1 

17-104-cr (L) 

United States v. Abdullaev, et al. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 7th day of February, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 17-104-cr (L) 

 17-909-cr (Con) 

v. 

SHAVKAT ABDULLAEV, AKA STAN, 

ALEXANDER POSOBILOV, AKA SASHA, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

ARC ELECTRONICS, INC., APEX SYSTEM, L.L.C.,

LYUDMILA BAGDIKIAN, AKA MILA, ANASTASIA 

DIATLOVA, AKA ANNA, VIKTORIA KLEBANOVA,

SERGEY KLINOV, YURI SAVIN, DMITRIY SHEGUROV,

SEVINJ TAGHIYEVA, SEVA, SVETALINA ZAGON, AKA

ALINA, ALEXANDER FISHENKO,

Defendants. 

 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ABDULLAEV: Richard B. Lind, New York, NY. 
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FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT POSOBILOV: STEVE ZISSOU (Randall D. Unger, on the 

brief), Bayside, NY 

FOR APPELLEE: RICHARD M. TUCKER (Emily Berger, on the 

brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, 

for Richard P. Donoghue, United States 

Attorney, Eastern District of New York, 

Brooklyn, NY. 

Appeals from judgments of conviction in the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of New York (Sterling Johnson, Jr., Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgments of the District Court be and hereby are 

AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-Appellant Shavkat Abdullaev (“Abdullaev”) appeals from a judgment entered on 

January 4, 2017 convicting him, following a jury trial, of conspiring to violate the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) and to commit wire fraud (Count One), as well as 

substantive IEEPA violations (Counts Five, Six, and Seven). He was sentenced principally to 36 

months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Abdullaev argues: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to 

support all of his convictions; (2) that the Government failed to establish that venue was proper in 

the Eastern District of New York for the substantive IEEPA violations; and (3) that the District 

Court’s venue instruction was erroneous. 

Defendant-Appellant Alexander Posobilov (“Posobilov”) appeals from a judgment entered 

on March 30, 2017 convicting him, following a jury trial, of conspiring to violate IEEPA and the 

Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”), and to commit wire fraud (Count One); substantive IEEPA 

violations (Counts Two through Eight); a substantive AECA violation (Count Nine); and conspiring 

to commit money laundering (Count Ten). He was sentenced principally to 135 months’ 

imprisonment. On appeal, Posobilov argues: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction on the money laundering conspiracy (Count Ten); (2) that the District Court failed to 

adequately ascertain whether jurors had been exposed to extraneous information about the case 

during trial; and (3) that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. 

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the 

case, and the issues on appeal. 
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I. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

A. Law 

“We review sufficiency of evidence challenges de novo, but defendants face a heavy burden, as 

the standard of review is exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 

2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the [G]overnment, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the [G]overnment’s 

favor, and deferring to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the weight 

of the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “[W]e will sustain the jury’s 

verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted) (emphasis in original). 

B. Substantive IEEPA Violations 

Abdullaev challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions for Counts 

Five, Six, and Seven—the substantive IEEPA violations. He contends that there was insufficient 

evidence to establish that he acted “willfully” in facilitating the export of controlled microelectronics 

to Russia. Specifically, he claims that “he was not aware that he might be doing something illegal,” in 

part because he was making a “paltry salary” at ARC Electronics (“ARC”) and had “neither the time, 

nor responsibility, nor expertise” to determine whether the exports he facilitated required licenses. 

Abdullaev Br. 22, 25. 

 To establish a “willful” violation of a statute—or, in this case, an IEEPA-promulgated 

regulation—“the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct 

was unlawful.” Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 

also United States v. Homa Int’l Trading Corp., 387 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying the Bryan

willfulness standard to the IEEPA). 

The evidence at trial firmly established that Abdullaev had substantial knowledge of the 

regulatory regimes governing ARC’s operations. As early as 2009, Abdullaev—then an ARC 

salesperson—would receive emails from suppliers regarding the Export Control Classification 

Numbers (“ECCNs”) for their equipment. Record emails also reflect that Abdullaev would educate 

his co-workers about export regulations. For example, in May 2009, Abdullaev emailed ARC’s CEO, 

Alexander Fishenko (“Fishenko”), a photocopy of the regulations governing the highly controlled 

“3A001” ECCN designation. The jury also heard testimony from FBI Special Agent Olga Novosad, 

who described how Abdullaev was able to provide a detailed explanation of the significance of 

ECCN numbers—including the restricted “3A001” designation—during his post-arrest interview. 

Not only was Abdullaev familiar with these regulations, but he was also practiced in their 

evasion. As an ARC salesperson, Abdullaev repeatedly provided suppliers with the names of 
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fictitious end users. As shipping manager, he prepared fraudulent export documentation that 

deliberately misstated the ECCNs. For example, between June 29 and October 2, 2011, Abdullaev 

received 324 shipping notices from a supplier, 59 of which indicated that the supplier was shipping 

restricted “3A001” parts to ARC. Yet 78% of the associated export documents prepared by 

Abdullaev indicated that the parts were “EAR99”1

 and required no license. As for the shipments 

charged in Counts Six and Seven, Abdullaev personally received two shipping notices from the 

supplier indicating that the enclosed parts had a restricted ECCN classification. Nevertheless, 

Abdullaev entered “EAR99” on the documentation for these shipments.2 In sum, we hold that there 

was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that Abdullaev acted with knowledge that 

his conduct was unlawful when he prepared fraudulent documentation for each charged export. 

C. Conspiracy to Violate IEEPA and to Commit Wire Fraud 

Abdullaev further contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove the existence of a 

“scheme to defraud” ARC’s U.S.-based suppliers, as charged in Count One. He claims that the 

suppliers were not deprived of any “essential element of the bargain,” since they were paid for the 

microelectronics they supplied. See United States v. Shelleff, 507 F.3d 82, 108 (2d Cir. 2007).

During trial, representatives from three U.S.-based suppliers testified about how their 

respective corporate polices prohibit them from selling microelectronic parts to specified foreign 

countries for military application. To enforce these corporate policies—and as consideration to 

contract—the suppliers require distributors to provide assurances that the parts are not intended, 

directly or indirectly, for military use. Suppliers may also require distributors to supply additional 

information about end users. Thus, in lying about end uses and end users, ARC misrepresented an 

“essential element of the bargain”—namely, that the parts would not be sold to the Russian 

government for military application in violation of United States export laws. See United States v. 

Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 421 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he fact that [the supplier] was paid for its [product] 

does not mean that [the supplier] received all it bargained for. In fact, it did not. [The supplier] 

insisted its product not be exported from the country illegally and defendants’ conduct deprived [the 

supplier] of the right to define the terms for the sale of its property in that way, and cost it, as well, 

good will because equipment [the supplier], a government contractor, sold was exported illegally.”). 

 

1

 The designation “EAR99” means that the item is subject to the Export Administration 

Regulations (“EAR”) but does not have a specific ECCN and does not require an export license. 

2

 That ARC’s own invoices did not reflect ECCN numbers for the enclosed parts is immaterial; 

Abdullaev had direct knowledge from the forwarded emails that the shipments contained parts with 

restricted ECCN classifications. 
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D. Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering 

Posobilov contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he knowingly 

engaged in the money laundering conspiracy charged in Count Ten. His argument focuses 

principally on the fact that he did not have access to ARC’s bank accounts. In so arguing, however, 

he ignores the overwhelming evidence demonstrating his active involvement in the money 

laundering scheme. 

As ARC’s manager and procurement director, Posobilov regularly received copies of emails 

coordinating wire payments from ARC’s Russia-based clients. Not only did these emails contain 

wire transfer information, but they offered advice on how ARC’s Russian clients could wire 

payments without raising red flags. In fact, one of the emails contained an article entitled: “How to 

Rid an Offshore Company Of The Image Of The Offshore Company.” GA 124. Posobilov could 

also access the “banking deposits” and “accounts receivable” sections of ARC’s electronic recordkeeping system, which enabled him to see how ARC’s Russian clients used shell companies to pay 

their invoices. Finally, Posobilov served as Director of ARC’s corporate shell, “Electrodevices,” 

which ARC used to obtain parts from manufacturers that otherwise refused to supply ARC. In sum, 

there was ample evidence to support the jury’s determination that Posobilov entered into a money 

laundering conspiracy with Fishenko and others to promote ARC’s unlawful operations. 

II. Venue 

A. Law 

“Venue is proper only where the acts constituting the offense—the crime’s ‘essential 

conduct elements’—took place.” United States v. Tzolov, 642 F.3d 314, 318 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting 

United States v. Rodriguez–Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 280 (1999)). “For each count of an indictment, the 

[G]overnment bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that venue is 

proper.” United States v. Thompson, 896 F.3d 155, 171 (2d Cir. 2018). 

“When a defendant challenges the propriety of the trial venue after conviction by a jury . . . 

we review the sufficiency of the evidence as to venue in the light most favorable to the 

[G]overnment, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in its favor.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “If the facts are not in dispute, venue challenges raise questions of law, 

which we review de novo.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Where a defendant fails to object to 

the substance of a venue instruction, however, we review for plain error. United States v. Svoboda, 347 

F.3d 471, 484 (2d Cir. 2003). 

Conspiracy is a continuing offense. United States v. Rutigliano, 790 F.3d 389, 395-96 (2d Cir. 

2015). Venue in a continuing offense is proper in any district in which the offense “was begun, 

continued, or completed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). Thus, in a conspiracy prosecution, “venue is proper 
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in any district in which an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the 

coconspirators.” Svoboda, 347 F.3d at 483 (internal quotation marks omitted). Venue is also proper 

where: “(1) the defendant intentionally or knowingly causes an act in furtherance of the charged 

offense to occur in the district of venue or (2) it is foreseeable that such an act would occur in the 

district of venue.” Id. Accordingly, “a defendant need not himself have ever been physically present 

in a district for a conspiracy charge against him to be venued there.” United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 

108, 120 (2d Cir. 2007). 

B. Discussion 

Abdullaev first contends that the Government failed to establish that venue was proper for 

the substantive IEEPA violations charged in Counts Five, Six, and Seven. His argument fails. 

Because the charged substantive offenses involve the transportation of restricted articles in interstate 

or foreign commerce, they constitute continuing offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (“Any offense 

involving . . . transportation in interstate or foreign commerce . . . is a continuing offense . . . .”). 

Thus, venue is proper in “any district from, through, or into which such commerce . . . moves.” Id. 

The Government established, to the satisfaction of the jury, that venue was proper in the 

Eastern District of New York through the testimony of the Vice President of Operations at TNT—

the company ARC used for the exports charged in Counts Five, Six, and Seven. The TNT witness 

testified that at the time of export, “[t]he exit to Europe ha[d] always been from JFK.” GA 429. 

Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that ARC 

transported restricted parts through the Eastern District of New York. 

For the first time on appeal, Abdullaev challenges the District Court’s venue instruction.3

 He 

argues that the District Court should have advised the jury that venue is proper only where a co-

 

3

 The District Court charged the jury on venue as follows: 

The [G]overnment need not prove that the crime itself was 

committed in this district or that a particular defendant was present 

here. It is sufficient to satisfy this element if any act in furtherance of 

the specific crime you are considering occurred within this district. 

However, even if you find that some act in furtherance of the crime 

occurred in this district, you must also find that it was foreseeable to 

the individual defendant you are considering that some act occurred 

in the Eastern District of New York. . . . Thus, with respect to each 

count, the [G]overnment has satisfied its venue obligations if you 

conclude that it is more likely than not that any act in furtherance of 
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conspirator commits an overt act. But this argument misunderstands the law of venue as it pertains 

to conspiracies. We have repeatedly found venue proper where an out-of-district defendant causes 

an overt act to be committed by an innocent third party within the district of venue. See Svoboda, 347 

F.3d at 483-84 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding venue proper where the defendant had notice that his trades 

were being executed by a broker in the Southern District of New York); United States v. Kim, 246 

F.3d 186, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding venue proper where the defendant “caused communications 

to be transmitted into and out of the Southern District when he approved fraudulent invoices 

knowing that [the victim] paid its vendors from New York banks”); see also United States v. Odunaike, 

273 F. App’x 58, 60 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that the phrase “in a district where the defendant 

intentionally or knowingly causes an act in furtherance of the charged offense” refers to “actions 

taken by third parties who are not part of the conspiracy, but whose actions furthered the aims of 

the conspiracy”). Thus, the District Court’s venue instruction was not plainly erroneous, since it 

properly instructed the jury that it “must also find that it was foreseeable to the [defendant] . . . that 

some act [in furtherance of the crime] occurred in the Eastern District of New York.” GA 439. 

Abdullaev further contends that the District Court erred by omitting the phrase “overt act” 

from its instruction. It is well-established that an “overt act” is “any act, innocent or illegal, as long 

as it is done in the furtherance of the object or purpose of the conspiracy.” Tzolov, 642 F.3d at 320. 

Thus, the District Court did not err by supplanting the term “overt act” with its definition: “some 

act in furtherance of the crime.” GA 439. 

Finally, Abdullaev correctly notes that the District Court’s venue instruction fails to 

distinguish between the substantive and conspiracy IEEPA counts. But if anything, the instruction 

holds the Government to a higher burden than otherwise required to establish venue for a 

substantive IEEPA violation. The District Court’s instruction required the jury to find not only that 

some act in furtherance of the substantive offense occurred within the Eastern District of New 

York, but that it was foreseeable to Abdullaev that the act would occur there. Thus, insofar as the 

venue instruction erroneously failed to distinguish between a substantive IEEPA violation and a 

conspiracy to violate IEEPA, we find this error harmless. 

 

the count you are considering occurred within the Eastern District of 

New York. 

GA 439-40. 
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III. Publicity and Juror Impartiality 

A. Law 

“A district court’s decision regarding juror impartiality is reviewed for abuse of discretion 

and deserves deference.” United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). District courts usually follow a three-step procedure when investigating whether 

publicity has potentially prejudiced a juror or otherwise interfered with his ability to decide the case 

fairly. See United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1987). First, the court “determine[s] whether 

the coverage has a potential for unfair prejudice.” Id. Second, the court “canvass[es] the jury to find 

out if they have learned of the potentially prejudicial publicity.” Id. Finally, the court “examine[s] 

individually exposed jurors—outside the presence of the other jurors—to ascertain how much they 

know of the distracting publicity and what effect, if any, it has had on that juror’s ability to decide 

the case fairly.” Id. 

B. Discussion

 During trial, one of the jurors was overheard in the jury room discussing how the case could 

be found online. Upon learning of this situation, the District Court immediately conducted a careful 

and individualized inquiry into the possibility and extent of juror exposure to publicity. The District 

Court’s questioning revealed that Juror Number 8 had discussed with a fellow juror the fact that his 

mother was able to read about the case online. There was no suggestion that Juror Number 8 

himself researched the case online or consulted outside news sources. Absent any indication of 

actual exposure to outside publicity, we find no flaw in the District Court’s handling of this matter. 

IV. Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness of Posobilov’s Sentence 

A. Law 

We review sentences for both procedural and substantive reasonableness, applying a 

“deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district 

court fails to calculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the 

Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selects a 

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.” United 

States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). A 

sentence is substantively unreasonable only if it “cannot be located within the range of permissible 

decisions.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted). The purpose of our review is 

not to substitute our view for that of the district court, but to “provide a backstop for those few 

cases that, although procedurally correct, would nonetheless damage the administration of justice 
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because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a 

matter of law.” United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). 

B. Discussion 

 1. Procedural Reasonableness 

 Posobilov argues that the District Court procedurally erred by denying his request for an 

“acceptance-of-responsibility” downward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.4

 “As the sentencing 

judge ‘is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,’ [his] 

determination whether or not to grant the reduction is ‘entitled to great deference on review.’” 

United States v. Delacruz, 862 F.3d 163, 178 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.5). We 

will not disturb a court’s acceptance-of-responsibility determination “unless it is without 

foundation.” Delacruz, 862 F.3d at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the District Court declined to apply a downward adjustment despite finding that 

Posobilov “had wanted to plead guilty throughout the course of this litigation and nothing could be 

worked out.”5

 Posobilov App. 150. As the District Court explained, “I am dealing with a defendant 

who went to trial [and] who was convicted.” Id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2 (“This adjustment 

is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by 

denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses 

remorse.”). Moreover, Posobilov refused to accept full responsibility for his actions. During the 

sentencing hearing, he insisted that his participation in the conspiracy was “exaggerated,” that he 

was just doing his “duty,” and that he had committed mere “mistakes” that were not “intentional” 

or “deliberate.” Posobilov App. 140. He also continued to deny his involvement in the money 

laundering conspiracy. Id. Finally, while it was Fishenko’s intractability that prevented Posobilov 

from securing a more favorable plea offer, Posobilov always retained the option of pleading guilty to 

the entire indictment, as Fishenko ultimately did. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the 

District Court’s refusal to grant a downward adjustment. 

 

4

 Section 3E1.1 states in relevant part: “If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of 

responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) (emphasis 

omitted). 

5

 Posobilov’s plea agreement with the Government was made contingent upon Fishenko also 

pleading guilty. Fishenko, in turn, refused to plead guilty until the eve of trial, when it was too late 

for Posobilov to accept the Government’s offer. 
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Posobilov further claims that the District Court erred in applying a two-level “sophisticated 

laundering” enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3).6 “Sophisticated laundering” means 

“complex or intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956 offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) cmt. n.5. Sophisticated laundering typically involves the use 

of, inter alia, “fictitious entities,” “shell corporations,” “offshore financial accounts,” or “two or 

more levels (i.e., layering) of transactions, transportation, transfers, or transmissions, involving 

criminally derived funds that were intended to appear legitimate.” Id. 

As noted above, there was ample evidence to convict Posobilov of the money laundering 

conspiracy charged in Count Ten. Additionally, the Government presented evidence at trial 

demonstrating that Posobilov was the director and principal operator of Electrodevices—ARC’s 

alter ego and shell corporation. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 

applying the sophisticated laundering enhancement. 

Finally, Posobilov summarily argues that the District Court did not adequately set forth its 

basis for denying the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment and imposing the sophisticated 

laundering enhancement. It is well-established that “[i]n the absence of record evidence suggesting 

otherwise, we presume that a sentencing judge has considered the relevant statutory factors.” United 

States v. Romano, 794 F.3d 317, 340 (2d Cir. 2015). District courts need not fill the record with 

“robotic incantations that [they have] considered each of the § 3553(a) factors.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 

193 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor must they “make specific responses to points argued by 

counsel in connection with sentencing.” United States v. Bonilla, 618 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 

Here, the District Court expressly adopted the findings of the Presentence Report. 

Posobilov App. 150. It heard arguments and pleas for leniency from counsel and disagreed with 

counsel’s characterization of the sentence as “greater than necessary.” Id. at 153. The District Court 

also found that a Fatico hearing7 would not change the Guidelines calculation, and that it was 

rejecting counsel’s objections to the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment and the sophisticated 

laundering enhancement. Id. at 151. Accordingly, we find no procedural error. 

 

6

 Section 2S1.1(b)(3) provides that if the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and 

“the offense involved sophisticated laundering, increase by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) 

(emphasis omitted). 

7

 A “Fatico” hearing is “a sentencing hearing at which the prosecution and the defense may 

introduce evidence relating to the appropriate sentence.” United States v. Lohan, 945 F.2d 1214, 1216 

(2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979). 
11 

2. Substantive Reasonableness

Posobilov challenges the substantive reasonableness of his 135-month sentence. He again 

emphasizes his willingness to accept the Government’s plea offer. He also highlights how he 

received the most severe sentence of all his co-defendants, including Fishenko—the founder and 

owner of ARC. 

We find that a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range was entirely appropriate 

considering Posobilov’s supervisory role in ARC’s export scheme. Not only did Posobilov 

personally circumvent export control laws, but he repeatedly directed his subordinates to lie to 

suppliers about end uses and users. Additionally, Posobilov sought to promote ARC’s illegal 

activities by facilitating a money laundering conspiracy that enabled ARC to evade detection by 

suspicious suppliers and U.S. authorities. In sum, the District Court’s sentence appropriately reflects 

the seriousness of the offenses of which Posobilov was convicted. 

CONCLUSION 

We have reviewed all of the remaining arguments raised by Abdullaev and Posobilov on 

appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the January 4, 

2017 and March 30, 2017 judgments of the District Court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk