RENDERED: MARCH 1, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2023-CA-0398-ME

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY AND 

PENNY COX, IN HER OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS TREASURER OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY APPELLANTS 

v. 

APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 18-CI-00627

AMELIA LONG; MARK METCALF, 

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

KENTUCKY STATE TREASURER; 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, 

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; 

KAREN DEVIN; RICHARD HARDY 

II; SHERRIE TURNER; AND 

TABITHA MARCUM APPELLEES 

AND

NO. 2023-CA-0411-ME

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, 

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 18-CI-00627
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AMELIA LONG, INDIVIDUALLY 

AND ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF 

OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED; 

KAREN DEVIN, INDIVIDUALLY 

AND ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF 

OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED; 

PENNY COX IN HER OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS TREASURER, 

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY; 

RICHARD HARDY, II, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF 

OF A CLASS OF OTHERS 

SIMILARLY SITUATED; SHERRIE 

TURNER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON 

BEHALF OF A CLASS OF OTHERS 

SIMILARLY SITUATED; TABITHA 

MARCUM, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON 

BEHALF OF A CLASS OF OTHERS 

SIMILARLY SITUATED; AND 

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING 

IN PART, AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, GOODWINE, AND JONES, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Appellants, the University of Kentucky (UK), Penny Cox, in 

her official capacity as Treasurer of UK, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 

Department of Revenue (Department), challenge the Franklin Circuit Court’s 

rulings on the issues of class certification and sovereign immunity. In an August 
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15, 2022 order granting partial judgment on the pleadings, the circuit court 

determined sovereign immunity did not apply to any of Appellees’ claims. In a 

March 28, 2023 order, the circuit court granted Appellees’ motion for class 

certification. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

BACKGROUND

Appellees Amelia Long, Karen Devin, Richard Hardy II, and Sherrie 

Turner are former patients of UK HealthCare; Appellee Tabitha Marcum is the 

parent of a minor child who was a patient at UK. Each Appellee was billed for the 

medical care they or their child received. Insurance or another payor did not cover 

at least a portion of each Appellee’s amount owed. UK sent each Appellee 

statements for the unpaid balances.

At all times relevant to this appeal,1 UK took additional steps to 

pursue payment in the event a patient’s balance remained unpaid. UK sent unpaid 

accounts to CKMS, an affiliated debt collection corporation, which would send 

additional notices to the patient. Should these efforts prove unsuccessful, CKMS 

would mail a final notice letter, a “Letter 8,” to the patient. The Letter 8 would 

inform the patient as to his or her right to contest the amount owed and how to 

1 As UK notes in its brief, UK stopped referring unpaid healthcare balances to the Commonwealth 

of Kentucky, Department of Revenue in 2020. In 2022, the General Assembly amended Kentucky 

Revised Statute (KRS) 131.130 to prohibit Department collection of debt for healthcare goods and 

services. See KRS 131.130(12). 
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initiate such contest. The contest procedure would include a hearing before a 

hearing officer. 

The Letter 8 also informed the patient that, should he or she fail to 

contest the amount owed, the balance would be referred to the Department for 

collection.2 KRS 45.238 empowers executive branch agencies3to “certify” debts, 

and, having done so, must refer their certified debts to the Department for 

collection. See KRS 45.238.

None of Appellees requested a hearing, and, therefore, each of their 

outstanding balances were referred to the Department for collection. The 

Department proceeded to collect the balances via wage garnishment, levies against 

bank accounts, and state income tax offsets. The Department imposed statutory 

interest and collection fees. All Appellees, except Marcum, entered voluntary 

payment plans with the Department. Pursuant to these agreements, the Department 

2 UK explains in its brief that referral to the Department is not the exclusive avenue should balances 

remain unpaid or unchallenged after CKMS sends out a Letter 8. Accounts ineligible for referral 

to the Department (which were those accounts held by a nonresident of Kentucky or whose 

information did not include a social security number, date of birth, or mailing address) were instead 

referred for collection to private companies. Only debts referred to the Department are at issue in 

this appeal.

3 KRS 45.237(1)(a) defines an “agency” as “an organizational unit or administrative body in the 

executive branch of state government as defined in KRS 12.010[.]” In University of Kentucky v. 

Moore, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded UK is “in the executive branch of government” 

but remanded to the circuit court to determine whether UK is entitled to refer debts to the 

Department as an executive branch agency pursuant to KRS 45.238. 599 S.W.3d 798, 810 (Ky. 

2019). This same issue is before the circuit court in the instant case, but is not before this Court 

in this interlocutory appeal.
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would agree to cease collection in exchange for regular payments toward the 

patient’s outstanding balance. 

Appellees filed the underlying lawsuit on June 19, 2018, on behalf of 

themselves and “a class of others similarly situated” against UK, UK Treasurer 

Susan Krauss in her official capacity, the Department, and Allison Ball in her 

official capacity as Kentucky State Treasurer. Record (R.) at 1. Central to their 

lawsuit, Appellees (1) argue UK is not an “agency” as defined by KRS 45.237 for 

the purpose of debt certification and referral under KRS 45.238 and, therefore, 

unlawfully referred Appellees’ medical debts to the Department; and (2) challenge 

these statutes and the Department’s debt collection procedures as violative of their 

due process rights under both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. 

Appellees also contest the Department’s application of collection fees. 

Appellees seek a variety of relief. In their second amended complaint, 

they request declarations that (1) UK may not legally refer debts to the Department 

for collection and that the Department may not engage in collection efforts; (2) that 

KRS 45.237 to 45.241 are unconstitutional, both facially and as applied; (3) that 

the Department was not entitled to impose its collection fees; (4) that Appellees 

and class members are entitled to an order and judgment directing the return of all 

unlawfully collected funds; and (5) that Appellees are entitled to “the equitable 

remedy of restitution of their moneys from the Defendants.” R. at 657-58. They 
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also seek an order directing the Kentucky State Treasurer and the UK Treasurer to 

return Appellees’ and other class members’ funds, as well as prejudgment interest, 

and costs and attorneys’ fees. R. at 658. 

On August 15, 2022, the circuit court entered an order granting partial 

judgment on the pleadings to Appellees. Therein, the circuit court ruled on three 

threshold issues in the case, including rulings on the merits of Appellees’ suit 

regarding the meaning and application of KRS 45.237, 45.238, and 45.241. 

Relevant to this appeal, the circuit court determined UK and the Department were 

not entitled to sovereign immunity for any of Appellees’ claims.

On March 28, 2023, the circuit court entered an order granting 

Appellees’ motion for class certification. In their motion, Appellees requested 

certification of the following class:

All persons who, within ten (10) years preceding the filing 

of the Complaint herein, were subjected to actions taken 

or threatened by Defendants to collect UK HealthCare 

accounts pursuant to KRS 45.237 to KRS 45.238 and KRS 

45.241, or any other statutory authority, and who had 

money seized or collected from them by the Department 

of Revenue as a result or consequence of such actions, 

including through payment plans which the class members 

entered into under threat of Department of Revenue 

collection activities.

R. at 1500.4

4 We note the circuit court defined the class slightly differently than Appellees requested in their 

motion. The circuit court certified and defined the class as follows:
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UK and the Department now appeal. 

ANALYSIS

“[T]he general rule in appellate procedure is that only a trial court’s 

final orders are appealable.” Hensley v. Haynes Trucking, LLC, 549 S.W.3d 430, 

436 (Ky. 2018) (citing Breathitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883, 886 

(Ky. 2009)). However, “select issues” may be appealed in the absence of a final 

order. Id. (citing Prater, 292 S.W.3d at 886; Baker v. Fields, 543 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 

2018)). Class certification is one such issue. CR 23.06 (“An order granting or 

denying class action certification is appealable within 10 days after the order is 

entered.”). Sovereign immunity is another, because immunity “entitles its 

possessor to be free ‘from the burdens of defending the action, not merely . . . from 

liability.’” Prater, 292 S.W.3d at 886 (citing Rowan Cnty. v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 

469, 474 (Ky. 2006); Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 

128, 135 (Ky. 2004)) (modification original). 

All persons who, since January 1, 2009, were subjected to actions 

taken or threatened by Defendants to collect on health care accounts 

with the University of Kentucky, including Kentucky Medical 

Services Foundation accounts, pursuant to KRS 45.237, 45.238, 

45.241, or any other statutory authority, and who did have money 

collected from them by the Department of Revenue as a result or 

consequence of such actions.

R. at 1840. 
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Appellees argue the sovereign immunity issue is not properly before 

this Court for our review. We disagree. The circuit court plainly ruled on 

sovereign immunity as a threshold issue in this dispute in its August 15, 2022 

order. The Department indicated it would raise the immunity issue in its notice of 

appeal. And, analysis of both the interlocutory issues of class certification and 

sovereign immunity will promote efficient and economic resolution of this matter.

Because the circuit court has not entered a final judgment, our review 

in this interlocutory appeal is limited to the issues of class certification and 

sovereign immunity. This requires us to proceed with caution. “We must focus 

our analysis on th[ese] limited issue[s] and in so doing scrupulously respect the 

limitations of the crossover between” an analysis on the merits of Appellees’ case 

and the issues raised on this interlocutory appeal. Hensley, 549 S.W.3d at 436. 

While we note the circuit court has made partial rulings on the merits of Appellees’ 

case, those issues are beyond the scope of our review. We will discuss the issues 

of class certification and sovereign immunity in turn.

I. Class Certification

Standard of Review

Appellate courts review class action certifications for abuse of 

discretion. Sowers v. Atkins, 646 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Ky. 1983). A circuit court has 

abused its discretion when its “decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or 
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unsupported by [sound] legal principles.” Lawson v. Lawson, 290 S.W.3d 691, 

694 (Ky. App. 2009) (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 

575, 581 (Ky. 2000)). “Under this standard, we review the record and the ruling 

while giving deference to the trial court’s factual findings and rulings because the 

trial court is in the best position to evaluate the evidence before it.” Nebraska All. 

Realty Co. v. Brewer, 529 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Ky. App. 2017) (citing Miller v. 

Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 917 (Ky. 2004)). The abuse of discretion standard 

requires appellate courts to be “highly deferential” to a circuit court’s decision. Id. 

at 315. “An abuse of discretion exists when the reviewing court is firmly 

convinced that a mistake has been made.” Walters v. Moore, 121 S.W.3d 210, 215 

(Ky. App. 2003) (quoting Romstadt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 

1995)). 

Class Certification Analysis

“Taken together, [CR 23.01 and 23.02] provide a comprehensive 

roadmap to class certification.” Swearington v. Hagyard Davidson McGee 

Assocs., PLLC, 641 S.W.3d 186, 195 (Ky. App. 2022). These rules synthesize to 

form a two-step analysis. First, each of CR 23.01’s prerequisites must be met and, 

second, one of CR 23.02’s three conditions must apply. Manning v. Liberty Tire 

Servs. of Ohio, LLC, 577 S.W.3d 102, 111 (Ky. App. 2019). If one of CR 23.01’s 

requirements is not satisfied, or if none of CR 23.02’s requirements are satisfied, 
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then class certification should be denied. Id. “The party seeking certification bears 

the burden of proof.” Summit Med. Grp. Inc. v. Coleman, 599 S.W.3d 445, 449 

(Ky. App. 2019) (citations omitted).

A. CR 23.01

As CR 23.01 provides:

Subject to the provisions of Rule 23.02, one or more 

members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 

parties on behalf of all only if (a) the class is so numerous 

that joinder of all members is impracticable, (b) there are 

questions of law or fact common to the class, (c) the claims 

or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 

claims or defenses of the class, and (d) the representative 

parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 

the class.

CR 23.01. “The four requirements in CR 23.01 to maintaining a class action can 

be summed up as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 

representation requirements.” Hensley, 549 S.W.3d at 443-44 (citing Brewer, 529 

S.W.3d at 311) (emphasis original). Because Appellants do not challenge the 

numerosity of Appellees’ proposed class, we will limit our discussion to the 

remaining three.

1. Commonality

Commonality exists where “questions of law or fact are common 

among the class members.” Brewer, 529 S.W.3d at 312; CR 23.01. Commonality 

is not the same as identity; “[i]t is unnecessary to have a ‘complete identity of facts 
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relating to all members as long as there is a common nucleus of operative facts.’” 

Manning, 577 S.W.3d at 113 (quoting Wiley v. Adkins, 48 S.W.3d 20, 23 (Ky. 

2001)). Indeed, commonality “does not require that all questions of law or fact be 

common.” Wiley, 48 S.W.3d at 23. Instead, the relevant inquiry is “[w]hether the 

class plaintiffs’ claims ‘depend upon a common contention . . . that is capable of 

class wide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will 

resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one 

stroke.’” Hensley, 549 S.W.3d at 443 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 

564 U.S. 338, 350, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011)) (modification 

original).

The circuit court identified several considerations common to the 

class. At core, the circuit court noted Appellants used KRS 45.237 to 45.238 to 

institute collection actions. It noted the Department used this authority to collect 

from Appellees’ bank accounts, wages, and tax refunds, unless the Appellee began 

making payments himself or herself. And, the circuit court listed several questions 

common to each Appellee and class member, including whether UK had statutory 

authority to refer these debts to the Department for collection and whether the 

Department had the statutory authority to collect those debts; these questions will 

be met with the same defenses from Appellants.
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In our view, the commonality requirement has been met in the instant 

case. We agree with Appellees that UK and the Department engaged in common 

actions to collect unpaid balances: after repeated notices, the final “Letter 8” is 

sent, and eligible accounts are referred to the Department for collection should the 

Letter 8 prove ineffective. Unpaid balances were either obtained forcefully or by 

agreement upon the debtor’s entry into a payment plan. Any ruling by the circuit 

court as to the authority of Appellants to collect unpaid debts in this manner would 

indeed result in class wide resolution of that issue for each class member. The 

circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining the commonality 

requirement had been met.

2. Typicality

“Unlike commonality, which focuses on the group characteristics such 

as the relationship of common facts and legal issues related to the class as a whole, 

typicality examines the individual characteristics of the named plaintiffs in relation 

to the class.” Manning, 577 S.W.3d at 114. Claims or defenses are typical “if they 

arise from the same event, practice, or course of conduct that gives rise to the 

claims of other class members and if the claims of the representative are based on 

the same legal theory.” Hensley, 549 S.W.3d at 443 (citation omitted). In other 

words, the legal claims of the class representatives and the individual class 

members must share a “sufficient nexus[.]” Brewer, 529 S.W.3d at 312 (quoting 
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Piazza v. Ebsco Indus., Inc., 273 F.3d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 2001)). “As with 

commonality, the claims need not be identical, and ‘cases challenging the same 

unlawful conduct which affects both the named plaintiffs and the putative class 

usually satisfy the typicality requirement irrespective of the varying fact patterns 

underlying the individual claims.’” Id. at 313 (quoting Baby Neal for & by Kanter 

v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir. 1994)). 

Appellees claims indeed arise from the same event, practice, or course 

of conduct that give rise to other class members’ claims: UK and the Department’s 

practice of referring unpaid medical debt for collection purposes, which Appellees 

assert is done without statutory authority to do so. As discussed in our analysis of 

the commonality requirement, the manner in which UK and the Department 

interfaced with Appellees was fundamentally the same: repeated notices, a final 

notice, referral to the Department, and then either institution of collection action or 

a payment plan. The method of communication with each class member prior to 

UK’s referral to the department, and the Department’s course of conduct following 

referral, was fundamentally the same across Appellees and class members.

Further, Appellees’ claims each rest on the same legal theories.

Chiefly, Appellees argue that UK lacks authority to refer its debts to the 

Department because it is not a KRS 45.237 agency, and that KRS 45.237 and 

45.238 are violative of both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. While 
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trivial differences exist between each Appellee’s particular circumstances – for 

instance, each Appellee except Marcum entered a payment plan with the 

Department – none of these differences frustrate typicality. Appellees’ claims are 

typical of those of the class, and the circuit court ‘s conclusion in this regard was 

not an abuse of discretion.

3. Adequacy of Representation

Finally, class representatives must “fairly and adequately protect the 

interests of the class.” Manning, 577 S.W.3d at 115; CR 23.01. The adequacy 

requirement contains two considerations: “1) the representative must have 

common interests with unnamed members of the class[;] and 2) it must appear that 

the representatives will vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through 

qualified counsel.” Brewer, 529 S.W.3d at 313 (quoting Senter v. Gen. Motors 

Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir. 1976)). Naturally, this requirement overlaps 

with the commonality and typicality requirements; how could class members 

ensure named plaintiffs will adequately represent their interests if they do not share 

common questions of law or fact, or if the claims of the named plaintiffs’ claims 

are not typical of those of the class? However, adequacy additionally requires us 

to determine whether named plaintiffs have any significant conflicts of interests 

with other class members. Id. (citing Hensley, 549 S.W.3d at 443). While this 

prong ordinarily requires our examination of both named class representatives and 
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class counsel, id., Appellants do not challenge the adequacy of their opponents’ 

counsel. Therefore, our inquiry will focus upon Appellees themselves.

As already stated, Appellees and other class members were subject to 

Appellants’ collection procedures, and it is these procedures which Appellees 

challenge. This challenge will require resolution of questions of law common to 

all class members, named and unnamed. Accordingly, Appellees have common 

interests with the unnamed class members sufficient to certify the class action. 

Further, Appellees have no conflicts of interest with other class members which 

would prevent Appellees from adequately representing the class. The circuit 

court’s ruling on adequacy does not reflect an abuse of discretion.

B. CR 23.02

Again, one of CR 23.02’s three requirements must be met for class 

certification to be appropriate. Appellees moved for, and were granted, class 

certification under CR 23.02(c). Accordingly, our review will be limited to 

whether class certification under CR 23.02(c) was appropriate.

CR 23.02(c) contains two requirements for class certification: 

predominance and superiority. See CR 23.02(c); Manning, 577 S.W.3d at 116 (“A 

CR 23.02(c) class must satisfy a two-part test of predominance and superiority.”). 

As for the predominance prong, the rule requires that “the questions of law or fact 

common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting 
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only individual members[.]” CR 23.02(c). “[I]n contrast to CR 23.01’s 

commonality requirement, CR 23.02(c)’s predominance criterion is far more 

demanding.” Manning, 577 S.W.3d at 118 (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2250, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997)). 

The predominance requirement is satisfied “if resolution of some of 

the legal or factual questions for class-wide resolution can be achieved using 

generalized proof, and if these particular issues are more substantial than those 

requiring individualized proof.” Id. at 116 (citing Thacker v. Chesapeake 

Appalachia, L.L.C., 259 F.R.D. 262, 268 (E.D. Ky. 2009)). Conversely, it has not 

been satisfied if the claims of individual class members would give rise to 

idiosyncratic issues which “would detract from the benefit of a conglomerate 

approach.” Id. While this requirement may be met even if unique issues apply to 

individual plaintiffs, “[t]he predominance inquiry ‘asks whether the common, 

aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the 

non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual issues.’” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 

Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045, 194 L. Ed. 2d 124 (2016) 

(quoting 2 W. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:49, pp. 195-96 (5th 

ed. 2012)).

In Manning v. Liberty Tire Services of Ohio, LLC, a tire fire at a 

facility operated by Liberty Tire Services deposited soot, ash, and other 
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particulates onto surrounding neighborhoods. Manning, 577 S.W.3d at 108. An 

estimated 2,500 individuals were exposed. Id. at 109. The appellants, residents of 

the area, sought class certification. Id. They sought certification of two subclasses; the first related to a shelter-in-place order, and the second related to 

particulate smoke exposure. Id. The circuit court determined the CR 23.02(c) 

requirements were not met, and a panel of this court agreed. Id. at 108-09. The 

individualized questions which would have to be resolved for each plaintiff 

included:

whether soot and ash actually landed on the property of the 

individual class member living within the geographical 

boundaries of the plume; whether the source of the soot 

and ash was the Appellees’ fire; whether soot and ash 

caused damage; whether the [shelter-in-place] order 

impacted the individual putative class member’s ability to 

enjoy his or her property, and even whether the individual 

plaintiffs obeyed the [shelter-in-place] order.

Id. at 117. Though common questions existed, several individualized questions 

related to causation, impact, and damages would require separate, often differing 

answers as to each appellant. Id. For that reason, we determined the circuit court 

did not abuse its discretion in determining common issues did not predominate 

individual issues. Id. at 118.

The issues relating to the individual class members in Manning 

contrast with those presented in the present appeal. Here, Appellees challenge an 

identical pattern of conduct in which Appellants engaged for each class member. 
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Unlike the appellants in Manning, where several individualized questions of fact 

regarding pollutant exposure would have frustrated resolution of a class action, the 

instant case presents a much higher degree of uniformity. The communications 

and notices UK sent each class member were pursuant to a standardized procedure. 

The Department’s methods of seeking repayment of referred debts took one of two 

forms: collection or a payment plan. And, the legal challenges pertinent to each 

class member are the same, as detailed previously. While some variation exists 

between the circumstances relevant to each Appellee and class member, the 

common questions of law and fact predominate. The circuit court did not abuse its 

discretion in this conclusion.

Second, CR 23.02(c) requires class action to be “superior to other 

available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” CR 

23.02(c). The rule provides four “matters pertinent to” the superiority inquiry:

(i) the interest of members of the class in individually 

controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; 

(ii) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 

controversy already commenced by or against members of 

the class; (iii) the desirability or undesirability of 

concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular 

forum; (iv) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the 

management of a class action.

CR 23.02(c). In short, “[t]he superiority requirement asks the court to balance, in 

terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against those of 

alternative available methods of adjudication.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. America 
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Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 316 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

As the circuit court found, the typical class member incurred 

relatively minor damages, which, when weighed against the expense required for 

an individual class member to litigate his or her claims separately, would promote 

interest in the resolution of this matter via class action. It found a class action 

would promote efficiency because controlling issues common to each class 

member would be resolved at once rather than through separate actions which 

could number into the hundreds or thousands. We cannot say these considerations 

constitute an abuse of discretion by the circuit court in determining whether a class 

action would be the superior vehicle to adjudicate this controversy. 

In sum, we detect no reversible error in the circuit court’s decision to 

certify this class. As the circuit court found, questions of law or fact are common 

across class members, Appellees’ claims are typical of the class, and Appellees 

would adequately represent class interests. Further, it found common issues 

predominate over individual issues, and a class action would be the superior 

method of resolution of this dispute. None of these conclusions demonstrate an 

abuse of discretion, and we therefore affirm the circuit court’s order granting class 

certification.
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II. Sovereign Immunity5

Standard of Review

Whether sovereign immunity applies is a question of law. Ohio v. 

Great Lakes Minerals, LLC, 597 S.W.3d 169, 171 (Ky. 2019) (citing Rowan Cnty. 

v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Ky. 2006)). Questions of law are reviewed de 

novo. Id. (citing Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell Cnty. Coal Corp., 

238 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Ky. 2007)). 

Sovereign Immunity Analysis

Before we begin our review, we note the similarity between this 

appeal and its companion consolidated appeal, University of Kentucky, et al. v. 

Kimberly Bennett, et al., No. 2022-CA-1276-MR, Commonwealth of Kentucky, et 

al. v. Kimberly Bennett, et al., No. 2022-CA-1321-MR, and Commonwealth of 

Kentucky, Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Bennett, et al., No. 2022-CA-1321-MR. 

Therein, the same circuit court determined sovereign immunity was waived for 

suits challenging referral of educational debts held by public educational 

5

“Sovereign immunity” and “governmental immunity” are different concepts. Governmental 

immunity is derived from sovereign immunity. Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 519 (Ky. 2001) 

(citing 57 AM.JUR.2D Municipal, County, School and State Tort Liability § 10 (2001)). “However, 

to the extent that the agency is performing a governmental function, as a state university does, its 

governmental immunity is functionally the same as sovereign immunity.” Furtula v. Univ. of 

Kentucky, 438 S.W.3d 303, 305 n.1 (Ky. 2014) (citing Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 519). Because these 

immunities are “functionally the same” in the context of this appeal, id., and the terms are often 

used interchangeably, see Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 519, we will refer to the form of immunity at issue 

in this appeal as “sovereign immunity.”
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institutions to the Department via the same KRS 45.237 et seq. procedure. 

However, the circuit court identified a different sovereign immunity waiver in 

Bennett than it did in the present appeal. Therefore, our analysis herein will cover 

much of the same ground as in Bennett, but will not be identical.

“Sovereign immunity is a bedrock component of the American 

governmental ideal, and is a holdover from the earliest days of the Commonwealth, 

having been brought over from the English common law.” Caneyville Volunteer 

Fire Dept. v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 799 (Ky. 2009). 

Legal actions may only be maintained against the Commonwealth where immunity 

has been waived. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 518 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 

THE LAW OF TORTS § 895B(1) (A.L.I. 1979); 72 AM.JUR.2D States, Territories, and 

Dependencies § 99 (1974)). 

Immunity is not simply a defense. Where it applies, it “affords the 

state absolute immunity from suit[.]” Transit Auth. of River City v. Bibelhauser, 

432 S.W.3d 171, 173 (Ky. App. 2013). This means, rather than simply absolving 

the state from liability, the immune party is free “from the burden of defending 

oneself altogether.” Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d at 135 (quoting Fralin & Waldron, Inc. 

v. Henrico Cnty., Va., 474 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D.C. Va. 1979)). By extension, 

those afforded sovereign immunity do not have to incur the expenses arising from 

trial and discovery. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S.
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Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)). Indeed, “the essence of absolute 

immunity is its possessor’s entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a 

civil damages action.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 

2815, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985) (citations omitted). 

UK and its officers who were sued in their official capacities are 

subject to the protections of sovereign immunity, so long as immunity has not been 

waived. “The state universities of this Commonwealth, including the University of 

Kentucky, are state agencies that enjoy the benefits and protection of governmental 

immunity except where it has been explicitly waived by the legislature.” Furtula, 

438 S.W.3d at 305; see also Withers v. Univ. of Kentucky, 939 S.W.2d 340, 344 

(Ky. 1997) (“[The] University of Kentucky is entitled to sovereign immunity.”). 

And because the Commonwealth is the real party against which relief is sought, 

immunity “extends to public officials sued in their representative (official) 

capacities[.]” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 518 (citations omitted). 

“[T]he granting of waiver is a matter exclusively legislative.” 

Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 344. “It is an inherent attribute of a sovereign state that 

precludes the maintaining of any suit against the state unless the state has given its 

consent or otherwise waived its immunity.” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 517 (citing 

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 895B(1) (A.L.I. 1979); 72 

AM.JUR.2D States, Territories, and Dependencies § 99 (1974)). Waiver of 
-23-

immunity must be “specific and explicit[.]” Commonwealth v. Whitworth, 74 

S.W.3d 695 (Ky. 2002) (citing Withers, 939 S.W.2d 340). Purported statutory 

waivers are strictly construed in favor of the government, and waiver will only be 

identified where “the intention of the legislature to effect this object is clearly 

expressed.” Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t Bd. of Health v. Bd. of Trustees of 

Univ. of Kentucky, 879 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Ky. 1994) (citations omitted). Waivers 

of immunity are construed narrowly. Commonwealth, Just. & Pub. Safety Cabinet, 

Dep’t of Kentucky State Police v. Gaither, 539 S.W.3d 667, 676 (Ky. 2018). “We 

will find waiver only where stated ‘by the most express language or by such 

overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other 

reasonable construction.’” Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 346 (quoting Murray v. Wilson 

Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S. Ct. 458, 464-65, 53 L. Ed. 742 (1909)) 

(modification original). 

In University of Kentucky v. Moore, the Kentucky Supreme Court 

recognized exceptions to sovereign immunity for declaratory and injunctive relief. 

599 S.W.3d 798, 811 (Ky. 2019) (citing Beshear v. Haydon Bridge Co., Inc., 416 

S.W.3d 280, 293-94 (Ky. 2013)). As noted above, Appellees seek a variety of 

declaratory and injunctive relief. However, as explained below, application of 

sovereign immunity requires a closer look at the nature of the specific relief 

sought. 
-24-

The circuit court determined sovereign immunity does not apply 

because Appellees do not actually seek monetary damages, but instead seek the 

return of money to which UK and the Department were never entitled. The circuit 

court determined the funds at issue “never vested with the state treasury[,]” R. at 

1366, and, therefore, Appellees actually seek a return of their own private funds 

rather than withdrawal of public funds. And, the circuit court finds further support 

for its blanket waiver in KRS 45.111, which provides that “[a]ny funds received 

into the State Treasury which are later determined not to be due to the state may be 

refunded to the person who paid such funds into the Treasury.” KRS 45.111.

The cases that the circuit court cites for its distinction between 

lawsuits seeking return of private funds as opposed to payment out of public funds

– Ross v. Gross, 188 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1945), Barnes v. Levy Bros., 175 S.W.2d 

495 (Ky. 1943), Barnes v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Company, 175 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. 

1943), and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Lexington, 76 S.W.2d 894 

(Ky. 1934) – make no mention of sovereign immunity or any waiver thereof. 

Instead, the circuit court provides these cases as an analogy to the relief sought in 

the present case. For instance, in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Great Atlantic 

sued the city of Lexington for its payment of $2,106.20 in cigarette license taxes 

which no ordinance required. 76 S.W.2d at 894. Lexington argued “that there is 

no implied promise of a municipality to refund money paid to it and that there is no 
-25-

authority of a statute – the source of all its powers – for such refund.” Id. at 895. 

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, then the highest court in Kentucky, concluded 

that “[m]oney paid without consideration and which in law, honor, or good 

conscience was not payable ought in law, honor, and good conscience to be 

recoverable, and that rule applicable to transactions between individuals should be 

generally made applicable to municipalities and other governments.” Id. We find 

these cases less helpful to resolve the sovereign immunity issue than did the circuit 

court.

Instead, more recent jurisprudence directly discusses the sovereign 

immunity issue and provides more helpful guidance. Ultimately, upon exploration 

of this jurisprudence and its application to the various relief Appellees seek, we 

conclude, in sum, that sovereign immunity bars monetary relief but does not bar 

declaratory relief. However, where a plaintiff seeks a declaration that they are 

entitled to monetary relief –as Appellees seek here – such monetary relief is 

disguised as declaratory relief and is similarly barred. And, because Appellees 

have not yet obtained any final judgment declaring that Appellants’ debt referral 

and collection scheme is contrary to law for any of the reasons that Appellees 

argue, the question of whether sovereign immunity bars monetary relief sought 

pursuant to such declaratory judgment is unripe.
-26-

A. Sovereign Immunity Bars Appellees’ Requested Monetary Relief and 

Declarations that Appellees are Entitled to Monetary Relief.

The circuit court believes Beshear v. Haydon Bridge Co. Inc., 416 

S.W.3d 280 (Haydon Bridge II)

6

to be so factually disanalogous to the present case 

that it provides no guidance. We disagree. Haydon Bridge II is quite instructive 

and makes plain that the nature of the relief which a plaintiff seeks must be closely 

examined to determine whether sovereign immunity applies. Further still, Haydon 

Bridge II is helpful for its discussion of KRS 45.111 – the statute upon which the 

circuit court partially relies in concluding sovereign immunity does not apply. 

In Haydon Bridge II, the plaintiffs contested the suspension of 

appropriations from the General Fund to the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation 

Funding Commission’s Benefit Reserve Fund (BRF) and transferring money from 

the BRF to other state funds. 416 S.W.3d at 283-84. The Governor argued 

sovereign immunity barred: (1) injunctive relief prohibiting movement of funds 

out of the BRF into the General Fund or to other state agencies; and (2) 

“retroactive injunctive relief” returning “any and all monies that had been 

6 Haydon Bridge II is the second appeal arising from a lawsuit filed by Haydon Bridge Company, 

Inc., Greater Louisville Auto Dealers Association, Kentucky Automobile Dealers Association, M 

& M Cartage Co., Inc., Springfield Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc., and Usher Transport, Inc.

against the Governor and the State Budget Director. Haydon Bridge II, 416 S.W.3d at 284. The 

plaintiffs requested a declaration that provisions in budget bills suspending an annual appropriation 

from the General Fund to the BRF and transferring money out of the BRF were unconstitutional. 

The Kentucky Supreme Court determined the suspension of appropriations to the BRF was 

constitutional, but that the bills’ transfers of money out of the BRF were not. Id. The second 

appeal resulted from the plaintiffs’ amended complaint upon remand. Id. at 285-86.
-27-

transferred from the BRF to the General Fund in the decade from 2000-2010.” Id. 

at 284.

The plaintiffs in Haydon Bridge II argued KRS 45.111 waived 

sovereign immunity against their claims because it provides for repayment of funds 

not due to the state. Id. at 289. However, the workers’ compensation insurance 

premiums at issue were “literally ‘due to the state’” because they were lawfully 

subject to assessment. Id. And, because the plaintiffs did not seek a refund of their 

premiums directly but, rather, requested the amounts moved from the BRF be 

restored, the Kentucky Supreme Court determined KRS 45.111 did not apply to the 

funds at issue. Id. at 289-91. Though the Supreme Court did determine that KRS 

45.111 supplied “a limited waiver of sovereign immunity,” id. at 291, it was not 

required to explain the parameters of this waiver due to the inapplicability of KRS 

45.111. This marks an important distinction between Haydon Bridge II and the 

instant appeal, as Appellees assert the amounts collected for healthcare services 

were not due to the state. 

Appellees seek two kinds of relief to which Haydon Bridge II’s 

distinction between prospective declaratory relief and retroactive injunctive relief 

applies. They seek prospective declaratory relief in the form of a declaration that 

Appellants’ referral and collection program is illegal, whether statutorily, 

constitutionally, or both. They also seek the sort of “retroactive injunctive relief” 
-28-

that Haydon Bridge II contemplates in the form of an order directing the return of 

their money. The Supreme Court determined the retroactive injunctive relief at 

issue in Haydon Bridge II – an order directing money transferred out of the BRF be

returned to it – is barred by sovereign immunity “regardless of whether it is labeled 

a retroactive injunction, equitable restitution, or some other type of remedy.” Id. at 

294-95. This is because such relief “would require the Commonwealth to 

withdraw monies from the General Fund, an action the Commonwealth has not 

consented to through waiver of its sovereign immunity.” Id. at 294. 

In its discussion of sovereign immunity, the circuit court in the 

present appeal concluded that KRS 45.111 “confirms that the funds paid into the 

Treasury that are not due to the state should be refunded[.]” R. at 1367. While 

Haydon Bridge II mentions that KRS 45.111 provides a limited waiver of 

sovereign immunity, 416 S.W.3d at 291, the Supreme Court was not required to

explain the parameters of this waiver. However, we cannot read Haydon Bridge II

to arrive at two opposite conclusions: that sovereign immunity does not apply to 

claims for monetary relief – including claims for equitable restitution or for an 

injunction ordering the return of money – while also concluding sovereign 

immunity applies to relief which would require withdrawal from the state treasury. 

See Haydon Bridge II, 416 S.W.3d at 292-94.
-29-

Central to the circuit court’s conclusions that sovereign immunity 

does not apply here is its determination that Appellees’ collected money had not 

vested with the Commonwealth. This is indeed an important factual distinction 

between this case and Haydon Bridge II. In Ross – a case upon which the circuit 

court relies and the Supreme Court discusses in Haydon Bridge II – money was 

paid into the state treasury pursuant to a statute requiring such payment should the 

population of a county total 75,000 or greater. Ross, 188 S.W.2d at 476. Because 

Harlan County had a population of less than 75,000, plaintiffs sought the return of 

money mistakenly paid pursuant to that statute. Id. Ultimately, the Ross court 

concluded that “since the money belonged to the appellees or the County, its 

payment into the State Treasury did not vest the State with title thereto or a right to 

its custody” and, therefore, that Section 230 of the Kentucky Constitution’s 

prohibition against drawing money from the State Treasury absent an appropriation 

made by law did not apply. Id. at 477.

Ross makes no mention of sovereign immunity, however. In effect, 

therefore, the circuit court concluded that, because the source of Appellees’ relief 

would be repayment of their own money rather than withdrawal from the state 

treasury, sovereign immunity does not apply. We disagree, as sovereign immunity 

is not waived simply because relief would not be drawn from the state treasury. 

Again, sovereign immunity “is an inherent attribute of a sovereign state that 
-30-

precludes the maintaining of any suit against the state unless the state has given its 

consent or otherwise waived its immunity.” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 517. 

Because sovereign immunity is an inherent attribute of the state, 

Sections 230 and 231 of the Kentucky Constitution do not imply that sovereign 

immunity does not apply to suits against the Commonwealth seeking to recover 

funds from sources other than the treasury.

[C]ontrary to assertions sometimes found in our case 

law, Sections 230 and 231 of our Constitution are not the 

source of sovereign immunity in Kentucky, but are 

provisions that permit the General Assembly to waive the 

Commonwealth's inherent immunity either by direct 

appropriation of money from the state treasury (Section 

230) and/or by specifying where and in what manner the 

Commonwealth may be sued (Section 231).

Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 524. The characterization of the money collected from 

Appellees as having vested with the Commonwealth or not is not relevant to the 

sovereign immunity issue. Because there has been no direct appropriation 

directing the return of Appellees’ money, and, as discussed above, the general 

assembly has not waived sovereign immunity against suits seeking repayment of 

money wrongfully paid – by enacting KRS 45.111 or otherwise –sovereign 

immunity bars Appellees’ requested relief in the form of an order directing the 

return of the money at issue.

As for Appellees’ requested declarations that they are entitled to an 

order and judgment which returns the collected funds, as well as to the “equitable 
-31-

remedy of restitution,” R. at 657-58, we conclude such relief is monetary relief 

disguised as declaratory relief. The rationale in Haydon Bridge II applies: we 

must look to the nature of the requested declarations to determine whether 

sovereign immunity prohibits it. The Kentucky Supreme Court determined 

requests for equitable restitution and retroactive injunctive relief were effectively 

requests for monetary damages, and therefore barred. By extension, Appellees’ 

requested declarations that they are entitled to an order and judgment returning 

money they paid and that they are entitled to equitable restitution is also barred. 

Therefore, Appellees’ requested monetary relief – both their requests 

for injunctive relief and those requests for declaratory relief discussed above – is 

barred by sovereign immunity and the circuit court erred in applying a blanket 

waiver of sovereign immunity.

B. Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar Appellees’ Remaining Requested 

Declaratory Relief.

Appellees seek other declarations from the circuit court. They seek 

declarations that UK is not statutorily authorized to refer debt to the Department 

for collections, that the challenged KRS Chapter 45 referral and collection scheme 

is unconstitutional both facially and as applied, and that the Department was not 

entitled to impose collection fees. Rather than requests for monetary relief, these 

declarations, if granted, would declare Appellees’ legal rights, and sovereign 

immunity does not bar such relief.
-32-

The distinction again lies in the nature of the requested relief. “[A] 

declaratory judgment action is not a claim for damages, but rather it is a request 

that the plaintiff’s rights under the law be declared.” Commonwealth v. Kentucky 

Ret. Sys., 396 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Ky. 2013). “There is no harm to state resources 

from a declaratory judgment.” Id. Despite the above discussion of sovereign 

immunity in relation to money damages, “[w]e do not have a government that is 

beyond scrutiny.” Id. at 839. Rather, the government is “subject to appropriate 

scrutiny[,]” because “[i]f sovereign immunity can be used to prevent the state, 

through its agencies, from being required to act in accordance with the law, then 

lawlessness results.” Id. 

The Kentucky Declaratory Judgment Act, found in KRS Chapter 418, 

contemplates that a declaratory judgment may be obtained even if other kinds of 

relief are foreclosed:

In any action in a court of record of this Commonwealth 

having general jurisdiction wherein it is made to appear 

that an actual controversy exists, the plaintiff may ask for 

a declaration of rights, either alone or with other relief; and 

the court may make a binding declaration of rights,

whether or not consequential relief is or could be asked.

KRS 418.040. The Declaratory Judgment Act “is intended to be remedial in 

nature, and its purpose is to make courts more serviceable to the people by way of 

settling controversies and affording relief from uncertainty and insecurity with 
-33-

respect to rights, duties and relations.” Mammoth Med., Inc. v. Bunnell, 265 

S.W.3d 205, 209 (Ky. 2008).

The same statutory referral and collection program challenged in the 

present appeal was at issue in the recent University of Kentucky v. Moore, 599 

S.W.3d 798. In the exact manner as the present appeal, UK certified healthcare 

debt and referred it to the Department for collection using the KRS 45.237 et seq. 

mechanism. 599 S.W.3d at 800-01. Ultimately, and unlike the current case, 

Moore amended her complaint to only seek declaratory relief. Id. at 801-02. 

Moore therefore did not seek monetary relief, and instead requested the following 

declaration:

UK and UK HealthCare may not legally refer Moore’s 

debt to the Enterprise Collections Office for collection and 

consequently the Department of Revenue and/or the 

Enterprise Collections Office may not legally undertake 

efforts to collect debt owed to UK, including efforts such 

as garnishing Moore's bank accounts, wages and tax 

refunds.

Id. at 801 (footnotes omitted). 

Relevant to the current appeal, the Supreme Court determined 

Moore’s declaratory relief was not barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 810. 

Consistent with Retirement Systems, the Supreme Court determined a declaratory 

judgment action may be sustained “when a person’s rights are affected by a statute 

or other government regulation.” Id. It noted that, following a declaratory 
-34-

judgment, “further relief based upon that declaration may be granted whenever 

necessary or proper” whether in the same proceeding or by separate action. Id. 

(citing KRS 418.055). And, whether relief derived from a declaratory judgment 

will be or may be pursued, “declaratory relief is not predicated on whether 

associated future consequential relief may be requested.” Id. at 812. 

Therefore, Appellees’ requested declaratory relief – except for that 

relief identified previously as being, in truth, monetary relief – is not barred by 

sovereign immunity. Though the circuit court erred in exempting Appellees’ 

claims from sovereign immunity on a wholesale basis, it did not err in exempting 

Appellees’ requested declaratory relief.

C. Whether or Not Sovereign Immunity Bars Monetary Relief Flowing from 

a Declaratory Judgment is an Unripe Issue.

Both Moore and Retirement Systems are distinct from the present 

appeal in an important respect: here, Appellees seek relief other than declaratory 

relief, while the plaintiffs in Moore and Retirement Systems only sought 

declaratory relief. Id. at 801-02, Ret. Sys., 396 S.W.3d at 836. However, 

sovereign immunity bars the monetary relief Appellees immediately request but 

does not bar their sought-after declaratory relief – except as previously discussed. 

Because Appellees request multiple forms of relief, we are required to apply 

sovereign immunity in relation to each form of relief, rather than using an all-ornothing approach.
-35-

This leads us to the next issue, which the Moore Court discussed: 

whether sovereign immunity functions as a bar to monetary relief flowing from a 

declaratory judgment. Moore, 599 S.W.3d at 813. Despite noting “it is also true 

that in subsequent . . . actions to enforce declared rights, the immunity issue could 

be relevant if the revenue or property of the state would be affected[,]” the 

Supreme Court determined this issue to be unripe. Id. at 813 (modification 

original) (quoting Ret. Sys., 396 S.W.3d at 838). It observed several necessary 

questions were not yet resolved, including UK’s status as an agency for purposes 

of KRS 45.237 et seq. Id. 

The circuit court in Moore had already entered a declaratory judgment 

in the underlying action, which the Supreme Court determined was an act within 

the circuit court’s jurisdiction. Id. In the instant case, the circuit court has ruled on 

select issues on the merits, including holding that UK was not entitled to refer 

debts to the Department for collection. R. at 1360-69. However, Appellees’ 

challenges to the constitutionality of KRS 45.237 et seq. are still pending. And, 

Appellees have yet to pursue monetary relief flowing from a declaratory judgment

– which the circuit court has yet to enter. “The Court will not render advisory 

opinions or consider matters which may or may not occur in the future.” Id. at 812 

(quoting Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Ky. 2007)). Because this issue 

is unripe, we decline to examine it.
-36-

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Franklin Circuit Court’s March 

28, 2023 order granting class certification. Additionally, we affirm in part and 

reverse in part the Franklin Circuit Court’s August 15, 2022 order granting partial 

judgment on the pleadings regarding the sovereign immunity issue. We remand 

for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS 

FOR APPELLANT

COMMONWEALTH OF 

KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF 

REVENUE:

R. Campbell Connell

Frank L. Dempsey

Austin T. Greene

Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENTS 

FOR APPELLANT UNIVERSITY 

OF KENTUCKY AND PENNY COX 

IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

TREASURER OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY:

Bryan Beauman

Lexington, Kentucky

BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENTS 

FOR APPELLEES AMELIA LONG, 

KAREN DEVIN, RICHARD 

HARDY, II, SHERRIE TURNER, 

TABITHA MARCUM, AS 

REPRESENTATIVES OF A CLASS:

E. Douglas Richards

Lexington, Kentucky

Brian C. Hicks

Frankfort, Kentucky