### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 25 , 200 9
ROB ERT CU MM INS v. JIM MO RR OW, WAR DEN
Appeal from t he Circuit Court for Bledsoe County No. 88-2007 Budd y D. Per ry, Judge

No. E2008-00228-CC A-R3- HC - Filed August 20, 2009

The Petitioner, Robert Cummins, appeals the denial of habea s corpus relief by the Circuit Court f or Bledsoe County. The Petitioner pled gui lty to second degree murder, a C lass A felony, and rec eived a thirty-yea

r sentenc e as a

Range II , multipl e off

ender to be serve d at one hundr ed p er cent. On appea l, he contends the trial court erre d in dismiss ing the petit ion. He claims that an illegal sente nce is a proper

ground to allege in a habe as cor pus pet i t ion, that his guil ty plea wa s unknowingly and involu n t ar i l y enter ed, that his sentenc e is illegal bec ause it does not conf orm to Tennesse e Code Annotated se ctions 40-35-112(a )(1) (2006) and 40-35-501( i)(1), (2)( B) (2006), and that he re ceive d the ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel bec ause tria l counsel shoul d h av e known the sente nce w as illegal. We a ffirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court Affir med

J OS EP H M. T I P TO N , P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR W OOD W I TT , J R ., and D. K EL LY T HOMAS , J R ., JJ., joined.
Robert Cummins, Nashvill e, Te nnessee , Pro Se.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr ., Attorne y G e ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Le sli e E. Pr ic e , A ssi stant A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; and Jame s Michael Taylor, District Attorney Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

Th is c a se ari se s f

ro m th e ro bb e ry a ndkil lin g o f the vic tim by the Pe tit ion e r an d two oth e rs

. A j ury c on vic te d th e Pe tit ion e r o f fi rs t deg re e fe lon y mur de r an d sen te nc e d h im t o li feimp ri so nme nt. On appea l, this court found the trial court err ed in not instructing the jury on t h e l es s er i n cl uded offe nses of fir st d egree fe lony murder, and it rever sed the c onviction and re manded the c ase f or a new tria l

. S t ate v. Robert A. Cummi ns, No. W2000-00277- CCA-R3-CD, Shelby Count y (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. Au g. 10, 2 00 1) . O n r e ma nd , th e Pe tit ion e r p le d g uil ty t o s e c on d d e gr e e mur de r a s a Range II , multipl e off

ender , and wa s sentence d to thirty years in the De partment of Correction.-2-

In 2007, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief i n which he c ontended that he did not know he was pleading guilty as a multipl e offe nder to what he claims wa s an illegal
se nte nc e of

thi rty y e ars to b e se rv e d at on e hu nd re d p e rc e nt. He state s in the pe tit ionthat be c aus e he had no prior criminal convic tions, he should ha ve been sentenc ed as a Range I, standard of fende r, and that bec ause his sente nce of thirty years e xcee ds the range of fifte en t o twenty-five year s for Range I of

fende rs convicte d of a Class A f elony, his sentence is ill egal. Also in his petition, he
asserts Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501( i)(1) was amended in 2002 to repe al the one hundred pe rce nt service for de fendants convicted of se cond degr ee mur der and to repla ce it with a sixty perce nt relea se eligibility. He relies on McConne ll v. St ate, 12 S.W.2d 795 ( Tenn. 2000), f or his claim that the trial court imposed an illegal sentenc e.
The trial court denied relief afte r finding the Petitioner had not stated a c l ai m fo r h abea s corpus relief. The trial court held that a R ange II sentence imposed as a r esult of a plea bargain was valid if the plea was voluntarily and know ingly made, although a de fendant would otherwise qua lify to be a Range I, standard offe nder. See Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1997) . The trial c ourt stated that a c laim of an involuntary a nd unknowing guilty plea was c ognizable in a proce eding for post-conviction re lief, not in a habe as cor pus proce eding. The trial court stated that the sentenc ing court ha d jurisdiction to im pose the thirty-ye ar se ntence beca use the sente nce w as within the range of pu nis hme nt f

or Cla ss Afe lon ies, wh ic h s pa ns fr om f if te e n to six ty y e ars . T he tria l c ou rt a lso stated that the Petitioner’s c laim rega rding a si xty-perc ent release eligibili ty was incor rec t pursuant to Code section 40-35-501(i)(1) (2006) (amended 2007) and that the Petitioner’s judgment re flec ted the prope r cla ssification of one hundr ed per cent se rvice for se cond degr ee mur der.

On app e a l, the Pe tit ion e r co nte nd s the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d indis mis sin g th e pe tit ion . T he State
re sp on ds that th e tr ia l c ou rt c or re c tly dis mis se d th e pe tit ionbec aus e the Pe tit ion e r f a ile d to demonstrate t h at t he trial c ourt lacke d jurisdiction to im pose the sente nce. T he State asse rts the Petitioner failed to show that the tria l court wa s without jurisdiction to impose a thirty-yea r sentenc e as a Ran g e I I , mu lt ip le o f f e n d e r , th a t th e tria l c o u r t w a s w ith o u t j u r is d ic ti o n to imp o s e a s e n te n ce with one hundre d perc ent servic e, and that the Pe t i t i oner’ s allegedly involuntary a nd unknowing guilty plea was a

cogniza ble ground for

habea s corpus re lief.

The de termination of wh et h er h abea s corpus re lief should be g rante d is a question of law which we revie w de novo on a ppeal. Ha

rt v. State, 21 S.W .3d 901 , 9 0 3 (T en n

. 2 001). Ha beas
c or pu s r e lie f w ill be grant ed when the Pe tit ion e r c an s ho w t hat a jud g me nt i s v oid , n ot m e re ly
vo ida ble . T aylor

v. State , 9 95 S.W. 2d

78 , 8 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . T o th is e nd , a wr it of ha be a s c or pu s is g rante d only

“whe n it appear s upon the fac e of the judgme nt or the re cord of the proc eeding s upon which the judg ment is render ed that a cour t lacked jur isdiction or authority to sentence a def

endant or that the sente nce ha s expi red.” Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W .3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Ar c he r v . St a te , 851 S.W .2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993) ). The bur den is on the Petitioner to establish by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the judg ment is void or that a sentenc e has expired. See Wy a tt
v. State , 24 S.W. 3d 31 9, 32 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; State e x re l. Kuntz v. Bomar
, 381 S.W .2d 290, 291-92 (1964). I f the Petitioner ca rries this b u rd en , h e i s entitled to immediate rele ase r elative to that judgme nt. Pa ssa

re lla v. State , 891 S.W .2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

. Howeve r, the trial court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus without an evidentiary hear ing and without-3-

appointing a l awyer when the pe tition does not st ate a cog nizable claim for r elief. Hi c kma n v . St a te , 153 S.W .3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004); State ex rel. Edmondson v. Hender son, 421 S.W .2d 635, 636-37 (1967); see also T.C.A. § 29-21-109 ( 2000).

W e c on c lud e the tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y d e nie d r e lie f i n v ie w o f the Pe tit io ner’ s f a ilu re to demonstrate that the trial court lac ked jurisdiction to impo s e the Petit ioner’s RangeII, thirty-ye ar sentenc e with one hundr ed per cent se rvice o r t h at hi s sentence has expire d. We note that the Petitioner’s claims of a n involuntary and unknowing guilty plea a nd the i n ef fe ctive assistanc e of counsel a re not c ognizable gr ounds in T en n essee for ha beas c orpus re lief. Arc her v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 163 (Tenn. 1993) (unknowing pl ea) ; Passare lla v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (inef

fec tive assistance of counse l). T h o s e claims , if proven, w ould rende r the judgment voidable, not void. See Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255-256, 258 (Te nn. 2007) (stating that a “voidable j udgment is one that is fac ially valid and requires proof beyond the f ace of the re c or d o r j ud gme nt t o es tab li sh it s inva lid ity ,” wh ile a “ vo id j ud gme nt i s o ne that is fa c ia lly inv al i d b ec au s e the c ourt did not have the statutory a uthority to render

such judgment,” a nd that when a Petitioner must testi fy re garding his or he r “knowledg e and understanding of t h e plea
a g re e me nt, ” the jud g me nt i s v oid a ble , n ot v oid ).
Next, the Petitioner ha s not shown that his sente n ce was il legal as imposed. He relies on language from a 2002 bill from the Tenne ssee House of Repre sentatives that would have permitted offe nders c onvicted of c erta in crimes, i n cl uding second de gree murder, to ha ve a sixty-pe rce nt rele ase e ligibil ity. Howeve r, this bill was not enacte d. See T.C.A. § 40-35- 501(i)(1) , (2)( B) (2003, Se nte nc ing Com m’ n Cm ts. ); se e a lso T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 50 1( i) (1 ), (2 )( B) (2 00 6) (ame nd e d 2 00 7) (b oth statutes require one hundre d perc ent ser v i ce t ime for se cond degr ee mur der c onviction). Additionally, the Petiti oner misconstrue s McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3 d 795 (Tenn. 2000) . In McConnell, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court held that the trial c ourt err ed in imposing a sente nce ba sed on the 1982 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act when the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t applied for offe nses commi tted afte r a certain date. In t hat case, t he 1989 S entenc ing Act provided
a min imu m a ndma xi mu m sen tenc e le ng th, wh ic h w a s a jurisd ic tio na l is su e fo r the tria l c ou rt in imposing a sentence

. McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 798 (stating that sentenc ing is “jurisdictional” and that a c ou rt is witho ut j urisd ic tio n to imp os e a se nte nc e “ hig he r o r l ow e r tha n th e statut orily aut h o rize d punishment”). The supreme c ourt distinguis hed betwe en “the subjects of plea bargaining,” consisting of offe nder c lassi fi ca t i o n s and re lease eligibilit y, and “the length of a sentenc e.” I d. at 798. The supreme court stated that the valid sentenc ing act “e stablishes the outer lim its wi thi n w hic h th e State a nda defe nd a nt a refr e e to n e go tiate , a ndthe c ou rt s a rebo un d to respe ct those limits.” Id. at 799. The c ourt rea ffirme d that if a sente nce w as wi t h i n the statutory min imu m a nd ma ximum se nte nc e s f or a pa rt ic ula r s e nte nc ing rang e , th e n a n a pp e llate c ou rt

c ou ld aff irm a sentence that was withi n the particular range, even i f t he defenda nt would otherwise qua lify for a lesser of fende r status, for e xample, Range I off ender status. See id. at 798; Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tenn. 1997) (construing State v. Mahler, 765 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tenn. 1987) ). If the sentenc e is not within the l ength between the minimum and maximum sentenc es for a particular range , the s entenc e mus t be vacated. McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 798. Additionally, a def endant c an “wa ive the range cla ssification as part of a ne gotiated guilty plea.” Hic ks v. State, 945 S.W.2d at 708. In the Petitioner’s c ase, the judgment r ef l ec t s t he Petitioner wa s sentence d as a RangeII,-4-

mul tip le of

fe nd e r t o th ir ty year s’ c on fi ne me nt. Cla ss Afe lon y s e nte nc e s f or a Ra ng e II , mu lti ple
o f f e n d e r r a n g e f r o m t w e n ty

- f

iv e to f o r ty y e ar s

. T

. C. A

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 2 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 6 )

. Be c au s e the Petitioner was sente nced to punishment falling within the Range II , multipl e off ender spectrum f

or a Class A felony, his se ntence was proper

. See McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 798; H icks v. State, 945 S.W.2d at 707; Mahler, 765 S.W.2d at 227. He is not entitled to relief.

Ba se d o n th e fo re go ing a ndthe re c or d a s a wh ole , w e a ff

ir m the jud gme nt of the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, PRES IDIN G JUDGE