IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-41015

Summary Calendar

SHERON GABRIEL TERRELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GARY HUNTER; DONALD MUNIZ; MICHAEL BUTCHER; BONNY BURKS; 

BRANDY MOSLEY; RACHAEL SMITH; TIMOTHY FITZPATRICK; 

SAVANNAH HARRIS,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 9:15-CV-123

Before JOLLY, JONES, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Sheron Gabriel Terrell, Texas prisoner # 1779108, appeals pro se the 

district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint, based on 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), against various employees of the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice. The district court held that the constitutional and state-law 

claims asserted by Terrell, related to prison disciplinary case number 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 3, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-41015

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20130333522, were frivolous and failed to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted. Because Terrell failed to file objections to the magistrate judge’s 

report and recommendation, our review is for plain error. See Longoria ex rel. 

v. San Benito Indep. Consol. Sch. Dist., 942 F.3d 258, 270 (5th Cir. 2019).

Terrell has filed a motion requesting that this case be consolidated with 

appeal number 18-41016. His motion to consolidate is DENIED. 

Terrell has raised no argument with respect to the district court’s

determinations that the claims against the defendants in their official 

capacities were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity; that Terrell had 

not shown that the supervisory defendants were liable because of personal 

involvement in a constitutional deprivation or implementation of a 

constitutionally deficient policy; and that his claims related to the prison 

disciplinary proceeding were barred by the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477, 486–87 (1994). Terrell has waived those issues by failing to brief them. 

See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993).

Terrell argues that counsel should be appointed because of the 

complexity of the factual issues. Terrell states that he needs counsel to 

challenge the conviction for which he is incarcerated but that is not at issue in 

this case. It is unclear whether Terrell wishes to assert that the district court

erred in denying his motion for appointment of counsel, in which case no abuse 

of discretion has been shown, or whether he is requesting this court to appoint 

counsel, in which case the request is DENIED. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 

F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982). 

Next, Terrell contends that the conditions of his confinement prevented 

him from filing timely objections to the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation. He also argues that the 10-day extension of time he received 

to file objections was inadequate, and that the district court erred in denying

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as moot his “motion to revitalize.” Except insofar as these contentions relate 

to the difficulties presented by the pendency of his habeas case during the 

period when his objections were due, they were raised for the first time in the 

motion to revitalize. Terrell has not filed a notice of appeal from the denial of 

that motion and we thus lack jurisdiction to consider it. See Fiess v. State Farm 

Lloyds, 392 F.3d 802, 806–07 (5th Cir. 2004). To the extent that Terrell wishes 

to challenge the district court’s ruling on his motion to extend the period for 

filing objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, no 

abuse of discretion has been shown. See Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 

771 (5th Cir. 1997).

With respect to the merits of his claims for denial of access to the courts, 

Terrell contends that the district court erred in dismissing his claim against 

corrections officer Bonny Burks. Terrell makes no effort to explain how Burks’s 

actions negatively impacted any of his legal proceedings. See Ruiz v. United 

States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998). Terrell complains of the seizure of 

his legal materials by the defendants in another civil action, but that seizure 

does not relate to the constitutional claims asserted in this case.

Terrell offers conclusory arguments that disciplinary proceedings were 

initiated against him in retaliation for exercising his right of access to the 

courts; that state officials conspired to deny him equal protection by failing to 

act upon his grievance about the retaliation; that the inspector general 

determined that no investigation into the prison officials’ conduct would be 

conducted; that classification officers moved him in retaliation for filing 

grievances and lawsuits; that his grievance against the classification officers 

was improperly discarded; that his reclassification interfered with his religious 

observance; and that he has been denied access to public officials. 

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Terrell offers all of these unsupported and generalized assertions to show 

that he “has been experiencing a campaign of harassment for the last six (6) 

years on the Polunsky Unit.” He contends that all of his civil actions are 

interrelated and should be consolidated; that the conditions at the Polunsky 

Unit have prejudiced his position as a litigant; that this court should remand 

the case and order the district court to appoint counsel “for every complaint 

that occurred on the Polunsky Unit;” and that this court should order his 

transfer to another unit. Terrell has confused his various legal proceedings. 

No error has been shown, plain or otherwise. 

The appeal is DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. 

Prior to the commencement of this action, Terrell had accumulated two 

strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Terrell v. Mustfa, No. 3:13-CV187 (S.D. Tex. May 21, 2014) (strike 1); Terrell v. Cox, No. 3:14-CV-35 (S.D. 

Tex. July 29, 2016) (strike 2). Both the dismissal of Terrell’s complaint here 

by the district court as frivolous and for failure to state a claim and the 

dismissal of this appeal as frivolous count as strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). McGarrah v. Alford, 783 F.3d 584, 584–85 (5th Cir. 2015). 

Therefore, because Terrell now has at least three strikes, he is subject to the 

Section 1915(g) bar. Terrell may not proceed in forma pauperis in this or any 

other federal lawsuit unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical 

injury. See § 1915(g). Terrell is WARNED that the filing of actions or appeals 

that are frivolous or fail to state a claim will result in the imposition of 

additional and more severe sanctions. 

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