U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

58–385 PDF 2010

S. Hrg. 111–649 

NEW BORDER WAR: CORRUPTION OF U.S. 

OFFICIALS BY DRUG CARTELS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, 

AND PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS AND 

INTEGRATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 11, 2010 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK l. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, AND PRIVATE SECTOR 

PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

KRISTIN SHARP, Staff Director 

MIKE MCBRIDE, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010 

Kevin L. Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice ....................................... 3 

Thomas M. Frost, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, Office of 

Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................ 4 

James F. Tomsheck, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ...... 6 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Frost, Thomas M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 23 

Perkins, Kevin L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19 

Tomsheck, James F.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

APPENDIX 

Chart entitled ‘‘CBP Growth: Staffing Levels FY 2004–2009,’’ submitted by 

Mr. Tomsheck ....................................................................................................... 32 

Chart entitled ‘‘Cities Reporting the Presence of Mexican Drug Trafficking 

Organizations,’’ submitted by Mr. Tomsheck ..................................................... 33 

Chart entitled ‘‘CBP Corruption Related Arrests FY 2005 to Present,’’ submitted by Mr. Tomsheck ...................................................................................... 34 

Questions and responses submitted for the Record from: 

Mr. Perkins ....................................................................................................... 35 

Mr. Tomsheck ................................................................................................... 37 

Mr. Frost ........................................................................................................... 40 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(1) 

NEW BORDER WAR: CORRUPTION OF U.S. 

OFFICIALS BY DRUG CARTELS 

THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, AND

PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION, OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:07 a.m., in 

room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark L. Pryor, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senator Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. I will go ahead and call the Subcommittee to 

order. I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming to the Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and 

Integration. We are meeting in the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee room. I want to thank all of you for 

being here and participating. What I would like to do is go ahead 

and give my opening statement—Senator Ensign is on his way, and 

maybe a couple of others; I am not quite sure—and then I will turn 

it over to the witnesses. Then we will ask questions. 

Let me start just with a couple of facts. Fact No. 1 is that Mexico 

ships over 50 percent of the methamphetamine and marijuana into 

the U.S. market. Over 50 percent of it comes from Mexico. And 90 

percent of the cocaine in the United States comes from Mexico. 

That is about a $25 billion industry in Mexico, drugs, and drug 

trade. 

As a result of that, fact No. 2 would be that the U.S. border defenses have beefed up, and they have tried to squeeze these drug 

routes, which has been good, and to some extent that has been effective. But to gain an advantage, the cartels have begun to infiltrate U.S. law enforcement. I think that is very troubling for the 

Senate, and it is very troubling for most Americans, and it is troubling for those agencies. 

Our review suggests that the cartels are broadly targeting Federal border law enforcement as well as State and local governments. We are not going to focus on State and local today, but we 

have to acknowledge that is a large concern as well, and we will 

be working with the Federal agencies and the State and local governments to try to get a better handle on this and work through 

good strategies on how we can prevent this from happening. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
2 

The Border Patrol seems to be the biggest target and have the 

most corruption. A news report recently said that there has been 

a 40-percent increase in U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

corruption arrests and there are dozens of open investigations. 

Other possible Federal targets would be the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), and probably a few more. But they seem to 

be less vulnerable, and I am assuming that is because the CBP is 

on the front line and they are the face of our border; and it has 

doubled its size in 10 years with a lot of new people coming, new 

faces, and new personnel. I think we are starting to see some problems as a result of that. 

Our review suggests that CBP may not be using all of the accepted tools to screen job applicants. I think they have a goal of 

polygraphing all job applicants, but today they are only doing about 

10 percent. So we want to talk about that today. And this is not 

just drugs, but there are guns and money that are moving across 

the border; largely from north to south across the border. And 

there is always the possibility of terrorists coming into the country 

if we have a weakened border. 

So these cartels in Mexico are very powerful. We should not underestimate their ability to try to corrupt U.S. law enforcement 

agencies. Right now we think that the Mexican drug cartels have 

drug operations in 230 U.S. cities. Three of those happen to be in 

my State: Fort Smith, Fayetteville, and Little Rock. And also in 

2009, the statistics indicate that there were 6,500 drug war-related 

deaths in Mexico. 

So this is a very serious problem. It is on our border. There is 

a war going on down around the border and in Mexico related to 

the drug cartels. 

What I would like to do now is go ahead and give a brief introduction for each of our witnesses, and I appreciate you all for being 

here. And in a few moments, when Senator Ensign comes, if he 

wants to make an opening statement, that would be great. 

What we are going to do is we are going to leave the record open 

for a week or 2 weeks for some of the Senators who could not be 

here today because of other committee hearings and what is going 

on on the floor, so we may have some written questions that we 

would ask you to follow up on. 

Our first witness is Kevin Perkins, the Assistant Director of the 

Criminal Investigative Division at the FBI. He began his career as 

a special agent in 1986 and has served in operational and investigative positions focusing extensively on white-collar crime and 

public corruption. The FBI has established several interagency Border Corruption Task Forces designed to bring local, State, and Federal parties together as needed to coordinate efforts on border-related corruption, but I understand your real claim to fame is you 

are from Mountain Home, Arkansas? 

Mr. PERKINS. Graduated in 1978. 

Senator PRYOR. There you go. We can talk more about that in a 

few minutes, but thank you. That is great. 

Mr. PERKINS. Yes, sir. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
3 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Perkins appears in the Appendix on page 19. 

Senator PRYOR. Our second witness will be Tom Frost. He is the 

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations of the Department of 

Homeland Security. Mr. Frost has been involved in and has served 

as a Federal law enforcement officer since 1976 in a variety of investigative, protective, and leadership roles. 

And then our third witness today is James Tomsheck. He is the 

Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Internal Affairs at CBP. 

Mr. Tomsheck is a former Deputy Assistant Director of the Office 

of Investigations at the U.S. Secret Service as well as the former 

Deputy Assistant Director of the Office of Government and Public 

Affairs. The Office of Internal Affairs has developed and implemented a comprehensive integrity strategy designed to prevent, detect, and investigate all threats to the integrity of the CBP. 

With that, what I would like to do is call on Mr. Perkins, and 

what we are going to do is if you could limit your remarks to 5 

minutes, please understand that we will put your written statements in the record, so that will be part of the record. But if you 

could limit your statements to 5 minutes, that would be perfect. 

Mr. Perkins. 

TESTIMONY OF KEVIN L. PERKINS,1 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, 

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. PERKINS. Good morning, Chairman Pryor. I am pleased to be 

here today to discuss the FBI’s efforts to combat public corruption. 

The FBI recognizes that fighting public corruption is vital to preserving our democracy, protecting our borders, and securing our 

communities. In fact, it is our top criminal priority following only 

the national security priorities of counterterrorism, counter-intelligence, and cyber crimes. 

We are directing resources to root out public corruption all across 

the country, but we cannot, and fortunately do not have to, do it 

alone. We rely heavily on our partners at all levels of law enforcement. 

Through our vigilance, we have achieved some notable successes. 

In the past 2 years alone, our efforts have helped convict 1,600 

Federal, State, and local officials. We have approximately 2,500 

pending corruption investigations ongoing today. 

The Southwest border is a particular focus of our corruptionfighting efforts. Of the 700 agents leading our charge against corruption, approximately 120 of those are working along our U.S. 

Southwest border. 

Our 12 Southwest Border Corruption Task Forces share information with the Southwest Intelligence Group, the El Paso Intelligence Center, and our Mexican legal attache ́s to both identify and 

disrupt Mexican drug-trafficking organizations from utilizing and 

soliciting U.S. public officials to commit criminal activities. 

One particular case highlights the potential national security implications of public corruption along our Nation’s borders. In that 

case, an individual gained employment as a border inspector for 

the specific purpose of trafficking in drugs. Through our collaborative efforts and a year-long investigation, this public official pled 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
4 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Frost appears in the Appendix on page 23. 

guilty to one count of conspiracy to import more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana into the United States while at the same time 

receiving more than $5 million in bribe payments. This individual 

has since been sentenced to 20 years in Federal prison. 

While the threat posed in the region is real, the Southwest border is not and should not remain the only focus of our efforts. Each 

day the Federal Government is charged with protecting over 7,000 

miles of land bordering Canada and Mexico and over 300 ports of 

entry across the United States. Each of these entry points has the 

potential for criminal and/or terrorist organizations to exploit corrupt officials willing to misuse their official positions for financial 

or personal gain. 

In fiscal year 2009 alone, FBI field offices along the Nation’s Canadian border conducted nearly 300 public corruption investigations. 

The FBI has recognized the very real threat public corruption 

poses at our Nation’s borders and ports of entry. We are working 

lock-step with our law enforcement partners to address that threat. 

At FBI Headquarters, for example, we have established our National Border Corruption Task Force. Consisting of representatives 

of the FBI, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Customs and Border Protection-Internal Affairs, and the Transportation Security Administration, this task 

force ensures general guidance and oversight of border corruption 

programs ongoing across the country. 

Through trend analysis, intelligence and information sharing, 

and the utilization of lessons learned and best practices, we are 

uniquely positioned to address the very real threat of border corruption and the risk it poses to our national security. 

To that end, our National Border Corruption Task Force is coordinating with other impacted divisions at FBI Headquarters. 

These include the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence, the Counterintelligence Division, the Counterterrorism Division, and our Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. By working together, sharing 

information, and becoming more creative in our approach, we are 

making great strides. 

I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you 

today and share some of the FBI’s work in combating public corruption, and I will be able to answer your questions at the appropriate time. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Mr. Frost. 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS M. FROST,1 ASSISTANT INSPECTOR 

GENERAL FOR INVESTIGATIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. FROST. Chairman Pryor, thank you for the opportunity to 

discuss the work of the Department of Homeland Security Office of 

Inspector General. As Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, my office is responsible for investigating all allegations of 

DHS employee criminal misconduct, including those related to the 

security of the Nation’s borders. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
5 

Our mission, in part, is to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of DHS by conducting investigations and exercising oversight that will help protect the Nation from dangerous people and 

dangerous things. The OIG reports both to the Secretary and the 

Congress, and our position provides necessary objectivity to inspire 

the public trust and the confidence of the DHS workforce. We have 

a staff of highly trained and experienced criminal investigators deployed in 25 offices in the United States and complemented by a 

staff of audit and inspection professionals. 

Border-related corruption is not limited to one DHS component. 

It can touch employees and contractors across DHS as well as employees of State and local governments. 

In fiscal year 2009, we opened over 839 criminal cases involving 

DHS employees and programs. Our investigations resulted in 313 

arrests, 293 indictments, 281 convictions, and 59 administrative actions. 

One of our strategies is to leverage existing resources and share 

intelligence through our working partnerships with the DEA, ICE, 

FBI, and others, and by participating on various task forces including the FBI’s Border Corruption Task Force Initiative. 

Law enforcement has recognized that the smuggling of people 

and things across the border is large-scale business dominated by 

organized criminal enterprises. As we disrupt traditional smuggling routes and networks, organizations resort to alternative tactics, including bribing DHS employees, infiltrating our ranks, and 

engaging in fraudulent schemes to acquire immigration benefits. 

We have found the tactics used by the drug-trafficking organizations as they attempt to compromise our employees are similar to 

tactics used by foreign intelligence services to recruit spies. 

CBP staffing and funding levels have increased dramatically 

since 2003, creating the largest uniformed law enforcement agency 

in the country, an agency that, along with ICE, occupies the front 

line in securing our physical border. 

Since 2003, we have made arrests of 129 CBP officers and Border 

Patrol agents. For example, we recently arrested a CBP officer for 

alien and narcotic smuggling in a joint FBI investigation in 

Brownsville, Texas. The officer was sentenced to 135 months in 

Federal prison. 

As already noted, we are confronted with corruption in other layers of border security. Law enforcement officers from ICE and CBP 

have been corrupted for their access to sensitive law enforcement 

information. Drug-trafficking organizations have purchased information to vet their members, to track investigative activity, and to 

identify cooperating individuals. 

At international airports, or even on interstate highways, for 

that matter, you can have border corruption because these organizations need to move their product and proceeds further inland or 

out of the country. We have arrested TSA and other DHS employees as they smuggled narcotics and weapons onto aircrafts and 

even for selling TSA-screened baggage tags. 

As an example, we conducted an investigation with DEA of an 

ICE immigration enforcement agent who used his government credentials to bypass TSA security. We arrested him when he tried to 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Tomsheck appears in the Appendix on page 30. 

2The chart submitted by Senator Pryor appears in the Appendix on page 32. 

smuggle 10 pounds of marijuana through the checkpoint in his 

carry-on luggage. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services employees are targeted because drug-trafficking organizations need to have personnel operating inside the United States to facilitate their business, and 

criminal organizations use corruption and fraud to obtain immigration benefits to place conspirators in position to assist their criminal enterprises. 

We have worked joint investigations along the Northern border 

with Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We have worked a case with 

the FBI where we arrested a Mexican chief of police who attempted 

to bribe a Border Patrol agent offering him $25,000 per load of 

marijuana. The police chief received a 90-month prison sentence. 

For all our successes, we recognize the need for continued improvement. We suggest increased suitability screening for prospective DHS employees, increased monitoring efforts on backgrounds 

of current employees, increased employee training through integrity briefings, enforcing administrative regulation, workplace rules, 

ensuring all relevant allegations are promptly and efficiently referred. 

Acts of corruption within the Department of Homeland Security 

represent a threat to our Nation and undermine the honest and 

hard-working employees of the Department. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be 

pleased to answer any questions. Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Mr. Tomsheck. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES F. TOMSHECK,1 ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND 

BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. TOMSHECK. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to 

be here this morning and answer your questions. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection is responsible for securing 

our Nation’s borders while at the same time facilitating the movement of legitimate travel and trade, both key components to our 

Nation’s economy. Our purview spans more than 5,000 miles of 

border with Canada and 1,900 miles of border with Mexico. CBP 

is actually the largest law enforcement organization in the United 

States, comprised of 20,000 Border Patrol agents deployed between 

the ports of entry and over 20,000 CBP officers actually stationed 

at the various land, air, and sea ports of entry throughout our 

country. They are joined by an 1,000-agent force of air and marine 

interdiction agents, whose job it is to implement the air and maritime responsibilities of CBP. There are an additional 2,300 agricultural specialists and other professionals that bring the sum total of 

CBP staffing, as is reflected in the chart,2 to over 58,000 individuals. 

A snapshot of what it is CBP is able to accomplish with that 

large workforce. In fiscal year 2009 alone, CBP processed more 

than 360 million pedestrians and passengers, 109 million conveyVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:09 Oct 19, 2010 Jkt 058385 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\58385.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
7 

ances, apprehended over 556,000 illegal aliens between our ports of 

entry, and encountered over 224,000 inadmissible aliens at our 

ports of entry. We also seized more than 5.2 million pounds of illegal drugs. Every day, CBP processes over 1 million travelers seeking to enter the United States by land, air, or sea. 

Unfortunately, we are encountering integrity challenges for any 

one of a number of reasons. We are the largest law enforcement 

agency in the country. For a large number of reasons, we are the 

most vulnerable to integrity threats. We deploy that very vulnerable workforce to the highest threat environment for integrity 

threats—our Southwest border that we share with the country of 

Mexico—and all of this is occurring at a point in time that 

transnational criminal organizations are doing all that they can to 

infiltrate CBP through our hiring initiatives and at the same time 

compromise our existing workforce through recruitment. 

The overwhelming majority of CBP employees routinely demonstrate the highest levels of integrity. Acts of corruption, unfortunately, do occur. Since October 1, 2004, 103 of our agents or officers 

have been arrested for corruption. These charges include drug 

smuggling, alien smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy. 

Corruption is an issue that CBP takes extremely seriously, and 

we are deeply concerned about our current state. CBP must ensure 

its employees adhere to a culture of integrity. Although the percentage of prosecutions for corruption is very small, no incident of 

corruption is tolerated. 

Please remember once again the overwhelming majority of CBP 

agents and officers perform their duties with honor and distinction. 

Those that do not put our country and our fellow agents and officers at risk. 

CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs is fully committed to working in 

a cooperative and collaborative relationship with the FBI, DHS Office of Inspector General, Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 

Office of Professional Responsibility, and others to address all integrity-related issues within CBP. This layered approach we believe is the appropriate response to a multidimensional attack by 

those wishing to compromise our workforce. 

Placing the investigative resources of those agencies and our 

other key partners in the environment of the FBI-led Border Corruption Task Force (BCTF) facilitates the effective and efficient 

sharing of information and resources. The BCTFs also serve to 

deconflict investigations and enhance agent and officer safety 

issues and also assure that those cases presented for prosecution 

include all available evidence. 

Today CBP Office of Internal Affairs manages a wide array of 

integrity- and security-related functions or programs that combine 

to form, again, what you referred to as our comprehensive integrity 

strategy. This includes the three pillars of prevention, detection, 

and investigation—three initiatives that we believe are inextricably 

intertwined. 

Prevention, which is the prevention of bad people from entering 

CBP, we hope to accomplish through a combination of background 

investigations and the strategic application of the standard Federal 

law enforcement pre-employment polygraph examination, detection 

of bad people who have found their way into our workforce through 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
8 

1The chart referred to submitted by Senator Pryor appears in the Appendix on page 32. 

a combination of research and all available information within the 

organization, and a careful analysis of our employees’ behavior that 

may very well suggest integrity problems. Also, the use of periodic 

reinvestigations is a vital tool in the detection of corruption. Investigation of those bad people that have found their way into our 

workforce is accomplished in a partnership with the persons sitting 

here at the table with me and others not at this table but in this 

room. 

Our Investigative Operations Division is comprised of 214 agents 

deployed to 22 locations currently there investigating in excess of 

900 cases. 

Again, I very much appreciate the opportunity to be here this 

morning and look forward to answering your questions. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you very much. Let me follow up, if I can, 

Mr. Tomsheck, with you. I see this Customs and Border Protection 

chart we have here, and you can see the numbers have grown on 

this chart.1 I know there are a lot of good reasons why those numbers have grown, but my understanding is that the CBP policy is 

to do a polygraph on all the applicants. 

Mr. TOMSHECK. That is our goal, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. And my understanding is you are only doing 

about 10 percent right now. Is that right? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. That is accurate. At this point we concluded calendar year 2009 testing closer to 15 percent of the applicant pool. 

That occurred because near the end of the year there was a dramatic decline in the size of the applicant pool. We are unable to 

deploy any additional polygraph examiners or agent polygraph examiners, but there were substantially fewer applicants to be tested 

in the final weeks of calendar year 2009. 

Senator PRYOR. And is the polygraphing a resource issue for you? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. It is, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. And of those who are polygraphed, what percentage are found unsuitable for service? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. Approximately 60 percent. 

Senator PRYOR. Sixty percent. Can we extrapolate from that, if 

there is 90 or even 85 percent of the folks that are on this chart 

that have not been polygraphed, maybe 60 percent of them might 

not pass the polygraph if they took the test? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. We and others have done that analysis, Senator, 

and reached the same conclusion, that many of those persons hired 

during CBP’s hiring initiatives who did not take a standard Federal law enforcement pre-employment polygraph exam may very 

well have entered into our workforce despite the fact that they 

were unsuitable. 

Senator PRYOR. What can we do to address that with those employees now? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. Again, it is our goal to reach that point that we 

are doing 100 percent polygraph screening of all of our applicant 

pool as soon as possible. 

Senator PRYOR. How long will it take you to get to that goal? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. At this point we are unable to expand our polygraph program beyond where it currently is staffed with 31 agent 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
9 

examiners. It would require substantially more examiners to be 

certain that we would have adequate resources to screen just for 

that hiring that may occur by virtue of attrition within our workforce. 

Senator PRYOR. Do you know how many more examiners you 

would need? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. Approximately 50. 

Senator PRYOR. And would those have to be full-time, or could 

you do them on a contract basis to get rid of the backlog? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. We would have to utilize full-time employees to 

accomplish those polygraph exams. There are fairly rigid requirements associated with not allowing contractors to test full-time 

government employees or law enforcement applicants. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. That 60-percent number is alarming to me. 

Mr. TOMSHECK. It is to me as well, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Perkins, let me ask you, what Federal agencies have been targeted for infiltration? You all have covered this, 

but I just want to hear it again. My understanding is maybe the 

FBI, DEA, TSA, ICE, as well as CBP. Are there others that have 

been targeted for infiltration? 

Mr. PERKINS. I cannot speak directly to which other agencies 

may have been infiltrated. I know speaking from the FBI’s perspective, we are constantly on the lookout for outside on this—whether 

it is foreign government or a drug-trafficking organization or anything along those lines trying to infiltrate our ranks. We have fairly robust procedures in place involving polygraphs and the like. All 

of our special agents are required to maintain a top secret security 

clearance, which requires 5-year reinvestigations and the like, 

which includes a national security polygraph exam. 

While we are constantly on the lookout for that, I do not have 

the exact numbers of times attempts have been made to the Bureau, but I do know that has occurred. 

Senator PRYOR. I know that we see some of these charts with 

how many arrests have been made in these agencies. But one thing 

that I think the Subcommittee is trying to get a handle on is how 

pervasive is this problem. Whether it be a percentage or a number, 

do you have a sense of how pervasive this problem is? 

Mr. PERKINS. I can give an example that I think may get to the 

answer we need here. It is without a specific number, but if you 

look at the actual cases where we have had interdiction, the 

Crispin case, in fact, I mentioned in my opening statement. This 

individual was paid over $5 million in bribes. So when you back 

into that amount, you quickly figure out from a business standpoint exactly how valuable it is to the drug-trafficking organizations to get their loads and other things across the border that they 

are willing to pay an individual $5 million. I can extrapolate from 

that to say it is significantly pervasive. 

Senator PRYOR. And in the Crispin case, I guess that is a Mr. 

Crispin. 

Mr. PERKINS. Miss. 

Senator CRISPIN. Miss Crispin. 

Mr. PERKINS. Margarita Crispin. 

Senator PRYOR. What was her job title? What did she do? 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
10 

1The chart referenced by Senator Pryor appears in the Appendix on page 34. 

Mr. PERKINS. She was a CBP officer, and essentially what she 

was able to do was clear vehicles coming through her checkpoint 

without inspection, knowing ahead of time which vehicles they 

were, which ones to wave through, and these vehicles were able to 

get into the country with no inspection at all. 

Senator PRYOR. And do you know how long that went on before 

she was caught? 

Mr. FROST. Senator, that went on for many years. Prior to 2003, 

she was suspected of being involved in smuggling operations. Additionally, Martha Garnica was an El Paso police officer we believe 

was also recruited to further the smuggling scheme by becoming a 

customs officer. 

Senator PRYOR. Well, Mr. Tomsheck, on this chart,1 I think you 

mentioned that you have had 102 or 103 arrests, and I think that 

chart reflects that at CBP. Does a chart like this tell the whole 

story? I know you have some investigations, you have some arrests, 

but does it—can we look at that chart and say that this problem 

is getting worse and that this is something that if we do not get 

on top of—we already have a major problem, but it is about to get 

out of control? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. Senator, I believe that excellent chart, which I 

think was created by the ICE Office of Professional Responsibility, 

is a good insight as to what our current state actually is. It reflects 

the number of those persons who have actually been arrested by 

DHS-OIG, FBI, and other agencies participating in a collaborative 

way to accomplish that. But those are the persons that have been 

arrested. Those are the ones that we came to be aware of. 

Our grave concerns are how many other persons are in our workforce, how many other persons have gained access to our workforce 

through the hiring initiatives that are not recorded by that chart. 

But the chart would be a good indicator of how many might be in 

our workforce. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask about your impression of this—I 

know there is no empirical data on this, but is your impression 

that there is a bigger problem with the new hires, that people may 

be intentionally trying to infiltrate and go in and try to do this on 

behalf of the cartels? Or is it the existing workforce, people out in 

the field right now that just over time get corrupted? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. I think both of those scenarios are true, Chairman Pryor. The reality of it is we know from our analysis of those 

persons that have been arrested, at the beginning of my assignment at CBP, which began in June 2006, the vast majority of those 

persons arrested had nearly 10 years of service. Those numbers 

began to change significantly as CBP’s hiring initiatives came 

about. We see a bimodal universe of the data at this point where 

there are two groups of persons being charged with corruption. 

They include both the more senior person who had been recruited, 

but they also include persons who clearly came to CBP solely for 

the purpose of being corrupt and taking advantage of the authorities they have as a CBP employee, a CBP law enforcement officer 

to further their pre-existing involvement in a criminal organization. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
11 

The polygraph program, also, and the careful review of the information we obtain through the interviews following the exam has 

given us an insight to the number of persons who may have seized 

on our hiring initiatives to gain access to CBP. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Perkins mentioned the Crispin case, and he 

mentioned a figure of $5 million. What is typical? How much 

money does it take to corrupt a Border Patrol officer? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. Well, I am afraid, be it Border Patrol agents or 

CBP officers, we find that some are willing to compromise their authorities and sell out their allegiance to those that would harm our 

country in any way they can and harm our fellow agents in any 

way they can for remarkably small amounts of money. 

At the same time, some of the employees are determined to be 

corrupt, appear to have done so only after having been asked—or 

offered vast sums of money similar to what Ms. Crispin was determined to have taken. 

There is a wide array of what makes somebody decide to become 

corrupt. 

Senator PRYOR. And we have talked about the polygraphs, but 

also, as I understand it, CBP and all Federal law enforcement 

agencies do a periodic reinvestigation background check on their 

current employees as well. I think it depends on the agency and 

the status of the employee. But how are there in terms of your 

checking the workforce you have in place right now? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. To be honest, Chairman Pryor, we are challenged 

to keep up with the pace of the periodic reinvestigations that are 

required once every 5 years for a person in a sensitive position, as 

our CBP law enforcement officers. We have a backlog of periodic 

reinvestigations at this point, are doing everything we can to both 

improve the quality of those investigations while at the same time 

keep pace with the numbers that come due every year. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. The two words you mentioned are ‘‘challenged’’ and ‘‘backlogged.’’ Give me a sense of how far behind you 

are, whether that is a percentage or a number or amount of years. 

How far behind are you on the periodic background checks? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. Today over 10,000 of our employees are overdue 

to have their periodic reinvestigation concluded. By the end of this 

calendar year, there will be an additional 9,000 of our law enforcement officers who are due to have their periodic reinvestigations 

updated, conducted. And it is an excellent tool to detect corruption 

in the workforce. 

Senator PRYOR. And how many do you think you will be able to 

get done this year? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. At this point our current budget situation does 

not allow for us to hopefully reach that 19,000 number. The goal 

is to accomplish as many as we can. If we are able to accomplish 

half, that may be what our budget situation currently allows for 

this calendar year. 

Senator PRYOR. Half of the 19,000. 

Mr. TOMSHECK. Yes. Some of that answer resides in how many 

persons are hired by CBP for the remainder of this calendar year. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. 

Mr. TOMSHECK. The same personnel security resources that do 

background investigations for new employees conduct those periVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:09 Oct 19, 2010 Jkt 058385 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\58385.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
12 

odic reinvestigations. If we do hire substantially in this calendar 

year for attrition, we will have to divert some of those resources 

from periodic reinvestigations to do new applicant or new employee 

background investigations. 

Senator PRYOR. Do you have a sense of what your oldest backlog 

is? In other words, if you have 19,000, are you 2, 3, 4 years behind 

on some people? Or do you know? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. That was the case at the beginning of this fiscal 

year because the hiring of CBP employees decreased drastically. In 

the last 3 months of calendar 2009, we were able to address some 

of those oldest periodic reinvestigations, and those were investigations that were a year or 18 months overdue. 

Senator PRYOR. And I will ask a similar question as I did with 

the polygraph. How many employees do you get that do not pass 

one of these periodic background checks? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. A small number of the periodic reinvestigations, 

actually less than 1 percent of the period reinvestigations, as they 

are conducted today, detect significant integrity issues. 

Senator PRYOR. And you said ‘‘as they are conducted today’’ because you indicated that you might also need to improve the quality and the thoroughness of the background checks? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. We would like to see the periodic reinvestigations evolve into a continuous monitoring scenario, the never-ending background investigation, if you will. We would like to have the 

resources to continuously monitor our workforce, increasing and decreasing the intensity of that personnel security investigation, depending on what that employee is doing, what their assignment is, 

whether they are assigned to a high-risk environment, whether 

there is any information received that might indicate there is an 

integrity issue. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Do you have a sense of how many new personnel you would have to have in order to get to the level that you 

need to be? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. Right now the vast majority of our background 

investigations and periodic reinvestigations are conducted by contractors. We recently had to reduce the staffing of rehired annuitants that were dedicated to personnel or to periodic reinvestigations. To maintain our own investigative source and to eliminate 

the use of contractors would require several hundred individuals 

dedicated to doing periodic reinvestigations. 

Unfortunately, we just had to furlough or relieve of their duties 

99 of our persons that were rehired annuitants, retired former FBI 

agents, DEA agents, Secret Service agents, ICE, customs agents 

who were re-employed dedicated to doing periodic reinvestigations. 

Unfortunately, last pay period we had to release 99 of them—temporarily, hopefully. 

Senator PRYOR. And that is because of budget issues? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. It is, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Mr. Perkins, we talked about these task 

forces or multiagency meetings that you have. Could you tell the 

Subcommittee a little bit more about that, please? 

Mr. PERKINS. Certainly. Yes, Senator. Presently we have 12 Border Corruption Task Forces established. What these are, these are 

operational entities that involve agents from the agencies sitting 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
13 

here at the table as well as the Transportation Security Administration. They work up and down the Southwest border—and not 

only there, but they are also on the Northern border of the country. 

They work specifically cases involving corruption along the border, 

particularly the Southwest border, obviously involving drug trafficking, but, really, whatever else might come along, whether it is 

State, Federal, local law enforcement individuals, members of CBP, 

or the like. These turned out to be very—we are trying to stay 

ahead of the curve as much as we can. We enjoy probably—in all 

the task force operations the Bureau is in that I oversee on the 

criminal side, these are among the best as far as cooperative efforts, sharing of information, and people working together along 

the border. We are looking to expand those to other points of entry 

around the United States, but right now we are focusing on the 

Southwest border. 

Senator PRYOR. How often do they meet face to face? Or is this 

more of just a conference call meeting? 

Mr. PERKINS. No. These are actually collocated physical space investigators. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Good. And is it your experience that by 

them sharing information and being around each other and spending a lot of time with each other that they actually—the Federal 

side is helping the State side and the county is helping the Federal 

side? 

Mr. PERKINS. Without a doubt. It is vital to have those types of 

relationships to leverage the resources each one of us can bring to 

the table, the various expertise each one of us can bring to the 

table, and the information sharing that comes there also. Without 

a doubt, that is vital. 

Senator PRYOR. I know this isn’t the focus of this hearing, but 

in those task forces, are you seeing evidence of State and local corruption as well? 

Mr. PERKINS. Yes, sir, that is the case. And, in fact, one of the 

things we are trying to do with everybody’s budgets—we have to 

work and live within them. Recently in the 2010 appropriation we 

were able to receive additional bodies to fight gang violence across 

the United States. So instead of parsing these out across the 

United States in little pieces, we decided to go where we thought 

we could make a major impact, and we went to the Southwest border, and we queried our SACs, our agents in charge, to provide proposals to us so that we could place, for instance, an entire squad— 

eight agents, an intelligence analyst, staffing, and the like—into a 

field office to address a particular issue. 

What we wanted them to do was, one, have something to do with 

gang violence; two, have some tie into public corruption along those 

lines; three, have something to do with money laundering. So it 

was kind of a joint, across-the-stovepipes effort. 

We have identified two of the three offices where we are going 

to select those squads right now and go forward. So we are trying 

to use that type of information that not only addresses gang violence in these areas but addresses State and local corruption along 

the border also. 

Senator PRYOR. This next question might be a little bit sensitive, 

and if you cannot answer it, I understand. But one of the concerns 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
14 

when you hear a story about this, about corruption on the border 

and some problems with drugs, guns, money, etc., coming in and 

out, would be terrorism. Are you seeing any evidence of terrorists 

tapping into this and coming into the country? 

Mr. PERKINS. I think what we are trying to identify, you step 

back and you look at individuals, if they are willing to wave a carload of marijuana or cocaine or illegal aliens through, why wouldn’t 

they be willing to wave through a known terrorist or even perhaps 

some components to an improvised explosive device of some type? 

It is all the same to us. That is why we are trying to focus on this 

as seriously as we are to address these issues. 

If you recall back, I mean, history shows—it was on the Northern 

border when components attempted to smuggle in back during the 

millennium, back in 2000, an explosive device into the country. At 

that point that was successfully interdicted. 

So while I am not saying that—we are prepared for that. We suspect that is possible, and we are trying to do what we can with this 

effort to interdict those potentialities. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Frost, let me do a little follow-up with you. We have talked 

about Customs and Border Protection. Can you give us a sense, 

though, of ICE and TSA and other agencies in terms of the frequency of corruption or the scope and nature of it? 

Mr. FROST. Well, the numbers for ICE and CBP are quite different, but also their mission is different and their numbers of employees are different. Probably the—they are right about half, if 

you look at arrests and case openings and case investigations. But 

ICE also includes the element of ICE that deals with detainees, 

alien detainees, and transport of those individuals. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) is probably, from a 

homeland security investigation standpoint, our area of most concern. Immigration benefits are such a valuable commodity to enemies of the United States, whether they are drug-trafficking organizations or other persons that would do us harm. And the ability 

of lower-level employees to make decisions on immigration benefits 

is disproportionate, similar, I would say, to CBP’s authorities at the 

border where you have your average employee who is making decisions about whether someone could come in the country. Certainly 

with immigration benefits, the impact is even more lasting and profound. 

Senator PRYOR. Do you have a sense of how these agents in the 

various agencies, are being penetrated and corrupted? How do they 

go from Point A to Point B in terms of being corrupted? 

Mr. FROST. Well, we have looked at kind of comparing it to the 

espionage-related corruption techniques where organized criminal 

groups actually look for vulnerable employees, and it may be someone that they already have a social relationship with. People down 

on the Southwest border like to say that to them the river is just 

a river. There is a lot of commerce, family, and other interaction 

between people on both sides of the border. And the same is true 

on the Canadian border where DHS employees often go to have 

meals or entertainment or just for tourism. 

So recruiters try and target people that are vulnerable or people 

that they know, people who are willing to talk about their work. 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
15 

And then they assess those people, and they look for those who 

have obvious vulnerabilities, who may be prone to infidelity or alcohol abuse. And then they target them and begin a relationship, a 

further relationship that starts with small favors and expands until 

they are committed to these levels of corruption that we believe are 

in some cases traitorous. 

Senator PRYOR. There again, that is very concerning. So besides 

polygraphs and background checks that are supposed to happen 

every 5 years, what do you do to try to monitor your workforce in 

all your various agencies? 

Mr. FROST. Well, within the Department there are internal affairs components, both with CBP, ICE/OPR, Secret Service, TSA, 

Coast Guard, and we work closely with those internal affairs components to monitor those administrative-type cases. 

Senator from, I think, all of our perspectives, administrative-type 

cases are important tells, if you will, of employee misconduct. You 

know, a leaking faucet starts with a drip, and the first sign of corruption is not generally when someone is knee deep and already involved with an organization. 

Senator PRYOR. Which, really also raises another question that 

we have not talked about, and that is, Mexico’s commitment to 

thwarting the efforts of these cartels. This is really just for the 

panel at large, anyone who wants to answer. But what is your 

sense of Mexico’s commitment, Mexico’s level of determination to 

get these cartels under control and break them up, however they 

do that under Mexican law? What is your sense of their commitment level? 

Mr. PERKINS. Speaking from the Bureau’s perspective, we have 

a very good relationship with our colleagues on the Mexican side 

through our legal attache ́ in the embassy and through other agents 

who are actually stationed and work in Mexico. Really, for the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Drug Enforcement Administration 

has the lead in working those matters, but we do receive a great 

deal of cooperation from the Mexican Government. 

Obviously, of late, a number of leaders of various drug-trafficking 

organizations have either been captured or killed within the last 6 

months, which has caused somewhat of a destabilization in the 

area down there. That is kind of sorting itself out right now, and 

I know the Mexican Government is attempting to push harder and 

try to further destabilize these organizations and break them into 

components that can be dealt with directly. 

But from the Bureau’s standpoint, we enjoy a very good relationship with the Mexican Government in the sharing of information. 

Senator PRYOR. Great. 

Mr. FROST. Mr. Perkins is, I think, very correct that the level of 

violence, our understanding from our DEA law enforcement partners and ICE, who all have human intelligence assets wherever 

they can get them down there, the level of violence down there is 

very bad, and it causes the local government closest to the border 

to make some very difficult decisions about at what level and how 

they can cooperate with us in trying to stem this smuggling. 

Senator PRYOR. Well, and I assume that a pretty healthy amount 

of drugs are smuggled in via air. Is that right as well? Or do they 

all come in vehicles over the road? 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
16 

Mr. PERKINS. I think it is a combination of all—land, sea, and 

air—on that. The exact percentages I do not have with me. 

Senator PRYOR. One of the questions I have—and this is more of 

an internal question—is I know you have IGs and you have Internal Affairs and you have different agencies that may have different 

structures and different personalities and missions and turf. How 

are the agencies doing in your view, Mr. Frost? How are the agencies doing internally in terms of making sure that these cases are 

being handled properly within the agency and if they need to work 

with another agency, that is being done and there is cooperation? 

How is that going internally? 

Mr. FROST. Well, I think we are making great strides there. You 

know, we have to recall that the Department of Homeland Security 

is pretty new still, relatively. And we are continuing to define our 

roles within the Department. 

The good news, the best news of this is that we all want the 

same thing. We are all dedicated to stopping this and to locking up 

the bad guys, and I am very confident that minor issues between 

agencies are things that will always occur and that we will always 

be able to work it out as long as we have that same goal. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Tomsheck, do you have any comment on 

that? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. I would, Senator. I think we need to continue to 

work really hard at working better together at each and every 

level. Previously, I mentioned the FBI-led Border Corruption Task 

Forces. I think having all of the agencies involved, working well in 

that environment, is the right response. I think working in genuine 

full partnerships in an atmosphere where you know there is redundant verification that information is being shared, that all available resources are being brought to bear in a coordinated way, is 

the only way forward. 

I believe all of us sitting at the table and ICE/OPR and other 

agencies need to bring to bear all of our resources working in a 

highly collaborative way. I have concerns that at the end of the 

day, resources being what they are in all of those agencies, if we 

are working in a perfectly harmonious way, we still may be short 

of what is needed. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. So still work to be done there, then. 

Mr. TOMSHECK. I believe it is something we need to continually 

work at. 

Senator PRYOR. Now, I think almost everybody has mentioned 

here that you may need more resources, especially you, Mr. 

Tomsheck. You talked about at CBP you need more resources in 

terms of polygraph, etc. 

Aside from resources, can you all think of any changes in the 

law, any changes in legislation that would help this? Or do you see 

this as pretty much just a resource issue? 

Mr. TOMSHECK. Senator, I believe having the authority to require 

polygraph examinations as part of the periodic reinvestigation process would be helpful. I do not know that we would necessarily administer periodic polygraph examinations to everyone in the CBP 

workforce, but do it on a strategic basis when we deem it is appropriate and necessary based on the degree of risk this employee may 

pose, based on their assignment, the nature of their duties, and 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
17 

other information that the periodic reinvestigation may have developed. We do not have that authority, and I think that is something 

that would be enormously beneficial. 

Senator PRYOR. Good. Thank you. Anybody else on that? 

Mr. PERKINS. I would just say at this point we are confident that 

we have the tools to move forward, but I will leave it also in the 

fact that I meet regularly, if not multiple times a week, with the 

Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Division, Lanny Breuer, at 

the Department of Justice, and these matters are always on the 

table and always being discussed, and I would defer to the Department on those matters. But for the time being, I believe we have 

the tools in place. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Well, that is encouraging, but please check 

back with us if you find something else, and the same for the other 

two witnesses. 

We are going to keep the record open for 15 days, and there will 

be some other questions from other Subcommittee Members who 

got caught up at hearings or down on the floor, because we have 

a busy floor schedule this week. 

I guess I would be remiss if I did not mention before we leave 

here that the vast majority of your agents and employees do a 

great job and they are not corrupt and they are out there putting 

their lives on the line every day to try to keep America secure. And 

we cannot forget them, and we cannot paint everybody with too 

broad of a brush here. But I do think that we have a very serious 

problem here that we need to address, and I think it is largely a 

resource issue. There may be a few changes in the law that we can 

make here or there to make this better. 

But I really want to thank all of you for coming today and being 

part of this hearing. I think you have helped us as a Subcommittee 

to understand the scope and nature of the problem. I think you 

have helped us identify some practical approaches to solve this and 

gave us a snapshot of where we are, and I think that is very helpful. 

But I will say this: I do think that this is something that is critically important that we address and address very quickly and thoroughly and do it in the right way. So I think I can speak for the 

whole Subcommittee and the whole Committee and probably the 

whole Senate in saying that we need to prioritize this and help you 

all solve this, because we are on very dangerous ground here with 

corruption within our Federal law enforcement agencies. 

So we will continue to work with you on this, and we would really appreciate your ideas, your suggestions, your recommendations, 

other people that we can talk to help us get a better feel for how 

we can address this, because it is a very serious need. 

But with that, what I will do is we will leave the record open for 

15 days, and if other Senators have questions, which I know some 

will, we would love to get those back from you within the next 15 

days. 

Unless there is something else, I will go ahead and close, but 

thank you very much for all your participation, your preparation, 

and your presence here today. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER

ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER
(19) 

A P P E N D I X 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.001
20 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.002
21 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.003
22 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.004
23 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.005
24 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.006
25 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.007
26 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.008
27 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.009
28 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.010
29 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.011
30 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.012
31 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.013
32 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.014
33 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.015
34 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.016
35 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.017
36 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.018
37 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.019
38 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.020
39 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.021
40 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.022
41 

Æ 


ph44585 on D330-44585-7600 with DISTILLER58385.023