Filed 6/2 7 / 24 Donkin v. Federizo CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

ANNEMARIE DONKIN et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents

,

v.

AILEEN FEDERIZO, as Interim Trustee , etc.
,
Defendant and Respondent ;

MATTHEW DONKIN et al.,

Appellant s

. B 323043

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BP109463 )

O RDER MODIFYING OPINION (NO CHANGE IN THE JUDGMENT)

The opinion in the above

- entitled matter filed on May 30,
2024 is modified as follows:

On page 7

, the language in footnote 5 is deleted and replaced with the following :2 Matthew’s notice is captioned as a notice of cross

- appeal. Because Matthew’s cross

- appeal is the only challenge currently before us, we refer to Matthew’s challenge simply as an appeal,
rather than a cross

- appeal.

This m odification does not constitute a change in the judgment.

__________________ __ _______________________ ____________

_____ ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J. WEINGART, J.Filed 5/30/24 Donkin v. Federizo CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

ANNEMARIE DONKIN et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents

,

v.

AILEEN FEDERIZO, as Interim Trustee , etc.
,
Defendant and Respondent ;

MATTHEW DONKIN et al.,

Appellant s

. B 323043

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BP109463 )

APPEAL from order s of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ana Mari a Luna, Judge. Affirmed

. Matthew E. Donkin, in pro

. per., for A ppellant. No appearance for Appellant Christopher Donkin. Mark H. Boykin for Plaintiffs and Respondents Annemarie
Donkin and Lisa Kim. Rodnunsky & Associates and Yevgeny L. Belous for
Defendant and Respondent Aileen Feder i zo , as Interim Trustee,

etc

.2 Matthew Donkin appeals from two probate orders regarding the trust of his grandparents: one requiring the sale
of a property in the trust and one requiring liquidation of the trust’s assets. He argues that his contingent interest in the

trust entitled him to notice of the proceedings leading to these orders, and that because he and other contingent beneficiar y grandchildren did not receive such notice, the orders are void. We conclude that neither the Probate Code nor due process

re quired notice to Matthew 1 of the petitions or proceedings resulting in the challenged orders.
Matthew also challenges the order appo i nting an interim

trustee
, respondent Aileen Federizo , as void for lack of proper
service on any party

. Even assuming Ma tthew has standing to challenge this order , we conclude it is not void for lack of proper
service. Finally, Matthew argues the probate court erred in declining to enforce the trust’s no contest provisions, which he
contends were triggered by the petition to liquidate the trust

assets

. Because Matthew had the opportunity to raise this issue
below and did not

, he has forfeited the argument. Accordingly, we affirm the orders.

FACT UAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. The Trust In August 1988, Rodney E. Donkin and Mary E. Donkin,

a married couple, executed a revocable trust as part of their

1 To avoid confusion, we use first names to identify the various members of the Donkin family involved in the events and proceedings leading to this appeal . No disrespect is intended thereby.3

estate plan, which they then amended in 2002. 2 According to the trust document, the primary beneficiaries of the trust after the
death of b oth t rustors were their children: Rodney E. Donkin, Jr. (Rodney Donkin, Jr.)

, Lisa

, and Annemarie. “Rodney Jr. and his
wife Vicki R. Donkin were named as ‘first’ co

- successor trustees, while Lisa and Annemarie were

. . . ‘second’ co

- successor trustees.” 3 ( Donkin I

I , supra , B266036 , capitalization omitted .) The trust provides that, upon the death of the first t rustor (the predeceasing spouse or decedent), “the t rustee shall divide
the t rust e state into two

. . . separate shares” (capitalizatio n omitted) : (1) the “Survivor’s Trust” (Trust A), consisting of the surviving spouse’s interest in Trustors’ community property and the surviving spouse’s separate property, and (2) the “Decedent’s Marital Share,” consisting of the predeceasing spouse’s i nterest in the community property and the predeceasing spouse’s separate property. (Under scoring omitted.) Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the trust requires the t rustee to further
divide the decedent’s marital share into decedent’s Trust B and
d ecedent’s Trust C. The t rustee is to include in Trust B only
assets in an amount up to the maximum marital deduction from federal estate tax, and to allocate the remainder of the marital
share to Trust C

.

2 The effect of the 2002 amendment is not at issue on appeal.

3 In our March 2017 unpublished opinion, Donkin v. Donkin (Mar. 29, 2017, B266036) ( Donkin I I ) , we summarized many of the key underlying facts of the dispute between the parties. We replicate portions of that summary a s relevant here.4 In 2002, Rodney, Sr.

, died. Under the terms of the trust,
this rendered the d ecedent’s t rust, both the Trust B and Trust C portions thereof, irrevocable. The trust further provides that, “upon the death of the

s urviving s pouse [Mary] , the t rustee shall hold, administer and
distribute the t rust in the following manner.” (Capitalization omitted.) The provisions that immediately follow require the trustee to do various things not relevant to the instant appeal (for example, dispose of personal property and make special
distributions under certai n circumstances). Then, “[w]hen [these] conditions are satisfied, the debts and obligations of
the t rust e state have been paid, and any special bequests have been distributed, the t rustee shall allocate and divide [the] t rust

e state as then constituted in to separate shares so as to provide one share for each of the designated p rimary b eneficiaries [

— as noted, the trustors’ children, Rodney

, Jr., Lisa, and Annemarie

— ] living at the death of the s urviving [ t rustor] .” (Capitalization omitted.) Finally, the trust requires that “the t rustee

. . . distribute the shares allocated to p rimary b eneficiaries outright as soon as is practicable .” (Capitalization omitted.)
The t rust also provides instruction on how the trustee

s hould proceed in the event that a primary beneficiary dies after
the trustee has divided the trust estate into shares for each of
the primary beneficiaries, but before the trustee has distributed
those shares. Namely: “After division into shares

. . . up on the death of a p rimary b eneficiary

. . . prior to [ the ] complete
distribution of his or her share

, ” the remaining undistributed
balance of their share shall be distributed to th e deceased primary beneficiary’s then

- living issue pursuant to an age and

pe rcentage formula

. (Capitalization omitted.) “If a p rimary5

b eneficiary has no such issue, the remaining balance of their
share shall be distributed to the [trustors’] then living issue.” (Capitalization omitted.) Currently, there are six living
individuals who are issue of the p rimary b eneficiaries: Matthew
Donkin , Kathryn Rose Donkin, Christopher Kenneth Donkin

, and Robert Craig Donkin

— all of whom are the children of Rodney

, Jr.

— and Lisa ’s children : April Kim Co rtesi and
Laura Kim Shaunessy . Of these six individuals (the secondary beneficiaries) , only Matthew is a party to the instant appeal. 4 In 2004, shortly before her own death, Mary executed an amendment to the trust. The amendment “substituted a new
parag raph regarding the allocation of the trust assets after her death as the surviving spouse. Instead of directing an immediate allocation and division of the assets into separate shares for
the beneficiaries, the new paragraph grants the successor

trustees

— . . . initially,

. . . Rodney Jr. and Vicki

— ‘complete discretion’ after the death of Mary to retain the assets of the
f amily t rust intact and to continue to manage the property for
the equal benefit of the primary beneficiaries. Among other things, the new paragraph granted the successor trustees ‘sole discretion’ over distribution of income and principal from
the t rust to the beneficiaries.” ( Donkin II, supra , B266036

, capitalization omitted .) The language in the contested
amendment did not differ entiate between Trusts A, B, and C

. In the unpublished portion of the April 3, 2020 opinion, however,

we concluded that this amendment could only apply to the

s urviving s pouse’s t rust (Trust A), because at the time Mary

4 Christopher signed the notice of appeal as well, but has not made an appearance in the appeal.6

executed the 2004 amendment, both t he Trust B and Trust C portions of the d ecedent’s t rust had already become irrevocable. ( Donkin v. Donkin ( Apr. 3, 2020 , B2 93127 ) ( Donkin I II ).)
We further concluded that the terms of the trust s requir ed
distribution of Trusts B and C to b eneficiaries “ ‘ “ as soon as is practicable ” ’ ” after Mary’s death and did not permit the t rustees

to continue to administer Trusts B and C as spendthrift trusts
for any longer after Mary’s death than necessary to addre ss the special scenarios addressed in the trust , calculate the primary beneficiaries’ shares, and prepare the trust assets
for distribution according to those shares

. In 2005, Mary died, at which point the Trust A po r tion
of the trust became irrevocable as well.

B. Prior Litigation and Appeals Regarding No Contest Clause

The trust contains a no contest clause. The 2004
amendment , which we have concluded applies only to Trust A

, also includes a no contest clause. For several years beginning
in 2008, Rodney

, Jr.

, and Vicki , as trustees, and the primary
beneficiaries besides Rodney, Jr. ( Lisa, and Annemarie )

, litigated
the no contest clauses resulting in one California Supreme Court decision, Donkin v. Donkin (2013) 58 Cal.4th 412, 416 ( Donkin I )

, and m ultiple Court of Appeal decisions , including Donkin I I and
Donkin III

. T he final reviewing court determined that none of the conduct at issue triggered a no contest clause

.7 C

. Petitions a t Issue i n Challenged Orders The two orders identified in Matthew’s notice of appeal 5

are: (1) An April 13, 2022 order (the Baker p roperty o rder) granting a May 10, 2021 petition of interim trustee Aileen
Federizo 6 requesting instructions to sell a property known as the Baker prop erty ( the Baker p roperty p etition ) ; and (2) a n April 25

, 2022 order (the l iquidation o rder) granting Annemarie’s May 7,
2019 petition to instruct the interim trustee to terminate and
distribute the t rust ( the l iquidation p etition )

. The proof of service for the liquidation petition reflects that it was served on Matthew by mail in 2019 at the Baker property
address. The proof of service for the Baker property petition reflects that it was served on Matthew by mail in March 2021 at

an address in Florida on Belle Grand e Avenue (the Belle Grande address). Per a declaration Matthew would later file with the

5 Matthew’s notice is correctly captioned a s notice of cross

appeal, given that Rodney, Jr.

, and Vicki had already appealed the orders Matthew identifies in his notice

. After Rodney, Jr.

, and Vicki twice failed to file the requisite documents to prosecute their appeal, however, this court dismissed it. Matthew’s cross

appeal is thus the only challenge currently before us. To avoid confusion, we refer to Matthew’s challenge simply as an a ppeal, rather than a cross

- appeal.

6 Aileen Federizo is a professional fiduciary and not related to the Donkin family. Because we refer to all other individuals by their first name, however, we refer Aileen in this way as well. No disrespect is thereby i ntended. T he court memorialized its appoint ment of Aileen as interim trustee in a December 13, 2018 order. We discuss additional details regarding Aileen’s appointment below as needed

.8

court, he did not live at either of these addresses at the time s the petitions were served. The record contains proofs of service fi led with the court reflecting that in 2021, Matthew was served with notice of the hearing on the Baker property petition by mail, as well as a continuance of that hearing, at an address in West Virginia

on Craighill Drive (the Craighill address). Per a de claration Matthew would later file with the court, he was living at the Craighill address at the time of these mailings.

1. Objections b ased on n otice to s econdary b eneficiaries Rodney

, Jr.

, and Vicki objected to the liquidation petition
based on , inter al ia, lack of sufficient notice to the secondary
beneficiaries , including Matthew

. T hey did not make this

same objection to the Baker property petition

. T hey , however

, did object to Ann e marie ’s October 4, 2016 petition involv ing

, inter alia, the sale of the Baker property, based on lack of sufficient notice to the secondary beneficiaries

. Rodney

, Jr.

, and Vicki’s objections alleged both a failure to even attempt to give
notice to some secondary beneficiaries, and the use of inaccurate

a ddresses for sending notices to some secondary beneficiaries, including Matthew. Rodney

, Jr.

, and Vicki filed proofs of service attesting to having mailed copies of their objections in October 2016 and June 2019 to, inter alia, Matthew at the Belle Grand e address. Per a declaration Matthew would later file with the court, he was living at the Belle Grande address at both times

. In August 2021 briefing, Rodney

, Jr.

, and Vicki reiterated
the ir objections based on insufficient notice to the secondary
beneficiaries

.9 2. Trial and t entative r ulings on p etitions

The court heard the liquidation petition , the Baker property petition , and the October 4, 2016 petition involving
the Baker property on various days between August 17, 2022
and September 8, 2022

. On September 8, 202 2
, t he c ourt issued tentative ruling s denying the October 4, 2016 petition, granting the Baker property petition

, and partially grant ing the liquidation petition

. The court overruled Rodney

, Jr. and Vicki’s objections regarding notice to the secondary beneficiaries, but “direct[ed] [counsel] to give notice of the tentative [rulings] to the [primary and secondary beneficiaries]

. ” The c ourt further
direct ed Annemarie, Rodney

, Jr., and Lisa “ to provide the curr ent or last known addresses of their children to Aileen Federizo by [September 15, 2021] ” and set a n October 19, 2021 deadline
for the secondary beneficiaries to object to the tentative ruling s ,

“ otherwise they will be deemed waived and the c ourt will adop t the tentative ruling as its final ruling on [November 19, 2021] .” (Capitalization omitted.) Counsel provided notice of the tentative rulings to , inter alia, all secondary beneficiaries, including
Matthew. This notice was sent to Matthew at the Craighill
address. Per a declaration Matthew would later file with the court, he was living at the Craighill address at the time this
notice was sent.

3. Secondary b eneficiary o bjections to the
t entative r ulings and c ourt’s f inal o rders

Four of the six se condary beneficiaries

— Matthew, Christopher, Robert, and Kathryn

— filed a joint set of objections to the court’s rulings based entirely on the lack of effective
notice to all secondary beneficiaries. The y also requested

a written statement of decision. The objections were signed10

by and supported by Matthew ’s and Christopher ’s declarations

. Matt h ew’s declaration states that he lived at the Belle Grand e address “ [ f

] rom 2015 to 2019

. ” He also identifies his “ current [ ] ”
addres s

— that is, his address as of October 2021 when he
executed the declaration

— a s the Craighill Drive address , and
further states that he had not lived at the Baker p roperty since
2010. On January 21, 2022 , the court held a hearing at which
it considered the se objections to the tentative rulings

. Matthew and Christopher appeared at th is hearing

. The c ourt overruled
all o bjections on the basis that notice to the secondary beneficiaries was not required by statute, and thus any failure

to provide sufficient not ice of the petitions to them was not

a basis for changing the court’s tentative ruling s

. The court explained that it had “ordered that notice be given [to the secondary beneficiaries] in an abundance of cautio n , so everybody
was clear w hat was going to be happening with these properties.” The court declined to provide a written statement of decision and adopted its September 8, 2021 tentative ruling s as final . These rulings were ultimately memorialized in orders dated April 13,
2022 and April 25, 2022, respectively. Matthew timely appealed, identifying the April 13, 2022 and April 25, 2022 orders as the subject s of his appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. Notice to Secondary Beneficiaries

Matthew contends that , based on his and the other secondary beneficiaries’ contingent interests in the trust

— that is, their entitlement to receive the shares of Trusts B and C allocated to their respective parents if such parents die after the11

trustee divides the trust assets into shares

, but before the trustee
distribute s those shares

— he and all other secondary beneficiaries were entitled to notice in the trust proceedings . He contends
that he and the other secondary beneficiaries did not receive the required notice regarding the liquidation petition

, Baker property petition , a nd related hearings , and that, as a result

, the Baker property order and the liquidation order are void. We disagree
with Matthew that his status as a secondary beneficiar y entitled
him to notice either under the applicable statutes or as a matter of due process.

1. Statutory n otice r equirements In arguing he is entitled to notice, Matthew relies on
Probate Code section 17203, 7 which describes the service required for petitions initiating probate proceedings, in relevant part, as follows: “At least 30 days before the time set for the hearing on the petition, the petitioner shall cause notice of hearing to be delivered pursuant to S ection 1215 to all of
the following persons: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Al l beneficiaries, subject

to Chapter 2 (commencing with S ection 15800) of Part 3.” (§ 17203, subd. (a) & (a)(2).) Th e notice requirement is
thus qualified by the provisions of “Chapter 2

, ” among them
section 15804. S ection 15804 provides, in relevant part, that “it is sufficient compliance with a requirement in this division that notice be given to a beneficiary, or to a person interested
in the trust, if notice is given as follows: [¶]

. . . [¶]

. . . Where

an interest has been limited to a living person and the same interest, or a share therein, has been further limited upon the

7 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are
to the Pro bate Code.12

happening of a future event to the surviving spouse or to persons who are or may be the distributees, heirs, issue, or other kindred of the living perso n, notice shall be given to the living person.” (§ 15804 , subd. (a) & (a)(2).) This section applies to the trust provisions governing when and how the secondary beneficiaries

m ay be entitled to distributions directly from the trust. Namely,

t he trust r equires the distribution of its assets in Trusts B and C,
in equal shares, to each of the p rimary b eneficiaries if they are “living person[s]

. ” I f at the time of distribution, all primary
beneficiaries are “ living person [s,]” the secondary beneficiaries are entitled to nothing. But “ u pon the happening of a future event to . . . persons who are

. . . the distribute e s”

— here , upon the death of any of the p rimary b eneficiaries after division of
the trust assets into shares, but prior to distri b ution of those
shares

— the “same interest” that would have otherwise been granted to the deceased p rimary b eneficiary is either granted to the issue of the deceased primary beneficiary (i.e., one or more secondary beneficiaries) or is reallo cated between the shares of the living p rimary b eneficiaries. Because section 15804 applies

to Matthew’s interest in the trust as a secondary beneficiar y , and because all primary beneficiaries are alive, the only notice
section 17203 and section 15804 require is notice to the primary
beneficiaries

— the “living person[s]” referenced in section 15804.
Matthew ’s status as a secondary beneficiary thus does not statutorily entitle him to notice

.

2. Due p rocess n otice r equirements Matthew also argues that because “[t]he law has long recognized that a contingent future interest is property [citation] no matter how improbable the contingency” ( In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 846, fn. 8), he, as a secondary13

beneficiary, h as a property interest in the trust triggering certain due process procedural protections. ( Roth v. Jelley (2020) 45 Cal.App. 5 th 655, 669

– 670 ( Roth ) [interests “ ‘subject to complete
divestment’ ” are still property interests that may trigger due process right to notice ].) Specifically, he argues that due process required he receive notice of the Baker property petition and liquidation petition, even if the code did not require notice,
based on the potential effect of these petitions on his intere st

as a secondary beneficiary. ( See id. at p. 674 [under Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. ( 1950) 339 U.S. 306, 319 ( Mullane )

, “meeting a state’s statutory notice requirements does not automatically satisfy federal due process”].) According to Matthew, because he did not receive such notice, the orders on these petitions are void. Due process requires “ ‘notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action affecting their property interest and an opportunity t o present their objections. [Citation.]’ ” ( Ryan v. California Interscholastic
Federation

- San Diego Section (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1048,
1072 ( Ryan ).) Thus, “[i]f a proceeding will ‘adversely affect’ a

person ’ s property interest, due process requires that the person be given notice by mail of the proceeding and an opportunity

to be heard when the person’s name and address are reasonably ascertainable.” ( Roth , supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 670, quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams (1983) 4 62 U.S. 791, 800 .) These concepts apply with equal force in the probate context

. I n “a proceeding to determine the rights of beneficiaries under a

trust

. . . when the rights of beneficiaries to a trust are inevitably affected, they are entitled to notic e.” ( Estate of Reed (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 14, 21 ( Reed ) .)14 But what it means to “adversely affect” or “inevitably affect” a property interest depends on the context of the specific proceedings and the specific interest at issue. D ue process,

“ ‘ “unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with

a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” ’ ” ( Barclay Hollander Corp. v. California Regional Water Quality
Control Bd. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 479, 510 .) It “ is a flexible

con cept, as the characteristic of elasticity is required in order

to tailor the process to the particular need. ” ( Ryan, supra , 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072, citing People v. Hansel (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1211, 1219 .) Here, the petitions could not and did not adversel y affect Matthew’s interest in the trust in the manner necessary

to trigger due process notice obligations

. R egardless of how
the court ruled on the petitions, Matthew’s rights under the

trust would remain (and, indeed, have remained) unchanged:
If certa in circumstances outlined in the trust come to pass, Matthew will be entitled to distribution per those trust provisions. The challenged orders granting the petitions do no t alter how those provisions are applied or what they require. Matthew’s “ right [ ] [as a] [secondary] beneficiar [y] under [the]

trust ” is thus not “ inevitably affected” by the petitions ( Reed

, supra, 259 Cal.App.2d at p. 21)

— to the contrary, that right is

not affected at all. Of course, the petitions might change the amount or value
of what Matthew stands to collect , should the circumstances come to pass that trigger his right to collect directly from the trust,
because the relief the petitions seek may reduce the value of the trust corpus. But this is an insuffic ient adverse effect to justify15

requiring notice to Matthew as an element of due process

. 8 Were such notice required

, any contingent trust beneficiar y, regardless
of how remote the likelihood that he or she will ever collect anything from the trust, could require notice of even the most mundane of housekeeping tasks, citing as a basis a possible reduction in the value of the trust corpus . Such “ ‘ [a] construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way [c an not ] be justified.’ ” ( Noel

v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 981 ; see ibid

. [describing courts’ “nuanced and pragmatic approach ” to assessing the requirements of due process] ; see also Mullane,

supra , 339 U.S. at pp. 314

– 315 [noting significance of “the practicalities and peculiarities of the case ” in assessing the
notice du e process requires and that “ ‘ [t] he criterion is not
the possibility of conceivable injury but the just and reasonable character of the requirements [of the notice statute] , having reference to the subject with which the statute deals’ ” ] .)
The primary due process cases on which Matthew relies
in arguing to the contrary

— Roth, supra

, 45 Cal.App. 5 th 655

, Reed

, supra , 259 Cal.App.2d 14

, and Estate of Sigourne y (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 593 ( Sigourney )

— are distinguishable

. T hese

cases involve a failure to give notice to the appellant of a probate
court order that effectively changed or eliminated the terms of a
will or trust governing the appellant’s contingent interest in the

trust

. Such orders plainly “adversely affect ed ” these appellants ’ respective interests in the trusts at issue , because the interests
ceased to exist in the wake of the orders. This is in stark contrast

to the chall enged orders here, which have no effect on Matthew’s

8 To the extent Estate of Lacy (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 172 is inconsistent with this conclusion, we disagree with its holding.16

right to collect from the trust (even though they may indirectly
affect th e amount he stands to collect)

. In Roth , the appellant was the grandson of the trustor
, McKie Roth, Sr. ( McKie

, Sr.)

. ( Roth, supra , 45 Cal.App.5 t h at

p. 659.) McKie

, Sr.

, “ created [the] trust in his will for the benefit of his wife Yvonne Roth (Yvonne) during her life and granted her

a testamentary power of appointment over the remainder. The will provided a default distributi on scheme in case Yvonne did not exercise her appointment power, under which McKie

, Sr.’s three adult children from a prior marriage ”

— one of wh om was the appellant’s parent

— “an d Yvonne ’ s one adult son from a prior marriage would each take a one

- quarter sha re of the remainder of the trust, with the proviso that, if an adult child did not survive Yvonne, then that child ’ s surviving issue would take that
child ’ s share

. . . . Thus, under the will, the issue of each of the
four adult children ”

— which included th e appellant grandson

—

“ had a contingent remainder interest in the trust, subject to divestment by Yvonne ’ s exercise of her appointment power. ” ( Ibid .) In the 1991 decree that was the subject of the appeal, the
trial court “ included language changing the d efault distribution of the trust upon Yvonne ’ s death,

. . . specif [ying] that the remainder of the trust was to be distributed solely to Yvonne ’ s son or his surviving issue in case of default (i.e., failure of Yvonne to exercise her testamentary power of a ppointment). ” 9 ( Id. at

9 The court revised the trust provisions in this manner consistent with a settlement agreement, to which appellant

was not a party and of which appellant did not receive notice, in which McKie

, Sr.’s

, children (including appellant’s parent ) disclaimed any right to collect distributions from the trust under its original terms . ( Roth, supra , 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 659.)17

pp. 659

– 660.) McKie

, Sr.’s grandchildren , including appellant,

“ were not given prior notice of the 1991 decree, even though the
decree eliminated their contingent interests in the remainder of
the trust.” ( Id. at p. 660.) Thus, in Roth , the challenged 1991 decree “adversely
affected [the appellant’s] property interest

. . . [because] u nder
the

. . . will

, [appellant] had a contingent future remainder interest in the trust, but under the 1991 d ecree, he had no

p roperty interest in the trust.” ( Roth, supra

, 45 Cal.App.5th at

p. 670 , capitalization omitted.) U nder the terms of the original
trust in Roth , the appellant was a contingent remainderman, even though he may or may not have received any actual money

or p roperty as a result of this interest . U nder the trust as revised by the challenged decree, however, he was no longer a contingent
remainderman and under no circumstances would receive any property from the trust

. On these facts, “due process required that [the appellant] be given notice of the proceeding that resulted in the 1991 decree and an opportunity to object. Because [the appellant] was not given such notice, the 1991 decree [was] void.” ( Roth, supra , 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 660, capital ization omitted.)
In Reed , supra, 259 Cal.App.2d 14 , the son of the trustor of a testamentary trust had a power of appointment over the corpus of the trust estate

. ( Id. at p. 23.) T hrough his (the son’s)
will , the son “disposed of his entire estate, dev ising one

- third
of the remainder of the [trust] corpus to each of [three] named
charities.” ( Ibid. ) Reed held that the charities were entitled to notice of proceedings assessing whether th e son’s disposition of
his share of the trust constituted an effective exercise of the son’s power of appointment, because if the court concluded that it did18

not
, the charities would lose any interest in the trust corpus they would otherwise have under the terms of the son’s will . ( Id. at pp. 19

– 22 .) An order to this effect resulting from proceedings of
which the charities did not receive notice was thus void for lack
of due process. ( Id. at pp. 19 & 23.)
And in Sigourney, supra , 93 Cal.App.4th 593, “the

court held that wh ere a will gave an organization authority to select future trustees of a testamentary charitable trust, that organization had a property interest in the selection power created by the will, and the executor could not simply eliminate the organization ’ s int erest in the charitable trust under the guise of construing the will without providing notice to the organization and [ an ] opportunity to be heard.” ( Roth, supra , 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 675.) A t issue in Sigourney was a “ petition ‘ to construe, amend, and conform [ the ] will and

. . . trust ’ ” ( Sigourney

, supra , at p. 596 ) so that the organizatio n would no longer have
ultimate authority to select the successor trustees. (See id. at

pp. 596

– 597.) Sigourney held that an order grant ing th is petition
and amend ing the terms of the charitable trust was “void because the [organization] was not given notice of the proceeding.” ( Roth,

supra , 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 674 [summarizing Sigourney ].) In conclusion, due process did not entitle Matthew to receive notice of the Baker property petition or liquidation petition

. The orders are thus not void on this basis.
I n analyzing Matthew’s argument that he , as a secondary beneficiary, was entitled to notice of the p etitions at issue

,

we have necessarily resolve d the issue of whether the other secondary beneficiar ies are entitled to notice of the petition

. I t is therefore moot whether Matthew has standing to challenge19

the lack of notice to other secondary beneficiari es

. We thus need
not address the standing issue.

B

. No Contest Clause

Matthew also argues that , based on Annemarie and
Lisa ’s role as the original petitioner s prosecuting the liquidation petition

, the no contest clause in the trust and/or the no contest clause in the 2004 amendment required Annemarie and Lisa to
forfeit any interest they had in the trust

. Rodney

, Jr.

, and Vicki argued below that the liquidation petition constituted a contest

. Matthew contends that because t he liquidation orde r partially grant ed the petition without consequence for Annemarie and
Lisa , it reflects the court’s implicit ruling that the petition

was not a contest

. He argues this ruling was in error and is reviewable in an appeal from the liquidation order

. Based on this purported ly erroneous ruling, Matthew asks this court to “[d]irect the probate court to enforce the no contest clauses

. . . and enter
an order that all asset distributions allocated to the shares of challenging beneficiaries Annemarie

. . . and Lisa

. . . shall be
retained in trust and distributed to the remaining beneficiaries herein named, as if said challenging beneficiary and his or her
issue had predeceased the distribution of the trus t estate.” Matthew failed to raise this argument in his objections

to the court’s tentative ruling granting the liquidation petition

,

as well as at the January 2022 hearing, in which he personally participated. During that hearing, the court specifically asked Matthew whether he “ want[ed] to put anything else on the record with regard to [his] objection ” beyond his notice

- based objections, and Matthew responded, “No, that would be my objection.” Having failed to raise this issue below, despite hav ing been invited by the court to do so twice , Matthew has forfeited the20

right to raise it now. 10 (See Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184

– 185
, fn. 1 [ “ ‘ [a] n appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings,
in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where

an objection could have been but was not presented to the lower court by some appropriate method ’ ”].)

C. Aileen’s Appointment as Interim Trustee

Matthew also challenge s the De cember 13, 2018 order appoint ing Aileen as interim trustee (the appointment order)

, arguing , inter alia, that it is void for lack of service to any parties (not just the secondary beneficiaries). He notes that
the formal request to appoint Aileen as inter im trustee came through Annemarie’s October 4, 2016 petition ( originally regarding matters unrelated to Aileen’s appointment ), which

on October 16, 2018, the court and parties deemed amended

to include the relevant appointment request. Matthew argues that this petition was never served on anyone , and thus the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the request for appointment it was deemed to contain, rendering the appointment order void

. ( See
Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1200 [a jud gment or order may be “void, as a matter of law, due to improper service”] .)

10 Matthew suggests that the court’s refusal to provide him the request ed statement of decision somehow prevented him from raising this issue below. But the argument he has forfeited

— that a petition requesting immediate liquidation of the trust assets trigge rs the no contest clause

— is based on an aspect of the petition that is evident in the petition’s very title. Matthew thus cannot attribute his failure to object on this basis to a lack of a statement of decision.21 1. Threshol d a

ppealability i ssues
The July 2022 notice of appeal is untimely as it applies

to the December 2018 appointment orde r. Because a void order may be collaterally attack ed at any time, however, including for the first time on appeal (see People v. Safety National Casualty Corp. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 11, 17 ) , to the extent Matthew’s appeal challenges the appointment order as void, we may
entertain it. But we may not and do not address Matthew’s additional arguments challenging the appointment order on
the other bases Matthew raises. To the extent his appeal from the appointment order relies on these additional arguments,
it is time

- barred.

2. The a

ppointment o rder i s n ot v oid As the sole basis for his contention that the petition ultimately resulting in the appointment order was not served (and that the appointment order is therefore void), Matthew cites the lack of a signature on the proof of service for the October 4, 2016 petition and a declaration of Annemarie’s counsel stating, inter alia, that such counsel had no direct recollection of serving anyone with that petition. This declaration further states, however, that based on decades of custom and practice and

proo fs of service his office filed, counsel had caused all primary
beneficiaries to be served with the October 4, 2016 petition.
In considering such arguments based on disputed evidence of service, “we defer to factual findings on disputed evidence so long

as those findings are supported by substantial evidence.” ( First American Title Ins. Co. v. Banerjee (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 37,
42 [discussing service of summons and complaint in context of motion to vacate purportedly void judgment for lack of service].)
H ere, the court found that notice of the October 4, 2016 petition22

was proper. Substantial evidence in the record supports this finding: namely, the declaration of counsel. ( Giorgio v. Synergy Management Group, LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 241, 247 [“ [w] het her the evidence is oral testimony, affidavits, or documents, when there is conflicting evidence, the trial court ’ s express and implied factual determinations are not disturbed

on appeal if supported by substantial evidence”].) Moreover, because the agree ment to amend the petition to include the appointment request was made in open court with the agreement of all primary beneficiaries, all those entitled to receive notice of the petition’s appointment request (see Discussion ante , part A)
received actual n otice thereof at that hearing. Accordingly, the record does not support Matthew’s argument that the appointment order is void for lack of notice or proper service.23 DISPOSITION The orders are affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

.

R OTHSCHILD, P. J. We concur:

BENDIX , J.

WEINGART , J.