C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEX AS ELPASO, TEXAS MA E D AV I S, Ap pe lla nt,
v. STA TE OF F I CE O F RI SK MANAGEMEN T , Appellee
. § § § § § § No. 08-06-00257- CV

Appea l from the 34th District Court of El Paso County , Texas (TC# 2004-2233)

O P I N I O N Appellant, Mae Davis, appe als from a no-evide nce summary judgme nt gr anted in fa vor of Appellee , the State Offic e of Risk Manag ement (“ SORM”). Be cause we de termine that Da vis raised
mor e tha n a sc int ill a of e vid e nc e c on c e rn inghe r e nti tle me nt t o li fe tim e inc ome be ne fi ts, we re ve rs e summary judgme nt and re mand this case. I. BACKG ROUND D a v is s u f f e r e d a c o mp e n s a

b le in ju r y o nN o v e mb e r

3 0 , 1 9 9 9
. A s a

r e s u lt , s h e u nderw ent bil a te ra l kn e e re pla c e me nt. Da vis so ug ht lif

e tim e inc ome be ne fi ts fo r the tot a l los s o f u se of bo th fee t. Pursuant to the Texas L abor Code, a contested c ase he aringwas he ld on Febr uary 4, 2004. See T EX . L AB . C ODE ANN . §§ 410.151 et seq. The he aringoffice r found th at t h e evide nce w as insufficient to establish that Davis’ fee t no longe r possessed a ny substantial utilit y

as a me mber of the bo dy
. Th e he ari ng of

fi c e r al so fo un d tha t the e vid e nc e wa s insu ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli shthat D a vis ’ condition was such that she could not g et and ke ep employ ment requiring the use of both f eet at or
a bo ve the ank le
. Ac c or din g ly , the he ari ng of fi c e r de te rm ine d tha t Da vis wa s not el ig ibl e fo r l if e tim e2

inc ome be ne fi ts. Da vis a pp e a le d thi s de c isi on to the Te xas Wo rk e rs ’ C omp e ns a tio n Co mmi ssi on ’s Ap pe a ls Panel. The A

ppeals Pane l affir

med the hea

ring office r’s de cision. Dav i s next s oug ht judicial reviewin the 34th District Court of El Paso County . I n her orig inal p et i t i o n, Davis alleg ed that she w as an e mploy ee of the El Paso State Center on or about No ve mbe r 3 0, 19 99 , w he n s he wa s in jur e d o n th e job , and that sh e wa s e nti tle d to l if e tim e inc ome be ne fi ts. On Au g us t 4, 20 05 , SO RM f ile d a no -e vid e nce m oti on

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt i n w hic h it
argue d th a t th e re wa s n o e vid e nc e tha t D a vis su ff

e re d a tota l and pe rm ane nt los s of the us e of bo th fee t at or above her a

nkle. SORM also notified counsel for Davis that a he aring on the no-e vidence motion was set for Septembe r 12, 2005. On S ep t em b er 7 , 2005, Davis filed a motion for continuance of the he aring . Two day s later, Da vis filed a motion for l eave to file a re sponse and evidenc e. Davis attache d a propose d summary judgme nt response a

nd aff idavit to the m o t i o n for leave and re quested that the tria l court g rant lea ve to file it. On September 29, 2005, the trial cour t g rante d Davis’ motion for c ontinuance. On Marc h 28, 20 06 , th e tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d D a vis ’ m oti on

and or de re d th e dis tr ic t c le rk

to f ile the re sponse. On June 16, 2006, ne w counse l for Davis filed an entr y of appe ara

nce, e x plaining that Davis’ pr evious attorney was, by then, decease d. On J uly 13, 2006, the trial cour t gr anted SORM’s
no -e vid e nc e mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. Th e or de r g ra

nti ng the mot ion re c ite s tha t “ [t]he Court , afte r hea ring argument from the pa rties and r eviewingth e m o t i o n and plea dings on f ile, is of the opinion the motion has merit and should be GRANTED.” Davis appe als the trial cour t’s g rant of summar y j u dg ment on two g rounds. Fir st, she3

contends that the tria l court i mproperly g rante d the j udg ment without notice of either a hea ring or
a su bmi ssi on date . Se c on d, Da

vis argue s tha t the tr ia l court e rr e d b y g ra nti ngthe jud g me nt, be c a

us e she presented more than a sc intill a of e vidence to raise a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t as to whether sh e su ff e re d a tot a l and pe rm ane nt l os s o f u se of bo th f e e t. II. DI SCU SSIO N A. Standard of

Review We apply a de novo standard of re view to summary judgme nts. Casill as v. State Office of Ri sk Mg mt
. , 146 S.W .3d 735, 739 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2004, no pet. ). A n o-evide nce motion for summary judgme nt is essentially

a pretria l dir ecte d verdic t, a nd we apply

the same le g al suffic iency standard. King Ranch, Inc. v . Chapman , 118 S.W .3d 742, 750-51 (Te x . 2003). The pa rty moving for summary

judgme nt must specifically state the e lements for w hich there is no evidence
. Aguilar v. Morales , 1 62 S.W. 3d

82 5, 83 4 ( Te x. Ap p. -- El Pa so 20 05 , pe t. de nie d)
. Th e burd e n th e n s hif ts t o the n o n - mo v an t to p r o d

u c e c o mp e te n t s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t e v id e n c e r a is in g a g e n u in e issue of
mate r ia l f a c t f o r e a c h e le me n t c h a ll e n g e d b y th e motion. Id. The e vidence is viewed in the lig ht most favora

ble to the non-movant, disre g ardingall contra ry evidenc e and infere nces. King Ranch , 11 8 S. W.3 d at 75 1; Forbes, Inc . v. Granada Bioscie nces, I nc. , 124 S.W .3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003). “A no evidence point will be sust ained when (a) t here is a complete absenc e of evidence of
a vit a l f a c t, ( b) the c ourt

is b arr e d b y

ru le s o f l aw o r o f evi den ce f ro m g ivi ngwe ig ht t o th e on ly evidenc e off

ere d to prove a vital fac t, (c) the evidence offer ed to prove a vital fac t is no more than
a mer e scintilla, or (d) the evidenc e conc lusively establishes the opposite of the vital fac t.” King Ranch , 11 8 S
. W
. 3 d at 7 5 1. I f the e vidence supporting a finding is such that it would allow
rea sonable, fa ir-minded per sons to differ in their conc lusions, then more than a sc intill a of e vidence4

exis ts. Forbes , 1 24 S.W. 3d a t 17 2; He rn an de

z v . D e La R os a , 172 S.W .3d 78, 81 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2005, no pet.). “L ess t han a scintilla of evidence e x ists when the evidenc e is ‘so we ak as to do no more than c reate a mer e surmise or s u s p i ci o n ’ o f a fa ct.” King Ranch , 118 S.W .3d at 751 (q u o t i n g Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc. , 650 S.W .2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)). B. I ssu e One I n her f irst issue, Davis contends that the trial court er red in g ranting summary

judgme nt without first providing notice of a he aringor submission. Davis ar gu es t h at , following the trial court’s g rant of he r motion to continue the September 12, 2005, he aring , the trial cour t gr anted SORM’s moti on for summary judgme nt wit h o u t n o tice that the motion would be re hear d or resubmitted. Davis asserts that this resulted in a denial of her rig hts under article I , sections 13 and 19 of the Te x as Constitut ion and the F ourtee nth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion. The Rules of Civil Procedure entitle a non-mova nt to twenty -one day s ’ notice bef ore a summary judgme nt hear ing. T EX . R. C IV . P
. 1 6 6 a ( c )
. A n o n - m o v an t ’ s r e s p o n s e i s d u e s e v e nd a ys prior to the hea

ring date. Id. I n order

to file a re sponse within seven da y s of hea ring , the nonm o v an t must have leave of c ourt. Id. A n o r a l h e ar in g o n a mo ti o n f o r s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t is not
re qu ir e d, and

the de c isi on

wh e the r to g ra

nt a n o ra l he ari ngis w ith in t

he dis c re tio n o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
. Gi ese v . NC

NB T e x . F or ne yBa nk ing Ctr

. , 881 S.W .2d 776, 783 (Tex. A pp.--Da llas 1994, no writ). Ne ve rt he le ss, no tic e of he ari ng or su bmi ssi on of a su mma

ry jud g me nt m oti on

is r e qu ir e d, be c a

us e the hea ring date de termi n es t h e time for r esponse to the motion. Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc. , 989 S.W .2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998)
. Wit hout suc h notice, the responde nt cannot know when his response is due. Id. ; se e als o Ro riev . G oo dwi n , 171 S.W .3d 579, 583 (Tex. App.--Ty ler 2005, no pet.) (“ [a] trial court must g ive n o tice of the submissi on date f or a motion for summar

y5

judgme nt beca

use this date dete rmines the date the nonmovant’s re sponse is due.”)
. Davis re lies on Courtney v. Ge lber , 905 S.W .2d 33 (Tex . App.--H ouston [ 1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). In Courtney , notice of a hear ing on the defe ndant’s motion for su m m ar y j u d gm ent was g iven, but the par

ties ag ree d to pa ss on the hear ing pr ior to the due date for the plaintiffs’ re sponse. Id. at 34. Severa l months later, without notice to a ny party , the trial court g rante d the motion. Id. The c ourt of appe als reve rsed, r easoningthat the dea dline for the de fenda nt’s response had not been
r e a c h e d , b e c a

u s e th e p arti e s h a d

a g r e e d to p a s s th e h e ar in g d a te
. Id
. at 3 4 . Be cause the date w as
never rese t, the response was not due at the time the trial court r uled on the motion. Id. I n Ma rti n , the trial court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of the def endants four

day s after they had filed the ir motion. 989 S .W.2d at 358. The plaintiff did not rec eive notice of submission and had not f

iled a re sponse. Id . Two day s af t er the orde r g ranting the motion was signe d, the plaintiff filed a

response . Id
. There afte r, t he trial court iss ued another order i n which it stated that it had consi d er ed t he re sponse and r econf irmed its ruling. Id. Al tho ug h th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in g ranting the motion without not ice to the plaintiff, the err or w as h ar mless, beca use the trial c ourt
rec onsidered its orde r in light of the response . Id. at 359. Unlike the situation in Courtney , it is undisputed that Davis had notice of the Septembe r 12, 2005, hear ing and t hat s he mi ssed t he deadline for her response. Neve rtheless, the trial court g rante d Davis’ motion for c ontinuance, as well as he r motion for leave to file a response . I n the motion for leave , Davis reque sted that the trial court “g rant lea ve to file the attached Re sponse in Opposition including a ll ex hibits and supporting summary judgme nt pr oof.” Davis’ c ounsel attac hed a sig ned response , to which he attached a copy of an affidavit by Dr. J oseph Neustein, acc ompanied by three pag es of medic al re cords c oncer ning D avis. Thus, despite missing the deadline to f ile a re sponse,T ho ugh s ect i o n 40 8
. 1 6 1 has b een am end ed s i nce t he d at e o f D av is’ i njury and t he d at e o f t he l awsui t , t he 1 a b o v e -q u o te d s e c tio n s h a v e r e m a ine d u n c h a n g e d
. See A ct o f M ay 2 5 , 2 0 0 1 , 7 7 t h Le g. , R
. S., ch. 14 5 6 § 9
. 0 1 , 20 0 1 T ex. G en . La ws 5167, 5190; Act of M ay 29, 2005, 79t h Le g . , R. S. , c h
. 265 § 3. 126, 2005 T ex . G en . La ws 469, 528.

6 Da vis wa s p e rm itt e d to fi le a la te re sp on se to S ORM’ s mo tio n f or su mma ry jud g me nt. Un de r t

he se circ umstances, the tr ial cou rt was not re quired to notify Davis that it was conside ring SORM’s motion and Davis’ re sponse. C . I s s ue Tw o I n h e r s e c on d is su e , Davis c on te nd s tha t she pr e se nte d mor e tha n a sci nti lla

of e vid e nc e to rai se a genuine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f

a c t on he r e nti tle me nt t o li fe tim e inc ome be ne fi ts. Th e statut e
un de r w hic h D a vis se e ks re c ov e ry , p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art : (a) L ifetime income be nefits ar e paid until the death of the employ ee f or:

. . . (2) loss of both fe et at or a bove the a

nkle; (3 ) l os s o f b oth

ha nd s at or a bo ve the wr ist ; (4) loss of one foot at or a bove the a

nkle and the loss of one ha nd at or a bo ve the wr ist ;

. . . (b) F or purpose s of Subsection (a) , the total and perma nent loss of use of a body

part is the los s o f t

hat bo dy pa rt
. T EX . L AB . C ODE ANN . § 408.161(a) , (b). 1 We h a ve no te d th a t: “Total loss of use” of a me mber of the body exis ts wh en ev er b y

rea son of injury such member

no longe r possesses a

ny substantial utilit y

as a me mber of the body or the c ondition of the injured member is suc h that the worke r ca nnot ge t and keep e mploy

ment requiringthe use of suc h member.7

Galindo v. Old Republic Ins. Co. , 146 S.W .3d 755, 759 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2004, pet. de nied). The los s o f u se mus t a lso be pe rm ane nt i n o rd e r f or a c la ima nt t o q ua lif y fo r l if e tim e inc ome be ne fi ts. Id. SORM ar g ued in its motion that there was no evidenc e that Davis suffe red a total a nd perma nent loss of use of both fe et at or a bove the a

nkle. Davis contends that the affidavit of Dr. Neustein provides more than a scinti lla of probative
e vid e nc e to r a ise a

g e nu ine i ss ue of mat e ri a l f a c t. D r. Ne us te in s ta te s th a t he is b oa rd c e rt if ie d in orthopae dic surg ery

and that he ha s evaluated Davis ove r t he past few y ear s for multiple workplac e inj ur ie s “ c on sis tin g pr ima ri ly of bil a te ra l sh ou lde r a

nd kn e e inj ur

y .” Dr
. Ne us te in state s that D a vis takes Ultram and Tylenol 3 and suff ers f rom pain i n b o t h k n ee s and her shoulders. He adds that Davis continues to have problems with her knees; t hat s he is at risk of serious injury , beca use she does not ha

ve proper ambulatory equipment; and that she “ almost falls down on fre quent occ asions.” Dr. Ne ustein conclude s that “[d] ue to her medical condition she is una ble to r eturn to any

form of work e ither limited or full. I n my profe ssional opin i o n , M s . Da vis has no ability to ge t or kee p employ ment with the us e of both shoulders and both knees. . . . For all prac tical purposes I

consider her to be totally

disabled.” Three pag es of medic al re cords c oncer ning two of

fice examinations i n the pre cedingmonths
are attache d to the aff

idavit. The first re cord c oncer ns an off ice visit on May 11, 2005. The re cord notes that Davis indicated that she is able to ambulate with a whee led walke r, has trouble g etting up from a c hair, a

nd almost falls down on fre quent occ asions. The sec ond re co rd concerns a n office visit on J uly

6, 2005, and notes that Davis has pain i n both knees and that she uses a walker. The
rec or d s li s t, a mo n g o th e r th in g s , th e in te r

n a l d e r an g e me n t o f

b o th kn e e s an d

c h o n dr o ma la c ia

as conditions of Davis’ kne es. Both rec ords l ist her projected return to li mited work and f ull work as8

“neve r.” SORM arg ues that its no-evidenc e mot ion established the complete absenc e of a vital fac t and conc lusively

estab l i s h ed the opposite of a vital f act, be cause the af

fidavit and a ccompa

ny ing medical r ecor ds addre ss problems with Davis’ shoulders a long w ith her knee s. SORM arg ues that the onl y issue befor e the trial court was whether Davis was entitled to lifetime income bene fits for the loss of both fee t at or above the ankle, be cause no claim conc erningher shoulder s was pre sented to the Commi ssion’s Hear ing O ffice r or the A ppeals Pane l. SORM arg ues t h at , b ec au se Dr. Neustein’s a ffidavit conc ludes that Davis “has no ability to g et or keep employ ment with the use of both shoulders and both knee s,” the plain mea ning of the af fidavit is that a combination of inj uries to Davis’ shoulders a

nd knees is what preve nts her from g etting or keeping employ ment, not injury to her kne es alone
. The re cord indicates that only a claim for benef its for the alleg ed injury

to Davis’ knee s was prese nted to the C ommissi on’s Appeals Panel. We ag ree that the t rial court is li mited to the issues decide d by

the Appea ls Panel. See T EX . L AB . C ODE A NN . § 4 10.302(b). We do not consider evidenc e conc erningDavis’ shoulder s. Howeve r, t h e fa ct that Davis also pre sented e vidence
conce rning injury

to her shoulder s does no t co m p el the conc lusion that evidence conce rning her knees is neg ated. The statute permits rec overy of l ifetime i ncome benefits i f a claimant ca n prove
a t o tal and per

manent loss of use of

both fee t at or above the ankle. T EX . L AB . C ODE A NN . §§ 408.161(a) (2) a

nd (b). While the affidavit ref ere nces Davis’ shoul ders, it also addre sses injury to both knees, which is a g round for rec overy under the statute. Considering the fore g oing, w e conc lude that the evide n ce p re sented by Davis is sufficie nt to cre ate more than a scintilla of evidenc e conc erningthe total and per manent loss of use of

both fee t9

above the ankle. Ac cording ly , we sustain I ssue Two. III . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons stated he rein, we reve rse the summary judgme nt and remand this case to the trial court f

or fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.

KENNET H R. CARR, J ustice April 3, 2008 B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l u r e , a n d C ar r , JJ.