, though the 

policies pursued in support of them change over time.

From the dawn of the Cold War, the fates of the 

United States and Western Europe were bound 

together by the devastation of two world wars and the 

necessity of confronting the Soviet bloc. Europe was 

dependent upon the United States for security and 

economic reconstruction. The United States looked 

at Europe as the front line in the war against communism and as a partner in creating and sustaining a new 

world order. Thus, the United States took a broad view 

of its interests, a view that held until the early 21st 

century. In 2000, a bipartisan Commission on America’s National Interests articulated some of those U.S. 

national interests as:

• Limited threat of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) attacks on U.S. and forces abroad.

• Survival and cooperation of U.S. allies.
4

• The viability and stability of major global 

systems.

• Productive relations with China and Russia.4

The same commission identified “a Europe whole, 

free and at peace” as a vital U.S. interest.5 This was 

nothing new. The initial articulation of this interest 

harkens back to President Harry Truman, who realized that the United States could never again withdraw from events in Europe, nor could it pursue an 

isolationist course. The Truman doctrine, based on the 

dual concepts of deterrence and containment, was a 

reaction to the civil war in Greece and Turkey’s dispute with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR) over the Dardanelles Strait. Truman also instituted the Marshall Plan to rebuild the war torn economies of Europe. In a speech to Congress in March 1948, 

Truman emphasized the need for the United States 

to address the threats to Europe:

Until the free nations of Europe have regained their 

strength, and so long as communism threatens the very 

existence of democracy, the United States must remain 

strong enough to support those countries of Europe 

which are threatened with communist control and policestate rule.6

Recognizing the importance of Europe to the 

United States, President Dwight Eisenhower continued the policy of deterrence and containment initiated 

by President Truman, as did his successor, President 

John Kennedy. In his famous Ich bin ein Berliner speech 

in June 1963, President Kennedy declared, “Freedom is 

indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not 

free.”7 Even though a lot had changed since Truman’s 

administration (e.g., the Cuban missile crisis and the 
5

space race), U.S. interests in Europe remained constant. 

In his speech at Independence Hall in Philadelphia the 

year before, President Kennedy more clearly outlined 

the role of Europe in pursuing U.S. national interests:

We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival 

but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the basic 

object of our foreign policy for 17 years. We believe that 

a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role 

in the common defense, of responding more generously 

to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United 

States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving 

problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and 

developing coordinated policies in all economic, political, 

and diplomatic areas. We see in such a Europe a partner 

with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the 

great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a 

community of free nations.8

Twenty years later, the United States retained its 

fundamental commitment to a Europe whole, free, and 

at peace. President Ronald Reagan famously called for 

Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall in 

his speech at the Brandenburg Gate in 1987. His earlier speech at Normandy beach, in commemoration 

of D-Day in 1984, emphasized continued U.S. interdependence with, and commitment to, Europe:

We are bound today by what bound us 40 years ago, 

the same loyalties, traditions, and beliefs. We’re bound 

by reality. The strength of America’s allies is vital to 

the United States, and the American security guarantee 

is essential to the continued freedom of Europe’s 

democracies. We were with you then; we are with you 

now. Your hopes are our hopes, and your destiny is our 

destiny.9

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the strategic environment abruptly and dramatically changed. 
6

The USSR, the focus of U.S. security strategy since the 

end of World War II, imploded and broke-up. Yet in 

spite of the loss of this existential threat, U.S. interests in Europe persisted. Shifts in the global balance 

of power enabled the United States to pursue a more 

ambitious foreign policy based on expanding democracy and enlarging NATO to promote peace and stability. Despite this dramatic change, President Bill 

Clinton’s 1994 National Security Strategy (NSS) painted 

a very familiar picture of U.S. interests in Europe:

European stability is vital to our own security, a lesson 

we have learned twice at great cost this century. Vibrant 

European economies mean more jobs for Americans 

at home and investment opportunities abroad. With 

the collapse of the Soviet empire and the emergence of 

new democracies in its wake, the United States has an 

unparalleled opportunity to contribute toward a free and 

undivided Europe. Our goal is an integrated democratic 

Europe cooperating with the United States to keep the 

peace and promote prosperity.10

Al-Qaeda’s attack on the United States again 

changed the strategic environment and America’s 

approach to foreign policy. President George W. Bush 

articulated U.S. willingness, if necessary, to act alone 

and protect Americans with preemptive force. Yet, 

even after the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the 

security of Europe remained an essential U.S. national 

interest. In his second and final NSS, President Bush 

presented twin pillars of U.S. strategy. The first articulated the desire to promote freedom, justice, and 

human dignity. This idealistic approach to security 

echoed the liberal school of international relations. The 

second pillar emphasized U.S. leadership of a community of democracies to confront the contemporary challenges facing the world.
7

Europe is home to some of our oldest and closest allies. 

Our cooperative relations are built on a sure foundation 

of shared values and interests. This foundation is 

expanding and deepening with the ongoing spread of 

effective democracies in Europe, and must expand and 

deepen still further if we are to reach the goal of a Europe 

whole, free, and at peace.11

The two strategies published by President Barack 

Obama again signaled a shift in U.S. foreign policy. 

Obama clearly took a more cautious and selective 

approach to U.S. engagement in crisis management 

operations around the globe than did Bush. At the 

same time, Obama continued to extol the importance 

of Europe to the United States. In his 2015 grand strategy, Obama stated:

The United States maintains a profound commitment to a 

Europe that is free, whole, and at peace. A strong Europe 

is our indispensable partner, including for tackling global 

security challenges, promoting prosperity, and upholding 

international norms.12

The NSS published by President Donald Trump 

in 2017 represents a different approach to grand strategy. Even though the geostrategic environment and 

U.S. approach to the world changed, the U.S. enduring interest in a Europe that was whole and free never 

wavered.13 A strong and effective NATO has been and 

remains essential to promoting that interest as well as 

other vital U.S. interests. NATO and the EU were created in order to promote this vision of a democratic, 

peaceful, prosperous, and united Europe. Language in 

the current NSS reinforces the importance of NATO in 

promoting that vision: “The NATO alliance of free and 

sovereign states is one of our great advantages over our 

competitors, and the United States remains committed 
8

to Article V of the Washington Treaty.”14 Since their 

creation, the EU and NATO have been essential to 

promoting U.S. interests in Europe and projecting 

U.S. instruments of power globally. NATO has been 

the primary multilateral mechanism for addressing 

security challenges and promoting democratic values 

in Europe; the EU has been the key to promoting economic prosperity and common values (democracy) in 

the region and adjacent areas. Rather than being relics 

of the Cold War, NATO and the EU have adapted to 

the changing geostrategic environment. The following 

sections examine the roles, functions, and capabilities 

of NATO and the EU. It also looks at the resources they 

bring to the table and how they have adapted over time 

to changes in the global environment.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO is one of the most successful alliances in 

history. NATO was founded as a traditional military 

alliance to deter aggression from the Soviet Union and 

to reassure countries in Europe that the United States 

had a security commitment to their survival as independent and democratic states. The United States was 

directly responsible for the creation of NATO. NATO’s 

founding document, the North Atlantic Treaty (known 

as the Washington Treaty) was signed in 1949. To this 

day, any member wishing to join the Alliance must 

still deposit their diplomatic instruments in Washington, DC, before officially joining NATO.

The Alliance was formed out of self-interest. It was 

in the interest of the United States to contain the Soviet 

Union and to provide security in Europe necessary for 

the mutual prosperity and peace of both the United 

States and Europe. As such, the Alliance was a tool, 
9

or way to achieve the survival of U.S. allies in Europe 

and to promote the viability and stability of the liberal 

international system. In the words of General Lord 

Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, NATO was in 

Europe’s interest “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”15

Seven decades later, NATO has evolved from a 

traditional alliance to a security community. There 

is a qualitative distinction between an alliance and a 

security community. Historically, an alliance is outwardly focused and rather transitory in nature. As the 

balance of power shifted, so too did alliances. Security 

communities are different in that they are inwardly 

focused and enduring. According to international relations scholars, security communities “develop mutual 

images of each other that make the thought of violent conflict (with each other) unthinkable.”16 There 

is an element of trust, developed in conjunction with 

a common identity, which is established in a security 

community. So long as that trust remains, the survival 

of the community becomes an objective unto itself.

While NATO is, first and foremost, a collective 

defense agreement, it is also a political alliance. “NATO 

strives to promote democratic values and encourages 

consultation and cooperation on defense and security 

issues to build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict.”17 As noted in the 1967 Harmel Report, political 

solidarity is just as important as military capability in 

deterring aggression.18 One must recall, at its founding, NATO did not have any infrastructure, nor did it 

have a common, integrated military structure. Rather, 

it was a commitment by the allies—mostly European 

democracies, the United States, and Canada—to stand 

together in the face of an authoritarian threat to their 

common security. Political solidarity, exemplified by 
10

NATO’s consensus decision-making procedures, was 

perhaps the greatest contribution of NATO to U.S. and 

European security.

That dual nature as both a political and military 

alliance is embodied in two key provisions of the 

Washington Treaty: consultations (Article 4) and collective defense (Article 5). First, with regard to Article 

4, any ally can convene Article 4 consultations when 

it feels threatened. There have been four instances of 

such consultations in the post–Cold War period: three 

invoked by Turkey over Iraq/Syria and one by Poland 

over the Ukraine crisis. Turning to Article 5, an attack 

against any member is considered an attack against all 

Alliance members. In spite of several significant challenges in NATO’s history, such as the Berlin Crisis 

from 1958 to 1962, NATO had never invoked its collective defense provisions under Article 5 until after 

the attacks on the United States on 9/11. The first and 

only time NATO used the Article 5 declaration was to 

demonstrate political solidarity and unity as much as 

to signal commitment to defend its ally.19 America’s 

post-World War II investment in NATO paid great 

dividends in 2001.

The question remains, why has NATO remained in 

existence after the end of the Cold War? A traditional 

alliance would have disbanded after the common 

threat had been vanquished. The answer is that NATO 

persists because it has been able to adapt and continue 

providing benefits to its member states. In his book, 

How NATO Adapts, Seth Johnston attributes NATO’s 

survival to its ability to adapt institutionally, in terms 

of size, organization, and mission, to changes in the 

European and global security environment.20

At its founding, NATO consisted of 12 member 

states (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, 
11

Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

Between 1949 and 1998, NATO only added four new 

members: Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain. These 

allies were added because they provided military 

value to the Alliance. The end of the Cold War provided a permissive environment for other states to join 

the Alliance. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO 

expanded from 16 members in 1998 to 29 members 

in 2017 (the 16 members already mentioned plus the 

Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, 

Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro). Many of these states 

added little to the collective capabilities of NATO, 

but did contribute to advancing the political aim of a 

Europe whole, free, and at peace. Nations continue to 

find value in the security provided by the Washington 

Treaty.

NATO also has demonstrated its ability to change 

its organizational structure in response to geopolitical 

developments. Two examples demonstrate this organizational flexibility: the empowerment of the Defense 

Planning Committee (DPC), and the creation of Allied 

Command Transformation. The DPC was established 

in 1963 as a decision-making body. It did not start 

making a significant contribution until after France left 

NATO’s integrated military structure (but remained in 

the Alliance) in 1967. The departure of a key member 

state, such as France, could have been devastating to 

the Alliance. In fact, France also insisted that NATO 

Headquarters leave France. The question then became 

how the Alliance could continue to seek consensus 

with one member only in the political part of NATO. 

The DPC provided a solution to this problem. As Seth 

Johnston explained:
12

[T]he two-tiered political structure . . . in which leaders 

met to discuss defense-related issues in the DPC, from 

which France abstained participation while all other 

issues continued to be addressed in the NAC (North 

Atlantic Council).21

The DPC provided a mechanism to keep France 

actively involved in NATO’s political discussions, 

while allowing the other members to cooperate in 

military matters without France. The DPC immediately proved its worth. The DPC provided the political approval to undertake the critical strategy review 

in 1967, which lead to the flexible response strategy, 

which lasted until the end of the Cold War.22 The DPC 

was dissolved by the Alliance in 2010, and its responsibilities were absorbed into the NAC (which will be 

discussed later).

The other major organizational adaption concerned 

Strategic Command Atlantic (SACLANT). During the 

Cold War, SACLANT was designed to protect the vital 

trans-Atlantic sea link. This function was viewed as 

obsolete with the fall of the Soviet Union. Yet, NATO 

wanted to retain a major headquarters in the United 

States and to respond better to current and future 

challenges and opportunities in the global strategic

environment. Thus, Allied Command Transformation 

(ACT) replaced SACLANT in 2003. ACT provided a 

formal institution to transform NATO’s organization, 

capabilities, and doctrine. It also provided NATO 

with another four-start billet when France reentered 

the NATO integrated military structure in 2009. With 

mechanisms in place to help understand complexity 

and allow NATO to adapt quickly in rapidly changing circumstances, ACT stays abreast of developments 

regarding artificial intelligence, learning machines, 

and enhanced decision-making, and establishes 
13

partnerships with non-military activities. Thus, ACT 

performs an essential role in promoting interoperability through education, training, and exercises, 

reducing transaction costs for the United States and 

providing the Alliance with focal points to guide cooperation. Current Secretary of Defense General James 

Mattis was ACT commander until 2009, and he has 

been succeeded by two French general officers. Without NATO’s ACT, the United States would have to 

assume these functions, or find another organization 

to do so.

Probably the most important adaptation of the 

Alliance was the addition of two new core tasks: cooperative security and crisis management. Adding the 

mission of cooperative security was an acknowledgment that political and security developments beyond 

NATO borders could impact the Alliance, and its 

member states. It was also a recognition that NATO 

was uniquely positioned to affect stability in the region 

and globally. The seeds for cooperative security were 

planted as early as 1967 in the Harmel Report mentioned earlier.23 In recognizing that military security 

and a relaxation of tensions in Europe could proceed 

in tandem, that report set the stage for the cooperative 

security role adopted over 20 years later. Since the end 

of the Cold War, NATO has pursued cooperative security (including the promotion of security, stability, and 

democratic values) through the Partnership for Peace 

(PfP) program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 

Council (EAPC).

NATO’s PfP program provides the United States 

and its allies with a valuable tool for cooperative security. By promoting interoperability and cooperation 

through educational opportunities, training exercises, 

and assistance visits, the PfP promotes U.S. and NATO 
14

values such as maintaining civilian control over the 

military, promoting democracy, and protecting human 

rights. PfP also increases the utility of these nations to 

contribute to existing and future coalition operations. 

Today, NATO’s PfP program has 22 partner nations, 

including Russia. NATO has various other regional 

partner forums that provide information and focal 

points for cooperation. These include the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

NATO also created a body to mimic the NAC as 

a part of its cooperative security efforts. In 1991, the 

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was 

established to provide a mechanism for security dialogue between NATO and non-NATO partners.24 It 

was replaced by the EAPC in 1997. “NATO’s 2010 

Strategic Concept [which was approved at the Lisbon 

Summit in November 2010] identifies the EAPC and 

PfP as central to the Allies’ vision of a Europe whole, 

free and at peace.”25 Those programs continue to promote stability, interoperability, and shared NATO 

values.

The other major adaption by NATO was the addition of crisis management as a core function. With the 

mixed record of the United Nations (UN) and other 

organizations in preventing conflict, member states 

realized that NATO was uniquely capable of preventing crises from becoming conflicts and resolving those 

conflicts once underway. The members of the Alliance 

also realized that crisis management could give NATO 

a new purpose, an idea that was especially important 

to the United States given its global interests beyond 

Europe. As U.S. Senator Richard Lugar stated in 1993, 

“NATO should either go out of area or out of business.”26 Crisis Management, as NATO would practice 

it, was grounded in the liberal school of international 
15

relations, and sought “the indivisibility of peace” in 

the world, especially on NATO’s borders. Not long 

after the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO took on its first 

crisis management mission: Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Bosnia peacekeeping mission was groundbreaking in that it took place outside of NATO borders. 

European states, operating under the UN, had proved 

incapable of stemming the violence in the Balkans. 

Thus in April 1993, NATO’s first major air operation, 

Operation DENY FLIGHT, began to enforce a UNimposed no fly zone in Bosnia established under UN 

Security Council Resolution 816.27 A more aggressive 

bombing campaign followed, Operation DELIBERATE 

FORCE. The United States provided the majority of 

aircraft during these air operations. These operations 

led to the halting of the civil war and the agreement 

of the Dayton Peace Accords. To implement these 

accords, the UN approved the NATO Implementation 

Force (IFOR) in December 1995 and the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996. Every NATO member 

contributed to SFOR, which helped to stabilize the 

region. The EU later assumed responsibility to oversee 

the Dayton Peace Accords from NATO in 2004, with 

the establishment of European Union Force Althea 

(EUFOR Althea). Althea continues to keep the peace 

today.

NATO’s next crisis management mission was in 

Kosovo. In many ways, Kosovo was a riskier operation than Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, the Alliance did 

not have UN authorization. Second, domestic opinion 

was much more divided on intervention. Finally, the 

Kosovo operation took place in the same year NATO 

expanded from 16 to 19 members. This expansion was 

not only the largest single expansion in NATO history, but also the first one that included three former 
16

members of the Warsaw Pact: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. In spite of these challenges and other 

frictions, NATO was able to reach consensus to act and 

initiated Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999. After 78 

days of aerial combat against Serbian forces, an agreement was reached, and the Kosovo Stabilization Force 

(KFOR) was created to enforce the peace. All three new 

NATO members contributed to KFOR, as did Russia. 

The KFOR mission was augmented by an EU rule of 

law mission—EULEX—in 2008; and as of this writing, 

KFOR and EULEX missions continue to keep the peace 

in Kosovo. Thus, in Bosnia and in Kosovo, NATO and 

the EU responded to out-of-area crises, thereby contributing to regional stability.

Probably NATO’s most ambitious crisis management operation was undertaken in support of U.S. 

operations in Afghanistan. The International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was established by the UN Security Council in December 2001. 

NATO took charge of ISAF in August 2003 to support 

the Afghan Government in providing security and to 

prevent Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist safe 

haven.28 ISAF was especially challenging because it 

was out of the European region, in a land-locked country with very difficult terrain, over 7,000 kilometers 

(km) from Brussels, Belgium. The mission was also 

approved at a time of heightened U.S. tension with 

France and Germany over the Iraq War. In spite of 

these challenges, NATO allies stood by U.S. efforts 

to stabilize Afghanistan. “At its height, the force was 

more than 130,000 strong, with troops from 51 NATO 

and partner nations.”29 Non-U.S. NATO nations contributed around 35,000 of those forces.30 While ISAF 

ended in 2014, NATO continues to support a follow-on 

mission to Afghanistan, Resolute Support Mission, to 
17

train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. As of 

June 2018, almost 16,000 NATO and partner troops 

remain in Afghanistan (of which about half were 

U.S. Soldiers).31 While there have been criticisms over 

caveats by NATO members and contribution shortfalls over the years, NATO was there to support the 

United States. Not only did NATO flags contribute to 

a robust coalition, tamping down perceptions of the 

United States as “going it alone,” sizeable NATO contingents in Afghanistan enabled the United States to 

project power into Iraq during the critical period of 

the Iraqi Surge. In Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, 

NATO demonstrated its value to the United States and 

its allies in promoting stability globally.

In addition to NATO’s ability to adapt, the Alliance also provides a robust military capability to its 

members. NATO nations, excluding the United States, 

collectively spent about US$271 billion on defense in 

2017.32 The combined military budgets of NATO’s top 

four powers alone equaled around US$170 billion in 

2017. While much less than that of the United States, 

these expenditures exceeded both China’s (US$145 billion) and Russia’s (US$59 billion) defense spending in 

2016. That said, NATO allies have been criticized for 

not contributing enough to their defense from almost 

the very beginning of the Alliance.33

Burden-sharing debates often inform the discussions of NATO’s relevance. In the 1970s, the Mansfield amendments threatened to reduce U.S. troops 

on the continent dramatically, if Europe did not pay 

more for its own defense.34 In 2016, President Obama 

described the NATO allies as often being complacent 

about their own defense.35 President Trump has also 

criticized defense contributions by NATO members 
18

and increased the pressure on allies at the May 2017 

mini-summit.

NATO members must finally contribute their fair share 

and meet their financial obligations, for 23 of the 28 

member nations are still not paying what they should be 

paying and what they’re supposed to be paying for their 

defense.36

However, the burden-sharing issue is more nuanced 

than often acknowledged.

Both U.S. and NATO spending fell as a percentage 

of gross domestic product (GDP) following 1991, with 

U.S. spending falling at a greater rate than Europe’s 

until 9/11.37 While U.S. expenditures increased after 

the al-Qaeda attacks, defense spending in other NATO 

members continued the gradual decline. As of 2016, 

only five NATO countries met the 2-percent goal: the 

United States, Greece, the United Kingdom, Estonia, 

and Poland. The new U.S. Secretary of Defense echoed 

concern over declining NATO spending in early 2017:

America will meet its responsibilities, but if your nations 

do not want to see America moderate its commitment 

to the alliance, each of your capitals needs to show its 

support for our common defense.38

Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also called 

for NATO allies to establish a timeline for meeting 

this 2-percent commitment by 2024, as pledged at the 

Lisbon Summit.39 Leading up to the NATO summit in 

July 2018, President Trump sent letters to individual 

NATO leaders to encourage them to meet the 2-percent 

target. “It will, however, become increasingly difficult 

to justify to American citizens why some countries continue to fail to meet our shared collective security commitments.”40 While Trump’s statements about NATO 
19

have been inconsistent, at one time critical and another 

supportive, he has consistently pointed to a direct 

relationship between European defense spending and 

NATO relevance and U.S. support of the Alliance.

In spite of this criticism, it appears that NATO has 

turned a corner on declining defense expenditures. 

The trend toward increased defense spending by 

America’s NATO allies began well before President 

Trump’s inauguration with the Russian invasion and 

annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2017, non-U.S. NATO 

expenditures showed a 4.87-percent increase from 2016 

(the third year in a row of increasing defense expenditures) and 11 members (12 including the United States) 

met the equally important target of 20 percent or more 

of defense expenditures on equipment.41 In 2017, 

Romania came close to meeting the target at 1.8 percent 

of GDP, and Latvia and Lithuania have also greatly 

increased their defense spending, pledging to meet 

the 2-percent target by 2018.42 In addition, Canada 

committed to increasing its defense expenditures by 

70 percent over the next 10 years.43 More importantly, 

Germany, one of Europe’s largest and wealthiest states, 

made a commitment to increase its contributions. In 

its white paper published in July 2016, Germany 

pledged to meet the NATO target gradually.44 However, in spite of significant planned increases in defense 

expenditures, from €38.9 billion in 2018 to €43.9 billion, 

Germany will not meet the 2-percent level even by 

2022, partially due to a growing German economy.45

Many argue that this discussion is misguided and 

that the 2-percent target is rather arbitrary and does 

not necessarily reflect the needs of the Alliance. In a 

2016 article, Alexander Mattelaer made a compelling 

case that NATO should focus on capabilities required 

to meet contemporary challenges and establish a 
20

division of labor within the Alliance.46 Burden-sharing 

arguments also overlook the fact that allies contribute 

a much larger part of NATO common funding than 

does the United States. The United States provides 

only 21.7 percent of the civilian budget, 22.5 percent 

of the military budget, and 21.7 percent of the investment budget.47 Therefore, the issue of burden sharing 

is more nuanced than the discussion over the 2-percent target implies, and national security professionals 

should have a nuanced understanding when considering NATO relevance.

NATO forces have also been criticized for a lack of 

capability. According to data from the International 

Institute for Strategic Studies, “active personnel totals 

across key NATO European members France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom fell from about 

1.3 million in 1996 to around 716,000 in 2016.”48 While 

the Alliance has endured a quantitative reduction in 

capability, it has also suffered a qualitative degradation. A 2016 Parameters article captures this limitation:

Not all NATO forces are equipped for engagements in 

which light armored vehicles are vulnerable to massive, 

intense fire strikes and in which cyber and electronic 

warfare plays a central role in affecting command and 

control.49

NATO also lacks many of the key enablers such as 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, air 

refueling, and airlift capabilities. These shortcomings 

are more important concerns than levels of defense 

expenditures. In this area too, it appears that NATO is 

making progress.

Thanks to Russian aggression in Ukraine, NATO 

has made some strides toward increasing its capabilities since the Wales Summit in 2014. For example, 
21

NATO increased the size of the NATO Response Force 

to 40,000 and established a 5,000 person Very High 

Readiness Joint Task Force, significantly reducing 

NATO’s response time, and increasing capability.50

At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO declared 

Initial Operational Capability of the NATO ballistic 

missile defense system, designed to shield Alliance 

countries from attacks from outside the Euro-Atlantic 

area. “This means that the US ships based in Spain, the 

radar in Turkey, and the interceptor site in Romania 

are now able to work together under NATO command 

and NATO control.”51 After the summit, the Alliance 

increased its ability to deter Russian aggression by 

increasing its forward presence.52 These capabilities 

point to another benefit of NATO—its ability to coordinate and facilitate collective efforts on the part of the 

allies. For example, the framework nation concept provides Alliance members with a mechanism to promote 

multinational capability development that would be 

more costly, if even possible, for individual states.

In addition to member capabilities, NATO, as an 

organization, provides significant functional benefits 

to the United States. The NAC is the principal decision-making body within the Alliance. Having the 

imprimatur of the NAC lends legitimacy to NATO 

operations, especially in the absence of a UN mandate, 

as in the air operations in Kosovo. NATO also has a 

Nuclear Planning Group to coordinate nuclear policy 

within the Alliance. The NATO Secretary General, the 

International Staff, the International Military Staff, and 

the various NATO committees also provide significant 

functional benefits to its members. Like other international institutions, they provide information, enhance 

cooperation, provide focal points, and monitor capabilities and contributions made by member states.53
22

NATO’s integrated military structure also provides 

benefits to the United States.

Under heavy U.S. influence, NATO’s integrated 

military structure provides a stable and reliable command and control backbone, allowing the Alliance to 

implement political decisions effectively to America’s 

advantage. In addition to the military efficiencies of 

this standing structure, it also yields a political benefit 

of projecting solidarity and commitment to potential 

adversaries and partners. The Military Committee is 

the senior military authority within the Alliance, while 

the uniformed forces come under the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). SHAPE’s 

role is to “prepare, plan, conduct and execute NATO 

military operations, missions and tasks in order to 

achieve the strategic objectives of the Alliance.”54

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe is the commander of SHAPE, and from NATO’s inception, it has 

been an American also dual-hatted as the U.S. European Command Commander.55 This position gives 

the United States additional leverage and influence in 

shaping actions and attitudes of Alliance members and 

NATO itself. In addition to these organizational benefits, NATO also brings a great deal of potential power 

to the table.

The Alliance is also often viewed as a resource for 

U.S. operations. NATO is currently an alliance of 29 

members, over 936 million people, and a combined 

GDP of NATO members exceeds US$41.5 trillion 

in 2018.56 With few permanently assigned personnel, NATO relies upon national troop contributions. 

NATO has about 1.8 million European troops (over 3.1 

million including Canada and the United States) and 

an impressive array of advanced military capabilities.57

NATO promotes interoperability and standardization 
23

of Alliance and partner forces. Despite the aforementioned concerns about capability shortfalls, these forces 

are capable contributors to NATO operations and U.S.-

led coalitions.

Finally, it should be noted that NATO provides 

operating bases for the United States to project power 

within Europe and outside of the region. For example, the Air Force has major bases in Germany, Italy, 

Turkey, and the United Kingdom, while the U.S. Navy 

has bases in Greece, Italy, and Spain. These bases, over 

4,600 miles from the United States, give America’s military tremendous reach and sustainability. Thus, NATO 

enhances U.S. diplomatic and military instruments of 

power in pursuit of both Alliance and U.S. interests 

worldwide. In sum, NATO enhances the ability of the 

United States to deter, defend, and to promote stability in Europe and beyond. Perhaps less apparent is the 

role that the EU plays in promoting U.S. interests.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

The EU is considered by academics as a sui generis 

international organization. It has been described as a 

supranational organization, a regional organization, 

and an economic community. However the EU is categorized, it is undoubtedly an economic powerhouse, 

representing over 22 percent of global GDP.58 The EU 

is also the United States and the world’s largest trading 

partner and the largest source and recipient of foreign 

direct investment.

While indirectly supported by the United States, 

the development of the EU was an internal effort on 

the part of European nations. The movement toward 

greater cooperation began with the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, which committed key European allies to 
24

mutual defense of each other in the face of an attack.59

Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands were signatures to this treaty. This treaty, which 

later formed the basis of the Western European Union 

(WEU), not only met European security needs in the 

face of an increasingly hostile Soviet Union, it also 

demonstrated a willingness by key allies to share the 

burdens of defense. While security concerns were the 

initial impetus for European cooperation, the seeds of 

the EU were planted in the economic sphere and that is 

where, perhaps arguably, the greatest relevance to the 

United States lies. Like NATO, the EU evolved over 

time in response to changes in the international environment, in terms of size, organization, and mission.

The first major step to promote formally both the 

economic and security goals of Europe was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established 

by the Treaty of Paris in 1951. The ECSC included all 

countries of the Brussels Treaty, with the exception of 

Britain. More importantly, the ECSC included former 

combatants West Germany and Italy. The organization’s roles and functions evolved over time, leading 

to even greater cooperation and interdependence. The 

1957 Treaty of Rome expanded the remit of the ECSC 

by creating a European Economic Community (EEC), 

eventually leading to creation of a common market. All 

these efforts helped promote economic development 

in Europe and the continued survival and vibrancy of 

U.S. allies facing down the Warsaw Pact.

At its founding, the ECSC, a forerunner of the EU, 

consisted of six member states (France, West Germany, 

Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). 

Between 1952 and 2004, the EEC (and its predecessor) 

only added six new members: Denmark, Ireland, and 

the United Kingdom in 1973, and Greece, Portugal, and 
25

Spain in the 1980s. Again, the fall of the Soviet Union 

opened the possibility of even greater expansion. Like 

NATO, the EU expanded from 12 members in 1995 

to 28 members in 2013 (member states already mentioned plus Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 

Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 

Sweden). Many more nations would like to join the EU 

in order to share in its economic prosperity and solidarity. In addition to enlargement, the EU has undergone many organizational changes. This monograph 

will focus on those changes after the fall of the Soviet 

Union.

The post-Cold War Maastricht Treaty (1992) formally created the EU and gave it much greater authority than the EEC. The EU represented the culmination 

of those initial efforts to promote peace and prosperity 

in Europe. Under Maastricht, a three-pillar system was 

established covering different issue areas with varying levels of cooperation and delegation of authority: 

economic matters, foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs. The highest levels of delegation 

took place in the economic and justice pillars. Under 

Maastricht, the EEC became the European Community 

(EC). A subset of the EC was committed to creating 

a common currency, the euro. Within the Eurozone, 

states delegated monetary policy to the European Central Bank and surrendered their national currencies. 

In return, the EU sought to promote economic growth 

and convergence, and allow member states to compete 

better in the international marketplace.

The Amsterdam Treaty in 1998 established the 

Office of the High Representative for Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP), a position somewhere 

between a Secretary of State and a Secretary of Defense. 
26

The Treaty of Lisbon subsequently created the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is the EU’s 

diplomatic corps. The EEAS works for the High Representative to carry out the CSFP, which deals with the 

external security concerns emanating from terrorism. 

The EU produced its first European Security Strategy in 

2003 to guide the CSFP, and it published a more outwardly focused security strategy in June 2016. Among 

other changes, the new Global Strategy for Foreign and 

Security Policy calls for the EU to develop strategic 

autonomy.60 These developments have enhanced the 

capabilities the EU can bring to addressing those collective action problems discussed earlier, problems 

usually affecting American interests.

With these changes mentioned earlier, the EU has 

developed the capability to conduct crisis management operations in Europe and around the world. The 

roots of this capability lay with the WEU and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), created to 

deal with low-level security issues facing post-Cold 

War Europe.61 The 1998 St. Malo Declaration, between 

France and the United Kingdom led to the renaming of ESDP as the CSFP, and the transfer of responsibility to the EU, an arrangement codified under the 

Lisbon Treaty in 2007. Under today’s CSFP, the EU has 

undertaken a very active role in crisis management 

operations. The CSFP allows member states to coordinate foreign policy and leverage a unique whole-ofgovernment approach that is greater than the sum of 

its parts. Its diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, 

and economic instruments of power will be essential in 

addressing migration and extremism.

The CSFP allows EU member states to conduct missions not only in Europe, but out of area as well. These 

missions help to promote regional stability (a U.S. 
27

interest) and enable the United States and NATO to 

focus on other security matters. Since 2003, the EU has 

completed some 18 missions, mostly in Africa (10) and 

Europe (5).62 Eleven of these were civilian missions and 

six were military missions, reflecting the EU’s comparative advantage in providing a whole-of-government 

approach. As of June 2018, the EU had 16 active missions, again concentrated near Africa (8), Europe (6), 

and the Middle East (3). Ten of these were civilian missions and six were military missions.63 In 2016, European nations had over 12,000 troops deployed as part 

of either EU or NATO missions. Even more troops were 

provided to support the Organization for Security and 

Co-operation in Europe and UN missions worldwide.64

There is even a mechanism for the EU to conduct operations using NATO assets when the Alliance does not 

wish to get involved directly. Thus, in cooperation 

with NATO, the EU enhances the development of a 

“‘comprehensive approach’ to crisis management and 

operations.”65 These missions help to promote stability 

and relieve the United States and NATO of potential 

burdens. All of this makes the EU quite relevant to U.S. 

foreign policy.

Like NATO, the EU has a mutual defense clause. 

Unlike NATO, the United States is not a member. 

This clause was introduced as a part of the Treaty of 

Lisbon, under Article 42(7). The article stipulates, “if 

an EU country is the victim of armed aggression on 

its territory, the other EU countries have an obligation 

to aid and assist it by all the means in their power.”66

In November 2015, French President François Hollande invoked the EU treaty’s self-defense clause in 

the aftermath of terrorist attacks in Paris. This was the 

first time that this article had been invoked, and like 

the activation of Article 5 after 9/11, it was activated in 
28

response to a terrorist attack. This defense clause gives 

EU members an additional venue to pursue security 

cooperation in the face of contemporary threats. The 

Treaty of Lisbon also created a mechanism to facilitate 

cooperation and collaboration within the union called 

permanent structured cooperation. This includes participation in the European Defense Agency and the 

commitment to attain certain capabilities and readiness levels in support of the CSFP.67 Should the United 

States distance itself from NATO, the self-defense 

clause could take on added importance, as a venue 

for European defense cooperation without the United 

States having a formal voice as a member state.

Ironically, Brexit has renewed interest in further 

security integration among the remaining EU members. The EU’s 2016 Summit explored creating a dedicated border control force, improving EU battlegroups, 

and loosening EU common funding rules for Common 

Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) operations.68 In the 

2 years since the summit, the CSDP program advanced 

more than in the previous 2 decades. This was largely 

due to two initiatives: permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund (EDF).

The Lisbon Treaty set the stage for PESCO in 2007. 

Under PESCO, EU member states can pursue further 

cooperation on the development and procurement of 

equipment as long as at least three member states are 

involved. Unlike previous efforts, PESCO establishes 

binding commitments upon the nations. As of 2018, 

25 of 28 members had signed up for PESCO (Austria, 

Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, 

Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 

Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the 

Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 

Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden). In addition to providing 
29

the modalities for enhanced cooperation, the EU is 

also providing funding for research and development 

for PESCO projects in conjunction with the EDA. The 

goal is to reduce the number of individually produced 

military systems and increase the efficiency of scarce 

funds devoted to defense. In addition to PESCO, the 

EU has established the EDF (with up to €5.5 billion per 

year after 2020) to help pay for the costs of research 

and development.69 These initiatives harken back to 

the European Defense Capability discussed earlier and 

terminated in 1954. In fact, some European nations 

have expressed support for a European Defense Union. 

“Germany has declared it will support the creation of 

a permanent civil–military operational headquarters 

within the Brussels-based security and defense structures.”70 It has also suggested a major harmonization 

of national defense industries.

There are some concerns that these efforts might 

divert scarce resources from operational capabilities 

to fund redundant headquarters and staffs.71 On the 

other hand, a European Defense Union might also 

deepen EU military cooperation and motivate member 

countries to develop greater capabilities and avoid 

unnecessary duplication, thus fulfilling their ambition for some strategy autonomy and the U.S. desire 

for greater burden sharing efforts. If the Europeans 

come to see the United States as more of a competitor than trusted partner, EU defense efforts could lead 

to a security arrangement that de-emphasizes NATO, 

while excluding the United States. As a partner that 

shares many U.S. interests and values, the EU also 

provides the significant economic heft in pursuit of 

common goals. The EU had an estimated combined 

GDP of US$19.7 trillion in 2018 and the Euro area had 

a combined GDP of US$14.3 trillion.72 While Brexit will 
30

certainly weaken the EU’s collective economic heft, the 

EU will still have a population of 444 million, and a 

US$16.7-trillion economy after Britain leaves. The EU 

is the world’s largest trading bloc and largest source 

and destination for foreign direct investment.73 The EU 

is also the largest trading and investment partner of the 

United States. In addition, the EU is the largest contributor to the UN’s operating budget and funds about 40 

percent of UN peacekeeping operations.74 Finally, the 

EU is also the largest provider of Official Development 

Assistance in the world. All this means the EU exerts 

a great deal of leverage with regard to the economic 

instrument of power. The EU gives the United States 

a partner to address collective action problems such as 

the support of the global economic system, the proliferation of WMD, the promotion of international stability, the maintenance of the global international system, 

the mitigation of climate change, and the continuance 

of productive relations with both China and Russia.

The EU offers a robust diplomatic capability that 

can benefit the United States when employed in the 

pursuit of common interests. With 139 delegations 

worldwide, the EEAS has been a major player in negotiations over the Arctic, Syria, Iran, and North Korea, 

as well as other concerns, such as energy issues, climate change, human rights, and even the Middle East 

Peace Process. Of course, EEAS efforts do not supersede the diplomatic efforts of individual EU member 

states. For example, in February 2015, the leaders of 

France and Germany negotiated the Minsk II agreement with Russia to stop the fighting in Ukraine and 

establish a framework for resolving the conflict. The 

EU also has a mechanism, the European Neighborhood 

Policy (ENP), for promoting cooperative security, similar to NATO’s PfP program. Under the new European 
31

Security Strategy, the ENP is focused on promoting 

resilience and better governance with its partners, contributing to international stability. The benefits of the 

EU’s capabilities for U.S. policymakers may be indirect, but it seems better for the EU to see the United 

States as a valued partner in their diplomatic endeavors than as a rival.

GRAND STRATEGIES

Having reviewed the roles, functions, and capabilities of NATO and the EU, it is now necessary to 

look at U.S. grand strategy. A grand strategy is “the 

art of reconciling ends and means.”75 In other words, 

it links what the United States is trying to accomplish 

with how it goes about getting there. A grand strategy 

implies a purposeful pursuit of U.S. national interests 

by defining objectives, ways, and means.76 The United 

States has pursued various grand strategies since its 

founding, and past presidents have typically mixed 

elements of the four traditional grand strategies to fit 

the circumstances of their times. Since the end of the 

Cold War, U.S. foreign policy has tilted slightly toward 

one approach or another, while always maintaining 

elements of other grand strategies. In fact, the United 

States has been largely consistent in its definition of 

and pursuit of national interests over time.

In 2016, the RAND Corporation published a study 

examining the global liberal international order, and 

four potential approaches to U.S. grand strategy: 

retaking the offensive, selective engagement/retrenchment, offshore balancing, and zero sum.77 Ideally, the 

grand strategy would guide U.S. foreign policy. If the 

administration believes that the liberal international 

order has benefited the United States, then they should 
32

pursue retaking the offensive, or selective engagement. 

If Trump believes that this order has not benefited the 

Unites States or has led to exploitation by others, then 

offshore balancing or zero-sum strategies would be 

the best course. Whatever direction the administration takes, U.S. grand strategy will determine which 

national interests to pursue and how relevant the 

EU and NATO are to promoting or impeding those 

interests.

The RAND study modifies a typology found in a 

classic article by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visons for U.S. Grand Strategy,” published in 

1997.78 That article sought to help guide the strategy 

of the Clinton administration as it entered its second 

term. It also outlined four competing visions of U.S. 

grand strategy: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. This monograph will use these categories of U.S. grand strategy 

to further analyze the relevance of the EU and NATO 

in the pursuit of U.S. national interests.79 It also compares each of these grand strategies to trends in President Trump’s foreign policy.

Neo-Isolationism

Perhaps the grand strategy that most closely aligns 

with the rhetoric of the current administration is 

neo-isolationism. This is what the RAND study called 

the zero-sum strategy. Defensive realism is the intellectual underpinning of neo-isolationism. Stephen Walt, a 

distinguished scholar at the Harvard Kennedy School, 

argues that realism “depicts international affairs as a 

struggle for power among self-interested states and is 

generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war.”80 In order to survive, states have 
33

to focus on relative gains. Thus, if others gain more 

than the United States by cooperation, this threatens 

U.S. security; in other words, the international system 

is a zero-sum game.

In many ways, the America First policy resembles a grand strategy of Isolationism.81 The policy 

rests on the premise that the international system and 

U.S. allies have taken advantage of the United States, 

which threatens U.S. security. Early in his administration, Trump scrapped the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 

major element in the rebalance strategy to Asia. The 

United States also announced a major renegotiation of 

the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 

between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. In 

2018, the United States imposed tariffs on washing 

machines and solar energy cells from China and South 

Korea, followed by tariffs on steel and aluminum 

imports from Canada, China, the EU, and Mexico. 

This zero-sum approach to trade has upset allies and 

non-allies alike. During his campaign, Trump had 

previously labeled NATO as obsolete, though he later 

reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the Alliance. Since 

the election, the administration has pursued tighter 

controls on immigration, with a 2017 budget request 

that increases funding for immigration and border 

control. The President also withdrew the United States 

from the Paris Climate Agreement and the Joint Plan 

of Action (JPOA), the agreement to limit and monitor 

Iran’s nuclear program. In his America First approach 

to U.S. policy, Trump has signaled a new approach to 

these challenges, including a hesitance to entangle the 

United States in global issues not directly impacting its 

core national interests. These moves are all consistent 

with neo-isolationism.
34

Under a grand strategy of isolationism, the focus 

would be on promoting a very narrow set of core U.S. 

interests. The United States would aim to reduce hostility and minimize balancing behavior against it by 

minding its own business in global affairs. The ultimate 

objective of this approach would be to preserve the 

global status quo and to avoid foreign entanglements. 

This grand strategy would also seek to husband scarce 

U.S. resources. It would also adopt a neo-mercantilist 

trade policy, meaning the United States would only 

pursue trade deals in which the United States gained 

more than its trading partners. This would lead to an 

increase in barriers to free trade; in other words, the 

focus would be on relative gains.82

The germane point for this monograph is the 

impact of neo-isolationism on the nature of U.S. relations with the EU and NATO. This approach to grand 

strategy would make the EU a competitor to the United 

States; the EU would therefore continue to be relevant, 

but not necessarily promote U.S. economic interests. In 

January 2017, the EU Trade Commissioner cautioned, 

“if rising protectionism from elsewhere [read U.S.] is 

a threat to the Chinese economy, we (EU and China) 

stand ready to engage and fight against it together.”83

This is a credible risk because, after the United States, 

China is the EU’s second largest trading partner.

This grand strategy would also render NATO 

obsolete or at least seek to extract greater contributions 

or side payments from NATO allies.84 There is clear 

evidence for the latter. The administration has consistently called for greater contributions on behalf of 

NATO (e.g., in combating terrorism) and its member 

states (e.g., meeting the 2 percent of GDP norm for 

military expenditures). However, there are also indications that the President questions the relevance of 
35

NATO and that he feels that allies have taken advantage of the United States.

Since it is impossible to withdraw from a globalized 

world, a neo-isolationist grand strategy entails significant risks. First, the United States would probably 

become less secure as threats multiplied globally. As 

Trotsky is alleged to have said, “you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”85 Second, 

a neo-isolationist grand strategy would undermine 

the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and probably lead 

to the proliferation of WMD. While Germany, South 

Korea, and Japan might be responsible nuclear powers, 

other countries might not be so prudent. With the withdrawal of U.S. active leadership, it is also likely that 

the international institutional framework the United 

States helped to establish (e.g., the UN, International 

Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the World Trade 

Organization) would collapse. Finally, viewing the EU 

only as a competitor and restricting trade with Europe 

would make both the United States and its allies less 

prosperous.

The risks to the United States in a weakened NATO 

are even greater. Many Europeans were alarmed at 

Trump’s omission of an overt commitment to Article 5 

in the May 2017 NATO mini-summit. As NATO allies 

lose faith in U.S. commitment to NATO, they may seek 

other institutional or bilateral security arrangements. 

In a speech shortly after the mini-summit, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that Europeans could 

no longer rely upon others and stated that Europeans 

“really must take our fate into our own hands.”86 This 

could mean a renewed European defense commitment 

under the EU, or a shift to more coalitions among willing European members. In either case, it would reflect 

a loss of U.S. influence over European allies.
36

At the end of the day, NATO membership does not 

cost the United States that much. According to the 2016 

NATO Secretary General’s Annual Report, the NATO 

common funding budget equaled about US$2.3 billion, 

of which the United States contributed about US$513 

million.87 This is a small cost in relation to a defense 

budget of about US$700 billion in 2018. While pressuring allies to fulfill their commitments to defense is 

justified, abandoning or weakening NATO would be 

harmful to both the United States and its allies. Not 

only would the United States thus sacrifice a great deal 

capability and global influence, but also it would have 

a difficult time trying to reconstruct these institutions 

later on if it decided to change course.

 Selective Engagement

Balance of power realism is the intellectual underpinning of selective engagement. It agrees with the 

assumptions of realism discussed under neo-isolationism. It also agrees that U.S. power is finite and should 

be preserved. Selective engagement is also concerned 

about foreign entanglements since they could lead to 

balancing behavior against the United States, or lead 

to great power conflict. Where it differs from isolationism is that it views the liberal international order 

as beneficial for the United States.88 Former-President 

Obama’s grand strategy matches most closely selective engagement, with its emphasis on multilateralism.89 Obama significantly reduced the U.S. presence 

in Afghanistan and withdrew most U.S. forces from 

Iraq. While Obama intervened in Libya, under the auspices of NATO (leading from behind), he declined to 

intervene directly in the Syrian civil war other than to 

call for regime change, target the Islamic State of Iraq 
37

and Syria (ISIS), and provide limited support to certain 

rebel forces.

President Trump has also shown some indications 

of a selective engagement approach. He has made a 

concerted effort to maintain peaceful, if not friendly, 

relations with both China and Russia, the two great 

powers. In the May 2017 NATO mini-summit, President Trump urged the allies to pursue a “greater 

focus on terrorism and immigration.”90 Trump also 

announced his intention to have a summit with Vladimir Putin after the 2018 NATO Summit. While he 

made defeating ISIS one of his top priorities, Trump 

has been very skeptical of getting the United States 

more involved in other problems in the Middle East.91

Trump has also downplayed the promotion of liberal 

democratic values and sought to promote better ties 

with Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The administration’s policy on nuclear proliferation could also be 

seen as consistent with selective engagement. In 2017, 

Trump took a strong stand against North Korea, indicating a potential willingness to use force to prevent 

further nuclear proliferation. However, he followed 

that with a summit with the North Korean dictator in 

April 2018 to pursue peaceful denuclearization. Yet, 

Trump has pursued some initiatives that run counter to 

the traditional selective engagement approach. Rather 

than reduce military expenditures, Trump requested 

a significant increase in the U.S. defense budget.92

Also, the United States is still involved in the wars in 

Afghanistan and Syria.

Under a grand strategy of selective engagement, the 

focus would be on promoting a slightly broader set of 

U.S. interests than under isolationism. The objectives 

of selective engagement would be to prevent a major 

war with China or Russia and to maintain the current 
38

global balance of power. Key to this approach would 

be to husband scarce resources, as in neo-isolationism. 

Cooperation with international institutions and allies 

would be essential to maintain peace between the 

great powers, to limit the proliferation of WMD, and 

to address issues that could directly impact the global 

balance of power. Thus, the United States would support a robust collective defense capability and a strong 

nuclear deterrent that would extend to its NATO 

allies. Crisis management operations would be limited 

to protect scarce means. Selective engagement would 

signal a continuance of U.S. liberal economic trading 

policies, with a focus on absolute versus relative gains. 

Thus, the EU would be both an economic competitor 

and a major trading and security partner. The United 

States would remain committed to NATO, but would 

shift its focus back to Article 5 and collective defense. 

Under selective engagement, prudence would dictate 

abandoning any hopes for Georgia and Ukraine to join 

the Alliance in the foreseeable future.

As with isolationism, this grand strategy would 

entail risks. As Posen and Ross noted 20 years ago, this 

grand strategy lacks an ideological appeal.93 Holding 

the line is not a very inspirational theme. Esteem for 

the United States would also probably diminish with 

a less active role in crisis management. Syria is a good 

example of the likely reaction if the United States were 

to allow other actors, such as China, Iran, and Russia, 

to dictate the outcome of local struggles. Even when 

the United States decided to intervene, it would likely 

do so with limited means. Therefore, unintended 

outcomes would be harder to contain, as in Libya 

after 2011.

The risks of selective engagement would make the 

EU and NATO even more important to U.S. national 
39

interests. Those organizations would help to share the 

burdens of crisis management and deterrence with the 

United States and provide a greater veneer of legitimacy during crisis management operations. Trump’s 

emphasis on NATO members paying “their fair share” 

of security costs in Europe is consistent with an overarching grand strategy of selective engagement. Certainly, the EU’s diplomatic and economic weight and 

NATO’s military power and interoperability would 

be an asset in sharing the burdens under this grand 

strategy.

Terrorism, one of Trump’s priorities, is one area 

where both NATO and the EU can contribute under a 

strategy of selective engagement. The day after 9/11, 

NATO invoked Article 5 in response to the terrorist 

attacks.94 On October 26, 2001, NATO also initiated 

Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR to detect and deter 

terrorist activity and illegal trafficking. NATO has also 

been a major contributor to counterterrorist operations 

in Afghanistan since 2003, and after meeting in May 

2017, NATO has also joined the coalition against ISIS.

The EU has also contributed capabilities to the 

counterterrorism effort. In addition to supporting 

operations in Afghanistan with development aid and 

an EU police training mission, the EU has also developed capabilities to improve cooperation in combating 

terrorism. In 2016, the EU established the European 

Counter Terrorism Center, to enhance counterterrorism intelligence collection and to provide operational 

support to member states.95 That effort has born some 

fruit with an increase in information exchange and 

operational support. Clearly, NATO and the EU would 

be highly relevant as a rival and as a partner under a 

grand strategy of selective engagement.
40

Cooperative Security

Cooperative security is firmly grounded in the 

international relations tradition of liberalism. In 

their seminal article, “The Promise of Institutionalist 

Theory,” scholars Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin 

lay out the intellectual framework that counters the 

realist underpinnings of the other grand strategies.96

While they accept that states are instrumental and selfinterested, they are more optimistic about the prospects for cooperation. States cooperate when they gain 

more than the costs involved. Institutions like NATO 

and the EU often provide synergistic effects where the 

whole is greater than its parts. Similarly, liberal theory 

focuses more on absolute gains than relative gains; in 

other words, cooperative security is a positive sum 

game. “The most important distinguishing feature of 

cooperative security is the proposition that peace is 

effectively indivisible.”97 Thus, conflict anywhere is a 

problem everywhere. This leads to a broader view of 

national interests and a more active role globally.

The continuation of NATO enlargement under 

Trump, with the recent addition of Montenegro in 

May 2017, is something that you might expect under 

cooperative security. However, there is very little indication that Trump is inclined to follow a cooperative 

security grand strategy more broadly. Perhaps the best 

example of a cooperative security approach to grand 

strategy was the Clinton administration.98 Under a 

grand strategy of cooperative security, the key objectives would be to promote greater international interdependence, to promote democracy, and to pursue 

global stability. This grand strategy would emphasize cooperation among the great powers, especially 
41

with the EU and other allies like Japan, to engage with 

China and Russia.

In practice, this grand strategy would treat NATO 

more as a partner, and because it espouses a more 

interconnected worldview, would call for more frequent crisis management and humanitarian operations. It would also seek to prevent the proliferation 

of WMD. Perhaps more than any other grand strategy, cooperative security would rely heavily upon 

the cooperation of both the EU and NATO. Arrangements like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 

Partnership (TTIP) would help strengthen U.S. ties 

with Europe and increase their mutual prosperity. The 

United States would encourage NATO to expand its 

crisis management and cooperative security efforts, 

as well as to continue NATO expansion. NATO and 

the EU’s partnership and neighborhood programs 

would also be essential to spreading democracy where 

countries are willing to embrace the rule of law and 

democratic values. The PfP, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and Mediterranean dialogue would all be key 

instruments for cooperative security. The EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) would complement 

these efforts by promoting political association and 

economic interdependence where conflict might arise. 

Cooperative security would also support greater EU 

strategic autonomy in order to increase European military capabilities.

Perhaps the greatest risk of this grand strategy 

would be resource exhaustion and declining support 

for U.S. involvement abroad. In fact, it could result in 

an isolationist backlash as costs in human lives and 

treasure mounted. There is also the risk that this would 

exacerbate burden-sharing issues within the NATO 

Alliance, leading to further resentment on both sides of 
42

the Atlantic. In addition to these risks, it would be very 

difficult to pursue a cooperative security grand strategy without the support of both the EU and NATO. 

The collective diplomatic and economic weight of 

the United States and Europe would be necessary, as 

would NATO’s military capabilities.

As mentioned earlier, there is little indication that 

Trump will pursue a grand strategy of cooperative 

security. He has made disparaging remarks about the 

EU, for example, saying the EU was “possibly just as 

bad as China” on trade.99 He has vigorously sought to 

renegotiate traditional trade agreements like NAFTA. 

Trump has also indicated a disdain for an activist role 

for the United States in regional conflicts outside of 

defeating ISIS. The administration also withdrew the 

United States from the Paris Climate Accords, saying 

that it hurt U.S. economic interests and was unfair, and 

unilaterally pulled out of the JPOA on Iran’s nuclear 

program. So, to some degree, it seems likely there will 

be continued tension between the United States and 

our long-standing European allies, and perhaps more 

competition in the future.

Primacy

Like neo-isolationism and selective engagement, 

primacy is based on the principles of realism. More 

precisely, primacy is based on the tenets of offensive 

realism, outlined by John Mearsheimer, distinguished 

scholar at the University of Chicago, in his book, The 

Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

100 Under offensive realism, great powers are always looking for ways to gain 

power at the expense of others. Therefore, they are 

driven by the pursuit of relative gains to become more 

and more powerful, which ironically could lead to 
43

them being less secure. Unlike selective engagement, 

it is insufficient to maintain the international balance 

of power. The objective of primacy is U.S. domination 

along the entire spectrum of power (i.e., diplomatic, 

intelligence, military, and economic). Hal Brands, Peter 

Feaver, William Inboden, and Paul D. Miller argue in a 

2017 study that the United States has pursued a:

consistent and successful global strategy that has aimed 

to perpetuate American international primacy, to solidify 

and extend the liberal international order, and to avert 

the emergence of new or resurgent threats to that order.101

While leaning more toward selective engagement 

and isolationism, Trump has pursued some policies 

that are consistent with a grand strategy of primacy. 

He has been very vocal in confronting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially in regards to North 

Korea. Prior to the June 2018 summit in Singapore with 

North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un, Trump had indicated a willingness to act unilaterally, if necessary, in 

dealing with North Korea. In an interview with the 

Financial Times, the President stated, “If China is not 

going to solve North Korea, we will.”102 The administration’s increased investment in the military is also 

consistent with primacy.

Under a grand strategy of primacy, the key objectives 

would be to preserve American hegemony, to prevent 

the emergence of a peer-competitor, and to protect the 

political, security, and economic interests of developed 

countries (e.g., Europe) so that they would acquiesce 

to U.S. primacy. This grand strategy would emphasize 

the containment of other great powers, such as China 

and Russia, but also discourage greater autonomy of 

allies like Japan and Germany. Primacy would mean 

a robust U.S. military presence in NATO and more 
44

frequent crisis management and humanitarian operations. Like cooperative security, it would also seek to 

prevent the proliferation of WMD. A grand strategy of 

primacy would seek to expand and strengthen NATO, 

but would be leery of any European Defense Union. 

Therefore, the United States would support continued 

CSFP interventions, but would not support EU efforts 

to achieve strategic autonomy. As long as the EU 

focused on low-level conflict and crisis management, 

such as humanitarian intervention, primacy would 

support cooperation with the EU. The United States 

might seek a division of labor where NATO focused 

on high-end crisis management operations, and the 

EU focused on lower end operations. Under primacy, 

the United States would also pursue continued NATO 

and EU expansion. Like cooperative security, primacy 

might support TTIP, but the United States would be 

more focused on ensuring that U.S. gains outweighed 

those of Europe. Primacy would also support continuing both NATO and EU partnership programs.

Perhaps the greatest risk of this grand strategy 

would be the emergence of a rival power. China and 

Russia would be the most likely candidates for military rivals, while China, the EU, or Japan could 

become economic rivals and challenge U.S. leadership of the global economy. China’s naval exercises 

with Russia off the coast of Kaliningrad in July 2017 

demonstrate the need to act collectively with European 

allies. Another risk is that indiscriminate use of force 

and the unilateral approach of a grand strategy of primacy might increase balancing behavior of both rivals 

and allies alike. The French and German resistance to 

the Iraq invasion is one example of this type of balancing behavior by allies. French, German, and British 

support for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
45

led by China, might be another example.103 Even more 

so than in cooperative security, resource exhaustion 

and declining domestic and international support for 

U.S. involvement abroad would be another major risk 

of pursuing primacy. Acknowledging the possibility 

of friction, cooperation with both the EU and NATO 

would be essential to mitigating all of these risks.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, 

and that is fighting without them!104

—Winston S. Churchill

No matter what grand strategy (or combination 

thereof) the United States pursues, NATO and the EU 

are very likely to be vital to American efforts to deter 

Russia and China and manage security challenges 

elsewhere across Africa, the Middle East, and Central/

South Asia. As demonstrated above, the relevance 

of NATO and the EU is directly related to how they 

support, or hinder the achievement of U.S. national 

interests via its grand strategy. NATO and the EU are 

also critical elements in maintaining the viability and 

stability of major global systems and the current international order. As a recent RAND report concluded, 

“[O]rder is easiest to create and has its greatest effects 

among states that share significant norms and values.”105 NATO and the EU represent organizations 

whose members share these values with the United 

States and possess significant capabilities to pursue 

mutual interests. The question then becomes how to 

deal with these organizations to further U.S. values 

and interests in the future. This monograph recommends three ways to do just that.
46

First, the United States must maintain flexibility 

and resilience in the face of numerous, complex challenges. In 2017, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments published an insightful study of American grand strategy, Critical Assumptions and American 

Grand Strategy.

106 This study argued that the United 

States should “pursue offsets and hedges” that could 

mitigate unfavorable global trends.107 One offset would 

be to strengthen partnerships with like-minded nations 

(e.g., Japan) and to rely upon coalitions of willing states 

when NATO and the EU lacked the consensus or capabilities to support U.S. initiatives. These offsets could 

provide greater flexibility and decisiveness when solutions needed to be adopted quickly, or in areas where 

allied interests diverge. Offsets could still benefit from 

the interoperability provided by NATO allies, or their 

partnership programs.

Hedging would suggest that the United States 

invest more, and not less, into its relationship with 

both NATO and the EU.108 This means continued U.S. 

presence and cooperation in Europe, closer economic 

and political ties, and U.S. support for an orderly British exit from the EU. While the United States should 

certainly work to strengthen other partnerships, it 

should invest more energy and resources in NATO 

and the EU as bulwarks of the global liberal order. 

Those proven institutions provide the prosperity, stability, and democratic values to promote U.S. interests 

in Europe and the world. While NATO had shifted its 

focus away from collective defense after the fall of the 

Soviet Union, it is time that it refocus on Article 5 capabilities, while retaining the ability to conduct crisis 

management and cooperative security missions.

The second recommendation would be to continue 

to pressure NATO allies to increase their capabilities, 
47

while taking a more nuanced view of burden sharing. 

The United States should negotiate with its allies and 

where necessary provide incentives and other side 

payments to overcome their rational incentives to free 

ride on U.S. power and security. While some consider 

the norm of spending 2 percent of GDP on the military 

as an arbitrary figure, it represents an easy to measure 

(and understand) benchmark. As long as it remains the 

norm, the U.S. public will expect NATO allies to meet 

their commitments; perceptions matter in sustaining 

public support for NATO. The Alliance needs to come 

to an agreement about what contributions it expects 

from its members and articulate that standard in an 

easily understood format.109

In addition to increasing spending, the United States 

must continue to prod NATO and its allies to improve 

their collective defense capabilities, readiness, and forward presence. It must also support NATO efforts to 

promote innovation and sharing. Whatever approaches 

the United States decides to pursue, the irreplaceable 

contribution of NATO to collective defense must be 

retained, as well as the principles of solidarity and reciprocity within the Trans-Atlantic community. As two 

scholars on NATO burden sharing have argued, “past 

successes and failures . . . show that mission accomplishment requires give and take, including the occasional acceptance of unequal costs and benefits among 

the members.”110 As shown earlier in this monograph, 

NATO and its European allies already bring a great 

deal of diplomatic, intelligence, foreign assistance, 

and military capability. What European allies lack in 

peer-equivalent military capabilities, they make up for 

in robust capabilities in other instruments of national 

power. In addition, the United States should support 
48

enhanced cooperation by member states under the 

PESCO framework.

The final recommendation is that the United States 

should strengthen its ties to the EU and promote greater 

NATO and EU cooperation. Whether or not the TTIP 

is approved, the United States should push to promote 

a harmonization of regulations and a reduction in 

trade barriers that inhibit economic growth. However, 

pursuing trade wars with the EU is unhelpful in this 

regard. Brexit is another challenge facing Europe and 

the U.S.-EU relationship. While the United Kingdom 

will remain an important member in NATO, its status 

in the EU is being negotiated. Not only will a hard Brexit 

reduce the EU’s (and the United Kingdom’s) economic 

heft, but Brexit could also significantly impact the EU’s 

capabilities under CSFP to conduct crisis management 

operations and to combat terrorism.111 Not only that, 

Brexit could also undermine the survival of the EU 

itself. “Brexit foretells the potential demise of the EU, 

a democratic bulwark to authoritarian Russia’s predatory strategy of divide and conquer.”112 The United 

States must support its British and European allies as 

they navigate this difficult process. Perhaps NATO’s 

adaptation to accommodate France’s withdrawal from 

the integrated military structure provides some lesson 

for how the EU can best manage Brexit. The survival of 

the EU is a vital interest to the United States.113

CONCLUSION

In reviewing U.S. national interests, the strengths 

and weaknesses of NATO and the EU, and the possible grand strategies available to the United States, it is 

clear that the United States is better able to pursue its 

national interests in concert, rather than in competition 
49

with these two institutions. The United States is facing 

numerous threats and challenges to its interests in 

Europe and globally that both the EU and NATO are 

uniquely capable of addressing. Their institutional 

capacity, experience, and competency in these areas 

provide added value to U.S. efforts to address these 

challenges. These institutions also give European 

countries the ability to exert influence globally, often in 

support of common U.S.-European interests.114 While 

there are numerous challenges facing Europe, a united 

Europe is still a formidable power.115 More importantly, Europe is a region that shares U.S. values and 

interests across a broad spectrum of issues. Europe 

represents the largest and most robust partner in the 

community of free nations seeking to spread the ideals 

that John Locke characterized as life, liberty, and estate. 

Only if the United States pursues a more isolationist 

grand strategy, what Hal Brands called a zero-sum 

approach, do NATO and the EU become less relevant, 

or even harmful to U.S. interests.116 Even then, the cost 

of wrongly gauging the geopolitical environment and 

rashly dismantling NATO or marginalizing the EU are 

dramatic. It would not be an easy matter to reassemble these enduring institutions if the United States later 

decided to change course.
50

ENDNOTES

1. Antoine-Henri Jomini, The Art of War, Mechanicsburg, PA: 

Stackpole Books, 1996.

2. Michael J. Mazarr, Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin, and 

Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Understanding the Current International 

Order, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016, p. xi.

3. Robert Ellsworth, Andrew Goodpaster, and Rita Hauser, 

co-chairs, “America’s National Interests: A Report from the Commission on America’s National Interests,” July 2000, p. 15.

4. Ibid., p. 20.

5. Ibid., p. 29.

6. Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on 

the Threat to the Freedom of Europe,” March 17, 1948, transcript 

of address archived in Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 

The American Presidency Project, n.d., available from http://www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13130.

7. Ted Widmer, “Ich Bin Ein Berliner,” The New York Times, 

June 25, 2013.

8. John F. Kennedy, “Remarks at Independence Hall,” Boston, 

MA, July 4, 1962, transcript archived at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, available from https://www.jfklibrary.

org/Asset-Viewer/RrjaDhW5B0OYm2zaJbyPgg.aspx.

9. Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating 

the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, D-day,” Normandy, France, June 6, 1984, transcript archived at the Ronald 

Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, available from https://

www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/60684a.

10. William Jefferson Clinton, National Security Strategy of 

Engagement and Enlargement, Washington, DC: The White House, 

July 1994, p. 21.

11. George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United 

States, Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006, p. 38.
51

12. Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, 

DC: The White House, February 2015, p. 25.

13. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United 

States of America, December 2017, p. 47.

14. Ibid., p. 48.

15. Geoffrey Wheatcroft, “Who Needs NATO?” The New York 

Times, June 15, 2011.

16. Harald Müller, “Security Cooperation,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations, London, UK: Sage, 2002, p. 382.

17. “What Is NATO?” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

n.d., available from http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html, 

accessed December 12, 2016.

18. The report to the North Atlantic Council, “The Future 

Tasks of the Alliance: Report of the Council – ‘The Harmel 

Report’,” Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

December 14, 1967, last updated December 2, 2009, available from 

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm.

19. NATO contributed aerial early warning capabilities to 

help monitor the skies over the United States in the aftermath of 

the attack, and many allies contributed to the U.S. global war on 

terrorism, first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq.

20. Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Adapts, Baltimore, MD: 

Johns Hopkins Press, 2017.

21. Ibid., p. 115.

22. Ibid., p. 110.

23. “The Future Tasks of the Alliance.”

24. “Euro-Atlantic Partnership,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated June 7, 2017, available from http://www.

nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67979.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 

May 15, 2017.
52

25. Ibid.

26. Richard G. Lugar, “NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business,” Remarks Delivered to the Open Forum of the U.S. State 

Department, August 2, 1993.

27. Joel R. Hillison, Stepping Up: Burden Sharing by NATO’s 

Newest Members, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, November 2014.

28. “ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Archived),” 

Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 1, 2015, available from http://www.nato.int/cps/eu/natohq/

topics_69366.htm, accessed May 15, 2017.

29. Ibid.

30. “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts 

and Figures,” Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, October 25, 2010, available from http://www.nato.int/isaf/

placemats_archive/2010-10-25-ISAF-Placemat.pdf, accessed May 15, 

2017. 

31. “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,” 

Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 2018, 

available from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/

pdf_2018_06/20180608_2018-06-RSM-placemat.pdf, accessed June 

27, 2018.

32. “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010-2017),” 

Press Release, Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 15, 2018, available from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/

natohq/news_152830.htm.

33. See Jamie Shea, “Foreword,” in Hillison, Stepping Up, p. 

xiii.

34. Phil Williams, The Senate and US Troops in Europe, New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985.

35. President Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in 

Address to the People of Europe,” Hannover, Germany, April 

25, 2016, transcript available from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
53

gov/the-press-office/2016/04/25/remarks-president-obama-addresspeople-europe, accessed May 15, 2017.

36. Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump at NATO 

Unveiling of the Article 5 and Berlin Wall Memorials—Brussels, 

Belgium,” May 25, 2017, transcript available from https://www.

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-natounveiling-article-5-berlin-wall-memorials-brussels-belgium/.

37. Hillison, Stepping Up.

38. Dan Lamothe and Michael Birnbaum, “Defense Secretary 

Mattis Issues New Ultimatum to NATO Allies on Defense Spending,” The Washington Post, February 15, 2017.

39. Lorne Cook, “Tillerson Gives NATO Allies 2 Months to 

Boost Defense Spending,” Chicago Tribune, March 31, 2017.

40. Aaron Mehta, “Trump’s letters to allies mean the NATO 

Summit could be in trouble before it begins,” Defense News, June 

27, 2018, available from https://www.defensenews.com/smr/natopriorities/2018/06/27/trump-picks-a-fight-with-norway-and-the-natosummit-could-be-in-trouble-before-it-begins/, accessed May 15, 2017.

41. “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010-2017),” 

pp. 2-38.

42. Ian Bremmer, “Risk Report: The Only 5 Countries That 

Meet NATO’s Defense Spending Requirements,” Time Magazine, 

February 24, 2017.

43. “Canada to Boost Military Budget by 70% after Pressure 

from US to Spend More,” The Guardian, June 7, 2017. However, 

this will still leave it well short of the 2-percent target.

44. Jeff Daniels, “Defense Budgets Climb as NATO Countries Step Up Spending,” CNBC, December 20, 2016. See also “On 

German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr,” white 

paper, Berlin, Germany: Federal Ministry of Defence, June 2016.

45. Guy Chazan, “Germany to Miss NATO Defence Spending 

Pledge,” Financial Times, April 27, 2018.
54

46. Alexander Mattelaer, “Revisiting the Principles of 

NATO Burden-Sharing,” Parameters, Vol. 46, No. 1, Spring 2016, 

pp. 25-34.

47. Hillison, Stepping Up, p. 320.

48. “Chapter Four: Europe,” The Military Balance, Vol. 117, No. 

1, 2017, p. 63.

49. Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’,” Parameters, Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 2015-16, p. 73.

50. Jens Stoltenberg, “The Secretary General’s Annual Report 

2016,” Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

March 13, 2017, available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/

opinions_142149.htm, accessed May 15, 2017.

51. Jens Stoltenberg, “Press Conference,” Brussels, Belgium: 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 8, 2016, updated July 9, 

2016, transcript available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/

opinions_133276.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed May 15, 2017.

52. NATO deployed four multinational battlegroups: one 

each in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. As this monograph goes to print, three of these are being led by Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

53. Robert Keohane, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” 

International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, p. 42.

54. “Military Command Structure,” NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, n.d., available from https://shape.

nato.int/military_command_structure, accessed August 14, 2018.

55. As an indication of the important political and military 

influence of this position, the first Supreme Allied Commander 

Europe (SACEUR) was General Dwight Eisenhower and his 

Deputy SACEUR was Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery.

56. “World Economic Outlook Database,” Washington, DC: 

International Monetary Fund, 2018, available from https://www.

imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/index.aspx, accessed 

June 28, 2018.
55

57. “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010-2017),” 

pp. 2-38.

58. Joel Hillison, “Will Brexit Unravel the European Union’s 

Common Foreign and Security Policy?” War on the Rocks, 

posted September 12, 2016, available from https://warontherocks.

com/2016/09/will-brexit-unravel-the-european-unions-commonforeign-security-policy/, accessed May 15, 2017.

59. Joel Hillison, “Erin Go Brussels: Treaty of Brussels at 

70,” War Room, March 16, 2018, available from https://warroom.

armywarcollege.edu/special-series/anniversaries/erin-go-brusselstreaty-brussels-70/, accessed May 15, 2018. Also see, Jonathan 

Olsen and John McCormick, The European Union: Politics and Policies, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017, p. 41.

60. Sven Biscop, “All of Nothing? European and British Strategic Autonomy after the Brexit,” Egmont Paper, No. 87, Brussels, 

Belgium: Egmont, Royal Institute for International Relations, September 2016, pp. 1-23.

61. Ronald Tiersky and Erik Jones, eds., Europe Today, New 

York: Rowan and Littlefield, 2015, p. 451.

62. The EU conducts these missions under the auspices of the 

Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), a critical component of the CSFP. See “Military and civilian missions and operations,” Brussels, Belgium: European Union External Action, May 

3, 2016 (orig.), updated continuously, available from https://eeas.

europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/

military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en, accessed August 

14, 2018.

63. See “The EU strengthens cooperation on security and 

defence,” European Union External Action, March 1, 2018, 

available from https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/35285/eu-strengthens-cooperation-security-and-defence_en, 

accessed August 14, 2018.

64. “Chapter Four: Europe.”

65. “Relations with the European Union,” North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization, July 18, 2018, available from http://www.
56

nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm?selectedLocale=e, accessed 

May 15, 2017.

66. European Union, “Glossary of summaries: Mutual defence 

clause,” EUR-Lex Access to European Union Law, n.d., available 

from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/mutual_defence.html,

accessed May 15, 2017.

67. EU nations have a significant military capability. European 

nations in the EU and/or NATO have over 1.9 million active military personnel and over 1.8 million reservists. European NATO 

armies have over 7,300 main battle tanks, 7,200 infantry fighting 

vehicles, and over 20,000 artillery pieces. They have 8 strategic 

submarines, 72 tactical submarines, 51 destroyers, 92 frigates, 

and 176 minesweepers. European NATO air forces have over 

1,100 fighter ground-attack jets and 217 attack jets. Both Britain 

and France have aircraft carriers and, more importantly, nuclear 

weapons. These military capabilities alone have made Europe relevant to U.S. national interests.

68. “Chapter Four: Europe,” p. 80.

69. “Defending Europe: European Defence Fund - factsheet,” Brussels, Belgium: European Union External Action, 

March 5, 2018, available from https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/

headquarters-homepage/35203/defending-europe-european-defencefund-factsheet_en, accessed June 28, 2018.

70. “Chapter Four: Europe,” p. 64.

71. “Potemkin Euro-armies,” Economist, September 24, 2016, 

p. 12.

72. “World Economic Outlook Database,” 2018.

73. “EU position in world trade,” European Commission, last 

updated October 2, 2014, available from http://ec.europa.eu/trade/

policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/, accessed May 15, 2017.

74. Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe, the Second Superpower,” 

Current History, March 2010, p. 94.

75. Peter Feaver, “What Is Grand Strategy and Why Do We 

Need It?” Foreign Policy, April 8, 2009.
57

76. Objectives or ends describe desired end states, ways 

describe how to use the instruments of national power to promote those objectives, and means refers to the resources required 

to accomplish those objectives.

77. Hal Brands, American Grand Strategy and the Liberal Order, 

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016.

78. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions 

for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, 

Winter 1996-97, pp. 5-53.

79. Ibid., pp. 38-39.

80. Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, 

Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers 

of Knowledge, Spring 1998, p. 31.

81. John Judis, “America’s Failure—and Russia and Iran’s 

Success—in Syria’s Cataclysmic Civil War,” Talking Points Memo 

(TPM), January 10, 2017, available from http://talkingpointsmemo.

com/cafe/americas-failure-russia-success-in-syrias-war, accessed May 

2, 2017.

82. Theodore H. Cohn, Global Political Economy, New York: 

Routledge, 2016.

83.Eszter Zalan, “EU ready to help China fight protectionism,” 

World Affairs Journal, February 7, 2017, available from http://www.

worldaffairsjournal.org/content/eu-%E2%80%98ready%E2%80%99-

help-china-fight-protectionism, accessed May 2, 2017.

84. Brands, p. 24.

85. Phillip Carter, “Welcome to the Forever War,” CNAS, 

May 12, 2017, available from https://www.cnas.org/publications/

commentary/welcome-to-the-forever-war, accessed August 1, 2018.

86. Henry Farrell, “Thanks to Trump, Germany Says It Can’t 

Rely on the United States. What Does That Mean?” The Washington Post, May 29, 2017.

87. Stoltenberg, “The Secretary General’s Annual Report 

2016,” pp. 88-90.
58

88. Brands, p. 16.

89. Walt would disagree with that assertion. See Stephen 

M. Walt, “Barack Obama Was a Foreign-Policy Failure,” Foreign 

Policy, January 18, 2017.

90. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump at NATO Unveiling of the Article 5 and Berlin Wall Memorials.”

91. Richard Burt, “A Grand Strategy for Trump,” The National 

Interest, May/June 2017. However, as of this writing, the President is also considering a modest increase in U.S. troop presence 

in Afghanistan.

92. Donald Trump, “America First: A Budget Blueprint to 

Make America Great Again,” Washington, DC: U.S. Office of 

Management and Budget, March 2017.

93. Posen and Ross, p. 20.

94. In addition to other support, the Alliance provided seven 

NATO airborne early warning and control systems to patrol U.S. 

airspace, flying over 360 sorties.

95. “European Counter Terrorism Centre - ECTC,” Europol, 

n.d., available from https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/

european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc, accessed July 2, 2018.

96. Keohane, p. 42.

97. Posen and Ross, p. 21.

98. While President Clinton’s foreign policy at times lacked 

a coherent vision, it had many elements that reflected a cooperative security approach. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Clinton 

sought to support a transitioning democracy in Russia, but did not 

hesitate to pursue a much larger set of U.S. interests that suddenly 

seemed achievable in the new unipolar environment. He reluctantly, but forcefully, intervened in the Balkans under NATO, 

even after the disastrous end to the U.S. humanitarian mission 

in Somalia. Clinton supported and encouraged the enlargement 

of both NATO and the EU into former Soviet and Warsaw Pact 

states. He also signed NAFTA, furthering economic interdependence among Canada, Mexico, and the United States, as well as 
59

a trade agreement with the People’s Republic of China. As a part 

of this agreement, the United States also supported China’s membership in the WTO, reflecting a very liberal institutional view of 

great power relations.

99. Caroline Houck, “Trump calls Europe ‘as bad as China’ 

on trade,” Vox, July 1, 2018, available from https://www.vox.com/

world/2018/7/1/17522984/europe-china-trade-war-trump, accessed 

July 2, 2018.

100. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 

New York: Norton, 2001.

101. Hal Brands, Peter Feaver, William Inboden, and Paul D. 

Miller, Critical Assumptions and American Grand Strategy, Washington, DC: U.S. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 

2017, p. i.

102. Eli Watkins, “Trump: US will act unilaterally on North 

Korea if necessary,” CNN, April 3, 2017, available from http://

www.cnn.com/2017/04/02/politics/donald-trump-north-korea/, 

accessed August 1, 2018.

103. Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar, “Why US Allies Are 

Happy to Join China’s AIIB,” The Diplomat, June 30, 2015, available from http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/why-us-allies-are-happy-tojoin-chinas-aiib/, accessed May 2, 2017.

104. Winston S. Churchill quoted in Kenneth Harris, “Wartime Lies,” The New York Times, April 27, 1997, available from 

https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/97/04/27/

reviews/970427.27harrist.html, accessed August 1, 2018.

105. Mazarr, Priebe, Radin, and Cevallos.

106. Brands, Feaver, Inboden, and Miller.

107. Ibid., p. ii.

108. Luis Simón, “Balancing Priorities in America’s European 

Strategy,” Parameters, Vol. 46, No. 1, Spring 2016, pp. 13-24.

109. See Mattelaer, pp. 25-34.
60

110. Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter Kent Forster, “The U.S. 

NATO and Military Burden Sharing: Post-Cold War Accomplishments and Future Prospects,” Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 

33, No. 2, 2017, p. 115.

111. David Omand, “Keeping Europe Safe: Counterterrorism 

for the Continent,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 95, No. 5, September 2016, 

pp. 83-93.

112. James Kirchick, “The Road to a Free Europe Goes 

Through Moscow,” Politico, March 17, 2017.

113. John Deni, “Strategic Insights: Is the European Union 

Really That Important to U.S. Security Interests?” Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

March 9, 2017, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/

index.cfm/articles/Is-the-EU-Really-That-Important-to-US-SecurityInterests/2017/03/09.

114. For further arguments as to why the EU is important to 

U.S. security, see Ibid.

115. Moravcsik, pp. 91-98.

116. Brands.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General John S. Kem

Commandant

∗∗∗∗∗

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

AND

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

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Author

Dr. Joel R. Hillison

Editor for Production

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Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil