SOVIET NAVY

I N T E L L I G E N C E A N D A N A L Y S I S 

DURING THE COLD WAR

 SOVIET NAVY

I N T E L L I GE N C E A N D A N A LY S I S 

DURING THE COLD WAR
This collection of documents, spanning three decades from 

the 1960s to the 1980s, focuses on CIA’s collection and 

analysis of the Soviet Navy. In addition, this collection is a 

continuation of previous releases on the Warsaw Pact forces 

(available at cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/ciaanalysis-warsaw-pact-forces and cia.gov/library/readingroom/

collection/soviet-and-warsaw-pact-military-journals) and 

adds 82 newly released documents ranging from translations of the clandestinely-obtained articles from the Soviet 

military journal, Military Thought, to the high-level National 

Intelligence Estimates. Many of the documents in this 

collection reflect the tensions in the bipolar Cold War 

and specifically focus on the Soviet Navy’s development of 

its naval forces during that timeframe. After World War II, 

U.S. leaders faced a nuclear armed rival and in no time, 

Soviet tanks were in the streets of Budapest, and the first 

Sputnik satellite was launched. Understanding how the 

Soviet Union envisioned the next combat situation required 

in-depth knowledge of both their high-level theory of 

warfare and probable tactical behavior. The collection will 

provide new insight into the Agency’s analysis of the evolving 

Soviet Navy and its military posture during the Cold War. 

All statements of facts, opinion, or analysis expressed in this booklet are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or 

views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other U.S. Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed 

as asserting or implying U.S. Government endorsement of an article’s statements or interpretations.
Partners

HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

CIA’s Information Management Services of the Agency Data Office is responsible 

for executing the Agency’s Historical Review Program (HRP). This program seeks to 

identify and declassify collections of documents that detail the Agency’s analysis and 

activities relating to historically significant topics and events. The HRP’s goals include 

increasing the usability and accessibility of historical collections. To do that, HRP works

with partner organizations to organize release events to highlight each collection and 

make it available to the broadest audience possible. 

The mission of the HRP is to:

• Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the intelligence information

that has helped shape major U.S. foreign policy decisions. 

• Broaden access to lessons learned, presenting historical material that gives 

greater understanding to the scope and context of past actions.

• Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on 

the impacts and effects arising from past foreign policy decisions. 

• Showcase CIA’s contributions to national security and provide the American

public with valuable insight into the workings of its government. 

• Demonstrate the CIA’s commitment to the Open Government Initiative and 

its three core values: Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration.

NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE UNITED STATES NAV Y

A component of the Naval History and Heritage Command, the National Museum of 

the United States Navy in Washington, D.C., collects, preserves, displays, and interprets 

historic naval artifacts and artwork for the information, education, and inspiration of 

naval personnel and the general public. As one of 10 naval museums throughout the country, 

it is the only one to present a complete overview of U.S. naval history 1775 to the present. 

Permanent and temporary exhibitions commemorate the Navy’s wartime heroes and battles, 

as well as its peacetime contributions in exploration, diplomacy, navigation, and humanitarian service. The museum’s Cold War Gallery highlights the Navy’s role in our nation’s

50-year-conflict with the Soviet Union. Special events and school programs are held

throughout the year in both buildings, including book signings, demonstrations, lectures, 

and exhibition openings.

NAVAL HISTORICAL FOUNDATION

The Naval Historical Foundation (NHF) preserves and commemorates America’s naval heritage, 

using it to inform, educate and inspire current and future leaders in understanding the importance of our Navy, sea power and the maritime domain. We do this through education, youth 

programs and commemorative events; deep sea exploration of the maritime domain; increasing 

the awareness of naval history, heritage and maritime scholarship; award programs; and conferences. NHF supports the Naval History and Heritage Command by serving as the foundation 

partner to the National Museum of the United States Navy. NHF is a 501(c)3 membership

organization located in the historic Washington Navy Yard. 

www.navyhistory.org 

1

CIA Analysis of Soviet Naval Strategy, Operations, and Force Capabilities 

A Note about What You Are Reading 

CHAPTER I

Stalin’s Navy and the Early Khrushchev Period

CHAPTER II

Soviet Debate on Military Doctrine and Strategy 

The Role of the Navy in Nuclear War 

CHAPTER III

Admiral Gorshkov’s Navy

Admiral Gorshkov’s Role in Transforming the Soviet Navy

CHAPTER IV

Beginnings of Soviet Distant Naval Operations

Political Use of Sea Power in Peacetime

An Overview of the Growth of the Soviet Navy

 

Timeline

Catalog of Documents and Summaries

2

5

7

11

15

21

24

28

30

Contents
CIA Analysis of 

Soviet Naval Strategy, Operations, 

and Force Capabilities

This collection of declassified documents on the Soviet Navy augments CIA’s 

initiative to provide the public with more detail on this subject. These documents 

were provided to U.S. policymakers, including the President, Vice President, 

Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and other cabinet members, and used to 

assess the political and military strategy between the Warsaw Pact and NATO 

during the Cold War. The finished intelligence products1

 in the collection were 

based on clandestine, technical, and open sources, as well as other relevant 

intelligence information. These products, including NIEs (National Intelligence 

Estimates), influenced U.S. efforts to preserve the peace during the Cold War.

These declassified documents augment those that were previously released for the 

CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact: The Importance of Clandestine Reporting and the 2007 

CIA release of the Caesar series of studies2

 and other significant CIA documents, 

as well as releases by other Intelligence Community (IC) agencies. These collections 

complement separate external projects, which include those of the Smithsonian 

Institution, Wilson Center and NATO’s reexamination of the Cold War with 

newly available documents released by several former Warsaw Pact countries. 

1 “Finished Intelligence Products” is the CIA’s term for the final product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available 

intelligence information.

2 The Caesar Studies are analytic monographs and reference aids that were produced by the CIA/Directorate of Intelligence during the period 1950 through the mid-1970s. 

They provided in-depth research on Soviet internal politics primarily intended to provide insight on selected political and economic issues and CIA analytic thinking of the period.
3

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action 

through 1960 and it states, “Owing to their small size, their 

meager equipment, and the unreliability of personnel, the 

satellite navies provide only a minor contribution to Soviet 

naval strength.” 

The collection also includes many NIEs and finished intelligence products prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence 

(DI)5

, some of which have been previously released. The DI 

reports were the detailed basis of CIA’s contributions to 

the NIEs focused on the Soviet Navy and its complementary role in a Warsaw Pact conflict with NATO. Those 

reports also provided the background for subsequent current 

intelligence. Included with this essay is a catalog with 

summaries of the newly released documents for each chapter 

and an appendix of documents previously released. All the 

documents are available on the CIA’s website at 

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/historical-collections. 

Some of the historical background information is taken or 

quoted from Robert W. Herrick’s book, Soviet Naval Strategy, 

first printed in 1967 and John B. Hattendorf ’s, The Evolution of 

the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986. A secret version 

was published in 1989; an unclassified version was published 

in 2004 in the Naval War College Newport Papers, No. 19.

3 The acronym, DO, Directorate of Operations, used interchangeably throughout the paper 

with the acronyms used in the earlier years: Directorate of Plans, 1950 to 1973, or National 

Clandestine Service (NCS), 2005 to 2015.

4 See NSCID No. 3, Coordination of Intelligence Production, 13 January 1948 and NSCID No. 3, 

Coordination of Intelligence Production, 21 April 1958 for details of the responsibilities of the CIA 

and other intelligence departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. NSCID No. 1 limited 

the role of CIA to economic and scientific analysis, making the military services responsible for 

all military intelligence. The 1958 revised version broadened the areas for which the CIA could 

produce intelligence.

5 The Directorate of Intelligence, renamed Directorate of Analysis in 2015, houses the Agency’s 

analytic cadre, and is responsible for the production of finished intelligence. This essay uses the 

DI terminology, as consistent with the nomenclature of the time frame.

The CIA intelligence reports, produced by the Directorate 

of Operations (DO)3

 made a significant contribution to 

understanding the history, plans and intentions of the Soviet 

Navy. Many of these documents are being released for the 

first time. These intelligence reports, however, do not represent the complete record—much information essential in the 

estimative process was from émigrés and defectors, as well 

as from the U.S. Navy, and imagery and signals intelligence, 

which are not specifically highlighted in this collection.

In accordance with the National Security Council Intelligence 

Directive4 from 1955 to 1961, the military services’ intelligence 

components were the principal contributors to the militaryfocused NIEs. The CIA, however, did make contributions on 

military-related economic and scientific subjects. The released 

finished products do not specifically address the contributions of political, weapons, and scientific intelligence efforts 

or economic analyses, including armaments production and 

naval shipbuilding; however they do address, as appropriate, 

the operational and strategic consequences of these efforts. 

A command structure for a combined Warsaw Pact Navy 

existed, but the real Warsaw Pact Navy was the Soviet Navy 

from the signing of the Warsaw Pact Treaty in 1955 to the 

fall of the USSR in 1991, therefore the non-Soviet Warsaw 

Pact “navies” are not specifically addressed. An IC assessment 

of the Warsaw Pact “navies” appeared in NIE 11-3-55, 

Soviet battleships—fighting U-boats in the Baltic Sea, WWII
4

Pacific Fleet Marines of the Soviet Navy hoisting the Soviet Naval ensign in Port Arthur, 1 October 1945
5

CLANDESTINE SOURCE REPORTING

Intelligence reporting derived from human and technical collection provide intelligence information that may 

contribute to or form the basis of such analysis—“raw” 

intelligence reports support “finished” intelligence 

products. During this period, the DO used the titles 

“Information Report,” “Intelligence Information 

Report,” and “Intelligence Information Special Report” 

for disseminated clandestine intelligence reports. 

DIRECTOR ATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DI) 

ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTS

The DI produces all-source finished intelligence (analysis) 

on topics of interest to the President, members of 

Congress, Cabinet members and the military services. 

All-source products are based on all relevant photographic, signals intelligence, clandestine and open 

source information. “Finished intelligence” has gone 

through the proper coordination within the office of 

origin, with other appropriate DI and/or DO offices; 

and has been reviewed by the appropriate managers 

including the DDI (Deputy Director for Intelligence).

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (NIE) 

A NIE is the highest form of finished national intelligence. 

It is intended to reflect the consensus of the Intelligence 

Community regarding some issue of major importance 

to national security, and it attempts to forecast the future 

development of present military, political, or economic situations in order to identify the implications for 

national policymakers. Most NIEs relate to issues of 

continuing concern, for example, Warsaw Pact naval 

forces opposite NATO, and are produced or updated 

annually or biannually, or on some other regular schedule. A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 

is produced when some unforeseen development, for 

example, the Berlin crisis, requires an immediate ad hoc 

collection of the situation. An Interagency Intelligence 

Memorandum (IIM) does the same thing as a NIE only 

on a more narrow issue of interest to a smaller audience.

A Note about 

What You Are Reading

7

CHAPTER I 

Stalin’s Navy and the Early 

Khrushchev Period 

Under Stalin’s direction, the Soviet Navy underwent 

a dramatic expansion after World War II, first in the 

Cruiser-destroyer force and later in submarines, becoming 

by many measures the second largest Navy in the world 

by 1957. The Stalin-era navy generally reflected the Soviet 

World War II experience but did not reflect the impact of 

nuclear weapons nor did it represent any real expeditionary 

capability—the Soviet Navy was seldom seen outside of 

home waters. When Stalin died the Navy lost its patron. 

After Khrushchev became First Secretary of the party 

in 1955, he decisively altered Stalin’s naval policy and 

the direction of military policy and doctrine in general. 

His vision for the navy was not without precedent. In 

the earliest days of the Communist state until the early 

1930s, the navy and naval thinking was dominated by 

ex-Tsarist officers, the “old school” theorists, who advocated

the development of a high-seas fleet analogous in 

composition and intent to the fleets of other naval powers. 

Those naval officers were purged or sidelined by a new 

crop of officers brought up through the ranks under Lenin 

and Stalin. These were the “new school” theorists, who 

advocated limiting the navy to a coastal defense role with 

only modest forces of aviation and coastal patrol craft. 

Khrushchev’s vision bore all the earmarks of the “new 

school” naval theories, but in the context of the nuclear age. 

As a result, new construction of major surface vessels for 

the Navy was very nearly terminated. Four or more cruisers 

were left unfinished in their shipyards and other projects 

were curtailed. At the same time Khrushchev shifted 

resources to the construction of new classes of submarines 

including conventionally-powered and nuclear-powered, 

missile-armed and torpedo-attack. He also shifted naval 

aviation emphasis to long-range attack and anti-submarine 

warfare (ASW), and abolished Naval Fighter Aviation. 

Analysis in 1963 describes the changes in naval forces, 

strategy and doctrine during the period 1950–1959 based 
8

on open source documents and Soviet classified documents 

clandestinely passed to CIA from 1961 to 1962.6

Developments in nuclear and conventional weapons offered 

Khrushchev an opportunity to dramatically reduce overall 

military expenditures and reallocate military manpower 

quotas to civilian industry. This is reflected when Khrushchev 

announced a reduction of 640,000 men from the Soviet 

armed forces in August of 1955. In May 1956 he called 

for another cutback of 1.2 million men. Khrushchev later 

announced two additional unilateral troop reductions: 

one of 300,000 in January 1958 and another of 1.2 million 

in a January 1960 speech to the Supreme Soviet. All of 

the proposed reductions were meant to serve several purposes: to shift funds to the production of missiles and 

long-range bombers; to lessen the burden of military force 

requirements on heavy industry; to free labor for productive 

purposes in the civilian economy; and to bring international pressure on the United States to reduce its forces.

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND 

ANALYSIS IN THE EARLY Y EARS

CIA analytic efforts on the Soviet Navy during 

the 1950s focused on technical analysis of naval weapons 

systems and naval ship-building. Intelligence research 

on Soviet naval operations was conducted almost 

exclusively by the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence and associated military intelligence entities. 

The Department of Defense intelligence entities had 

several important collection efforts against the Soviet Navy. 

CIA had a military clandestine source in place inside the 

Soviet armed forces during this time, Lieutenant Colonel 

Pyotr Popov. He provided the IC with unique classified 

documents otherwise unavailable after the late 1940s,7

 and 

although he was an Army officer, he also provided some 

information gained in conversations with naval personnel, 

for example, the sinking of a Soviet battleship in 1955. 

CIA was successfully operating U-2 aircraft covertly 

over the Soviet Union and analyzing the photography 

of military targets including naval shipyards and bases. 

The U-2 also photographed the Soviet construction of 

a new submarine base and the Soviet submarine squadron 

stationed in Albania in the late 1950s. In addition, 

CIA had a successful effort gathering and analyzing open 

source and classified Soviet naval-related documents.

“All of the proposed reductions were 

meant to serve several purposes: 

to shift funds to the production of 

missiles and long-range bombers; 

to lessen the burden of military force 

requirements on heavy industry; 

to free labor for productive purposes 

in the civilian economy; and to 

bring international pressure on the 

United States to reduce its forces.”

6 See Soviet Naval Strategy and Its Effect on the Development of Naval Forces 1953–63, 

CIA/DI/ORR, 22 October 1963. 

7 By 1949, the Soviet Union and its allies were concealing much of their military activities and 

policy decisions from the outside world. The police state that Stalin established made recruiting 

human sources inside the USSR extremely difficult and prevented Western diplomats and military attaches from traveling widely there.

Soviet Naval Infantry
“In the course of the discussion which 

developed over the path of future development of our Navy in the mid-fifties, 

there abruptly appeared a...struggle of 

the old views with the new ones not yet 

proved by life. At that time, too, were 

expressed even extreme ‘leftist’ views. 

It turned out, unfortunately, that we had 

some very influential ‘authorities’ who 

considered that with the appearance of 

atomic weapons the Navy had completely 

lost its value as a branch of the armed 

forces. According to their views, all of 

the basic missions in a future war allegedly could be fully resolved without 

the participation of the Navy, and even 

in those circumstances when to do so 

would require the conduct of combat 

operations on the broad expanses of the 

seas and oceans. At that time it was 

frequently asserted that only missiles 

emplaced in ground launching sites were 

required for the destruction of surface 

striking forces and even submarines.”

“In opposition to the views which were 

accepted in the early postwar years as 

to the significance of joint operations of 

the Navy with ground troops as one of 

its [the Navy’s] primary missions, views 

were advanced which were completely 

divorced from any necessity for the 

Navy to cooperate with ground troops 

in the conduct of coastal operations. 

According to these [views] it was considered that, for ground troops having 

nuclear weapons, support from the sea 

was unnecessary since, with their own 

forces, they could overcome any water 

obstacles in the way or even fight with 

an enemy fleet which attempted to strike 

blows against them from the sea.”

“...Obviously, the spreading of such ideas 

in addition to the still existing defensive 

tendencies not only interfered with the 

determination of the correct directions 

for the further development of the Navy 

but also held back the forward movement of our military-theoretical thought.”*

*Gorshkov, “Razvitie Sovestskogo 

Voenno-morskogo iskusstva,” Morskoi 

Sbornik February 1967, pp19–20

as quoted in Robert W. Herrick, Soviet 

Naval Strategy, p 68.

In 1967 Admiral Gorshkov wrote about the mid-fifties 

Khrushchev-Zhukov naval strategy and its consequences:

Kosmonaut Yuri Gagarin underway, 1986

1 1

CHAPTER II 

 Soviet Debate on Military 

Doctrine and Strategy 

The Role of the Navy in a Nuclear War 8

CIA efforts to understand the Soviet Naval forces 

increased steadily and culminated in Soviet Naval 

Strategy and Its Effect on the Development of Naval 

Forces 1953–1963 and NIE-11-14-69, Soviet and 

East European General Purpose Forces, which represented the IC’s knowledge about the Warsaw Pact forces, 

including the Soviet Navy at the end of the 1960s. 

After the death of Stalin in March 1953, sweeping 

reappraisals of political, economic, and military matters 

occurred, calling into question many of the policies 

Stalin personally supported. In the military field, his 

death offered a long overdue opportunity to devise a 

strategy more suitable to changing world concepts for 

waging war, and unleashed a debate about theoretical 

military science. In support of the effort, the Soviet 

military press undertook a systematic program to 

educate military officers and other responsible personnel 

on the character and potential of new weapons and 

military technology, and to induce responsible officers 

to write about military science and military art. 

After Khrushchev had consolidated his position by 1955, 

new policies began to be implemented. In the military 

sphere high-ranking officials recognized the potential 

of nuclear power and weaponry, and criticized the 

capability of the Soviet conventional naval fleet to defend 

the USSR in a future nuclear-missile war. The criticism 

was based on the failure to integrate nuclear-power 

and missile systems in its ships and to develop an ability 

to counter the emerging threat of a greater striking 

power, particularly nuclear, developed by the U.S. Navy. 

The Soviets believed they needed to revise their naval 

strategy and policies drastically. The Soviet Main Naval 

Staff was faced with determining the magnitude of the 

threat likely to be posed by the United States, and then 

attempting to develop the required naval organization, 

strategy, tactics, and weapons to counter that threat. In 

1955 Soviet military publications began to emphasize the 

importance and value of submarine-launched missiles.

8 Much of the text in this essay is taken from Soviet Naval Strategy and Its Effect on the Development of Naval Forces 1953–63, disseminated 22 October 1963, pp 28–38.
1 2

9 See CIA Current Intelligence Staff Collection, Caesar XI-60, Khrushchev on Nuclear Strategy, 

19 January 1960, Annex page t. 

During his May 1956 visit to London, Khrushchev stated 

“guided-missile submarines were the most suitable naval 

weapon and they would receive emphasis in the future 

development of the Soviet Navy.” Khrushchev reportedly 

added possession of this weapon would give the USSR the 

capability to make “defensive” attacks against the United 

States. In May 1956, the Soviet military publication, Krasnaya 

Zvezda (Red Star), contained the following statement: 

“Submarines, having atomic propulsion and guided missiles 

as basic armaments, can perform at great distances from their 

bases and secretly strike blows not only against ships but also 

against land targets deep in enemy territory.” This apparently 

included nuclear strikes against the American continent. 

From 1953 to 1959, the Soviet military debate was centered 

largely around the effect on the military of the rapidly 

advancing weapons technology on organization, doctrine 

and strategy. The early debate focused on adapting the new 

weapons to traditional concepts. By the end of 1959, when 

new long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking most 

of Europe had been successfully developed and put into 

production, Khrushchev and some influential Soviet military 

leaders began to advocate for long-range missiles, for the 

quick and decisive defeat of the enemy, which relegated 

conventional forces to a minor role. The more conservative 

or “traditionalist” elements of the military were opposed.

The navy was able to muster support to rebuild the Soviet 

fleet along “modern” lines by integrating nuclear power 

and missiles. The Soviets emphasized the construction 

of submarines, and in particular, submarines capable of 

launching ballistic missiles. The Soviet Navy took its place 

in the new military strategy as its potential grew for naval 

ships to launch nuclear-armed missiles at enemy navies 

and land targets in both offensive and defensive roles.

Khrushchev viewed the potential of the new ballistic missiles 

as a means to provide greater security for the USSR at less 

cost, and outlined a new military policy in his January 

1960 report to the Supreme Soviet. The essence of his 

plan was to place main reliance on nuclear-missile forces, 

reduce military manpower substantially, and accelerate the 

retirement of older weapons and forces. This, he asserted, 

was the force structure best suited both to deter war and 

to fight one when necessary. Khrushchev declared surface 

naval forces and other conventional armed forces no longer 

useful and predicted they would soon become obsolete. 

CIA analysts judged Khrushchev’s speech probably was 

prepared after consideration of this policy by the Central 

Committee of the Communist Party in December 1959.9

“In May 1956, the Soviet military 

publication, Krasnaya Zvezda

(Red Star), contained the following 

statement: ‘Submarines, having 

atomic propulsion and guided 

missiles as basic armaments, 

can perform at great distances 

from their bases and secretly 

strike blows not only against 

ships but also against land targets 

deep in enemy territory’.”

Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy
13

10 Much of the discussion in this section is taken from “Penkovskiy’s Legacy and Strategic Research” by Len Parkinson, Studies in Intelligence, Volume 16, Spring of 1972.

In the context of the new weapons developments, in late 

1959 the Soviet leadership instituted a “military-theoretical conference by correspondence.” Minister of Defense 

Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskiy authorized the publication 

of a Top Secret Special Collection series of the premier 

Soviet military journal, Voyennaya Mysl ’ (Military Thought), 

in addition to the regularly published Secret version to 

stimulate theoretical discussions of the most important and 

pressing problems of “Soviet military science, and above 

all, of military art.” Distribution of the Special Collection 

was restricted to a limited circle of officials from army 

commanders upward. Leading personnel of the armed 

forces, the troops, the military academies, the chief and 

central directorates, and the General Staff, who could 

contribute most to the development of Soviet military 

theory in the light of the requirements of modern warfare, 

were invited to write articles for the Special Collection. 

There were twelve articles about naval matters written 

by ten senior naval authors among the many articles in 

the Special Collection during the period from early 1960 

to 1962. They expressed a view of a future war as one of 

some duration and therefore, one involving extensive use 

of naval forces. These authors believed over-all military 

requirements necessitated the expansion, rather than 

a reduction, of naval forces. Furthermore, the officers 

supported a more conservative military position on 

strategy and policy, rather than the more radical position 

outlined by Khrushchev in January 1960. Indeed, there 

were some transparent refutations of Khrushchev’s 

position accomplished by attacking military proponents 

of his general hypothesis in the Special Collection. 

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND ANALYSIS

In 1960, the CIA acquired an important new 

clandestine source, Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy. He had 

served with distinction in World War II as a Soviet 

artillery officer and had access to high-level military 

officials and highly classified military documents. 

He began reporting in April 1961, passing articles from 

the Top Secret Special Collection of Military Thought and 

other classified Soviet military publications, along with 

other intelligence information to the West until arrested by 

the KGB in 1962. He provided the first high-level insight 

into the development of Soviet military hardware and 

strategy, and a wealth of data about the military establishment. He supplied invaluable insights into Khrushchev’s 

inclinations to use conventional military forces to achieve 

foreign policy goals while espousing a military policy and 

doctrine dependent on strategic nuclear-strike capabilities 

developed at the expense of those conventional forces. 

His reporting exposed the growing concern among the 

Soviet elite that Khrushchev’s threats and actions risked 

uncontrolled war. During this period Penkovskiy supplied 

approximately 5,000 pages of classified Russian-language

documentary information of which over 90 percent 

concerned military subjects including the 1960–1962 Special 

Collection of the Top Secret journal Military Thought.

10

For more than ten years, the IC continued to use Penkovskiy’s reporting in their analysis on Soviet naval planning, 

capabilities, and intentions, and about developments in 

Soviet strategic thought, especially as it continued to be 

validated by other, more circumstantial evidence becoming 

available over the decade. The discussions of some new 

systems and their use remained relevant for naval analysts 

through the late 1960s and early 1970s. A large number 

of hardware developments observed in the early 1970s could 

be traced to discussions in the material Penkovskiy supplied, as the time from decision to completion of new ships 

and other sophisticated weapons could take more than 

ten years. Of perhaps more importance, the discussions 

about future naval operations and strategy revealed the 

purpose for new shipbuilding programs and fleet operations. 

The Penkovskiy collection helped validate the relevance of 

the new evidence for evaluating the Soviet naval capabilities. 

15

CHAPTER III

 Admiral Gorshkov’s Navy 

Admiral Gorshkov’s 

Role in Transforming the Soviet Navy

As with Khrushchev’s new nuclear focus following the 

death of Stalin, the October 1964 replacement of 

Khrushchev with the “collective” leadership of Leonid 

Brezhnev (General Secretary) and Aleksey Kosygin 

(Premier) occasioned another shift in Soviet Navy doctrine. 

CIA analysts characterized the new leadership as cautious, 

conservative, and consumed by internal debates and political 

maneuvering to consolidate their positions. Astutely, 

and in contrast to his predecessor, Brezhnev relied on 

the military for advice on strategic military policy issues. 

His policies emphasized persistent international dangers, 

citing the 1966 U.S. military expansion in Vietnam. 

He backed the military on the utility of conventional 

forces and supported the increase of strategic forces. He 

defended military interests by buttressing investment 

in heavy industry and the defense sector of the Soviet 

economy. The Soviet Navy was one of the beneficiaries. 

With the change in policy under the “collective” leadership 

and in the context of the Vietnam War,11 Soviet military 

doctrine evolved in the late 1960s and during the 1970s, 

broadening the scope of official military doctrine to 

include the wartime contingency of conflict in which only 

non-nuclear weapons would be used. The seeds of the 

shift in the doctrinal development were already evident 

in debates among leading Soviet naval theoreticians 

contained in the Soviet classified writings dating from 

1960-1962, passed clandestinely to the West by 

Colonel Penkovskiy. Although generally couched in 

terms consistent with Khrushchev’s focus on wars decided 

by massive use of nuclear-armed missiles, naval theoreticians described tasks for the navy consistent only with 

longer campaigns. Although there were no classified12

Soviet naval documents dated after 1962 available 

later in the decade, doctrinal shifts were evident in the 

unclassified Soviet military writings reflecting new or 

renewed Soviet interest in preparing for non-nuclear 

conflict, that is, wars of some scope in whole or in part 

not involving the use of nuclear weapons. The insight 

from the earlier classified articles illuminated the way 

for analysis of the evolving doctrinal changes. 

11 For a discussion about the new “collective” leadership, see CIA/DI/SRS Intelligence Report Caesar XXX, Policy and Politics in the CPSU Politburo: October 1964 to September 1967, 

31 August 1967. 

12 There were some Soviet “restricted” versions of Military Thought available during this period.
1 6

Admiral Gorshkov*

In 1955 when he became First Secretary, 

Khrushchev removed Stalin’s Commanderin-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, 

a principal proponent of Stalin’s shipbuilding program, replacing him by 1956 with 

Admiral Sergey Georgevich Gorshkov. 

Under Khrushchev, Gorshkov navigated 

through what must have seemed a dim future 

for the Navy, barely protecting programs that 

would later blossom to support the building 

of the Soviet version of a high seas fleet.

The story of Admiral Gorshkov is very nearly 

the story of the Soviet Navy for the thirty 

years he served as Commander-in-Chief of 

the Navy. His lengthy tenure as Commanderin-Chief of the Soviet Navy was a tribute 

both to his professional naval expertise and, 

perhaps more important in Moscow, his 

bureaucratic skill navigating through the 

hazards of the changing attitudes of the 

national and party leadership. In retrospect 

it seems clear Admiral Gorshkov never lost 

sight of his goal of creating a world class navy 

operating proudly on all the world’s oceans.

The doctrinal developments addressing conflicts waged 

without nuclear weapons after Khrushchev moved the 

assumed timelines of conflict from hours or days to 

a much longer time frame more consistent with the 

times required for the movement of naval forces and the 

accomplishment of naval tasks. Evidence mounted that a 

new naval strategy reflecting the expectations of a longer 

and perhaps non-nuclear war was clearly in the making.

ADMIR AL GORSHKOV’S ROLE IN 

TR ANSFORMING THE SOVIET NAV Y

Admiral Gorshkov had been gradually transforming the 

Navy into a truly ocean going navy after assuming the 

position of Commander-in-Chief. He presided over the 

dramatic increase in the use of the Navy for diplomatic 

purposes; the expansion of the Navy ship and submarine 

construction programs and establishing the importance 

of the Navy in the Soviet strategic strike forces in 

naval policy, doctrine and strategy throughout his tenure. 

The expansion in roles and size, although implemented 

gradually, was as important for the Navy in a positive 

sense as its precipitous decline in the years following the 

death of Stalin was negative. Many of the more important 

changes were obvious to even the casual observer; others

became clear only with the passage of time. 

Soviet naval developments did not occur in a vacuum. 

The 1961–1962 and later documents made it clear no 

matter what Soviet propagandists wrote, many Soviet 

naval theoreticians continued to believe the U.S. Navy 

was dominant on the oceans throughout the period. 

Even Stalin’s ambitious naval programs did not change 

their minds. The “Old School” Soviet naval theorists, 

however, did seek a navy that could be seen challenging the U.S. dominance in some significant way. The 

Khrushchev-inspired military doctrine had no room for 

such challenges except during an all-out nuclear war. 

Hence, the Soviet Navy, largely designed to Stalin’s dictates 

and affected by Khrushchev’s reductions, played relatively little role in the non-nuclear Cuban Missile Crisis. 

By the time Admiral Gorshkov published his book in the 

mid-1970s, it was clear to CIA analysts that the Soviets 

were building toward a “balanced fleet,” i.e., a fleet for 

open ocean operations and a broad array of contingencies. 

Nonetheless, it was equally clear that the Soviets still 

afforded top priority to defend against aircraft carriers 

operating within striking distance of the USSR and against 

western SSBNs. In Western terms the Soviet Navy aimed 

for sea control of the waters adjacent to the USSR and sea 

denial in the areas more distant but still within striking 

*See also Sea Power of the State by Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, 

English Translation, Pergamon Press, Oxford England, 1979.
17

range of Soviet targets. Gorshkov’s vision of the Soviet Navy 

was still years in the future but signs were already appearing 

in the USSR naval-shipbuilding industry. The Soviets 

continued to produce long-range missile-carrying bombers 

and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, nuclear submarines, 

and had a broad array of major surface combatants under 

construction, including the Kiev-class aircraft carriers. 

Into the 1980s Admiral Gorshkov continued to transform 

the Navy into a truly ocean going navy. By the time he 

was retired, he had presided over the dramatic increase 

in the size and prominence of the Navy. At the time of 

his retirement there were building programs for seven 

classes of major surface combatants in addition to a new 

aircraft carrier. Four 36,000 ton class VSTOL13 aircraft 

carriers and the largest nuclear-powered cruisers in the 

world were in or soon to be put into service. Several 

classes of new model nuclear submarines were entering 

service and Naval Aviation was being equipped with the 

new Backfire supersonic medium-range bomber. It was 

a far cry from the Navy advocated by Khrushchev.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, CLANDESTINE 

REPORTING AND OTHER SOURCES

New classified intelligence on the Soviet military became 

available when the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia 

in 1968 provided the catalyst for an increase of intelligence 

information on the Warsaw Pact militaries. Clandestine sources provided many highly classified documents 

bearing on the discussions of future Soviet naval strategy, 

operations and tactics during the 1970s and beyond. 

Some of the documents were articles published during 

the 1960s in the Secret version of the Soviet military 

journal, Military Thought, but were not available through 

clandestine sources until sometime after the invasion of 

Czechoslovakia. Although analysts had other sources of 

information about the Soviet Navy during the 1960s, the 

availability of the older theoretical discussions provided 

invaluable insights into the future of Soviet naval strategy.

NIE 11-14-69 reflected the views in the IC of the 1969 

Soviet naval capabilities and planning, as well as judgments 

about trends for the 1970s. The CIA contribution to the 

1969 NIE focused on emerging Soviet naval capabilities 

13 VSTOL is the acronym for vertical short take-off and landing aircraft carriers.

Soviet Navy Personnel—1982
1 8

to perform the tasks of ASW and anti-carrier strikes. 

Earlier, CIA analysts judged the Soviets were becoming 

more cautious in doctrinal discussions about the 

certainty that war with the West would necessarily be 

nuclear in the initial stages. As more Soviet classified 

military documents became available, CIA and other IC 

analysts saw an increasing prevalence of Soviet military 

theoreticians debating the thesis that war might even 

stay at a non-nuclear level to its conclusion, or very nearly 

so. It was not yet evident to the analysts that more 

than a technological evolution of Soviet naval forces 

was in the offing. By the 1970s, new shipbuilding

programs indicated the Soviets had made major 

decisions about the nature, composition, and role of 

the Navy in a wide spectrum of conflict situations.

These newly available ten-year old documents were significant because they laid the groundwork for the doctrinal 

discussions and decisions that followed. Analysts were 

able to piece together the main outlines of the Soviet naval 

strategy for war with NATO on the high seas. Not only 

was Gorshkov’s navy continuously present on many oceans 

and seas around the world, but the construction program 

included larger surface combatants, for example aircraft 

carriers, he believed were necessary for a true “Blue Water 

Navy.” The challenges for analysts evolved from quantitative 

to qualitative questions. For example, how did the Soviets 

intend to operate to deny ocean areas to NATO? How 

well could the Soviet Navy execute tasks such as ASW in 

sea-denial operations and in sea-control operations? What 

was the real readiness of Soviet naval forces? How were 

the Soviets likely to apportion forces for the competing 

operational missions and tasks? Fortunately, the new clandestine reporting and other intelligence information during 

the 1970s addressed those questions. These documents 

were a major ingredient in the watershed estimate of Soviet 

naval operations and strategy presented in NIE 11-14-79. 

Differences of opinion existed from time to time among 

members of the naval analytic community. Those differences are noted in this collection and in several interagency 

documents including: NIE 11-14-79; Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM), Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces; 

the IIM, Soviet Intentions and Capabilities for interdicting 

Sea Lines of Communication in a War with NATO; and 

in some previously classified interagency correspondence. 

New judgments often were initially controversial, but 

by the time NIE 11-15-82, Soviet Naval Strategy and 

Programs through the 1990s, was completed, there was 

general consensus in the IC about the most important 

capabilities and likely operations of the Soviet Navy.

“The seeds of the shift in the 

doctrinal development were 

already evident...in the 

Soviet classified writings 

dating from 1960–1962 passed 

clandestinely to the West 

by Colonel Penkovskiy.”

Gerald Ford and Leonid Brezhnev
19

U.S. Developments

During the same period the United States Navy was undergoing major 

readjustments in size and focus. As military involvement in Vietnam was 

winding down, many of the Navy’s World War II ships were reaching 

the end of their service life. In the context of the attempt to reduce U.S. 

defense expenditures, Navy plans for replacing the retiring WWII era 

ships came under great pressure. Under the leadership of Admiral Elmo 

Zumwalt in the early 1970s, the U.S. Navy proposed a naval construction program controversially described as a “high-low” mix of new naval

combatants. The “high-low” mix was in part an attempt to obtain a large

number of new low-cost ships while retaining some fewer numbers of

high capability combatants. Admiral Zumwalt’s vision was not fully 

implemented by his successors.

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt

USNS Vanguard

21

CHAPTER IV 

 Beginnings of Soviet Distant 

Naval Operations

Political Use of Sea Power in Peacetime 

The changes implemented by Admiral Gorshkov 

resulted in not only an expanded navy that could function 

militarily, but also serve as an important diplomatic

tool for the Soviets in the non-aligned world.

As far back as the time of Tsar Peter the Great, the Russians 

sought naval access to the western seas.14 Tsar Peter and his 

successors succeeded in establishing enduring control of a 

land outlet to the Baltic Sea, and gained control of much of 

the Black Sea coast through a number of wars with Turkey 

and its various allies. However, Russian efforts to seize 

non-contiguous territory in Europe had not produced lasting 

gains. Russian attempts to gain control of the Bosporus 

and Dardanelles all failed. Similarly, the Russians were 

thwarted in their late eighteenth and early nineteenth 

century efforts to gain enduring control of some islands in 

the Mediterranean Sea seized from Turkey and France.

In the Pacific, Tsar Alexander II sold Russian North 

American and Aleutian Island territories to the United 

States in 1867. The Russo-Japanese War cost Russia 

its Yellow Sea bases in China in 1905. Following 

territorial losses from World War I and the Russian Civil 

War, there were no real naval bases outside the USSR 

except in adjacent Finland and in China (which the Soviets 

voluntarily gave up in 1956) and by 1958, the sum total 

of bases in areas not contiguous to the USSR was zero. 

“The first recorded Soviet naval activity outside fleet home 

waters after World War II occurred in 1953, when ships 

of the Soviet Navy participated in a coronation fleet 

review in England. In the Fifties some 20 ‘show’ visits to 

foreign ports. These visits were typically conducted by a 

Sverdlov-class light-cruiser accompanied by three or four 

destroyers, and most were to European countries.”15

In the late 1950s, the Soviet Navy was actively establishing 

a naval base in the area of Valona, Albania.16 It had moved 

a submarine support ship and a squadron of submarines to the 

area as improvements ashore were underway. With this base 

14 See Admiral Gorshkov’s discussion of Russian naval history in his book, Sea Power of the State, pp 66–79.

15 See CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, Soviet General Purpose Naval Deployments Outside Home Waters: Characteristics and Trends, June 1973, page 5.

16 Valona is also known as Vlone or Vlorë.
2 2

the Soviets would have their first unhindered naval access to 

the Mediterranean Sea for their Black Sea Fleet. The base 

was lost, however, as tensions between the two countries 

increased, and Albania broke with Moscow in 1961. In 1962 

the Soviet Navy attempted to participate in the Cuban missile 

venture, but the imposition of the quarantine by the United 

States evidently foreclosed the participation of additional 

Soviet naval units. In the event, the intended Soviet Naval 

forces component of the Group of Soviet Forces Cuba, 

including a small combined cruiser-destroyer force, was 

so overshadowed by the massive size of the U.S. Navy quarantine force it never reached Cuba.17 It seemed clear to the 

analysts the Soviets did not believe their navy was 

ready to confront U.S. forces in the open ocean. The 

incident probably was a basis for the Soviet Navy to 

push through new and expanded shipbuilding programs 

after the removal of Khrushchev from office. 

A 1964 policy statement by Admiral Gorshkov, the then 

Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, placed 

unprecedented emphasis on conducting long cruises, and 

marked the beginning of more extensive deployments. 

Moscow began realizing its aspirations in a modest way with 

the 1964 deployment of a small naval force to the Mediterranean Sea evidently capable only of maintaining itself largely 

at anchorages in international waters. Between 1965 and 1970 

these deployments grew fivefold and were extended into the 

Indian Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and West African waters.18

The 1967 international crises in the Mediterranean area 

ushered in a new stage of Soviet naval activity. The Soviets 

began using their Navy to provide a military response to 

spontaneous crises when a client state was involved. In 1967, 

in 1970, and in 1973 they used surface ships and submarines in some kind of interposition operation in the Mediterranean to influence U.S. actions and show solidarity with 

erstwhile allies. In each case the Soviets surged extra surface 

combatants and submarines to join the ships already on station. 

Although the Soviets refrained from any hostile actions, 

they did keep combatants in the vicinity of U.S. forces. In 

the Pacific the Soviets surged several cruise missile-firing 

submarines and 5 to 10 surface combatants and auxiliary ships 

in response to the U.S. mining of North Vietnamese ports. 

The National Intelligence Estimate 11-15-74, Soviet Naval 

Policy and Program, judged after the mid-1960s the Soviets 

had actively used the navy to support their economic and 

“As far back as the time of

Tsar Peter the Great, 

the Russians sought naval 

access to the western seas.”

17 For information on Soviet naval participation, see CIA/DI/ORR Staff Collection, 

Cuba 1962: Khrushchev’s Miscalculated Risk., pages 41–47.

18 National Intelligence Estimate, 11-6-1967, Soviet Strategy and Intentions in the Mediterranean 

Basin, contains a full discussion of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, the largest 

distant Soviet naval operation with military and political ramifications during the period. The 

estimate, however, was completed slightly before the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict and did not 

benefit from observations of Soviet naval reactions to the crisis.

Statue of Peter the Great on the Moscow River
23

political influence around the world. The number of annual 

naval visits to distant areas increased from six or less in 

the early 1960s to hundreds by the end of the decade. 

Such visits, involving a great variety of ships, became 

a common occurrence during the 1970s and 1980s. 

NIE 11-15-74 judged regular out of area operations by 

the Soviet Navy were approaching their structural limits 

because of ship characteristics and inadequate at-sea logistic support. Indeed, NIE 11-10-79, Soviet Military 

Capabilities to Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas, 

stated the size of the Soviet Naval force in the Mediterranean had declined slightly during the period 1974–1979. 

Estimates in the early 1980s predicted improvements in 

capabilities for distant operations, if not in numbers of ships 

involved, but certainly by the impact of a new class of aircraft 

carrier, then under construction, when it became available 

sometime in the latter part of the decade or during the 1990s. 

Despite the limitations of the capabilities of its navy, the 

Soviets continued to use it in support of military operations 

involving clients such as Angola, Somalia and Ethiopia during the 1970s. Support to clients often included 

agreements to use ports and some facilities ashore. The 

Soviets did not succeed in gaining a real base ashore in a 

non-conflict zone, however, until they began using and 

improving the facilities at Cam Ranh, Vietnam about 

1980. By 1984 the Soviet Navy had a major presence of 

ships, submarines, and naval aviation supported by naval 

auxiliary ships and shore facilities in Vietnam with a 

more predictable, but independently minded, client.19

NIE 11-15-82 and NIE 11-15-85, Soviet Naval Strategy and 

Programs through the 1990s, contain sections about distant 

naval operations short of war with the main naval powers. 

The major changes in Soviet posture followed construction of ships better suited to the mission. The estimates 

judged the Soviet use of naval diplomacy and power 

projection would increase during the 1980s and 1990s.20

The 1980 Soviet Law of the Sea treaty negotiating 

instructions show the Soviets had changed their attitude 

about naval use of world oceans in two decades from 

one seeking to restrict Western naval access to one of 

virtually unconstrained transit of naval ships and aircraft.21

“The 1980 Soviet Law of the Sea 

treaty negotiating instructions 

show the Soviets had changed 

their attitude about naval use 

of world oceans in two decades 

from one seeking to restrict 

Western naval access to one of 

virtually unconstrained transit 

of naval ships and aircraft.”

19 NIE 11-15-82 and NIE 11-15-85 contain sections about distant operations short of war 

with the main naval powers. The major changes in Soviet posture follows the construction of 

ships better suited to the mission. Those Estimates judge the use of naval diplomacy and power 

projection would increase in the 1980s and 1990s. See pp 5–6 of the key judgments of NIE 

11-15-84.

20 Ibid NIE 11-15-84.

21 See NIE 11-15-84, Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through the 1990s, 

Key Judgments, pp 5–7.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1980
An Overview of the Growth 

of the Soviet Navy

BY DAVID F. WINKLER, PH.D.

Devastated by the Germans and restricted to supporting land operations during 

World War II, the Soviet Navy could muster no challenge even to a greatly reduced 

postwar U.S. Navy. In presentations to the President and Congress, Vice Adm. 

Forrest P. Sherman noted that the 700 to 800 ships the Soviet Navy possessed 

were “of low combat value except for submarines and motor torpedo boats.”1

 The 

Soviets also faced an ongoing internal struggle over their employment of naval 

forces and the types of forces to deploy. With origins long predating World 

War II, the struggle pitted “old school” officers favoring a traditional Mahanian 

battle fleet against a “young school” that argued for a Navy with a guerre de 

course strategy centered on submarines, light surface ships, and aircraft.2

Learning from World War II and noting how the United States deployed its fleets 

to support its foreign policy, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin selected a modified old 

school approach. He wanted a big navy, capable of deterring Western sea powers 

from employing their maritime supremacy. Stalin’s proposed force structure 

combined elements of the young school strategy with a “fortress fleet” of craft 

and shore-based elements designed to provide coastal defense. There would also 

be a “fleet in being” to form the foundation of a blue water navy centered on 

aircraft carriers. American naval actions off Korea at the start of the Korean

1 Michael A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy: The Development of American Naval Strategy, 1945–1955 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 38.

2 Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1968), 9, 21-22.
25

War only reinforced Stalin’s conviction that the USSR needed 

a large ocean-going navy. The Soviet leader pushed forward 

a large construction program that began producing cruisers 

and fast destroyers at about the time of his death in 1953.3

After Stalin’s death, plans for the large Navy also died. 

The Soviet Union’s top security nightmare was surprise attack

by Strategic Air Command bombers, and the new leadership

shifted resources to improve air defenses and build up the 

USSR’s own strategic forces. The Soviets curtailed large surface ship construction and concentrated instead on submarines, 

light surface craft, and land-based naval aviation. While the 

shift marked an apparent victory for the “young school,” the 

dearth of resources allocated by the Kremlin made implementing even the envisioned lighter force structure a challenge. 

Years later, Soviet Navy Commander in Chief Admiral Sergey 

G. Gorshkov wrote that with the development of atomic 

weapons, influential authorities believed that the Navy had 

completely lost its value as a branch of the armed services. 

Future wars could be fought without Navy participation. 

With such a mindset, the Soviets allowed the navies of the 

United States and the western alliance to steam uncontested on the world’s oceans through the end of the 1950s.4

Then on 20 July 1960, the submarine George Washington fired a ballistic missile from under Atlantic waters 

off Cape Canaveral. The imminent deployment posed 

by Polaris missiles on board American nuclear-powered 

submarines was a threat that the Soviets were unprepared 

to handle. The new mobile undersea strategic missile bases 

were simply beyond the reach of the Soviet submarines, 

warships, and land-based aviation that had been amassed 

to counter the nuclear threat from the new big-deck carriers being commissioned by the United States Navy.5

Facing this new threat, Adm. Sergey G. Gorshkov began a 

deliberate campaign to urge Nikita Khrushchev to reverse 

his naval outlook. As of January 1960, the Soviet leader still 

retained his view that the surface ships had a diminished 

role in the modern Soviet Navy. Gorshkov first succeeded 

in preventing the scrapping of the Sverdlov-class cruisers 

built as part of Stalin’s postwar shipbuilding program. In 

1960 and 1961, additional reassessments of naval strategy 

apparently took place within the Kremlin leadership. By the 

spring of 1962, the conversion had almost been completed 

as Khrushchev toured a Leningrad shipyard and praised 

the work on new surface ships under construction.6

If Khrushchev had any doubts of the value of a strong blue 

water Navy, they evaporated after the Cuban Missile Crisis. 

After the conclusion of the crisis, Khrushchev reportedly 

summoned Admiral Gorshkov. The soon to-be-deposed 

Ukrainian told his navy chief that neither he nor any successor should ever have to back down again in such a situation. 

Gorshkov assured his leader that plans were being implemented to prevent a repetition of such humiliation in the 

future.7

 Gorshkov had reason to offer such reassurance. Soviet 

shipyards were beginning to produce the type of warships 

3 Ibid., 59-61, 63-65.

4 Michael MccGwire, “The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy: 1960–74,” in Soviet Naval

Policy: Objectives and Constraints, ed. Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth, and John McDonnell

(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 506; Sergei G. Gorshkov, “Razvitie Sovetskogo

Voenno-morshogo iskusstva” (Development of Soviet Naval Art), Morskoi Sbornik No. 2

(February 1967): 19–20, quoted in Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, 68.

5 Gary E. Weir, Forged in War: The Naval-Industrial Complex and American Submarines

Construction, 1940–1960 (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center. 1993), 246–48, 263.

6

 Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, 71–73; Michael MccGwire, “The Evolution of Soviet Naval

Policy,” Soviet Naval Policy, 507–08.

7

 As told to then Secretary of the Navy John Warner by Gorshkov during the 1972 Moscow 

summit. John W. Warner, interview by Thomas B. Allen, 6 June 1989. Interview provided 

by Allen.

An aerial starboard beam view of a Soviet Charlie I class nuclear-powered submarine underway
2 6

that could be deployed away from home waters. Late in 1962, 

the Soviets completed the first of four Kynda-class cruisers. 

Armed with large deck canisters containing SS-N-3 anti-ship 

cruise missiles, this first modern Russian warship class 

displaced 5,500 tons fully loaded. Early in the following year, 

the Kynda was joined by another revolutionary ship class: the 

Kashin. Featuring a gas turbine propulsion plant over a decade 

before any American warships did, the Kashin offered high 

speed and an ability to get underway at the flick of a switch. 

These sleek warships packed an intimidating array of sensors 

and weapon systems, some modified to carry the SS-N-2 

Styx surface-to-surface missile. With the addition of these 

modern warships to a fleet that already held an inventory of 

fourteen Sverdlov-class light gun cruisers completed during 

the Stalin shipbuilding program, plus assorted conventional 

destroyers and frigates, Admiral Gorshkov finally could 

begin to challenge western supremacy on the high seas.8

“Could the Soviet Union agree to the age-old dominance 

on seas and oceans of the world by western maritime 

powers, especially in conditions which allow the extension of these areas as nuclear launch platforms? 

Of course not!” wrote the Soviet Navy Commanderin-Chief.9

 To demonstrate their developing naval 

capabilities, the Soviets conducted two massive global 

OKEAN naval exercises in 1970 and then in 1975.

Soviet submarines remained a major concern to the Americans 

three decades after the struggle in the North Atlantic 

against German U-boats. The Soviets had always maintained 

a large undersea fleet. By the early 1970s, that fleet was 

composed of both conventional diesel-electric and nuclearpropelled classes. In addition to launching torpedoes, 

many of the newer Soviet submarines could fire missiles at

surface ships. While some, such as the Juliett and Echo 

II classes, had to surface to fire their missile salvos, the 

Charlie-class could launch its anti-ship missiles from below 

the surface.10 Newer classes of surface warships entering the 

Soviet naval inventory compounded the problem. The Kresta 

and Kara classes, typifying the new-construction Soviet 

warships, bristled with weapons and electronic sensors and 

were increasingly seen on the world’s oceans. Meanwhile, 

shore-based Soviet naval aviation aircraft carrying long-range 

air-to-ship missiles posed another threat. Under Gorshkov, 

the submarine remained the capital ship in the naval inventory for countering American submarine and surface forces. 

However, to complement Soviet submarine deployments 

and contribute to the hunt for American ballistic-missile 

“...Soviet naval deployments 

would eventually cover all 

areas of the globe—including 

the Caribbean. The Cold War 

at sea entered a new era.”

8 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief

of Naval Operations, 1978), 30–31.

9

 Sergei Gorshkov, The Seapower of the State (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 119–23.

10 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 72, 74, 76.

Honor Guard of Soviet Navy
27

submarines, Gorshkov ordered his growing surface fleet away 

from home waters. The need to deploy to the Mediterranean 

became a major priority, given the American deployment of 

Polaris missile submarines into this basin beginning in 1963. 

Despite relative inexperience, lack of training, and logistical 

difficulties, by mid-1964 Soviet warships had established 

a continual presence in the Mediterranean Sea that would 

only grow larger. Soviet naval units also ventured farther 

out into the Atlantic and Pacific. As additional modern 

combatants joined the fleet, Soviet naval deployments 

would eventually cover all areas of the globe—including 

the Caribbean. The Cold War at sea entered a new era.11

U.S. naval leaders agreed that maintaining the North Atlantic 

SLOCs was a critical mission and practiced for that contingency in exercises such as Northern Wedding. However, they 

thought that the Navy could do more than reenact World War 

II’s Battle of the North Atlantic to help stem the Red Army 

push in Central Europe. Besides, there were indicators that 

the Soviet naval strategy was shifting away from the sea denial 

mission that the Nazis had pursued three decades earlier.

With the commissioning of Delta-class ballistic missile 

submarines in the 1970s with 4,000-mile-range SS-N-8 

ballistic missiles, the Soviet strategic submarine force did not 

need to venture past the ASW chokepoints constructed by 

the United States and its allies along the northeastern rim 

of the Atlantic and the northwestern rim of the Pacific. Since 

the Deltas could launch ballistic missile attacks from the

Barents Sea or the Sea of Okhotsk, Western analysts speculated that the Soviets were configuring their fleet to complement a strategy that would establish and protect Soviet 

SSBN bastions.12

In retrospect, the indicators were obvious. Whereas Soviet 

ships built in the 1960s such as the Kynda, Kresta I, and 

Kashin-classes featured anti-ship missiles as a component 

of their main batteries, the Kresta II, Kara, Krivak, and 

Kiev-class ships of the 1970s were armed with antisubmarine missiles for use against American SSNs.13 Analysts did 

not immediately recognize the Soviet shift because of an

intelligence blunder that classified the main missile carried 

by Kresta II and Kara-class cruisers and Krivak-class 

destroyers as an anti-ship missile. One intelligence officer 

noted that the Soviets had classified the Kresta II and Kara 

as large ASW ships, “but we simply did not believe them.”14

By 1975, Western intelligence analysts had finally begun to 

conclude that the Kresta II, Kara, and Krivak-classes indeed 

had an ASW mission. The same was true of the Kiev 

when this ship became operational in 1976. The largest Soviet 

surface warship built to date, featuring an angled flight 

deck that initially carried helicopters and later could operate 

vertical/short take-off and landing (VSTOL) jet aircraft, 

the Kiev was seen by Western naval analysts as a first step 

in challenging Western carrier and air power dominance on 

the high seas. When the Soviets declared that the ship 

was a “large aircraft carrying cruiser,” analysts simply saw 

that as a ploy to get her legally through the Dardenelles to 

conform to the Montreux Convention, which forbade the 

transit of aircraft carriers through the strait. However, with 

her complement of KA-25 Hormone helicopters and assorted ASW weaponry, the Kiev also had an ASW mission.15 

After 1975, the Soviets conducted no more OKEAN global fleet 

exercises to practice delivering a crippling blow to Western 

naval forces in a coordinated, devastating strike. By the late 

1970s, analysts had begun speculating about a new Soviet 

bastion strategy, and U.S. naval leaders had to account for this 

trend in their calculus on how to use the fleet if war broke 

out.16 U.S. Navy operational commanders reacted. In the 

Pacific, during his tenure as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific 

Fleet, from 1977 to 1978, Adm. Thomas B. Hayward developed a “Sea Strike Project” that envisioned Pacific Fleet units 

conducting offensive actions against the eastern Soviet Union. 

In the 1980s the Soviet Navy continued to grow in size 

and capability, but was challenged by a reinvestment in 

American sea power by the Reagan administration that 

aimed for a 600 ship navy to execute a “Maritime Strategy.” 

In the late 1980s, recognizing that a naval arms race was 

hurtful to the Soviet economy, Soviet president Mikhail 

Gorbachov took a less confrontational approach to the 

western alliance with “Glasnost.” This easing of relations 

and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union, effectively eliminated the Russian Navy as a serious threat to the 

United States for nearly two-decades. Today, the Russian 

Navy is again demonstrating a blue water capability but still 

remains far less capable than its Cold War predecessor. 

Excepted from Dr. Winkler’s dissertation. Cold War At Sea

(American University, 1998) to be republished in December by 

the Naval Institute Press under the title Incidents At Sea: 

Confrontations and Cooperation between the United States, Russia,

and China, 1946–2016.

11 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 13-15. See also Michael MccGwire, “The Evolution 

of Soviet Naval Policy: 1960–1974,” in Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, ed. 

Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth, and John McDonnell (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 

518–21; Lacouture, 32.

12 Hattendorf, “The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy,” 12–13, citing James M. McConnell, 

“Strategy and Missions of the Soviet Navy in the Year 2000,’’ in James L. George, ed., Problems 

of Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-First Century (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 

Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), 61–62.

13 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 84–86, 88, 90.

14 Muir, Black Shoes and Blue Water, 200; Norman Polmar, Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the 

1970s, rev. ed. (New York, NY: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1974), 45–46, cites these ships 

as having anti-ship missiles.

15 For a critique of the Kiev emphasizing her role as an aircraft carrier, see Polmar, Soviet Naval 

Power, 53–54.

16 Hattendorf, “The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy,’’ 12–13.
2 8

Key Events During the Cold War

1950 1960

1953

Stalin dies

Khrushchev becomes

General Secretary 

1956

Hungarian Revolution

“We will bury you” 

1957

Sputnik launched

1961

Construction of 

Berlin Wall

1963

Nuclear Test 

Ban Treaty

1964

Brezhnev becomes 

First Secretary

1968

Prague Spring

Eisenhower

1953–1961

Kennedy

1961–1963

Johnson

1963–1969

1962

Cuban Missile Crisis

1964

Gulf of Tonkin 

Resolution

united

states

soviet

union

Stalin

1941–1953

Khrushchev

1953–1964

Brezhnev

1964–1982
29

1970 1980

1972

SALT and 

ABM Treaties

1973

Yom Kippur War

1975

Saigon falls

1979

USSR invades 

Afghanistan

1983

Able Archer war scare

1989

Berlin Wall falls

Nixon

1969–1974

Ford

1974–1977

Carter

1977–1981

Reagan

1981–1989

1972

Nixon to China

1974

Nixon resigns

1979

U.S. Embassy in 

Tehran seized

Chernenko 1984–1985

Andropov

1982–1984

Gorbachev

1985–1991
Catalog of Documents and Summaries 

Finished Intelligence, 

Clandestine Reporting, and Other Sources

This catalog contains a list and summaries of the declassified clandestine source 

reports and finished intelligence publications by chapter. There are also memoranda

between the CIA and NSC officials, with officials from policy-making agencies 

and departments, as well as within the Intelligence Community. The documents are 

generally arrayed chronologically, according to the dates of dissemination within the 

IC, not the dates of publication by the Soviets, which sometimes were years earlier. 

For every newly-released document in the catalog there is some commentary 

describing the background and substance of the clandestine report or the analysis. 

In some cases, there are additional comments, pertaining to customer comments, 

for example, describing the impact on U.S. policy, or some context for a 

clandestine report. 
31

Much of the text in this section is from the foreword to

“Essential Facts of the Penkovskiy Case,” from Deputy 

Director for Plans, Richard Helms, CIA/DP Memorandum for the DCI, 31 May 1963.

Soviet military ranks, “general-mayor and generalleytenant,” are one-star and two-star ranks respectively.

To avoid confusion with U.S. military ranks, they are

not translated. 

The Soviet term, “front,” approximates a Western 

army group plus an air army in support. It is underlined

to avoid confusion with the usual U.S. military 

term, front, meaning forward area or front line. 

Similarly it is not always possible to find precise English 

synonyms for the military nomenclature used by Soviet 

naval writers. Even the Soviet authors themselves do not 

always agree on the precise meaning and scope of coverage 

of some military terms. Moreover, the conceptual scope 

of these Soviet terms differs from seemingly similar U.S. 

terms, as shown in the following highly simplified diagram:

 

United States Soviet

Grand Strategy Strategy

Strategy Operational Art

Tactics Tactics

The term military science had been defined in the USSR as 

“a unified system of knowledge on preparing and conducting 

armed struggle in the interests of defending the socialist 

fatherland against imperialist aggression...It studied armament and technology, working out the most effective 

methods and forms of armed struggle, the basic principles 

in organizing the army and navy, and the training and 

upbringing of the armed forces personnel. It also took into

account and studied economics and moral, political, and 

military capabilities of the imperialist aggressors.” 

In November 1961, Minister of Defense Malinovskiy used 

the term doctrine to refer to the “theses” he enunciated 

in his speech before the Twenty-Second Party Congress. 

Malinovskiy established a new trend in the use of this term, 

and subsequent Soviet commentators attempted to use the 

term in a similar manner. Another Soviet definition from 

the same period is the term military doctrine, defined as 

embracing “unified principled views of a guiding nature, 

touching on the nature and aims of a possible war, the 

basic problems of preparing the country and the people 

for repelling an imperialist aggression, and the basic 

problems of organizing and consolidating the combat power 

of the USSR armed forces and their utilization in war.”

The CIA translations of Soviet military terminology 

conform as nearly as possible to U.S. practice, as follows:

• Grand military strategy is the science and art of employing 

all of the armed forces to achieve national objectives.

• Strategy embraces all phases of planning, disposition, 

and general employment of armed forces preliminary to 

their contact with an enemy force. This term is similar 

to, although less broad in scope than, the Soviet term

operational art.

• Strategic defense includes strategic planning directed toward 

attaining national objectives and the use of armed forces in 

the large-scale or over-all defense of the country by preventing or repulsing attacks by the enemy’s armed forces.

• Mission is the major continuing duty assigned to naval, air, 

or ground forces as their part in strategic defense.

• Task is a definite, usually operational, objective assigned to a 

unit or group of units within the naval, air, or ground forces.

• Doctrine refers to officially formulated and accepted principles for conducting military operations or principles intended or proposed by military theorists for the future conduct of 

naval combat.

• Tactics denote the maneuvering of forces during combat.

A Note about Translating Soviet Military Ranks 

and Naval Terminology to English

33

The documents included in this collection showcase a range 

of topics from the mundane to reports on Soviet submarines 

and the introduction of nuclear propulsion and nuclear 

armed missiles, and represent a variety of types of intelligence products. They tell the story of the movement of the 

Clandestine Service from modest beginnings to increasing 

accomplishment, and the expansion of DI military analysis 

to cover Soviet military capabilities, intentions, and threat. 

The collection also highlights internal debates about 

roles and doctrine. Included are documents Colonel Oleg 

Penkovskiy provided containing articles in the debate 

among the Soviet high-ranking military officers conducted 

during the period 1960–62. The debate centered on the 

role of and doctrine for nuclear weapons and missiles in a 

war with NATO in Europe, including the role of the navy

in a future war. The collection includes articles by both 

sides in the debate, some of which directly attack positions 

taken by other officers in articles appearing in the special 

collection of top secret and secret Military Thought issues. 

The editors have included several Military Thought articles 

that do not primarily address naval issues, but describe 

a strategy that would seem to exclude or reduce the role 

of naval forces to which naval officers responded. 

Other documents include information and documents 

provided by clandestine sources, finished intelligence 

analysis documents, and estimates of the Soviet naval forces, 

their capabilities, doctrine, strategy, and intentions 

relevant to the evolution of Soviet naval operations in areas 

distant from the USSR. The collection also shows the 

long-term utility of intelligence information in formulating 

analysis; a number of documents depict discussions of future 

Soviet naval strategy, operations, and tactics during the 

1970s and beyond that were clandestinely obtained by 

CIA during the period following the 1968 Warsaw Pact 

invasion of Czechoslovakia through the first half of the 1980s. 

Documents such as the Military Thought articles—many 

previously released—remained valuable for years because 

of the nature of the classified discussions on such topics 

as the initial period of war, naval doctrine, and the role 

of surface vessels, submarines and air defense forces in 

various warfare situations. As a collection such documents 

formed the basis of the watershed estimate of Soviet naval 

operations and strategy presented in NIE 11-14-79. Also 

important are the analyses of Soviet antisubmarine warfare 

strategy, the readiness of Soviet forces, and interdiction 

of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs), some of 

which were controversial in the intelligence community.

As additional context for the reader, CIA participation in the collection and production of intelligence in 

the 1950s was constrained by NSCIDs. See NSCID 

No. 1 (revised), Duties and Responsibilities, 28 March 

1952; NSCID No. 2, Coordination of Collection 

Activities Abroad, 13 January 1948; NSCID No. 3, 

Coordination of Intelligence Production for details

about the responsibilities of the CIA and other IC entities. 

These NSCIDs limited the role of CIA to economic and 

scientific collection and analysis, and directed the military 

services to provide military intelligence. The revised version 

of NSCID No. 3, Coordination of Intelligence Production, 

21 April 1958, broadened the areas about which the CIA 

could produce intelligence to include military intelligence.

Overview of the Catalog
3 4

Soviet Naval Arsenals, 

CIA/DP Information Report, 7 September 1954 

This reporting provides limited information about two 

possible naval support installations in the USSR. 

Alleged New Type of Soviet Submarine,

CIA/DP Information Report; 10 August 1955

This reporting contains second-hand information and rumors 

about a new submarine that reportedly could operate to a 

depth of 400 meters, where it was believed it could not be 

detected by aircraft and was secure from depth charges. 

(1) Conversion of Soviet Naval Vessels to Nuclear 

Propulsion and Missile Weapons, (2) Operational Status 

of Soviet Atomic Submarine, CIA/DP 

Intelligence Information Report, 20 June 1957 

This reporting provides second-hand information 

claiming nuclear-powered submarines and surface vessels 

were being built in the USSR and one nuclear-powered 

submarine was in operation. The source reported he believed 

an official announcement had been made stating that Soviet 

ships were to convert to nuclear systems and missiles. 

Soviet Government Acceptance of a Series 

Production Nuclear Submarine in 1957, 

CIA/DP Information Report, 23 September 1958 

This reporting relates information from an unidentified

Soviet naval officer claiming he had been sent to Leningrad in 1957 to accept a nuclear submarine,

which was one of a series in production. 

“The Utilization of the Forces of the Navy in a 

Nuclear-Missile War,” by Rear Admiral V. Lisyutin, 

special collection, Military Thought, top secret 

issue No. 1, 13 January 1961, CIA/DP 

Information Report, 12 December 1961 

The article discusses the combat goal of disorganizing and 

destroying U.S. capability to support a nuclear war and its 

capabilities for nuclear attack. The author looks at missions 

naval and aviation forces could accomplish. They include 

the strategic mission of destroying enemy transport and 

other ships carrying wartime supplies of weapons, delivery 

systems, forces and fuel, a portion of which he believes 

would probably be dispersed at sea at the beginning of a 

war. He believes the strategic missile troops were not yet 

ready to accomplish these missions effectively, but that it 

was a mission the navy and aviation could accomplish.

“The Nature of Modern Warfare,” by Colonel General 

A. Kh. Babadzhanyan, special collection Military Thought, 

top secret issue No. 1, 1961, CIA/DP Information

 Report, 18 January 1962

Babadzhanyan reviews the positions on the nature of 

modern war taken by five Soviet general officers in articles 

published in the special collection of top secret Military 

Thought issues during the period 1960–1961. (Editors’ 

note: For the Five Generals’ articles see Goryainov, 1960; 

Gastilovich and Tolkonyuk, 1960; Tolkonyuk, 1960, 

Baskakov, 1960; Kurochkin, 1960) Babadzhanyan contests 

the views of Gastilovich et al on the singularly decisive 

nature of nuclear weapons in modern warfare, but he 

sees merit in the arguments of General Kurochkin who 

seeks a more balanced mix of missile and ground forces.

“To Develop the Theory of Soviet Military Art,” by 

Admiral V. Tributs, special collection Military 

Thought, top secret issue No. 3, 17 October 1960, 

CIA/DP Information Report, 23 February 1962 

The article illustrates the continuing interest in changing 

naval strategy and doctrine long after the death of Stalin. 

Admiral Tributs expresses support for Marshal Malinovskiy’s 

decision to establish the special collection of Military Thought

to develop a new theory of military art and to close the gap 

in developing a unified view on waging nuclear war. He 

singles out the period of threat and the initial period of war 

as the most important military problems needing solutions. 

He disagrees with the authors appearing in the special 

collection of Military Thought who assert war could begin 

suddenly and a period of threat would not occur under 

modern conditions. He declares the period of threat will 

always occur but its duration could be extremely short. 

He disagrees with those who assert preparations for a surprise 

attack against the Soviet Union could not be detected 

and agrees there would be warning sufficient to allow for 

preparations and readiness of all forces. His list of indications 

of an imminent threat include: sociopolitical, economic, 

mobilization, and military measures, as well as defensive 

measures undertaken by the populous and the military 

preparations for combat operations. He emphasizes the 

importance of increased intelligence collection to ensure 

ample warning and to prepare naval and other forces to defeat 

an initial attack. He concludes with a critique of Colonel 

General Gastilovich’s Military Thought article that disparages 

the use of naval forces to defeat enemy amphibious landings 

along the coastal front. Admiral Tributs asserts that the 

best defense against seaborne invasions is before they reach 

Catalog
35

land, not after they have already landed as he characterizes 

Gastilovich’s position supporting a massive use of nuclear 

missiles. (Editors’ note: For the articles mentioned in this 

article see Gastilovich and Tolkonyuk, 1960; Zakharov, 1970)

“On the Problems of the Tasks of the Navy and Methods for 

Accomplishing Them,” by Admiral V. Kasatonov, special 

collection, Military Thought, top secret issue No. 4, 20 

October 1961, CIA/DP Information Report, 15 May 1962 

The article is critical of Admiral V. Platonov’s article, 

The Missions of the Navy and Methods of Carrying Them 

Out. (Editors’ note: See Platonov, 1961.) The author 

questions several of Platonov’s propositions about naval 

operations in a future war. For example, he believes there 

is no basis for Platonov’s assertion that enemy carrier groups 

would operate mainly on the open sea. He cites Western 

military specialists, NATO command, and numerous U.S. 

and NATO exercises carried out by joint naval forces to 

demonstrate the ability of carrier groups to maneuver in 

small areas and cover large distances in minimum time. 

He also believes the enemy would not choose to operate 

carrier groups in coastal waters. He disputes Platonov’s idea 

that carrier groups should provide cover for convoys or be 

part of a complement of hunter-killer groups of antisubmarine defenses in remote areas. He disagrees with Platonov 

on his low evaluation of the long-range possibilities of 

nuclear-armed aircraft because their range is insufficient at 

low altitudes, which Platonov claims will impede their use in 

distant areas of the ocean. He agrees, however, with Platonov 

on the threat from enemy nuclear-armed submarines and 

the Soviet “less than perfect” capability to defeat them. He 

believes it is wrong to rely solely on a single weapon. Instead 

he suggests using an array of weapons to defeat the submarines and employing nuclear-armed aircraft alone only in 

an emergency. He disagrees with Platonov’s opinion that 

there is no other way to defeat submarines and with Platonov’s pessimistic evaluation of the capability of Soviet naval 

aviation to detect submarines. He believes the technology for 

detecting submarines and flight ranges at low altitudes had 

improved. His solution to the problem is to improve the ability 

to detect submarines and an array of weapons to attack them. 

“Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation 

on a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a War,” by 

Colonel General Khetagurov, special collection Military 

Thought, top secret issue No. 4, 20 October 1961, 

CIA/DP Information Report, 28 May 1962 

This author agrees with the thesis espoused by the ‘modernist Khrushchev group in the special collection of Military 

Thought articles. The thesis claims the initial period of war 

would be characterized by nuclear-missile attacks by both 

sides; the strikes would set the operational-strategic situation 

in the theaters of military operations and determine the tasks 

facing the maritime fronts. The author differentiates between 

ICBM attacks and those carried out in a theater of military 

operations. The naval missile fleets would participate in the 

latter case with their forces forming the basis of the strategic 

offensive in the theaters of military operations. He believes 

a thorough examination of all aspects of the concept, including 

the makeup of the forces and the expected results are necessary to correctly plan the maritime-axis front operation. The 

remainder of the article contains his analysis of the elements 

for, and the planning of, such an operation. (Editors’ note: 

The articles mentioned in the text and in the footnotes of this 

article are in order of appearance: Gorbatov, 1960; Gusakovskiy, 1960; Babadzhanyam, 1961; Field Service Regulations, 

1959; Malykhin, 1960; Ivanov, 1961; Kastonov, 1960)

Cuba 1962: Khrushchev’s Miscalculated Risk,

CIA/DI/ORR Staff Study, 13 February 1964

This is one of the definitive CIA analyses of the 1962 

Cuban Missile Crisis conducted immediately following 

the agreement by Khrushchev to remove the missiles from 

Cuba in 1962. Part One, Section IV contains evidence 

concerning the nature, scope and timing of the Soviet naval 

buildup in Cuba and the implications of that evidence. 

Leningrad Enters Nuclear Submarine Program with New 

Attack Class, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, 1 May 1968 

This report merges theoretical information about naval 

strategy found in the 1960–62 Soviet top secret special collection of Military Thought articles with other evidence about 

submarine production. It describes the increased Soviet efforts 

to produce nuclear-powered submarines in larger numbers and 

states the program reflects the expanded role of the Navy in 

strategic offense and in defense against western naval forces. 

The Soviet Y-Class Submarine Construction Program,

CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, October 1968

The report states that the production of this submarine at 

the Severodvinsk shipyard probably will reach a level of six 

per year by 1969 because of new construction techniques. 

The paper also reports that Y-class submarines may be 

under construction in the Soviet Far East. The paper 

predicts that the tempo of construction at Severodivnsk 

could result in a fleet of nearly 35 submarines by 1974 and 

that the program could enable this goal a year sooner. 

The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron,

CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, December 1968

This report provides intelligence on expanded Soviet distant 

naval operations after the publication of NIE 11-6-67. It 

provides more documentation and a broader assessment 

of Soviet intentions for, and capabilities of, the growth 

of distant operations of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. 
3 6

Contribution to NIE 11-14-69, Soviet and East European 

General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, August 1969

The OSR contribution examines Soviet capabilities against 

submarines, carrier task forces and Sea Lines of Communications. OSR also scrutinized Soviet “forward posture” 

capabilities and that of East European naval forces. An annex 

covers Warsaw Pact general purpose naval forces, Soviet 

general purpose large combatant ships; Soviet general purpose 

naval air forces and Eastern European naval strength at 

midyear 1969. OSR concludes that the Soviets had pressed 

forward with a number of maritime programs and had 

emerged as one of the major maritime nations. For example, 

since 1945 the Soviet navy’s missions had extended beyond 

coastal defense, support of theater forces and anti-shipping 

operations. The emphasis had changed to defense against 

U.S. carrier and ballistic missile submarine forces and to 

strengthening Soviet strategic strike capability. Moscow also 

had increased the use of its naval forces for political ends, 

notably in the Mediterranean. The analysts estimated that the 

Soviet Navy’s missions would not change appreciably during 

the 1970s, assessing that Moscow would continue increasing 

its capabilities for long-range operations. For example, OSR 

reported the Soviet merchant marine had trebled its tonnage 

since 1959; and its fishing fleet was one of the world’s largest, 

ranking third in fish catch. The analysts concluded that the 

USSR had a large oceanographic fleet comparable to that of 

the United States, but that its research activities fell behind 

Western work in some qualitative aspects. OSR predicted 

that the Soviets would continue their efforts on undersea 

warfare, development of fisheries and would devote increasing attention to exploring the mineral resources of the sea

The Soviet Attack Submarine Force: Evolution and Operations,

CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Memorandum, 1 September 1971 

The memorandum traces the evolution in the missions of the 

Soviet attack submarine force during the period 1950–71 

and describes the various classes of attack submarines the 

Soviets had built. It briefly describes the operations and 

capabilities of the force and speculates about trends in 

force composition, capabilities, and operations. An annex 

contains the characteristics of Soviet attack submarines. 

The Soviet Naval Cruise Missile Force: Development and Operational Employment, CIA/DI/

OSR Intelligence Report, 1 December 1971

The report provides the history behind the Soviet decision 

in the 1950s to build cruise missiles to counter the threat 

posed by Western aircraft carriers. It describes the acceleration in Soviet development of cruise missile forces 

beginning in the mid-1960s, discusses the Soviet cruise 

missiles and their missions in the Soviet Navy in 1971, and 

describes projected cruise missile force levels for 1975. 

The Uses of Soviet Military Power in Distant Areas 

Annexes A through I, 15 December 1971 

Tied to NIE 11-10-71, these annexes provide detailed 

information regarding specific Soviet military capabilities and logistics in areas such as the Indian Ocean, 

Mediterranean, and western Africa, as well as information on basing arrangements and airlift capabilities. 

Soviet Capabilities to Counter U.S. Aircraft Carriers, 

CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, 1 May 1972

The report reviews the history of the Soviet naval forces 

designed specifically to counter Western aircraft carriers 

beginning in the mid-1950s with the Soviet decision to 

concentrate on cruise missiles as the weapon best suited to 

counter the threat. The report describes how those capabilities continued to grow through the 1960s as the Soviet 

naval operations expanded beyond their coastal waters and 

they recognized the need to protect their deployed naval 

forces from the carrier-based air power. It discusses how 

the cruise missiles became the main armament on Soviet 

submarines, aircraft, and surface ships designed to combat 

Western surface forces. Finally, the report describes the 

Soviet response to the U.S. carrier threat, tracing the development of the anti-carrier forces, describing their operations, and examining recent improvements in these forces. 

Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare: Current Capabilities and 

Priorities, CIA/DI/OSR and DST/Office of Scientific 

Intelligence, Intelligence Report, 1 September 1972

The report examines the evolution of attack submarines 

beginning with WW I, when they emerged as a serious 

threat to surface ships, through the advent of ballistic missile 

submarines that radically altered the dimensions of the 

ASW problem for the Soviets. It describes the first Soviet 

efforts in open ocean ASW coinciding with the post–WW 

II venture of the Soviet Navy from coastal waters onto the 

high seas and its subsequent development of ASW defenses. The report then examines the Soviet response to the 

emergence of the U.S. nuclear-attack submarine in the late 

1950s that increased Moscow’s longstanding concern for 

the security of its coastal areas, and examines Soviet efforts 

to develop ASW defenses in coastal areas as well as on the 

open ocean. The report judges that by the mid-1960s the 

Soviets probably had enough experience to realize that their 

conventional naval forces could not solve the problem of the 

Polaris submarine. This report then evaluates the spectrum 

of Soviet ASW operations, including early-1970s ASW 

methods, the ships and aircraft employed, and the organization and command and control of Soviet ASW forces. 
37

“Surface Effects Vehicles and Other Developments in 

Antisubmarine Warfare,” (“Amphibian Antisubmarine 

Forces,”) by Captain First Rank A. Potemkin, Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 1, 1970, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 18 April 1973

The article discusses the use of amphibious aircraft and 

surface-effect vehicles in antisubmarine warfare. The author 

describes new developments for detecting submarines, 

emphasizing sound-ranging and underwater surveillance. 

Along with standard antisubmarine weapons, the author 

mentions a remote-controlled torpedo directed from helicopters operating either from shore or off helicopter carriers. 

“The Location and Destruction of Polaris Submarines,” 

(“Some Problems of Combat with Nuclear Missile 

Submarines,”) by Rear Admiral N. Gonchar, Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1968, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 22 May 1973 

The article addresses identifying patrol areas of enemy 

nuclear missile submarines, determining effective search 

methods and the best methods to attack them. The author 

is most concerned with locating and identifying Polaris 

submarines in peacetime rather than waiting for a crisis or 

the outbreak of war. He assumes U.S. missiles are ready for 

launch within 15 minutes and are not limited to specific 

launch areas. He recommends establishing zonal defenses 

to locate Polaris submarines and “explosive signaling for 

communications relay” to hunter-killer submarines. 

(Editors’ note: Rear Admiral Gonchar believed that Soviet 

antisubmarine submarines must carry out searches for the 

enemy [Polaris SSBNs] at “great depths (130 to 240 meters).” 

He proposed using a relay submarine operating at a depth 

consistent with current radio frequency propagation wherein 

the relay submarine receives the long distance radio commands 

and converts them to a combination of small explosions in 

accordance with a specific previously established signal. The 

explosives are to be set to activate near the floor of the underwater sound channel with consequent propagation of the 

simple message over as much as several thousand kilometers.)

Soviet Naval Shipbuilding Programs: Impact on Major Surface 

Forces, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, 1 November 1973

The report describes the Soviet program to construct new 

major surface combatants and to modernize some older 

types and the growing problem of obsolescence affecting 

many of the ships in the 1973 force. For example, in late 

1973 the Soviets had over a dozen new surface combatants 

under construction including two VSTOL aircraft carriers, 

four frigates, at least seven destroyers, and probably a few 

ocean escorts. The Soviets also had programs to improve 

antisubmarine, air defense, and probably anti-ship systems 

on destroyers and to install improved antisubmarine systems 

on ocean escorts. Programs to modernize older combatants, 

some of which were built in the early 1950s, included the 

conversion of two cruisers to command ships and the addition 

of surface-to-air missiles to a number of destroyers. The 

report judges that to maintain the size of the force would 

require either an increase in new construction substantially above 1973 levels or retaining aging ships of doubtful 

combat effectiveness. Subsequent events showed the Soviets 

had accepted some reduction in the size of the forces while 

deploying fewer, but relatively more capable, surface ships. 

“Increasing Soviet Capability to Operate against Missile 

Submarines” by General-Mayor (Aviation) P. Nevzorov, 

Military Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1966, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 25 February 1974 

The article characterizes Soviet forces as generally capable 

of assisting in operations against enemy missile submarines 

and makes recommendations for improving these capabilities. The author disagrees with the thesis of Colonel G. 

Lebedev in his article appearing in Military Thought, Issue 

No. 1, 1965 that long-range aviation can combat missile 

submarines. He rules out long-range as a significant element 

in antisubmarine warfare, but builds a case for upgrading 

other antisubmarine warfare aircraft forces and equipment. 

He advises Soviet forces to carry out preemptive attacks 

against missile submarines or destroy them after only a few 

of their missiles have been launched. (Editors’ Note: The 

article by Colonel G. Lebedev mentioned on page one of 

this article has not been found in the CIA archives.) 

“The Employment of Tactical Rockets against Naval 

Targets” (“The Rocket Troops of the Ground Forces 

in Combat with Naval Targets”) by Marshal of Artillery K. Kazakov, commander of Rocket Troops 

and Artillery of the Soviet Ground Forces, Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 2, 1968, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 7 May 1974 

The article examines possibilities for using tactical rockets 

against naval targets. The author looks at the possibility 

of using four rockets with ranges of 65 to 500 kilometers with yields of 10 to 500 kilotons against probable 

naval targets such as enemy nuclear attack capabilities, 

carrier strike forces, and amphibious landing forces. 

“Coordination of Warsaw Pact Naval Forces in the 

Black Sea” (“Some Problems of Improving the Control 

of Naval Forces in Combined Combat Operations”) 

by Rear Admiral V.G. Yanakiyev, commander-in-chief 

of the Bulgarian Navy, Information Collection of the 

Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined 

Armed Forces, secret issue No. 4, 1972, published by 

Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 11 June 1974

The article discusses the necessity of creating a reliable 

system for controlling combined Warsaw Pact naval actions. 

It recommends expanding the system of communications 

among the allies’ naval command posts, adopting more 

sophisticated equipment, and establishing communications 
3 8

among computer centers. The article also recommends introducing unified planning and measures to detect and maintain 

surveillance of enemy groups, using the U.S. Sixth Fleet as an 

example because it enters the Black Sea several times a year. 

Soviet Naval Strategy: Concepts and Forces for 

Theater War against NATO, CIA/DI/OSR

Intelligence Report, January 1975 

Based mainly on classified and open-source Soviet naval 

writings, the author concludes: Soviet naval strategists as of 

1975 had become more flexible in their view of the possible 

course of development of a theater war with NATO.

Likely future developments in Soviet naval strategy for

theater war with NATO would include greater emphasis

on open-ocean ASW, greater use of submarine 

launched ballistic missiles, and the development

of increased capabilities for conventional war. 

“Certain Problems in the Coordination of Large Units and 

Units of Allied Navies in Combined Tactical Exercises,” 

by Rear Admiral V. Saakyan, Information Collection of the 

Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined 

Armed Forces, published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters, 

Moscow, secret issue No. 5, 1973, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 February 1975 

The author reviews problems coordinating combined 

naval forces in minesweeping efforts and in ASW and 

air- and antimissile-defense during combat operations in a 1972 tactical exercise. Although generally 

successful, the exercise demonstrated a need for more 

emphasis on underwater sabotage and communications in future combined training operations. 

“Some Questions Regarding Coordination of the Hydrographic Services of the Navies,” by Engineer Captain 

First Rank K.F. Smirnov, Information Collection of the 

Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined 

Armed Forces, published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters, 

Moscow, secret issue No. 2, 1971, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 February 1975 

The article deals with hydrographic support to the combined 

operations of Warsaw Pact navies. The author proposes 

that the efforts of the individual hydrographic services 

be coordinated in volume, location and time, and that 

these services cooperate in theater studies, cartographic 

production and in preparing operating instructions for 

a common system of navigational and hydrographic support.

“Forms of Coordination of Allied Navies,” by Rear 

Admiral Kh. Petrashkevich, chief of staff of the Polish Navy, 

Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical

Committee of the Combined Armed Forces, published by 

Warsaw Pact Headquarters, Moscow, secret issue No. 2, 1971,

CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 

28 March 1975 

This article addresses several aspects of coordinating among 

Warsaw Pact navies including planning, communications, 

and control in combined exercises and other activities. 

Soviet Fleet Logistics: Capabilities and Limitations, 

CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, 1 August 1976 

The report describes the Soviet concept for providing supplies 

to naval forces. It describes the naval ships dedicated to 

supplying the naval operations and the merchant ships 

subordinated to the Navy and available to sustain large-scale 

noncombatant operations. The report describes the Soviet 

logistics system capabilities and judges it to be ineffective 

should the USSR become engaged in sustained combat operations. The report judges the Soviets will try to improve their 

logistics capabilities, including constructing new supply ships, 

but is uncertain how well the system would perform under 

combat conditions. The report concludes that, regardless of the 

plan, the Soviets will not have a fleet of logistic ships capable 

of supporting extensive combat operations for five to 10 years. 

“Tasks to be Accomplished by the Navy when Assisting 

Ground Forces Attacking on a Coastal Axis,” by Vice 

Admiral V. Em, Information Collection of the Headquarters

and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed 

Forces, secret issue No. 5 1973, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 2 August 1976 

The article examines a ground forces offensive operation 

on a coastal axis requiring support of naval forces. It 

enumerates specific tasks to be accomplished by the navy: 

destroying enemy naval forces, conducting amphibious 

landings, anti-landing defense, disrupting enemy SLOCs 

(Sea Lines of Communications), and defending Soviet 

SLOCs. He emphasizes the importance of close and well-organized cooperation and careful coordination of actions 

to achieve success. The article lists measures requiring 

cooperation and gives specific attention to coordinating the 

efforts of troops in delivering the initial massed strike. 

“Reconnaissance Indications of Preparation for a 

Surprise Attack by U.S. Naval Carrier Strike Large 

Units,” by Captain first Rank V. Anufriyev, Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 5, 1962, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 3 June 1977 

The article examines the role of Soviet attack carriers and 

the development of reconnaissance capabilities for ships 

and aircraft. The authors discuss the problems ships have in 

assessing U.S. capabilities for carrying out a surprise nuclear 

strike and Soviet capabilities and difficulties in detecting 

enemy strike preparations. They explain that the main 
39

reconnaissance indicators of U.S. preparations for a surprise 

nuclear attack are to be developed by carrier task forces at 

sea and could involve the movement of forces from the U.S. 

mainland to various parts of the globe or the activation of 

the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, the replenishment of supplies, 

increase in combat readiness, and alerts transmitted by radio. 

“Certain Problems of Superiority at Sea under Conditions 

of Closed Naval Theaters,” by Vice Admiral V. Em, Deputy 

Minister of National Defense, commander of the Navy 

of the German Democratic Republic, Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the 

Combined Armed Forces, secret issue No. 11, 1976, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 29 June 1977 

The article discusses the capabilities of naval forces for gaining 

superiority at sea in a closed naval theater. He explains 

that the prerequisites and tasks for gaining superiority 

require the massive use of ship strike forces and aircraft. He 

proposes ways of preventing the buildup of enemy forces 

once superiority has been gained to retain superiority at sea. 

Fundamentals of a Strategic Operation in a Continental Theater

 of Military Operations, by General of the Army Ivan Shavrov,

 Chief of the Military Academy of the General Staff, 

CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report,

30 September 1977 

This is a translation from Russia of an apparent draft of an

undated top secret Soviet Academy-level text or a lecture.

It provides an overview of Soviet thinking on the content, 

planning and conduct of strategic operations in the western

theater. The front is considered the basic force operating

in a continental theater in conjunction with strategic rocket 

forces, long-range aviation, air defense forces, and

the navy under the overall leadership of the Supreme

High Command. A strategic operation may include both

nuclear and non-nuclear offensive actions. The defense is 

considered a legitimate action of a forced, temporary

nature. The majority of the document is devoted to measures 

for restoring combat effectiveness and resuming the offensive following an exchange of nuclear strikes, and to a 

strategic offensive begun with conventional weapons.

“Problems of Rear Services Support of Naval Forces under 

Conditions of a Closed Theater of Naval Operations,” 

by Rear Admiral F. Scheffler, Information Collection 

of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the 

Combined Armed Forces, secret issue No. 5, 1973, published 

by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 4 October 1977 

The author describes the functions, organization, and 

procedures of rear services support of naval forces under 

conditions of a closed theater of naval operations. He 

explains the need for cooperation with the rear services 

of other armed forces branches, in this case with the 

ground forces operating on the coastal axis. He also 

explains several features characteristic of coastal theaters 

hampering or facilitating the work of the fleet rear. 

The Principles of the Organization and Control of a 

Combined Fleet in a Theater, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 31 March 1978 

The document is a draft of a secret Warsaw Pact document 

that examines the wartime organizational structure and 

system of control of the combined fleets formed in the Baltic 

and Black Sea theaters from the naval forces allocated to the 

Combined Armed Forces. The document stresses measures for 

cooperation among the forces of the national navies, including the use of standard documents and a common communications and observations system intended to ensure coordinated 

actions of the combined fleets. It lists the main tasks of the 

command of the combined fleets in peacetime and in wartime.

The Role of Interdiction at Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy 

and Operations CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report,

17 February 1978. 

This report is the first of several reports assessing the level 

of resources the Soviets would likely assign to attacks on 

merchant shipping in a war with NATO. It also assesses 

Soviet capabilities for such interdiction. Major findings 

include: the Soviets would allocate the majority of their forces

in wartime to three principal missions, strategic strike, 

antisubmarine warfare, and anticarrier warfare; they would 

conduct selected attacks on merchant shipping over a wide 

arc of ocean to disperse Western naval resources; and the 

Soviet submarine force was not optimized for operations against 

Western SLOCs in the open ocean. Major limitations of 

Soviet submarines for the anti-SLOC role were: low opertional availability and limited torpedo loads on many of the 

submarines, long transits from Soviet bases to the likely areas 

through which the SLOCs would run, and Soviet naval strike 

aviation had insufficient range to participate realistically on 

open ocean anti-SLOC operations. The report concludes the 

Soviets probably would allocate only a small portion, perhaps 

10 percent, of their attack submarine force toward this task. 

The Role of Interdiction in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Assessment, May 1978 

This CIA Intelligence Assessment is the second of several 

versions addressing interdiction of Western SLOCs. 

Each of the succeeding versions responded to concerns 

expressed by the NIO for General Purpose Forces, by 

DCI Turner, and by various Navy components. There are, 

however, no significant substantive differences in the 

two versions. (Editor’s note: For the first pieces of CIA 

analysis on this topic, see “Soviet Viewpoint on Interdiction of Merchant Shipping in Wartime,” 1977)
4 0

“Regarding Size of the NATO Owned and Controlled Merchant 

Fleet,” Memorandum for Presidential Briefing Coordinator, 

from John S. Loverro, chief, International Transportation 

Branch, International Trade and Services Division, 

CIA/DI/Office of Economic Research, 29 August 1978 

The memorandum questions the difference in data provided 

by the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) on the 

size of the NATO-flag merchant fleet with those cited 

in the Intelligence Assessment, The Role of Interdiction at 

Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations. He further 

states the NISC analysts believe there is undercounting of 

certain ships and would like to have more precise data. 

“Response to DCI Comments on SLOC Paper,” 

Memorandum for the DCI from OSR, 11 September 1978

This OSR memo addresses DCI Turner’s comments 

on the OSR intelligence memorandum preparatory 

to the DCI’s meeting with the Secretary of the Navy 

and OSR’s responses to the DCI’s comments. 

SLOC Interdiction, Memorandum from the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for the Director of 

Central Intelligence, 12 September 1978

The memorandum includes a sequence of 

Memoranda about the OSR SLOC paper.

SLOC Interdiction, Memorandum for the 

Director of Central Intelligence from the Presidential

Briefing Coordinator, 14 September 1978. 

Two days later this memorandum suggested the DCI 

attach a note proposing a joint CIA-Navy study to his 

proposed forward for a revised study on The Role of Interdiction at Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations. 

“Comments on Navy Review of Revised OSR SLOC Paper,” 

CIA/DI/OSR Memorandum to the DCI, 25 January 1979. 

OSR addresses in detail every Navy question 

about the OSR assessments of Soviet intentions 

and capabilities to interdict NATO SLOCs. 

The Soviet Attack Submarine Force and Western Sea

Lines of Communication, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence

Assessment, 1 April 1979

This widely disseminated version represents the final 

CIA analysis of the SLOC question laid out first in 

an Intelligence Report on 17 February 1978. DCI Turner, 

in an unusual move, included a foreword to this printed 

version outlining some of his views on the subject. He 

also notes his plan to sponsor an Interagency Intelligence 

Memorandum (IIM) with Navy participation to assess 

the Soviet capabilities on a broader basis. He also stressed 

the Navy would be able to supply more information 

about possible U.S. actions in interdiction scenarios. 

“Combat Actions by Naval Forces in the Process of Achieving Supremacy at Sea,” by Commander T. Mandat, Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical 

Committee of the Combined Forces, secret issue No. 12, 1976, 

published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters, Moscow, 

CIA/DO Intelligence Information Report, 15 February 1979

The article contains an overview of the basic factors involved 

in attaining supremacy at sea in an enclosed naval theater 

with the goal of supporting the coastal flanks of ground forces 

in the capture of straits. The author explains the various 

aspects of coping actively and passively with a mine threat 

and the need for air supremacy, support for amphibious 

operations, and blockade action. The article also discusses 

organizing for combat, combat methods, reconnaissance 

requirements and tasks, and coordination and control. 

“Combined Instruction of Seamen and Petty Officers: 

An Important Condition for Training Navy Specialists,” by R. L. Heinecke, Information Collection of the 

Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined 

Armed Forces, secret issue No. 12, 1976, published by 

Warsaw Pact Headquarters, Moscow, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 15 February 1979 

The article describes in general terms the organization and 

procedure for training conscript seamen and conscripts 

selected to be petty officers in the East German Navy. 

This training was provided on combat ships until 1970–71 

when the training was switched to a training detachment with instructions taking place on a training brigade 

of ships and craft. The duration, nature, and content 

of the training are described only in general terms. 

Soviet Naval Presence Outside Home Waters in 1978,

CI/DI/OSR Research Paper, June 1979 

Naval deployments to areas outside the USSR’s home waters 

in 1978 were slightly higher than in 1977 but below the peak 

of 1974, when Soviet ships were involved in mine-clearing and 

salvage operations in Bangladesh and the Suez Canal, and 

the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron had access to facilities in 

Egypt. Although the level of deployments remained relativity constant, there were fluctuations in the number of ships 

deployed to particular regions. The high levels of naval activity 

during the first 3 months of 1979almost guarantee that total 

Soviet ship-days in distant areas would increase slightly once 

again. When measured against the terms of either operational capability or potential political impact, the Soviet naval 

presence was expected to be more significant than in the past. 

Warsaw Pact Modernization Program, CIA/DI/OSR

Memorandum for DCI, 13 August 1979 

This memorandum from OSR assesses probable developments 

in the modernization of Polish ground and tactical air forces 

through the mid-1980s. According to the Polish General Staff 

recommendations, the number of weapons to be procured falls 

far short of the goals established by the Warsaw Pact plan.
41

Naval Aviation in Soviet Anti-ship Attack Planning,

CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Assessment, 1 September 1979 

The assessment focuses on the naval air forces for anti-ship 

attack. It describes those forces, discusses the concepts 

guiding Soviet planning for anti-ship attacks, and examines 

the capability of Naval Aviation to carry out such attacks 

in various operational situations. Special emphasis is placed 

on anti-ship attacks during a theater war with NATO 

because Soviet anti-ship strategy is keyed to such a war. 

Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the 

Combined Armed Forces on the Combat Readiness 

of the Troops and Naval Forces Allocated to the 

Combined Armed Forces, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 13 March 1978 

The directive defines the levels of combat readiness to 

be maintained by the troops and naval forces allocated 

to the Combined Armed Forces in wartime. It describes 

the notification procedures and steps to be taken in shifting to increased and full combat readiness levels in the 

armed forces as a whole and in the individual branches. 

It came into effect in 1972, superseding a 1968 directive. 

“The Experience of Conducting Integrated Checks of 

Combat Readiness in the People’s Navy,” by Rear Admiral 

G. Hesse, Information Collection of the and the Technical 

Committee of the Combined Armed Forces, secret issue No. 12, 

1976, published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters, Moscow, 

CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 

31 January 1979 

The article is a synopsis of how the East German Navy 

does combat readiness evaluation of a unit. It lists the 

objectives, describes the general procedure, and offers 

some techniques that had been found effective to 

improving the quality of the evaluations or checks. 

Draft Directive on the Combat Readiness of the Troops 

and Naval Forces Allocated to the Combined Armed Forces,

issued by Commander-in-Chief of the Combined 

Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 30 March 1979 

The directive defines the levels of combat readiness used in 

the Combined Armed Forces and describes the notification 

procedures and steps to be taken in shifting the Warsaw Pact

forces to successively higher levels of combat readiness. It 

also defines a new level of readiness called “military threat”

as an intermediate level between increased and full combat 

readiness. Other new information includes the role of military

educational institutions and commissariats in the mobilization process. When finalized, the directive will supersede the 1971 directive on combat readiness. 

Wartime Fuel Stockpiles and Authorizations, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 25 April 1980 

This report contains a translation of three documents, 

classified top secret or secret. Together they provide the 

size of the Warsaw Pact Combined Command fuel 

stockpiles in Poland and proposed wartime unit allocations 

to the Polish Armed Forces. The list of materiel supplies 

indicates the total Combined Command reserve located 

in Poland as of 1 January 1979. The other two documents 

provide the tonnages of one fueling for the combat 

equipment of the Polish army, Air, front, and missile 

units, and totals for the Air Defense Forces and Navy. 

“Ways of Improving the Operational and Combat Training 

of the Allied Navies,” by Vice Admiral Vasily Yanakiev,

Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical

Committee of the Combined Armed Forces, secret issue No. 16,

1978, published by the Warsaw Pact Headquarters, Moscow,

CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report,

18 July 1980

The article emphasizes the importance of the combined training of senior naval personnel as the key to organizing cooperation and control of multinational naval forces during 

combined combat actions and operations. The author explains 

the advisability of establishing combined naval forces in 

closed theaters and their organization under a unified command. 

“From the Experience of Using Computer Equipment in 

the Control of Troops and Naval Forces,” by MGen G. 

Kunze of the East German Army, Information Collection 

of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the 

Combined Armed Forces, secret issue No. 18, 1979, published 

by Warsaw Pact Headquarters, Moscow, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 21 August 1980 

This article provides an overview of the use of computer 

equipment to promote effective problem solving in the 

control organs of the East German armed forces. The author 

describes a mobile subscriber center established by the 

army in 1978 to make effective use of stationary computers 

similar to the way other services use a common computer 

system. The author describes the time required for computer calculations on radar field parameters, radiation and 

meteorological conditions, marches, engineer preparations, 

minesweeping, and other operations. He advocates the 

development of systems of minicomputers for use by ground 

troops, as well as further program design, staff training, and 

the prioritization of computer use throughout the services.

Reserve Supplies for Polish Forces Assigned to the Warsaw 

Pact in Wartime as of 1 January 1980, a Russian document 

classified “Secret of Special Importance,” CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 6 October 1980 

The document contains charts with data on the locations 

and capacities of storage depots and bases. There 

are charts containing data on the tonnage of differ-
4 2

ent ammunition, mines, and explosives at the depots 

and information about distribution capabilities. 

“Some Questions of Combined Actions of Allied Navies 

in Combating the Threat of Mines,” by Commander W. 

Grzadkowski, Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed 

Forces, secret issue No. 18, 1979, published by the 

Warsaw Pact Headquarters, Moscow, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 10 October 1980 

The article discusses NATO plans to employ mines for 

offensive and defensive purposes in the event of war in the 

Baltic Sea and recommends responses for Warsaw Pact 

naval forces. The author proposes the creation of a unified 

Combined Fleet anti-mine observation system to track 

NATO mine carriers in peacetime with the intention of 

destroying them at the start of war. The author also proposes 

establishing multiple-arm large units to perform anti-mine 

support tasks in naval operations during the debarkation of 

an amphibious landing and during the clearing of obstacles 

from the straits. He explores possible compositions, command 

structures, and operating methods for an anti-mine force. 

Soviet Instructions Relating to the Tenth Session of the Law 

of the Sea Conference Scheduled for March 1981, issued by 

the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 21 November 1980 

The document provides details of the instructions issued 

for use by the Soviet delegation to the Law of the Sea 

conference [LOS] during the Ninth Session of the LOS 

conference in late August 1980 and the Tenth Session, 

scheduled for March 1981. The instructions are the basis 

for Soviet positions to be taken at the next conference and 

were generally consistent with known Soviet positions. 

“The Navies of the Fraternal Countries,” by V. V. Mikhaylin, 

deputy commander in chief for the Navy of the Combined 

Armed Forces, Information Collection of the Headquarters

 and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed 

Forces, secret issue No. 19, 1980, published by Warsaw Pact

 Headquarters, Moscow, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 28 November 1980 

The article is part of a series devoted to the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact. The author surveys trends in 

the development of U.S. and NATO naval forces and 

outlines the main achievements of the Warsaw Pact 

maritime countries after the mid-1950’s in improving the 

combat capabilities of their navies. These include a major 

ship-building program and the introduction of new naval 

weapons and combat equipment. The author emphasizes 

the operational and combat training measures carried out in 

common by the national navies to strengthen cooperation 

for countering the NATO naval threat. He emphasizes 

training for amphibious-landing operations and working 

out methods of repelling enemy landings from the sea. 

Appraisal of the Naval Forces of the Potential Enemy,

a secret Polish document, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 29 June 1981 

The document provides current status information on the 

navies of the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG], Denmark, 

and Norway about their naval vessels, naval aviation, 

command and control systems, projected vessel strengths, 

tactical-technical data on missile and torpedo craft, submarines and fighter bombers. It also provides detailed tactical-technical data about Warsaw Pact and NATO missiles, 

the range and lift capacities of FRG and Polish aircraft, and 

FRG, Danish, and Polish information about naval mines. 

Recommendations on the Preparation and Organization of Alternate Naval Loading-Unloading Areas 

to be Established on the Territories of the Warsaw 

Pact Member States, secret, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 30 November 1981 

The document provides recommendations on the preparation 

and operational organization of alternative naval loading-unloading areas [ZMPVRs] to be set up near small ports in 

the Warsaw Pact countries to ensure continuity in troop and 

materiel transport and transshipment when main naval ports 

are threatened or destroyed, or when land traffic routes are 

obstructed. The document covers site selection and deployment 

design of ZMPVRs in peacetime by Ministry of Defense 

organs, the allocation of the forces and means for preliminary 

preparation of communications and transportation lines, 

security and control, the deployment time and minimum daily 

throughput capacity of a ZMPVR for dry and liquid cargo, 

and the responsibilities of the ZMPVR chief and subordinate 

officials and organs. There are two appendices with the organizational chart of a ZMPVR and its deployment on the ground. 

Protocol on Assignment of Polish Army and Navy Forces to

 the Combined Armed Forces and Their Development in 

1981–85, Polish Ministry of National Defense document,

secret of special importance, CIA/DO Information

Intelligence Special Report, 19 April 1982 

The document specifies the forces assigned to the Warsaw 

Pact Combined Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime. 

It provides details about the development and expansion 

guidelines of the forces assigned to the Combined Armed 

Forces and the mechanism for supplying the Polish forces. The 

protocol examines the need to improve rear services support 

and maintain essential materiel reserves and lists the projects 

preparing Polish territory as part of a theater of military 

operations. There are five attachments listing basic command 

organs of the Polish armed forces, personnel strength and 

equipment of units assigned to the Combined Armed 

Forces, materiel reserves, and details of preparatory projects 

for their potential use in a theater of military operations. 
43

Warsaw Pact Recommendations on Anti-mine Defense 

in the Baltic Sea by Polish Navy Commander, Admiral 

Janczyszyn, for the Polish General Staff, secret, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 21 April 1982 

The document presents the Polish Navy Command approval 

of implementing Warsaw Pact recommendations dealing with 

anti-mine defense in the Baltic Sea. The tripartite approach 

includes the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the German Democratic 

Republic [GDR] and Polish Navies. It calls for standardized 

support and training approaches and the use of minesweepers 

and sweeping gear manufactured by Poland. The report also 

recommends continued work on the tactical use of frogmen, 

data recording and display equipment, sonar, and the underwater vehicle, Blotniak, about to go into production in Poland. 

Prospects for Use of Liquid Propellants in Sea-Based 

Strategic Missiles, by V. P. Makeyev of the Design Bureau 

of Machine Building, top secret, CIA/DO Intelligence

 Information Special Report, 19 May 1982 

The document is one of a series of Soviet documents about 

the development of liquid rocket propellants and the 

strategic missile weaponry and rocket-space systems based 

on them. The documents are based on reports delivered 

at a 6–8 June 1978 interagency, all-union conference of 

leading representatives of the Soviet missile research and 

design establishment to discuss the status and prospects 

for developing programs dealing with liquid rocket propellants. This document discusses the problem of selecting a 

new liquid propellant for naval ballistic missiles to replace 

the standard pair that had been used in sea-based missiles 

for more than 15 years. The conference considered two new 

propellants, one of which was more attractive because it 

would make prospective Soviet naval missiles superior to 

Trident-2 in terms of tactical-technical characteristics. 

The author describes the experience of its design bureau in 

developing liquid-propellant missiles for the Navy beginning with the R-13 missile put in service in 1961. The 

document includes a cutaway view for the R-29D missile 

and its basic specifications. It lists various designs and 

technological and organizational measures the 

Soviets devised to ensure safe and reliable operations for submarine-based missiles. 

Conclusions on Results of an Inspection of the Ninth 

Coastal Defense Flotilla of the Polish Navy signed by 

Admiral V. Mikhaylin and approved by General of 

the Army A. Gribkov, chief of staff of the Warsaw 

Pact Combined Armed Forces, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 20 September 1982 

According to the document the inspection team recommended 

the flotilla make plans to replace its aging fleet, acquire OSA 

and STRELA missile systems for defense against low-level 

air attacks for the next five-year plan. It stresses improving 

command and control and operating skills for transitioning 

to combat readiness and for functioning in environments 

of electronic warfare, the use of weapons of mass destruction, bad weather, and darkness. (Editors’ note: Strela is 

the name for Russian-built surface to air missile systems.)

Design and Performance of Soviet Naval Nuclear 

Reactors, CIA/DO Intelligence Information

 Special Report, 11 January 1983 

This report describes some aspects of the Soviet development program for naval nuclear propulsion plants, which 

makes extensive use of nuclear icebreakers as test-beds 

for new core designs. The cores described are the VM-14-

5/02, the VM-14-5/03 using reprocessed fuel, and the 

VM-149/M. Brief data are given on the nuclear reactor 

aboard the KIROV-class guided missile cruiser and the 

liquid-metal cooled reactor aboard the ALFA-class submarine. A new type of nuclear submarine “with eggs” is 

reported to be undergoing testing in the Black Sea. The fuel 

burn-up value is given for a future icebreaker reactor core. 

(Editors’ note: The meaning of “with eggs” is unknown.)

“Some Aspects of an Operation to Destroy Enemy Missile 

Submarines, by Rear Admiral V. Saakyan special collection Military Thought, secret issue No. 2, 1975, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special report, 23 August 1983 

The article describes the methods to be employed by the Soviet 

Navy in a two-phase operation to detect and destroy enemy 

SSBNs with the use of either conventional or nuclear weapons 

at the outbreak of a war. The first phase of the operation 

involves a massed search by diversified Soviet naval forces 

consisting of nuclear attack submarines, diesel submarines, 

long-range ASW aircraft, and surface ship hunter-killer 

groups having ASW helicopters with all elements operating 

jointly; using torpedoes, mines, depth charges, and “special” 

nuclear warheads. A second phase of the operation is a nuclear-war-fighting scenario in which the Soviet Navy targets 

land-based ballistic missiles from the Strategic Rocket Forces 

and Air Force long-range aviation against detected enemy 

SSBNs, and, in some cases, distant straits and narrows. 

“An Operation to Destroy Enemy Submarine Forces by 

Rear Admiral V.A. Samoylov, special collection Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 7, 1975, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 23 September 1983 

The document judges that the Soviet naval infantry had 

improved its ability to carry out amphibious assaults near 

the Soviet Union, and that large Soviet exercises indicated the Soviets were exploring concepts for conducting 

amphibious operations in distant areas. For example there 

was evidence that Moscow was showing some willingness to use small contingents of naval infantry to protect 

Soviet interests in the third world. The paper judges 

that the Soviets were not moving rapidly to overcome 

major deficiencies in the force structure or in training. 
4 4

Soviet Nuclear-Powered Submarines and Their 

Propulsion Systems, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 21 November 1983 

This identifies four Soviet nuclear-powered submarines by project number and comments on the type of 

propulsion system installed in each submarine. The 

report also mentions a new submarine called Akula. 

Technical Characteristics of the Soviet Typhoon 

Nuclear Powered Submarine, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report 16 April 1984 

The document states the Typhoon was launched in 

1980 from Severodvinsk and underwent sea trials in 

the White Sea in 1981. It is equipped with two nuclear 

reactors and 20 D-19 solid propellant MIRVed ballistic missiles with a range of up to 20,000 kilometers. 

Submarine Projects at [Redacted], Memorandum for DCI 

from Clair E. George, DDO, 10 December 1984 

The memorandum is to alert the DCI to a clandestine report 

on a number of Soviet submarine projects completed or under 

construction, including code names, project numbers, and 

production and dimensional data. There is also a brief description of how anechoic coatings are applied to a submarine’s hull.

The following nine documents 

are translations from Russian of a 12-chapter 

secret edition of the Combat Regulations 

of the Navy for Division, Brigade, Regiment, 

and Ship. They were put into effect in 26 January 

1983 by Order 039 of the USSR Minister 

of Defense and published by the Military 

Publishing House, Moscow, 1983. The twelve 

chapters of have been arranged by chapter, 

not the date of dissemination to the IC.

“Combat Regulations of the Soviet Navy for Division, Brigade, 

Regiment, and Ship, Chapter 1: “The Navy and the Fundamentals of its Combat Employment in Operations,” CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 18 August 1986 

Chapter 1 provides a basic overview of the component 

structure of the Soviet Navy Brigades, a listing of naval 

operational terminology, the main functions and the 

responsibilities of the Soviet Navy plus a description of 

its highest readiness state in peacetime. It is divided into 

three sections. The first section provides a description of 

the different forces and components within the Soviet Navy, 

with a delineation of the composition and responsibilities 

of each component. The second section covers basic 

operational doctrine and terminology as it applies to the 

Navy. The roles played by components of the navy in a battle 

are extensively treated. The third section defines the highest 

peacetime readiness state and “combat duty for the Soviet 

Navy,” wherein Soviet naval forces can be in close proximity 

to enemy forces and must be ready for immediate conflict. 

It also delineates in detail the component and command 

responsibilities entailed in the performance of “combat duty”.

Combat Regulations of the Soviet Navy for Division, 

Brigade, Regiment, and Ship, Chapter 2: “The 

Control of Forces,” CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 19 September 1986 

Chapter 2 covers the command, control, and communications of Soviet naval forces. It also delineates the responsibilities of commanders, staffs, flag staff-officer specialists, and 

subordinate units in a wide range of specific situations. The 

chapter covers the use of stationary and mobile control 

posts and systems for automated control of forces along with 

a description of the responsibilities of the control posts of 

naval aviation, the organization of communications, the command and control decision making process, and the precise 

form and content of combat orders for effective performance

of combat tasks. The last part of the chapter covers the 

allocation of tasks and responsibilities in different combat 

situations when the Soviet Navy is involved in organizing 

joint cooperation between its own forces and those of the

 other branches of the Soviet armed forces.

Combat Regulations of the Soviet Navy for Division, Brigade, 

Regiment, and Ship, Chapter 3, “Political Work,” CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 30 April 1987 

Chapter 3 contains an overview of the political officer’s 

duties and responsibilities, including instilling the virtues of

 Marxism-Leninism., Soviet patriotism, a heightened 

sense of political consciousness, high morale, military 

discipline, and a readiness to obey all combat orders in 

the servicemen and officers during battle and especially 

during a nuclear engagement. The political officers are 

also responsible for protecting state secrets, and ensuring 

they are not disclosed. The chapter also discusses special 

propaganda measures, such as radio broadcasting and 

leaflet distribution, which are directed at undermining 

the morale of the troops and the populace of the enemy.

Combat Regulations of the Soviet Navy for Division, Brigade, 

Regiment, and Ship, Chapter 4: “The Combat Activity of 

the Division, Brigade, and Regiment,” CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 7 October 1986 

Chapter 4 is about general operational doctrine for naval 

combat missions involving submarines, surface ships, naval 

aviation, naval infantry, and coastal missile-artillery units 

at the division, brigade, and regimental level. It provides an 

overview of the commander’s decision-making process, and 

general guidelines for deployment, protection, and support 

of SSBNs (Submarine ballistic missile nuclear propulsion); 
45

deployment, and weapons employment of general-purpose 

submarines; employment of surface ships in strike forces and 

with amphibious forces; the process of landing amphibious 

forces; and the positioning of coastal missile-artillery forces. 

Combat Regulations of the Soviet Navy for Division, 

Brigade, Regiment, and Ship, Chapter 5: “The Combat 

Activity of the Ship,” CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 30 January 1979 

Chapter 5 describes the details of the command structure 

for a Soviet warship , the duties performed aboard a warship, 

and, where applicable on a submarine by the ship’s commanding officer, the executive officer, the first lieutenant, and the 

ship’s department heads prior to, during, and after battle. It 

describes the functions of the following eleven shipboard 

departments: control, navigation, missile-gunnery, mine-torpedo, communications, engineering, aviation, radio-technical, 

medical, chemical, and supply. It also describes the ship’s 

two combat readiness levels and their variants, the methods 

used to defend and protect the ship against diverse naval 

conventional and nuclear weapons, and the procedures to 

follow to survive nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) 

warfare and to restore the ship’s combat capability after battle.

Combat Regulations of the Soviet Navy for Division, 

Brigade, Regiment, and Ship: Chapters 6–8:“Combat 

Actions to Destroy Enemy Submarines, Surface Ships, 

Land Targets, and Troops,” CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 11 November 1986 

Chapters 6–8 cover the methods used by Soviet submarines, 

surface ship combatants, and naval aviation to destroy enemy 

SSBNs, aircraft carrier groups, ASW forces, and pertinent 

land and coastal targets, with the main emphasis on the elimination of enemy SSBNS and aircraft carriers. Specifically:

Chapter 6 covers methods that Soviet SSBNs, cruise missile 

submarines, naval attack aircraft, and coastal missileartillery troops use to knock out enemy land and coastal targets. 

Chapter 7 provides directives for Soviet ASW forces, 

made up of surface ships, submarines, aircraft and helicopters, operate and coordinate their actions against enemy

SSBNs, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces in open

ocean areas and littoral seas.

Chapter 8 discusses the combat actions of a variety of Soviet 

combatants (submarine reconnaissance-strike groups, surface 

ship strike groups, guided-missile and torpedo boats, aircraft, 

etc.) against enemy aircraft carrier groups, ASW forces, and 

general-purpose surface ships. The main focus of this chapter 

is the destruction of the enemy’s aircraft carriers by the above 

Soviet forces in groups or singly, and also in cooperation with 

Soviet Long-Range Aviation and Strategic Rocket Forces. 

Combat Regulations of the Soviet Navy for Division, 

Brigade, Regiment, and Ship, Chapter 9: “Joint Actions 

of Naval Large Units with Large Units and Other 

Branches of the Armed Forces,” CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 10 April 1987 

Chapter 9 describes the combat actions of Soviet naval 

forces afloat and ashore when coordinating and cooperating with different branches of the Soviet Armed Forces 

(Ground Forces, Air Forces, Long-Range Aviation, and 

Air Defense Forces) in airborne and amphibious landing 

operations and in anti-landing operations on maritime 

axes. The primary focus of the chapter is on landing and 

supporting amphibious landing forces. The chapter 

provides details for the various phases of landing, staging, 

embarkation, and loading of the forces onto ships, sea 

transit of the force; and the actual assault. It describes the 

types of naval forces which participate (landing-support 

forces, fire-support ship detachments, obstacle-clearing 

groups, landing ship detachments, etc.), the missions and 

dimensions of landing sectors and deployment areas, and the 

specifics of command and control responsibilities. The final 

section of the chapter relates information about cooperation 

with troops advancing and defending on a maritime axis. 

Combat Regulations of the Soviet Navy for Division, 

Brigade, Regiment, and Ship, Chapters 10 and 11:

“The Defense of Basing Areas, Sea Lines of Communication 

and the Basing and Rebasing (Redeployment) of Large 

Units and Units. CIA/DO Intelligence Information 

Special Report published by USSR Ministry of Defense, 

Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1983, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 30 April 1987 

Chapter 10 describes the actions taken by the Soviet 

Navy when operating alone or in cooperation with other 

branches of the armed forces to defend naval basing 

areas, sea lines of communication (SLOCS) and 

convoys against mines, submarines, or small-combatant threats. It describes the system of basing, rebasing, and redeployment of Soviet naval forces and 

defines naval basing. The bases are protected by setting 

up defenses against enemy submarines, mines, 

small combatants, and combat-swimmer forces using 

naval war ships and, when warranted, using units from the 

ground forces and air defense forces. The chapters describe 

the methods used to protect Soviet submarines, ships, 

and auxiliaries as they exit from or enter basing areas. 

It also describes how to provide those areas with maximum 

protection against nuclear weapons before, during, and 

after a nuclear attack. The section on SLOC defenses deals 

primarily with the screening and protection of convoys 

against enemy submarines, mines, and small combatants. 

Chapter 11 describes the system and purpose of basing,

 rebasing, and redeployment of Soviet naval forces, and 

defines such terms as main basing points, dispersal 

basing points, maneuver basing points, supply points, 

anchorages, and dispersed ship-repair points.
4 6

Combat Regulations of the Soviet Navy for Division, 

Brigade, Regiment, and Ship, Chapter 12: “The Support 

of Combat Actions,” CIA/DO Intelligence Information 

Special Report published by USSR Ministry of Defense, 

Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1983, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 13 March 1987 

Chapter 12 provides in-depth coverage of the different 

types of support provided to Soviet naval forces afloat and 

ashore during their preparations for and during combat 

action. This support is broadly categorized as combat 

support, special technical support, and rear services 

support. The section on combat support contains information on the Soviet Navy’s support requirements for 

intelligence, and intelligence collection, radioelectronic 

warfare, cover and deception and for engineers. It also 

covers support for chemical and radioelectronic warfare, 

cover and deception, and for ASW and navigation. 

The special technical support section primarily deals 

with the procedures for handling, storage, repair, and 

combat preparation of nuclear and missile weaponry 

and its associated equipment. It consists of organizing and 

implementing measures to maintain nuclear munitions 

and other weaponry of all types, and providing, maintaining and restoring them under constant combat readiness. 

The section about rear services support includes details 

on various aspects of logistics support in the areas of 

materiel supply, transportation, billeting, and about 

medical, financial, and general services support. It consists 

of carrying out measures to prepare, deploy, and relocate 

rear services units during a developing situation to provide 

timely and uninterrupted materiel and other support.

Combat support consists of organizing and implementing 

measures designed to attain high effectiveness when, for 

example, large units, or ships are employed in combat actions. 

“On the Trail of Submarine Disasters”

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sergey Petrovich 

Bukan compiled information and wrote a book on the 

Soviet Navy titled, On the Trail of Submarine Disasters (Po 

Sledam Podvodnykh Katastrof), published by Gildya masterov “Rus,” Moscow. It contains translations of a collection 

of Russian newspaper and periodical articles written during 

the period 1956–1991 about disasters that occurred to the 

Soviet submarine force. It uses photographs and materials from holdings of the Northern Fleet Museum, the 

TASS pictorial review, the journal TIME (USA) and the 

pamphlet “Soviet Military Power,” 1987 (USA). It was 

published on 15 September 1992 in Russian with 208 

pages, and is available in Russian or potentially online. 

Related Documents Previously Released:

Reductions in Officer Strength in the Soviet Army; 

CIA/DP Intelligence Information Report, 8 November 1954 

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses 

of Action through 1960, CIA/DI/ONE 

National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-55, 17 May 1955

Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the 

USSR (Corps-Division), CIA/DP Intelligence 

Information Report, published by the Ministry of 

Defense of the USSR in February 1949, 31 May 1955

Marshal Zhukov Cites Changes in Soviet Armed Forces,

CIA/DI/OCI Central Intelligence 

Bulletin (CIB), 25 May 1956 

Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 

1958–1963, CIA/DI/ONE National Intelligence

 Estimate 11-4-58, 12 December 1958

Some Implications of Khrushchev’s Speech to the Supreme Soviet, 

CIA/DCI/ONE Memorandum for Director, 21 January 1960

Khrushchev on Nuclear Strategy, CIA/DI/OCI, Current 

Intelligence Staff Study Caesar XI-60, 19 January 1960

“The Missions of the Navy and Methods of Carrying 

Them Out,” by Admiral V. Platonov, special collection, Military Thought, top secret issue No. 2, 1961, 

CIA/DP Information Report, 5 September 1961

“The Use of Naval Forces in Closed Sea Theaters in the 

Initial Period of a War,” by Admiral V. Kasatonov, special 

collection, Military Thought, top secret issue No. 2, 1960, 

CIA/DP Information Report, 15 September 1961 

“The Nature of Modern Armed Combat and the Role and 

Place in it of the Various Branches of the Armed Forces,” 

by General of the Army P. Kurochkin, special collection 

Military Thought articles, secret issue No. 2, 1960, CIA/DP 

Clandestine Report Special Collection, 19 September 1961

“Establishment of the Top Secret Special Collection of 

Articles of the Journal, Military Thought, by the Ministry 

of Defense, USSR,” Editor’s Preface to the initial issue 

of the collection, issue No. 1, 1960, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 8 November 1961 

“The Tasks of Military Science at Its Present Stage 

and the Main Directions of Work of the Journal 

Military Thought,” by Marshal Zakharov, Military 

Thought secret issue No. 2, 1970, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 18 October 1973
47

 “A Turning Point in the Development of Soviet Military 

Art” by Colonel General Ye. Ivanov, special collection Military Thought, top secret issue No. 2, July 1961, 

CIA/DP Information Report, 7 December 1961 

“The Use of Surface Vessels in Modern Naval Warfare,” 

by Rear Admiral N. Zvyagin, special collection, 

Military Thought, top secret issue No. 2, 1961, CIA/

DP Information Report, 11 December 1961 

“The Utilization of the Forces of the Navy in a NuclearMissile War,” by Rear Admiral V. Lisyutin, special collection, Military Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 13 January 

1961, CIA/DP Information Report, 12 December 1961 

The Theory of Military Art Needs Review,” by 

Colonel-General A.I. Gastilovich and General-Leytenant 

I.A. Tolkonyuk, special collection Military Thought, 

top secret issue No. 1, 1960, CIA/DP Clandestine 

Report Special Collection, 18 December 1961 

Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Soviet 

Union (Division-Corps), published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in Moscow on 2 March 1959, CIA/DP 

Clandestine Report Special Collection, 19 December 1961. 

The manual supersedes the Field Service Regulations of 

the Armed Forces of the Union of SSRs (Corps-Division) of 

1948 and the Manual on the Characteristics of the Conduct 

of Combat Operations under Conditions of the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (Corps-Battalion) of 1954

“Nuclear/Missile Armament and Some Principles of 

Military Doctrine,” by General-Mayor of the Engineering-Technical Service M. Goryainov; special collection 

Military Thought, top secret issue No. 2, 1960, CIA/DP 

Clandestine Report Special Collection, 27 December 1961 

“The Nature of Modern Warfare,” by Colonel General 

A. Kh. Babadzhanyan, special collection Military 

Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1961, CIA/DP, 

Clandestine Report Special Collection, 18 January 1962 

“Some Problems of Modern Operations,” by General 

Leytenant I. Tolkonyuk, Special Collection 

Military Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1960, 

CIA/DP Information Report 13 January 1961 

“The Role of Aviation in Military Operations at Sea,” 

by Rear Admiral V. Bogolepov, Special Collection 

Military Thought, top secret issue No. 3, 17 October 

1960, CIA/DP Information Report, 29 January 1962 

“New Developments in Operational Art and Tactics,” by 

Lt. Gen. V. Baskakov, special collection of Military 

Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1960, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 31 January 1962 

“Some Problems in the Preparation of the Rear Area 

for Support of the Armed Forces in the Initial Period 

of a War,” by Colonel General F. Malykhin, special 

collection of Military Thought, top secret issue No. 2, 

1960, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Initial issue of this 

publication Special Collection, 13 February 1962 

“The Submarine Operation of the Navy—the Naval 

Operation of the Future,” by Admiral Yu Panteleyev, 

special collection, Military Thought, top secret issue No. 3,

1961, CIA/DP Information Report, 21 Feb 1962 

“To Develop the Theory of Soviet Military Art,” by 

Admiral V. Tributs, special collection Military 

Thought, top secret issue No. 3, 17 October 1960, 

CIA/DP Information Report, 23 February 1962 

“The Nature of Modern Armed Combat,” by General of 

the Army A. Gorbatov, top secret special collection 

of Military Thought, issue No. 3, 1960, CIA/DP 

Clandestine Report Special Collection, 2 March 1962 

“Soviet Military Thought on Future War,” (Doctrine 

and Debate Since 1960), CIA/DI/OCI, Soviet 

Staff Study, Caesar XIV-62, 3 April 1962 

“On the Problems of the Tasks of the Navy and Methods for 

Accomplishing Them,” by Admiral V. Kasatonov, special 

collection, Military Thought, top secret issue No. 4, 20 

October 1961, CIA/DP Information Report, 15 May 1962 

“Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation on a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a War,” 

by Colonel General Khetagurov, special collection 

Military Thought, top secret issue No. 4, 20 October 

1961, CIA/DP Information Report, 28 May 1962 

“Combat against Enemy Missile Submarines,” by 

Rear Admiral O. Zhukovskiy, special collection, Military 

Thought, top secret issue No. 4, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 29 May 1962 

“Soviet Strategic Doctrine for the Start of War 

(Doctrine and Debate Since 1960),” CIA/DI/OCI, 

Soviet Staff Study, Caesar XIV-62, 3 July 1962

“The Tasks of the Navy and the Methods of Performing 

Them,” by Admiral Kharlamov, special collection, Military 

Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1962, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 11 September 1962 

Preliminary comments on an article from the top secret 

version special collection of the Soviet publication Military 

Thought; Memorandum for DCI from DDI transmitting the article, Document II-24, 11 September 1962
4 8

“New Developments in Combat with Carrier-Attack Forces 

in the Initial Period of a War,” by Captain, First Rank Ye. 

Mamayev, Military Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1962, CIA/

DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 5 October 1962 

“Preliminary Comments on an Article from the 

Secret Version of the Soviet Journal, Military Thought, 

Memorandum for DCI from DDI, 5 October 1962 

“On the Question of the Tasks, Organization and Planning 

of Military-Scientific Work,” by Rear Admiral V. Bogolepov, Military Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1962, CIA/DP 

Clandestine Report Special Collection, 8 October 1962 

The memorandum transmitting the report to 

the DCI includes the preliminary comments of 

the DDI on the article. 8 October 1962. 

“Essential Facts of the Penkovskiy Case,” from 

Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, 

CIA/DP Memorandum for the DCI, 31 May 1963

Soviet Naval Strategy and Its Effect on the Development of 

Naval Forces 1953–63, CIA/DI/ORR, 22 October 1963 

Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack, CIA/DI/ORR 

Contribution to NIE 11-8-66, 1 August 1966 

“Penkovskiy’s Legacy and Strategic Research,” CIA/DCI/

CSI, Studies in Intelligence, Volume 16, Spring 1972 

NIE 11-4-61. Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and 

Policies, 1961–1966, “Annex A: Soviet Military Forces 

and Capabilities and Annex B: Tables of Sino-Soviet 

Bloc Military Strengths and Characteristics of Selected Weapons and Equipment,” 21 August 1961 

Cuba 1962: Khrushchev’s Miscalculated Risk, CIA/

DI/ORR Staff Study, 13 February 1964 

Contribution to NIE 11-14-64, Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964–1970, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

Soviet Strategy and Intentions in the Mediterranean Basin, NIE 11-6-67, 1 June 1967 

The Evolution of Soviet Doctrine on Limited War, CIA/

DI/OSR, Intelligence Memorandum, 9 October 1967 

Trends and Prospects in Soviet Maritime 

Activities, NIE11-10-69, 12 June 1969 

The Uses of Soviet Military Power in Distant 

Areas, NIE 11-10-71, 15 December 1971

Soviet General Purpose Naval Deployments outside 

Home Waters: Characteristics and Trends, CIA/

DI/OSR Intelligence Report, June 1973 

The Significance of Soviet TU-95 Bear D Deployments, in West Africa, IIM, April 1977 

Soviet Military Capabilities to Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas, NIE 11-10-79, October 1979 

Policy and Politics in the CPSU Politburo: October 1964 to 

September 1967, CIA/DI/ONE Caesar XXX, 31 August 1967

This is an analysis of the underlying motives and 

reasons for policy decisions during the first three years 

of the Brezhnev-Kosygin collective leadership and 

the impact of the decisions on the Warsaw Pact and 

its relations with the United States and NATO. 

Soviet and East European General Purpose 

Forces, NIE 11-14-69, 4 December 1969

Soviet Naval Writings: a Framework for 

Antisubmarine Warfare Strategy, CIA/DI/

OSR Intelligence Report, 1 July 1971

The Soviet Navy: Strategy, Growth, and Capabilities, CIA/DI/OSR Working Paper, June 1972

“Some Reflections on the Initial Period of War,” by 

Colonel (Retired) G. Isserson, Military Thought, 

secret issue No. 1, 1967, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 8 March 1973 

“Observations on Naval Doctrine,” by Soviet Navy 

Commander-in-Chief, Fleet Admiral Gorshkov, Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 1, 1970, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 6 April 1973 

“The Role of Surface Vessels in Combat at Sea,” by 

Rear Admiral I. Sysoyev, Military Thought, secret 

issue, No. 2, 1968, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 29 May 1973 

“Tactical Air Operations in Conventional Warfare on 

a Maritime Front,” by General-Mayor A. Bukhantsev, 

Military Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1970, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 22 June 1973 

“The Tasks of Military Science at Its Present 

Stage and the Main Directions of Work of the Journal 

Military Thought,” by Marshal Zakharov, Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 2, 1970, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 18 October 1973 
49

“The Employment of Rocket and Artillery Troops in 

Conventional Warfare” by General-Mayor (Artillery) 

I. Konoplev, and General-Mayor (Artillery) V. Kuznetzov, Military Thought, secret issue No. 2, 1965, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Report, 9 November 1973 

“Air Defense of Naval Operations,” by Colonel V. Nosov, 

Military Thought, secret issue No. 2, mid-1967, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 5 February 1974 

“Soviet Naval Operations against a Naval Missile Attack,” 

by General-Mayor (Aviation) A. Sukhanov, Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1966, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 20 February 1974 

“Characteristics of Employing Naval Forces in a War 

Which Begins Without the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” 

by Rear Admiral Arkadiy Kruchenykh, Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 1, 1966, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 21 February 1974 

“The Development of the Means of Armed Combat in 

the Postwar Period,” by Marshal of the Soviet Union

 M. Zakharov, Military Thought, secret issue No. 1, 

1969, CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special

 Report, 26 February 1974 

“Fleet Operation in a Front Offensive Operation in a Coastal 

Zone During the Initial Period of a War,” by Rear Admiral A. 

Kruchenykh, Military Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1963, CIA/

DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 5 May 1976 

“Naval Operations in Conventional Warfare,” by 

Rear Admiral A. Brezinskiy, Military Thought, 

secret issue No. 2, 1968, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 15 April 1974 

“The Employment of Naval Forces at the Beginning of a War” 

by Captain First Rank N. Vyunenko, Rear Admiral (Reserve) 

D. Tuz, Military Thought, secret issue No. 1, 1968, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 18 April 1974 

“The Nature of Modern Warfare and the Missions of the 

Military Services,” by Marshal of the Soviet Union M. 

Zakharov, Military Thought, secret issue No. 2, 1969, CIA/

DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 26 April 1974 

“National Air Defense Participation in Naval Operations,”

 by General-Mayor (Aviation) I. Lyubimov and Colonel 

V. Zemlyunushkin, Military Thought, secret issue

No. 2, 1968, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special

Report, 2 May 1974 

“Air Defense of Amphibious Landings,” by Colonel V. 

Zemlyanushkin, Military Thought, secret issue 

No. 1, 1967, CIA/DO Intelligence Information

 Special Report 6 May 1974 

“Organization of a Landing of Amphibious Force,” by 

Vice Admiral F. Savelyev and CAPT. O. Shulman, 

Military Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1970, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 4 June 1974 

“Reconnaissance at Sea,” by Rear Admiral B. Bobkov 

and Captain First Rank I. Khurs, Military Thought, 

secret issue No. 2, 1964, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 17 June 1974 

“The Control of Forces in a Naval Landing Operation,”

 by Captain First Rank N. Shmarov, Military Thought, 

No. 3, 1969, CIA/DO Intelligence Information 

Special Report, 23 June 1974 

“Control of Naval Forces under Modern Conditions,”

 by Rear Admiral Yu. Ladinskiy, Military Thought, 

secret issue No. 5, 1962, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Report, 18 November 1974 

“Combat with Airlifts across the Ocean,” by Colonel 

N. Sopelev, Military Thought, secret issue No. 2, 1967, 

CIA/DO Intelligence Information Report,

18 November 1974 

Soviet Naval Policy and Programs, NIE 

11-15-74, 23 December 1974 

Critique of an Operational War Game on Maps Conducted 

on the Southwestern Axis, CIA/Directorate of Operations 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 13 June 1975 

“The Initial Strike in Armed Combat at Sea,” by 

Captain First Rank N. Vyunenko, Military Thought, 

secret issue No. 1, 1964, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 8 September 1975 

“Organization and Conduct of an Anti-landing Defense by 

an Army Corps in Cooperation with Naval Forces (Based 

On The Experience of Corps Exercises),” by General-Mayor 

of Tank Troops A. Zvartsev and Colonel N. Nemozhenko, Military Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1966, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 31 October 1975 

“Cooperation between a Front and a Fleet in Protecting

Against Weapons of Mass Destruction During an Offensive on a Coastal Axis,” by General-Mayor of Tank Troops 

A. Zvartsev and Colonel N. Nemozhenko, Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1966, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 11 November 1975 
5 0

“The Operational-Strategic Employment of Naval 

Forces,” by Admiral S. Kucherov, Military Thought,

secret issue No. 1, 1966, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 19 December 1975 

“Three Years of Combat against American Aviation by the 

Air Defense and Air Forces of the Democratic Republic 

of Vietnam,” by General-Mayor of Artillery M. Naumenko, Military Thought, secret issue No. 1, 1968, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 23 December 1975 

“Combat Actions of Air Defense Troops and the Air 

Forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” by 

Colonel A. Gryaznov; Military Thought, secret 

issue No. 2 1967, 18 September 1973 

“Features of the Combat Employment of SAM 

Troops by the Vietnamese People’s Army,” by 

General-Leytenant S. F. Vikhor, Military Thought, 

secret issue No. 3, 20 September 1973 

Report of the Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed 

Forces on the Val-74 Command-Staff Exercise for 

Allied Fleets in the Baltic Sea, by General of the Army 

Sergey Matveyevich Shtemenko; secret, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 9 January 1976 

Soviet Dependence on Space Systems, IIM, November 1975 

“Fleet Actions in a Front Offensive Operation on a 

Coastal Axis during the Initial Period of War,” by 

Rear Admiral A. Khruchenykh, Military Thought, 

secret issue No. 3, 1963, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 13 May 1976 

“The Initial Naval Operation,” by Captain First Rank 

I. Ignatyev, Military Thought, secret issue No. 1, 1964, 

CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report,

12 July 1976 

Trends in Soviet Military Programs, CIA/DIR/NIC 

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, October 1976 

“Certain Matters of the Organization of Military Science 

Work in Fleets and Flotillas,” by Captain First Rank I. 

Argunov and Engineer Captain First Rank V. Skugarev, 

Military Thought, secret issue No. 2, 1964, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 15 March 1977 

“Certain Questions of the Development of Soviet 

Military Art from 1953–1960,” by General-Leytenant K 

Kolganov, Military Thought, secret issue No. 1, 1966, 

CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 

11 April 1977 

“Cooperation between Forces and Means of a Front and 

a Fleet in an Offensive Operation on a Coastal Axis,” by 

Colonel General I. Pavlovskiy and Captain First Rank 

F. Bukatar, Military Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1966, 

CIA/DO Intelligence Information 

Special Report, 18 April 1977 

“Seizure of Straits under Present Conditions,” by 

Rear Admiral Kruchenykh, Military Thought, 

secret issue No. 3, 1966, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 26 April 1977 

“Soviet Naval Art in the Great Patriotic War,” by Colonel 

N. Mazunin, Military Thought, secret issue No. 2, 1974, 

CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report,

11 May 1977 

“The Conduct of Reconnaissance on Coastal Axes by the 

Forces of Formations of the Navy and the Air Defense 

Forces of the Country,” by Colonel A. Krasnov, Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 1, 1966, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 11 May 1977 

“Certain Questions of the Employment of Rocket 

Troops in a Landing Operation,” by GeneralMayor of Artillery A. Sapozhnikov, Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 1, 1966, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 May 1977 

“The Employment of Operational-Tactical Missiles 

for the Destruction of Enemy Amphibious Landing 

Forces,” by General-Leytenant of Artillery A. 

Sapozhnikov and Lieutenant Colonel S. Ostroumov 

Military Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1967, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 2 June 1977 

“The Initial Naval Operation,” by Captain First Rank Ye 

Mamayev, Military Thought, secret issue No. 1, 1963, 

CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report,

18 August 1977 

Manual on the Conduct of Operations, Part V: Operations 

of the Navy (Fleet-Flotilla), issued by the General Staff 

of the Armed Forces of the USSR, published by the 

General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, 1963, 

CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report,

25 October 1977 

“Engineer Support of Naval Operations,” by 

General-Mayor of Engineer Troops N. Mokov, 

Military Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1965, 

CIA/DO, Intelligence Information Special Report, 

31 January 1978 
51

“Organizing Combat against Underwater Sabotage Forces 

and Means in Naval Theaters,” by Captain First Rank G. 

Ditskiy, Military Thought, secret issue No. 2, 1965, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 1 February 1978 

Statute on the Combined Armed Forces and Combined 

Command of the Warsaw Pact Member States, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 21 March 1978 

Statute on the Combined Fleet of the Combined Armed Forces 

of the Warsaw P act Member States in a Naval Theater, CIA/

DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 27 June 1978

Naval Geographic Handbook, by Rear Admiral Ye. Shvede, 

Military Thought, secret issue No. 2 1964, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 20 July 1978 

“Air and Antisubmarine Defense of a Carrier-Strike Forces 

and Methods of Negotiating It,” by Captain First Rank V. 

Kurguzov, Military Thought, secret issue No. 1, 1966, CIA/

DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 31 August 1978

“The Preparation and Conduct of Amphibious Landing 

Operations by General-Leytenant L. Pern, General-Leytenant S. Petrov and Colonel V. Prokhorov, Military 

Thought, secret issue No. 3, 1965, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Scial Report, 21 September 1978 

“Combat against Landing Forces” by Captain 

First Rank Z. Slepenkov. Military Thought, secret 

issue No. 3 1965, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report 16 November 1978 

“The Soviet Viewpoint on Interdiction of 

Merchant Shipping in Wartime,” CIA/DI/

OSR Memorandum for DCI, early 1977 

Navy Comments on OSR SLOC paper, Memorandum 

for John Bird from Rear Admiral (USN) J. J. Ekelund, 

NIO for Conventional Forces, 26 May 1978

Soviet Intentions and Capabilities for Interdicting Sea Lines 

of Communication in a War with NATO, CIA/NFAC/NIC 

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 1 November 1981 

Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, Volume I Summary 

Estimate, NIE 11-14-1979, 31 January 1979 

Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, Volume II The 

Estimate, NIE 11-14-1979, 31 January 1979 

Soviet Amphibious Forces: Tasks and Capabilities

 in General War and Peacetime, 

CIA/DI/OSR Research Paper, 1 June 1979 

General Staff Academy Lecture, The Front 

Offensive Operation, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 15 June 1979

“Bringing Naval Forces to Combat Readiness,” by 

Captain First Rank S. Filonov, Military Thought, 

secret issue No. 2, 1964, CIA/DO Intelligence 

Information Special Report, 26 May 1976 

CIA/DI/OSR, Memorandum conveying an OSR 

Typescript, Stages of Soviet Military Readiness, to the 

National Security Council Staff, 17 March 1977 

The Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces, CIA/DI/NIC, 

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 1 June 1980 

“USSR General Staff Academy Lessons: Critique of 

the Plan of Operational Cover and Deployment of the 

Front’s Troops and Their Occupation of the Departure 

Position for the Offensive,” top secret, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 12 June 1980 

“USSR General Staff Academy Lesson: Study and Critique 

of the Decision of the Commander of the Combined 

Baltic Fleet on the Combat Actions of the Fleet’s Forces 

in the Front Offensive Operation, USSR General 

Staff Academy Lesson,” top secret, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 7 August 1980 

“Study and Critique of the plan of the Amphibious Landing 

Operation, USSR General Staff Academy Lesson No. 8,” 

a translation of a secret Polish document, CIA/DO 

Intelligence Information Special Report, 14 August 1980 

“USSR General Staff Academy Lessons: 

Reports by the Commander and Chief of Staff of the 

Combined Baltic Fleet,” top secret, CIA/DO 

Information Intelligence Special Report, 8 February 1982 

Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs through 

the 1990s, NIE 11-15-82/D, March 1983 

Soviet Submarine Warfare Trends, Special National 

Intelligence Estimate [SNIE] 11-20-84/D, March 1985 

Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact 

Theater Forces, 1985–2000, NIE 11-14-

85/D, CIA/DCI/NIC September 1985 
Notes

HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

The Historical Review Program—part of CIA’s Information Management Services—identifies, 

collects, and produces historically significant collections of declassified documents. The collections, 

centered on a theme or event, are supplemented with supporting analysis, essays and photographs 

showcased in this booklet. All of our Historical Collections are available on the CIA Library 

Publication page located at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/historical-collections.