J-A18027-17

2017 PA Super 287

IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHN BRUMBAUGH IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: JUDY MCCLINTOCK

No. 154 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order of December 21, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 26 for 2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 6, 2017

Judy McClintock appeals from the order entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Bedford County, Orphans’ Court Division, sustaining 

Appellee Marjorie Brumbaugh’s appeal from the Register of Wills. Upon 

careful review, we affirm.

John Brumbaugh (“Decedent”) died on November 7, 2015. At the time 

of his death, he resided with McClintock, with whom he had been 

romantically involved for over nine years. Letters of Administration were 

issued to Decedent’s mother, Marjorie Brumbaugh, on November 12, 2015. 

On January 15, 2016, McClintock filed a petition before the Register of Wills 

seeking to probate a document dated March 22, 2015 and purporting to be a 

photocopy of Decedent’s last will and testament. McClintock claimed to have 

found the document in the Decedent’s zippered bank pouch, in which he 
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kept his important papers. Brumbaugh opposed the petition, but, on May 4, 

2016, the Register issued a decision admitting the document to probate as 

the Decedent’s will and revoking Brumbaugh’s Letters of Administration. In 

her decision, the Register stated as follows:

The document produced by Ms. McClintock and purported to be 

the decedent’s Will was notarized by Dorothy E. Lykins, formerly 

Dorothy E. Hilton, a notary public in the state of Ohio. She also 

serves as the Clerk of Courts for the City of Franklin Municipal 

Court in Franklin, Ohio. Ms. Lykins confirmed the subject Will 

was signed by the decedent in front of her and the Will sought to 

be admitted to probate was in fact the one signed by the 

decedent. She also explained the circumstances involving his 

execution of the Will and the type of writing instrument he used. 

No handwriting expert testified before me on [McClintock’s] 

behalf so as to give an opinion contesting the Will or the 

decedent’s signature thereon.

Per the document admitted into evidence, the testimony 

presented to me at the hearing, including the Affidavit of Ms. 

Lykins, and my telephone conversation with Ms. Lykins, it 

appears that such document is the decedent’s Last Will and 

Testament and was intended so to be.

Decision of the Register of Wills, 5/4/16, at [2]. 

Brumbaugh filed an appeal to the Orphans’ Court1asserting that the 

Register improperly admitted the photocopy to probate, absent the requisite 

proof that the original had not been revoked and/or destroyed. Brumbaugh 

____________________________________________

1 A hearing on appeal to the Orphans’ Court from a decision of the Register 

of Wills is de novo, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. See 20 

Pa.C.S.A. § 776; In re Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 960 (Pa. Super. 

2003). In a hearing de novo, the Orphans' Court does not base its decision 

on the testimony offered before the Register, but hears all evidence that 

either party desires to present and makes its own credibility determinations. 

Luongo, supra. 
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argued that the Register improperly relied on an affidavit signed by the 

notary, despite her repeated objections to the admissibility of the statement. 

Brumbaugh also asserted that the Register’s decision was based, in part, on 

an improper ex parte conversation with the notary. Brumbaugh argued that 

the document was either forged or altered and that neither the proponent 

nor the Register permitted her to submit it to a document examiner for 

analysis prior to the Register rendering its decision.

The Orphans’ Court held hearings in the matter on August 25, 2016 

and October 7, 2016, at which time it heard the testimony of, inter alia, 

McClintock, Lykins and Khody Detwiler, a document examiner. On 

December 21, 2016, in open court, the court rendered its decision, 

concluding that McClintock had failed to sustain her burden of proving that 

the original will was not revoked by the testator. Specifically, the court 

found that McClintock failed to prove that the contents of the original will 

were substantially as appeared on the copy of the will presented for probate. 

Accordingly, the Orphans’ Court reversed the order of the Register and 

directed that the probate of the document in question be vacated. 

McClintock filed a timely appeal, in which she raises the following issue for 

our consideration:

Did the Orphans’ Court below err in reversing the decision of the 

Register of Wills, which had admitted to probate the document at 

issue at the Last Will and Testament of John Edward Brumbaugh, 

on the basis it could not so qualify because of the photostatic 

nature of its non-notarial content, given the circumstances 

present?
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Brief of Appellant, at 4.

We begin by noting our scope and standard of review on appeal from a 

decree of the Orphans' Court adjudicating an appeal from probate:

[T]he hearing judge determines the credibility of the witnesses. 

The record is to be reviewed in the light most favorable to 

appellee, and review is to be limited to determining whether the 

trial court’s findings of fact were based upon legally competent 

and sufficient evidence and whether there is an error of law or 

abuse of discretion. Only where it appears from a review of the 

record that there is no evidence to support the court’s findings or 

that there is a capricious disbelief of evidence may the court’s 

findings be set aside.

In re Estate of Nalaschi, 90 A.3d 8, 11 (Pa. Super. 2014), quoting In re 

Bosley, 26 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal citations omitted).

Here, the document submitted for probate was not an original will, but 

a photocopy.2 Where a testator retains the custody and possession of his 

will and, after his death, the will cannot be found, a presumption arises that 

it was revoked or destroyed by the testator. In re Estate of Murray, 171 

A.2d 171, 176 (Pa. 1961). In order to establish the existence of a lost will 

which was in the custody of the testator prior to his death, the proponent of 

the will must overcome the presumption that the testator destroyed or 

revoked the will. Burns v. Kabboul, 595 A.2d 1153, 1167 (Pa. Super. 

1991), citing In re Estate of Keiser, 560 A.2d 148, 151 (Pa. Super. 1989). 

In order to overcome the presumption and establish the existence of a lost 

____________________________________________

2 The only portion of the document that was not photostatic in nature was 

the notarial act. 
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will, the proponent of the copy must prove that: (1) the testator duly and 

properly executed the original will; (2) the contents of the will were 

substantially as appears on the copy of the will presented for probate; and 

(3) when the testator died, the will remained undestroyed or revoked by 

him. In re Estate of Janosky, 827 A.2d 512, 519–20 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

The proponent’s evidence must be positive, clear and satisfactory. In re 

Estate of Murray, 171 A.2d at 176. 

Here, the Orphans’ Court concluded that McClintock failed to prove the 

second prong of the test, i.e., that the contents of the photocopied will were 

substantially the same as the original document. In arriving at this 

conclusion, the court relied primarily on the testimony of two witnesses: 

Detwiler, the forensic document examiner, whose testimony the court found 

credible, and Lykins, the notary, whose testimony the court found not 

credible. A brief summary of these witnesses’ testimony is in order.

Dorothy Lykins is a notary from Franklin, Ohio. Lykins’ husband, Jeff, 

is the owner/operator of a trucking company. Decedent served as Jeff’s 

dispatcher, acquiring loads for him to haul. Although Lykins had never met 

Decedent prior to the execution of his will, she stated that she had 

previously notarized documents for him. Lykins testified that, on March 22, 

2015, Decedent called her husband’s cell phone and asked if Lykins could 

come to Zanesville, Ohio – approximately three hours away – to notarize his 

will. Lykins agreed and rode to Ohio with Jeff in his semi-truck. The couple 
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met Decedent at AK Steel in Zanesville, where Jeff was also picking up a 

load of steel. 

Lykins testified that she, Jeff and Decedent then drove to the parking 

lot of a nearby truck stop. Lykins stated that, by that time, it was “late 

evening, early morning” and it was dark. N.T. Trial, 10/7/16, at 21. She 

testified that the Decedent “held up a document and indicated that that was 

his Will that he wanted me to [n]otarize for Judy.” Id. at 22. She asked 

him for his driver’s license and he provided her with a state I.D. Lykins 

indicated that she was familiar with Decedent’s signature because she 

deposited the checks with which Decedent paid her husband. She stated 

that she notarized the document and took a photograph of it with her cell 

phone. Lykins testified that she did not actually see the Decedent write or 

sign the will, but that she had seen him strike out the misspelled name of 

Muskingum County and handwrite the correctly spelled name on the 

document. Lykins testified that she had provided a copy of the photograph 

she took of the executed will to McClintock’s counsel after Decedent’s death. 

However, she had since obtained a new phone and had lost access to the 

original picture.

On cross-examination, Brumbaugh’s counsel raised certain 

discrepancies between Lykins’ in-court testimony and the affidavit she had 

previously prepared for submission to the Register of Wills. Notably, 

although Lykins had testified at trial that the only word she actually 

witnessed the Decedent hand-write on the will was the correction for 
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Muskingum County, her affidavit stated that Decedent “complet[ed] and 

sign[ed] the document in his own hand” and that “[i]mmediately prior to 

signing his name he wrote the name of Judy McClintock.” Affidavit of 

Dorothy E. Lykins, 2/4/16. 

Khody Detwiler also testified. Detwiler has been employed as a 

forensic document examiner since 2008. Based upon toner particles present 

on the document, Detwiler concluded that, while the notarial act contained 

on the document was original, “[t]he printed text in the body of the 

document as well as the signature of John Brumbaugh is a photocopy 

reproduction[.]” N.T. Trial, 8/25/16, at 59-60. Detwiler also concluded that 

the name “Judy McClintock” in the center portion of the document – that 

portion of the document that purports to dispose of “[a]ll other money and 

properties” belonging to the Decedent, see Purported Will, 3/22/15 – was 

also a photocopy reproduction and not original ink. See N.T. Trial, 8/25/16, 

at 61. Detwiler noted an extraneous mark attached to the name “Judy 

McClintock,” as well as “trash marks”3surrounding the name, which can only 

____________________________________________

3 A “trash mark” or “artifact” results from repeated reproduction of a 

document. Detwiler testified as follows:

[B]asically when you have artifacts on the document, it comes 

from the copying process when the document is copied over and 

over and over and over. Again, different machines, whether or 

not it’s scanned, sent in an E-mail, and then printed out, and 

then copied again.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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be found in that particular portion of the document. Detwiler testified that 

“if [the] document was all created at the same exact time, you would expect 

those trash marks to be everywhere else as well.” Id. at 63. Detwiler 

concluded that “having this many artifacts around that particular portion, 

and nowhere else, I can’t eliminate the possibility that that didn’t come from 

a separate document, and was incorporated into this document.” Id. at 65. 

In other words, Detwiler could not rule out that McClintock’s name had been 

cut and pasted into the document. 

Detwiler also noted peculiarities in the document’s layout. In 

particular, Detwiler testified:

[T]he thing that really really strikes me is the very last, almost 

full line of printed text, there’s a very large void at the end of 

the line. But then when you look right beneath it, the name 

Judy McClintock is indented almost an inch, and it’s also 

squeezed right up against the bottom of the last line.

. . .

If you look at – for example the vertical spacing between each 

line, it’s fairly consistent as you go up the page.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

If it’s faxed, you’re going to pick up marks. You’re going to pick 

up marks from the machine, whether or not there’s a mark on 

the drum, a mark on the glass. That they get put on the 

document, and then they get copied again over and over and 

over. 

The other thing that can create trash marks is if the document 

isn’t perfectly flat on the glass when you’re making a photocopy. 

N.T. Trial, 8/25/16, at 64.
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But it’s not consistent here between the name Judy McClintock 

and the last full line. Now if you look at the left and right 

margins. Again, you see that the writer goes essentially the 

whole way from the left to the right. And every single sentence, 

except for the last one, they stop short. And then all of a 

sudden the Judy McClintock name, is indented almost an inch. 

And then it’s just the name squeezed in.

Id. at 70, 72. 

Detwiler further testified that the correction of the spelling of 

Muskingum County was also a photocopy reproduction and not originally 

written on the paper. Detwiler concluded this based on the fact that “there’s

no bleed through on the back of the document which you would expect to 

find. There’s no impressions or indentations here [under the word 

“Muskingum”], but you can feel them [w]here there is original writing.” N.T. 

Trial, 10/7/16, at 109. Detwiler also noted toner deposits around the 

corrected word “Muskingum.” Detwiler concluded that he “[a]bsolutely” had 

questions about the validity of the document. N.T. Trial, 8/25/16, at 73. 

McClintock concedes that the will is a copy. However, she speculates 

that the Decedent, himself, “made a copy, either at the steel company site 

or at the convenience store, of the original document first shown at the steel 

site to [Lykins], and that he substituted the photocopy for the original as a 

less messy and clearer representation of his Will for her to notarize[.]” Brief 

of Appellant, at 8. McClintock argues that Detwiler, the document examiner, 

“did not testify that any ‘doctoring’ had in fact occurred in reproducing the 

document from the original.” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original). 
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McClintock asserts that this matter is controlled by our Supreme 

Court’s decision in Estate of Ervien, 233 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1967). There, the 

decedent and her husband executed wills on the same day with virtually 

identical dispositive provisions. Decedent’s husband predeceased her, 

leaving her his share of his family business, which in turn formed the bulk of 

decedent’s estate upon her own death. Prior to her death, and in the course 

of moving from her house to an apartment, decedent, who had weak 

eyesight and was extremely careless about her personal effects, had gone 

through her personal papers and disposed of a great deal of trash. Following 

her death, an unsigned copy of her will was located in an envelope also 

containing an unsigned copy of her husband’s will, her apartment lease, and 

other printed material given to her by her landlord. The envelope was 

addressed to her brother-in-law, whose daughter and grandson were the 

beneficiaries of decedent’s will. The envelope was found in a desk drawer on 

which decedent’s brother-in-law had placed a lock to help decedent 

“preserve her things from her carelessness.” Id. at 889 (Roberts, J., 

dissenting). 

Following the decedent’s death, the Register of Wills of Montgomery 

County refused to probate the unsigned copy of the decedent’s will. After a 

hearing de novo, the Orphans’ Court reversed and ordered that the 
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document be admitted to probate. The lower court’s reasoning was 

summarized by Justice Roberts in his dissent4as follows:

From the fact that no less than a year before her death 

[decedent] placed the unsigned copy of her will in the same 

envelope with a copy of her husband’s will and with her lease, 

the orphans’ court concluded that she deemed it of great value 

at that time. Then the court proceeded to reason that 

[decedent] could hardly have considered the copy of her will to 

be of value if she had destroyed the original [a]nimo revocandi. 

In addition, the opinion of the court seems to suggest that 

[decedent’s] poor eyesight, carelessness and moving explain the 

absence of the will from her effects and that the source of her 

property[, i.e., her husband’s family business,] the situation in 

which she made her will[, i.e., at the same time as her husband 

and with virtually identical dispositive provisions,] and her 

relationship to [her brother-in-law] make it unlikely that she 

would have deliberately acted to prevent her estate from passing 

to [her brother-in-law’s] descendants.

Id. The Supreme Court, without explication, affirmed the decision of the 

Orphans’ Court.

McClintock analogizes the instant matter to Ervien, as she testified to 

having found the purported will with Decedent’s other valuable papers. 

McClintock asserts:

The same question asked in Ervien should be asked in this case. 

If [Decedent] destroyed the original of his Will with the intent of 

revoking it, why would he have preserved the document at issue 

for more than 71⁄2 months after its notarization until his death? 

Like the decedent in Ervien, he kept it together with other 

financial items in one contained enclosure which he carried with 

____________________________________________

4 The majority’s brief opinion discusses neither the evidence adduced in the 

Orphans’ Court nor the applicable law. Rather, the Court simply noted its 

review of the record and concluded there was no abuse of discretion by the 

lower court. Accordingly, we rely on the facts recited in the dissent.
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him in going from location to location. In this case, unlike in 

Ervien, those other items were current by their very nature, 

i.e. his checkbook with blank checks and registers. Why should 

the document at issue be assigned any different character as to 

its nature?

Brief of Appellant, at 21 (emphasis in original).

This argument, however, misses the mark. In particular, it assumes 

that the Orphans’ Court found credible McClintock’s claim that she 

discovered the alleged will with Decedent’s other important documents. 

Indeed, the court found just the opposite: 

I understand that Ms. McClintock’s testimony that she found the 

will with the decedent’s other important documents is important 

evidence and I do consider that. But I do not find it to be 

especially credible given the other circumstances 

surrounding the will[.] 

N.T. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 12/21/16, at 12. Based upon 

the foregoing, it is apparent that the court did not, in fact, believe that 

McClintock discovered the photocopied document amongst the Decedent’s 

important papers, and, thus, the holding in Ervien garners McClintock no 

relief. 

McClintock also argues that the court erred in relying on document 

examiner Detwiler’s testimony to conclude that the document in question 

was doctored or fraudulently altered. McClintock asserts that, in fact, 

Detwiler testified that his examination was “inconclusive” as to whether the 

document had been altered. This argument mischaracterizes both Detwiler’s 

testimony and the burden of proof applicable to McClintock in this matter. 
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In order to probate a copy of a lost will, the proponent must overcome 

the presumption that the testator destroyed or revoked the will by positive, 

clear and satisfactory evidence. Estate of Murray, supra. While Detwiler 

did testify that his examination of the document was inconclusive, it does 

not follow that the trial court committed error by relying on his testimony to 

conclude that the burden as to the second prong of that test – that the 

contents of Decedent’s will were substantially as appears on the copy of the 

will presented for probate – had not been met. Detwiler testified that, 

because the document he examined was a photocopy, he could not 

conclusively determine the significance of the various anomalies within the 

document without examining the original. See N.T. Trial, 8/25/16, at 92. 

In other words, by the very nature of the only available document, a 

definitive conclusion as to its authenticity was impossible. However, 

Detwiler did point out numerous anomalies, such as isolated trash marks 

and toner particles, the presence of white-out, and the inconsistent spacing 

of Judy McClintock’s name, which raised serious questions as to the 

document’s authenticity. On this basis, the Orphans’ Court was well within 

its discretion to conclude that McClintock did not meet her heavy burden of 

proof. 

Finally, we briefly address McClintock’s argument regarding the 

testimony of Dorothy Lykins. As noted above, the Orphans’ Court found 

Lykins to be an incredible witness. McClintock challenges the court’s 

credibility assessment as follows:
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As not only the Notary Public but also the Chief Clerk of the City 

of Franklin Municipal Court for the State of Ohio, Dorothy Lykins 

is an authority figure whose word/testimony is to be and should 

be respected. There is nothing in the record to indicate anything 

that would or could have biased or impeached her testimony on 

these key facts. Therefore, even if her Affidavit was not 

completely in line with her testimony, that is of no significance 

whatsoever.

Brief of Appellant, at 26. 

The notion that Lykins’ testimony is not to be questioned because of 

her status as a public official is both dangerous and absurd and, as such, 

may be dismissed out of hand. The testimony of an elected official in a court 

of law is entitled to no greater presumption of credibility than that of any 

other citizen; to suggest otherwise is to begin a journey down a slippery 

slope. 

In sum, the Orphans’ Court’s decision in this matter was based largely 

on credibility determinations which, based upon our review, are clearly 

supported in the record. Nalaschi, supra. Moreover, we can discern no 

error of law in the court’s conclusion that McClintock failed to establish by 

positive, clear and satisfactory evidence, Murray, supra, that the contents 

of Decedent’s will were substantially as appeared on the photocopied 

document presented for probate. Janosky, supra. Accordingly, we affirm 

the order of the Orphans’ Court. 

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/6/2017