[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13612

____________________

CARELYN FYLLING, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-21953-JEM

____________________

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 1 of 17
2 Opinion of the Court 21-13612

Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

LAGOA, Circuit Judge:

Because “[t]he great value of the trial by jury certainly consists in its fairness and impartiality,” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 

49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (Marshall, C.J.), we have long required excusal of biased jurors and required district courts to adequately investigate potential juror bias when specific facts suggesting such 

bias surface.

The parties to this personal injury action tried the case to a 

jury for two weeks. Following voir dire, the jury was selected and 

sworn, and the trial began. Shortly after opening arguments, the 

district court became aware that one of the impaneled jurors—Juror Eight—had a niece who worked for the Defendant, Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. The district court did not remove Juror Eight, 

did not subject her to any questioning about her niece and any potential for bias, and eventually, permitted her to deliberate—even 

though there were enough jurors to return a verdict without her. 

The jury found Royal Caribbean negligent, but it assessed a comparative-negligence finding against Plaintiff Carelyn Fylling that reduced her recovery by ninety percent.

After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, 

we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by not investigating whether Juror Eight could impartially discharge her responsibilities after learning that her niece worked for Royal Caribbean and by allowing her to participate in deliberations. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. 

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 2 of 17
21-13612 Opinion of the Court 3

I. BACKGROUND

On March 4, 2017, Fylling tripped, fell, and struck her head 

while entering deck five of Royal Caribbean’s Harmony of the Seas

cruise ship. Fylling sued Royal Caribbean for negligence in the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

The case proceeded to trial. The parties both submitted proposed voir dire questions. One of Royal Caribbean’s proposed 

questions, which Fylling did not object to, was whether the prospective jurors “[knew] or [were] related to anyone employed by a 

cruise line.” After filing proposed questions, Fylling filed an unopposed motion for limited attorney voir dire. The district court denied the motion, explaining its typical practice of not allowing lawyers to ask questions during voir dire.

Jury selection began on September 13, 2021. The district 

court allowed counsel for each party to introduce themselves, their 

clients, and others in the courtroom with them. Royal Caribbean’s 

counsel introduced himself, his co-counsel, his paralegal, his IT 

consultant, and Royal Caribbean’s corporate representative. The

district court asked the venire panel, “Do you know any of these 

folks?” No one said yes. The district court then requested that the 

parties read their witness lists and asked the members of the venire 

panel if they knew any of the witnesses. Again, no one said yes.

Next, the district court individually asked each prospective 

juror a series of questions. The district court asked the prospective 

jurors to state their names, occupations, and marital statuses, and 

asked them whether they had been involved in any lawsuits, had 

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 3 of 17
4 Opinion of the Court 21-13612

served on any juries, or had any immediate family members who 

had been involved in a lawsuit. The district court also asked the 

panel members whether they had children and, if so, what their 

children’s occupations were. 

After individual questioning, the district court posed several 

questions to the venire panel as a group. Those questions included

whether panel members knew any other prospective juror before 

that day, whether they belonged to a religion or group that would 

prevent them from judging the case, whether they or someone 

close to them had been injured on a cruise ship, whether they had 

ever suffered a concussion or a brain injury, whether they would 

accept their role as the factfinder, and whether they had any physical, emotional, or language problems that would make it difficult 

for them to participate. The district court did not ask Royal Caribbean’s proposed question about whether the prospective jurors 

had any relatives who worked for a cruise line. 

Finally, the district court asked, “Can you think of any reason why you cannot sit on this jury and render a fair and impartial 

verdict based on the evidence and the law as I instruct you?” Only 

one prospective juror raised his hand. The district court asked him 

what his reason was. The prospective juror answered that he was 

an investor in Royal Caribbean. The district court replied, “You 

are. Okay. That’s easy. Thank you. You’re excused.” The district 

court again asked, “Anybody else? Think of any reason why you 

could not be fair and impartial?” No one on the panel responded.

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 4 of 17
21-13612 Opinion of the Court 5

The parties then selected the jury, with each party exercising 

several challenges. Eight jurors were selected in total. The jury 

was impaneled and sworn, and the district court gave the jury preliminary instructions.

After opening statements, the district court dismissed the 

jury for the day. It then informed the parties and their lawyers that 

while the courtroom deputy was gathering the jurors’ information, 

“one of the jurors”—Juror Eight—“said that her niece worked for 

the Defendant.” The district court stated, “I don’t know that that’s 

disqualifying because I did ask is there anything that you—have any 

reason to think that you might not be fair and impartial in this case” 

and explained that it was “considering what to do about it.” Fylling’s counsel suggested that the juror should be excused because 

she would likely “be reluctant to return any kind of significant verdict.” The district court responded, “If she thought it was going to 

put them out of business, that would be one thing. I doubt that 

this case is significant as it is to put them out of business.” Ultimately, the district court advised the parties that it would likely 

“wait until the end of the case and if we have still eight jurors, excuse her as an alternate.” “[I]f we have eight,” the district court 

reasoned, “I would not have a problem with excusing her and telling her that she was an alternate all along. But if we had six, I think 

that she’s covered herself by her answers to the questions.”

The parties tried the case to the jury for ten days. On the 

ninth day of trial, the district court informed the parties that it had 

changed its mind about Juror Eight’s fitness to deliberate, 

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 5 of 17
6 Opinion of the Court 21-13612

reasoning that “she has indicated that she could be fair.” It also 

observed that even though, “[a]dmittedly, [Fylling] might have 

used a peremptory challenge on her,” Fylling “had already used all 

of [her] peremptory challenges, long before we got to this juror.” 

When Fylling’s counsel protested that Fylling could not have 

known about Juror Eight’s niece when exercising her challenges, 

the district court reiterated that Juror Eight’s niece’s employment 

did not justify her removal from the jury, reasoning that any verdict “is not going to break Royal Caribbean and therefore, her niece 

is not likely to get fired.” Royal Caribbean, for its part, emphasized 

that Juror Eight had indicated that she could be fair and impartial 

in response to the district court’s questions. The district court 

agreed, stating that any family relationship to the parties is “covered by asking [jurors] if they could be fair and impartial in the 

case.” Juror Eight remained on the jury and participated in deliberations.

The jury returned a verdict soon after being instructed. It

found that both Royal Caribbean and Fylling were negligent. More 

specifically, it found that Fylling’s negligence accounted for ninety

percent of her damage and Royal Caribbean’s negligence accounted for ten percent. As for damages, the jury determined that 

Fylling suffered $750,000 in non-economic damages, but—in light 

of the ninety-percent comparative-negligence finding—awarded 

Fylling only $75,000. 

The district court entered judgment in accordance with the 

verdict. Fylling timely appealed. 

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 6 of 17
21-13612 Opinion of the Court 7

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s decision on whether to dismiss 

a juror for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Brown, 40 F.3d 

1171, 1182 (11th Cir. 2021). The abuse of discretion standard allows 

“a range of choice for the district court, so long as that choice does 

not constitute a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Kelly, 888 

F.2d 732, 745 (11th Cir. 1989). 

III. ANALYSIS

Fylling raises two distinct jury-related challenges on appeal. 

First, Fylling argues that the district court’s voir dire questioning 

was insufficient to reveal the biases of prospective jurors, as shown

by the post-voir dire revelation that Juror Eight’s niece worked for 

Royal Caribbean. Second, Fylling contends that even if the district 

court did not reversibly err in conducting voir dire, the district 

court abused its discretion when it declined to excuse, or at least 

individually question, Juror Eight after discovering her family connection to Royal Caribbean during trial. We address only Fylling’s 

second argument.1

“One touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact—

‘a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence 

before it.’” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 

554 (1984) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)). “Civil 

1 On appeal, Fylling also challenges one of the district court’s evidentiary rulings and its refusal to give two of Fylling’s proposed jury instructions. We do 

not address these issues, however, as we conclude that Fylling is entitled to a 

new trial.

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 7 of 17
8 Opinion of the Court 21-13612

juries, no less than their criminal counterparts, must follow the law 

and act as impartial factfinders.” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 

500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991). To that end, we have held that a district 

court must dismiss a juror for cause if the juror reveals actual bias 

or if bias is implied because of the juror’s relationship to a party. 

See United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1976).2

A corollary of the requirement to excuse biased jurors is the 

duty to investigate colorable claims of juror bias when they arise. 

When a district court becomes aware of potential juror bias, “the 

trial judge must develop the factual circumstances sufficiently to 

make an informed judgment” as to whether bias exists. United 

States v. Corey, 625 F.2d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 1980). Developing an 

adequate record sometimes requires “specific and direct questioning” of an individual juror. Id. We have explained that “specific 

questioning is necessary” when, “under all of the circumstances 

presented, there is a reasonable possibility that a particular type of 

prejudice might have influenced the jury.” Berthiaume v. Smith, 875 

F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 2017). Thus, “[b]road, vague questions 

of the venire will not suffice” when a reasonable possibility of bias 

develops. Corey, 625 F.2d at 707.

To be sure, “the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies 

in the first instance with the trial judge.” United States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733, 735 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. 

2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), 

this Court adopted as precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued 

prior to October 1, 1981. See id. at 1209.

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 8 of 17
21-13612 Opinion of the Court 9

United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981)). Pretrial voir dire is the primary vehicle through which the district court can detect potential 

juror bias. Voir dire examination serves to protect against a partial 

trier of fact “by exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors.” McDonough, 464 U.S. at 

554. Accordingly, we have recognized that district courts have

“ample discretion in determining how best to conduct voir dire.” 

Montgomery, 772 F.2d at 735 (quoting Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189); 

see also, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 47(a) (affording district courts substantial discretion over the questioning of prospective jurors during 

voir dire); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010) (“Jury 

selection . . . is ‘particularly within the province of the trial judge.’”

(quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594–95 (1976))).

But a district court’s obligation to protect the right to an impartial jury does not end when the jury is impaneled and sworn. 

For example, in United States v. Cannon, 987 F.3d 924 (11th Cir. 

2021), we reviewed a district court’s dismissal of a juror whose hairdresser was the defendant’s wife. Id. at 936. The district court did 

not learn of the juror’s connection to the defendant until the second day of trial. Id. Still, the district court placed the juror under 

oath to question her about the relationship and invited both parties 

to participate and present authority. Id. at 945. 

Ultimately, the district court in Cannon dismissed the juror, 

and we affirmed. Id. In doing so, we observed that the juror had 

“told the district court the relationship would not impact her ability 

to perform her duties,” but we explained that “[d]espite her 

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 9 of 17
10 Opinion of the Court 21-13612

statement of no actual bias, the court was still required to determine 

if there would be implied bias due to the relationship.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, even when a “reasonable possibility” of juror bias 

is revealed after trial has begun, Berthiaume, 875 F.3d at 1358, the 

district court “must develop the factual circumstances sufficiently 

to make an informed judgment on the existence of actual bias,” Corey, 625 F.2d at 707; see also United States v. Gemar, 65 F.4th 777, 781 

(5th Cir. 2023) (holding that a district court abused its discretion by 

declining to individually question a juror when that juror’s potential bias came to light after trial); Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475, 

484 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing a trial judge’s “responsibility to 

conduct an adequate investigation” when potential bias “surface[s] 

during . . . trial”).

Fylling argues that Juror Eight’s revelation about her niece’s 

employment required either her removal or further investigation 

by the district court. Royal Caribbean responds that no further investigation was necessary because, before learning about Juror 

Eight’s niece, the district court had asked the venire panel as a 

group whether there was any reason they could not be impartial, 

and Juror Eight did not raise her hand or speak. That broad question during voir dire, according to Royal Caribbean, reasonably assured Juror Eight’s impartiality.

Royal Caribbean’s position conflicts with our precedents. 

We have held that “when a defendant is trying to prove presumed 

bias, the court has the duty to develop the facts fully enough so that

it can make an informed judgment on the question of ‘actual’ bias.”

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 10 of 17
21-13612 Opinion of the Court 11

Nell, 526 F.2d at 1229 (citing United States v. Montelongo, 507 F.2d 

639, 641 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also Cannon, 987 F.3d at 945 (applying 

this rule to potential bias discovered after trial began and noting 

that the district court “was . . . required” to determine whether juror was impliedly biased). Thus, it follows that when a juror reveals a familial connection to a party, the district court must—at 

minimum—develop a record adequate to rule on whether the juror is actually or impliedly biased. See Corey, 625 F.2d at 707. And 

that task, in turn, requires “specific questioning.” Berthiaume, 875 

F.3d at 1358. 

Our predecessor court’s decision in United States v. Nell

makes clear a district courts’ obligations when presented with concrete facts suggesting potential bias. The Nell court reversed and 

remanded for a new trial because the district court failed to adequately question a potentially biased juror. Id. at 1230. The juror, 

Mr. Schane, knew who the defendant was and disclosed that his 

union previously “had a little problem” with the defendant’s union. 

Id. at 1228. The defendant’s counsel informed the court that the 

“little problem” was a riot prompted by a jurisdictional dispute between the two unions, and the conflict between the organizations 

was an issue in the case. Id. The defense moved to strike Schane 

for cause and alternatively requested that the district court question Schane further about his place in the inter-union conflict, but 

the district court denied both requests. Id. The district court 

“never went beyond quite general questions regarding Schane’s actual association with [the defendant]” and Schane insisted “on several different occasions that he believed he could be impartial.” Id. 

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 11 of 17
12 Opinion of the Court 21-13612

The district court denied the defendant’s for-cause challenge to 

Schane, forcing the defendant to use a peremptory challenge. Id.

at 1229.

In reversing, the former Fifth Circuit first emphasized that 

“presumed bias depends heavily on the surrounding circumstances,” so when a party attempts to establish presumed bias, “the 

[district] court has the duty to develop the facts fully enough so that 

it can make an informed judgment on the question of ‘actual’ bias.” 

Id. (citing Montelongo, 507 F.2d at 641). Our predecessor court underscored that “[t]his duty cannot be discharged solely by broad, 

vague questions once some potential area of actual prejudice has 

emerged.” Id. at 1229–30. Turning back to the record, the court 

explained that “in light of counsel’s proffered information about 

the close connection between Schane’s union and [the defendant]’s 

union . . . , we think the court erred in refusing to question Schane 

further about the particulars of these matters.” Id. at 1230. The 

court declined to “say that Schane was actually prejudiced” based 

on the record, but it noted that “further questioning might have 

elicited an admission or have revealed sufficient circumstances . . . 

so that bias could be presumed.” Id. The court therefore reversed 

because the district court “failed to explore Schane’s potential bias 

adequately.” Id.

Here, too, the district court did not fulfill its investigative obligation. As this Court has concluded, the district court’s discovery—after impaneling the jury—that Juror Eight’s niece worked for 

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 12 of 17
21-13612 Opinion of the Court 13

Royal Caribbean triggered its duty to investigate the potential bias.3 

See, e.g., Berthiaume, 875 F.3d at 1358. But the district court did not 

do so. It did not place Juror Eight under oath to ask her specific, 

direct questions about whether she could serve impartially despite 

her niece’s employment by Royal Caribbean. And the district court 

allowed Juror Eight to deliberate when it could have excused her 

for cause and still had enough jury members to return a verdict. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 48(a) (“A jury must begin with at least 6 and no 

more than 12 members, and each juror must participate in the verdict unless excused under Rule 47(c).”). Permitting Juror Eight to 

remain on the jury without questioning her further was an abuse 

3 To be clear, the familial relationship at issue here is not a direct one between 

a juror and a party, but one between a juror and an employee of a party. But 

that fact does not eliminate the reasonable possibility that bias existed; it 

merely highlights the need to have a clear record to determine whether implied bias warranted removal. See United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1532 

(11th Cir. 1984) (“A relationship between a juror and a defendant, albeit a remote one, can form the basis of a challenge for cause.”); United States v. Mitchell, 690 F.3d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that although “little case law explores the outer boundary of the kinship category” of juror bias, some courts 

find “implied bias whenever a juror shares ‘any degree of kinship with a principal in a case’” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d 

750, 754 (7th Cir. 2009))). Because the district court did not ask Juror Eight 

any specific questions about her relationship with her niece or her niece’s employment, we have no way of knowing key facts that would confirm or dispel 

the reasonable possibility of bias. We cannot know, for example, whether Juror Eight’s niece is compensated with stock options, works in Royal Caribbean’s legal or risk management departments, or gives Juror Eight cruise discounts. Without this specific and direct questioning, we conclude that the 

district court abused its discretion in allowing Juror Eight to participate in deliberations. 

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 13 of 17
14 Opinion of the Court 21-13612

of discretion. See Nell, 526 F.2d at 1229–30 (“[T]he court has the 

duty to develop the facts fully enough so that it can make an informed judgment on the question of ‘actual’ bias. This duty cannot be discharged solely by broad, vague questions once some potential area of actual prejudice has emerged.” (citation omitted)); 

Corey, 625 F.2d at 707 (“Because presumed bias depends entirely on 

surrounding circumstances, the trial judge must develop the factual 

circumstances sufficiently to make an informed judgment on the

existence of actual bias. Once a party has raised the spectre of potential actual prejudice, specific and direct questioning is necessary 

to ferret out those jurors who would not be impartial.”). 

In defense of its decision, the district court pointed to Juror 

Eight’s silence in response to its general question whether anyone 

could think of a reason they could not be impartial. Royal Caribbean echoes this rationale. The problem is that our precedent in 

Nell rejected that exact argument. In Nell, the former Fifth Circuit 

admonished district courts entertaining claims of implied juror bias 

“to develop the facts fully enough so that [they] can make an informed judgment,” emphasizing that “[t]his duty cannot be discharged solely by broad, vague questions once some potential area 

of actual prejudice has emerged.” 526 F.2d at 1229–30. Indeed, we

and our predecessor court have repeatedly rejected the view that 

general questions can satisfy a district court’s duty to explore potential juror bias. See, e.g., United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 

1350–51 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the obligation to explore

potential bias is not discharged by the general question, “Is there 

any reason you cannot fairly and impartially try this case?” (quoting 

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 14 of 17
21-13612 Opinion of the Court 15

United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir. 1972))), overruled 

on other grounds by United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1221–22 

(11th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Corey, 625 F.2d at 707 (“Once a party has 

raised the spectre of potential actual prejudice, specific and direct 

questioning is necessary to ferret out those jurors who would not 

be impartial. Broad, vague questions of the venire will not suffice.”); United States v. Shavers, 615 F.2d 266, 268 & n.3 (5th Cir. 

1980) (holding that a district court’s voir dire questions, including 

one that asked the venire panel generally whether there was any 

reason they couldn’t render an impartial verdict, were “too 

broad”).4

The district court also suggested that it could reasonably expect Juror Eight to be impartial because Fylling was not seeking a 

verdict large enough to put Royal Caribbean out of business or 

cause Royal Caribbean to fire Juror Eight’s niece. Royal Caribbean 

makes a similar argument, asserting that “the employment of Juror 

[Eight’s] niece likely held little to no weight in Juror [Eight’s] 

mind.” Maybe, or maybe not—but on the record before us, we can 

only speculate about facts that might have affected Juror Eight’s 

decision-making. And such speculation is an inadequate substitute 

for a complete record. See Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 976 (9th 

4 Accord Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 2001) (“We cannot 

say that an ambiguous silence by a large group of venire persons to a general 

question about bias is sufficient to support a finding of fact in the circumstances of this case.” (quoting Johnson v. Armontrout, 961 F.2d 748, 753–54 (8th 

Cir. 1992))); Lewin, 467 F.2d at 1138 (general questions insufficient when potential source of actual prejudice is apparent).

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 15 of 17
16 Opinion of the Court 21-13612

Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“[A] judge investigating juror bias must find 

facts, not make assumptions . . . .”); United States v. Gaston-Brito, 64 

F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[I]t was the district court’s obligation to 

develop the relevant facts on the record, not merely presume 

them.”). Without a record speaking to the details of Juror Eight’s 

relationship with her niece or of her niece’s employment, we cannot assume that the district court’s failure to investigate was harmless. See Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 956 F.2d 1112, 1128–29 (11th

Cir. 1992) (reversing and remanding for a new trial because, among 

other reasons, the district court left “inadequately explored” an issue bearing on a juror’s ability to be impartial); Nell, 526 F.3d at 

1230 (“Doubts about the existence of actual bias should be resolved 

against permitting the juror to serve . . . .”). 

In sum, when it discovered during trial that one of the jurors 

had a niece who worked for Royal Caribbean, a party in the trial,

the district court was obligated to investigate the matter further

and exercise its discretion properly by developing “the facts fully 

enough so it [could] make an informed judgment on the question 

of actual bias.” Nell, 526 F.3d at 1229–30. Because the district court 

did not conduct such an inquiry, we hold that the district court 

abused its discretion by failing to make an informed judgment on 

the question of the Juror Eight’s bias and by allowing Juror Eight 

to deliberate over the objection of Fylling’s counsel.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, we reverse the judgment below and 

remand for a new trial.

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 16 of 17
21-13612 Opinion of the Court 17

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

USCA11 Case: 21-13612 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2024 Page: 17 of 17