RENDERED: MAY 19, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-0623-MR

JOHNNY REVLETT APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JAMES R. REDD, III, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 22-CI-00006

SCOTT JORDAN, WARDEN APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Johnny Revlett, pro se, appeals from the April 14, 2022,

Order of Dismissal entered by the Lyon Circuit Court dismissing his petition for 

declaratory relief. We affirm.1

1 We note there are numerous deficiencies in Johnny Revlett’s brief including the failure to 

include a preservation statement of the issues raised on appeal, in violation of Kentucky Rules of 

Appellate Procedure (RAP) 32(A). Due to the record’s relatively concise nature and the readily 

evident issues on appeal, we exercise our discretion to ignore the deficiencies and review on the 

merits. See RAP 31(H).
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BACKGROUND

Revlett is an inmate at the Kentucky State Penitentiary (KSP) in 

Eddyville, Kentucky. On July 2, 2021, he received a disciplinary write-up for a 

physical altercation with another inmate. The write-up stated that the 

“investigation determined, through witness interviews deemed reliable by 

substantiated physical evidence, that [another inmate] and [Revlett] were in a 

physical altercation on June 26th in the boiler room.” Write Up and Disciplinary 

form at 1. On July 26, 2021, an investigative report was submitted which 

concluded there was evidence to support a charge against Revlett for “[p]hysical 

action resulting in injury to another inmate.” Write Up and Disciplinary form at 3. 

A disciplinary hearing was held on August 10, 2021, after which Revlett was found

guilty and sanctioned to fifteen days of disciplinary segregation. Revlett filed an 

appeal with Warden Scott Jordan, who upheld the finding on August 17, 2021. 

On February 7, 2022, Revlett filed a petition for a declaration of rights 

with the Lyon Circuit Court asserting his due process rights were violated. The 

primary argument asserted by Revlett in his petition and brief filed in this appeal is 

that the evidence presented at the disciplinary hearing was not sufficient to 

establish he was involved in a physical altercation with another inmate. This,

coupled with his sentence of fifteen days in disciplinary segregation, deprived him 

of a protected liberty interest. The circuit court dismissed the petition pursuant to 
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Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02(f) on the basis Revlett failed to 

“demonstrate that his segregation assignment constitutes a liberty interest to which 

constitutional due process protections apply.” Order of Dismissal at 3. This 

appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is governed by CR 

12.02(f) and presents a question of law subject to de novo review. Campbell v. 

Ballard, 559 S.W.3d 869, 870 (Ky. App. 2018). The pleadings must be liberally 

construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the allegations 

contained in the complaint are taken as true. Id. at 870-71. And, the circuit court 

should deny the motion to dismiss “unless it appears the pleading party would not

be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of his 

claim.” James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883 (Ky. App. 2002) (citation omitted). 

However, our standard of review requires us to recognize that 

“[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the 

full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Webb 

v. Sharp, 223 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Ky. 2007) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 

539, 556 (1974)). And, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not criminal 

prosecutions; and punishment is imposed as warranted by the severity of the 

offense in order to correct and control inmate behavior within the prison.” 
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Conover v. Lawless, 540 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Ramirez v. Nietzel, 

424 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Ky. 2014)). Accordingly, the standard of review in prison 

disciplinary proceedings is highly deferential to prison administrators. Smith v. 

O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Ky. App. 1997).

ANALYSIS

Kentucky courts have adopted the “some evidence” standard in the 

course of reviewing prison disciplinary proceedings. Houston v. Fletcher, 193 

S.W.3d 276, 278 (Ky. App. 2006). This form of review was set out by the United 

States Supreme Court in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, 

Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985); Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 358. In Houston, we 

highlighted the U.S. Supreme Court’s directive:

[T]he requirements of due process are satisfied if some 

evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary 

board to revoke good time credits. This standard is met 

if “there was some evidence from which the conclusion 

of the administrative tribunal could be deduced . . . .” 

Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not 

require examination of the entire record, independent 

assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of 

the evidence. Instead the relevant question is whether 

there is any evidence in the record that could support the 

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.

Houston, 193 S.W.3d at 278 (quoting Walpole, 472 U.S. at 455-56).

We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal including the 

prison Write Up and Investigation form and the Hearing/Appeal report. Clearly 
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there was “some evidence” presented sufficient to establish that Revlett was 

involved in a physical altercation with another inmate resulting in injury to said 

inmate in violation of applicable Kentucky Correction Policies and Procedures. 

Any arguments raised by Revlett regarding the sufficiency of evidence presented 

during the disciplinary hearing are without merit.

As concerns his due process arguments, Revlett has failed to 

demonstrate that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest. “In order to 

prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, a party must 

establish (1) that he enjoyed a protected ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interest within the 

meaning of the Due Process Clause, and (2) that he was denied the process due 

him under the circumstances.” Marksberry v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Ky.

App. 2003) (citation omitted). “A protected liberty interest may arise from two 

sources–the Due Process Clause itself and state law or regulations.” Id. “In 

addition to the existence of language guiding or restricting the discretion of prison 

officials, an inmate must now establish that the condition imposes atypical and 

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life.” Id. at 750 (internal quotation marks and footnote citation omitted). 

“[D]isciplinary segregation typically does not implicate a liberty interest protected 

by the Due Process Clause itself because it is the sort of confinement an inmate can 

reasonably anticipate receiving.” Id. at 749-50. Factors related to the duration or 
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degree of restriction are relevant in determinations regarding whether restrictions 

imposed are “atypical and significant.” Id. at 750 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). While these determinations involve factual issues, “the 

ultimate issue of atypically is a legal issue subject to de novo review.” Id.

(footnote citation omitted).

Revlett argues his punishment was atypical since his classification 

level was increased, and consequently, he was subjected to more restrictive 

confinement along with the curtailment of various privileges compared to what he 

enjoyed at his previous classification level, resulting in a significant hardship. This 

argument is also without merit. It has been expressly held that “inmates do not 

have a constitutional right to a particular security classification or to be housed in a 

particular institution.” Marksberry, 126 S.W.3d at 751 (footnote citation omitted). 

And, “[s]imply because disciplinary segregation involves different physical 

conditions and limited privileges does not mean that a prisoner maintains a liberty 

interest in freedom from that form of segregation.” McMillen v. Kentucky Dep’t of 

Corr., 233 S.W.3d 203, 205 (Ky. App. 2007) (citation omitted). Furthermore, 

there is absolutely no evidence to establish that a duration of fifteen days in 

disciplinary segregation constitutes a significant hardship. We also note that 

Revlett failed to plead any other facts demonstrating the conditions of his 

segregation “were more onerous, harsh or restrictive than those applicable to 
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inmates normally assigned to disciplinary segregation.” Marksberry, 126 S.W.3d 

at 751. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Order of Dismissal of the 

Lyon Circuit Court, dismissing Revlett’s Petition for Declaration of Rights.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Johnny Revlett, Pro Se

Eddyville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Robert Chaney

Frankfort, Kentucky