J-S19035-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOSEPH VUKOV 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1374 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 3, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-SA-0000183-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 25, 2017

Appellant Joseph Vukov appeals the judgment of sentence entered by 

the Court of Common Pleas of York County after Appellant was convicted of 

illegally passing a school bus in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3345 (“Meeting or 

Overtaking a School Bus”). Appellant claims there was insufficient evidence 

to support his conviction and asserts that the trial court improperly admitted 

his inculpatory statements in violation of the corpus delicti rule. We affirm.

The circumstances leading to Appellant’s citation occurred on the 

afternoon of March 3, 2016. At Appellant’s summary appeal hearing, the 

Commonwealth presented the testimony of Megan Stambaugh, a school bus 

driver. On the day in question, Stambaugh was driving a school bus on 

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Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Bitternut Road in York County. As Stambaugh pulled out onto Lewisberry 

Road, she noticed Appellant’s Jeep coming around a bend on Lewisberry 

Road. Once Appellant drove up behind Stambaugh’s bus, he followed her 

very closely until she reached her last stop. Even though Stambaugh had 

activated the bus’s red signal lights and extended the stop sign to alert 

drivers that she was about to drop off a student, Appellant proceeded to 

drive around the bus. When questioned about the specific point at which 

Appellant drove around the bus, Stambaugh claimed Appellant had followed 

her closely when her amber lights were illuminated and began to drive 

around her bus when she activated the red lights.

Shortly after this incident, Stambaugh submitted a written report of 

the alleged violation to the Northern York County Regional Police pursuant to 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3345(b). Once Officer Patrick McBreen received Stambaugh’s 

report, he ran the registration plate of the Jeep, which he determined 

belonged to Appellant. After Officer McBreen contacted Appellant to further 

investigate the matter, Officer McBreen believed that there was a sufficient 

basis to cite Appellant for illegally passing the school bus and issued him a 

citation for a violation of Section 3345 of the Vehicle Code. 

Appellant testified to his account of the events of March 3, 2016. 

Appellant admitted to becoming “frustrated” after Stambaugh’s bus pulled 

out in front of his vehicle on Lewisberry Road. As Appellant noticed the bus 

was traveling slowly, he began to follow the bus very closely and looked for 

an opportunity to pass the bus. After observing no oncoming traffic, 
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Appellant decided to go around the bus; he asserted that he was already in 

the other lane and had begun to accelerate when he saw the bus’s yellow 

lights begin to flash. Although Appellant knew that the bus was about to 

make a stop, he felt that he was committed to making the pass as he was 

already in the other lane. He conceded that he “had already made a bad 

decision... [and] decided to keep going.” N.T. (Notes of Testimony), 8/3/16, 

at 22. Appellant denied ever seeing the bus’s red signal lights or the stop 

sign arm extended. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the lower court convicted Appellant of 

Overtaking a School Bus. Appellant filed a timely appeal and complied with 

the lower court’s direction to file a concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Our standard of review from an appeal of a summary conviction 

heard de novo by the trial court is limited to a determination of 

whether an error of law has been committed and whether the 

findings of fact are supported by competent evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super. 2002). 

“The adjudication of the trial court will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth 

v. Parks, 768 A.2d 1168, 1171 (Pa.Super. 2001).

Commonwealth v. Marizzaldi, 814 A.2d 249, 251 (Pa.Super. 2002).

Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

conviction for Overtaking a School Bus under Section 3345 of the Vehicle 

Code, which provides in relevant part:

(a) Duty of approaching driver when red signals are 

flashing.--Except as provided in subsection (g), the driver of a 

vehicle meeting or overtaking any school bus stopped on a 
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highway or trafficway shall stop at least ten feet before reaching 

the school bus when the red signal lights on the school bus are 

flashing and the side stop signal arms are activated under 

section 4552(b.1) (relating to general requirements for school 

buses). The driver shall not proceed until the flashing red signal 

lights are no longer actuated. In no event shall a driver of a 

vehicle resume motion of the vehicle until the school children 

who may have alighted from the school bus have reached a 

place of safety. The driver of a vehicle approaching an 

intersection at which a school bus is stopped shall stop his 

vehicle at that intersection until the flashing red signal lights are 

no longer actuated.

***

(b) Duty of approaching driver when amber signals are 

flashing.--The driver of a vehicle meeting or overtaking any 

school bus shall proceed past the school bus with caution and 

shall be prepared to stop when the amber signal lights are 

flashing.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3345.

In a similar case, Commonwealth v. Schlegel, 577 Pa. 321, 845 

A.2d 759 (2004), a driver of a commercial fuel truck was cited with violating 

Section 3345 after he passed a stationary school bus that had activated its 

flashing amber lights on a two-lane roadway divided by a double-yellow line. 

As the cab of Appellant’s truck came even with the bus’s rear axle, the bus 

driver had illuminated its red signal lights and extended the stop sign arm. 

Despite seeing these signals, Appellant continued to pass the bus and was 

stopped by two police officers. 

In upholding the defendant’s conviction for overtaking a school bus 

under Section 3345, our Supreme Court provided the following analysis:

a motorist within ten feet of a school bus at the time that its red 

lamps are activated cannot fully comply with Section 3345(a), as 

the statute requires the operator to maintain at least a ten-foot 

distance. This, however, does not absolve the motorist of the 
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responsibility to stop when confronted with an extended, school 

bus stop signal arm. There are a finite number of other instances 

in law in which a regulatory directive is made so immediately 

and graphically apparent to citizens as when they are confronted 

with this explicit, visual mandate, issued for the obvious and 

critical purpose of shielding boarding and departing children from 

the danger presented by moving traffic. Moreover, Section 

3345(b) affords no safe haven for a motor vehicle operator who 

heeds a flashing amber signal and stops the requisite distance 

behind a school bus, but nonetheless, within seconds elects on 

his own initiative to proceed past the bus. A motorist in such 

circumstances fails to exercise the due caution required by the 

Legislature, since the warning of the impending stop signal is too 

clear and immediate to permit renewed movement within such 

an abbreviated interval. This is particularly the case in situations, 

such as the present one, in which the motorist lacks a full and 

unobstructed view.

Id. at 327, 845 A.2d at 762.

Likewise, viewing the testimony in this case in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we find ample evidence that 

Appellant failed to exercise caution as required by Section 3345. Although 

neither party could estimate the distance between the vehicles at the point 

that the bus’s signal lights were activated, Appellant admitted to following 

the school bus closely out of frustration. Stambaugh testified that she had 

activated her amber lights on Lewisberry Road as she needed to drop 

another student off. As Stambaugh approached the final stop, activated her 

red signal lights, and extended the stop sign arm, she observed that 

Appellant was just beginning to pass her bus. The trial court, as factfinder, 

was free to find Stambaugh’s account to be credible. As a result, we 

conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s conviction 

under Section 3345.
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Appellant also asserts that the lower court erred in permitting the 

admission of his inculpatory statements in violation of the corpus delicti rule. 

Our standard of review for a challenge to the corpus delicti rule is wellsettled.

The corpus delicti rule is designed to guard against the 

hasty and unguarded character which is often attached to 

confessions and admissions and the consequent danger of a 

conviction where no crime has in fact been committed. The 

corpus delicti rule is a rule of evidence. Our standard of review 

on appeals challenging an evidentiary ruling of the trial court is 

limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. The corpus delicti rule places the burden on the 

prosecution to establish that a crime has actually occurred 

before a confession or admission of the accused connecting him 

to the crime can be admitted. The corpus delicti is literally the 

body of the crime; it consists of proof that a loss or injury has 

occurred as a result of the criminal conduct of someone. The 

criminal responsibility of the accused for the loss or injury is not 

a component of the rule. The historical purpose of the rule is to 

prevent a conviction based solely upon a confession or 

admission, where in fact no crime has been committed. The 

corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence. 

Establishing the corpus delicti in Pennsylvania is a two-step 

process. The first step concerns the trial judge's admission of 

the accused's statements and the second step concerns the fact 

finder's consideration of those statements. In order for the 

statement to be admitted, the Commonwealth must prove the 

corpus delicti by a preponderance of the evidence. In order for 

the statement to be considered by the fact finder, the 

Commonwealth must establish the corpus delicti beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 39 A.3d 406, 410–11 (Pa.Super. 2012) 

(citations omitted).

While Appellant cites the legal principles relevant to the corpus delicti 

rule, he fails to develop any analysis to support his claim. Appellant merely 
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states that “the Commonwealth failed to prove the corpus delicti of 75 

Pa.C.S.A. 3345(a) as a result of the testimony of the bus driver to articulate 

whether the dark Jeep stopped at least 10 feet from the bus when the lights 

and arm were implemented.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. However, as 

emphasized above, the fact that Appellant could not fully comply with 

Section 3345(a)’s directive that motorists maintain a ten-foot distance from 

a bus that has activated its red lamps “does not absolve [Appellant] of the 

responsibility to stop when confronted with an extended, school bus stop 

signal arm.” Schlegel, supra. Appellant was admittedly tailgating the bus 

as he was frustrated that he had to follow the slow moving vehicle. The 

Commonwealth presented evidence that even after Appellant had clear 

warning of the bus’s impeding stop, he continued on to elect on his own

initiative to proceed past the bus. Appellant has provided no support for his 

claim that the trial court violated the corpus delicti rule.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/25/2017