J-S35025-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WANYAI AHMERE PARKER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1005 MDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 8, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0004873-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 26, 2024

Wanyai Ahmere Parker (Appellant) appeals from the order, which was 

entered following remand from this Court, denying his first petition for relief 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).

1

 We affirm.

This Court previously summarized the pertinent factual and procedural 

history underlying this appeal:

On November 12, 2021, while represented by Rian Thompson, 

Esq. [(plea counsel)], Appellant entered an open guilty plea to one 

count each of criminal attempt – homicide, persons not to possess 

firearms, burglary, and discharging a firearm into an occupied 

structure; two counts ... [of] simple assault; and three counts of 

recklessly endangering another person. [18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901,

6105(a)(1), 3502(a)(1)(i), 2707.1, 2701(a)(3), 2705.] At the 

plea hearing, the trial court conducted a thorough on-the-record 

colloquy during which Appellant confirmed, inter alia, that he was 

not under the influence of drugs, and that he had completed the 

written guilty plea colloquy.

[FN 1]

 The court accepted Appellant’s 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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plea and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. On January 20, 

2022, Appellant received an aggregate sentence of 15 to 30 years’ 

incarceration.

[FN 1] During the verbal colloquy, the court asked Appellant whether 

he was “under the influence of any alcohol or drugs[,]” to which 

Appellant responded “no.” N.T. Plea Hr’g, 11/21/21, at 3. On the 

written plea colloquy, Appellant answered “yes” to [the] question 

of whether he has been or is now being treated for a mental 

illness, and “no” to whether that medication affected his ability to 

understand the colloquy questions. Guilty Plea Colloquy, 11/4/21, 

at 1.

Appellant filed a counseled post-sentence motion 

challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence, which the 

[trial] court denied on January 27, 2022. Neither Appellant nor 

his counsel filed a notice of appeal. Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence became final on February 28, 2022.

On August 16, 2022, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA 

petition. On the standard PCRA form petitioning the court, 

[Appellant] indicated that he wanted to raise claims implicating 

the constitutionality of his trial proceeding, ineffective assistance 

of [plea] counsel, and the legality of his sentence. Although 

Jonathan Chieppor, Esq., had entered his appearance on August 

29, 2022, the docket indicates that on September 1, 2022, the 

court appointed his law partner, Alexander Egner, Esq., to 

represent Appellant and permitted him to file an amended PCRA 

petition. Nevertheless, Attorney Chieppor continued to represent 

Appellant and filed a motion requesting an extension of time to 

file an amended petition.

Although the [PCRA] court granted the motion to file an 

amended petition, Attorney Chieppor instead filed a petition to 

withdraw as counsel and a Turner/Finley no-merit letter.

[FN 2]

 In 

his letter, Attorney Chieppor characterized the issue that 

Appellant raised pro se as one challenging plea counsel’s 

stewardship for allegedly failing to inform Appellant of certain 

sentencing enhancements, which allegedly resulted in the trial 

court imposing an illegal sentence. Appellant did not respond. On 

January 31, 2023, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 

notice informing Appellant of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s 
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petition without a hearing. On February 21, 2023, the court 

dismissed Appellant’s petition and granted counsel’s motion to 

withdraw.

[FN 2] See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en 

banc).

On March 7, 2023, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. 

Appellant filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement indirectly 

challenging plea counsel’s stewardship by challenging PCRA 

counsel’s [] failure to raise plea counsel’s effectiveness. The court 

filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion first finding that Appellant waived his

challenge to PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. The court, however, 

addressed Appellant’s claim that plea counsel was ineffective by 

concluding that Appellant had not pleaded or proved any element

of the tripartite ineffectiveness test.

Commonwealth v. Parker, 307 A.3d 684, 379 MDA 2023 (Pa. Super. 2023) 

(unpublished memorandum at 1-4) (footnotes in original; some footnotes 

omitted; some capitalization modified).

On appeal, this Court concluded that Appellant had properly challenged 

Attorney Chieppor’s ineffectiveness at his first opportunity to do so, in 

accordance with Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 401 (Pa. 2021)

(“[A] PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denied relief[,] ... raise claims 

of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on 

appeal.”). Parker, 307 A.3d 684 (unpublished memorandum at 4-5). This 

Court therefore proceeded to address the merits of Appellant’s layered 

ineffectiveness claim.
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Appellant first argued plea counsel was ineffective for “permitting” 

Appellant to plead guilty even though he was taking anti-psychotic 

medications that impaired his understanding of the colloquy. Id. (unpublished 

memorandum at 7-8). We concluded this claim lacked merit, as Appellant 

expressed, in both the written and oral guilty plea colloquies, that he was not 

under the influence of drugs or medication that would affect his ability to 

understand the proceedings. Id. (unpublished memorandum at 8-9); see 

also id. (unpublished memorandum at 2 n.2).

Appellant also argued PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a 

claim that plea counsel was ineffective for not filing a direct appeal on his 

behalf. Id. (unpublished memorandum at 9). Noting that the PCRA court 

declined to hold a hearing to determine whether plea counsel had failed to file 

a requested direct appeal, this Court vacated the PCRA court’s order and 

remanded for a PCRA hearing. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 

A.2d 564, 571-72 (Pa. 1999) (stating that failure by counsel to file or perfect 

a requested direct appeal constitutes ineffectiveness per se)). We also 

directed the appointment of new PCRA counsel to represent Appellant. Id.

(unpublished memorandum at 10).

On remand, the PCRA court appointed Christopher Lyden, Esquire

(Attorney Lyden), to represent Appellant. The PCRA court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing on April 10, 2024, during which plea counsel, Attorney 

Chieppor, and Appellant testified. The PCRA court directed the parties to 
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submit additional briefs; Appellant and the Commonwealth complied. On July 

8, 2024, the PCRA court entered an order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.

This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the PCRA court have 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2

Appellant raises the following issue for review:

Did the PCRA court err by failing to find that plea counsel was 

ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal after Appellant, 

immediately after the sentencing hearing, expressed that he was 

dissatisfied with the sentence and wanted to know everything he

could do, and, after the post-sentence motion was denied, emailed 

plea counsel three times indicating he wished to challenge his 

sentence?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant claims he contacted plea counsel on January 29, 2022, 

indicating that Appellant wanted to file a motion to reconsider his sentence. 

Id. at 10-11. According to Appellant, plea counsel’s February 2, 2022, 

response indicated that plea counsel had filed the motion, but the trial court 

had not issued a ruling. Id. at 11. In fact, the trial court had denied 

Appellant’s post-sentence motion on January 27, 2022. Id. Appellant argues 

“[t]his miscommunication deprived [A]ppellant of an opportunity to simply 

indicate ... that he wished to continue to appeal.” Id. Appellant also contends 

the PCRA court should have construed the emails Appellant sent to plea 

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2

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court stated it would rely on the 

reasoning it set forth in its July 8, 2024, order.
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counsel after the denial of his post-sentence motion as requests to pursue a 

direct appeal. Id.

“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review calls 

for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the 

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Wharton, 263 A.3d 561, 

567 (Pa. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Preliminarily, we presume that counsel is effective, and the appellant 

bears the burden of proving otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 

57 A.3d 1185, 1195 (Pa. 2012). The appellant must demonstrate that: “(1) 

the underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction 

lacked any objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s 

interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there was a reasonable 

probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s error.” Commonwealth 

v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). Failure 

to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim. 

See Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d 79, 88 (Pa. Super. 2016).

As we acknowledged in Appellant’s prior PCRA appeal, counsel is per se

ineffective where there is an “unjustified failure to file a requested direct 

appeal.” Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 572. However, “[t]o establish per se

ineffectiveness, a defendant must still prove that he asked counsel to file a 

direct appeal.” Commonwealth v. Markowitz, 32 A.3d 706, 715 (Pa. Super. 

2011).
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Instantly, plea counsel testified that after sentencing, he told Appellant 

he would challenge the sentence in a post-sentence motion. N.T., 4/10/24, 

at 6; see also id. (plea counsel indicating Appellant hoped for a sentence of 

10 to 20 years). Plea counsel testified,

[w]e had discussed the difference between a post-sentence 

motion and appeal and that if [Appellant] wanted a change in the 

sentence, I could file a post-sentence motion. We discussed what 

that would entail, the [timeline]. Everything that’s discussed in 

the guilty plea colloquy, we had already talked about all of that 

ahead of time.

Id.; see also id. at 14-16 (plea counsel stating that he had advised Appellant 

regarding his options following sentencing several times). 

According to plea counsel, after the court denied Appellant’s postsentence motion, Appellant told plea counsel he wanted to raise an 

ineffectiveness claim. Id. at 8. Plea counsel informed Appellant that an 

ineffectiveness claim had to be raised in a PCRA petition, rather than a direct 

appeal. Id. at 8-9. Plea counsel testified that Appellant never asked him to 

file a direct appeal. Id. at 12; see also id. (plea counsel stating that Appellant 

only indicated he wished to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).

Further, Attorney Chieppor testified that during his review of the record, 

he did not find any evidence that Appellant had requested a direct appeal. Id.

at 22; see also id. at 22-23 (Attorney Chieppor stating he had spoken with 

Appellant while preparing his PCRA petition, and Appellant never indicated a 

desire to challenge plea counsel’s failure to file a requested direct appeal).
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Appellant testified that he was “upset” about the sentence he received. 

Id. at 25. Appellant stated he asked plea counsel to file a post-sentence 

motion to reconsider his sentence. Id. While Appellant testified he would 

have liked to file a direct appeal, his written communication to plea counsel 

indicated he wished to pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id.

at 26-27; see also id. at 27-28 (reviewing written communications to plea 

counsel, and Appellant indicated he wanted a shorter sentence). Appellant 

acknowledged he never specifically asked plea counsel to file a direct 

appeal. Id. at 29.

The PCRA court concluded Appellant “did not ask for a direct appeal 

despite being informed by [plea] counsel of the process....” PCRA Court Order, 

7/8/24, at 3-4. The PCRA court’s conclusion is supported by the record, 

including the testimony summarized above. Additionally, our review of the 

written communications between Appellant and plea counsel confirms that 

Appellant never requested plea counsel to file a direct appeal. See 

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 (correspondence, 1/29/22: Appellant indicating he 

would like to file a motion challenging his sentence), (correspondence,

2/15/22: Appellant stating he would like a new attorney to raise an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim), (correspondence, 2/24/22: Appellant stating, 

“[I] would like to withdraw my plea due to ineffective coun[se]l and go to 

trial....”). Because Appellant failed to plead and prove that he had asked plea 
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counsel to file a direct appeal, his ineffectiveness claim fails. See Markowitz, 

32 A.3d at 715. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 09/26/2024