IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

May 12, 2015 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. SUSAN GAIL STEPHENS

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Coffee County

No. 35,064F Vanessa Jackson, Judge

No. M2014-01270-CCA-R9-CD – Filed July 7, 2015

In this interlocutory appeal, Susan Gail Stephens (“the Defendant”) challenges the 

prosecutor‟s denial of her application for pretrial diversion. She asks this court to remand 

the case to the prosecutor with instructions that the Defendant be granted pretrial 

diversion. She also asks us to instruct the prosecutor to grant pretrial diversion nunc pro 

tunc to the Defendant‟s 2012 update to her application for pretrial diversion. Upon 

review, we find that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the denial of 

pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand the 

case to the trial court with instructions that the Defendant be granted pretrial diversion

upon the terms and conditions of the diversion to be established by the trial court. 

However, we decline to instruct that pretrial diversion be granted nunc pro tunc to 2012.

Tenn. R. App. P. 9 Interlocutory Appeal; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed 

and Case Remanded

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JAMES 

CURWOOD WITT, JR., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.

Edward M. Yarbrough and J. Alex Little, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Susan 

Gail Stephens.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy Wilber, Senior Counsel;

Craig Northcott, District Attorney General; and Jason M. Ponder, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
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OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background

This is the third time this case has been appealed to this court from a denial of 

pretrial diversion. In the first appeal, we summarized the facts as follows:

The record in this case contains two recitations of the facts. In her 

pretrial diversion application, the Defendant recounted the facts as follows:

On February 24, 2006, I was with [the victim] and 

other teenagers in my car in the Eaves‟ driveway and they had 

alcoholic beverages. They appeared to be intoxicated. The 

next night, Saturday, February 25, 2006, I was at the home of 

Chris and Kelly Eaves when the teenagers were again present 

and were drinking. I drank some beer and probably this is 

what caused me to lose my normal inhibitions and led to what 

happened later.

My memory of the exact events is hazy. However, I 

know that I became physically involved with [the victim] and 

we had intercourse. I am very sorry for what I did. This 

event has had a devastating effect on me and my family. I 

immediately went to seek treatment with a counselor. I did 

this even before I got a call from the investigator. The 

therapist is helping me understand why this happened and is 

helping me to prevent anything like this from happening in 

the future.

The State compiled a more detailed account of the relevant events in 

its memorandum denying pretrial diversion. According to the State, the 

circumstances of the offense are as follows:

Officers with the Tullahoma Police Department began 

receiving information and complaints about the Defendant 

and her friend (codefendant Kelley Renee Eaves) in late 2005 

and early 2006. The complaints were in reference to the 

Defendant and Eaves hosting parties for high school students 

in the Eaves‟ home at 421 Albermarle Drive in Tullahoma.

Several parents and students reported that defendants Eaves 

and Stephens allowed numerous boys into the home to 

consume alcohol and smoke cigarettes. Also, the defendants 
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would consume alcohol, dance and act inappropriately with 

the boys. Complaints also came in that the women would 

drive around town in the Defendant‟s vehicle with their 

daughters and act inappropriately with the high school boys.

Upon investigation, Officer Joe Brown with the 

Tullahoma Police Department found that the defendants each 

had a 14 year-old daughter that was allowed to date a 17 yearold boy. Apparently the boys were then encouraged to come 

to the Eaves house and invite their friends to join the 

festivities. During these parties, the Defendant and Eaves 

would allow the high school boys to drink beer and smoke 

cigarettes. Although they deny giving beer to the boys, 

witnesses report that it was freely available and further, both 

defendants admit they knew the boys were drinking.

On or about February 18, 2006, during one of these 

“parties,” the Defendant, Susan Stephens began her pursuit of 

the minor victim in this case . . . by kissing and fondling him.

[The victim], a 17 year-old high school student would attend 

the parties and become intoxicated. He and the Defendant 

would speak on the phone, exchange text messages and see 

each other at the parties.

On February 24, 2006, the Defendant again met [the 

victim] at the Eaves home in Tullahoma. Again, [the victim] 

had been drinking and the Defendant made sexual advances 

toward him[.]

It should be pointed out that the [sic] both defendants‟

14 year-old daughters were present during these parties with 

their respective 17 year-old boyfriends. Their boyfriends 

were also allowed to consume alcohol although both 

defendants deny their daughters consumed any themselves.

On February 25, 2006, the Defendant and Eaves 

hosted another “party.” Witnesses report that [the victim] 

along with several other boys were intoxicated both inside 

and outside the residence. During this time, [the victim] and 

the other boys were yelling in the driveway and being loud.

Sometime after this the Defendant and Eaves got into the 

Defendant‟s vehicle, which was parked in the driveway, 
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along with [the victim] and another high school boy . . . .

Defendant was talking to [the victim] because he was drunk 

and about to fight another boy. Reportedly, while this 

conversation was taking place, codefendant Eaves was 

engaged in kissing and petting with the minor . . . in the 

backseat. [The victim] then exited the vehicle followed by 

the Defendant. Later in the evening the victim . . . describes 

the following events:

Everyone went inside. Me and [the 

Defendant] were in the garage. She was 

smoking a cigarette and I was drinking a beer. I 

turned on a Terry Clark song and we were 

dancing. [The Defendant] then pulled me over 

to the couch and said “come here.” She was 

sitting on my lap. [The Defendant] then started 

kissing me and I kissed her back. She fell back 

on the couch and pulled me on top of her. I 

unbuttoned her pants, she unbuttoned my pants. 

She pulled down my pants to my knees and then 

she pulled her pants off. She said, “Do you 

really want to do this?” I said, “It‟s up to you.” 

I said “Do I need to go get a condom?” She 

said “Yes.” I ran out to my truck and got a 

condom. When I returned she jerked me back 

on the couch and asked “Do I need to put it on 

for you?” I said “No, I got it.” Then we started 

making out and then I penetrated her.

The Defendant and the victim were then interrupted by 

the codefendant, Eaves, who laughed and went back into the 

house. As the evening went on, [the victim] was allowed to 

sleep in the Eaves‟ bonus room along with two other boys 

because they were still drunk. The Defendant chose to sleep 

in the bonus room with them. After she mistakenly believed 

everyone was asleep, the Defendant went to the recliner 

where [the victim] was sleeping, unbuttoned his pants, and 

had sex with him. Defendant‟s 14 year-old daughter was also 

in the house as well with her 17 year-old boyfriend.
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State v. Susan Gail Stephens, No. M2008-00998-CCA-R9-CO, 2009 WL 1765774, at *1-

2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2009) (alterations in original). The Defendant was charged 

with two counts of statutory rape and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a 

minor. Id. at *3. The Defendant applied for and was denied pretrial diversion.

In the Defendant‟s first appeal, this court found that the prosecutor failed to 

consider the Defendant‟s amenability to correction. Id. at *5. Consequently, the case 

was remanded to the prosecutor for reconsideration. Id.

After the case was remanded, the Defendant submitted additional information to 

the prosecutor to support her application for pretrial diversion. The additional 

information detailed her work history since the filing of the original application, updated 

the prosecutor about her daughters‟ progress in school, informed the prosecutor that the 

Defendant was going through a divorce, and described how media coverage of the case 

had affected her daily life. Additionally, the Defendant noted that she had not been 

charged with any other crime since the filing of her original application. The Defendant 

also stated, “To say I regret my actions would be a huge understatement. I realize how 

many people I have hurt and changed lives forever. I am hugely remorseful and very 

sorry for all the pain I have caused everyone involved.” The prosecutor again denied 

pretrial diversion. In his written denial, the prosecutor claimed, “[T]he State is under no 

obligation to permit the Defendant to file a new application or to consider any other 

factors than those originally filed and considered by the Circuit Court and Court of 

Criminal Appeals.”

On appeal from this second denial, this court again remanded the case for 

reconsideration. State v. Susan Gail Stephens, No. M2010-01373-CCA-R9-CD, 2012 

WL 340247, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2012). We held that the prosecutor should 

have considered the Defendant‟s updated information because such “surely would have 

reflected upon the likelihood that the Defendant would or would not become a repeat 

offender.” Id. at *5.

Again, the Defendant submitted updated information to support the third 

consideration of her application for pretrial diversion. This information included an 

updated work history, an explanation as to how the Defendant was coping as a single 

mother following her divorce, and details about her daughters‟ success as honors students 

in their respective schools. Additionally, the Defendant gave an account of how her 

charges were affecting her daily life, including the following statement:

I am ashamed of my behavior and will always be. I am greatly 

saddened by how it has affected all those involved, the victim, my family, 

and my friends.
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Since February 2006 I have been a fully law-abiding citizen, with 

not even a traffic ticket. I continue to regret the pain I have caused others 

due to my actions in February 2006.

The prosecutor again denied the Defendant‟s application for pretrial diversion. He

claimed that, although he erroneously stated he was not obligated to do so, he had 

considered the updated information submitted before denying the Defendant‟s application 

the second time. To clarify the record for the instant appeal, the prosecutor explicitly 

stated that he was considering all of the information the Defendant had submitted to 

support her original application.

The prosecutor noted that, aside from the instant offenses, the Defendant had no 

criminal record. Additionally, the prosecutor concluded that the Defendant had a 

favorable social history, including participation in numerous church activities and extracurricular functions with her daughters. The prosecutor noted that the Defendant‟s 

physical and mental health were not relevant to the proceeding. As to the Defendant‟s 

amenability to correction, the prosecutor expressed concern that the Defendant 

“appear[ed] to describe the events in a light most favorable to her own cause,” a practice 

the prosecutor had seen from “countless child sexual offenders.” Additionally, the 

prosecutor noted that, while the Defendant had sought counseling after the charged 

offenses, she stopped counseling shortly after her application for pretrial diversion was 

filed due to “insurance issues.” The prosecutor commented that “the dates certainly raise 

suspicions as to her motives.” Nevertheless, the prosecutor concluded that the Defendant 

was “moderately amenable to correction.” Despite this conclusion, however, the 

prosecutor did not believe the Defendant was a suitable candidate for pretrial diversion 

because “she ha[d] expressed much more remorse over the consequences to herself and 

her family than the effects to the victim, his family, the other children present, or to the 

community.” 

Turning to specific and general deterrence, the prosecutor described the Defendant 

as a “predator” who pursued the victim over the course of several encounters. Looking at 

specific deterrence, the prosecutor again commented he could not determine whether the 

Defendant was remorseful for her actions or for being caught. As to general deterrence, 

the prosecutor cited the television show Desperate Housewives to illustrate a need to 

deter middle-aged defendants from taking advantage of teenage victims. Additionally, 

the prosecutor stated that the community trusted adults to ensure the safety of children. 

The prosecutor concluded that the Defendant‟s actions were a breach of that trust, as 

evidenced by “the flood of communication to [the district attorney general‟s] office from 

members of the general public.” Therefore, granting pretrial diversion would lessen the 

seriousness of the offense and “do nothing to deter others from committing the same or 

similar offenses[.]”
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Finally, the prosecutor concluded that pretrial diversion would not serve the ends 

of justice or the best interests of the public or the Defendant. Instead, the prosecutor 

concluded that granting pretrial diversion would “unquestionably make a mockery of the 

ends of justice while at the same time place the public and more specifically, our 

children, at a higher risk.” 

The Defendant petitioned the trial court for a writ of certiorari. Upon review, the 

trial court found that the prosecutor had considered all the relevant factors and did not 

abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. The Defendant requested and was 

granted permission to file this interlocutory appeal.

Analysis

In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the prosecutor abused his discretion in 

denying pretrial diversion. She asks this court to reverse the trial court‟s order affirming

the denial of pretrial diversion and remand the case with instructions that diversion be 

granted. Additionally, the Defendant asks this court to direct the prosecutor to grant 

pretrial diversion nunc pro tunc to the date of her 2012 application as an equitable 

remedy. We agree that the prosecutor abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion 

and remand the case with instructions that the Defendant be placed on pretrial diversion. 

However, we decline to instruct the prosecutor to grant pretrial diversion nunc pro tunc to 

2012.

The pretrial diversion statute allows a qualified defendant to enter into a 

memorandum of understanding with the State to suspend prosecution for up to two years. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105(a)(1)(A) (2006). A qualified defendant is one who has not 

been previously granted diversion and who does not have a disqualifying prior 

conviction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105(a)(1)(B)(i)(a)-(b) (2006). Additionally, 

the offense for which pretrial diversion was sought cannot be a Class A or B felony, an 

enumerated Class C felony, an enumerated sexual offense,1driving under the influence, 

or vehicular assault. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105(a)(1)(B)(i)(c) (2006). If granted 

pretrial diversion, the defendant is required to observe at least one condition in order to 

successfully complete diversion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105(a)(2) (2006). 

Statutory eligibility for pretrial diversion does not entitle a defendant to diversion. 

State v. McKim, 215 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tenn. 2007) (citing State v. Curry, 988 S.W.2d 

153, 157 (Tenn. 1999)). The decision of whether to grant pretrial diversion lies within 

the prosecutor‟s discretion. State v. Bell, 69 S.W.3d 171, 176 (Tenn. 2002). In deciding 

 

1 Because statutory rape was not an enumerated sexual offense under Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 40-15-105(a)(1)(B)(ii) at the time of the offense, the Defendant was not disqualified from seeking 

pretrial diversion.
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whether to grant pretrial diversion, the prosecutor “should focus on the defendant‟s 

amenability to correction.” Id. Consequently, “[a]ny factors which tend to accurately 

reflect whether a particular defendant will or will not become a repeat offender should be 

considered.” State v. Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tenn. 1983). Such factors 

include the circumstances of the offense, the defendant‟s criminal record, social history, 

physical and mental condition, the need for general and specific deterrence, and the 

likelihood that pretrial diversion will serve the ends of justice and the best interests of 

both the public and the defendant. Id. at 354-55; see also State v. Richardson, 357 

S.W.3d 620, 626 (Tenn. 2012); McKim, 215 S.W.3d at 786-87. However, the 

circumstances of the offense and the need for deterrence “cannot be given controlling

weight unless they are „of such overwhelming significance that they [necessarily] 

outweigh all other factors.‟” McKim, 215 S.W.3d at 787 (emphasis and alterations in 

original) (quoting State v. Washington, 866 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993)). “Absent 

such exceptional circumstances, the prosecutor must consider the defendant‟s amenability 

to correction and the likelihood that the defendant will not commit further crimes.” State 

v. Russell L. Tipton, No. M2006-00260-CCA-R9-CO, 2007 WL 2295610, at *6 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2007).

A prosecutor‟s denial of pretrial diversion must be in writing and enumerate all the 

relevant factors considered as well as the weight accorded to each. Richardson, 357 

S.W.3d at 626. The defendant may appeal the prosecutor‟s decision by petitioning the 

trial court for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 626-27. The district attorney general‟s decision 

is presumed to be correct, Curry, 988 S.W.2d at 158, and the trial court must determine 

whether the prosecutor abused his or her discretion by examining only the evidence 

considered by the prosecutor. Bell, 69 S.W.3d at 177. The trial court may not reweigh 

the evidence but can only look to the district attorney general‟s methodology. State v. 

Yancey, 69 S.W.3d 553, 558-59 (Tenn. 2002). The appellate court‟s review is confined 

to a determination of whether the trial court‟s decision was supported by a preponderance 

of the evidence. Richardson, 357 S.W.3d at 627 (citing Curry, 988 S.W.2d at 158 and

State v. Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Tenn. 1997)). 

“A reviewing court may find that the district attorney general abused his or her 

discretion in one of two ways: either by failing to consider or articulate all the relevant 

factors or considering and relying upon an irrelevant factor, or (2) by making a decision 

that is not supported by substantial evidence.” Richardson, 357 S.W.3d at 627 (citing 

McKim, 215 S.W.3d at 788-89; Bell, 69 S.W.3d at 179; Curry, 988 S.W.2d at 158).

Should the district attorney general fail to consider all the relevant factors or give 

undue consideration to an irrelevant factor, the reviewing court must vacate the district 

attorney general‟s decision and remand the case to allow the district attorney general to 

reconsider and weigh all the relevant factors. Id. However, if the reviewing court 
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determines that the district attorney general properly weighed all the relevant factors and 

did not give undue consideration to any irrelevant factors, but the denial of pretrial 

diversion is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, “the reviewing court may 

order the defendant to be placed on pretrial diversion rather than remand the case to the 

district attorney general.” Id. (citing McKim, 215 S.W.3d at 788 n.3); see also Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-15-105(b)(3) (2006). 

In this case, it is evident that the prosecutor considered and weighed all the 

relevant factors. However, we do not believe the decision to deny pretrial diversion is 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. The prosecutor identified the need for 

deterrence and the ends of justice as factors weighing against granting pretrial diversion. 

Additionally, even though the prosecutor concluded that the Defendant was “moderately 

amenable to correction,” he did not believe this factor weighed in favor of granting

diversion because the Defendant had not expressed sufficient remorse for her actions.

As this court has previously held, the prosecutor may not require the Defendant to 

admit guilt before granting pretrial diversion. See Russell L. Tipton, 2007 WL 2295610, 

at *5 (citing State v. Thompson, 189 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005)). To do 

so constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. Therefore, we conclude that the prosecutor 

abused his discretion when he concluded that the Defendant‟s amenability to correction 

weighed against granting pretrial diversion because she had not demonstrated sufficient 

remorse for her actions. Consequently, the record does not contain substantial evidence 

to deny pretrial diversion on the basis that the Defendant is not amenable to correction. 

Likewise, the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the 

conclusion that the ends of justice and best interests of the Defendant and the public favor 

denying pretrial diversion. In regard to this factor, the prosecutor simply stated, 

“[P]retrial diversion in this case would unquestionably make a mockery of the ends of 

justice while at the same time place the public and more specifically, our children, at a 

higher risk.” The prosecutor does not point to, nor can we find, any evidence in the 

record to support this conclusion. 

The only remaining factor the prosecutor cited as weighing against pretrial 

diversion is the need for specific and general deterrence. As noted above, the 

circumstances of the offense and need for deterrence “cannot be given controlling weight 

unless they are „of such overwhelming significance that they [necessarily] outweigh all 

other factors.‟” McKim, 215 S.W.3d at 787 (emphasis and alterations in original) 

(quoting Washington, 866 S.W.2d at 951). We do not believe there is substantial 

evidence in the record to show that the need for deterrence in this case is so exceptional 

as to outweigh all other factors to be considered when determining whether the

Defendant should be granted pretrial diversion. This is especially true when the record 

clearly indicates that the Defendant has not been arrested for or charged with any other 
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crime since the instant offenses. Because there is no substantial evidence in the record to 

support the prosecutor‟s decision to deny pretrial diversion, we reverse the order of the 

trial court and remand this case with an instruction that pretrial diversion be granted.

However, we decline to instruct the prosecutor to grant pretrial diversion nunc pro 

tunc to the Defendant‟s 2012 update to her application. A judgment may be ordered nunc 

pro tunc when the judgment is pronounced but not entered. Thomas v. State, 337 S.W.2d 

1, 4 (Tenn. 1960). The nunc pro tunc order allows the order to be entered as of the date 

of its pronouncement. Id. However, our supreme court has stated that,

The general rule is that to justify a nunc pro tunc order there must exist 

some memorandum or notation found among the papers or books of the 

presiding judge, and a nunc pro tunc order will not be valid unless there is 

some such memorandum showing what judgment or order was actually 

made and these facts recited.

Id. 

This is not a case where the Defendant was granted pretrial diversion but, through 

some error, that fact was never recorded. Instead, the prosecutor has consistently denied 

pretrial diversion. Accordingly, a nunc pro tunc order is not appropriate in this case. 

Additionally, although the Defendant asserts that she has been under “court 

supervision” during the pendency of these charges, there is nothing in the record 

indicating that she had been required to comply with any of the conditions listed in 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-15-105(a)(2). Successful completion of pretrial 

diversion requires that the Defendant comply with one or more conditions as agreed upon 

by the parties. Tenn. Code Ann. Section 40-15-105(a)(2) (2006). Because she has not 

been required to comply with any of these restrictions, the Defendant has not yet 

successfully completed pretrial diversion. Therefore, contrary to the Defendant‟s 

assertions, equity does not require granting pretrial diversion nunc pro tunc to 2012.

Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. The 

case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to order the prosecutor to grant 

pretrial diversion under such terms and conditions as are deemed appropriate by the trial 

court. 

_________________________________

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE