### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00197- CV

Je ane tt e Br iz e ndine , A ppe lla nt

v. Texas Depart m ent of Health, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN102320 , HO NORAB LE ROSE SP ECTOR, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Jeanette B rizendine sued her e mploy er Te x as De partment of H ealth (the Depa rtment) alleg ing that she was r etaliated a g ainst for filinga discrimination and reta liation complaint. See Tex. L abor Code Ann. § 21.055 (West 1996). The Department sought a no- evidenc e
summa ry jud g me nt whic h th e tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d. B e c a

us e B ri zen din e pr e se nts mor e tha n a sc int ill a of evide nce that she was reta liated ag ainst for filing a complaint, and be cause the Depa rtment failed to e sta bli sha le g iti mate jus tif

ic a tio n f or re pe a te dly

re je c tin g he r r e vis e d jo b d e sc ri pti on , w e re ve rs e the summa

ry jud g me nt.
F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND Th e De pa rtme nt h ir e d J e ane tte B ri zen din e in 1 98 6. She is c ur re ntl y c la ssi fi e d a s a Gr a ph ic De signe r I Iin t

he B ur e a u o f E me rg e nc y

Ma na g e me nt.2 Although this ca se conc erns e vents occur ring afte r 1999, it is helpful to consider the circ umstances that se rved a s a bac kdrop to the fa cts in question. Brizendine a lleges t h at i n 1992 Bur eau Chief

Gene W ea t h er all , now dec ease d, instructed her to escort Dr . Robert B onham, a member of

the Texas Boa

rd of He alth, for the evening
. Br izendine alleg es that Weather all direc ted her to pick up D r. B onham at the a irport, take him to dinner, take him to a nig htclub for drinks and dancing , and esc ort him back to his hotel. Br izendine c laims that Weathera ll indicated that doing
so wo uld be ne fi t he r p ro fe ssi on a lly . Sh e c la ims that wh e n s he re fu se d to g o o ut w ithDr . B onham, We a th e r a ll to ld

h e r th a t s h e w o u ld

n e v e r g e t a n o th e r p r o mo ti o no r

p ay in c r e a s e a s lo n g a s she
wo rk e d in

his bure a u. Af te rw ard s, B ri zen din e fi le d a n inte rn a l c omp la int

wi th t he De pa rtme nt. In order for Br izendine to be elig ible for promotions or merit-base d pay incre ases at the De pa rtme nt, he r j ob mus t be re c la ssi fi e d. Ho we ve r, to re c la ssi fy he r job sh e mus t f ir st s ub mit a revised j ob descr iption detailing all of the tasks she pe rfor ms regularly , illust ratingthat her a ctual duties and skills surpass those included in her curr ent job c lassification. Since she declined to e scort Dr. B onham in 1992, Br izendine c laims that she has been denied the opportunity to r esubmit he r job descr iption. As a result, s he has also been denied an a ccur ate e valuation of he r job perf ormanc e, a job rec lassification, and merit-base d pay incre ases. Conseque ntly , in September 1999, B rizendine fi le d a se x disc ri min a tio n and

re ta liatio n c omp la int

wi th t he Te xas C omm iss ion

on Human Ri g hts (TCHR) and the Equal Employ ment Opportunity

Commi ssion (EEOC). At the beg inning of

November

1999, Br izendine ag ain attempted to submit a revised job description to her c urre nt supervisor Ke lly Har rell. The r evised de scription rema ined in Har rell’s in-box for f

ive months. I n Marc h 2000, Har rell re turned B rizendine’s propose d job description statin g , “ No thi ng wi ll ha

pp e n wi th y our job de sc ri pti on un til y ou have wi thd ra wn y our c omp la int
.3

Yo ur job de sc ri pti on

mus t st ay the same a s it

wa s w ri tte n (o n 2/1 7/9 7) .” On Ap ri l 6, 20 00 , H arr e ll ag ain told Bri z en d i ne that unless she w ithdrew he r complaint, she c ould not rewrite he r job descr iption. On April 25, Brizendine fi l ed an o t h ercomplaint with the TCHR and the EEOC cl ai m i n g re t al i at i o n . On M ay 2 4 , 2 0 0 1 , th e T C HRad m i n i s tra t i v el y d i s m i s s edBr i z en d i n e’ s ch ar ge and issued a r ight to sue letter. On Aug ust 3, the EEOC also issued a rig ht to sue letter. B rizendine then broug ht suit aga inst the Depar tment for re taliation pursuant to section 21.055 of t he labor code.
DI SCU SSIO N Stand ard of Review

A no-e vidence summa

r y ju d gme nt is properly

g rante d if the non-movant f ails to bring forth more than a sc intill a of pr obative evide nce to r ais e a gen u i n e issue of material fa ct as to an essential ele ment of any

claim on which the non-movant would have the burden of proof at trial. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 (a )i ; Merre ll Dow Pharms., Inc. v. H avner , 953 S.W
. 2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). Thus, a no-e vidence summary judgme nt is essentially a pretria l dir ecte d verdic t, and we a pply the
same le g a l s uff

icien c y sta nd ard in r e vie wi nga

no -e vid e nc e summa

ry jud g me nt a s w e a

pp ly in revie wing a dire cted ve rdict. J ac k so n v. Fi esta Ma rt , 979 S.W .2d 68, 70 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). Our

task is to determine whether the plaintiff has pr oduced a ny evidenc e of pr obative for ce to r aise fac t issues on the materia l que stions presented. Se e id
. We must consider all the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the pa rty ag ainst whom t h e n o -e v i d ence summary judgme nt was
re nd e re d, e ve ry

re a so na ble inf e re nc e mus t be ind

ulg e d in fa vo r o f t he no n- mov ant, and

any do ub ts resolved in its favor
. Havne r , 953 S.W .2d at 711.Se c tio n 2 1. 05 5 r e a ds : 1 An employ er, la

bor union, or employ

ment ag ency

commits an unlawf

ul em p loy ment prac tice if the e mploy er, la bor union, or employ

ment ag ency reta liates or discriminates a g ainst a per son who, under this cha pter: (1) opposes a discr iminatory prac tice; (2) makes or f

iles a cha rg e; (3) files a c omplaint; or (4) testifies, ass ists, or participates in a ny manner in an investig ation, p ro ce ed i n g, o r h ea ri n g. Tex. L abor Code Ann. § 21.055 (West 1996). 4

Sect io n 2 1
. 0 5 5 o f th e labor code pr ohibits an employ er f rom dischar g ing a

n employ ee in r e ta liatio n f

or op po sin g a

dis c ri min a tor

y pr a c tic e , f

ili nga c ha rg e or a c omp la int , o r a ssi sti ngin
an y wa y i nan i n v es t i gat i o no r p ro ce ed i n g. See Tex. L abor Code Ann. § 21.055. In reta liation cases 1 broug ht under this provision, an employ ee must first establish a pr im a fa c ie c a se by sh ow ingthat: (1) she eng ag ed in a protected activity , (2) a n adver se employ

ment action occ urre d, and (3) a ca usal link ex isted betwee n the protec ted ac tivity and the a dvers e em p loy ment action. Ra

gg s v . M iss
. P o we r & Li

ght Co. , 27 8 F.3d 4 63 , 4 71 (5 th C ir . 2 00 2) ; Ma rsa gli a v . U niv . o f Te x as , E l P as o , 22 S.W .3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 1999, pet. denied). The causal li nk require d by the third prong of the pr im a fa c iecase of re taliation i s l es s stringe nt than a “but f or” standa

rd. Lon g v . E

as tfi e ld Col l. , 88 F. 3d

30 0, 30 5 ( 5th

Cir . 1 99 6) ; La Tier v. Compaq Computer Corp. , 123 S.W .3d 557, 562 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n Ant on io 2 00 3, no pe t.) . A n e mpl oy e e ne e d n ot p ro ve that th e pr ote c te d a c tiv ity is the sole fac tor motivating the employ er’ s adver se employ ment action in or der to satisfy the ca usal element. Id. Once an employ ee e stablishes a pr im a fa c ie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the5

employ er who must rebut the allege d reta liation by showing that there was a leg itimate rea son for the adve rse a ction. La Ti er , 1 2 3 S
. W
. 3 d at5 6 1 (c i t i n g M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor I ns t
. v. W illri ch , 28 S.W .3d 22, 24 (Tex. 2000)). I f the employ er establishes a non-retaliatory rea son for the adver se ac tion, the burden shif t s b ack to the e mploy ee to pr esent e vidence showing that the employ er’ s proffe red r eason f or t h e ad v er se ac tion was prete x tual, and that, in fa ct, without the protec ted ac tivity , the employ er’ s adver se employ ment action would not ha

ve occur red when it did. Id. ; Te x as Di v .- Tra nte r, In c . v

Car rozza , 876 S. W.2 d 3 12 , 3 13 (T e x. 19 94 ); Continental Coffee Prods. v. Cazarez , 937 S.W .2d 444 (Tex. 1996).
Ca usa l Lin k Al tho ug h b ot h partie s d isc us s e ve nts pr ior to 1 99 9 at le ng th, in a c c or d w ith Br izendine’s lawsuit, we focus only on her 1999 complaint and the alleg ed reta liation that followed. In evaluating the D epar

tment’s no-evide nce summary judgme nt a rgument, we first consider whether Br izendine succe ssfully

met her initial burden by

making a pr im a fa c ie showing that the Depa rtment denied he r acce ss to employ ment revie w and a dvance ment proce dures be cause she filed a discrimination and retaliation complaint with the TC HR and the EEO C. See La Tier , 123 S.W .3d at 562. The pla in lang uag e of section 21.055 identifies filing a complaint as a protec ted ac tivity , see Tex. L abor Code Ann. § 21.055, and the De partment c oncede s that d en y i n g Br izendine the opportunity

to rewr ite her job de scription is an adve rse em ploy ment action. Thus, B rizendine established the first two elements of her prima facie case . The De partment c ontends that Br izendine fa ile d, ho we ve r, to sub mit e vid e nc e e sta bli sh ing a c a

us a l link be tw e e n he r c omp la int and the a dv e rs e employ ment action.6 In order to meet her b u rd en on the third prongof her prima facie case , Br izendine must present more than a scintilla of evidenc e raising a g enuine issue of materia l fac t with respec t to wheth er h er 1 999 complaint is causally linked to the Depa

rtment’s denia l of her r evised job d e s c r ip ti o n. See Tex
. R. C iv. P. 1 66 (a )i ; Havne r , 9 53 S.W. 2d a t 71 1 ( Te x. 19 97 ). F ir st, c los e temporal proximit y

betwee n an employ ee’ s protecte d acti v it y a n d a n a d v e r s e e mp lo y

me nt a c ti on may provide a sufficie nt causa l connec tion for a showingof re taliation. Armstrong v

. City of Dallas , 997 F.2d 62, 67 ( 5th Cir. 1993). L ess than two months passed be tween the fi l i ng of B rizendine’s complaint and Ha

rre ll’s refusa l to submi t Brizendine’ s revised job de scription. Depe nding on the fac ts a nd circ umstances, two months may be suff iciently proxi mate to establish a pr im a fa c iecausa l link between a

n employ ee’ s protecte d activity a n d a n a d v e rse e mploy

ment action. Che mi c al E

x pr ess Carriers, Inc. v. Pina , 819 S.W .2d 585, 590 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied).

Her e, howe v er , we h ave other evide nce, be sides the close te mporal proximi ty that bear s on the causal link. After letting Brizendine’s revised job descr iption sit in her in-box for five months, Harre ll returned it a nd informed Br izendine that it would not be ac cepte d until Brizendine withdrew he r complaint. Approximately one month later, H arr ell reiter at ed that she would not
ac ce p ta re v i s ed j o b d es cr i p t i o n un t i l Br i z en d i n e wi th dre w he r co mp l ai n t
. E v en as s u m i n g arguendo that Br izendine’s oth er evidence –corr oboratingtestimony from seve ral c o-worke rs–is hear say or incompetent as the Depa

rtment urg es, Har

rell’s statements are direc t e vidence of re taliatory motive
an d a c a u s a l l i n k b e tw e e nth e a dv e r s e e mp l o ym e n ta c t i o nan d B r i z e n d i n e ’ s p r o t e c t e d

a c t i v i ty. Th e De pa rtme nt d e nie s that thi s e vid e nc e e sta bli sh e s any

c a us a l li nk be c a us e Ha rr e ll is not the final decision make r with re s p ec t t o the Depa rtment’s employ ee a dvance ment. See7

Ma rsa gli a , 22 S.W .3d at 5 (a ffirmingsu m m ar y judgme nt where there was no e vidence that university president, who ha d authority over tuition decisions, knew ab o u t p l aintiff’s se x ual hara ssment complaints). H o w e v e r , wh il e B r iz e n d in e ’ s 1 9 9 9 c o mp la int focused on a lleg ed re taliation in the form of de nied promotions and pay raises, this ca se is the result of re taliation following the 1999 complaint in the form of Har rell’s re fusal to eve n acc ept and submit her r evised job desc ription in order for Brizendine t o be eligible for the t y pe of revie w t hat could result in a promotion or a r aise. Th e State has con c e de d f or purp os e s o f t

his a pp e a l th at H arr e ll’ s a lle g e d r e fu sa l to su bmi t Br izendine’s revised job des cription alone c onstitut es an a ctionable a dverse employ ment action. And, eve n if Har

rell wa s not the “final decision maker” with respec t to this ty pe of a ction, as the Depa rtment contends, ther e is evidenc e that Weat h er all had told Har rell not to submit t he re vised job description. W e have previously found l eg ally sufficie nt evidenc e of r etaliation base d in part on a super ior’s ordering a plainti ff’ s immediate s upervisor to withhold an e valuation nec essar y for the plaintiff t o rec eive a

merit pay

incre ase. See Maybe rry v. Texas Dep’ t of Agric. , 948 S.W .2d 312, 315-16 (Te x . App.—Austin 1997, writ denied) . This evidence , alongwith Harr ell’s statements that sh e re fu se d to su

bmi t th e re vis e d jo b d e sc ri pti on be c a us e B ri zen din e ha d f

ile d a c omp la int

a g a ins t the Depa rtment, espec ially when coupled with close tempora l prox imity , is sufficient to establish a
causa l link for the purposes of the prima facie case . Legitim ate R eason

B e c a u s e B r iz e n d in e s u c c e e d s in e s ta b li s h ing a p r i ma facie case of re taliation, the burden shifts to t he De partment to show that ther e wa s a leg itimate rea son for re fusing to acc ept Br izendine’s revised job de scription. La Ti er , 123 S.W. 3d a t 561. Al tho ug h th e De pa rtme nt c la ims8

that financ ial constraints pre vented it from o ffe ringBr izendine merit-base d pay incre ases f

or the period in que stion, it has offe red no leg itimate e x planation for H arr ell’s re fusal to submit a revised job de scr ip ti on aft e r B ri zen din e fi le d th e 19 99 c omp la int . T he re fo re , th e De pa rtme nt f a ils in meetingits burden to establish a leg itimate rea son for the a dverse employ ment action. Con se qu e ntl y , w e ne e d n ot p ro g re ss t o th e thi rd and fi na l st e p o f t

he burd e n- sh if

tin g ana ly sis to consider the issue of pre text
. See id.

Be cause Br izendine presente d more than a scintilla of evidenc e that the De partment preve nted her

from submitting a r evised job desc ription in r et al i at i o n for the f iling of he r 1999
c omp la int wi th t he TCH R and the EE OC , and be c a us e the De pa

rtme nt f a ile d to pr e se nt a

le g iti mate
non-re taliatory

rea son for doingso, we hold that the t rial court improperly g rante d the Depa

rtment’s no-evide nce summar

y judgme nt motion.
CO NC LU SION Havingresolved Brizendine’ s issue in her favor, we reverse the trial cour t’s summary jud g me nt a

nd re mand the c a us e fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.

Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore J ustices Kidd, B . A. Smith and Pemberton Reverse d and Remande d Filed: De cembe r 9, 2004