J-S60012-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JONATHAN LARUE CARNRIKE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 346 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 1, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-08-CR-0000092-2017

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 28, 2018

Appellant, Jonathan Larue Carnrike, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered following his convictions of crimes stemming from a drug 

transaction. We affirm.

We summarize the history of this case as follows. On March 2, 2016, 

members of the Bradford County Drug Task Force arranged for a confidential 

informant (“CI”) to purchase Oxycodone from Appellant. The CI organized 

the time and location of the transaction with Appellant by cellphone text 

messages. The police provided the CI with $100 in buy money. The 

transaction occurred at a mini-mart, which was under surveillance by the 

police. The CI testified that he handed $100 to Appellant and received pills 

wrapped in cellophane from Appellant. The CI turned over to police eight 7.5-
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milligram Oxycodone pills, which were white in color, and three 10-milligram 

Oxycodone pills, which were pink in color.

On October 12, 2016, Appellant was charged with criminal use of a 

communication facility, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a), possession of a controlled 

substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), and possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). On 

November 15, 2017, a jury convicted Appellant of all three crimes. On 

February 1, 2018, Appellant was sentenced to serve an aggregate term of 

incarceration of twenty-four to eighty-four months. Appellant filed a timely 

post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. Both Appellant and the 

trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

I. Was the evidence in this case sufficient to sustain a verdict of 

guilty where the Commonwealth did not test the narcotic 

evidenced in the case but instead relied on the testimony of a 

pharmacist to identify pills, where that pharmacist admitted that 

he could not testify specifically as to the actual make up of the 

pills themselves?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant’s sole issue challenges whether there was sufficient evidence 

to sustain his narcotics convictions. Appellant’s Brief at 6-10. Essentially, 

Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient 

evidence to prove that the pills in the transaction were illegal narcotics. In 

particular, Appellant avers that the testimony of the pharmacist, who testified 
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as an expert, was insufficient to prove that the pills involved in the transaction 

were a controlled substance. Id. at 8-9.

Our standard of review is well established:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we 

may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the 

fact-finder[’s]. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying 

the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder 

of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none 

of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943-944 (Pa. Super. 2011).

In order to uphold a conviction for PWID pursuant to 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(30), the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the defendant possessed a controlled substance and did so with the intent to 

deliver it. Commonwealth v. Aguado, 760 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Pa. Super. 

2000) (en banc). Regarding the crime of simple possession of narcotics, 35 

P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) prohibits “[k]nowingly or intentionally possessing a 

controlled or counterfeit substance by a person not registered under this act, 

or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, 
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unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid 

prescription order or order of a practitioner, or except as otherwise authorized 

by this act.”

In Pennsylvania, it is well settled that “[t]he existence of narcotic drugs 

does not have to be proved by chemical analysis and may be proved either by 

direct or circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 428 A.2d 

165, 167 (Pa. Super. 1981). Indeed, merely circumstantial evidence is 

sufficient. See Commonwealth v. Minott, 577 A.2d 928, 932 (Pa. Super. 

1990) (noting well-established policy that circumstantial evidence is sufficient 

and applying it to extrapolation method employed to ascertain quantity of 

narcotics seized); Commonwealth v. Stasiak, 451 A.2d 520, 525 (Pa. 

Super. 1982) (rejecting need for chemical analysis of suspected narcotics 

where circumstantial evidence, consisting of sealed and labelled bottles 

recently stolen from pharmacy, was sufficient); Commonwealth v. 

Leskovic, 307 A.2d 357, 358 (Pa. Super. 1973) (rejecting need for chemical 

analysis of capsules allegedly provided to the victim where the description 

matched that of known barbiturate and urine sample of victim revealed 

quantity of barbiturate in bloodstream).

In addition, we are mindful of the following:

The basic distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence 

is that in the former instance the witnesses testify directly of their 

own knowledge as to the main facts to be proved, while in the 

latter case proof is given of facts and circumstances from which 

the jury may infer other connected facts which reasonably follow, 

according to the common experience of mankind.
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Commonwealth v. Broughton, 390 A.2d 1282, 1284 (Pa. Super. 1978) 

(quoting 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 264 at 312). 

The trial court offered the following analysis in reviewing Appellant’s 

sufficiency of the evidence claim:

The Commonwealth called a pharmacist[, John Brown,] as 

a witness to identify the pills that Appellant sold. The pharmacist 

testified that he had been a pharmacist since 1991 after 

graduating from Temple University. Prior to that, he was a 

pharmacy tech in the US Air Force. He further testified, as a 

pharmacist, he is familiar with controlled substances. The 

pharmacist was asked by the Commonwealth to look at pictures 

of pills which he ran through his drug i/d/ program and with the 

marks on the pills, he identified them to a reasonable degree of 

scientific certainty as a 10 milligram oxycodone made by KBT 

pharmaceuticals and a generic Percocet (oxycodone 7.5 milligram 

with 325 milligrams Acetaminophen) made by Rohes 

Pharmaceutical. Both are controlled substances.

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It is “well-established in this Commonwealth that the 

identity of the illegal narcotic substances may be established by 

circumstantial evidence alone.” Commonwealth v. Minott, 395 Pa. 

Super. 552, 562, 577 A.2d 928, 932 (1990). See also 

Commonwealth v. Myers, 452 Pa. Super. 299, 309, 681 A.2d 

1348, 1353-[13]54 (1996) (vacated on other grounds by 554 Pa. 

569 , 722 A.2d 649 ); and Commonwealth v. Rickabaugh, 706 

A.2d 826 ([Pa. Super.] 1997). In this case, the police officer with 

years of experience and training recognized the substances as 

narcotics. The pharmacist recognized the substances as narcotics. 

The [CI] had contacted [Appellant] to obtain those specific 

narcotics. [Appellant] sold those substances to the [CI]. This 

evidence is sufficient for the jury to conclude as they did that the 

substances were controlled substances.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/18, at 6-7.
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Our review of the record, in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, indicates that the evidence was 

sufficient to support every element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 

With regard to the nature of the items sold by Appellant to the CI, Officer

Bruce Hoffman of the Sayre Borough Police Department testified as to his 

direct observations of the nature of the items, as informed by his training and 

experience. N.T., 11/15/17, at 36. Officer Hoffman indicated that the pills 

sold by Appellant were controlled substances. Id. Likewise, pharmacist John 

Brown, the owner of Brown’s Pharmacy, testified that the pills in question were 

controlled substances. Id. at 100-104. While the persuasiveness of this 

testimony may be less compelling than chemical analysis, it nonetheless 

constitutes direct evidence. Broughton, 390 A.2d at 1284.

Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the evidence presented was 

sufficient to prove that the contraband was a controlled substance. Based on 

the foregoing, Appellant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support 

his convictions fails. Hence, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Strassburger joins the Memorandum.

Judge Nichols concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/28/2018