alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7689 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7689

   To amend title 18, United State Code, to amend the definition of 
      ``official act'' for purposes of the prohibition of bribery.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 15, 2024

  Ms. Craig (for herself, Ms. Mace, Mr. Sorensen, and Mr. Kim of New 
   Jersey) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title 18, United State Code, to amend the definition of 
      ``official act'' for purposes of the prohibition of bribery.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Gifts for Officials, Legislators and 
Delegate (GOLD) Standard Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. OFFICIAL ACT DEFINED.

    Section 201(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following:
            ``(3) the term `official act' means any decision, action, 
        approval, disapproval, recommendation, rendering of advice, or 
        investigation on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding 
        or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may 
        by law be brought before any public official, in such 
        official's official capacity, or in such official's place of 
        trust or profit.''.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 23









INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT




We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration
Statements No. 33-56438 and No. 33-98124 of Taco Cabana, Inc. on
Form S-8 of our report dated February 4, 1997 appearing in this
Annual Report on Form 10-K of Taco Cabana, Inc. for the year
ended December 29, 1996.



DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP



San Antonio, Texas
March 28, 1996
Page 1 of 3

Disposition Comments

Docket No: FAA-2012-0934 These comments are in

Directorate ID: 2011-NM-260-AD response to an SNPRM

Originating Office Tracking No.: 

Next Step: FRAN SNPRM

 No Comments/Only Supportive Comments Received – If this box is checked, no signatures are 

required.

No Has the referenced service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? If yes, 

list latest revision and attach a copy. Note that changes beyond the scope of the previously 

published NPRM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point for guidance.

Instructions: Summarize all comments by issue (not by commenter) and provide your recommended resolution of 

each issue. All comments relating to the same issue should be discussed together. Do not list all of the issues 

from one commenter together. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and 

describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA-IR-M-8040.1C Chapter 9.

ISSUE 1: Select one of the following: 

If other, explain: 

Commenter(s): 

What change to the AD action is requested? 

Why is the change requested or how is it justified? 

Do we agree? 

If YES, we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: 

If PARTIALLY AGREE, we agree with because We disagree with because 

Make the following changes to the AD: 

If NO, we don’t agree because 

ISSUE 2: Select one of the following: 

If other, explain: 

Commenter(s): 

What change to the AD action is requested? 

Why is the change requested or how is it justified? 

Do we agree? 

If YES, we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: 

If PARTIALLY AGREE, we agree with because We disagree with because 

Make the following changes to the AD:
Page 2 of 3

If NO, we don’t agree because 

For additional issues, double-click here
Page 3 of 3

Signature Section

Signature indicates concurrence with this action.

Originating Office Tracking No.: 

ASE Printed Name: Date

Branch Manager Date
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-2001
<PERIOD-START>                             MAY-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-2000
<CASH>                                          10,933
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  682,115
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (14,000)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               709,998
<PP&E>                                       3,596,172
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,012,583
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,421,303
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      (5,437,940)
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        11,040
<OTHER-SE>                                 (2,027,677)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,421,303
<SALES>                                        797,146
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               797,146
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              (1,000,289)
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (93,471)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (296,614)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (296,614)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (296,614)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.03)


</TABLE>
Editorial Note on Part 862
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 862 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 862.1195 Corticoids test system. ( a ) *Identification.* A corticoids test system is a device intended to measure the levels of corticoids (hormones of the adrenal cortex) in serum and p lasma. Measurements of corticoids are used in the diagnosis and treatment of disorders of the cortex of the adrenal glands, especially those associated with hypertension and electrolyte disturbances.
( b ) *Classification.* Class I (general controls). The device is exempt from the premarket notification procedures in subpart E of part 807 of this chapter subject to § 862.9.
[52 FR 16122, May 1, 1987, as amended at 65 FR 2305, Jan. 14, 2000]
§ 830.120 Responsibilities of an FDA-accredited issuing agency. To maintain its accreditation, an issuing agency must: ( a ) Operate a system for assignment of unique device identifiers (UDIs) that meets the requirements of § 830.20;
( b ) Make available information concerning its system for the assignment of UDIs;
( c ) Maintain a list of labelers that use its system for the assignment of UDIs and provide FDA a copy of such list in electronic form by December 31 of each year;
( d ) Upon request, provide FDA with information concerning a labeler that is employing the issuing agency's system for assignment of UDIs; and
( e ) Remain in compliance with the eligibility and accreditation criteria set forth in § 830.100.
REGULATORY EVALUATION

Directorate Identifier: 2011-NM-142-AD

Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific 

requirements for aircraft operated in Alaska, where aviation might be the only mode of 

transportation?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)
IN THE

FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

OF TEXAS

WILLIAM MARKS § §

VS. § CASE NOs. 14-15- 00 06 4- CR

, § 14-15- 00 06 5- CR &
THE STATE OF TEXAS § 14-15- 00 06 6- CR

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME WITHIN WHICH TO FILE APPELLATE

BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT:

NOW COMES, WILLIAM MARKS, appellant in the above-styled and

numbered cause, by and through h is attorney of record, Daucie Schindler, and

respectfully moves the Court for an extension of time within which to file the

appellate brief, and for cause would show the Court as follows:

I.

Mr. Marks was convicted of three counts of violating the private securities act on

January 7, 2015. That same day, this court assessed his punishment at a probated

sentence of one (1) year in the Harris County Jail in each count. Mr. Marks was

represented at trial by Brian Coyne, while the State was represented by Assistant

District Attorney Heyward Carter. The Honorable Judge Pam Derbyshire presided

over the entirety of the trial proceedings. ACCEPTED

14-15-00065-cr
FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS
9/18/2015 1:50:53 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERKII.

Mr. Marks filed timely notice of appeal. Undersigned counsel , of The Harris

County Public Defender’s Office was appointed to represent Mr. Marks on January

22, 2015. Mr. Mark ’ s filed a Motion for new Trial on February 3, 2015. The Motion

for New Trial was denied by the trial court

.

III.

The appellate brief i s due to be filed wi th the Court on or before September 18

,

201 5

. No p revious extension s ha ve been requested

.

IV.

Counsel has been working simultaneously on the Appellant’s Briefs in Paul

Briones v. State , Martinez v. State, Tavarez v. State, Edwards v. State, Rodriguez v.

State, and Wiggins v. State . Additionally, counsel has been working on the Petitions

for Discretionary Review in Earvin v. State and Fletcher v. State and the Motion for

new Trial on State v. Branch

. Counsel is diligently working on the brief in this case,

but requests additional time to research and confer with the client.

V.

This request is made not to delay the proceedings, but to ensure that M r

. Marks

is adequately represented.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, M r

. Marks respectfully prays that this

m otion be granted and that the Court permits an extension of time until October 19

,

201 5 , to file the appellate brief.Respectfully submitted,

ALEXANDER BUNIN

Chief Public Defender Harris County Texas

/s/ Daucie Schindler

DAUCIE SCHINDLER

Assistant Public Defender Harris County Texas 1201 Franklin, 13 th Floor

Houston Texas 77002 (713) 368

- 0016 (713) 368

- 9278 (Fax) Daucie.Schindler@pdo.hctx.net

Attorney for Appellant,

WILLIAM MARKS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant’s

Motion to Extend Time within Which to File Appellate Brief was e

- mailed to the

Appellate Division of the Harris County District Attorney’s Office on this 18 th day of

September , 201 5

.

/s/ Daucie Schindler

DAUCIE SCHINDLER
§ 807.93 Content and format of a 510(k) statement. ( a ) ( 1 ) A 510(k) statement submitted as part of a premarket notification shall state as follows: I certify that, in my capacity as (the position held in company by person required to submit the premarket notification, preferably the official correspondent in the firm), of (company name), I will make available all information included in this premarket notification on safety and effectiveness within 30 days of request by any person if the device described in the premarket notification submission is determined to be substantially equivalent. The information I agree to make available will be a duplicate of the premarket notification submission, including any adverse safety and effectiveness information, but excluding all patient identifiers, and trade secret and confidential commercial information, as defined in 21 CFR 20.61.
( 2 ) The statement in paragraph (a)(1) of this section should be signed by the certifier, made on a separate page of the premarket notification submission, and clearly identified as “510(k) statement.”
( b ) All requests for information included in paragraph (a) of this section shall be made in writing to the certifier, whose name will be published by FDA on the list of premarket notification submissions for which substantial equivalence determinations have been made.
( c ) The information provided to requestors will be a duplicate of the premarket notification submission, including any adverse information, but excluding all patient identifiers, and trade secret and confidential commercial information as defined in § 20.61 of this chapter.
[59 FR 64295, Dec. 14, 1994]
39011.

#### LACEY v. MANN *et al.*

Bell, Judge.

Plaintiff assigns error on the order of the trial court which sustained the defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s answer to the defendant’s plea of release and further sustained the defendant’s plea of release which had been filed to the plaintiff’s petition. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as prematurely brought, under *Code Ann.*§ 6-701.

The record before this court does not show the final determination of the cause in the court below by dismissal or otherwise Where the sole assignment of error in a. bill of exceptions is on a judgment sustaining a demurrer to an answer to a plea and sustaining the plea, the record not showing that the case has been terminated in the court below, the case will be held to have been brought to this court prematurely, and the writ of error will be dismissed. *Bozeman v. Ward-Truitt,*141 Ga. 45 (80 SE 320). See also *Grier v. Grier,*100 Ga. App. 322 (111 SE2d 256); *Bedingfield v. Parkerson,*211 Ga. 386 (86 SE2d 215); *Mavity v. Associates Discount Corp.,*211 Ga. 471 (86 SE2d 325).

*Writ of error dismissed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Hall, J., concur.*

*586Decided September 19, 1961

Rehearing denied October 5, 1961.

*Judge $ Strother,*for plaintiff in error.

*Nall, Miller, Cadenhead & Dennis, A. Paul Cadenhead, Theodore G. Frankel,*contra.
IN THE 

FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 

OF TEXAS 

WILLIAM MARKS § 

§ 

VS. § CASE NOs. 14-15-00064-CR, 

§ 14-15-00065-CR & 

THE STATE OF TEXAS § 14-15-00066-CR

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME WITHIN WHICH TO FILE APPELLATE 

BRIEF 

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT: 

NOW COMES, WILLIAM MARKS, appellant in the above-styled and 

numbered cause, by and through his attorney of record, Daucie Schindler, and 

respectfully moves the Court for an extension of time within which to file the 

appellate brief, and for cause would show the Court as follows: 

I.

Mr. Marks was convicted of three counts of violating the private securities act on 

January 7, 2015. That same day, this court assessed his punishment at a probated 

sentence of one (1) year in the Harris County Jail in each count. Mr. Marks was 

represented at trial by Brian Coyne, while the State was represented by Assistant 

District Attorney Heyward Carter. The Honorable Judge Pam Derbyshire presided 

over the entirety of the trial proceedings. 

ACCEPTED

14-15-00065-cr

FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

9/18/2015 1:50:53 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 14th COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 9/18/2015 1:50:53 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
II.

Mr. Marks filed timely notice of appeal. Undersigned counsel, of The Harris 

County Public Defender’s Office was appointed to represent Mr. Marks on January 

22, 2015. Mr. Mark’s filed a Motion for new Trial on February 3, 2015. The Motion 

for New Trial was denied by the trial court. 

III.

The appellate brief is due to be filed with the Court on or before September 18, 

2015. No previous extensions have been requested. 

IV.

Counsel has been working simultaneously on the Appellant’s Briefs in Paul 

Briones v. State, Martinez v. State, Tavarez v. State, Edwards v. State, Rodriguez v. 

State, and Wiggins v. State. Additionally, counsel has been working on the Petitions 

for Discretionary Review in Earvin v. State and Fletcher v. State and the Motion for 

new Trial on State v. Branch. Counsel is diligently working on the brief in this case, 

but requests additional time to research and confer with the client.

V.

This request is made not to delay the proceedings, but to ensure that Mr. Marks

is adequately represented.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Mr. Marks respectfully prays that this 

motion be granted and that the Court permits an extension of time until October 19,

2015, to file the appellate brief.
Respectfully submitted,

ALEXANDER BUNIN

Chief Public Defender

Harris County Texas 

/s/ Daucie Schindler

DAUCIE SCHINDLER

Assistant Public Defender 

Harris County Texas 

1201 Franklin, 13th Floor

Houston Texas 77002

(713) 368-0016

(713) 368-9278 (Fax)

Daucie.Schindler@pdo.hctx.net

Attorney for Appellant,

WILLIAM MARKS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant’s 

Motion to Extend Time within Which to File Appellate Brief was e-mailed to the 

Appellate Division of the Harris County District Attorney’s Office on this 18th day of 

September, 2015.

/s/ Daucie Schindler

DAUCIE SCHINDLER
# C_2016027EN.01005302.xml

| 25.1.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 27/53 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.1.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 27/53

---

Judgment of the General Court of 30 November 2015 — Hong Kong Group v OHIM — WE Brand (W E)

(Case T-718/14) (1)

1

((Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for a Community figurative mark W E - Earlier Community word mark WE - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009))

(2016/C 027/68)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Hong Kong Group Oy (Vantaa, Finland) (represented by: J.-H. Spåre, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: S. Bonne, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervening before the General Court: WE Brand Sàrl (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: R. van Oerle and E. de Groot, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervening before the General Court:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 4 August 2014 (Case R 2305/2013-2) concerning opposition proceedings between WE Brand Sàrl and Hong Kong Group Oy.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 4 August 2014 (Case R 2305/2013-2) concerning opposition proceedings between WE Brand Sàrl and Hong Kong Group Oy and the decision of the Opposition Division of OHIM of 30 September 2013; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 4 August 2014 (Case R 2305/2013-2) concerning opposition proceedings between WE Brand Sàrl and Hong Kong Group Oy and the decision of the Opposition Division of OHIM of 30 September 2013;

| 2. | Rejects the opposition; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rejects the opposition;

| 3. | Orders OHIM and WE Brand to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by Hong Kong Group, including those necessarily incurred by Hong Kong Group for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders OHIM and WE Brand to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by Hong Kong Group, including those necessarily incurred by Hong Kong Group for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM.

---

(1)  OJ C 431, 1.12.2014.

1

---
No. 14-0637 Fleet v. Webber Springs Owners Ass’n, Inc. 

### FILED May 26, 2015 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA Benjamin, J., dissenting:

I dissent because this Court has no jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal, which means this appeal should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.

In the case before us, the order being appealed was the grant of summary judgment to the respondent homeowners’ association on the petitioner’s counterclaims. This order did not address or enter judgment on the respondent’s claims for past due assessments, attorney fees or costs. Nothing in this order professes to, purports to or otherwise claims to address the respondent’s claims. The order merely resolved the counterclaims of the petitioner and left for resolution the underlying collection action instituted by the respondent.

The majority makes short work of the lack of jurisdiction, positing in footnote 8 that despite clear precedent and other authority in the form of this Court’s rules and a statute, this order “approximates a final order in its nature and effect.” The majority makes this statement with the knowledge that the underlying claim of the respondent remains unsettled and the only portion of this case that was affected by the ruling was the counterclaim of the petitioner.Under our rules and by statute, there must be a full and final judgment on all claims and parties before a party may appeal a final order of a circuit court. See W.
Va. Code § 58-5-1; see also W. Va. R. Civ. P 54(b) (authorizing entry of a final judgment in accordance with the specification of § 58-5-1 but instructing that “any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the parties shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims or parties ”) (emphasis added).

Further, we held in Syl. pt. 3 of James M.B. v. Carolyn M ., 193 W. Va. 289,
456 S.E.2d 16 (1995), that

Under W. Va. Code 58-5-1, appeals only may be taken from final decisions of a circuit court. A case is final only when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. As recognized by the majority, there are instances where an order “approximates a final order in its nature and effect. . . .” Syl. pt. 1, in part, State ex rel.
McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick , 196 W. Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995). Unfortunately, this is not one of those cases because the underlying claim of the respondents was never addressed.This is clearly an interlocutory appeal, one that should have been dismissed as improvidently granted. I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.
#### § 610.39 Definitions.

The definitions set out in § 630.3 of this chapter apply to this subpart.

[80 FR 29896, May 22, 2015]