OCS Study MMS 2004-038

Final Report 

A Study of the Drift Gillnet Fishery and Oil/Gas Industry Interactions and 

Mitigation Possibilities in Cook Inlet 

Prepared for 

U.S. Department of the Interior 

Minerals Management Service, Alaska OCS Region 

by 

Impact Assessment, Inc. 

2166 Avenida de la Playa, Suite F 

La Jolla, California 92037 

iai@san.rr.com

John S. Petterson, Ph.D., Principal Investigator 

Edward W. Glazier, Ph.D., Co-Principal Investigator 

This study was funded by the U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service (MMS), 

Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Region, Anchorage, Alaska under Contract Number 1435-01-03-CT71847 

This report was prepared under contract between the Minerals Management Services (MMS) and Impact 

Assessment, Inc. The report has been technically reviewed by the MMS and approved for publication. 

Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Service, nor 

does mention of trade names or commercial products constitute endorsement or recommendation for use. 

The report is, however, exempt from review and compliance with the MMS editorial standards.

May 2004 
Acknowledgements

We wish to thank the many drift fishery participants who contributed their time and energy to 

this project. It is our hope that the effort will benefit the fleet and fishery in future years. We

also acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game; the 

Alaska Division of Oil and Gas; XTO Energy; Shell Oil; the United Cook Inlet Drift 

Association; and Mapmakers Alaska. We would like to extend special thanks to Mr. Bill 

Osborne. Without his assistance we would not have been able to experience the rare opportunity 

of oil platform ethnography. 

ii
Project Organization

-IAI Staff and Project ManagementJohn S. Petterson, Ph.D., Principal Investigator 

Edward W. Glazier, Ph.D., Co-Principal Investigator 

Project Manager 

J. Cody Petterson, M.A., Field Director 

-Research and Support StaffAmy Craver, ABD, Field Manager 

University of Alaska at Anchorage, 

Institute for Social and Economic Research 

Stephen Williams, M.A., Social Scientist 

Data Analyst 

Julia M. Stevens, B.A., Cultural Geographer 

Logistical Support 

Luke Sherman, M.S. 

Ecological Economic Consulting

Archival Research

* * * 

-MMS Technical OversightDee Williams, Ph.D., Sociocultural Specialist 

Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative 

U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service 

Alaska OCS Region 

iii
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................................................ii 

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................ ES-1 

1.0 Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1 Policy and Administrative Background .................................................................................. 2 

1.2 The Research Problem and the Purpose of the Study ............................................................. 2 

1.2.1 Coexistence as Context.......................................................................................... 4 

1.2.2 Trends of Diminishing Production ........................................................................ 5 

1.2.3 Interactions and Challenges .................................................................................. 8 

1.2.4 Areas of Inquiry ..................................................................................................... 9

1.3 Project Objectives and Research Methods Employed .......................................................... 10 

1.4 Organization of this Report ................................................................................................... 11 

2.0 Research Methods........................................................................................................................ 12 

2.1 Overview of Research Methods and Data Analysis............................................................... 12 

2.2 Summary of Research Interaction in the Study Area............................................................. 12 

2.3 Interview Sampling and Social Network Analysis................................................................ 13 

2.4 Group and Focus Group Meetings........................................................................................ 15

3.0 The Oil and Gas Industry and the Drift Gillnet Fishery in Cook Inlet .................................. 17 

3.1 Oil and Gas Operations in Cook Inlet.................................................................................... 17 

3.1.1 History and Overview.......................................................................................... 17 

3.1.2 The Economic Importance of the Oil and Gas Industry ...................................... 18 

3.1.3 Prospects.............................................................................................................. 19 

3.1.4 Relevant Aspects of the MMS Scenario .............................................................. 19 

3.2 The Cook Inlet Drift Gillnet Fishery ..................................................................................... 21 

3.2.1 Early History........................................................................................................ 21 

3.2.2 Labor History....................................................................................................... 23 

3.2.3 Into the Contemporary Fishery ........................................................................... 23 

3.2.4 Geographic Aspects of the Cook Inlet Drift Gillnet Fishery ............................... 26 

3.2.5 The Drift Gillnet Season ...................................................................................... 29 

3.2.6 Learning to Fish with Gillnets ............................................................................. 30 

3.2.7 The Drift Gillnet and its Use ............................................................................... 32 

3.2.8 The Process of Drift Gillnet Fishing.................................................................... 33 

3.2.9 Challenges and Rewards...................................................................................... 37 

3.2.10 Social Organization and Communication on the Inlet......................................... 39 

3.2.11 Local and “Outside” Participants......................................................................... 40 

3.2.12 The Russian Old Believer Fleet ........................................................................... 41 

3.2.13 Fishing and other Work ....................................................................................... 42 

3.2.14 Small Fishing Vessel Economics and the Market................................................ 43 

3.2.15 The Contemporary Labor Environment .............................................................. 45 

3.2.16 Decline of Profits for Regional Processors and Support Sectors ........................ 45 

3.2.17 An Aging Fleet .................................................................................................... 46

3.2.18 Demise of Cash Buyers........................................................................................ 47 

3.2.19 Regulatory Regime .............................................................................................. 48 

3.2.20 Escapement and Cook Inlet Sport Fisheries ...................................................... 50 

3.2.21 The Drift Gillnet-Halibut Charter Interface ........................................................ 51 

iv
4.0 Drift Gillnet and Oil and Gas Industry Interactions on Cook Inlet ............................................ 53 

4.1 The Drift Gillnet and Industry Interface: Overview .............................................................. 54 

4.2 Issues, Perspectives, and Experiences.................................................................................... 56 

4.2.1 Seismic Survey Effects.......................................................................................... 56 

4.2.2 Drilling Muds ........................................................................................................ 57 

4.2.3 Subsurface Obstructions ........................................................................................ 57 

4.2.4 Surface Obstructions.............................................................................................. 58 

4.2.5 Oil Spills................................................................................................................ 59 

4.2.6 Platform Interactions and Drift Gillnet Fishing as Fluid Operation ...................... 60 

4.2.7 Vessel Traffic, Fluidity, and Cook Inlet as Navigational System ......................... 65 

5.0 Identification of Possibilities for Mitigating Potential Spatial Conflicts................................. 70 

5.1 Overview................................................................................................................................ 70 

5.2 Mitigation Issues by Central Issue of Concern ...................................................................... 71 

5.2.1 Mitigation through Elimination of Potential Interaction........................................ 72 

 Appropriate Siting........................................................................................... 73 

 Extended Reach Drilling................................................................................. 75 

5.2.2 Mitigation of Gear Entanglement, Loss of Harvest, Platform Hazards................. 77 

 Fishermen’s Contingency Fund and Needed Modifications........................... 77 

 Local Fishermen’s Contingency Fund ............................................................ 78 

 An Emergency Response Vessel Program...................................................... 79 

5.2.3 Mitigation of OCS-Related Oil Spills Affecting Drift Gillnet Fleet...................... 81 

 Establishment of an Insurance-Type Oil Spill Bond........................................ 81 

 Time Limitations on Spill Litigation and Settlement....................................... 81 

 Involvement of Drift Gillnet Fleet in Spill Response ...................................... 82 

5.2.4 Mitigation of Vessel Traffic and Spatial-Navigational Issues............................... 82 

 Regulatory Concessions................................................................................... 82 

 Seasonal Restrictions on Drilling to Avoid Increased Traffic ......................... 83 

 A System of Communication........................................................................... 83 

5.2.5 Comprehensive and Communication-Based Mitigation Strategies ...................... 84 

 A Joint Council or Standing Advisory Committee .......................................... 85 

 Fisheries and Market Enhancement Programs................................................. 89 

 

6.0 Summary Conclusions and Recommendations......................................................................... 92 

6.1 Summary of Project Objectives and Findings........................................................................ 92 

6.1.1 Summary of Descriptive Findings: Potential for Interaction ................................ 92 

6.1.2 Summary of Mitigation Research Findings........................................................... 94 

6.1.3 Summary Conclusions........................................................................................... 97 

 

7.0 References................................................................................................................................... 100 

v
Appendix A: Annotated Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 106 

 

Appendix B: Social Network Methods, Hypotheses, Results.................................................................. 141 

Appendix C: 2003 Upper Cook Inlet Season ADF&G Emergency Orders............................................. 145 

 

Appendix D: Regulatory Framework Relevant to Study ......................................................................... 151

Appendix E: Review of Archival Materials Reporting Industrial Accidents on Cook Inlet.................... 154 

 

Appendix F: A Drift Gillnet Career......................................................................................................... 159 

Appendix G: Drift Gillnet Interview Protocol ......................................................................................... 165 

 

List of Tables, Maps, Charts, and Selected Figures

Table 1-1 Population Trends and Year 2000 Permits and Landings, Kenai Peninsula....................... 6 

Table 1-2 Oil and Gas Employment, Persons by Sector, Kenai Peninsula ......................................... 8 

Table 1-3 Project Objectives and Associated Research Methods..................................................... 10 

Table 2-1 The Core of the Network Sample: The Most Highly Recommended............................... 15 

Table 3-1 Summary Description Important Aspects of Drift Gillnet Operation............................... 20 

Table 3-2 Summary of EIS Analysis by Issue .................................................................................. 36 

Table 3-3 Basic Regulatory Strategy for Cook Inlet District Drift Gillnet Fishery .......................... 49 

Table 5-1 Santa Barbara County Fisheries Enhancement Fund: Project Examples.......................... 90 

Table 6-1 Summary of Identified Mitigation Options Determined Feasible..................................... 98 

Map 1-1 Lease Sale Areas 191 and 199 in the Cook Inlet Planning Area ........................................ 3 

Map 3-1 The Cook Inlet OCS and the Drift Gillnet Fishery ........................................................... 28 

Map 4-1 Area of Special Consideration .......................................................................................... 74 

Chart 3-1 Seasoned Drift Gillnetters Reporting Financial Hardship ................................................ 26 

Chart 3-2 Drift Gillnetters Holding Alternative and Secondary Employment.................................. 42 

Chart 3-3 Salient Issues for Drift Gillnetters .................................................................................... 44 

Chart 4-1 Leading Environmental Concerns among Drift Gillnetters.............................................. 60 

Chart 5-1 Seasoned Drift Gillnetters Advocating Communication-Based Mitigation...................... 84 

Figure 1-1 Oil Production Trend Line for Cook Inlet Region.............................................................. 7 

Figure 1-2 Gas Production Trend Line for Cook Inlet Region............................................................. 7 

Figure 2-1 The Most Frequently Recommended Gillnetters.............................................................. 14 

Figure A-1 Network of Kenai Peninsula Drift Gillnet Fishery Participants by Residence ............... 143 

Figure A-2 Drift Gillnet Fishery Network by UCIDA Affiliation .................................................... 144 

 

vi
-EXECUTIVE SUMMARYINTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This report describes the salmon drift gillnet fishery in Cook Inlet in Southcentral Alaska, and 

the nature of its historic and potential future interactions with offshore oil and gas industry 

activities in the region. The description and supporting literature review serve as context for 

identifying and assessing appropriate means and venues for mitigating problems that might occur 

should the fishery and offshore industry eventually interact on the Outer Continental Shelf 

(OCS) of Cook Inlet. Such mitigation could benefit both forms of enterprise. 

Oil and gas industry activity on the OCS is administered by the U.S. Department of the Interior, 

Minerals Management Service (MMS). MMS is responsible for administering oil and gas 

development on the OCS under stipulations in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). 

An important provision of the OCSLA authorizes MMS to conduct and sponsor studies of 

coastal and marine environments potentially affected by oil and gas industry activities occurring 

on the OCS. 

This report provides information needed by MMS to pursue balanced management of resources 

under its jurisdiction on the Cook Inlet OCS. Project findings are based on a period of intense 

research conducted during and soon after the summer 2003 drift gillnet season, and into the 

spring months of 2004. The research and report have been completed under MMS Contract 

1435-01-03-CT-71847 by Impact Assessment, Inc. (IAI), a firm specializing in maritime social 

science research. 

PROJECT GOAL AND RATIONALE

The overarching goal of this project was to identify options for mitigating spatial conflicts 

between the drift gillnet fleet and the oil and gas industry that could potentially result from

development activities on the Cook Inlet OCS. The research issues and information needs were 

identified through scoping efforts associated with OCS Lease Sales 191 and 199. 

First we sought to determine whether establishment of platform drilling and associated activities 

in the federal jurisdiction waters of Cook Inlet could actually cause problems for the drift gillnet 

fleet. The conflict outcome was treated as a working hypothesis, and various research methods 

were used to examine fleet and oil/gas industry operations and the nature of their spatial 

interactions in the region over time. The resulting information provided rich context for 

subsequent examination of possible mitigation alternatives and the feasibility of their 

implementation in the study region. 

ES-1 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, METHODS, AND ANALYSIS

A series of interrelated objectives were formulated by MMS to satisfy the intent of the project. 

IAI subsequently designed a research plan and used various social science research methods to 

document the manner in which drift gillnet vessels operate in Cook Inlet, and the potential for 

spatial challenges and hazardous interactions between the fleet and prospective oil/gas industry 

activities on OCS. A subsequent round of focused research was conducted during the following 

autumn months to identify mitigation possibilities in increasingly specific terms. The project 

objectives, rationale, and corresponding research methods employed by IAI during the course of 

the project are depicted in summary form in Table ES-1 below. 

TABLE ES-1 PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH METHODS

Objective Purpose Method/Approach

Conduct Literature Search Investigate how similar conflicts 

have been handled around world 

Collect/analyze all relevant data 

from existing secondary sources 

Synthesize Relevant

Secondary Source and 

Archival Information

Integrate existing information about: 

conflict mitigation; social, economic, 

and demographic conditions; and 

drift gillnet and oil/gas operations

Synthesize into single database

searchable by topic, location 

environmental factor, group or other

relevant characteristic 

Collect Data on Drift Gillnet 

Operations, Preferred Fishing 

Locations, and Salmon 

Migration Patterns

Identify areas of competing use and 

basic operational aspects of the drift 

gillnet fleet including issues of 

navigation, safety, fishing strategies 

Use social network sampling approach

to identify seasoned drift gillnet 

participants for purpose of in-depth

interviewing

Construct a Geographic 

Information System (GIS) 

Depict/analyze spatial elements of

historic, current, and future 

interactions between drift gillnet fleet 

and oil/gas industry 

Use existing baseline and new data 

collected through interviews and 

mapping exercises with key informants

Conduct Ethnographic Work

on Drift Gillnet Vessels 

Develop insight into contemporary

drift gillnet operations and potential 

interaction with oil/gas industry 

vessels and/or infrastructure 

Observe/interview key informants on

their vessels and record behaviors and 

strategies of operators and operations

Conduct Ethnographic Work

on the Oil Platforms 

Develop insight into contemporary

oil platform operations and potential

interaction with drift vessels 

Observe/interview platform operators, 

record relevant information about 

operations 

Meet and Consult with Fishery 

Participants and Groups

Refine information about drift gillnet 

operations and mitigation issues;

provide opportunity for commentary 

on preliminary research findings

Hold focus group meetings with

seasoned drift gillnet operators in the 

study region. 

ES-2 
The research design was configured so that most types of information collected through any one 

method could be verified in terms of validity through comparison with data collected by other 

methods or from other sources. For instance, we were able to check the reports of resource 

managers about historic interactions between the drift gillnet fleet and drilling platforms in state 

jurisdiction waters against the reports of: (a) persons who have been fishing in Cook Inlet for 

decades, (b) oil/gas platform personnel working in the area, and (c) U.S. Coast Guard personnel. 

Similarly, while identification of mitigation possibilities was based in large part on the

perspectives of our sample of seasoned fishermen, various other primary and secondary sources 

were also consulted. The resulting project analysis is thereby based on multiple sources of crossvalidated information and concern for generating a representative set of mitigation possibilities. 

PRIMARY ISSUES OF CONCERN

During the course of environmental assessment work conducted in association with Lease Sales 

191 and 199, MMS determined that drift gillnet fishery participants held a number of concerns 

about the prospect of oil and gas industry activities on the Cook Inlet OCS. Among the most 

salient concerns were the following: (1) emplacement of drilling platform in fishing grounds 

could affect drift gillnet operations, (2) oil spills of blowouts could affect the salmon resource 

and the fishery, and (3) increased vessel traffic related to offshore activity could affect the 

fishery. The research described in this study was largely organized around investigation of the 

context surrounding the concerns, and around identification of effective ways to mitigate the 

potential problems. 

SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS

Findings clearly suggest that the navigational challenges of operating drift gillnet fishing vessels 

on Cook Inlet are real and can test even the most skilled mariners. Emplacement of a stationary 

object such as a drilling platform in the swift currents of the fishing grounds could increase the 

challenges and present the possibility for spatial conflict. 

But of equal significance, the research has uncovered important information that suggests: (a) 

navigational challenges and spatial conflicts may be avoided through strategic planning on the 

part of the oil and gas industry and its regulators, and (b) many problems for the drift gillnet fleet 

potentially associated with prospective drilling on the OCS can be mitigated. 

Finally, the research indicates that while oil and gas industry activity on the OCS could affect 

fishery operations in certain ways, the salience of the issue is in reality overshadowed by a host 

of economic and other challenges. Key findings include, but are not limited to, the following: 

ES-3 
• Market conditions and marketing problems are especially significant in the modern 

context, and threaten drift gillnet fishing as an economically viable enterprise. 

• Regulatory constraints have a major bearing on the perceived viability of the commercial 

fishery in Cook Inlet. 

• The fishery in question is conducted in an unusually challenging marine environment. 

The rip zones considered to be productive fishing areas can be extremely hazardous. 

• There is some historic precedence of interaction between drift gillnet operations and oil 

platforms on Cook Inlet. 

• Navigational problems typically occur when a stationary object such as an anchored 

vessel is encountered during the “drift.” 

• Lateral drift induced by anomalous current movement can present additional challenges. 

• Given rapid currents, time involved in retrieving nets with various amounts of catch, and 

a host of other factors including those mentioned above, response time and strategies 

needed to respond to a stationary object in the fishing grounds can vary extensively. 

• While oil/gas industry activities are generally supported by drift gillnetters insofar as 

these could contribute to the regional economy, resistance to any OCS development 

activity that could negatively affect drift gillnet fishery operations remains a wellentrenched norm. 

• Resistance to OCS activity relates in large part to fears about possible navigational 

hazards and new constraints on a challenged fishery. 

SUMMARY OF MITIGATION RESEARCH FINDINGS

Our approach to investigation of means and venues for addressing potential spatial conflicts 

between the drift gillnet fishery and oil and gas industry activities on the Cook OCS yielded a 

range of alternatives. The following were identified as both potentially effective and feasible: 

• Research participants commonly asserted that the most logical form of mitigation is to 

avoid placement of platforms in highly productive areas of the drift gillnet fishing 

grounds. 

• Deferral of specific popular fishing locations from lease sale areas is a preferred option 

for many fishery participants. 

ES-4 
• There is an area where drift gillnet fishing occurs relatively infrequently in the regulated 

fishing zone. This “Area of Special Consideration” coincides with an area of potential 

interest to the oil and gas industry within and south of the Cosmopolitan Unit. 

• Extended reach drilling combined with additional distance gained by drilling from the 

western portions of the Special Area of Consideration could open up the possibility of 

exploration and production on parts of the OCS with minimized disruption of drift gillnet 

operations. 

• Programs funding replacement of fishing gear lost due to entanglement on platforms 

would need to accommodate the unique characteristics of drift fishing in swift and 

unpredictable currents in the proximity of OCS platform facilities. 

• Many research participants reported that any limitations resulting from emplacement of 

an oil platform in the fishing grounds could involve a “trade” for a longer fishing season 

(and/or more openings), and/or expansion of allowable fishing grounds. This would 

require collaboration with state policy decision makers and development of inter-agency 

resource management arrangements. 

• IAI has identified models for potential involvement of stakeholders in oil and gas and 

fishery resource management decisions in the study region. These should guide local 

establishment of a Joint Council or Standing Advisory Committee on fisheries and oil 

industry activities. 

• Given its centralized position in the social structure of the fishery, and its coalescing 

function in representing the concerns of drift gillnetters in the region, the United Cook 

Inlet Drift Association (UCIDA) should take a leading role in the workings of a Joint 

Council or Committee. 

• Means for enhancing the fishery in exchange for potential or actual problem interactions 

on the OCS have been identified. The Santa Barbara County model indicates that a wide 

range of enhancement projects may be funded via industry fees stipulated through the 

offshore development permitting process. 

• Given the economic challenges encountered by drift gillnetters, an ideal means for 

enhancing the Cook Inlet drift gillnet fishery would involve improving market conditions 

for harvested salmon. The participation of the oil and gas industry in collaborative 

efforts toward this end would likely contribute to mutually beneficial relations. 

ES-5 
Table ES-2 below summarizes the primary issues of concern for participants in the drift gillnet 

fishery, and viable mitigation alternatives identified during the course of the project. 

TABLE ES-2 SUMMARY OF IDENTIFIED MITIGATION POSSIBILITIES DETERMINED TO BE FEASIBLE

Agent/Concern Mitigation Option

Emplacement of Drilling Platform in

Fishing Grounds Could Cause Net

Entanglement, Navigational Problems, 

and/or Net Loss of Fishing Grounds 

• Avoid emplacement in the fishing grounds 

• Defer rip zones and other important areas from lease sales 

• Consider reaching the OCS from the infrequently-fished Area of 

Special Consideration with extended reach drilling 

• Establish a fund that would reimburse fishermen for platformrelated gear loss in the uniquely challenging environment of 

Cook Inlet 

• Establish a vessel response program to assist in platform-related

fishing emergencies 

Oil Spills or Blowouts Could Affect 

the Resource and Drift Gillnet Fishery 

• Involve drift gillnet fishery participants in spill consultation and

response efforts 

Oil and Gas Industry Activities on the 

OCS could Increase Vessel Traffic and 

Complicate Navigation and Fishing in

Cook Inlet 

• Award affected drift captains concessions to time and area 

regulatory restrictions 

• Establish seasonal restrictions on drilling

• Establish an organized system of communication between drift

gillnet and other vessels using the Inlet, especially tankers 

All 

• Establish a Joint Council or Committee to enable inter-industry 

communication 

• Develop fisheries and product market enhancement programs to

help offset potential problems resulting from offshore oil and 

gas activity. 

ES-6 
1.0 Introduction

Cook Inlet in Southcentral Alaska is rich in oil and natural gas and marine fisheries resources. 

Offshore oil and gas production has been occurring in close proximity to fishing operations in 

the state waters of central and upper Cook Inlet since the mid-1970s. The geologic potential of 

submerged lands on the federally-administered Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) further to the 

south may eventually be explored and developed by the oil and gas industry. Research is being 

conducted to examine the feasibility, costs and benefits, and potential effects of such efforts. 

Portions of the Cook Inlet OCS are important fishing grounds, and research has been undertaken 

to examine potential interactions between fisheries and oil and gas activities in the region. 

Oil and gas industry activity on the OCS is administered by the U.S. Department of the Interior, 

Minerals Management Service (MMS). MMS has prepared an Environmental Impact Statement 

(EIS) assessing the potential effects that oil industry activities on the Cook Inlet OCS could have 

on the region’s human and physical environments. The EIS was conducted in advance of Lease 

Sales 191 and 199. The northerly portion of the lease sale area coincides with the southern range 

of the salmon drift gillnet fleet.1

 Scoping efforts associated with the EIS revealed that some

participants in the fishery were concerned that prospective oil and gas industry activities on the 

OCS might affect their at-sea operations. 

Some drift captains have reported that drilling platforms in the state jurisdiction waters of Cook 

Inlet have in the past presented navigational hazards to their operations. There are currently 15 

platforms in Upper Cook Inlet, 12 of which remain operational. These are largely outside (north) 

of the most popular contemporary drift gillnet grounds. There are no platforms in the federal 

jurisdiction waters of Cook Inlet. 

This report describes the process and results of research conducted for MMS to examine historic 

and potential future interactions between the drift gillnet fishery and the offshore oil and gas 

industry operating in Cook Inlet. Its focus is on objective definition and assessment of specific 

means for mitigating spatial conflicts between the fishery and the oil and gas industry if offshore 

platform-based exploration and development were to occur on the OCS in future years. 

Project findings are based on a period of intense research conducted during and soon after the 

summer 2003 drift season, and into the spring months of 2004. The research and report have 

been completed under MMS Contract 1435-01-03-CT-71847 by Impact Assessment, Inc. (IAI), a 

firm specializing in maritime social science research. 

In fulfillment of contract requirements, IAI has rigorously sought and identified options that 

could prove useful in mitigating spatial conflicts associated with the fisheries-oil and gas 

interface on the Cook Inlet OCS. These options and the associated description and analyses are 

intended as useful resources for MMS analysts and others with relevant responsibilities and 

 

1

 Drift gillnets are also used to harvest herring in Cook Inlet. This study focuses on the more popular and productive 

salmon drift gillnet fishery.
interests in the region. We note at the outset, however, that our findings do not imply or in any 

manner obligate any local, state, or federal agency (including MMS) or other public or private 

institution to pursue or implement any action described or recommended. 

1.1 Policy and Administrative Background 

MMS is responsible for administering oil and gas development on the OCS under stipulations in 

the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 19532

 (OCSLA). An important provision of OCSLA 

authorizes MMS to conduct and sponsor studies of coastal and marine environments potentially 

affected by oil and gas industry activities occurring on the OCS. 

NEPA (the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969) calls for use of natural and social 

science to contribute to decisions associated with major environmental policy around the United 

States. As such, federal agencies including MMS acquire, analyze, and use environmental, 

economic, and social information pertinent to decisions associated with resources on the OCS. 

MMS Offshore Program-Alaska Region oversees oil and gas activities on the OCS throughout 

Alaska, including the Cook Inlet OCS (see Map 1-1 below). As part of its functions under 

OCSLA and NEPA, the agency’s Environmental Studies Section (ESS) administers the Alaska 

Environmental Studies Program. Its purpose is to “define information needs and implement 

studies to assist in predicting, projecting, assessing, and managing potential effects on the 

human, marine, and coastal environments of the OCS and coastal areas that may be affected by 

gas and oil development” (MMS 2002c:1). Information from MMS studies is used for various 

decision-making and planning purposes, including use in agency Environmental Assessment 

(EA) and EIS documentation. 

1.2 The Research Problem and Purpose of the Study

This report provides focused description of the drift gillnet fishery and its historic and potential 

future interactions with the offshore oil and gas industry in Cook Inlet. The question of whether 

spatial interactions between the industries have or may present significant problems for the drift 

gillnet fleet is treated as the primary area of inquiry for the research. Analysis of findings under 

this frame of inquiry is necessary for defining and assessing options for mitigating potential 

interface problems on the OCS. As described in this and later subsections, both industries have 

long and productive histories in the region. 

 

2

 As amended through P.L. 105-580, December 29, 2000 

2
 Map 1-1 Lease Sale Areas 191 and 199 in the Cook Inlet Planning Area

3
1.2.1 Coexistence as Context 

Fishing and extraction of oil and gas resources occur in close proximity in various parts of 

Alaska. This is certainly the case in Cook Inlet where communities have developed in 

association with involvement in both forms of enterprise. Cook Inlet is a geologic basin 

characterized by varied and extensive oil and gas reserves, and a large embayment encompassing 

some 8,000 square-miles of tidal water and extensive marine fisheries resources. 

The drainage area associated with Cook Inlet includes approximately 39,000 square-miles of 

Southcentral Alaska (Cook Inlet Keeper 2003). Large runs of salmon move in from the ocean to 

return to their native streams in this region each summer, typically ending the migration by late 

August. Silver salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch), also known as Coho salmon, continue spawning 

in the Kenai River well into October. 

The region’s first salmon cannery was opened at Kasilof in 1882 (Sherwood 1974:105), and the 

Alaska Petroleum Company initiated drilled in Oil Bay in 1901 (Moffitt 1974:133-137). 

Discovery of the gas-rich Swanson Field occurred in the mid-1950s at about the same time drift 

gillnet fishing methods were introduced in the region. 

Drift gillnet fishing involves the laying out of long gill nets in targeted areas and at calculated 

times to harvest Sockeye salmon, also known as Red salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka), and other 

salmon species. Reds are the primary target given a relatively high market value. King or 

Chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) are also valuable, though the species generally 

constitutes only about 2.5 percent of Upper Cook Inlet ex-vessel salmon value (Alaska 

Department of Fish and Game 2003a). Each of the salmon species are taken incidentally (and on 

occasion by design) by drift gillnet methods, depending on the timing and location of 

coincidental runs, and the market value of the moment. 

Drift gillnet vessels are typically between 28 and 44 feet in length. Many experienced captains 

set their nets in rip tide zones where salmon are said to congregate. Others opt for less turbulent 

areas. Rip tides are areas of unusual current movement, often characterized by unique patterns 

of surface flow and flotsam (readers are referred to LGL Alaska Research Associates (2000) for 

detailed analysis of rip tides in Cook Inlet). The vessel drifts in the vicinity of the net prior to 

retrieval. A more detailed description of the operation is provided in Section 3.0 of this report. 

Fishing in Cook Inlet is unique insofar as participants encounter some of the most challenging 

current conditions of any Alaska fishery. Currents can sometimes reach seven and eight knots, 

and wind waves are characteristically steep. Water depth in the fishing zone is typically in the 

range of 25 to 50 fathoms. Local weather is affected by orthographic flow associated with 

terminal end of the high and glaciated Alaska Range on the western shoreline of the Inlet. Four 

active volcanic peaks are visible. Smoke and steam are often seen above Mt. Redoubt, which 

towers 10,198 feet above Cook Inlet. 

4
There are numerous adjacent fisheries. Among the important fleets and fisheries with which 

participants in the drift gillnet fishery interact (and in some cases participate) are: (1) the purse 

seine and set net salmon fisheries3

; (2) the halibut sport, charter, and commercial fisheries; (3) 

the herring fisheries; (4) various subsistence fisheries; and (5) the salmon sport and charter 

fisheries (see Hermann et al. 2001 for description of the latter). 

The operating range and efficiency of the drift fleet increased dramatically during the late 1960s 

and into the 1970s in proportion with improving efficiency of vessels, engines, and gear. This 

occurred during the same era when offshore drilling activity was initiated in earnest in Cook 

Inlet. The first offshore oil platform was developed in Cook Inlet in 1964, the same year as a 

large discovery near the McArthur River (Kenai Peninsula Borough 2003). Industry activity was 

extensive during the 1960s and 1970s, with 15 offshore facilities moving into production mode 

in Upper Cook Inlet during the period (State Of Alaska 1999a:6-14). 

By the mid-1970s, offshore production was occurring in close proximity to vessels pursuing pink 

or humpback salmon (Oncorhynchus gorbuscha), and chum or dog salmon (Onchorynchus keta) 

in the more northerly reaches of the Inlet.4

 The 1980s were boom years for oil development and 

fisheries production and value in the region, and reportedly it was not uncommon for Kenai 

Peninsula oil industry workers to take time off from their jobs to participate in the drift gillnet 

fishery. 

1.2.2 Trends of Diminishing Production 

Salmon production in Cook Inlet is extensive, though it has varied over time. Total salmon 

harvest in 1975, the first year documented by Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G), 

was 9.5 million pounds, with fleet-wide gross earnings totaling $4.5 million. Production peaked 

in 1992 at 45.3 million pounds, with fleet earnings totaling $66.4 million. There were 580 active 

permits that year. Decline in productivity since the peak was precipitous and lasted through the 

1990s, averaging 12.2 million pounds between 1994 and 2001, across an average of 539 active 

permits. Production in 2002 was 12.6 million pounds, with fleet-wide gross earnings totaling 

$5.7 million across only 409 permits. 

Market conditions underlie a significant decline in drift gillnet activity in recent years. Many 

Cook Inlet operators have chosen not to fish their permits, opting to wait until prices improve. 

Part of the problem relates to saturation of the domestic seafood market with pen-reared salmon 

from domestic and foreign sources. Some pen-reared salmon was recently found to contain 

relatively high levels of dioxin (Hites et al. 2004:226-229; Stokstad 2004:154-155). Public 

 

3

 There were 743 active/viable Cook Inlet set net permits in 2002 (Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission

2003). Many participants in this fishery are members of the Kenai Peninsula Fishermen’s Association. As of

February 2003, the official position of the Association on Lease Sales 191 and 1999 was “cautious concern” (Kenai 

Peninsula Fishermen’s Association 2003). 

4

 Participants report that formerly favorable prices for pink salmon and the migration patterns of pinks historically

lead some vessels to work in areas near the existing platforms. There reportedly is now little market incentive to

fish in those areas and hence little interaction between the vessels and industry infrastructure. 

5
concerns about farmed salmon may actually benefit Alaska market conditions, if marketing 

strategies can capitalize on the attractive attributes of salmon caught in the state. Some drift 

gillnet participants in the region look to the apparent success of “Copper River wild” as a model 

for marketing Cook Inlet salmon. 

As noted in Table 1-1 below, participation in the drift gillnet fishery occurs at varying levels of 

involvement across the Kenai Peninsula and other communities. Of note in the table, many of 

the communities along the Peninsula are experiencing some measure of population growth. 

Total population in Kenai Borough in 2000 was 49,691 persons, or roughly about eight percent 

of the year 2000 statewide population of 626,932 persons. 

Table 1-1 Population Trends and Year 2000 Permits and Landings: Kenai Borough Communities 

Community or 

CDP 

1990 Pop./ 

2000 Pop. 

Households/ 

Permit Holders 

% Drift Gillnet 

Households 

Permits 

Fished 

Total lbs. 

Landed 

Est. Gross 

Earnings $ 

Kenai 6,327/6,942 2,622/66 2.5 61 768,418 521,666

Sterling CDP 3,802/4,705 1,676/5 .2 5 74,565 49,527

Nikiski CDP 2,743/4,327 1,514/17 1.1 * * * 

Homer 3,660/3,946 1,599/102 6.3 92 1,245,730 842,620

Soldotna 3,482/3,759 1,465/55 3.7 53 635,643 438,598

Anchor Point CDP 866/1,845** 711/15 2.1 15 212,644 147,124 

Ninilchik 485/757 320/11 3.4 9 122,697 81,733

Kasilof 316/477 180/32 17.0 30 380,014 266,164

Nikolaevsk CDP 371/345 96/5 5.2 4 54,787 36,922

Clam Gulch 62/186 67/3 4.4 3 † †

Source: State of Alaska, Department of Fish & Game, ACFEC, and U.S. Census Bureau 2000; 

*Data included with the City of Kenai; ** Growth is related in part to allocation of $22 million to construct the North

Pacific Volcano Learning Center near Anchor Point; † Reporting would violate the “rule of three.”

With regard to interest in the Cook Inlet region oil and gas resources, over 40 lease sales have 

been held in the region by the State of Alaska since a 77,000 acre area in Upper Cook Inlet was 

leased during the first bidding in 1959. The most recent sale in May 2004 resulted in successful 

sale of 72 tracts sold, a significant increase over the 27 tracts sold in 2003. Cook Inlet OCS lease 

sales have been held in 1977, 1981, 1982, and 1997, though again, there has never been 

production on the OCS in this region. No companies expressed immediate interest in OCS Lease 

Sale 191 tracts in May 2004, leading to its cancellation. Lease Sale 199 is scheduled for 2006. 

As of 2002 - the most current year for which total production had been calculated at the time of 

this writing - the Kenai Peninsula and offshore fields had produced since initial days of 

production some 1.293 billion barrels (bbl) of crude and 6.421 trillion cubic feet (cf) of natural 

gas. The year 2002 production level in the Cook Inlet basin was 11.284 mbbl of oil and 209 bcf 

of natural gas. Natural gas is exported for as liquid natural gas and fertilizer, and used to 

produce electricity and heat throughout the region, including Anchorage. As noted in Figures 1-

1 and 1-2 below, oil production levels peaked in the 1970s, but gas production has only just 

peaked, with indication of a impending steep decline (Alaska Division of Oil and Gas 2003). 

6
Cook Inlet Historic and Forecast Oil Production

1958 - 2022

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

120.0

195819621966

19701974

1978

1982

1986

1990199419982002

2006

2010

2014

20182022

Millions of Barrels per Year

Beaver Creek

Cannery Loop1

Redoubt (Osprey)

McArthur River

All Other

West McArthur River

Trading Bay

Granite Point

Middle Ground Shoal

Swanson River

Figure 1-1 Oil Production Trend Line for Cook Inlet Region (from Alaska Division of Oil and Gas) 

Cook Inlet Historic and Projected Gas Production

1958 - 2022

0.0

50.0

100.0

150.0

200.0

250.0

1958

1962

1966

1970

1974

1978

19821986

1990

1994

1998

2002

2006

2010

2014

2018

2022

Bcf perYear

Proven Undeveloped

All Other

Swanson River

Kenai

McArthur River

Beluga River

North Cook Inlet

Figure 1-2 Gas Production Trend Line (from Alaska Division of Oil and Gas) 

The trend of diminishing oil and gas resource development in Cook Inlet (State of Alaska 

Division of Oil and Gas 1999:6-20) is reflected in the regional employment figures depicted in 

Table 1-2. While numbers of persons working in the extraction sector have increased, 

increasingly fewer persons are employed in manufacturing. 

7
Table 1-2 Oil and Gas Employment, Persons by Sector, Kenai Peninsula Borough 

Sector 1990 1995 2000

Oil and Gas Extraction 1,175 1,104 1,622 

Oil and Gas Manufacturing 444 482 408 

Chemicals and Allied Products N/A N/A N/A 

Petrolem and Coal Products N/A N/A N/A 

TOTAL 1,619 1,586 2,030

Source: State of Alaska, Department of Labor and Workforce Development

Moreover, oil and gas industry employment has declined in recent years relative to other forms 

of employment in the region. Kenai Borough employment figures for 1980 indicate employment 

in the industry reached 16 percent, but by the end of the 1990s the figure had dropped to 8.9 

percent. 

The fishing and oil and gas industries have and been and remain important throughout the Kenai 

Peninsula. But both appear to be waning in terms of production and economic return. 

Diminishing production has led residents to report concern about the future economic well-being 

of their families and communities, though many such concerns also relate to national economic 

trends and challenges experienced at the local level. 

1.2.3 Interactions and Challenges 

Geologists are optimistic that northeasterly portions of the Cook Inlet OCS (southwest of 

Ninilchik) could yield significant volumes of oil and natural gas. Many Kenai Peninsula 

residents recognize the benefits of offshore exploration and development, while others voice 

concern about potential environmental problems. 

There have been incidents of discord between the fishing and oil and gas industries and their 

participants and representatives in the region. This was the situation following the grounding 

and spillage of crude oil by the Glacier Bay in Cook Inlet 1987, and the Exxon Valdez in Prince

William Sound in 1989. In the former case, the drift gillnet fishery was disrupted by the local 

presence of oil at the height of a particularly productive season and when market prices for 

salmon were particularly high. The fishery was closed entirely during the 1989 season due to 

fears of tainting from the Exxon Valdez accident. The protracted nature of litigation associated 

with the Exxon Valdez spill has led to dissatisfaction among fishers5

 involved in the situation. 

The United Cook Inlet Drift Association (UCIDA) formally represents drift gillnet fishery 

participants in the region. Its leadership has officially alternated in recent years between 

opposition to and support of oil and gas industry activity in Cook Inlet. Opposition was 

particularly strong after the oil spills, but has shifted in recent years to guarded support based on 

concerns about the regional importance of the oil industry. Concern about the probabilities of a 

 

5

 There are relatively very few women active in the Cook Inlet drift gillnet fishery. While we use the gender-neutral 

phrases “fishery participants,” or “drift gillnetters” throughout most of this report, the term “fishermen” is most 

accurate in terms of rate of participation by gender, and is also used. 

8
significant spill resulting from activities on the Cook Inlet OCS appear to underlie the beginnings

of a shift in official stance back toward politically cautious opposition to offshore drilling and 

related activities. 

The stated concerns of drift gillnet fishery participants are highly focused on three potentialities: 

(1) fishing and navigation would be physically compromised by placement of an oil platform in 

the fishing grounds; and (2) an oil spill in the region would potentially damage the resource, and 

disrupt fishing and market conditions, and (3) increased vessel traffic due to offshore activity 

could affect fishing and navigation, and reduce the total allowable fishing area. 

1.2.4 Areas of Inquiry 

Given the stated concerns of drift gillnet fishery participants, and the interest of MMS in 

mitigating problems on the OCS, the agency has sponsored this study to more fully examine the 

issues, to identify viable mitigation options, and to assess the issues and options given the social, 

economic, and ecological context of the region. IAI’s approach to the research has thus been 

designed to address two basic areas of inquiry. 

First, we seek to fully understand and describe the drift gillnet-oil industry interface in Cook 

Inlet. The intent of the sponsored research to investigate mitigation strategies logically presupposes that oil and gas industry activities on the OCS would indeed disrupt the drift fleet. 

Claims and concerns of this nature have been asserted by drift gillnetters in the region for some

years. Our research treats the assertion as a working hypothesis, and uses various research 

methods to “ground-truth” the claims. In short, we seek to answer whether establishment of 

platform drilling and associated activities (for example, movement of support vessels, acoustic 

testing, transport, release of contaminants) on the OCS could actually cause problems for drift 

gillnetters. As part of this effort, we examine the historical interface between the fleet and oil 

and gas operations in the state jurisdiction waters of Cook Inlet. 

If the study shows that there is potential for problems, the research moves on to explore and 

define specific ways to mitigate them. In order to do this, we systematically identify a sample of

seasoned drift fishery participants with whom to discuss individually and in group settings (a) the 

range of problem interactions that could occur between the fleet and oil and gas industry on the 

OCS, and (b) feasible means for reducing or solving those problems. 

The mitigation analysis draws heavily on our literature search of offshore interface problems and 

solutions developed in various other places around the world (Appendix A). Of particular note 

in this review is the work of Cormick and Knaster (1986), Fusaro (1991), and Knaster et al. 

(1998), who describe a Fisheries/Oil Committee and Liaison Office that addresses the concerns 

of fishery participants and oil and gas industry firms active on and around the California OCS 

west of Santa Barbara County and Ventura County. The work of the Faroe Islands Hydrocarbon 

Planning Commission (1997) is also relevant. Like the newly commissioned Canadian group 

called Ocean One, it advocates the participation of fishing and oil and gas industry 

representatives in various think-tank and decision-making processes. Finally, the research and 

analysis provided in the MMS Final EIS for Lease Sales 191 and 199 (MMS 2003a,b,c), and in 

9
the Final Findings of the Director for the Cook Inlet Areawide Oil and Gas Lease Sale (State of 

Alaska Division of Oil and Gas 1999) are topically and geographically highly relevant to the 

current project. 

1.3 Project Objectives and Research Methods Employed 

A series of interrelated objectives were formulated by MMS ESS to gather the range of 

information needed to satisfy the primary goals of the project. IAI subsequently designed a 

research plan and used various social science research methods to meet those objectives and to 

collect and analyze the various data needed to address the research questions outlined above.6

 

The project objectives, rationale, and corresponding research methods used during the course of 

the project7

 are depicted in Table 1-1 below: 

Table 1-3 Project Objectives and Associated Research Methods 

Objective Purpose Method/Approach

Conduct Full Literature Search Investigate how similar conflicts 

have been handled around world 

Collect/analyze all relevant data 

from extant secondary sources 

Synthesize Relevant Secondary

Source and Archival 

Information 

Integrate existing information about: 

conflict mitigation; social, economic, 

and demographic conditions in the 

region; and regional drift gillnet and 

oil/gas operations

Synthesize into single database

searchable by topic, location 

environmental factor, group or other

relevant characteristic 

Collect Data on Drift Gillnet 

Operations, Preferred Fishing 

Locations, and Salmon 

Migration Patterns 

Identify areas of competing use and 

basic operational aspects of the drift 

fleet including issues of navigation, 

safety, fishing strategies. 

Use social network sampling approach

to identify seasoned drift fishery 

participants for purpose of interviewing

Construct a Geographic 

Information System (GIS) 

Depict/analyze spatial elements of

historic, current, and future 

interactions between drift gillnet fleet 

and oil/gas industry 

Use existing baseline and new data 

collected through interviews and 

mapping exercises with key informants

Conduct Ethnographic Work on

Drift Gillnet Vessels 

Develop insight into contemporary

drift gillnet operations and potential 

interaction with oil/gas industry 

vessels and/or infrastructure 

Observe/interview key informants on

their vessels and record behaviors and 

strategies of drift operators and

operations 

Conduct Ethnographic Work on

the Oil Platforms 

Develop insight into contemporary

oil platform operations and potential

interaction with drift gillnet vessels 

Observe/interview platform operators, 

record relevant information about 

operations 

Meet and Consult with Fishery 

Participants and Groups

Refine information about drift 

operations and mitigation issues;

provide opportunity for commentary 

on preliminary research findings 

Hold meetings with seasoned drift 

gillnet operators in the study region. 

 

6

 The project research design is described in the deliverable titled “Guide to Field Activities: Driftnet Fishery 

Research,” submitted early in the period of contract performance. 

7

 Preliminary findings have been provided in the previously submitted Literature Review and Mid-Fieldwork

Progress Report deliverables. 

10

2.0 Research Methods

This section describes the research methods and design used to meet the project goals and 

objectives. A social network methodology is emphasized and described at the level of detail 

necessary for understanding our sampling rationale and subsequent analysis of the perspectives 

and experiences of seasoned drift gillnetters. Additional aspects of our approach to primary and 

secondary source data collection are reviewed in brief. Appendix A of this report provides 

further detail regarding the social network methodology and its results. 

2.1 Overview of Research Methods and Data Analysis 

Meeting the goals and objectives of the project required that IAI attend to three basic research 

priorities. These were: (1) in-depth attention to the socio-political nature of the Cook Inlet drift 

gillnet fishery, (2) development of a scientifically sound and objective approach to the topics of 

inquiry, and (3) collection of reliable information for purposes of valid and meaningful analysis. 

The following reviews the most pertinent elements of the research design based on these needs. 

Multiple research methods were used during the course of the project, as described below. 

Interview sampling was systematic, thoroughly documented, and designed to allow for testing of 

pertinent research hypotheses. We sought to observe activities in a range of geographic and 

social settings. Interview and observational data were organized by topical category and by 

informant, and the resulting databases were systematically consulted to build the analyses. 

Wherever possible, the analyses were based on information gathered through multiple research 

methods or measures. This helped ensure that the information collected was reliable, and the 

analyses were valid and meaningful. 

2.2 Summary of Research Interaction in the Study Area 

As summarized in Table 1-1, the study team conducted various forms of social research during 

the 2003 drift gillnet season. The information generated through these methods contributed to 

the various analyses needed to meet project goals and objectives, including thorough description 

of the fishery and the OCS interface issues, and identification of feasible mitigation alternatives. 

This work involved: 

a) Compiling, analyzing, and synthesizing various relevant secondary source information; 

b) Developing a literature review of fisheries and oil/gas interactions and mitigation issues 

from maritime contexts around the world; 8

 

c) Observing and documenting fleet activities in and around the region’s harbors throughout 

the season; 

 

8

 Findings are provided in the Literature Review project deliverable, and in Appendix A of this report. 

12
 

d) Systematically identifying 149 drift gillnet fishery participants through social network 

sampling, and conducting preliminary phone interviews with a majority of these persons; 

e) Conducting in-depth interviews with 52 seasoned drift gillnetters, many of which 

included mapping exercises to determine and depict spatial aspects of fleet activities, and 

31 of which were guided by an ethnographic protocol (Appendix F); 

f) Conducting some 25 unstructured interviews with persons active in the fishery processing 

and support sector; 

g) Engaging in scores of in-depth discussions with local, state, and federal government 

officials involved in marine fisheries management and/or oil and gas industry activities in 

the region; 

h) Engaging in participant observation case studies with five different drift gillnet operators 

on five drift gillnet trips in Cook Inlet; 

i) Engaging in interview and observational work on a drilling platform above Cook Inlet; 

j) Identifying a group of (19) highly recommended and seasoned drift gillnet fishery 

participants; and 

k) Conducting, facilitating, and documenting a series of in-depth interviews, focus group 

meetings, and follow-up interviews with those key informants. 

2.3 Interview Sampling and Social Network Analysis 

A social network sampling process was used and rigorously documented to identify persons with 

extensive experience in the Cook Inlet drift gillnet fishery, and to better understand the social 

structure of the fishery. Experienced captains were initially identified through our discussions 

with ADF&G staff, and each was subsequently asked to identify other highly experienced fishery 

participants. This process was repeated until no new seasoned participants were named by peers. 

This work was conducted in all of the main communities along the Kenai Peninsula. Field staff 

made directed efforts to contact and interview otherwise potentially obscured groups, including 

persons of Russian ancestry (most of whom live in the Nikolaevsk and Ninilchik areas), and 

fishery participants who live in the Pacific Northwest, but who travel to drift fish in Cook Inlet in 

the summers. Given that members of the out-of-state (termed “Outside” in Alaskan vernacular) 

fleet typically make a quick exit south at season’s end, the field team focused on working with 

these participants in Alaska during the early part of the drift gillnet season. 

Groups of highly recommended and socially integrated participants were ultimately identified 

through social network analysis. The core of the sample is depicted in Figure 2-1 below. 

Incoming arrows in the figure depict incoming and outgoing nominations, proxies for 

13
interpersonal social connections. We emphasize the value of the social network method for 

identifying and consulting with persons of extensive achieved status.9

 Scores of fishermen were 

consulted for their fishing knowledge and expertise during the course of the project, but these 

were the most highly recommended, and those with whom we worked most extensively. 

Figure 2-1 The Most Frequently Recommended Drift Gillnetters 

Given our interest in using the reported perspectives and experiences of seasoned drift gillnetters 

to aid in describing and explaining the issues and processes of relevance to this study, we 

provide in Table 2-1 the pseudo-identities of the core group. Readers may thus “locate” the 

status of the informants within the core network.10 Based on the respect given the core 

participants by their peers, and their heightened level of integration with the overall sample, we 

emphasize the importance of their experiences and perspectives in this report, and refer to them

by pseudonym throughout relevant portions, especially in Sections 4.0 and 5.0. For purposes of 

additional reference, the table also depicts the fisherman’s general area of residence (north or 

south of Ninilchik), and whether or not he is affiliated with UCIDA. 

 

9 This reputation-based method may be seen as introducing sampling bias in that it does not include beginners 

whose experiences are useful for understanding the issues addressed by this study. Some beginners were included in

the more generalized sample, however, and moreover we submit that the seasoned fishermen were once also 

beginners and remember in empirical terms that earlier phase. They are therefore uniquely situated to and do report 

both their own period of learning, and their observations of novice captains active in the fishery today. It may also 

appear that the sample does not include highly independent and/or asocial participants. This is not necessarily the 

case since aloof and independent participants can also be highly productive fishery participants, and are often wellrespected by peers (Glazier 2002).

10 Of note in the table, and speaking to the value of the social network sampling method weighed against more 

traditional but less systematic methods for identifying ethnographic informants, Mr. D. Sparrow was contacted early 

in the study on a tip that he was highly knowledgeable and experienced. Subsequent interaction gradually proved

this to be true and he was eventually judged also to be a highly analytical insider – in short, an ideal informant. The 

more systematic method subsequently supported that assessment.

14
As revealed in the table, through the hypothesis-testing investigations described in Appendix B, 

and throughout the course of this project, UCIDA is an important institution for fishery 

participants in the region. While many fishermen also speak for themselves, the Association 

serves an important coalescing and representative function. This may ultimately prove to be 

critically important in implementing strategies to mitigate potential fishery-industry problems on 

the Cook Inlet OCS. 

Table 2-1 The Core of the Network Sample: The Most Highly Recommended Seasoned Drift Gillnetters 

Drift Gillnetter Residence UCIDA Afffiliation Nominations Normalized In-degree** Rank

D. Sparrow North Yes 23 15.54 1 

T. Band North Yes 11 7.43 2 

B. Herrs North Yes 9 6.08 3 

D. Earle North Yes 8 5.4 4 

T. Eaves North Yes 8 5.4 4 

R. Merton North Yes 8 5.4 4 

F. O’Malley Interface* Yes 8 5.4 4 

B. Cuenta North Yes 7 4.73 5 

D. Mootan North Yes 7 4.73 5 

E. Thomas North Yes 7 4.73 5 

C. Willis North Yes 7 4.73 5

J. Eaves North No 6 4.05 6 

W. Hybrid South Yes 6 4.05 6 

W. Polley North Yes 6 4.05 6 

S. Sontrap North Yes 6 4.05 6 

D. Boot South Yes 5 3.38 7 

J. Rank South No 5 3.38 7 

J. Shower North No 5 3.38 7 

S. Watt North Yes 5 3.38 7 

* This informant is relatively well-integrated with drift gillnetters in both parts of the study area. 

** An indicator of peer-reported achieved status in the fishery

2.4 Group and Focus Group Meetings 

Research staff held a series of meetings with UCIDA representatives. These were held on three 

different occasions in order to: (a) document the perspectives of group leadership on fleet 

activities, operational economics, and other factors of importance, (b) elicit spatial information 

that would aid in depicting the historic and contemporary range of the drift gillnet fleet in the 

region, and (c) document perspectives on issues associated with mitigation of potential problems 

between the fleet and offshore industry on the OCS. 

Focus group meetings were held with our sample of core participants late in the course of the 

study. These served to: (a) refine our understanding of drift operations and spatial aspects 

thereof, (b) provide a venue for in-depth discussion of mitigation issues, and (c) enable the 

participants review and comment on study findings to date. A series of follow-up phone calls 

was conducted with the core group and other knowledgeable fishermen through the analytic and 

report-writing phases of the project as needed to further investigate or refine our understanding 

of specific issues and questions. 

15

3.0 The Oil and Gas Industry and the Drift Gillnet Fishery in Cook Inlet

This section reviews in brief the history and current status of the Cook Inlet oil and gas industry, 

and provides a more in-depth description of the drift gillnet fleet. The description is based on 

archival research, interview data, and participant observation. It is provided as context for 

understanding the historic involvement of Kenai Peninsula communities in marine fisheries and 

oil and gas industry, and for examining physical interactions between the industry and fleet on 

the OCS should oil and gas exploration move forward in future years. By extension, the section 

also provides materials needed to gauge the implications of mitigation options for the region, as 

developed in later sections. 

3.1 Oil and Gas Industry Operations in Cook Inlet 

Production of oil and gas resources in the state jurisdiction waters of Cook Inlet now has a 

lengthy history. Current interest in portions of the Cook Inlet OCS actually relates to a series of 

exploratory efforts conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, and to industry activities associated with 

the Cosmopolitan Unit. Cosmopolitan straddles state and federal waters northwest of Anchor 

Point (MMS 2003a:I-2). This subsection describes some of the history and contemporary 

characteristics of oil and gas development in the region. While production in the upper reaches 

of the Inlet has peaked, the potential for significant new findings underlies the industry’s current 

interest in the area. 

3.1.1 History and Overview

Oil was observed in Cook Inlet as early as 1853. Seepage around Inishkin and Chinitna Bays, 

and what was subsequently called Oil Bay, made the increasingly valuable resource readily 

visible. A formal claim was first made near the town of Kenai on the eastern side of the Inlet 

in1892, though no work was done to recover the oil. Pomeroy and Griffin are said to have 

staked claims near the head of Oil Bay in 1896. The Alaska Petroleum Company was organized 

to work the site in 1897, and drilling was underway by 1901. Some 50 barrels of oil were 

recovered daily until the well was abandoned in 1903. Similar efforts were undertaken in 

adjacent areas during the same period by the Alaska Oil Company. Outcomes also were similar, 

and though some oil was recovered, the wells were soon abandoned (Moffitt 1974:133-137). 

World War I and particularly World War II led to increased demand for petroleum products in 

Alaska and across the U.S. But oil and gas exploration yielded little product until 1957 when 

extensive deposits were discovered by Richfield Oil Company at what was subsequently called 

the Swanson River Oil Field. The first gas field discovery at the site is still producing. This find 

led to a leasing boom in the Alaska Territory. The State of Alaska held fifteen competitive lease 

sales between 1959 and 1965 (Naske and Slotnick 1994:242-247). By 1958, over 100 oil 

companies were actively leasing 18 million acres in Anchorage (Roderick 1997:83). A pipeline 

was constructed in 1960 to transport natural gas from the Kenai Peninsula to Anchorage where it 

could be sold and transported to various locations in the state and to other states to the south. 

17
Another pipelinewas built during the same year to move oil from the Swanson River field to 

Nikiski. 

The State of Alaska held its first offshore lease sale in 1959, a 77,000 acre area in Upper Cook 

Inlet. The first offshore oil discovery was made in 1962 at Middle Ground Shoals, soon 

followed by discovery at Beluga River. During this same period, Standard Oil broke ground for 

the first Alaskan refinery since the Katalla operation closed in the 1930s. The first offshore oil 

platform arrived in Cook Inlet in 1964, the same year during which a large discovery was made 

offshore the McArthur River (Kenai Peninsula Borough 2003). Industry activity was extensive 

during the 1960s and 1970s, with 15 active offshore facilities in Upper Cook Inlet (State Of 

Alaska 1999a:6-14). 

The State’s oil lease areas in Upper Cook Inlet cover approximately 4,400 square miles. There 

are now seven producing oil fields in the basin. Reserves are estimated at 76 million barrels of 

oil and three trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Recent industry operations include activity at the 

Tyonek Deep oil platform, the Westfork gas project in the Swanson River field, and the Osprey 

platform on Redoubt Shoals (Kenai Peninsula Borough 2003). Oil and gas field lease units in 

state jurisdiction waters include, from north to south: the South Middle Ground Shoal Unit 

(UNOCAL); the Kenai River Unit (Marathon Oil Company); the Kasilof Unit (Marathon); the 

Ninilchik Unit (Marathon, UNOCAL, Anadarko, ConocoPhillips AK, Inc., Aurora Gas, Inc., and 

ConocoPhillips Company); and the South Ninilchik Unit (UNOCAL). 

The Spark and Spurr platforms were shut-in in 1992 following decline in production. The Dillon 

platform stopped production in January 2003, and Baker was scheduled for the same in April 

2003, with shut-in mode likely to follow. Some analysts suggest that shut in costs are in the 

range of $1.5 to $2 million and that full abandonment is significantly more costly. Such costs 

are therefore factored into operational plans amidst conditions of diminishing resources in the 

upper regions of the Inlet. 

3.1.2 The Economic Importance of the Oil and Gas Industry in the Cook Inlet Region

The offshore petroleum industry has been central to the economies of Kenai Peninsula Borough, 

Southcentral Alaska, and Alaska itself since offshore production was initiated in 1967. As noted 

above, production peaked in the 1970s, and while the number of persons employed in the 

industry has been consistent or growing, the industry has employed a smaller percentage of the 

regional population. The industry reported taxable properties approaching $500 million in the 

1990s, a major source of municipal revenues through property taxation (State Of Alaska 1999; 

Kenai Peninsula Borough, 2003; Terry et al. 1980:374-386). Given the importance of the oil and 

gas industry to the region and State of Alaska, and the ongoing national demand for petroleum

products and by-products, the industry is likely to remain active in state jurisdiction waters of 

Cook Inlet, and in future years perhaps on the OCS as well. Thus, the potential for future 

interaction with the region’s drift gillnet fleet is equally likely. 

18
3.1.3 Prospects 

Cook Inlet is a geologic basin with a relatively well-understood yield potential notable in state 

waters and on the OCS within a line from about Falls Creek southwest to the COST well11 at 

153°10′ N. Increased sediment thickness and associated source rock potential here are correlated 

with enhanced potential for oil and gas (Alaska Division of Oil and Gas 1999a). There is a large 

submerged acreage of particular interest in this regard on the OCS in the southerly portions of 

Upper Cook Inlet and northerly reaches of Lower Cook Inlet. The entire Cook Inlet OCS 

planning area extends far to the south and west of this particular zone, and in total encompasses 

about 2.5 million acres. Industry activities may occur in other Cook Inlet OCS areas in future 

years, but current commercial attention is focused particularly on the northeast OCS described 

above (Craig 2004). 

For the purposes of EIS analysis, MMS assumes some 140 mbbl of oil and 190 bcf of natural gas 

may be recoverable from any given single development potentially resulting from lease sales on 

the Cook Inlet OCS (MMS 2003a:ES-I). Various companies continue to show interest in 

exploring and developing State lease areas in the vicinity of the northeastern OCS such as the 

Cosmopolitan Unit. Both traditional offshore platform and evolving shore side directional 

drilling technologies are being considered for use in the area of particular interest. 

3.1.4 Relevant Aspects of the MMS Scenario for Cook Inlet OCS Development 

This sub-section describes the nature of OCS operations under proposed scenarios of limited and 

site-specific exploration and potential production. As stated in the Cook Inlet EIS (MMS 

2003a:ES-1), MMS does indeed anticipate that if exploration and production activity is to occur 

on the Cook Inlet OCS, it will be limited in scope and highly focused in area: 

The proposal for each sale is to offer for leasing 517 whole or partial lease blocks in the 

Cook Inlet OCS Planning Area, an area encompassing approximately 2.5 million acres. 

The proposed sale area is seaward of the State of Alaska submerged lands boundary in 

Cook Inlet and extends from 3-30 miles offshore from Kalgin Island south to near

Shuyak Island. The proposed sale area excludes Shelikof Strait. Although water depths 

may exceed 650 feet, Minerals Management Service (MMS) expects most, if not all, 

exploration and development activities will take place in shallower water. For purposes 

of analysis, we assume that 140 million barrels of oil and 190 billion cubic feet of natural 

gas could be discovered and produced from a single development as a result of either or 

both sales. Only a small percentage of the blocks available for lease under the Proposed 

Action for Sales 191 and 199 likely would be leased. Of the blocks that would be leased, 

only a portion would be drilled. Of these, only a very small portion, if any, likely would 

result in production. 

 

11 Continental Offshore Strategic Test Wells were OCS exploratory wells drilled in the mid-1970s in Lower Cook

Inlet and northeast Gulf of Alaska (see Minerals Management Service 1980).

19
If activities are to move forward, a range of industrial activities would be associated with 

exploration, production, and post-production phases of a drilling operation on the OCS. Of 

these, five types of prospective activities or potential events present the possibility of affecting 

the drift fishery and its participants. These potential impacting agents are: (1) emplacement of a 

drilling platform in an area where drift gillnet fishing occurs or has historically occurred and 

could disrupt navigation and/or fishing, (2) oil spills or blowouts that could affect the resource or 

disrupt the fishery, (3) increased vessel traffic in the Inlet, (4) discharge of drilling muds or other 

drilling-related materials into the water column in a manner that would affect salmon, and (5) 

seismic testing during periods and in locations that could affect salmon behavior, 

MMS has drawn on the best available research and monitoring information to address each of 

these impacting agents in its EIS. Relevant EIS findings are depicted in summary form in Table 

3-1 below. 

Table 3-1 Summary of EIS Analysis by Issue of Concern for Drift Gillnetters 

Agent/Concern Summary MMS EIS Analysis Based on Proposed Scope of Action 

Emplacement of Drilling Platform in

Fishing Grounds Could Affect Drift

Gillnet Operations

“Offshore construction, platforms, and pipelines are expected to result

in some space-use conflicts; however, these are expected to be few in 

number and minor in scope.”1

Oil Spills or Blowouts Could Affect the 

Resource and the Drift Gillnet Fishery 

“Small oil spills are not expected to result in closures, or reduced 

market values over the life of the proposal.” “Based on the losses from

a closure and the annual average value of the Cook Inlet commercial 

fishery (about $41 million), the unlikely 4,600 bbl oil pipeline in

Lower Cook Inlet could cause closure of the fishery over tainting 

concerns and result in an estimated loss of about 22% to 37% per year 

for two years. It is possible that the fishery could be closed for a whole 

year, resulting in a 100% loss for that year . . These effects are 

considered unlikely given the chance of a spill occurring.” 1

Oil and Gas Industry Activities on the 

OCS could Increase Vessel Traffic in 

Cook Inlet 

“Space conflicts associated with the transportation of platforms or 

logistics (supplies or personnel) between construction or production 

sites and shore bases will need to be coordinated between the lessees 

and operators and the commercial-fishing industry . .” 2 

Discharge of Drilling Muds Could

Affect Salmon Migration Patterns

“Drilling discharges from exploration are not expected to affect 

commercial fishing due to the limited area affected near the platform

discharge point.” 1

Seismic Testing Could Affect Salmon 

Behavior 

“Seismic surveys, planned and coordinated with the commercialfishing industry, are expected to have a minimal effect on the Cook 

Inlet commercial-fishing industry.” 1

1

 Analysis of potential effects from MMS (2003c: Table II.B-2) 2

 Analysis of potential effects from MMS (2003a:IV-137) 

Under conditions of what is projected to be a limited production scenario, MMS (2003a:IV-43) 

reports that operations would require construction of one drilling platform, up to 50 miles of 

offshore pipeline, and up to 75 miles of onshore pipeline. The latter pipeline would connect 

offshore pipe at the Anchor Point landfall to the Nikiski oil and gas complex. 

20
3.2 The Cook Inlet Drift Gillnet Fishery 

The drift gillnet salmon fishery has a long tenure in Cook Inlet and remains an important aspect 

of the region’s economy and way of life. The treacherous nature of Cook Inlet, and the 

productive nature of its fisheries lend both challenge and reward to its participants. While drift 

gillnetters have expressed concern about the potential for new oil and gas activity in the vicinity 

of their fishing grounds, they face more certain challenges as well. This section describes the 

history of the fishery, and the range of environmental challenges encountered by the fleet at the 

beginning of this new century. 

3.2.1 Early History 

The salmon fishery of Cook Inlet has been an important aspect of life on Kenai Peninsula for 

centuries. The Dena'ina Indian village of Skitok at the mouth of the Kenai River was a prime 

fishing locale centuries before the arrival of Russian fur traders (Osgood 1974:9). The Russians 

later relied heavily on salmon at their trading posts throughout the region. But the commercial 

fishing era did not begin until the United States purchased Alaska from the Russians (Naske and 

Slotnick 1994:101). 

Cook Inlet’s commercial salmon fishery was established in 1882 when a cannery was built on 

the north bank of the Kasilof River (Sherwood 1974:105). The fishery has always been a 

dangerous one, and in 1898 the Fish Commission described commercial pursuit of salmon here 

as extremely hazardous given its “swift currents.” During the early era, much of the harvest was 

taken by trap. In 1896, the Kasilof cannery reported that 87 percent of the red salmon catch was 

taken with traps. The cannery employed about 35 harvesters during that period (Fribrock 1999). 

By the turn of the twentieth century, the salmon fishery had become the economic mainstay of 

the region. It remained so up until the Second World War. Salmon harvest during the first half 

of the century peaked in 1939 throughout Alaska, then entered a long period decline until it was 

temporarily halted by the institution of conservation measures following establishment of 

statehood in 1959 (Colt 1999:7). 

In the early days of the drift gillnet fishery, canneries leased vessels to the fishermen. A woman 

contacted during the field phase of this project recalled that her father and his friends paid their 

cannery 22 percent of earned revenue for use of the boat, and 11 percent more if they used 

company-owned gear such as nets and line. Different canneries purchased and leased different 

types of boats. For instance, Kenai Packers bought and leased metal boats, while Ward’s Cove 

and R. Lee purchased and leased wood vessels. 

The high rate of efficiency of fish traps preceded the conservation measures. Use of traps was 

widespread as they enabled canneries to maximize yield while minimizing labor and equipment 

costs. Pile-type traps required a large initial investment to drive piles into the Inlet bottom. This 

limited competition from small independent operations and required little maintenance, but was 

21
accompanied by strong opposition from independent operators and reportedly led to fierce debate 

in Congress about its effects on the sockeye salmon stock and local employment: 

Representative John Rankin of Mississippi said that in traveling along the coast of British 

Columbia he saw a large number of people out in small fishing boats making their living 

from the sea, but that in Alaska he found the traps had virtually driven the little man from

the fishery (Cooley 1963:120). 

The U.S. House of Representatives passed the White Bill of 1924 in response to outcry from

independents. The Bill included the following provisions: (a) it outlawed “exclusive fishing 

privileges,” (b) established that “no fixed gear could be set in waters where the distance from

shore to shore was less than one thousand feet, or within five hundred yards of any salmon 

stream, (c) made “it unlawful to place traps in bays, inlets, or estuaries less than three miles wide 

or within one mile of the mouth of any stream,” and (d) did the same for purse seines (Cooley 

1963:120-121). 

With accumulation of capital and clout, cannery operators were relatively more capable than 

independents of attaining their interests through politics. Despite arguments to the contrary 

offered by independents, cannery representatives successfully argued that the resource could 

sustain contemporary harvest levels. Restrictions on traps and purse seines were eventually 

removed under pressure from cannery operators. 

But the trend shifted in 1930 when the Commissioner of Fisheries introduced restrictions by 

which “both the number of traps and the number of operating canneries were reduced by around 

50 percent” (Cooley 1963:135). The measure was aimed both at easing pressure on the resource 

and reducing production levels that at the time were driving down salmon prices. 

Federal conservation measures were nevertheless unable to reduce declining salmon runs 

throughout the 1940s. As the resource diminished, market prices encouraged further exploitation. 

This situation continued essentially until management of the fishery was turned over to the State 

in 1959 (Cooley 1963:165-166). In the last year of federal control of the fishery, “fishermen [in 

Cook Inlet] caught the fewest salmon taken since the earliest days of the fishery - only 1.3 

million” (Rearden 1983:77). Once the state took control of the fishery, the stock began to slowly

rebuild until 1982 when the Cook Inlet fishery had its largest year ever, with 3.1 million landed 

salmon. 

22


Despite current trends, many fishermen clearly love the lifestyle. As one noted optimistically, 

“as soon as prices pick up, you better believe those permits are gonna’ get fished, and it’s just a 

matter of time.” In the meantime, however, marketing problems abound, and many participants 

are reportedly relying on other skills and opportunities to earn a living. 

The State of Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission administers Cook Inlet drift gillnet 

permitting. Permits are transferable, and therefore there is extensive turnover and changing 

participation in the fishery over time. Permit values have varied dramatically in recent years, 

peaking at $202,058 in 1990, and falling to their lowest value of $11,500 in 2002. 

Salmon fisheries are in widespread decline across Alaska. This is blamed partly on poor prices 

that are, in turn, related to competition with farmed salmon product. But as noted by 

McGoodwin (1990), a host of factors underlay the difficulties of small vessel fishing fleets 

around the world, including, but not limited to: frequent market fluctuations, rising fixed and trip 

costs, competing fleets, and demanding regulatory regimes. 

While this research project involved some limited assessment of change in salmon migration and 

abundance patterns, there was little evidence that these factors are or are perceived as important 

sources of change in the contemporary fishery. While pink and chum salmon are no longer 

pursued in the northerly reaches of the Inlet as in years past, the shift is probably more closely 

associated with diminished market prices than with migratory changes, although both fishery 

participants and biologists agree that the species is not being tracked. 

The common sentiment regarding general patterns of abundance and migratory patterns is that 

these are cyclic. This is expressed by F. O’Malley, one of the highly recommended fishermen in 

our sample: 

“No big change in the migration of the salmon that I’ve noticed. There may be 

fewer fish earlier in the season than in years past. But it’s cyclical. In the ‘60s, 

we had good fishing and then in the ‘70s it was poor. We had some really lousy 

years in mid-70s due to poor catch and escapement. Then the stocks were rebuilt, 

and they got back to normal and in ’86 to ’92 they were good. Now we are in a 

decline again.” 

As described throughout this report, drift fishery participants blame their fishing problems

primarily on the market. These have wide ranging effects, and problems in the fishery are not 

without apparent effects at the household level. As depicted in Chart 3-1 below, over half of the 

31 drift gillnetters participating in our protocol-driven interviews reported experiencing 

household finance problems. These problems may or may not be fully and directly related to 

participation in marine fisheries in Alaska, but in any case it may be correctly inferred that such 

participation is not solving money problems as it did for some, for quite some time, in the boom

years of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 

25
Chart 3-1 Seasoned Drift Gillnetters Reporting Financial Hardship

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Responding Seasoned

Participants (N=31)

In responding to the current economic situation, certain processors and other fishing interests in 

Kenai Peninsula Borough have begun to market Cook Inlet salmon as a uniquely “wild” product, 

similar to a program undertaken by marketers active in the Copper River fishery. Although 

processing plants in the regions are still routinely called canneries, in fact most fish is frozen 

prior to distribution. The industry as a whole is focusing increasingly on the production of highquality and value-added products. There is a growing perception that adding value to salmon 

through smoking, de-boning, and filleting will lead to increased profits. While such efforts may 

bear some positive results, it should be noted that improved economic conditions in the fishery 

may have the effect not only of heightening profits in the distribution sector, but may also 

improve the chances that marginally situated harvesters can perpetuate a much valued fishing 

lifestyle. 

3.2.4 Geographic Aspects of the Cook Inlet Drift Gillnet Fishery 

Extensive effort was applied during the course of this project to determine and document spatial 

aspects of drift gillnet operations in Cook Inlet. The in-depth interviews we conducted involved 

general and specific questioning about spatial aspects of drift fishing, and a series of mapping 

exercises. The latter required that drift gillnetters indicate on specially designed maps where 

they used to fish, where they fish now, and other spatial aspects of their operations and those of 

the fleet in its entirety. We compiled this information and developed a draft composite map of 

the historic and contemporary range of the fleet, areas of contemporary focus across the drift 

season, areas and locations of concentrated runs and associated harvest areas now and over time, 

and areas of known interaction with other fleets. This map was subsequently used for 

discussion with, and repeatedly revised by, our sample of highly recommended drift gillnetters. 

The essential finding of the geographic analysis is that strategy varies so extensively across the 

fleet that documentation of its overall range over time is the only information that can be 

provided with confidence. For instance, it was not possible to pinpoint areas where “the fleet” 

focuses effort during specific parts of the season since some experts report fishing in certain 

26
areas during certain parts of the season, and others report more favorable conditions in specific 

locations elsewhere. Still others report the best fishing occurred at different times during a given 

season, and at disparate locations. Reports about migratory patterns of the resource over time

were similarly mixed. While there was general agreement that salmon abundance and migration 

patterns were cyclic in nature, questions about specifically “where” and “when” variation has 

occurred led to highly variable accounts across the sample. In sum, questions about specific 

spatial patterns in the fishery tended to yield little consensus.12

Less specific questioning, and analysis of interview and mapping data with less concern for 

geographic specifics, allowed documentation of fleet operations with more confidence. 

Subsequent review of simplified maps depicting the range of the fleet, general areas of historic 

activity, and general areas of interaction were finally confirmed by the experts. For sake of 

clarity, Map 3-1 emphasizes the general range of the fleet. General areas of historic fishing 

activity and general areas of interaction with other fleets are provided, but with the caveat that 

these parameters should be considered more approximate than the overall range. 

Thus, Map 3-1 is a finalized composite GIS map compiled to fulfill the spatial-descriptive 

objectives of the research. In reiteration, the product is based on: (a) extensive and detailed 

initial input offered by various drift gillnetters, (b) subsequent revision based on careful 

comparative analysis of interview and mapping data, and (c) repeated review and refinement by 

our panel of highly recommended drift gillnetters. 

As noted in the legend, the dark blue line indicates the parameters of contemporary drift gillnet 

fleet activity. The southern boundary of activity approximates portions of the “Anchor Point 

line” (the APL). This is the ADF&G southern limit on the fishery, extending from the shoreline 

at Anchor Point along 59° 46.2' north latitude, to the shoreline on the west side of the Inlet south 

of Mt. Chinitna. 

A combination of bottom conditions, salmon migration patterns, and other factors render the first 

six or so miles of the Inlet due west of the Anchor Point shoreline and northeastward to a point 

about three miles offshore Ninilchik largely unused by the drift gillnet fleet. The fishery starts in 

earnest further west along the APL. We term this zone an “Area of Special Consideration.” The 

zone is highly significant for the purposes of this study given its proximity to areas of 

contemporary interest to the oil and gas industry. It is depicted and discussed in more detail in 

sub-section 5.2.1 of this report. 

The black line depicted west of the eastern shore of the Inlet from south of Point Nikiski south to 

just north of Ninilchik and three miles offshore is also an ADF&G regulatory boundary. This is 

“the corridor,” a highly regulated area of escapement managed via periodic openings and 

closures. The black line denoting the western boundary of the corridor is sometimes crowded 

with vessels fishing waters immediately east of the regulatory line. 

 

12 Significant exceptions to this rule are very specific point locations such as the Kalgin Buoy or “can.” 

27
Map 3-1 The Cook Inlet OCS and the Drift Gillnet Fishery

28
The northernmost area of drift gillnet activity necessarily coincides with the ADF&G northern 

regulatory boundary. Moving south and west, the fleet follows the bottom contours around 

Kalgin Island to the Kalgin Island Buoy (the Kalgin “can”), itself a favored location for many 

drift gillnetters. Shallow areas are avoided as vessel navigation hazards. Net snagging and 

tearing concerns further limit interest in the shallows, though a few adept captains may target 

certain such areas. Most fishing occurs in relatively deep water. The western limit of the fleet is 

also limited by the shallows along the western side of the Inlet. Much of the southwestern range 

of the fleet approximates the three-mile limit and thus the OCS Planning Area boundary. 

As indicated in orange, shallow waters in Chinitna Bay northward along the coast to about the tip 

of Chisik Island were once popular areas for late season pursuit of silver salmon. This was also 

the case for portions of the Kalgin Island coastline, and for the stretch of coastline west of Kalgin 

Island from Harriet Point to West Foreland. Given that the drift season is now limited to the early 

part of August, silver salmon can no longer be taken by the fleet during their late peak runs. 

Of particular note on the map is the location of the east, middle, and west rip zones. While the 

location of these zones of interest to the drift fleet shifts somewhat with water volume and to a 

lesser degree with changes in subsurface strata, the symbols indicate their approximate locations 

over time. As noted throughout this report, these areas are highly favored for drifting. 

3.2.5 The Drift Gillnet Season 

The sockeye salmon season is essentially the month and a half it takes for the bulk of the salmon 

stocks to pass from Anchor Point to the mouths of their respective spawning grounds – the 

various streams and rivers along the Cook Inlet basin. In regulatory and management terms, the 

season usually lasts from mid-June to early August. Although salmon pass a given point along 

the Peninsula in waves rather than en masse, there is a general motion from the waters offshore 

Anchor Point up to the Forelands, where the run makes a broad clockwise turn and enters the 

Kenai and Kasilof rivers. While there are numerous exceptions to strategy, many drift gillnetters 

follow this general motion, typically fishing the first two or three openings near the southern 

line, then following the run or components of the run up past Kalgin Island toward the Forelands, 

then finally fishing along the shores of the Inlet above Kenai. Description of the 2003 regulatory 

openings is provided in Appendix C. 

In the early days of the fishery, mobility was somewhat constrained by the horsepower of

available motors. When boats were limited to eight or nine knots, Kenai and Kasilof captains 

fished primarily in the area around Kalgin and up at the Forelands. Ninilchik boats fished 

primarily in the middle of the Inlet, and Homer boats focused primarily on the southern reaches. 

Today, increased engine power and range enables captains to fish much larger portions of the 

Inlet during an opening. Some few captains with extensive horsepower and fuel capacity are 

now able to explore the full range of the drift zone in a single day. 

Even in the earliest days there was strategic tendency to move with the fish from south to north 

as the season progressed. Kenai fishermen would sometimes spend the early portion of the 

29
season down at Snug Harbor where there was a processor (after Snug Harbor closed, Kenai 

processors operated tenders in the southwest of the Inlet). Later in the season, the Kenai fleet 

would often fish northward. After the reds moved above Kalgin Island, the Kenai fleet would 

typically work from Kenai for the rest of the season. Likewise, late in the season, Homer and 

Ninilchik fishermen might fish periodically near the Forelands, but more typically around their 

own harbors. Again, the advent of faster boats has been important in increasing the range of the 

fleet. Reliable trailers, strong truck engines, and improved road conditions have also enabled 

expanded range, and some Homer drift gillnetters report transporting their vessels northward 

over the road system to follow the run. 

Homer-based captains often start the season fishing the main rip offshore Anchor Point, 

returning to Homer at night. Many do this only for the first two or three openings, until the run 

has moved farther up the Inlet. Later, they may trailer or power their boats up-Inlet and moor in 

the Kenai, Ninilchik, or Kasilof harbors. If they travel by sea, a friend or family member may 

pick them up and drive them home. On subsequent openings, many drive to the harbor the night 

before and fish the opening in the morning. When the day is over and having delivered their fish, 

many tie up to a cannery buoy, take a cannery skiff in (or, if they are at Ninilchik, tie up to the 

dock and walk ashore), and drive back to Homer later. 

Although contemporary Kenai and Kasilof participants generally moor their boats and deliver 

their fish throughout the season at their home port, they also tend to follow the general progress 

of the run from south to north. While some are highly mobile and fish the entire Inlet, many 

Kenai fishermen spend little time in the far south of the allowable fishing area, and Homer 

fishers rarely spend much time fishing off the Forelands. 

 

3.2.6 Learning to Fish with Drift Gillnets 

 

It is important to recognize at the outset that like any other enterprise, fishing, and especially 

fishing with nets in the treacherous waters of Cook Inlet, is an acquired skill. Seasoned veteran 

participants were once novices, and accumulated their expertise only through a long period of 

learning, some through interaction with experienced family members, others through fishing 

with friends, and others through trial and error on their own. Indeed, even the saltiest of our core 

group of fishermen spoke of learning something new every season. 

Thus, while the experiences and perspectives of seasoned participants are emphasized in this 

report, it should be kept in mind that at any given time during the course of the drift gillnet 

season, the fleet is comprised both of persons who are highly experienced and who are passing 

into and through various stages of learning. As discussed in the subsequent section of this report, 

this variable level of experience has implications for potential interactions between the fleet and 

oil and gas industry infrastructure and support vessels on the OCS. 

While the physical action of fishing a net alongside a drifting vessel is not a highly complex 

process in and of itself, there are many necessary actions and processes that lead up to, are 

associated with, and follow the activity. Among other actions and processes involved in the drift 

gillnet enterprise, one must learn to: 

30
a) Navigate the vessel in the challenging waters of Cook Inlet, 

b) Use the vessel’s electronics and fishing gear with efficiency, 

c) Acquire knowledge of and adhere to the changing general regulatory frameworks 

and specific rules used to manage vessel operations and the fishery itself, 

d) Identify optimal tides and times for pursuing fish, 

e) Understand the nature of rips and currents with regard to vessel safety and salmon 

behavior, 

f) Assess the combined effects of wind, currents, and rips on the vessel and the 

behavior of the resource, 

g) Detect potentially hazardous objects and obstructions in the water column that 

pose a threat to the vessel or nets, 

h) Set, manipulate, and tow nets with and without fish and with and without 

obstructions and objects in the water column, 

i) Pick salmon from the net and continue to navigate at the same time, 

j) Navigate around other vessels including large tankers in treacherous conditions, 

k) Develop relationships with buyer/processors, understand the nature of the local 

market and negotiate relationships with buyers as well as possible, 

l) Maintain the vessel, engine, and gear, and/or develop ways to pay for others to do 

so, 

m) Balance capital outlay in fixed and trip costs with revenue to keep the operation 

fiscally viable over time (if possible), 

n) Identify, teach, manage, and pay skilled crew, and 

o) Balance time spent preparing to fish, fishing, marketing or distributing the 

seafood product, and maintaining the operation with other forms of employment, 

with familial duties, and with other life activities and options.

Drift gillnet fishery participants thus operate with a base of accumulated knowledge, skills,

and experience in a zone of activity involving others possessing varying levels of the same

attributes. Knowledge of corridor and other openings and regulations, and effective 

strategic response to such changing conditions, is critical to success during the time-limited 

drift season. 

31

The drift captain and crew typically target an area for fishing based on a combination of factors, 

including but not limited to: (a) present and predicted tide, weather, and sea conditions, (b) 

information gleaned from others fishing a specific zone on a previous day or tide during a given 

run, (c) previously accumulated knowledge of an area during specific times of the season or 

conditions, (d) the presence and activity of other vessels in a specific area, (e) purposefully 

communicated comments of friends, or overheard comments of others on the (VHF) radio about 

the location and/or behavior of fish, (e) the behavior of specific rip tide zones on a given time or 

tide, (f) visible signals indicative of the presence of fish such as logs, sticks, or other flotsam in 

the rips, numerous active birds, and jumping fish, and (g) regulatory factors. Again, rip tide 

areas are very often favored for setting a drift gillnet. Periods and places of extreme tidal flow 

are typically avoided for their dangers, but there are exceptions, and many experienced drifters 

focus on rips and other moderately hazardous areas during much of the season. 

With one of the largest tidal ranges in the world,13 current conditions change rapidly on Cook 

Inlet. The interaction of changing water volume with subsurface topographic features has a 

dramatic effect on the nature of currents and rips. An area that is relatively calm in ebb or 

maximum flood stages can become a torrent within a quarter change in the tide. Experienced 

drift gillnet fishery participants are very keen in their knowledge of tidal flow and how it affects 

surface and columnar water conditions and salmon behavior in specific areas. This knowledge 

and associated navigational and fishing strategies are essential aspects of the fishery. 

Knowledge and ability to judge weather, wind, and wave conditions are also important. The 

destabilizing nature of choppy surface conditions can complicate the drift fishing process. Very 

high winds are not uncommon in the area and many captains avoid problems through careful 

monitoring of the weather band on the radio, the clouds, sky patterns over the mountains, and 

subtle clues of impending problems detected on distant waters by experienced eyes. Some

winds, such as the strong southwesterly, are positive in that they can bring favorable currents and 

fish closer to the eastern side of the Inlet. 

Knowledge of the resource, local conditions, and associated fishing strategies vary widely. 

There are tendencies to fish the tide-changes, and to focus on specific rips at certain lunar phases. 

But there are no hard and fast rules, and some captains avoid the challenging conditions around 

the rips. Moreover, for many participants, the demands of family and other forms of 

employment often impose more influence on when and where one can fish and for how long than 

do optimal conditions for fishing. On the other hand, many other participants arrange their lives 

around the drift season and make sure they are available to fish what they deem to be the best 

times, tides, rips, and other conditions. 

3.2.8 The Process of Drift Gillnet Fishing 

There are three primary rip zones of focused interest to drift gillnet fishery participants active in 

the region: the east, middle, and west rips. These span the eastern and central portions of Cook 

Inlet. Intermediate rip zones and more westerly rips are also areas of activity, though the 

westerly rips are more distant and so less popular. The fleet focuses extensively on the east and 

 

13 Cook Inlet high tides reach 39 feet and even higher at full and new moon phases during certain times of year. 

33
mid-channel rips, but again, variability is common, and some owner-captains have invested in 

vessels that can reach distant locations fairly easily, while others operate relatively small vessels 

with more limited fuel capacity and range. 

Some participants rely on information of others to inform their fishing strategies. As described 

further along in this section, many are consistently involved in radio groups in which information 

about movement of salmon and other important information is regularly transferred. Other 

persons assume a less social strategy and power out from the harbor straight to the edge of the 

middle rip, look around at the water, and drop their net if there are more than a few salmon 

breaking the water – “jumpers.” Of course, seasoned fishermen hold knowledge that beginners 

are only developing, knowledge of favorite spots, special techniques, and a cultivated feel for 

where salmon are most likely to be given the date and patterns of salmon migration in years past, 

prior progress of the current run, wind direction, tide, and current. 

Once an area is determined to hold some promise for high yield of salmon, the captain will direct 

and/or participate with the crew (or in some cases act alone) to lay out the net by releasing it 

from the hydraulically-operated rolling drum or reel. Operators of vessels with a stern-fed net 

(common) will typically idle or slowly motor bow-first into and across the current to facilitate 

the smooth unraveling of the net in and across the flowing water column. A bow-picker 

(relatively rare) will do the reverse. The vessel then accompanies and monitors the net as it 

floats in the rip or other target area, hopefully entangling fish as it goes. Occasionaly, as when 

the vessel is approaching the corridor boundary, or if the captain wants to “test” an area, only 

part of the length of net is released, ensuring more rapid retrieval. 

There is often much worry about the movement of the net in the water as it is not unusual for it 

to ball up, twist, bend, or otherwise contort in a way that minimizes the surface area of mesh 

available to gill the fish. There is often extensive and strategic towing and tugging of the net to 

coax it to float in optimal fashion after it is set. 

Minimal and even moderate action of fish in the target area can be hard to detect depending on 

the degree of chop on the surface, the position of the sun, and level of turbidity. In such cases it 

can take good judgment on the part of the captain to determine when the net has reached its 

maximum likely harvest in an area and thus when to start pulling it in. Sometimes a captain will 

insert a net in a rip and stand back from it a bit. But the net is rarely too distant and typically 

remains connected by line and buoy. If detached, the captain and crew will track the buoy and 

retrieve it with gaff when ready. When the fishing action is vigorous, the net naturally fills 

quickly and rapidly assumes a characteristic “V” shape, with numerous fish visibly breaking the 

surface as they crowd and splash against its sides. Length of set thus varies widely depending on 

the presence or absence of fish and the strategic success of the harvesters. 

34

buoy and sometimes “raft” or tie up alongside three or four other vessels to wait. Casual 

socializing and comparison of catch and locations is common. Unloading can be done remotely, 

by skiff, or in the case of large loads, directly on the dock. Some operators load their catch into 

brailer (storage and transfer) bags. These can be transferred by crane onto the dock. Otherwise 

fish are unloaded by hand. This is time-consuming. A large catch can take in excess of an hour to 

unload. Local teenagers are sometimes paid a nominal amount to climb into the hold to throw 

fish out into boxes or totes. Ice is shoveled into the bottom before loading and on top of the fish. 

Each tote is taken up the dock to be weighed and its sides cleaned. The boat is then moored at 

buoy and cleaned. Finally, a cannery skiff takes the crew ashore. Checks are usually distributed 

by the buyer/processors some weeks later based on average market values at the time of sale, 

with additional monies disbursed if and when prices improve. 

Table 3-2 Summary Description of Important Aspects of the Drift Gillnet Operation 

Factor Quantitative and Qualitative Description 

Length of net 150 fathoms or 900 in length by about three shackles or 20 feet in depth 

Speed of net retrieval

Ranges considerably depending especially on volume of salmon in net. Empty net 15-20

minutes with full power hydraulics (best case), net full of fish and pieces of flotsam can 

take up to four hours to retrieve and pick (worst case) 

Distance of drift per set Ranges considerably based on current speed, presence of fish, and other factors. Key

informants report a range of never less than a mile, as much as 15 miles 

Distance from east 

shore 

Varies extensively based on strategy, corridor openings, size of vessel, fuel and

economic considerations, word of fish further out

Harvest lost due to

mistakes Varies extensively based on skill of participant; hard to quantify 

Time and harvest lost in

event of various 

entanglements

Entanglements are more frequent in rips and can slow the operation extensively. But fish 

and sticks in the net can be concurrent. Observation suggests a loss of 10 minutes for

every 100 sticks; given gilling effect, loss of harvest minimal 

Frequency, magnitude 

of navigational

corrections due to

traffic or obstruction 

Informants report the number of corrections naturally varies based on level of traffic and

number of obstacles; observation suggests such corrections are made a few times each 

trip, but that corrections due to traffic are less frequent as one navigates and fishes 

further west; obstructions such as logs are a constant possibility no matter the area 

Frequency of return to a 

target location 

Varies depending on strategy, skipper preferences, and vessel speed. Regarding the 

latter, captains of fast boats often abandon a non-productive spot and move to other 

favored zones more readily than a slower vessel, captains of which tend to frequent

known-as-productive areas in fewer regions. 

Perceived risk

associated with 

collisions

Tanker interactions most feared, frequency of occurrence depending on tendency to fish

in shipping lanes, hard to quantify but frequently mentioned among key informants 

Frequency and duration 

of radio conversations 

Length and frequency vary depending on type of social relation (friend, radio group 

member, relative stranger) and urgency of need for information. But communication is

frequent and extensive for many (10 to 25 per trip), and short (1 to 5 minutes) during

busy periods, longer while steaming or idling 

Distances maintained 

between vessels

Vessels sometimes touch along the corridor line; interaction with other’s nets and lines 

stringently and universally avoided 

Weather/sea and traffic 

effects on operation 

Weather and seas can slow steaming speed by many knots, especially for smaller vessels

Distance maintained 

between net and vessel

during drift

Varies depending on current speed, and strategic placement in a rip while avoiding the 

rip with the vessel, but always within sight, frequently within 50 yards, often within 10

yards 

Average duration of

sets 

Varies extensively depending on conditions (see speed of retrieval above); observation 

suggests a normative range of 15 to 20 minutes until an empty net determines a new set 

or strategy

36
3.2.9 Challenges and Rewards 

Drift gillnet fishing in Cook Inlet is uniquely challenging for the many reasons described above. 

Becoming an accomplished drifter in this environment requires accumulation of experience and 

knowledge. Once skills are gained, one is often willing to range further and take bigger risks. 

Success, in turn, brings greater confidence. Transcending the challenges and bringing reds to 

port brings money, social status, and numerous subjectively experienced rewards. Regarding the 

latter, drift gillnetters tend to truly enjoy their work on the Inlet and also what it brings them

besides economic return: independence from a boss, the hands-on acquisition of a product, 

meeting physical challenges, and being on the ocean. 

Patrick Dixon provides a colorful description of drift fishing in Running Against the Tide, an 

Oral History of Commercial Fishing in Cook Inlet, Alaska (1999). The author’s actual account 

of two captains meeting the physical challenges of drift gillnetting on Cook Inlet in the mid1990s is particularly relevant to the present research. It is reprinted here in abridged form with 

permission from the author. The fishermen work in a truly challenging setting with awareness of 

each other and a readiness to assist. The dangers can be immediate and compelling, even 

without other vessels or obstructions downstream. But the bounds of safety are pushed to the 

limit as getting fish to port is the prime objective: 

The waves were huge . . The [drift gillnet vessel] would shudder as the force of a wave 

would smack into the stern. Fishing alone was one thing. Fishing alone under these 

conditions was something else entirely. He [Gordon] had already tried picking up the 

gear once, but when he tried to pull the boat backwards into the waves they crashed into 

the stern with such ferocity that he was nearly knocked down. The back deck filled with 

enough water to be over the top of his boots. Realizing his predicament was getting 

serious, he reeled the lines back over the stern and returned to the cabin to call his friend 

Herman on the marine radio. 

Finally, over the tops of the waves, Gordon spotted a light. Herman’s big boat 

approached slowly, and the two skippers came out on deck as Herman’s son steered the 

boat into the waves alongside . . 

[Herman] looked at the net riding behind Gordon’s boat. Even in the gathering darkness 

it was possible to see the hundreds of fish hanging in the net between the waves. Gordon 

had a big load in that net. It’d be a crying shame to cut it loose and run for cover. “Tell 

you what,” [Herman] yelled . . “You cut loose and head for the north end, and we’ll pick 

it up for you!” 

“. . things had gotten worse. The seas weren’t calming, and the wind was blowing harder 

still. The net was absolutely plugged with fish, which made the job of picking harder that 

it would have been with a moderate set. The extra weight pulled at the stern . . and so 

many waves were breaking over the stern and crashing into the picking cockpit with them

that he ordered his son to get some line and tie themselves to the boat. He didn’t want to 

have to attempt a man-overboard rescue under these conditions. It was now completely

dark, and they were picking by the dim illumination of the small electric light . . on the 

37
back deck . . Herman was determined to meet this challenge head on. He would get all of 

Gordon’s fish back for him and that was that. 

By dawn, Gordon was beginning to think the worst. No radio call had come, and the 

winds, though calming some, were still churning up the distant part of the Inlet he could 

see. As he scanned the horizon, he spotted spray in the distance. A boat? He went to the 

radio expecting no response and picked up the microphone. When Herman’s voice 

boomed back . . “How ‘ya doin’ there, Gordon?,” Gordon snorted a laugh. He wasn’t 

concerned for his fish, all of which Herman had retrieved and eventually delivered . . in 

Gordon’s name. He was just glad his friend had survived. Herman, for his part, would 

take no compensation for his efforts other than his own sense of accomplishment and the 

satisfaction of helping a friend. Considering the odds he had overcome, that payment 

was indeed high (Dixon 1999). 

3.2.10 Social Organization and Communication on the Inlet 

“Radio groups” are an important part of the Cook Inlet drift gillnet fishery. These usually 

develop informally over time as participants interacting as family or friends on land or at sea 

become amenable to conversing with each other by radio about fishing and weather conditions 

on the Inlet. Once developed, further growth of the group is usually limited to invitation. Norms 

demand that the core subject of most radio conversations - presence of salmon in a given location 

- remains secretive; that is, limited to within the group. Some even modify their radios to 

include special channels difficult to receive by others hoping to listen in and benefit from the 

revealed accumulated knowledge and experience of the group. 

Although various underwater features and areas can yield salmon, as noted above, most drifters 

consider the rip zones to be highly productive. For many, the middle rip is considered the best 

place to fish. Because the rips zones shift constantly with changes in tide, rip locations and the 

nature of conditions in and around the rips are frequent subjects of conversation. General 

information about the progress of a run as a whole is communicated widely in and across Kenai 

Peninsula communities, and as such is not necessarily the confidential information of radio 

groups. 

While a large part of the outcome of any given day of fishing is luck, the most common way of 

increasing the odds of finding large concentrations of sockeye salmon is to work with a radio 

group. Most range in size from two or three to sometimes as many as 20 persons. Most 

fishermen will say that in terms of gathering information to catch fish, the bigger the radio group 

the better. But most also agree that groups today are smaller than in the past, mostly because 

old members are dying or getting out of the fishery. The largest group IAI researchers 

encountered numbered 22 captains, but most involved between about five and eight members. 

38
Drift gillnet fishery participants often begin communicating to their radio group even before 

leaving their place of mooring, chatting as they drink a cup of coffee. Each captain decides 

where to go first based on a combination of factors, including information gleaned from others in 

the group. A variety of starting locations across the group increases the breadth of the sample of 

first sets. Each participant usually tells the others how many jumpers are seen at each of 

potential set. If there are numerous jumping fish at any given location, the participant will tell 

the group, then set and watch the net for a while, waiting to see the telltale signs of salmon. 

Then it’s back on the radio to communicate the outcome. If there is significant action and other 

members of the group are not experiencing equivalent success, location will be verified and 

others will begin heading toward potential success. In this way, individual success can be 

transformed into collective success. 

 

The radio group functions also serves as means for entertainment during long sets and equally 

long ‘drives’ in search of jumpers. Participants are quite often seen holding handset to mouth - 

talking, laughing, offering advice, complaining, and philosophizing. The groups are patently 

social and cooperative in nature, and facilitate trading of technical expertise, tools, and even gear 

and vessel parts, both at sea and in harbor. 

The groups facilitate social connections on land as well. Fellow members of radio groups often 

share spare time both during the season and in the winter months. This aspect of the relationship 

can be especially important for participants from other parts of Alaska or other states who are 

usually isolated from their families during the summer season. 

Finally, radio groups significantly enhance communication about hazards and problems among 

other drift gillnet vessels operating on the Inlet. In days past, drift gillnetters often relied on 

cannery-operated tenders to tow them back to harbor in the event of mechanical or other 

problems. Today, one typically reports problems to fellow radio group members before turning 

to other means of assistance. The closest or fastest vessel in the group will usually respond first. 

This is not to suggest that assistance is limited to within radio groups only. Information about 

vessels in trouble travels quickly across the Inlet since a range of VHF channels are monitored, 

especially mainstream channels reserved for such information. Moreover, experienced 

participants can often readily spot potential trouble and actual trouble in its early stages. Such 

seasoned veterans tend to “keep an eye on things,” and their communications are critical to 

safety among drift vessels operating on Cook Inlet. 

39

An even more significant difference between the two populations is their respective forms of 

social-familial interaction during the season. Many local fishermen live with their families or in 

some reasonable proximity to friends. For many Kenai Peninsula fishermen, nights are spent 

eating home-cooked meals, interacting with wives and children, and otherwise spending time 

around the house and shop, often preparing for the next fishing trip. 

Outside gillnetters, on the other hand, are often far from home. They spend the drift season 

without family and hometown-friends. Virtually all out-of-state fishermen spend the season 

living in cramped trailers on the grounds of their avowed buyer-processor, often two to a trailer. 

That said, the spirit of camaraderie in the processor trailer-parks is palpable. Many of the 

fishermen have been coming to the same site for upwards of three decades, and laughing, 

arguing, and talking story with the same friends for as long as they can remember. There is a 

camp-like aspect to the trailer-parks, and many fishermen joke about how good it is to “get away 

from the wife for a while.” On weekends and non-openings, out-of-state fishermen are often seen 

working on their boats, talking or playing cards with friends, or perhaps watching TV with other 

fishermen in the local lounge. 

One result of inter-group differences in social and familial arrangements is that there is little 

interaction between the groups on land. But things are different on the water. Radio groups 

almost always include both Outside and local participants, and both groups assert that 

interrelations on the water are very good. So while there are differences in local political 

participation and social behavior, on the water the distinctions are generally unimportant. The 

current level of limited interaction between local and Outside participants may be accentuated by 

the fact that processors are increasingly less involved in the social lives of the fleets. Many outof-state and local participants talked about days past when canneries like Ward’s Cove provided 

breakfast and other meals to the fishermen, held cribbage tournaments, and generally were more 

directly involved in their lives. Some complain that what processors really care about these days 

is merely “the bottom line” – prices and profits. 

3.2.12 The Russian Old Believer Fleet 

The Russian Old Believer communities of Kachemak Bay include three distinct settlements 

located near Homer and Anchor Point. Settled in 1967, Nikolaevsk was the first of the Russian 

Old Believer villages to be established in Alaska. Most residents emigrated from Oregon and 

and are descendants of dissident Christians who split from the Russian Orthodox Church in the 

17th century. Typically, Old Believers lead a family-oriented, self-sufficient lifestyle that 

includes gardening, raising small livestock, fishing, and hunting. Traditional clothing is worn by 

many, Russian is the first language, and church rules require that males do not shave. 

Today, most of Kenai Peninsula’s Old Believers are employed in the Anchor Point and Homer 

areas, primarily in commercial fishing and construction. Commercial fishing activities include 

spring and fall halibut fishing, summer salmon fishing including drift gillnet fishing, and cod 

fishing in January. Many of the younger residents are getting out of fishing and choosing to 

relocate to Anchorage to work in the construction trades. Most such persons report that poor 

market conditions in the seafood industry have led them to change careers. 

41
The Russian fleet primarily fishes from the Ninilchik boat harbor. Although some captains in this 

group fish from Homer early in the season and after July 15, a number of captains will steam or 

trailer their vessels north to fish from Kasilof. Generally speaking, these participants prefer to 

fish the middle and east rips. Old Believers are known for their top-quality boats and have a 

reputation for fishing hard and fearlessly. Readers are referred to Dolitsky (1998) for an account 

of the history of this small, adaptive Alaska society. 

 

3.2.13 Fishing and other Work 

Many participants believe that decline in profitability of the Cook Inlet drift gillnet fishery is like 

that of other industries across America in which independent producers struggle to break even 

under globalizing markets, the conditions of which provide little return on the dollar. 

Interestingly, some report that the initial compensatory payouts from the Exxon Valdez spill have 

enabled ongoing maintenance of gear, vessels, and engines and in some cases even allowed 

operational upgrade. 

But with regard to the fishery itself, most participants say that return on operational investment 

from all sources is minimal, and operating in the red is not uncommon. Though some drifters 

also fish in other areas and fisheries, increasingly fewer drift gillnetters make their entire living 

from fishing. As noted in Chart 3-2 below, still fewer earn all of their income solely from the 

drift gillnet fishery. Some 77 percent of the seasoned fishermen participating in our protocolguided interviews reported working non-fishing related jobs during the bulk of the year. Thus, 

the drift fishing enterprise is largely a side-line to full or part-time work in other fields. 

Chart 3-2 Drift Gillnetters Holding 

Alternative and Secondary Employment

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Responding Drift Gillnetters (N=31)

Negotiating other forms of employment with drift gillnet fishing can be difficult, but for many it 

is the enjoyment of the act of fishing as much as the return on investment that is motivating. The 

enthusiasm of many participants to persist despite meager return on investment that characterizes 

modern drift gillnet operations, has to be explained by non-monetary factors. These include 

enjoyment of the hunt and the marine environment, freedom at sea, and participating in a 

respected activity in challenging conditions. 

42
3.2.14 Small Fishing Vessel Economics and the Market 

In the typical fashion of quick calculation during an interview with a fisherman, one participant 

estimated his gross revenue from drift fishing the previous season was about $20,000. But he 

went on to report the costs: 

“$3,000 to 4,000 for groceries, $3,000 to 4,000 for maintenance, $1,500 to 2,000 for gas . 

. then there’s fees – two percent aquaculture tax, one percent to the Alaska Marketing 

Association [pause], and then the deckhands . . Last year my [two] deckhands made 

more than myself. I paid them a thousand bucks. Should have paid them seven or eight 

hundred, but I just couldn’t do that to them. You figure it out. I barely made a profit at 

all.” 

Another permit holder estimated his annual drift gillnet profits had dropped from $50,000 in the

early 1990s to $2,000 to $3,000 over the last couple of years.14 These figures are rough 

estimates provided during interviews, but their validity is strengthened in that many drift 

gillnetters working in the region offer similar assessments. Moreover, the figures are similar to 

those generated through a survey of drift gillnet salmon fishery participants in Bristol Bay.

Bristol Bay drift fishery participants also struggle economically. Carlson (2002:25) reports that 

the mean net operating income

15 for her sample of local rural drift gillnetters in the Bristol Bay

fishery was $1,169 (N=40). At $6,936, mean net income for non-residents (N=148) was

significantly higher, but not highly significant relative to years past. 

As one Cook Inlet fisherman noted with an air of prophesy, “a young guy would be foolish to get 

into this fishery now.” Indeed, apart from youthful deckhands, there are but a few unwrinkled 

faces visible in the Cook Inlet drift gillnet fleet. 

Several factors appear to underlay the precipitous decline in salmon prices that began in Alaska 

in the early 1990s. The deflation of the Japanese yen had a profound effect on the price of 

salmon. While lively Japanese markets kept sockeye salmon prices high even into the early 

1990s, and led to extensive capitalization in the short-term, the situation also bred over-reliance 

on a single market. Local processors failed to fully develop connections with the domestic and 

alternative foreign markets. In light of changes in Japanese consumption patterns amidst the 

failing Japanese economy in the late 1990s, many fishermen and processors recognized the need 

to market fresh-frozen fish to consumers in the rest of the nation. 

Some perceive pen-reared or “farmed” salmon as presenting a serious threat to the drift gillnet 

fishery. This was a common topic of conversation with informants. Drift gillnetters review a 

long list of perceptions about farmed fish: disease and its potential spread to wild populations, 

extensive use of steroids for growth, use of antibiotics to fight disease, red dye to simulate the 

 

14 Informants rarely included an estimate of the full value of labor in their cost estimates, and thus profit estimates 

are typically inflated. 

15 Net operating income is defined here as gross earnings minus crew shares, transportation, food, fuel, maintenance,

nets, miscellaneous gear, insurance, moorage/haulout, property tax, raw fish tax, vessel and permit license fees, and 

administrative services (Carlson 2002:25). 

43
color that fresh fish acquire through krill consumption, and the effect of farm effluent on water 

quality in surrounding waters. The desire to inform consumers about the ostensible risks clearly 

relates to the perceived effects that farmed fish have had on the demand for and price of fresh 

fish from Alaska. Some informants believe that recent popular news stories about problems with 

pen-reared salmon may eventually benefit those who harvest and market “wild” Alaska seafood. 

Persons in all quarters agree that price is the single biggest challenge confronting participants in 

the Cook Inlet drift gillnet fleet. Prices paid by processors for reds have fallen from as high as 

$3.00 per pound to as low as 50 cents per pound in a little over a decade. Based on interview 

data, profits earned by individual participants have in many instances fallen by as much as 90 

percent. Permit and boat values have likewise plummeted. In many cases, participants no longer 

generate or can hope to generate enough revenue to purchase new vessels or refurbish old ones. 

While a thorough economic assessment of market issues for drift gillnetters is outside the scope 

of the current project, it is clear and significant that the market issue is one of the two most 

salient current issues for Cook Inlet drift gillnet operators. The other highly salient issue is the 

region’s resource management regime. Many drift gillnetters report dislike for what they say is a 

trend of increasing control of Cook Inlet salmon resources based on political rather than 

biological and ecological factors. 

As noted in Chart 3-3 below, of the 31 seasoned fishermen who participated in our protocoldriven interviews and offered perspectives on important factors affecting their operations, more 

than half (55%) mentioned a need for improved management. This issue is discussed in further 

detail in sub-section 3.6.18 below. Meanwhile, some 35 percent also discussed market problems

and potential solutions such as marketing Cook Inlet salmon as a “wild” Alaska product. While 

numerous other issues were discussed, these two were foremost for the interviewees. 

Chart 3-3 Salient Issues for Seasoned Drift Gillnetters

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

New Management Needed Need Marketing Strategy

Responding Drift

Gillnetters (N=31) 

Fishery issues associated with oil and gas industry activities in the region are, in the reported 

perceptions of our informants, largely peripheral and currently secondary to management and 

market issues. In fact, informants were typically eager to move interview discussions away from

oil development and back to prices and politics. The specter of a future oil spill in the Inlet, and 

experiences with the Glacier Bay and Exxon Valdez oil spills, are exceptional to this tendency, 

and many informants spoke extensively on such matters. But these conversations were the result 

of direct questioning about oil and gas issues. General queries about the most salient issues for 

44
the fishermen led to discussion about the most cogent issues of the day – fisheries management 

and market conditions. 

3.2.15 The Contemporary Labor Environment 

The average drift gillnetter is an independent small business operator with limited political 

involvement or power to change the market conditions within which he operates. The focus is 

on preparing to fish and fishing during the season, and engaging in other fisheries and/or forms 

of employment during the rest of the year. Prices are determined not by the harvester but “topdown” by buyers on the distribution end. In the absence of truly creative or proactive solutions 

to marketing, the harvesters will continue to merely react to pricing issues. 

Salmon prices are virtually always within five or 10 cents per pound no matter the buyerprocessor. Thus, changing buyers is not normally a rational option for bettering one’s profit 

margin since foregoing allegiance to a specific buyer-processor can in many cases be detrimental 

in the long-run. For instance, lacking sufficient space at home, or means for conveying large 

vessels, many operators depend on the buyer-processor for vessel storage. This is especially true 

of drift gillnetters from other states. Buyer-processors allow rent-free storage so long as the 

captain in question agrees (tacitly) to stay loyal the following season. A change would be likely 

to force retroactive payment of rent. Moreover, some processors pay five cents per pound as a 

bonus at the beginning of the current season for total catch landed the previous year. With 

current fish prices at 50 to 55 cents per pound, forgoing this bonus could result in a 10 percent 

loss in fishery-specific income. 

3.2.16 Decline of Profits for Regional Processors and Support Sectors 

The often-difficult position of drift gillnetters does not necessarily imply that processors are in a 

correspondingly advantageous position. The market economics of the fishery are complex at all 

levels and for all sectors. As for numerous harvesters, many processors have pulled out of the 

industry or scaled back significantly in the face of fiscal challenges. For example, of the four 

processing plants formerly owned and operated by a certain corporation, two have been sold, and 

a third is nominally operational but in actuality off-line. Only one facility is currently 

operational. Another processor also awaits better times - its single year-round employee is its 

owner and president. Likewise, when Icicle’s processing plant in Homer burnt down several 

years ago, the firm’s president reported he would love to rebuild the plant. But without a stable, 

guaranteed season, he couldn’t take the risk until and unless the situation improved. 

Most of the ancillary jobs the salmon fisheries in Cook Inlet once provided have either 

disappeared or have been replaced by lower-paying equivalents. As several informants pointed 

out, many Kenai Peninsula residents once envisioned commercial fishing and processing as 

career paths. Today, even office and other corporate staff positions in the industry are seasonal. 

College students looking for lucrative summer jobs have disappeared from the docks. The highpaying jobs that brought them to this line of work – deckhand work, or throwing, hauling, 

45


3.2.19 Regulatory Regime 

Regulatory measures established to manage a complex set of resources can present various 

challenges to harvesters, not the least of which is remaining informed of rules and “regs.” The 

most basic limitation to activity is that drift gillnet fishing is allowable across the entire district

only on Mondays and Thursdays from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. The situation is now obviously 

vastly different from years past when drift gillnetting could legally occur any day, time, or 

month. This basic limitation drives the timing strategies of the entire fleet. Many captains work 

part-time in the summer and therefore make work arrangements, family arrangements, and 

arrange for crew to work on the vessel based on these allowable times. Much has to be readied 

for a drift trip – vessel and engine maintenance and checks, fueling, gear preparations, purchase 

of ice, and so forth – and everything has to be timed around the days of the week when fishing is 

allowed. 

While weather conditions can and do preclude planned trips, periodic emergency closures and 

discretionary emergency openings make participation in the fishery particularly unpredictable. 

The drift gillnet fishery is managed by means of a three-year plan that can allow some prior 

planning for participants, but in recent times the Board of Fish has significantly reworked the 

plan each year. Field researchers involved in this project were able to witness first-hand the 

challenges many fishermen encounter in attempting to interpret the nautical and temporal 

parameters of emergency openings. Many operators worry about enforcement and fines amidst 

uncertainty of regulations, and many earn only marginal profits and so have reduced capacity to 

absorb the costs of fines. The result of this situation is that many participants will not fish as 

avidly as they might, or will end up fishing with many others in relatively confined areas. One 

key informant summed up his frustration thus: 

“Before, it was hard work, but fun. Now it’s stressful, staring at electronics all day, trying 

not to cross imaginary lines, [being] put into an area where you know the fish aren’t . . . 

you spend the day staring at equipment so you don’t violate the law, terrified of getting a 

citation.” 

A recent UCIDA survey indicated that nearly 75 percent of Cook Inlet drift gillnet participants 

are between the ages of 50 and 75, and that a similar percentage of drift gillnetters have over 25 

years of experience in the fishery. While this experience may enhance efficient pursuit and 

harvest of salmon, it also means that most participants today have been through literally dozens 

of shifts in regulatory policy and may have trouble keeping track of changes, and/or maintaining 

avid interest in keeping track of such changes, and which policies currently apply. Many 

participants try to adhere to the regulations, but sometimes fail, as described by a Kasilof area 

fisherman: 

“What turned me off especially was getting stuck in the corridor. When we get stuck in 

the corridor everyone gets so cutthroat. I try to be honest about the fishing rules but I got 

picked up for going over the line. Our radio group decided to make it a point to not go 

over the line. We figured we could still try to be competitive without breaking the law. I 

got sloppy when I made a set. In a matter of minutes, I was over the line. I got 10 years 

probation. I sure was [angry].” 

48
We reiterate that the biology and habitat ecology of Cook Inlet salmon fisheries are highly 

complex and that effective management is challenging. Many drifters nevertheless report that it 

is difficult to follow the many rules and regulations affecting the fishery. The regulatory scheme

for year 2003 basic regulations is provided in Table 3-3 below to give the reviewer a sense of the 

basic regulatory variables that are typically subject to change and more detailed modification 

over the course of the season (see also Appendix C). 

Table 3-3 Basic Regulatory Strategy for Cook Inlet Central District Drift Gillnet Fishery: 2003 

Basic Regulation* 

There will be one regular period restricted to the Kenai and Kasilof Sections between July 9 and July 15. 

This will either be on July 10 or July 14 in 2003. 

Between July 16 and July 31 the department will restrict two consecutive drift gillnet periods to either or 

both of the following areas: (1) the Kenai and Kasilof Sections; and/or, (2) that portion of the Central 

District south of Kalgin Island. The area south of Kalgin Island may be used when necessary in runs when 

the Kenai sockeye salmon run strength is approaching 3 million or there are Kenai chinook salmon

concerns which may prevent fishing by set gillnets in the Upper Sub-district. 

If the sockeye salmon run is greater than three million and the department restricts the periods immediately 

before or on July 25 and after July 25 then the area in Figure 2 may be added to the other open area during

these restricted periods 

If the sockeye salmon run is greater than four million for the fishing period immediately after July 25, the 

entire Central District normally open to drifting may be open to fishing. If this occurs, only one regular 

period restriction from July 16 to July 31 may actually occur.

The season closes on August 9 so the last regular period is August 7 and there is no experimental pink

salmon fishery after August 9 in odd years. 

The latitude of the Anchor Point Light is now officially 59° 46.15'

* ADF&G notes that this summary is for informational purposes rather than a comprehensive review, and 

that full regulations are available in local area ADF&G offices. This information is available online at 

cf.adfg.state.ak.us/region2/finfish/salmon/uci/uciout03.php 

 

Buyer-processor representatives often assert that the current regulatory regime makes marketing 

of salmon and maintaining adequate processing capacity more difficult than it would otherwise 

be. It is argued that the Cook Inlet stock is of itself highly dependable, but that the uncertain 

nature of openings and closures reduces steady and predictable supply of available seafood. This 

inconsistency is seen as partially causal in depressing prices and encouraging buyers to seek out 

more dependable sources. Moreover, given that production levels have been so seriously 

reduced in recent years, processors now lack the ability to accommodate very large catches that 

can occur with certain openings. 

One processor recalled an enormous catch of 800,000 pounds during an emergency opening 

during a recent season. Since the plant was able to process only 200,000 pounds a day, extensive 

profit was lost. Given such situations, processors contacted during the course of this project 

asserted that if openings were more steady and dependable, so would be their ability to process 

and market the product. 

49
Perhaps most relevant among regulatory issues is the common assertion among drift gillnetters 

that the current management regime leaves insufficient time and space for harvesting, and that 

because fishing time and place is increasingly restricted, openings tend to encourage extensive 

traffic and activity on the water. This has long been a criticism of derby-style fisheries in 

Alaska. Criticism of the situation is common among drift gillnetters, including a former 

president of UCIDA who assessed the relative importance of the problems encountered by 

participants active (that is, ideally more active) in the drift gillnet fishery:

“It is a tie between access to fishing areas, regulations, and the market. The restrictions 

on time allowed to fish keep getting cut back. We can’t afford to lose any more time or 

area.” 

 

3.2.20 Escapement and Cook Inlet Sport Fisheries 

Drift gillnetters typically agree that political competition from the sport fishing industry is a 

threat to their livelihood. Many drifters believe that industry now exerts extensive influence 

because fishing-related tourism fuels the regional economy during the summer months, whereas 

commercial fishing has been unable to contribute as extensively as in years past. 

The issue of salmon “escapement” is critical to understanding salmon fisheries in Alaska. The 

term refers to the number of fish that are allowed to swim to their spawning grounds (without 

being caught). ADF&G seeks to set escapement levels so that the various fisheries have the 

maximum possible number of fish available for harvesting, while also assuring that a sufficient 

number can return to spawn so that maximum harvest levels can be achieved in the future. This 

concept is called maximum sustainable yield (MSY). But the factors involved in determining the

ideal figure for MSY are complex, and the numbers are perennially contested by a range of 

parties. 

Many commercial harvesters and their representative tend to desire the lowest sustainable levels 

of escapement possible so as to allow for a greater harvest in the open waters of Cook Inlet. 

Meanwhile, sport anglers and their representatives tend to seek the highest sustainable levels of 

escapement, which puts more fish in the rivers. Actual levels of escapement over the past 

several years is said to attest to the lobbying success of the sport fishing community. Drift 

gillnetters assert that openings mandated by the Board of Fish prior to the season rather than by 

AF&G in response to actual emerging salmon counts have led to consistent over-escapement for 

four of the five Inlet river systems over the last several years. The issue is politically contested 

to be sure. 

Most drift gillnetters consulted for the purposes of this research envision ideal escapement 

between 400,000 to 700,000 sockeye salmon per run. With runs of over a million, they argue, the 

salmon begin to deplete the upriver lakes of the zooplankton they need to survive and either 

starve or eat each other. ADF&G biologists agree, in theory, that over-escapement can cause and 

has in the past caused population declines. The exact number at which such population declines 

occur is a matter of some debate, but escapement for the last several years reportedly has exceed 

the technical maximum. 

50
3.2.21 The Drift Gillnet-Halibut Charter Interface 

While halibut and drift gillnet vessels do not compete for the same resource, they often operate 

in the same areas. Interactions between the two fleets are potentially dangerous in that the 

halibut boats often anchor to fish for the bottom-dwelling halibut, and thereby present a static 

obstacle for the drifting gillnet boat. As depicted on Map 3-1, our informants reported that most 

such interaction occurs in the southerly portions of the drift gillnet fishing grounds. Coast Guard 

personnel describe the interaction and associated dangers as a “gray area” of nautical law. 

The first guided charter boat services in Cook Inlet were started in the late 1960s and for a 

decade less than a dozen or so operated in the region. There are now many scores of such vessels 

working from Deep Creek, Ninilchik, Kasilof, Kenai, Anchor Point, and Homer. Charter captains 

search the Inlet for halibut holes, and occasionally anchor when conditions warrant. Captains of 

moving drift gillnet boats are often unable to determine if such vessels are other drift boats or 

charter boats, or whether they are anchored or also moving. It is sometimes too late to respond 

in time to avoid affecting either operation. 

Problem interactions between the drift vessel and the halibut charter vessel provide some insight 

into challenges potentially associated with emplacement of a drilling platform in areas of known 

drift gillnet fleet activity on the OCS. Reeling in a gillnet is time consuming, requiring at least 

15 minutes even for an empty net. Quick evasive action with net extended in swift currents is 

very difficult. If the drift boat is unable to detect the anchored halibut boat in time, there is some

possibility that the drifting gillnet will “wrap” the latter. Stories of drift gillnetters wrapping 

platforms and objects such as the Kalgin buoy are provided in subsequent sections of this report. 

If the angle of the anchor line and the drifting gillnet are such that net can ride up the anchor line, 

there is potential for capsizing. In such cases, the charter operator would need to rapidly cut the 

cork-line of the gillnet. Interactions between the vessels reportedly have resulted in significant 

loss of gear and damage of vessels. One drift fisherman reported having observed a gill net 

moving in a strong current quickly work its way up the bow of an anchored charter vessel, 

ultimately shearing the cabin from its hull. 

W. Hybrid, one of the most frequently recommended informant in our core sample of seasoned 

drifters, reports extensive experience with drift gillnet-halibut charter interactions. His

perspective is common among drift gillnetters and particularly relevant given that the fisherman 

resides in and operates his vessel from the southerly portions of the drift fleet area, said to be the 

zone of primary interaction with the halibut charter fleet: 

“The main problem is the charter boats anchoring. They anchor out there, and I don’t 

have the words to tell you how angry that makes me. I was laying my net out and . . this 

idiot was anchored out and I kept hollering at him and he didn’t do anything. I had to 

pick my net up quick! If the net hit the boat it will go over the boat and take the people 

down with it. I screamed at the people to get their heads inside the boat. I don’t 

understand why it is that we have all these safety devices yet none of those people have 

life jackets. We are a helluva lot more safety conscious . .” 

51

4.0 Drift Gillnet and Oil and Gas Industry Interactions on Cook Inlet

This section describes interactions between the drift gillnet fleet and oil and gas industry 

infrastructure and associated activities in the Cook Inlet region. The section emphasizes the 

three forms of potential interaction that are most frequently mentioned as points of concern by 

drift fishery participants, and that are of obvious analytical importance given the purpose of this 

study. These are: (1) the potential for emplacement of a stationary drilling platform in a place 

that could disrupt drift gillnet harvest or navigation activities, (2) the potential for spilled oil to 

affect salmon resources or to affect drift operations during the summer season, and (3) the 

potential for increased vessel traffic in the active drift gillnet zone.16 

We attempt in this section to report interaction issues in an objective fashion. Observations and 

logic do suggest some potential for problematic interaction, but the issues are also obviously 

politically charged. We therefore use a combination of observational data, information from

existing literature, and interview data to enhance the validity of the information and analysis. 

The perceptual data from the interviews are complex given the nature of the relationship between 

fishing and oil and gas industry interests in the study region. These relationships are expressed 

differently across our sample of drift gillnetters. The words of two of our highly recommended 

informants, both members of UCIDA, one residing in Kenai, the other Homer, exemplify the 

differences and similarities in perspective. The first, D. Earle (in the top four of our sample of 

recommended drifters), offers a candid perspective that suggests tolerance rather than heightened 

affection for the oil industry, this despite his residence in a region and state significantly 

involved in and dependent on oil and gas development: 

Part of the problem with fishermen and the oil industry is that so many of the fishermen 

work in the oil industry and they aren’t making much money fishing nowadays. They see 

that oil is what will save them economically. If we were getting a good price for our 

salmon you can bet your last dollar that the fishermen wouldn’t be so cozy with the oil 

guys. They didn’t used to be. I’m sure not. But I’ve got a different perspective because 

I live in Anchorage and I have another way to support myself other than oil. 

D. Boot from Homer (another highly recommended drift gillnetter) offers a more

supportive point of view of the offshore industry, despite his residence in an area where 

many hold patently anti-development perspectives: 

We have to have the fuel industry like it or not. The way we are set up, it is what runs 

our boats and car. Look at what it costs us when we can’t produce oil from our own 

country [the informant refers to crises in the Middle East]. We should try to do as much 

exploration here as we can. My only real concern is pollution. We’ve already had one 

major oil spill, but it wasn’t really even the oil company’s fault. I don’t think they’re 

doing a bad job. There is pollution, but there is pollution coming from our boats too. 

 

16 Offshore loading of tankers in Cook Inlet is discouraged in both Stipulation No. 4 (Transportation of

Hydrocarbons) (see MMS 2003a:II-13), and in the Tri-Borough Position Paper, which comments on important

elements of the Cook Inlet OCS Lease Sale program. The issue is therefore not likely to be relevant to drift gillnet 

fishing operations and associated concerns. 

53
Think about all the pollution that comes from cars and boats alone. So when we talk 

about oil spills and pollution, we also need to think about our own use of cars and boats. 

Such is the typical range of perspectives and the nature of their reporting among our sample of 

seasoned drift gillnetters. The mixture of ideas indicates the close relationship between fishing 

and the oil and gas industry in the region. 

This section begins with an overview of the zone and topics of interface between the Cook Inlet 

drift gillnet and oil and gas industries. These materials preface more in-depth discussion of real 

and potential interaction events based on the reported experiences and perspectives of our panel 

of highly recommended drift gillnetters. A brief summary of popular news media reports of 

industrial accidents on the Inlet is provided in Appendix D of this report. 

4.1 The Drift Gillnet and Industry Interface: Overview 

Fishing and oil and gas industry interactions in the state jurisdiction waters of Cook Inlet are not 

new; nor are associated political and legal processes and positions. Flagg (1992:7) argued that 

such interactions already had a long history in 1992. At that time, UCIDA opposed potential loss 

of habitat associated with “site preparation, shoreline alteration, dredging and filling, and 

disposal of drilling muds and cuttings.” The author conceded that most oil industry activity had 

to date occurred north of the principal fishing areas in the Inlet. But he asserted that “if

commercial quantities of oil and gas are discovered and developed in offshore areas of central 

and Lower Cook Inlet, conflicts between the two industries can be expected to increase 

dramatically [with] loss of fishing gear [becoming] a serious concern to both salmon drift 

fishermen and shellfish fishermen” (Flagg 1992:15). 

Portions of the OCS area of apparent interest to the oil and gas industry coincide with portions of 

what ADF&G describes as the Central District Drift Gillnet area (Fox and Shields 2003:29). 

While about half of the drift gillnet range is on the OCS, the most likely area for potential 

interaction between the fleet and oil and gas industry infrastructure is limited to the northeastern 

portion of the OCS or the most southeastern area of fleet activity. This includes part of the 

Cosmopolitan Unit, and an area extending to the southwest of Cosmopolitan. Thus, the OCS area 

of apparent interest does include portions of the east and middle rip zones favored by fishery 

participants at the southern terminus of the fishery (LGL 2000; Alaska Division of Oil and Gas 

1999a:5-46). 

But as noted by our panel of seasoned drift gillnetters, without knowing more precisely the 

location of the OCS area of interest to the oil and gas industry, it is difficult to identify: (a) the 

exact area of likely interface, (b) the extent of historic or contemporary drift gillnet activity in the 

exact area of potential interface, (c) the kinds of challenges platform infrastructure and 

associated activities may or may not incur for the fleet given variation in conditions across the 

Inlet, and (d) specific reasonable mitigation options under specific conditions and operations 

across the Inlet. In the absence of precise knowledge, we necessarily proceed with analysis 

under a more generalized scenario in which there is some potential for interaction to occur in the 

northeastern portions of the Cook Inlet OCS, which is also the most southeasterly range of the 

drift gillnet fleet. 

54

The Final Findings of the Director for the 1999 Areawide Oil and Gas Lease Sale (Alaska 

Division of Oil and Gas 1999:5-47) responds to this precedent with sensitivity to the interests of 

the region’s fisheries and their representatives, determining that certain industry activities could 

affect commercial fisheries in the Cook Inlet region and that mitigation strategies could 

subsequently be warranted on a case basis. These perspectives are further supported by EIS 

findings and assertions associated with Lower Cook Inlet OCS Lease Sale 149 in 1995, and 

through findings in the MMS EIS conducted for Lease Sales 191 and 199. 

4.2 Issues, Perspectives, and Experiences 

This section describes various issues associated with the drift gillnet and oil and gas industry 

interface on Cook Inlet. We review various issues, but apply special descriptive and analytical 

emphasis to those factors that (a) are of stated concern by drift gillnet fishery participants, and 

(b) data collected through the range of research methods used in this study suggest have or could 

pose problems for the fleet, and thus which are relevant for subsequent analysis of mitigation 

issues and options. 

4.2.1 Seismic Survey Effects 

Seismic surveys are used to detect oil and gas reserves. Concerns about the potential effects of 

such surveys on the region’s salmon resources, and/or reduction of harvest through dispersal by 

noise, were reported in the 1995 Lower Cook Inlet EIS. These effects were thought to be readily 

mitigable with proper planning and timing with fishery openings (MMS 1995:IV.B1-8). 

MMS (2003c: Table II.B-3) reports that fisheries-effects from seismic testing on the OCS, 

planned and coordinated with the commercial fishing industry, would be highly limited in both 

spatial and temporal terms. The agency reports that shallow-hazard geophysical surveys 

(seismic testing) would likely occur within a 62 square mile area for a total of between 14 and 35 

days. This would occur sometime between 2006 and 2010 (2003c: Table II.B-1). As such, 

seismic testing effects on the region’s fisheries and fish resources were also deemed to be readily 

mitigable in the EIS (MMS 2003c: Table II.B-3). 

Given that seismic testing was not a commonly reported point of concern among drift gillnet 

fishery participants contacted during this study, and is deemed in this context to present minimal 

and readily mitigable effects, the issue is not a pointed focus of this study. It was, however, an 

important issue in Alaska in the early 1980s when it was perceived as a threat to commercial 

fishing interests in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands in advance of lease sales in the Norton, 

St. George, and Navarin Basins. Significantly, the situation lead to formation of the 

Oil/Fisheries Group of Alaska, an inter-industry committee charged with addressing potential 

interface issues between the fishing and oil and gas industry. While the group and its mission 

diminished in tandem with diminished interest in the lease sale areas, it served as a model for 

negotiating similar conflict on the California OCS (Fusaro 2004), and is discussed in further 

detail in the following section of this report. 

56
4.2.2 Drilling Muds 

Some drift gillnet fishery participants contacted during this study have mentioned concerns about 

release of drilling muds into Cook Inlet and the potential effects such releases might have on 

salmon stock, and particularly smolt and juvenile fish. A specific concern was expressed about 

potential release of drilling materials into the more southerly portions of the drift gillnet area 

since water conditions in those areas are often perceived as less turbid than those farther north. 

Many drift gillnetters communicate fairly complex models of the Cook Inlet ecosystem, the 

growth and migratory patterns of salmon, and the potential effects that changes in the marine 

environment might have for the fishery. Some informants offered their understanding that the 

amount of materials that likely would be released would be minimal relative to the massive 

volume of water flowing in and out of the Inlet each day, and especially in the midst of high 

volumes of suspended and solid materials in the Cook Inlet water column. 

While it was difficult in many cases to determine whether perspectives on this issue were 

rhetorical or scientific in nature, our conversations with our most highly recommended drift 

gillnetter, D. Sparrow, furthered evidence that there is indeed concern among some drifters that 

salmon fry could be affected by discharge of contaminants. The fisherman recommended that 

the timing of such release should be scheduled to miss the timing of smolt out-migration each 

spring. This is also the officially stated position of UCIDA representatives. 

The 1995 MMS EIS reports that potential drilling and production discharges were not found to 

significantly threaten fisheries in Lower Cook Inlet. The 2003 EIS for Lease Sales 191 and 199 

concurs with this finding, noting that: 

Drilling discharges could cause disturbance on [sic] demersal fishes and displacement 

from the immediate vicinity, within a radius probably not to exceed 100 meters. These 

effects very likely would be limited to only the short time periods of discharge (MMS 

2003c: Table II.B-3). 

Drilling muds from offshore operations would necessarily be discharged within EPA and 

NPDES guidelines, and authorized for exploration wells only. Drilling muds and cuttings for 

production wells would be injected via a disposal well or brought to shore for disposal. Given 

the nature of EIS findings and the apparent mitigability of this potential form of interaction, we 

do not emphasize its analysis in this report. 

4.2.3 Subsurface Obstructions 

Submarine pipelines present obvious hazards to fishing gear. But this was not commonly 

mentioned as a concern among informants contacted during this study, and it is a reported rarity 

in Cook Inlet (Bucerri 2003). While there is an extensive network of pipes and subsurface 

infrastructure in portions of the state jurisdiction waters of the Inlet, these are quite deep and 

generally out of the range of drift gillnets. There reportedly is more potential for interaction in 

the shallows adjacent to the eastern shore of the Inlet near the infrastructure-rich areas around 

Kenai and Nikiski, but those shallow contours are universally avoided for fear of grounding the 

57
vessel. In cases where pipelines are present in navigational channels, they lay far deeper than 

vessel draft. Informant’s stated concerns relating to underwater obstructions were rather 

primarily associated with potential failure of aging pipes and the possibility of subsurface 

blowouts, rather than with snagging or grounding. 

While underwater obstructions and associated problems were not a stated concern for drift 

gillnetters involved in this study, these are important issues for fishery participants active along 

other parts of the nation’s OCS. Fishing groups in California, Louisiana, Texas, and other Gulf 

states have long argued the need for compensation for fishing gear lost through snagging with 

underwater oil and gas industry infrastructure. 

The Fishermen’s Contingency Fund was established by law in 1978 as a standing federal funding 

and administrative source for such compensation. Significantly, the fund is available only for 

gear loss due to entanglement with OCS-associated pipelines and uncharted underwater 

obstructions on the OCS. While it does not address gear loss associated with visible 

infrastructure such as platforms, its history does provide some insight into mitigation issues 

relevant to the current research. The fund is addressed in more detail later in this report and is 

described in our literature review in Appendix A. 

4.2.4 Surface Obstructions 

The issue of interactions between drift boats and surface obstructions such as anchored vessels or 

drilling platforms is critical to the current description and analysis. This was a universal concern 

among our informants. Even those without direct experience of gear entanglement problems 

tended to resist the idea of any permanent obstruction in the fishing zone. J. Rank, a wellrespected drift gillnetter from the southern portion of the Kenai Peninsula expresses common 

sentiment: 

We haven’t fished around platforms for years. I’ve never gotten any gear wrapped around 

a platform. I’ve seen gear hanging on the legs though. You don’t take a chance and you 

back off. I’m a conservative fisherman and try not to push my luck. I’m willing to skip 

the fish so as not to get messed up with a platform. I can deal with the platforms that 

already exist because they don’t bother me much, but I don’t want to see any platforms 

where we fish. 

The nature of the drift gillnet fishery is such that the vessels drift downstream at a rapid pace. 

Unobstructed waters are ideal both for navigational safety and for unrestricted time for harvest. 

Downstream obstructions such as an anchored vessel require drift vessel captains to adjust 

course. This can be difficult and time-consuming when towing a long net, and more so when the 

net is full or partially full of fish. Rapid and lateral current movement can complicate the 

situation. 

If, however, a surface obstruction is situated in a given location for a long period of time, its 

position can become readily known, and is more easily avoided than a less permanent 

58
obstruction. This is not to say that a drilling platform is not or cannot be a hazard (sections of 

this report describe a variety of situations in which platforms have been and may become

hazardous), but rather that drift gillnet captains can more readily adapt to its presence if its 

location and characteristics are known. But again, unpredictable lateral current movement can 

foil navigational strategies regardless of one’s knowledge and awareness of a stationary surface 

obstruction. 

While numerous exploration and production wells may be drilled in the event oil and gas 

industry activity on the OCS moves forward under the preferred alternative, MMS reports that 

actual offshore platforms and pipelines would be few in number and minor in scope. 

Emplacement of such potential obstructions is, however, “expected to result in some space-use 

conflicts” (MMS 2003c: Table II.B-2). Development of mitigation possibilities for such 

problems is the primary goal of the current project, and is described in the following section of 

this report. 

4.2.5 Oil Spills 

Oil spills are consistently mentioned as a point of concern among drift gillnet fishery participants 

assessing the potential effects of new oil and gas industry activities on the OCS in Cook Inlet. 

While drilling operations in state jurisdiction waters have endured no major spill problems, the 

Glacier Bay spill and the Exxon Valdez event continue to shape the generalized perceptions or 

stated perspectives and opinions of many. Informants active in the drift gillnet fishery in the 

late-1980s reported that oil from the Glacier Bay spill tended to collect in the rip tide zones, and 

that it lingered in the area for some time after the fishery was closed. The discussions tended to 

be unhappy ones in that the season had been a particularly productive and profitable one prior to 

the spill and closure. 

The long-term and as yet unresolved nature of litigation associated with the Exxon Valdez spill 

event is sore point among drift gillnetters who stand to receive substantial awards in the event of 

settlement. That problem issue notwithstanding, it appears that despite its actual operational and 

corporate diversity, “the oil and gas industry” is, for apparent political-strategic and rhetorical 

purposes, sometimes labeled and described as a whole with disapproval. 

Thus, some drift gillnetters interviewed during the study describe oil spills in the abstract as a 

potential outcome of an uncaring industry. Others report oil spills and their effects on fishing 

operations through direct experience. As noted above, most informants, and especially our panel 

of highly recommended drift gillnetters, tend to converse in a way that reflects apparent 

dissatisfaction with settlement associated with the 1989 spill, but while also revealing their belief 

that the presence of the oil and gas industry is vital to communities along the Kenai Peninsula. 

One seasoned drift gillnetter and UCIDA member revealed this perspective, but while also 

forcefully injecting his opinion that prospective oil industry operations on the OCS should be 

conducted with all possible care for fish resources and habitats in the region. Some participants 

in the region reveal skills in expressing multiple perspectives and sensitivities while arguing for 

their own beliefs and/or those of their group of affiliation. Such is the nature of politics and 

59
social realities in communities dependent on multiple natural resources and competing industries. 

Scientific study and analysis (and history) make clear that large oil spills do pose a threat to 

fishing operations in Cook Inlet. The 1995 MMS EIS notes that large spills are the “greatest 

threat to commercial fishing, with both gear and catch at risk” in Lower Cook Inlet, since oil can 

affect juvenile salmon, public perceptions about contaminated product, and lead to fishing 

closures, loss of income, and marketing problems (MMS 1995:IV.B1-72). 

The MMS Final EIS for Cook Inlet Lease Sales 191 and 199 also indicates the oil spill threat to 

marine fisheries in the Inlet, including drift gillnet fishing. The assessment in the agency’s EIS 

that “the chance for a large spill greater than or equal to 1,000 barrels occurring and entering 

offshore waters is 19 percent” reportedly led to concern among UCIDA leaders and subsequent 

re-thinking of the group’s official position on oil and gas activity on the Cook Inlet OCS. Again, 

reported perspectives on spills and potential industry activity on the OCS are often tempered by a 

complex combination past experiences, political motivation, cognitive models about spill effects,

and real concerns about the salmon resource and the drift gillnet fishery. 

4.2.6 Platform Interactions and Drift Gillnet Fishing as a Fluid Operation 

“Sometimes that net can seem awfully long”17

One unqualified finding of this research is that drift gillnetters have difficulty accepting the 

possibility that a drilling platform or platforms could eventually be emplaced in areas 

favored for drift gillnet fishing, especially in rip zones. Expression of resistance to the 

possibility is immediate and common. As noted in Chart 4-1 below, the perceived dangers 

of platforms were commonly expressed by seasoned fishermen participating in our protocoldirected interviews; more than half discussed platforms as navigation and gear hazards. 

Chart 4-1 Leading Environmental Concerns among Drift Gillnetters

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Platforms Dangerous Pollution or Spills Change in Salmon

Migration

Responding Drift Gillnetters

N=31

 

17 Perspective of a Russian-born drift fisherman residing in Ninilchik.

60
Fox (2003) concurs with study observations that drift gillnet fishery participants especially like 

to fish the east and mid-rip zones, and that drifting in the most northerly reaches of the Inlet is 

more of an historical than contemporary phenomenon. Yet, discussions with fishermen in the 

Kenai area indicate that pre-development activities associated with the Osprey platform were on 

occasion factored into their navigation considerations. Other informants report that the presence 

of platforms such as Dillon, and Shell platforms “A” and “C” have on occasion figured into the 

manner in which they conduct or conducted their drift gillnet operations in the northerly reaches 

of the upper Inlet, and some report having wrapped their nets on the platforms in years past. 

Conversations with oil industry workers while visiting Shell Platform A suggest such events 

were rare at best, and probable only during an era when pink salmon prices were good and some

captains pursued them on their runs toward natal streams north of the bend at Point Nikiski. 

Nevertheless, our drift gillnet informants made occasional reference to interaction with platforms 

in the state jurisdiction waters, and given the relevance of the matter to the present analysis, we 

provide here some specific reports offered by some of our most highly recommended drift 

captains. 

For instance, D. Earle (ranked fourth most highly recommended seasoned fisherman) says that 

about 20 years ago he came close to wrapping his gear around a platform, and that the near miss 

“ripped his buoy off.” Mr. Earle resides in the Kenai area and in close proximity to the offshore 

rigs. Though he managed to avoid direct contact, F. O’Malley (also ranked fourth) reported 

some experience working around platforms in the upper Inlet some years ago, as noted below: 

“Years ago we fished up around the platforms. You have to avoid the legs of the 

platforms so your gear doesn’t get wrapped around them. It’s especially tricky when you 

have a net full of fish. I’ve seen numerous boats’ gear wrapped around the legs. Fear 

mostly guides me away from wrapping. I’m cautious because I don’t want to lose fishing 

time and don’t want to spend the rest of the day waiting out the tide [to free the net 

during slack water at the change of tide].” 

R. Merton (similarly prominent in our sample of seasoned fishermen) reported interacting with 

platforms early in his career as a drift gillnetter, stating that in one instance he knew his vessel 

and net were getting close to a platform but that it “came up in a hurry.” The fisherman reported 

that his net actually wrapped about the legs, forcing him to motor around the area until the tide 

changed and the flow of the tide lessened its pressure on the net, whereupon he managed to free 

it and salvage some of his catch. 

Relatively few seasoned drift gillnetters reported wrapping nets around platforms. But some

did mention wrapping their gillnets around the Kalgin and Kasilof cans (navigational 

buoys). As noted below by seasoned drifter D. Mootan (ranked fifth in our network of core 

informants), given the nature of setting nets in strong currents, it is clear that one need not 

have empirical understanding of a wrap to calculate how a drift gillnet and its parent vessel 

might interact with a stationary object in its path: 

We used to fish up near the platforms in the ‘70s and early ‘80s . . I wasn’t stupid enough

to set in front of a platform on the ebb. You can’t set above the platform if the tide is 

ebbing and you can’t set below it if the tide is flooding or you’ll wrap. 

61
Navigating and fishing on Cook Inlet is tricky work. The interaction of tidal flow, wind waves, 

rip currents, and cold water are among the many factors that make the Cook Inlet drift gillnet 

fishery one of the more dangerous fisheries in Alaska. The physical enterprise of drift gillnetting 

is best conceptualized as a fluid process. Participants insist that as long as everyone and 

everything is drifting in relative motion, problems are unlikely since all objects are moving 

together. Even when vessels enter strong or extensive rip zones exhibiting lateral pull, drift 

gillnet vessels can usually negotiate the challenges – as long as nothing is in the way. Many 

problems arise when there is a need to change direction to avoid an obstacle such as a charter 

boat or buoy. This is because the very forces that are moving all unhindered objects along at 

relatively similar speeds and directions are the same energetic forces that must be countered to 

evade such an obstacle. 

R. Merton reports, and direct observations support his and the assertions of other drift gillnetters, 

that there can be extensive lateral current movement in Cook Inlet, and that this must be factored 

into navigational decisions as a captain works his way through the rips and currents to find the 

fish. Moreover, once fish are in the net, speed and maneuverability are significantly reduced. 

Mr. B. Cuenta (fifth most recommended in our sample) offered the following analogy during a 

meeting with a group of seasoned drift gillnetters. He explained the nature of navigating on the 

Inlet, and the problem of introducing a stationary object into the fluid mix: 

 “[Anything stable] situated in the middle of Cook Inlet would be similar to a concrete 

block dropped in the middle of the road – cars swerve to avoid it, but it is a matter of time 

before a car hits the block or collides with another vehicle while trying to avoid it.” 

D. Sparrow notes that the Kalgin and Kasilof Cans (buoys) are relatively unobtrusive, yet drift 

nets are occasionally wrapped around them, with and without fish. E. Thomas also expressed 

worries about immovable objects, namely, drilling platforms in the drift fishing zone, and 

especially navigating in such areas with fish in the net: 

“I can’t see there being any platforms anywhere that would be appropriate except for 

south of our southern boundary. Another thing about the platforms. If they put platforms 

out there, where will the tankers go? When we used to fish around the platforms it 

caused problems. Up there in the Forelands it is a real problem because of the tides. 

When you have a lot of fish you are helpless and when you are around a fixed object you 

can’t just move away from something like that easily.” 

D. Sparrow did wrap a net on a platform in the 1970s, and this may be affecting his revealed 

perspectives. His insight into that event and navigating in Cook Inlet with net in tow bears direct 

relevance to this analysis. Mr. Sparrow points out that under conditions of four-knot flow, a 

conservative current speed for Cook Inlet, a drift boat will travel about one mile in 15 minutes. 

Because it takes a minimum of 15 minutes to retrieve an empty net from the water, captains must 

in effect continually keep their vessels and nets at least one mile from any stationary object in 

their field of vision. Because full and partly full nets take much longer to retrieve and pick, this 

additional time lag must also be factored into navigation of the vessel, as must considerations 

about the power of the engine to tow a net in the conditions at hand. 

62
Sea surface conditions and wind also play important roles in strategy and may work with or 

against the vessel. Sometimes more control is afforded when traveling into wind and/or current 

than it is on a “downhill run.” Other times, wind, seas, and current present opposing forces and 

make for truly chaotic conditions. As noted above, lateral current movement and the movement 

of other vessels further complicate the mix. 

Mr. Sparrow reports that on the day he wrapped his net, such complicating factors were minimal. 

He was working south of a platform on a rising tide with no significant wind or sea state, and had 

come into some nice action. The fish were picked and put in the hold as the vessel continued 

flowing north with the tide. The captain concedes that while the waters ahead are always on the 

drift gillnetter’s mind, it is naturally the case that picking fish and attending to other tasks 

onboard detract from complete attention to “the road.” In this sense, the highway and block 

analogy are also insufficient, because one can “get away” with non-continual focus as long as 

periodic visual checks are made. 

But on this day, the captain looked up to realize with a start that the platform (he did not recall 

exactly which it was) was not far ahead and directly off the bow of the vessel. He hustled to 

correct course but realized it was too late and was forced to cut the towline. The net 

subsequently wrapped the legs. Mr. Sparrow reports that, upon release, the vessel spun away in 

time to avoid collision. But as he passed by to the north the platform and spun back into the 

current to assess the disposition of the net, his engine stalled. Since he was down-current, he was 

no longer in immediate danger. But the situation called for some quick repair and replacement 

of a distributor bearing. Once under power again, he motored back to wait for slack water and 

eventually peeled the net from the rig. While part of the catch was recovered, the net was 

reportedly in poor shape and had to be replaced.

Our panel of seasoned veteran drift gillnetters asserts that there is much danger in the potential 

interface between their vessels and oil and gas industry infrastructure. Some say that 

experienced captains can avoid the dangers, but also that one cannot rely on the less experienced 

to perform as well, and that unforeseen conditions can complicate navigation for both beginners 

and experts. Significantly, these perspectives often appear to be stated based on direct 

experience with platforms and/or on understanding developed through general long-term drift 

gillnet fishing experience on the Inlet, rather than rhetorically. Indeed, very few informants 

objected to drilling on the OCS in its entirety and for most the issue of primary concern is where

a platform might be sited if that outcome becomes inevitable. 

Meanwhile, platform operators also agree that there is danger associated with fishing around the 

structures, but suggest that the interaction has historically been a rarity. Some mention was 

made among workers during interview research on Shell Platform A that the monopod platform

design, while slightly structurally weaker that the classic four-leg structure, would present less 

surface area upon which drift nets could wrap or vessels could collide. But it was clear in talking 

with workers on Shell A that Cook Inlet platforms are built to and do withstand immense forces: 

63


navigator is capable of negotiating minor and even moderate changes in speed and direction of 

flow, non-uniform flow across space, and/or extensive lateral movement in any given area can 

also disrupt uniformity in motion and challenge effective maneuvering. As such, the relativityin-motion model presented by the drifters is also simplified given the full dynamics of the 

setting. 

The situation changes further when one or more vessels hold variable amounts of fish in the drift 

net, since added weight and surface area in the water column slow such vessels and change their 

maneuvering capacity to greater and lesser degrees relative to vessels with no or empty nets in 

the water. Seasoned drifter E. Thomas from the Kenai area (tied for fifth most recommended 

fisherman) relates some experience relevant to this discussion: 

“There are rips that can suck you in and cause you to lose control. One time there was a 

stupid guy next to me who saw I was getting fish. What he didn’t see though, was that I 

was also drifting into him. So, what does he do? He lays his net out [to get into the 

action] . . He [clearly] sees me coming but doesn’t move. Of course I know what is 

going to happen so I had to tow my net out of there. God, he was stupid. And of course 

there were no fish on the other side of the rip where he was. He didn’t catch much there. 

Serves him right.” 

The concept of relative motion is central to the larger picture of navigational and safety issues in 

Cook Inlet. The previously described halibut charter-drift gillnet interface is another example of 

the potential implications of two vessel types moving towards each other at different rates of 

speed. In this case, a drift gillnet vessel commonly as long as 40 feet tows or drifts with an 

attached net that is typically 900 feet in length. Although the gillnet is usually curved in the 

water column and hence generally not extended to that length, it can be. Further, with towline at 

distance from the reel, it is possible for a drift gillnet vessel to present a total profile of 1,000 feet 

or more. 

Meanwhile, vessels with a much larger profile are plying the Inlet on a daily basis. Various 

supply vessels, barges, ships, tankers, and ferries regularly use the shipping channels in Cook 

Inlet. MMS (2003c: Table II.B-1) estimates that between 912 and 1,825 supply boat trips may 

be made in conjunction with exploration on the OCS under the preferred alternative, and 

between 730 and 1,460 during development and production phases. 

While there are normative nautical rules for giving way to larger vessels, and in some areas of 

the U.S. new terrorism-related rules about distance that has to be maintained from tankers, there 

are no restrictions against smaller vessels such as drift or halibut boats working in or steaming 

through the shipping lanes. This is, in fact, a common occurrence throughout the drift season. A 

repeatedly mentioned point of concern among drift gillnetters is that vessel traffic can tend to 

complicate navigation especially with net in tow, and otherwise detract attention from fishing 

activities. Fishing with long nets in challenging currents can be a particularly cogent problem

when much larger vessels are navigating nearby. The latter are less likely to yield or alter course 

for what may appear to be a much smaller boat, despite the extensive overall profile of the drift 

gillnet vessel. 

66
Awareness of non-fishing vessel traffic was related by one of the fisherman who provided the 

study team with an opportunity for participant observation on his drift boat. As is notable in the 

account, navigational awareness and expertise or lack thereof on the part of both operators can 

factor into a potentially serious situation: 

“Just a couple of weeks ago I was fishing two to three miles below Collier’s Pier and 

there was a huge [expletive deleted] tanker heading right for us. I got on the radio and 

told them it looked like they were bearing down on us and immediately the tanker verged 

in the other direction [but didn’t respond]. I don’t normally fish in that area and I’m not a 

professional seaman and I don’t know what the different lanes are. I can’t believe that 

the guy didn’t see me but I just wanted to make sure and that is why I got on the radio. 

That was pretty unusual, but who knows? I think the guy probably saw me on his 

instruments and knew what he was doing. I was just a little nervous with a 600 foot 

vessel heading toward me.” 

Some drift gillnet captains describe a particularly unhappy relationship with large oil tankers, 

asserting that there is little person-to-person communication between the captains of the massive 

and the small vessels. Captains of smaller ships and freighters apparently tend to communicate 

more readily and frequently with the smaller boats. Of significance for this analysis, UCIDA 

representatives have sought to communicate to its members known tanker schedules, and to the 

Coast Guard the scheduled and emergency openings for the drift gillnet fleet. There is thus a 

standing relationship between the fleet and the primary federal regulatory/enforcement body that 

addresses navigation issues in federal waters, and which might be further developed. 

Despite common reports of navigational corrections by drift gillnet vessel captains, and reports 

of close calls, collisions are rare. While net wraps are reported, collisions between fishing 

vessels and platforms are very rare, and interview data gathered while on Shell Platform A for 

the purposes of this research indicated that only one or two such events have occurred in the last 

two decades, neither of which was highly significant in terms of damage. 

There have been documented collisions involving platforms and non-fishing vessels. The latest 

occurred in 1997 when a tug and barge bound for Seattle collided with Platform C. There were 

no injuries aboard the platform, and the crew of the tug suffered only minor injuries. The 

platform was reportedly brightly lit and visibility was five to eleven miles. Damage to the 

platform was minimal and no oil was spilled (Anchorage Daily News 1997a:C1). The Chief 

Mate of the tugboat was charged the next day with misconduct and negligence. The Coast Guard 

found no evidence of equipment failure on the tug. 

A collision between an oil industry vessel and a platform also occurred in August 1993. 

Approximately 13,000 gallons of diesel fuel was spilled when a spill response boat chartered by 

Arco collided with the leg of a drilling rig (Anchorage Daily News1993b:A1). Finally, the barge 

Oregon collided with the tug towing it from a Unocal facility near Nikiski. The barge capsized, 

but the hatch covers remained closed and the spill was minimal (Schultz 2003). 

67
The few documented incidents of vessel-platform collisions aside, accidents in the existing Cook 

Inlet drill zone appear to be rare.19 Navigational patterns among the range of vessels active in 

the area may be characterized as a functioning system. There is awareness among drift gillnet 

and other fishing vessel operators about the presence and movement of each other, about the 

presence and movement of other, larger vessels, and about the location of stationary objects such 

as the navigational buoys and platforms. 

While the ultimate effects of adding a new stationary object into the OCS portion of this zone 

and system remain uncertain, it is clear that adjustments would have to be made by those drift 

gillnet vessel operators active in any new (prospective) platform area. The zone of interaction 

has to be seen as not entirely linear given lateral flow, and not entirely predictable given the 

dynamic nature of changing tidal flow and corresponding changes in rip currents and other 

features in the water column. The zone is also enlarged given that drift boats can present surface 

area profiles exceeding length of vessel, and must react with that profile to other vessels in the 

area. Moreover, any buffer zones associated with navigating in the vicinity of platforms or 

tankers passing through the OCS would further enlarge the zone of adjustment. 

Given the nature of the drift gillnet fishing operation – its actual profile of exposure amidst other 

vessel traffic, its focus on areas of significant flow and current movements, its unique 

navigational challenges, its economic constraints, and its spatial-regulatory limitations – 

operational adjustments potentially necessitated by the presence of a new platform on the OCS 

cannot be seen as linear and straightforward. Rather, those adjustments have to be seen as 

occurring within a complex system of interaction between: (a) the drift captain and the marine 

environment within which he or she operates the vessel and gear, (b) the captain, crew, and other 

adjacent drift gillnet operators, (c) the drift gillnet operator and the full range of other fishing, 

work, freight, and tanker vessel operators active in and operating through their own venues in the 

area, and (d) the drift operator and the economic system within which he or she operates. 

The system is complex to be sure. But as repeatedly asserted by drift boat operators during the 

course of this study, there is ample economic motivation for members of the fleet to work toward 

a solution that would enable the continued productive coexistence of the drift gillnet fleet and the 

oil and gas industry in the Cook Inlet Region. The State’s Final Findings for its 1999 Areawide 

Lease Sale delineate specific potential forms of inter-vessel conflicts along the drift gillnet

fishing corridor. These approximate the same issues addressed by the current study: problems 

navigating and fishing around platforms, oil spills, and navigation problems associated with 

increased vessel traffic.20 

But it also conditions these with a strong caveat that with controls in place, the potential for 

conflicts are minimized. While there is clear precedent and obvious potential for drift gillnetters 

to physically interface with a platform emplaced on the OCS in the range of the fishery, there is 

 

19 A significant exception is the 1987 Steelhead natural gas blowout and fire. Roughly half of the platform was 

destroyed and repairs took nearly one year. 

20Drilling discharges and seismic testing are not considered to present the potential for interrupting or significantly 

affecting drift gillnet operations in Cook Inlet under the preferred scenarios outlined in the State’s Cook Inlet 

Areawide Oil and Gas Lease Sale (State of Alaska Division of Oil and Gas 1999:5-47).

68

5.0 Identification of Possibilities for Mitigating Potential Spatial Conflict on the OCS

This section addresses the ultimate objective of the project to define and assess specific means 

and venues for mitigating the potential spatial challenges described in previous sections. A 

series of systematic efforts were undertaken to identify options for mitigating the prospective 

fishery-industry interface on the OCS. 

First, our literature review brought to light various relevant studies and mitigation alternatives 

from around the world. These were analyzed and synthesized to inform our thinking about what 

has been tried and is currently being implemented to solve similar problems in maritime contexts 

elsewhere. 

Second, in keeping with the study emphasis on documenting the perspectives and experiences of 

the fishery participants, each of our 31 protocol-guided interviews with seasoned drift gillnet 

captains involved queries designed to elicit mitigation ideas. Further, members of the core 

sample of 19 highly recommended drift gillnetters were asked to address the mitigation issue in 

various contexts, including focus group meetings held for this specific purpose. Individual 

telephone follow-up discussions were conducted to verify and refine the resulting information. 

Third, area fisheries and oil/gas resource managers were asked to lend their expertise to the 

effort. These conversations were particularly fruitful in that such persons typically provided 

highly objective and candid analytical insight into whether the fishing fleet and offshore industry 

would be able to interact in a way that would enable mitigation of potential problems. 

Fourth, we traveled to a Cook Inlet drilling platform to speak with offshore platform workers 

about various issues of relevance to the study, including possible ways to reduce potential safety 

problems around a prospective new platform on the OCS. Years of experience in this unique 

setting gave the workers unique and invaluable insight into the issues. 

Finally, UCIDA representatives were repeatedly consulted about preferred options for mitigating 

potential interface problems. These interactions generated a series of discussions about a 

comprehensive means for addressing a range of critical issues through effective communication 

and collaborative planning. 

5.1 Overview

Mitigation of interactions between oil and gas industry and drift gillnet operations has been a 

consideration in federal lease sale processes in the Cook Inlet region for some time. For 

instance, Terry et al. (1980) reported potential fishery-oil/gas interactions and mitigation 

possibilities for Lower Cook Inlet development scenarios early in the Alaska submerged lands 

leasing program. The 1995 EIS for Cook Inlet Lease Sale 149 recommended various mitigation 

strategies for relieving potential conflicts in Lower Cook Inlet, including sensitivity to timing of 

release of drilling materials vis-à-vis smolt out-migration. Scoping conducted in advance of the 

70
scheduled 2004 and 2006 Cook Inlet OCS lease sales also noted that problem interactions could 

occur and that they could and should be mitigated: 

Commenters emphasized the importance of the commercial and recreational fishery of Lower 

Cook Inlet to the economic well-being and quality of life aspects of the area. They also 

expressed concerns over the effects leasing may have on these resources including conflicts that 

may result between offshore energy activity and fishing activity. Commenters suggested 

specific plans be developed to minimize and avoid commercial fishing gear conflicts with the 

exploration and development activities. Examples of areas identified where conflicts may result 

include riptide areas favored by driftnet fishing, areas of set net fishing, and the potential 

restoration of the Tanner Crab fishery around Cape Douglas (MMS 2002a:I-6) 

An actual strategy for mitigating spatial problems between the fishing and oil and gas industries 

is noted in LGL’s assessment of Cook Inlet rip tides and associated drift gillnet issues (2000:1): 

The possibility of offshore oil and gas industry development in Cook Inlet poses potential 

conflicts with the salmon driftnet fishery. Construction of stationary drilling rigs could create 

obstacles where fishermen typically fish. Oil and gas exploration and development and 

production facilities would add possible sources of contaminants to existing sources, i.e., 

commercial vessels and other boats. There is the possibility that spilled contaminants may

concentrate along rip tides. Because some Cook Inlet fishermen fish predominately along rip 

tides, they have requested that the MMS consider excluding rip tide locations from future lease 

sales to avoid interference with the fishery.

The State of Alaska Division of Oil and Gas has garnered much experience with fisheries and oil 

and gas industry interactions in Cook Inlet. Litigation has driven some of that process, resulting 

in a fleshing out of potential mitigation strategies and a call for evaluation on a case basis: 

The division, during review plans of operation will work with other agencies and the 

public to assure that potential conflicts are identified and avoided to the fullest extent 

possible. Available options include alternative site selection, requiring directional 

drilling, buried pipelines, and seasonal drilling restrictions. Plans of operation are subject 

to the Kenai District Coastal Management Plan. Proposed operations will be evaluated 

and restrictions will be applied on a case-by-case basis depending on the specific activity

proposed, its location, and the time of year. 

The State’s manner of examining and mitigating issues of potential conflict on a case-bycase basis is sensitive to variation between different types of proposed operations. The 

following section proceeds in similar fashion. That is, we examine a range of mitigation 

possibilities by specific issue of relevance to the study. 

5.2 Mitigation Possibilities by Central Issue of Concern 

In reiteration, this research effort indicates three principal forms of concern about potential 

physical interaction between the drift gillnet fleet and oil and gas activities on the OCS. These 

involve: (1) above-surface structures such as exploration and production platforms that may call 

for navigational adaptation since drift gear is long, Cook Inlet currents are swift, and buffer 

71
zones are typically established around such structures; (2) oil spills that may shorten or close the 

drift gillnet seasons or otherwise affect the fleet, and (3) increased vessel traffic associated with 

supply or survey vessels, exploration rigs, pipe laying barges, and other vessels (Terry et 

al.1980:374-386). 

Release of drilling materials and subsurface obstructions are not currently highly salient concerns 

for most drift gillnetters. The former is considered readily mitigable by MMS, and the latter is 

not a looming problem for the fleet. As such, these issues are not addressed here. 

5.2.1 Mitigation through Elimination of the Potential for Interaction on the OCS 

Drift gillnet fishery participants report concern that emplacement of a drilling platform in the 

drift fishing grounds could cause: (a) navigational challenges and hazards, (b) loss of total 

allowable fishing grounds, and (c) loss of gear and harvest. This sub-section presents options for 

mitigating such potential problems. 

Deferral/Exclusion of Fishing Areas from OCS Activity 

Previous sections have demonstrated how the particular manner of drift gillnet fishing on a 

highly dynamic body of water combines with various other factors to make the placement of 

drilling platforms in popular fishing areas on the Cook Inlet OCS a point of concern for the 

fishery participants. From the perspective of most drift gillnetters, should a platform option 

become reality, the most reasonable form of mitigation would call for its placement outside the 

drift gillnet fishing area. This was thought to eliminate the change for physical interactions 

between the fleet and drilling facilities, while also preventing any loss of total allowable fishing 

area that might be associated with an enforced buffer zone around a drilling platform. 

There was much consensus on this perspective among the full sample of drift boat captains 

contacted during the study. No matter their place of residence, group affiliation, or other factor, 

the fishery participants expressed concern about potential obstacles in the drift zone. 

Experienced drift gillnetters tend to immediately reject the idea of new obstacles of any sort in 

“their” fishing grounds. The State of Alaska Division of Oil and Gas noted this obvious form of 

mitigation in assessing the fishery prior to the 1999 State lease sale: 

When fishermen encounter an object, they may have to pull in their gear until they pass 

by or maneuver around the object. Thus, a platform or temporary drilling unit would 

infringe to some extent on commercial fishing in the fishing corridor . . . Siting offshore 

facilities outside of the fishing corridor would lessen the potential for interference on 

commercial fishing in Cook Inlet (ADO/G 1999:5-47) 

Fishing in the rip zones is not universal among drift gillnetters, but many if not most do focus 

much of their activity in those areas. The east and middle rips are most popular, in part because 

of their relatively close proximity to ports on the eastern side of the Inlet. Many of our 

informants asserted that such areas of focused fishing activity should be set aside for fishing 

only. 

72
It should be noted at the same time that, again, many captains report appreciation for the 

potential economic benefits OCS activities could bring to the region, including additional jobs 

and revenue. Indeed, while the research team did encounter strong resistance to the scenario of a 

platform being sited in the drift grounds on the OCS, the highly recommended informants 

revealed surprisingly supportive views of OCS drilling in a general sense. There is thus at once 

strong opposition to disrupting the fishery, but general support for well-planned oil and gas 

activity on the OCS. This indicates an opportunity for interactive discussion between involved 

parties about how OCS oil and gas activity might best proceed vis-à-vis the spatial concerns of 

drift gillnetters. 

Appropriate Siting: Identification of an “Area of Special Consideration”

If a platform-based exploration or production drilling scenarios are to move forward, the 

essential issue becomes one of appropriate siting. Despite that some captains reject the

possibility of drilling across the entire Inlet, and despite extensive variation in reports about 

which areas are fished most frequently, our in-depth research revealed that certain areas in the 

allowable drift gillnet zone are not as important to the fleet as others. 

Of practical significance in this regard is the aforementioned area east of the 18-fathom curve in 

the southeastern portion of the allowable drift zone. Early work with informants indicated this 

area is not frequently fished. Given that it is in close proximity to areas of known interest to the 

oil and gas industry, a series of additional interviews and mapping exercises were conducted to 

refine our understanding of its attributes. While the geographic parameters of the zone are 

necessarily “loose” and reflective of the tendency of fishers to fish opportunistically rather than 

rigidly, the effort did serve to verify an offshore area that is relatively infrequently fished, termed 

here a “Special Area of Consideration.” This is depicted in Map 4-1 below. 

As noted on the map, the first offshore mile from Anchor Point north to Ninilchik River is 

permanently off-limits to the drift fleet, and managed for sport fishing. But the remainder of the 

area from one to about six miles offshore Anchor Point northeastward to a point about three or 

four miles offshore Ninilchik is fished only occasionally. Fishing reportedly occurs here 

primarily when strong southwesterly winds push salmon to the east, and at certain times during 

the early season when a few drifters “prospect” for northbound fish east of the east rip. But most 

often, most of the fleet will fish west of the east rip and middle rip zones. 

As for others active in and knowledgeable of the southern area, M. Cards (a recommended drift 

gillnetter who resides in and focuses on fishing in the southern portion of the study area) asserts 

that the most southeastern portions of the allowable drift zone are not generally favored for drift 

gillnet fishing: 

“It wouldn’t bother me if they put platforms south of the Anchor Point line [laughs].

21 

But there’s a big area there above Anchor Point and out to about six or six and a half 

 

21 There reportedly is some potential for yield in a general area some few miles south of the Anchor Point line and 

roughly 20 miles or so west of Anchor Point (Craig 2004).

73
miles that we don’t fish. There’s waves, and sand . . The Cosmopolitan area too, a 

platform in that area wouldn’t affect me either.” 

Map 4-1 Area of Special Consideration

Mr. W. Hybrid (ranked sixth among the most recommended drift gillnetters in our sample, and a 

southern area resident) concurs. He describes a relative lack of fishing in the zone, but adjacent 

to an area that is very important to the drift gillnet fleet: 

74
“Now, from seven to about 12 miles out - that’s the hot spot. But anywhere from about 

six or so miles off Anchor Point up to about three or four miles off Ninilchik, we just 

don’t fish it much. [Usually] everybody stays west of the east rip ..”

Efforts to identify areas deemed by drift gillnetters to be relatively more suitable for platform

siting than others have been fruitful. Our findings in this regard may prove significant, but they 

are also general in nature. What is obviously missing is a more accurate understanding of 

specifically where drilling would likely occur on the OCS. A more specific scenario would 

enable more specific assessment of the reaction and formulation of spatial mitigation alternatives 

by the drift gillnetters. 

MMS does provide an estimated range of 25 miles for distance from platform to shore (MMS 

2003c: Table II-B-1, although there is indication that oil and gas industry interests also lay 

further east. Our “Area of Special Consideration” bisects the Cosmopolitan Unit,22 and may 

therefore be meaningful in that it is near an area of known interest to the oil and gas industry. 

But its real significance in this regard will necessarily remain speculative until more is known 

about the actual interests of industry. 

Extended Reach/Directional Drilling

Most of our core panel of seasoned drift captains offered extended reach drilling as an attractive 

alternative to drilling from a platform directly above the drift fishing grounds. Drilling from the 

shoreline, or from a point offshore that is not used for fishing, was advocated as a way to satisfy 

both interests. 

But the actual feasibility of the extended reach option is not easily determined given that little is 

known or disseminated about corporate interests in fields within range of any directional drilling 

unit that could be emplaced from the shoreline or other area outside the fishing grounds. 

As such, while it is a good conceptual solution to mitigating the potential interface, in reality it 

cannot automatically be seen as a cure-all, particularly if oil and/or gas reserves were to be 

pursued on the OCS at the further limits of the MMS-estimated range from shore to platform. 

One of the longer extended reach successes in an offshore setting was achieved at the Xijiang 

field in China in the late 1990s. Roughly eight kilometers or nearly five miles of horizontal 

distance was covered to reach a yielding bottom hole (Tompkins et al. no date; Phillips 

Petroleum 1997). Based on local geology and drilling challenges encountered in the 

Cosmopolitan Unit, Craig (2004) estimates that extended reach technology could gain some two 

miles of distance from point of operation in this area, and possibly three under conditions of 

incremental improvements in reach technology over the next couple of decades. 

 

22 The Cosmopolitan Unit is comprised of roughly 23,369 acres of submerged and shoreline lands. It straddles 

federal and state jurisdiction waters in Cook Inlet, and is operated by Phillips Alaska, Inc. Anadarko Petroleum

Company, Forest Oil Corporation, Devon Energy Production Company, and ExxonMobil also maintain working

interests in the area. The unit remains in exploration status at the time of this writing. 

75
This calls for some basic description of constraints on directional drilling. We note that use of 

extended reach technology is determined primarily by geologic conditions and cost/benefit 

considerations. The research may appear dated, but the constraints are constant and 

technological improvements have been slow to occur. Schmidt (1994), describes the unchanging 

nature of the technological challenge in the region, and confirms the challenges encountered at 

Cosmopolitan: 

The limitations of directional drilling are primarily dependent upon maximum hole angle, 

rate of angle change, and torque or friction considerations. In directional drilling, it is 

now common for the horizontal displacement of the bottom hole location to be twice the 

vertical depth of the well. That is, a well with a vertical depth of 7,000 ft. could have a 

bottom hole horizontal displacement of 14,000 ft. from the drill site. However, in a 

shallower well, such as one in which a potential target is two miles away from the drill 

site but only one mile deep, directional drilling would be much more difficult, risky and 

costly . . The type of geology or rock that must be drilled in order to reach a target may

also limit directional drilling. Cook Inlet is particularly difficult because of its many coal 

seams and faults. Coal and shale deposits tend to collapse and cause the drill string to get 

stuck. Faults are difficult to track and if a fault is crossed by the drill bit, the type of rock 

being drilled may suddenly change and a new geologic reference must be established 

(Schmidt 1994). 

Extended reach drilling is also costly, and this is an obvious consideration for oil and gas 

companies. The firms often deal with uncertainty of yield and encounter and respond 

with associated costs to unexpected challenges as boring progresses. Winfree (1994) 

summarizes some of the obvious cost factors: 

Perhaps the greatest limitation on directional drilling is cost. Although directional drilling 

may be technically possible, it is not always economically feasible. Factors such as where 

the oil or gas deposit is in relation to the drilling rig, the size and depth of the deposit, and 

the geology of the area, are all important elements in determining whether directional 

drilling is cost effective. The environment and the cost of multiple pads or locations are 

also considerations in determining the cost-effectiveness of directional drilling.

 

The viability of directional drilling as means for mitigating potential conflicts between drift 

gillnetters and oil and gas industry operations is dependent on a number of factors that are as yet 

largely unknown to us. Reaching potentially productive areas of the OCS from the shoreline is 

highly unlikely. But, significantly, when considered in conjunction with offshore distance 

potentially achieved by siting a platform on the western margins of the “Area of Special 

Consideration” described above, extended reach technology may hypothetically enable access to 

fields some reasonable distance into the Cook Inlet OCS. 

76
5.2.2 Mitigation of Gear Entanglement, Loss of Harvest, and Platform Hazards 

Drift gillnetters resist the idea of platforms in the drift gillnet zone. When informants could be 

encouraged to envision a platform or platform in “their” drift fishing zone in order to elicit 

potential mitigation possibilities, they typically reported concern about, or reports of seeing or 

being directly involved in, wrapping a net. The exercise also often elicited emotional response. 

For instance, when encouraged to think about how best to mitigate wrapping a net on a 

prospective platform, highly recommended informant D. Sparrow responded with intensity: 

Well, damn it, if it has to be then you have to look at it the other way around. If we went 

out there and somehow managed to shut down their platform for a day, how would they

react? Well, they would start adding up the numbers – how much down time, how many

man-hours lost, how much it would cost to replace the equipment. Well, that’s how we 

have to look at it too. How many fish did I lose? What did the new net cost me? What 

might I have made if I could have fished the next two openings if I’d had that net? 

The Fishermen’s Contingency Fund and Needed Modifications 

There is precedent in the United States for funding replacement of fishing gear lost due to 

interaction with oil and gas industry infrastructure on the OCS. This has been the role of the 

Fishermen’s Contingency Fund (FCF), established as Title IV of the OCSLA in 1978. Most 

claimants are shrimp trawl captains in Louisiana who operate in close proximity to drilling 

platforms and other industry infrastructure, often in relatively shallow water. As noted in the 

federally-sponsored report titled “Assessing the Need for the Fishermen’s Contingency Fund,” 

(Gadsby et al. 2000:5), the intent of the Fund and the federal government’s administrative role 

therein involves “reconciling the competing objectives of maintaining viable fishing industries 

while promoting the development of economical sources of energy.” 

Based on the intent of the FCF, in concept it could serve as a model for mitigating loss or 

damage of drift gillnet gear entangled in platform legs or other prospective industry 

infrastructure on the Cook Inlet OCS. But the FCF claimant and claim must satisfy various 

criteria prior to award (including the basic requirement that the fishing operation in question 

must be commercial in nature, and the entanglement not be attributed to a single entity). Most 

significantly, the obstruction causing the damage cannot have been charted or marked with a 

navigational aid when the loss or entanglement occurred. OCS-related pipelines are the 

exception to the charting rule. 

There is at present no federally-administered mechanism for reimbursing gear or harvest lost to 

surface obstructions such as drilling platforms. We would suggest, however, that the unique 

environmental conditions in Cook Inlet (especially current speed and lateral drift), and the 

operational aspects of drift gillnet fishing on this body of water as described above, may warrant 

reconsideration of FCF criteria to include a special class of claims for this unique fishery. 

The FCF is relevant to the Cook Inlet case in that it provides a model for how reimbursement for 

lost gear might be administered by the federal government through a claims process in which the 

burden of proof rests largely on the fishing captain. But it is not relevant in that the Fund does 

77
not reimburse for gear lost or entangled on surface obstructions such as drilling platforms – the 

key issue in the current case. Further, while it does reimburse for losses associated with OCS 

pipeline entanglements, pipeline problems reportedly have not been a major problem in the deep 

waters of Cook Inlet. 

Gadsby et al. (2002) report that, while the Fund is important and viable, it is not without 

problems. The authors assert that some fishers are duly reimbursed for losses, but also that there 

has been a net decrease in fishing grounds that hasn’t been and can’t legally be reimbursed by 

the Fund. This net loss is a result of increasing OCS activity (in the Gulf) and increasing 

amounts of underwater infrastructure which forces vessel operators to avoid previously fished 

areas. Meanwhile, improved charting and marking of such potential obstructions is said to be 

reducing the number of claim approvals. For example, there were 1301 claims and 860 

approvals in 1990, but only 355 claims and 177 approvals in 1999 (p. 11). 

The assessment report concludes that the FCF remains valid and should be continued under 

federal administration since there are no other legal or private sector options for compensating 

damages to fishing operations that are attributable to offshore oil activities. Yet, the reviewers 

also assert that “the fund ameliorates, but falls short of remedying the problems associated with 

underwater obstructions,” and that “despite continuing increases in offshore oil and gas 

activities, the steady decline in claims paid and the declining area eligible for compensation 

[through increased charting and marking] underscore that the value of the fund to fishermen is 

eroding” (p. 24). 

The reviewing body concludes that the benefits from the Fund are real but inherently short-term

in nature, and that “the time appears to have come when offshore oil, fishing, and government 

should increase their focus on obstruction removal, site clearance, and mitigation efforts, rather 

than rely solely on the fund to compensate the fishing industry for damages” (p. 25). Thus, the 

lessons learned from the FCF relate more directly to (a) the production and post-production 

phases of OCS activity, and (b) submerged obstruction issues in relatively shallow waters. Both 

issues are, at present, largely tangential to the situations addressed by this study. 

The Local Fishermen’s Contingency Fund in California 

 Some of the shortcomings of the FCF for addressing gear loss and entanglement on the OCS in 

California were addressed via funds generated through per-barrel production fees required as part 

of permitting stipulations by the County of Santa Barbara. Santa Barbara is an area of extensive 

shore-side support for offshore development in both state and federal jurisdiction waters. This 

non-litigated agreement was negotiated to lessen the effects of offshore activity on local 

fishermen as it was deemed the local fleets were being displaced from historic fishing grounds 

and otherwise affected by offshore activities, and because pipelines constituted a physical 

linkage between offshore sites, both state and federal, back to Santa Barbara County (Armstrong 

2004). 

As such, the Local Fishermen’s Contingency Fund (LFCF) was established in 1988 to 

complement the FCF by providing loan monies to commercial fishing vessel operators to enable 

78
repair or replacement of gear while the often lengthy FCF claims process moves forward. The 

fund also reimburses fishers for costs associated with repairing or replacing gear damaged in 

state jurisdiction waters. A similar program is administered in Louisiana through the Louisiana 

Department of Natural Resources. 

But the criteria for awards under the LFCF are essentially the same as those for the FCF. That is, 

the fund is largely irrelevant to the platform entanglement issue since it does not cover loss or 

damage associated with obstructions that are charted or marked with a navigational device. 

Pipelines are exempted in the LFCF as well. Again, the arrangement is not an appropriate 

measure for the mitigating the problem of gear damage or loss associated with an offshore 

platform. It does, however, exemplify a unique mechanism for generating funds for

reimbursement to local fishing fleets from private industry sources, and administering them

through local government. As described below, there is also a fisheries enhancement component 

to the local program (and to the Louisiana program). 

The LFCF could thus serve as a model through which the State of Alaska and/or the federal 

government could induce the offshore industry to mitigate a problem interaction with the drift 

gillnet fleet. But in order for it to be beneficial in this specific instance, criteria for 

reimbursement would need to include entanglement with platforms in swift current conditions 

such as those that characterize Cook Inlet on a diurnal (tidal) basis. 

An Emergency Response Vessel Program

Commissioning vessels that could be launched to help drifters in distress avoid collision or gear 

entanglement is a conceptually viable mitigating possibility. The possibility clearly holds some

mitigating promise, for as noted by one of our seasoned drift gillnetters, the possibility of gear 

entanglement and/or vessel collision should be seen not only in terms of potential loss of gear or 

harvest, but also one of human safety and “the need for fishermen to deal with an additional 

source of fear.” 

There are actually a number of commercial vessel-assist operations active in the Cook Inlet 

region that could respond to an emergency of this nature, as could the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Representatives of Cook Inlet Oil Spill Response Incorporated (CISPRI) report that while 

CISPRI’s mandate is primarily oil spill response under the Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990, 

participating vessel captains, many of whom are drift gillnetters, would also likely respond to a 

vessel emergency of any kind under the maritime code of ethics. The CISPRI official with 

whom we spoke also reported that if its official mandate should change to include responding to 

stricken vessels, its members would be highly skilled and prepared to do so. 

These remote response options are viable, but under the platform hazard scenario, by the time the 

operator of the stricken vessel deemed assistance necessary, travel time from port to point of 

offshore assist would often be too lengthy. This is particularly true when strong opposing winds 

and seas slow rescue time while simultaneously worsening the situation for the stricken mariner. 

79
The key requirement of this mitigation option would be close proximity and/or quick access of

response vessel to fishing grounds or platform. A common strategy for platform rescue work is 

to have available a “mother” rescue vessel with smaller deployable craft on board at the ready. 

Although the rate of current flow and sea state in a given setting are crucial considerations, risk 

assessment work undertaken in the North Sea in the 1990s (Riskassesor.com 2004) concluded 

some important relevant points about these matters: 

. . conventional standby vessels with open fast rescue craft operating at a distance of five 

nautical miles from the manned installation [platform] are capable of rescuing a single 

person within 30 minutes with 50 percent probability. The upper bound rescue time

(90% probability) is 72 minutes. The upper bound reflects the difficulties in locating a 

person in heavy seas and conditions of strong current and wind drift (Riskassesor.com

2004: Section 2, page 3). 

While locating a person in the water is more difficult than finding a vessel, the findings do 

provide some insight into response time. Most obviously, the closer the rescue craft, the quicker 

the response. As such, three viable options are envisioned. Each assumes a high-level of 

communication between drift gillnet vessel operator and rescue dispatch. 

First, a platform-launched vessel would clearly present rapid and targeted response potential in 

the area of need. The technology to launch such a response vessel in Cook Inlet clearly exists, 

although observation of conditions around platforms during periods of strong tidal flow, and 

conversation with platform operators suggest this may be challenging. But such platformlaunched vessels are used around the world. Numerous platforms in the North Sea are equipped 

with crane-deployed safety and rescue craft. 

Such a vessel may also benefit oil and gas industry offshore operations insofar as it may serve to 

reduce any threat to continued safety on the platform itself. For instance, a rescue boat could 

potentially mitigate problems associated with scenarios such as a vessel without power 

approaching platform legs or other infrastructure, a vessel approaching a platform or other 

infrastructure while on fire, or a platform worker stricken during a period of high winds when 

platform helicopter rescues are impossible. The real-time nature of maritime emergencies is hard 

to predict, but at-sea response options may clearly reduce threats to life and property. 

Second, a shore-side rescue vessel could prove valuable in responding to drift gillnet vessels in 

distress if it was dedicated to this use and kept at the ready. Logically, such a vessel would be 

moored in a place and position enabling minimal response time to the platform and surrounding 

upstream area. The “mothership” with auxiliary rescue craft could maximize scope of response, 

though this may not be necessary given that collisions and net wrapping were and are rare 

occurrences. 

Third, mechanisms to enhance within-fleet cooperation to assist may in reality constitute the 

most natural and likely to succeed means for mitigating entanglement and collision hazards. 

Drift gillnet captains are the best candidates for assisting other drift gillnet captains since they 

typically: (a) work in close proximity to each other, (b) remain alert both visually and through 

radio contact to the situations of other drifters, (c) maintain a maritime custom of assisting other 

80
mariners, (d) know the waters and associated hazards of Cook Inlet, and (e) know the nuances of 

nets, drift boats, and drifting. Therefore, response to emergency-type vessel, gear, and platform

interactions might best be performed from within the fleet itself. Programs to formalize the skills 

and readiness of drift gillnetters in this respect may be underwritten by a number of parties. 

Given the mitigating intent of such programs in this case, industry and government could 

potentially avoid various fishery-offshore oil and gas industry interface problems through 

administrative support and or sponsorship. 

5.2.3 Mitigation of OCS-Related Oil Spills Affecting the Drift Gillnet Fleet 

Past experience and lingering issues associated with oil spills have left many of our seasoned 

drift gillnet informants with unhappy dispositions on the issue. While many drift gillnetters 

received compensatory monies from the Exxon Valdez event early on, and some still stand to 

benefit from punitive awards resulting from closures of the Cook Inlet fisheries following the 

spill, the long wait has conditioned thinking on what might ideally happen in the event of future 

spills affecting the region. Mitigation possibilities are thus perceived by the fishermen in terms 

of both physical response to spill events, and means for reducing potential social and economic 

effects of spills on the fishery participants. 

Establishment of an Insurance-Type Oil Spill Bond

Some of our research participants have advanced the idea of an insurance-style bond that would 

serve multiple purposes in assisting drift gillnetters and other fishery participants in the event of

an oil spill on Cook Inlet. According to its proponents, the most appropriate means of funding 

this sort of arrangement would be under a permitting stipulation that required oil and gas 

industries active on the OCS to pay into and maintain an insurance policy to compensate at some

level fishers and other user groups affected by an oil spill, blowout, or similar event. From the 

perspective of the drift gillnetters, compensation amounts would be based primarily on the value 

of lost gear and harvest value. Secondary losses, such as diminished value of seafood products 

in subsequent years, and loss of lifestyle issues, were also discussed by the fishermen. Many 

fishermen are not aware that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires operators of offshore 

facilities to maintain evidence of financial responsibility of $150 million to meet liability 

potentially associated with a spill or other oil pollution event.

Time Limitations on Spill Litigation and Settlement 

Members of our core panel of drift gillnetters asserted that one viable means of mitigating spill 

effects on the fleet would involve limiting the amount of time involved in litigating and settling

spill claims. Clearly based on their experiences with Exxon Valdez oil spill litigation and 

settlement processes, these participants felt that Cook Inlet OCS lease sales should be 

conditioned by such stipulations. W. Hybrid recommended a top-end limit of five years to 

process spill litigation and claims – a limit based on his personal tolerance. While this 

recommendation was made with visible enthusiasm and consensus at the group meeting held 

81
with drift gillnetters in the southern portion of the study area, it should be noted that there is no 

precedent, mechanism, or likelihood that due process could be constrained a priori. 

Involvement of the Drift Gillnet Fleet in Spill Response Activities

Many of the drift boat captains with whom the research team interacted during this project are 

expert navigators and possess extensive knowledge of the unique marine environment of Cook 

Inlet. Some participate in the Ship Escort/Response Vessel System (SERVS) in Prince William

Sound, and others work or have worked for CISPRI. As recommended by various seasoned drift 

netters during the present study, one potentially highly effective means of mitigating spills and 

their effects on the region’s fish resources and fisheries is to further recruit and further involve 

drift gillnetters in oil spill response contingency plans and programs. According to some

informants, monies for funding programs that would pay expert fisher-navigators as spill 

responders should come from the above-mentioned insurance bond or from an as yet to be 

designed publicly-administered program specific to Cook Inlet. It was suggested that this group 

might potentially interact with the Cook Inlet Regional Citizen’s Advisory Council (CIRCAC), 

established in the region in the early 1990s following the Exxon Valdez event in Prince William

Sound. 

5.2.4 Mitigation of Vessel Traffic and Spatial-Navigational Issues 

Given spatial constraints imposed on the fleet by the contemporary drift gillnet regulatory 

regime, many participants speak with concern about potential additional limitations that might 

result from emplacement of a platform in the Inlet. Increases in supply, maintenance, and other 

vessel traffic during various phases of OCS exploration and development were seen to have the 

potential to affect navigational patterns and other aspects of fleet operations. This sub-section 

addresses possibilities for mitigating these potential problems. 

Regulatory Concessions

Some seasoned drift gillnetters stated an interest in receiving concessions to existing fishing 

regulations in exchange for: (a) loss of fishing grounds around a platform, (b) down time

associated with prospective OCS operations, and/or (c) forced alterations to fishing operations 

and/or navigational patterns as might be incurred through increased vessel traffic to and from a 

platform. This was particularly attractive to our panel of core informants in that many asserted 

that fishing production has been slowed by seasonal and area limitations, and that another 

potentially impeding factor could further diminish production. But from a regulatory standpoint, 

it is clear that any addition of concessions to limits on drift gillnetting would require a complex 

set of changes to ensure the objectives and goals of resource management are met, including 

balanced escapement allowance, maximum sustainable yield for multiple user groups, and so 

forth. The arrangement would therefore require some form of cooperation between participating 

federal and state government agencies. 

82
Seasonal Restrictions on Drilling to Avoid Increased Traffic During Drift Season

 Inasmuch as movement of supply and other vessels in the drift fishing grounds could be 

reduced, seasonal or other temporal restrictions on drilling were seen to have some potential for 

mitigating changes to the existing system of navigation on Cook Inlet, and the relationship of the 

drift gillnet fleet to that system. But it should be noted that the volume of OCS platform vessel 

traffic would likely vary extensively between operational phases. While there would be various 

and extensive vessel activity associated with exploration and construction phases, platform-based 

production operations on the treacherous waters of the Inlet tend to be facilitated and supplied 

via helicopter rather than marine vessel traffic. In any case, given the brevity of the drift gillnet

season and the fact that it occurs only on Mondays and Thursdays, limitations on industry vessel 

activity during that period would not require highly burdensome scheduling changes on the part 

of industry. 

A System of Communication between Drift Gillnet and other Vessels

Finally, there may be utility in more optimal communication between tankers, drift gillnet

vessels, and other vessel traffic on the Inlet. As one UCIDA representative suggested, this might 

be facilitated through stringent requirements that captains of tankers and other large vessels 

regularly provide their positions on a known frequency as they move along the shipping lane in 

the proximity of the fishing fleets. He reports that UCIDA and the Coast Guard historically have 

coordinated information about large-vessel activity, fishery openings, and other navigational 

issues, but that interaction with tanker operations has been “one-sided.” 

Alaska Division of Oil and Gas (1999:5-18) reports that tanker personnel voluntarily follow 

practices that reduce the chance for oil spills. By extension, in concept at least, these could also 

lend to awareness of drift gillnet vessels. Two of the more relevant practices involve having two 

licensed officers or one licensed officer and one marine pilot on deck at all times, and plotting 

fixes every 20 minutes. 

In the late 1990s, the Coast Guard examined the need for tanker escort vessels in Cook Inlet 

(State of Alaska Division of Oil and Gas 1999:5-19). As an escort captain would necessarily be 

on the alert for potential problems with small vessels, the escort measure could obviously reduce 

the likelihood for problem interactions with a drift gillnet vessel. But the agency ultimately 

found that there was “no historical justification for an escort system for Cook Inlet, nor sufficient 

risk posed by the tanker fleet that currently operates” (p. 19). A stand-by tug for Lower Cook 

Inlet was recommended instead. 

While drift gillnetters often do not believe tanker operations or emergency contingency plans 

incorporate their concerns, smaller freight vessels reportedly do communicate their position in 

the Inlet over specific VHF channels. Drift gillnetters believe that Coast Guard-enforced rules 

for oil tankers to do the same may reduce stressful situations and the potential for serious 

accidents on the Inlet. Further, such a strategy may reduce tension across the entire navigational 

83
system and enable fishing captains to focus on the task at hand without the specter of large and 

rapidly moving vessels catching them unaware. 

A concerted venue for improving communication between all parties is an obvious strategy for 

mitigating any potential increase in vessel activity as might be anticipated in relation to oil and 

gas work on the OCS. This might be best facilitated through a central communications and 

dispatch center. 

5.2.5 Comprehensive and Communication-Based Mitigation Strategies 

Some mitigation options identified during the course of this project are relatively comprehensive 

rather than highly specific in nature and potential effect. The aforementioned insurance bond, 

for instance, could serve to mitigate a variety of problem interactions potentially occurring on the 

OCS - loss of fishing gear or harvest, oil spills, collisions, and so forth. But insofar as there is 

little precedent or apparent likelihood of such a program being established, other comprehensive 

options must also be considered. Establishment of a council through which industry and fishing 

concerns may be voiced, also has the potential for broad-reaching effects in that this alternative 

may function as a general forum for collaborative solutions to a range of problems potentially 

affecting industries using the OCS in upcoming years. 

The seasoned drift gillnet fishermen who participated in our protocol-directed interviews 

strongly supported the idea of a formalized means through which their knowledge and expertise 

could contribute to OCS-related decision-making and planning. In fact, there was much more 

agreement about the importance and viability of this option than any other. As noted in Chart 5-

1 below, 71 percent of these research participants supported enhanced communication 

opportunities as effective means for mitigating problems between the fishing and oil and gas 

industry in the region. Our focus group work confirmed this interest. 

Chart 5-1 Seasoned Drift Gillnetters Advocating 

Communication-Based Mitigation

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Responding Drift Gillnetters (N=31)

This sub-section focuses on the precedent for and potential of such options. Two basic 

communication-based mitigation models are elaborated. Both are relatively encompassing in 

their potential mitigating effects, and both involve extensive input of drift gillnetters into OCS 

decision-making processes. 

84
A Joint Council or Standing Advisory Committee 

UCIDA representatives strongly advocated the establishment of a council or committee through 

which the concerns, interests, and expertise of their constituents could be formally expressed 

within or prior to significant OCS-related decision-making processes. Drift Association members 

envision a standing body of representatives from the drift fleet, from the set net contingent, from

ADF&G, MMS, and other involved or responsible parties. The range of interaction issues 

explored in this report would be fair game for discussion in such a forum, and within the broad 

context of other relevant natural resource use, social, and economic issues of importance to 

communities in the region. 

The intent of including representatives from the commercial fishing industry in such a forum is 

clear – to lend empirical understanding of the fisheries and environmental conditions of Cook 

Inlet to petroleum-related decision-making processes that could affect the region’s fleets, fish 

resources, and associated habitats. Such representation would also presumably contribute to lease 

sale-related decisions and negotiation, including providing input about the most appropriate 

locations for emplacing platforms, and for mitigating the effects of the full range of exploration 

and production activities on the OCS. 

There are examples of councils and committees that have been convened elsewhere to provide 

for the level of interaction and meaningful participation desired by UCIDA and many drift 

gillnetters. The Joint Oil/Fisheries Committee to address issues on the California OCS is one. 

The Oil/Fisheries Group organized and long since disbanded in Alaska is another. The newly 

formed Ocean One group in Canada provides a particularly powerful model. 

The Oil/Fisheries Group of Alaska (OFGA), and California’s Joint Oil/Fisheries Committee and 

Liaison Office (CC/LO) were closely related entities convened in the early 1980s to address 

problem interactions between fishing fleets and the offshore oil and gas industry on the Alaska 

and California OCS. Fusaro (2004) reports that the CC/LO was designed based on the guidance 

provided in early versions of A Manual for Geophysical Operations in Fishing Areas of Alaska 

(Hanley 1984), developed by representatives of the OFGA. 

The OFGA was itself formed in 1983 in response to concerns voiced by fishing industry 

representatives then active in the Bering Sea, that oil and gas industry seismic vessels would 

likely interfere with and undermine their fishing and processing operations. The particular 

impetus for convening the group was related both to then-pending OCS lease sales in the 

Navarin, St. George, and Norton Basins, and to broader concerns about seismic testing 

throughout Alaskan waters, including Lower Cook Inlet. Fishermen were also concerned about 

gear loss and disruption of fishing operations associated with prospective OCS activity. 

The inter-industry group was designed to involve representatives from several major oil 

companies, from the primary fishing and processing organizations in Alaska, and from a number 

of geophysical testing companies (see Hanley 1984 entry in Appendix A for a full listing of 

participants). The intent of the group was to “provide a forum for inter-industry communication, 

education, and resolution of potential problems related to [geophysical] operations in Alaska, 

85
and to promote the successful co-existence of commercial fishing, processing, and oil industry 

activity in Alaska offshore areas (p. C-1). Initial meetings emphasized the importance of 

enhancing inter-industry communication and knowledge about operations and equipment in 

order to avoid and minimize inter-industry conflict. 

 

The recommendations outlined in the 1983 manual draw upon the experiences of ongoing oil 

exploration programs in California and the North Sea, and information contained in the 

Alaska Oil and Gas Association's Operating Guidelines for Marine Geophysical Operations. 

Although the OFGA became obsolete, the principal recommendations it developed in the 1983 

manual remain pertinent and highly relevant to the current research. We have taken the liberty 

of deleting specific references to seismic operations so as to underscore the utility of the 

recommendations for mitigating a broad range of interface issues, including platform and vessel 

traffic. These recommendations would be suitable for incorporation into a regional mitigation 

plan for the Cook Inlet industry interface: 

(1) Consult fishing area maps and fishing season bar charts to ascertain whether 

planned programs will coincide with fishing activities; 

(2) Consult additional information in the fishing industry to learn about the types of 

vessels, gear, fishing seasons/areas and types of fishing activity [oil and gas] 

operators are likely to encounter: 

(3) Contact the regional representative of ADF&G to receive the most 

recent information on fishing seasons and activities. ADF&G has agreed to 

cooperate and will also disseminate information to fishermen regarding the 

[operator’s] location, timing, and vessel; 

(4) Consult with local experts in advance to determine the potential for conflict with 

fishing operations; 

(5) Take measures to avoid conflicts. If potential conflicts have been identified, 

consider rescheduling operations to avoid times of heavy fishing activities. If 

operations cannot be rescheduled negotiate with affected area fishermen to 

temporarily remove their gear for appropriate compensation, or to make 

arrangements for appropriate compensation in advance if gear removal is 

infeasible; 

(6) Be prepared to recognize (and avoid) fishing operation vessels and gears likely to 

be encountered during operations; make regular radio contact with fishermen to 

monitor fishing activities and gear placement; 

(7) Contact the regional weather service broadcaster [or dispatch], who will 

disseminate information to the fishermen regarding offshore vessel and 

[infrastructure] location; and, finally, 

86
(8) Use guide craft, aircraft, and observers in areas where [infrastructure] is [a 

potential problem] (which should be determined in a pre-operation survey of the 

area). Record and report gear damage caused by operations so that the fishermen 

can be expediently compensated. 

The California-based Joint Oil/Fisheries Committee and Liaison Office (CC/LO) drew from the 

1983 Alaska manual and its recommendations to develop a similar plan for the OCS offshore 

Santa Barbara and Ventura Counties. The CC/LO were established in 1983 to address interindustry problems occurring between fishermen and oil industry operations in the state and 

federal jurisdiction waters of California. This was and is an area of extensive offshore 

exploration and production activity, and many fishermen have reported gear loss, vessel traffic 

problems, and other problem interactions and spatial conflicts. 

In short, this was a challenging socio-political environment for attempts at discussion and 

negotiation between the industries (Cormick and Knaster 1986:9). But a professionally-mediated 

negotiating session was convened, and eventually led to the establishment of a formal means 

through which participants could interact and communicate on a regular basis. The Joint 

Committee involved the participation of five members from the offshore oil and gas industry and 

five from the fishing industry. 

One of the more important functions of the Committee was communication about the timing of 

offshore testing and exploration activities. The Liaison Office was established to assist in 

relaying information between key members in each of the industries, and to provide a neutral 

meeting place and support for interactions. Its functions gradually expanded to include 

facilitation of claims between fishing operations and the offshore oil and gas industry, such as 

gear loss claims under federal and local reimbursement programs, and right-of-way issues and 

claims presented by both parties. The Committee and Office continue to function under state and 

local funding administration. Cormick and Knaster (1986) provide more detail about the origins 

of the program, as does Fusaro (1991:20): 

As an outcome of years of difficult negotiations on the issues of compensation for 

or mitigation of perceived negative impacts of the oil industry on the fishing 

industry, a proposal was made jointly by the oil and fishing industries to the State 

of California. The Joint Committee believed that state and federal oil revenue 

sharing monies (funds distributed to coastal states pursuant to OCSLA section 

8[g], Public Law 83-212) were an appropriate source of funds to develop a series 

of innovative programs to mitigate some of the effects of multiple-use ocean 

development. After a long series of false starts and dead ends, the Joint 

committee and Liaison Office successfully secured 8[g] funds for these programs. 

The author proceeds with specifics of the programs, with those selected for presentation bearing 

clear relevance to the prospective activities and potential effects of industry activity on the Cook 

Inlet OCS: 

87
[1] The State Secretary of Environmental Affairs contracted for research and 

development on new fishing areas, gear, or technology to seek means by which 

the fishing industry might offset the areal loss of fishing grounds caused by oil 

industry exploration and development 

[2] The State Coastal Conservancy identified fishing ports in which space and 

facilities were needed and could be provided for the repair of gear damaged by 

seafloor debris or other oil industry equipment or operations. 

[3] The Secretary of Environmental Affairs made grants of up to $5,000 per 

commercial fishing vessel over the three-year program for vessel or personnel 

safety and survival equipment, to enable fishermen to more safely expand their 

range beyond areas of multiple-use conflicts. 

Clearly, the CC/LO provides a model for how a negotiating body might be formed, and what it 

might eventually accomplish in the interests of both the oil and gas and fishing industries 

operating in Cook Inlet. As many in the drift gillnet fishing contingent currently support the 

offshore oil and gas industry and what it brings and might in the future bring to the region in 

terms of economic benefit, a committee or council and liaison office established in the Cook 

Inlet region would initiate its tenure with pre-existing potential for collaboration. Interaction and 

discussions with oil and gas industry representatives and resource managers in the region 

indicate similar interests. 

One Ocean is another communication-based entity established to mitigate problems between the 

fishing and oil/gas industries. This is a newly formed inter-industry organization that provides a 

forum for communication and information exchange between the in Newfoundland and 

Labrador. Inspired by similar liaison models developed by other jurisdictions such as the North 

Sea and Norway, One Ocean assists both industries in understanding each other’s operations and 

activities so each can work safely and efficiently in close proximity. The organization works to 

solve various spatial conflicts and provide independent expert analysis of interaction issues. 

The One Ocean advisory board consists of seven representatives from each industry, including 

members of the Fish, Food and Allied Workers (which has more than 20,000 members in 

Newfoundland and Labrador); the Fisheries Association of Newfoundland and Labrador, (an 

industry trade association accounting for some 80 percent of regional seafood production); and 

the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (a group representing 140 member companies 

of Canada’s upstream oil and natural gas industry that works closely with companies, 

government agencies, and stakeholders to analyze various oil and gas issues. An independent 

Secretariat lends advice and oversight to One Ocean’s mission in the region. The scope of this 

organization is quite large and complex in comparison to the prospective Cook Inlet and thus 

bears watching as a model for complex negotiations as it progresses through time and trying 

issues. 

Slade (2004) asserts that, unlike similar entities elsewhere, One Ocean is inter-industry-driven. 

The group is focused on communication between and education of all participating parties, and 

was initiated in part as a means for industries and government entities to “start talking outside of 

88
their own circles.” An example is the group’s role in informing each side about the technical and 

spatial aspects of a new submerged land sale in the Orphan Basin. The fishing representatives 

used One Ocean as a forum for presenting information about historical fishing operations active 

in that area, and the oil and gas industry (in this case ExxonMobil) presented discussion about 

three-dimensional seismic testing in the area. The Secretariat then converted the language of 

both groups, and framed it in relation to relevant regulating issues so as to generate mutually 

understandable information for all. 

One Ocean has now been active for two-years. May (2004) reports that the group is enjoying 

success to date, and has gradually enlarged the scope of issues it addresses. There is indication 

the group’s industry-funded four year budget of $200,000 will be renewed, although there is 

some movement toward converting the entity to a non-profit corporation. 

Fisheries and Market Enhancement Programs

Previous sections of this report have described some of the challenges historically and currently 

faced by participants in the Cook Inlet drift gillnet fishery. Among these, problems with 

offshore oil platforms or other oil and gas industry activity cannot be seen as primary. But as 

described in Sections 3.0 and 4.0, the drift gillnet captain operates within a navigational and 

operational system that does have the potential to be disrupted by activities on the OCS 

One form of mitigation of potential problems can be thought of as a kind of trade-off, wherein 

the risks associated with OCS oil and gas activity may be offset, prior to or after the fact, by 

programs seeking to reduce some of the cogent problems facing the fishery. There are such 

programs operating in Louisiana and California. As the programs have similar structure and 

intent, we review here relevant aspects of the Santa Barbara program only. 

The Santa Barbara County Fisheries Enhancement Fund (SBFEF) was established in 1987 in 

conjunction with the Local Fishermen’s Contingency Fund to “help mitigate significant impacts 

of offshore oil and gas development to commercial fisheries and the local commercial fishing 

industry.” As for the LFC, funding for this program also derives from permitting stipulations 

that involve per barrel fee assessments on production from the Gaviota Marine Terminal, the 

Santa Ynez Unit, and the Point Arguello and Point Pedernales offshore sites. A wide range of 

projects have been funded through the program, including those listed in summary form in Table 

5-1 below. The projects are listed as example of what might be possible for fisheries 

enhancement in Cook Inlet should a similar program be developed through a state-federalborough arrangement to encourage nominal funding from the region’s oil and gas industry. 

89
Table 5-1 Santa Barbara County Fisheries Enhancement Fund: Project Examples 

Project Grantee Grant Amount Description

Santa Barbara Harbor 

Fishermen’s Market 

Santa Barbara Fishermen’s 

Association 9,764 

One-year start-up costs for the

fishermen’s market at Santa 

Barbara Harbor 

Santa Barbara Harbor 

Ice Machine 

Santa Barbara City 388,278 Purchase and install a new ice 

machine at the harbor 

Waypoint Newsletter Ventura County

Fishermen’s Association 12,000

Two-year start-up costs for a

newsletter about fisheries affairs 

with updates on fishing and 

oilfield activity 

New Fish Hoist 

at Santa Barbara Harbor City of Santa Barbara 27,500

Assist hoisting fish landings on

dock (due to increased congestion 

at Santa Barbara Harbor). 

Grappling Hook and Gear

Southern California 

Trawlers Association 48,785

Equipment to retrieve and repair 

fishing nets snagged on subsea

debris. 

Fishwalk Interpretive 

Panels 

Santa Barbara County and 

Santa Barbara City 29,359 Nine interpretive panels depicting 

regional commercial fishing 

Morro Bay Net Repair 

Area 

Morro Bay Commercial 

Fishermen’s Association 7,000 

Asphalt two areas for storing

fishing equipment and repairing

nets at Morro Bay harbor

Computer Upgrades at 

Morro Bay Fishermen’s 

International Center 

Morro Bay Commercial 

Fishermen’s Association 1,750 

Upgrade computer system of 

offshore weather patterns and 

water temperatures 

Chinook Salmon

Rearing Project 

Commercial Fishermen’s 

of Santa Barbara, Inc. 7,000 

Expand the Chinook salmon

rearing project from 70,000 to

140,000 fish

Source: County of Santa Barbara, Planning and Development, Energy Division. Available online at: countyofsb.org/energy/mitigation/fef.asp 

As noted in the table, the program awards monies for a wide range of projects, from those highly 

specific to the physical-operational needs of fishers, to venues for communication between the 

offshore industries, to various resource and marketing improvements. Similarly, there are 

numerous ways in which the drift gillnet fishery and its resource base might be improved given 

the unique environs of Cook Inlet. A study of enhancement potential in the region is warranted. 

Contributions to Cook Inlet salmon marketing efforts may be a truly advantageous form of 

mitigation for the region’s drift gillnet fleet. Any meaningful analysis of mitigation in this 

context has to address the possibility that clearly has potentially far-reaching efforts for fleet – 

bettering the market value and/or distribution opportunities for sockeye and other species of 

salmon. While the economics of the salmon market are highly complex and related to a host of 

factors, including issues of national and global scale, providing some form of assistance to 

improve the economic situation for the drift gillnet fleet may be the best form of compensation 

that could be offered in return for problems associated with new oil and gas industry activities on 

the OCS. 

Efforts to improve market conditions by marketing Cook Inlet salmon as “Kenai Wild” have 

been initiated by processors and harvesters in the region. The results of that effort have not yet 

been assessed in full. But an important motivation for encouraging external assistance is the fact

that the harvesters are typically too involved in fishing itself and in other forms of employment 

to fully engage in the marketing end of the equation. 

90
This situation has been observed by the authors in many contexts, and is noted of small boat 

commercial fishing operators around the world (McGoodwin 1990). In some cases, processors 

and distributors may attempt new marketing venues to improve revenues, but when successful, 

resulting profits may or may not reach the harvesters. If prices for Cook Inlet salmon are ever to 

approach even a reasonable percentage of former values, collaborative efforts need be applied to 

improving the marketing potential of the product and/or the likelihood that profit will reach the 

harvester. How the oil and gas industry might assist in marketing-related efforts or other means 

for improving the economics of fishing in Cook Inlet should be a primary form of discussion in 

the event a joint council or committee is convened in the region in the future. 

There is observable willingness and interest among drift gillnetters to collaborate with industry, 

and there is widespread recognition of the economic importance of the oil and gas industry in the 

region. Indeed, many drift gillnetters work in that industry and depend on it for their livelihoods. 

While the difference in scale of production between commercial fishing and oil and gas 

production is truly immense, the tenure of each industry in the Cook Inlet Region is quite similar. 

The two forms of enterprise developed in tandem here. It may be in part for this reason that 

during the final moments of our last meeting with our panel of seasoned Cook Inlet drift 

gillnetters, there was strong insistence that this report communicate the desire of the fishermen to 

be at the table when regionally definitive resource-use decisions are considered and made. 

 

91
6.0 Summary Findings and Conclusions

The research described in this report has enabled focused description of the Cook Inlet drift 

gillnet fishery and the nature of its historic and potential future interactions with oil and gas 

industry activities in the region. That description and supporting literature review serve as 

context for identifying and assessing appropriate means and venues for mitigating potential 

problems where these industries interact. This concluding section summarizes the project 

objectives and findings and presents a set of overarching recommendations for those affected by 

or involved in the Cook Inlet OCS planning and decision-making processes. 

6.1 Summary of Project Objectives and Findings 

Our first of two principal goals was to determine whether establishment of platform drilling and 

associated activities in the federal jurisdiction waters of Cook Inlet could actually cause 

problems for the drift gillnet fleet. The conflict outcome was thus treated as a working

hypothesis, and various research methods were used to examine fleet and oil/gas industry 

operations and the nature of their spatial interactions in the region over time. 

Based on understanding developed through this initial phase of the research, specific types of 

known and potential spatial conflicts were presented as subjects for discussion with a significant 

sample of seasoned drift gillnet fishery participants. The process served to satisfy our second 

principal objective which was to systematically identify reasonable possibilities for reducing the 

effects of such conflicts as potentially experienced by the drift gillnet fleet. Understanding of 

these possibilities and their implications were then refined and elaborated through focus group 

and other in-depth research methods with a core sample of highly recommended drift gillnetters. 

The resulting information was examined in light of relevant mitigation options developed in 

similar contexts elsewhere in the world. 

6.1.1 Summary of Descriptive Findings: The Drift Gillnet Fleet and the Potential for 

Interaction with Oil/Gas Industry Activities on the OCS 

Systematic research of drift gill net operations on Cook Inlet led to a set of important findings. 

Significantly, these clearly indicate that the navigational concerns stated by fishermen during the 

initial scoping processes associated with Lease Sales 191 and 199 are real, and rooted in the 

challenges of operating vessels under conditions that can test even the most skilled mariners. 

Investigation of the way drift gillnet vessels operate in Cook Inlet clearly does indicate the 

potential for spatial challenges and hazardous interactions with prospective oil/gas industry 

infrastructure and vessels in certain portions of the OCS. But of equal significance, the research 

has uncovered important information that suggests: (a) spatial conflicts may be avoided through 

strategic planning on the part of the oil and gas industry and its regulators, and (b) many 

problems for the drift gillnet fleet potentially associated with prospective drilling on the OCS can 

be mitigated. Finally, the research indicates that while oil and gas industry activity on the OCS 

92
could affect fishery operations in certain ways, the salience of the issue is in reality 

overshadowed by a host of economic and other challenges. Key findings include, but are not 

limited to, the following: 

• Drift gillnet operators working Cook Inlet waters are currently encountering various 

challenges in addition to the perennial challenges presented by wind and sea and 

uncertain annual abundance of returning salmon. Market conditions and marketing 

problems are especially significant in the modern context, and threaten drift gillnet 

fishing as an economically viable enterprise. 

• Finite salmon resources are allocated between numerous fishing technologies. As a 

result, the Cook Inlet drift gillnet fishery is extensively regulated. The regulatory 

structure includes spatial and time limitations to fishing activity. These regulatory 

constraints have a major bearing on the perceived viability of the commercial fishery in 

Cook Inlet. 

• The fishery in question is conducted in an unusually challenging marine environment. 

The rip zones typically considered to be highly productive fishing areas can be extremely 

hazardous to navigation, and Cook Inlet currents as a whole can be swift, variable, and 

dangerous. These factors make emplacement of a stationary drilling platform in the 

fishing grounds a real cause of concern for drift gillnetters. 

• There is some historic precedence of interaction between drift gillnet operations and oil 

platforms on Cook Inlet. While platform-related net wrappings and collisions in the state 

jurisdiction waters were and remain infrequent, reports of such experiences were 

reportedly harrowing for those involved. The infrequency of these events is attributed in 

part to the fact that existing platforms are well beyond the boundary for the present 

commercial fishery. 

• With nets extended, drift gillnet operations can present a physical “profile” of up to 1,000 

feet in length while fishing and navigating the Inlet. Operators report that despite this 

elongated profile, multiple drift gillnet operations can occur in close proximity as long as 

all are moving in unison with the current. Navigational problems typically occur when a 

stationary object such as an anchored vessel is encountered during the “drift.” 

• Tankers and other large vessels can also present navigational challenges to the drift 

gillnet fleet as they move against the current and, therefore, in opposition to the “drift.” 

These challenges can, of course, be mitigated through effective radio communication, but 

the largest vessels typically do not make their movements known to fishermen nor do 

they respond to efforts by fishermen to establish radio communication during transit. 

• Lateral drift induced by anomalous current movement can present additional challenges. 

Drift gillnet operators report that this phenomenon can significantly reduce the ability of

captains to effectively respond to the need for course changes that might be required 

upon sighting of a stationary object or non-drifting vessel traffic. 

93
• Given rapid currents, time involved in retrieving nets with various amounts of catch, and 

a host of other factors including those mentioned above, response time and strategies 

needed to respond to a stationary object in the fishing grounds can vary extensively. This 

is particularly important for the less experienced fisherman. The novice drift gillnet 

operator must learn how to deal with the range of challenges and conditions, while the 

seasoned participant has already tested and proven his mastery of vessel and tides.. There 

is thus a rationale for examining vessel operations on Cook Inlet as developed social and 

navigational systems. Introduction of new elements (such as a drilling platform and any 

associated changes in vessel traffic) may lead to shifts in those systems and associated 

need for adaptive responses and strategies. 

• Of particular note in the data collection process associated with this project was 

widespread and vigorous resistance to the possibility of establishing a drilling platform in 

the drift gillnet fishing grounds of Cook Inlet. This was noted among the full range of 

fishery participants. While oil/gas industry activities are generally supported by drift 

gillnetters insofar as these could contribute to the regional economy, resistance to any 

OCS development activity that could negatively affect drift gillnet fishery operations 

remains a well-entrenched norm. 

• This mixed perspective was additionally noted among regional drift gillnet association 

(UCIDA) leaders. Although such leaders reported official support for OCS lease sales 

based on potential economic contributions to the region, that support was qualified from 

the outset of the study by unconcealed dissatisfaction with aspects of oil/gas industry 

operations and actions in the larger region that posed a direct or indirect threat to the 

success of the fishery. Such dissatisfaction relates especially to the threat posed by 

potential oil spills that might contaminate their harvests or, worse, taint the long-term

market for Cook Inlet salmon. The representatives were also sanguine about their ability 

to recover future losses from such an event, given the protracted nature of the Exxon 

Valdez settlement process.23 

6.1.2 Summary of Mitigation Research Findings 

Our approach for identifying reasonable alternatives for mitigating potential spatial conflicts (our 

second principal goal) involved multiple research methods, including: (1) thorough review and 

synthesis of pertinent literature, (2) preliminary interview work with the full range of research 

participants, (3) protocol-guided interview work with 31 seasoned drift gillnetters, and (4) focus 

group and other forms of research interaction with our core sample of highly recommended drift 

gillnetters. Following are select mitigation options identified as both potentially effective and 

feasible: 

 

23 Many of the research participants qualify for and await spill settlement awards. Frustration with the litigation

process is obvious and appears to pervade perspectives on the industry in general even among those who strongly

support its prospective growth in the region. 

94
• Significantly, research participants commonly asserted that the most logical form of 

mitigation is to avoid placement of platforms in productive areas of the drift gillnet 

fishing grounds altogether, and especially in the rip zones. While the fishing grounds are 

extensive, there is also an area where drift gillnet fishing occurs relatively infrequently in 

the regulated fishing zone. This “Area of Special Consideration” lies east of the east rip 

zone from Anchor Point to Ninilchik and coincides with an area of potential interest to 

the oil and gas industry within and south of the Cosmopolitan Unit. Drilling could 

potentially occur in this area with minimized chance for problem interactions. 

• Deferral of specific popular fishing locations from lease sale areas is a preferred option 

for many fishery participants. Our ability to fully assess spatial aspects of this alternative 

(and the alternative above) is limited since specific areas of potential interest to the oil 

and gas industry are as yet unknown. 

• Extended reach drilling is also commonly envisioned among drift gillnetters as a feasible 

mitigation option. But the option is not a panacea in that the geology of Cook Inlet and 

existing technology are limiting factors, and such operations are costly. Analysts suggest 

an additional two or eventually three miles might be gained through extended reach 

drilling in the region. This option, combined with what additional reach might be gained 

through drilling from the western portions of the Special Area of Consideration could 

open up the possibility of exploration/production on parts of the OCS with minimized 

disruption of drift gillnet operations. 

• Establishment of programs for funding replacement of fishing gear lost due to 

entanglement on platforms is considered a viable mitigating option. Arrangements for 

acquiring compensatory funds from the oil and gas industry through permitting processes 

do exist. There is, however, no precedent for coverage of net damage or loss due to 

platform entanglement. Programs such as the federally-funded Fishermen’s Contingency 

Fund (NMFS) and locally-funded variations (e.g., Santa Barbara Local Fishermen’s 

Contingency Fund) reimburse for pipeline and uncharted obstructions only. To be 

effective in the Cook Inlet region, comparable programs would need to be fashioned to 

accommodate the unique characteristics of drift fishing in swift and unpredictable 

currents in the proximity of OCS platform facilities. 

• Establishment and administration of an industry insurance bond was advocated by 

seasoned drift gillnetters as a way to compensate for spill-induced loss of harvest and 

operational investment. It was not widely known among fishermen that the Oil Pollution 

Act of 1990 requires that offshore operators establish and maintain evidence of $150 

million to meet liability potentially associated with a spill or other oil pollution event. 

• Based on direct experience with spill litigation and settlement processes, some fishery 

participants asserted that OCS lease sales should be conditioned by stipulations limiting 

95
potential future litigation and settlement to a specific time period. While this concern and 

recommendation are understandable, given their past and ongoing experience, this is not 

considered a viable option. No legislative or regulatory mechanism could be identified 

that would, in effect, circumvent legal due process.

• Because regulatory limits on the allowable times and areas for drift gillnetting are seen as 

constraining factors, many research participants reported that any further limitations 

resulting from emplacement of an oil platform in the fishing grounds should involve a 

“trade” for a longer fishing season (and/or more openings), and/or expansion of allowable 

fishing grounds. This is a viable form of mitigation, but would require extensive 

collaboration with state policy decision makers and development of inter-agency resource 

management arrangements. 

• UCIDA leadership and the core group of informants strongly advocated establishment of 

a Joint Council or Standing Advisory Committee on fisheries and oil industry activities in 

the region. As presently conceived, such a council would be established to enable 

communications between fisheries, oil and gas, and government representatives regarding 

interactions on the OCS and associated management issues of importance to communities 

and stakeholders in the region. 

• Given its centralized position in the social structure of the fishery, and its coalescing 

function in representing the concerns of drift gillnetters in the region, UCIDA should take 

a leading role in the workings of a Joint Council or Committee. 

• The contractor has identified models for potential involvement of stakeholders in oil and 

gas and fishery resource management decisions in the study region. One Ocean is a 

newly formed inter-industry organization designed to provide a forum to enhance 

communication and information exchange between the fishing and oil and gas industries 

across the Canadian Maritime Provinces. The scope of this oil and gas industry-funded 

organization is quite large and complex and bears watching as a potential model for Cook 

Inlet as it progresses through time and trying issues. 

• Any meaningful examination of mitigation in this context should identify means for 

enhancing the fishery in exchange for potential or actual problem interactions on the 

OCS. The Santa Barbara County model is an interesting example in that a wide range of 

enhancement projects are funded via industry fees stipulated through the offshore 

development permitting process. 

• Given the economic challenges encountered by drift gillnetters, an ideal means for 

enhancing the Cook Inlet drift gillnet fishery would involve improving market conditions 

for harvested salmon. The participation of the oil and gas industry in collaborative 

efforts toward this end would likely contribute to mutually beneficial relations between 

these primary stakeholders. 

96
6.1.3 Summary Conclusions 

Analysis indicates that oil and gas industry activities occurring on that portion of the OCS used 

for drift gillnet operations could cause problems for the fleet. But it is also clear that the 

challenges to navigation and fishing presented by platforms, increased vessel traffic, or related 

factors, will not terminate the fishery. Cook Inlet drift gillnetters have in years past proven 

capable of adapting to the presence of platforms and associated offshore industry activities, if 

only in learning how best to avoid them. 

But as this study has also determined, the Cook Inlet drift gillnet fishery is conducted within a 

system of relationships. The drift fishing system is a complex and dynamic aggregate of 

physical-environmental, social, and economic variables. Altering the nature of the way the 

fishery can be prosecuted in a given area would have spatial effects throughout the system. 

As when flowing waters in a river are separated and increase force of flow upon meeting the 

foundation of a bridge, so would fishing pressure increase in other areas of a spatially limited 

system if a portion of it was to be rendered unusable. The width of that unusable zone may be 

narrow at its terminus, but variable lateral forces in flow coupled with (a) the profile of drift 

vessel with net in tow, (b) the presence of other vessels including large tankers, and (c) difficultto-predict factors such as a vessel drifting without power, increase the potential width of that 

zone considerably. In terms of upstream considerations, the zone of reaction time to a stationary 

object depends on a host of factors inherent in the navigational system at any given time. 

Thus, while emplacement of a platform is not in itself fatal to the fishery, it does have the 

potential to change the dynamics of the existing arrangement of spatial relationships in the Inlet. 

An oil spill on the OCS would have a similar effect on the fishery. For those already adapting to 

what are said to be cumbersome regulations, and to declining market conditions, introduction of 

a new constraint or condition in an already challenging environment may lead to diminished 

interest or capacity to continue, potentially resulting in further attrition to an aging fishery. This 

is the problem of “thresholds” – where a fisherman concludes that just “one-too-many” problems 

have arisen and it is time to quit. 

Mitigating the potential constraining or damaging effects of new factors introduced into the 

existing system may serve to encourage ongoing participation and the health of the fishery. 

Effective mitigation plans and efforts may also enhance industry efforts to move toward 

exploration and development on the OCS in the region. Table 6-1 below depicts the primary 

mitigation options identified as feasible and bearing potential to further the history of productive 

marine fisheries and oil and gas industry in Cook Inlet. 

97
Table 6-1 Summary of Identified Mitigation Possibilities Determined to be Feasible 

Agent/Concern Mitigation Option

Emplacement of Drilling Platform in

Fishing Grounds Could Cause Net

Entanglement, Navigational Problems, 

and/or Net Loss of Fishing Grounds 

• Avoid emplacement in the fishing grounds 

• Defer rip zones and other important areas from lease sales 

• Consider reaching the OCS from the infrequently-fished Area of 

Special Consideration with extended reach drilling 

• Establish a fund that would reimburse fishermen for platformrelated gear loss in the uniquely challenging environment of 

Cook Inlet 

• Establish a vessel response program to assist in platform-related

fishing emergencies 

Oil Spills or Blowouts Could Affect 

the Resource and the Drift Gillnet 

Fishery 

• Involve drift gillnet fishery participants in spill consultation and

response 

Oil and Gas Industry Activities on the 

OCS could Increase Vessel Traffic and 

Complicate Navigation and Fishing in

Cook Inlet 

• Award affected drift captains concessions to time and area 

regulatory restrictions 

• Establish seasonal restrictions on drilling

• Establish an organized system of communication between drift

gillnet and other vessels using the Inlet, especially tankers 

All 

• Establish a Joint Council or Committee to enable inter-industry 

communication 

• Develop fisheries and product market enhancement programs to

help offset potential problems resulting from offshore oil and 

gas activity. 

The oil and gas industry contributes extensively to the study region - in terms of employment, 

economic output, tax revenue, and other important factors. This is well-known to residents of 

the Kenai Peninsula, fishery participants included. But given the geologic and oceanographic 

challenges of Cook Inlet, it is possible that in the end the projected costs of exploration and 

production will lead industry to search for oil and gas in other areas. Many steps remain to be 

taken prior to exploration and production on the Cook Inlet OCS, and the challenges are 

extensive. 

98
The drift gillnetter also seeks to harvest and market a valuable product. The scale of production 

is quite different, but as described extensively in this report, the fishery is also very important in 

the region, and also faces extensive challenges. In this case, the concerns of its participants 

would be diminished if the value of Cook Inlet salmon could be enhanced and the spatial and 

economic tension of the fishery’s system of operation could be reduced. 

In short, both of the stakeholder groups described in this report face significant challenges. The 

potential utility of mitigation possibilities in this case lay not in denying either party full 

opportunity to produce, but rather in seeking an arrangement that would move each party along 

toward the end goal of productive and responsibly managed enterprise. 

Collaborative and communication-based efforts toward that end may be the best way to proceed. 

The oil and gas industry in the Cook Inlet region offers considerable potential for contributing to 

solutions of problems being encountered by its neighboring drift gillnet fleet. Widespread 

recognition of its importance to the region indicates willingness on the part of fishery 

participants to seek out and support a balanced approach to offshore exploration and production 

in the spatial context of the fishery. Moreover, the drift gillnetters are highly knowledgeable of 

the Cook Inlet environment and its challenges to navigation - perhaps more so than any other 

group in the region. Transfer of information both about the fishery and about local conditions 

and challenges would likely benefit the offshore oil and gas industry in numerous ways. As 

UCIDA serves an important coalescing and representative function in the fishery, it could play 

an important role in an oil-fisheries communication venue to ensure that the knowledge and 

concerns of its constituency are fully incorporated into OCS-related decision-making processes. 

Whether the fishing constituency ultimately influences the course of industry activities on the 

Cook Inlet OCS may in large part depend on the nature of communication between government, 

industry, and drift gillnet fishery representatives as industry moves through the many steps 

needed to actually explore for, and produce, oil and/or natural gas. As this project makes clear, 

there are numerous ways in which communication could be nurtured and facilitated. A venue for 

inter-industry interaction could enable meaningful discussion and negotiation of a wide range of 

issues of importance to all parties. Movement toward that end is strongly recommended as a 

proactive means for preventing problems that could otherwise occur and affect both forms of 

enterprise should they eventually interact on the Cook Inlet OCS. 

99
7.0 References

Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission. 2003. Basic Information Table for S 03H 

Salmon, Drift Gillnet, Cook Inlet, and S 04H Salmon, Set Gillnet, Cook Inlet. Available 

online at www.cfec.state.ak.us/bit/X_S03H.htm

Alaska Department of Fish and Game. 2003a. Alaska Commercial Salmon Harvest and Exvessel Value. Available online at www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us. 

 

2003b. 2002 Cook Inlet Inseason Sockeye Salmon Harvest Timing as Compared to 2001 

and 5-year Average. Analysis available online at 

cf.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo/finfish/salmon/catchval/charts/02cooksock.htm. 

2003c. Upper Cook Inlet Salmon Fishery Outlook. Available at Analysis available at the 

ADF&G Commercial Fisheries web page at www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/ 

2001. Division of Commercial Fisheries 2001 Overview. Division of Commercial 

Fisheries. Juneau. 

1999. What kind of fishing boat is that? ADF&G informational page available at 

www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo/ pubs/fv_n_ak/fv_ak1pg.pdf 

1997. Catch and Production in Alaska’s Commercial Fisheries. 1995 Edition. Special 

Publication Number 11. Compiled by Brian Frenette, Marianne McNair, and Herman 

Savikko. Commercial Fisheries Management and Development Division. Juneau. 

Alaska Division of Oil and Gas. 1999. Cook Inlet Areawide 1999 Oil and Gas Lease Sale - 

Final Findings of the Director. State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources. 

2003. Annual 2003 Report. State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources. 

Anchorage. 

Alaska Oil and Gas Association. 2001. Economic Impact of the Oil and Gas Industry on 

Alaska. Report prepared for AOGA by Alaska Information Insights and McDowell 

Group. Anchorage. 

1999. Cook Inlet Talking Points. Summary of Cook Inlet Production and Reserve 

Potential compiled by Therese Rockhill, Administrator. Anchorage. 

Anchorage Daily News. 1997. “Tugboat Rams Inlet Oil Rig.” September 9, 1997. 

1993. “Fuel Fouls Inlet Oil-Spill Response Vessel hits Drilling Platform, Loses Diesel.” 

August 24, 1993. 

100
Armstrong, Doug. 2004. Personal Communication. Senior Policy Analyst. County of Santa 

Barbara Planning and Development, Energy Division. Santa Barbara, CA. 

Browning, Robert J. 1980. Fisheries of the North Pacific – History, Species, Gear, and 

Processes. Alaska Northwest Publishing Company: Anchorage. 

Bucceri, Tom. 2003. Personal Communication. Natural Resource Officer, State of Alaska, 

Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas. May. Anchorage. 

Carlson, Stephanie. 2002. 2002 Survey of Bristol Bay Salmon Drift Gillnet Fishery Permit 

Holders: Preliminary Summary of Responses. State of Alaska, Commercial Fisheries 

Entry Commission. Report Number 02-4N. Juneau. 

Colt, Steve. 1999. Salmon Fish Traps in Alaska. Publication of the University of Alaska 

Anchorage, Institute for Social and Economic Research. Anchorage. 

Cooley, Richard A. 1963. Politics and Conservation: The Decline of the Alaska Salmon. 

Harper & Row, Publishers. New York. 

Cook Inlet Keeper. 2003. About the Watershed. Available online at 

http://www.inletkeeper.org/abtwatershed.htm.

Cormick, Gerald, and Alana Knaster. 1986. Oil and fishing industries negotiate: mediation 

and scientific issues. Environment, 28(10), 6–15, 30. 

Coughenhower, D.D. 1989. Central Kenai Peninsula Commercial Fishing Study. Alaska Sea 

Grant Program. Marine Advisory Bulletin No. 39. University of Alaska at Fairbanks. 

Craig, James. 2003 and 2004. Personal Communication. Senior Geologist and Resource 

Analyst, U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Alaska OCS 

Region. Resource Evaluation and Economic Analysis Unit. Anchorage. 

Division of Oil and Gas, State of Alaska. 2003. Annual Report. Available online at 

www.dog.dnr.state.ak.us/oil/products/publications/ 

1993. Final Finding of the Director Regarding Oil and Gas Lease Sale 78, Cook Inlet. 

Alaska Department of Natural Resources. Anchorage. 

1999a. Cook Inlet Areawide 1999 Oil and Gas Lease Sale - Final Finding of the Director. 

Volume I. Alaska Department of Natural Resources. Anchorage. 

1999b. Cook Inlet Areawide 1999 Oil and Gas Lease Sale Final Finding of the Director. 

Volume II. Alaska Department of Natural Resources. Anchorage. 

101
Dixon, Patrick S., 1999. Running Against the Tide: An Oral History of Commercial Fishing in 

Cook Inlet, Alaska. An Independent Learning Project. Master’s Thesis presented to the 

Department of Education, Cambridge College. Cambridge, Mass. 

Dolitsky, Alexander B. 1998. Old Russia in Modern America - a Case from Russian Old 

Believers in Alaska. Alaska-Siberia Research Center. Juneau. 

Flagg, Loren B. 1992. Cook Inlet, Alaska: A 30 Year History of Commercial Fishing and Oil 

Industries Operating Concurrently in an Offshore Subarctic Environment. In Petropiscis 

II. 2nd International Conference on Fisheries and Offshore Petroleum Exploration. 

Bergen, Norway. 

Fox, Jeff, 2003. Personal Communication. May. Regional Fisheries Biologist, Cook Inlet. 

Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Commercial Fisheries Division. Soldotna. 

Fox, Jeff, and Pat Shields. 2003. Upper Cook Inlet Commercial Fisheries Annual Management 

Report, 2002. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Commercial Fisheries Division. 

Anchorage. 

 

Frenette, Brian, Marianne McNair, and Herman Savikko. 1997. Catch and Production in 

Alaska’s Commercial Fisheries. 1995 Edition. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 

Commercial Fisheries Management and Development Division. Juneau. 

Fribrock, Dorothy. 1997. Sockeye Sunday – and other Fish Tales. Fribrock Kistler Publishing. 

Kasilof, Alaska. 

Fusaro, Craig. 2004. Personal Communication. Point Oil/Fisheries Liaison Office. May. Santa 

Barbara. 

1991. Improving Communication between the Oil and Fishing Industries. In Colleen S. 

Benner and Robert W. Middleton (eds.), Fisheries and Oil Development on the 

Continental Shelf, pp. 9-17. American Fisheries Society Symposium 11. Funded by the 

U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service. Bethesda. 

Glazier, Edward W. 2002. A Sociological Analysis of Fishing Hawaiian Style. Ph.D. 

dissertation. University of Hawaii at Manoa. Honolulu. 

Hanneman, Robert A. 2001. Introduction to Social Network Methods. Online text for UCINET 

software. University of California, Riverside. Available online at

http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/SOC157/NETTEXT.PDF 

Herrmann, Mark, S. Todd Lee, Charles Hamel, Keith R. Criddle, Hans T. Geier, Joshua A. 

Greenburg, and Carol E. Lewis. 2001. An Economic Assessment of the Sport Fisheries 

for Halibut, and Chinook and Coho Salmon in Lower and Central Cook Inlet. Prepared 

for the U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Alaska OCS 

Region, Environmental Studies Unit. OCS Study MMS 2000-061. Anchorage. 

102
Hites, Ronald A., Jeffery A. Foran, David O. Carpenter, M. Coreen Hamilton, Barbara A. Knuth, 

and Steven J. Schwager. 2004. Global assessment of organic contaminants in farmed 

salmon. Science. Volume 303. 

Kenai Peninsula Borough. 2003. Community and Economic Development Division. Available 

in the situations and prospects portion of the following site: 

www.borough.kenai.ak.us/CEDD. 

LGL Alaska Research Associates, Inc. 2000. Mapping Cook Inlet Rip Tides Using Local 

Knowledge and Remote Sensing. Prepared for the U.S. Department of the Interior, 

Minerals Management Service, Alaska OCS Region, Environmental Studies Unit. OCS 

Study MMS 2000-025. Anchorage. 

May, Arthur. 204. Personal Communication. Ocean One Advisory Board Chair, former Deputy 

Minister of the Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans. May. St. John. 

McGoodwin, James R. 1990. Crisis in the World’s Fisheries - People, Problems, and Policies. 

Stanford University Press. Stanford. 

Minerals Management Service. 2003a. Cook Inlet Planning Area Environmental Impact 

Statement. Oil and Gas Lease Sales 191 and 199. Volume I. Final. U.S. Department of 

the Interior, MMS, Alaska OCS Region. Anchorage. 

2003b. Cook Inlet Planning Area Environmental Impact Statement. Volume II. Final. 

U.S. Department of the Interior, MMS, Alaska OCS Region. Anchorage. 

2003c. Cook Inlet Planning Area Environmental Impact Statement. Oil and Gas Lease 

Sales 191 and 199. Volume III. Final. U.S. Department of the Interior, MMS, Alaska 

OCS Region. Anchorage. 

2002a. Cook Inlet Planning Area Draft Environmental Impact Statement. Oil and Gas 

Lease Sales 191 and 199. Volume I. U.S. Department of the Interior, MMS, Alaska OCS 

Region. Anchorage. 

2002b. Cook Inlet Planning Area Draft Environmental Impact Statement. Oil and Gas 

Lease Sales 191 and 199. Volume II. U.S. Department of the Interior, MMS, Alaska 

OCS Region. Anchorage. 

2002c. Alaska Annual Studies Plan. Final FY 2003. Alaska OCS Region. 

Environmental Studies Section. U.S. Department of the Interior, MMS, Alaska OCS 

Region. Anchorage. 

1995. Cook Inlet Planning Area Oil and Gas Lease Sale 149 Final Environmental Impact 

Statement. U.S. Department of the Interior, MMS, Alaska OCS Region. Anchorage. 

103
Naske, Claus-M., and Herman E. Slotnick. 1994. Alaska: A History of the 49th State. Second 

edition. University of Oklahoma Press. Norman. 

Nebesky, William. 2003. Personal Communication. May. Commercial Analyst, State of 

Alaska, Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas. Anchorage. 

Office of Technology Assessment. 1985. Oil and Gas Technologies for the Arctic and 

Deepwater. Available online at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/ns20/topic_f.html

OCSLA, 33 CFR. 1953. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 33 Code of Federal Regulations. 

Osgood, Cornelius. 1974. Tanaina Tales. The Cook Inlet Collection. Alaska Northwest 

Publishing Company: Anchorage. 

Petroleum News. 2002. “Number of Pipeline spills in Cook Inlet at Issue” Vol. 7, No. 3, 2002. 

Available online at www.petroleumnews.com. 

Rearden, Jim (ed.). 1983. Alaska’s Salmon Fisheries, Alaska Geographic. Vol. 19, No. 3, 

Anchorage: Alaska Geographic. 

Roderick, Jack. 1997. Crude Dreams: A Personal History of Oil & Politics in Alaska. Epicenter 

Press: Fairbanks. 

Roppel, Patricia. 1986. Salmon from Kodiak: An History of the Salmon Fishery of Kodiak 

Island, Alaska. Alaska Historical Commission: Anchorage. 

Schempf, F. Jay. 2003. Alaska's Cook Inlet Gets Renewed E&P Activity. In Rigzone, Oil and 

Gas Industry News. Available online at www.rigzone.com. February 2, 2003. 

Schmidt, G. Russell. 1994. Personal Communication from G. Russell Schmidt, UNOCAL to 

Tom Bucceri, Alaska Division of Oil and Gas. April 22. As cited in Alaska Division of 

Oil and Gas. 1999. Cook Inlet Areawide 1999 Oil and Gas Lease Sale Final Findings of 

the Director. State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources. Anchorage. 

Schultz, Steve. 2003. Steve Schultz' World Maritime News. Available online at

geocities.com/~sandusky99/world 

Sherwood, Morgan. 1974. The Cook Inlet Collection – Two Hundred Years of Selected Alaskan 

History. Alaska Northwest Publishing Company: Anchorage. 

Slade, Gordon. 2004. Personal Communication. Ocean One Secretariat. May. St. John. 

Stokstad, Erik. 2004. Salmon survey stokes debate about farmed fish. Science. Volume 303. 

104
Supreme Court of the State of Alaska. 1996. State of Alaska v. Ninilchik Traditional Council, 

Alaska Center for the Environment, Greenpeace, Trustees for Alaska, Kenai Peninsula 

Fishermen’s Association, and United Cook Inlet Driftnetter’s Association. Supreme 

Court No. S-6683/6733. Opinion No. 4450. December 27. Anchorage. 

Terry, Joseph, Roger G. Scoles, and D.M. Larson. 1980. Alaska OCS Socioeconomic Studies 

Program Lower Cook Inlet Petroleum Development Scenario: Commercial Fishing 

Industry Analysis. Technical Report Number 44. Prepared for the Bureau of Land 

Management, Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Office by Alaska Sea Grant Program, 

University of Alaska. 

Tompkins, D., X.F. Bai, K. Deepak, D. Hill, M. Wilger, and S. Turner. No date. World Record 

Extended Reach Drilling and LWD Sonic Tools Confirm Additional Reserves. Available online 

at www.oilfield.slb.com/media/resources/casestudies/drilling/erd_xjiang_field_china.pdf 

Winfree, Mike. 1994. Personal Communication from Mike Winfree, Arco Alaska, to Tom

Bucceri, Alaska Division of Oil and Gas. April 25. As cited in Alaska Division of Oil 

and Gas. 1999. Cook Inlet Areawide 1999 Oil and Gas Lease Sale Final Findings of the 

Director. State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources. Anchorage. 

105
Appendix A: Annotated Bibliography

This appendix presents the annotated bibliography developed during the course of the study. 

The intent of the bibliography is two-fold. First, it is developed as a reference source for persons 

interested in the fisheries-oil and gas interface, related mitigation issues, and associated topics. 

While the references and entries are in large part specific to the interface and region of interest, 

materials from various maritime contexts around the world are also reviewed, thereby 

broadening the opportunities for comparative analysis. Second, the bibliography reveals 

strategies and models used around the United States and abroad to mitigate problems associated 

with the interface of interest. As such, it allows identification of the cases best suited to 

understanding and mitigating the drift gillnet-oil and gas industry interface in Cook Inlet. The 

bibliography is arranged alphabetically by author. Entries are selected from often extensive 

literatures based on degree of relevance to the goals and objectives of the project. 

* * * * * 

Ackefors, H., and K. Grip. 1994. Swedish Coastal Zone Management: A System for 

Integration of Various Activities. Copenhagen, Denmark: International Council for the 

Exploration of the Sea. 

This report describes the Swedish coastal zone with regard to multiple uses and pressures such as

urban settlement, industries, tourism, fishing, aquaculture, mineral exploitation, pipelines, 

shipping, nature conservation, and marine archeology). Analysis addresses attendant 

competition and conflicts among human users, and the challenges of managing human activities 

and marine wildlife in this resource rich area. Conflicts between the oil and fishing industries are 

managed in part under policies associated with Swedish laws that are analogous to those 

enforced in the United States. Relevant laws in Sweden include the Water Act, the Natural 

Resources Act, the Environmental Protection Act, the Nature Conservancy Act, and the Water 

Pollution Act. 

Al-Rashoud, A. K., et. al. 1994. Conservation and Management of Coastal Fishery 

Resources of Kuwait. In P. G. Wells and P. J. Ricketts (eds.), Cooperation in the Coastal 

Zone: Conference Proceedings. Vol. 1. Dartmouth, Nova Scotia: Coastal Zone Canada 

Association, Bedford Institute of Oceanography. 

Kuwaiti fisheries management strategies take the form of limitations on catch per unit effort and 

strict implementation of coastal laws and regulations. The 1991 Gulf War incurred extensive 

effects on the region’s 195-kilometer coastline, including some six million barrels of spilled oil 

and extensive airborne emissions, with lessons for managing spills elsewhere. The proceedings 

review the effect of the oil spills and oil fire fallout on the productivity of the marine ecosystem

and commercial fishing interests in Kuwait, and suggest ways to conserve fish, shrimp, and pearl 

oyster stocks under these challenging environmental conditions. 

106
Bergen Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 1989. Proceedings of the First International 

Conference on Fisheries and Offshore Petroleum Exploitation. Chamber of Commerce and 

Industry. Bergen, Norway. 

Fisheries and petroleum industry interactions are the focus of these proceedings. The main areas 

of potential conflict reviewed include loss of access to fishing grounds, the threat of oil spills and 

blowouts, various impacts on marine life, and damage to fishing gear and vessels. A variety of 

policy options are reviewed, with relevance for similar conflicts in other high latitude areas such 

as Alaska. 

Berkes, Fikret. 1989. Co-Management and the James Bay Agreement. In Evelyn 

Pinkerton (ed.), Cooperative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for Improved 

Management and Community Development, pgs. 189-208. University of British Columbia 

Press: Vancouver. 

Several land claim agreements with Canada’s Natives demonstrate detailed provisions for Native 

co-management in the allocation of subsistence resources. The chapter deals specifically with 

the James Bay Agreement of 1975. Key themes are greater local participation, preferential and 

exclusive rights, and deregulation of native fishing rights subject to a conservation principle. 

The study centers on the impact of a hydro-electric project, harvesting regulations, and fish and 

wildlife resource planning. A joint government-Native Coordinating Committee works as a 

forum for Native concerns and as an advisory group to state and federal agencies. Problems are 

found in the meshing of traditional Native “political” mechanisms and non-Native mechanisms

of policy and control. The question of whether or not Natives have an inherent system of 

resource management is debated. The author sees a lack of clarity, despite detailed provisions, 

and conflicts with current government policies. 

Berman, Matthew D. and Teresa Hull. 1987. The Commercial Fishing Industry In 

Alaska’s Economy. Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska, 

Anchorage. 

Berman and Hull describe the commercial fishing industry against the larger Alaska economy, 

focusing on the nature and importance of direct, indirect, and induced economic elements and 

effects of fishing. Employment and income associated with harvesting are considered direct 

elements, while indirect elements involve employment and income generated from the seafood 

processing industry and associated business transactions. Induced effects addressed in the study 

involve income and employment derived from spending income generated from the direct and 

indirect elements. The study provides an overview of commercial fishing, and insight into the 

economic configuration of the industry across Alaska. 

107
Boudreau, P. R., D. C. Gordon, G. C. Harding, J. W. Loder, J. Black, W. D. Bowen, S. 

Campana, P. J. Cranford, K. F. Drinkwater, L. Van Eeckhaute, S. Gavaris, C. G. Hannah, 

and G. Harrison. 1999. The Possible Environmental Impacts of Petroleum Exploration 

Activities on the Georges Bank Ecosystem. Canadian Technical Report of Fisheries and 

Aquatic Sciences, No. 2259. Dartmouth, Nova Scotia: Department of Fisheries and Oceans. 

This Department of Fisheries and Oceans regional advisory report describes an assessment of the 

Georges Bank ecosystem and summarizes potential effects from petroleum exploration activities 

in the region. The assessment process included input from Canadian and U.S. government 

scientists, external reviewers, and representatives from fishing groups and petroleum industry 

interests. According to the report, routine exploratory seismic activity could have significant but 

temporary effects on adult fish behavior and movement, which could in turn affect catch rates 

and spawning behavior. It was further reported that (1) the effect of routine operational 

exploratory drilling activity on the ecosystem and fishing fleets depends on the location and 

timing of activities, and on the properties of drilling discharges, (2) drilling could lead to a 

temporary loss of access to relatively small portions of the fishing grounds, and (3) seismic 

activity could lead to temporary space conflicts with fishing activities, depending on timing, 

location, and the gear types involved. 

Bradner, Tim. 2003. “Salmon Season a Time of Hope.” Alaska Journal of Commerce. 

June 30. Online at <http://alaskajournal.com/stories/063003/loc_20030630001.shtm>. 

This article assesses the prospects for the 2003 Cook Inlet salmon harvest on the eve of the drift 

gillnet openings. Bradner interviews fishermen and stock assessment specialists who provides 

mixed reviews of the harvest forecast. The fishermen were cautiously hopeful that low rates of

harvest and low prices of recent years had bottomed out and that this season held better 

prospects. The stock assessment specialists also anticipated a modest recovery over recent years. 

 

Bureau of Land Management, Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Office. 1978. Monitoring 

Petroleum Activities in the Gulf of Alaska. Alaska OCS Socioeconomic Studies Program, 

Technical Report, Number 17. Anchorage. 

This report describes exploratory drilling activity occurring on the OCS in the Northern Gulf of 

Alaska and Lower Cook Inlet between 1975 and 1978. The report provides information 

concerning the number, timing, location, depth, and results of wells drilled, as wells as the kinds 

of equipment used, changes in community-level employment, wages paid, transportation routes 

used, and communities affected by the activity. The document provides some useful if dated 

insight into the nature of effects associated with exploration in the Cook Inlet region. 

Communities examined in the study include Homer, Seward, and Yakutat.

108
Busiahn, Thomas R. 1989. The Development of State/Tribal Co-Management of 

Wisconsin Fisheries. In Evelyn Pinkerton (ed.), Cooperative Management of Local 

Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management and Community Development, pgs. 170-

185. University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver. 

This subjective chapter deals with attempts in Wisconsin to develop co-management 

arrangements in Lake Superior fisheries and smaller lake fisheries. A polemic has formed in the 

experience of Lake Superior co-management processes versus those of the smaller local lake

processes. The former has experience, business-like demeanor, and success. The latter has inexperience, politicized fervor, and unsuccessful results. Reasons cited for the successes are: 

information and technical expertise available to both parties, the groups interacted constructively 

(both wanted an agreement), and inclusion of professional mediators to keep the meetings on 

track. Inland fisheries and fishing are portrayed as an altogether different animal. 

State officials and Natives have yet to find compromise on many issues, most specifically, 

spearing. Although a mechanism for consensus was established in the Technical Working 

Group, lack of utilization has produced little positive results. Most conflict is seen as stemming 

from treaty rights given to Natives and the regulations placed on their neighbors. Here comanagement is wrapped in larger issues such as sovereignty and validity of tribal governments. 

California Coastal Commission. 2001. Legislative Report. February. California Coastal 

Commission. San Francisco. 

This report includes a summary and analysis of California S.B. 1, which would create the 

California Endowment for Marine Preservation and the California Marine Resources Trust Fund 

as a permanent funding sources for projects designed to conserve, protect, restore, and enhance 

the state’s coastal marine resources. The primary revenue source for both the endowment and the 

fund would be the savings afforded to owners/operators of decommissioned oil and gas 

platforms that remain in place after lease expiration. The report suggests that the absence of 

conclusive scientific evidence about the viability of marine habitats associated with offshore oil 

and gas platforms in part defines conflicting interests between key ocean user groups in 

California. 

California State Lands Commission. 1999. Mineral Resources Management Division Rigsto-Reefs Workshop. Los Angeles. 

There are 33 oil facilities active in the offshore waters of California. Ten are situated in State 

jurisdiction waters, and 23 are on the OCS. Six of the state facilities operate on islands. The 

remaining are steel platforms. There have been proposals to use drilling platforms for artificial 

reefs since the first platform was decommissioned and removed in 1974. But no artificial reefs 

have been established since the productivity of reefs built from structural steel is a subject of

debate, and because of lingering concern about hazards to navigation and liability. The need to 

complete prospective artificial reef projects in a timely manner has also limited such efforts 

amidst a complex permitting process. Nevertheless, the potential benefits of artificial reef from

109
rigs are reportedly attractive to many, and remain a subject of interest to various parties in the 

region. 

Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science. 2001. Strategic 

Environmental Assessment 2: North Sea Fish and Fisheries. Technical Report 3. United 

Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry. London. Available online at 

<http://www.offshore-sea.org.uk/sea/dev/html_file>. 

The European Commission is instituting increasingly stringent fishery management strategies to 

alleviate declining fish stocks in the North Atlantic and North Sea. This report notes that such 

actions have the potential to increase conflict between the fishing industry and the offshore oil 

and gas industry since fleets in the region could potentially be displaced from traditional fishing 

grounds and forced to fish closer to existing and prospective offshore oil and gas fields. 

Meanwhile, mobile exploration activities (both seismic and drilling), and the physical presence 

of offshore infrastructure required for production reportedly can incur significant effects on 

fishing activities. Direct effects are said to include (a) loss of access to fishing grounds at 

exclusion zones and near obstructions, (b) gear entanglement and damage, and (c) safety risks 

associated with “fastening” of fishing gear to obstructions. Indirect ecological effects on 

commercially targeted species reportedly can occur as a result of various physical disturbances 

and discharges inherent in oil-and-gas exploration and production activities. In addition to 

reviewing such inter-industry conflicts, this report summarizes regionally well-established means 

of liaison between government agencies and the fishing and offshore oil and gas industries. 

Though the efforts are not without notable problems, such agencies typically take a proactive 

role in overseeing safety issues, addressing compensation claims, and providing for an interindustry forum on best practices. 

Chamberlain, Dilworth W. 1991. Effects of Non-explosive Seismic Energy Releases on 

Fish. In Colleen S. Benner and Robert W. Middleton (eds.), Fisheries and Oil Development 

on the Continental Shelf, pgs. 22-25. American Fisheries Society Symposium 11. Bethesda. 

This short piece discusses a major concern of fishermen, government agencies, and the general 

public, namely petroleum exploration related non-explosive energy releases. Early geophysical 

seismic techniques used explosives and were lethal to marine life. Those practices have been 

outlawed in the USA. The air gun is now the primary tool of choice for geophysical surveys. 

Testing of non-explosive effects focuses on the use of the air gun and water gun at varying 

decibels and distances. All though some harmful effects are noted, the author claims

inconclusive evidence of detriment to marine life. Main conclusions focus on a “no harm to 

marine life, but possible harm to commercial fishermen” discussion. The author suggests “with 

concern and adequate communication between the petroleum industry and commercial 

fishermen, potential economic effects can be substantially reduced”. 

110
Cicin-Sain, B., and A. Tiddens. 1989. Private and public approaches to solving oil/fishing 

conflicts offshore California. Ocean and Shoreline Management, 12(3), 233–251. 

This paper draws on a survey of regional fishery participants to examine the effects of oil 

operations on the commercial fishing industry in California. Reportedly significant effects 

include displacement, wherein participants in the various sectors work to adapt to new locations, 

supply sources, and markets. Both public and private efforts have been undertaken to mitigate 

such problematic effects in California, reportedly with mixed results. According to the authors, 

in conflict cases involving publicly owned resources and contestants of unequal power, private 

mediation should be a supplement to and not a replacement for established public policy 

decision-making processes. 

Cook Inlet Keeper. 2003. The Keeper. Protecting the Cook Inlet Watershed and The Life it 

Sustains. Winter/Spring edition. Homer. 

This bi-annual newsletter documents various environmental issues affecting the Cook Inlet 

watershed. Articles in this issue include citizen protests concerning gas and oil lease sales, 

reportedly toxic oil and gas dumping in the inlet, and other news items outlining environmental 

effects of energy resource development. The tone and content of the editorial “Message from the 

Keeper” is pessimistic about trends in contemporary environmental legislation in the region, 

asserting that “anyone concerned about the health of our natural systems has been labeled an 

‘enemy of the state,’ harkening back to the red-baiting scare tactics of the early Cold War years.” 

Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council (CIRCAC). 2002. 2002 Annual Report. 

Kenai. 

The CIRCAC annual report outlines short-term objectives and long-term projects for effecting 

CIRCAC policy interests in the region. Since its inception in 1990 following the Exxon Valdez

oil spill, Alaska’s Regional Citizen’s Advisory Councils have worked with various 

environmental, fishing, and oil interests to improve maritime transportation and safety. CIRCAC 

is one such Council. Some of the issues specifically addressed by CIRCAC in recent years 

include vessel crew training, vessel inspection, and oil spill response. The 2000 Annual Report 

reviews CIRCAC’s resent efforts in water monitoring activities, resource mapping, various 

natural science research, and public outreach. 

Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council (CIRCAC). No date. How the Pieces of the 

Puzzle Fit Together. Kenai. Pamphlet. 

This pamphlet outlines the efforts of the Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council and its 

accomplishments in addressing the threat of oil spills in the region. The document also 

summarizes: (1) the historical and economic importance of commercial fishing to the 

communities of Cook Inlet, (2) the Council’s commitment to protect the region’s “pristine” 

environment, (3) the importance of the oil industry in the region, (4) CIRCAC’s putative 

111
responsibility to Alaska Natives residing in the region, and (5) its commitment to promote 

recreation and tourism in the region. 

Coriel, Paul. 1993. The Diversification of a Louisiana Coastal Community. In S. Laska and 

A. Puffer (eds.), Coastlines of the Gulf of Mexico, pp. 96-102. American Society of Civil 

Engineers. New York. 

This article discusses community-level reactions to rapidly changing oil prices in the mid-‘80s. 

The author argues that most coastal Louisiana communities failed to anticipate the effects of

economic dependency on oil operations, and when both oil and fishing industries experienced 

problems, few parishes were prepared to react. The local government of Cameron Parish was 

exceptional in that its leadership sought to diversify the local economy by sponsoring various 

tourism-related projects such as town festivals, development of various attractions, and 

investment in a visitors' bureau. The author argues that Cameron leadership successfully 

advocated economic diversity largely as a result of the ability to anticipate, conceptually grasp, 

and effectively act in response to a growing problem. 

Cormick, Gerald, and Alana Knaster. 1986. Oil and fishing industries negotiate: 

mediation and scientific issues. Environment, 28(10), 6–15, 30. 

This article reviews the manner in which the discovery of oil reserves and subsequent 

development activities along the California coast led to interactions between the oil industry 

and commercial fishing industry. Issues included increased traffic as seismic exploration 

vessels surveyed promising areas and as supply vessels sought to use the fastest routes to the 

platforms. Such traffic occasionally resulted in damaged fishing nets and gear, and some

fishing groups expressed concerns that acoustic signals from seismic exploration would 

disperse fish and damage eggs and larvae. Rather than turn to protracted and expensive court 

battles, the parties tended to pursue mediation. 

An impartial scientific subcommittee was organized to address the seismic testing issue, and 

equity issues were addressed through traditional negotiations in a joint committee. The 

authors observed that “although some of the research findings (of the seismic science 

subcommittee) failed to meet the expectations of particular industries or agencies, the 

participants’ mutual commitment to a process that they had designed helped both the 

negotiators and their constituents to accept the results” (p. 13). The reputation and credibility 

of the scientists involved reportedly also helped legitimate the mediation process and its

results. 

112
Dale, Norman. 1989. Getting to Co-Management: Social Learning in the Redesign of 

Fisheries Management. In Evelyn Pinkerton (ed.), Cooperative Management of Local 

Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management and Community Development, pgs. 

49-72. University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver. 

A public policy problem: how to invent approaches for collaborative problem-solving across 

broad and heterogeneous social groupings. Using the Pacific coast as a case study in solutionresistant conflicts, the author sets out to discover lessons, mechanisms, and procedures for 

dealing with conflict in salmon use and management in British Columbia. The Northwest Indian 

Fisheries Commission was established in 1974 to create an “equal share” stake in fisheries 

management for the tribes. With the courts forcing cooperation, new organizational conflicts 

and various co-management efforts sprang forth. The Fisheries Advisory Board (FAB) was 

created in 1976 to handle various controversies. This and other councils revealed differences in 

terminology, definitions, and goals. 

After nearly a decade of struggle and finally mediation at Port Ludlow, compromises were made 

and a new “consciousness” developed. An era of cooperation led to a diminished role for the 

FAB. The author suggests that using the tools of “social learning” is the best way to reach comanagement goals with the least amount of conflict. 

Daly, Emma, Mark Townsend, and Antony Barnett. 2002. “How Oil Slick Will Bring 

Black Death to Coast's Way of Life.” Guardian Unlimited, The Observer Online. 

November 24. 

These journalists provide an on-location account of the extensive environmental effects resulting 

from the sinking and cargo leakage of the oil tanker Prestige, in November 2002, 133 miles west 

of the Spanish coast and port city of Galicia. The incident and its aftermath preceded litigation in 

which the governments of Spain and Britain, municipal authorities of Galicia (home of the 

majority of the EU commercial fishing fleet), the EU, and the ship’s operators continue to seek 

resolution of damage claims. The situation is seen to typify the complexities of conflict between 

the petroleum and fishing industries on environmental risk and loss-of-livelihood issues. The 

authors argue that the petroleum transport industry remains largely unseen and unregulated on 

the high seas. 

Dixon, Patrick S. Running Against the Tide: An Oral History of Commercial Fishing in 

Cook Inlet, Alaska. (1999). Unpublished Thesis, Cambridge College, Cambridge, MA. 

In this Master’s Thesis, Patrick Dixon uses an oral history approach to describe chronologically 

over a century fishing and associated community life in the cook Inlet region of Southcentral 

Alaska. Of particular note and relevance are detailed descriptions of gillnet fishing and

associated techniques, and the changing regulatory process which has had a reportedly profound 

effect on the fleet. The author further addresses the politics of fishing in the region, contending 

that politics, especially politics associated with the sport fishing fleets have resulted in a shorter 

113
fishing season and a more limited area of fishing for the drift gillnet fleet. Dixon also examines 

the growing influence of the oil industry in the region. 

Doubleday, Nancy C. (1989). Co-Management Provisions of the Inuvialuit Final 

Agreement. In Evelyn Pinkerton (ed.), Cooperative Management of Local Fisheries: New 

Directions for Improved Management and Community Development, pgs. 209-227. 

University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver. 

The Inuvialuit Final Agreement of 1985 is the means by which the claims to traditional lands of 

the Inuvialuit people have been exchanged for title to lands in fee simple, cash ($45 million), and 

specific land rights such as participation in resource development and management. This 

agreement draws a blueprint for the construction of a co-management regime. Each affected 

department and member describes its needs and wants and responsibilities. Final decisions rest 

with government ministers. On paper, the agreement seems to be the closest to “proper” comanagement yet. However, several of the institutions have yet to be created, and it is noted that 

these very institutions are constructs of the non-Native population (a sentiment echoed in the 

James Bay Coordinating Committee). A positive wait-and-see attitude is expressed. 

Edyvane, K. S. 1999. Coastal and marine wetlands in Gulf St. Vincent, South Australia: 

understanding their loss and degradation. Wetlands Ecology and Management, 7(1), 83–104. 

Despite the vast size of the South Australia coast, approximately 95 percent of its population of 

1.4 million resides in and around the Adelaide metropolitan area along the coastline of the Gulf 

of St. Vincent. The concentration of human activity around this shallow, sheltered gulf 

ecosystem has led to extensive conflict and competition over the use of marine and coastal 

resources. According to the authors, continual loss and degradation of marine and coastal 

wetlands in the gulf has been exacerbated by inadequate environmental protection measures, lack 

of integrated management structures and policies, and conflict between competing user groups, 

most notably the oil and fishing industries. 

Stringent marine and coastal resource use policies and integrated decision-making based on 

sound information are reportedly needed for equitable and sustainable use of the coastal nearshore ecosystem. Priorities for regional marine and coastal zone policy-makers are said to 

include development of coastal and biodiversity inventories, understanding of regional estuarine 

and marine ecological processes, understanding of linkages between coastal and offshore 

habitats, and establishment of coastal spatial mapping and information systems. 

114
Faroe Islands Hydrocarbon Planning Commission. 1997. Report to the Faroese 

Government Preparation for Oil Exploration. Ministry of Petroleum: Tórshavn, Faroe 

Islands. Available online at <http://www.oms.fo/uk/petrol_info_reports_reportcont.htm>. 

In light of the predominant position of the fishing industry in Faroese society, this report views 

government policy-making as the key to cooperation between the fishing and oil industries. By 

this account, the disagreements that may arise from the two industries operating in the same area 

are mainly attributable to competition over specific areas but can also be incurred at times by 

damage to fishing gear and by marine pollution. According to the region’s Planning 

Commission, area conflicts occur due to the presence of seismic vessels, drilling platforms, 

production platforms, and loading buoys on the fishing grounds. Displacement of fishers around 

safety zones, underwater installations, temporarily abandoned drilling holes, satellite wells, 

manifolds, templates, and various pipelines is also contested. 

To ensure that fishers in the Faroes can continue to work under secure conditions and with the 

least possible inconvenience, Commission recommendations include bringing fishery-related 

problems into early phases of petroleum-planning; starting investigations before conflicts arise to 

determine whether additional regulations are needed on the selection of areas for the oil industry; 

continuing seasonal restrictions on seismic activities; ensuring that there are trained personnel 

available who can safeguard the fishing industry’s interests in relation to the oil industry; 

establishing a liaison committee consisting of the fishing organizations, the fisheries authorities, 

the licensees, and the petroleum administration; establishing adequate damage and compensation 

rules; and designing offshore installations so that the authorities have a real choice concerning 

removal, abandonment, or salvaging at the time of decommission. 

Fentiman, Alicia. 1996. The anthropology of oil: the impact of the oil industry on a fishing 

community in the Niger Delta source.” Social Justice: A Journal of Crime, Conflict & World 

Order, 23(4), 87–99. 

The village of Oloma is an Ibani fishing community on the Island of Bonny in the Eastern Niger 

Delta. According to Fentman, oil production has affected components of the local environment 

and indigenous sources of livelihood. The author suggests that one problematic aspect of oil 

industry activities that often goes unrecorded is the way in which culture is affected, and that the 

institutions central to the identity of the Ibani fishing community need to be documented and 

examined to understand the full range of effects of oil development in the region. Apparently, 

Niger delta communities have experienced extensive environmental and cultural degradation, the 

former seen, the latter largely unrecognized. 

The author documents one of the major obstacles to traditional fishing methods in the creeks and 

waterways; that is, the constant movement of trucks traveling to and from the flow station 

located at the end of the creek in Oloma. Fishing lines, nets, and traps are often torn by the 

vehicles despite protests from the community. While some argue that overfishing and 

overpopulation are responsible for low returns on fishing effort, many believe oil pollution has 

115
adversely affected the fishing economy. Numerous residents have been forced to find alternative 

sources of livelihood, and the resulting migration has led to gradual depopulation of Bonny and 

associated socio-cultural change.

Fox, Jeff and Pat Shields. 2003. Upper Cook Inlet Commercial Fisheries Annual 

Management Report, 2002. April. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Commercial 

Fisheries Division, Central Region. Anchorage. 

This report outlines the fish harvest for the salmon, herring, and razor clam fisheries for the 2001 

season. The authors calculate harvest by gear type, Inlet sub-region, and harvest levels for each 

fishery. The report also provides statistics for personal use fisheries for 2001. Tabulated fishery 

statistics for the period 1960 to 2002 are also included. Of note in the tables is the dramatic 

growth of the drift gillnet fleet between 1960 and 1970, and the particularly high yield in pounds 

and dollars during the mid-1980s 

Frenett, Brian, Marianne McNair, and Herman Savikko. 1995. Catch and Production in 

Alaska’s Commercial Fisheries. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Commercial 

Fisheries Management and Development Division. Juneau. 

This report incorporates catch and production figures for the commercial fisheries of Alaska for 

1995. That was a year of numerous records in catches for the salmon industry. Overall harvest 

exceeded 200 million fish, which had the unfortunate effects of a saturated world market and 

poor prices. These problems were exacerbated by an increase in farmed salmon production in 

Chile and Scandinavia. Data are categorized by region, and further refined to specific subregion. In the Cook Inlet area of the Central region, the average drift gillnet take of Chinook was 

506 pounds, and the product sold at $1.02 per pound on average. Average sockeye salmon 

harvest was just over 10,000 pounds and sold for $1.18 per pound. Take of Coho averaged 1,373 

pounds per vessel and sold at $.49 per pound on average. Average pink harvest was 222 pounds, 

selling at $.15 per pound on average, and chum harvest averaged 472 pound and sold at $.25 per 

pound on average (p. 25). 

Freudenburg, William R. and Gramling, Robert. 1992. Community impacts of 

technological change: toward a longitudinal perspective. Social Forces 70 (4): 937-955. 

Freudenburg and Gramling suggest that while sociologists have made advances in understanding 

community-level effects of technological and environmental change, attention to date has 

focused almost exclusively on the relatively brief development stage of construction and rapid 

expansion. Significant social changes reportedly can take place both before and after the phases 

of the most intense physical activities (construction, production, expansion), and pathways of 

influence can be social as well as physical. The authors model an "opportunity-threat" stage, 

during which most social and economic effects are associated with opportunities and/or threats to 

biophysical, economic, social, cultural, and psychological aspects of the human environment. It 

is asserted that if development proceeds, opportunities and threats are joined by effects of visible, 

116
physical activities. Over time, both of these types of effects are said to be joined by an 

accumulation of experience with the project (cumulative effects). 

Freudenburg, William R. and Robert Gramling. 1993. Socioenvironmental factors and 

development policy: understanding opposition and support for offshore oil. Sociological 

Forum 8:341-64. 

This article examines social response to the siting of offshore oil projects, and attempts to 

theorize the role of environmental variables in the divergent attitudes and movements for and 

against OCS development in Northern California and in Louisiana. The authors examine and 

compare between regions issues of coastal land access, marine access, energy of sea, and 

topography and composition of the sea bottoms. In California, the slope of the OCS is very steep 

and relatively close to shore and as such requires rigs to be sited within site of land (most are in 

state waters). In Louisiana, the broad, shallow shelf allows distant siting of platforms. Similarly, 

the wide flat shelf in Louisiana means that fisheries can operate close to shore and do not have to 

compete as voraciously with rig activity for space as in California where the corridor of 

movement is quite narrow. 

Social and economic factors are also considered. Louisiana's coastal economies have been 

traditionally extractive-oriented, whereas the California coast is (now) valued primarily for 

amenity. The authors assert that Louisiana's ongoing dependence on both oil and fishing has led 

to a level of integration not experienced in California. Indeed, Louisiana residents experiencing 

little direct contact with the oil industry reportedly have positive feelings about it because they 

see the value for their friends and neighbors. Residents of coastal areas in California are said to 

be most typically socially disconnected from people directly involved in the oil industry or who 

would stand to benefit directly from oil development. It is argued that many of California’s 

coastal residents are newcomers who have chosen to live on the coast for its beauty rather than 

for its development potential. These factors are said to combine to shape how people in each area 

perceive their physical environment, and thus how they think about and organize themselves visa-vis offshore oil development. 

Freudenburg, William R. and Robert Gramling. 1994. Oil in Troubled Waters: Perceptions, 

Politics and the Battle over Offshore Oil Drilling. SUNY Press. New York. 

This book examines reactions to offshore oil leasing in several coastal communities in the U.S. 

The authors assert that the attitudes of people in communities near offshore oil projects are 

shaped primarily by their experiences with the local economic effects of the oil industry, by their 

perceptions of whether and how the industry will raise living standards and opportunities, and by 

their perceptions of the likely effects of drilling on the coastal environment. The analysis 

suggests that residents of Southern Louisiana communities have generally favored oil drilling 

because they saw increased potential for employment, wages, and investment in their 

community, and reportedly felt uneasy about their dependence on oil whenever the industry was 

in a state of decline. Such persons tended to perceive oil drilling as a means to modernization 

and progress in a rural area. While rtesidents in Northern California communities generally 

117
shared this interest in economic growth, perceived environmental impacts tended to diminish 

overall interest in oil development in the region.. 

The authors point to several historical factors in Louisiana’s recent economic development to 

explain overwhelmingly favorable attitudes to oil drilling. These include the fact that there was 

relatively little commercial fishing and shrimping activity occurring in the region prior to 

offshore drilling, and that “both of the major offshore activities in Louisiana -- oil and gas 

development, and the [commercial] harvesting of fish and other types of renewable resources -- 

essentially grew up together” (p. 76). Meanwhile, Northern California’s fishing interests are said 

to have predated interest in oil exploration, ostensibly leading to a different kind of relationship 

to drilling and the ocean and coastal environment. 

Fribrock, Dorothy. 1997. Sockeye Sunday - and other Fish Tales. Fribrock Kistler

Publishing. Kasilof, Alaska. 

This memoir describes life in the Cook Inlet region during the early to mid-twentieth century. 

Various aspects of fishing around the Kenai Peninsula are reviewed from the perspective of an 

avid fishing family. Fribrock recounts memories of Snug Harbor, and develops various stories 

about life in the region, many of which in some fashion relate to set netting, drift gillnetting, and 

other kinds of fishing in the Inlet. The author describes a range of activities associated with 

fishing, including the nature of life for winter watchmen at local canneries, daily life for the 

wives of fishermen, and the evolution of fishing practices in the region. The volume includes 

many photographs from the period. 

Fusaro, Craig. 1991. Improving Communication between the Oil and Fishing Industries. 

In Colleen S. Benner and Robert W. Middleton (eds.), Fisheries and Oil Development on the 

Continental Shelf, pp. 9-17. American Fisheries Society Symposium 11. Funded by the 

U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service. Bethesda. 

Fusaro describes the origins of the Joint Oil/Fisheries Committee and Liaison Office, established 

in 1983 to address inter-industry problems occurring between fishermen and oil industry 

operations in the state and federal jurisdiction waters of California. This was and is an area of 

extensive offshore exploration and production activity, and many fishermen have reported gear 

loss, vessel traffic problems, and other problem interactions and spatial conflicts. A 

professionally-mediated negotiating session led to the establishment of a formal mechanism

through which the groups could interact and communicate. The Joint Committee involved the 

participation of five members from the offshore oil and gas industry and five from the fishing 

industry. One of the more important functions of the Committee was communication about the 

timing of offshore testing and exploration activities. The Liaison Office was established to assist 

in relaying information between key members in each of the industries, and to provide a neutral 

meeting place and support for interactions. Its functions gradually expanded to include 

facilitation of claims between fishing operations and the offshore oil and gas industry, such as 

gear loss claims under federal and local reimbursement programs, and right-of-way issues and 

118
claims presented by both parties. The Committee and Office continue to function under state and 

local funding administration. 

Gadsby, J. William, Arnold E. Donahue, Martha S. Ditmeyer. March 2000. Assessing the 

Need for the Fisherman’s Contingency Fund. Prepared by the National Academy of Public 

Administration for the Financial Services Division, National Marine Fisheries Service, 

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. Washington, D.C. Available 

online at: www.napawash.org/pc_management_studies/fcf.pdf). 

This document examines the question of continuing need for the Fishermen’s Contingency Fund. 

The fund was established as Title IV of the OCSLA in 1978, and serves to reimburse fishermen 

who can prove gear loss due to underwater obstructions associated with oil and gas industry 

infrastructure. The document outlines the history of the fund, describes patterns of claims and 

claim actions, examines the issue of fraud, and evaluates its ongoing utility. Most claimants are 

shrimp trawl captains in Louisiana where there are thousands of drilling platforms operating in 

close proximity to the fleet, and often in relatively shallow water. Possible alternatives for the 

program are reviewed. These include termination, privatization, and remanding its operation to 

states and/or counties. 

Of note, the claimant and claim must satisfy various criteria prior to award. For instance, the 

fishing operation must be commercial in nature, and with the exception of pipelines, the 

obstruction causing the damage must be sub-surface, and cannot have been charted or marked 

with a navigational aid. But increasing charting and marking of sites is said to be reducing the 

number of claim approvals despite increasing rates of underwater obstruction. There were 355 

claims and 177 approvals in 1999, down significantly from 1301 claims and 860 approvals in 

1990 (p. 11). 

The report concludes that the fund remains valid and should be continued under federal 

administration since there are no other legal or private sector options for compensating damages 

attributable to offshore oil activities. But there are significant caveats. The reviewers assert that 

“the fund ameliorates, but falls short of remedying the problems associated with underwater 

obstructions,” and that “despite continuing increases in offshore oil and gas activities, the steady 

decline in claims paid and the declining area eligible for compensation [through increased 

charting and marking] underscore that the value of the fund to fishermen is eroding; this will 

continue” (p. 24). The reviewing body concludes that the benefits from the fund are inherently 

short-term in nature, and that “the time appears to have come when offshore oil, fishing, and 

government should increase their focus on obstruction removal, site clearance, and mitigation 

efforts, rather than rely solely on the fund to compensate the fishing industry for damages” (p. 

25). 

119
Gaskin, Malcolm. The Implications for the Economy. pp. 83-104). In Peters, A. F, (ed.) 

1974. Impact of Offshore Oil Operations. Applied Science Publishers, Ltd. Essex. 

This article draws on the European experience in the early years of North Sea oil development to 

suggest that the local and regional economic effects of offshore development tend to be positive 

where it is perceived that the new industry would lead to creation of new jobs and development 

of modernized infrastructure. This perspective and prediction is qualified in that the author 

asserts that in embracing offshore oil development to the exclusion of other options, the 

communities in question may subsequently have to endure the effects of reduced economic 

diversification. 

Gil, Rocio. 1998. Laguna de Terminos, an Ecological Reserve. Victoria, British Columbia: 

Lester B. Pearson College. 

The ecological reserve Laguna de Terminos is located along the coastal zone in the State of 

Campeche in the southern part of Mexico. Since the mid-1970s, the reserve has been a strategic 

zone for gas and petroleum extraction. According to the author, when oil activity started in the 

region, the area experienced an influx of oil industry workers from around the country. Social 

conflicts between cultural and linguistic groups, and effects on local fishing production from oil 

pollution and restrictions on fishing areas reportedly resulted from the changes. 

Gramling Robert and Sarah Brabant. 1986. Boomtowns and offshore energy impact 

assessment: the development of a comprehensive model." Sociological Perspectives 29(2): 

177-201. 

This article examines the applicability of the boom-effects model of offshore energy 

development in Louisiana. The boomtown model predicts that energy development will result in

enhanced job opportunities and elevated income for affected communities, but also a strained 

local labor pool, rapid in-migration, and stressed service infrastructure. Moreover, the model 

suggests that boomtowns are vulnerable to busts when intensive development fails or ends. The 

authors argue that new offshore oil development in St. Mary's Parish, Louisiana has not followed 

this pattern in full. Its labor pool was able to meet the needs of the new industries and thus little 

in-migration occurred, and because of the nature of offshore work, new rig workers who did 

arrive generally lived outside of the affected area. Long-time residents of St. Mary's thus did not 

directly compete with the pool of new workers, but rather worked in the secondary and tertiary 

support industries. Finally, rather than experiencing a simple bust after the boom, oil-dependent 

communities in the parish experienced fluctuating economic conditions related to complex and 

ongoing changes in the global oil market. 

120
Gramling, Robert and William R. Freudenburg. 1990. A closer look at local control: 

communities, commodities, and the collapse of the coast." Rural Sociology 55(4):541-558. 

Gramling and Freudenburg compare the effects of the 1981 decline in oil prices on two Lousiana 

communities partly dependent on OCS drilling. One is a diversified administrative center and 

the other a blue-collar community with a large proportion of offshore platform and shore-side 

support workers. The authors assert that external structures shaped the nature and intensity of 

the social impacts of the sudden price drop. As evidence, the authors show that the world-wide 

price of oil was a better predictor of local rates of employment than endogenous factors 

(measured by previous years' employment trends at the national and local levels). They conclude 

by suggesting that locally controlled planning and management of economic development had 

little effect on how impacts were experienced, and thus social impact studies should examine the 

dynamics of larger-scale systems to understand the development and impact-recovery process. 

Grant, J. P. 1978. The conflict between the fishing and the oil industries in the North Sea: 

a case study. Ocean Management, 4(2–4), 137–149. 

This report finds that the activities of the fishing and oil industries can in various ways be less 

than optimally compatible. Offshore extractive operations, and the attendant installations and 

devices, are reportedly problematic for a long-established fishing industry: marine areas can be 

closed to fishing, offshore structures can constitute a hazard to navigation, debris from offshore 

operations can damage fishing gear and vessels, and offshore operations can result in damage to 

fish stocks and their food through pollution. By this author’s account, with the exception of the 

control of pollution, laws and government regulations may be in need of revision to meet the 

needs of the two industries and resolve inter-industry conflicts. 

Hanley, Peter T. 1984. A Manual for Geophysical Operations in Fishing Areas of Alaska. 

Prepared by the Oil/Fisheries Group of Alaska. Peter T. Hanley (ed.). Anchorage. 

The Oil/Fisheries Group of Alaska (OFGA) was formed in 1983 in response to concerns voiced 

by fishing industry representatives then active in the Bering Sea that oil and gas industry seismic 

vessels would likely interfere with and undermine their fishing and processing operations. This 

inter-industry group involved representatives from several major oil companies, from the 

primary fishing and processing organizations in Alaska, and from a number of geophysical 

testing companies. The intent of the group was to “provide a forum for inter-industry 

communication, education, and resolution of potential problems related to [geophysical] 

operations in Alaska . . and to promote the successful co-existence of commercial fishing, 

processing, and oil industry activity in Alaska offshore areas (p. C-1). 

Participants included representatives from the following organizations: Amoco, Chevron, Exxon, 

Gulf Oil, Mobil, Placid, Shell, Soho Alaska Petroleum, Union Oil, Alaska Independent 

Fishermen’s Marketing Association, Bering Sea Fishermen’s Association, Central Bering Sea 

Fishermen’s Association, Alaska Draggers’ Association, Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association, 

North Pacific Vessel Owners’ Association, Peninsula Marketing Association, Pacific Seafood 

121
Processors’ Association, United Fishermen’s Marketing Association, Western Alaska 

Cooperative Marketing Association, Comap Geosurveys, Inc., Geophysical Service, Inc., 

International Association of Geophysical Contractors, McClelland Engineers, Inc., Marine 

Technical Services, Inc., and Nekton, Incorporated. 

The Manual for Geophysical Operations was developed by the OFGA for potential use by 

seismic vessel companies active in Alaska’s offshore zones. The intent of the work was to 

develop and advocate voluntary procedures for circumventing problems and conflicts between 

the fishing and oil and gas industries occurring potentially occurring as a result of seismic testing 

and associated vessel activity in the fishing grounds on the OCS. Facilitation of problem-solving 

through inter-group communication and cooperation is emphasized. 

Hamilton, Lawrence C. and Carole L. Seyfrit. 1994. Resources and hopes in 

Newfoundland. Society and Natural Resources. Volume 7, pp. 561-78. 

The authors compare surveys of high school students in two rural towns in Newfoundland during 

the construction of Hibernia, the region's first major offshore oil facility. Newfoundland is one of 

the poorest provinces in Canada, traditionally dependent on a fragile and fluctuating fishing 

industry. The region’s population has steadily declined over the last decades due to outmigration. The Hibernia project has been mired in controversies over public financing, but was 

expected to transform and modernize a rural economy. The surveys were conducted in one 

"boomtown" area most affected by Hibernia construction and one "comparison" area. Results 

were similar in both surveyed area, and students' expectations of a future career generally 

differed markedly from that of their parents. 

Students generally preferred jobs in non-extractive industries, but were likely to foresee shortterm employment in a resource industry. Students' anticipation of the need to migrate for 

preferred forms of employment was not significantly different between the survey areas. 

Students in this case were not attracted to offshore oil development as a hope for the future and 

were generally pessimistic about the promises of both oil and fishing as venues for employment. 

Huskey, Lee. 1986. Labor Force Participation in Rural Alaska: The Determinants of 

Change. Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska: Anchorage. 

This report examines the community-level economic benefits of the OCS lease sale process, 

developing and testing an economic model of labor force participation for various rural Alaska 

communities. Huskey notes that OCS beneficiary communities may ultimately share economic 

rents generated by the resource, and enjoy increases in employment opportunities associated with 

various project phases. 

122
International Collective in Support of Fishworkers. 1999. For a few oil dollars more. 

Samudra Report. Issue 24, pp. 24–26. 

This brief NGO report describes a campaign by regional and international environmental groups 

to slow the plans of a multinational oil consortium to construct an offshore oil terminal in the 

fishing area of Campo-Kribi, Cameroon. The main concerns of the local fishermen included 

diminishment of resources, lack of information on fisheries regulations, oil pollution, and 

problems along the coastal zone potentially resulting form exploration and production. The NGO 

views the current retreat of the oil multinationals from this region as temporary. 

Jannotta, Sepp. 2002. “Salmon Fisherman have their Say.” Homernews.com. November 

14. <http://homernews.com/stories/111402/new_111402mew0020001.shtml>. 

This article outlines the concerns of local fishermen about the future of the fishing industry on 

Cook Inlet. Fishermen argue that the flooding of the U.S. market with farmed salmon from

Chile and the loss of various overseas markets has ruined the salmon industry in Alaska. 

Indicative of the anxious mood of many harvesters and processors in the region, one fisherman 

interviewed for the purposes of the article stated that, “None of us who recently bought a salmon 

permit expect to survive the next few years.” 

Kearney, John F. 1991. Co-Management or Co-Optation? The Ambiguities of Lobster 

Fishery Management in Southwest Nova Scotia. In Evelyn Pinkerton (ed.), Cooperative 

Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management and Community 

Development, pgs. 85-102. University of British Columbia Press: Vancouver. 

Initiating co-management in a cooperative vacuum is very difficult. In the case of fishery 

licensing, it is easier to attach to a cooperative project or social movement already in action. 

This study deals less with the development of co-management between state and fishermen and 

more with the capacity of the fishermen to respond to such a possibility. Arguments for social 

solidarity and cooperative social movements call upon the fishermen of the region to stand 

together in efforts to be on equal footing with state officials. The author places these needs as 

preeminent and movement into co-management as subsequent if any chance at effectiveness is to

be had. Relationships between historically opposing parties were deemed necessary to create a 

united front. Organization on the local and regional level, overcoming categorical differences 

(boat size, type of rig, catch), and maintaining momentum are all essential in a strong union. 

Kenai Peninsula Borough Planning Commission. 1993. Meeting Minutes. August 23. 

Soldotna, Alaska. 

These minutes provide an informative snapshot of a community-based planning commission 

weighing competing and on certain issues, conflicting interests of the region’s oil and fishing 

industries. In their review of State Oil and Gas Lease Sale 78, Kenai Peninsula Borough 

commissioners note the concerns of the Kenai Peninsula Fishermen’s Association and the United 

123
Cook Inlet Drift Association. Among the principal concerns were that the fishing fleet must 

adapt their fishing strategies to stationary objects such as offshore platforms. The potential of 

reduced water quality from possible oil spills was another stated concern. 

Kenai Peninsula Historical Commission. 2002. Alaska’s Kenai Peninsula: The Road We’ve 

Traveled. Kenai Peninsula Historical Association. Hope. 

This history derives from L.H. Allen’s 1946 publication, Alaska’s Kenai Peninsula. The 

publication builds on the original text by adding communities not included in the original and by 

offering insights on the region’s prehistory. In addition to describing the fishing industry of the 

Kenai Peninsula, this volume describes the regional influence of the oil and gas industry. The 

author describes the area’s oil and gas fields and nearby operations in Cook Inlet, suggesting that 

practicality underlay the importance of Kenai as the region’s industrial center, stating that “with 

a major airport, plus sea and highway access, Kenai was the logical center for the oil industry in 

the area” (p. 85). 

Kenai Historical Society. (1985). Once Upon the Kenai: Stories from the People. Kenai 

Peninsula Historical Society. 

This anecdotal history of the Kenai Peninsula features personal stories from people who have 

built their home and lives in the region. The volume examines experiences from “nearly every 

point of view – as told by native-born Alaskans, adventurers, homesteaders, doctors, nurses, 

merchants, lawmen, teachers, missionaries, fishermen, trapper, homemakers, laborers, builders.” 

The text is referenced by individual’s names, some of whom are members of long-standing Cook 

Inlet fishing families. Section two includes a chapter titled “The Pile Driver and Fish Traps” 

which describes the summer salmon seasons from as early as 1946, until 1959 when fish traps 

were declared illegal. This publication was published for the 25th anniversary of Alaska’s entry 

into the Union. 

Kenai Watershed Forum. 2003. Hydrocarbon pollution in the Kenai River - the facts. 

Currents, (1-7). Soldotna. 

This article outlines efforts to monitor hydrocarbon pollution in the Kenai River watershed. 

Although such monitoring has been limited to date, the program of mention has managed to 

establish baseline water quality measures, with recommendation for ongoing monitoring over 

time. Findings thus far indicate that the Moose River, a tributary of the Kenai River, was the 

only area in which hydrocarbons were detected from July 2000 to July 2002. Concentrations [in 

that area] exceeded state standards “for fish and aquatic life in the lower river on each of the 

three summer sampling occasions.” (p. 3). The article concludes that all potential sources of 

pollution have not yet been identified and more studies are needed to evaluate the watershed. 

124
Klapp, M. G. 1980. Inter-Industry Conflict in the North Sea and South China Sea: A 

Comparative Analysis of Oil, Shipping, and Fishing in Four Nations. Unpublished doctoral 

dissertation, University of California. Berkeley. 

This research documents four cases (in Norway, Britain, Indonesia, and Malaysia) that illustrate 

how inter-industry conflict has arisen among oil, shipping, and fishing interests owing to 

competing industrial investment or use of offshore space. The author conducted nearly two 

hundred interviews with officials of national government ministries and international 

organizations, and with high-level representatives of corporations and trade unions. Klapp 

suggests that inter-industry conflict emerged in each of the countries analyzed due to variable 

interplay of four primary factors: (1) new offshore industrial development held great economic 

promise, (2) extensions of national jurisdiction were in a state of contestation, (3) recognition of 

the broader economic and political significance of offshore resources was gaining force, and (4) 

international competition for ocean industrial resources was considerable. 

Knaster, A. S., C. Fusaro, and J. Richards. 1998. Mediating conflicts between fish and 

oil: a prototype for joint problem solving of space-use and resource conflicts.” In O. R. 

Magoon, H. Converse, B. Baird, and M. Miller-Henson (eds.), Taking a Look at 

California’s Ocean Resources: An Agenda for the Future. Vol. 2. Reston, VA: ASCE. 

In April 1983, negotiations between the offshore oil industry and commercial fishermen were 

convened to address a number of issues resulting from increase oil and gas permitting activities 

along the central California coast. According to the authors, both industries experienced 

challenges in their attempts to coexist in a constrained work space and without a formal

mechanism for communication and coordination. Representatives of the two industries invited 

the State Lands Commission, Coastal Commission, and Minerals Management Service to 

participate in these initial talks. This meeting set a course for future problem-solving that 

remains operational to the present and that has been replicated as an approach for resolving a 

variety of issues among disputants in the region. The lessons learned regarding the effective 

elements of a dispute resolution system and consensus-building process are applicable to a wide 

variety of ecosystem and resource management conflicts 

Langdon, Steve J. (1989). Prospects for Co-Management of Marine Mammals in Alaska. 

In Evelyn Pinkerton (ed.), Cooperative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for 

Improved Management and Community Development, pgs. 154-169. University of British 

Columbia Press, Vancouver. 

The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972 (amended 1982) calls for a near universal 

moratorium on the taking of marine animals with exemption for Alaskan Natives. Federal 

government, state government, and Alaskan Natives all have an interest in marine mammal 

management. Management practices surrounding the Pacific walrus are used as examples of this 

three-way interaction. The federal government, specifically the US Fish and Wildlife Service, 

sought to return management to the state. This was nearly unilaterally opposed by Native 

groups. In 1978, Native leaders formed the Eskimo Walrus Commission (EWC) to show state 

125
and federal groups that the Natives were in a position to best deal with walrus management. The 

management plan, modeled after federal and state management plans, is lacking in enforcement 

procedures and provisions for self-regulation. Talks between the state, US FWS, and the EWC 

concerning co-management were begun in 1986, but were discontinued for unstated reasons. 

The co-management of marine mammals in Alaska is of limited quality and scope due to poor 

communication and “divergent objectives”. The author predicts only a biological threat to the 

species will precipitate a true drive towards a co-management environment. 

Laychak, Eugenia. 1991. Mitigation for offshore development/fishing conflicts. In Orville 

T. Magoon et al. (eds.) Coastal Zone ’91. Volume 3, pp. 2182-2196. American Society of 

Civil Engineers. New York. 

Laychak analyzes three cases of conflict associated with the interaction of fishing fleets and 

offshore development. The two Alaska cases are quite different. One addresses a gold 

extraction operation in relatively rich fishing grounds offshore Nome in the Bering Sea. The 

other examines offshore oil operations at Endicott Causeway offshore the North Slope where 

commercial fishing is minimal. The California case examines offshore oil development at the 

Irene Platform near Santa Barbara. This was a moderately active commercial fishing zone at the 

time of the study. Extensive mitigation efforts were undertaken by the lessees in all cases. 

Laychak’s WestGold case is most relevant to the situation in Cook Inlet. An offshore gold 

mining operation was initiated in the rich commercial fisheries of Norton Sound under a 

regulatory regime delineated by the Alaska consistency process. A conflict avoidance strategy 

was arranged through the establishment of a project review committee comprised of WestGold 

and its consultants, and representatives of the University of Alaska, state and federal regulatory 

and wildlife agencies, local/regional governments, and special interest groups like the Bering Sea 

Fishermen’s Association. 

WestGold worked under committee guidance to establish a clear pre-impact environmental 

baseline and monitoring program. The monitoring program was flexible in that its emphasis 

shifted as the base of knowledge about how fisheries and other environmental elements were 

affected also evolved. Subsequent mining plans were then subject to the results of monitoring 

and associated analysis. Most parties praised WestGold’s operation. The review committee 

process was generally seen as an excellent forum for defining and addressing the issues of 

concern, and for encouraging meaningful communication between what might have been highly 

conflicted marine resource user groups. 

LGL Alaska Research Associates, Inc. 2000. Mapping Cook Inlet Rip Tides Using Local 

Knowledge and Remote Sensing. Prepared for the U.S. Department of the Interior, 

Minerals Management Service, Alaska OCS Region, Environmental Studies Unit. OCS 

Study MMS 2000-025. Anchorage. 

This report, prepared for the Minerals Management Service, is intended to map rip tides in Cook 

Inlet, to develop and analyze existing records concerning the consistency of rip tide locations, 

126
and to develop an information base on fishermen’s use of these rip tides. The objective of the 

study was to assist MMS in planning to avoid conflicts between local fishermen and future 

offshore oil industry activities. Using Canadian RADARSAT 1 satellite data, in conjunction 

with local fisherman “ground-truthing,” in combination with historic radar imagery from the 

ERS-1 and ERS-2 satellites between 1992 and 1999, principal rip tides (a west rip tide and a 

combined middle and east rip tides) appeared consistently in both the satellite and fisherman 

reports. This information, and the fact that fish tend to closely follow these rip tides, and 

fishermen tend to concentrate effort along these rip tides, supports the view that the location, 

persistence, and importance of these rip tides needs to be carefully considered in future MMS 

lease sale activities in Cook Inlet. 

The report describes the possibility of conflict between offshore oil and gas industry 

development and the salmon drift gillnet fishery. Sources of conflict include the construction of 

stationary drilling rigs that obstruct fishing patterns, contaminants from operations affecting fish 

reproduction or marketability, and the increased risk of accidents and catastrophic oil spills. 

 

Lasut, Markus T., and Veronica A. Kumurur. 2001. Consequences of anthropogenic 

pressures in coastal areas: conflict of interests.” Ekoton, 1(2), 71–77.

The authors summarize and describe the range of conflicts that can develop among multiple 

users of coastal resources, such as fishermen, offshore oil operators, pleasure boaters, and other 

recreational groups. The article describes the interaction of offshore oil development with fish 

stocks (concentration and reproduction), and various forms of competition between fishermen 

and offshore oil interests. Especial focus is applied to the manner in which fishing and oil 

interests vie for limited infrastructure such as harbor space. 

Lawson, D., R. Scoles, and J. Terry. 1980. Lower Cook Inlet Petroleum Development 

Scenarios: Commercial Fishing Industry Analysis. Final Report to Minerals Management 

Service. Contract Nos.: BLM: CT6-61, MMS: 14-12-0001-29002. Anchorage: Alaska Sea 

Grant Program, University of Alaska. 

The subject of this report is potential conflict between the commercial fishing industry and OCS 

oil and gas industry interests as examined in advance of Lease Sale 60 in Lower Cook Inlet. The 

authors forecast activity levels of Cook Inlet and Shelikof Strait commercial fishing in the 

absence of OCS activity associated with Lease Sale 60 based on then current and select historical 

information. Oil and gas industry activities in the area (under low-, medium-, and high-find OCS 

petroleum scenarios) and associated pertinent projections of economic conditions, physical 

systems, and transportation systems were derived from prior studies. Three potential sources of 

conflict are considered in detail: labor, components of community infrastructure, and ocean 

space. 

The four main findings of this study are as follow. First, the effect of OCS labor requirements on 

the commercial fishing industry increased between low find and high find scenarios. Under the 

low find conditions, OCS oil and gas operations require primarily skilled labor. As operations 

127
and the use of unskilled labor increase, competition with fish-processing employees can be 

expected to increase. 

Second, competition for ocean space could also increase with successively larger find scenarios, 

and would be reflected in increased fishing costs. The commercial fishing industry conceived in 

its entirety was not expected to be affected significantly, although individual participants could 

be significantly affected relative to degree of dependence on fishing and ability to engage in 

other forms of employment. Gear loss was the major area of conflict. Drift gillnet and purse 

seine fisheries are active further from shore and use large areas to pursue their quarry, and as 

such are most susceptible to conflicts involving use of ocean space. 

Third, the anticipated competition for electric power and water was not deemed significant for 

any scenario. Finally, competition for port and harbor facilities is expected to increase with 

successively larger finds but is expected to be relieved by construction of dedicated facilities 

during the development phase. 

Loshbaugh, Doug. 2001. “Against the Current: Commercial Fishers Cry Foul at Recent 

‘Fish Politics.’” Peninsula Clarion. July 18. Available online at 

<http://www.peninsulaclarion.com/stories/071801/cha_0718010001.shtml>. 

This article states that the commercial fishing industry in Upper Cook Inlet is perceived by 

residents to be endangered by decisions that have been made by the Governor and the Board of 

Fisheries. The article outlines various fishery allocation disputes, and implies that current 

government policy is moving toward replacement of the commercial fishing industry with 

tourism-related industry. 

Loy, Wesley. 2003. “More Gloom: Low Prices, Spotty Catches Leave Many Fisherman 

Frustrated.” July 6. Anchorage Daily News. 

The article outlines the uneven yields throughout Cook Inlet, and the low prices fisherman 

expect for the catch of the 2003 season. Cannery closings and fewer processing ships on the 

water indicate the decline of the industry may be permanent. The article also discusses local 

residents may welcome the gas and oil industry back to Bristol Bay to create new industry and 

help stimulate the local economy. 

Mann, Anthony. 1953. Thunder Bay [Film]. USA. 

This classic black and white film chronicles a struggle between Louisiana shrimpers and out-oftown offshore oil entrepreneurs. The story is set in 1946, with ex-Navy engineer Steve Martin 

(James Stewart) arriving in Morgan City, Louisiana with a dream: to build a safe platform for 

offshore oil drilling. Having finessed financing from a big oil company, formerly penniless Steve 

and his partner are in business. But opposition from the fishing community grows rapidly, led by 

Stella Rigaud (Joanne Dru). Other hazards include sabotage, a hurricane, and challenges from the 

128
company’s board of directors. According to Nadel (1988; see entry below), Mann depicts 

shrimpers as backward, ignorant folk who resist the economic promise of energy development. 

Matthews, Mary. 2002. Regional Stakeholder Analysis in the Caspian Environment Programme:

Identification of Potential Conflicts of Interests in Caspian Waters. Paper presented at the 

Caspian Sea Regional Policy Symposium. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of State and the 

Starr Foundation. March 15. Shepherdstown, West Virginia, 

Matthew examines relationships among stakeholder groups in the Caspian region in order to test 

environmental attitudes, commitments, concerns, and conflicts associated with the region’s 

marine and coastal environment. Based on analysis of surveys administered during the summer 

of 2001 in all Caspian states, the author identifies eight major perceived problems and issues: 

decline in certain fisheries, decline in coastal infrastructure and amenities, decline in overall 

environmental quality, threats to human health, decline in biodiversity, coastal landscape 

degradation, potential damage from oil and gas activities, and potential damage from invasive 

species. Survey participants were also asked to rank basic causes for environmental concerns in 

the region so as to assess the likelihood for generating conflicts between groups in the region, 

and to recommend strategies for avoiding those conflicts. 

Maw, Roland. 2002. Tri-Borough Position Paper Federal Outer Continental Shelf Oil & 

Gas Leasing Program. State of Alaska Comments on the Call for Information for Cook 

Inlet Lease Sales 2007. United Cook Inlet Drift Association. Soldotna. 

This position paper states the support of the United Cook Inlet Drift Association (UCIDA) for 

Lease Sales 191 and 199, with the provisions that drift gillnet fleet experiences no loss of fishing 

area or fishing time. The paper outlines five items the Association argues must be included in 

the Lease Sale EIS: (1) no offshore loading of tankers, (2) plans implemented to minimize 

commercial gear conflicts with oil exploration and/or production, (3) adequate spill prevention 

and response implementation, (4) identification of critical habitat areas and prioritization of 

habitat protection, and (5) provisions for local government revenue sharing. The paper 

concludes that if the items are not addressed, the association would not support future lease sales 

in the region. 

McGoodwin, James R. 1990. Crisis in the World’s Fisheries: People, Problems, and Politics. 

Stanford University Press. Stanford, CA. 

This book addresses fisheries management for small-scale fishers. The modern fishing 

environment is described and followed by a chapter on maritime anthropology, or the cultures of 

fishing peoples. Several chapters are devoted to active and passive indigenous regulation as 

examples for fisheries management methodology. Each topic gives the manager a means to 

regulate the fishing industry from within its unique geographic and cultural setting. The author 

chastises governments for a perceived lack of social analysis in solving fisheries problems and 

influencing policy decisions. A move away from “top-down” management and toward to comanagement with public input and coordination is proffered as a step in the right direction. 

129
McKernan, Donald L. John T. Gharrett, and Howard Tait. 1956. A Study of Proposals to 

Reduce Fishing Effort in Cook Inlet During 1957. Special Management Study 56-2. U.S. 

Department of the Interior, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Commercial 

Fisheries Administration of Alaska Commercial Fisheries. Anchorage. 

This early study examines fishing methods and regulations in place during the early 1950s, and 

describes efforts to reduce high harvest levels following the introduction of then new and 

relatively highly efficient gear. The report’s findings suggest that weekly limits placed on access 

led to uneven harvest. Because the red salmon run in total is comprised of numerous relatively 

small runs and individuals do not mix homogeneously as they move towards their spawning 

grounds, and weekly limits did not account for geographic variability, some spawning tributaries 

were under harvested while others were over-harvested. The report suggested that in order to 

remedy the uneven harvest, drift gillnet licensing levels should be maintained and beach gear be 

reduced by one-third. 

McLaughlin, Shirley. 2003. “Newfoundland and Labrador’s Fishing and Petroleum 

Industries Launch ‘One Ocean.’” Ocean Resources Magazine. January 6. Available 

online at www.oceanresources.com/backissues>. 

McLaughlin asserts that by recognizing a need to discuss and address issues of mutual 

concern, Newfoundland and Labrador’s fishing and petroleum industries now share more 

than just a common marine environment. The newly formed inter-industry organization One 

Ocean provides a forum to enhance communications and information exchange between 

these two regionally important industries. Inspired by similar liaison models developed by 

other jurisdictions such as those operating in the North Sea and Norway, One Ocean will 

assist both industries in understanding each other’s operations and activities so that they can 

work safely and efficiently together. 

The organization will also work to solve conflicts, identify potential problems, and provide 

an independent expert analysis of key issues. The advisory board consists of seven 

representatives from each industry, including members of the Fish, Food and Allied 

Workers, which has more than 20,000 members in Newfoundland and Labrador; the 

Fisheries Association of Newfoundland and Labrador, an industry trade association 

accounting for about 80 percent of the province’s seafood production and sales; and the 

Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, the official voice of Canada’s upstream oil 

and natural gas industry, which represents more than 140 member companies and works 

closely with members, governments, and stakeholders to analyze key oil and gas issues. 

130
Meacham, Charles P. and John H. Clark. 1994. Pacific Salmon management – the view

from Alaska. Alaska Fishery Research Bulletin 1 (1): 76- 80. 

Meacham and Clark argue that since Alaska’s constitution, unique among the fifty states, 

mandates the management and protection of the state’s natural resources, the state has a 

responsibility to prevent over utilization, destruction, or neglect of its fishery resources. The 

paper outlines the state of Alaska’s fisheries prior to statehood, and how Alaska has recovered its 

fisheries since it entered the Union. The Cook Inlet salmon fisheries are described. The article 

compares Alaska’s approach to conservation with that of the Pacific Northwest. 

Minerals Management Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. 2002. Cook Inlet 

Planning Area Oil and Gas Lease Sales 191 and 199: Draft Environmental Impact 

Statement. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Alaska OCS 

Region, OCS EIS/EA MMS 2002-065, December 2002, Volume I (Executive Summary, 

Sections I through VI). 

 

Cook Inlet OCS Lease Sales 191 and 199 are scheduled for 2004 and 2006, respectively. A 

Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was completed by MMS Alaska COS Region in 

2002 in advance of those sales. The Cook Inlet Lease Sale Area 191 is scheduled for lease in 

2004, and Lease Sale Area 199 is scheduled for lease in 2006. Together, the planning area 

consists of 2.5 million acres in 517 whole or partial lease blocks. The area is located seaward of 

the State of Alaska submerged lands boundary in Cook Inlet and extends from three to 30 miles 

from the coast in water depths from 30 feet to more than 650 feet. 

The scoping process associated with the Cook Inlet EIS process elicited citizen’s comments 

about the upcoming lease sales and potential future oil and gas industry activities in Lower Cook 

Inlet. Drift gillnet fishermen attending scoping meetings voiced perspectives about the potential 

effects of oil and gas industry activities on their fishing operations in Lower Cook Inlet. 

Concerns related primarly to the chance for oil spills, navigational challenges, reduced fishing 

time, and reducted fishing grounds. Additional sections of the report of relevance to the present 

study include consideration of: (1) cumulative effects; (2) fisheries resources; (3) economy; (4) 

commercial fishing; (5) sociocultural systems; (6) recreation, tourism, and visual resources; (7) 

sportfishing; and (8) environmental justice. 

Molotch H., J. Woolley and T. Jori. 1996. Growing firms in declining fields: unanticipated 

impacts of oil development. Society and Natural Resources. 11(2):137-156. 

This study of offshore oil development in the Santa Barbara Channel found that many local oilrelated firms adapted to declines in the oil industry by diversifying into other realms, thus 

forestalling their expected demise. The article describes instances of how such adaptation 

occurs. Firms' success at self-transformation alters the type of environmental impacts caused by 

the oil industry's coming to the region. This can mitigate the boom-bust cycle often associated 

with extractive industries, but can also set into motion other long-term consequences. The 

131
authors argue that environmental assessment of industrial projects is incomplete unless they 

consider how the support industry firms themselves evolve and adapt over time. 

Nadel, Jane Hurwitz. 1988. Changing Waters: a Cross-cultural Survey of Petroleum 

Development Impacts on Artisanal Fishing Communities. In Identidad y Transformacion de 

las Americas, pp. 106-112. Ediciones Uniandes. Bogota. 

This chapter surveys the current literature on conflicts between offshore oil development and 

fishing communities. The author argues that these conflicts are inevitable. Their outcome hinges 

on the following key variables: fishing technology, fishery ecology, petroleum geology, and the 

degree of political consciousness and mobilization in the involved fishing communities. Nadel 

points out that representatives of fishing-dependent communities are often ineffective in 

articulating their side of the conflict. It is argued that in order for fishing communities to be 

recognized and compensated for the impacts of development, such communities and their leaders 

must make allies with more powerful agencies and entities in the broader society. 

Northern Economics. 1994. Commercial Fishing Industry of the Gulf of Alaska. Minerals 

Management Service, Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Region. MMS Study TR-159. 

Anchorage. 

This study was completed to provide the Minerals Management Service with updated 

information concerning the contribution of the fishing industry at the community level 

throughout the various MMS OCS regions and sub-regions. The study recognized that 

commercial fishing was of paramount importance to the Gulf of Alaska, and its most “volatile” 

industry. Gulf communities examined in the report included: Cordova, Homer, Kenai, King 

Cove, Kodiak, Seward, Unalaska/Dutch Harbor, and Yakutat. The report determined that, with 

the exception of low value of fish species, there are no new fisheries to exploit within the region 

and competition for remaining stocks will only increase in the near future. This is particularly 

significant given that the report also finds that the fishing industry sustains the lives of local 

residents by providing employment and income, creating municipal revenues, providing 

justification for state funding of capital projects, and providing a user base for service charge 

revenues to support maintenance costs and amortization of infrastructure. 

Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. 1997. Opprydding av havbunnen i Nordsjoeen 1996 

[Clean-Up of the Sea Bed in the North Sea 1996]. Oljedirektoratet, Stavanger (Norway). 

The Norwegian Protectorate argues that petroleum activities in the North Sea have resulted in 

gear entanglement conflicts with fishermen due to oil industry littering of the seabed. A clean-up 

operation undertaken in 1996 and paid for by the state is described. The clean-up area, 1,000 

kilometers offshore Karmoey, was mapped by side-scan sonar. Select targets were then identified

and eventually removed. Of the 59 targets examined, 11 were removed and dumped onshore. At 

one point a chain cable of 9 tons was removed from the seabed. The report also briefly discusses 

a related compensation agreement with Norwegian fishermen. 

132
O'Connor, Oonagh. 2000. “The Hidden Costs of Offshore Oil.” Watershed Sentinel, 10(2). 

Available online at <http://www.rfu.org/wss.htm>. 

O’Conner asserts that exploration and development of offshore oil and gas have been prohibited 

on the west coast of Canada for almost 30 years largely because of potentially deleterious 

environmental and economic effects. Now, downturns in the British Columbia economy appear 

to be making the industry more attractive. Various preliminary efforts have been undertaken in 

order to find out more about the experiences of communities where offshore oil and gas 

exploration and production are occurring. O’Connor briefly reviews some of these, noting 

various potential problems and comparing the study region to others around the world. 

Olomola A. S. 1998. Sources and resolution of conflicts in Nigerian artisanal fisheries. 

Society and Natural Resources 11(2):121-135. 

The increasing dependence on fisheries as a source of livelihood in the maritime states of Nigeria 

has been associated with intensive management of available resources and an upsurge of 

contestation of ownership and use rights. In the Ondo and Rivers States, infringements on the 

rights of ownership and violation of resource management rules have been the major sources of 

conflict associated with the artisanal fisheries. It has been possible to resolve the emerging 

conflicts through non-adjudicatory approaches such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration. In 

effecting these approaches, the organization of conflict resolution is seen as informal and the 

operational rules are clear, reconciliatory, and easily comprehensible. The strength and resilience 

of the approaches ostensibly lie in the cohesiveness of the social, kinship, linguistic, and cultural 

interconnections among the owners and users of the fishing grounds. Usually, the resolution of 

conflict is accomplished speedily and openly, and the process is relatively inexpensive. 

Parravano, Peitro. 1999. “Organizing Globally and Acting Locally: The World Forum of 

Fish Harvesters and Fishworkers.” Fishermen's News (Pacific Coast Federation of 

Fishermen’s Associations). September. Available online at <http://www.pcffa.org>. 

The author recounts the founding history of the World Forum of Fish Harvesters and 

Fishworkers (WFF). This organization was established in 1997 in response to the perceived 

need within the fishing industry to organize across national boundaries to address issues of 

pollution, habitat destruction, and short-sighted fishing practices, and to foster sustainable fishing 

on a global scale. Interactions with the international petroleum industry figure prominently in 

the discussion. 

133
Peters, A. F, ed. (1974). Impact of Offshore Oil Operations. Applied Science Publishers, 

Ltd. Essex, United Kingdom. 

This is a now fairly dated edited volume of proceedings from an Institute of Petroleum 

conference. Chapters address different aspects of the impacts of offshore drilling in the North 

Sea, and reflect much optimism. Community impacts are discussed in passing but are advanced 

as largely positive aspects of modernization and development of rural economies. There is some

discussion of the need for the government to involve itself in fishery protection around offshore 

development sites (pp. 60-61). 

Priyono, B. E. 1996. Integrated Management Plan (IMP): The Case of Riau Province, 

District of Bengkalis. In E. Duursama (ed.), Proceedings of the Conference on Coastal 

Change, Bordomer. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Report, No. 105, Suppl. 

Paris: UNESCO. 

This study of the Indonesian district of Bengkalis, including the Riau province, describes 

conflicts between coastal resource user groups, such as those surrounding putative degradation of 

water quality associated with paper-pulp-plywood industries, deterioration of sanctuary areas 

from mangrove cutting and pollution, and water quality issues associated with offshore oil 

drilling. The author recommends greater collaboration and coordination efforts among the 

various cognizant government agencies and affected communities as a means to resolve conflicts 

and preserve and protect the region’s marine environment. 

Proschaska, F., M. Roessler, and D. Tabb. 1981. Assessment of Space and Use Conflicts 

between the Fishing and Oil Industries. Vols. 1–5. Final Report to the Minerals 

Management Service. Contract Nos.: BLM: CT9-26, MMS: 14-12-0001-29167. Centaur 

Associates, Inc. Washington, D.C. 

With increasing oil and gas activities on the OCS during this period, the Bureau of Land 

Management supported a comprehensive survey to assess the manner in and degree to which oil 

and gas operations conflict with fishing activities. The objectives of the study were to: (1) to 

review historical conflicts between OCS oil and fishing industries, (2) to identify potential and 

ongoing fishing gear type versus oil structure conflicts, (3) to develop a predictive catch loss 

model due to space loss by OCS oil structures, and (4) to assess the ability of particular harbors 

to accommodate oil support vessels and staging operations. The geographic scope of the study 

included the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, and California OCS lease sale regions. 

The researchers found that otter trawls, bottom dredges, and purse seines were most likely to 

entangle with structures. Submerged wellheads, pipelines, and other subsea structures were most 

hazardous for these gear types. Structure-related debris and activities caused more problems to 

fishermen than the actual oil structures. Most significant projected catch losses were related to 

otter trawl fisheries in the North Atlantic, Mid-Atlantic, and eastern Gulf of Mexico regions. 

134
Reggio Jr., Villere, and Rick Kasprzak. 1991. Rigs to Reefs: Fuel for Fisheries 

Enhancement through Cooperation. In Colleen S. Benner and Robert W. Middleton (eds.), 

Fisheries and Oil Development on the Continental Shelf, pgs. 9-17. American Fisheries 

Society Symposium 11. Bethesda, MD. 

This paper focuses on one component of offshore petroleum development, the production 

platform, and attempts to demonstrate how knowledge, understanding, and cooperation are 

benefiting fish, fishermen, and the petroleum industry in the Gulf Region. By engaging the 

public and private sectors, MMS opened a new level of cooperation and advancement. The 

creation of REEFS Task Force (Recreation, Environmental Enhancement and Fishing in the Sea) 

in 1983 and its work culminated in the National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984. The 

artificial reef plan that followed cited oil and gas structures as potential artificial reef material. 

The Louisiana Artificial Reef Initiative (LARI) of 1985 is cited as a working model for rigs to 

reefs programs for individual states. Louisiana set up an Artificial Reef Trust Fund, asking the 

oil companies to donate half of the savings gained by using the rigs to reefs program. At a 

savings of nearly $1 million per structure, this allows for generous donations. The interest is 

then used for operational costs. Benefits appear in every sector, from the private oil companies 

to the public and private fishing industries. The authors stress government-to-private sector 

cooperation and coordination “consistent with existing authorities and responsibilities”. 

Richards, John B., and Carolynn S. Culver. 1990. Offshore: Communications in a 

Crowded Sea (Video). Marine Science Institute, University of California, Santa Barbara. 

This 30-minute VHS video describes conflicts between commercial fishing vessels and seismic 

survey vessels operating in association with offshore oil exploration off the California coast. The 

piece examines the philosophies and perspectives of workers in both industries and reviews ways 

in which conflicts have been eased through communication, education, mediation, and research. 

The video was developed for planners and decision makers in both government and industry. 

Seventeenth Coast Guard District. Fishing Vessel Safety. 1997. Federal Requirements for 

Commercial Fishing Industry Vessels. October. Juneau, Alaska. 

This pamphlet outlines vessel requirements for safely operating fishing vessels within the waters 

of Alaska. It also outlines applicable federal laws and stability requirements for commercial 

vessels. 

Seydlitz, Ruth, P. Jenkins, S. Hampton. (1995). Economic impacts of energy development. 

Society and Natural Resources 8(4):321-337. 

This article examines the economic impacts of offshore petroleum extraction and production on 

communities in Louisiana. The study extends previous work concerning the economic impacts of 

energy development by including all phases of petroleum development, by accounting for the 

135
degree and type of involvement of the community in petroleum production, by using analysis of 

variance to determine the effect of the rate and direction of change in as well as level of 

petroleum activity, and by using time-series regression to examine the effect of year-to-year 

changes in activity on year-to-year changes in various economic sectors. The findings show an 

initial improvement in economic conditions, followed by serious economic decline. The authors 

suggest that the communities should seek to diversify involvement in petroleum production, and 

also identify mitigation programs to effect during the boom and decline in petroleum activity. 

Spence, Hal. 2003. “Federal Lease Sales in Cook Inlet Win Kenai Assembly Approval.” 

Morris News Service-Alaska. February 19. Available online at 

<http://www.oilandgasreporter.com/stories/021803/ind_20030218010.shtml>. 

A resolution supporting proposed OCS Lease Sales 191 and 199 (scheduled for 2004 and 2006), 

was adopted by the Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly on February 4, 2003. During these 

proceedings, the assembly added amendments intended to reinforce its position that specific 

steps be taken to mitigate potential effects of Lower Cook Inlet oil and gas exploration and 

development on the region’s environment and economy prior to that activity. 

By the author’s account, some public testimony opposed the sale, and recommended 

modifications may not have gone far enough to reassure opponents of the sales that Lower Cook 

Inlet and Kachemak Bay will not be significantly affected by a potential future oil spill or the 

effects of pollution associated with oil production. The article also reviews provisions of an 

agreement reached in 2001 among the Kenai Peninsula and Kodiak Island Boroughs that 

specified a ban on offshore loading of tankers and called for specific plans to minimize and avoid 

conflicts between development activities and commercial fishing gear. 

Springer, Susan Woodward. 1997. Seldovia, Alaska: An Historical Portrait of Life in 

Herring Bay. Blue Willow, Inc.: Littleton, Colorado. 

This book describes the history of the small village of Seldovia in the Kachemak Bay region of 

Cook Inlet, contrasting life in the once thriving seaport, before the devastating earthquake of 

1964, to its quiet existence today. The book describes the village’s ancient history, its Native 

Influence, and Russian Culture. Of particular interest, Springer details the history of the salmon 

industry and various fishing methods employed in the region, and local fishing traditions 

associated with the salmon, herring, halibut, cod, and crab fisheries. 

State of Alaska, Division of Oil and Gas, Department of Natural Resources. 1999. Cook 

Inlet Areawide 1999 Oil and Gas Lease Sale: Final Finding of the Director. January 20. 

Anchorage. 

This report describes commercial salmon fishing areas in Cook Inlet, and potential conflicts 

between fish harvesting and oil and gas industry activities in the Lease Sale area. Central to the 

issue is the tightly controlled commercial fishing “corridor” and the need for coordination among 

136
various users of the zone. The report describes activities associated with exploration, 

development, and production of oil and gas reserves in the region and potential effects on 

fisheries harvest areas, and notes that commercial fishers have expressed concern that the 

presence of oil and gas industry activities could interfere with fishing operations and 

inadvertently alter the distribution of returning fish among harvesting areas and vessels. 

Offshore platforms were noted as creating a potential obstacle to drift gillnet fishing, and semisubmersible drill rigs and anchoring systems were said to have the potential to incur loss of

fishing space or impede access to the water column, especially given the current one-mile buffer 

around platforms in the Inlet. Other areas of potential interaction include possible gear loss, and 

dispersal of herring or salmon by seismic testing. According to the report, the greatest potential 

threat to commercial fishing is a large oil spill, with both gear and catch at risk. The report 

asserts that an oil spill could pose a threat to juvenile salmon and future runs if these were 

present in the surface portions of the water column at the time of a spill. Perceptions of tainted 

seafood are also described as a potential topical area of effect. 

The report proposes various mitigation measures or regulatory provisions that could serve to 

minimize effects on commercial fishing in the region: (1) Restrict lease-related use when it is 

necessary to prevent unreasonable conflicts with local subsistence harvests and commercial 

fishing operations; (2) Offshore pipelines could be located and constructed to prevent 

obstructions to marine navigation and fishing operations; (3) Require lessees to implement oil 

spill prevention, control, and countermeasures plans; and (4) Prohibit use of explosives for 

seismic activities with a velocity of greater than 3,000 feet per second in marine waters. 

Supreme Court of the State of Alaska. 1994. Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. United Cook 

Inlet Drift Association, Kenai Peninsula Sportsman’s Association, Ronald Cox, Timothy 

Moore, and Henry Wojtusik, Appellees, Ninilchik Traditional Council, Appellee/CrossAppellant. Supreme Court Nos. S-4966/4967. Superior Court No. 3KN-91-596 CI. 

February 18. Available online at <http://touchngo.com/sp/html/sp-4054.htm>. Anchorage. 

This appeal brought about by the Ninilchik Traditional Council contested the policy invalidating 

the Boards of Fisheries and Game’s declaration that all Alaskans were eligible subsistence users 

of the fisheries. The Council contested the order on the grounds that it adversely affected the 

lifestyle and culture of its members. The Superior Court decision was reversed in this decision. 

137
Supreme Court of the State of Alaska. 1996. Ninilchik Traditional Council, Alaska Center 

for the Environment, Greenpeace, Trustees for Alaska, Kenai Peninsula, Fisherman’s 

Asociation, Inited Cook Inlet Drift Association, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Harry 

Noah, Commissioner, State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources, ames Eason, 

Director, Division of Oil and Gas, State of Alaska, Resources, and State of Alaska,

Department of Natural Resources, Appellees/Cross-Appellants. Supreme Court No. S6683/6733. Superior Court No. 3KN-93-1174 CI. December 27. Anchorage. 

This appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, 

opposes the decision of the Department of Natural Resources to Oil and Gas Lease Sale 78. The 

area in question is quite large, nearly 403,000 acres of submerged land and tidelands in the 

Upper Cook Inlet and uplands on the Kenai Peninsula and in the lower Susitna Valley” (p.2). 

Although the Department of Natural Resources determined that the sale was consistent with the 

Coastal Management Program and in the best interest of the State, the litigants challenged the 

validity of the Department’s findings in Superior Court. The Supreme Court affirmed part of the 

Superior Court’s findings, but it reversed other parts in its decision. 

Susskind, Lawrence, and Scott McCreary. 1985. Techniques for resolving coastal resource 

management disputes through negotiation.” Journal of the American Planning Association, 

51(3), 365–374. 

The authors argue that many disputes involving coastal resources would be better resolved 

through negotiation than through legislative or judicial processes. For example, in the overhaul 

of the tideland licensing process in Massachusetts in the early 1980s, the legislative process was 

effectively supplemented by facilitated, face-to-face dialogue among the contending parties. In 

disputes between developers and the California State Coastal Conservancy, teams of scientists 

and citizen panels produced land-use alternatives that would allow development while protecting 

natural resources. The article also reviews the success of The Mediation Institute which helped 

the oil and fishing industries reach consensus on various issues. Conflicts between local and state 

governments over development along the Columbia Estuary were also favorably resolved in 

workshop sessions sponsored by the Mediation Institute. According to the authors, these 

examples suggest that face-to-face negotiation can serve to obviate extensive and expensive 

adjudicatory processes common in modern society. 

Tunseth, Matthew. 2003. “Fish board wants residents to be heard Fish and Game special 

meeting will allow board members to listen to comments.” Peninsula Clarion. March 9. 

Available online at www.peninsulaclarion.com/stories/030903/new_03090002.shtml>. 

This news article alerted Kenai communities about an opportunity to voice their opinions 

concerning the early-run Kenai king salmon during a special meeting of the Kenai-Soldotna Fish 

and Game Advisory Committee. The special meeting was scheduled to address local concerns 

since the regular meeting, held in Anchorage, would not include local residents. 

138
Peninsula Clarion (editorial). 2002. “Fishing Groups’ Request for Restraining Order 

Against Fish and Game Denied Judge Rules in Favor of State.” July 10. Available online 

at www.peninsulaclarion.com/stories/071002/new_0710020002.shtml>. 

The requests of two commercial fishermen to obtain a restraining order against the Alaska 

Department of Fish and Game are outlined in this article. The request had been denied since the 

fishermen could not show irreparable harm would result from its salmon resource management 

policies. Although the request was denied, Judge Harold Brown acknowledged that the 

fishermen had raised serious questions concerning the validity of the escapement goals 

advocated and enforced by ADF&G. 

University of Alaska, Coastal Marine Institute. 2001. An Economic Assessment of the 

Sport Fisheries for Halibut, and Chinook and Coho Salmon in Lower and Central Cook 

Inlet. Prepared for the U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, 

Alaska OCS Region, Environmental Studies Unit. OCS Study MMS 2000-061, Anchorage. 

The overall objective of the Minerals Management Service-sponsored study was to address the 

concern that potential lease-related activities associated with the Cook Inlet lease sales (191 & 

199) might affect the productivity of local fisheries, the quality of recreational opportunities, or 

the demand for tourism-related services. The study was to “develop a predictive model of 

participation rate changes that can be linked to a regional input-output model to estimate net 

benefits to sport fishers and the regional economic impact of marine sportfishing on the Kenai 

Peninsula economy.” 

The authors rely on modifications to the standard IMPLAN I-O model, intended to address the 

unique characteristics of the Kenai Peninsula fishing industry, in order to generate five 

alternative impact scenarios resulting from three decreases associated with oil and gas activities 

and two increases from baseline mean catch per fishing vessel trip. The study concludes that the 

sport fishing industry is particularly sensitive to even marginal reductions in expected salmon 

and halibut catch, and that, for example, a 10 percent decrease in expected catch could be 

expected to result in a 23 percent reduction in net benefits to sport fishermen – and a 

concomitant $2.5 million decrease in direct, indirect, and induced output expenditures in the 

Kenai Peninsula region, and loss of 72 jobs. 

 

Woodell, George, Craig J. Forsyth, and Robert Gramling. 1996. "Technological Change, 

Resource Management and Conflict: Commercial Shrimping in Louisiana." Sociological 

Spectrum 16(4): 437-472. 

This article discusses how the interaction of boom/bust economic cycles, environmental 

protection policy, and ecological degradation contributes to conflict among small-scale 

commercial shrimpers in coastal Louisiana. The authors argue that competition among shrimpers 

is exacerbated by threats to the ecosystem on which they depend, but which shrimpers do not 

fully perceive. Analysis of interview reveals that shrimpers rarely if ever blamed offshore oil 

rigs for estuary degradation, and usually cited declines in the oil industry and environmental 

139
regulations (specifically turtle exclusion device requirements) for their difficulties. In times of

decline in oil, workers turned to shrimping as an alternative livelihood. During boom times, 

shrimpers could not compete for dock access. The long-standing and generally positive local 

perceptions of the oil industry mitigated potential conflicts between shrimpers and oil interests, 

and intensified conflicts between shrimpers. 

140
Appendix B: Social Network Methods, Hypotheses, and Results

This appendix describes in further detail the social network methodology used for this project. It 

presents the rationale for the work, the revealed network itself, and summary analysis of social, 

political, and geographic factors and relationships relevant to network analysis in this case. 

Objectives 

The intent of our social network methodology was manifold. Through it we sought to: (1) 

generate valid depiction of a social network of peer-identified expert drift gillnetters, (2) identify 

key nodes of social relationships; that is, participants nominated by peers most frequently, (3) 

identify the effects of geographic and political orientations on the peer-nomination process and 

the distribution of nominees across the region, (4) conduct interviews and mapping exercises 

with persons in representative nodal positions in the network , and (5) identify persons with 

reputations as expert drifters for subsequent in-depth discussion of perspectives on mitigation, 

and for participation in group meetings. 

Background and Rationale 

The data resulting from our social network methods and associated achieved status inquiries 

were entered in a binary matrix of 149 rows and 149 columns. That is, we contacted 149 drift 

gillnet fishery participants to reach closure in determining a network of peer-recognized experts. 

Rows and columns in the matrix are labeled with the names of nominated participants. Cells in 

the matrix are entered with value one (1) where row participant i nominates column participants 

j, and no value (zero) is entered where nomination does not occur. In technical terms, this 

constitutes an adjacency matrix that is asymmetric with directed ties (the ties travel from the 

source row to the receiver column). 

Such a matrix reveals, in mathematical terms, whether there is a path or social tie from one 

fishery participant to another. A value of one represents the presence of a path, a zero the lack of 

a path. This simple method serves as a means for organizing and analyzing data about many 

relationships, and for identifying relationships across multiple groups of actors. As noted by 

Hanneman (2003:73), the utility of social network analysis lies in its ability to reveal important 

patterns of social organization and the variable positions of social status held by the individuals 

constituting societies:

Differences among individuals in terms of how connected they are can be extremely

consequential for understanding their attributes and behavior. More connections often 

mean that individuals are exposed to more, and more diverse information. Highly 

connected individuals may be more influential, and may be more influenced by others . . . 

[Well]-connected populations may be better able to mobilize their resources, and may be 

better able to bring multiple and diverse perspectives to bear to solve problems. In 

between the individual and the whole population, there is another level of analysis -- that 

of "composition." Some populations may be composed of individuals alike in the extent 

to which they are connected. Other populations may display sharp differences, with a 

141
small elite of central and highly connected persons, and larger masses of persons with 

fewer connections. Differences in connections can tell us a good bit about the 

stratification order of social groups. 

Use of social network-based sampling in this case enables both identification of highly 

knowledgeable individuals and examination of patterns of attributes across groups of fishery 

participants. 

Hypothesis-Testing 

Based on understanding of social organizational aspects of marine fisheries around the country, it 

was expected that groups or cliques of participants would interact closely with each other and 

therefore that analysis of the network revealed through this research would reveal distinct 

clusters of social relationships (with peer nominations of expertise used as a proxy to indicate 

those relationships). Given reports of differences in environmental and political perspectives 

between communities in northern and southern portions of the Kenai Peninsula, it was surmised 

that social interaction and sharing of ideas would occur with greater frequency within than 

between fishery participants resident in these sub-regions, and thus hypothesized that clustering 

in the network would relate in part to place of residence. It was also hypothesized that clustering 

would occur in association with membership in UCIDA. These suppositions are expressed here 

as null hypotheses: (1) there would be no discernible clustering associated with residence, and 

(2) there would be no discernible clustering associated with affiliation with UCIDA. 

Findings of the Sampling and Network Studies

Regarding depiction of the networks, those persons who exhibit the greatest number of social ties 

with other participants and who are nominated with frequency are positioned centrally in the 

graphic by the analytical software (via a centrality measure). Those exhibiting the most tenuous 

linkage to the larger group and who receive few nominations are positioned on its margins. 

The network derived from our work with drift gillnetters to enable examination of social ties 

based on place of residence is depicted as Figure A-1 below. In the figure, the blue oval symbol 

indicates persons residing north of and including Ninilchik, orange indicates drift gillnetters 

residing south of Ninilchik, and green denotes drifters residing outside of Alaska, primarily 

Oregon and Washington. The persons symbolized by the yellow ovals are either dual residents 

with social ties within and outside Alaska, or Alaska residents who have revealed strong 

relationships with persons living in other states. 

The structure of the revealed network visibly (mathematically) disproves null hypothesis one. 

Thus, we accept the research hypothesis that clustering of social relations based on peer 

judgment of expertise does occur in association with sub-region of residence. 

While the network depicts real data about revealed relationships and testaments to status, all 

names presented are pseudonyms. As depicted in the figures, within-residence group nomination 

is extensive, while external relationships or nominations are relatively infrequent. There are 

142
often strong social connections between fishery participants residing in the Pacific Northwest 

and participants residing in the northern portions of the Kenai Peninsula, but there are few direct 

relationships between the out-of-state group and participants residing in the southern Peninsula. 

Also of note with regard to the social organization of the fishery is the outlying position (the lefthand side of the depiction) and weakly connected network of drift gillnetters of Russian heritage 

involved in the study. 

Measures of centrality indicate the network is not highly concentrated and the majority of the 

actors do not reveal characteristics of influence or prominence.24 Rather, the data indicate a 

network of loosely connected subgroups and a few highly respected and well-integrated actors. 

With a couple of key exceptions, those key actors are centralized in the relatively tightly 

connected cluster comprised of fishery participants resident in the northern part of the Kenai 

Peninsula. 

• = Northern Peninsula 

• = Outside

• = Southern Peninsula 

• = Outside/Local Interface

 Figure A-1 Network of Kenai Peninsula Drift Gillnet Fishery Participants by Area of Residence

 

24 Freeman’s Degree Centrality Measures indicate out-degree centralization of 10.6 percent, and in-degree 

centralization of 14 percent. 

143
We are also able to reject the null hypothesis that clustering will not occur in association with 

UCIDA affiliation. Figure A-2 clearly indicates that the majority of the centrally- positioned 

actors in the overall network are UCIDA members. Moreover, while there is some degree of 

affiliation with the fishing organization across the entire network, most of the centrally 

positioned participants, i.e., the persons most frequently nominated as experts and exhibiting 

social ties with the greatest number of other participants, are members of UCIDA. Finally, it is 

not unusual for drift gillnet permit holders residing outside of Alaska to be affiliated with 

UCIDA. While membership in UCIDA does not guarantee parity of perspective between 

individual and official position on any given issue, it is clearly an important coalescing and 

representative social institution for fishery participants. 

Figure A-2 Drift Gillnet Fishery Network by UCIDA Affiliation

144
Appendix C: 2003 Upper Cook Inlet Season ADF&G Emergency Orders

Order Date Action Reason

1 26-Jun

Extended set gillnetting in the Kasilof Section on Thursday, 

June 26 from 7:00 pm until 7:00 pm on June 27. Drift 

gillnetting was opened in the Kasilof Section on Thu, June 26

from 7:00 pm to 12:00 midnight, and Fri, Jun 27 from 5:00 am

to 7:00 pm. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kasilof River 

sockeye salmon. 

2 27-Jun

Extended set gillnetting in the Kasilof Section of the Upper 

Subdistrict on Friday June 27, 2003 from 7:00 p.m. until 7:00

p.m. on Saturday June 28, 2003. Drift gillnetting was opened in 

the Kasilof Section on Friday June 27, 2003 from 7:00 p.m. to

12:00 Midnight and on Saturday June 28, 2003 from 5:00 a.m.

to 7:00 p.m.. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kasilof River 

sockeye salmon. 

3 30-Jun

Extended set gillnetting in that portion of the Western

Subdistrict of the Central District south of the latitude of 

Redoubt Point from 7:00 p.m. on Monday, June 30 until further 

notice. 

To increase the exploitation 

rate on Crescent River 

sockeye salmon. 

4 30-Jun

Extended set gillnetting in the Kasilof Section of the Upper 

Subdistrict on Monday, June 30 from 7:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. 

Drift gillnetting was opened in the Kasilof Section of the Upper 

Subdistrict on Monday, June 30 from 7:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kasilof River 

sockeye salmon. 

5 3-Jul

Extended set gillnetting in the Kasilof Section of the Upper 

Subdistrict on Thursday, July 3 from 7:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m

on Friday, July 4. Drift gillnetting was opened in the Kasilof 

Section on Thursday, July 3 from 7:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. and 

on Friday, July 4 from 5:00 a.m. until 11:00 p.m

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kasilof River 

sockeye salmon. 

6 4-Jul

Extended set gillnetting in the Kasilof Section of the Upper 

Subdistrict on Friday, July 4 from 11:00 p.m.until 5:00 p.m on

Saturday, July 6. Drift gillnetting was opened in the Kasilof 

Section on Saturday, July 5 from 5:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kasilof River 

sockeye salmon. 

7 9-Jul

Opened set gillnetting in that portion of the Kasilof Section of

the Upper Subdistrict within 1/2 mile of the mean high tide mark

on the Kenai Peninsula shoreline on Wednesday, July 9 from

7:00 a.m until 3:00 p.m.

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kasilof River 

sockeye salmon. 

145
-continuedOrder Date

Action Reason

8 10-Jul

Closed commercial salmon fishing with drift gillnets in all areas 

of the Central District of Upper Cook Inlet, except in the Kenai 

and Kasilof Sections of the Upper Subdistrict, on Thursday, 

July 10 from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

To reduce the exploitation 

rate on Susitna River 

sockeye salmon. 

9 12-Jul

Opened set gillnetting in that portion of the Kasilof Section of

the Upper Subdistrict within 1⁄2 mile of the mean high tide mark

on the Kenai Peninsula shoreline on Saturday, July 12 from

7:00 a.m. until 11:00 p.m.. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kasilof River 

sockeye salmon. 

10 14-Jul

Closed drift gillnetting in all areas of the Central District, except 

in the Kenai and Kasilof sections and that portion of the Central 

District south of 600

 27.10 minutes N. Latitude, which is the 

latitude of the Blanchard line, on Monday, July 14 from 7:00

a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

To reduce the exploitation 

rate on Susitna River 

sockeye salmon. 

11 14-Jul

Extended set gillnetting in the Kenai, Kasilof and East 

Forelands Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Monday, July 14

from 7:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. Drift gillnetting was opened in

the Kenai and Kasilof Sections on Monday, July 14 from 7:00 

p.m. to 9:00 p.m.. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

12 16-Jul

Opened set gillnetting in that portion of the Kasilof Section of

the Upper Subdistrict within 1⁄2 mile of the mean high tide mark

on the Kenai Peninsula shoreline on Wednesday, July 16 from

8:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m.. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kasilof River 

sockeye salmon. 

13 16-Jul

Extended set gillnetting in that portion of the Kasilof Section of

the Upper Subdistrict within 1⁄2 mile of the mean high tide mark

on the Kenai Peninsula shoreline on Wednesday, July 16 from

8:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. on Thursday, July 17. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kasilof River 

sockeye salmon. 

14 17-Jul

Extended set gillnetting in the Kenai, Kasilof and East 

Forelands sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Thursday, July 

17 from 7:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. Drift gillnetting was opened 

in the Kenai and Kasilof Sections on Thursday, July 17 from

7:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m.. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

146
-continued- Order Date

Action Reason

15 18-Jul

Emergency Order Number 2S-15-03 opens set gillnetting in the 

Kenai, Kasilof and East Forelands sections of the Upper 

Subdistrict on Friday July 18 from 2:00 p.m. until 12:00

midnight. Drift gillnetting was opened in the Kenai and Kasilof 

Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Friday July 18 from 2:00

p.m. until 12:00 midnight. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

16 19-Jul

Emergency Order Number 2S-16-03 opens set gillnetting in the 

Kenai, Kasilof and East Forelands Sections of the Upper 

Subdistrict on Saturday, July 19, from 3:00 p.m. until 12:00

midnight. Drift gillnetting was opened in the Kenai and Kasilof 

Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Saturday, July 19, from

3:00 p.m. until 12:00 midnight. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

17 20-Jul

Extended set gillnetting in the Kenai, Kasilof and East 

Forelands Sections of the Upper Subdistrict from midnight on

Saturday, July 19 until 5:00 p.m. on Sunday, July 20. Drift 

gillnetting was opened in the Kenai and Kasilof Sections of the 

Upper Subdistrict on Sunday, July 20 from 5:00 a.m. until 5:00

p.m.. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

18 21-Jul

Extended set gillnetting in the Kenai, Kasilof and East 

Forelands Sections of the Upper Subdistrict from 7:00 p.m. on

Monday, July 21 until 12:00 midnight. Drift gillnetting was 

opened in the Kenai and Kasilof Sections of the Upper 

Subdistrict from 7:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. on Monday, July 21

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

19 23-Jul

Opened set gillnetting in the Kenai, Kasilof and East Forelands 

Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Wednesday, July 23, from

7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. Drift gillnetting was opened in the 

Kenai and Kasilof Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on

Wednesday, July 23, from 7:00 a.m. until 12:00 midnight. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

20 23-Jul

Extended set gillnetting in the Kenai, Kasilof and East 

Forelands Sections of the Upper Subdistrict from 9:00 p.m. on

Wednesday, July 23 until 7:00 a.m. on Thursday, July 24. Set 

gillnetting was opened in the Kenai, Kasilof and East Forelands 

Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Friday, July 25 from 7:00

a.m. to 7:00 p.m. Drift gillnetting was opened in the Central 

District on Friday, July 25 from 7:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m.. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

147
-continuedOrder Date

Action Reason

21 24-Jul

Closed drift gillnetting in all areas of the Central District, except 

in the following four areas: (1) that portion of the Central 

District south of 600

 20.43’ N. lat., (2) in the Kenai and (3) 

Kasilof sections of the Upper Subdistrict, and (4) that portion of

the Central District enclosed by the following five points:600

20.43' N. lat., 1510 54.83' W. long.; 600 34.00' N. lat., 1510

41.75' W. long.; 600 34.00' N. lat., 1510 25.93' W. long.; 600

27.10' N. lat., 1510

 25.50' W. long.; 600 20.43' N. lat., 1510

28.55' W. long. on Thursday, July 24 from 7:00 a.m. until 7:00

p.m.. 

To reduce the exploitatioin

rate of Northern District 

coho salmon while also

allowing fishing in an area 

that would reduce the

escapement rate of Kenai 

and Kasilof River sockeye 

salmon. 

22 26-Jul

Opened drift gillnetting in the seaward portion of the Kenai and 

Kasilof Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Saturday, July 26

from 5:00 a.m. until 11:00 p.m. Those waters located within one 

mile of the mean high tide mark north of the Kenai River and 

within one and one half miles of the mean high tide mark south

of the Kenai River remain closed to drift gillnets and set gillnets 

during this period. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

23 27-Jul

Opened set gillnetting in the Kenai, Kasilof and East Forelands 

Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Sunday, July 27 from 7:00 

a.m. until 7:00 p.m. Drift gillnetting was opened in the Kenai 

and Kasilof sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Sunday, July 

27 from 7:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m.. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

24 28-Jul

Closed drift gillnetting in all areas of the Central District on

Monday, July 28 from 7:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m, except in the 

following four areas, which are open: (1) that portion of the 

Central District south of 600

 20.43’ N. lat., (2) in the Kenai and 

(3) Kasilof sections of the Upper Subdistrict, and (4) that 

portion of the Central District enclosed by the following five 

points:

To reduce the exploitatioin

rate of Northern District 

coho salmon while also

allowing fishing in an area 

that would reduce the

escapement rate of Kenai 

and Kasilof River sockeye 

salmon. 

148
-continued- Order Date

Action Reason

25 29-Jul

Opened set gillnetting in the Kenai, Kasilof and East Forelands 

Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Tuesday, July 29, from

8:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. Drift gillnetting was opened in the 

Kenai and Kasilof Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on

Tuesday, July 29, from 5:00 a.m. until 11:00 p.m., except from

5:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. and from 8:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. those 

waters within one mile of the mean high tide mark north of the 

Kenai River and within one and one half miles of the mean high

tide mark south of the Kenai River were closed to drift gillnets. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

26 30-Jul

Opened set gillnetting in the Kenai, Kasilof and East Forelands 

Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Wednesday, July 30, from

9:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. Drift gillnetting was opened in the 

Kenai and Kasilof Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on

Wednesday, July 30, from 5:00 a.m. until 11:00 p.m., except

from 5:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. and from 9:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.

those waters within one mile of the mean high tide mark north

of the Kenai River and within one and one half miles of the 

mean high tide mark south of the Kenai River were closed to

drift gillnets. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

27 31-Jul

Opened drift gillnetting in the seaward portion of the Kenai and 

Kasilof sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Thursday, July 31, 

from 7:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m., and on Friday, August 1, from

5:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., except that those waters within one 

mile of the mean high tide mark north of the Kenai River and 

within one and one half miles of the mean high tide mark south

of the Kenai River were closed to drift gillnets. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

28 1-Aug

Rescinded Emergency Order Number 3 effective at 7:00 p.m.

on Friday, August 1. Fishing in the Western Subdistrict South

of Redoubt Point closed at 7:00 p.m. on Friday, August 1, and 

returned to the regular fishing schedule on Mondays and

Thursdays from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.. 

To reduce the exploitation 

rate on coho salmon in the 

Western Subdistrict. 

149
-continued- Order Date

Action Reason

29 2-Aug

Opened drift gillnetting in the seaward portion of the Kenai and 

Kasilof Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Saturday, August

2, from 5:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., except that those waters within

one mile of the mean high tide mark north of the Kenai River 

and within one and one half miles of the mean high tide mark 

south of the Kenai River were closed to drift gillnets. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

30 3-Aug

Opened set gillnetting in the Kalgin Island Subdistrict of the 

Central District on Sunday, August 3 from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00

p.m.. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Packers Lake

sockeye salmon. 

31 3-Aug

Opened set gillnetting in the Kenai, Kasilof and East Forelands 

Sections of the Upper Subdistrict from 7:00 a.m. on Sunday,

August 3 until 7:00 a.m. on Monday August 4. Drift gillnetting

was opened in the Kenai and Kasilof Sections of the Upper 

Subdistrict on Sunday, August 3 from 5:00 a.m. until 11:00

p.m., except from 5:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to

11:00 p.m. those waters within one mile of the mean high tide 

mark north of the Kenai River and within one and one half

miles of the mean high tide mark south of the Kenai River were 

closed to drift gillnets. Drift gillnetting was opened in the Kenai 

and Kasilof sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Monday, 

August 4 from 5:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

32 4-Aug

Opened drift gillnetting in the seaward portion of the Kenai and 

Kasilof Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Monday, August 4 

from 7:00 p.m.until 11:00 p.m., and Tuesday, August 5, from

6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., except that those waters within one 

mile of the mean high tide mark north of the Kenai River and 

within one and one half miles of the mean high tide mark south

of the Kenai River were closed to drift gillnets during this time 

period. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

33 6-Aug

Opened drift gillnetting in the seaward portion of the Kenai and 

Kasilof Sections of the Upper Subdistrict on Wednesday, 

August 6, from 6:00 a.m. until 11:00 p.m., and on Thursday, 

August 7, from 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m., except that those waters 

within one mile of the mean high tide mark north of the Kenai 

River and within one and one half miles of the mean high tide 

mark south of the Kenai River were closed to drift gillnets 

during this time period. 

To reduce the escapement 

rate of Kenai and Kasilof 

River sockeye salmon. 

150
Appendix D: Regulatory Framework Relevant to the Drift Gillnet 

and Oil/Gas Industry Interface on Cook Inlet

This appendix summarizes aspects the legislative and regulatory frame that guides oil and gas 

activities on the OCS as these affect or may affect fishing activities. The discussion is not 

exhaustive of the entire relevant system of laws, rules, and agencies, but rather focuses on those 

that are either overarching in effect or are directly relevant to the context of the current project. 

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA) defines the Outer Continental Shelf 

(OCS) as all submerged lands lying seaward of state coastal waters (three miles offshore) which 

are under U.S. jurisdiction (ending at the 200-mile boundary with international waters). 

Numerous amendments to the original Act of relevance to the current study were incorporated in 

the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (P.L. 95-372): 

Title II of these amendments provides for the cancellation of leases or permits if

continued activity is likely to cause serious harm to life, including fish and other aquatic 

life. It also stipulates that economic, social, and environmental values of the renewable 

and nonrenewable resources are to be considered in management of the OCS. 

The timing and location of leasing activities are to be based on several factors, including 

the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas of the 

OCS. An environmental studies program is authorized and the Secretary is required to 

study any region included in a lease sale in order to assess and manage environmental 

impacts on the OCS. 

Title III of these amendments established an Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Compensation 

Fund to be financed by a tax on oil obtained from the OCS and stipulated the damages for 

which claims could be made against the fund. 

 

Title IV of the amendments established a Fishermen's Contingency Fund to compensate 

fishermen for damages of fishing gear by materials, equipment, tools, containers, or other 

items associated with oil and gas exploration. 

Title V amended the 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act to authorize grants to coastal 

states under a Coastal Energy Impact Program. 

Amendments enacted in 1984 provided for changes to certain administrative provisions 

in the Fishermen's Contingency Fund. 

Under the OCSLA and its regulations, private industry is responsible for the safety of its 

employees and the workplace environment on the OCS. The Act states that each lease or permit 

holder within the lease or permit area on the OCS shall ensure, “all places of employment ... are 

maintained in compliance with workplace safety and health regulations of this part, and, in 

addition, free from recognized hazards” (OCSLA, 33 CFR Sections 142. 1(a) (b)). The private 

151
sector must monitor and report safety violations and accidents. Safety oversight is governed by a 

complex regulatory structure that involves several federal agencies. The OCSLA gives primary 

offshore safety responsibilities to the Coast Guard and MMS. 

In the case of floating facilities, the Coast Guard is the lead agency for personnel protection, and 

enforcement of most workplace safety regulations. The USCG also assumes lead investigating 

authority for death and injuries, damages, and failures of propulsion, auxiliary, emergency, and 

other safety-related systems. MMS is the lead agency for evaluation of fixed facilities and 

associated damage assessment. It also oversees investigation of fires and explosions, pollution, 

and failure of or damage to these facilities. MMS bears responsibility for enforcing safety 

regulations for all drilling and production activities. 

A Memorandum of Understanding between the Coast Guard and MMS enables the agencies to 

share some responsibilities in this regime. Both have responsibilities for reviewing the design 

and construction of offshore facilities. Each also addresses regulations associated with training 

drills and emergency procedures on such facilities, and has provisions for conducting scheduled 

and unannounced inspections to ensure compliance. 

A distinction is made between offshore facilities that are fixed on the seafloor or floating. 

Agency responsibility depends on this distinction. Some facilities require both MMS and Coast 

Guard approval, including structures that convert from floating during transit to fixed when on 

site. Jurisdiction in some situations is even more complicated. For instance, the surface portion 

and legs of the tension leg platform are approved by the Coast Guard, while the approval process 

for the ocean floor foundation is the responsibility of MMS. 

As of 1985, the need for post-installation inspections of the legs or underwater portion of the 

floating structure of the tension leg platform had not been determined. Regular docking 

inspections are the general rule for other floating structures certified by the USCG such as 

mobile drilling units and ships. 

MMS depends largely on third-parties to verify designs and inspections during fabrication. 

Approved verifiers are paid by the construction or operating company, but report to the 

responsible agency on whether the facility meets regulatory requirements. 

Other federal agencies also have jurisdiction over certain aspects of offshore safety. A

Memorandum of Understanding exists between the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA) and the USCG. This states that the Occupational Safety and Health Act 

(which is enforced by OSHA) applies to offshore working conditions, but “does not apply to 

working conditions with respect to which the Coast Guard or other Federal agencies exercise 

statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards affecting occupational safety and health.” In 

state waters, OSHA enforces standards (Texas and Florida out to 9 miles). California and Alaska 

are the exception; these states administer federally approved safety and health programs. Title 18 

of the Alaska Statutes states that, “(T)he Department of Labor and Workforce Development shall 

. . . establish and enforce occupational safety and health standards that prescribe requirements for 

safe and healthful working conditions for all employment, including state and local government 

152
employment, and the requirements are to be at least as effective as those requirements adopted 

by the United States Secretary of Labor under 29 U.S.C. 655. 

Separate offshore inspections are not conducted by OSHA, but the agency is notified when 

USCG inspectors detect violations of OSHA standards. Data is shared by the two agencies: the 

USCG reports results of accident investigations to OSHA, and OSHA reports all worker safety 

and health complaints to the USCG. OSHA jurisdiction includes vessels in navigable, territorial 

waters that have not been inspected by the USCG. 

 

The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) investigates work-related 

injury or illness. The Institute has sponsored research on diving hazards and on identifying the 

causal factors that lead to injuries on drilling rigs, and has developed an extensive data base of 

commercial fishing accidents in Alaska. The Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics is 

also responsible for collecting and reporting statistics for work-related injury and illness. 

153
Appendix E: A Review of Archival Materials Reporting 

Industrial Accidents on Cook Inlet from 1960 to 2003 

This appendix draws on archival materials to provide a brief historical overview of maritime 

accidents occurring in the Cook Inlet region. The overview is based primarily on news articles, 

with limited contributions from unpublished secondary source materials. In-person discussions 

with U.S. Coast Guard personnel served to validate some of the news stories. 

There have been ten industrial accidents of sufficient scope for popular news reporting since 

offshore industrial activities began in 1960. Three major collisions with petroleum industry 

structures have been reported, though our primary source interviews suggest that numerous 

minor incidents have gone unreported over the years. 

The two most significant accidents were the 1987 grounding of the Glacier Bay that spilled 

between 33,000 and 85,000 gallons of crude into Cook Inlet, and the December 1987 fire on the 

Steelhead platform. That blaze remained out of control for almost a week. 

All of the incidents discussed occurred in state waters and so the regulatory framework 

addressing these events is slightly different from that surrounding accidents potentially occurring 

in federal jurisdiction waters. Various Alaska agencies are involved in the investigation, 

prevention, and mitigation of industrial accidents occurring in state waters. Appendix C of this 

report describes the regulatory framework and agencies that would be involved in accidents on 

the OCS. 

 

Collisions 

There have been two documented collisions involving vessels and drilling structure on Cook 

Inlet. The latest occurred on September 9, 1997 when a tug pulling a barge bound for Seattle 

collided with Platform C roughly miles five offshore Nikiski. According to Coast Guard Lt. 

Cmdr. Spencer Wood (Anchorage Daily News (ADN) 1997b:A1), “(I)t [the tug] slammed into 

the leg (of the platform) and stopped there, like a car running into a telephone pole.” The two 

platform employees who were on watch at the time reportedly thought the platform movement 

was the result of an earthquake. There were no injuries aboard the platform, and the crew of the 

tug suffered only minor injuries. The platform was brightly lit and visibility was five to 11 

miles. Damage to the platform was minimal and no oil was spilled (ADN 1997a:C1). The Chief 

Mate of the tugboat was charged the next day with misconduct and negligence. The Coast Guard 

found no evidence of equipment failure on the tug. 

A collision between an oil industry vessel and a platform occurred in August 1993. 

Approximately 13,000 gallons of diesel fuel was spilled when a spill response boat chartered by 

Arco collided with the leg of a drilling rig (ADN 1993b:A1). 

On January 25, 1997 the barge Oregon, owned by Crowley Maritime Services, loaded with 

12,500 tons of fertilizer and 1,600 gallons of diesel fuel, collided with the tug towing it from a 

154
Unocal facility near Nikiski. The barge capsized, but the hatch covers remained closed and the 

spill was minimal (Schultz 2003). 

Platform Fires and Accidents

The King Salmon platform fire broke out April 20th, 2002 when a stream of natural gas ignited 

while workers were pulling two miles of well tubing. The platform is located in Trading Bay, 

about 55 miles southwest of Anchorage. Four contract workers were injured; three were released 

from hospital within a day of the incident. The fourth employee was flown to Seattle for 

treatment of burns to his face and hands. The fire was extinguished within 45 minutes. Safety 

regulators investigating the accident shut down the facility and it remained closed for 13 days 

(Alaska Journal of Commerce 2002, and ADN 2002b:E1). This was the first serious blaze on an 

Inlet platform since the 1987 Steelhead Platform blowout that burned uncontrolled for a week. 

On the 20th of December in 1987, a platform owned by Marathon Oil and Unocal caught fire 

when a crew was setting protective casing in a partially completed well. According to regulators 

from the Alaska Oil and Gas Commission (ADN 1987b:A1), gas unexpectedly rushed through 

the well where the crews were unable to properly vent the gas away from the rig. The gas caught 

fire several hours later when a spark lit a huge plume of gas that engulfed the northwest corner of 

the platform. At the time of ignition, crews were trying to plug the hole by pumping heavy drill 

muds into it (ADN 1987a:B1). The blaze was intense and the steel drilling rig that had been 

working the well weakened and collapsed (ADN 1987b). Forty-nine workers evacuated in life 

pods but there were no serious injuries. The firm of Boots & Coots was called in to fight the fire 

and cap the well. The well burned out of control for most of a week and was visible in 

Anchorage. Eventually the fire extinguished itself (ADN 1987a). Six months later the platform

experienced two more well blowouts and evacuations (ADN, 1988b:B3, 1988a:A1) while 

workers tried to repair the damage from the previous blowout. 

Two Granite Point platform workers were injured in an accident in September of 1997. A broken 

leg and other injuries were suffered by two workers with Nabors Drilling. Nabors Drilling is a 

platform refurbishing contractor hired by UNOCAL, the platform’s operator and part-owner 

(ADN 1997a: D1). 

An oil spill response worker died from a head injury while moving equipment from Nikiski Bay 

to Seldovia for the winter (ADN 2002b). The accident occurred as the crew was weighing anchor 

and a cable unspooled and struck the worker in the head. The accident was investigated by the 

Coast Guard and OSHA.

Oil Spills 

Cook Inlet environmental interest group Cook Inlet Keeper (CIK) reported in early 2002 that oil 

and gas pipeline leaks in the region were increasing and averaged one per week (Petroleum

News 2002). That assertion is disputed, however, and Unocal Alaska’s operations manager 

argued that, “Cook Inlet pipelines have about a [much] better safety record than the national 

155
average.” Morell argued that leaks have occurred, but the largest spills have occurred due to 

external damage. The CIK claim is made in the report Lurking Below, written by Lois Epstein, 

an engineer and pipeline safety advocate active in the region. Epstein asserts that numerous 

pipelines in the region are not subject to federal regulation because they are “gathering lines,”

which transport oil from wells to tank farms and other collection points (Seattle PostIntelligencer 2002). 

CIRCAC representatives reported in 1998 that no environmental damage was expected from a 

100-gallon crude oil spill that occurred at the Steelhead platform in February that year (ADN 

1998:B3). The spill occurred while the crew was discharging treated seawater. CIRCAC staff 

reported that most of the crude was recovered. 

Diesel fuel spilled into Cook Inlet in August 1993 when a spill-response vessel working for Arco 

collided with a leg of the platform Gilbert Rowe (ADN 1993b:A1). The Sun Tide, one of several 

boats hired to hover close by two drilling operations, was maneuvering under the rig the collision 

occurred. The boat was pinned there by tidal currents for two hours while a ruptured fuel tank 

emptied 13,000 gallons of diesel into the Inlet (ADN 1993a:B1). The Coast Guard charged the 

first mate of the Sun Tide with negligence. A similar accident occurred in 1991 when the 

Atlantic Seahorse collided with an Arco rig and spilled 4,000 gallons of diesel. 

The first accident to significantly disrupt the Cook Inlet drift fishery (and other fisheries in the 

region) occurred in July of 1987 when the Standard Oil Company-chartered tanker Glacier Bay

ran aground five miles south of the Kenai River during the height of the drift season. The first 

articles published about this incident reported that within ten days following the event, the tanker 

had leaked 125,000 gallons of crude oil (ADN 1987d). A 1993 article asserts that between 

33,000 to 85,000 gallons of crude was spilled (ADN 1993a). Our interview work in the region 

suggests that the Glacier Bay spill had significant effects on that summer’s drift gillnet harvest 

and, in conjunction with the effects of the Exxon Valdez spill, has led to lingering feelings of 

uncertainty about oil industry activity in the Cook Inlet among members of the drift gillnet fleet. 

Prior to the Glacier Bay spill, many area fishermen reportedly felt they had an unwritten compact 

with the industry in which possible efforts would be made to contain and minimize damage from 

an in-season spill (ADN 1987d:A1). The responsible parties in this case reportedly seemed 

unwilling to take full measures to contain the spill and the Coast Guard took over on the seventh 

day. Within 18 hours of response, the Coast Guard had 20 boats and barges at work recovering 

oil. Coast Guard Captain Rene Roussel said at the time: 

“I don’t trust any of the scientific data that’s been offered to me. The experts said the oil would 

disappear. It didn’t. The experts said the inlet would quickly flush itself. It didn’t.” He said that the 

next time it happened, “my reaction will be, let’s go get it.” 

Another large spill in Cook Inlet occurred in 1976 when approximately 300,000 gallons of jet 

fuel spilled into the Inlet. This incident did not involve either commercial fishers or the 

petroleum industry. 

156
References to Appendix D 

Alaska, State of 

1999 Cook Inlet Areawide 1999 Oil and Gas Lease Sale Final Findings of the Director. Alaska 

Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas. Anchorage. 

 

Alaska Journal of Commerce 

2002 “Cook Inlet Oil Platform Produces Again After Fire.” May 6. Anchorage. 

Anchorage Daily News 

2002a “Oil-Spill Worker Dies of Injuries Due to Accident in Alaska’s Cook Inlet.” October 23. 

2002b “Platform Likely Crippled Until May.” April 23. 

1998 State News. February 12. 

1997a “Tug Mate Charged in Oil Rig Mishap.” September 10. 

1997b “Tugboat Rams Inlet Oil Rig.” September 9. 

1993a “Mistake Caused Oil Spill Coast Guard Expects Charges Against Mate.” August 26. 

1993b “Fuel Fouls Inlet Oil-Spill Response Vessel hits Drilling Platform.” August 24. 

1988a “Another Blowout Hits Rig Marathon Workers Evacuated Again.” June 6. 

1988b “Crews Control Blowout on Drilling Rig.” June 4. 

1987a “Oil Platform Fire Extinguishes Itself.” December 30. . 

1987b “Oil Production Platform Continues to Burn in Cook Inlet Diverter System Fails to Halt 

Gas Blowout.” December 12. 

1987c “Famed Team Fights Blaze.” December 22.

1987d “Spill Shakes Fishermen’s Faith. They Say Oil Industry’s Response Doesn’t Live Up to 

30 Year Trust.” July 12.

OCSLA, 33 CFR 

1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Code of Federal Regulations. 

Office of Technology Assessment 

1985 Oil and Gas Technologies for the Arctic and Deepwater. Available online at 

http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/ns20/topic_f.html

157
 

Petroleum News 

2002 Number of pipeline spills in Cook Inlet at issue. Vol. 7, No. 3. Available online at 

www.petroleumnews.com 

Schultz, Steve 

2003 Steve Schultz’ World Maritime News. Available online at

www.geocities.com/~sandusky99/world 

Seattle Post-Intelligencer

2002 “Unacceptably High Rate of Pipeline Leaks Reported.” September 21. 

158
Appendix F:

-A Drift Gillnet CareerIntroduction

This appendix provides a brief oral history of a drift gillnet career as told by an elderly resident 

of the Kenai Peninsula. The informant had retired from drift fishing some years prior, but 

retained a deep interest in and knowledge of the fleet and its current status. The material is 

intended to provide additional insight into the history and workings of drift gillnetting on Cook 

Inlet. The story is one of the numerous research components that informed the description and 

analyses developed in the main body of the report. 

Childhood 

I was raised by my grandmother. My birth language was Aleut and Russian, and I didn’t learn 

English until I was six or seven. The teacher prohibited us from speaking other languages and 

we had to learn English. School was in all English and at home we spoke Aleut and Russian. 

The teacher was from the States and there was no bilingual program at that time like there is 

now. I grew up in Ninilchik. After I was 16, I was an orphan. I decided to take off when I was 

17 and worked my way to Seattle on a fishing boat. 

The War 

When I got to Seattle I started high school at the YMCA on 4th and Madison. The War was 

going on, and I decided to join the Merchant Marines. I was shipped to the South Pacific for nine 

months and 27 days. After my first trip I was given 30 days off and I got on a tanker that was 

headed for Anchorage and Cook Inlet. I was able to point out the landmarks to the captain. 

Next I joined the Air Force and got training in Scottville and then went on to New Jersey. Then I 

was shipped off to France, Germany, Rome and Naples. Finally I was stationed in Casablanca for 

16 months and was it ever hot there! The temperatures got up to 106 degrees and I had a hard 

time getting used to it. After my duty, I wrote a letters requesting to be sent to Alaska to be 

discharged and instead I was sent to Great Falls, Montana and that was where I was discharged. 

I was paid and given per diem to go back to Alaska. I started to get into fishing in ’47. 

Set Net Fishing 

As a youngster, I started commercial fishing at Kalifornsky on a set net site. I was raised by a 

family of fishermen. Fishing was our main source of income, that and cannery work. I bought 

159
my first fishing license for $2. I was involved in fishing for about five years before I left when I 

was 16. Before I left, I was familiar with trap fishing, set netting, and seining. 

In ’47, I came back and set netted. At that time the season was open from May 25 and closed 

when the cannery ran out of can or didn’t want any more fish. Back then on the 20th of August 

we would still be fishing 51⁄2 days a week. We did a lot of fishing back then. 

Back then commercial fishing was an industry and not a part time occupation like it is now. 

People would invest more and plan more because of the length of time you had to fish. You 

started fishing the last of May and continued until hunting season. 

I started set netting after the service. When I got back into it they still had the same five a.m.

opening Monday through Saturday. People fished all over the place back then. The Copper 

River people would arrive in Cook Inlet to fish after their early season was finished. 

The Early Drift Gillnet Fleet 

The drift fleet started in the late 40s and early 50s. Squeaky Anderson started it. The drift fleet 

was mobile. There were no gear restrictions then. People fished with 200-fathom nets and 60 

meshes deep. Now you are restricted to 150 fathoms and 45 meshes deep. 

Education 

While I was set netting, I went back and forth between fishing and school. I still had to finish 

high school and then I started University of Washington. During that time I fell in love and 

brought the little lady up to Alaska, and she accepted it real well. 

Schooling for me was important but after a while I got frustrated with school. The classes didn’t 

move fast enough for me and I wasn’t being challenged. I became frustrated with all the 

ridiculous requirements. I spoke Russian and took Russian classes and had to sneak into the 

more advanced classes. Finally I quit the university. 

After we had a little girl, we decided to go to Alaska for the winter and fish. But we first needed 

a base. So we homesteaded acres in Kasilof and had children. All my kids have college degrees. 

This year my wife and I celebrated our 53rd wedding anniversary. 

Fishing Regulations 

Soon there was an influx of fishermen showing up in Cook Inlet from Copper River, Southeast, 

and Prince William Sound. Then Fish and Game and the state decided they needed stronger 

regulations. So they started regulating the Inlet. The first cut was Monday, Wednesday, and 

Friday 24-hour periods. 

160
Then, since the fish cycle changes from one year to the next, they cut us down to three days a 

week for three 12-hour periods. I’ll give Fish and Game credit. They were trying to manage our 

fish biologically. Over escapement is more harmful than under escapement. 

For example, if you have a small garden and you throw a bunch of seeds into the ground, those 

seeds turn into plants. But unless you thin the plants, nothing can grow. The simple fact is that 

you get a better return if you thin out the plants rather than allow them all to grow. But that is 

just common sense. 

Other Work 

I sold my set net site and started drifting in the 50’s. Because of the fluctuation of fish, massive 

amounts of gear that you need, and then their cutting of time, fishing seemed like a poor 

occupation to rely on to feed a family. So I had to find a steady job to help the family. I was 

good at electrical work because I’d learned about it in the Army. So I became a journeyman 

lineman during the winter months. I was in the International Brotherhood of Linemen for 33 

years. 

I always took my summers off for fishing and worked all over Alaska. I worked out on the 

[Aleutian] chain all the way north of Nome. We were the first workers at the North Slope. 

After they established oil, we were the first union up there building power lines. 

Drifting 

I started drifting mostly because of the time requirements required for set net fishing. Set net 

fishing took a lot of time. So I got a boat. On a boat you have everything ready before you 

launch for the season. I had a big 36-foot trailer and a 36-foot Roberts boat. I’d bring it home 

next to my shop and when it was spring I’d get the gear together and I’d be ready to launch in 

May. 

Most all of my children helped me on the boat. My wife didn’t help much. Both boys helped 

out and the girls helped on the boat and worked at the cannery. 

When I first stated out, I leased a boat from Columbia Ward. We also beach fished for Libby. 

After a few years, I bought my own boat and then another boat that I used for 25 years. 

Eventually my legs gave out after climbing poles for so many years. When I was a lineman, we 

didn’t have bucket trucks. They came out after my legs gave out. 

Native Fishermen/Non-Resident Set Netters & Drifters 

Mostly it was the Natives or part-Natives that were involved in set netting. They were there first 

and then the other people got in. May 1st the season started, and we king fished with king nets 

that were eight-inch mesh, which was allowed at that time. The families used to move down to 

161
the beach, and they’d live in tents. At that time it was mostly residents who were set netters and 

they also built hand traps. 

There was a lot of work involved in building hand traps. After the war, the homesteaders came 

in and there were more non-residents showing up. You couldn’t make any money homesteading 

and the homesteaders would buy into set nets or buy into the commercial fleet when it was easier 

to get into drifting. 

Generally, more non-residents got into drifting because locals had set nets and traps. Owning a 

boat like myself meant you could stay wherever until the season started. The cannery stored 

your boat and gear for you. The good thing about drifting is that you could show up a week 

before the season and in a week be ready to fish. 

Set nets and traps took a lot more time. You could only build traps on the big minus tides. You 

also had to drive anchors for your set net buoys. 

The traps were staked out when the tide went out. This would start happening about a month or 

so before fishing started. It was hard work. M.S. is my cousin in Ninilchik, and he can tell you a 

lot about hand traps. But it was more convenient for me to work on a boat and fish rather than 

set net or trap. 

 

I bought my last boat from LaConner, Washington in ’74. It took me 12 days to bring up. I took 

it to Seattle’s Ward’s Cove and took off from Lake Union to Kasilof in 12 days. 

The older generation had grandfathers and fathers who had beach sites. If you were a young 

guy, and you wanted a boat so you could make a living drifting. 

Changes 

I don’t know exactly when the guides came in. I had a friend at Fish and Game, and he was 

against setting up sports guiding. He’d seen it set up in Idaho. The pressure was too great on the 

rivers just like what we are facing now. The Kenai River is small and there are only so many 

fish it can handle and every year. We have more pressure all the time and everyone feels like 

they’ve got to get their share and if the sports guys don’t get their share then they blame it on the 

commercial fishery. 

Everything these days is high speed. Boats are fast and time is short. Everything has to be 

mechanically perfect. Today things are more cut throat because you only have a limited time to 

fish and make money. Everyone is in a big frenzy and everyone is in a big hurry to make 

money. The leisure time fishing is long gone. Friendship ceases when there are fish. Used to 

be that you’d pull up beside another boat to chat. Now you’ve got GPS and plotters and 

everything is geared for speed. 

162
Now it is dangerous to take a family out to fish. Today you have to be careful because 

everything is so much faster. One reason fishing is dangerous is speed and another thing too is 

the time for fishing is preset regardless of weather. 

It used to be that you could make a living only fishing. Then the homesteaders and people started 

migrating to Alaska and that was when the competition came in and our time started getting cut 

to three days a week, 12 hours a day. 

In the ‘70s a red was worth more than a barrel of oil. We were getting $2 a pound for reds. 

Setnetting used to be a family operation. You had several family members with a number of 

permits. People could make a good living from their family’s set netting operation. 

Platforms 

The Inlet has strong tides. I used to fish close to the platforms but I’ve never gotten tangled in a 

platform. The strongest tides are near the platforms. You have to be able to anticipate where the 

tide is going to take you. 

I don’t think it is a hazard to put a platform in the lower Inlet because the current isn’t as strong 

there. I don’t have much concern if they put them there. 

You look out for things like platforms. You’ve got to be on duty all the time. This is where you 

need experience and this is where I’ve got 60 or so years. 

Drift Gillnet Vacations

Because of the demand for subsistence fishing with dipnetting, the quota on the Kenai River gets 

cut back for us in terms of our fishing time. 

The commercial fishing industry impacts natives in terms of you see a lot of professionals 

involved in the fishery now. They have other jobs other than fishing. They take their vacations 

and go fishing. Now because of the demand on fish is cut down you can’t make a living unless 

you have another job. People fish during their paid vacations and if they don’t make money they 

are able to write off the season. 

 

Geography 

We used to go to Harriet Point and to Readout Bay to fish for kings around the 20th of May. 

We’d start on the 25th of May and go until about the 20th of June and then we’d go across and go 

to the beach for Reds, to Kalifornsky beach. The peak was about the first week in June. 

163
We’d mostly see the reds in the middle rip and east rip. Middle rip and up the Susitna, and we’d 

travel along east side. 

Dogs were up Crescent Creek and that is where they would form in different schools. 

Kings go west. 

Migration of Salmon 

There has been a change in the humpies. The 1964 earthquake sunk and disrupted a lot of the 

beds. I remember the pinks coming the second week of August, and they used to be thick. 

I drifted alone off Humpy Point and for two weeks picked humpies 24 hours a day. One year I 

got 17,000 humpies. I made my last set August 18 and quit for the season because I wanted to 

go moose hunting. After awhile, the canneries would stop taking the fish. 

There is no change in the red run except for the regulations. 

Humpies go into the Kasilof and Salamatof and up into Turnagain Arm. Generally it is about the 

second week of August that is the peak. Late in the season we used to go chum fishing and that 

was pure profit. It was the same with the humpies. The humpies paid for the bills and were pure 

profit. The kings and the early reds would get you out of the hole and the humpies and chum

would be your profit. 

164
Appendix G: Drift Gillnet Interview Protocol

• Personal History of Drift Gillnet Operations and Local Residence 

• Other Work Undertaken (type and for which part of year(s)) 

• Knowledge of Salmon Migration and Abundance Patterns 

• Preferred Fishing Areas (and rationale) 

• Experience with and Negotiation of Dangerous Situations (other vessels, underwater 

obstructions, weather, currents). 

• Beginners versus Experienced Drift Gillnetters and Implications for Interactions

• Prior gear entanglement experience 

• Various Other Challenges Encountered (operational, market, competition) 

• Changes in Operational Strategies over Time (vessel, gear, at-sea tactics) 

• Social and Economic Changes in Community and Region (including number of friends 

and family involved and/or no longer involved in drift gillnetting; competing fisheries; 

other opportunities) 

• Most Important Factors Affecting Drift Gillnet Operations and Way of Life 

• Experience with Oil and Gas Industry (vessels, platforms, in community, other) 

• Potential for Operational Changes Should Limited Industry Occur on the OCS (type of 

changes, where, why) 

• Preferred Options for Mitigating the Effects of Such Changes 

• Long-term Collaborative Strategies between the Industries 

165
The Department of the Interior Mission

As the nation’s principal conservation agency, the Department of the Interior has responsibility for most of our 

nationally owned public lands and natural resources. This includes fostering sound use of our land and water 

resources; protecting our fish, wildlife, and biological diversity; preserving the environmental and cultural values of

our national parks and historical places; and providing for the enjoyment of life through outdoor recreation. The 

Department assesses our energy and mineral resources and works to ensure that their development is in the best

interests of all our people by encouraging stewardship and citizen participation in their care. The Department also 

has a major responsibility for American Indian reservation communities and for people who live in island territories 

under U.S. administration. 

The Minerals Management Service Mission 

As a bureau of the Department of the Interior, the Minerals Management Service’s (MMS) primary responsibilities 

are to manage the mineral resources located on the Nation’s Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), collect revenue from

the Federal OCS and onshore Federal and Indian lands, and distribute those revenues. 

Moreover, in working to meet its responsibilities, the Offshore Minerals Management Program administers the OCS 

competitive lease program and oversees the safe and environmentally sound exploration and production of our 

Nation’s offshore natural gas, oil, and other mineral resources. The MMS Royalty Management Program meets its 

responsibilities by ensuring the efficient, timely, and accurate collection and disbursement of revenues from mineral 

leasing and production due to Indian tribes and allottees, States, and the U.S. Treasury. 

The MMS strives to fulfill its responsibilities through the general guiding principles of: (1) being responsive to the 

public’s concerns and interests by maintaining a dialogue with all potentially affected parties and (2) carrying out its 

programs with an emphasis on working to enhance the quality of life for all Americans by lending MMS assistance 

and expertise to economic development and environmental protection. 

166