IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2016-CA-01308-COA
JANE DOE APPELLANT

v. HOLMES COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/08/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JANNIE M. LEW I S COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HOLMES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN CURTIS HALL II ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: SANDRA DENISE BUCHANAN KYE CNEE’ HANDY NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 05/08/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE LEE, C.J., WILSON AND WESTBROOKS, JJ. WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. This action derives f rom a civil suit f

iled b y m inor Jane Doe, 1 i ndividually , against the Holm e s County School District (HCSD) u nder the Mississippi Tort Claim s A ct (MTCA) in the Holm es County Circuit C ourt. HCSD f iled a m otion to dism iss alleging that the statute of lim itations had run o n Jane’s claim and that she lacked s tanding to f i le the com

p laint. In turn, Jane f

iled a m otion f

or substitution of p arties. The circuit court granted HCSD’s m otion

to dism iss and denied Jane’s m otion f or substitution. Af

ter r eviewing the r ecord, we reverse the judgm ent o f the circuit court dism i ssi n g J ane’s com plaint a n d deny ing h er m otion f or

1 L ik e t h e circu it co u rt, w e su b stitu te th e alias “Jan e D o e ” t o p r o t ect th e m in o r’s id en t ity

.substitution. W e rem and this m atter f or proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. In 2013, Jane was a s ixteen-y ear-old high-school student at J.J. McClain High School 2
in Lexington, Mississippi. On April 4, 2013, George L o m a x , the assistant p rincipal,

sum m oned Jane to the band hall and sexually assaulted her. ¶3. Jane rep o r t e d t h e a s s a u l t t o h e r c ousin, who was also a student at the high school.
Jane m aintains that s h e a n d h er cousin reported the sexual assault to a s c hool em ploy ee; however, no f

urther a ction w as taken. As a result, Jane n o t i f i e d her parents of the assault af ter arriving hom e f

r om school, and her parents called the police. Lom a x was s u bsequently arrested and convicted of assaulting Jane. ¶4. O n M a r c h 2 6 , 2 014, Jane, through her parents as her next f rie n d s a n d n a t u r a l guardians, served a notice o f claim to HCSD. On April 2 3, 2014, HCSD sent a f orm al denial letter. H owever, J ane’s parents never f iled a com

plaint f ollowing their receipt of t he denial letter. In October 2015, a second noti c e o f c l a i m w a s s e nt, a n d o n J a nuary 29, 2016, Jane f iled a com plaint against HCSD on her own behalf

. At the tim e, Jane was nineteen y ears old. ¶5. HCSD f

iled a m oti o n to dism i ss, asserting t hat t he statute of lim itations had run on Jane’s claim b ecause of its 2014 denial letter. I n response, Jane f iled a m otion t o substitute her m o ther as an interested party under Mississippi R ule of Civil Procedure 17. The circuit

court granted H CSD’s m otion to dism iss and denied Jane’s m otion f or substitution

. Jane appeals.

2 T h e h ig h sch o o l is n o w called H o lm es C o u n ty C en tral H i g h S ch o o l. 2STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. “W hen considering a m otion to dism iss, this Court’s standard of review is de novo.” Scaggs v. GPCH-GP Inc ., 931 So. 2d 1274, 1275 (¶6) (Miss. 2006). “[ T]he allegations in the com plaint m ust be taken as t rue and the m otion should not be granted unless it appears bey ond doubt that the plaintif f will be unable to prove a ny set of f acts i n support of his claim .” Id

. DISCUSSION
I. Jane’s com plaint w as not untim e ly . ¶7. HCSD argues that J ane’s c om plaint was properly dism issed under M ississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-11(3)(a)-(b) (Rev. 2012), which provides: (a) All a ctions brought under this chapter s hall be com m enced w ithin one (1) y ear next a f

ter the d a te of the tortious, wrongf ul [ , ] or otherwise a ctionable conduct on which the liability p hase of the action is based, an d not af ter, except t hat f

i ling a notice of claim within the required o ne-y ear period will t oll the statute of lim itations f or ni n e t y - f

i v e (95) day s f

rom the date the chief executive o f

f icer of th e s t a t e entity or the chief e xecutive of f icer or other statutorily designated of

f icial of a political subdivision receives the notice of claim

. (b) No action whatsoever m ay be m aintained by the claim ant until the claim ant receives a notice of denial of claim or t he tol l i n g p e riod e x pires, whichever com es f irst, af t er which t he claim ant has an a dditional ninety (90) d ay s to f ile suit; f a i l u r e to f

ile within the tim e a llowed i s an absolute bar to any f urther proceedings under this chapter. ¶8. However, Jane f

i r s t asserts that the statute o f lim itations has not run because she is protected under the m inors savings clause f ound under M ississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-11(4). This section provides: [ I]f any person entitled to bring a ny a ction u nder this chapter shall, a t t he tim e

3at which the cause of a ction a c c rued, be under the disability of inf ancy or unsoundness o f m ind, h e m ay bring the action within the tim e a l lowed in this section af ter his d isability shall be rem oved as provided by law. T he savings in f avor of persons u nder disability of unsoundness o f m ind shall n ever extend longer than twenty

- one (21) y ears. ¶9. W e agree with HCSD that this is a m atter of st a t u t o r y i n t e rpretation. “Statutory interpretation is a m atter of law which we review in its entirety .” Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr.

v. Robinson , 876 So. 2d 337, 3 3 9 (¶10) (Miss. 2004). M oreover, “[ o ]ur p rim ary objective when construing statutes is to adopt that interpretation which will m eet the true m eaning of the Legislature.” Id

. at 340 (¶10). The Mississippi Suprem e Court has h eld that “statutory interpretation is appropriate if a statute is a m biguous or is silent on a specif ic issue.” Tipton

v
. S t a t e , 150 So. 3d 82, 8 4 (¶7) (Miss. 2014). Further, “if a statute is am biguous, th e [ reviewing] Court m

u st caref ully review statutory l anguage and apply its m ost r e a sonable interpretation and m eaning to the f acts of a p articular case.” Id. (quotation m arks om itted). ¶10. Accordingly , w e f

ind that t he m inors savings clause f ound under section 11-49-11(4) is the controlling provision in Jane’s claim because the purpose of the statute is t o “protect the legal rights o f those who are unable to a ssert their own r ights due to disability .” Hays v. Lafayette C

ty. S c h. Dist. , 759 So. 2d 1144, 1147 ( ¶16) (Miss. 1999). As a result, Jane’s claim is tolled under section 11-46-11(4) until she reaches the a g e of m a jority or an interested party actually f iles a com

p l aint on her behalf

. ¶11. Jane f

urther argues that the circuit court c ommi t t e d reversible error in apply ing the holdings of Stockstill v. State , 854 So. 2d 1017 (Miss. 2003) and Hays v. Lafayette County School District , 759 So. 2d 1144 (Miss. 1999) to her case. W e agree. T he claim s in both of

4those cases accrued prior to the enactm ent o f the MTCA’s m inors savings clause. In Hays

and Stockstill , the Suprem e Court sim ply held and then reaf

f irm ed that the general m inors savings clause, M i ssissippi Code Annotated section 15-1-59 (Rev. 2012), does not apply to claim s brought under the MTCA. See Hays , 759 S o. 2 d at 1148 (¶19); Stockstill , 854 So. 2d

at 1021-23 (¶¶10-13). The L egislature responded to the Suprem e Court’s r ulings b y adding

a m inors savings clause f or M TCA claim s. S

e e Robinson , 876 So. 2d at 339 (¶¶7-8). Theref ore, Jane is correct that H ays and Stockstill have no bearing on her case. ¶12. T h e MTCA’s o ne-y ear lim itations period is tolled f o r a p e r i o d o f t i me o n c e a designated of

f icial o f the State or political subdivision receives a tim ely n otice of claim f rom

a tort-claim ant; the Suprem e C ourt has explaine d that once that period of tim e ends, “the claim ant has an additional 90 d ay s granted b y t he statute in which to f i le suit.” Page v. Univ. of S. Miss. , 878 So. 2d 1003, 1006-07 (¶12) (Miss. 2004); see also Miss. Code A nn. § 11-46- 11(3)(a)-(b). However, the m ere f iling and reception of a notice of claim do not trigger the running of a statute of lim itations when, as in this case, the statute of lim itations is tolled by the m inors savings clause. ¶13. The S uprem e Court has, h owever, previously a d d r e s s e d the issue o f pretrial notice and the m inors savings clause in wrongf ul-death actions. In Pioneer Co m m u n i t y Hospital of
Newton v. Roberts , 214 So. 3d 259, 261 (¶3) (Miss. 2017), the Suprem e Court held that “only when som eone who is qualif i ed to bring a w rongf

ul-death suit actually

files a wrongf

ul-death suit o n the m inor benef

iciaries’ b ehalf will t h e mi n o rs savings c lause not apply , because,

once the suit is f

iled, the running of the s tatute of lim itations is i m m ate r i a l

. ” T h a t case

5“involve[ d the] t im e liness of a wrongf ul-death action and t h e i n terplay between the wrongf ul-death statute and the m i nors savings clause.” Id . at 260 (¶1) (f ootnote om itted). ¶14. Here, t h e S uprem e Cou r t ’ s t r e a t me n t o f t h e mi nors savings clause in Pioneer is instructive in t his case. Accordingly , we f ind that the trial court erred in concluding that the presuit notice f

iled by Jane’s parents triggered the statute of l im itations. Jane’s p arents never f iled a com plaint on her behalf

. Further, this Court and the Suprem e Court have held that the
“statute of lim itations does not begin to run u ntil the person a t tains h is twenty -f irst birthday .” Reeg v. Keel , 174 So. 3d 309, 313 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (collecting cases). ¶15. W e also note t hat under Mississippi l aw, the statute o f lim itations d oes n ot run against

a m inor s i mp l y because the m inor’s parents c ould have f i led a lawsuit sooner. That is, “a child is not held responsible f or [ her] parent’s f

ailure to f ile a lawsuit o n the child’s behalf .”
W eaver v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 2015 W L 197617, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 14, 2015) (Reeves, J.) (collecting cases). Otherwise: [ T]he m inors s avings clause would be rendered m e aningless: the statu t e o f lim itations would run against ever y c hild im m ediately , sim ply b ecause their parent was also their legal g u a r d i a n . As a result, every child would be h eld responsible f

or their parent’s f

ailure. T hat cannot be the case in light of num erous Mississippi Suprem e Court cases declining to hold children so responsible. Id. at *5 (discussing t he general m inors savings clause). Theref ore, we reverse t he j udgm ent of the circuit court.
II. Jane’s m other can be substituted as a party . ¶16. Because Jane was still incapacitated under the law during the tim e she f iled a claim against HCSD, s h e s h o u l d have been allowed t o substitute her m other as a r eal party in

6interest. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 17 states in pertinent part:

(a) Every action shall be prosecuted i n t he n am e of the re a l p a r t y i n i nterest. An executor, adm inistrator, guardian, bailee, trustee, a party with whom or in whose n am e a contract has been m ade f or the b e n e f

it of another, o r a p arty authorized by statute m ay sue in his re p resentative capacity without joining with him the party f

or w hose benef

it the a ction is brought. No action shall be dism i ssed on the ground that it i s not p rosecuted in the nam e of the real p arty in interest until a reasonable tim e h a s b e e n allowed af ter objection f

or ratif ication of com m encem ent of t he action by , or joinder or s u b s t itution of , the r e a l p a r ty in interest; and such ratif ication, joinder or substitution shall have the sam e ef

f ect as if the action had been com m enced in the nam e of the real party in interest.

. . . . (c) W henever a party to an action is an inf ant or i s u nder legal disability and has a representative duly appointed under the laws o f the S tate of Mississippi or t he laws of a f

oreign state or country , t he representative m ay sue or d ef end on behalf of such party . A party

def endant who is an inf

ant or is under legal disability and i s not so r epresented m ay be r epresented by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court when the court considers such appointm ent necessary f or the protection of

the interest of

such def endant. ¶17. Here, J ane’s parents d i d not f ile suit against HCSD o n J ane ’ s b e h alf

. Accordingly , we f ind that Jane’s m other can be substituted as a n interested party and f ile a com plaint on
Jane’s behalf until Jane is twenty

- one, or Jane c a n individually f ile af ter turning twenty -one within the one-y ear statute of lim itation p rescribed under the MTCA. See Lewis v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd. , 662 F.3d 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that a m inor lacks “capacity to sue,” but “[ u]nlike standing, t he lack of which cannot be waived or cured, c a p a c i t y t o sue

can be cured” on rem a nd and is not a jurisdictional issue; also h o l d i n g t h a t the m inor “indisputably ha[ d] standing as the party af f ec t e d b y the alleged w r ongf ul” conduct). Theref ore, we rem and to provide Jane’s m other with the opportunity to be substituted as an

7interested party or f or Jane to f

ile on her own behalf

at the appropriate tim e . ¶18. REVERSED AND REMANDED. LEE, C.J., I RVING AN D GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, FAIR, WILSON, G R E E N L EE AND TINDELL, J J., C ONCUR. C A R L T O N , J . , C O N C U R S I N R E S U L T ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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