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STRUCTURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND 

HOMELAND SECURITY AT THE WHITE HOUSE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

OF THE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 12, 2009 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 


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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BETH M. GROSSMAN, Senior Counsel 

ERIC P. ANDERSEN, Professional Staff Member 

CHRISTIAN J. BECKNER, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ANDREW E. WEIS, Minority General Counsel 

ADAM J. KILLIAN, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 


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C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 19 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2009 

Hon. Thomas J. Ridge, Former Secretary of Homeland Security ........................ 5 

Frances Fragos Townsend, Former Assistant to President George W. Bush 

for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism ................................................... 8 

Christine E. Wormuth, Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 10 

Hon. James R. Locher III, Executive Director, Project on National Security 

Reform ................................................................................................................... 14 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Locher, Hon. James R. III: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41 

Ridge, Hon. Thomas J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27 

Townsend, Frances Fragos: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31 

Wormuth, Christine E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

APPENDIX 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Ridge ........................................................................................................... 50 

Ms. Townsend ................................................................................................... 54 

Ms. Wormuth .................................................................................................... 56 

Mr. Locher ......................................................................................................... 58 


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STRUCTURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND 

HOMELAND SECURITY AT THE WHITE HOUSE 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. 

Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Pryor, Burris, Collins, 

McCain, and Graham. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning and welcome to this hearing. Thanks to everybody for being here, particularly to our witnesses. 

In the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States on 

September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002, which not only created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), but also formally established a Homeland Security 

Council (HSC), within the Executive Office of the President of the 

United States. Before being codified in law, the HSC operated 

under an Executive Order which President Bush issued a month 

after September 11, 2001. 

The Homeland Security Council was created to advise the President of the United States on homeland security matters. Like the 

National Security Council (NSC), the Homeland Security Council’s 

statutory direction is general, ‘‘more effectively coordinating the 

policies and functions of the U.S. Government relating to homeland 

security.’’ Its central role is to also advise the President of the 

United States on matters related broadly to homeland security. Its 

required membership includes only the President, Vice President, 

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Attorney General, and Secretary of Defense. Although the position is not in statute, it has been led since President Bush’s original Executive Order 

by the Homeland Security Advisor. 

The Homeland Security Council also acts as the originator of 

Homeland Security Presidential Directives, which in the lingo of 

this field are called HSPDs. They promulgate homeland security 

policy across the government and are quite significant. Like the 

National Security Council, policy on specific issues is typically developed by coordinating committees consisting of subject matter experts from relevant agencies and normally are negotiated up 


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through to the Deputy’s Committee and finally the Principal’s Committee before being approved by the President. 

In recent years, a number of analysts and a number of commission reports have questioned the wisdom of having a separate 

Homeland Security Council and a National Security Council, arguing that they should be merged. The basis of the argument, and I 

am going to state it too simplistically, is that homeland security is 

really just one element of national security, so it should be the purview of the National Security Council. Proponents of this point of 

view say that in an era when threats are transnational and borderless, it does not make sense for the White House to split its coordinating organization, and have separate councils for domestic and 

international security issues. 

Others, argue that our homeland security challenges are broad, 

that is they are not just counterterrorism but involve, for instance, 

national disasters, and also that the concerns of homeland security 

may well be lost or at least inadequately focused on if the Homeland Security Council merges with the National Security Council. 

Last month, in early January, President Obama appointed John 

Brennan to serve as both a Deputy National Security Advisor for 

Counterterrorism and as Homeland Security Advisor, bringing 

those functions together. This Committee has worked with John 

Brennan over the years in his time of service to the government. 

I personally have the highest respect for him and I welcome his appointment to work in the White House on our behalf. 

More recently, President Obama has asked John Brennan over 

the next 50 days to consider this question of whether the Homeland Security Council should be merged with the National Security 

Council. I have spoken with Mr. Brennan and told him that I am 

at this point of open mind on this question. Today’s hearing really 

is to draw from the advice of experienced people who have thought 

about this to help the Committee be in a position to answer questions and interact with Mr. Brennan, and ultimately with President Obama, on the question of whether these two councils should 

be merged. 

There is a certain extent to which the President of the United 

States can have broad latitude by Executive Order or informally 

within the White House, but as I said at the outset of my statement, the unique, separate Homeland Security Council is a matter 

of statute now and it would be our intention to make some decision 

related to statute and hopefully to work together with the Administration in doing that. 

Every President since President Truman, who was President 

when the previous most significant reorganization and reform of 

our national security apparatus occurred—that is, prior to the postSeptember 11, 2001, period—has adapted the structure of the National Security Council to best serve the needs of the country and 

the needs of the President and the Presidential leadership style, in 

light of the challenges then facing the Nation. President Obama, of 

course, will want to do the same with both the National Security 

Council and the Homeland Security Council. 

But on this Committee, I would say there is a bottom line to 

these discussions, that whatever structure emerges, we have to believe that it will protect our homeland security, that it will provide 


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the best coordination and information to the President of the 

United States on matters related to homeland security with the 

aim of providing the best security possible to the American people. 

Where legislation may be needed to either effect some changes or 

alter in some way the existing statute. I look forward to working 

with Members of this Committee and with the Administration to 

make sure that we get this right, because though it is in some 

senses a relatively dull matter of governmental organization, the 

consequences of it are very significant for our homeland security. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The decision on whether or not the Homeland Security Council 

and the National Security Council should be merged should not be 

taken lightly. While some dismiss this question as being too insidethe-beltway, the fact is that a decision to merge these two councils 

could have serious unintended consequences. 

In my judgment, merger advocates need to answer a number of 

difficult questions. First, are there any examples of how having 

separate entities has actually impeded or undermined national security? To the best of my knowledge, the answer to that question 

is no. There are none. To the contrary, the Nation has achieved 

considerable success in the one area in which the Homeland Security Council and the NSC share joint responsibility, and that is 

counterterrorism policy. Multiple terrorist attacks have been 

thwarted, including a 2002 plot to hijack an airplane and fly it into 

the tallest skyscraper in Los Angeles, a 2003 plot to hijack and 

crash planes into targets on the East Coast, and a 2006 plot to 

blow up multiple jets traveling from London. 

Another important question: Will the NSC with its traditional 

focus on international diplomatic and military issues, be able to devote enough time and attention to the domestic aspects of homeland security? I am very concerned that vitally important domestic 

security issues could become less visible within the White House 

were a merger to take place. These issues include emergency preparedness and response, critical infrastructure protection, and disaster recovery. 

The breadth of issues with which the National Security Advisor 

must contend on a daily basis is daunting: Managing the conduct 

of two wars, attempting to contain terrorism and proliferation activities, deciding the future of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and 

that is just a sampling. Is it really feasible or practical to add an 

entirely new and massive portfolio of domestic issues to that 

weighty agenda? 

Think of the issues that the Homeland Security Advisors have 

had to contend with. They range from responsible for the levees’ integrity in New Orleans, flooding in Maine, an ice storm in Kentucky, a wildfire in California. What should be the coordinated response? Which agencies should do what? I am concerned that adding those responsibilities would divert the NSC’s primary focus 

from the Nation’s military and diplomatic missions. 

The fact is, no matter how qualified, having one of the NSC’s 

many deputies as the senior-most White House official in charge of 


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homeland security will likely not be sufficient to ensure enough of 

a focus on homeland security issues. Disaster declarations, catastrophic planning, grant funding, and State and local information 

sharing must receive high-level support and attention within the 

White House. 

In a city where rank matters, I also question whether a deputy 

will have sufficient stature to compel the most senior officials, particularly members of the President’s Cabinet, to take action on a 

pressing homeland security issue. Given those realities, who will 

referee the inevitable turf battles and rivalries between the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal departments and 

agencies? Because DHS is still a relatively new department, it is 

particularly vulnerable to the machinations of other agencies seeking to enhance their homeland security footprint. We have seen 

that, for example, with the Department of Justice, which has 

sought to minimize the Department of Homeland Security’s role in 

terrorist bombing prevention, despite a presidential directive to the 

contrary, and that dispute has delayed the release of a national 

bombing prevention strategy plan for more than a year. 

Almost 6 years since its inception, DHS is still enmeshed in jurisdictional disputes with other departments over the homeland security mission, battling the Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS) over the responsibility for medical preparedness 

and response, jousting with the Department of Agriculture (USDA) 

over agricultural inspections and agroterrorism. The Department 

needs a neutral arbiter within the White House to settle disputes 

like this. An independent, effective, and I would argue, stronger 

HSC would better fulfill that essential mission. And NSC, not focusing relentlessly on the homeland will almost certainly fail to 

give the attention that is needed. 

Nevertheless, I am, of course, open-minded on this issue—— 

[Laughter.] 

And I look forward to hearing the statements of our witnesses. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins, for that very 

thoughtful and open-minded opening statement. [Laughter.] 

You and I are both open-minded in the same direction. 

I thank Senator McCain and Senator Burris for being here. 

We have a great panel to advise us, people of experience and expertise, and I appreciate very much that you are here. 

We are going to start with Governor Tom Ridge, the former Governor of Pennsylvania, and the Nation’s very first Homeland Security Advisor. Though he is now a figure in history, he remains 

youthful nonetheless. 

Mr. RIDGE. Yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We are very glad you are here, Governor 

Ridge. He then went on to become the Nation’s first Secretary of 

Homeland Security and served in that position until January 2005. 

I was thinking that former Secretary of State Dean Acheson once 

wrote a book called ‘Present at the Creation,’’ in which he described 

the creation of the post-Second World War world and the formation 

of American security policy. You really have been both present at 

the creation and a tremendous contributor to our security since 

September 11, 2001, so we thank you for your extraordinary service 


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1The prepared statement of Mr. Ridge appears in the Appendix on page 27. 

and welcome your comments now on this question before us this 

morning. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. THOMAS J. RIDGE,1 FORMER SECRETARY 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. RIDGE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Ranking Member Collins, 

Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to speak to 

you this morning. It has been roughly 5 years since I last sat before you. I cannot remember when I had so much fun. [Laughter.] 

Chairman Lieberman, I spoke to you many times as the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and later as Secretary 

of the Department. I wore a different hat then and I notice chairs 

have changed on the dais, as well—the same people, different 

chairs. But nothing has changed for me, and I suspect for you, 

when it comes to the desire we still all have to do what we can and 

what we must to keep our country secure, our economy thriving, 

our people safe, and our republic free as we continue to face the 

ominous domestic and global challenges these 8-plus years after 

September 11, 2001. 

I welcome and appreciate the opportunity to offer my thoughts 

as you review whether or not to merge the Homeland Security 

Council and its functions under the umbrella of the National Security Council. I also appreciate that you have brought before you 

people of differing points of view on this issue, my colleagues on 

the panel, which I think allows for an approach that hopefully is 

consensus-driven and an outcome that is both thoughtful and bipartisan. 

My personal viewpoint on this issue is that the Homeland Security Council should not be subsumed by the National Security 

Council. The Department of Homeland Security is still a young, 

maturing Cabinet agency established just 6 years ago. It needs an 

independent ally and advocate within the White House. A good 

working relationship with the National Security Advisor is also important to be sure—but it needs its own voice, and a voice that will 

be heard by its chief report, President Obama. 

On the face of it, it is easy to understand why some believe that 

HSC folding within NSC sounds easy enough, and certainly appears to be simple, common sense. Many people view each council 

through a national security lens, so why not put the two together? 

However, in my view, the merger of these two councils would not 

work and if carried forward would diminish and potentially damage 

a council whose work needs to be elevated, accelerated, and properly resourced versus diluted in a mix of security roles and responsibilities of an entirely different kind. 

The NSC focus is primarily on foreign governments, military involvement, diplomatic involvement, enemy combatants overseas, 

calming geopolitical tensions, mapping the strategies around the 

world, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and addressing bubbling 

military conflicts. 

The Homeland Security Council focuses more on the American 

people. Their constituency is 300 million strong, and the aim is 


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keeping our citizens safe and helping them to recover from an incident on home soil, not foreign soil. 

The Department as its primary mission is not, on the whole— 

and I repeat this again—not a counterterrorism agency. Rather, 

the chief focus of DHS is the protection of the American people. 

Prevention is part of the DHS role, but as much if not more is the 

responsibility to respond to an attack or catastrophic event, minimize the damage should an incident occur, and assist in the often 

long and arduous process of recovery. 

Sometimes the true scope of homeland security, frankly, gets lost 

in all the talk of terrorists and tyrants, but it is important to underscore that the Department of Homeland Security is an all-hazards agency focused on threats and potential attacks of any kind, 

including the threats of terrorism, but also the threats and the 

power and the influence of Mother Nature and hurricanes, 

wildfires, flooding, biospills, tornadoes, nuclear accidents, anything 

that threatens the safety of our citizens, in addition to all the traditional legacy missions of all those units and bureaus that were 

combined and aggregated into the Department. 

Addressing such hazards requires that the mission of Homeland 

Security not be federally-driven, but national in scope. At the Federal level, homeland security encompasses the horizontal integration of many Federal Cabinet agencies. From HHS to Energy to the 

Department of Defense (DOD) to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and elsewhere, more than 30 departments and agencies 

have homeland security functions. 

Take biosecurity, for example. I wanted to highlight—and I think 

this is a good way to demonstrate the concern that I have. What 

the United States needs to do to improve our biosecurity against 

major biological threats is extraordinarily complex. Biosecurity depends on different programs managed by different agencies. There 

is no way to simplify that. 

DHS is in charge of the biological risk assessment that analyzes 

these threats. HHS is responsible for the research and development 

of medicines and vaccines. DOD does its own research and development (R&D). The Food and Drug Administration has a role. Let us 

not forget the National Institutes of Health. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is responsible for our Strategic 

National Stockpile and for coordinating the grant program and 

technical assistance to States and locals. The intelligence community is responsible for assessing the biological threats posed by our 

adversaries. Without very close White House coordination, our bio 

programs will move in different directions, different goals, at different time lines. 

Putting this and other challenges under the NSC’s purview 

would only complicate, in my judgment, the NSC’s mission and the 

HSC’s ability to receive adequate attention as part of the National 

Security Council that is already engaged in Iran, North Korea, 

Russia, Pakistan, India, the Middle East, and other matters around 

the world. 

Moreover, the vast interagency coordination does not end there. 

Federal agents have equally key roles in providing grant support, 

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cies, those who are first on the scene, whether it is a bio event or 

not. 

And that brings me to one of the most important complexities, 

vertically integrating homeland security responsibilities. Homeland 

Security is a Federal Cabinet agency, but the mission is national, 

and so you worry about the horizontal integration, but I also think 

you have to worry about the vertical integration. It is a national 

mission. It requires a national response, and that means well-established coordination, communication, and cooperation with our 

56 States and territories and thousands of localities. 

A significant difficulty in the vertical integration piece is that the 

President and the Federal Government as a whole on many occasions lack the authority to mandate States to carry forward all recommended or preferred protocols. The Federal Government cannot 

ensure training is carried out and emergency equipment is required. The President cannot call out the National Guard. Only the 

governor of the State can do that. These kind of sovereignty issues 

and others led to the creation of the Homeland Security Council in 

the first place, and the unique role between relationship building 

between States, local and tribal governments. 

I would also point out that one of our strongest partners in the 

homeland security mission is that of the private sector. Its responsibility to secure its own infrastructure, planes, railways, bridges, 

nuclear facilities, and the like, and the ability to drive technological 

innovation, to develop weapons of detection, weapons of protection 

and response are critical to the Nation’s ability to secure everything from our chemical facilities to our Nation’s borders and the 

skies overhead. 

The need to work effectively with the private sector has not been 

a focus of the traditional national security community, nor has it 

been the focus to work with State and local governments. But it is 

readily understood, nurtured, and advanced by those with existing 

national homeland security expertise and authority. 

I will not give you the full extent of my testimony, my colleagues, 

but I would like to move forward and make a couple of recommendations. 

One, keep it where it is. Instead of relocating it, let us reform 

it. The HSC staff and resources are minimal compared to the National Security Council and the HSC is not sufficiently empowered 

to lead the homeland security effort in the White House, as was the 

intention when it was created by Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 1. 

So let us talk quickly about reform. I would personally like to see 

the Secretary of Homeland Security be a permanent member of the 

National Security Council. 

Second, the Homeland Security Council should not be faulted for 

doing its utmost while lacking the resources to do its job. Instead, 

it would be advisable to staff up the HSC with more than adequate 

resources. It is quite slim compared to the formidable staff of the 

National Security Council. I say again, the complexity of its responsibilities far exceed what most people understand. Less budgetary 

and salary constraints can make sure that the personnel at the 

Homeland Security Council have the tools and the experience and 


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1The prepared statement of Ms. Townsend appears in the Appendix on page 31. 

subject matter expertise to do their job efficiently and without impediment. 

And finally, I read about John Brennan’s relationship and I, too, 

Senator Lieberman, I have enormous respect for the man. We 

worked with him very closely. His judgment, his analytical capability, but I say this again, the third notion is let us not categorize 

the Department of Homeland Security’s primary mission as 

counterterrorism. It is not. And having someone such as John 

Brennan, with the stature and the experience, being a liaison between the National Security Council and the independent Homeland Security Council to make sure that the information that HSC, 

DHS, States, locals and private sector need is transmitted in a 

timely and appropriate way would be a huge plus-up for the Department and for the Homeland Security Council. 

I think I have exceeded my time. I apologize for that to my colleagues on the panel and I look forward to the questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Governor Ridge. Excellent testimony, a good beginning to the discussion. 

Next, we have Fran Townsend, who served our country as the 

third person to be Homeland Security Advisor, from May 2004 to 

November 2007. Before becoming Homeland Security Advisor, Ms. 

Townsend served in a variety of positions in the Department of 

Justice and at the U.S. Coast Guard. 

We thank you for being here and look forward to your testimony 

now. 

TESTIMONY OF FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND,1 FORMER ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH FOR HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Senator. It is a real privilege to be 

here before the Committee. I have had the privilege of working 

with the Committee, particularly Senators Lieberman and Collins, 

on the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the 

Homeland Security Act, and so it is a privilege to be back before 

you. 

There is no more solemn responsibility that the President bears 

than to protect American lives. During my 41⁄2 years at the White 

House, I came to believe for that reason, organization must be dictated by effectiveness, and so I think you will find, Senator, that 

I, too, come here with an open mind, not as an advocate, but suggesting a framework by which you might consider this issue. 

How best to maintain effectiveness will inevitably change over 

time as we continue to see the weakening of al-Qaeda and our 

other enemies and the continued strengthening of the Department 

of Homeland Security and as our government better learns how to 

integrate the various capabilities that it has across the Federal 

Government since the tragedy of September 11, 2001. 

As you consider the most effective means of organizing the White 

House structure, I would respectfully submit that any structure 

should be judged against three fundamental criteria. First, there 

must be a single person both responsible and accountable to the 

President who monitors threat information and who has the auVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:33 Oct 20, 2010 Jkt 049490 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\49490.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

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thority to marshal all instruments of national power—military, intelligence, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and public diplomacy—to defeat those threats. The individual cannot wait until the 

threat arrives on our shores, but must have the responsibility, as 

I did, and the means to identify those threats where they originate 

and to ensure a coordinated response to defeat them. The President’s Homeland Security Advisor must not be constrained by geographic boundaries that our enemies fail to respect. 

Second, the Homeland Security Advisor must have direct and immediate access to the President. Ultimately, if terrorists successfully strike the United States, it is the President and not his staff 

who will be accountable to the American people for the failure. The 

Homeland Security Advisor must be able to get to the President 

quickly without the clearance from his or her colleagues on the 

White House staff. Unfortunately, there will be times when American lives are at stake, whether that is from a terrorist threat or 

a natural disaster, and the President will need to be advised, and 

operational decisions taken and communicated to the relevant Cabinet Secretary in real time. These sorts of crises do not lend themselves to the normal bureaucratic process. 

Third, the homeland security issues faced by our government are 

diverse and many, as Secretary Ridge outlined. They range from 

preparedness and response to natural disasters, ice, flooding, fires, 

wind, to pandemic planning and biological and nuclear threats. 

These issues are often distinct from the more traditional foreign 

policy issues faced by the National Security Council and require experienced staff with significant expertise. The staff must understand State and local emergency management policy issues and 

concerns. They must be organized not simply to facilitate the homeland security policy process, but also to anticipate and respond to 

State and local political leaders in a time of crisis. The Homeland 

Security Advisor requires adequate staffing to deal both with 

counterterrorism and homeland security issues. 

We remain a Nation at war with a very determined enemy. We 

have troops deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and the National Security Advisor has many important responsibilities in addition to those two theaters. For example, he must contend with 

the Middle East peace process and counterproliferation around the 

world, most especially in Iran and North Korea. I worry that increasing the span of control of the National Security Advisor could 

dilute the homeland security mission and make it just one more 

item on a list that is already overburdened. 

That said, I wish to be clear. We should judge any potential reorganization by the substance and criteria, as I have suggested. We 

must be careful not to assume that a merger means the President 

cares less about homeland security. We must resist the easy organizational chart test and look at the substance of how responsibilities are allocated and how we are being protected as a Nation. 

Again, let me suggest the three questions I would hope the Committee would ask. Is there one person responsible and accountable 

to the President who looks around the world and advises the President? Second, does this one person have direct and immediate access to the President? And third, does this person have adequate 

staff to fulfill his or her responsibilities? These are the questions 


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1The prepared statement of Ms. Wormuth appears in the Appendix on page 33. 

that we should be asking and the criteria against which we should 

judge the effort. 

Senator thank you again for the opportunity to be here and to 

testify before you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Ms. Townsend. Excellent, very 

helpful testimony. 

We move now to our last two witnesses, both of whom have been 

in government but also have thought a lot about these issues. First, 

Christine Wormuth is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies (CSIS) and has served previously in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. She has also written extensively 

on the need for interagency reforms, particularly for more effective 

incident management. 

We are very happy to have you here and please proceed with 

your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH,1 SENIOR FELLOW, 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. WORMUTH. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Members 

of the Committee, for inviting me here today. I greatly appreciate 

the opportunity to share my views with you. 

I want to say, as a self-described homeland security zealot, I very 

much want to see homeland security issues elevated inside of the 

White House and receive more time and attention from the President. I very much want to see the Department of Homeland Security be more effective and spend less time fighting bureaucratic 

battles. So I actually, while I am a proponent of merging the Homeland Security Council into the National Security Council, I offer 

that recommendation in the spirit of trying to achieve, I think, the 

same objectives as the witnesses here on the panel and many of the 

objectives that Senator Collins mentioned. 

I would like to talk a little bit about why I think organizational 

changes at the White House are necessary and then I would like 

to put out a handful of design principles that I think are worth 

thinking about when considering organizational options. And finally, I would like to talk briefly about how I think a merged Security Council might work. 

Fundamentally, homeland security issues, in my view, are both 

inextricably part of national security issues and are inherently 

interagency and intergovernmental in character, that vertical integration of which Governor Ridge spoke. In our system of government where you have a Cabinet made up of independent department secretaries who each answer directly to the President, I think 

the only way to have a well-functioning homeland security enterprise is to have a White House structure that is very strong and 

that provides overall direction, sets priorities, and resolves interagency disputes in the policy development process. 

To date, I think the Homeland Security Council has struggled to 

be effective in this role for three reasons. First, by establishing a 

separate council and an associated staff to address homeland security issues, the White House under President Bush artificially 


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bifurcated its approach to a wide range of important national security challenges. 

Today, most national security challenges have international and 

domestic components that need to be addressed holistically. For example, preventing and countering nuclear proliferation starts overseas, but has important elements here at home, such as preventing 

movement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the country, 

neutralizing WMD, if possible, and then consequence management 

strategies are going to be needed at home if we are not able to keep 

the worst from happening. 

Effectively combatting terrorism involves not only tracking down 

the terrorists overseas, but also working with State and local law 

enforcement to prevent radicalization of individuals here in the 

United States. Another example is determining how to allocate finite military capabilities, and that requires weighing and prioritizing international and domestic requirements to best manage the 

overall level of risk to the Nation. 

Addressing these kinds of challenges requires an integrated approach, but I think that is difficult to achieve when you have two 

separate organizations working the issues in the White House. In 

a world where it is difficult to define where homeland security ends 

and national security begins, managing today’s globalized challenges using two separate organizations may no longer be the best 

answer. 

Second, as numerous practitioners and commentators have 

noted, the agency to date, sadly, has largely been perceived as the 

NSC’s weak stepbrother. For example, the NSC has more than 200 

staff and the HSC most of the time has had around 35 to 45 people. 

Given the breadth and complexity of the homeland security challenges and the homeland security landscape, this just is not enough 

people to do justice to the issues. 

Moreover, I believe that the perceived second-class status of the 

HSC has made it more difficult to attract the best and brightest 

staff to the organization. While there have absolutely been excellent public servants serving on the HSC, on balance, more of the 

HSC staff come from political backgrounds and have a lesser overall level of professional experience than their NSC counterparts. 

This disparity, I think, has made it more difficult for the HSC staff 

to work effectively with their peers in the interagency. 

From an organizational process, you want to have a structure in 

the White House that is going to provide the best possible advice 

and support to the President, be able to inject that advice into the 

interagency process, and oversee its implementation. It is not clear 

in my view to date that the HSC has had the personnel to really 

fulfill this mandate. 

Third and finally, I think the HSC as a separate organization so 

far has struggled to lead the interagency process in developing core 

strategy and guidance on homeland security issues and in overseeing the implementation of those policies once they are developed. I think a part of this is because of the small staff and some 

of the issues that Governor Ridge mentioned, but I think it is also 

associated with the Bush Administration’s preference for the lead 

agency approach, which has the NSC and HSC staffs playing more 

of a coordination role than a policy development role. 


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In my view, as security challenges become more complex and 

interrelated, the lead agency model is likely to prove inadequate to 

many of the security tasks we have ahead. Current and future security challenges require a strong White House structure to develop integrated strategies and oversee their implementation. I also 

believe a more effective White House structure would enable DHS, 

a relatively new and fragile bureaucracy, to spend less time fighting bureaucratic battles and more time maturing as an organization, which I think is very important. 

When you think about how you might reorganize or restructure 

in the White House, really, it is results, not wiring diagrams, that 

are what matter. With that in mind, I would like to put forward 

four principles that I think could guide thinking about how to organize at the White House level. 

First, the White House structure should enable homeland security issues to be considered substantively as part of the larger national security domain. 

Second, the White House structure should facilitate consideration 

of homeland security issues as equally important to traditional national security issues. As a former DHS official said in a New York 

Times article about the potential for a merger, you want your 

issues considered. You do not want to be off in some second bucket, 

which is, I think, how a lot of people have perceived it so far. 

Third, the White House structure should enable the staff organization to serve as an honest broker in the interagency process, and 

if necessary, to be strong enough to enforce implementation of presidential decisions and priorities on reluctant Cabinet actors, if that 

is necessary. 

Fourth and finally, the White House structure should facilitate 

recruitment and retention of the best possible staff with the full 

range of expertise and experience that is needed across the spectrum of the homeland security disciplines. 

In my view, the best way to achieve an organization that is consistent with these design principles is to merge the HSC into the 

NSC. In reports we have published at CSIS, we offered a structure 

that would include two, and only two, Deputy National Security 

Advisors under the National Security Advisor: A Deputy for Domestic Affairs and a Deputy for International Affairs. Reflecting 

the view that most national security challenges have international 

and domestic components, many of the staff in the merged council 

would report to both of these deputies. 

And to try to address a concern Senator Collins raised, she is absolutely correct that the individuals in the White House that are 

going to be managing the homeland security issues have to have 

the stature to be able to interact effectively and adjudicate, frankly, 

disputes between Cabinet secretaries. To do that, these two deputies would have to have very significant stature and experience to 

be able to operate effectively at that level. 

But I believe under this kind of arrangement, you would no 

longer have a situation where homeland securities are organizationally stovepiped, and I think they would be more likely to receive the kind of serious attention that traditional security matters 

receive in the NSC. 


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The merged Security Council that we put forward would be empowered to lead the interagency in formulating homeland security 

policy and to oversee its implementation on behalf of the President. 

In reading last Sunday’s article in the Washington Post, it seems 

evident to me that President Obama and General James Jones, the 

new National Security Advisor, are clearly envisioning a more robust structure in the White House to address national security 

issues. 

While many scholars and organizations have recommended a 

merger of the two councils, there certainly are arguments against 

a merger, and we have heard some of them this morning. I think 

the two most prevalent arguments against a merger are that, one, 

the National Security Advisor (NSA) already has too many issues 

on his or her plate, and two, the traditional National Security 

Council staff does not have the expertise in homeland security 

issues to do justice to those issues, and under a merger you then 

might actually run the risk of having the issues be handled less 

skillfully than they are today. 

It is true that the NSA already has one of the most grueling jobs 

in Washington, bearing responsibility for a vast array of issues. 

Merging the two councils would, I believe, add to this burden. But 

in my view, the benefits of addressing security challenges holistically and elevating homeland security issues to be on an equal 

footing with traditional national security issues outweighs the concerns about the span of control. 

In a merged council, the National Security Advisor ultimately 

would be the single person responsible and accountable to the 

President for the full range of challenges. Again, to try to ease the 

burden of that span of control, we offer two deputies who would essentially manage the two portfolios, homeland and national security, on a day-to-day basis. In the event of a crisis, the President 

would have to be able to turn to either one of those deputies to do 

day-to-day crisis management. Both deputies would have to have 

a very close relationship with the National Security Advisor for 

that to work effectively. 

The second major argument against merging the two councils is 

that the traditional NSC staff does not have the appropriate expertise or experience. I think the best way to address this concern is 

to be straightforward. Do not try and staff the homeland security 

issues with people with traditional national security backgrounds. 

Instead, populate the merged council staff with sufficient numbers 

of personnel with backgrounds in the full range of disciplines, from 

law enforcement and intelligence to critical infrastructure to emergency preparedness and response, and ensure that these individuals understand and are sensitive to the concerns of State and 

local governments. 

I see that I have run over time, so I just want to end and say, 

again, I think that how you manage these issues out of the White 

House is one of the most important determinants of ensuring we 

approach these challenges from a whole of government perspective, 

and I think the best way to do that is to merge the two councils. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. That was clear and 

direct, and different from what we heard from our first two witVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:33 Oct 20, 2010 Jkt 049490 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\49490.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Locher appears in the Appendix on page 41. 

nesses. I will look forward to their response to some of the things 

that you had to say. I appreciate it very much. 

Our final witness is James Locher. He has had quite an extraordinary record and resume of service. Most significant to us here is 

that he served as a staff member of the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, and particularly during the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, which was very important. He has also been Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, both under President Clinton and under the first President 

Bush. 

He comes to us now as Executive Director of the Project on National Security Reform, which was a congressionally organized and 

supported entity that recently culminated 2 years of study with an 

extensive report and implementation plan which was presented to 

the Administration. Incidentally, and for what it is worth, among 

the bipartisan guiding coalition for the Project on National Security 

Reform were General Jim Jones, now the National Security Advisor, and Admiral Denny Blair, now the Director of National Intelligence. 

Mr. Locher, thank you for your work, and for being here. Please 

proceed with your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JAMES R. LOCHER III,1 EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM 

Mr. LOCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Committee. I am delighted to be here to talk to you about the organization for national security and homeland security in the White 

House and across the Federal Government. 

Most fundamentally, I believe that drawing a bright line between 

national security and homeland security, as current arrangements 

do, is a mistake. The Nation would be better served by merging the 

National Security Council and Homeland Security Council into a 

single council, but with safeguards to ensure that homeland security issues are not lost in a unified system. 

This hearing addresses a key issue: How should the highest level 

of the U.S. Government be organized to protect the Nation’s security? It is important, however, Mr. Chairman, to put this specific 

issue into a much larger context. The overall national security system, including its national security and homeland security components, is broken. About the seriousness of our organizational problems, the Project on National Security Reform’s guiding coalition, 

made up of 22 distinguished Americans, stated in its November report, ‘‘We affirm unanimously that the national security of the 

United States of America is fundamentally at risk.’’ 

The basic problem is the misalignment of the national security 

system with 21st Century challenges. Today’s threats require a 

tight integration of departmental expertise and capabilities. We 

need highly effective teams that stretch horizontally across departmental boundaries. Our government, however, Mr. Chairman, is 

dominated by rigid, bureaucratic, competitive, vertically-oriented 

departments and agencies. In sum, we have horizontal problems 

and a vertical government. 


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This misalignment results from a gross imbalance. We have powerful departments and agencies, while our integrating mechanisms, 

the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council, and 

their staffs are weak. Missing are robust mechanisms capable of 

producing tight, effective integration. This imbalance was a design 

flaw of the National Security Act of 1947 and this flaw was carried 

forward into the Homeland Security Council, which was modeled 

on the 60-year-old National Security Council. 

In recent years, Mr. Chairman, there has been compelling evidence of the inadequacy of current arrangements: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, troubled stability operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, and the poor response to Hurricane Katrina. 

These setbacks are not coincidental. They are evidence of our organizational dysfunction. Bold transformation of the national security 

system must happen. Otherwise, we will suffer repeated setbacks, 

wasted resources, and declining American power and influence. 

Among the early reform topics to be addressed is the issue of this 

hearing, how to organize our integrating mechanisms at the top of 

government. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001, we bifurcated national security into two major components, 

what we called national security and homeland security. This bifurcation served the important function of jump-starting our attention 

to many long-neglected tasks in protecting the American homeland. 

Although additional improvements are needed, we have succeeded 

in elevating these tasks to an appropriate level of attention. 

The basic question now becomes, does this bifurcation at the very 

top of government serve our needs in handling the increasingly 

complex and rapidly changing security environment of the 21st 

Century? The answer is no. Dividing our security components at 

the water’s edge is artificial and creates an organizational boundary, a barrier, gaps and seams that weaken our overall security 

posture. 

The security challenges that the United States faces, Mr. Chairman, must be viewed in the context of one global system. National 

security and homeland security are subsystems of the larger global 

system. But the overarching organizing principle for the U.S. national security system must be the global system. We must assess 

this system as a whole and understand it in the global security environment. Decisions on our policy, strategy, planning, development 

of capabilities, and execution will maximize our security when they 

are taken in an integrated, systemwide context, not when they are 

artificially subdivided. Moreover, by having separate National Security and Homeland Security Councils, we force the President to 

integrate across this divide. He does not have the time or capacity 

to do so. 

This past week, General Jim Jones, President Obama’s National 

Security Advisor, discussed the major changes that the President 

and he intend to make at the top of the national security system. 

In an interview in the Washington Post this past Sunday and a 

speech on the same day in Munich, General Jones stated that the 

National Security Council would expand its membership and have 

increased authority to set strategy across a wide spectrum of international and domestic issues. In essence, many, if not all of the 

functions of the Homeland Security Council may be subsumed into 


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the National Security Council. At the same time, as has been mentioned, General Jones has asked John Brennan to do a 60-day review to ensure homeland security issues will receive appropriate 

attention in a merged council. 

The Project on National Security Reform agrees fully with the 

changes that General Jones outlined. Our own recommendations 

parallel the direction that President Obama and General Jones 

have set. This convergence is not surprising. As the Chairman 

mentioned, General Jones served on the Project on National Security Reform’s guiding coalition, as did other Obama appointees, Admiral Denny Blair, Jim Steinberg, and Michele Flournoy. 

Merging the HSC and NSC is a critical step towards building a 

more coherent and unified approach to national security in the 

broadest sense of the term. Though I believe that a merger is a necessity, it must be undertaken with safeguards that will ensure 

homeland security issues remain at the forefront of national security affairs. Merging the NSC and HSC must be done in a way that 

ensures that homeland security issues receive the focus and resources they deserve. 

Mr. Chairman, as the Committee approaches this issue, it has 

two hats to wear. The first hat is as the Senate’s overseer of homeland security functions. The second hat, focused on government affairs, in my view, ranks more important in examining this issue. 

To make a wise decision on this organizational question, we must 

take a whole-of-government perspective focused on the global system. Doing so, in my view, reveals the value of the new direction 

that the Obama Administration intends to pursue. 

This Committee, Mr. Chairman, worked hard to create the Department of Homeland Security and to guarantee in law a functioning Homeland Security Council. The idea of merging the HSC 

and the NSC is intended to preserve and enhance the key roles of 

both councils through integration, not subordination. And since the 

details of the integration are still under study by the new Administration, I trust that this Committee’s views can help shape the 

final arrangements. I believe that you should view integration as 

an opportunity for preserving high-level focus on homeland security 

issues, not as a threat to that vital function. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you again for 

inviting me to speak on this important subject and I look forward 

to answering any questions you may have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Locher. Thanks 

for the case that you put before us. 

Incidentally, Mr. Brennan has made very clear that he wants to 

hear the Committee’s opinions on this question of whether to 

merge. As I said at the outset, ultimately, the basic structure 

should be in law. Presidents will come and go who will change 

pieces of it, but the basic judgment is there. 

Secretary Ridge and Ms. Townsend, Ms. Wormuth and Mr. 

Locher put together strong arguments before this Committee now 

for merging the two councils. You obviously have different points 

of view and I want to give you a chance to respond now. 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, first of all, I want to thank my colleagues on 

the panel. I think it has been a very thoughtful and a very 

thought-provoking discussion—— 


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Chairman LIEBERMAN. It has. 

Mr. RIDGE [continuing]. And I appreciate that. It just seemed to 

me that running through the testimony of my colleagues who disagree with this opinion, they talk about staffing, which I do not 

think has as much to do with integration as it does with adequate 

resources. They talk about the need to elevate the visibility and the 

stature of the Homeland Security Council. It is tough for me to conclude that you elevate the stature by subsuming it into a large organization that is dominated by the military. 

They do talk very specifically, and I share the point of view with 

them that it ought to be integrated into the global perspective, but 

I would say to them, respectfully, that the National Security Council is uniquely and almost exclusively global. The Homeland Security Council, there is redundancy there. In part the focus is global, 

but in equal part or even larger measure, it is national, State, 

local, and private sector. 

Whether it is immigration or whether it is bioterrorism, these 

issues being subsumed into a completely different structure where 

the voice of the Homeland Security Council mission is part of, 

again, this larger, more complex entity, I just think reduces and diminishes, does not elevate. I think the one cause we all believe in, 

we need to elevate it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. RIDGE. But subsuming it, I do not think gets us where we 

all want to be. 

And then the other concern I might have is just that Homeland 

Security is not a mature agency. The Department is not mature 

yet. The traditional NSC, DOD, and the Department of State are. 

National security is more external. Homeland security is more internal. For national security, there is overlap within HSC, but foreign affairs and foreign engagement are the primary responsibility 

of the NSC, and only secondarily for the Homeland Security Council though in important ways. 

Two quick examples, and then I will turn to my colleagues. There 

was a notion that you think about in terms of nuclear proliferation. 

Is there a potential role for Homeland Security there? Yes, but is 

it the same level, status, focus, resources, and outreach as the National Security Council? Absolutely not. It becomes a role for the 

Homeland Security Council in terms of prevention or in terms of 

response and recovery if the NSC does not do its job with regard 

to proliferation. 

In terms of intelligence sharing, the Homeland Security Council 

and the Homeland Security Department are consumers of information. It does not really generate it. The great role is to have global 

information being shared with the Department and with the State 

and locals. There is a joint global interest there, but it is primarily 

in the NSC’s sphere, not in the HSC’s sphere. 

So at the end of the day, I think suggesting everything that the 

Homeland Security Council or the Department of Homeland Security does you can tie into the global dimension, I think is an inadequate description of the overall responsibilities that it has, and I 

apologize for the lengthy answer. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Not at all. Ms. Townsend. 


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Ms. TOWNSEND. Senator, both of my colleagues make the argument that there should not be the bifurcation that currently exists, 

that a bright line would be a mistake. I would say to you that as 

a sort of theoretical matter, I agree with that. 

There was not a bifurcation when I was there as Governor Ridge 

experienced as Secretary and after he departed the Department. I 

had responsibilities overseas, as well, as related both to counterterrorism and homeland security because, of course, to the extent any 

individual Nation takes seriously their own homeland security and 

invests in their homeland security, it reduces the threat to us. And 

so I worked across geographic boundaries. It was not limited. I 

spent a tremendous amount of my time on the homeland issues. 

But the fact that we have a staff that is a Homeland Security 

Council that focuses exclusively on homeland missions is not a bifurcation that causes a problem. In fact, it enhances the capability. 

The HSC was not treated, in the 41⁄2 years I was at the White 

House, as a second-class citizen or a stepchild. I sat in many NSC 

meetings, for example, in the counterterrorism area, related to 

Pakistan and the tribal areas because that posed a threat to the 

United States. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Who would decide that, when you would 

attend a NSC meeting? 

Ms. TOWNSEND. It was a very collaborative relationship with the 

National Security Advisor. Obviously, I worked both with Secretary 

of State Condoleezza Rice, when she was the National Security Advisor, and with Steve Hadley when he was. It was also true if it 

was a proliferation issue. I sat in on those meetings. Or, as you can 

imagine, when you are discussing immigration policy or visa waiver, issues that have a very serious homeland security impact, if 

this was a homeland security meeting, Steve Hadley was invited 

and members of his staff, so we worked as an integrated whole. 

What was important was, as to Governor Ridge’s point, homeland 

security issues need an advocate in the White House who can work 

across and ensure the very integration that my colleagues suggest. 

Let me make one last point, because in fairness, it is the one 

that I cannot just let go. There have been suggestions by my colleagues that there is more staff needed. I think that is right. I 

think the issues are serious and there are many, and so I do agree 

there needs to be more staff. But to suggest that the Homeland Security Council staff at the White House was political or inexperienced is unfair and inaccurate. In fact, these brave public servants 

who worked many long hours to protect the American people came 

from not only the various departments and agencies across the 

Federal Government, they came from academia and from Capitol 

Hill, some of whom have returned here, so I presume that my colleagues in Congress would not think them inexperienced. And so 

in fairness to those people, they worked very hard and we recruited 

them and retained them because of their experience. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much. 

I want to ask a quick question to Ms. Wormuth. In your testimony, you say that HSC has been viewed often as NSC’s weak 

stepchild, and part of that was the lack of comparable funding resources for the Homeland Security Council as compared to the National Security Council. Am I correct to assume, however, from 


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your testimony, that you think the problem was more than that? 

In other words, let us assume that we could equalize the resources, 

or at least greatly increase the resources, staff, etc., that the Homeland Security Council had, that would not do the job because even 

then, a merger would be necessary? 

Ms. WORMUTH. Well, Senator Lieberman, for me, the primary argument in favor of the merger as opposed to a reform of the HSC, 

as Governor Ridge has argued—I think there is a lot of value there. 

I think many of the issues that have been challenges for the HSC 

could be addressed through reforms in terms of getting at some of 

the staff issues. But to me, the most important issue is the integration issue that Mr. Locher and I talked about. So I think that is 

the strongest argument, trying to change how we address the 

issues conceptually. 

That said, to your specific question, you could fix the funding 

issues, I think, and you could clearly fix the number of staff that 

have been on the homeland security side without doing a merger. 

I think the issue really in part is a somewhat intangible one. Because the HSC, whether fairly or unfairly, was perceived as being 

weaker than the NSC, it simply made it more difficult for the staff 

to get the job done and that is what I am getting at. 

I would argue that by merging the two organizations into one, 

and the NSC having already a long-established history with a lot 

of stature, it is easier to recruit people to that organization because 

there are literally civil servants banging down the door to have the 

opportunity to go to the NSC. So that is a slightly intangible thing. 

And just to be clear, I certainly do not, and I tried to be clear 

on this in my statement, I do not want to impugn in any way the 

quality of the people on the homeland security staff. They were excellent public servants. The experience issue, I think, is relative to 

the NSC staff, but I am by no means saying that you had inappropriately qualified or inappropriately politicized staff. I just want to 

be clear on that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. I appreciate that you said that. 

I am going to yield now to Senator Pryor. I want to express my 

regrets to the Members of the Committee because I have really 

been engaged in your testimony. 

Senator Collins and I, as you may have heard, are not only involved in matters of homeland security, we are also involved in 

matters of economic security these days. She is out of here for that 

reason. I have been asked to go join her. I hope I can return. But 

Senator Pryor, enjoy the chair. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. If you are ready to adjourn, just send 

somebody back to make sure that we do not want to come back out. 

Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR [presiding]. I would be glad to. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. Thank you for your leadership on this and all of the 

Committee pending issues. 

Let me, if I may, start with Mr. Locher. Your organization is the 

Project on National Security Reform, and the first question for you 


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is how important is it to you in your effort to reform national security to have this merger? How important is that? 

Mr. LOCHER. We think it is one of the very fundamental reforms 

that needs to be undertaken. 

Senator PRYOR. And why? 

Mr. LOCHER. Well, in our view, as I mentioned in my statement, 

the world is incredibly complex and it is moving very rapidly, and 

this bifurcation into two components at the very top of our government is not serving us well now and will serve us less well in the 

future. We think that in the National Security Council, we need 

that expertise on homeland security and it needs to be improved 

over what it is today. But we want it in one system where we can 

look at the global security environment instead of having two separate organizations that are doing that. 

When you have two separate organizations, you have two separate strategies, you have two separate sets of policies, you have different processes, and we have the view that the integration at the 

highest level will serve us well. There will be much more integration that is required at lower levels where we can bring departments and agencies together in a true teaming fashion to address 

the Nation’s problems. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask again on your vision and what your 

group is working on, how would you like to see it structured? 

Would you like to see the homeland security component of that to 

be a separate subset of the National Security Council, where they 

would always be a little bit distinct and always focused on the 

homeland issue of this? Tell me how you guys would structure it 

if you could. 

Mr. LOCHER. The first thing I should say is that if you look at 

our current approach to national security, the National Security 

Council, it really has the World War II concept of national security. 

It is still focused on defense, diplomacy, and intelligence. That is 

the membership. The Secretary of Energy has been added recently 

by the Congress. 

We know in today’s world that national security is much broader 

than that. We have all of the economic issues that need to be addressed. There are lots of law enforcement and legal issues that 

need to be part of it. There are the environmental issues and the 

energy issues that need to be addressed. 

And so in our project, as we looked at this broadening scope of 

national security, we have proposed that there be one council at 

the top to serve the President. It would not have a specified membership, rather the President would pull to that council table the 

expertise that he or she needed for any particular issue. So it 

would be a much more flexible arrangement. It would be driven 

issue by issue. If the meeting gets too large and it becomes a formal arrangement as to who is going to attend, it does not serve the 

President’s needs and it wastes lots of time of our senior busy officials at the top of our government. 

So we have in mind, and this is something that General Jones 

in his interview in the Washington Post and in his speech at Munich laid out in terms of his view as to how the National Security 

Council would be structured in the Obama Administration, a much 

larger membership because we know that we need more expertise 


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brought in on national security issues, but that the membership 

would be selected, the attendees would be based upon an issue-byissue basis. 

Senator PRYOR. How do you protect against the concern that if 

you do the merger, that the homeland security focus will be swallowed up by the national security focus? 

Mr. LOCHER. Well, obviously, that is a legitimate concern. I 

think, in my view, that we can get the benefits of a merged system 

while ensuring that the homeland security issues receive appropriate attention, and I think the step that General Jones has taken 

by asking Mr. Brennan to do this 60-day review is a good indication that he understands that there are benefits to be achieved by 

merging the two councils, but he wants to make certain that we 

are going to have the safeguards to make certain that homeland security issues are at the forefront. 

In my view, I have lots of confidence in General Jones. He is 

quite a capable leader and manager and I think that he would be 

a forceful advocate on homeland security issues. I think he is very 

determined to ensure that they have a proper place in a merged 

council. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes. I think a lot of us have a lot of confidence 

in General Jones. One of the things that I am sure we are thinking 

about is the next guy, whoever that may be, and just to make sure 

they get it. 

Let me, if I can, change to Secretary Ridge. Again, Mr. Secretary, 

thank you for your public service. We appreciate your time very 

much. 

When I look at these two organizations, you have the Homeland 

Security Council and the National Security Council. The names 

sound the same because they both contain the words ‘‘security 

council.’’ In your view, are they fundamentally different in what 

they do and should be doing, and can you put them together in a 

way where the two missions that exist right now can be compatible 

under one roof? 

Mr. RIDGE. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I think there 

are fundamental differences between their missions. There is no 

doubt in my mind that homeland security has, to Mr. Locher’s 

point and Ms. Wormuth’s point, a global and an international component, and it is a significant part, but it is not the exclusive domain of homeland security, whereas the National Security Council, 

given the perils of the world today in the 21st Century, you spin 

the globe and you say, General Jones is going to deal with all that 

with just 200 people? 

In a culture, let us face it, that is dominated by primarily one 

large department, the Department of Defense, a culture that historically rarely is engaged within the domestic front—I mean, there 

was some logistic support in Hurricane Katrina, but for a lot of 

legal reasons, we do not have the DOD doing some of the work that 

DHS would do, there is a whole range of legal issues like posse 

comitatus—so you say to yourself, the missions are fundamentally 

different. 

The constituency they seek to serve—obviously, they both serve 

300 million Americans, but how they effect their mission is quite 

different. A successful National Security Council is engaged in 


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countries and citizens of other worlds and a successful Homeland 

Security Council is engaged primarily with citizens of the United 

States. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me interrupt you right there, not to knock 

you off track but just for clarification. In your view, do both right 

now have the same and equal access to the President? 

Mr. RIDGE. I cannot speak for the situation now, but my colleague, I think, had a very unique perspective when she indicated 

that as the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, a 

great deal of her time was on counterterrorism. A great deal of her 

time was on the global side, the international side. But she would 

put another hat on and go to another meeting and deal with domestic concerns within the Department of Homeland Security—this 

is an organization and a Cabinet agency that is still maturing, still 

growing, still learning, and still needs to integrate. There are still 

significant turf battles not only within the Department, within the 

horizontal framework within which it has to operate. 

And I say to myself, will a Deputy Secretary of the National Security Council be bringing together two or three Cabinet members 

and say, this is the way it is going to be? I do not think so. It is 

not as if General Jones does not have enough on his plate. 

And I just think, again, you subsume it into a much larger organization with a different culture, with an exterior focus rather than 

an interior focus, and I think you have not elevated it. I think you 

have created some problems in terms of organization and in terms 

of outreach to the State and locals. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask the rest of the panel, if I can, to comment on what Secretary Ridge said about the mission being fundamentally different. Would any of you like to comment? 

Ms. WORMUTH. I think there are certainly differences and unique 

aspects to homeland security, and particularly in its vertical quality, that is a characteristic, I think, of the mission that you have 

not seen to date as much on the national security side. I absolutely 

agree with the recommendation that Governor Ridge made in his 

statement that whatever the structure is in the White House, you 

need to have a very strong core of State and local understanding 

to be able to address that part of the homeland security challenge. 

However, I think the national security side is evolving to a certain degree to move beyond its traditional overseas focus, and you 

see this more and more, for example, on the evolution of the regional combatant commands in the military that are starting to 

have different structures inside of them to deal more effectively 

with the interagency activity and to deal more effectively with the 

private sector. You are really starting to see, I think, that evolution, and in my mind, that again is a global evolution, which is 

where we need to go. 

So I think in a way, the homeland side is already farther along, 

but I think the national security side is moving in that direction, 

as well, and again, I tend to see the issues as part of a single system and I just think trying to address it structurally as a single 

system is the best way to go. 

Mr. LOCHER. Senator, if I might, I would like to add one point. 

Secretary Ridge was talking about how we only have 200 people in 

the National Security Council staff. If you think about the headVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:33 Oct 20, 2010 Jkt 049490 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\49490.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

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quarters of our national security system, we have two components 

now, the National Security Council staff and the Homeland Security Council staff. They are incredibly small. We have a four million-person national security system and we have a headquarters 

that is that small and it has no headquarters powers. It is completely advisory. Not only does it have a small staff, it has an incredibly small budget. I know the budget for the National Security 

Council is like $8.6 million for all of the things that they have to 

do. 

One of the things that General Jones said in his interview that 

was in the Washington Post is he talked about a much more robust 

role for the National Security Advisor, essentially going from a National Security Advisor to a National Security Manager, where, 

right next to the President, we have much more authority to make 

a system that is decisive, a system that is fast, that ensures that 

we have integrated activity, and that we have lots of collaboration. 

And so when we think of this one issue that we are discussing 

today, it needs to be put in the larger context of some of the other 

changes that President Obama and General Jones have in mind. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Senator, if I might make—— 

Senator PRYOR. Yes, ma’am? 

Ms. TOWNSEND [continuing]. Two quick points: You asked Secretary Ridge about equal access with the National Security Advisor. I was the longest-serving Homeland Security Advisor to date 

and I can tell you, I was in the President’s daily briefing in the 

morning. I had the complete access that Steve Hadley or Condi 

Rice had. I never had a problem in terms of my immediate access 

to the President, particularly in a crisis where I needed to advise 

him. And so it was not a question of, at least from my perspective, 

having a disparity in terms of accessibility to the President or into 

information. 

One example I would use, Governor Ridge talked about the difference of focus on issues. Probably one of the things I spent a tremendous amount of time on that the National Security Council just 

did not have the staff or the width to do was the strategy to deal 

with pandemic influenza. It meant dealing with State and local 

public health officials and first responders. It meant dealing with 

doctors and CDC, a variety of agencies that the National Security 

Council did not ordinarily deal with, in addition to the traditional, 

the National Guard and the active duty military, making sure people had the response capability, and that it was a fully integrated 

plan. By the way, it also meant dealing with the World Health Organization and health organizations and governments around the 

world. 

I use that as an example, but I think it is important to understand it is just one of those sorts of issues that the Homeland Security Council brought to bear its experience in planning for a bioterrorism event and other sorts of events, but was able to pull together a strategy that worked seamlessly with the National Security Council and the interagency. 

Senator PRYOR. Great. Ms. Wormuth, let me ask you a question. 

I think you mentioned in your statement that the current structure 


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has impaired preparedness efforts. Could you elaborate on that and 

tell us how you think it has impaired preparedness? 

Ms. WORMUTH. Well, I think I was citing as an example the challenges in trying to oversee the implementation of policy and I specifically called out the implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) on national preparedness. I think it 

speaks to the challenges of the smaller staff, the challenges of the 

perception of the relative strength or weakness of the organization. 

But HSPD–8 was put out quite early in the history of the Administration and called for development of a vision on national preparedness and the development of an overall system to assess preparedness in the United States and that process of putting all of those 

pieces in place has been very slow. I would also say, in the same 

vein, I think it has taken quite a bit of time for the interagency 

to try and develop the integrated planning system to try and help 

us think through how we will address the various scenarios. 

This is a case where, again, it speaks to the need to elevate within the White House the treatment of these issues because I think 

we have made progress, but that progress has been slower than 

most Americans would like to see, and part of it is because of the 

various challenges that the HSC has faced that we have talked 

about this morning. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me go ahead and alert the Chairman’s staff 

that this is going to be my last question, so if you want to ask the 

Chairman and Ranking Member if they want to return. Otherwise, 

I am sure we will leave the record open for a few days to ask questions in writing. 

Let me change gears a little bit. We all know that President 

Obama and his national security team are looking at whether the 

Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council 

should be merged or restructured in some ways. Have any of you 

been involved in that White House review that they are doing? 

Mr. RIDGE. No. 

Mr. LOCHER. No. 

[All shaking heads from side to side.] 

Senator PRYOR. Does anyone know what the time frame is for 

them to make a decision? Have they laid out any sort of time 

frame? 

Mr. LOCHER. None. 

Senator PRYOR. This question may be for you, Mr. Locher, you 

may know more about this than anyone. As it stands today with 

the Obama Administration, and I know we are very early in this 

Administration, 3 or 4 weeks, who is the primary advocate in the 

Obama Administration today for homeland security issues in the 

White House? Is it the Department of Homeland Security or is it 

the National Security Advisor? How is that working today? I know 

it will change because they are still filling out their slots there. 

Mr. LOCHER. I really do not have a lot of insight, but I think that 

General Jones sees himself, given the approach that they are currently taking, as having this as part of his portfolio. He has John 

Brennan, who is more designated to have this responsibility, but 

those details have not been made public. I really cannot say exactly 

who has that responsibility. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. 


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Mr. RIDGE. We are coming to the conclusion of this hearing. It 

has been very helpful, and hopefully it has been a provocative 

enough discussion that the staff and the Members will get some insight that they did not have before. 

But I would just like again to put my oar in the water one more 

time in opposition to the merger. Homeland security is a national 

mission. It has a national mission that has international dimensions, no question about it. But in order for it to achieve its national mission with these international dimensions, you need an 

advocate and a staff and a capacity in the White House, personified 

by an Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, in order 

to accomplish its national mission to integrate the entire country, 

and that means horizontally, across Federal agencies, bureaus, and 

the like, and vertically, State, local, private sector, academic institutions, and nonprofit organizations. 

That horizontal and vertical integration, I am just very concerned, gets absolutely subsumed if it is put in an agency or a unit, 

National Security Council, that has primarily an international mission with some national implications, a fundamental difference in 

the mission, outreach, and constituency. 

Senator PRYOR. Well, I thank you all for being here and thank 

you for your comments and your insights and your views on whether this merger should take place or not. 

Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins will not be able to return. They have asked me to let the Committee and the panel 

know that we are going to keep the record open for 15 days. Be 

prepared to receive some written questions. There are a few senators, I know, who were trying to get here that could not attend 

today. 

Again, we want to thank you for your time and your focus on this 

issue and thank you for your public service. We appreciate all that 

you do. 

With that, we will adjourn the hearing, and thank you again. 

[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 


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