### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00055- CV

Ri c k J. De yo e , A ppe lla nt

v. Gr ay, Jansin g & Associate s, Inc., Appellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. 259,91 4, HO NORAB LE ORLINDA NARANJO , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lle e Gr ay , Jan sin g & As so c iate s, I nc . bro ug ht s uit fo r b re a c h o f c on tr a c t a g a ins t
a p p e l l an tR i c k

D e y o e , R e a l t e x D e v e l o p m e n tC o r p o r a t i o n , C a m e r o n P l a c e , Lt d
. , C a m e r o nP l a c e I, L td., and Cameron Plac e I I , I nc., to re cover $6982.38 in unpaid eng ineer ing se rvi ce s fee s plus
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s and

c os ts i n c onne c tio n w ith th e dev elopme nt o f t he Came ro n Pl a c e Ap artme nts projec t. After a

bench tr ial, the trial cour

t rende red judg ment in favor of Gra y J ansing , awa

rding the
sum of $6 98 2. 38 plu s p re - a

nd po st- jud g me nt i nte re st, a tto rn e y ’s fees , and cos ts. I n tw o is su e s, Deyoe cha lleng es the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, asse rting that he wa s not a party to the contra ct and the c on tr a c t di d n ot i mpo se any ob lig a tio ns on

him . We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND Deyoe is the pre sident and so l e shar eholder of Realtex Development Corpor ation. Re a lte x wa s f

ound e d in

Ap ri l 19 98 to d e ve lop mul tif a mil y ho us ing pro

jec ts for th e a ff

or da ble2

housing ma

rket. Deyoe is also the reg istered ag ent for Cameron Pl ace , L td., Cameron Pl ace I , L td., and Camer on P l ac e I I , I n c., and the president of Cameron Place I I , I nc. (“ Cameron Place defe ndants”). T he Camer on Place de fenda nts did not answer a

nd did not appear
. On August 4, 1999, Gray

J ansing submitt ed a pr oposal for eng ineer ing se rvice s for the C amer on Place Apartments project. Under the Eng ineer ing Ser

vices Ag ree ment, Gra

y J ansing was to provide e ng ineer ing se rvice s to support the site development per mit for the apa

rtments. The p ro p o s al wa s s u

b m i t t ed b y Gr ay , J an s i n g & As s o ci at es , I n c. , o v er t h e s i gn at u re o f J o h nM
. J an s i n g, J r., P.E. The proposa l was submitted to Dey oe in ca re of Cameron Place , Ltd., on Aug ust 16, at the addre ss for Rea ltex
. Deyoe counte rsig ned the pr oposal on a line be neath the w ord “a pproved,” and no repr esentative desig nation appea red be low Deyoe’s name. When Gray

J ansing was not paid for services rende red, it filed suit ag ainst Deyoe, Realtex, and the Cameron Plac e def endants for b re ac h of contra ct, suit on a sworn a ccount, a nd,
a l t e r n a t i v e l y, qu an tu m m e r

u i t
. In a d d i t i o n , G r ay J an s i n g a s s e rt e d , a s an a l t e r n a t e t h e o r y o f r e c o v e r y, that Deyoe and Re altex were the alter eg o of t he C amer on Place defenda nts. At trial, Gray

J ansing claimed that De y oe sig ned the contra ct i n his individual capac ity and wa s individually

liable; Deyoe urg ed that he a

pproved the proposal as a g ent for Cameron Place , L td., which wa s owned by an individual known as Charlie Palmer , an d that Deyoe wa s not indivi dually liable bec ause G ray Jans ingha d a c tua l kn ow le dg e of the ide nti ty

of the pr inc ipa l. Af t er a b en ch t ri al , t h e t ri al co urt fo u n d i n fa v o r o f Gr ay J an s i n g an d fi l edfi n d i n gs of fa ct and c onclusions of law in support o f i t s final judg ment. The trial c ourt also found De y oe3

individually

liable, Realtex not li able, and the Cameron Place defe ndants in defa ult and liable. The fi n d i n gs o f f

ac tan d co n cl u s i o n s o f l aw al s o i n cl u d edt h e f o l l o wi n g: Findings of Fact 1. On or a

bo ut Au g us t 16 , 19 99 , Pla int if f and De fe nd ant Ric k De y oe e nte re d into a contr act whe reby

Plaintiff would provide engi n ee ri ng service s for a de ve lop me nt k

no w a s Came ro n Pl a c e Ap artme nts
. 2
. T h e c o n t r a c tw a s s i g n e d b y R i c k J
. D e yo e i nh i s i n d i v i d

u a l c a p a c i t y. 3. Th e c on tr a c t on

its fa c e ob lig a te s Ri c k J. D e y oe and Ca mer on P lac e , Ltd. to pe rf or m un de r t he c on tr a c t. 4. Rick J
. Deyoe did not disclose t o Plaintiff any intent to sign the c ontrac t as an a g e n tf o r an y o t h e r p e r s o no r e n t i t y. 5. Def endant C am eron Plac e, L td. is a Texas lim ited partne rship, whose g ener al partne r is Cameron Place I , L td., a T ex as l imited partnership, whose g ener al partne r is Cameron Place I I , I nc. Conclusions of L aw 2. Def endant Rick De y oe fa iled to show by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that h e d i s c l o s e d

t o P l a i n t i f

f h i s i n t e n tt o s i g no n l y i na r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c a

p a c i t y. 3
. R i c k D e yo e i s l i a

b l e i nh i s i n d i v i d

u a l c a p a c i t y. 4. Def endants Rick De y oe, Camer on Place, Ltd., Cameron Place I , L td. and Came ro n Pl a c e I I , I nc. have br e a c he d th e c on tr a c t w ithPla int if f f or fa ilure to pay for se rvice s rende red by

the Plaintiff.

**** 10. Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment a g ainst Realtex Development Corpora tion.
De y oe a pp e a ls f ro m th is j ud g me nt.4 AN AL YSI S On a pp e a l, D e y oe c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in fi nd inghim ind ivi du a lly

lia ble beca use (i) he mere ly signe d the agr eeme nt on behalf of a disclosed principal, and (ii) the a g ree ment did n o t im

p o s e an y o b li g a ti o n s o n h im
. H e a s s e rts th a t G r ay Jan s in g h a d a c tu a l kn o w ledg e that Came ro n Pl a c e , Ltd. wa s th e pr inc ipa l. Gr ay Jans ingre sp on ds that D e y oe sig ne d th e c on tr a c t in his individual c apac ity , that he never disclosed that he signe d the contra ct as ag ent for a ny principal, a

nd that the principa l was undisclosed.

When the trial court acts as fac t-finder , we revie w its findings unde r leg al and f actua l sufficie ncy

standards. A n d

e r s o n v . C i t y o f Se v e n P oin ts , 8 0 6 S. W. 2 d 7 9 1 , 7 9 4 ( T e x. 1 9 9 1 )
. We revie w fa ct finding s for suff iciency under the same standards t hat are applied in review ing e vidence supporting a

jury ’s answe r. Catali na v. Blasdel , 881 S.W .2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). I n evaluating l e g a l s u f f i c i e n c y , w e v i e w t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y. Transport ation Ins. Co. v. Moriel , 879 S.W .2d 10, 24 (Tex. 1994)
. To support a reve rsal on g rounds that the evidenc e is leg ally insufficient, we must be persua ded that rea sonable mi nds could not differ on the matter in que stion. Id . at 25. When revie wi ng a cha lleng e to the fa ctual suff iciency of the evidenc e, we must consider, we igh, a nd examine all of the evide nce in the r ecor d. Plas-Tex , Inc. v

. U.S. Steel Corp. , 772 S.W .2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989)
. We se t a side the finding only if it is so contrary to the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e as to be clearl y wr o ng and unjust. Ortiz v. Jones , 917 S.W .2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996).

A part y att emptingto o ve rc ome an a dv e rs e fa c t f ind inga s a

matte r o f l aw mus t surmount two hur dles. Anderson , 806 S.W .2d at 795 & n.3. First, the r ecor d must be examined for5

evidenc e that supports the finding , while disreg ardingall evidenc e to the contr ary . Id . at 795. Second, if there is no evidenc e to s upport the finding , the entire rec ord must then be examined to see if the contra

ry proposition is established as a matter of law. Sterner v. M

arathon Oil Co. , 767 S.W .2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989).

The lawis well s ettled. Unless t he parties have a g ree d otherwise, a person making or purpor ting to make a contract with another as a g ent for a disclosed principa l does not become a party to the contra ct. A to Z R e nta l Ctr . v . B urris , 714 S.W .2d 433, 435 (Tex. App.—Austin 1986, writ ref ’d n.r.e .); see also Burch v . D. L. Hancock , 56 S.W .3d 257, 261 (Tex. A pp.—Tyler 2001, no pet.); Restatement (Second) of Ag ency § 320 (1957). I f, howeve r, the principal rema ins undisclosed, or if it is known that a per son is acting as an ag ent but the principa l’s identity is not disclosed, the
a g e nt is a par

ty to the c on tr a c t. R e state me nt ( Se c on d) of Ag e nc y §§ 32 1, 32 2 ( 19 57 ); see Boy les v. Mc Clu re , 2 43 S.W. 10 80 , 108 1- 82 (T e x. Com m. Ap p. 19 22 , ju dg m’ t a do pte d) ; see also 12 Wil liston on Contracts § 35:43 (4th ed. 1999)
.

F or an a g e nt t o avo id pe rs on a l lia bil ity , he mus t dis c los e to t he c on tr a c tin g pa

rt y his intent to sign as a

repr esentative as we ll as the identity of his principal; the pa

rty with whom the ag ent deals has no dut y

to discover the pr incipal. Bu rri s , 7 14 S.W. 2d

a t 43 5; Mahoney

v. Pitman , 43 S.W .2d 143, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amar illo 1931, writ ref ’d). Uncommunicate d intent will not suffice
. Se ale v . Ni c ho ls , 50 5 S.W. 2d 25 1, 25 5 ( Te x. 19 74 ). Th e inf e re nc e that th e a g e nt i s a

pa rt y to the contra ct exist s until t he ag ent g ives such complete informati o n conce rning the principa l’s identity that the principa l ca n b e re adily distinguished; if the other party has no re asonable means of ascerta ining the principal, the infere nce pr evails unless the pa rties have ag ree d otherwise. Bu rri s ,6

71 4 S. W.2 d at 43 5; see also Restatement (Sec ond) of Ag ency § 321 cmt. a (1957) . Disclosure of
an ag e nc y , the n, is inc omp le te to re lie ve an ag e nt fr om l ia bil ity un le ss i t a lso inc lud e s th e ide nti ty of the princ ipal. Bu rri

s , 714 S.W .2d at 435. The burde n does not fall on the pa rty dealing with the ag ent to discover the exis tence
o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p m e r e l y b e c a u s e h e h a d a m e an s o f

d i s c o v e r i n g t h e a g e n t ’ s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c a p a c i t y. Id .; Anderson , 398 S.W .2d at 794. Actual knowledg e of the exis tence and identity of the princ ipal i s t he test; the contra cting party ’s suspicion is not sufficient. S o u th w es t e rn B e l l

M e dia , Inc. v

. Trepper , 7 84 S.W. 2d

68 , 7 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 98 9, no wr it) ; Bu rri s , 7 14 S.W. 2d

a t 43 5; se e als o Johnson v. Arm strong , 18 S.W. 5 94 , 5 95 (T e x. 18 92 ); Carter v. W alton , 4 6 9 S. W. 2 d

4 6 2 , 4 7 1 ( T e x. Civ. App.—Corpus Christ i 1971, writ ref ’d n.r.e .). I n deter

mining whe ther suff

icient disclosure of
an a g e nc y

re latio ns hip wa s ma de , w e loo k to the tim e that th e parties e nte re d into t he c on tr a c t. Posey v . Broughton Farm Co. , 997 S.W .2d 829, 832 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, pet. de n i ed); Lacqueme nt v. Handy , 8 7 6 S
. W
. 2 d 9 3 2 , 9 4 0 (T ex . Ap p . — Fo rt W o rt h1 9 9 4 , n o wr i t ). Kn o wl ed ge
ac q u i re d afte r a c ause of action has a ccr

ued ca nnot affe ct the rig ht to recove r fr om the ag ent persona lly

on a contr act. See D odson v. Pec k , 75 S.W .2d 461, 463 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1934, writ dism’d w.o.j.).

Th is c a se tur

ns on the fi nd ing s of fa c t by the tr ia l c ourt . T he iss ue of dis c los ur e is a question of fa ct. Lacqueme nt , 876 S.W .2d at 939. Where c o n flicting evidenc e is prese nted
conce rning disclosure, the issue must be r esolved by the t rier of fac t. Id . We are no t a uth or ize d to substitut e our assessment of the evidenc e for that of the trial cour

t. Southern States Transp. , Inc. v

.7

Sta te , 774 S.W .2d 639, 640 (Tex. 1989)
. I f the trial court’s finding s are supported by p ro b ati ve evidenc e, then we may

not disreg ard the m as a matter of law. Id
. Deyoe cha lleng es the t rial cour t’s finding that he contr acte d with Gray J ansing individually

rathe r than a s an ag ent. Her e, the tria l court hear d evidenc e that Deyoe sig ned a c ontrac t with G r ay

Jan s in g f o r e n g in e e r in g s e r

v ic e s o na

p r o je c t k n o w na s th e Ca

me r o nPl a c e Ap artme nt Project. The pr oof at trial showe d that the sole ag ree ment betwee n the par ties, the Eng ineer ing Service s Ag ree m en t , was sig ned by J ohn J ansing for Gr ay

J ansing and by

Rick Deyoe with no company identified next to hi s name. The letter a g ree ment was addre ssed to Deyoe in ca re of Cameron Place L td. at the addr ess for Re altex. Gray J ansing submitt ed its monthly invoices for work done on the projec t to Deyoe at Realtex. Dey oe testified that he informed Gr ay J ansing of the addre ss for the contra ct. Two of the i nvoices were paid with chec ks drawn on Re altex’s operating
acc ount; the chec ks were signe d by Deyoe. De spite these pay ments, Deyoe neve r notifi ed Gra y J ansing that he wa s not the party responsible for

the pay ments. J ansing testified at trial that De y oe
never identified anyone else who was responsible for the pay ment of t he invoi ces. Jansing te stified that he wa s “not awa

re of any other pa rties, any other owners, any

other side a g ree ments whatsoeve r. Idealt solely

with Mr. Deyoe on this project in re lation to setting up the proje ct, r eviewing the projec t, and proposingour ser vices to c omplete the projec t f or him.” J ansing also testified that he “wa s led to believe that Mr. Deyoe was the owner of the projec t,” and that he alway s believed he was doing busine ss with Dey oe.

Deyoe testified t h at he was the pre sident and sole shar eholder of Realtex Deve lopment Corporation. His relationship t o the Cameron Plac e def endants wa s less clea

r. When8

asked w hether

he wa s the preside nt of Cameron Plac e I I , I nc., he r esponded, “ Iwas a ppointed to that position by

Charlie Palmer.” He did not know whe ther he rema ined the re g istered a gen t fo r the company and could not re call whe ther he had incor porate d the company , but he re called that he or his company

had paid a

n attorney

for the inc orporation of Cameron P lace I I , I nc. The following te sti mony tr ans pir e d o n e xami natio n o f D e y oe by op po sin g c ouns e l: Q: You ar e a limited par tner in Camer on Place, Ltd., are n’t y ou? A: No. Q: You wer e at one time, were n’t y ou? A: Idon’t know. Q : And y o ud id

n o t k n o w a t t h e ti me o f

y o u r d e p o s it io n , o nN o v e mb e r 1 2th, whether y ou wer e eve r a limited partne r in Cameron Plac e, L td., did y ou? A: No. Q: You have not done any thing since November

12, 2002 to determine whether or not y ou are a limited partner in Cameron Place , L td., have you? A: No. Q: Okay . You ar e a limited par tner for Cameron Place I , L td., are n’t y ou? A: No. Q: Well, at the t ime of y our depositi on, November 12th, y ou said that y ou did not know if y ou wer e a limited par tner for Cameron Place I , L td. Do y ou now know for sure that y ou are not a limited partner? A: No. Q: Okay . You have not done any t h i ngin the last eig ht months t o deter mine w h e t h e r o r n o ty o uar e n o w o r

e v e r w e r e a l i m i t e d p art n e r f o r C a m e r o nP l a c e I, L td., have you? A: No.9

On examination by

his counsel, Dey

oe rec alled that he had not rec eived a K-1 stateme nt for Camer on Pla c e , L td. or

fo r C ame ro n Pl a c e I , L td. , w hic h, a c c or din g to D e y oe ’s te sti mony , w ou ld “ ind ic a te [he ] wa s n e ve r a

lim ite d p art

ne r. ” De y oe te sti fi e d th a t th e a dd re ss o n the a gre e me nt b e lon g e d to Realtex and th at h e h ad given the a ddress to Jansing for purposes of the contra ct. He de nied knowledg e of a

ny bank ac counts opene d for t h e Camer on Place de fenda nts and of Rea ltex ’s pay ments to e ig h t e n ti ti e s o n b e h a lf o f Ca me r o n Pl a c e in th e a mo u n t o f $ 5 2 , 0 0 0
. D e y o e further testified that any

money paid by Realtex wa s funded by Charlie Palmer. Upon re ceipt of the invoices from Ga ry J ansing , Deyoe would conta ct Palmer a nd Palmer would wire the funds. The evidenc e at trial s h o we d Dey oe had r ece ived and maintaine d rec ords for w ire tra nsfer s from Palmer in the amount of $25,000.

I n a pre -trial Reque st for Disclosure admit ted i nto evidenc e, De y oe stated that he and Realtex “have no a ffiliation with the Cameron Place entities.” He testified at trial, howe ver, that he
wo rk ed fo r t hem and a cted a s their ag ent. When asked whether he had e ver disclose d to J ohn Jans ing or to G ra

y Jans ingthat Ch arl ie Pa lme r w a s th e ow ne r o f C a me ro n Pl a c e , Ltd. , D e y oe c ou ld not rec all. Deyoe testified that he and Realtex we re orig inally the develope r of the proje ct but that

“ Cha rl ie Pa lme r de c ide d he wa nte d to take ov e r t

he de ve lop me nt a

nd it w a s h is p ro

je c t.” De y oe did not know whether

J ansing knew that Palmer took ove r the proje ct and c ould not reca ll whether he told him t hat information.

Apar t from his testimony

in support o f hi s contention that Gra y J ansing had ac tual knowledg e, De y oe places si g nificanc e on the f act that whe n Gra

y J ansing initially

filed suit, it sued only Cameron Place , L td. Deyoe wa s identified only as the re g istered a g ent of Camer on Place, Ltd.10

in t he or ig ina l pe tit ion . D e y oe and the oth e r p art ie s w e re l ate r add ed to th e laws uit in t he fi rs t amende d petition, which wa s fi l ed wh en Gr ay J ansing chang ed leg al counse l. From this, Deyoe
a rg ue s t h a tG r ay

Jan s i n g h a d

a c tu a l kn o w l e d g e o f

t h e a g e n c y

r e l a t i o n s h i p an d

t h a th e “ j u d i c i a lly admitted” that the pa

rty owing the debt wa s Cameron Place , L t d
. , not Deyoe or Rea ltex . But statements containe d in supersede d pleading s—unlike live pleading s—are not co n cl u sive and indisputable judicial admissions. Sosa v. Central Power & Light , 909 S.W .2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1995). I n a ny e ve nt, thi s issu e wa s wa ive d whe n co ntr ary e vid e nc e wa s in tr od uc e d a nd a pp e lla nt f a ile d to ob je c t. We h ave re vie we d th e re c or d a nd c on c lud e tha

t th e re is evi de nc e in t

he re c or d to support eac h of the findings of fac t. Specifica lly , the evidence in the record supports the trial cour t’s finding that Deyoe sig ned the c ontrac t in his i n d i v i d ual ca pacity , that it obligated D eyoe and Cameron Place , L td. to perfor m under the c ontrac t, and that Deyoe did not disclose to Gra y J ansing any intent to sign the c ontrac t as an age nt for any other person or entit y . To be sure , Deyoe disputes that he sig ne d in his ind ivi du a l c a pa c ity
. He of

fe re d no te sti mony , ho we ve r, tha t he re pr e se nte d to J ansing or anyone at Gr ay J ansing that he wa s actingon behalf of Charlie Palmer

or Camer on Place. J ansing ’s testimony

that he thought Came ron Place , L td. was also a pa rty to the contra ct is at odds with his other testimony

that “I never understood there to be any body else involved other

than Mr. D e yo e . I w a s n e v e r t o l d

t h a tt h e r e w e r e an y o t h e r p ar t i e s i n v o l v e d
. ” F o r

D e yo e t o a v o i d

l i a b i l i t y, howeve r, he must disclose bot h that he is acting in a represe ntative capacity and the identity of the principal. The rec ord does not re veal a ny g reat weig ht of evidenc e contr adictingthe tri al court’s finding s in this case.11 I n both Bu rri

s and Lacqueme nt , the cour ts held the ag ent liable be ca u s e the contra cting party

had no knowledg e of the unidentified p ri n ci p al i n the transa ctions. 714 S.W .2d at 437; 876 S.W .2d at 940. I n those case s, the ag ent disclosed his repre sentative status, but failed to d isc los e the tr

ue ide nti ty

of the pr inc ipa l. L ike wi se , h e re the c ourt fou nd th a t D e y oe fa ile d to dis c los e his int e nt t o s ig n a s a g e nt o r t he pr inc ipa l’ s a c tua l id e nti ty . T he re ma ini ngqu e sti on is whether Gra

y J ansing had ac tual knowledg e. The owner ship of the Cameron Plac e def endants a nd the relationship betwe en Charlie Palmer and Deyoe rema ined contra dictory even i n Dey oe’s testimony at trial. De y oe testified that Palmer took over the de velopment of the C am er o n Place projec t, but he could not rec all whether he eve r informe d J ansing that P al m er wa s t he owne r or de ve lop e r o f t

he Came ro n Pl a c e pr oje c t. A t mo st, the ide nti ty of Came ro n Pl a c e —b ut n ot i ts
ro le —w a s k

no wn to G ra y Jans ing . B e c a

us e the duty

to d isc los e lie s w iththe a g e nt— and the pa rt y with whom the ag ent dea ls is not obl igated to discover the exis tence of a pr incipal or his identity —a party ’s mere knowledg e that others are somehow involved does not tr ansfor m it into knowledg e of ag ency sufficie nt to defeat liabilit y . Se e Bu rri s , 714 S.W .2d at 437. I t was for

the trial cour

t to r esolve the c onflicting testimony , and the c ourt was
e nti tle d to e va luate the wi tne sse s’ c re dib ili ty and a c c e pt or re je c t so me or a ll of

the te sti mony . T his Court is no t a

fa c t- fi nd e r a

nd may no t pa ss o n th e c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s o r s ub sti tut e its judgme nt for that of the trier of fac t, even if a differe nt conclusion could be re ache d on the evidenc e. Se e He rb e rt v . H

e rb e rt , 754 S.W .2d 141, 144 (Tex. 1988). Be cause there was e vidence to support t h e t ri al court’s finding that the ag ency relationship was undisclosed and that De y oe sig ned the12

c on tr a c t in

his ind ivi du a l c a

pacit y , w e ho ld t

hat th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o
su pp or t th e tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s. Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d D e y oe ’s iss ue s, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: Mar ch 17, 2005