2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-18-2012

USA v. James Davidson

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-1123

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. James Davidson" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 704.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-1123

___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JAMES WALTER DAVIDSON, Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 95-cr-00495-001)

District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 17, 2012

Before: AMBRO, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed July 18, 2012)

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

In 1995, a federal jury found Davidson guilty of possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine base within 1000 feet of a playground in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860. 

In light of his criminal history, he was sentenced as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of 
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the Sentencing Guidelines. Under that section, his offense level was 34, which was 

higher than his offense level would have been based on his crimes relating to cocaine 

base (“crack cocaine”). The District Court sentenced him within the guidelines of 262 

months to 327 months to 264 months of imprisonment (plus a fine of $2000, eight years 

of supervised release, and $100 special assessment). Davidson appealed. We affirmed 

the District Court’s judgment.

In addition to other challenges to the judgment, in 2008, Davidson filed a pro se 

motion for a two-level reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The 

District Court appointed counsel, who argued that Davidson’s sentence should be reduced 

because of the retroactively applied Amendment 706 (which lowered the base offense 

levels for crack cocaine offenses under § 2D1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines by two 

levels). The District Court denied Davidson’s motion, citing United States v. Mateo, 560 

F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2009). In Mateo, we explained that Amendment 706 has no effect on

the application of the career offender offense level under § 4B1.1, and a career offender 

cannot seek a reduction of sentence under § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 706. 560 

F.3d at 155. On appeal, Davidson, through counsel, acknowledged that Mateo barred his 

claim but sought to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review. We excused the 

Government from filing a brief and summarily affirmed the District Court’s decision. 

In November 2011, Davidson filed another pro se motion for a two-level reduction 

in sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In his motion, he argued that he was 

entitled to a reduction under part A of retroactively applied Amendment 750, which 
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altered the offense levels in § 2D1.1 relating to crack cocaine. He also claimed that the 

District Court erred in considering one of his prior convictions (a state conviction for 

possession with intent to deliver heroin) as a predicate offense for his career offender 

designation. Lastly, he contended that under current law (specifically the Fair Sentencing 

Act of 2010) his crime would be classified differently and his sentencing guideline range 

would change, so he would be entitled to a lower career offender sentence. Considering 

Mateo and Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2688 (2010), which provided 

guidance to district courts about reductions in sentences based on a retroactively 

applicable Guidelines amendment, the District Court denied Davidson’s motion. 

Davidson appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our 

review of a district court’s interpretation of the guidelines is plenary, while our review of 

the ultimate decision whether to grant or deny a motion for a sentence reduction under 

§ 3582(c)(2) is for abuse of discretion. Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154. On review, we conclude 

that the District Court did not err in denying Davidson’s motion. 

The District Court followed the procedure outlined in Dillon. Namely, a court 

must first determine if a sentence reduction is consistent with § 1B1.10 before it 

considers whether an authorized reduction is warranted. Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2691. As 

the District Court concluded, a sentence reduction based on Amendment 750 was not 

consistent with the policy of § 1B1.10 because that provision disallows a reduction where 

Amendment 750 “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable 

guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). As in Davidson’s earlier attempt to 
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reduce his sentence, the rationale of Mateo bars his claim (including the arguments he 

repeats). See Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155; see also United States v. Thompson, --- F.3d ---, 

No. 11-4120, 2012 WL 2308099, at *5 (3d Cir. Jun. 19, 2012). Like Amendment 706, 

Amendment 750 has no effect on his offense level, which was based on his designation as 

a career offender. Accordingly, it is not a basis for a reduction of sentence under 

§ 3582(c)(2). 

Furthermore, in his § 3582(c)(2) motion, Davidson could not bring his challenge 

to his classification of a career offender (based on his argument that one of his prior 

convictions did not qualify as a predicate offenses for the career offender designation). It 

simply is not the type of claim intended to be brought under the statutory provision. See

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 

Also, Davidson was not entitled to a reduction of sentence under § 3582(c)(2) 

based on his argument that his offense level as a career offender was reduced by the Fair 

Sentencing Act of 2010 when it altered the statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses. 

Davidson contends that the statutory penalty for the crime on which the calculation of his 

offense level as a career offender was based has been lowered by the Fair Sentencing Act.

However, the Fair Sentencing Act’s change to the statutory penalties for crack cocaine 

offenses does not apply retroactively to defendants who committed their crimes and were 

sentenced before its enactment. See United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 113-15 (3d 

Cir. 2010); see also Dorsey v. United States, No. 11-5683, --- U.S. ---, 2012 WL 

2344463, at *14 (U.S. 2012) (summarizing that the ordinary practice in federal 
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sentencing “is to apply new penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding 

that change from defendants already sentenced”). Accordingly, any difference in the

penalty cannot change Davidson’s offense level and cannot serve as a guideline change 

that is a basis for a reduction of his sentence under § 3582(c)(2). 

 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.