Security Weaknesses Increase 

Risks to Critical United States 

Coast Guard Database 

(Redacted)

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Information Technology 

OIG-05-35 August 2005

Notice: The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, has redacted this report 

for public release. The redactions are identified as (b)(2), comparable to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2). A 

review under the Freedom of Information Act will be conducted upon request.
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528

 Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the department. 

This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of database security controls over United States 

Coast Guard (Coast Guard) resources. It is based on interviews with Coast Guard officials, direct 

observations, technical scans, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

 

 Richard L. Skinner 

 Inspector General 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

 Executive Summary....................................................................................................................... 1 

 Background.................................................................................................................................... 3 

 

 Results of Audit ............................................................................................................................. 5 

 Strengthening of Database Security Procedures Is Needed..................................................... 5 

 Recommendations.................................................................................................................... 8 

 Management Comments and OIG Analysis ............................................................................ 8 

 MISLE Servers Are Vulnerable.............................................................................................. 10

 Recommendations................................................................................................................... 19 

 Management Comments and OIG Analysis ........................................................................... 19 

Appendices 

 Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology ..................................................................... 21 

 Appendix B: Management’s Response.................................................................................... 23 

 Appendix C: Vulnerabilities Identified and Addressed ........................................................... 27 

 Appendix D: FISMA Metrics................................................................................................... 28 

 Appendix E: MISLE Architecture........................................................................................... 30

 Appendix F: Major Contributors to this Report ...................................................................... 32 

 Appendix G: Report Distribution............................................................................................. 33 

Abbreviations 

 ATL Advanced Technology Laboratory 

 C&A Certification and Accreditation 

 CIO Chief Information Officer 

 DBMS Database Management System 

 DHS Department of Homeland Security 

 DHS Handbook DHS Sensitive Systems Handbook 

 DHS Policy DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Publication 4300A 

 DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

 Coast Guard United States Coast Guard 

 FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 

 ID Identifier 

 ISS Internet Security Systems

 IT Information Technology 

 MISLE Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement 

 NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

 --------- ----------------------------------

 OIG Office of Inspector General 

 OMB Office of Management and Budget 

 OSC Operations Systems Center 

 POA&M Plan of Action and Milestones 

 SP Special Publication 

 ----- -------------- ---------
OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 1 

Executive Summary 

 

We audited the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its organizational 

components’ security program to evaluate the security and integrity of select 

sensitive but unclassified mission critical databases.1

 This audit included 

reviews of access controls, continuity of operations, and change management 

policies and procedures. This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of 

security controls over United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) database 

resources.

Our objective was to determine whether the Coast Guard had implemented 

adequate and effective controls over sensitive data contained in its Marine 

Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) system. We interviewed 

Coast Guard officials; reviewed database security documents; and, performed 

technical tests of one -------------------------- database server, one --------

database server, three application and authentication servers, and two domain 

controllers. 

The Coast Guard has not established adequate or effective database security 

controls for MISLE. The Coast Guard has developed and implemented many 

essential security controls for the MISLE system, including a process to control 

routine changes to the system and a process to maintain and review an audit trail 

of operating system level security events.2 However, additional work remains 

to implement the access controls and continuity of operations safeguards 

 

1

 DHS “organizational components” are defined as directorates, including organizational elements and bureaus, and critical 

agencies. 

2

 Audit trails maintain a record of system activity both by system and application processes and by users of the systems and 

applications. The audit trail is the evidence that demonstrates how a specific transaction was initiated, processed, and 

summarized. In conjunction with appropriate tools and procedures, audit trails can assist in detecting security violations, 

performance problems, and flaws in applications. 
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 2 

necessary to protect sensitive MISLE data effectively. Specifically, the Coast 

Guard has not 1) implemented effective procedures for granting, monitoring, 

and removing user access; 2) maintained and reviewed adequate -----------------

------------- ------; or 3) developed and tested an adequate Information 

Technology (IT) contingency plan. In addition, vulnerabilities existed on 

MISLE servers related to access rights and password administration, 

configuration management, --------- ------ -----, and encryption. Due to these 

database security exposures, there is an increased risk that unauthorized 

individuals could gain access to critical Coast Guard database resources and 

compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive MISLE 

data. In addition, the Coast Guard may not be able to recover MISLE following 

a disaster. 

Subsequent to the completion of our audit work, officials from the Coast Guard 

stated that they had taken or planned to take corrective action to address 65 of 

the 74 vulnerabilities identified during our technical testing. The Coast Guard 

did not provide a corrective action plan for the remaining nine vulnerabilities. 

As our fieldwork was complete, we did not verify that the vulnerabilities had 

been remedied. See Appendix C for an overview of the vulnerabilities we 

identified. 

We recommend that the Chief Information Officer (CIO): 

• Ensure that adequate controls for granting, monitoring, and removing 

user access to MISLE are implemented. 

• Maintain and review MISLE -------------------------------------. 

• Develop an IT contingency plan for MISLE. 

• Implement corrective action plans to address all identified MISLE 

vulnerabilities and configuration weaknesses. 

• Examine methods to expedite the implementation of ---------------------

------------------------------------------ . 

• Ensure that corrective actions for the above recommendations are 

applied to all Coast Guard database systems. 

In addition, to comply with the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 

Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) reporting 

requirements, we evaluated the effectiveness of the Coast Guard’s information 

security program and practices as implemented for MISLE.3

 The Coast Guard 

 

3

 FISMA is included under Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347). 
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 3 

has not yet fully aligned its security program with DHS’ overall policies, 

procedures, or practices. For example: 1) security controls have not been tested 

and evaluated in the last year; 2) a contingency plan has not been established 

and tested; 3) security control costs have not been integrated into the life cycle 

of the system; 4) system and database administrators have not obtained 

specialized security training; and, 5) MISLE does not have any existing plan of 

action and milestones (POA&M). Appendix D summarizes the results of our 

FISMA evaluation. 

Fieldwork was conducted from January through February 2005 at the Coast 

Guard headquarters in Washington, DC; the Coast Guard Operations Systems 

Center (OSC) facility in Martinsburg, WV; and, the Office of Inspector 

General’s (OIG) Advanced Technology Laboratory (ATL).4

 See Appendix A 

for our purpose, scope, and methodology. 

In response to our draft report, the Coast Guard Chief of Staff concurred with 

our recommendations and is in the process of implementing corrective 

measures. In addition, POA&Ms will be created and tracked for the 

vulnerabilities we identified. The Coast Guard’s response is summarized and 

evaluated in the body of this report and included, in its entirety, as Appendix B. 

Background 

A database is one or more large structured sets of data (fields, records, and files) 

organized so that the data can be easily accessed, managed, and updated. Most 

often, databases are associated with software used to update and query the data, 

called a database management system (DBMS). The DBMS can be an 

extremely complex set of software programs that controls the organization, 

storage, and retrieval of data in a database. In addition, the DBMS, in 

conjunction with its host operating system, controls access to the data and 

ensures the security and integrity of the database. DBMS’ can be classified 

according to their architectural model (e.g., relational, hierarchical, or network), 

and can be centralized on one platform or distributed across multiple servers. 

Databases and DBMS’ have become a more frequent target of attack for 

malicious users. Such an attack can result in financial loss, loss of privacy, or a 

breach of national security as well as the many other varieties of corruption that 

 

4

 The ATL supports our capability to perform effective and efficient technical assessments of DHS information systems 

and diverse operating environments. The ATL is a collection of hardware and software that allows the simulation, testing, 

and evaluation of the computing environments that are most commonly used within DHS. 
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 4 

result from unauthorized access to sensitive data. To counter this threat, a 

number of security options are available to protect the data housed in databases. 

For these measures to be effective, however, DBMS security controls must be 

properly configured and maintained. In addition, as database products have 

become more complex and the attacks against them have increased, a number of 

vulnerabilities have been identified that could be exploited by attackers. DBMS 

vendors have responded by issuing patches or fixes for discovered 

vulnerabilities. These patches must be applied—quickly and appropriately—to 

ensure that critical data is protected adequately. 

MISLE is a web-based, mission critical database system that is used to track 

marine safety and law-enforcement activities involving commercial and 

recreational vessels. The system provides ad hoc query, reporting, and file 

downloading capabilities to the Coast Guard Marine Safety and Law 

Enforcement operating programs. MISLE is comprised of two main 

components: the Marine Safety Network and the Vessel Documentation 

System. The Marine Safety Network allows Coast Guard personnel to input 

and obtain information on Coast Guard marine safety activities, such as 

waterway details, inspection information (vessel and facility), and incident 

investigation data. The Vessel Documentation System, which supports the 

marine banking community, is used by the National Vessel Documentation 

Center to assist in processing vessel registrations and tracking vessel ownership 

information. Certain vessel data in the Vessel Documentation System is also 

accessible to personnel accessing the Marine Safety Network. 

MISLE utilizes a multi-tiered architecture based on database servers, web and 

application servers, and individual user workstations. The Marine Safety 

Network utilizes ---------------------------------------------- and ----------

----------------------------------------- ----- , while the Vessel Documentation 

System employs ---------------------- ------ -----------------------------------. 

According to a Coast Guard official, the Marine Safety Network provides 

approximately 90 percent of the MISLE system’s functionality. There are 

approximately ------ registered Marine Safety Network users and ---- registered 

Vessel Documentation System users. 

DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Publication 4300A (DHS Policy) provides 

direction to DHS components regarding the management and protection of 

sensitive systems. Also, this policy outlines the management, operational, and 

technical controls necessary for ensuring confidentiality, integrity, availability, 

and authenticity within the DHS IT infrastructure and operations. DHS Policy 

requires that its components ensure that strong access controls, IT contingency 

planning safeguards, and change and configuration management procedures are 
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 5 

implemented for all systems processing sensitive but unclassified information. 

The department developed the DHS Sensitive Systems Handbook (DHS 

Handbook) to provide components with specific techniques and procedures for 

implementing the requirements of this policy. Further, in November 2004, DHS 

published a series of secure baseline configuration guides for certain software 

applications, such as -------- ----------

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has issued several 

publications related to database system access controls, change and 

configuration management, and IT contingency planning. Specifically, NIST 

Special Publication (SP) 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security: The 

NIST Handbook, provides guidance for establishing adequate access controls for 

sensitive government systems, including the use of strong passwords, 

encryption, and user administration practices. Also, NIST SP 800-12 provides 

guidance on effectively controlling changes to sensitive information systems. 

Further, NIST SP 800-34, Contingency Planning Guide for Information 

Technology Systems, provides instructions, recommendations, and 

considerations for government IT contingency planning. 

Results of Audit 

Strengthening of Database Security Procedures Is Needed 

The Coast Guard has not developed or implemented the security controls 

necessary to protect MISLE and its data. In assessing the procedures governing 

the security of sensitive data contained in MISLE, we identified user 

administration, auditing, and IT contingency planning weaknesses. Therefore, 

there is significant risk that the security procedures implemented to protect the 

Coast Guard’s critical databases may not prevent unauthorized access to its 

systems and data. In addition, the Coast Guard may not be able to recover 

MISLE operations following a disaster or disruption. 

User Administration Procedures Are Incomplete

The Coast Guard has implemented a process for granting, monitoring, and 

removing MISLE user access that includes controls to protect access to the 

system and its data. For example, the Coast Guard has established a process to 

control emergency and temporary access for privileged MISLE users. 

However, additional work remains to implement the access control procedures 
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 6 

needed to limit system access to appropriate personnel adequately and 

effectively. Specifically: 

• The Coast Guard has not established sufficient controls over account 

creation for Marine Safety Network users. --------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------- ----------------------- ---------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------ ---- ----- -------- ------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------- ----------------------------. Further, 

there is no process to document Marine Safety Network user access 

authorizations, and there is ------- ------------------------------ --------

---------- ------------- ----------------------- ----. MISLE officials stated that 

the implementation of -----------------------------------------------------------

---------- was pending the completion of an upcoming system upgrade. 

The Coast Guard plans to complete the upgrade by December 2005. 

• The Coast Guard has not implemented procedures to ensure that regular 

reviews of all accounts with access to MISLE are performed. Periodic 

revalidations ensure that access granted to users remain appropriate. 

According to Coast Guard officials, the capability to perform periodic 

revalidations exists, but they were not aware of a policy requiring that 

such reviews be performed. 

• The Coast Guard has not conducted annual security training or 

completed rules of behavior documents for Vessel Documentation 

System users, including several with privileged access to the MISLE 

system. According to MISLE officials, informal security training is 

provided to new Vessel Documentation System users. Users are orally 

briefed on their security responsibilities during orientation. However, 

there is no annual refresher training, and completion of the initial 

security training is not documented. 

DHS Policy requires that components ensure that user access is controlled and 

limited based on positive user identification and authentication mechanisms that 

support the minimum requirements of access control, least privilege, and system 

integrity.6

 The policy also requires that: 

• A user’s supervisor or project manager determines the systems the user 

needs to access as well as the levels of access the user needs to do his or 

 

-

------------- - ------------------ - ------------------------ ----------------------------------------------------- 6

 The principle of least privilege requires that users be given the most restrictive set of privileges needed to perform 

authorized tasks. 
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 7 

her job, and that the program official or designated representative 

approve user access privileges. 

• System managers or owners revalidate all accounts at least annually. 

• DHS personnel and contractors accessing DHS IT systems receive initial 

and annual training in security awareness, and sign rules of behavior 

documents. 

Because MISLE user administration procedures have not been fully 

implemented, there is greater risk that individuals with --- -----------------

----------------- may gain inappropriate access to MISLE, while current users 

may have more access to the system than needed to fulfill their job 

responsibilities. As a result, sensitive information in MISLE may not be 

adequately protected. 

MISLE Auditing Is Inadequate

The Coast Guard does not ---------------------------------------- ----------------------

-------- - --------- for MISLE. The Coast Guard maintains audit logs of pertinent 

information related to---- ------------------------ --------- -- --------------------- ----

------ - ---------------- ----- --- ------------------------ ----------------------. These 

audit logs are reviewed on a daily basis using --------------------------- - Further, 

a historical record of audit trail information has been maintained since the 

implementation of the system. -- - --- -------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------- - ----------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------

------------------------------------------ ------------------------- ---- According to 

MISLE officials, --------------------------------- --------------------------------

because they were not aware of any requirement for -------------------- . 

According to DHS Policy, audit trails must contain sufficient information to 

facilitate the reconstruction of events if compromise or malfunction occurs or is 

suspected. Audit trails help ensure individual accountability by providing the 

ability to track a user’s activities while accessing an automated system. 

------------------------------------------------- --------------- - -------------------------

------------------------------------------------ - . As a result of the lack of -----------

--------- , inappropriate access to sensitive data or malicious changes to MISLE 

----------------------------------------- . 

 

-

---------- -- ----- -------- --------- ------------ --------- - --------------- - - ------------ ------ --------- -- -------------- ---- ---- -

--- -------- --- - ------
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 8 

An IT Contingency Plan Has Not Been Developed and Tested 

The Coast Guard has created an IT contingency plan for MISLE, but the plan 

does not contain all of the information necessary to ensure that the system can 

be recovered. For example, the current MISLE IT contingency plan ----------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ 

Coast Guard officials stated that they are aware of the deficiencies in the current 

MISLE IT contingency plan, and that they are in the process of developing 

comprehensive IT contingency plans for all major applications housed at the 

OSC. However, the development and testing of the updated MISLE IT 

contingency plan is pending completion of the new Coast Guard disaster 

recovery site--------------------

According to the Coast Guard, the disclosure, inaccuracy, or non-availability of 

sensitive information processed and stored by MISLE could have a significant 

impact on the component’s ability to complete its mission. Consequently, it is 

critical that the system be able to operate effectively without excessive 

interruption. Contingency planning supports this requirement by establishing 

thorough plans, procedures, and technical measures that can enable a system to 

be recovered quickly and effectively following a service outage or disaster. IT 

contingency plan testing enables deficiencies to be identified and addressed, and 

helps evaluate the ability of the recovery staff to implement the plan quickly 

and effectively. As a result of the lack of adequate contingency planning and 

testing for the system, there is greater risk that MISLE officials may not be able 

to restore the system in a timely manner following a disaster. 

Recommendations 

To protect sensitive MISLE data, we recommend that the Coast Guard 

Commandant direct the CIO to: 

1. Ensure that adequate controls for granting, monitoring, and removing 

MISLE user access are implemented according to DHS requirements 

and NIST guidelines. 

2. --------------------------------------------- ------------------ ---------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------- --- --------------

3. Develop and implement a MISLE IT contingency plan and ensure that 

an annual test of the plan is conducted. 
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 9 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

The Coast Guard concurs with recommendation 1. The Coast Guard plans to 

verify user access via the Coast Guard’s --------------------------------

environment. The Coast Guard will require that --------------- -------------- -

------------ before access is granted to the system. These changes will adhere to 

DHS requirements. In addition, by 4th Quarter FY 2006, the Coast Guard will 

comply with NIST guidelines for access control, auditing, and user 

authentication. 

We accept the Coast Guard’s response to align its controls for granting, 

monitoring, and removing user access with DHS requirements and NIST 

guidelines. 

The Coast Guard concurs with recommendation 2. The Coast Guard plans to 

implement --------------------------------------------- - -- in accordance with DHS 

requirements. However, because DHS has not issued guidelines for ------

-------------- - ------------ , configuration settings will be reviewed in accordance 

with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Database Secure 

Technical Implementation Guide. These changes will be in place by 2nd Quarter 

FY 2006. 

We accept the Coast Guard’s response to implement ----------------------- --

--------------------- , as well as additional --------------- in accordance with DISA 

guidelines. 

The Coast Guard concurs with recommendation 3. The Coast Guard has a new, 

NIST compliant contingency plan under draft, which will be tested and reported 

in MISLE’s FISMA TAF tool. The MISLE disaster recovery site is scheduled 

to be in place by September 2005. 

We accept the Coast Guard’s plan of action to develop and test a NIST 

compliant contingency plan. However, the Coast Guard did not indicate that an 

annual test of the plan would be completed. We maintain that the Coast Guard 

should have a process to ensure that an annual test of the contingency plan is 

conducted. 
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 10 

MISLE Servers Are Vulnerable 

The Coast Guard has not established effective database security controls for 

MISLE. To assess the security of MISLE databases, we performed 

vulnerability assessment scans to identify configuration weaknesses on MISLE 

servers; and, conducted manual checks of the security settings on a central 

MISLE database server to identify additional configuration weaknesses and 

verify the results of the vulnerability assessment scans. In assessing the 

effectiveness of database controls, we identified issues related to access rights 

and password administration, configuration management, --------- -------------

and encryption. These control weaknesses could enable an attacker to gain 

inappropriate access to MISLE and its data. 

Access Privileges Were Not Appropriately Restricted

The Coast Guard did not enforce strong identification or authentication 

measures for MISLE. Six of the seven servers we tested did not appropriately 

restrict access to the system. For example: 

• ---------------------------------------------------- --- -------------------------------

---------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------

------------------------------------------- ------- ----------------------------

---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------

--------------------------------------------

• -------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------

-------------------------------------------- ------------- - -------------------- ------

--------------------- - -- ------------------ -----------------------------------

---------------------- - ------ ---------- ------------------------------------------

--------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------

• --------------------------------------- --------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

-

--- --- --- -------- -- --- --- - -- ------ --------- ----- - ---- ---- --- ---------- ----- - --- -------- -- ----------------------------- - ---

-------- ------- -- ------ ---- ----- ---- ---- - --- ------ ---------------- ----- --- ------ ---- -------- ----- ----------------

--- ------------------- ------------------------- --- ------ ---------------- ----- ---- ---------- - -- --- --- -------------------- -----

----------- - ------------ ----------------------- --------- ---------- ---------------------------- ----------- -------------------------- --

- ---------- ------------------------------- ------------- -------- ----- - -- - -------------------- -- --------------- ------------------
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 11 

----------------------- --- ----------------------- ------ -----------------

------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------- -

Several of the access rights and password vulnerabilities we identified are the 

result of default operating system and DBMS settings that were not changed at 

the time the software was installed. ------------- ------------------------------------

---------------------------- ------- . Unless this default setting is changed-----------

------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------

----------------------------------------- --------------------------------

Table 1 illustrates the number of access rights and password vulnerabilities that 

we identified for the MISLE database servers and related hosts, along with the 

corrective actions that the Coast Guard has planned or already taken to address 

these weaknesses. 

 

-

-- -- - --- -- - --- -- --------- ---- - ----- ------------- ------ ----------- ------------------------- ------------ - ------ --------- -------

- - --------- --- ---- -----
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 12 

Table 1: Access Rights and Password Vulnerabilities Identified and Addressed

Number of Vulnerabilities Identified Number That Have Been Addressed

Server High 

Risk 

Medium 

Risk Total Corrected Planned Total 

----------------

-----------------------

------ -

- ---

-

0 5 5 0 

5 

(100%) 

5 

(100%) 

----------------

------------------------- 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 

--- --- -

-------- ---------

- - -----------------

------ -

3 8 11 0 

11 

(100%) 

11 

(100%) 

--- --- -

-------- ---------

- - - --- --- ---- --- -- 

0 3 3 0 

3 

(100%) 

3 

(100%) 

--- --- -

-------- ---------

- - --------------------

------ -

1 0 1 0 

1 

(100%) 

1 

(100%) 

----- --- ------ ---

------------- 2 5 7 

7 

(100%) 

0 

7 

(100%) 

-------------------

------------- 1 5 6 

6 

(100%) 

0 

6 

(100%) 

Total 7 26 33 

13 

(39%) 

20 

(61%) 

33 

(100%) 

(a) Manual security parameter tests were only conducted on the Marine Safety Network database server. 

Source: OIG table based on the results of technical testing and interviews with Coast Guard 

personnel. 

DHS Policy requires that its components ensure that user access is controlled 

and limited based on user identification and authentication mechanisms that 

support the minimum requirements of access control, least privilege, and 

system integrity. The DHS Handbook also forbids ----------- ---------------

--------------------------------------- ---- ------ Further, NIST and the National 

Security Agency provide specific guidelines related to certain operating system 

and database security settings, including --- -------------------------------

------------------------------ -------------------------------- ----------------- ------- -

---------------------------- --------------------------
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 13 

Often, passwords are the first line of defense against hackers or insiders who 

may try to obtain unauthorized access to a computer system. The use of weak 

password controls, combined with inappropriate access rights, might allow 

unauthorized internal users or external hackers to gain access to Coast Guard 

networks and systems. 

MISLE Servers Are Not Configured Appropriately 

The Coast Guard did not configure network services and security parameters to 

protect MISLE data and files. For example: 

• -------------- -------------------------------------- --------- -------------------

---------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------

------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------- ------------- ----

• ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------- ---------------

----------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------

----------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------

Table 2 illustrates the number of configuration management vulnerabilities that 

we identified for the MISLE database servers and related hosts, along with the 

corrective actions that the Coast Guard has planned or already taken to address 

these weaknesses. 

 

------------------------------- --- - ----- ----------- - ----- ------------ ------- ---------- - ---- - -- - ----- - ------------------------------- - ------------------------------------ - ---------------- -------------------- ------ ---------- ----- ------

---------------- ------------------------ ------ ----------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------

----------------- ---- --------------- - - ----- - ------- --- - ------------------------ - ---- ---------- -
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 14 

Table 2: Configuration Management Vulnerabilities Identified and Addressed

Number of Vulnerabilities Identified Number That Have Been Addressed

Server High 

Risk 

Medium 

Risk Total Corrected Planned Total 

Number For Which 

No Corrective Action 

Plan Was Provided 

----------------

----------------------

------ -

- --- 1 4 5 0 

4 

(80%) 

4 

(80%) 

1 

(20%) 

----------------

------------------------ 0 1 1 0 

1 

(100%) 

1 

(100%) 

0 

--- --- -

-------- ---------

- - -----------------

------ -

0 1 1 0 

1 

(100%) 

1 

(100%) 

0 

--- --- -

-------- ---------

- - - --- --- ---- --- -- 

0 2 2 0 

2 

(100%) 

2 

(100%) 

0 

--- --- -

-------- ---------

- - ---------------------

------ -

0 2 2 0 

2 

(100%) 

2 

(100%) 

0 

----- --- ------ ---

------------- 0 5 5 

3 

(60%) 

2 

(40%) 

5 

(100%) 

0 

-------------------

------------- 0 5 5 

3 

(60%) 

2 

(40%) 

5 

(100%) 

0 

Total 1 20 21 

6 

(29%) 

14 

(67%) 

20 

(95%) 

1 

(5%) 

(a) Manual security parameter tests were only conducted on the Marine Safety Network database server. 

Source: OIG table based on the results of technical testing and interviews with Coast Guard personnel. 

The configuration weaknesses noted above are largely the result of default 

operating system and DBMS settings that were not changed at the time the 

software was installed. These configuration weaknesses had not been identified 

or corrected by Coast Guard personnel, in part, because --------------------------

--------- of the MISLE system are not performed. 

MISLE Has Not Been - --

The Coast Guard has not ---------------------------------. We examined each of 

the seven servers to determine if all of the ---------------------------------- ---------

--------------------. Also, we reviewed the Marine Safety Network database 
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 15 

server to determine if all of the appropriate -----------------------------------. 

Although the Coast Guard had -------------------------------------, the component 

has ------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------- , 

including those running ------------- ------

Some -------------------------------------- ------------ --- because Coast Guard 

officials did not believe ------------- were needed for the MISLE operating 

environment. However, according to the vendor of the operating system 

software, ------------- are relevant to the software version running on the MISLE 

servers. The vendor has indicated that ------------------------------------------------

------------------------- ----------------------------- ---------- . In addition, some of 

---------------------------- ------ because the systems administrators had 

previously attempted------------------------- ------------------------- . However, the 

installation had not been successful because --- --------- --------- had not been 

previously installed. 

Table 3 illustrates the number of --------- ------------------------------ that we 

identified for the MISLE database servers and related hosts, along with the 

corrective actions that the Coast Guard has planned or already taken to address 

these weaknesses. 
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 16 

Table 3: - - Vulnerabilities Identified and Addressed 

Number of Vulnerabilities Identified Number That Have Been Addressed

Server High 

Risk 

Medium 

Risk Total Corrected Planned Total 

Number For Which 

No Corrective Action 

Plan Was Provided 

----------------

-----------------------

------ -

- --- 1 0 1 0 

1 

(100%) 

1 

(100%) 

0

----------------

-----------------

------ -

0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 

--- --- -

-------- ---------

- - -----------------

------ -

0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 

--- --- -

-------- ---------

- - - --- --- ---- --- -- 

0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 

--- --- -

-------- ---------

- - ---------------------

------ -

0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 

----- --- ------ ---

------------- 5 3 8 

4 

(50%) 

0 

4 

(50%) 

4 

(50%) 

-------------------

------------- 5 3 8 

4 

(50%) 

0 

4 

(50%) 

4 

(50%) 

Total 11 6 17 

8 

(47%) 

1 

(6%) 

9 

(53%) 

8 

(47%) 

(a) Manual security parameter tests were only conducted on the Marine Safety Network database server. 

Source: OIG table based on the results of technical testing and interviews with Coast Guard personnel. 

DHS Policy requires that IT security ---------------------- in accordance with 

configuration management plans or direction from higher authorities. 

According to --------------------- ---------------------------------------------------

---------- is critical to the operational availability, confidentiality, and integrity 

of information technology systems. NIST recommends that organizations have 

an explicit and documented ------------------------------- policy as well as a 

systematic, accountable, and documented process for --------------------- 
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 17 

Because Coast Guard officials ------------------------------------------------------

-------- , the system was ----------------------------------------------------------------

-------- --------------- --------- --------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------

------------------------- ---------------- ---- ------------------------ -----------------------

----------------------------- ------------------- ---------------------- --- -------- ---

------------------------------------- ----

MISLE Data and Files Were Not Encrypted 

MISLE was not configured to protect sensitive data and files through the use of 

encryption. Specifically: 

• --------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------

-------------- -------- ----------------------- ---- ---------------------------------

-------------- ----------------------------------------

• ---------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------

----------------------------------------- --- ----------------------------------

-------------------- - --------------------------------------

Coast Guard officials stated that they are examining the implementation of 

----------------------------- --------- ----------------------------------------------------

----------------- However, the implementation of ------------------ is still in the 

planning stage because it will require extensive system changes. MISLE 

officials anticipate that it will take two years to implement these changes. 

Table 4 illustrates the number of encryption vulnerabilities that we identified for 

the MISLE database servers and related hosts, along with the corrective actions 

that the Coast Guard has planned or already taken to address these weaknesses. 

 

----- ---------------- -- - --- ----------- -- ---------- - -- ------ ------- -- ------ - ------------- --------------------- ----------- - ------ -

- ---- ------- --------- --- --- -- ---- ------------------ -- - - ------------ -- ------------- --- -- - ----- --- --- ----- -------

- - --- - ---------- ----- - --------------- --------- - ------------- --- ---- - --- - ------------ ------------------------ - -- - - - ---- -----

------------------ ----------- ------------------- ------------------ -- ----- - ----- --------------- - --- ------- - --- ---------------- ------ -- ------------------ ----- - ---- --------- --- ---- --- --- --- ----- --- ------ --- - --- --- ----- -- ------- ----- ------ ------- - -

----------- ----------------- ------------------- -------------------------- ---------- - --------- -------- ---------- ------- - ---- ------ -------- ----- - - ----- -------- ----- ------- --- --- ----- ---- --- ---------- ------ ----

----------
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 18 

Table 4: Encryption Vulnerabilities Identified and Addressed

Number of Vulnerabilities Identified Number That Have Been Addressed

Server High 

Risk 

Medium 

Risk Total Corrected Planned Total 

----------------

-----------------------

------ -

- --- 0 1 1 0 

1 

(100%) 

1 

(100%) 

----------------

------------------------ 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 

--- --- -

-------- ---------

- - -----------------

------ -

1 1 2 0 

2 

(100%) 

2 

(100%) 

--- --- -

-------- ---------

- - - --- --- ---- --- ---

0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 

--- --- -

-------- ---------

- - ---------------------

------ -

0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 

----- --- ------ ---

------------- 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 

-------------------

------------- 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 

Total 1 2 3 0 

3 

(100%) 

3 

(100%) 

(a) Manual security parameter tests were only conducted on the Marine Safety Network database server. 

Source: OIG table based on the results of technical testing and interviews with Coast Guard 

personnel. 

According to the DHS Handbook, encryption is a reliable and achievable way to 

ensure confidentiality for sensitive data. DHS Policy requires that the 

department’s components identify IT systems transmitting sensitive information 

that may require protection, and develop encryption plans for their sensitive IT 

systems. NIST recommends that cryptographic tools be implemented to protect 

the integrity and confidentiality of critical data and software programs--------

------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------

----- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------- -----------------------------------------
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 19 

Subsequent to the completion of our review, Coast Guard officials stated that 

they have taken or plan to take steps to address many of the access rights and 

password administration, configuration management,---------------- ----- and 

encryption weaknesses we identified. We did not verify that the problems have 

been resolved. The Coast Guard did not provide a corrective action plan for the 

remaining vulnerabilities. 

Recommendations 

To protect sensitive MISLE data, we recommend that the Coast Guard 

Commandant direct the CIO to: 

4. Develop and implement corrective action plans to address all identified 

MISLE vulnerabilities and configuration weaknesses to reduce the risk 

of system compromise or failure. 

5. Examine methods to expedite the implementation of ---------------------

------------------------------------------ to ensure that sensitive data is 

adequately protected. 

6. Ensure that corrective actions for the above recommendations are 

applied to all Coast Guard database systems. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

The Coast Guard generally concurs with recommendation 4. The Coast Guard 

will develop and implement corrective action plans for the MISLE 

vulnerabilities we identified. However, the Coast Guard disagreed with the 

severity categorizations of three of the findings identified during our review. 

Specifically, Coast Guard officials stated that, due to the presence of mitigating 

controls, three findings categorized as medium risk only pose a low risk to 

MISLE operations. Nonetheless, the Coast Guard plans to take action to 

address these weaknesses. 

We accept the Coast Guard’s plan to develop and implement corrective action 

plans for all of the identified MISLE vulnerabilities. 

The Coast Guard concurs with recommendation 5. The MISLE team will 

examine ways to expedite the implementation of ------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------ -------

------------------------------ ---------------------
Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 20 

We agree that the action the Coast Guard plans to take satisfies the intent of the 

recommendation. 

The Coast Guard concurs with recommendation 6. The Coast Guard indicated 

that lessons and best practices learned from the MISLE audit would be 

considered for all major application with a comparable FIPS 199 sensitivity 

level as they are scheduled for C&A. 

We agree that the action the Coast Guard plans to take satisfies the intent of the 

recommendation. 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

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Page 21 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The objective of this audit was to determine whether DHS has implemented 

adequate and effective controls over sensitive data contained in its mission 

critical databases. As part of our audit of DHS database security, we 

conducted reviews of critical databases at the following DHS components: 

• Emergency Preparedness and Response 

• United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

• United States Coast Guard 

• United States Secret Service 

For each of the databases included, we determined whether the component 

had implemented effective access controls, continuity of operations 

capabilities, and change management processes. Our focus was to test the 

implementation of secure configurations on the hosts controlling access to 

sensitive DHS data. In addition, we obtained FISMA information required for 

our annual independent evaluation. 

To identify the Coast Guard’s critical database systems, we analyzed the DHS 

Enterprise Architecture inventory of the Department’s IT assets as of 

October 2004. We supplemented this information with NIST SP 800-26 

Security Self-Assessments, where available. Based on our analysis, we 

selected MISLE for inclusion in our review. 

We used two software tools to conduct internal security tests to evaluate the 

effectiveness of controls implemented for MISLE: 

• Internet Security Systems (ISS) Internet Scanner 7.0 was used to 

detect and analyze vulnerabilities on DHS servers. NIST SP 800-42, 

Guideline on Network Security Testing, identifies ISS Internet Scanner 

as a common testing tool. 

• ISS Database Scanner 4.3 was used to analyze the configurations of 

the databases and DBMS’ selected for review. 

In addition, we performed extensive manual security parameter checks on the 

Marine Safety Network database server to confirm the results of our scans and 

identify any additional security weaknesses. Upon completion of the tests, we 

provided the Coast Guard with technical reports detailing the specific 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 22 

vulnerabilities detected on the MISLE system and the actions needed for 

remediation. 

We conducted fieldwork at the Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, DC; 

the Coast Guard OSC facility in Martinsburg, WV; and, the OIG’s ATL. We 

conducted our audit between January and February 2005 under the authority 

of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Major OIG contributors to the audit 

are identified in Appendix F. 

Our principal points of contact for the audit are Frank Deffer, Assistant 

Inspector General for Information Technology Audits at (202) 254-4100; and 

Edward G. Coleman, Director, Information Security Audit Division at 

(202) 254-5444. 
Appendix B 

Management’s Response

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Page 23 
Appendix B 

Management’s Response

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 24 
Appendix B 

Management’s Response

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Page 25 
Appendix B 

Management’s Response

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 26 
Appendix C 

Vulnerabilities Identified and Addressed

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Page 27 

Number of 

Vulnerabilities Identified

Number of Vulnerabilities 

That Have Been Addressed

Server 

High 

Risk 

Medium 

Risk Total Corrected Planned Total 

Nu

A

Access Rights and Passwords 7 26 33 

13 

(39%) 

20 

(61%) 

33 

(100%) 

Configuration Management 1 20 21 

6 

(29%) 

14 

(67%) 

20 

(95%) 

-----------------------

11 6 17 

8 

(47%) 

1 

(6%) 

9 

(53%) 

---------- 1 2 3 0 

3 

(100%) 

3 

(100%) 

Total 20 54 74 

27 

(36%) 

38 

(51%) 

65 

(88%) 

Source: OIG table based on the results of technical testing and interviews with Coast Guard personnel.
Appendix D 

FISMA Metrics 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 28 

FISMA Requirements 

Title III of the E-Government Act, entitled FISMA, provides a comprehensive 

framework to ensure the effectiveness of security controls over information 

resources that support federal operations and assets.16 The agency’s security 

program should provide security for the information as well as the systems 

that support the operations and assets of the agency, including those provided 

or managed by another agency, contractor, or other source. 

To comply with OMB’s FISMA reporting requirements, we evaluated the 

major applications selected for this audit to determine whether DHS continues 

to make progress in implementing its agency-wide information security 

program. We collected information relative to certification and accreditation 

(C&A), system impact level determination, NIST SP 800-26 annual 

assessment, security control costs integrated into the life cycle of the system, 

assessment of E-authentication risks, specialized security training, and 

POA&Ms.17 

Our evaluation of MISLE shows that the Coast Guard has not implemented 

certain security management practices into its information security program, 

as required by FISMA. 

 

16 The E-Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347), signed into law on December 17, 2002, recognized the 

importance of information security to the economic and national security interests of the United States. 

17 As required by: OMB M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies, and NIST SP 800-63, Electronic 

Authentication Guideline.
Appendix D 

FISMA Metrics 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 29 

Table 5: FISMA Compliance Metrics 

FISMA Reporting Requirements 

Coast 

Guard 

(MISLE)

Notes 

Does the major application have a complete 

and current C&A, including a risk assessment 

and security plan? 

Yes 

The system has a current authority to operate, 

and the C&A documentation includes a 

security plan and a risk assessment. 

Has the major application’s impact level been 

determined according to Federal Information 

Processing Standard 199 criteria? 

Yes 

The loss of confidentiality, availability, or 

integrity of MISLE would have a high impact 

on the Coast Guard’s mission. 

Does the major application have a complete 

and current NIST SP 800-26 annual 

assessment? 

Yes A MISLE assessment was completed on 

October 11, 2004. 

Does the assessment indicate that security 

controls have been tested and evaluated in the 

last year? No 

Although vulnerability assessments are 

conducted quarterly, the MISLE system has 

not undergone a detailed configuration 

review in the past year. 

Does the assessment indicate that a 

contingency plan has been established and 

tested? No 

The assessment indicated that an IT 

contingency plan has been established and 

tested. However, the MISLE contingency 

plan is lacking key information and has not 

been tested in the past year. 

Have security control costs been integrated 

into the life cycle of the system? No 

Security control costs are being integrated 

into the life cycle for systems currently under 

development or undergoing certification and 

accreditation. 

Has an assessment of E-Authentication risk 

been performed for the major application? 

Not 

Applicable 

The MISLE system is only used by Coast 

Guard personnel. 

Have the system and database administrators 

obtained specialized security training? 

No 

The Coast Guard provides training 

opportunities to MISLE systems and 

database administrators, but does not provide 

mandatory, specialized security training for 

these personnel. 

Does the major application have any existing 

POA&Ms? No 

At the time of our review, POA&Ms had not 

been entered into the Trusted-Agent FISMA 

application. 

Source: OIG table based on interviews with Coast Guard personnel and analysis of database documentation.
Appendix E 

MISLE Architecture 

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Page 30 
Appendix E 

MISLE Architecture 

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Page 31 
Appendix F 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 32 

Information Security Audits Division

Edward G. Coleman, Director 

Patrick Nadon, Audit Manager 

Jason Bakelar, Audit Team Leader 

Chris Udoji, Auditor 

Steven Staats, Referencer 

Advanced Technology Division

Jim Lantzy, Director 

Michael Goodman, Security Engineer 
Appendix G 

Report Distribution 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical USCG Database 

Page 33 

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

United States Coast Guard, Commandant 

Executive Secretary 

General Counsel 

Chief Information Officer 

Chief Information Security Officer 

Public Affairs 

United States Coast Guard, Chief Information Officer 

United States Coast Guard, Audit Liaison 

Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Director, Compliance and Oversight Program 

Chief Information Officer Audit Liaison 

Office of Security 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress

Appropriate Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG 

web site at www.dhs.gov/oig.

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind 

of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations, call the OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to DHS Office of 

Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, Attention: Office of Investigations – 

Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, Washington, DC 20528; fax 

the complaint to (202) 254-4292; or e-mail DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.