1

National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling

LONG-TERM REGIONAL RESTORATION IN THE GULF:

FUNDING SOURCES AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

Staff Working Paper No. 15

Staff working papers are written by the staff of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater 

Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling for the use of members of the Commission. They do not 

necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or any of its members. In addition, they may be 

based in part on confidential interviews with government and non-government personnel.

I. INTRODUCTION

This staff working paper analyzes alternative funding mechanisms and governance 

structures for a multi-jurisdictional entity that would oversee implementation of long-term 

restoration activities in the Gulf of Mexico. The paper: (1) reviews the current status of Gulfwide restoration efforts; (2) considers proposals for new initiatives and increased funding; and 

(3) analyzes options and offers several possible recommendations for Commissioner

consideration. 

Lack of sustained and predictable funding, project coordination, and long-term planning 

have resulted in incomplete and often ineffective efforts to restore the Gulf. A unified Gulf-wide 

restoration effort that is governed by a single entity (referred to in this paper as a “council”) with 

decision-making authority and accountability would provide numerous benefits. It would 

minimize duplication of effort and waste in spending. It would provide a mechanism to resolve 

conflicts, so projects can go forward in a coordinated manner that directs funding to the places 

and resources most in need of restoration. And, ideally, it would be empowered to ensure that 

restoration efforts are science-based, but not unnecessarily delayed by a lack of scientific 

certainty, and that the stakeholders most affected by restoration efforts are given a meaningful 

voice in the process. 

A. Funding

No entity with authority to make restoration decisions will be effective without a 

sustained source of funding dedicated to restoration. This fact has been demonstrated repeatedly 

in other region-wide restoration efforts. Currently, no such Gulf-wide funding source exists. 

While a range of sources currently provide funding to individual states for restoration, or for 

specific agency projects, none is directed to Gulf-wide restoration, and none is sustainable. 

The federal and state litigation against BP and other parties offers opportunities to direct 

restoration funding to the Gulf: first, significant Natural Resource Damages payments will be 

recovered; second, any Clean Water Act penalties recovered by the federal government could be 

directed, by Congress, to the Gulf to fund restoration projects not funded through Natural 

Resource Damage payments; and third, a global settlement of civil and criminal litigation may 

include features (such as Supplemental Environmental Projects, criminal restitution, and criminal 
2

“community service” payments) designed to fund Gulf-wide restoration. Other funding sources 

– revenues from Outer Continental Shelf drilling, an increased per barrel tax on oil production, 

and appropriated funds directed at Gulf-wide restoration – have been considered by Congress 

and others. All of these potential funding sources (perhaps with the exception of Natural 

Resource Damages recoveries) face hurdles, political and otherwise, but are worthy of the 

Commission’s consideration. They are more fully described in Part II.

B. Governance Structure

Separate from, but related to, funding sources is an array of options for the governance 

structure of a long-term restoration council. A Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force 

recommended by the Mabus Report1 and established by Executive Order, is now in place. As 

contemplated by the Executive Order, the Task Force represents an important first step towards

coordinating restoration projects undertaken by the various jurisdictions in the Gulf, coordinating 

applicable science, and engaging stakeholders. However, as many in Congress and the 

Administration have suggested, the Task Force lacks some of the features necessary to achieve 

long-term Gulf restoration. Legislation that would build upon the Task Force’s mandates, 

through creation of a long-term council, passed the House in the 111th Congress, was considered

by the Senate in the 111th Congress, and (along with legislation introduced in the 112th Congress) 

informs the current debate on long-term restoration goals for the Gulf. Region-wide restoration 

initiatives elsewhere in the United States add some useful lessons learned to the debate. In 

examining options for the governance structure of a long-term council, the Commission should 

consider a range of relevant factors, including the council’s required adherence to restoration 

goals; the extent of its decision-making authority and its decision-making structure; the manner 

in which funds are allocated; the role of science; and opportunities for public involvement. An 

analysis of these factors is laid out in Part III.

C. Recommendations

Part IV contains specific recommendations for funding and governance structures 

applicable to three scenarios: (1) expenditure of Natural Resource Damages funds; (2) 

expenditure of global settlement funds; and (3) expenditure of a larger pool of sustained funding 

by a long-term restoration council. All of these recommendations are informed, to a degree, by 

lessons learned from four existing region-wide efforts: the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council; the 

Chesapeake Bay Program; the Everglades Task Force; and the California Bay-Delta program. 

II. LONG-TERM FUNDING FOR GULF RESTORATION

Experience in the Gulf and elsewhere has demonstrated that full restoration cannot be 

accomplished without sufficient and sustained funding.

2

 1 Ray Mabus, America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (September 

2010), 10, 

 Interested stakeholders share this 

http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/gulf-recovery-sep-2010.pdf. 2 It is difficult to define “full restoration,” given that the historic acreage and configuration of Gulf wetlands and 

barrier islands are generally viewed as impossible to reconstitute. As described in Chapter 7 of the Commission’s 

final report, restoration means enhancing the quality of the Gulf Coast ecosystem to the point where there is a strong 

degree of resilience against natural and manmade assaults. 
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essential premise, wholly apart from their inevitable disagreements about how available monies 

can best be allocated. In other region-wide restoration efforts – even those that receive 

significantly more annual funding than the Gulf – lack of sufficient resources is often cited as a 

key impediment to reaching long-term restoration goals.

3

 

Estimates of the cost of Gulf restoration vary widely. According to testimony before the 

Commission, full restoration of the Gulf will require a total of $15–20 billion, or a minimum of 

$500 million per year, over 30 years.4 Existing funding sources do not amount to anywhere near 

these figures; the exception is that, beginning within a few years after 2017, Gulf of Mexico 

Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA)

5 revenues will provide a substantial source of funding 

to individual Gulf states, though their use for coordinated, strategic restoration purposes may be 

limited. The lawsuit brought by the Department of Justice against BP and other companies6

could result in significant funding for Gulf-wide restoration if Congress passes the requisite 

legislation. Other proposals suggested by Congress and non-governmental organizations include 

increased annual appropriations for Gulf restoration, an increased per barrel tax on oil 

production, and accelerated availability of outer continental shelf revenues under GOMESA. 

These funding sources are discussed below. 

A. Existing and Proposed Funding Sources

1. Primary Existing Sources of Gulf Restoration Funding

Water Resources Development Act of 20077: Title VII of the Act authorizes

approximately $1.9 billion in projects to address ecosystem restoration, hurricane damage, and 

storm protection in coastal Louisiana. However, the legislation merely authorizes the Army 

Corps of Engineers to perform restoration projects; the necessary funding requires a separate 

appropriation from Congress. To date, no construction projects in the Louisiana Coastal Area 

have been funded.8

 3

 See, e.g, Anne Swanson (Chesapeake Bay Commission), interview with Commission staff, October 18, 2010 ; 

Lynn Scarlett (former Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior, who coordinated the Department’s 

Everglades Task Force participation in the last Administration,) interview with Commission staff, October 19, 

2010. See also Government Accountability Office, Chesapeake Bay Program: Improved Strategies Are Needed to 

Better Assess, Report, and Manage Restoration Progress (October 2005), 6 (lack of assurance of long-term funding 

impedes ability to target resources); Little Hoover Commission, Still Imperiled, Still Important: The Little Hoover 

Commission’s Review of the CALFED Bay-Delta Program (November 17, 2005), 39-41(lack of plan for sustained 

funding hampers ability to gain public support for implementation of restoration objectives).

4 Testimony of James Tripp (Environmental Defense Fund), Hearing before the National Commission, September 

28, 2010, 205; Testimony of Brian McPeek (The Nature Conservancy), Hearing before the National Commission, 

September 28, 2010, 285.

5 Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 109-432, Div. C, 120 Stat. 2922, 3000. 6 Complaint of the United States of America, United States v. BP Exploration & Production Inc., No. 10-cv-4536 

(E.D. La., Dec. 15, 2010).

7 Water Resources Development Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-114, 121 Stat. 1041. 8 See Louisiana-Mississippi Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Working Group, Roadmap for Restoring Ecosystem 

Resiliency and Sustainability (March 2010), 8, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/gulfcoast/roadmap. The President’s FY2011 budget 

requested $19 million for such projects. As of this writing, that budget has not been approved by Congress. 
4

Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act of 1990 (Breaux Act)

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: The 

Breaux Act identifies, prepares, and funds coastal wetlands restoration projects in Louisiana. 

The Act, which is currently authorized through 2019, provides for “long-term conservation of 

such wetlands and dependent fish and wildlife populations in order of priority, based on the

cost‐effectiveness of such projects in creating, restoring, protecting, or enhancing coastal 

wetlands . . . .”10 The Breaux Act directs approximately $30 million to $80 million per year to 

coastal restoration, depending on revenues from taxes on fishing equipment, import duties, and 

small engine motorboat fuel.11

GOMESA: The Act allocates revenues from certain outer continental shelf leasing areas 

to the Gulf oil and gas producing states of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Until 

2017, GOMESA revenue sharing is limited to revenues from specific geographical areas; after 

that date, revenues will be available from all eligible areas. In fiscal year 2010, qualified 

GOMESA revenues totaled about $2.3 million.12 The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 

Regulation and Enforcement estimates that, by the early 2020s, shared revenues could total $3.1 

billion through 2022 and could reach $59.6 billion through 2067.13 State share of revenues is 

capped at $500 million per year from 2016-2055.

14 States and political subdivisions may use the 

funds for the following purposes: coastal protection, conservation, or restoration; mitigation of 

damage to fish, wildlife, and natural resources; implementation of federally-approved 

conservation management plans; onshore infrastructure projects that mitigate the impact of outer 

continental shelf activities; and planning assistance and administrative costs of complying with 

GOMESA.

Coastal Impact Assistance Program15: The Program directs the Secretary of the Interior 

to disburse $250 million to outer continental shelf producing states (including the five Gulf 

states) for each of fiscal years 2007-2010. Funds may be used for essentially the same purposes 

as GOMESA funds. 

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) Section 8(g)16: Under the Act, generally 

27% of oil leasing rentals, royalties, and other revenues paid to the United States for leases 

within 3 nautical miles of a state are to be paid to that state. In fiscal year 2008, revenues 

directed to Gulf states under Section 8(g) totaled approximately $75 million.17

 9 Pub. L. No. 101-646, Title III, 104 Stat. 4761, 4778-88; 16 U.S.C. §§ 3951-3954. 10 16 U.S.C. § 3952(a)(1). 11 26 U.S.C. § 9503(c); 26 U.S.C. § 9504(b)(2); Mabus, America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after 

the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 46; see U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection & 

Restoration Act,” http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pd/cwppra_mission.htm. 12 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, “Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 

2006 Fiscal Year 2010 Allocations,” http://www.boemre.gov/offshore/PDFs/GOMESAFY2010Final.pdf. 13 Minerals Management Service, “Oil and Gas Revenues: Fund the Future,” MMS Ocean Science: The Science and 

Technology Journal of the Minerals Management Service (April/May/June 2008), 12-13. 14 Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 3006 (Dec. 20, 2006). 15 43 U.S.C. § 1356a. 16 43 U.S.C. § 1337(g). 17 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, “MMS Fast Facts” (April 2009), 2, 

http://www.boemre.gov/ooc/PDFs/MMSFastFactsApr09.pdf. 
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While these existing sources provide significant funding, they are not sufficient to 

achieve Gulf-wide restoration because: (1) they are not of the necessary scale to accomplish 

Gulf-wide restoration; (2) funding amounts vary by year, may be subject to congressional 

appropriation, and are not predictable; and (3) not all of the funding provided is required to be 

used for restoration. In addition, individual authorized projects are often designed and 

implemented without regard to larger regional ecosystem restoration goals. Even after 

GOMESA revenues reach their full potential, those revenues will be directed to the individual 

states, which may or may not use them to fund restoration consistent with Gulf-wide goals. 

2. Potential Funding from Litigation 

BP and other named parties may be subject to significant civil and criminal penalties, in 

addition to Natural Resources Damages claims, for violations of the Oil Pollution Act, Clean 

Water Act, and a number of federal wildlife statutes.18 Given the cost of lengthy litigation and 

the high penalties that may be imposed, BP and the other parties have a strong incentive to settle 

all federal and state claims in one global settlement. The federal, state, and tribal parties likewise 

would benefit from a global settlement that would avoid litigation expenses as well as delays in 

the actual implementation of restoration projects.19

As described further below, a global settlement under the Oil Pollution Act and Clean 

Water Act, and other statutes would result in substantial penalties and damage awards payable to 

the federal government, though it is unclear what portion of these funds would be directed to the 

Gulf. 

a. Natural Resource Damages Recovery

Federal and state trustees designated under the Oil Pollution Act have formed a Trustee 

Council to begin the Natural Resource Damage Assessment process for the Deepwater Horizon

spill. Through either litigation or a settlement, BP and other responsible parties will pay 

damages, which may be used for “restoration, rehabilitation, replacement or acquisition of the 

equivalent” of natural resources injured by the spill.20 The total amount of damages is not 

currently known. 

Under the Oil Pollution Act, recovered Natural Resource Damages funds must be used

for restoration of resources injured as a result of the spill. It is not yet clear how the damage 

award will be allocated. It is likely that the Trustee Council in its current form, or some 

reconfiguration of the Trustee Council, will make such decisions. Observers and participants 

have identified a number of challenges including: (1) whether federal trustees will maintain a 

united front in pursuing Natural Resource Damages claims; (2) how five Gulf states and several 

 18 See Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. Note that this paper 

focuses on federal Clean Water Act claims and federal, state, and tribal Natural Resource Damage claims. Other 

possible legal actions include state claims for economic loss and claims under federal wildlife statutes. They are not 

addressed here. 

19 Testimony of Richard Stewart (New York University Law School), Hearing before the National Commission , 

September 28, 2010, 197 (full litigation of Natural Resource Damages claims alone could take 20 years or more). 20 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c), (f).
6

federal agencies will be able to reach agreement on project selection; (3) whether funding or 

project selection will be targeted to geographical areas (such as Louisiana) that suffered the most 

damage or by some other criterion; (4) how Natural Resource Damages projects will be 

integrated with other restoration efforts in the Gulf; and (5) the difficulties of establishing a 

“baseline,” and the determination of whether restoration should be targeted to a pre-spill or 

“enhanced” baseline.

21 For more information on this topic, please refer to the Commission staff 

working paper titled: Natural Resource Damage Assessment: Evolution, Current Practice, and 

Preliminary Findings Related to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (No. 17).

b. Civil and Criminal Penalties

In addition to a Natural Resource Damages action, the federal government has the 

authority to bring civil and criminal enforcement actions under a variety of federal statutes, 

primarily the Clean Water Act.

22 On December 15, 2010, the United States filed a civil 

complaint in the Eastern District of Louisiana naming BP and other companies as defendants. 

The complaint seeks civil penalties for alleged violations of the Clean Water Act and “a 

declaration that the [d]efendants are responsible and strictly liable for unlimited removal costs 

and damages under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.”23 For more information on authorities for 

civil and criminal penalties, please refer to the Commission staff working paper titled: Unlawful 

Discharges of Oil: Legal Authorities for Civil and Criminal Enforcement and Damage Recovery

(No. 14) (Legal Authorities staff working paper). As that paper describes, civil and criminal 

penalties could total in the billions of dollars, depending on a variety of factors. Ordinarily, 

those penalties would be deposited in to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund24; however, as noted 

below, the Administration and some in Congress have proposed that a portion of the funds be 

directed to restoration of the Gulf. 

Additionally, as discussed in the Legal Authorities staff working paper, a criminal action 

could result in a court order to one or more parties to make restitution or community service 

payments, which could be directed to Gulf restoration. A civil action settlement could include a 

Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP), which is a tool used by the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in settlements in environmental 

enforcement actions. SEPs are a potential mechanism for directing funding resulting from the 

litigation against BP and others to the Gulf region. Louisiana Governor Jindal issued a press 

release on August 16, 2010, encouraging EPA and BP to work with the state to develop a SEP 

program to use potential settlement funds for coastal restoration projects.25 

 21 Testimony of Richard Stewart, 195, 198-200, 219-20, 238-39; Testimony of Garrett Graves (Louisiana Office of 

Coastal Activities), Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010, 323-25. 22 Statutes other than the CWA, including the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and 

the Endangered Species Act, are described in the Legal Authorities paper. 

23 Complaint of the United States of America, United States v. BP Exploration & Production Inc., No. 10-cv-4536 

(E.D. La., Dec. 15, 2010).

24 26 U.S.C. § 9509(b)(8); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(s). 25 Press Release, Louisiana Office of the Governor, Governor Jindal on Coastal Restoration: Time to Act is Now

(August 16, 2010), http://emergency.louisiana.gov/Releases/81610Release.htm; see also Testimony of Richard 

Stewart Testimony, 221-22; Testimony of James Tripp, 205; Testimony of Garrett Graves, 312.
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The primary advantage of a SEP program in this case would be to ensure that monies 

recovered from BP and other responsible parties are directed to Gulf restoration. The likelihood 

of inclusion of a SEP in a settlement with BP, or the size of any agreed-upon SEPs, may be 

limited by the so-called “nexus” requirement. EPA requires a nexus between the violations 

being enforced and a proposed SEP. EPA recognizes a nexus only if a proposed SEP meets one 

of the following criteria: 

the project is designed to reduce the likelihood that similar violations will occur in 

the future; or the project reduces the adverse impact to public health or the 

environment to which the violation at issue contributes; or the project reduces the 

overall risk to public health or the environment potentially affected by the 

violation at issue.26

In its SEP Policy, EPA notes that a nexus may be established more easily if the project 

impacts the site where the violation occurred or a site in the same ecosystem or geographic area. 

“Immediate geographic area” is generally within a “50 mile radius of the site.”27 Restoration 

projects included in a settlement with BP and others could fit within the second criterion 

established by EPA (reduces the adverse impact to public health or the environment to which the 

violation at issue contributes), but they would likely need to be directly related to the effects of 

the Deepwater Horizon spill itself. 28

In sum, funds recovered from litigation or settlement may be directed to Gulf restoration 

in the following ways: 

• Natural Resource Damage awards must be spent to restore the Gulf;

• Civil and/or criminal penalties could be directed to the Gulf, but only through 

Congressional action, because under the Clean Water Act such funds are directed to the 

Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund;

• If the United States reaches a settlement with BP and other parties, the settlement could 

include one or more Supplemental Environmental Projects aimed at Gulf restoration;

• The court in a criminal action could order restitution or a community service payments, 

which could be used for Gulf restoration; and

• A small amount of funds may be directed to Gulf restoration pursuant to federal wildlife 

statutes.29

 26 EPA, Nexus Requirement in the Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy (2002), 1, 

http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/sepnexus-mem.pdf. 27 EPA, Final Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy (1998), 5, 

http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/resources/policies/civil/seps/fnlsup-hermn-mem.pdf. 28 Examples of past SEPs resulting from Clean Water Act oil spill violations include the purchase and permanent 

protection of resources in the affected area. See Written Statement of Richard Stewart (New York University Law 

School), Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010, 4.

29 See Legal Authorities paper. 
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3. Legislative Proposals 

Legislative proposals in the 111th Congress attempted to fund Gulf restoration in several 

ways:

• Direction of at least 80% of civil and criminal Clean Water Act penalties resulting 

from the Deepwater Horizon spill to Gulf restoration (Landrieu bill);

30

• Creation of a new retroactive penalty – in addition to existing section 311 penalties –

under the Clean Water Act of $200 million for each 1 million barrels discharged

(CLEAR Act, as passed by the House of Representatives on July 20, 2010);

31

• Authorization of $2.5 billion to fund Gulf restoration from 2012 – 2021 (Reid bill);

32

• Direction of 20% of civil and criminal penalties resulting from the Deepwater 

Horizon spill to an endowment to fund community restoration projects (draft 

legislation proposed by several NGO’s);

33

• Acceleration of GOMESA funding (Landrieu bill);

• Direction of funds resulting from an increase in the per barrel tax on oil production to 

Gulf restoration (Reid bill);

34

In the Mabus Report, the Administration called on Congress to enact legislation that 

would direct a portion of Clean Water Act penalties resulting from the Deepwater Horizon spill

to restoration and other recovery needs in the Gulf region, and a separate portion of these 

penalties directly to the Gulf states.35

There are several challenges to the creation of new funding mechanisms for the Gulfwide restoration. First, directing 80% (or another amount) of Clean Water Act penalties to the 

Gulf would take congressional action. Informal reports suggest that, under Congressional budget 

rules, these funds would likely need to be “scored,” meaning there would have to be a budgetary 

offset.

36

 30 Restoring Ecosystem Sustainability and Protection on the Delta Act, S. 3763, 111th Cong. (2010) (“Landrieu 

bill”). 

 The mechanism passed in the CLEAR Act – imposition of additional penalties not 

31 Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act, H.R. 3534, 111th Cong. (2010) (“CLEAR Act”). 32 Clean Energy Jobs and Oil Company Accountability Act of 2010, S. 3663, 111th Cong. (2010) (“Reid bill”). 33 The Nature Conservancy, Draft Legislation: Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration, 

http://www.nature.org/wherewework/northamerica/gulfofmexico/explore/art33031.html

34 This funding source is also included in proposals being advanced by several non-governmental organizations, 

such as the Nature Conservancy and the Environmental Defense Fund. See Testimony of Brian McPeek, 284; 

Testimony of James Tripp, 206.

35 Mabus, America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 6-7. The 

report also covers economic recovery and recommends that Clean Water Act penalties be directed to human health 

and economic recovery in addition to Gulf restoration.

36 Interviews with Congressional staff. see also John Maginnis, “Between the flow of BP’s oil and BP’s money,” 

Times Picayune (August 25, 2010), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oilspill/index.ssf/2010/08/between_the_flow_of_bps_oil_an.html (“Justice would be served to use BP fines to pay for 

coastal restoration projects and business development, but congressional budget-scoring rules make a simple swap 

difficult.”). Under the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (PAYGO), new legislation that reduces taxes or 

increases mandatory expenditures (spending not controlled by the annual appropriations process) must include 

offsets in the form of tax increases or cuts to other mandatory expenditures that render the legislation “budget 
9

previously authorized under the Clean Water Act – would not be subject to the same scoring 

requirement. As noted above, additional funding through a per-barrel tax and through revenue 

sharing (including acceleration of GOMESA, which was initially proposed by Sen. Landrieu) has

been proposed – but those funding measures have not gained sufficient support to advance in 

Congress. 

B. Options for the Commission to Consider

1. Legislative Options

a. Direction of up to 80% of the civil and criminal Clean Water Act penalties

resulting from the Deepwater Horizon spill to Gulf restoration:

Pros: Ensures significant funds for Gulf restoration; generally supported by 

the Administration and many in Congress; not subject to the appropriations 

process;

Cons: Faces hurdles because of congressional scoring requirements; unclear 

how likely it is that such legislation will pass; benefits to restoration will be 

decreased if some of the funding goes to non-restoration uses (as is

recommended by the Administration); litigation could take several years to 

resolve.

b. Direction of 20% of the civil and criminal Clean Water Act penalties resulting 

from the Deepwater Horizon spill to fund an endowment for community 

restoration projects:

Pros: Ensures states and local communities have control over a portion of the 

restoration funds;

Cons: Same hurdles as noted in “Option a” above.

c. Creation of a new retroactive penalty under the Clean Water Act that is applicable 

to the Deepwater Horizon spill:

Pros: At least $1 billion directed to Gulf restoration; not subject to 

congressional scoring requirements;

Cons: One-time payment only.

d. Congressional appropriations directed to Gulf restoration:

Pros: Can target funding directly to Gulf restoration;

Cons: Dependent on the appropriations process (i.e. not predictable).

e. Direction of a percentage of an increased per barrel tax on oil production to Gulf 

restoration:

Pros: Extremely small percentage of the increase could result in substantial 

funding; not subject to annual appropriations;

 

neutral.” Office of Management and Budget, The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010: A Description, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/paygo_description/; 
10

Cons: Faces significant hurdles in Congress.

f. Acceleration of GOMESA or other revenue sharing measures:

Pros: Significant resources would be directed to Gulf states;

Cons: Faces significant hurdles in Congress..

g. Reliance on GOMESA as a source to fund state restoration efforts:

Pros: High level of funding; in Louisiana, funds must be spent on restoration

and other uses defined in GOMESA;

Cons: Unlikely that these funds will be made available for allocation by a 

multi-jurisdictional Task Force; restoration is not only allowable purpose.

2. Litigation Options

a. Inclusion of Supplemental Environmental Projects, criminal restitution, or 

community service payments as part of a global settlement with BP and other 

responsible parties:

Pros: Could ensure funding goes towards Gulf restoration;

Cons: Depends on settlement strategy of state and federal governments and 

the defendants; funding would not be available until a settlement is reached, 

which could take years.

III. LONG-TERM RESTORATION GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

Despite the widespread recognition that Gulf restoration requires a coordinated strategy 

in order to succeed, there is no single unifying structure to guide such efforts. There are several 

entities currently engaged in Gulf restoration – including the Gulf of Mexico Alliance, the 

Hypoxia Task Force, and the National Ocean Council – but none of them have developed and 

funded a comprehensive, unified strategy for Gulf-wide restoration. 

Prior to the Gulf spill the Administration created the Louisiana-Mississippi Gulf Coast 

Ecosystem Restoration Working Group, which identified, in its Roadmap for Restoring 

Ecosystem Resiliency and Sustainability, a near term strategy for addressing ecosystem 

degradation along the Mississippi and Louisiana coasts.37 Following the spill, and as 

recommended by the Mabus report,

38

 37Louisiana-Mississippi Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Working Group, Roadmap for Restoring Ecosystem 

Resiliency and Sustainability. 

the President created the Gulf Coast Restoration Task 

Force. That Task Force is a critical first step towards a coordinated Gulf-wide restoration effort. 

But, the Administration has stated that it views the Task Force as “transitional,” and has asked 

Congress to pass legislation establishing a long-term council with greater, and different,

authority. Several legislative proposals build upon the new Task Force in useful ways. This 

section: (1) describes the new Task Force and summarizes existing proposals for a new Gulfwide restoration council; and (2) discusses factors relevant to the new council’s governance 

structure.

38 Mabus, America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 10-12.
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A. Existing or Proposed Region-Wide Governing Entities

1. The Mabus Report and the Gulf Coast Restoration Task Force 

On October 5, 2010, Executive Order 13554 created the Gulf Coast Ecosystem 

Restoration Task Force (Gulf Coast Task Force).39 The Task Force was recommended by the 

Mabus Report.

Membership: The Gulf Coast Task Force is comprised of representatives of 7 federal 

agencies, four offices within the Executive Office of the President, the five affected Gulf states, 

and potentially affected tribes.

Functions of the Task Force include: 

• coordinating intergovernmental efforts to improve restoration actions; 

• supporting the Natural Resource Damage Assessment effort by referring potential 

restoration actions to the Natural Resource Damages trustees; 

• developing a Gulf of Mexico Regional Ecosystem Restoration Strategy;

• engaging stakeholders to ensure that their needs and viewpoints are shared in order to 

inform the work of the Task Force; and

• providing leadership and coordination in relation to research needs.

Strategy: The Gulf Coast Task Force must propose a restoration agenda that includes:

restoration goals, performance indicators, and a means of coordinating restoration efforts guided 

by shared priorities. In developing its Strategy, the Task Force shall: 

• define ecosystem restoration goals and describe milestones;

• consider existing research and planning efforts;

• identify major policy areas where coordinated intergovernmental action is necessary;

• propose new programs or actions to implement elements of the Strategy where existing 

authorities are not sufficient;

• identify monitoring, research, and scientific assessment needs and evaluate existing 

monitoring programs and gaps in current data; and

• describe circumstances under which termination of the Task Force would be appropriate. 

Source and Allocation of Funding: The Executive Order contains no explicit direction 

regarding funding for restoration projects or the method for allocating any funding that is 

secured. Rather, the Executive Order directs federal agencies, to “consider ways to align their 

relevant programs and authorities with the Strategy.”40 

As noted above, the Administration has stated that it considers the Gulf Coast Task Force 

to be “transitional” 41

 39 Exec. Order No. 13554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62313 (Oct. 5, 2010).

and, through the Mabus Report, it has called upon Congress to enact 

40 Ibid, at 62315. 41 Lisa Jackson (EPA), Remarks on the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Task Force, EPA (October 5, 2010); Lisa Jackson 

(EPA), Remarks on the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Task Force, EPA (September 29, 2010).
12

legislation that would establish a Gulf Coast Recovery Council that would oversee and 

implement restoration funding sources. The Mabus Report recommends that the Council be 

structured to incorporate transparency, accountability to the public and relevant scientific and 

technical knowledge.42

2. Legislative Proposals for a Gulf Coast Restoration Task Force in the 111th

Congress

There were several legislative proposals in the 111th Congress for long-term Gulf restoration 

task forces, including:

• H.R. 3534, Title V (the CLEAR Act, passed by House of Representatives on July 20, 

2010); 

• S. 3763, Section 4 (Senator Landrieu’s RESPOND Act); and

• S. 3663, Title XLII (Senator Reid’s Clean Energy Jobs and Oil Accountability Act of 

2010).

All of these bills would establish a Gulf Restoration Task Force, with representation by 

relevant federal agencies and governors of the Gulf states. In addition, they recommend that the 

Task Force develop a Comprehensive Plan, which incorporates existing Gulf restoration plans, to 

promote long-term Gulf-wide restoration. The three bills vary on the content of the 

Comprehensive Plans they require: 

• The CLEAR Act lists particular restoration programs and projects to be addressed in the 

plan, which range from specific resources (oyster reefs, wetlands, fish passages) to more 

general goals (research, restoring biological productivity and ecosystem function,

improving resilience, restoring fisheries). 

• The Landrieu bill requires the plan to list specific restoration projects that give priority to: 

projects established by the Water Resources Development Act of 2007; the Louisiana 

Master Plan; projects that maximize beneficial uses of dredge material; and projects 

benefitting the areas most affected by the Deepwater Horizon spill. Projects are then 

further selected based upon ability to generate ecosystem sustainability, biological 

productivity, flood protection, and ecosystem function.

• The Reid bill calls for a plan that prioritizes projects based upon their ability to promote

ecosystem sustainability, biological productivity, flood protection, and ecosystem 

function.

Other features in the three bills include:

• Public involvement in restoration planning through a Citizens Advisory Council that 

advises the Task Force (CLEAR Act).

• Representation on the Task Force for local jurisdictions from each Gulf state, in addition 

to representation for the states themselves (Landrieu and Reid bills).

• A heightened role for the Chair of Task Force (Reid bill).

 42 Mabus, America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 8, 12. 
13

B. Analysis and Factors to Consider 

Based upon an analysis of four existing region-wide governance restoration efforts

throughout the United States43 and a review of the status of existing restoration efforts in the 

Gulf, as well as legislative proposals, several themes emerge that are valuable in assessing any 

proposal for a future Gulf restoration governance structure. Each of these themes is described 

below, with an accompanying analysis of their application to the Gulf. Hereinafter, a long-term 

Gulf restoration governing structure will be referred to as a “council.” 

1. Commitment to Restoration Goals 

a. Shared Vision 

A key element of successful regional restoration efforts is the development of a 

consistent set of shared restoration goals.44 In the Gulf, a coherent plan will help ensure 

stakeholder support and will provide a basis for developing specific restoration criteria.45 The 

Executive Order establishing the Gulf Coast Task Force, and the legislative proposals, all 

establish a vision, or purpose, for a region-wide Gulf Coast Task Force.46

Any Gulf-wide restoration effort will benefit from a clear description, in the governing 

legislation, of restoration goals. In addition, if ecological restoration is truly the focus, then that 

point should be stated explicitly, so that funding and project implementation are directed solely 

towards restoration, and activities aimed at navigation structure, flood or hurricane protection, or

other objectives are implemented in a manner consistent with restoration goals.47

 43 Staff reviewed features of the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council, the Chesapeake Bay Program, the South Florida 

Ecosystem Restoration Task Force (Everglades Task Force), and the California Bay-Delta (CALFED) program as 

examples of existing regional initiatives, through research and interviews with individuals who have participated in, 

or are knowledgeable about, these region-wide efforts. These efforts have had many successes, but each of these 

initiatives is complex, and complex in its own way, so none of the four is a perfect fit as a model for the Gulf. 

However, certain themes and lessons learned emerge from an analysis of these other models. 44 See, e.g., Government Accountability Office, Chesapeake Bay Program: Improved Strategies Are Needed to 

Better Assess, Report, and Manage Restoration Progress (October 2005), 4; Government Accountability Office, 

Chesapeake Bay Program: Recent Actions Are Positive Steps Toward More Effectively Guiding the Restoration 

Effort (July 2008), 7-8; Little Hoover Commission, Still Imperiled, Still Important: The Little Hoover Commission’s 

Review of the CALFED Bay-Delta Program (November 17, 2005), iv, 46. 45 Louisiana-Mississippi Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Working Group, Roadmap for Restoring Ecosystem 

Resiliency and Sustainability, 8 (defining a shared vision ecosystem restoration along the Louisiana and Mississippi

coasts); Testimony of Thomas Strickland (Department of the Interior), Hearing before the National Commission, 

September 28, 2010, 295. 46 For example, the CLEAR Act states that the Task Force will “maximize efforts in restoring biological integrity, 

productivity and ecosystem functions in the Gulf of Mexico.” CLEAR Act § 501. The Executive Order states that 

“The United States needs a vibrant Gulf Coast, and the Federal Government is committed to helping Gulf Coast 

residents conserve and restore resilient and healthy ecosystems in the Gulf of Mexico and surrounding regions that 

support the diverse economies, communities and cultures of the region.” Exec. Order No. 13554, 75 Fed. Reg. 

62313 (Oct. 5, 2010). 

47As a point of comparison, the multi-pronged goals set forth in the statute that authorized the Everglades Task 

Force (including water supply, restoration, and flood protection) have complicated decision making and slowed 

restoration. Scarlett, interview; see Water Resources Development Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-303, 110 Stat. 

3767 (1996)
14

b. Binding Goals

Experience in the Gulf and other regions has shown that, absent binding goals to drive the 

restoration process, restoration projects are not sufficiently funded, focused, or coordinated.

48

This stands to reason because natural resource managers are constantly subject to multiple 

demands, and will of necessity give a higher priority to specific requirements than they give to

general aspirations. Indeed, it is sometimes a lawsuit or other regulatory driver imposing specific 

requirements that results in action to achieve restoration goals. Examples are: (1) the Chesapeake 

Bay, where Clean Water Act litigation has led to a requirement that local jurisdictions develop 

Watershed Implementation Plans;

49 and (2) the Exxon Valdez restoration process, where a courtordered consent decree required projects to meet specific statutory requirements for restoration.50 

The Executive Order creating the Gulf Coast Task Force directs it to develop a Strategy, 

but does not impose any requirements on project selection, or otherwise require adherence to the 

purposes of the Strategy in Gulf restoration efforts. The Senate legislative proposals, on the 

other hand, require the legislatively-created Task Force to: (1) develop a comprehensive plan for 

Gulf restoration (consistent with purposes set forth in the legislation); (2) identify in the plan 

projects that are eligible for funding and implementation; and (3) select only projects that are 

consistent with the plan.51 Thus, the Senate bills create binding goals (in the legislation), and an 

obligation to implement projects consistent with criteria laid out in a comprehensive plan. 

Legislation of this nature appears to be the surest way to require governments to commit to 

restoration, and to provide a basis for accountability.

c. Specific Restoration Criteria

The legislation or other legal authority that establishes the Gulf restoration council, or the 

comprehensive plan implementing the purposes set out in the legislation, can be more or less 

explicit regarding the overall criteria applicable to projects eligible for funding. Criteria must be 

broad enough to endure over time, specific enough to inform project selection, and flexible 

enough to allow for adaptive change as the decision makers’ understanding of the underlying 

ecology, or the ecology itself, changes.

 48 Scarlett, interview; Mark Bryer (Chesapeake Bay Director, The Nature Conservancy), interview with Commission 

staff, October 15, 2010; Written Statement of Brian McPeek (The Nature Conservancy), Hearing before the National 

Commission, September 28, 2010, 6-7.

49 See Settlement Agreement, Fowler v. United States, No. 09-cv-05 (D.D.C. dismissed May 17, 2010), and 

litigation leading up to that settlement.

50 Agreement and Consent Decree, United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-82 CIV (D. Alaska, Sept. 30, 1991); see 

also Government’s Memorandum in Support of Agreement and Consent Decree, United States v. Exxon Corp., No. 

A91-082 CIV (D. Alaska, Oct. 8, 1991). 51See, e.g., Landrieu bill § 4(c); Reid bill § 4201(c). The CLEAR Act also requires the development of a 

comprehensive plan, but does not explicitly require project selection consistent with that plan. § 501. There seems to 

be little or no disagreement that a comprehensive plan is a key part of any restoration effort. The benefits of this 

approach are numerous: the plan elaborates on the goals of the governing entity and provides specific milestones and 

restoration objectives; it helps ensure that projects are not duplicative; it could include a map that ties projects to 

specific places; and it provides a useful mechanism for public involvement. The disadvantage is that developing 

comprehensive plans take time and a significant amount of coordination. To address this “plan fatigue” and to 

maximize the use of state plans, some of the legislative proposals require that the region-wide comprehensive plan 

incorporate existing state plans. Landrieu bill § 4(c); Reid bill § 4201(c).
15

There are several advantages to greater specificity in applicable criteria. Specificity 

ensures discipline in spending, helps decision makers target funding to particular projects, and 

minimizes the risk of financing projects that do not contribute to overall restoration goals.52

Specificity also makes project choices (including decisions not to fund a project) easier to 

explain to the public. Finally, specificity also takes some responsibility away from local decision 

makers, which has the benefit of insulating decisions from near-term and near-space demands 

that are not necessarily consistent with larger restoration goals.53 In some cases, local decision 

makers may actually welcome this approach. On the other hand, because circumstances, 

scientific knowledge, and ecosystems change, overly restrictive criteria may unnecessarily

prevent otherwise effective restoration projects. Also, the more specific the applicable criteria, 

the less discretion and flexibility are left to decision makers. One way to balance these factors 

would be to provide general goals and criteria in the governing legislation, and more specific 

priorities and criteria in the comprehensive restoration plan. 

Options for specifying restoration goals and criteria include: 

• Listing a small number of guiding principles;54

• Listing restoration programs and projects to be addressed in the comprehensive 

restoration plan (e.g. oyster reefs, wetlands restoration, fish passage); 

• Listing goals such as biological productivity, improving ecosystem resilience, and 

restoring fisheries; 

• Defining desired outcomes or performance objectives (e.g. number of acres restored);

• Listing types of habitats to be restored (e.g., key estuaries, sea grass, wetlands, coral 

reefs).

One cautionary note: The more goals that are identified in a plan or strategy, the greater 

the risk that efforts will be dispersed, the region-wide vision will be diluted, and desired results 

will not be attained. This was one challenge in the initial effort to restore the California BayDelta.

55

 52 Swanson, interview. In analyzing other region-wide initiatives, commentators have identified the lack of 

specificity in the goals established in guiding documents as an obstacle to achieving desired results. For example, 

the California Legislative Analyst’s Office made similar criticisms of the California-Bay Delta (CALFED) process, 

stating that CALFED was “not being guided currently by clear, specific goals that reflect the state’s priorities for the 

program.” While the governing Record of Decision and legislation have objectives for the program, “these are 

stated very broadly, thereby leaving decisions to be made in the future about the specific means to pursue them.” 

California Legislative Analyst’s Office, Reforming the CALFED Bay-Delta Program (Feb. 2006), 

Although the parties agreed on the general goals set forth in the governing documents, 

http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2006/resources/res_02_anl06.html. 53 Scarlett, interview. 54 For example, the Mabus Report lists the following five principles for ecosystem restoration: (1) coastal wetland 

and barrier shoreline habitats should be healthy and resilient; (2) fisheries should be healthy, diverse, and 

sustainable; (3) coastal communities should be adaptive and resilient; (4) a more sustainable storm buffer should 

exist; and (5) inland habitats, watersheds, and off-shore waters should be healthy and well-managed. Mabus, 

America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 38-39. 55CALFED was created in 1994 as a consortium of state and federal agencies with regulatory authority over water 

and resource management responsibilities in the Bay-Delta region. Funding was later authorized by federal statute; 

federal law also set forth objectives. California Bay-Delta Authorization Act, Pub. L. 108-361, 118 Stat. 1681 (Oct. 

25, 2004). The objectives of the program were to: provide good water quality for all uses; improve fish and wildlife 

habitat; reduce the gap between water supplies and projected demand; reduce the risks from deteriorating levees. See 
16

they did not agree on priorities for project implementation.56 Despite the expenditure of billions 

of dollars, evidence of tangible results was lacking, and this outcome is often cited as a central 

reason for CALFED’s ultimate dissolution.57 In a different way, in the Everglades the existence 

of multiple divergent goals has generated some criticism that projects are too focused on water 

delivery and not sufficiently focused on ecosystem restoration.58 A Gulf-wide restoration effort 

risks this same result, given the multitude of distinct causes of Gulf degradation. 

2. Decision-Making Authority and Council Structure

Factors to be considered in analyzing the decision-making structure of a Gulf restoration 

council are: (1) the extent of the council’s decision-making authority; (2) the relative roles of 

state and federal governments; (3) the council’s authority to allocate funding; and (4) the extent 

to which agencies are required to align their policies and budgets.59

a. Overall decision-making structure and conflict resolution

One common criticism of existing region-wide restoration initiatives – which could apply 

to the new Gulf restoration council – is that the lack of authority to select projects and/or make 

funding decisions limits their effectiveness. Many existing initiatives have coordination but not 

decision-making functions.60 Coordination of multiple jurisdictions’ activities, if carried out 

with discipline, is a critical step to restoration at an ecosystem scale. But an exhortation by 

Congress or the President to coordinate is not sufficient to ensure the most efficient use of 

resources, or the accountability necessary to achieve restoration goals.61 Even where there is a 

binding, comprehensive plan for the region, restoration will be more easily achieved if a single 

decision-making council has the authority both to determine whether proposed projects are 

consistent with the plan and to prioritize and select projects. 

Factors that bear upon a Gulf restoration council’s decision-making structure are: 

• Degrees of authority: Legislation could authorize the council to do one of a range of 

things: for example, the council could set goals, against which all projects are measured; 

 

California Legislative Analyst’s Office, Reforming the CALFED Bay-Delta Program (Feb. 2006), 

http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2006/resources/res_02_anl06.html

56 See Little Hoover Commission, Still Imperiled, Still Important: The Little Hoover Commission’s Review of the 

CALFED Bay-Delta Program, ii, 36 (lack of agreement on priorities stalled progress and impeded ability to achieve 

goals).

57 Giorgos Kallis, Michael Kiparsky and Richard Norgaard, “Collaborative Governance and Adaptive Management: 

Lessons from California’s CALFED Water Program,” Environmental Science & Policy 12 (2009), 632, 639. 58 See, e.g., Pervaze Sheikh and Nicole Carter, “South Florida Ecosystem Restoration and the Comprehensive 

Everglades Restoration Plan,” Congressional Research Service (2008), 5; Scarlett, interview. 

59 The roles of the public, and of scientists, are also relevant to this question are described in Sections III.B.3 and 

III.B.4, below.

60 Mabus, America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 10 (“While the 

Task Force would not direct the actions of other federal agencies, it would serve in a critical advisory capacity to 

ensure that Gulf restoration efforts are coordinated, collaborative, and effective.”).

61 See, e.g., Little Hoover Commission, Still Imperiled, Still Important: The Little Hoover Commission’s Review of 

the CALFED Bay-Delta Program, 63 (lack of clear authority and accountability impeded CALFED partners’ ability 

to achieve results).
17

it could prioritize projects according to factors such as geography or restoration need; it 

could select individual projects; and it could allocate funding to individual jurisdictions 

and allow them to select projects.

• Identity of the actual decision maker: Most region-wide restoration initiatives are led by 

a Task Force or governing council.62 The Reid and Landrieu bills, which establish Gulfwide decision making bodies, vest increased authority in a single individual (the Chair of 

the Task Force) who is appointed by the President and advised by the Task Force. In 

these proposals, funds are made available to the Chair, who has authority to select 

projects and, presumably, transfer the funds to the agency or jurisdiction that would 

implement the project. The advantages of this model are efficiency and clear lines of 

decision-making. One major disadvantage is that decision making could be seen as “top 

down”; this would likely be a concern in the Gulf. The model also depends on a source 

of funding available to the single decision maker. A variation on this model is the 

“super-trustee” proposed by some for the Natural Resource Damages restoration decision 

making process.63 Finally, there could be a “superboard” to look holistically at Natural 

Resource Damages and Clean Water Act funds. 64

• Level of agreement necessary to approve a project: In the absence of a single decision 

maker, the council should be structured to reach decisions quickly. The Exxon Valdez 

Trustee Council structure required unanimity, but this would likely not work in a multijurisdictional region like the Gulf. Other proposed models would require a majority,65 or 

a lead state and lead federal decision maker.66

b. State v. Federal Roles

Initiatives that manage and restore natural resources on a multi-state scale, and even those 

that only involve one state, struggle with the relative balance of state and local representation and 

decision-making authority. Projects are implemented at the local level and will not succeed 

 62 See, e.g., Exxon Valdez Trustee Council (comprised of three state and three federal trustees), established in a 

Memorandum of Agreement between the federal government and the State of Alaska. Memorandum of Agreement 

and Consent Decree, United States v. State of Alaska, A91-81 CIV (D. Alaska, August 29, 1991); Chesapeake Bay 

Program’s Executive Council (comprised of representatives of the federal government, Maryland, Virginia, 

Pennsylvania, Washington D.C., and the Chesapeake Bay Commission), established by Agreement between the 

federal government and several states , Chesapeake Bay Program, 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement (1987); the 

South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force (comprised of federal and state officials and chaired by the 

Secretary of the Interior), established by statute, Pub. L. No. 104-303, 110 Stat. 3767 (1996). 63 Testimony of Richard Stewart, 10 (“One step towards a solution would be for the President to provide by 

Executive Order for appointment of a supervisory or head federal ‘Super Trustee’ to exercise final review and 

decisional authority over federal decisions on restoration and NRD expenditures, and strongly encourage the states 

to do likewise. The arrangement could provide for joint federal-state appointment of a third Super Trustee to decide 

restoration priorities, plans and expenditures, along with the other two. Alternatively, Congress could establish such 

an arrangement by legislation.”).

64 Written Statement of Garrett Graves (Louisiana Office of Coastal Activities), Hearing before the National 

Commission, September 28, 2010, 5; see also Exec. Order No. 13554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62313 (Oct. 5, 2010) (requiring 

coordination between the Gulf Coast Task Force and the Natural Resource Damages Trustee Council). 

65 Written Statement of Brian McPeek, 7. 66 Written Statement of Garrett Graves, 5. 
18

without a high degree of buy-in from local decision makers and citizens. Nor will the projects’ 

value be maximized without the contribution of local knowledge regarding industry, culture and 

other local values. On the other hand, the federal government is typically the source of both 

funding and expertise (perhaps most importantly, scientific expertise) at a scale that state and 

local governments simply do not possess. 

The Gulf Coast Task Force as envisioned in the Executive Order includes at least 11 

federal agencies or offices, representatives of the five Gulf states, as well as representatives of 

affected tribes.67 The Reid and Landrieu proposals list nine federal agencies, representatives of 

four states, representatives of local governments in the four states (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, 

and Mississippi), and tribal representatives.68 In the Gulf and elsewhere, states have expressed 

concerns about top-down decision making, as well as concerns that, with a large number of 

federal agencies at the table, states will simply not have a sufficient voice.69 

One way to address the tension between state and federal interests is to apportion funding 

so that an identified portion of available resources go to the states with flexibility as to how they 

can be spent (see the following section), or to have all project selection occur at the state level, 

consistent with a comprehensive region-wide plan. As noted below, this objective may be 

achieved once GOMESA funding begins to flow to the states in large amounts.

c. Allocation of Funding

One of the most contentious and challenging tasks facing any governing council is to 

determine how to allocate available funding. The following are several models for how 

allocation decisions can be made: 

• Based on enumerated restoration-focused criteria. An example is the Exxon Valdez 

Trustee Council restoration project selection process, which was based on restoration 

need, according to criteria laid out in a Restoration Plan.70

• Based on habitat type (coastal vs. marine).

• Based on an enumerated list of priorities. The Landrieu and Reid bills prioritize projects 

based on ecosystem function and other science-based criteria. Other proposals prioritize 

projects that have already been authorized under the Water Resources Development Act 

of 2007.71

• Based on those geographical regions most impacted by the Deepwater Horizon spill. 

This is the recommendation of the State of Louisiana.72

 67 Exec. Order 13554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62313 (Oct. 5, 2010). 68 Reid bill § 4201(g); Landrieu bill § 4(f). 69 Testimony of Garrett Graves, 262, 301, 324; Testimony of Governor Haley Barbour (Mississippi), Hearing before 

the National Commission, September 28, 2010, 104-05. Similarly, when states are excluded from the process of goal 

setting or implementation, they have less incentive to support the goals or implementation, a result that in turn 

impedes achievement of goals. Swanson, interview. 

70 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Restoration Plan (November 1994), 

http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/Documents/Restoration/1994RestorationPlan.pdf. 71 Written Statement of Brian McPeek, 7. 72 Testimony of Garrett Graves 262, 324-25; Testimony of Thomas Strickland, 327-28.
19

• Based on geography more generally (e.g., a set percentage for Louisiana as well as for 

other Gulf states). 

Ecosystem-wide restoration needs versus local jurisdictional prerogatives: Because 

ecosystems cross political boundaries, restoration funding, to a large degree, will not be effective 

unless it is targeted to the needs of the entire ecosystem. This fact is often in tension with the 

pressure on local decision makers to drive funding to near-term and near-place projects. There 

are several ways to address this: 

• Restoration funding could be divided in to two pots: one that would require compliance 

with ecosystem-wide restoration goals, and a smaller one that would give more discretion

to local jurisdictions in the selection of restoration projects. This model was successful in 

the Exxon Valdez context.73

• The legislative proposal of The Nature Conservancy recommends that one fund (80% of 

Clean Water Act penalties) is dedicated to accomplishing the most expensive, large-scale 

projects and a separate fund (interest on 20% of the penalties) is provided to local 

communities for smaller projects.

 

74

• GOMESA funds, which are directed towards states, will provide substantial funding after 

2017, and would not likely be available for allocation by the council for Gulf-wide 

spending. Therefore, a state and local desire for greater control over restoration funding 

may be addressed after 2017. Expenditure of GOMESA funds could be guided and 

informed by the Comprehensive Plan and the state/federal partnerships in place as part of 

the region-wide council. 

 

• Under the Landrieu and Reid bills, local decision makers have some role in the decisions 

of the council because local jurisdictions from each Gulf state are required to have 

representation on the council.75

d. Alignment of Budgets and Policies

Federal agency authorities and activities often overlap and/or are inconsistent with one 

another. This creates specific hurdles in the Gulf, where multiple federal agencies are deeply 

involved in both protection and restoration activities, and where the Army Corps of Engineers’ 

mandates, in particular, are not entirely consistent with restoration goals.76

 73 Molly McCammon (former Executive Director, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council), interview with 

Commission staff, October 28, 2010;

 A requirement that 

federal agencies align their policies should help ensure that individual restoration projects do not 

conflict with one another and that resources are maximized. One possible mechanism is an 

74 The Nature Conservancy, Draft Legislation: Gulf Coast Ecosystem Legislation. 

http://www.nature.org/wherewework/northamerica/gulfofmexico/explore/art33031.html

75 Reid bill § 4201(g)(2)(L); Landrieu bill § 4(f)(2)(L). 76 See Louisiana-Mississippi Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Working Group, Roadmap for Restoring Ecosystem 

Resiliency and Sustainability, 9 (describing lack of coordination and inconsistent policies and priority setting among 

agencies active in the Gulf); Written Statement of Garrett Graves, 4 (“While the funding stream is critical, the 

current dysfunctional federal water resources project development and implementation process is equally as 

challenging. Without changes, oil spill remediation dollars could remain escrowed as federal policy obstacles 

prevent critical action.”).
20

Executive Order modeled after the Chesapeake Bay Protection and Restoration Executive 

Order.77 That Order requires a Federal Leadership Committee to publish a detailed and 

performance-based strategy for coordinated implementation of existing federal restoration 

programs and projects, and has been credited with improving federal agency coordination on 

efforts to address watershed pollution in the Chesapeake Bay.78 The California Bay-Delta 

Memorandum of Understanding likewise creates a Federal Leadership Committee to coordinate 

federal agency activities and priorities.79

The alignment of agency budgets would also improve the efficiency of federal agency 

restoration efforts. This goal is difficult to accomplish, especially given the large number of 

federal agencies involved in the Gulf, not to mention the fragmented committee jurisdictions in 

Congress. Some region-wide restoration initiatives, including the Everglades and CaliforniaBay Delta initiatives, have developed “crosscut budgets” as a way to organize and coordinate 

agency activities. 80 Crosscut budgets provide a single locus for tracking spending and measure 

progress according to performance indicators; they are thus a good tool for establishing 

accountability among agencies.

81 They also offer a process for identifying an eliminating 

overlaps in spending between agencies. There are challenges to using crosscut budgets 

effectively, including defining the level at which funding should be tracked and the scope of 

projects to be included in the budget. 82 But the mechanism has considerable potential for 

ensuring efficient use and coordination of agency spending. A federal agency crosscut budget is 

an option to consider for the Gulf. 

3. The Role of Science

Modern regional restoration initiatives generally recognize that sound science must 

inform region-wide planning and program selection.83 Decisions must be based on an accurate 

understanding of ecological functions; physical, chemical, and biological conditions; and the 

impact of restoration projects on those functions and conditions. There are many benefits to an 

approach that relies heavily on science and input from scientists: project selection and funding 

allocation are more likely to lead to effective restoration results; transparency in the decision 

making process may increase; and restoration decisions therefore have more credibility with the 

public.84

 77 Executive Order 13508, 75 Fed. Reg. 26226 (May 12, 2009).

The challenge is that the science of ecological restoration, in the Gulf and elsewhere, is 

incomplete and often inconclusive. There is a cost to waiting for the science to be settled before 

78 Bryer, interview. 79 California Bay Delta Memorandum of Understanding (Sept. 29, 2009), 

http://www.doi.gov/documents/BayDeltaMOUSigned.pdf. 80 Pervaze Sheikh, “Crosscut Budgets in Ecosystem Restoration Initiatives: Examples and Issues for Congress,” 

Congressional Research Service (2008), 7-10. See P.L. 104-303, § 529(f)(1)(f) (Everglades); P.L. 108-361 § 106 

(California Bay-Delta). 81 Pervaze Sheikh, “Crosscut Budgets in Ecosystem Restoration Initiatives: Examples and Issues for Congress,” 1-3. 82 Ibid., 3-4. 83 See, e.g., Pub. L. 108-361, 118 Stat. 1681 (October 25, 2004)(authorizing the CALFED initiative); Chesapeake 

Action Program, “Report to Congress: Strengthening the Management, Coordination, and Accountability of the 

Chesapeake Bay Program” (July 2008), 2, 12; Louisiana-Mississippi Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Working 

Group, Roadmap for Restoring Ecosystem Resiliency and Sustainability, 9. 84 McCammon, interview. 
21

acting. Moreover, scientific research or data can turn out to be incomplete or wrong, so there 

may be a cost to deferring all restoration decisions to the scientific process, or to particular 

models or data. Finally, the context itself is dynamic, as a consequence of the effects of climate 

change, continued land development and other factors. Thus, even where the science is robust, 

changing conditions may require new analysis and adaptation. Because all restoration decisions 

implicate both policy and scientific concerns, one of the most challenging (and consequential) 

factors in creating a governance structure is the role that science will play.

a. The Level of Scientific Engagement

One important question is the degree to which scientists should be involved in the 

decision-making process. There are at least two areas in which their involvement will be useful: 

(1) reviewing the scientific feasibility of individual projects (e.g., oyster bed restoration at a 

particular location), and (2) conducting research on general restoration issues (e.g., the degree to 

which certain restoration techniques result in oyster bed regeneration). One commentator has 

described five potential roles for scientists in natural resource decision-making: reporter, 

interpreter, integrator, advocate, and decision maker.85 As the involvement of scientists 

increases, the degree of decision-making credibility and the potential for slowing down project 

selection and implementation increase as well. 

The Gulf Coast Task Force does not include a distinct role for scientists, but clearly 

contemplates that they will play a role in defining ecosystem restoration goals, developing 

performance indicators, and identifying needed monitoring, research, and scientific 

assessments.86 The current legislative proposals are similarly general in their requirements. For 

example, the Landrieu bill provides only that the Task Force “coordinate scientific and other 

research associated with restoration of the Gulf ecosystem.”87

The following are several options for creating an institutional role for science in Gulf 

restoration decision-making:

• Establish a Science Panel to review all proposed individual projects both for technical 

merit and for consistency with the overall restoration goals (as set forth in the Restoration 

Plan) and annual work plans. (Example: Exxon Valdez Trustee Council.)

• Establish a Science Panel to research key scientific issues, develop adaptive management 

plans in coordination with program managers, identify performance indicators, monitor 

progress, and provide information to decision makers. (Example: Chesapeake Bay

Program.)

• Establish a Science Panel that has a coordinating, but not a formal advisory role. 

(Example: Everglades Task Force.)

 85 Denise Lach, Peter List, Brent Steel, and Bruce Shindler, “Advocacy and Credibility on Ecological Scientists in 

Resource Decisionmaking: A Regional Study,” BioScience 53 (2) (February 2003); see also Lynn Scarlett, 

Everglades Restoration: Governance, Science and Decision Making (presentation to the National Research Council, 

February 25, 2010).

86 Exec. Order 13554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62313, 62314-15 (Oct. 5, 2010). 87 Landrieu bill § 4(f)(4)(D).
22

• Ensure that scientists have the opportunity for formal or informal interaction with 

decision makers as individual projects and research needs are evaluated.

• Ensure that scientists have a seat at the decision-making table during project selection.

b. Adaptive Management

“Adaptive management” is a method for testing decisions regarding planned activities 

and adjusting the course of action if those activities are not achieving their intended purposes. A 

robust adaptive management plan establishes clear restoration goals, identifies indicators of 

whether the goals are being achieved, monitors those indicators, and based on information 

gained, considers new courses of action. Adaptive management offers a means to proceed

iteratively to reduce uncertainty through the refinement of management actions,

88 and avoid 

investing in projects that do not ultimately promote restoration goals.

89 Adaptive management is 

critical to any long-term restoration plan because of underlying uncertainty regarding ecological 

processes, and the high likelihood that natural or human-caused activities will change the 

circumstances affecting restoration while the plan is underway.

90

In order to ensure that adaptive management principles inform the decision-making 

process, the Gulf restoration council’s structure could require an adaptive management plan as 

part of the comprehensive plan. The adaptive management plan could include a 5-year review

and update of the comprehensive plan, and smaller adaptive management plans, requiring more 

frequent review, could be required for individual projects or groups of projects. The adaptive 

management plans could contain explicit performance measures against which progress may be 

measured.

4. Public Involvement

Leaders of restoration efforts repeatedly emphasize the importance of gaining the support 

of the people directly impacted by restoration projects.

91 Local citizen support is important for 

several reasons: (1) it can reduce delay of projects due to litigation or other opposition; (2) it 

contributes to political support for overall goals and funding in the short and long terms; and (3) 

it contributes to overall trust in government, which results in greater support for local projects.

 88 National Research Council, Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The First Biennial Review (2006), 

http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11754.html (citing K. Lee, Appraising adaptive management, Conservation Ecology 

3(2):3 (1999), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol3/iss2/art3/; and C. Walters and C. Holling, Large-scale 

management experiments and learning by doing, Ecology 71:2060-2068(1990)). 

89 Testimony of Brian McPeek, 282-83.

90 See, e.g., Ann Swanson, “Lessons from the Chesapeake Bay Have Applications Elsewhere,” Bay Journal (2001), 

http://www.bayjournal.com/article.cfm?article=2113&print=yes. In at least one region-wide initiative, the California 

Bay-Delta initiative, key scientific assumptions about the effect of implementation projects turned out to be wrong, 

resulting in failure to achieve restoration goals. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Kempthorne, 2007 WL 

4462395 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (authorized water pumping and conveyance operations had an adverse effect on the Delta 

smelt fish, a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act). An effective adaptive management plan can 

address situation where course corrections are needed. 

91 Testimony of Terrance “Rock” Salt, Hearing before the National Commission (Sept. 28, 2010), 288-90; 

Testimony of Thomas Strickland, 293-95; Swanson, interview; McCammon, interview. 
23

All multi-jurisdictional restoration initiatives have some mechanism for local 

involvement, providing for varying degrees of participation in the decision-making process. The 

creation of a mechanism for consolidating public involvement in an advisory group is beneficial 

for several reasons. First, it provides a venue where comments from a wide range of interests

can be presented. Second, it complements formal public meetings and public comment 

processes by identifying and filtering key substantive issues of interest to the public. Third, it

gives “ownership” to a group of citizens, who are then more likely to be accountable for the 

quality of their work. And, finally, it encourages long-standing citizens’ efforts, which results in 

greater local understanding of the history and substance of restoration efforts and, in many cases, 

greater trust within the citizens’ group, and between the citizens’ group and decision makers.92

On the other hand, in an area as vast as the Gulf, it may be difficult to balance full representation

of interested stakeholders with the need to have a manageably-sized decision-making entity.

The Executive Order creating the Gulf Coast Task Force contains no formal direction 

regarding public involvement, but directs the Task Force to “engage local stakeholders [and 

others] to ensure that they have an opportunity to share their needs and viewpoints to inform the 

work of the Task Force.”93 Given the importance of meaningful public participation in regionwide planning and decision making, any long-term governance entity would benefit from a 

formal citizens advisory group. One issue to consider is the manner in which the citizens’ group 

provides advice. In the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council context, the Public Advisory Group 

provided advice on every proposed restoration project.94 This may not be a feasible approach in 

the Gulf. The citizens’ group could, however, review and provide advice on comprehensive 

plans, restoration priorities, and categories of projects that should receive funding. 

The following are several options for providing a role for local citizens in Gulf 

restoration decision-making:

• Exxon Valdez Public Advisory Group: The Public Advisory Group established to advise 

the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council had a formal opportunity to review all individual 

projects and provide input on larger research issues. The composition of the group was 

based on specific interests (e.g., fishermen, environmental groups, outdoor sporting 

groups),95

• Citizens’ Advisory Group: The CLEAR Act creates a citizens’ group to advise the Task 

Force, but does not require that the group have as strong a role in the process as the 

Exxon Valdez Public Advisory Group did.

but a similar group could also have been based upon geographical 

representation.

96

• Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils: The Oil Pollution Act established Regional 

Citizens’ Advisory Councils for Cook Inlet and Prince William Sound. These Councils 

 A group under the CLEAR Act model 

could offer advice on comprehensive plans, review priorities, or review categories of 

projects to be funded.

 92 McCammon, interview. 

93 Exec. Order No. 13554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62313 (Oct. 5, 2010).

94Mccammon, interview.

95 Exxon Valdez Trustee Council, “Public Advisory Committee (PAC),” 

http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/people/pac.cfm. 96 CLEAR Act § 501(b)(4).
24

are comprised of voting members (members of the public representing identified interest 

groups and geographical groups) and nonvoting members (state and federal 

representatives). The Councils, among other things, provide advice and 

recommendations to government decision makers on regulatory issues, including 

permitting, review the adequacy of oil spill prevention and contingency plans, and review 

relevant scientific work.97 In practice, the Councils play as much of a watchdog role as 

they do an advisory role.98

• Representation on Council: Another option for public involvement is to include 

representatives of local jurisdictions, in addition to state officials, on the council itself. 

The Everglades Task Force includes such representation, as does the Task Force 

proposed by the Landrieu bill.

99 While this mechanism increases local representation –

and gives a decision-making role to local officials – it is unlikely to ensure full 

representation of the range of interested stakeholders. Additionally, government 

officials, even local ones, do not represent the views of all their constituents. The most 

effective approach may be to have both a citizens’ advisory council and local 

representation on the council itself.

100 

IV. SCENARIOS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Natural Resource Damages Awards

Currently, a Trustee Council comprised of state and federal officials is overseeing the 

Natural Resource Damage Assessment process. It is unclear how this process will play out and 

when damages will be awarded, but it is likely that federal and state trustees will maintain 

control over the process of spending the recovered funds. The Commissioners may want to 

consider the following recommendations related to the Natural Resource Damages process:

1. Spending of funds should be integrated and coordinated with other restoration 

projects in the Gulf, in order to maximize the ecological benefits of individual 

projects.

 97 33 U.S.C. § 2732.

98 Legislative Hearing on H.R. 4195, H.R. 5192, H.R. 5388, and H.R. 5494, Before the Subcomm. on Insular 

Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife of the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (2010) (Written statement of 

Dennis Takahashi-Kelso). 99 The Chesapeake Bay Program has a variation on this approach. It provides for two advisory councils, one 

comprised of citizens and the other comprised of local officials. See Chesapeake Bay Program, “Citizens Advisory 

Committee,” http://www.chesapeakebay.net/committee_cac_info.aspx?menuitem=46325; Chesapeake Bay Program, 

“Chesapeake bay Program Organizational Structure,” 

http://www.chesapeakebay.net/committeeactivities.aspx?menuitem=14890. 100 Several governing structures, albeit operating at a scale smaller than Gulf Coast Restoration, go beyond local 

government membership on governing councils and actually include representatives of nongovernmental 

organizations and citizen groups. The Boston Island Harbor National Recreation Area uses this public-private 

participatory model as does the Sonoita Valley Planning Partnership, which assists the BLM in managing the Las 

Cienegas National Conservation Area. See, e.g., National Park Service, “Boston Harbor Islands Partnership,” 

http://www.nps.gov/boha/parkmgmt/partnership-members.htm; Sonoita Crossroads Community Forum, “Appendix 

D-Las Cienegas National Conservation Area-Sonoita Valley Planning Partnership,” (2002),

http://www.sonoitacrossroads.org/compplan/AppD.html. 
25

2. Spending of funds should be consistent with any comprehensive restoration plan 

developed for the Gulf.

3. The Trustees should consider establishing one or more “Super Trustees” to facilitate 

decision making and the prioritization of restoration projects.

4. A citizens’ advisory council should be established, similar to the Public Advisory 

Group that advised the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council, to inform how these funds are 

spent.

B. Global Settlement

It is likely that the state and federal governments will attempt to reach a global settlement

with BP and other potentially responsible parties of all civil and criminal claims under the Clean 

Water Act, Oil Pollution Act, (including Natural Resource Damages claims), and applicable 

wildlife statutes. The Commission may want to consider the following recommendations: 

1. Congress should direct 80% of the Clean Water Act civil and criminal penalties to 

Gulf restoration. All of these funds should be directed to restoration (as opposed to 

divided between restoration and economic recovery, as is recommended in the Mabus 

Report). If such funding is directed to the Gulf, funding should be spent consistent 

with the Long Term Governance Structure outlined in part C.2, below.

2. The parties should consider structuring any settlement to allow a significant portion 

of recovered funds to be used for Gulf restoration. 

a) The parties should consider seeking a reduction of some portion of the civil 

penalties to secure an agreement that the responsible parties perform a 

Supplemental Environmental Project directed at Gulf restoration.

b) The parties should consider a settlement that replaces some portion of the criminal 

penalties with restitution payments and community service payments that are used 

for Gulf restoration. 

c) The federal and state governments should agree to a plan for spending restoration 

funds resulting from a global settlement in a coordinated manner so that 

restoration opportunities are maximized.

C. Long-Term Funding and a Gulf Coast Restoration Council

As described above, there are various potential sources of funding for long-term Gulf 

restoration. In addition, there is now a Gulf Coast Task Force in place. The Commissioners 

may want to consider the following recommendations related to funding and governance 

structure. 

1. Funding Sources: 

a) A dedicated source of sustained funding in the amount of at least $500 million per 

year for the next 15 years, or a total of $7.5 billion, should be available to the 

Council for Gulf-wide restoration. Funding sources for the Commission’s 

consideration include:

• Direction of at least 80% of civil and criminal Clean Water Act penalties 

towards Gulf restoration;
26

• Creation of a new, retroactive penalty (in addition to existing section 311 

penalties) under the Clean Water Act of $200 million for each 1 million 

barrels discharged and/or creation of a new, retroactive penalty under 

OCSLA;

• Congressional appropriation of funds for Gulf restoration;

• Direction of 20% of the civil and criminal Clean Water Act penalties to an 

endowment to fund community restoration projects in the Gulf;

• Direction of an increase in the per barrel tax on oil production towards

Gulf restoration;

b) Projects funded by Natural Resource Damage awards and (if directed by 

Congress) Clean Water Act penalties should be consistent with a Gulf-wide 

comprehensive plan. 

c) Although GOMESA funding will be directly available to the states, a large 

portion of it will likely go towards restoration projects. The expenditure of 

GOMESA funds should be guided by the Gulf-wide comprehensive plan and 

aided by state-federal partnerships that develop as a result of creating a Gulf 

restoration council. 

2. Governance Structure: The recently-created Gulf Coast Task Force should be 

succeeded by a joint federal-state Council, created by Congress, that would be:

a) Established to develop a binding vision for Gulf-wide restoration (this could also 

be enumerated in the legislation).

b) Directed to create a comprehensive regional restoration plan, which should 

incorporate the Louisiana Master Plan, the Mississippi Coastal Improvements

Program, and any other existing state plans. The comprehensive plan should list 

goals, priorities, and, where appropriate, individual projects. It should strike a 

balance between specificity and flexibility. It should also include an adaptive 

management plan and be reviewed every five years. 

c) Comprised of the appropriate balance of state and federal representatives, as well 

as representatives of local jurisdictions.

d) Authorized to identify priorities and/or projects for funding, consistent with the 

comprehensive plan. Funds could be apportioned between: (1) projects selected 

by the council in accordance with a comprehensive Gulf-wide plan; and (2) 

projects selected by individual states to meet state restoration priorities. 

e) Authorized to require federal agencies to align their budgets and policy priorities 

with the comprehensive plan, and to appoint a federal lead agency or create 

another mechanism for resolving disputes among federal agencies.

f) Required to appoint or create a science advisory group that would not have a 

decision-making vote, but would participate significantly in project selection, the 

development of a research program, and the development of an Adaptive 

Management plan.

g) Required to appoint or create a citizens’ advisory council.