PAAUZYUW RULYFOO0189 0202014-UUUU--RULYSUU.

ZNR UUUUU

P 202007Z JAN 15 ZYB

FM COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD//4.0P//

TO COMMARCORSYSCOM ACPS QUANTICO VA//HQ//

INFO COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD//4.0P//

NAVTESTWINGPAC PT MUGU CA//40P000E//

BT

UNCLAS 

MSGID/GENADMIN/MIL-STD-6040(SERIES)/B.0.01.00

/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER/-/-/-/-/-/-//

SUBJ/INSTANTEYE UAS CAT 3 IFC FOR FIELD USER EVALUATION IN

/RESTRICTED, WARNING AREAS, U.S. CLASS G AIRSPACE AND COMBAT 

ZONES//

REF/A/DESC:DOC/NAVAIR/-/120806ZJAN2015//

REF/B/MSGID:GENADMIN/NAVAIRSYSCOM/-/192000ZDEC2014//

REF/C/DESC:DOC/NOSSA/-/18DEC2014//

REF/D/DESC:DOC/PHYSICAL SCIENCES INC/-/15JUL2014//

REF/E/DESC:DOC/FAA/-/16SEP2013//

REF/F/DESC:DOC/JOINT PUBLICATION 3-52/-/20MAY2010//

REF/G/DESC:DOC/MARSOC/-/25NOV2014//

REF/H/DESC:NAVAIRINST 13034.1D CH-2/NAVAIR/-/15APR2014//

NARR/REF A IS AUTOMATED REQUEST.

REF B IS PREVIOUS INSTANTEYE UAS IFC.

REF C IS NOSSA CERTIFICATION FOR LITHIUM BATTERIES N841/2002.

REF D IS PSI INSTANTEYE MK-2 SUAS OPERATORS AND MAINTENANCE

 MANUAL REV-22.

REF E IS THE FAA/DOD MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR UAS OPERATIONS IN

 NATIONAL AIRSPACE.

REF F IS THE JOINT PUBLICATION 3-52 JOINT AIRSPACE CONTROL.

REF G IS MARSOC HIGHER PROBABILITY OF LOSS STATEMENT.

REF H IS FLIGHT CLEARANCE POLICY FOR AIR VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT

 SYSTEMS.//

POC/ALAN BJERKE/UAS FACILITATOR/UNIT:NAVAIRSYSCOM 

/NAME:PATUXENT RIVER, MD/TEL:301-995-4480 

/EMAIL:ALAN.BJERKE.CTR@NAVY.MIL//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. IRT REF A, NAVAIR UAS CATEGORY 3 INTERIM FLIGHT

CLEARANCE (IFC) IS GRANTED FOR THE INSTANTEYE MK-2 UAS FOR FLEET

OPERATIONS IN RESTRICTED AREAS, WARNING AREAS, U.S. CLASS G, AND

COMBAT ZONES. THIS IFC CANCELS AND SUPERSEDES REF B. OPERATIONS

SHALL BE IAW REFS C THROUGH F AND ARE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING

CONFIGURATION, LIMITATIONS, WARNINGS, CAUTIONS, AND NOTES.

THIS REVISION INCLUDES:

 A. ADDITION OF FAA/DOD MOA AS A REFERENCE.

 B. ADDITION OF JOINT PUB 3-52 AS A REFERENCE.

 C. ADDITION OF PARA 3.F(1)(B).

 D. CHANGES TO PARA 7.B, C, AND D.

 E. NO OTHER EXCEPT ADMINISTRATIVE.

2. CONFIGURATION: IAW REFS C, D, AND AS FOLLOWS:

 A. AIR VEHICLE: IAW REFS C, D, AND AS FOLLOWS:

 (1) ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM:

 (A) BATTERIES: NOSSA CERTIFICATION IAW REF C.

 (2) RADIOS/DATA LINKS: IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF D.

 (3) INSTANTEYE AUTOPILOT WITH SOFTWARE VERSION 3.3727.

 (4) PAYLOAD CONFIGURATION: IAW REF D.

 B. GROUND CONTROL STATION: IAW REFS C, D, AND AS FOLLOWS:
 (1) SOFTWARE VERSION 3.3727 IAW REF D.

 (2) BATTERIES: NOSSA CERTIFICATION IAW REF C.

3. LIMITATIONS: IAW REFS C, D, E, WITH THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONS

 AND EXCEPTIONS:

 A. GROUND CONTROL STATION (GCS):

 (1) FOR SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF AIR VEHICLES FROM

 SEPARATE GCS, ONLY ONE AIR VEHICLE SHALL BE

 ASSIGNED TO A FREQUENCY AT A TIME. MULTIPLE AIR

 VEHICLES CONTROLLED FROM THE SAME SITE SHALL BE

 OPERATED ON DIFFERENT FREQUENCIES. THIS APPLIES

 BOTH TO AIR VEHICLE OPERATIONS ORIGINATING FROM A

 GIVEN SITE AS WELL AS THOSE AIR VEHICLES WHOSE

 CONTROL IS TRANSFERRED TO THAT SITE. DATALINK

 FREQUENCIES SHALL BE APPROVED AND DECONFLICTED

 THROUGH THE LOCAL FREQUENCY MANAGER/COORDINATOR

 PRIOR TO CONDUCTING OPERATIONS.

 (2) SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF TWO OR MORE AIR VEHICLES

 FROM A SINGLE GCS: PROHIBITED.

 B. SHIPBOARD FLIGHT OPERATIONS: PROHIBITED.

 C. GROUND OPERATIONS:

 (1) GROUND OPERATIONS OF THE AIR VEHICLE SHOULD BE

 CONDUCTED AT THE GREATEST DISTANCE PRACTICAL

 (NOT LESS THAN 50 FEET) FROM ALL OTHER AIRCRAFT

 AND FUEL DEPOTS.

 D. ENVIRONMENTAL: IAW REF D AND AS FOLLOWS:

 (1) DAY OR NIGHT VMC ONLY.

 (2) FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITHIN 20 NM OF THUNDERSTORMS OR

 OBSERVED LIGHTNING: PROHIBITED.

 (3) FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN KNOWN OR OBSERVED ICING CONDITIONS:

 PROHIBITED.

 E. WIND LIMITS:

 (1) MAXIMUM WINDS, INCLUDING GUSTS: 25 KTS.

 (2) GUSTS: 5 KTS.

 F. AIRSPACE LIMITATIONS:

 (1) U.S. NATIONAL AIRSPACE:

 (A) FLIGHT WITHIN RESTRICTED AREAS OR WARNING AREAS ONLY:

 1) FLIGHT OPERATIONS SHALL BE OVER SPARSELY POPULATED

 OR UNPOPULATED AREAS ONLY.

 2) INTENTIONAL FLIGHT OVER PERSONNEL: PROHIBITED.

 (B) FLIGHT OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF RESTRICTED OR WARNING

 AREAS WITHIN U.S. CLASS G AIRSPACE SHALL BE IAW

 REF E, APPLICABLE APPROVED FAA COA (SEE PARA 7.C.),

 AND AS FOLLOWS:

 1) FLIGHT OPERATIONS SHALL BE OVER SPARSELY POPULATED

 OR UNPOPULATED AREAS ONLY.

 2) INTENTIONAL FLIGHT OVER PERSONNEL: PROHIBITED.

 3) FLIGHT ABOVE 1200 FEET AGL: PROHIBITED.

 (2) COMBAT ZONES, INTERNATIONAL, AND FOREIGN AIRSPACE IAW

 PARA 7.D AND AS FOLLOWS:

 (A) FLIGHT OPERATIONS SHALL BE PLANNED/CONDUCTED TO AVOID

 OVERFLIGHT OF PERSONNEL, POPULATED OR CONGESTED

 GROUND AREAS, AND TO MINIMIZE EXPOSURE TO MANNED

 AIRCRAFT. WHEN MISSION REQUIREMENTS DICTATE THE NEED

 TO OPERATE OVER PERSONNEL, POPULATED OR CONGESTED

 AREAS, DELIBERATE AND/OR TIME CRITICAL OPERATIONAL

 RISK MANAGEMENT SHALL BE CONDUCTED WITH DUE
 CONSIDERATION OF THE POPULATION DENSITY AND HAZARDS

 TO PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND. REFER TO

 OPNAVINST 3500.39 SERIES GUIDANCE. (SEE PARA 4.A).

 G. SAFETY EXCLUSION ZONES (LAUNCH, RECOVERY, AND GROUND

 OPERATIONS):

 (1) NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL PROHIBITED WITHIN A 25 FT

 RADIUS EXCLUSION CIRCLE CENTERED ON THE AIR VEHICLE WHEN

 IT IS BELOW 50 FT AGL. ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL SHALL

 MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE AIR VEHICLE AT ALL TIMES

 WHILE WITHIN THE 25 FT EXCLUSION CIRCLE.

 H. A SAFETY OBSERVER, EXTERNAL TO THE GCS SHELTER AND IN

 CONSTANT COMMUNICATION WITH THE AIR VEHICLE OPERATOR, SHALL

 BE PRESENT DURING ALL LAUNCH AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS:

 (1) THE SAFETY OBSERVER SHALL BE CAPABLE OF INITIATING A

 WAVE-OFF VIA DIRECT COMMUNICATION (RADIO, ETC.) WITH THE

 AIR VEHICLE OPERATOR.

 (2) THE SAFETY OBSERVER SHALL MAINTAIN VISUAL LINE OF SIGHT

 CONTACT WITH THE AIR VEHICLE DURING ALL PHASES OF THE

 LAUNCH AND RECOVERY OPERATION.

 (3) THE SAFETY OBSERVER SHALL ASSESS THE VEHICLE FLIGHT

 PATH FOR EXCESSIVE ERRORS ARISING FROM VEHICLE TRACKING

 OR NAVIGATION, AND IF THE ERRORS APPEAR TO BE

 UNREASONABLY LARGE OR GROWING QUICKLY, SHALL INITIATE A

 WAVE-OFF VIA A WAVE-OFF CALL TO THE AIR VEHICLE OPERATOR.

 I. OPERATE AWAY FROM OPERATING ANTENNAS OF OTHER-SYSTEM RADIO

 TRANSMITTERS AND RADARS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH EMIT HIGH

 LEVELS OF POWER:

 (1) MAINTAIN A SLANT-RANGE STANDOFF DISTANCE OF 2 NM

 (3,700 M) FROM OPERATING VERY-HIGH-POWERED AIR-SEARCH AND

 FIRE-CONTROL RADARS, AND SATCOM UPLINK TERMINALS,

 ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH EMIT HIGH LEVELS OF POWER

 (GREATER THAN 1 KW AND ANTENNA GAINS GREATER THAN

 20 DBI).

 (2) MAINTAIN A STANDOFF DISTANCE OF 70 FT (20 M) FROM

 OPERATING HF/VHF/UHF COMMUNICATIONS TRANSMITTERS (1 KW

 OR LESS) WITH LOW-GAIN ANTENNAS.

 J. AN ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC) SAFETY-OF-FLIGHT TEST

 (SOFT) SHALL BE PERFORMED PRIOR TO FIRST FLIGHT. FLIGHT

 CRITICAL SYSTEMS SHALL BE CHECKED AGAINST ALL NEWLY

 INSTALLED EQUIPMENT FOR EMC. THIS INCLUDES NEW TRANSMITTER

 FREQUENCIES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY CHECKED FOR

 COMPATIBILITY:

 (1) THE EMC SOFT SHALL BE CONDUCTED WHILE NEARBY RF

 EMITTERS (RADIOS/RADARS/CREW SYSTEMS) THAT WILL BE

 PROXIMATE TO THE AIR VEHICLE OR GCS DURING AIR VEHICLE

 OPERATIONS ARE ACTIVATED.

 (2) AN EMC SOFT IS NOT COMPLETE UNTIL ALL UNACCEPTABLE EMC

 ANOMALIES HAVE BEEN CORRECTED VIA MODIFICATIONS TO

 OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES.

4. WARNINGS, CAUTIONS, AND NOTES IAW REFS C, D, AND THE FOLLOWING:

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 A. CATEGORY 3 FLIGHT CLEARANCES ARE ISSUED TO UAS THAT OPERATE

 OVER AREAS OF LOW POPULATION DENSITY IN RESTRICTED AREAS,

 WARNING AREAS, MARITIME ENVIRONMENT OR COMBAT ZONES.

 CATEGORY 3 UAS HAVE AN INCREASED LIKELIHOOD OF FLIGHT

 CRITICAL FAILURES WHICH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF CONTROL OR

 LOSS OF AIRCRAFT, INCREASING THE RISK OF INJURY OR DEATH
 TO PERSONS ON THE GROUND.

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 B. THIS INTERIM FLIGHT CLEARANCE (IFC) BASES ITS LAUNCH,

 RECOVERY AND FLIGHT LIMITATIONS ON OEM FLIGHT MANUALS THAT

 HAVE NOT BEEN VALIDATED BY NAVAIR. FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS

 AND PERFORMANCE OF THE INSTANTEYE UAS HAVE NOT BEEN

 INDEPENDENTLY ASSESSED BY NAVAIR OR VERIFIED AGAINST

 ESTABLISHED AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS. LOSS OF AIR VEHICLE

 CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE MAY OCCUR WHILE

 OPERATING WITHIN THE PARA 3 USAGE ENVELOPE.

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 C. A CRITICAL SYSTEM FAILURE CAN LEAVE THE AIR VEHICLE IN AN

 UNCONTROLLED STATE WHILE OPERATING WITHIN THE PARA 3 USAGE

 ENVELOPE. SUCH A FAILURE MAY RESULT IN THE VEHICLE

 UNINTENTIONALLY DEPARTING THE OPERATIONAL AREA OR SAFE-FOR

 FLIGHT BOX. THE FAILURE MAY RESULT IN THE LOSS OF AIR

 VEHICLE, INJURY OR DEATH TO PERSONNEL, AND/OR DAMAGE TO

 PROPERTY EITHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE OF THE OPERATIONAL AREA:

 (1) IN THE EVENT OF AN ENGINE FAILURE OR OTHER CATASTROPHIC

 FAILURE, LOCAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (ATC)/RANGE CONTROL

 AUTHORITY SHOULD BE NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY AND THE AIRCRAFT

 SHOULD BE DITCHED OVER A PRE-SELECTED POINT. IF NOT

 POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE PRE-SELECTED WAYPOINT, EVERY EFFORT

 SHOULD BE MADE TO VISUALLY INSPECT THE PROBABLE IMPACT

 AREA PRIOR TO EXECUTING THE FLIGHT TERMINATION PROCEDURE.

 (2) UNINTENTIONAL FLIGHT OUTSIDE OF RESTRICTED/WARNING AREAS

 SHALL BE REPORTED TO THE FAA.

 (3) NO SECONDARY METHOD OF TERMINATING/CONTROLLING THE

 VEHICLE EXISTS.

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 D. THE INSTANTEYE UAS DOES NOT HAVE A SENSE AND AVOID SYSTEM.

 MID-AIR COLLISION WITH A MANNED AIRCRAFT MAY RESULT IN

 LOSS OF THE AIR VEHICLE, INJURY OR DEATH TO PERSONNEL,

 DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT, AND/OR DAMAGE TO OR LOSS OF THE MANNED

 AIRCRAFT. NIGHT OPERATIONS INCREASE THE POTENTIAL FOR MID-

 AIR COLLISION DUE TO THE LACK OF LIGHTING ON THE INSTANTEYE

 UAS. A SEPARATE METHOD OF DETECTING, AVOIDING, AND/OR

 DECONFLICTING WITH OTHER AIR TRAFFIC SHOULD BE USED TO

 COMPENSATE FOR THESE LIMITATIONS, SUCH AS COORDINATION WITH

 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (ATC). ALL FLIGHT OPERATIONS SHOULD BE

 CONDUCTED SO AS TO ENSURE THAT MANNED AIRCRAFT AND UNMANNED

 AIRCRAFT DO NOT CONCURRENTLY OCCUPY THE SAME AIRSPACE.

 TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF MID-AIR COLLISION:

 (1) OPERATORS SHOULD COORDINATE AIRSPACE USE WITH THE

 AIRSPACE CONTROLLING AUTHORITY AND BE IN COMMUNICATION

 WITH THIS AUTHORITY TO ACTIVELY DECONFLICT THE AIRSPACE

 WHEN OPERATING THE AIR VEHICLE.

 (2) OPERATORS SHOULD INITIATE A RTB OR EXECUTE FLIGHT

 TERMINATION PROCEDURES, AS CONDITIONS PERMIT, IF THE

 LOCATION OF THE AIR VEHICLE IS IN QUESTION.

 (3) IN CASE OF LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE AIR VEHICLE

 OPERATOR AND LOCAL ATC/RANGE CONTROL, THE OPERATOR SHOULD

 FOLLOW LOCAL PROCEDURES.

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 E. THE INSTANTEYE UAS HAS NOT UNDERGONE SAFETY OF FLIGHT

 EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERE TESTING. A SERIOUS FIRE OR EXPLOSION

 MAY OCCUR IF THE AIRCRAFT IS POWERED WHILE FLAMMABLE VAPORS
 ARE PRESENT DURING GROUND OR FLIGHT OPERATIONS RESULTING IN

 INJURY OR DEATH TO PERSONNEL AND LOSS OF AIRCRAFT.

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 F. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF THE INSTANTEYE UAS HAS NOT

 BEEN CONDUCTED. FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN RAIN MAY RESULT IN LOSS

 OF AIR VEHICLE WHILE OPERATING WITHIN THE LIMITS FOUND IN REF

 D AND THE PARA 3 USAGE ENVELOPE.

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 G. NOISE CHARACTERIZATION TESTING HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED ON THIS

 SYSTEM. PROLONGED EXPOSURE TO AIR VEHICLE NOISE AT CLOSE

 PROXIMITY MAY CONTRIBUTE TO HEARING LOSS. HEARING PROTECTION

 SHOULD BE WORN DURING GROUND OPERATIONS, LAUNCH AND RECOVERY

 OF THE AIR VEHICLE.

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 H. OPERATION NEAR ANTENNAS OF ACTIVE RADIO TRANSMITTERS AND

 RADARS, ESPECIALLY THOSE OPERATING AT HIGH POWER LEVELS, MAY

 RESULT IN LOSS OF AIR VEHICLE CONTROL, LOSS OF PAYLOAD USE,

 FLUCTUATIONS IN ENGINE RPM AND LOSS OF AIR VEHICLE, INJURY TO

 PERSONNEL, AND/OR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY. INSTANTEYE UAS HAS NOT

 UNDERGONE TESTING TO DETERMINE SUSCEPTIBILITY TO INTERNAL OR

 EXTERNAL ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, INCLUDING THOSE PRODUCED BY

 RADIO TRANSMITTERS AND RADARS. OBSERVE PARA 3.I EMITTER

 STAND-OFF LIMITS.

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 I. COMMAND AND CONTROL DATALINK INTERFERENCE MAY OCCUR WHEN

 OTHER UAS CONFIGURED WITH SIMILAR COMMAND AND CONTROL

 DATALINKS ARE OPERATING WITHIN THE SAME FREQUENCY BANDS OR

 HOPSETS, AND ARE WITHIN RANGE OF RECEPTION. THIS MAY RESULT

 IN LOSS OF THE COMMAND AND CONTROL DATALINK AND POSSIBLE LOSS

 OF THE AIR VEHICLE. UAS OPERATORS SHOULD COORDINATE

 FREQUENCIES WITH ANY OTHER UAS OR MANNED SYSTEMS IN THE

 OPERATING AREA IAW LOCAL SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT

 PROCEDURES.

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 J. THE EFFECT OF GPS JAMMING ON THE AIR VEHICLE NAVIGATION

 SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN FULLY CHARACTERIZED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT

 GPS ALTITUDE AND NAVIGATION REFERENCE CAN BE IN ERROR. IF

 GPS JAMMING IS SUSPECTED, THE AVO SHOULD COMMAND THE AIR

 VEHICLE TO A SAFE ALTITUDE AND EXIT THE AREA OF SUSPECTED

 JAMMING TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF UNEXPECTED NAVIGATION

 ERRORS.

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 K. THE INSTANTEYE UAS UTILIZES LITHIUM ION BATTERIES CERTIFIED

 BY THE NAVAL ORDNANCE SAFETY AND SECURITY ACTIVITY (NOSSA)

 (REF C). LITHIUM ION BATTERIES HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO RELEASE

 VAPOR CLOUDS OF CHEMICALLY ACTIVE TOXIC, FLAMMABLE, OR

 CORROSIVE MATERIALS WHICH MAY CAUSE INJURY TO PERSONNEL,

 DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT, AND/OR LOSS OF AIRCRAFT.

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 L. THE INSTANTEYE UAS DOES NOT HAVE NAVIGATION LIGHTS. THE

 ABILITY OF GROUND PERSONNEL TO SEE AND AVOID THE UAS IN

 THE EVENT OF CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OR LOSS OF CONTROL IS

 SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADED. THE OPERATOR SHOULD

 COMMUNICATE EGRESS AND INGRESS PATHS TO TAKEOFF AND

 LANDING SITES TO ALL PERSONNEL IN THE VICINITY (NOT JUST

 UAS FLIGHT CREW). THE AIR VEHICLE MAY COLLIDE WITH

 PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN LOSS OF AIR
 VEHICLE, INJURY OR DEATH TO PERSONNEL, OR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY

 EITHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE OF THE OPERATIONAL AREA.

------------------------------WARNING------------------------------

 M. A CATASTROPHIC ROTOR FAILURE OR LOSS OF AIR VEHICLE CONTROL

 MAY RESULT IN INJURY TO PERSONNEL. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE

 EQUIPMENT (MINIMUM OF HEAD PROTECTION AND BALLISTICALLY

 TOLERANT EYEWEAR) SHOULD BE WORN WITHIN 25 FEET OF THE AIR

 VEHICLE WHILE THE ROTORS ARE TURNING.

------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------

 N. A SAFE-FOR-FLIGHT BOX SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTED WITHIN THE

 AIRSPACE BOUNDARIES THAT ENSURES THAT THE AIR VEHICLE IS

 CONTAINED WITHIN THE AIRSPACE BOUNDARIES AT ALL TIMES.

 THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHEN CONSTRUCTING THE

 SAFE-FOR-FLIGHT BOX:

 (1) ABOVE GROUND LEVEL OPERATING ALTITUDES.

 (2) LOSS OF COMMUNICATION/LOSS OF LINK/GPS TIME OUT PERIODS.

 (3) LOSS OF COMMUNICATION/LOSS OF LINK PROFILES.

 (4) AIR VEHICLE ENGINE-OUT GLIDE RATIOS.

 (5) AIR VEHICLE MAXIMUM AIRSPEED.

 (6) AIR VEHICLE MAXIMUM RANGE/ENDURANCE.

 (7) MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE TAIL WIND.

 (8) FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEMS.

 (9) PERFORMANCE (IF APPLICABLE).

 (10) COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATION RANGES.

 (11) RF EMITTERS STAY CLEAR DISTANCES, ETC.

------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------

 O. CONDUCTING A MISSION WITHOUT GPS, OR WITH DEGRADED GPS DATA,

 INCREASES OPERATOR WORKLOAD AND INCREASES THE UNCERTAINTY IN

 REPORTED AIR VEHICLE POSITION. WITHOUT A FUNCTIONING GPS,

 THE AVO MUST USE ALTERNATE NAVIGATION TECHNIQUES.

------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------

 P. SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF AN EMC SOFT IS A CHECK, BUT NOT

 A GUARANTEE, THAT SYSTEM OPERATION WILL NOT BE DISRUPTED

 BY ITS OWN, OR NEARBY, ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT.

------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------

 Q. ALL ANOMALIES OBSERVED WITH THE INSTANTEYE UAS THAT RESULT

 IN, OR HAVE THE POTENTIAL OF CAUSING, AN AIR VEHICLE MISHAP

 SHALL BE REPORTED TO AIR 4.1 (SEE PARA 6.A).

5. TIME PERIOD: THIS IFC EXPIRES 13 NOVEMBER 2017.

6. POINTS OF CONTACT:

 A. DAVID CUDD, AIR-4.1.1.5 SMALL UAS CLASS DESK,

 TEL: 301-342-2247,

 EMAIL: DAVID.CUDD@NAVY.MIL.

 B. ALAN BJERKE, UAS FACILITATOR,

 TEL: 301-995-4480,

 EMAIL: ALAN.BJERKE.CTR@NAVY.MIL.

 C. AIRWORTHINESS GLOBAL CUSTOMER SUPPORT TEAM,

 TEL: 301-757-0187,

 EMAIL: AIRWORTHINESS@NAVY.MIL.

7. OTHER REMARKS:

 A. REQUEST TYCOM READDRESS THIS MESSAGE TO SUBORDINATE

 ACTIVITIES FORAC.

 B. APPROVAL TO FLY UAS WITHIN THE US NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM

 (NAS) OUTSIDE OF RESTRICTED OR WARNING AREAS, IS SUBJECT TO
 FAA APPROVAL.

 C. THIS IFC MAY BE USED AS A STATEMENT OF AIRWORTHINESS

 IN SUPPORT OF FAA CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION (COA) OR COA

 VIA NOTIFICATION APPLICATION IAW REF E.

 D. ALL UAS FLIGHT OPERATIONS SUPPORTING COMBAT ZONE OPERATIONS

 OF ANY KIND SHOULD BE PERFORMED UNDER AN AIR TASKING ORDER

 FROM THE JOINT FORCES AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER (OR EQUIVALENT)

 AND SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH THE DIVISION OR WING

 RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE SPECIFIC AREA OF

 RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). THIS CAN BE DONE WITH SUPPORT FROM ANY

 LOCAL AVIATION UNITS OPERATIONS GROUP. REF F PROVIDES

 ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF AIRSPACE OVER THE COMBAT

 ZONE AND CONTIGUOUS AREAS.

 E. INITIATING REQUEST FOR AND ADHERING TO RANGE AND AIRSPACE

 CLEARANCE IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OPERATORS.

 F. THIS FLIGHT CLEARANCE DOES NOT ADDRESS INTEROPERABILITY

 WITH MANNED AIRCRAFT.

 G. UAS OPERATOR QUALIFICATIONS, MAINTAINER QUALIFICATIONS,

 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT, SCHEDULED/UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE

 PRACTICES, AND OTHER ASSOCIATED PROCEDURES ARE BEYOND THE

 SCOPE OF THIS FLIGHT CLEARANCE BUT SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY

 ADDRESSED BY THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY TO ENSURE AN

 ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF SAFETY FOR THE UAS AND TO MINIMIZE RISK

 TO GROUND PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. REFER TO OPNAVINST

 3710.7U, CNAFINST 4790.2B CH-1, AND OPNAVINST 3750.6S FOR

 POLICY MANAGEMENT AND MOD AUTHORITY.

 H. PER REF G, MARSOC ACKNOWLEDGES HIGHER PROBABILITY OF

 LOSS OF THE UAV, AS DEFINED IN PARA 6.E.3.C OF REF H.

 I. PER REF H, THIS FLIGHT CLEARANCE PROVIDES A NAVAIR CATEGORY

 3 AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION SUBSEQUENT TO AN ENGINEERING

 REVIEW AND RISK ASSESSMENT TO ENSURE SAFETY OF FLIGHT AND

 REDUCE RISK TO PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY, AND/OR ENVIRONMENT.

 J. THIS IFC DOES NOT AUTHORIZE AIRCRAFT/SYSTEM MODIFICATION, NOR

 DOES IT SATISFY NAVAIR REQUIREMENTS FOR CONFIGURATION

 MANAGEMENT. AS DIRECTED BY OPNAVINST 4790.2J, REFER TO

 CNAFINST 4790.2B CH-1 FOR POLICY ON CONFIGURATION

 MANAGEMENT AND MOD AUTHORITY.

 K. INFORMATION REGARDING THE AIRWORTHINESS PROCESS, INCLUDING A

 LISTING OF ALL CURRENT INTERIM FLIGHT CLEARANCES, NATOPS AND

 NATIP PRODUCTS ISSUED BY NAVAIR 4.0P, CAN BE FOUND AT OUR

 WEBSITE: AIRWORTHINESS.NAVAIR.NAVY.MIL.

 L. EPOWER FOLDER 1130510, TRACKING NUMBER 64310.//

BT

#0189

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Pudlo, Robert (4.0P, PEO(A)(U&W) Sr Airworthiness Engr), 01/21/2015