United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 13, 2015 Decided July 10, 2015

No. 13-7196

WILMA ELEY,

APPELLEE

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-00309)

Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of the Attorney General of the District of Columbia, 

argued the cause for the appellant. Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney 

General at the time the brief was filed, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor 

General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General, 

were with him on brief.

Douglas W. Tyrka argued the cause and filed the brief for 

the appellee.

Bruce J. Terris, Carolyn Smith Pravlik, and Kathleen L. 

Millian were on brief for amici curiae The Class Members In 

Salazar v. District of Columbia in support of the appellee.
2

Before: HENDERSON and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, 

and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: After 

Wilma Eley prevailed in her lawsuit against the District of 

Columbia (District) alleging a violation of the Individuals 

with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et 

seq., the district court awarded her $62,225 in attorneys’ fees 

and costs for approximately one hundred hours of work. 

Although the District lodged a variety of challenges to the 

award in the district court, its sole objection on appeal is to 

the prevailing market rate that court used in its calculation. 

Specifically, the District argues that the district court abused 

its discretion when it adopted Eley’s proposed fee matrix, 

setting the prevailing market rate for her lawyer’s services 

well beyond the next highest hourly rate used by district 

courts in IDEA litigation. For the reasons set forth below, we 

vacate the district court’s fee award and remand. 

I. BACKGROUND

The IDEA requires the District to provide disabled 

children with a “free appropriate public education.” 20 

U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); see also id. § 1412(a)(1) (free 

appropriate public education “available to all children with 

disabilities . . . between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive”). If 

the District fails to do so, the child’s parents can file an 

administrative complaint with the District Office of the State 

Superintendent of Education (Superintendent’s Office). Id. 
3

§ 1415(b)(6).1 And if the administrative-complaint route 

fails, the parents can sue the District in district court. See id.

§ 1415(i)(2)–(3). 

If the parents’ lawsuit succeeds, the court, “in its 

discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Id. 

§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). An IDEA fee award “shall be based on 

rates prevailing in the community in which the action or 

proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services 

furnished.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(C) (emphases added). Thus, if 

the court finds that “the amount of the attorneys’ fees 

otherwise authorized to be awarded unreasonably exceeds the 

hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar services

by attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, reputation, and 

experience,” it “shall reduce . . . the amount of the attorneys’ 

fees awarded.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(F)(ii) (emphasis added). 

The IDEA provides no further guidance for determining 

an appropriate fee award. In Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 

895 n.11 (1984), however, the United States Supreme Court 

laid the foundation for the three-part analysis that this Court 

has since developed. First, the court must determine the

“number of hours reasonably expended in litigation.” Save 

Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel (SOCM), 857 F.2d 

1516, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc).

2

 Second, it must set 

 1

 See also D.C. Code § 38-2601.01 (Superintendent’s Office 

“perform[s] the functions of a state education agency for the 

District of Columbia under applicable federal law”).

2

 We apply the respective analyses from Blum and SOCM 

notwithstanding both cases involved different attorneys’ fees 

statutes. See Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 

754, 759 n.2 (1989) (“[F]ee-shifting statutes’ similar language is a 

strong indication that they are to be interpreted alike.” (quotation 

marks omitted)).
4

the “reasonable hourly rate.” Id. Finally, it must determine

whether use of a multiplier is warranted. Id. The “fee 

applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an 

award, documenting the appropriate hours, and justifying the 

reasonableness of the rates” and the opposing party remains 

“free to rebut a fee claim.” Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 

57 F.3d 1101, 1107–08 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

Here, the District no longer challenges the hours Eley’s 

lawyer spent litigating her IDEA case, and the IDEA prohibits 

application of any “bonus or multiplier,” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(C). Accordingly, we move to the second prong

of the SOCM analysis—the reasonable hourly rate. Whether 

an hourly rate is reasonable turns on three sub-elements: 

(1) “the attorney[’s] billing practices,” (2) “the attorney[’s]

skill, experience, and reputation” and (3) “the prevailing 

market rates in the relevant community.” Covington, 57 F.3d 

at 1107. Of these three sub-elements, the District contests

only the prevailing market rate in the relevant community. 

Determining the prevailing market rate is “inherently 

difficult.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. Even so, “[t]he 

complexity of the market for legal services does not . . . 

reduce the importance of fixing the prevailing hourly rate in 

each particular case with a fair degree of accuracy.” Nat’l 

Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 

1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Thus, a fee applicant must “produce 

satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own 

affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those 

prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of 

reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” 

Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11 (emphasis added); see also Nat’l 

Ass’n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1325 (“An 

applicant is required to provide specific evidence of the 
5

prevailing community rate for the type of work for which he 

seeks an award.” (emphasis added)). 

We allow a fee applicant to submit attorneys’ fee 

matrices as one type of evidence that “provide[s] a useful 

starting point” in calculating the prevailing market rate. 

Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109. The most commonly used fee 

matrix is the “Laffey Matrix”—the schedule of prevailing 

rates compiled in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (Laffey I), 

572 F. Supp. 354, 371 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in 

part on other grounds, Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc. (Laffey II),

746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other 

grounds, SOCM, 857 F.2d 1516. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 

1109. Laffey I established (and Laffey II affirmed) the 

following schedule for lawyers who practice “complex federal 

litigation”:

—$175 an hour for very experienced federal 

court litigators, i.e., lawyers in their 20th year 

or more after graduation from law school;

—$150 an hour for experienced federal court 

litigators in their 11th through 19th years after 

law school graduation;

—$125 an hour for experienced federal court 

litigators in their 8th through 10th years after 

graduation from law school;

—$100 an hour for senior associates, i.e., 4 to 

7 years after graduation from law school; and

—$75 an hour for junior associates, i.e., 1 to 3 

years after law school graduation.

Laffey I, 572 F. Supp. at 371–72; Laffey II, 746 F.2d at 8 n.14. 
6

Fee matrices in general are “somewhat crude” and the

Laffey Matrix in particular “lumps attorneys with four to 

seven years of experience in the same category” as well as 

“attorneys with eleven to nineteen [years].” Covington, 57 

F.3d at 1109. For this reason, a fee applicant supplements fee 

matrices with other evidence such as “surveys to update 

the[m]; affidavits reciting the precise fees that attorneys with 

similar qualifications have received from fee-paying clients in 

comparable cases; and evidence of recent fees awarded by the 

courts or through settlement to attorneys with comparable 

qualifications handling similar cases.” Id. Additionally, 

because the original Laffey Matrix is now more than thirty

years old, it must be updated to account for inflation. See 

SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1525. Competing updated Laffey 

Matrices have developed, two of which are at issue here. 

Both have their benefits and limitations. 

The first Laffey Matrix is maintained and updated by the 

District United States Attorney’s Office (USAO Laffey 

Matrix). See USAO Laffey Matrix – 2014-2015, available at 

http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-dc/legacy/2014

/07/14/Laffey%20Matrix_2014-2015.pdf. The USAO Laffey 

Matrix starts with “[t]he hourly rates approved in Laffey . . .

for work done principally in 1981–82” as its baseline. Id. ¶ 3. 

It adjusts these rates to account for inflation by using the 

Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) of 

the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. Id. The CPI-U

measures inflation across “100,000 commodities including 

food, fuel, and housing” for a given geographic area—here, 

the Washington, D.C area. Amicus Br. 4. Yet, “[l]ess than 

0.325 percent of the data” in the CPI-U “involves legal 

services.” Id. And according to the district court, the CPI-U

“shows that the cost of legal services nationally has far 

outstripped the increase in overall prices.” Eley v. Dist. of 

Columbia (Eley II), 999 F. Supp. 2d 137, 153 (D.D.C. 2013); 
7

see also id. (“The nationwide cost of legal services has 

jumped ninety-one percent, nearly twice as much as the

general CPI”). During Eley’s IDEA litigation, the USAO 

Laffey Matrix suggests that a litigator specializing in complex 

federal litigation with 11 to 19 years’ experience should 

receive between $420 and $445 per hour. 

Because the USAO Laffey Matrix relies on inflation in 

general rather than legal-services inflation specifically, its 

critics have advocated, to some degree of success,3 for a 

competing Laffey Matrix (LSI Laffey Matrix) that uses the 

Legal Services Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to 

adjust for inflation. Developed by Michael Kavanaugh, an 

economist from Hawaii, the LSI Laffey Matrix adjusts for the 

increases in costs for legal services only. It suffers, however, 

from its own imprecisions. Rather than tracking inflation 

levels specific to Washington, D.C., the LSI Laffey Matrix 

tracks the national rate of change in the cost of legal services. 

During Eley’s IDEA litigation, the LSI Laffey Matrix suggests 

that a litigator specializing in complex federal litigation with 

11 to 19 years’ experience should receive $625 per hour.4 

 3

 See, e.g., Salazar v. Dist. of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d. 8, 

15 (D.D.C. 2000) (LSI Laffey Matrix “more accurately reflects the 

prevailing rates for legal services in the D.C. community”).

4

 There are other differences between the USAO Laffey 

Matrix and the LSI Laffey Matrix. See generally Amicus Br. 8–14 

(comparing two matrices in greater depth). For example, the LSI 

Laffey Matrix uses as its starting point the rates established in 1989 

after our en banc decision in SOCM rather than the “hourly rates 

approved in Laffey” that “were for work done principally in 1981–

82.” See Laffey Matrix – 2014–2015, supra, ¶ 3; see also SOCM, 

857 F.2d at 1525 (discussing Laffey Matrix and suggesting parties 

develop “a similar schedule of prevailing community rates for other 

relevant years”). 
8

On September 13, 2010, Eley filed an administrative

complaint with the Superintendent’s Office, alleging that the 

District violated the IDEA by failing to place her specialneeds child in an appropriate public school. A hearing officer

denied her claim but Eley successfully challenged the denial

in district court. See Eley v. Dist. of Columbia (Eley I), 

No. 1:11-cv-309, 2012 WL 3656471, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 

2012). After concluding that Eley was entitled to 

reimbursement for the money she spent on her child’s 

education, the district court remanded her case to the 

Superintendent’s Office, which awarded her $2,850. 

Eley then filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, 

seeking $62,225 for 97.5 hours of work (approximately onethird of which occurred at the administrative stage) and 3 

hours of travel, as well as $350 for filing fees. To arrive at 

this figure, Eley used the prevailing market rate set forth in 

the LSI Laffey Matrix, which reflected that her lawyer should 

receive $625 per hour. To support her use of the LSI Laffey 

Matrix, Eley submitted a verified statement from her lawyer, 

averring that: 

• his firm has “always” charged the hourly rates 

in the LSI Laffey Matrix;

• “[t]he current hourly rate for [his] time is 

$625.00 per hour”; 

• his firm had settled cases in which the District 

“paid the firm 99.9% of what was billed” after 

applying a statutory fee cap; 

• “[t]he expenses in [his] itemization are the 

charges customarily paid in this field in this 

jurisdiction”; 
9

• “at least 95% of [his] practice has been in the 

field of special education law”; and in his 

“conservative and educat[ed] estimate,” he 

has “litigated over 1000 IDEA administrative 

cases and over 20 IDEA federal cases.” 

Verified Statement of Douglas Tyrka ¶¶ 7–9, 15. Eley also 

submitted her lawyer’s verified time sheets and a declaration 

of Michael Kavanaugh (prepared for a different case), 

explaining the methodology Kavanaugh used to generate the 

LSI Laffey Matrix. The District contested Eley’s attorneys’ 

fees request, arguing that the district court should award 

$749.25 only. In so doing, it cited over forty cases in which 

district courts had awarded attorneys’ fees awards in IDEA 

cases based on prevailing market rates set at (or below) the 

USAO Laffey Matrix, not one of which exceeded $425 per 

hour. In contrast, Eley cited only four cases in which district 

courts had used the LSI Laffey Matrix, none of which 

involved IDEA litigation. 

The district court referred Eley’s motion to a magistrate 

judge, who declined to use the $625 figure from the LSI 

Laffey Matrix. He reasoned that Eley failed to submit 

evidence demonstrating entitlement to an “elevated hourly 

rate.” R & R 8–9. Starting instead with the rates in the 

USAO Laffey Matrix (between $420 and $445 per hour), the 

magistrate reduced those rates by twenty-five per cent 

(between $315 to $333.75) in accordance with other IDEA 

cases. See R & R 9–10 (discussing Rooths v. Dist. of 

Columbia, 802 F. Supp. 2d 56, 62–63 (D.D.C. 2011); 

McClam v. Dist. of Columbia, 808 F. Supp. 2d 184, 190 

(D.D.C. 2011)). Because the Laffey Matrix was created for 

“complex federal litigation in the District of Columbia” and it 

contains presumptive maximum rates, id. at 9 (emphasis 

added), the magistrate found the maximum Laffey rates “not 
10

appropriate” for Eley’s IDEA litigation, id. at 10. Multiplying

the number of hours by his chosen hourly rate, the magistrate 

recommended that Eley receive $40,620.32 in fees and costs. 

Both sides objected to the magistrate’s report and 

recommendation. Eley challenged the magistrate’s choice of 

prevailing market rate, and the District attacked on multiple

fronts, urging the district court to reduce the award from 

$40,620.32 to no more than $2,900.62. The district court 

largely ruled in favor of Eley. The court first compared the 

USAO and LSI Laffey Matrices, ultimately deciding to use 

the LSI Laffey Matrix. Despite the “major criticism” that the 

LSI Laffey Matrix is “only indicative of ‘the prevailing 

market rates for attorneys engaged in complex federal 

litigation in the “big firm” context,’ ” Eley II, 999 F. Supp. 2d 

at 154 (quoting Heller v. Dist. of Columbia, 832 F. Supp. 2d 

32, 45 (D.D.C. 2011) (alterations omitted)), the court 

observed that Blum and SOCM held, respectively, that 

nonprofit lawyers and lawyers who charge reduced rates for 

certain types of litigation are entitled to receive the same 

prevailing market rate as private counsel who prevail in 

“equally complex Federal litigation.” Id. at 155 (citing Blum, 

465 U.S. at 895; SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1524). At bottom, the 

court concluded that Eley’s lawyer’s verified statement, “as 

well as [Kavanaugh’s] declaration explaining the 

methodology and rationale for the updated rates,”

demonstrated that the LSI Laffey Matrix was “an appropriate 

measure of the prevailing community rates for attorneys in the 

Washington, D.C. area.” Id. at 156. 

Next, the district court rejected the District’s argument

that “IDEA cases do not represent sufficiently complex 

federal litigation to warrant the presumptive use of the USAO 

matrix as the prevailing market rate, let alone the LSIadjusted rates requested by [Eley].” Id. at 157. It did so after 
11

concluding that “some version of the Laffey matrix is 

presumptively reasonable in civil rights litigation,” that “a 

complexity determination is not the dispositive question as to 

whether such rates apply” and that, in any event, nothing in 

D.C. Circuit precedent “indicates that IDEA cases, as a subset 

of civil rights litigation, fail to qualify as ‘complex’ federal 

litigation.” Id. at 159. In ordering the District to pay the full 

$62,225 requested by Eley, the court noted that the 

“complexity of [a] case is accounted for by the number of 

hours expended” and “should not be accounted for by a blunt 

reduction of rates before applying the rates to the number of 

hours expended.” Id. at 160. The District timely appealed. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s fee award for abuse of 

discretion, King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 785 (D.C. Cir. 

1991) (en banc), and will not upset its hourly rate 

determination “absent clear misapplication of legal principles, 

arbitrary fact finding, or unprincipled disregard for the record 

evidence.” Kattan ex rel. Thomas v. Dist. of Columbia, 995 

F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993), as amended (June 30, 1993). 

“This limited standard of review is appropriate in view of the 

district court’s superior understanding of the litigation and the 

desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what 

essentially are factual matters.” Covington, 57 F.3d at 1110 

(quotation marks omitted). At the same time, we “examine de 

novo whether the district court applied the correct legal 

standard.” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 699 F.3d 538, 542 

(D.C. Cir. 2012).

As noted, Eley had the burden “to produce satisfactory 

evidence—in addition to [her] attorney’s own affidavits—that 

[her] requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the 

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 
12

comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Covington, 57 

F.3d at 1109 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11). In 

Covington, this Court held that the “plaintiffs clearly met their 

burden and their requested rates were properly accorded a 

presumption of reasonableness.” Id. at 1110. We so held 

because the plaintiffs submitted not only “data demonstrating 

their attorneys’ experience in the legal profession and in 

litigating complex federal court cases, as well as information 

probative of their attorneys’ skill and reputation,” they also 

submitted “a great deal of evidence regarding prevailing 

market rates for complex federal litigation,” including “the 

Laffey matrix, the U.S. Attorney’s Office matrix, affidavits 

attesting to increases in the market rates since the original 

Laffey matrix” and, importantly, “memorandum opinions in 

district court cases which relied on these matrices.” Id. In 

rebuttal, the District failed to cite any relevant cases 

supporting its requested rates. Id. at 1111. For this reason, 

this Court rejected the District’s argument that “a civil rights 

and employment discrimination market actually exists 

independent of attorneys who handle other types of complex 

federal litigation” and that this market charges rates “lower 

than the prevailing rates in the broader legal market.” Id.

Here, however, the reverse is true. Eley’s evidentiary 

submission consisted of the LSI Laffey Matrix, Kavanaugh’s

declaration explaining the LSI Laffey Matrix and her lawyer’s

verified statement averring that he charged his paying clients 

the rates in the LSI Laffey Matrix. Absent from her 

submission, however, is evidence that her “requested rates are 

in line with those prevailing in the community for similar 

services,” i.e., IDEA litigation. Id. at 1109 (emphasis added); 

see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C) (IDEA fee awards “shall 

be based on rates prevailing in the community . . . for the kind 

and quality of services furnished”). Indeed, Eley directed the 

district court to only four cases that had employed the LSI 
13

Laffey Matrix—none of which was an IDEA case. The 

District, on the other hand, cited more than forty IDEA cases 

in which IDEA plaintiffs had received attorneys’ fees awards 

based on prevailing hourly rates at least $180 lower than the 

$625 rate applied by the district court here.

5

 On this record, 

Eley has not met her burden of “justifying the reasonableness 

of the rates.” Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107.

We conclude that, in relieving Eley of her burden, the 

district court abused its discretion. It relied on Blum and

SOCM but neither case establishes that the rates charged by 

lawyers in the largest law firms automatically set the 

prevailing market rate for IDEA litigation. Instead, Blum and 

SOCM held only that legal aid lawyers (Blum), lawyers in

nonprofit law firms (Blum) and lawyers who charge either

reduced rates or on a pro bono basis (SOCM) should receive 

fees based on the prevailing market rate charged by for-profit

lawyers if they are doing the same type of litigation. Implicit 

in both cases is the assumption that the legal aid and nonprofit lawyers are engaged in litigation that is “equally 

complex” to that of their for-profit counterparts. Blum, 465 

U.S. at 893; see also SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1524. But absent is 

any record evidence, other than the fee applicant’s 

declaration, demonstrating that IDEA litigation is as complex 

 5

 We do not mean to suggest that a fee applicant must always 

cite fee orders issued in other cases; rather, evidence of the 

prevailing market rate can take many forms. See, e.g., Covington, 

57 F.3d at 1113 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (“A statistically reliable, 

well-documented, and extensive survey of the rates clients pay for a 

certain sub-market of legal services would be powerfully 

persuasive.” (emphasis omitted)). Here, the prevailing market 

evidence proffered by both sides (save for the competing Laffey 

Matrices and Eley’s lawyer’s billing information) consists solely of 

awards made by other district courts. 
14

as the type of litigation that supports the “enhanced” hourly 

rates in the LSI Laffey Matrix. 

Nor is it an answer to rely on the fact that our precedent

does not “indicate[] that IDEA cases, as a subset of civil 

rights litigation, fail to qualify as ‘complex’ federal 

litigation.” Eley II, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 159. Indeed, this 

reasoning flips the burden of persuasion on its head. By

concluding that “some version of the Laffey matrix is 

presumptively reasonable,” settling on the LSI Laffey Matrix 

and applying it because no evidence was produced disproving

that IDEA litigation is sufficiently “complex,” id., the district 

court erred in not requiring Eley to demonstrate that her 

suggested rate was “in line with those prevailing in the 

community for similar services.” Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109 

(quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11). We do not decide 

today whether IDEA litigation is in fact sufficiently

“complex” to use either version of the Laffey Matrix (and if 

so, which version of the Laffey Matrix is more appropriate).6

 

But the obligation was Eley’s to demonstrate that her 

 6 See Price v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 14-7133, 2015 WL 

3916444, at *4 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2015) (Brown, J., concurring)

(“[T]he Laffey Matrix rate . . . is . . . an irrelevant benchmark for 

administrative proceedings before a D.C. Public Schools . . . 

hearing officer.”); see also id. (fee applicants “are entitled to the 

Laffey rate only if they can establish that the relevant legal market 

in this action, namely representation in IDEA administrative due 

process hearings, is subject to the same hourly rates that prevail in 

complex federal litigation. Absent such a finding, Laffey Matrix 

rates are irrelevant to the prevailing-rate determination.” (citations, 

quotation marks and alteration omitted)). See generally id. at *5

(“[W]hen courts are too generous in awarding fees, they create an 

incentive for needless conflict and enrich IDEA lawyers at the 

expense of public schools, and ultimately the very children the 

IDEA seeks to protect.”). 
15

suggested rates were appropriate. Because she was not 

required to do so, the district court, we conclude, “clear[ly] 

misappli[ed] . . . legal principles” and thus abused its 

discretion. Kattan, 995 F.2d at 278.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s 

fee award and remand for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

So ordered.
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join the 

Court’s opinion. I would simply add that, in my view, the 

United States Attorney’s Office Laffey matrix is appropriate 

for IDEA cases.