U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

35–369PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

MARKUP of H. Res. 75, H.R. 739, 

H. Res. 156, H.R. 596, and H.R. 295 

MARKUP 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 7, 2019 

Serial No. 116–11 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Ranking 

Member 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

JASON STEINBAUM, Staff Director 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Republican Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 106 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 107 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 108 

Prepared statement submitted from Representative Castro ................................ 109 

MARKUP SUMMARY 

Markup Summary .................................................................................................... 111 

ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

H. Res. 75, Strongly Condemning the January 2019 Terrorist attack on the 

14 Riverside Complex in Nairobi, Kenya ........................................................... 2 

H.R. 739, the Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2019 With the McCaul Amendment ...... 6 

Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 739 Offered by Mr. Mccaul 

of Texas ................................................................................................................. 35 

H. Res. 156 Calling for Accountability and Justice for the Assassination 

of Boris Nemtsov with the two Malinowski Amendments ................................ 64 

Amendment to H. Res. 156 Offered by Mr. Malinowski of New Jersey (1 

of 2 Listed) ............................................................................................................ 72 

Amendment to H. Res. 156 Offered by Mr. Malinowski of New Jersey (2 

of 2 Listed) ............................................................................................................ 73 

H.R. 596, Crimea Annexation Nonrecognition Act with the Connolly Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute .................................................................... 74 

Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 596 Offered by Mr. Connolly of Virginia .................................................................................................... 76 

H.R. 295, End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of 2019 with the Engel 

Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute ........................................................ 78 

Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 295 Offered by Mr. Engel 

of New York .......................................................................................................... 87 

(1) 

MARKUP OF VARIOUS MEASURES 

Thursday, March 7, 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Washington, DC 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ENGEL. So pursuant to notice, we meet today to markup five bipartisan measures. Without objection, all members may 

have 5 days to submit statements or extraneous materials on today’s business. 

As members were notified yesterday, we intend to consider today’s measures en bloc. The measures are H. Res. 75, strongly condemning the January 2019 terrorist attack on the 14 Riverside 

Complex in Nairobi, Kenya; H.R. 739, the Cyber Diplomacy Act of 

2019 with the McCaul Amendment; H. Res. 156 calling for accountability and justice for the assassination of Boris Nemtsov with the 

two Malinowski Amendments; H.R. 596, Crimea Annexation Nonrecognition Act with the Connolly Amendment in the nature of a 

substitute; and H.R. 295, End Banking for Human Traffickers Act 

of 2019 with the Engel Amendment in the nature of a substitute. 

[The bills and resolutions offered en bloc follow:] 
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AUTHCNT>CA<OD? U.S. GOVERNMENT INf.ORMATION 

GPO 

116TII CONGHESS H RES 75 1ST SESSIOX • • 

IV 

Strongly condemning the Jaunary 2019 terrorist attack on the 14 Rh'erside 

Complex in 1\airobi, Kenya, offering eondolenees to the famil~' and 

friends of the Yietims, and reaffirming solidarity with the people of 

Kenya. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANTARY 24, 2019 

Mr. E1'\GEI, (for himself, 1\Ir .. McCAUL, l\Is. BASS, and 1\Ir. Sl\IITII of 1\ew Jerse~') submitted the folhm~ng resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Porei!,'1l Affairs 

RESOLUTION 

Strongly condemning the January 2019 terrorist attack on 

the 14 Riverside Complex in Nairobi, Kenya, offering 

condolences to the family and friends of the victims, 

and reaffirming solidarity with the people of Kenya. 

\Vl1ereas, on January 15, 2019, armed gunmen attacked the 

14 Riverside Complex in Nairobi, Kenya, killing at least 

21 people during the 20-hour siege; 

Whereas one of the individuals killed in this heinous act of 

violence was an American citizen named Jason Spindler, 

a 9/11 survivor and former Peace Corps volunteer who 

was the CEO and managing director of a strategy and 

investment firm in Nairobi; 
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Whereas Kenyan security forces rescued more than 700 civilians from the complex; 

'Whereas al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist organization based in Somalia designated as a foreign terrorist 

organization by the Department of State, has claimed responsibility for the attack on the 14 Riverside Complex; 

"Whereas Kenya has previously been a target for al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist attacks in August 1998, when the 

United States embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and the 

United States embassy in Dares Salaam, 'l'anzania, were 

simultaneously bombed, killing 224 people and injuring 

over 5,000 people; 

\Vhereas al-Shabaab has previously perpetrated numerous 

mass-casualty terrorist attacks in Kenya, notably the 

siege at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September 

2013, ·which killed 67 people, and the assault on Garissa 

University College in April 2015, which killed 148 people; 

Whereas the United States and Kenya share a longstanding 

and mutually beneficial political, economic, and security 

partnership; and 

·whereas security cooperation between the United States and 

Kenya plays an essential role in combating teiTorism and 

violent e:A'tremism in the Horn of Mrica, particularly efforts to combat al-Shabaab; Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives2 (1) condemns in the strongest terms the recent 

3 terrorist attack by al-Shabaab in Nairobi, Kenya, 

4 that resulted in the tragic loss of 21 lives; 

5 (2) offers its deepest condolences to the family 

6 and friends of the victims and to the Republic of 

•HRES 75 IH 
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Kenya, and reaffirms its solidarity with the Kenyan 

2 people; 

3 (3) honors the memory of Jason Spindler, ·who 

4 was murdered in this horrific terrorist attack; 

5 ( 4) recognizes the heroism exhibited by Kenyan 

6 citizens, first responders, security forces, and the 

7 Kenya Red Cross Society to rescue those held hos8 tage during the siege; 

9 (5) expresses its support for the Government of 

10 Kenya's efforts to combat terrorism and violent ex11 tremism, including efforts to prevent, detect, and 

12 deter future attacks, and encourages all Kenyans to 

13 stand together in condemning terrorism and violent 

14 e:x'tremism; 

15 (6) recognizes Kenya's contributions to coun16 tering· terrorism and violent e:x'tremism in the region, 

17 particularly al-Shabaab, including as troop contribu18 tors to the African Union Mission in Somalia; 

19 (7) recognizes the important role of United 

20 States assistance to combat al-Shabaab and other 

21 terrorist activity in the region, including efforts to 

22 build Kenya's capacity to respond to and prevent 

23 such attacks; and 

24 (8) urges the Government of Kenya to work ex25 peditiously to bring the perpetrators to justice, ad-

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bering to the rule of law, respect for human rights, 

2 and due process in its efforts to counter terrorism 

3 and violent extremism. 

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AU<H<NnCA<W9 U.S. GOVERNMENT 

INFORMATION 

GPO 

I 16TH CONGRESS 

1ST SBSSION H.R.739 

To support United States iutemational cyber diplomaey, and for other 

Pl111JOSCS. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JA:'\UARY 24, 20]!) 

Mr. 1\fcCAFI, (for himself and Mr. I<J;-.;ngL) introdueed the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Poreig11 Affairs 

A BILL 

To support United States international cyber diplomacy, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 fives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SnouT TITijE.-This Act may be cited as the 

5 "Cyber Diplomacy Act of2019". 

6 (b) TABijE OF COXTENTS.-The table of contents for 

7 this Act is as follows: 

See. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. I<'indings. 

Sec. 3. Definitions. 

Sec. 4. United States International Cyberspace Policy. 

Sec. 5. Department of State responsibilities. 

Sec. 6. International cyberspace executive arrangements. 

8ec. 7. International strateg:\· f(W c~·herspace. 
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SPe. 8. Annual country rPports on human rights practices. 

Sec. 9. GAO report on <•ylwr threats and data misuse. 

Sec. 10. Sense of Congress on eybcrsecurit~~ sanctions against North Korea and 

cyberseeurit.'· legislation in Yi~tnam. 

Sec. 11. Rule of <'onstruction. 

SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress makes the following findings: 

3 (1) 'l'he stated goal of the United States Inter4 national Stratef,'Y for Cyberspace, launched on May 

5 16, 2011, is to '\vork internationally to promote an 

6 open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information 

7 and communications infrastructure that supports 

8 international trade and commerce, strengthens inter9 national security, and fosters free expression and in10 novation . . . in ·which norms of responsible behav11 ior guide states' actions, sustain partnerships, and 

12 support the rule of law in cyberspace". 

13 (2) In its June 24, 2013. report, the Group of 

14 Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field 

15 of Information and Telecommunications in the Con16 text of International Security (referred to in this 

17 section as "GGE"), established by the United Na18 tions General Ac;sembly, concluded that "State sov19 ereignty and the international norms and principles 

20 that f1ow from it apply to States' conduct of [infor21 mation and communications technology] ICT-related 

22 activities and to their jurisdiction over ICT infra23 structure \Vith their territory". 

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1 (3) In January 2015, China, Kazakhstan, 

2 Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan pro3 posed a troubling international code of conduct for 

4 information security, which could be used as a preS text for restricting political dissent, and includes 

6 "curbing tbe dissemination of information that in7 cites terrorism, separatism or extremism or that in8 flames hatred on ethnic, racial or religious grounds". 

9 ( 4) In its July 22, 2015 consensus report, GGE 

10 found that "norms of responsible State behavior can 

11 reduce risks to international peace, security and sta12 bility". 

13 (5) On September 25, 2015, the United States 

14 and China announced a commitment that neither 

15 country's government "will conduct or knmvingly 

16 support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, 

17 including trade secrets. or other confidential business 

18 information, \vith the intent of providing competitive 

19 advantages to companies or commercial sectors". 

20 (6) At the Antalya Summit on November 15 

21 and 16, 2015, the Group of 20 I.~eaders' 

22 communique23 (A) affirmed the applicability of inter24 national law to state behavior in cyberspace; 

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(B) called on states to refrain from cyberenabled theft of intellectual property for commercial gain; and 

(C) endorsed the vww that all states 

5 should abide by norms of responsible behavior. 

6 (7) 'fhe March 2016 Department of State 

7 International Cyberspace Policy Strategy noted that 

8 "the Department of State anticipates a continued in9 crease and expansion of our cyber-foeused diplomatic 

10 efforts for the foreseeable future". 

11 (8) On December 1, 2016, the Commission on 

12 Enhancing National Cybersecurity, which was estab13 lished within the Department of Commerce by Exec14 utive Order 13718 (81 Fed. Reg. 7441), rec15 ommended that "the President should appoint an 

16 Ambassador for Cybersecurity to lead U.S. engage17 ment \vith the international community on cyberse18 curity strategies, standards, and practices". 

19 (9) On April 11, 2017, the 2017 Group of 7 

20 Declaration on Responsible States Behavior in 

21 Cyberspaee22 (A) recognized "the urgent necessity of in23 creased international cooperation to promote se24 curity and stability in cyberspace"; 

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(B) expressed commitment to "promoting 

a strategic framework for conflict prevention, 

cooperation and stability in cyberspace, consisting of the recognition of the applicability of 

existing international law to State behavior in 

c~rberspace, the promotion of voluntary, nonbinding norms of responsible State behavior 

during peacetime, and the development and the 

implementation of practical cyber confidence 

building measures (CBMs) between States"; 

and 

(C) reaffirmed that "the same rights that 

13 people have offline must also be protected on14 line". 

15 (10) In testimony before the Select Committee 

16 on Intelligence of the Senate on May 11, 2017, Di17 rector of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats iden18 tified 6 cyber threat actors, including19 (A) Russia, for "efforts to influence the 

20 2016 US election"; 

21 (B) China, for "actively targeting the US 

22 Government, its allies, and US companies for 

23 cyber espionage"; 

24 (C) Iran, for "leverag[ing] cyber espionage, 

25 propaganda, and attacks to support its security 

•HR 739 III 
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priorities, influence events and foreign percep2 tions, and counter threats"; 

3 (D) Korth Korea, for "previously 

4 conductling) cyber-attacks against US commer5 cial entities-specifically, Sony Pictures Enter6 tainment in 2014"; 

7 (E) terrorists, who "use the Internet to or8 ganize, recruit, spread propaganda, raise funds, 

9 collect intelligence, inspire action by followers, 

10 and coordinate operations"; and 

11 (F) criminals, who "are also developing 

12 and using sophisticated cyber tools for a variety 

13 of purposes including theft, e21.."'tortion, and fa14 cilitation of other criminal activities". 

15 (11) On May 11, 2017, President Donald J. 

16 '!'rump issued Executive Order 13800 (82 Fed. Reg. 

17 22:391), entitled "Strengthening the Cybersecurity of 

18 Federal Ketworks and Infrastructure", which19 (A) <lesignates the Secretary of State to 

20 lead an interab:rency effort to develop an engage21 ment strateb'Y for international cooperation in 

22 cybersecurity; and 

23 (B) notes that "the United States is espc24 cially dependent on a globally secure and resil25 ient internet and must Y\·ork with allies and 

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other partners toward maintaining . . . the policy of the executive branch to promote an open, 

interoperable, reliable, and secure internet that 

fosters efficiency, innovation, communication, 

and economic prosperity, while respecting privacy and g1Jarding· against disruption, fraud, 

and theft". 

8 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 

9 In this Act: 

10 (1) APPROPHIATE CONGRESSIONAL COl\fl\fiT11 TEES.-'l'he term "appropriate congressional com12 mittees" means the Committee on Foreign Relations 

13 of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Mfairs 

14 of the House of Representatives. 

15 (2) INFORl\IATIOX AND COJ\Il\IUNICATIONS 

16 TECHKOI,OGY; ICT.-'l'he terms "information and 

17 communications technology" and "ICT" include 

18 hardware, software, and other products or services 

19 primarily intended to fulfill or enable the function of 

20 information processing and communication by elec21 tronic means, including transmission and display, in22 eluding via the Internet. 

23 (3) Eli."ECUTIVE AGENCY.-'l,he term "Executive 

24 agency" has the meaning given the term in section 

25 105 of title 5, United States Code. 

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1 SEC. 4. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE 

2 POLICY. 

3 (a) IN GEN'ERAL-It IS the policy of the United 

4 States to work internationally to promote an open, interS operable, reliable, unfettered, and secure Internet gov6 crned by the multi-stakeholder model, which7 (1) promotes human rights, democracy, and 

8 rule of la"w, including freedom of mqH·ession, innova9 tion, communication, and economic prosperity; and 

10 (2) respects priYacy and guards against dcccp11 tion, fraud, and theft. 

12 (b) Il\fPLEl\TE?\T ATIOK .-In implementing· the policy 

13 described in subsection (a), the President, iu consultation 

14 with outside actors, including private sector companies, 

15 nongovernmental organizations, security researchers, and 

16 other rclcYant stakeholders, in the conduct of bilateral and 

17 multilateral relations, shall pursue the follmving objectives: 

18 (1) Clarifying the applicability of international 

19 laws and norms to the usc of IC'l'. 

20 (2) Reducing and limiting the risk of escalation 

21 and retaliation in cyberspace, damage to critical in22 frastructurc, and other malicious cyber activity that 

23 impairs the usc and operation of critical infrastruc24 ture that provides services to the public. 

25 (3) Cooperating \vith like-minded democratic 

26 countries that share common values and cyberspace 

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policies with the United States, including respect for 

2 human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, to ad3 vance such values and policies internationally. 

4 ( 4) Encouraging the responsible development of 

5 new, innovative technologies and ICT products that 

6 strengthen a secure Internet architecture that is ac7 cessible to all. 

8 ( 5) Securing and implementing commitments 

9 on responsible country behavior in cyberspace based 

10 upon accepted norms, including the following: 

11 (A) Countries should not conduct, or 

12 lmo-wingly support, cyber-enabled theft of intel13 lectual property, including trade secrets or 

14 other confidential business information, ·with 

15 the intent of providing competitive advantages 

16 to companies or commercial sectors. 

17 (B) Countries should take all appropriate 

18 and reasonable efforts to keep their territories 

19 elear of intentionally vvrongful acts using IC'l's 

20 in violation of international commitments. 

21 (C) Countries should not conduct or know22 ingly support ICT activity that, contrary to 

23 international law, intentionally damages or oth24 envi.se impairs the use and operation of critical 

25 infrastructure providing senrices to the public, 

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and should take appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure from ICT 

threats. 

(D) Countries should not conduct or knowingly support malieious international activity 

that, contrary to international law, harms the 

information systems of authorized emergency 

response teams (also known as "computer 

emergency response teams" or "eybersecurity 

incident response teams") of another country or 

authorize emergency response teams to engage 

in malicious international activity. 

(E) Countries should respond to appropriate requests for assistance to mitigate malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory and aimed at the critical infrastructure of 

another country. 

(Ii') Countries should not restrict cross-border data f1ows or require local storage or processing of data. 

(G) Countries should protect the exercise 

of human rights and fundamental freedoms on 

the Internet and commit to the principle that 

the human rights that people have offline 

should also be protected online. 

•HR 739 IH 
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(6) Advancing, encouraging, and supporting the 

2 development and adoption of internationally recog3 nizcd technical standards and best practices. 

4 SEC. 5. DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITIES. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL-Section 1 of the State Depart6 mcnt Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) 

7 is amcnded8 (1) by redesignating subsection (g) as sub9 section (h); and 

10 (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the fol11 lowing: 

12 "(g) OFFICE oF lt\TERNATIONAL GY1mRSPACE PoL13 IGY.-

14 "(1) IN GEKERAL.-There is established, ''rithin 

15 the Department of State, an Office of International 

16 Cyberspace Policy (referred to in this subsection as 

17 the 'Office'). The head of the Office shall have the 

18 rank and status of ambassador and shall be ap19 pointed by the President, by and with the advice and 

20 consent of the Senate. 

21 "(2) DUTIES.-

22 "(A) IN GENERAI;.-Thc head of the Of23 fice shall perform such duties and exercise such 

24 powers as the Secretary of State shall prescribe, 

25 including implementing the policy of the United 

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States described in section 4 of the Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2019. 

"(B) DUTIES DESCHIBED.-The principal 

duties and responsibilities of the head of the 

Office shall bc-

•HR 739 m 

"(i) to serve as the principal cyberspace policy official ·within the senior management of the Department of State and 

as the advisor to the Secretary of State for 

cyberspace issues; 

"(ii) to lead the Department of 

State's diplomatic cyberspace efforts, including efforts relating to international cybersecurity, Internet access, Internet freedom, digital economy, cybercrime, deterrence and international responses to cyber 

threats, and other issues that the Secretary assigns to the Office; 

"(iii) to promote an open, interoperable, reliable, unfettered, and secure information and communications teehnology infrastrueture globally; 

"(iv) to represent the Secretary of 

State in interageney efforts to develop and 
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advance the policy described in section 4 of 

the Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2019; 

"(v) to coordinate cyberspace efforts 

and other relevant functions, including 

countering terrorists' use of cyberspace, 

within the Department of State and with 

other components of the United States 

Government; 

"(vi) to act as a liaison to public and 

private sector entities on relevant international cyberspace issues; 

"(vii) to lead United States Government efforts to establish a global deterrenee framework for malicious eyber activity; 

"(Yiii) to develop and execute adversary-specific strategies to influence adversary decisionmaking through the imposition of costs and deterrence strategies, in 

coordination with other relevant Executive 

agencies; 

"(ix) to advise the Secretary and eoordinate with foreig11 governments on external responses to national-security-level 

cyber incidents, including coordination on 
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diplomatic response efforts to support allies threatened by malicious cyber activity, 

in conjunction with members of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization and other 

like-minded countries; 

"(x) to promote the adoption of national processes and progTams that enable 

threat detection, prevention, and response 

to malicious cyber activity emanating from 

the territory of a foreign country, including 

as such activity relates to the United 

States' European allies, as appropriate; 

"(xi) to promote the building of foreign capacity to protect the global network 

·with the goal of enabling like-minded participation in deterrence frameworks; 

"(xii) to promote the maintenance of 

an open and interoperable Internet governed by the multi-stakeholder model, instead of by centralized government control; 

"(xiii) to promote an international 

regulatory environment for technology investments and the Internet that benefits 

United States economic and national security interests; 
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"(xiv) to promote cross-border flow of 

data and combat international initiatives 

seeking to impose unreasonable requirements on United States businesses; 

"(:x'V) to promote international policies 

to protect the integrity of United States 

and international telecomnmnications infrastructure from foreign-based, cyber-enabled threats; 

"(:x>>i) to lead engagement, in coordination \vith Executive agencies, with foreign governments on cyberspace and digital 

economy issues as described in the Cyber 

Diplomacy Act of 2019; 

"(:x>'.ii) to promote international policies to secure radio frequency spectrum for 

United States businesses and national security needs; 

"(:x>'.iii) to promote and protect the exercise of human rights, including freedom 

of speech and religion, through the Internet; 

"(xix) to build capacity of United 

States diplomatic officials to engage on 

cyher issues; 
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"(xx) to encourage the development 

2 and adoption by foreign countries of intcr3 nationally recognized standards, policies, 

4 and best practices; and 

5 "(xxi) to consult, as appropriate, with 

6 other Executive agencies with related fimc7 tions vested in such Executive agencies by 

8 law. 

9 "(3) QUALII<'ICATIOXS.-The head of the Office 

10 should be an individual of demonstrated competency 

11 in the fields of---

12 "(A) cybersecurity and other relevant cyber 

13 issues; and 

14 "(B) international diplomacy. 

15 "( 4) 0RGAl\'IZA'riOl'\AL PJ,ACEl\IEl\'T.-During 

16 the 4-year period beginning on the date of the enact17 mcnt of the Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2019, the head 

18 of the Office shall report to the Under Secretary for 

19 Political Mfairs or to an official holding a higher po20 sition than the Under Secretary for Political Affairs 

21 in the Department of State. Mter the conclusion of 

22 such period, the head of the Office shall report to 

23 an appropriate Under Secretary or to an official 

24 holding a higher position than Under Secretary. 

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"(5) Rei,E OF CO:t\'STIUJCTI0~.-1\othing in 

2 this subsection may be construe([ to preclude3 "(A) the Office from being elevated to a 

4 Bureau within the Department of State; or 

5 "(B) the head of the Office from being ele6 vated to an Assistant Secretary, if such an As7 sistant Secretary position does not increase the 

8 number of A<ssistant Secretary positions at the 

9 Department above the number authorized under 

10 subsection (c)(1).". 

11 (b) SKNSE OF CONGHESS.-lt is the sense of Con12 gress that the Offiee of International Cyberspace Policy 

13 established under section 1(g) of the State Department 

14 Basie Authorities Aet of 1956, as added by subseetion (a), 

15 should be a Bureau of the Department of State and the 

16 head of sueh Offiee should report directly to the Secretary 

17 of State or Deputy Secretary of State. 

18 (e) UmTED NATIOXS.-Thc Permanent Hcprescnta19 tivc of the United States to the United Nations should 

20 usc the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to 

21 oppose any measure that is inconsistent with the policy 

22 described in seetion 4. 

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SEC. 6. INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE EXECUTIVE AR2 RANGEMENTS. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.-'fhe President is encouraged to 

4 enter into executive arrangements with foreign governS ments that support the policy described in section 4. 

6 (b) TRANS::\IISSION TO CONGHESS.-Section 112b of 

7 title 1, United States Code, is amended8 (1) in subsection (a) by striking "International 

9 Relations" and inserting "Foreign Affairs"; 

10 (2) in subsection (e)(2)(B), by adding at the 

11 end the follovving: 

12 "(iii) A bilateral or multilateral cyberspace 

13 agTeement."; 

14 (3) by redesignating subsection (f) as sub15 section (g); and 

16 (4) by inserting after subsection (e) the fol17 lnwing: 

18 "(f) With respect to any bilateral or multilateral 

19 cyberspace agreement under subsection (e)(2)(B)(iii) and 

20 the information required to be transmitted to Congress 

21 under subsection (a), or with respect to any arrangement 

22 that seeks to secure commitments on responsible country 

23 behavior in cyberspace consistent with section 4(b) ( 5) of 

24 the Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2019, the Secretary of State 

25 shall provide an mqJlanation of such arrangement, includ26 ing-

•HR 739 IH 
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19 

"(1) the purpose of such arrangement; 

2 "(2) hmv such arrangement is consistent v.rith 

3 the policy described in section 4 of such Act; and 

4 "(3) how such arrangement will be imple5 men ted.". 

6 (c) STA'l'US REPOHT.-During the 5-year period im7 mediately following the transmittal to Congress of an 

8 agreement described in section 112b(e)(2)(B)(iii) of title 

9 1, United States Code, as added by subsection (b)(2), or 

10 until such agreement has been discontinued, if discon11 tinned "ithin 5 years, the President shall12 (1) notifY the appropriate congressional com13 mittees if another country fails to adhere to signifi14 cant commitments contained in such agreement; and 

15 (2) describe the steps that the United States 

16 has taken or plans to take to ensure that all such 

17 commitments are fulfilled. 

18 (d) E::AiSTING Exr;;ceTIVE AnHANGEl\IENTS.-Not 

19 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 

20 this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate 

21 congressional committees regarding any executive bilateral 

22 or multilateral cyberspace arrangement in effect before the 

23 date of enactment of this Act, including24 (1) the arrangement announced between the 

25 United States and Japan on April 25, 2014; 

•HR 739 m 
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20 

1 (2) the arrangement announced between the 

2 United States and the United Kingdom on January 

3 16, 2015; 

4 (3) the arrangement announced between the 

5 United States and China on September 25, 2015; 

6 ( 4) the arrangement announced between the 

7 United States and Korea on October 16, 2015; 

8 ( 5) the arrangement announced between the 

9 United States and Australia on January 19, 2016; 

10 (6) the arrangement announced between the 

11 United States and India on June 7, 2016; 

12 (7) the arrangement announced between the 

13 United States and Argentina on April 27, 2017; 

14 (8) the arrangement announced between the 

15 United States and Kenya on June 22, 2017; 

16 (9) the arrangement announced between the 

17 United States and Israel on .June 26, 2017; 

18 (10) the arrangement announced between the 

19 United States and France on February 9, 2018; 

20 (11) the arrangement announced between the 

21 United States and Brazil on lVIay 14, 2018; and 

22 (12) any other similar bilateral or multilateral 

23 arrangement announced before such date of enact24 meut. 

•HR 739 IH 
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21 

SEC. 7. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE. 

2 (a) STRATEGY REQUIHED.-1'\ot later than 1 year 

3 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, 

4 acting through the Secretary of State, and in coordination 

5 ·with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and 

6 agencies, shall develop a strategy relating to United States 

7 engagement with foreign governments on international 

8 norms '''ith respect to responsible state behm'ior in cyber9 space. 

10 (b) EijEME~Ts.-'l'he strategy required under sub11 section (a) shall include the follm,'ing: 

12 (1) A re\'iew of actions and acth'ities under13 taken to support the policy described in section 4. 

14 (2) A plan of action to guide the diplomacy of 

15 the Department of State \'.-'ith regard to foreign 

16 countries, including17 (A) conducting bilateral and multilateral 

18 activities to develop norms of responsible coun19 try behm'ior in cyberspace consistent »'ith the 

20 objectives under section 4(b)(5); and 

21 (B) rm'ie\V'ing the status of existing efforts 

22 in relevant multilateral fora, as appropriate, to 

23 obtain commitments on international norms in 

24 cyberspace. 

•HR 739 m 
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22 

(3) A review of alternative concepts with regard 

2 to international norms in cyberspace offered by for3 eign countries. 

4 ( 4) A detailed description of new and evolving 

5 threats in cyberspace from foreign adversaries, state6 sponsored actors, and private actors to7 (A) United States national secnrit~r; 

8 (B) Federal and private sector cyberspace 

9 infrastructure of the United States; 

10 (C) intellectual property in the United 

11 States; and 

12 (D) the privacy of citizens of the United 

13 States. 

14 ( 5) A review of policy tools available to the 

15 President to deter and de-escalate tensions 'vith for16 eib"ll countries, state-sponsored actors, and private 

17 actors regarding threats in cyberspace, the degree to 

18 which such tools have been used, and whether such 

19 tools have been effective deterrents. 

20 (6) A review of resources required to conduct 

21 activities to build responsible norms of international 

22 c~rber behavior. 

23 (7) A plan of action, developed in consultation 

24 with relevant Federal departments and agencies as 

25 the President may direct, to guide the diplomacy of 

•HR 739 m 
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23 

the Department of State >vith regard to inclusion of 

2 cyber issues in mutual defense agreements. 

3 (c) FOim OF STHATEGY.-

4 (1) PTJBJ,JC AVAILABILITY.-The strategy re5 quired under subsection (a) shall be available to the 

6 public in unclassified form, including through publi7 cation in the Federal Register. 

8 (2) CJ,ASSIFIED Ai\'NEX.-The strategy required 

9 under subsection (a) may include a classified annex, 

10 consistent ·with United States national security inter11 ests, if the Secretary of State determines that such 

12 annex is appropriate. 

13 (d) BHIEFii\'G.-Not later than 30 clays after the 

14 completion of the strategy required under subsection (a), 

15 the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate COilgres16 sional committees on the strategy, including any material 

17 contained in a classified annex. 

18 (e) UPDATES.-The strategy required under sub19 section (a) shall be updated20 (1) not later than 90 days after any material 

21 change to United States policy described in such 

22 strategy; and 

23 (2) not later than 1 year after the inauguration 

24 of each new President. 

•HR 739 m 
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24 

1 (f) PREE:A'1STI:l\'G REQUIREMENT.-The Rec2 ommenclations to the President on Protecting American 

3 Cyber Interests through International Engagement, pre4 pared by the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues 

5 on May 31, 2018, pursuant to section 3(c) of Executive 

6 Order 13800 (82 Feel. Reg. 22391), shall be deemed to 

7 satisfy the requirement under subsection (a). 

8 SEC. 8. ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 

9 PRACTICES. 

10 Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

11 (22 U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the 

12 follovving: 

13 "(h)(1) rrhe report required under subsection (d) 

14 shall include an assessment of freedom of expression vvith 

15 respect to electronic information in each foreign country 

16 that includes the following: 

17 "(A) An assessment of the eA.ient to which gov18 ernment authorities in the country inappropriately 

19 attempt to filter, censor, or otherwise block or re20 move nonviolent expression of political or religious 

21 opinion or belief through the Internet, including 

22 electronic mail, and a description of the means by 

23 which such authorities attempt to inappropriately 

24 block or remove such eA.lJression. 

•HR 739 IH 
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25 

1 "(B) An assessment of the e:x.'tent to which gov2 ermnent authorities in the country have persecuted 

3 or otherwise punished, arbitrarily and without due 

4 process, an individual or group for the nonviolent ex5 pression of political, religious, or ideological opinion 

6 or belief through the Internet, including electronic 

7 mail. 

8 "(C) An assessment of the e:x.'tent to which gov9 ernment authorities in the country have sought, in10 appropriately and with malicious intent, to collect, 

11 request, obtain, or disclose \vithout due process per12 sonally identifiable information of a person in con13 nection v;'ith that person's nom'iolent expression of 

14 political, religious, or ideological opinion or belief, in15 eluding expression that would be protected by the 

16 International Covenant on Ci,'il and Political Rights, 

17 adopted at Kew York December 16, 1966, and en18 tercel into force March 23, 1976, as interpreted by 

19 the United States. 

20 "(D) An assessment of the eA.'tent to which \\ire 

21 commtmications and electronic communications are 

22 monitored \\ithout due process and in contravention 

23 to United States policy \\ith respect to the principles 

24 of privacy, human rights, democracy, and rule of 

25 law. 

•HR 739 m 
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26 

"(2) In compiling· data and making assessments 

2 under paragraph (1), United States diplomatic personnel 

3 should consult with relevant entities, including human 

4 rights organizations, the private sector, the governments 

5 of like-minded countries, technology and Internet compa6 nics, and other appropriate nongovernmental organiza7 tions or entities. 

8 "(3) In this subseetion9 "(A) the term 'electronic communication' has 

10 the meaning given the term in section 2510 of title 

11 18, lTnited States Code; 

12 "(B) the term 'Internet' has the meaning given 

13 the term in section 231(e)(3) of the Communications 

14 Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 231(e)(3)); 

15 "(C) the term 'personally identifiable informa16 tion' means data in a form that identifies a par17 ticular person; and 

18 "(D) the term \vire communication' has the 

19 meaning given the term in section 2510 of title 18, 

20 ·united States Code.". 

21 SEC. 9. GAO REPORT ON CYBER THREATS AND DATA MIS22 USE. 

23 Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 

24 of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States 

•HR 739 IH 
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27 

1 shall submit a report and provide a briefing to the appro2 priatc congressional committees that includcs3 ( 1) a description of the primary threats to the 

4 personal information of United States citizens from 

5 international actors within the cyberspace domain; 

6 (2) an assessment of the extent to which United 

7 States diplomatic processes and other efforts vvith 

8 foreign countries, including through multilateral 

9 fora, bilateral engagements, and negotiated cyber1 0 space agreements, strengthen the protections of 

11 United States citizens' personal information; 

12 (3) an assessment of the Department of State's 

13 report in response to Executive Order 13800 (82 

14 Fed. Reg. 22391), which documents an engagement 

15 strategy for international cooperation in cybcrsccu16 rity and the c:x'tcnt to which this strategy addresses 

17 protections of U nitccl States citizens' personal infor18 mation; 

19 (4) recommendations for United States policy20 makers on methods to properly address and 

21 strengthen the protections of United States citizens' 

22 personal information from misuse by international 

23 actors; and 

24 ( 5) any other matters deemed relevant by the 

25 Comptroller General. 

•HR 739 IH 
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28 

SEC. 10. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CYBERSECURITY SANC2 TIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA AND CYBER3 SECURITY LEGISLATION IN VIETNAM. 

4 It is the sense of Congress that5 (1) the President should designate all entities 

6 that knowingly engage in significant activities under7 mining cybersecurity through the use of computer 

8 networks or systems against foreign persons, govern9 ments, or other entities on behalf of the Government 

10 of North Korea, consistent -with section 209(b) of 

11 the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement 

12 Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9229(b)); 

13 (2) the cybersecurity law approved by the Na14 tional Assembly of Vietnam on June 12, 2018-

15 (A) may not be consistent 'with inter16 national trade standards; and 

17 (B) may endanger the privacy of citizens 

18 of Vietnam; and 

19 (3) the Government of Vietnam should work 

20 with the United States and other countries to ensure 

21 that such law meets all relevant international stand22 ards. 

23 SEC. 11. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. 

24 (a) RULE OF COXSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this Act 

25 may be construed to infringe upon the related functions 

•HR 739 lli 
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29 

of any Executive agency vested in such agency under any 

2 provision of law. 

0 

•HR 739 IH 
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AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE 

TO H.R. 739 

OFFERED BY MR. MCCAUL OF TEXAS 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 

following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

2 (a) SIIOR'r TITI,E.-This Act may be cited as the 

3 "Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2019". 

4 (b) TARLE OF COKTEKTS.-'l'he table of contents for 

5 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Findings. 

Sec. 3. Definitions. 

Sec. 4. United States International Cyberspace Policy. 

SPc. 5. Department of State responsibilities. 

See. 6. International eyhrrspace executiYe arrangem0uts. 

St'<'. 7. Iutcrnational stratpg;· for cyberspace. 

Sec. 8. Annual connti:v rpports on human rights practic<'s. 

Sec. 9. GAO rPport on eyher diplomaey. 

Sec. 10. Sense of Congress on rybt~rst~cnrity sanctions against North Korea and 

eyherseeurity legislation iu Yit~tnam. 

Sec. 11. Rule of constmction. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 

8 (1) 'l'he stated goal of the United States Inter9 national Strategy for Cyberspace, launched on May 

10 16, 2011, is to "work internationally to promote an 

11 open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information 

12 and communications infrastnlCtnre that snppmts 

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2 

international trade and commerce, strengthens inter2 national security, and fosters free expression and in3 novation . . . in which norms of responsible behav4 ior guide states' actions, sustain partnerships, and 

5 support the rule of law in cyberspace". 

6 (2) In its ,June 24, 2013 report, the Group of 

7 Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field 

8 of Information and Telecommunications in the Con9 text of International Security (referred to in this 

10 section as "GGE"), established by the United NaIl tions General Assembly, concluded that "State sov12 ereignty and the international norms and principles 

13 that flow from it apply to States' conduct of [infor14 matiou and communications technology] ICT-related 

15 activities and to their jurisdiction over ICT infra16 structure with their territory". 

17 (3) In January 2015, China, Kazakhstan, 

18 K.vrg_vzstan, Hussia, 'l'ajikistan, and Uzbekistan pro19 posed a troubling international code of conduct for 

20 information security, which eould be used as a pre21 tm.:t for restrietiug politieal dissent, and ineludes 

22 "curbing the dissemination of information that in23 cites terrorism, separatism or extremism or that in24 flames hatred on ethnic, racial or religious grounds". 

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3 

( 4) In its July 22, 2015 consensus report, GGE 

2 found that "norms of responsible State behavior can 

3 reduce risks to international peace, security and sta4 bility". 

5 (5) On September 25, 2015, the United States 

6 and China announced a commitment that neither 

7 country's government "will conduct or knowingly 

8 support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, 

9 including trade secrets or other confidential business 

10 information, vv-ith the intent of providing competitive 

11 advantages to companies or commercial sectors". 

12 (6) At the Antalya Summit on November 15 

13 and 16, 2015, the Group of 20 I.~eaders' 

14 communique15 (A) affirmed the applicability of inter16 national law to state beha-v-ior in cyberspace; 

17 (B) called on states to refrain from cyber18 enabled theft of intellectual property for com19 mercia! gain; and 

20 (C) endorsed the view that all states 

21 should abide by norms of responsible behavior. 

22 (7) The March 2016 Department of State 

23 International Cyberspace Policy Strategy noted that 

24 "the Department of State anticipates a continued ing:IVHLC\030519\030519.287.xml 

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4 

crease and expansion of our cyber-focused diplomatic 

2 efforts for the foreseeable future". 

3 (8) On December 1, 2016, the Commission on 

4 Enhancing N"ational Cybersecurity, which vvas estab5 lishcd within the Department of Commerce by Exec6 utive Order 13718 (81 Fed. Reg. 7441), rec7 ommended that "the President should appoint an 

8 Ambassador for Cybersecurity to lead U.S. engag·e9 ment with the international community on cyberse10 curity strategies, standards, and practices". 

11 (9) On April 11, 2017, the 2017 Group of 7 

12 Declaration on Responsible States Behavior in 

13 Cyberspace14 (A) recognized "the urgent necessity of in15 creased international cooperation to promote se16 curity and stability in cyberspace"; 

17 (B) expressed commitment to "promoting 

18 a strategic framework for cm1flict prevention, 

19 cooperation and stability in cyberspace, con20 sisting of the recognition of the applicability of 

21 existing international law to State behavior in 

22 cyberspace, the promotion of voluntary, non23 binding norms of responsible State behavior 

24 during peacetime, and the development and the 

25 implementation of practical cyber confidence 

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5 

building measures (CBlVIs) between States"; 

2 and 

3 (C) reaffirmed that "the same rights that 

4 people have offline must also be protected on5 line". 

6 (10) In testimony before the Select Committee 

7 on Intelligence of the Senate on May 11, 2017, Di8 rector of National Intelligence Daniel R Coats iden9 tified 6 cyber threat actors, including10 (A) Russia, for "efforts to influence the 

11 2016 US election"; 

12 (B) China, for "actively targeting the US 

13 Government, its allies, and US companies for 

14 cyber espionage"; 

15 (C) Iran, for "leverag[ing] cyber espionage, 

16 propaganda, and attacks to support its security 

17 priorities, influence events and foreign percep18 tions, and counter threats"; 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

(D) North Korea, for "previously 

conduct[ing] cyher-attacks against US commercial entities-specifically, Sony Pictures Entertainment in 20 14"; 

(l<J) terrorists, who "use the Internet to organize, recruit, spread propaganda, raise funds, 

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collect intelligence, inspire action by followers, 

2 and coordinate operations"; and 

3 (F) criminals, who "are also developing 

4 and using sophisticated cyber tools for a variety 

5 of purposes including theft, eA-tortion, and fa6 cilitation of other criminal activities". 

7 (11) On May 11, 2017, President Donald J. 

8 Trump issued Executive Order 13800 (82 Fed. Reg. 

9 22391), entitled "Strengthening the Cybersecurity of 

10 Pederal N"etworks and Infrastructure", which11 (A) designates the Secretary of State to 

12 lead an interagency effort to develop an engage13 ment strategy for international cooperation in 

14 cybersecurity; and 

15 (B) notes that "the United States is espe16 cially dependent on a globally secure and resil17 ient internet and must work with allies and 

18 other partners tmvard maintaining ... the pol19 icy of the executive branch to promote an open, 

20 interoperable, reliable, and secure internet that 

21 fosters efficiency, innovation, communication, 

22 and economic prosperity, while respecting pri23 vacy and guarding against disruption, fraud, 

24 and theft". 

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7 

1 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) APPROPHIATE COl\GRESSIOl\AJ, COl\Il\IIT4 TEES.-Thc term "appropriate congressional com5 mittees" means the Committee on Foreig11 Relations 

6 of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

7 of the House of Representatives. 

8 (2) Il\FOIU\lATIOl\ Al\D COl\11\iUl\ICATIOl\S 

9 TECHNOLOGY; ICT.-'fhe terms "information and 

10 communications technology" and "ICT" include 

11 hardware, software, and other products or services 

12 primarily intended to fulfill or enable the function of 

13 information processing and communication by elec14 tronic means, including transmission and display, in15 eluding via the Internet. 

16 (3) EXECUTIVE AGEl\GY.-The term "Executive 

17 agency" has the meaning given the term in section 

18 105 of title 5, United States Code. 

19 SEC. 4. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE 

20 POLICY. 

21 (a) IN GEI\'ERAI,.-It is the policy of the United 

22 States to work internationally to promote an open, inter23 operable, reliable, unfettered, and secure Internet gov24 erned by the multi-stakeholder model, whichg:\VHLC\030519\030519.287.xml 

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8 

( 1) promotes human rights, democracy, and 

2 rule of law, including freedom of expression, innova3 tion, communication, and economic prosperity; and 

4 (2) respects privacy and guards against decep5 tion, fraud, and theft. 

6 (b) hiPI"El\IENTATION.-In implementing the policy 

7 described in subsection (a), the President, in consultation 

8 with outside actors, including private sector companies, 

9 nongovernmental org·anizations, security researchers, and 

10 other relevant stakeholders, in the conduct of bilateral and 

11 multilateral relations, shall pursue the follmving objectives: 

12 (1) Clarifying the applicability of international 

13 laws and norms to the usc of ICT. 

14 (2) Reducing and limiting the risk of escalation 

15 and retaliation in cyhcrspaee, damage to critieal in16 frastrueturc, and other malicious eyher aetivity that 

17 impairs the usc and operation of eritical infrastruc18 tnrc that provides services to the public. 

19 (:·n Cooperating with like-minded democratie 

20 countries that share common values and eyberspacc 

21 policies with the United States, including respect for 

22 human rights, democracy, and the rnle of law, to ad23 vance such values and policies internationally. 

24 ( 4) Encoura~ring the responsible development of 

25 new, innovative teelmologies and ICT products that 

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9 

1 strengthen a secure Internet architecture that is ac2 ccssiblc to all. 

3 (5) Securing and implementing commitments 

4 on responsible country behavior in cyberspace based 

5 upon accepted norms, including the following: 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

(A) Countries should not conduct, or 

knowingly support, cybcr-cnablcd theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or 

other confidential business information, with 

the intent of providing competitive advantages 

to companies or commercial sectors. 

(B) Countries should take all appropriate 

and reasonable efforts to keep their territories 

clear of intentionally 'vTongful acts using ICTs 

in violation of international commitments. 

(C) Countries should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity that, contrary to 

international law, intentionally damages or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical 

infrastructure providing services to the public, 

and should take appropriate measures to proteet their critical infrastructure from ICT 

threats. 

(D) Countries should not conduct or knowingly support malicious international activity 

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2 

3 

10 

that, contrary to international law, harms the 

information systems of authorized emergency 

response teams (also known as "computer 

4 emergency response teams" or "cybersecurity 

5 incident response teams") of another country or 

6 authorize emergency response teams to engage 

7 in malicious international activity. 

8 (E) Countries should respond to appro9 priate requests for assistance to mitigate mali10 cious IC'l' activity emanating from their terri11 tory and aimed at the critical infrastructure of 

12 another country. 

13 (F) Countries should not restrict cross-bor14 der data flows or require local storage or proc15 essing of data. 

16 (G) Countries should protect the exercise 

17 of human rights and fundamental freedoms on 

18 the Internet and commit to the principle that 

19 the human rights that people have offline 

20 should also be protected online. 

21 (6) Advancing·, encouraging, and supporting the 

22 development and adoption of internationally recog23 nized technical standards and best practices. 

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11 

SEC. 5. DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITIES. 

2 (a) IN' GENERAh-Section 1 of the State Depart3 ment Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) 

4 is amended5 (]) by redesignating subsection (g) as sub6 section (h); and 

7 (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the fol8 lowing: 

9 "(g) OFFICE OF INTERN'ATIONAI, CYBERSPACE POL10 ICY.-

11 "(1) IN GENERAL.-There is established, within 

12 the Department of State, an Office of International 

13 Cyberspace Policy (referred to in this subsection as 

14 the 'Office'). 'I'he head of the Office shall have the 

15 rank and status of ambassador and shall be ap16 pointed by the President, by and l>ith the advice and 

17 consent of the Senate. 

18 "(2) DUTIES.-

19 "(A) IN GENERAh-'rhe head of the Of20 fice shall perform such duties and exercise such 

21 powers as the Secretary of State shall prescribe, 

22 including implementing the policy of the United 

23 States described in section 4 of the Cyber Di24 plomaey Act of 2019. 

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2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

12 

"(B) DUTIES DESCRIBED.-Thc principal 

duties and responsibilities of the head of the 

Office shall be-

"(i) to serve as the principal cyberspace policy official within the senior management of the Department of State and 

as the advisor to the Secretary of State for 

c~'berspace issues; 

"(ii) to lead the Department of 

State's diplomatic c~'berspace efforts, ineluding efforts relating to international cyhcrsccurity, Internet access, Internet freedom, digital economy, cybercrime, deterrenee and international responses to cybcr 

threats, and other issues that the Secretary assigns to the Office; 

"(iii) to promote an open, interoperable, reliable, unfettered, and secure information and communications technology infrastructure globally; 

"(iv) to represent the Secretary of 

State in interagency efforts to develop and 

advance the policy described in section 4 of 

the Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2019; 

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2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

13 

"(v) to coordinate cyberspace efforts 

and other relevant functions, including 

countering terrorists' use of cyberspace, 

>Yithin the Department of State and with 

other components of the United States 

Government; 

"(vi) to act as a liaison to public and 

private sector entities on relevant international c~rberspace issues; 

"(vii) to lead United States Government efforts to establish a global deterrenee framework for malicious cyber activity; 

"(viii) to develop and execute adversary-specific strategies to influence adversary decisionmaking through the imposition of costs and deterrence strategies, in 

coordination \Vith other relevant Executive 

agencies; 

"(ix) to advise the Secretary and coordinate with foreign governments on external responses to llational-security-level 

cyber incidents, including coordination on 

diplomatic response effmts to support allies threatened by malicious cyber activity, 

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2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

14 

in con,junction with members of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization and other 

like-minded countries; 

"(x) to promote the adoption of national processes and programs that enable 

threat detection, prevention, and response 

to malicious cyber activity emanating from 

the territory of a foreig11 country, including 

as such activity relates to the United 

States' European allies, as appropriate; 

"(xi) to promote the building of foreign capacity to protect the global network 

with the goal of enabling like-minded participation in deterrence frameworks; 

"(xii) to promote the maintenance of 

an open and interoperable Internet governed by the multi-stakeholder model, instead of by centralized government control; 

"(xiii) to promote an international 

regulatory environment for technology investments and the Intemet that benefits 

United States economic and national seenrity interests; 

"(xiv) to promote cross-border flow of 

data and combat international initiatives 

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2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

15 

seeking to impose unreasonable requirements on United States businesses; 

"(J\.-v) to promote international policies 

to protect the integrity of United States 

and international teleeommunications infrastrueture from foreign-based, eyber-enabled threats; 

"(J\.\i) to lead engagement, in com·dination \vith Executive agencies, \vith foreign governments on relevant international 

eyberspace and digital eeouomy issues as 

deseribed in the Cyber Diplomaey Act of 

2019; 

"(xvii) to promote international policies to secure radio frequeney spectrum for 

United States businesses and national security needs; 

"(J\.\iii) to promote and proteet the exereise of human rights, including freedom 

of speeeh and religion, throug-h the Internet; 

"(xix) to build capaeity of United 

States diplomatie officials to engage on 

cyberspace issues; 

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16 

"(xx) to encourage the development 

2 and adoption by foreign countries of inter3 nationally recognized standards, policies, 

4 and best practices; and 

5 "(xxi) to consult, as appropriate, with 

6 other Executive agencies with related func7 tions vested in such Executive agencies by 

8 law. 

9 "(3) QuALIFICATIOJXS.-The head of the Office 

10 should be an individual of demonstrated competency 

11 in the fields of12 

13 

14 

15 

"(A) cybersecurity and other relevant 

cyberspace issues; and 

"(B) international diplomacy. 

"(4) 0RGANIZATIOJXAL PijACEl\IENT.-During 

16 the 4-year period beginning on the elate of the enact17 ment of the Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2019, the head 

18 of the Office shall report to the Under Secretary for 

19 Political Mfairs or to an official holding a higher po20 sition than the Under Secretary for Political Affairs 

21 in the Department of State. Mter the conclusion of 

22 such period, the head of the Office shall report to 

23 an appropriate Under Secretary or to an official 

24 holding a hig·her position than Under Secretary. 

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17 

"(5) RUIJE OF COKSTRUCTIOK.-l'\othing ll1 

2 this subsection may be construed to preclude3 "(A) the Office from being elevated to a 

4 Bureau within the Department of State; or 

5 "(B) the head of the Office from being clc6 vatcd to au Assistant Secretary, if such au As7 sistant Secretary position docs not increase the 

8 number of Assistant Secretary positions at the 

9 Department above the number authorized under 

10 subsection (c)(l).". 

11 (b) SEKSE OF COKGRESS.-lt is the sense of Con12 gress that the Office of International Cyberspace Policy 

13 established under section l(g) of the State Department 

14 Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as added by subsection (a), 

15 should be a Bureau of the Department of State and the 

16 head of such Office should report directly to the Secretary 

17 of State or Deputy Secretary of State. 

18 (c) UKI'l'Im NA'riOKS.-The Permanent Reprcsenta19 tiw~ of the United States to the United Nations should 

20 usc the voice, vote, and iuf1ucncc of the United States to 

21 oppose any measure that is inconsistent ·with the policy 

22 described in section 4. 

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18 

SEC. 6. INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE EXECUTIVE AR· 

2 RANGEMENTS. 

3 (a) li\' GENERAIJ.-Thc President is encouraged to 

4 enter into executive arrangements with foreign govern5 mcnts that support the policy described in section 4. 

6 (b) THANSl\IISSIOi\' TO COKGHESS.-Section 112b of 

7 title 1, United States Code, is amcnded8 (1) in subsection (a) by striking "International 

9 Relations" and inserting "Foreign Affairs"; 

10 (2) in subsection (c)(2)(B), by adding at the 

11 end the following: 

12 "(iii) A bilateral or multilateral cyberspace 

13 agreement."; 

14 (3) by redesiguating subsection (f) as sub15 section (g); and 

16 (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the fol17 lowing: 

18 "(f) With respect to any bilateral or multilateral 

19 cyberspaee agreement under subsection (e)(2)(B)(iii) and 

20 the information required to be transmitted to Congress 

21 under subsection (a), or with respect to any arrangement 

22 that seeks to seeurc eommitmcnts on responsible country 

23 behavior in eybcrspaec eonsistent with section 4(b )( 5) of 

24 the Cyber Diplomaey Act of 2019, the Secretary of State 

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19 

"(1) the purpose of such arrangement; 

2 "(2) how such arrangement is consistent with 

3 the policy described in section 4 of such Act; and 

4 "(3) how such arrangement will be imple5 mented.". 

6 (c) STATUS REPOR'l'.-During the 5-year period im7 mediately following the transmittal to CongTess of an 

8 agreement described in section 112b(e)(2)(B)(iii) of title 

9 1, United States Code, as added by subsection (b)(2), or 

10 until such agreement has been discontinued, if discon11 tinned within 5 years, the President shall12 (1) notifY the appropriate congTessional com13 mittees if another country fails to adhere to signifi14 cant commitments contained in such agreement; and 

15 (2) describe the steps that the United States 

16 has taken or plans to take to ensure that all such 

17 commitments are fulfilled. 

18 (d) E:A!STI;'\G EXECI:TI\'E ARRANGEMENTS.-.:'\ot 

19 later than 180 clays after the date of the enactment of 

20 this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate 

21 congressional committees regarding any executive bilateral 

22 or multilateral cyberspace arrangement in effect before the 

23 date of enactment of this Act, ineluding24 (1) the arrangement announced between the 

25 United States and Japan on April 25, 2014; 

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1 (2) the arrangement announced between the 

2 United States and the United Kingdom on January 

3 16, 2015; 

4 (3) the arrangement announced between the 

5 United States and China on September 25, 2015; 

6 ( 4) the arrangement announced between the 

7 United States and Korea on October 16, 2015; 

8 ( 5) the arrangement announced between the 

9 United States and Australia on January 19, 2016; 

10 (G) the arrangement announced between the 

11 United States and India on June 7, 2016; 

12 (7) the arrangement announced between the 

13 United States and Argentina on April 27, 2017; 

14 (8) the arrangement announced between the 

15 United States and Kenya on June 22, 2017; 

16 (9) the arrangement announced between the 

17 United States and Israel on ,June 26, 2017; 

18 (10) the arrangement announced between the 

19 United States and France on February 9, 2018; 

20 (11) the arrang·cment announced between the 

21 United States and Brazil on May 14, 2018; and 

22 (12) any other similar bilateral or multilateral 

23 arrangement announced before such date of enact24 ment. 

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1 SEC. 7. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE. 

2 (a) STRA'l'EGY HEQUIRED.-Not later than 1 year 

3 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, 

4 acting through the Secretary of State, and in coordination 

5 with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and 

6 agencies, shall develop a strategy relating to United States 

7 engagement with foreign governments on international 

8 norms with respect to responsible state behavior in cyber9 space. 

10 (b) JiJr~El\IENTS.-The strategy required under sub11 section (a) shall include the following: 

12 (1) A review of actions and activities under13 taken to support the policy described in section 4. 

14 (2) A plan of action to guide the diplomacy of 

15 the Department of State with regard to foreign 

16 countries, inclnding--

17 (lt) conducting bilateral and multilateral 

18 activities to develop norms of responsible coun19 try behavior in cyberspace consistent vvith the 

20 objectives under section 4(b)(5); and 

21 (B) reviewing the status of existing efforts 

22 in relevant multilateral fora, as appropriate, to 

23 obtain commitments on international norms in 

24 cyberspace. 

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(3) A review of alternative concepts vvith regard 

2 to international norms in cyberspace offered by for3 eign countries. 

4 ( 4) A detailed description of new and evolving 

5 threats in cyberspace from foreign adversaries, state6 sponsored actors, aml private actors to7 (A) United States national security; 

8 (B) Federal and private sector cyberspace 

9 infrastructure of the United States; 

10 (C) intellectual property in the United 

11 States; and 

12 (D) the privacy of citizens of the United 

13 States. 

14 (5) A review of policy tools available to the 

15 President to deter and de-escalate tensions with for16 eig11 countries, state-sponsored actors, and private 

17 actors regarding threats in cyberspace, the degree to 

18 which such tools have been used, and whether such 

19 tools have been effective deterrents. 

20 (6) A review of resources required to conduct 

21 activities to build responsible norms of international 

22 eyber behavior. 

23 (7) A plan of action, developed in consultation 

24 with relevant Federal departments and agencies as 

25 the President may direct, to 6'Uide the diplomacy of 

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the Department of State with regard to inclusion of 

2 cyber issues in mutual defense agreements. 

3 (c) Fmm OF STRA'rEGY.-

4 (1) Pum,rc AVAIJ,ABII,ITY.-'rhe strategy re5 quired under subsection (a) shall be available to the 

6 public in unclassified form, including through publi7 cation in the FederalHegister. 

8 (2) CI,ASSIFIED Al'\NEX.-'l'he strategy required 

9 under subsection (a) may include a classified annex, 

10 consistent with United States national security inter11 ests, if the Seeretary of State determines that such 

12 annex is appropriate. 

13 (d) BmEFil'\0.-Not later than 30 days after the 

14 completion of the strategy required under subseetion (a), 

15 the Seeretary of State shall brief the appropriate congres16 sional committees on the strategy, including any material 

17 eontained in a elassified annex. 

18 (e) UPDATES.-The strategy required under sub19 seetion (a) shall be updated20 (1) not later than 90 days after any material 

21 ehange to United States policy deseribed in sueh 

22 strategy; and 

23 (2) not later than 1 year after the inaug11ration 

24 of eaeh new President. 

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24 

1 (f) PREEXISTIN"G REQUIREJ\IENT .-The Ree2 ommenrlations to the President on Protecting American 

3 Cyber Interests through International Engagement, pre4 pared by the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues 

5 on May 31, 2018, pursuant to section 3(c) of Executive 

6 Order 13800 (82 I;~ed. Reg. 22391), shall he deemed to 

7 satis~v the requirement under subsection (a). 

8 SEC. 8. ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 

9 PRACTICES. 

10 Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

11 (22 U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the 

12 following: 

13 "(h)(1) The report required under subsection (d) 

14 shall include an assessment of freedom of expression ·with 

15 respect to electronic information iu each foreign country 

16 that includes the following: 

17 "(A) An assessment of the e:x.'tent to which gov18 ernment authorities in the country inappropriately 

19 attempt to filter, censor, or otherwise block or re20 move nonviolent expression of political or religious 

21 opinion or belief through the Internet, including 

22 electronic mail, and a description of the means by 

23 ·which such authorities attempt to inappropriately 

24 block or remove such expression. 

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"(B) An assessment of the e2..'tent to which gov2 ernment authorities in the country have persecuted 

3 or otherwise punished, arbitrarily and without due 

4 proeess, an individual or group for the nonviolent ex5 pression of politieal, religious, or ideologieal opinion 

6 or belief through the Internet, ineluding eleetronie 

7 mail. 

8 "(C) An assessment of the eA.i,ent to whieh gov9 ernment authorities in the eountry have sought, in10 appropriately and with malieious intent, to eolleet, 

11 request, obtain, or disclose v.rithout due process per12 sonally identifiable information of a person in con13 neetion with that person's nonviolent expression of 

14 political, religious, or ideological opinion or belief, in15 eluding e2..1)ression that would be protected by the 

16 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 

17 adopted at New York December 16, 1966, and en18 tercel into force March 23, 1976, as interpreted by 

19 the United States. 

20 "(D) An assessment of the extent to which wire 

21 communications and electronic communications are 

22 monitored \vithout due process and in contravention 

23 to United States policy with respect to the principles 

24 of privacy, human rights, democracy, and rule of 

25 law. 

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"(2) In compiling data and making assessments 

2 under paragraph (1), United States diplomatic personnel 

3 should consult with relevant entities, including human 

4 rights organizations, the private sector, the g·overnmcnts 

5 of like-minded countries, teclmology and Internet compa6 nics, and other appropriate nongovernmental organiza7 tions or entities. 

8 "(3) In this subsection9 "(A) the term 'electronic communication' has 

] 0 the meaning given the term in section 2 510 of title 

11 18, United States Code; 

12 "(B) the term 'Internet' has the meaning given 

13 the term in section 23l(e)(3) of the Communications 

14 Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 23l(e)(3)); 

15 "(C) the term 'personally identifiable informa16 tion' means data in a form that identifies a par17 ticular person; and 

18 "(D) the term 'wire communication' has the 

19 meaning given the term in section 2510 of title 18, 

20 United States Code.". 

21 SEC. 9. GAO REPORT ON CYBER DIPLOMACY. 

22 1'\ot later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 

23 of this Act, the Comptrolle1· General of the ·united States 

24 shall submit a report and provide a briefing to the appro25 priate congressional committees that includesg:IVHLC\030519\030519.287.xml 

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(1) an assessment of the extent to which United 

2 States diplomatic processes and other efforts >vith 

3 foreign countries, including through multilateral 

4 fora, bilateral engagements, and negotiated cyber5 space agreements, advance the full rang·e of United 

6 States interests in cyberspace, including the policy 

7 described in section 4; 

8 (2) an assessment of the Department of State's 

9 organizational structure and approach to managing 

10 its diplomatic efforts to advance the full range of 

11 United States interests in cyberspace, including a re12 view of13 (A) the establishment of a bureau in the 

14 Department of State to lead the Department's 

15 international cyber mission; 

16 (B) the current or proposed diplomatic 

17 mission, strncture, staffing, funding, and activi18 ties of the bureau; 

19 (C) how the establishment of the bureau 

20 has impacted or is likely to impact the strncture 

21 and organization of the Department; and 

22 (D) what challenges, if any, the Depart23 ment has faced or will face in establishing such 

24 bureau; and 

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(3) any other matters determined relevant by 

2 the Comptroller General. 

3 SEC. 10. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CYBERSECURITY SANC4 TIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA AND CYBER5 SECURITY LEGISLATION IN VIETNAM. 

6 It is the sense of Congress that7 (1) the President should designate all entities 

8 that knowingly engage in significant activities under9 mining cybersecurity through the use of computer 

10 networks or systems against foreign persons, govern11 mcnts, or other entities on behalf of the Government 

12 of North Korea, consistent with section 209(b) of 

13 the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement 

14 Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9229(b)); 

15 (2) the cybersecurity law approved by the Na16 tiona! Assembly of Vietnam on June 12, 2018-

17 (A) may not be consistent with inter18 national trade standards; and 

19 (B) may endang·er the privacy of citizens 

20 of Vietnam; and 

21 (3) the Government of Vietnam should work 

22 ''ith the United States and other countries to ensure 

23 that such law meets all relevant international stand24 ards. 

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1 SEC. 11. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. 

2 (a) RULE OP COXSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this Act 

3 may be construed to infringe upon the related functions 

4 of any Executive agency vested in such ageney under any 

5 provision of lmv. 

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AUTHeN.,CAnD9 U.S. GOVERN."-1ENT 

INfORMATION 

GPO 

116'l'II CONGRESS H RES 156 ls'l' SESSIOK • • 

IV 

Calling for accountability and jnstiee for the assassination of Boris NemtsoY. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN'l'A'I'IVES 

FEBIWAHY 27, 2019 

l\Ir. l~NGEL (for himself, Mr. J\lcCAlTI,, Mr. J\1ALINOWSia, and Ms. CIIEl\EY) 

submitted the following resolution; which m1s refeiTed to the Committee 

ou Foreign Affairs 

RESOLUTION 

Calling for accountability and justice for the assassination 

of Boris Nemtsov. 

"'Whereas Boris Nemtsov was a Russian statesman who, over 

25 years of public service, served as a Member of Parliament, Governor of the Nizlmy Novgorod Region, and 

First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia; 

"Whereas throughout his life, Boris Nemtsov showed an unwavering commitment to the ideals "of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law, and to upholding the rights and 

dignity of Russian citizens; 

"\Vhereas Boris N emtsov was a powerful voice in opposition to 

the authoritarianism and corruption of 'Vladimir Putin's 

government, publicizing its abuses, leading street protests 

ag·ainst election fraud and the war on Ukraine, and sue-
65 

2 

cessfully advocating for international sanctions on human 

rights violators; 

vV1lCreas Boris Xemtsov was co-chairman of a leading opposition party, won election to the Y aroslavl Regional Duma 

in 2013, and vvas planning to run for the Russian Parliament in 2016 and challenge Vladimir Putin for the 

Presidency in 2018; 

·whereas, on the evening of F'ebrnary 27, 2015, Boris 

N emtsov was shot in the back and killed as he walked 

across Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge near the Kremlin in 

Moscow; 

Whereas, on March 7 and 8, 2015, Russian authorities arrested five individuals, all of them natives of the Chechen 

Republic, on suspicion of carrying out the assassination, 

while a sixth suspect allegedly blew himself up during the 

attempted arrest; 

vVhereas the defendants were tried at the Moscow District 

Military Court, which on June 29, 2017, found them 

guilty of carrying out the assassination of Boris Nemtsov, 

and on July 13, 2017, sentenced them to different prison 

terms; 

vVhereas at the time of the assassination, the now-convicted 

gunman, Zaur Daclayev, was serving as a I__.ieutenant in 

the Internal Troops of the Interior Ministry of the Russian Federation and as Deputy Battalion Commander in 

the "Sever" ("North") Regiment stationed in the 

Chechen Republic, under the command of the Internal 

'l'roops Commander, General Viktor Zolotov, and the 

Kremlin-backed head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan 

Kadyrov; 

•HRES 156 IH 
66 

3 

Whereas Ramzan Kadyrov has called l1ieutenant Zaur 

Dadayev a "true patriot" and has publicly referred to 

Boris Nemtsov as an "enemy of Russia"; 

\Vhereas by Decree No. 115 issued on March 8, 2015, President \Ttadimir Pntin mvarded Ramzan Kad;vTov the Order 

of Honor; 

\Vhereas according to reports published in the RosBusinessConsulting (RBC) newspaper on January 20, 2016, General Alexander Bastrykin, chairman of the Investigative 

Committee of the Russian Federation, has on two occasions prevented investigators from indicting Major 

Ruslan Geremeyev, Battalion Commander in the "Sever" 

("North") Regiment of the Internal 'l'roops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation stationed in the Chechen Republic· and a dose associate of 

Ramzan Kadyrov, as an organizer in the assassination; 

·whereas according to reports published in Novaya Gazeta 

newspaper on December 9, 2016, operatives of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in the 

Chechen Republic have failed to serve Major Ruslan 

Geremeyev with a summons for questioning as a witness, 

reporting· to their superiors that on the sole occasion they 

attempted to do so, "nobody opened the door"; 

\Vhereas despite requests from the legal team representing 

Boris Nemtsov's family, the Investigative Committee of 

the Russian Federation and the :Moscow District Military 

Court have refused to question high-ranking persons of 

interest, including Ramzan Kadyrov and General Viktor 

Zolotov; 

Whereas the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation has, to this clay, not issued any indictments against 

•HRES 156 IH 
67 

4 

the organizers or masterminds of the assassination of 

Boris Nemtsov, with the exception of Major Huslan 

Geremeyev's driver, Huslan Mukhudinov, who is named 

alongside "other unidentified persons"; 

\Vhereas the Investigative Committee of the Hussian Federation and the Moscow District Military Court have refused 

to classifY the assassination of Boris Nemtsov nuder Article 277 of the Criminal Code as "encroaclnnent on the 

life of a statesman or a public figure," choosing instead 

Article 105 that deals with common domestic murders; 

vVhereas throughout the proceedings at the :Moscow District 

Military Court, the judge repeatedly disallowed questions 

relating to political motives behind the assassination; 

\Vhereas the Federal Protective Service of the Russian Federation has refused to release video footage from the security cameras on Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge from the 

night of the assassination, claiming in a letter to State 

Duma Member Dmitry Gudkov on November 6, 2015, 

that the bridge next to the Kremlin is "not a protected 

object"; 

Whereas, on lVIay 18, 2017, the Parliamentary Assembly of 

the Council of JiJurope appointed !Jithuanian Member of 

Parliament Emanuelis Zingeris as its special rapporteur 

on the need to shed light on the background of the murder of Boris Nemtsov, 1vith a mandate to review and report on the case and on the progress of the official Hussian investigation; 

Whereas, on May 24, 2018, the Russian Foreign Ministry informed Emanuelis Zingcris that he is forbidden from entering the Russian Federation; 

•HRES 156 IH 
68 

5 

·whereas, at its 27th annual session held on July 7 through 

11, 2018, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 

adopted a resolution urging Russian authorities to "undertake a new, full and thorough investigation into the 

February 2015 assassination of Boris Nemtsov"; 

\Vhereas, on ,July 8, 2018, the Parliamentary Assembly of the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

held a public event to discuss the need for OSCE oversight of the official Russian investigation into the assassination of Boris Nemtsov; 

Whereas the United States and the Russian Federation are 

full members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; 

vVhereas the OSCE Moscow Document has established that 

"issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, 

democracy and the rule of law . . . are matters of direct 

and legitimate concern to all participating States and do 

not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State 

concerned"; 

Wl1ereas, on February 27, 2018, Washington, DC, designated 

tlw street in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation as "Boris Nemtsov Plaza" to honor Mr. Nemtsov; 

and 

\Vhereas, on February 22, 2019, the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, George Tsereteli, appointed Swedish Member of Parliament and Vice President of the A"Jsembly Margareta Cederfelt as the 

rapporteur on the investigation of the assassination of 

Boris N emtsov, with a mandate to review and report on 

•HRES 156 IH 
69 

6 

the case and on the progress of the official Russian investigation: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, 'l'hat the House of Representatives2 (1) condemns ·vladimir Putin and his regime 

3 for targeting political opponents and covering up the 

4 assassination of Boris Nemtsov, a Russian opposi5 tion leader who worked to advance democracy and 

6 human rights in Russia; 

7 (2) urges the United States Government, in all 

8 its interactions with the Government of the Russian 

9 Federation, to raise the case of the assassination of 

10 Boris Nemtsov and underscore the necessity of 

11 bringing the organizers and masterminds to justice; 

12 (3) supports the efforts by the Organization for 

13 Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its 

14 Parliamentary Assembly to initiate oversight of the 

15 official Russian investigation into the assassination 

16 of Boris N emtsov; 

17 ( 4) calls on the Government of the Russian 

18 Pederation to allow au impartial international inves19 tigation of the assassination of Boris Nemtsov and 

20 to cooperate ''lith the Parliamentary Assembly of the 

21 OSCE and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun22 cil of Europe in their ongoing inquiries over this 

23 case; 

•HRES 156 1H 
70 

7 

1 ( 5) calls on the Secretary of State and the Scc2 rctary of the Treasury to usc their authority under 

3 the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability 

4 Act of 2012 (title IV of Public !Jcnv 112-208) and 

5 the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability 

6 Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328) 

7 to designate individuals whom they determine to 

8 have been involved in the assassiuation of Boris 

9 Ncmtsov as perpetrators, organizers, or mastcr1 0 minds, on the list of specially designated nationals 

11 and blocked persons maintained by the Office of 

12 Foreign A.;;scts Control of the Department of the 

13 'l'reasury, freezing their assets and making them in14 eligible to receive United States visas; and 

15 ( 6) calls on the Secretary of State, in consulta16 tion v.ith the Director of National Intelligence, to 

17 prepare and submit to CongTess a report detailing 

18 the circumstances of the February 27, 2015, assas19 sination of Boris Nemtsov, including the list of indi20 viduals whom they determine to have been involved 

21 in the assassination as perpetrators, organizers, or 

22 masterminds, and identifying what measures, if any, 

23 have been taken by the Government of the Russian 

24 Federation to investigate this crime and bring its 

•HRES 156 IH 
71 

8 

perpetrators, organizers, and masterminds to justice, 

2 and evaluating the effectiveness of such measures. 

0 

•HRES 156m 
72 

G:\CMTE\F A \16\HR156_A I.XML 

AMENDMENT TO H. REs. 156 

OFFERED BY MR. MALINOWSKI OF NEW JERSEY 

In the 11th clause of the preamble, insert "and Russian State Duma Member Adam Delimkhanov" after 

"Ramzan Kaclyrov". 

In the 13th clause of the preamble, strike "and General Victor Zolotov" and insert ", General Victor Zolotov, 

and Adam Delimkhanov". 

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G:\M\16\MALINJ\MALINJ_Oll.XML 

.AMENDMENT TO H. RES. 156 

OFFERED BY MR. MALINOWSKI OF NEW JERSEY 

Page 7, line 14, strike"; and" and insert";". 

Page 8, line 2, strike the period at the end and insert "; and". 

Page 8, after line 2, insert the following: 

(7) urges the Secretary of State to take all pos2 sible steps to3 (A) investigate the business activities of 

4 Ramzan Kadyrov and any entities controlled by 

5 Ramzan Kadyrov outside the Russian :B'edera6 tion; and 

7 (B) determine whether any such activities, 

8 or any entities facilitating such aetivities, are in 

9 violation of the sanetions imposed on Ramzan 

10 Kadyrov pursuant to the authorities provided 

11 by the Global Magnitsky Human Hights Ac12 countability Aet (22 U.S.C. 2G56 note). 

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AU;H<NnCAHD9 U.S COVERNMEN r INFORMATION 

GPO 

116TII CONGRESS 18'1' Sl<}SSION H.R.596 

To prohibit United States GoYermHent reeognition of Russia's annexation 

of Crimea. 

IN 'rHE HOUSE OF REPRESEN'rATIVES 

JANTTAHY 16, 2019 

.ii1r. Cmmm,JX (for himself and Mr. CHABOT) introduced the following bill; 

'"hieh mls referred to the Committee on l<'oreign Affaim 

A BILL 

To prohibit United States Government recognition of 

Russia's annexation of Crimea. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the "Crimea Annexation 

5 Non-recog11ition Act". 

6 SEC. 2. PROHffiiTION AGAINST UNITED STATES RECOGNI· 

7 TION OF RUSSIA'S ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA 

8 (a) STATE.iiiEXT OF' POLICY.-It is the policy of the 

9 United States not to recognize the de jure or de facto sov-
75 

2 

1 ereignty of the Russian Federation over Crimea, its air2 space, or its territorial waters. 

3 (b) PHOIIIBITION".-In accordance \Vith subsection 

4 (a), no Federal department or agency may take any action 

5 or e:J.'tend any assistance that recognizes or implies rec6 ognition of the de jure or de facto sovereignty of the Rus7 sian Federation over Crimea, its airspace, or its territorial 

8 waters. 

9 (e) \VAIVER-The President may waive subsection 

10 (a) or (b) if the President determines that it is vital to 

11 the national security interests of the United States to do 

12 so. 

0 

•HR 596 m 
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AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE 

TOH.R.596 

OFFERED BY MR. CONNOLLY OF VIRGINIA 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 

following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the "Crimea Annexation 

3 Non-re~ognition Act". 

4 SEC. 2. PROIDBITION AGAINST UNITED STATES RECOGNI5 TION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S CLAIM 

6 OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER CRIMEA. 

7 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.-lt is the policy of the 

8 United States not to recognize the Russian Federation's 

9 claim of sovereig11ty over Crimea, its airspace, or its terri10 torial waters. 

11 (b) PROIIIBITION.-In accordance ''ith subsection 

12 (a), no Federal department or agency may take any action 

13 or extend any assistance that implies recognition of the 

14 Russian Federation's claim of sovereignty over Crimea, its 

15 airspace, or its territorial waters. 

16 (c) WAIVER-The President may waive the prohibi17 tion in subsection (b) on a case-by-case basis if the Prcsig:\VHLC\030119\030119.032.xml 

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2 

dent determines that it is vital to the national security 

2 interests of the United States to do so. 

Amend the title so as to read: "A bill to prohibit 

United States Government recognition of the Hussian 

Pederation's claim of sovereignty over Crimea, and for 

other purposes.". 

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U.S. AUTH<NWAHD~ GOVERNMENT 

INFORM AriON 

GPO 

116m CO~GRESS 

1ST SESSTO~ H.R. 295 

'l'o increase the role of tlw financial industJ;· in combating human trafficking. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JAXlTARY 8, 2019 

J\lr. FITZPATHICK (for himself, J\Ir. KEAT!KG, J\Ir. J\ICCAFI~, and Mrs. CAROLYi\" B. i\Lu,OXEY of "t\ew York) introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to thP Connnittee on l•'oreig11 Affairs, and in addition to the 

Committee 011 l<'illancial Senices, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions 

as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To increase the role of the financial industry in combating 

human trafficking. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 fives of the United States ofAmeriea in Con.g1·ess assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the "End Banking for 

5 Human Traffickers Act of 2019". 

6 SEC. 2. INCREASING THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL INDUS7 TRY IN COMBATING HUMAN TRAFFICKING. 

8 (a) THEASURY AS A MEMBER OF THE PHESIDEKT'S 

9 lKTERAGENCY TASK FOHCE To MOKITOH AKD COMBAT 
79 

2 

1 TRAFFICKI:t\G.-Section 105(b) of the Victims of Traf2 ficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 

3 7103(b)) is amended by inserting "the Secretary of the 

4 Treasury," after "the Secretary of Education,". 

5 (b) REQUIRED REVIEW OF PHOCEDUHES.-Not later 

6 than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

7 the Financial Institutions Examination Council, in con8 sultation 1vith the Secretary of the Treasury, the private 

9 sector, victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons, 

10 advocates of persons at risk of becoming victims of severe 

11 forms of trafficking in persons, and appropriate law en12 forccment agencies, shall13 (1) review and enhance training and examina14 tious procedures to improve the capabilities of anti15 money laundering and countering the financing of 

16 terrorism programs to detect financial transactions 

17 relating to severe forms of trafficking in persons; 

18 (2) review and enhance procedures for referring 

19 potential cases relating to severe forms of trafficking 

20 in persons to the appropriate law enforcement agen21 cy; and 

22 (3) determine, as appropriate, whether require23 ments for financial institutions are sufficient to de24 teet and deter money laundering relating to severe 

25 forms of trafficking in persons. 

•HR 295 IH 
80 

3 

1 (c) INTERAGEKCY TASK FoncE RECOMl\IEKDATIOKS 

2 TAHGETING 1VIOKEY LAUNDI~HING HEI,ATED TO HUJ\1Ac\' 

3 THAFFICKIKG.-

4 (1) IN GENEHAIJ.-Not later than 270 days 

5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

6 Interagency Task Force To Monitor and Combat 

7 Trafficking shall submit to the Committee on Finan8 cial Services and the Committee on the Judiciary of 

9 the Honse of Hepresentatives, the Committee on 

10 Banking, Housing, and Urban Mfairs and the Com11 mittee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the head 

12 of eacl.1 appropriate Federal banking agency13 (A) an analysis of anti-money laundering 

14 efforts of the United States Government and 

15 United States financial institutions relating to 

16 severe forms of trafficking in persons; and 

17 (B) appropriate legislative, administrative, 

18 and other recommendations to strengthen ef19 forts against money laundering relating to se20 vere forms of trafficking in persons. 

21 (2) REQ"GIImD RECOl\Il\IENDATIONS.-The rec22 ommendations under paragraph (1) shall include23 (A) feedback from financial institutions on 

24 best practices of successful programs to combat 

25 severe forms of trafficking in persons currently 

•HR 295m 
81 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

4 

in place that may be suitable for broader adoption by similarly situated financial institutions; 

(B) feedback from stakeholders, including 

victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons, advocates of persons at risk of becoming 

victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons, and financial institutions, on policy proposals derived from the analysis conducted by 

the task force referred to in paragraph (1) that 

would enhance the efforts and programs of financial institutions to detect and deter money 

laundering relating to severe forms of trafficking in persons, including any recommended 

changes to internal policies, procedures, and 

controls relating to severe forms of trafficking 

in persons; 

(C) any recommended changes to training 

programs at financial institutions to better 

equip employees to deter and detect money 

laundering relating to severe forms of trafficking in persons; 

(D) any recommenclecl changes to e:J..'J)and 

information sharing relating to severe forms of 

trafficking in persons among financial institutions and between such financial institutions, 

•HR 295m 
82 

5 

appropriate law enforcement agencies, and ap2 propriate Federal agencies; and 

3 (E) recommended changes, if necessary, to 

4 existing statutory law to more effectively detect 

5 and deter money laundering relating to severe 

6 forms of trafficking in persons, where such 

7 money laundering involves the use of emerging 

8 technologies and virtual currencies. 

9 (d) l.Jil\TITATIOX.-N"othing in this Act shall be con10 strued toll (1) grant rulemaking authority to the Inter12 agency Task Force To Monitor and Combat Traf13 ficking; or 

14 (2) encourage financial institutions to deny 

15 services to victims of trafficking, victims of severe 

16 forms of trafficking in persons, or individuals not re17 sponsible for promoting severe forms of trafficking 

18 in persons. 

19 (e) DEFIJ'\ITIOKS.-As used in this section20 (1) the term "appropriate I<~ederal banking 

21 agency" has the meaning given the term in section 

22 3(q) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 

23 U.S.C. 1813(q)); 

24 (2) the term "severe forms of trafficking in per25 sons" has the meaning given such term in section 

•HR 295m 
83 

6 

1 103 of the 'frafficking Victims Protection Act of 

2 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102); 

3 (3) the term "Interagency Task Force 'fo Mon4 itor and Combat Trafficking" means the Interagency 

5 Task Force To Monitor and Combat Trafficking es6 tablished by the President pursuant to section 105 

7 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protec8 tion Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7103); and 

9 ( 4) the term "law enforcement agency" means 

10 an agency of the United States, a State, or a polit11 ical subdivision of a State, authorized by law or by 

12 a government agency to engage in or supervise the 

13 prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of 

14 any violation of criminal or civil law. 

15 SEC. 3. COORDINATION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING ISSUES 

16 BY THE OFFICE OF TERRORISM AND FINAN17 CIAL INTELLIGENCE. 

18 (a) FUKCTIOXS.-Section 312(a)(4) of title 31, 

19 United States Code, is amended20 (1) by redesignating· subparagraphs (E), (F), 

21 and (G) as subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respec22 tively; and 

23 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the fol24 luwing: 

•HR 295m 
84 

7 

"(E) combating illicit financing relating to 

2 severe forms of trafficking in persons;". 

3 (b) l:i\"l'ERAGEKCY CoOimi?\ATION.-Seetion 312(a) 

4 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at 

5 the end the following: 

6 "(8) 1.:\TERAGE.:\CY COORDI?\ATIOK-The See7 retary of the Treasury, after consultation ·with the 

8 Undersecretary for 'l'errorism and Finaneial Crimes, 

9 shall desig11ate an office \vithin the OTFI that shall 

10 coordinate efforts to combat the illicit financing of 

11 severe forms of trafficking in persons with12 "(A) other offices of the Department of the 

13 Treasury; 

14 "(B) other Federal agen~ies, includingIS "(i) the Offiee rro Monitor and Com16 bat Trafficking in Persons of the Depart17 ment of State; and 

18 "(ii) the Interagency Task Foree To 

19 Monitor and Combat Traffieking; 

20 "(C) State and local law enforeement agen21 cies; and 

22 "(D) foreign governments.". 

23 (c) DEFINI'l'IO?\.-Section 312(a) of title 31, United 

24 States Code, as amended by this section, is further amend25 ed by adding at the end the following: 

•HR 295 IH 
85 

8 

"(9) DEPINI'riON.-In this subsection, the term 

2 'severe forms of trafficking in persons' has the 

3 meaning given such term in section 108 of the Traf4 ficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 

5 7102).". 

6 SEC. 4. ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENT UNDER 

7 THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION 

8 ACT OF 2000. 

9 Section 105(d)(7) of the 'l'rafficking Victims Protec10 tion Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7103(d)(7)) is amended11 (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)-

12 (A) by inserting "the Committee on Finan13 cial Services," after "the Committee on Foreign 

14 Affairs,"; and 

15 (B) by inserting "the Committee on Bank16 ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs," after "the 

17 Committee on Foreign Relations,"; 

18 (2) in subpara~)Taph (Q)(vii), by striking " 

19 and" and inserting a semicolon; 

20 (3) in subparagraph (R), by striking the period 

21 at the end and inserting "; and"; and 

22 ( 4) by adding at the end the follmving: 

23 "(S) the efforts of the United States to 

24 eliminate money laundering relating to severe 

25 forms of trafficking in persons and the number 

•HR 295 IH 
86 

9 

of investigations, arrests, indictments, and con2 victions in money laundering cases '"''ith a ne:ll.clS 

3 to severe forms of trafficking in persons.". 

4 SEC. 5. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF 

5 TRAFFICKING. 

6 Section 1 OS(b) of the Trafficking Victims Protection 

7 Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7106(b)) is amended by adding 

8 at the end the follo"'ing new paragraph: 

9 "(13) \Vhether the government of the country, 

10 consistent "ith the capacity of the country, has in 

11 effect a framework to prevent financial transactions 

12 invohing· the proceeds of severe forms of trafficking 

13 in persons, and is taking steps to implement such a 

14 framework, including by investigating, prosecuting, 

15 convicting, and sentencing individuals who attempt 

16 or conduct such transactions.". 

0 

•HR 295 lll 
87 

G:\M\ 16\ENGEL\ENGEL_027 .XML 

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE 

TO H.R. 295 

OFFERED BY MR. ENGEL OF NEW YORK 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 

following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the "End Banking for 

3 Human Traffickers Act of 2019". 

4 SEC. 2. INCREASING THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL INDUS5 TRY IN COMBATING HUMAN TRAFFICKING. 

6 (a) REQUIRED REVIEW OF PROCEDUHES.-Not later 

7 than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

8 the Financial Institutions Examination Council, in con9 snltation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the private 

10 sector, victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons, 

11 advocates of persons at risk of becoming victims of severe 

12 forms of trafficking in persons, and appropriate law en13 forcement agencies, shall14 (1) review and enhance training and examina15 tions procedures to improve the capabilities of anti16 money laundering and countering the financing of 

17 terrorism programs to detect financial transactions 

18 relating to severe forms of trafficking in persons; 

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G:\M\16\ENGEL\ENGEL_027 .XML 

2 

1 (2) review and enhance procedures for referring 

2 potential cases relating to severe forms of trafficking 

3 in persons to the appropriate law enforcement agen4 cy; and 

5 (3) determine, as appropriate, whether require6 mcnts for finaneial institutions arc sufficient to de7 teet and deter money laundering relating to severe 

8 forms of trafficking in persons. 

9 (b) INTEHAGENCY TASK FoncE RECOl\Il\mNDATIONS 

10 TAHGE'l'Il\G lVImmY I_.AUNDEIUNG REI,ATED TO HUl\1AN 

11 THAFFICKING.-

12 (1) IN GEJ\EHAI~.-Not later than 270 days 

13 after the date of the cnaetment of this Act, the 

14 Interagency Task Force To Monitor and Combat 

15 Trafficking shall submit to the Committee on Finan16 cial ScrYiecs and the Committee on the ,Judieiary of 

17 the House of Representatives, the Committee on 

18 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Com19 mittee on the Judieiary of the Senate, and the head 

20 of caeh appropriate Federal banking ageney21 (A) an analysis of anti-money laundering 

22 efforts of the United States Government and 

23 United States finaneial institutions relating to 

24 severe forms of trafficking in persons; and 

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3 

(B) appropriate legislative, administrative, 

2 and other recommendations to strengthen ef3 forts against money laundering relating to se4 vere forms of trafficking in persons. 

5 (2) HEQUIRED RECOl\IMEKDATIONS.-'fhe rec6 ommendations under paragraph (1) shall include7 (A) feedback from financial institutions on 

8 best practices of successful progTams to combat 

9 severe forms of trafficking in persons currently 

10 in place that may he suitable for broader adop11 tion by similarly situated financial institutions; 

12 (B) feedback from stakeholders, including 

13 victims of severe forms of trafficking in per14 sons, advocates of persons at risk of becoming 

15 victims of severe forms of trafficking· in per16 sons, and financial institutions, on policy pro17 posals derived from the analysis conducted by 

18 the task force referred to in paragTaph (1) that 

19 would enhance the efforts and programs of fi20 nancial institutions to detect and deter money 

21 laundering relating to severe forms of traf22 ficking in persons, including any recommended 

23 changes to internal policies, procedures, and 

24 controls relating to severe forms of trafficking 

25 in persons; 

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4 

(C) any recommended chang·es to training 

2 programs at financial institutions to better 

3 equip employees to deter and detect money 

4 laundering relating' to severe forms of traf5 ficking in persons; 

6 (D) any recommended changes to mq)and 

7 information sharing relating to severe forms of 

8 trafficking in persons among financial institu9 t.ions and between such financial institutions, 

10 appropriate lmv enforcement agencies, and ap11 propriatc Federal agencies; and 

12 (E) recommended changes, if necessary, to 

13 existing statutory law to more effectively detect 

14 and deter money laundering relating to severe 

15 forms of trafficking in persons, where such 

16 money laundering involves the use of emerging 

17 technologies and virtual currencies. 

18 (e) J,rl\HTATIOK.-Nothing in this Act shall he con19 strued to20 (1) grant mlemaking authority to the Inter21 agency Task Foree To Monitor and Combat Traf22 fieking; or 

23 (2) encourage financial institutions to deny 

24 services to victims of trafficking, victims of severe 

25 forms of trafficking in persons, or individuals not reg:\VHLC\030119\030119.198.xml 

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G:\M\16\ENGEL\ENGEL_027 .XML 

5 

sponsiblc for promoting severe forms of trafficking 

2 in persons. 

3 (d) DEPil\Tl'IOl\'S.-As used in this scction4 (1) the term "appropriate Federal banking 

5 agency" has the meaning given the term in section 

6 3(q) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 

7 U.S.C. 181B(q)); 

8 (2) the term "severe forms of trafficking in per9 sons" has the meaning given such term in section 

10 103 of the Tr·afficking Victims Protection Act of 

11 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102); 

12 (3) the term "Interagency 'l'ask Force To lVIon13 itor and Combat Trafficking" means the Interagency 

14 Task Force To Monitor and Combat Trafficking es15 tablishcd by the President pursuant to section 105 

16 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protec17 tion Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7108); and 

18 ( 4) the term "law enforcement agency" means 

19 an ag·ency of the United States, a State, or a polit20 ical subdivision of a State, authorized by law or by 

21 a government agency to engage in or supervise the 

22 prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of 

23 any violation of criminal or civil law. 

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G:\M\16\ENGEL\ENGEL_027.XML 

6 

SEC. 3. COORDINATION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING ISSUES 

2 BY THE OFFICE OF TERRORISM AND FINAN3 CIAL INTELLIGENCE. 

4 (a) FUKCTIOKS.-Section 312(a)(4) of title 31, 

5 United States Code, is amended6 (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (E), (F), 

7 and (G) as subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respee8 tively; and 

9 (2) by inserting after subparagTaph (D) the folIO lowing: 

11 "(E) combating illicit financing relating to 

12 severe forms of trafficking in persons;". 

13 (b) lKTERAGENCY COORDIKATION.-Section 312(a) 

14 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at 

15 the end the follmving: 

16 "(8) INTERAGENCY COORDIKATION.-The Sec17 rotary of the Treasury, after consultation with the 

18 Undersecretary for 'ferrorism and Financial Crimes, 

19 shall designate an office within the OTFI that shall 

20 coordinate efforts to combat the illicit financing of 

21 severe forms of trafficking in persons with22 "(A) other offices of the Department of the 

23 Treasury; 

24 "(B) other Federal agencies, includingg:\VHLC\030119\030119.198.xml 

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G:\M\16\ENGEL\ENGEL_027.XML 

7 

"(i) the Office To Monitor and Com2 bat Trafficking in Persons of the Dcpart3 mont of State; and 

4 "(ii) the Interagency Task Force 'I'o 

5 Monitor and Combat Trafficking; 

6 "(C) State and local law enforcement agen7 cies; and 

8 "(D) forcig11 governments.". 

9 (c) DEFIXI'l'IOI\.-Sectiou 312(a) of title 31, United 

10 States Code, as amended by this section, is further amend11 ed by adding at the end the following: 

12 "(9) DEFil\ITIOl\.-In this subsection, the term 

13 'severe forms of trafficking in persons' has the 

14 meaning given such term in section 103 of the 'I'raf15 ficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 

16 7102).". 

17 SEC. 4. ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENT UNDER 

18 THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION 

19 ACT OF 2000. 

20 Section 105(d)(7) of the Trafficking Victims Protcc21 tion Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7103(d)(7)) is amended22 

23 

24 

25 

(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)-

(A) by inserting "the Committee on Financial Services," after "the Committee on Forei!,,'11 

Affairs,"; and 

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8 

(B) by inserting "the Committee on Bank2 ing, Housing, and Urban .Affairs," after "the 

3 Committee on Foreig11 Relations,"; 

4 (2) in subparagraph (Q)-

5 (A) in clause (vii), by inserting "anrl" after 

6 the semicolon; and 

7 (B) in clause (viii), by striking "and" after 

8 the semicolon; 

9 (3) in subparagTaph (R), by striking "and" 

10 after the semicolon; 

11 ( 4) in subparagraph (S), by striking the period 

12 and inserting "; and"; and 

13 (5) by adding at the end the follmving: 

14 "(T) the efforts of the United States to 

1 5 eliminate money laundering relating· to severe 

16 forms of trafficking in persons and the number 

17 of investigations, arrests, indictments, and con18 victions in money laundering cases with a ne::-,_-us 

19 to severe forms of trafficking in persons.". 

20 SEC. 5. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF 

21 TRAFFICKING. 

22 Section 108(b) of the Trafficking Victims Protection 

23 Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7106(h)) is amended by adding 

24 at the end the following new paragraph: 

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9 

"(13) \Vhether the government of the country, 

2 consistent with the capacity of the country, has in 

3 effect a framework to prevent financial transactions 

4 involving the proceeds of severe forms of trafficking 

5 in persons, and is taking steps to implement such a 

6 framework, including by investigating, prosecuting, 

7 convicting, and sentencing individuals who attempt 

8 or conduct such transactions.". 

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Chairman ENGEL. At this time I recognize myself to speak on today’s business. 

We have five good measures before us today and I am pleased 

to support them all. The first measure I want to discuss is H. Res. 

156, a resolution I authored with Ranking Member McCaul that 

calls for justice for the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. 

Nemtsov was a brave advocate for democracy and free elections 

in Russia. Sadly, that put him right in Vladimir Putin’s cross hairs. 

Now he joins a long list of brave journalists, human rights activists, and political opponents murdered by Putin’s henchmen in 

their quest to silence all criticism of the Kremlin and stamp out 

any perceived threat to Putin’s authoritarian regime. 

This resolution condemns the Kremlin’s systematic targeting of 

its political opponents and it calls on the administration to implement Magnitsky Act sanctions on those responsible for Nemtsov’s 

murder and cover up. 

It also requires the administration to deliver to Congress a thorough report on Nemtsov’s assassination. That is a critical part of 

this legislation because, sadly, the administration has not done 

nearly enough to give us much reason to stand up to Russia and 

call out Putin’s thuggery. 

So it is up to Congress to assert American leadership on this 

issue and Putin’s strong arm tactics extend beyond the authoritarian rule in his own country. We have seen this all too clearly 

in Russia’s malign actions with its neighbors, which brings me to 

our next measure. 

But before I do that, I want to just personally tell you I have on 

my desk in my office a picture of me shaking hands with Boris 

Nemtsov. It is shocking. When we moved offices I saw that picture. 

I had forgotten about it. 

He came and visited me and told me he was the opponent of 

Putin and that he was for free, independent elections and for a free 

Russia. 

I was very, very impressed with him and thought, wow, this man 

is really special. Unfortunately, Putin thought so too and had him 

killed right in Moscow. But I remember him telling me about how 

he felt how important his work was, and I told him that I thought 

he was really working, not for just the people in Russia, but for 

people all over the world. 

So I want to just mention that because it was quite an honor for 

me to meet Boris Nemtsov and, of course, just a few months later 

he was murdered. 

And so it is just startling. 

The Crimea Annexation Nonrecognition Act puts that conviction 

into law by stating that the United States will not recognize Russia’s claims of sovereignty in Ukraine. 

Putin’s disrespect for independent, sovereign democracies is 

something we in the United States know all too well. By advancing 

this legislation we send a clear message to our Ukrainian partners 

and their neighbors. We stand with you. I support this bill and I 

urge my colleagues to do the same. 

And just as an aside, I have been a strong supporter of Ukraine 

being admitted to NATO and I think we should pursue that down 

the road. 
97 

It is critical that we support our partners and allies whenever 

they are under threat and that brings me to our next measure, H. 

Res. 75. I want to thank Mr. McCaul, Ms. Bass, and Mr. Smith for 

joining me in this resolution that strongly condemns the January 

2019 attack by the terrorist group Al-Shabaab in Nairobi, Kenya. 

This horrific attack killed dozens of people, including American 

citizen Jason Spindler. Just last week, we saw another Al-Shabaab 

attack in Mogadishu, Somalia, claim the lives of nearly 30 people. 

So this resolution rightly affirms that the United States supports 

our regional partners in their ongoing efforts to counter terrorism 

and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa. I hope all members 

will join me in supporting this measure. 

Next, I would like to discuss the End Banking for Human Traffickers Act introduced by Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Keating. It is 

horrible that in 2019, we still live in a world where human beings 

are held in slavery. It is a moral outrage. 

So we need to be consistently evaluating our government’s efforts 

on this issue and looking for areas where we can improve. This bill 

does just that by having the financial industry play a bigger role 

in tracking down human traffickers. 

By connecting the industry with experts on human trafficking, 

banks and other financial institutions will be better equipped to 

spot suspect financial transactions that may be related to this heinous criminal enterprise. 

This bill continues our fight against the scourge of human trafficking, and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting it. 

And finally, we turn to Ranking Member McCall’s bill, the Cyber 

Diplomacy Act. Last Congress, I worked with Chairman Royce on 

this bill and we got it through this committee, the House, and the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee with broad bipartisan support. 

This Congress, Ranking Member McCaul has taken up that mantle and I am pleased to join him as we work to get this bill over 

the finish line and on the president’s desk. 

Cyberspace is an increasingly critical part of foreign policy and 

we desperately need to update our government agencies to reflect 

that reality. 

America has significant interest in cybersecurity, the digital 

economy, issues of internet freedom, and we need to be engaging 

with the international community to articulate and protect those 

interests. 

If we do not focus on all of these areas, we run the real risk of 

seeing authoritarian regimes like Russia and China playing a bigger role in determining the way the international community handles these issues. 

So this bill would create a high-level Ambassador position at the 

State Department dedicated to this endeavor and require a comprehensive cyberspace strategy. 

I am frustrated by the lack of progress on this issue at the State 

Department, and I hope they will work with us to ensure that this 

bill becomes law. 

I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting this measure. 
98 

Thank you to all of our members for your hard work on these 

good bills before us today. As I said before, I am pleased to support 

them all. 

And now, I recognize the ranking member, Mike McCaul of 

Texas, for his opening remarks. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today, our committee will markup three important bills and two 

resolutions, the Cyber Diplomacy Act, which I introduced with you, 

Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for working with me on that. 

It takes several steps to support an open and secure cyberspace. As 

chairman of Homeland Security, I elevated the mission at the Department of Homeland Security and I intend to do the same with 

you, sir, at the Department of State. 

It establishes an ambassador at large to lead the State’s cyber 

diplomacy efforts, outlines an international cyber policy to advance 

democratic principles and reject Russian and Chinese attempts to 

control and censor the internet. 

It requires the State Department to provide assessments related 

to internet freedom, freedoms in other countries, and, as you know, 

Mr. Chairman, malicious cyber activity by State and non-State actors threatens our national security and harms our economic interests. 

We understand the State Department has plans for a new cyber 

bureau, which varies a little bit from what our bill calls for. I 

pledge to work with the State Department and you, Mr. Chairman, 

and the Senate to find the best path forward to advance our shared 

goals of bolstering and elevating State’s critical cyber mission. 

I also want to thank Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Keating for their 

bipartisan bill, the End Banking for Human Traffickers Act, which 

will help address the scourge of human trafficking. 

This bill will help choke off traffickers’ access to financial systems. It is time we put an end to this modern-day form of slavery 

once and for all. 

We are also marking up the Crimea Annexation Nonrecognition 

Act. This bill clearly states that America will not recognize Russian 

sovereignty over Crimea. 

Doing so would condone Russia’s belligerent behavior toward its 

neighbors. Vladimir Putin needs to understand that we will not tolerate this kind of aggression in Crimea or anywhere else in the 

world. 

And that is also why today’s resolution condemning the assassination of Boris Nemtsov is also important. We cannot be silent 

when political opponents are targeted for supporting democratic reforms. 

I was proud to introduce this resolution with Chairman Engel because Putin needs to know that both Democrats and Republicans 

will call out and condemn his authoritarian ways. 

And finally, we must continue to stand united in our fight 

against Islamist terrorism. The terror attack in Nairobi, Kenya, on 

January the 15th that killed 21 people including Jason Spindler, 

a fellow Texan, was a painful reminder that our fight against terrorism is a global struggle. 

Our resolution condemns this attack and reaffirms our commitment to eradicating this evil. 
99 

I look forward to passing these bills out of committee with bipartisan support. 

And, finally, Mr. Chairman, on the floor and in the halls of Congress there has been much discussion recently about anti-Semitism. I want to thank you for your leadership on this issue and I 

look forward to continuing to work with you on measures that support our close ally, Israel, and denounce anti-Semitism wherever it 

may be. 

And with that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. 

Are there any other members seeking recognition? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman ENGEL. Yes, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair and the ranking member. I 

want to thank them both for putting together this bipartisan package of five bills for our consideration today. 

These measures condemn terrorist attacks, strengthen U.S. diplomacy, condemn Russia’s violations of human rights and territorial sovereignty, and bolster U.S. efforts to reduce global human 

trafficking, the scourge of our time. 

In particular, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the 

ranking member for including in this markup H.R. 596, the Crimea 

Annexation Nonrecognition Act, which I introduced with my good 

friend and Republican colleague, Representative Steve Chabot. 

This bill states that it is the policy of the United States not to 

recognize the Russian Federation’s claim of sovereignty over Crimea, its airspace, or its territorial waters. 

Furthermore, this bill prohibits the U.S. Government from taking 

any action that implies recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea. 

It has been the longstanding policy of the United States to not 

recognize territorial changes effected by force as dictated by the 

long-ago Stimson Doctrine established in 1932 by then-Secretary of 

State Henry Stimson. 

The matter of rejecting the forcible and illegal attack on sovereign territory is so important we should be satisfied with nothing 

less than absolute clarity about our position, which is one that supports Ukraine sovereignty over its own territory in Crimea. 

Failure to stand up, as Mr. McCaul just said, to Putin’s illegal 

annexation of Crimea sets a dangerous and irrevocable precedent. 

Crimea was Russia’s original violation in Ukraine and we have limited credibility objecting to Russia’s subsequent invasion of the 

Luhansk and Donetsk if we do not take a stand in Crimea. 

Russian occupation of Crimea has inflicted great harm within the 

Ukraine, throughout former Soviet occupied territories, and beyond. 

What has happened in Ukraine—Russia’s forcible and illegal annexation of Crimea, its invasion of Eastern Ukraine, and continued 

occupation in Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk, has precipitated an 

international crisis and the resulting conflict has claimed more 

than 10,000 lives. 

Russia has subjected Crimeans who refuse Russian citizenship to 

discrimination in accessing education, health care, and employ-
100 

ment, and Russian authorities have attacked travel rights and the 

free press. 

Acquiesence on the part of the United States threatens the security of all sovereign nations. Russia’s forcible and illegal annexation 

of Crimea has sent shock waves throughout the former Soviet occupied territories, many of whom are now NATO allies, including the 

Baltic States. 

After the Welles Declaration in June 1940, the U.S. refused to 

recognize the Soviet Union’s de facto or de jure sovereignty over 

the Baltics during the Soviet Union’s 50 years of illegal occupation. 

The Baltic Republics eventually received their independence and 

they are now reliable NATO allies, in part because of our steadfastness. 

We first introduced this bill in the wake of Russia’s forcible and 

illegal annexation in 2014. This committee previously passed this 

legislation in the 113th Congress. 

I inserted similar language into the Fiscal Year 2016 National 

Defense Authorization Act in order to prohibit the use of defense 

funds in a manner that recognizes Russian sovereignty over Crimea. That is to say that we did not. 

That language has remained in the NDAA, I am grateful to say, 

every year since. I have also successfully authored an amendment 

to Stand For Ukraine Act, which would create only one condition 

under which the president can relax Crimea-related sanctions—the 

restoration of Ukraine sovereignty. 

The United States must lead the way in refusing to recognize or 

legitimize Russia’s illegal and forcible annexation in Crimea. That 

is why both Mr. Chabot and I are glad to offer this bill, which expresses the will of Congress as a loud and declarative voice for sovereignty and freedom and I urge my colleagues to support it. 

And, again, I thank the chair and ranking member for including 

it in today’s markup. I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. SMITH. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman, I strongly support your resolution, H. Res. 156, calling for accountability and justice for the assassination of Boris 

Nemtsov, a Russian patriot killed in 2015, a great defender of democracy in his home country of Russia. 

Last July, I had the privilege of leading the United States delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Berlin and I actually chaired the public event that you reference in your resolution, 

the July 8th public event, and we featured Hanna Nemtsova, Boris 

Nemtsov’s daughter, who was absolutely compelling and brave and 

full of courage. 

Boris’s friend and colleague, Vladimir Kara-Murza, who serves as 

chairman of the board of trustees for the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom, and Vadim Prokhorov, who is a lawyer for the 

Nemtsov family. 

I believe that this resolution is a timely followup to that OSCE 

effort because we have been calling on the administration to do 

more and I think the fact that you articulate the concern and the 

need, frankly, to do some better reporting and to hold those respon-
101 

sible besides the five low-level individuals who have been tried— 

who ordered the hit. 

It was an assassination, and it seems to me that it is time, frankly, to really impose Magnitsky sanctions on those who are directly 

responsible for this. But we need that information. We need our 

government to redouble down. So thank you for that resolution. 

Second, I do want to thank you for marking up H.R. 295, the 

End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of 2019. This is authored, 

of course, by my good friend and colleague, Mr. Fitzpatrick. 

This bill will help ensure that human traffickers find trafficking 

even more unprofitable because they will be curbed in their financial work that they do. They often use banks. This helps to increase 

that net to catch these people. 

We have been making strides, Mr. Chairman, in this direction. 

For example, last Congress the Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act, which I authored along with my friend and colleague, Karen Bass, the prime 

Democratic co-sponsor, was signed into law on January 8th, and 

among its many provisions, it added the secretary of the Treasury 

to the President’s Inter-Agency Task Force to monitor and combat 

trafficking in persons. 

H.R. 295 calls on the task force to evaluate the anti-money laundering efforts of the U.S. Government and U.S. financial institutions to see if we are doing enough, and I do not think we are, to 

recognize and act against financial movements to signal red flags 

that human trafficking is occurring. 

The task force will consult with trafficking survivors and the financial industry representatives who have been pioneering antitrafficking efforts in their best practices. 

So, again, I want to thank you for all of these bills. I think they 

are all excellent pieces of legislation and I especially want to thank 

Mr. Fitzpatrick for his leadership on combatting the scourge of 

human trafficking. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Is there anyone else who seeks recognition? 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Move to strike the last 

word. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this markup 

today, and I want to thank you for this slate of five excellent bipartisan bills. 

First, Ukraine—I am honored to be the lead Republican co-sponsor of H.R. 596, Mr. Connolly’s Crimean Annexation Nonrecognition Act, and I want to thank him for his hard work on this important legislation. 

We have been working together on this since the bully Putin first 

acted on Crimea. I know a number of members of this committee 

have done so and I think it is critical that we continue to do so. 

So I want to thank Mr. Connolly for his hard work on this. 

Passage of this bill would cement firmly in place the policy that 

the United States will not recognize Putin’s bogus claims over Crimea and will prohibit any part of our government from taking any 
102 

action that would imply our recognition of Russian sovereignty over 

the peninsula. 

It is vitally important that we support a democratic and unified 

Ukraine by not giving in to Putin’s thuggish behavior and that behavior continues. 

For example, in November, Russian vessels blockaded the Kerch 

Strait, the entrance to the Sea of Azov, and illegally seized Ukrainian naval vessels. 

By these and other actions, Putin is seeking to strangle 

Ukraine’s trade and in all likelihood annex more of it. We cannot 

let that happen. The world cannot stand by as it did previously 

when Putin annexed Crimea. 

Unfortunately, Putin’s gangster ways are not confined to his foreign policy. That is why we are considering H. Res. 156, which I 

am also a co-sponsor of. This resolution calls for justice for Boris 

Nemtsov, who, as was mentioned, was murdered in cold blood near 

the Kremlin on February 25th of 2015. 

For those who do not know, Mr. Nemtsov was a leading opposition figure, outspoken Putin critic, and the former first deputy 

prime minister of Russia and was in all likelihood—we do not know 

for absolutely sure—but in all likelihood was executed at the direction of Putin. 

The Russian government must do a thorough investigation to uncover the truth behind Mr. Nemtsov—that we should not let this 

rest. 

I also want to turn briefly to a couple of other bills we have. The 

terrorist attack on Kenya earlier this year is yet another example 

of the scourge of radical terrorism and we must continue to fight 

against that every time it rears its ugly head. 

That is why I am a co-sponsor of H. Res. 75. And finally, I want 

to thank Ranking Member McCaul for his leadership on the critical 

issue of Cybersecurity. 

As a co-sponsor of the Cyber Diplomacy Act, I think it is necessary that we work with our like-minded allies to ensure that the 

internet remains a place of robust debate and access to uncensored 

information. 

This legislation provides the State Department tools and direction to help accomplish this important priority, and I want to echo 

the words that our ranking member mentioned before—Mr. 

McCaul. 

I completely agree with him that there is absolutely no place for 

anti-Semitism in this country, on this globe, or in this committee. 

I have been on this committee for a long time—23 years—and we 

have always been bipartisan on that issue. I would hope that would 

continue. 

Israel is a strong ally of the United States. The Jewish people 

have been for a long time and will continue to be, whether it is as 

a nation or whether as a people, and there is absolutely no room 

for anti-Semitism. 

And I think that we should work on that in a bipartisan manner, 

and it always has been that way. I hope it will be in the future. 

There is absolutely no place for anti-Semitism. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. 
103 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you. Thank you so much, Chairman 

Engel, Ranking Member McCaul. 

I wanted to say a few words in particular about the resolution 

regarding Boris Nemtsov and to explain the two small amendments 

that I will be offering today. 

First of all, thank you for introducing this resolution to help us 

remember this very good man and to put the Putin regime on notice that we are not going to forget what happened and who is responsible. 

If you read the resolution, you will see that one of the central villains in this terrible story is Ramzan Kadyrov, the strong man who 

rules and has ruled Chechnya with an iron hand for many, many 

years. 

Even the flawed Russian investigation of the murder of Mr. 

Nemtsov determined that the murder was carried out by members 

of an elite battalion loyal to Kadyrov. 

Kadyrov publicly praised the gunmen. Previously, he had publicly called for the death of Nemtsov. One of the chief suspects is 

still living at large in Chechnya under Kadyrov’s protection. 

Kadyrov has also, over the years, been credibly accused of murdering human rights activists, journalists. He has ordered his police forces to round up and torture gay men and women in 

Chechnya. He has ordered the assassination of his critics living in 

other countries, in Europe, and in the Middle East. 

In 2017, the U.S. Government put Mr. Kadyrov on the Global 

Magnitsky sanctions list, which means that his business activities 

overseas involving any sort of transactions through international 

banks should be blocked. 

In reality, though, Mr. Kadyrov has repeatedly shown himself 

outside of Russia, particularly in Persian Gulf countries such as 

the UAE and Saudi Arabia. 

His hobby is horse racing. He spends millions of dollars purchasing race horses, winning races around the world, again, particularly in the Middle East. 

He is blocked in Europe. What my first amendment does is simply to urge the administration to prioritize sanctions-enforcement 

with respect to Ramzan Kadyrov, to investigate his business activities and that of entities he may control outside of the Russian federation and to determine whether any of them might implicate the 

sanctions that we have imposed. 

The second amendment ensures that the resolution includes an 

additional key suspect in Mr. Nemtsov’s murder, Adam 

Delimkhanov, who is a notorious associate and relative of Ramzan 

Kadyrov. 

Delimkhanov is a member of the Russian State Duma where he 

has abused his immunity to shield himself from accountability for 

a range of human rights abuses. 

He has been identified by multiple independent sources as one 

of the organizers of Mr. Nemtsov’s murder. So this amendment 

would add his name to the list of suspects in two clauses of the resolution’s preamble. 

I ask my colleagues to support both of these amendments. Thank 

you very much. 
104 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Malinowski. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, I really do appreciate your considering of H.R. 295. As an FBI agent, one of the most horrific crimes 

that we were called upon to investigate was human trafficking, and 

human trafficking continues to devastate millions of lives around 

the world. 

And this criminal conduct may seem a distant problem but it is 

far from it. It exists right in all of our back yards, in every single 

congressional district in this country, in all of our communities, 

and at times it is right in front of us and we do not even know it 

exists. 

My legislation, H.R. 295, the End Banking of Human Traffickers 

Act, is one step we can take to end the suffering caused by human 

trafficking. 

Traffickers are not hiding their illegal profits under a mattress 

or burying them in their back yard. They use our very sophisticated global financial system to launder their illicit funds through 

banks, credit card companies, and money transfer companies, 

which are all used by traffickers to facilitate their business and to 

perpetuate their exploitation of victims. 

The scale of profits from this illicit trade is really staggering. The 

International Labor Organization estimates that over $150 billion 

in illegal profits are made from forced labor each year, and $99 billion are earned through the exploitation of victims of sexual exploitation, making human trafficking the third most lucrative criminal 

enterprise on this planet. 

The perpetrators of this exploitation play on the defenseless in 

our society, including young children. Cutting off their access to the 

banking system is a critical aspect both from the investigative 

standpoint, and the legislative standpoint and I am proud to push 

this bipartisan bill with my friend and colleague, Congressman 

Keating, to continue working to end this horror once and for all. 

And I thank my colleagues both on and off this committee for 

their support, many of whom have joined this effort. I also want 

to thank Congressman Chris Smith from New Jersey, who has 

made it one of his top priorities to advance this mission. 

This legislation directs Federal banking regulators to work with 

law enforcement and financial institutions to combat the use of the 

financial system for human trafficking. 

The bill further increases collaboration between law enforcement 

and experts in financial crimes by adding financial intelligence and 

regulatory officers to the President’s Inter-Agency Task Force to 

monitor and combat trafficking in persons and requires the task 

force to develop recommendations for Congress and regulators that 

would strengthen anti-money laundering programs to better target 

human trafficking. 

Moreover, this bill allows advocates of human trafficking victims 

to serve as stakeholders and to provide feedback to the U.S. Treasury and, additionally, clarifies that banks not restrict trafficker victims’ access to bank accounts. 
105 

I urge ever Member of Congress, especially those on this committee, to support this legislation, which passed both the committee and the House last Congress with broad bipartisan support. 

We must do everything possible to put an end to human trafficking and this legislation is a very important step along that 

path. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Fitzpatrick. 

Is there anyone else who seeks recognition? 

OK. Hearing no further requests for recognition, then without objection the committee will proceed to consider the noticed items en 

bloc. A reporting quorum is present. 

Without objection, the question occurs on the measures en bloc 

as amended. 

All those in favor, say aye. 

All those opposed, no. 

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. 

The measures considered en bloc are agreed to and without objection each measure in the en bloc is ordered favorably reported 

as amended and each amendment to each bill shall be reported as 

a single amendment in the nature of a substitute. 

Without objection, staff is authorized to make any technical and 

conforming changes and the chair is authorized to seek House consideration under suspension of the rules. 

This concludes—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman ENGEL. Yes, Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Pursuant to House rules, I request that members 

have the opportunity to submit views for any committee report that 

may be produced on any of today’s measures. 

Chairman ENGEL. Obviously, there is no objection to that and I 

thank Ranking Member McCaul and all of the committee members 

for their contribution and assistance with today’s markup. 

The committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:37 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
106 

FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Eliot L. Engel (D-NY), Chairman 

March 7, 2019 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN markup ofthe Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held 

in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

https://foreignaffairs.house.govO: 

DATE: 

TIME: 

MARKUP OF: 

Thursday, March 7, 2019 

!O:OOa.m. 

H.Res. 75, Strongly condemning the January 2019 terrorist attack on the 14 Riverside 

Complex in Nairobi, Kenya 

H.R. 739, Cyber Diplomacy Act of2019 

H.Res. 156, Calling for accountability and justice for the assassination of Boris Nemtsov 

H.R. 596, Crimea Annexation Non-recognition Act 

H.R. 295, End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of2019 

By Direction of the Chairman 
107 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF FULL COMMIITEE MARKUP 

Day Thunday Date, __ -"'0310~7.'-''11"'9 ___ ,Room, __ 2,1"'-7."'-'2"'Rili=O=!B'---

Starting Time 10:05 a.m. Ending Time 10:37 a.m. 

Recesses ......fL (__to___) L_to ___) L_to ___) L_to ___) L_to ___) L_to ___) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Clurlnnlllf Eliot Engel 

Check aU of the following that 11pply: 

Open Session 0 

Executive (closed) Session 0 

Televised(!:] 

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: Seetltttlchetl. 

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

NIA 

Electronically Record~taped) 0 

Stenograpblc Record 0 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.) 

SFR_Castro 

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: (Attach copies of legislation and amendments.) 

The measures considered en bloc were agreed to by voice vote. 

RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): (Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.) 

TIMEADJOURNED10:37a.m. 

!~SCREDULEDTORECONVENE ____ 

FuU 

~ 

Committee Hearlllg Coordln~ 

~ 

u 
108 

PRESENT 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

---c:X_ 

X 

X 

X 

X 

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP 

MEMBER PRESENT MEMBER 

Eliot L. Engel, NY X Michael T. McCaul, TX 

Brad Sherman, CA X Christopher H. Smith, NJ 

Gregory W. Meeks, NY X Steve Chabot, OH 

Albio Sires, NJ Joe Wllson, SC 

Gerald E. Connolly, VA X Scott Perry, PA 

Theodore E. Deutch, FL X Ted Yoho, FL 

Karen Bass, CA X Adam Kinzinger, IL 

William Keating, MA X Lee Zeldin, NY 

--

David Cicilline, RI James Sensenbrenner, Jr., WJ 

AmiBera,CA I X Ann Wagner, MO 

Joaquin Castro, TX X Brian J. Mast, FL 

Dina Titus, NV X Francis Rooney, FL 

Adriano Espaillat, NY X Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA 

Ted Lieu, CA X John Curtis, UT 

Susan Wild, PA X Ken Buck, CO 

Dean Phillips, MN X Ron Wright, TX 

Ilhan Omar, MN X Guy Reschenthaler, PA 

Colin Allred, TX X Tim Burchett, TN 

Andy Levin, MI X Greg Pence, IN 

Abigail Spanberger, VA X Steve Watkins, KS 

Chrissy Houlahan, PA X Michael Guest, MS 

Torn Malinowski, NJ 

David Trone, MD 

Jim Costa, CA 

Juan Vargas, CA 

Vicente Gonzalez, TX 
109 

Statement for the Record from Representative Joaquin Castro 

Markup of Various Measures 

March 7, 2019 

Thank you, Chairman Engel and Ranking Member McCaul, for your leadership on this committee. 

1 want to congratulate all the members whose bills are being considered here today. 

These measures cover a wide range of challenges we face around the world. 

These challenges include terrorism, assassination, cyber diplomacy, human trafficking, international 

aggression-all of which fall within this Committee's jurisdiction. 

I am happy to support each of the measures brought today that will address these important issues. 

I'd like to speak about just a few. 

Firstly, we are acutely aware of the many challenges that cyberspace presents to our national security. 

Our adversaries have actively used the domain to meddle in our democracy, steal data, and much more. 

But there are also opportunities to strengthen diplomacy to address these challenges and in turn 

strengthen our alliances abroad. 

It is only natural that we should complement our cyber defenses with cyber diplomacy. 

This bipartisan bill sets forth a U.S. international cyberspace policy that promotes an open, 

interoperable, reliable, unfettered, and secure Internet. 

It also lays out a model that promotes human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, while respecting 

privacy and guarding against deception, fraud, and theft. 

The State Department will have the lead in setting cyber diplomacy policy with the establishment of an 

Office of Cyber Issues. 

This legislation will improve our nation's ability to conduct cyber diplomacy within a policy framework 

I'm happy to support this important measure that will strengthen U.S. national security and diplomacy 

abroad. 

We've seen Putin's growing aggression and disregard for international law with his annexation of 

Crimea in 2014, hacking of our democracy in 2016, 2018 and now likely 2020, and repeated murders of 

opposition figures within Russia's society. 
110 

I'd like to thank Mr. Chabot for sending Congress' disapproval message of the annexation of Crimea, 

and introducing a resolution that will prohibit any federal department from recognizing Russia as 

exercising sovereignty over Crimea. 

It only makes logical sense that the U.S. government should not be in the business of rewarding such 

aggression. 

This resolution makes the correct statement of policy that the U.S. government will not recognize 

Russia's annexation of Crimea and I'm proud to support it. 

I would also like to voice my support for this resolution that demands justice for Boris Nemtsov, a 

Russian statesman who was assassinated in February of 2015. 

Mr. Nemtsov had an unwavering commitment to the ideals of democracy, freedom, and the rule oflaw, 

vocally opposing the authoritarianism espoused by Vladimir Putin. 

Ultimately becoming victim to state-sponsored murder, this is not an isolated event. 

From Saudi Arabia, to North Korea, and other places in between, we continue to see authoritarians 

target people who dare to critique their policies and regimes. 

We have a President who would rather nurture relationships with authoritarian thugs than repudiate their 

strong man tactics. 

This resolution allows Congress to send a message loud and clear. 

Brutal authoritarian regimes that target their political critics are a threat to democracy and rule of law 

globally. 

Lastly, human traffickers are preying on vulnerable populations throughout the world. 

We must do everything in our power to combat an issue that in many cases amounts to modern day 

slavery. 

One facet of that is clamping down on financial streams that breathe life into these networks. 

This legislation does just that, and I'm proud to support it. 

I'm glad to support all the measures before us today. 

Thank you again Mr. Chairman for your leadership, and to my colleagues for introducing these 

important measures. 
111 

Æ 

03/07/2019 House Foreign Affairs Committee Markup Summary 

By unanimous consent, the Chair called up the following measures and amendments, previously provided 

to Members, to be considered en bloc: 

( 1 ). H.Res. 75, Strongly condemning the January 2019 terrorist attack on the 14 Riverside Complex in 

Nairobi Kenya, (Engel) 

(2) H.R. 739, Cyber Diplomacy Act of2019, (McCaul) 

McCaul Amendment # 14 

(3) H.Res. 156, Calling for accountability and justice for the assassination of Boris Nemtsov (Engel) 

Malinowski Amendment #II 

Malinowski Amendment #A I 

(4) H.R. 596, Crimea Annexation Non-recognition Act (Connolly) 

Connolly, an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 596 

(5) H.R. 295, End Banking for Human Traffickers Act of2019 (Fitzpatrick) 

Engel, an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 295 

The measures considered en bloc were agreed to by voice vote. 

By unanimous consent, the measures were ordered favorably reported, as amended, to the House, and the 

Chairman was authorized to seek House consideration under suspension of the rules. 

The Committee adjourned.