Jeremy McKenzie

Samuel Klarich

Catherine Ardrey

Kristopher Lagor

The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through 

International Cooperation and Capability 

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Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs 

United States Coast Guard Academy Center for Arctic Study and Policy 

World Wildlife Fund Arctic Program
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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Disclaimer: The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not 

necessarily those of the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, the World 

Wildlife Fund, or the Center for Arctic Study and Policy at the United States Coast Guard Academy. We take 

full responsibility for all errors, omissions and misstatements. 
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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“We have an opportunity to lay out a strategic framework for the Arctic, to make it a region that 

focuses on humanitarian concerns, on environmental concerns, on the way of life of indigenous tribes and not 

as a war-fighting domain.”

Admiral Paul Zukunft

Commandant of the Coast Guard

“Identifying ways to reduce risk together will benefit both countries [the United States and Russian 

Federation] (environmentally, economically, strategically, culturally and in the court of international opinion). 

There is no downside to cooperating in the Bering Strait region.” 

Fran Ulmer

Chair of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission and Former Alaska Lieutenant Governor
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Executive Summary

Problem and Purpose:

Environmental changes are opening the Arctic to increased activity and risk, which will impact the sole 

connection between the Pacific and Arctic Oceans – the Bering Strait. The U.S. and Russia, the two nations 

that border the strait, are largely unprepared to manage this increased activity and risk. The primary risk in the 

region is a ship grounding. Additional risks include acts of terrorism or the possibility of ship collision as 

traffic increases. These risks are compounded by multiple factors including:

1. Outdated Charting,

2. Poor bilateral communications,

3. Inaccurate weather modeling exacerbated by climate change,

4. Increasing traffic without additional corresponding risk mitigation, and

5. A lack of prevention and response capability based in the region.

The purpose of this report is to recommend increased cooperation in the Bering Strait region between the U.S. 

and Russia, in order to reduce these risks.

Methodology:

This report is founded on unique interviews with government officials, academics, industry leaders, and other 

experts. As representatives from an academic institution, we were able to bridge the diplomatic divide. The use 

of off-the-record interviews enabled interviewees to speak freely and to provide honest, non-politically 

motivated answers. Thus, this report represents the various interests of the Bering Strait Region. The interview 

data was supplemented by government reports, literature, field research, and participation in conferences.

Recommendations:

We recommend starting with the following package of three steps:

1. Decouple the Arctic from other aspects of the U.S. and Russian bilateral relationship. As noted in the 

report, the U.S. and Russia have a long history of cooperation in the Arctic, even during periods of 

heightened political tension.

2. The U.S. and Russia should immediately plan to resume bilateral oil spill response and search and 

rescue (SAR) exercises in the Bering Strait Region. These exercises should alternate between 

functional and communications exercises on an annual basis.

3. The U.S. and Russia should pursue the establishment of a joint maritime domain awareness center 

(MDAC) to maintain situational awareness. The MDAC should be used to implement dynamic areas to 

be avoided (ATBAs) and maritime speed restrictions, based on the real-time situation in the Bering 

Strait Region.

The report details additional bilateral and unilateral recommendations to further decrease risk. The data 

provide a strong foundation for each of the recommendations, particularly the first steps towards the risk 

reduction package noted above.

Ultimately, bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Russia will mitigate the risks of increased maritime 

activity preserving the region for future generations.
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Table of Contents

Executive Summary......................................................................................................................................4

Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................................7

1. Introduction.............................................................................................................................................8

2. Research Questions, Problem Statement, Purpose and a Contextualization of the Bering Strait ................8

2.a. Research Questions...............................................................................................................................8

2.b. Problem Statement and Purpose...........................................................................................................9

2.c. A Scientific Contextualization of the Bering Strait...................................................................................9

2.d. A Practical Contextualization of the Bering Strait................................................................................. 13

2.e. An International Contextualization of the Bering Strait........................................................................ 25

2.f. Why the Bering Strait Matters.............................................................................................................. 35

3. Data and Methods ................................................................................................................................. 35

3.a. Interviews........................................................................................................................................... 36

3.b. Articles, Journals, and Periodicals........................................................................................................ 37

3.c. International Agreements.................................................................................................................... 37

3.d. Government Publications.................................................................................................................... 38

3.e. Accident Incident Database ................................................................................................................. 38

3.f. Field Research...................................................................................................................................... 39

4. Findings ................................................................................................................................................. 39

4.a. The Future of Maritime Activity in the Bering Strait ............................................................................. 40

4.b. What Does the Increase in Destinational Shipping and Eco- Tourism Mean for the Region?.................. 45

4.c. Findings from Stakeholders.................................................................................................................. 47

5. Recommendations................................................................................................................................. 53

5.a. Bilateral Recommendations................................................................................................................. 54

5.b. Recommendations for the U.S. Government........................................................................................ 61
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Conclusions................................................................................................................................................ 66

Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................. 69

Appendix 1: Glossary ................................................................................................................................. 86

Appendix 2: Regional Maps........................................................................................................................ 90

Appendix 3: An Analysis of Risk in the Bering Sea Using the Accident Incident Database............................. 92

Appendix 4: Meet the Authors................................................................................................................. 100
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Acknowledgments

A report of this scale requires the support of a large community, thus it is important to acknowledge all 

the help we have received along the way. 

First, we must thank our Faculty Advisors Bill Allen and Pat McGuigan. The entire Brown University 

community supported our efforts including the Graduate Student Council, Isabel Costa, Samantha Gates, 

Deborah Healey, Michael Kennedy, James Morone, Melissa Nicholas, Shankar Prasad, as well as the staff of 

the Graduate School Travel Office. 

We would like to thank both Rear Admiral Anthony “Jack” Vogt and Captain Brigid Pavilonis of the 

United States Coast Guard Academy, who forwarded Brown’s original request for proposals to the United 

States Coast Guard Academy’s Center for Arctic Study and Policy, where it landed on the desk of Rebecca 

Pincus. Rebecca Pincus wrote the proposal for this project, which was accepted by Brown, and which led us to 

Elena Argakova of the World Wildlife Fund’s (WWF) Arctic Program. Both Rebecca and Elena have been 

absolutely amazing to work with and have done much to ensure our success. They have introduced us to their 

networks, assisted our search for funding, reviewed our ideas, and provided valuable and constructive 

criticism.

We must also thank our generous funders who made our travels to Anchorage, New York City, 

Washington, Moscow and Saint Petersburg possible, including Brown University, the Arctic Domain 

Awareness Center of the University Alaska Anchorage, Jim and Maryanne McKenzie, Theodore Ni, Jenny 

Lloyd, Brenda and John Johnson, George Grant, Jefferson Cox, Ellen Dessloch, Debra Cotnoir, Kanika 

Khanna, Evan Lehrer, Richard Naiss, Steven McCarty, Thomas Schultz, Sho Iketani, Naoreen Chowdhury, 

Regis and Patty Hillow, and Paul Zemitzsch, in addition to several anonymous donors.

It is also important to mention both WWF Russia as well as our amazing guides/translators from both 

Bridge to Moscow and Guides to St. Petersburg. You made it easy for us to conduct research in Russia. 

Additionally, the scientists and researchers from the Central Marine Research and Design Institute in St. 

Petersburg were exceptionally helpful. We also appreciate Yuri Skripnikov, who translated our draft report for 

our Russian colleagues. It is also important to thank WWF for funding the translation of the draft report.

We would like to thank the many government officials, Coast Guard Officers, non-governmental 

organization leaders, industry professionals and academics for taking the time to speak with us. Our 

conversations with all of you provided the most important source of information used in this report, and 

without you this endeavor would have failed. Therefore, we are happy to conclude with a special thank you to 

Ambassador Mark Brzezinski, Ambassador James Collins, Admiral Robert Papp, Vice Admiral Roger Rufe, 

Rear Admiral Thomas Ostebo, Captain Lawson Brigham, Captain James Robinson, Captain Ed Page, Andrei 

Zagorski, Keith Stinebaugh, Yana Blinovskaya, Alexey Knizhnikov, Mikhail Babenko, and Jimmy Stotts. 

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we would like to acknowledge the support we have received 

from our family and friends as we’ve pursued this project over the last year. You read the report, edited it, 

provided criticism and valuable grounding to our ideas, and you have put up with the insane schedule of 

research and travel that this has required. Thank you!
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1. Introduction

Imagine the large liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker the Orb River transiting from the Yamal Peninsula over 

the Northern Sea Route to the Bering Strait on its way to China. Once in the Bering, the tanker loses power 

and begins to drift. The closest heavy tugboats are thousands of miles away, and the nearest U.S. Coast Guard 

response assets are in Anchorage. The vessel runs aground and begins to list as it takes on water. It is spilling 

thousands of gallons of fuel, contaminating a previously pristine environment.

This scenario is not unrealistic. The Arctic and Bering Strait are experiencing increased human activity due to 

growing opportunities in tourism, natural resource extraction, and economic development. The United States 

and Russian Federation share the responsibility for the management of the Bering Strait, each holding coastline 

across the 44 nautical mile waterway. However, there are barriers to effective prevention and response 

measures and capabilities, as well as the absence of joint maritime domain awareness and management.

The data demonstrate that there are very real concerns with each nation’s ability to respond to a major disaster 

in the Bering Strait Region. Such a disaster will negatively impact both the economy and the Indigenous 

people who live in there. 

Indeed, the complexity of this region cannot be overstated, but neither can the importance of effective planning 

and cooperation. In response, the research demonstrates that the time to establish a cooperative preventative 

approach in the Bering Strait Region is now – imagine the mutual benefits of greater safety, security, and 

response preparedness. Cooperation ensures that neither the U.S. nor Russia bears the entire cost. Rather, each 

will reap the benefits of efficient, joint action. Additionally, both will benefit by protecting the environment, 

demonstrating international leadership through diplomacy, and through expansions in science and 

understanding. The U.S. and Russia have just this opportunity.

2. Research Questions, Problem Statement, Purpose and a 

Contextualization of the Bering Strait

2.a. Research Questions

Increasing ship traffic in the Bering Strait region poses cross-border management challenges that are 

complicated by diplomatic tension between the U.S. and Russia. How effectively are international and bilateral 

agreements governing maritime activity in the Bering Strait region being implemented at the “street level” by 
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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responsible agencies on either side of the border? What is the anticipated timeframe of increasing ship traffic, 

and what pressure does that place on policymakers? Are there gaps in existing agreements that prevent 

effective bilateral collaboration?

2.b. Problem Statement and Purpose

Human activity is increasing in the Bering Strait region, and the U.S. and Russian governments are largely 

unprepared to deal with the associated risk. The lack of preparedness stems from the region’s remote location 

and the requirement to attain bilateral approval to implement any meaningful regulations, due to the Bering 

Straits’ classification as an international strait under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS). However, bilateral agreements are difficult to achieve for two (2) reasons. First, policymakers in 

both Washington and Moscow are generally more focused on other, more visible, policy concerns. Second, the 

U.S. and Russia have a strained relationship because of disagreements in other areas. Notwithstanding, the 

Bering Strait is a shared waterway, in which both countries are responsible for its management. Cooperation in 

the Bering Strait region stalled in 2014 as a result of U.S. restrictions on bilateral contacts after the crisis in the 

Ukraine (off-the-record interview, 2016). Thus, there has been no real cooperation in the region in the last two 

years. The last functional, bilateral oil spill preparedness exercise took place in 1998 (off-the-record interview, 

2016).

In this section, we will discuss the environment and region, which will provide context to the problem. 

Sections will include science, risk, stakeholders and the international community. Finally, we will conclude 

with why we believe the Bering Strait Region is important. 

The purpose of this report is to recommend increased cooperation in the Bering Strait region between the U.S. 

and Russia, in order to reduce risk by increasing safety, reliability, and communication in the region.

2.c. A Scientific Contextualization of the Bering Strait

The Bering Strait and the greater Arctic are experiencing environmental changes as a result of climate change, 

which have altered the ice formation cycle and general weather trends. Sea ice is forming later each year, and 

it is receding earlier (National Snow and Ice Data Center; Quick Facts, n.d.). Some analysts predict that the 

Arctic will be ice free in summer by mid-century (University Corporation for Atmospheric Research, 2006; 

Polyak et. al, 2010, & NOAA, 2013). 

The wildlife in and around the Bering Strait is exceptionally diverse and depends upon a relatively stable 

environment to survive. However, changing ice patterns have already had an effect on both wildlife and human 
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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activities – the latter of which is likely to affect the former through shipping and economic activity, which 

could prove to be devastating unless it is managed responsibly (Audubon Alaska, n.d.). The environment and 

wildlife are interconnected, and changes to one will impact the other. Such changes are detailed in this section.

2.c.i. Weather and Ice Trends

The Alaskan climate is frigid. In winter, northern areas see average temperatures of -40 degrees Fahrenheit. 

Average snowfall is between 24 inches to 49 inches, but it has relatively mild summers (National Snow and 

Ice Data Center; All About, n.d.). However, in 1976, the Arctic region witnessed the beginning of a warming 

pattern (see: Figure 1). This emerging pattern is characterized by temperature extremes in cold days (The 

Alaska Climate Research Center, n.d.). Moreover, the pattern foreshadowed a change in the formation of 

regional ice, according to leading scientists, including one interviewed for this report. Thus, while the average 

air temperature may not be increasing as rapidly since 1976, a new pattern has markedly emerged.

Figure (1): Mean Annual Temperature for Alaska1

Previously, the Arctic region witnessed a freezing period that began in September and ended in March 

(National Snow and Ice Data Center; Quick Facts, n.d.). During this time, the Arctic formed nilas ice, which 

typically forms in calm seas and resembles a sheet that grows and thickens, to the extent that the sun cannot 

penetrate to the ocean floor, and waves cannot become extreme or choppy (Wadhams, 2003).

 

1

Retrieved from The Alaska Climate Research Center, n.d.
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According to first-hand interviews with Alaska Indigenous peoples and scientists, as well current literature and 

research, such freezing periods are beginning to shift. It is believed that ice is now forming in October – not 

September – and is beginning to melt prior to March. This illustrates shorter periods of Arctic ice coverage, 

particularly in the Bering Strait.

The National Snow and Ice Data Center predicts that the winter of 2016 will set record lows for sea ice 

coverage (National Snow and Ice Data Center; February 4, 2016). The National Climate Assessment reports 

that, “The seven Septembers with the lowest ice extent all occurred in the past seven years” (U.S. Global 

Change Research Program, 2014). Figure (2) is provided by the National Snow and Ice Data Center (as of 

March 28th, 2016) and shows the levels of ice in the Arctic Ocean compared to previous years.

Although still a topic of study and debate today, changing sea ice is largely attributed to rising ocean 

temperatures (U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2014). Furthermore, most agree that less ice coverage 

creates new cycles in the Bering Strait and greater Arctic regions. The Arctic will face dramatic changes from 

the norm due to inconsistent ice coverage (Earth Observatory, n.d). For example, sunlight exposed to open 

water will increase ocean temperatures more quickly (U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2014), which 

then exposes ocean waves to more wind. Ocean waves (i.e. sea and swell) “are generated by winds blowing 

over a distance (i.e. “fetch”) for a duration of time” (Thomson, April 2014). The greater distance of open 

waves, or fetch, creates rough seas, which are uncommon to the Arctic.

The emergence of fetch in the region (and other factors) leads to pancake ice instead of the usual nilas ice 

(Thomson, April 2014). Pancake ice allows for larger amounts of light to penetrate and reach the ocean below. 

This further impacts the ocean temperature (Wadhams, 2003). In sum, the Arctic region sees less multi-year 

ice, and more first-year ice, which is less stable and melts more easily (National Snow and Ice Data Center. Ice 

Formation, n.d.).
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Figure (2): Arctic Sea Ice Extent2

2.c.ii. Wildlife

Alaska is home to an exceptionally diverse population of mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and invertebrates. The 

Bering Strait region “supports the...highest concentrations of Pacific walrus on earth, the world’s largest 

eelgrass beds, over 80% of the world’s population of breeding female polar bears, and 70% of the world’s 

northern fur seals concentrated in just a few sites” (Ecoregion-Based Conservation in the Bering Sea, 2013). 

There are approximately 549 vertebrate species that live in the Bering region. According to a 2006 

independent study, 34 species of birds, 21 species of marine mammals, and 11 species of fish are species of 

concern3(Center for Biological Diversity, Pacific Environment, 2006).

Changes in the Arctic put these species at risk. The changes include (among others) increased commercial 

fishing, pollution, hunting, a shift in the climate, habitat destruction, human disturbance by marine vessels, and 

invasive species, which are introduced to the environment (Center for Biological Diversity: Pacific 

Environment, 2006). These threats are mainly connected to human activity and are, thus, predicted to increase.

Wildlife migration patterns are another concern in the region. Species pass through the Bering Strait during the 

spring and fall months, because it is the only connection between the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. Thus, both 

 

2 Retrieved from National Snow and Ice Data Center. (March 28, 2016). 

3

See glossary.
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seasons are seen as high-risk times for human and wildlife interactions, including wildlife being exposed to 

pollutants, excessive noise, and the a higher risk of being struck by a ship (Audubon Alaska, n.d.).

Figure (3): Bowhead whale and calf4

2.d. A Practical Contextualization of the Bering Strait

What is the impact of decreasing ice coverage in a region that is both a strategic chokepoint and “biological 

hotspot of global significance” (McConnell, Brigham, Laughlin & Speer, 2012, p. 9; & Department of the 

Navy, 2014, p.6)? To answer this question, it is important to contextualize both current risk as well as the 

region’s stakeholders. Additionally it is important to understand the international environment of the Bering 

Strait Region. 

2.d.i. Current Risk and Response in the Bering Sea and Strait

The Bering Sea is already an area of increased risk. A statistical analysis of the Arctic Council’s (2009a) 

Accident Incident Database (AID) clearly demonstrates that the Bering Sea5is unique in the Arctic, with 

almost a third of the Arctic Marine Accidents occurring in the Bering Sea. Accidents in the Bering Sea are 

more likely to result in both fatalities and environmental damage from spilled fuel than other accidents in the 

Arctic. The data also demonstrate that fuel spills in the Bering are larger than in the rest of the Arctic. 

Therefore, it is logical to assume that this risk will both increase and continue to move north into the Bering 

Strait, as climate change continues to accelerate, thereby allowing for increased activity. Thus, the risk of 

 

4

Image from http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/gallery/202-b.jpg

5

See Appendix 2
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environmental damage or a mass rescue operation (MRO) in the Bering Strait or Sea will only continue to 

increase. 

The primary risk in the region is a ship grounding. Additional risks include acts of terrorism or the possibility 

of ship collision as traffic increases. These risks are compounded by multiple factors including:

1. Outdated Charting,

2. Poor bilateral communications,

3. Inaccurate weather modeling exacerbated by climate change,

4. Increasing traffic without additional corresponding risk mitigation, and

5. A lack of prevention and response capability based in the region.

A vessel grounding, collision, or act of maritime terrorism has the potential to develop into one of the two 

most dangerous scenarios in the region, which are (1) a mass rescue operation or (2) a large-scale oil spill 

(Fairhall, 2010, p. 190; Carmel, 2014; Rufe & Huntington, 2014; & Rufe, 2015). 

NOAA (n.d.) notes, “...most Arctic waters that are charted were surveyed with imprecise technology, dating 

back to the 1800s, before the region was part of the United States. Most of the shoreline along Alaska’s 

northern and western coasts has not been mapped since 1960.” In other words, inaccurate charting increases 

the risks to maritime traffic. Limited response capability by both the U.S. and Russia compounds the risk for 

disaster. Striking an uncharted underwater hazard is a real threat, as demonstrated by the MV Clipper 

Adventurer, a cruise ship that ran aground in 2010 in the Northwest Passage (CBC News, 2010). Stewart and 

Dawson (2011) describe the safe ending for the ship and its 118 passengers and 69 crewmembers as a matter 

of luck. They note that, “The fortunate circumstances that permitted the rescue of the Clipper Adventurer in 

2010 may not prevail during future incidents” (Stewart and Dawson, 2011). As Carmel (2014) notes, it is only 

necessary to look at the Costa Concordia, which ran aground in well-charted waters, close to numerous 

resources, in order to understand the risk of non-ice capable vessels sailing in an Arctic that is minimally 

charted and supported by almost no infrastructure to respond in case of a disaster (p. 4). 
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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Figure (4): The Cruise Ship Clipper Adventurer aground6

Another incident that demonstrates the risks and aftermath of a vessel grounding is the December 2004 wreck 

of the Selendang Ayu (a Panamax ship) 800 miles south of the Bering Strait in the Bering Sea. The ship lost 

power, ran aground and broke in two. This accident demonstrates the importance of response capabilities as 

the accident might have been prevented if there had been a local tugboat powerful enough to tow the ship to 

safety in the heavy sea state (Gutierrez, 2010; & Ropeik, 2014). The wreck resulted in the death of six sailors, 

the crash of a Coast Guard helicopter, and the spilling of more than 336,000 gallons of fuel (NTSB, 2006; &

Rufe, 2015).

 

6

Image from http://blogs.unb.ca/perspectives/files/2010/09/wpid-116f851283ca060500bfdd46d6748addmvclipperadventurer.jpg
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Figure (5): Aftermath of the Selendang Ayu disaster--a ship in two parts.

7

A third incident that could have resulted in a grounding occurred over ten months from October 2014 until 

August of 2015, when a Canadian barge owned by the Northern Transportation Company Ltd. with 950 

gallons of fuel separated from its tug in the Northwest Territories (Hanlon, 2014). The barge continued to 

remain adrift through Canadian, U.S., and Russian waters (See Figure above) for ten months (Thurton, 2015). 

As Thurton notes, “The barge’s journey all the way from the Canadian Beaufort Sea to the Russian Siberian 

coast sparked concerns that circumpolar nations were unprepared to deal with disasters in the Arctic Ocean, as 

the region welcomes more shipping traffic and interest from oil companies that want to drill” (Thurton, 2014). 

Another expert, Edward Struzik, told CBC News that, “...we still don’t have the infrastructure: the icebreakers, 

the cleanup technology, and the ports with which to deal with a potential disaster. It’s Third World 

management of a growing economic region” (CBC, 2015). 

World Wildlife Fund (WWF) noted that the U.S and Canadian Coast Guards worked cooperatively to track the 

barge, as it moved through their territory. However, when the barge entered Russian waters, WWF noted that 

neither the U.S. nor Canadian Coast Guards knew who to call on the Russian side. WWF served as an 

intermediary between the U.S. and Canadians and their Russian counterparts (off-the-record interview, 2016). 

It is plain to see that the lack of cooperation increases the risk of disaster in the region.

 

7

Picture from: http://officerofthewatch.com/2012/12/10/mv-selendang-ayu-grounding/
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Figure (6): Track of Canadian barge that was adrift for ten months.8

Figure (7): Photo of the Canadian Barge that was adrift for ten months.9 

Grounding is not the only risk that could result in a maritime disaster. Both the U.S. and Russia should be 

concerned about other security issues in the Arctic. Reiss (2012) describes three vessels, including a cruise 

ship, a catamaran, and a sailing vessel, which arrived in Barrow, Alaska unannounced (p. 98-99). Reiss (2012) 

notes that, “It seemed fitting that of all three civilian boats off Barrow that month, none were American, none 

 

8

Image from the Marine Exchange of Alaska. The Marine Exchange programmed and provided the satellite transponder that they then 

used to track the vessel. Then the Marine Exchange provided this data to the Coast Guard, the vessel owners, and others.

9

Photo from the USCG. http://i.cbc.ca/1.2814584.1414435460!/fileImage/httpImage/image.jpg_gen/derivatives/16x9_620/ntclbarge.jpg
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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were expected and all of them put ashore passengers who could have easily walked to the airport, avoiding US 

customs – which has no presence in Barrow – and flown off to anywhere in the United States” (p. 99). 

Limited bilateral communications between the U.S. and Russia also increases the risk as it hampers both 

prevention and response efforts. Additionally, inaccurate weather forecasting that is exacerbated by climate 

change increases the risk of ships requiring assistance after inadvertently ending up in severe weather. The 

increase in traffic without a government response to mitigate the increased risk is yet another factor. Finally, 

the lack of prevention and response capability in the region increases the likelihood for a catastrophic disaster.

The accidents and incidents discussed above demonstrate that both the U.S. and Russian governments are 

largely unprepared to meet the risk from today’s level of activity in the Bering Strait. What happens when 

activity increases, as the data demonstrates it will? 

2.d.ii. The Current USCG Response to Risk: The Port Access Route Study (PARS)

The USCG recognizes the increasing risk in the Bering Strait Region. It initiated the Port Access Route Study 

(PARS) (see Figure 8 below to see the current route proposed by PARS)

10 in 2010, in an effort to mitigate risk 

in the region through traffic control. The current PARS proposal recommends that ships transit using specified 

routes, much like cars must remain on the road or aircraft must land on runways. PARS has been ongoing 

since 2010. Rear Admiral Abel states that, although the route would be voluntary, compliance would be high 

because, “. . . eventually insurance companies and agents would ask ‘Why didn’t you follow what the Coast 

Guard recommended?” (Miller, 2015). 

Interviewees suggest that Alaskans and Russians are hesitant to accept the current PARS route proposal for 

similar reasons. Both sides were concerned that the routes would be of limited use to ship captains, who would 

already maneuver as necessary to avoid hazards. 

Alaskans do not want lines added to maps, nor do they want to be excluded from the discussion with the 

Federal Government. Yet, it would appear that some Alaska stakeholders feel left out, as Landreth (2015) 

describes a recent meeting on PARS:

The room for "Alaska Forum 2015: A Summit on Shipping and Ports" (Aug. 23-25 in Anchorage) was 

so full there were people standing at the back. I wandered around to the side and sat in a lone empty 

chair, still looking. 

 

10 The current proposal could change based on the public comment period that recently closed. The criticism of the PARS proposal in 

this report is based on publicly available data. Any future regulatory actions resulting from the PARS could look very different from 

the current proposal illustrated in Figure 8.
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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In a room of hundreds of people all talking about shipping off the west coast of Alaska, I saw maybe 

two people that I knew represented tribal governments, both from the same village. It struck me that 

this critically important conversation about developing a massive shipping corridor on their front 

doorstep was happening without the tribes. People are talking about them and their homes but not to 

them. (Landreth, 2015). 

The combination of Russian opposition, apparent lack of Alaskan and Russian Indigenous knowledge on 

PARS, and general dislike for lines on maps indicate that PARS is not likely the best option to reduce risk.

Figure (8): A graphical depiction of the USCG’s PARS Proposal11

2.d.iii. Stakeholders

The Bering Strait Region is a complex area for policy implementation. There are multiple stakeholders whose 

interests may or may not align depending on a given policy proposal. The goal of the research conducted was 

 

11 Image from http://www.ktoo.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/PARSrouteoverview.jpg
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to determine where those interests align. The major stakeholders in the Bering Strait Region include the 

Indigenous peoples of both Alaska and the Chukchi Peninsula, the people of the State of Alaska, industry, the 

international community, and both the U.S. and Russian governments.12

2.d.iii.1. Indigenous Peoples

The information in this section is largely derived from interviews conducted with Alaskan Indigenous 

representatives. It is important to note that while there are Indigenous populations along both the Russian and 

Alaskan coastlines, the predominant perspectives of this report will be the Alaska Indigenous population, 

because the Indigenous population of Russia has less organized representation, which limits the accessibility of 

their opinions. However, because the Alaskan and Russian Indigenous populations have regular 

communications across the border, it was possible to gain access to both perspectives. 

Along the U.S. side of the Bering Strait, there are sixteen completely different Alaskan Indigenous 

communities that vary in size, from populations of 1,000 to almost 4,000 people (Brubaker, 2015). Each 

community has a different language and cultural practice, which can create difficulties between the tribes and 

the government agencies when they attempt to work together (Working Effectively with Alaska Native Tribes 

and Organizations: Desk Guide, n.d). 

The Bering Strait Region is the home to mainly the Inuit-Yupik language family. However, this language 

family has many dialects of both Yupik and Inupiaq, such as Siberian Yupik, which is spoken on St. Lawrence 

Island and across the border in Russia. This is depicted in the figure below. The presence of different 

languages and cultures highlights that each Alaska Indigenous group is distinct from the next, and, while the 

Alaska Indigenous people are presented as one stakeholder, their opinions and views do not always agree.

The communities along the Bering Strait Region survive using some method of subsistence hunting, which 

means that each community survives off of the wildlife and the land and water itself. This practice has taken 

place for thousands of years, and is a key aspect of Alaska Indigenous cultures. According to multiple

Indigenous peoples who were interviewed, they do not see subsistence hunting as just a way to sustain life but, 

rather, as a lifestyle that enriches their lives.

 

12 Note, the U.S. and Russian governments positions will be examined in more depth in section 2.c
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Figure (9): A subsistence hunter prepares to launch a harpoon13

However, receding and thinner sea ice has already impacted the current way of life for the Indigenous peoples 

in the Bering region. For example, a later freeze means that there is a shorter hunting season; thinner ice means 

that the hunters must travel further from their villages to find walrus; and, low amounts of ice mean that the 

hunters will have fewer days to hunt (Bering Strait Marine Life and Subsistence Use Data Synthesis, 2014). 

While the cause of the change in the ice is debated, many Alaska Indigenous peoples have already documented 

the change in the ice and its effects on their lives. The importance of this topic was corroborated numerous 

times through interviews with representatives of Alaska Indigenous peoples.

The Indigenous population believes it can be an expert on the topic to inform other stakeholders. During 

interviews, they expressed that they have thousands of years of experience in the Bering region, which could 

be used in the process of decision-making. Experts from outside of the Alaska Indigenous community agreed 

that they could be a tremendous source of knowledge on climate change, ocean currents, wildlife migration 

patterns, sea depth, ice thickness and change, and many other concerns that are currently facing the region 

(Brubaker, 2015).

Further, an increase in human marine activities might disrupt wildlife migration patterns through acute noise 

and basic oil pollution (McConnell et al., 2012, p. 10). An oil spill, for example, could be catastrophic for 

wildlife in the region, destroying habitats, killing animals, and disrupting migration patterns. Because the 

Alaskan and Russian Indigenous communities rely on such wildlife, an oil spill would also be disastrous for 

their tribes (BEST-BSEIEF Bering Sea Project, 2010).

Therefore, Alaska Indigenous people are divided on the potential benefit of oil companies. Some 

representatives expressed a desire for more industry to increase economic development. On the one hand, these 

 

13 Image from https://i.ytimg.com/vi/iknm6evKur0/maxresdefault.jpg
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representatives mentioned that a higher industry presence would bring better technology to combat 

environmental disasters. On the other hand, others vehemently opposed the presence of oil companies 

altogether. Instead, they wished to maintain their subsistence lifestyles, unencumbered by outside influence. 

Figure (10): Map of Alaska Indigenous Language Groups14

2.d.iii.2. The State of Alaska

Alaska is the largest state by landmass and has a population of approximately 737,000 people – approximately 

11% of the population is made up of Indigenous peoples (United States Census Bureau, 2014). However, this 

population is spread across the state, and the population per square mile is 1.2 people (United States Census 

Bureau, 2014.). The majority of people live in the cities of Anchorage and Fairbanks, yet there are thousands 

of people in small pockets throughout the entire state. The combination of such population diversity and low 

population density presents Alaska with a major governance challenge.

 

14 Retrieved from Alaska Native Languages. (n.d).
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Figure (11) A comparison showing the size of Alaska compared to the rest of the U.S.15

Alaska has the longest coastline of any U.S. state according to NOAA, with 6,640 miles of general coastline,16

or 33,904 miles of shoreline distance (NOAA Office for Coastal Management, n.d.). 17 A number of 

interviewees noted the difficulties resulting from Alaska’s unique size and low population density. This 

combination creates unique challenges to justifying new projects, because the standard price per capita formula 

is incompatible to Alaska.

The State of Alaska is also unique in American politics. The people believe that they are disconnected from the 

“lower 48,” with some describing themselves as a “dependent colony” (off-the-record interview, 2015). This 

view refers to the Alaskan perception that the U.S. government is largely unaware of their actual needs. 

Additionally, many Alaskans cited government regulations imposed by the “lower 48” as a barrier to economic 

growth. In fact, the majority of Alaskans interviewed wanted a higher presence of oil and other extraction 

companies, in order to provide jobs, because the current unemployment rate is 7.7% (Department of Labor and 

Workforce Development, 2016)

 

15 Image from http://www-tc.pbs.org/prod-media/newshour/photos/2013/09/16/us-alaska-map_slideshow.jpg

16 According to NOAA general coastline figures measure the “general outline of the seacoast.”

17 NOAA defines shoreline distance as the “mileage of outer coast, offshore islands, sounds, bays, rivers, and creeks is included to the 

head of tidewater or to a point where tidal waters narrow to a width of 100 feet.”
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However, the development of industry comes with potentially negative side effects, which the state is trying to 

balance. That is, the potential for an environmental disaster could increase with large economic growth, and 

many interviewees noted their desire to keep Alaska pristine. Alternatively, others wanted certain 

environmental regulations lifted from the state while acknowledging the need to safeguard against an 

environmental disaster. 

These factors have created a state that looks to move forward and grow economically, but one which is also 

looking to maintain its history and beauty. This dichotomy creates a leadership challenge for Alaskan 

officials.18

2.d.iii.3. Industry

Alaska relies heavily on the three (3) economic drivers of oil, tourism, and fisheries. Smaller industries include 

mining and lumber. However, oil is by far the greatest economic driver and jobs provider in the state 

(Alaska.gov).

The oil industry accounts for at least 85% of Alaska’s economy and is its largest employer, providing 

approximately 110,000 jobs. The state has relied heavily on oil since 1957 and has collected $157 billion in 

revenue (Resource Development Council for Alaska, n.d.). However, according to many interviewees, Alaska

is on the verge of entering into a statewide recession due to the decline in oil prices (off-the-record interviews, 

2015). Reiss (2012) and numerous interviews with Alaskans demonstrate that certain Federal regulations 

increase costs for oil producers. This increased cost combined with historically low oil prices discourages 

development (off-the-record interview, 2015).

The second largest industry in Alaska is tourism, with approximately 1.9 million visitors each year. Likewise, 

it is one of the largest employers and accounts for around 46,000 jobs during peak season, 50% of which are 

generated through cruise vacations (Commerce.Alaska.gov; Economic Impact of Alaska’s Visitor Industry, 

2015). Interest in the Alaskan Arctic is expected to remain high, and marine eco-tourism is likely to expand in 

Alaska, which raises the risk for a catastrophic, mass rescue scenario (MRO).

The third largest industry in Alaska is fishing. Alaska produces about 6 billion pounds of seafood per year and 

is the largest wild salmon producer in the world, and the industry seems to be growing. In 2015, Alaska had 

the second largest commercial harvest in state-history (Alaska Department of Fish and Game, n.d.), which 

already accounts for about 78,500 jobs (Commerce.Alaska.gov, 2015). However, fishing is one of the most 

regulated industries in the U.S., which contributes to high operating expenses.

 

18 See Section 4 for more information.
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2.e. An International Contextualization of the Bering Strait

This section will discuss the Arctic Sea Routes and the internationally accepted definition of the Arctic. It will 

continue with a discussion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is the 

basic legal framework for the Arctic. Then, the section will discuss international interests in the region, 

followed by a discussion on U.S. and Russian Arctic strategies, coupled with an analysis on their bilateral 

relationship. 

2.e.i. The Arctic Sea Routes

The Bering Strait serves as the terminus for three (3) sea routes; (1) the Northwest Passage (NWP) over North 

America, (2) the Northern Sea Route (NSR) over Eurasia, and (3) the Central Arctic Route through the center 

of the Arctic Ocean. Each of these routes is now becoming potentially viable due to a massive reduction in sea 

ice (USCG, 2013, p. 5). There is an estimated $1 trillion in mineral wealth, 30% of the world’s undiscovered 

natural gas reserves, and 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves located in the Arctic, which is already 

leading to an increase in destinational shipping (USCG, 2013, p.5). 

At this stage, the Central Arctic Route’s future is unclear, because it depends on the pace of the ice melting in 

the Arctic Ocean. The research generally agrees that the Arctic Ocean will be ice-free in the summer between 

2040 and 2050 (University Corporation for Atmospheric Research, 2006; Polyak et. al, 2010, & NOAA, 

2013). It is important to note that no one is predicting an Arctic that will be ice free in the winter. The future 

use of the Northwest Passage as a shipping route is unlikely, due to bathymetry limitations, but it will have an 

impact on the Bering Strait as a corridor for eco-tourists. The most economically viable route right now is the 

NSR.

At its peak during the Soviet era, the NSR exceeded 6,000,000 tons of cargo (Emmerson, 2010, p. 159). It has 

almost regained its former prominence with 5,432,000 tons transported in 2015 (off-the-record interview, 

2016). After being asked if the NSR would reach the same tonnage as Soviet times, the official replied, “We 

will exceed it!” (off-the-record interview, 2016). The USCG agrees, estimating that the NSR will exceed 65 

million tons by 2020 (per a briefing to Naval War College Students). 
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Figure (12): A graphical depiction of the Arctic Sea Routes19

2.e.ii. What is the Arctic?

The Arctic Marine Assessment Program of the Arctic Council “has established a circumpolar region as a focus 

for its assessment activities that includes both high Arctic and sub-Arctic regions. In the marine environment, 

the 'AMAP area' includes northern seas that extend as far south as 51.1 degrees North (James Bay, Canada). 

Within this region, 10 'key' areas have been identified for coordinated pollution monitoring studies” (see: 

Figure 5) (Arctic Council, n.d.). 

 

19 Image from http://library.arcticportal.org/1498/1/Grunnkort_Siglingal_source_AP.jpg
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Figure (13): AMAP High and Sub-Arctic Areas of Interest compared with Arctic Circle20

U.S. Code defines the term Arctic as all “United States and foreign territory north and west of the boundary 

formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers: all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and 

the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain” (15 USC § 4111). 

Similarly, the Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period Till 2020 and 

for a Further Perspective (Russian Federation, 2008) defines the Arctic zone of Russia as “a part of the Arctic 

which includes, in full or in part, the territories of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Murmansk and 

Arkhangelsk provinces, Krasnoyarsk territory, Nenets, Yamal-Nenets and [more importantly for purposes of 

this report] Chukchi autonomous districts...” The document continues clearly including “the internal maritime 

waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation adjoining to 

such territories, areas and islands, within which Russia enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction under 

international law” (Russian Federation, 2008). 

Thus, the Arctic Council, the U.S., and Russia each view the Bering Sea and Bering Strait as part of the greater 

Arctic region.

 

20 Map from http://www.amap.no/about/geographical-coverage
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2.e.iii. Basic Legal Regime

The dominant legal framework in the Arctic is the UNCLOS. The U.S. is the only state in the Arctic 5 that has 

not ratified UNCLOS, but it does consider the convention to be customary international law.21 The U.S. was a 

party to the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008, whose signatories were all members of the Arctic 5. In the 

declaration, the Arctic 5 agreed that “an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean” and that:

...the law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning

the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the

marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine

scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal

framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims (Ilulissat, 2008).

Additional agreements of interest include the 1990 Agreement between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on the Maritime 

Boundary, 2011 U.S. and Russian Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Bering Strait Region, as well as the 

2015 Arctic Coast Guard Agreement, which extends security cooperation among the Arctic nations.

UNCLOS defines the broader regulatory and management rules for not just the Arctic coastal states, but for 

general maritime activities throughout international waters. Established in 1982 by 160 sovereign States, 

UNCLOS is the standard legal basis for determining:

1. Navigation limits

2. Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and Continental Shelves

3. Appropriate exploitation measures for mining and shipping activities

4. Basic maritime protections

5. A legitimate legal channel through which to resolve international disputes (UNCLOS, 1982)

It is important to note that the Bering Strait is generally considered an international strait under UNCLOS 

(Huntington et al., 2014, p. 120). 22 This classification limits the ability of both Russia and the U.S. to 

implement regulations either unilaterally or bilaterally. Both nations do have the ability to regulate their own 

ships, as well as foreign vessels operating in U.S. waters on a transit voyage to or from a U.S. port and 

engaged in U.S. trade (e.g. a foreign cargo vessel sailing to or from the Red Dog mine would be subject to U.S. 

jurisdiction). Additionally, both states can work together through the International Maritime Organization 

(IMO) to implement mandatory measures for all ships.

 

21 See glossary.

22 One of the interviewees from Russia noted that, “Russia is not so sure about the international status of the Strait. It prefer to treat it 

as bilateral (U.S.-Russia) business” (off-the-record interview, 2016).
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Of high concern is the sufficiency of the Arctic Council, UNCLOS, and other agreements to manage Arctic 

activities. A 2009 assessment by the World Wildlife Fund found that there were five categories of both 

governance and regulatory “gaps” in the current structure of the Arctic Council:

1. No legally binding obligations (i.e. enforceable)

2. The Arctic Council is not an “operational body”

3. Limited participation by non-Arctic States (other than observer statuses)

4. No permanent secretariat

5. No structural funding (Koivurova and Molenaar, 2009)

However, the Arctic Council has had some successes. The members of the Arctic Council signed an 

Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), which is legally 

“binding” to the signatories, although there are no enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. 

Additionally, the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 

Arctic establishes best practices for oil spill and pollution responses, including necessary equipment, training, 

and appropriated resources. 23 Yet, there are still concerns that the current international agreements are 

insufficient to address growing risk.

Furthermore, despite the provisions of the IMO Polar Code,24 there is a lack of Russian and U.S. cooperation 

and infrastructure to address (i) pollutants and other discharges (should they occur); (ii) the failure to move 

forward cooperatively on a ship routing system, which would limit the rate of accidents through the Strait as a 

chokepoint; and, (iii) the absence of how to implement the Polar Code’s CDEM (construction, design, 

equipment and manning) standards, which raises the possibility of low or under-equipped vessels passing 

through the Strait, which also is a far greater risk today, given the unpredictability of climate conditions and 

insufficient communication and routing systems.

2.e.iv. International Interest

The Bering Strait’s position as the sole entryway to the Arctic from the Pacific ensures that it is poised to grow 

in international importance, especially as climate change continues. Therefore, it is imperative that the U.S. 

and Russia cooperate to protect the region. Each of the Arctic 5, as well as the eight member states of the 

Arctic Council and a number of Arctic Council observer states (including China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore 

and South Korea) all have interests in the region. In addition, there are Indigenous peoples, non-governmental 

 

23 The agreement provides additional guidance for Arctic SAR beyond the guidelines established in the 1979 International Convention 

on Maritime Search and Rescue.

24 See Glossary.
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organizations, and economic interests, each converging upon the Bering Strait for its unique value, common 

necessity, and strategic importance. This increased importance will translate into both increased activity and 

risk, which makes the implementation of protective measures an important step for both the U.S. and Russia.

2.e.v. Arctic Strategy and the Bilateral Relationship of the Two Nation 

Stakeholders

The U.S. and Russia are both Arctic nations. The bilateral relationship between the two countries is currently 

strained due to events outside of the Arctic, yet the two nations have a long history of cooperation in the Arctic 

Region. This section analyzes the Arctic Strategy of both the U.S. and Russia, focusing on the two nations’ 

shared goals. The section will conclude by discussing the current bilateral relationship between the U.S. and 

Russia in the Bering Strait Region.

2.e.v.1 U.S. Arctic Strategy

The United States has increasingly narrowed its focus on the Arctic since January 9th, 2009 when thenPresident George W. Bush released National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66, which established 

“the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic region and directs related implementation actions” 

(Bush, 2009). Later, upon taking office, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13580, which 

established the Alaska Interagency Working Group and which also led to the publication of the report titled, 

Managing for the Future in a Rapidly Changing Arctic in March of 2013. This was quickly followed by the 

first United States Strategy for the Arctic Region (“U.S. Arctic Strategy”), which set three broad goals:

1. Advance United States Security Interests

2. Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship

3. Strengthen International Cooperation (p. 2).

The White House continued to direct focus on the Arctic in 2015, issuing an Executive Order titled Enhancing 

Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic. The President then planned a visit to Alaska in August -

September of 2015 and became the first President to travel above the Arctic Circle (McCain-Nelson, 2015). 

The White House (2015) followed up with this historic visit when it released a Fact Sheet, which called for 

new investments to “enhance safety and security in the changing Arctic,” including the acquisition of new 

icebreakers. 

Following the U.S. Arctic Strategy in May 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard published its own Arctic Strategy under 

Commandant Admiral Papp. Its objectives were to:
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1. Improve Awareness

2. Modernize Governance

3. Broaden Partnerships (p. 10)

Both the White House and USCG’s strategies clearly made the Arctic an area of national importance and were 

written with an aim to increase the government’s focus in the region.

Then, in November 2013, the Department of Defense (DoD) published its Arctic Strategy, which differed 

slightly in tone from the White House and Coast Guard. The DoD strategy took a relatively cautious approach 

towards investing in capability, given the uncertainties that surround both climate change and human activity 

in the region (Department of Defense, 2013, p. 12). The difference in tone can also be attributed to the tasks 

enumerated in the January 2014 Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which 

set specific tasks for Federal agencies in the Arctic. The U.S. Coast Guard was either the designated or implied 

lead agency in almost 25% of the tasks (The White House, 2014), whereas the DoD was the lead agency for 

only one task. 

The U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap (2014) took a similar tone to the DoD plan, stating that, “The Navy will 

emphasize low cost, long-lead time activities to match capability and capacity to future demands.” 

It is clear that the U.S. continues to believe that the Arctic is and should remain among the list of national 

priorities25, with an emphasis on maintaining cooperation in the region. Moreover, official U.S. strategy at this 

time is largely focused on highlighting the facts that (i) the U.S. is an Arctic nation; (ii) the Arctic is changing 

rapidly due to climate change; and, (iii) the Arctic is seeing increased activity and risk, which leads to a need 

for both increased infrastructure and regulation.

2.e.v.2. Arctic Strategy of the Russian Federation

The 2008 Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic from the Period Till 2020 and for a 

Further Perspective sets the broad strategy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. Its primary strategic goals 

are summarized to include:

1. National Interests

a. Economic development – including natural resources and the Northern Sea Route

b. National security

2. Environmental Protection

 

25 There is debate as to exactly where the Arctic should be in the list of national priorities among various Federal agencies (off-therecord interviews, 2015 and 2016).
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3. International Cooperation

Russian priorities in the Arctic include “the creation of a uniform regional system of search and rescue, and 

also prevention of man-caused accidents” as well as “strengthening” regional partnerships. The strategy notes 

an end-state that ensures that Russia will “maintain the role of a leading Arctic power.” 

2.e.v.2.a. Security Concerns Resulting from Russian Moves in the Arctic

There are concerns in the international community regarding Russian motivations in the Arctic. Slayton and 

Rosen (2014) wrote a piece titled, Another Region where the Russian Military Threatens to Dominate the U.S, 

which argued for increased strategic focus on the Arctic. Former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper also 

warned of the “spectre of Russian threat in Arctic” (Rennie, 2014). Newsweek’s Jeff Stein (2015) asked, “What 

is Russia Up to in the Arctic?” More recently, Arizona Senator John McCain (2015) wrote an opinion piece, 

which argued that President Vladimir Putin was an Arctic threat. 

Much of the geopolitical tension today is a combination of both historical remnants from the Cold War and 

concerns over each other’s actions. More than one interviewee noted that Russia has never been defeated yet 

many in the West treated Russia like it was a defeated nation after the fall of the Soviet Union (off-the-record 

interviews, 2016). The expansion of NATO to areas under Russia’s traditional sphere of influence was seen as 

provocative by the Kremlin. Indeed, a line could be drawn, connecting Russia’s recent and continuing transboundary interventions (e.g. Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria) to the expansion of NATO along Russia’s borders 

(Brown, 2014; & Mearsheimer, 2014). 

Academics like Lincoln Flake (2013) have argued that, “moving forward, Moscow’s Arctic posture may 

resemble its Near Abroad intransigence...” (p.44). American Admiral, James Stavridis, recently argued that, 

“the disputes in the north have been dealt with peacefully, but climate change could alter the equilibrium” 

(Mahr, 2010). Therefore, the changing environment could lead to expedite geopolitical confrontations among 

Arctic nations. 

Yet, as one Russian interviewee keenly asserted, the Arctic has been and will continue to be a region of 

strategic military importance as “the flight trajectory of intercontinental ballistic missiles pass through the 

Arctic” (off-the-record interview, 2016). Arctic waters continue to be a key patrol area for U.S. and Russian 

submarines as well, which is not new. What is new, however, is the increased Russian military focus on nontraditional tasks, such as control over navigation, resource protection, search and rescue, and environmental 

safety (off-the-record interview, 2016).

It is also important to note that the U.S. and Russia have always managed to cooperate in the Arctic despite 
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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their competition in other areas. Examples of this cooperation include the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation 

of Polar Bears, as well as the 1989 Agreement between the US and USSR on Cooperation in Combating 

Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas in Emergency Situations. As one Russian academic noted, Russia 

accepts the rights of the Arctic 8 in the Arctic Ocean and is interested in cooperative management of shared 

areas (off-the-record interview, 2016).

Given the research, we believe the perceptions of threat, in particular, are overblown in the media (see: section 

below). Russia has looked north for economic development since 1601, when it created its first settlement in 

the Arctic, Mangazeya, to trade “furs, bread, Chinese porcelain and damask swords” (Russian State Museum, 

2015, p. 6). Russia’s current Arctic strategy makes it clear that economics is the motivation for Russia’s 

northward gaze. 

2.e.v.2.b Russian Economic Concerns in the Arctic

Russia’s Arctic moves can be seen through a variety of lenses, but it is our assessment that Russia’s primary 

motivations in the Arctic are based on economics vice military assertion. First, as Flake (2013) notes, 

“Russia’s need for foreign technical assistance to develop its vast reserves in its EEZ (Exclusive Economic 

Zone) only further discourages it from destabilizing the region through a belligerent approach” (p. 46). Second, 

as Carmel (2014) notes, “20 percent of Russia’s GDP and 22% of Russian exports originate in the Arctic” (p. 

12). And, third, as a recent NATO report suggests, it is unlikely for a military confrontation to result out of a 

desire for resources, because “up to 95% of Arctic resources fall within the sovereign territories of Arctic 

states” (NATO, 2015).

According to the Russian International Affairs Council, a state run agency, “The search for, and effective 

development of, offshore deposits in the Arctic are impossible without the use and transfer of foreign 

technological and organizational-economic expertise and knowledge” (Pelyasov and Kotov, 2015, p.25). 

Additionally, our interviews in Russia with various officials, academics, NGOs and industry leaders all 

emphasized the economic importance of the Arctic to the Russian economy. Therefore, we believe that the 

Arctic is open to international cooperation as a means to secure economic benefit, which includes Russia’s 

ultimate goal to secure international cooperation in the Arctic to attract greater investments (Pelyasov et al., 

2015, p.72).

2.e.v.2.c Explaining Russia’s Arctic Military Buildup

According to some scholars, the belligerent actions of Russian aircraft and military forces in the region are 

largely illustrative of Russian capability and not threatening, because both sides know that the use of such 
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equipment does not “make sense or serve the interests of either side” (Stein, 2015). Indeed, one Russian 

academic asserted that “serious people do not believe in military risk” in the Arctic (off-the-record interview, 

2016). Finally, Stinebaugh explains Russian military build-up as a means to secure funding elsewhere, saying:

It may be that one way to get a project funded in the Russian military system today is to attach the 

word ‘Arctic’ to it, just like U.S. projects got funded by invoking [the global war on terror] and now 

get funded with ‘cyber’ even if the connection is tenuous (as quoted in Stein, 2015).

Thus, Russian military moves in the Arctic could be seen largely as political maneuvers for a domestic 

audience, rather than as an international military threat (MacFarquhar, 2015). 

Additionally, Russia has real security concerns along its Arctic coast. In 2013, the activist organization 

Greenpeace attempted to board a Russian oil rig in the Barents Sea (BBC, 2013). Imagine the devastation that

could have occurred if the boarders been terrorists.

Figure (14): Greenpeace activists attempt to board a Russian oil platform in the Arctic26

2.e.v.3 Bilateral Relationship of the U.S. and Russia

As noted earlier, the purpose of this report is to argue for increased cooperation in the Bering Strait region 

between Russia and the U.S. to reduce risk. Currently there is little to no cooperation in the region. According 

to USCG District 17: 

The last functional bilateral oil spill response exercise between the United States and Russian 

 

26 Image from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24141667
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Federation was conducted in May of 1998 in Sakhalin Russia. Since then there have been intermittent 

Joint Planning Group meetings in Russia and the US, renewal of the joint contingency plan (JCP) (HQ 

to HQ level) in 2011, and development of several 2-year work plans and some command center to 

command center comms ('check the circuit') scenario-based exercises, in 2012 (off-the-record 

interview, 2016). 

The last meeting between USCG D17 and the Russians was in Vladivostok in April of 2013, for the purpose of 

developing a two-year work plan, with the ultimate goal of a “multi-year ramp-up of meetings/exercises” (offthe-record interview, 2016). Soon thereafter, the Russians intervened in Ukraine and annexed Crimea. The 

U.S. government responded with sanctions and a prohibition on bilateral contacts between the two countries, 

resulting in the cessation of low-level contacts between operators on opposite sides of Bering. Thus, the Bering 

Strait is currently a shared waterway in which the two sides responsible for its management have not spoken in 

two years and have not carried out a functional, bilateral oil spill response exercise in 18 years. 

2.f. Why the Bering Strait Matters

As noted earlier, the 44 nautical mile wide Bering Strait is a strategic choke point27 as well as a “biological 

hotspot of global significance” (McConnell, Brigham, Laughlin, & Speer, 2012, p. 9; & Department of the 

Navy, 2014, p. 6). It is, thus, a critical marine habitat, which supports Indigenous peoples with subsistence 

lifestyles. This critical system must co-exist with increasing maritime activity in a region that is largely devoid 

of the infrastructure needed to support such an increase. 

Moreover, the combination of lax regulation, deficient infrastructure and heightened activity creates a security 

problem for both the U.S. and Russia. Therefore, it is critical for both nations to cooperate to ensure complete 

maritime domain awareness (MDA). If the U.S. and Russia can cooperatively manage the Bering Strait 

(despite their otherwise contentious bilateral relationship), then it will serve as a scalable model for the entire 

Arctic region. 

3. Data and Methods

This section discusses the data and methods used by the authors in the formulation of both the findings and 

recommendations discussed later in this report. The authors relied on a broad group of sources, from 

interviews to government reports and news articles. The goal was to find corroboration among sources, for the 

purpose of creating the most accurate picture possible.

 

27 See US Navy Arctic Strategy.
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3.a. Interviews

The foundation of this report is the fifty-two interviews, which were conducted over the course of seven 

months. Table (1) below breaks down each interview by country and position held by the interviewee. 

Table 1: Interviews Conducted by Category (N=52)

28

United States of 

America (N=37)

Russian Federation 

(N=15) Combined (N=52)

Interview Category Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Government Official*

3

7.50% 3 20.00% 6 10.91%

Elected Official or their staff

7

17.50% 0 0.00% 7 12.73%

Former Elected Official*

2

5.00% 0 0.00% 2 3.64%

Ambassador (Current or 

Retired) 3

7.50% 0 0.00% 3 5.45%

Coast Guard Admiral 

(Current or Retired)

4

10.00% 0 0.00% 4 7.27%

Military Officers

5

12.50% 0 0.00% 5 9.09%

Academics* 5 12.50% 5 33.33% 10 18.18%

Industry Leaders*

2

5.00% 4 26.67% 6 10.91%

Non-Governmental 

Organization Leaders 2

5.00% 3 20.00% 5 9.09%

Indigenous 7 17.50% 0 0.00% 7 12.73%

Total 40 100.00% 15 100.00% 55 100.00%

 

28 Note: The categories marked with a * contain an interviewee that was counted in two categories.
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The team used a “snowball sampling” method to conduct the interviews, from which other interviews and 

contacts were made. These were conducted under the condition of anonymity, in order to receive honest 

answers from the various experts. The interviews were recorded with detailed notes, which were both typed 

and handwritten. 

The majority of interviews were conducted in person. The team traveled to Anchorage, Alaska, New York 

City, and Washington D.C., U.S., and Moscow and Saint Petersburg, Russia, to conduct structured in-person 

interviews with key individuals. On a few occasions, when meeting in person was not possible, e-mail, phone 

and Skype interviews were conducted. Each interview followed a prepared questionnaire. The use of a formal 

questionnaire allowed for standardization and gave the team the ability compare answers across those who 

were interviewed. All interview data was transcribed and stored in an online drive, which is password secured 

and only accessible to the team. 

Upon completion of the draft report, the team sent a draft to each of the interviewees for comment. The team 

later received comments from ten of the interviewees (five Russian and five American), which were 

considered and incorporated into this report.

3.b. Articles, Journals, and Periodicals

This report is supported by findings and opinions published in journals and periodicals. Some of the articles 

present conflicting findings, and the variety of these findings serves to illustrate the uncertainty that surrounds 

the Bering Strait and greater Arctic. However, this report sought to include both the majority and minority 

views, for the purpose of presenting policy recommendations, which would be mutually agreeable to both 

sides.

3.c. International Agreements

This report considered existing international agreements, including law and treaties. As noted in Section 2, the 

Arctic 5 agreed that the dominant legal framework in the Arctic is UNCLOS, per the Ilulissat Declaration

(2008). Additional agreements that are central to this report include

● The 1989 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in the Bering 

and Chukchi Seas in Emergency Situations

● The 1996 Ottawa Declaration29

● The 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic

 

29 Established the Arctic Council
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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● The 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 

Arctic

● The 2015 Arctic Coast Guard Forum Agreement

The recommendations were designed to operationalize existing agreements through thoughtful cooperation at 

the regional level, combined with bilateral work towards an agreeable regulatory structure in the region. 

Ultimately, all recommendations should simultaneously enable development while reducing risk.

3.d. Government Publications

Moreover, this report referred to government publications, from internal memos to published national and 

agency Arctic strategies. Such publications were analyzed to determine areas of agreement between the U.S. 

and Russia. It is key to note here that both the U.S. Arctic Strategy (2013) and the Russian Arctic Strategy 

(2009) share the goals of protecting the environment and improving international cooperation, which is a 

foundation for further cooperation in the region. Government publications also provide a means to test 

academic predictions for the region and are used in conjunction with other sources to confirm our findings for 

the future of both maritime activity and risk in the Bering Strait Region.

3.e. Accident Incident Database

There is limited data available to evaluate risk in the Bering Strait. As one interviewee noted, “There haven’t 

been any accidents in the Bering Strait” (Off-the-record interview, 2015). Yet, there is real reason to be 

concerned that an accident will occur and that, when it does, it will be catastrophic. As noted in Section 2, the 

Bering Strait Region lacks the infrastructure to support the traffic that currently exists, much less any projected 

increase. 

Therefore, we chose to analyze the Accident Incident Database (AID), which was compiled for the Arctic 

Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) (the best publicly available data on marine accidents in the Arctic). The 

AID includes a “summary of the incidents and accidents occurring in the Arctic region between 1995-2004” 

(Arctic Council, 2009b, 86), and it was originally compiled from multiple sources, as no single source was 

available (Arctic Council, 2009a). The design of the dataset limits interpretation to descriptive statistics. The 

AMSA only included the following summary statistics from the database in its final report: vessel type, 

primary reason, month and year (Arctic Council, 2009b, p. 86). 

Accidents and incidents (hereafter “accidents”) were grouped into six broad accident categories. The dataset 

also includes the type of vessel, date of the incident, location, number of fatalities (if any), whether or not fuel 
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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spilled, amount of fuel spilled (in tons), whether the ship was an actual or constructive total loss, and whether 

or not the ship sustained ice damage. The database includes 292 accidents across the Arctic, but it may be 

missing information regarding human injury with no damage to a particular vessel (Arctic Council, 2009b, 87).

The AID (analyzed in Appendix 2) was used as a proxy to help determine the risk in the Bering Strait, as the 

ice clears and traffic moves north. We acknowledge that this is an imperfect proxy, but it is the only data 

available to make such a prediction. The Bering Sea is also a shared sea with the U.S. and Russia, each 

claiming part of its waters as a portion of their respective territorial sea and EEZ. Therefore, any trends noted 

in the Bering Sea Region could also be attributed to the level of international cooperation in the region. Thus, 

the Bering Sea's proximity to the Bering Strait, coupled with its status as a U.S. and Russian shared sea, make 

it a useful proxy for the Bering Strait. 

3.f. Field Research

The team traveled to conduct research and analyses onsite throughout the U.S. and Russia. Such travel 

provided cultural context to the problem as well as critical background information through interviews, 

testimonies of local people, and first-hand observations and experiences, for the purposes of establishing 

personal connections with individuals close to the matter and to provide a holistic, representative 

understanding of the environment. 

The key institutions of this field research in Alaska included the Anchorage Museum and the Alaska Native 

Heritage Center. Our team also actively participated in the University of Alaska Anchorage’s “U.S. and 

Canada: Shared Perspectives in the Arctic” conference, which was held in December of 2015. In Moscow, the 

team learned of the political and social contexts surrounding the Arctic through guided lectures at the Kremlin 

and the Museum of Contemporary History. In Saint Petersburg, the retired icebreaker Krasin and the Russian 

State Museum of the Arctic and Antarctic provided critical background information on the importance of the 

Arctic to the Russian people.

4. Findings

Maritime traffic will increase in the Bering Strait Region. Absent any new risk mitigation measures, the risk of 

a maritime disaster will continue to increase with the rise in traffic, which will increase the likelihood of the 

need for an MRO or oil spill response in the future. 
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4.a. The Future of Maritime Activity in the Bering Strait

The future of Arctic shipping is the key to determine the amount of risk in the Bering Strait Region. The Arctic 

Climate Impact Assessment found that “reduced sea ice is likely to increase marine access to the region’s 

resources, expanding opportunities for shipping and possibly for offshore oil extraction...” (Arctic Council, 

2009, p. 2). It is important to delineate the various types of marine traffic. Thus, there are three (3) primary 

types of maritime traffic of concern in the Arctic:

● Destinational shipping – shipping that is point to point with the purpose of supporting “some 

activity in the Arctic,” like mining or resupplying towns (Carmel, 2013); 

● Eco-tourism – all shipping traffic whose primary purpose is the transport of tourists, including all 

cruise ships;

● Transit or container shipping – the use of ships to move containers as a part of a global supply 

chain.30

The data suggest that traffic in the Bering Strait Region will continue to increase. In 2015, the U.S. Committee 

on the Marine Transportation System published A 10-Year Projection Of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic 

Region (Azzara et. al, 2015). Azzara et al. (2015) predict a significant increase in traffic and transit activity in 

the Bering Strait Region (see: Figures 15 and 16). If predictions are correct, then up to 2,637 vessels could 

transit to the Bering on an annual basis during ice-free periods (Azzara et al., 2015, p. 57). This is up from 540

vessels in 2015 (see Figures 15, 16, and 17).

Some have argued that Royal Dutch Shell’s recent decision to leave Alaska will lead to a decline in traffic. The 

research used for this report counters that assessment, because (1) there are other companies still working on 

the north slope of Alaska, (2) ecotourism is rising, and (3) Russian traffic via the NSR is poised to see a 

dramatic increase, due to the LNG facilities under development in the Yamal and Gydan Peninsulas. 

Additionally, Shell has sought to maintain its Arctic drilling leases (Brewyn, 2016).

 

30 Traffic related to fishing has been purposely omitted. In July of 2015, the Arctic agreed “that they will not start commercial fishing 

in the Central Arctic Ocean—the international waters beyond these nations’ 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ)—unless and 

until science-based fishery management measures are in place” (Pew, 2015). This is in addition to the U.S. ban on fishing within the 

U.S. EEZ north of the Bering Strait (Pew, 2009). We do not believe fishing traffic will be a major factor in the Bering Strait anytime 

soon, if ever.
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Figure (15): Number of Bering Strait Transits by Year

Figure (16) US Arctic Vessel Activity Projections Through the Bering Strait in 202531

 

31 Image from page 57 of the CMTS Arctic Shipping Report. (Azzara, A. et al., 2015) 
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Figure (17) Graph comparing projections of shipping in 202532

4.a.i. The Future of Destinational Shipping Through the Bering Strait

The literature almost universally agrees that destinational traffic will continue to increase, and this will largely 

be based upon commodities pricing (Arctic Council, 2009, p. 5; Lajeunesse, 2012; Carmel, 2013; Brigham,

2015, 32; & Azzara, Wang & Rutherford, 2015, p. 61). Arctic oil is technically difficult to drill, and, therefore, 

the price per barrel needs to be high enough to make it economically feasible (Emmerson, 2010, p. 210 & 

Deloitte, 2016). The same is true for other economic resources, but, as Emmerson (2010) notes, “...apart from 

oil and gas, Russia has little the world wants. Oil and gas represent a greater share of Russia’s national exports 

than for any other Arctic country” (p. 197). 

Russian officials, academics, and NGO leaders all noted the importance of resource extraction to their 

economy. Additionally, China is interested in securing access to additional energy resources and has partnered 

with the Russian to extract natural gas in the Yamal Peninsula (Ybanez, 2015). Some of the Russian 

interviewees noted that this might not be the preferred partnership, because China does not have the same level 

of expertise as the West, but economic sanctions have left the Russian government little choice (off-the-record 

interview, 2016). 

Despite decreasing oil and gas prices, the energy partnership between Russia and China continues to grow. 

This partnership will directly impact the Bering Sea Route, because liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) will be 

shipped directly to China, via the Northern Sea Route, which terminates in the Bering (Mazneva, 2016 & 

 

32 Image from page 61 of the CMTS Arctic Shipping Report. (Azzara, A. et al., 2015) 
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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Ybanez, 2015). The Yamal LNG project (which should be online in 2017) will result in ships transiting 

through the Bering Strait every 40 hours during ice-free periods. Additionally, Russian interviewees confirmed 

the construction of a new facility on the Gydan Peninsula, which will result in a further increase in traffic (offthe-record interviews, 2016).

When listing the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, the Russian Arctic Strategy (2008) 

starts with the assertion that, “The basic national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic are [the] use 

of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation providing 

the solution of problems of social and economic development in the country.” 

Government officials, academics, experts, NGO leaders, and even some of the Indigenous peoples noted the 

importance of resource extraction for the health of the Alaskan economy. The economic focus on resource 

extraction will lead to an increase in destinational shipping in the Bering Strait, as Arctic waters continue to 

open. The data gathered for this report confirm that destinational shipping in the region will continue to 

increase. 

4.a.ii. The Future of Eco-Tourism through the Bering Strait

Cruise ships are now entering Arctic waters in greater numbers than ever, including the Crystal Serenity, a

cruise liner, which will be carrying more than 1,000 passengers through the Northwest passage in the summer 

of 2016 (Arctic Council, 2009, p. 5; and CBC News, 2014). The increase in cruise vessel traffic is probably 

one of the most concerning Arctic developments. For example, cruise ships are at risk of grounding in 

uncharted waters (see: the Clipper Adventurer). Additional risks include contact with ice, and a complete lack 

of support infrastructure to include SAR support, weather forecasting, and access to current charts with 

accurate bathymetric information. 

Other risks come from smaller vessels, such as the unannounced cruise ship, catamaran, and sailing vessel 

noted in section 2 (Reiss, 2012, p. 98-99). A Russian official made a special point to describe the case of the 

French catamaran, the Babouchka, which became stranded in the ice and was ultimately rescued by a Russian 

icebreaker – the Admiral Makarov (off-the-record interview, 2016). As activity continues to increase, 

governments are going to be expected to respond when there is an emergency. 

It is a logical assumption that if the Crystal Serenity has a successful voyage in 2016, then there will be a 

further increase of large ships sailing through the Bering Strait, especially given the economic profitability per 

cabin (Crystal Cruises, n.d.). A recent article noted that the entire cruise was sold out, and that cabins were as 

much as $100,000 each (Goldenberg, 2016). Our team confirmed that Crystal Cruises is planning another 

voyage in 2017 (off-the-record interview, 2016). Stewart and Dawson note that the Northwest passage has 

seen a 57% increase in traffic from 2006 to 2010 (Stewart and Dawson, 2011, p. 264). 
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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4.a.iii. The Future of Transit or Container Shipping through the Bering Strait

A frequent discussion in the literature is how much distance, and therefore money, the Arctic routes save over 

the more traditional shipping routes, such as the Suez or Panama Canals (Fairhall, 2010, p. 167, and Alaska 

State Legislature, 2012, p. 14). The Alaska Northern Waters Task Force (2012), Alaska Arctic Policy 

Commission (2015), and Mead Treadwell (2015) (former Lieutenant Governor of Alaska) (2015), all believe 

that the potential savings from Arctic container shipping will rise and, therefore, they argue for increased 

investment, in order to be prepared for the rise of Arctic shipping. 

Chinese moves in the Arctic may prove the Alaska Northern Waters Task Force, Alaska Arctic Policy 

Commission, and Mead Treadwell correct. In 2010, the Chinese National Petroleum Cooperation and 

SOVCOMFLOT (a shipping corporation owned by the Russian Federation) signed an agreement to coordinate 

the use of the NSR (Staalesen, 2010). Why are the Chinese moving to ship in the NSR, if it does not make 

economic sense? The Chinese are moving towards the NSR for two reasons. First, as Carmel (2013) notes, 

“...the Northern Sea Route offers the Chinese at least a partial solution to their ‘Malacca Problem,’ providing a 

source of oil and gas from the Barents Sea that cannot be interdicted, unlike that obtained from the Persian 

Gulf.” Second, as Emmerson (2010) notes, “Money is no object [for the Chinese]” (p. 144). However, Malte 

Humpert (2013) of the Arctic Institute disagrees, saying:

Future shipping in the Polar region will mostly consist of seasonal destinational transport, delivering 

supplies into the Arctic for its increasing economic activity and transporting the region’s natural 

resources to markets in East Asia. Apart from these niche opportunities, Arctic shipping routes will be 

unable to compete with the world’s existing major trade routes. Thus, while climate change will, over 

the coming decades transform the frozen north into a seasonally navigable ocean, Arctic shipping 

routes will not become a new silk road for China. (p.4)

Regardless of academic predictions and economics, it appears that the Chinese are continuing to pursue 

container shipping in the NSR. In August, Staalesen (2015) reported that the Chinese shipping firm was still 

considering using the NSR, and, in September, Thurton (2015) reported that Cosco, another Chinese shipping 

firm, will begin “regularly scheduled vessel service through the Northern Sea Route.” Additionally, a recent 

Council on Foreign Relations Report notes that:

China strengthened its toehold in the Arctic by signing a free trade agreement with Iceland, its first 

with a European country, and building an embassy that is Reykjavik’s largest (Borgerson, Brigham, 

Byers, Conley & Laruelle, 2014).

Many consider this move the first to securing access to Arctic shipping routes (The Economist, 2013).

However, other authors are more cautious (or even skeptical) about the future of container shipping in the 

Arctic (Emmerson, 2010, p. 162; Emmerson; Lahn, 2012, p. 31; Lawson, 2015, 32; Carmel, 2013; & Carmel, 

2014, p. 17). Carmel notes that, “It is very unlikely then, that the Northern Sea Route across the top of Russia 

will become a major pathway for the global flow of commerce, and it is virtually certain the Northwest 
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

Improvements 45

Passage across the top of Canada will never be useful for international trade” (Carmel, 2013). A recent article 

by Stephenson, Brigham, and Smith (2014) note that traffic in the Northern Sea Route is increasing, but there 

are uncertainties regarding its future (p. 111). 

The key to determining the economic feasibility of container shipping in the Arctic is not the cost per ship but, 

rather, the cost per container. Carmel (2013) argues that the cost per container could be more than double, due 

to limited ship sizes, which are feasible on the Arctic routes. It is important to note that economics is not the 

sole factor in determining shipping routes, as noted above.

Ultimately, the data indicate that it is highly unlikely that there will be a massive increase in transit or 

container shipping in the Arctic and, therefore, through the Bering Strait Region. The majority of the Russian 

interviewees thought there would not be a large increase in shipping traffic.33 An expert from an environmental 

NGO noted that the Northern Sea Route saw a voyage from Korea to Europe in 2013, but they have not 

planned future voyages due to the high risk resulting from a lack of infrastructure, knowledge, up-to-date 

charts, weather forecasting, and communications. He noted that there is a two to three day period where ships

have no communications at all on the NSR. 

4.b. What Does the Increase in Destinational Shipping and Eco- Tourism Mean for 

the Region?

As one Russian interviewee noted, any emergency situation in the Arctic will have multiple impacts, including 

environmental, political, social and economic. The interviewee asserted that environmental security must be a 

priority for all Arctic states, because they are going to be the “first to experience all of the negative 

consequences of any environmental disaster” in the region (off the record interview, 2016). Ultimately, the 

increase in traffic leads to an increase in the risk of a maritime disaster if the U.S. and Russia do not take steps 

to mitigate the risk.

Additionally, increasing activity also makes the region a more attractive target for maritime terrorism. The lack 

of security described by Reiss (2012) of boats arriving unannounced (see: section 2.b.i) and unchecked by U.S. 

Customs (p.99) shows that the door is open to a potential maritime attack. Moreover, the attack on September 

11, 2001 demonstrates the importance of innovative thinking when evaluating national vulnerabilities. In 

particular, the lack of security presence in the Arctic region provides terrorists a window that could be used to 

execute an eco-terrorism attack using a vessel. Given international threats, imagine the ramifications if ISIS 

took over a ship near the Bering Strait (Murphy, 2008). For example, the ship could be run aground with the 

 

33 Note: the Central Marine Research and Design Institute in St. Petersburg, Russia recently presented the principle results of their 

research and believe that eventually container shipping on the NSR could be viable with the development of two modern container 

hub terminals capable of receiving conventional container ships. These ports would allow three ice class container ships to transport 

130-140 TEUs (twenty foot equivalent units) per year. This would result in one container ship passing through the Bering Strait per 

week (interview, 2016).
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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intent to create an environmental disaster. The region is almost completely unprepared to respond to such a 

disaster. 

The U.S. and Russia are both targets of terrorism and, therefore, have a shared interest in increased 

information sharing and cooperation to prevent such attacks on shipping in the Bering Strait Region. This 

increased cooperation could extend Arctic wide to ensure that the waterways of the Arctic 5 remain secure. 

4.b.i. Search and Rescue (SAR) 

As Roscoe, Campagna, and McNulty (2014) note, “In 2007 more than half of Alaska’s 1.7 million visitors 

were cruise ship passengers, and the economic impact of the tourist industry cannot be overstated.” Yet Alaska 

is unprepared, should one of these ships run into trouble. The worst possible scenario for Arctic nations would 

be a mass rescue operation (MRO) in Arctic waters, including the Bering Strait (Fairhall, 2010, p.190; Carmel, 

2014). 

The Bering Strait Region is more than 760 miles away from the nearest Coast Guard Station (Hartsig et al., 

2014). There is a tyranny of distance in Alaska – as Roscoe et al. (2014) note, “The nearest Coast Guard air 

station to the Arctic is in Kodiak and requires a 4-hour fixed-wing or 10-hour rotary-wing flight to support the 

most northern Alaskan population of Barrow, a distance of 820 miles.” The average water temperature in the 

Bering Strait during July of 2015 was 6.61 degrees Celsius or 43 degrees Fahrenheit, per the NOAA buoy just 

south of the Bering Strait. A person with proper survival gear has a survival time of approximately six hours, 

while a person without proper gear has a survival time of around 30 minutes – in either case, the survival time 

is less than the current time it would take to put a helicopter on scene to affect a rescue (Roscoe et al, 2014; & 

United States Coast Guard, 2013, p. 4-23). 

Even if the people could be rescued, the medical infrastructure to treat them is completely lacking in the 

region. The hospital in Nome, Alaska – one of the largest in the region – has just 18 beds, while the Crystal 

Serenity carries 1,700 passengers and crew (Goldenberg, 2016). 

4.b.ii Oil Spill Response

Almost as devastating as an MRO is the possibility of a large oil spill in or north of the Bering Strait. An oil 

spill would be catastrophic for wildlife in the region, destroying habitats, killing animals, and disrupting 

migration patterns, as well as for indigenous communities, who rely on such wildlife (BEST-BSEIEF Bering 

Sea Project, 2010). 

Oil spills are also immensely expensive to cleanup. Cohen (2010) asserts that cleaning up after the Exxon 
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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Valdez, “a spill of approximately 10.8 million gallons in Alaska in 1989 -- cost over $630 per gallon...” (p. 3). 

He estimates the total cost, excluding “the cost of the oil, litigation costs to Exxon, punitive damages, etc.” to 

be $6.8 billion in 2010 dollars (Cohen, 2010, p.4). 

Furthermore, there is still debate regarding whether or not cleaning up after an oil spill is even possible in an 

environment that is either completely or partially covered by ice (Petterson, 2010 & Reiss, 2012 and off-therecord interview, 2015). Even if it is possible, the tyranny of distance described in Section 4.b.i. also applies to 

oil spill response. Assets and personnel would need to be moved around the state, which takes time. The MV 

Clipper Adventurer and Selendang Ayu cases both illustrate the problems associated with distance, extreme 

weather, and the lack of infrastructure in the Arctic region. As Steward and Dawson (2011) note:

It was a matter of good fortune that the Amundsen [Canadian icebreaker] was relatively 

close to the Clipper Adventurer, and even more fortunate that the icebreaker was carrying the 

appropriate equipment and operational expertise to map a safe rescue course, which allowed the 

Amundsen access to the grounded ship “without risk of succumbing to the same fate.” (p. 263)

Similarly, the Selendang Ayu incident would have been far worse if CGC Alex Haley not been nearby with a 

helicopter to provide rescue capability, after another helicopter had crashed during rescue operations. Cleanup 

of the more than 300,000 gallons of fuel and other waste took 18 months, from December of 2004 to June of 

2006 (NOAA, 2006). The incident cost at least $100 million (State of Alaska, 2009).

4.c. Findings from Stakeholders

4.c.i. The Russian Federation

The information in this section is largely derived from interviews conducted with Russian government 

officials, academics, experts, and NGO and industry leaders. The 2008 Basics of the State Policy of the 

Russian Federation in the Arctic from the Period Till 2020 and for a Further Perspective clearly notes the 

importance of economic development in the Russian Arctic, which was confirmed by each interviewee. 

Each of the interviewees shared the desire for greater cooperation in the Arctic, but many noted that the U.S. 

did not know who to talk to on the Russian side. Each of the interviewees said that greater cooperation would 

reduce risk, and bilateral exercises should be conducted on an annual or biannual basis. Several of the 

interviewees mentioned that the U.S. and Russia should move to a Norway-Russia model of alternating 

communications and functional exercises annually. The interviewees also mentioned the need to design 

exercises, which include simultaneous requirements to exercise oil spill response and SAR. 
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Russian interviewees mentioned that falling oil prices are hurting their economy, and so they are concerned 

that their available resources are limited for any Arctic initiative, especially in the Bering Strait. With these 

concerns in mind, they continued to say that they would be interested in resuming bilateral cooperation as a 

way to gain efficiencies and increase reliability in the region. 

Despite the economic outlook for oil and gas, the Russians are developing new extraction facilities on the 

Yamal and Gydan peninsulas, which are expected to yield 32-37 million tons of LNG per year (off-the-record 

interview, 2016). Russia expects to ship the LNG east, across the NSR, to China during ice free periods, which 

is likely to impact the Bering Strait from the effects of heightened activity (off-the-record interviews, 2016). 

The Russians interviewed were not interested in a route like the one currently proposed by the USCG’s Port 

Access Route Study (PARS).34 Russian experts noted that the proposed routes were “not flexible enough for 

bad weather and changing conditions” and also asserted that the “traffic was not that dense” (off-the-record 

interviews, 2015 and 2016). They are, however, interested in the use of Areas To Be Avoided (ATBAs) and 

believe that a system of dynamic ATBAs would be the most useful. 

Finally, the Russian interviewees noted that the U.S. ratification of UNCLOS would increase international 

stability – particularly in the Arctic. The Russians said that they understood the U.S. political situation, 

recognizing the issue as contentious. However, they stated that the U.S. lack of ratification does not help with 

future cooperation in the region. Indeed, the absence of ratification provides an excuse not to cooperate.35

4.c.ii. The United States of America

Interviews with U.S. academics, experts, and local, state, and federal officials provided the following common 

themes regarding U.S. interests in the Arctic.

A surprising find was the general agreement that the Coast Guard Port Access Route Study was widely 

disliked. Instead, the majority of interviews (including many of the participants of the “U.S. and Canada: 

Shared Interests in the Arctic Conference”) were intrigued by the potential of dynamic ATBAs. According to 

Ed Page of the Marine Exchange of Alaska: 

The limited marine traffic density does not present a significant risk of collisions and therefore routing 

measures are not needed. Additionally, routing measures may be difficult to adhere to when navigating 

to avoid ice. However, maintaining a safe distance from environmentally sensitive areas is warranted 

 

34 See footnote 10 on page 18 and Figure 8 on page 19 for more information on the current PARS proposal.

35 See Section 5.b.vii. for additional information.
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and can best be addressed with ATBAs (off-the-record interview, 2016).

There is near universal support for increased cooperation with Russia – particularly in the vital areas of search 

and rescue (SAR) and oil spill response. All interviewees agreed that there needs to be regularly scheduled 

exercises between the U.S. and Russia to ensure adequate response capability. There were a number of calls to 

coordinate and collaborate efforts in the Arctic – both nationally and internationally – to avoid duplication of 

efforts and achieve the greatest possible efficiencies. Interviewees also noted a need for increased data 

collection and sharing. 

The U.S. Arctic suffers from a lack of infrastructure and a “tyranny of distance.” U.S. officials at all levels 

asserted that per capita spending is the wrong measure to determine the worth of new projects, especially when 

compared to the rest of the U.S. Instead, the correct measure will address the cost of inaction in the long-term. 

Moreover, the right question is, “How prepared are we to respond to an issue that was not of our making?” For 

instance, the Crystal Serenity sold out its cabins, and the cruise industry notified U.S. officials to expect future 

cruises in the Arctic (off-the-record interview, 2016). The Crystal Serenity is already making plans for another 

voyage in 2017. A senior staffer for a U.S. Senator noted, “We are not going to keep getting lucky” (off-therecord interview, 2016). Clearly, luck is not an appropriate risk reduction strategy. 

U.S. interviewees advocated for a variety of infrastructure, and it is important to note that the cost of these 

improvements varies widely. Some of the infrastructure needed to support increased human activity in the U.S. 

Arctic includes communications architecture, increased AIS coverage, additional Coast Guard assets stationed 

throughout Alaska (at strategic points based on traffic estimates,) the pre-positioning of environmental 

response equipment and personnel, building an E-ATON capability,

36 the need for a plan to update nautical 

charts, the need for heavy tugs stationed throughout Alaska, and the need for an Arctic deep-draft port. As one 

U.S. Senator’s staff member noted, “eventually you are going to need all of this, but if we start now with a 

strategic plan, then you can spread the investment out to make it more affordable, in addition to reducing the 

risk of a disaster in the interim” (off-the-record interview, 2016).

The majority of the interviewees expressed support for additional icebreakers, because of their potential to 

project U.S. commitment to the Arctic, as well as their value as national assets. 

Finally, it is important to note that most interviewees – and, in particular those in the state of Alaska – believe 

that the Arctic should be decoupled from broader international events. The reality is that the geography of the 

 

36 Traditional aids to navigation like buoys are impractical in waters like the Bering Strait that are impacted by heavy ice coverage for 

part of the year. E-ATON or virtual aids to navigation can be provided in lieu of traditional buoys, while providing a similar degree of 

safety.
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Bering Strait Region ensures that a maritime disaster will impact both the U.S. and Russia. 

4.c.iii. The State of Alaska

The diversity of the state of Alaska, as discussed in Section 2.d.iii.2., creates many difficulties in areas that the 

people of the state (including officials, Indigenous peoples, wildlife, and industry) cannot all come together. 

However, interview data suggests that the majority of Alaskan state officials agreed that economic growth 

should be one of the highest priorities of the state. Development is needed to stimulate the economy, which 

was referred to as almost completely dependent on natural resource extractions. The state has a high level of 

unemployment, and the majority of government officials would like to see this made a higher priority than 

environmental protection.

In order to have economic growth, many would like to see environmental regulations lifted, which would help 

to encourage industry to re-invest in Alaska. One former senior state official noted that it was time to stop 

drawing lines on maps and closing areas off before “we know what the hell is there” (off-the-record interview, 

2015).

Many noted that another essential way to promote industry investment is to have Alaska and the U.S. 

government further invest in infrastructure. A lack of infrastructure throughout the state, but specifically along 

the coastline, was mentioned many times in other interviews with Alaskans as a high priority. However, there 

was a divide in what type of infrastructure should be prioritized, but it was found that most would like to see 

this as a way to improve the entire state.

4.c.iv. Indigenous Peoples

The information in this section is largely derived from interviews conducted with Indigenous peoples on the 

Alaskan side of the Bering Strait.

The majority of those interviewed believed that a database of Indigenous knowledge would benefit the 

stakeholders of the Bering Strait. This database would be a collection of first-hand knowledge, and it would be 

used to provide a practical perspective of the region.

Nearly all confirmed that some form of oil spill response is needed in the region, as well as a prevention 

system. Moreover, most would be open to working with AIS technology to inform vessels of their subsistence 

activities, coupled with noise and speed limitations to protect the marine wildlife. 

The Alaskan Indigenous peoples agreed that there needs to be more infrastructure and a larger Coast Guard 
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presence. Infrastructure, for example, would allow for greater access to remote areas in Alaska, and would 

allow the USCG to have faster response times in search and rescue and oil spill response. The Alaskan 

Indigenous people consistently commented that they would want the USCG to have more than a seasonal 

presence and make the infrastructure permanent.

4.c.v Industry

Industry representatives want to keep the Arctic open for development and are supportive of infrastructure 

improvements, which would increase reliability and safety in the region (and reduce operating costs, like 

insurance). The largest divergence in industry opinion is between those who argue that transit shipping is the 

future, and those who argue that container shipping will never be economically feasible, because of variations 

in weather and ice. All industry leaders agreed that both destinational and eco-tourism activities will continue 

to expand, as the Arctic becomes increasingly ice-free for longer periods.

4.c.v.i. The International Community

The international community has a vested interest in Arctic and Bering Strait Region. There is an opportunity 

for the Bering Strait to serve as model for Arctic management if the U.S. and Russia (the two Arctic neighbors 

who arguably share the most contentious relationship of any of the Arctic neighbors) can cooperate in the 

region. The key interests for the international community include the safety and security of maritime shipping. 

Additional areas of interest include the reliability of Arctic states to support economic activities, attain access 

to natural resources, conduct scientific research, and maintain peaceful cooperation. 

4.c.vii. Common Ground

There is room for agreement in the Bering Strait and greater Arctic. The interviews reveal that despite disputes 

elsewhere in the world, there is an appetite for increased cooperation between the U.S. and Russian 

governments, in order to establish specific mechanisms that would not only safeguard the Arctic from potential 

disasters but stabilize a number of critical national interests as well. Thus, safety and security are shared 

interests that could benefit from bilateral action.

The USCG is under resourced in the Alaska region – particularly in the Bering Strait Region and in northern 

Alaska, which limits its ability to successfully fulfill its statutory responsibilities in the region. Furthermore, 

most agree that there needs to be at least an oil spill response capability pre-positioned in the U.S. Arctic and a 

greater focus on oil spill prevention in general. An oil spill is a real possibility that would be “catastrophic for 

the region” (off-the-record interview, 2016).
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All Stakeholders agree that joint oil spill response and SAR exercises between the U.S. and Russia benefit 

everyone. This concern, in particular, was noted by government officials on both sides to be a matter of 

significance, in that the cooperation contributes to the process of information sharing and the state of 

preparedness in the region to respond to disasters of all sizes. Furthermore, joint exercises will establish crossborder connections via the act of cooperating side-by-side with the equivalent agency on the other border, 

which is likely to foster trust and familiarity (the benefits of which include increased response time and overall 

effectiveness of a joint operation). 

Notwithstanding geopolitical issues and disputes, the concerns surrounding joint exercises are primarily 

financial and secondarily logistical. On the one hand, interviews and data analyses revealed that both countries 

are financially constrained to the extent that there are noticeable gaps in operational capability in the region. 

On the other hand, logistical concerns include type, location, frequency, and scale of such exercises. However, 

nearly all believe that resuming joint exercises would provide considerable benefit, which could also act as a 

simple resolution to a variety of concerns with high impact.

The U.S. and Russia agree that current international agreements are necessary but not sufficient. This 

includes the sufficiency of current “binding” agreements to ensure the fulfillment of their respective purposes. 

Given the provisions of these agreements, State financial limitations, and the general uncertainties of operating 

in the region, an isolated or singular approach to Arctic activity is neither sufficient in and of itself to be 

successful.

Pursuant to the concerns above, interviews revealed common frustration that such agreements do not 

comprehensively address the matters of SAR and oil spill response preparation. Although such agreements 

exist, there are no operational measures therein that specify the extents to which each State must be prepared to 

respond in case of an incident. Rather, the agreements assert that the U.S. and Russia should respond, which is 

progress toward future stability but insufficient to ensure reduced risk.

The U.S. and Russia agree that communications and information sharing are critical to operational cost 

effectiveness and adherence to national objectives. Currently, both the U.S. and Russia have relatively little 

infrastructure in the Bering Strait Region. The Russians are focused on their Western Arctic that has far more 

traffic than the Bering Strait region and are constrained by limited resources. Interviewees from both nations 

noted the need for increased focus on the region to include communications infrastructure, AIS, maritime 

domain awareness systems and charting.

Both countries stand to benefit from heightened communications structures and information sharing. These 

would ensure that redundant and duplicative findings are avoided, while supplementing the known information 

of the other side. Such information might include scientific discovery, charting, weather forecasting, shipping 
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data, and wildlife migration patterns. The benefit of this collaborative activity is likely to result in operational 

efficiency and lead to further collaborations.

The U.S. and Russia agree there must be a responsibly established system with which to manage traffic in the 

Bering Strait. While many interviewees agree on the need for increased management of traffic in the region, 

the exact structure of the proposed regulation to create this control is widely debated, yet there is almost 

universal agreement that the current route proposed by PARS is not the answer. One option is to create 

dynamic ATBAs. Using an ATBA as a method of rerouting maritime traffic provides many of the same 

benefits as shipping lanes without the political challenges of drawing permanent routes. The use of dynamic 

ATBAs would also permit the flexibility to shift, change, and move according to season and with marine 

wildlife migration patterns. 

Regardless of the management apparatus, the data indicate that the predicted increase in human activity 

warrants an analysis into the best method to mitigate the risk associated with ships passing through the Bering 

Strait.

5. Recommendations

In this section we will provide our recommendations based upon our research conducted over the last year. The 

recommendations are arranged under bilateral recommendations and unilateral recommendations for the U.S.

The data support the following bilateral recommendations:

 Implement dynamic areas to be avoided (ATBAs) with speed restrictions.

 Consider Officer exchanges between the USCG and Russian Coast Guard or Maritime Rescue Service.

 Establish a maritime domain awareness center (MDAC) to manage the region.

 Renew joint exercises focusing on both oil spill response and search and rescue (SAR).

 Resume Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment data collection and start collection of an Indigenous 

Knowledge database.

 Strengthen both the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and Arctic Council.

The data support the following unilateral recommendations for the U.S. government:

 Decouple the Arctic from other aspects of the Russian and U.S. bilateral relationship.

 Review who the U.S. is partnering with in the Russian Government. 

 Consider the acquisition and operation of heavy tugs in the Bering Strait and broader U.S. Arctic 
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

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regions.

 Increase USCG presence in the Bering Strait Region.

 Increase communications and automatic identification system (AIS) infrastructure in the Bering Strait 

Region.

 Increase funding for updating nautical charts.

 Ratify UNCLOS.

Each of these recommendations will be discussed in further detail below.

5.a. Bilateral Recommendations

5.a.i. Implement a System of Dynamic ATBAs and Speed Restrictions

ATBAs are different from the route proposed by PARS, in that ATBAs “...tell mariners where they should not 

go for reasons of hazards, safety, or environmental or cultural risk” (p. 123). ATBAs allow more freedom, 

particularly dynamic ATBAs (off-the-record interview, 2016). It is reasonable to expect a high-level of 

compliance, even if ATBAs are not mandatory for the same reasons that the Coast Guard expects a high 

degree of compliance with a voluntary route structure.

Rufe (2015) argues that it is time for the Coast Guard to implement ATBAs in both the Bering Strait and the 

Bering Sea. One of the more innovative ideas is to implement dynamic ATBAs, based upon the current 

situation in the region.37

There are multiple benefits to this type of system, including the need to develop detailed knowledge on what is 

actually happening in the region, which would lead to an increase in maritime domain awareness (MDA). 

Increased MDA is necessary to implement dynamic ATBAs. The other advantage is that dynamic ATBAs 

require communications infrastructure to ensure that stakeholders’ interests are represented.

Speed restrictions could be combined with dynamic ATBAs to add an additional risk mitigation measure. 

Speed restrictions have been used with great success to reduce maritime risks, like colliding with endangered 

whales. As Huntington et. al (2015) note that:

For some hazards, including ship-to-ship collisions and ship strikes of whales, speed

 

37 Ed Page of the Marine Exchange noted, “ATBAs may in some cases be dynamic and other cases static. I prefer the term dynamic 

marine protected areas in lieu of dynamic ATBAs. If a herd of walrus haul out on an island that is not their normal habitat a dynamic 

MPA could be established to inform vessels to remain X miles away from the island to avoid causing stampedes.”
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restrictions can greatly reduce impacts and risks. Seasonal management areas were also found to be 

effective in reducing vessel strikes of migratory North Atlantic right whales (Eubalaena glacialis).

The U.S. government currently restricts “All vessels 65 feet (19.8m) or longer” to “10 knots or less in certain 

locations along the U.S. east coast at certain times of the year to reduce the threat of ship collisions with 

critically endangered North Atlantic right whales” (NOAA Fisheries, n.d.).38

Speed restrictions could be used in the Bering Strait at specific times of the year (based on risk) to protect 

different populations (e.g. marine mammals or subsistence hunters). Speed restrictions could also be enacted 

during certain weather conditions to reduce risk (for instance fog). 

Reducing speed can also incur both additional costs and risk (Huntington et. al, 2015). First, “voyages will 

take longer,” but “slower speeds are more fuel efficient” (Huntington et. al, 2015). Additionally, slower speeds 

can reduce ships maneuverability, so any speed limits must account for “the safety of mariners and their 

vessels” (Huntington et. al, 2015). Finally, implementing a dynamic speed limit system would require an 

infrastructure investment, although this investment could also be used to coordinate and communicate dynamic 

ATBAs.

Dynamic ATBAs and speed restrictions could be used to protect oil drilling, Indigenous hunting and fishing, 

marine mammal migration, and scientific exploration. The temporary nature of the restrictions provides the 

most freedom for maritime users. Finally, dynamic ATBAs require cooperation between the U.S. and Russia, 

which could lead to other collaborative efforts in the region. The data indicate that the use of dynamic ATBAs 

with speed restrictions is a better option than the current USCG PARS proposal.39

It is recommended that the USCG work with the Russian Ministry of Transportation to develop a plan to 

coordinate a dynamic ATBA system. A joint Maritime Domain Awareness Center (MDAC) may be the best 

option to implement such a system (see Section 5.a.iii).

5.a.ii. Consider Officer Exchanges between the USCG and Russian Coast Guard or 

Maritime Rescue Service

The USCG exchanges officers with other nations when it is considered beneficial for both countries. The U.S. 

and Russian governments should consider exchanging their officers. It is likely that this type of cooperation 

would increase the capability of both countries to manage an environmental or SAR operation as well as build 

 

38 This regulation only applies to U.S. vessels or foreign vessels arriving or departing U.S. ports. Innocent passage vessels are exempt 

from these regulations.

39 See Figure 8 on page 19.
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trust. 

These officers would help to de-escalate the Cold War style adversarial discourse and, instead, establish 

working relationships. Additionally, the exchanged officers could serve as focal points when a joint response is 

necessary. It would then be easier, for instance, for a Russian officer to request the appropriate resources than 

for an American officer to work with a Russian agency directly. Similarly, the USCG officer assigned to the 

Russian station would be able to move the coordination process along much more quickly than a Russian 

could. 

Challenges to this option include security concerns, the language barrier, and career viability for officers 

assigned to the exchange.

5.a.iii. Establish a Maritime Domain Awareness Center (MDAC) to Manage the 

Region

A Maritime Domain Awareness Center (MDAC) is the best option to increase bilateral cooperation in MDA, 

traffic management SAR, and oil spill response. Strader (2012) and Rufe et al. (2014) call for a joint Russian 

and American coordination center for the Bering Strait. As Rufe et al. argue, such a center could “coordinate 

exercises, manage traffic, respond to disasters and share information.” Strader (2012) goes even further by 

arguing that it should include support infrastructure, including:

...aids to navigation, a port facility to harbor emergency tow service vessels and icebreakers, heated 

hangars and helicopter pads for the Russian Federation Border Guard and/or US Coast Guard air 

rescue. A strategically placed spill response should also be included.

Strader (2012) continues, noting that the economic costs of such actions would be offset by increased 

reliability and safety for shippers, which would result in lower insurance costs, thus allowing additional room 

for economic investment in the region. An MDAC would be responsible to maintain an operational picture of 

all maritime events in the Bering Strait Region. A key question when developing such a center is whether 

there is an existing model that could be followed. In this case, there are two models. 

First, the Strait of Malacca has a command and control information center that is probably the most successful 

model of cooperation to manage an international between states with contentious relations (Gudev, 2015; & 

Miles, 2012). As Ibrahim and Nazery note, “The Strait of Malacca is one of the world’s most strategic and 

important shipping lanes. It is a vital artery linking the region’s economy with the rest of the world” (Ibrahim 

& Nazery, 2007, p. 2). Yet, as Miles (2012) noted, the strait was a dangerous place even ten years ago but the 

security situation has improved due to increased cooperation in a region. A command and control information 
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center opened in 2009 that drew “together information shared by 11 nations” (Miles, 2012). This is the result 

of cooperation between nations that formerly “resisted engaging in multilateral, multinational operations” 

(Miles, 2012).

Second, the non-profit Alaska Maritime Prevention and Response Network is an example of a Maritime 

Domain Management system that monitors and manages over 1.2 million square miles of Alaskan waters. 

Over 2,000 vessels from around the world are enrolled in and pay into the system. The Network "aids" vessels' 

compliance with risk mitigating measures and notifies authorities and owner/operators of vessel incidents, so a 

timely response can be undertaken. The Network also has procured several million dollars of oil spill response 

equipment.40

There are three options to establish an MDAC in the Bering Strait Region, including the government option, 

the non-governmental organization (NGO) option, and Arctic Coast Guard Forum option. 

5.a.iii.1. Option 1: The NGO Led MDAC

In the NGO option a third party NGO that is not tied to either government would take funding from both 

governments and private donors or investors to process and analyze information to maintain MDA. The 

MDAC would use this information to establish dynamic ATBAs and speed limits, develop and evaluate joint 

exercises, assist in the management of SAR and response efforts, and serve as an intermediary to enable 

cooperation. 

The center could alleviate concerns of varying levels of cooperation by de facto decoupling the Bering Strait 

Region from other international events by routing cooperation through a third party. We believe that this is the 

most viable option for the Bering Strait Region and recommend that the United States and Russian 

Governments pursue this option. One potential option would be to work with the Alaska Maritime Prevention 

and Response Network to upgrade its capabilities, to include the adjacent Russian waters (see section 5.a.iii. 

for more on the Alaska Maritime Prevention and Response Network).

5.a.iii.2 Option 2: The Government Led MDAC

In this case, the MDAC would be a joint governmental operation, with alternating command given to U.S. and 

Russian officers. The establishment of this type of facility would likely be more contentious on the issues of 

where the facility would be based, who would be in command, and the requirement for close cooperation and 

 

40 For more information go to www.ak-mprn.org.
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coordination. We believe this is the least viable option given the current geopolitical situation.

5.a.iii.3. Option 3: An Arctic-Wide MDAC Led by the Arctic CG Forum

A final option is to develop an Arctic-wide MDAC, led by the Coast Guard Forum. The advantages of this 

option are that each Arctic state would be included in the framework, and each state would work together to be 

protected from disaster. The disadvantage is primarily one of scale. For example, it would be difficult to reach 

consensus between the Arctic 8, and there would be added start-up challenges for an MDAC of this size. 

Additionally, the infrastructure required to monitor and communicate across the entire Arctic region would be 

a challenge. Alternatively, if the NGO-led MDAC is chosen and is a success, then it could be used as a model 

to scale up to a larger Arctic-wide MDAC in the future.

5.a.iv. Renew Joint Exercises Focusing on both Oil Spill Response and SAR

A common theme in all of the interviews in both the United States and Russia was the need to resume normal 

exercises. The Bering Strait is a critically sensitive environment and strategic strait, and it should be managed 

as such. There have been eighteen years (and counting) since the last bilateral functional oil spill exercise, 

which is far too long to ensure effectiveness. This section will discuss the importance of scientifically designed 

exercises and a model that other Arctic nations are using to ensure preparedness.

5.a.iv.1. Exercises Based on Science and Technology

On one hand, science is an internationally understood language, which is capable of bridging the gap between 

political and practical actions across the Arctic. On the other hand, technology is the tool to accomplish it. In 

virtually every interview on the matter, there is consensus surrounding the importance of up-to-date science 

and technology in managing safety and security concerns in the Bering Strait. Steven Carmel of Maersk noted 

that the “pressing issue for the Arctic is science not commerce” (off-the-record interview, 2016).

With consideration to halted communications since 2014, bureaucrats in both the U.S. and Russia are ready to 

resume high level collaboration and cooperation in the Arctic, especially with regard to science and 

technology. According to one senior U.S. official, “the U.S. is categorically open to speaking to the Russians 

on Arctic matters,” despite ongoing sanctions and disputes (off-the-record interview, 2016).

Moreover, there is a policy window to work collaboratively in these areas, but the initiative must be from the 

Americans. According to one senior Russian official, Russia “will not initiate” steps to renew collaboration 

themselves (off-the-record interview, 2016). However, this does not mean that it is not willing – indeed, 
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multiple Russian officials independently stated that they were “waiting” to hear from the Americans and 

expressed frustration that they had not been contacted.

However, such exercises must not be replications of the past, which predominantly ran under the banner of 

simple cooperation with little intent to build upon scientific knowledge and increase preparedness. Rather, it is 

imperative that renewed exercises be focused to expand the levels of scientific knowledge and preparedness 

toward environmental and SAR disasters. Moreover, these exercises should be realistically and scientifically 

based to achieve expressed outcomes that enhance both countries’ Arctic understanding and operational 

effectiveness.

Such outcomes ideally will be targeted to broaden the scientific understandings of ice conditions, wildlife, 

bathymetry, and the effects of oil on the Arctic environment. Other outcomes will be response-based to ensure 

timely and effective search and rescue and which would test the individual and combined capabilities of both 

countries to respond in case of an incident. Finally, each exercise would be measured against an objective 

standard, in order to improve operational effectiveness, promote informational discovery, and equip firstresponders with the necessary skills and abilities to fulfill specific missions.

5.a.iv.2 Communications and Functional Exercises on the Norwegian/ Russian 

Model

The idea to establish comprehensive communication systems and functional, joint exercises is not uncommon 

in the Arctic. According to interviewees on both sides of the Bering Strait, the Russian and Norwegian model 

of cooperation and management is exemplary, and the model could be replicated in certain areas and applied to 

the U.S. and Russia’s relationship in the Bering Strait. In particular the 2010 Russian-Norwegian treaty settled 

a dispute over claimed Arctic territory, and was praised by then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev as a 

“practical illustration” that “all disputes in the Arctic must be tackled by the Arctic nations themselves by way 

of talks and on the basis of international law” (Harding, 2010). The Russians and Norwegians also serve as a 

model for functional cooperation, conducting alternating communications and oil spill response exercises on 

an annual basis (multiple off-the-record interviews).

Specifically, we recommend that the United States and Russia agree to conduct annual, scientifically designed 

exercises to further operationalize the Arctic Council’s SAR and Oil Spill Agreements. These exercises should 

include a scenario designed to simultaneously require both sides to respond to a combined SAR and oil spill 

response scenario.
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5.a.v. Resume Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Data Collection and Start 

Collection of Indigenous Knowledge Database

After consultation with numerous representatives of the Indigenous community and previously existing 

literature, we recommend that a knowledge database be created in order to better inform policy and better 

incorporate the Indigenous population in all policy changes in the Bering Strait Region. A database would 

allow for traditional knowledge to be collected and organized in order to be used most effectively. Currently, 

this knowledge is mostly shared only among the Indigenous community.

The knowledge that could be collected would detail weather patterns, climate changes, ocean currents, wildlife 

migration patterns, sea depth, ice thickness and change, and other constantly changing characteristic of the 

Bering region. This knowledge could help to better inform search and rescue operations, oil spill response 

programs, shipping routes, and other potential policies.

We also recommend that along with the creation of this database of existing knowledge that other entities work 

with the Indigenous population to create a database that allows for the general tracking of seasonal use of the 

Bering Strait. This type of database would allow for indigenous people to report their activities along the 

Bering so that mariners know to avoid which areas to avoid. 

Additionally, the Arctic Council should begin to maintain a shipping database, which would track all Arctic 

shipping as well as update the AID. The continued collection of data will allow researchers to analyze trends 

and help time infrastructure expenditures to meet the needs in the region.

5.a.v.i. Strengthen Both the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and Arctic Council

Finally, the U.S and Russia should continue to work together to strengthen both the Arctic Coast Guard Forum 

and Arctic Council. Both organizations are valid channels through which actions can be taken to reduce the 

risk of a disaster in the region. The U.S. and Russia have a shared interest in safe economic development, 

environmental protection, and increased security. The most effective way to accomplish these goals is through 

a cooperative, bilateral approach, which leverages the strengths and resources of both nations and could serve 

as a model for other Arctic nations. 
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5.b. Recommendations for the U.S. Government

5.b.i. Decouple the Arctic from Other Aspects of the Russian and U.S. Bilateral 

Relationships

It is necessary to start this section with a quick discussion of why the U.S. and Russian systems are different. 

In the U.S., mid-level bureaucrats and junior military officers often have significant authority to take the 

initiative and formulate policies. As one U.S. NGO leader (and multiple Russian interviewees) noted, the 

USCG has approached the Russians on PARS without this understanding. Junior officers from USCG District 

17 who call junior officers in the Russian Coast Guard stationed near the Bering to work on a route structure 

will likely be unsuccessful. Whereas, Russian bureaucrats will not act without senior level approval. All of our 

interviewees in Russia stressed the importance of political direction from either President Putin or the 

Ministerial level. Therefore, high-level cooperation is necessary to empower “street-level” bureaucrats to act to 

reduce risk in the region. The alternative is unilateral action, which is insufficient to mitigate the rising risk in 

the region.

The U.S. and Russia have shared interests in the Bering Strait Region (as well as the broader Arctic), including 

environmental protection, economic development, search and rescue, and maritime domain awareness. Both 

countries, however, have limited resources to devote to the region, which means that increased cooperation 

enables both sides to achieve more of their goals with greater efficiency.

Multiple interviewees on both the U.S. and Russian sides of the Bering voiced the opinion that the Arctic 

should be largely decoupled from other disputes, similar to U.S. and Russian cooperation on the International 

Space Station (ISS). U.S. Astronaut Scott Kelly was recently photographed (see Figure 6) with Russian 

cosmonaut Mikhail Kornienko and Secretary of State John Kerry in Moscow. He noted that, “Countries 

working together make the seemingly impossible, possible.” The U.S. Arctic Strategy (2013) also notes that, 

“Just as a common spirit and shared vision of peaceful partnership led to the development of an international 

space station, we believe much can be achieved in the Arctic region through collaborative efforts, coordinated 

investments, and public-private partnerships” (p. 4). 
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Figure (17): Secretary of State John Kerry with Astronaut Scott Kelly and Cosmonaut Mikhail Kornienko41

Cooperation in the region will help to maintain Indigenous people’s ability to continue with subsistence 

hunting, preserve the unique ecological character of the region, enable economic development, enhance 

collective security, and ensure economic prosperity, all of which benefit both Russia and the U.S.

Russia has the largest stake of the Arctic of any nation and must be a part of any decision-making in the 

region. Unilateral action to prevent risk is more expensive and less effective. Moreover, unilateral action by 

the U.S. will only be voluntary. Absent cooperation, the U.S. will assume the costs of infrastructure

improvements needed to reduce risk but will still be susceptible to damage from the other side. However, 

meaningful cooperation will distribute the costs and responsibility of protecting the region through a bilateral 

agreement, which could be presented to the IMO to create a regulatory structure, mandatory for all ships.

Cooperation at the “street-level” between the U.S. and Russia is required to operationalize key international 

agreements, including the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 

Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in the 

Bering and Chukchi Seas in Emergency Situations, the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 

Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, and the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution 

Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. However, such agreements are little more than words on paper 

 

41 Image posted Astronaut Scott Kelly’s Facebook Page on March 24th, 2016.
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without regular exercises, which test the capabilities of both parties to coordinate a response to a major 

environmental or SAR event.

Therefore, it is recommended that the U.S. resume high-level contacts and cooperation in the Arctic Region. 

These contacts should be conducted with the aim to increase cooperation in the Bering Strait Region. Areas of 

cooperation should include pursuing the six bilateral recommendations listed above.

5.b.ii. Review who is Being Partnered with in the Russian Government

Information from the Russian interviews indicates that the U.S. does not speak to the appropriate agencies on 

the Russian side. Currently, the U.S. Coast Guard has sought to establish a working relationship with the 

Russian Coast Guard. However, Russian officials noted that meaningful communications must go through the 

Ministry of Transportation. In particular, the Ministry of Transportation would be the lead agency to negotiate 

bilateral action with the U.S., including ship routing procedures (e.g. PARS and ATBAs). Other interviewees 

mentioned that the Russian Interagency Arctic Commission could also take a leading role. Additional agencies 

will likely take an active interest – but not a leading role – including the Ministry of Natural Resources, the 

Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Marine Rescue Service, the Russian Coast Guard, the Federal Marine 

and River Transport Agency, the Marine Safety Committee, the Northern Sea Route Administration and the 

military (likely as an observer). 

The success of any bilateral action will require high-level approval from either the Presidential or Ministerial 

level in the Russian system. For the U.S., renewed work on cooperative regulation in the region will likely 

require the request of a senior U.S. official in the administration to raise the issue with their Russian 

counterparts. 

5.b.iii. Consider the Acquisition and Operation of Heavy Tugs in the Bering Strait 

and Broader Arctic Region

The lack of rescue tugs is a concern for the entire Alaska region, and multiple authors have called for rescue 

tugs to be strategically placed near the areas of the highest risk, including the Bering Strait Region (Rufe, 

2015; Rufe & Huntington, 2014; Fletcher, 2014; Ropeik, 2014; Gutierrez, 2010). Basic economic theory 

provides that if the market demanded such a capability that it would provide it. In this case, the level of traffic 

is not sufficient to enable the market to provide strategically placed heavy tugs throughout the Bering Strait 

Region. Therefore, we recommend that the USCG conduct a study (similar to the Aleutian Islands Risk 

Assessment, n.d.) to determine the feasibility, cost, and size of the tug needed, as well as the best basing 

locations. The USCG should then proceed with a procurement and training program to provide a rescue tug 
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

Improvements 64

capability to the Alaskan region. This should be the highest priority for USCG ship development in the US 

Arctic region.

5.b.iv. Increase USCG Presence in the Bering Strait Region

As noted in Section 2.d.iii.2., Alaska has the largest coastline of any other state. California, Oregon, and 

Washington states have a combined general coastline distance of 1,293 miles (7,593 miles of shoreline 

distance), which is protected by two USCG districts (Districts 11 and 13) (NOAA Office for Coastal 

Management, n.d.; & United States Coast Guard, n.d.). These two districts have a combined seven sectors and 

eight air stations or facilities42 assigned to them (United States Coast Guard, n.d.).43 By comparison, Alaska 

has just one USCG district (District 17), which is responsible for all 6,640 miles of general coastline (33,904 

miles of shoreline distance) (NOAA Office for Coastal Management, n.d.; & United States Coast Guard, n.d.). 

All of the assets of USCG District 17 are concentrated in the southern part of the state. Air Station Kodiak, the 

most northern Air Station, is “a 4-hour fixed-wing or 10-hour rotary-wing flight” from Barrow “a distance of 

820 miles” (Roscoe et. al, 2014). Sector Anchorage, the most northern Coast Guard Sector, is responsible for a 

massive area and, like the rest of District 17, currently has no assets permanently deployed in Alaska’s North 

or West.

The Coast Guard faces two problems with regard to distance. The first is that the low density of ship traffic 

makes it hard to justify an investment for new infrastructure, especially when compared to other areas of more 

pressing need, such as fleet revitalization. The USCG, like other agencies in Alaska, must communicate the 

cost of inaction, as this is the only figure that will communicate the economic necessity for action in a way that 

will gain the traction necessary to gain the funding needed to build additional infrastructure in the state. 

Second, there is not currently enough data to determine where new investments in infrastructure should be 

focused. Our recommendation is that the USCG should be funded to commission a study to determine the best 

locations for future infrastructure investments in the Alaskan Arctic, including the Bering Strait Region. 

The long-term goal should be the addition of another sector and air station with sole responsibility for the 

Alaskan Arctic. The short-term solution would be to continue a robust Operation Arctic Shield, where the 

USCG forward deploys assets during peak periods to Arctic locations, including the Bering Strait. 

Additionally, the USCG could incrementally build permanent capability by adding smaller units, like marine 

safety detachments or air facilities that could eventually be scaled into another full sector or air station. It is 

important to note that our interviewees from Alaska universally called for the USCG to increase its presence in 

 

42 An Air Station has a full personnel complement and command where an Air Facility is a satellite of a full Air Station in order to 

provide a service to that area.

43 Data compiled from www.uscg.mil
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

Improvements 65

the Arctic.

5.b.v. Increase Communications and AIS Infrastructure in the Bering Strait Region

Communications infrastructure, particularly Automatic Identification System (AIS) coverage, also needs to be 

upgraded to ensure maritime domain awareness and increase safety (Alaska State Legislature, 2012, p. 15; 

McConnell et al., 2012, p. 13; & Heiman, 2014, p. 5). Many interviewed saw this as a major issue, but also as 

“low hanging fruit” that could be easily achieved. AIS coverage could be further expanded by encouraging all 

vessels to participate, even those currently not required to.44 This system could then be enforced by insurance 

companies to achieve compliance by all ships. However, many of those interviewed believed that, based on the 

prudent mariner standard, most ships would comply if the system was made available to them (off-the-record 

interview, 2015).

Additionally, there are non-governmental organizations, including the Marine Exchange of Alaska,45 that are 

currently doing a large amount of work with AIS and vessel tracking systems, which could be contracted to 

operate this type of system. Working with an NGO in this instance may prove to be the best route, as they 

would already have the expertise and existing systems to allow this recommendation to come to fruition more 

quickly.

Expanding use of the AIS tracking system would allow for the tracking of ships throughout the Arctic region. 

This would create much needed data surrounding ship traffic, which could assist in creating a better 

understanding of ship traffic patterns that could be used to enact policies and procedures to reduce risk. 

5.b.vi. Increase Funding for Updating Nautical Charts

There are many articles that recommend focusing on improving the region’s charts (Alaska State Legislature, 

2012, p. 15; Rufe and Huntington, 2014; Huntington et al., 2014, p. 119; & Heiman, 2014, p. 3; & Alaska 

Arctic Policy Commission, 2015, p. 24). As NOAA (n.d.) notes, “...most Arctic waters that are charted were 

surveyed with imprecise technology, dating back to the 1800s, before the region was part of the United States. 

Most of the shoreline along Alaska’s northern and western coasts has not been mapped since 1960.” Uncharted 

underwater hazards are real threats, as demonstrated by the MV Clipper Adventurer. 

 

44 Note that new USCG regulations that went into effect in March 2016 require all commercial vessels over 65' to have AIS as well as 

many other vessels less than 65' such as tugs and passenger vessels.

45 The Marine Exchange of Alaska built and operates over 125 AIS receiving stations in Alaska. They have also built and operates 

AIS transponders that can sent messages to vessels (weather, ice, virtual aids to navigation, safety alerts, marine protected areas, etc.). 

The Marine Exchange's system provides complete AIS coverage to the Bering Strait now but has some coverage gaps in the Arctic.
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

Improvements 66

Smart investment in charting using data to determine the priority of work is probably one of the best measures 

to reduce risk in the region for both the U.S. and Russia.

5.b.vii. Ratify UNCLOS

The U.S. ratification of UNCLOS should be a priority for the Senate (Alaska State Legislature, 2012, p. 4; 

Reiss, 2012, p. 38-9; Alaska Arctic Policy Commission, 2015, p. 24, and every single one of our 53 off-therecord interviews). As the Alaska State Legislature (2012) notes, “The United States is the only major 

maritime power and the only Arctic nation that is not a party to the convention. More than 160 nations and the 

European Union have joined UNCLOS. Ratification will substantially benefit our country’s economic and 

national security interests” (p. 4). 

The ratification of UNCLOS will give the U.S. the ability to lodge formal claims and complaints under the 

treaty. As noted by the Russian Embassy (2015) in a letter to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow regarding the U.S. 

concerns over the Russian Federation’s Northern Sea Route Regulations, “In the opinion of the Russian Side, a 

State that is not party to a treaty [UNCLOS] cannot enjoy advantages that it grants. In particular, that concerns 

the right to cite articles of the treaty to challenge actions by a signatory State” (Russian Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, 2015).

U.S. ratification of UNCLOS would avoid such diplomatic confrontation and increase international stability, 

all while lending credibility towards any action it takes in its Bering Strait interests. The ratification of 

UNCLOS was supported by President Bush (2009) in NSPD-66/HSPD-25 and by President Obama (2013) in 

the National Strategy for the Arctic Region (p. 9). The practical benefit of the U.S. ratification of UNCLOS is 

increased moral authority on the international stage, which could be important if the U.S. attempts to work 

with Russia to improve bilateral cooperation in the Bering region.

Conclusion

Many regard the Arctic as the last frontier. This last frontier is now facing development as climate change 

increases the region’s accessibility. Marine traffic, largely the result of natural resource extraction and ecotourism, is increasing. At the same time, international interest is growing in the Arctic’s resources and shipping 

routes. The Arctic Council is observed by non-Arctic states, and preparations must be made to accommodate 

the rising activity from both individual nation states and private interests.

Opportunities and risks abound in the Arctic, and all of these factors are converging on the Bering Strait. 

Currently, the lack of cooperation and infrastructure increase the risk of a maritime disaster.
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

Improvements 67

This report is founded on unique interviews with government officials, academics, industry leaders, and other 

experts. As representatives from an academic institution, we were able to bridge the diplomatic divide. The use 

of off-the-record interviews enabled interviewees to speak freely and to provide honest, non-politically 

motivated answers. Thus, this report represents the various interests of the Bering Strait Region. The interview 

data was supplemented by government reports, literature, field research, and participation in conferences. 

The data demonstrate that now is the time to act proactively and responsibly in the Bering Strait to prevent 

disaster and to safeguard the interests of the region’s stakeholders. There are examples that might guide this

endeavor, such as the Russian-Norwegian cooperation in the Barents Sea, as well as the efforts of Singapore, 

Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand in the Strait of Malacca. The International Space Station also illustrates 

cooperation at the highest level, demonstrating just how much can be accomplished when we work together 

towards a common goal. 

The data support the following bilateral recommendations:

 Implement dynamic areas to be avoided (ATBAs) with speed restrictions.

 Consider Officer exchanges between the USCG and Russian Coast Guard or Maritime Rescue Service.

 Establish a maritime domain awareness center (MDAC) to manage the region.

 Renew joint exercises focusing on both oil spill response and search and rescue (SAR).

 Resume Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment data collection and start collection of an Indigenous 

Knowledge database.

 Strengthen both the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and Arctic Council.

The data support the following unilateral recommendations for the U.S. government:

 Decouple the Arctic from other aspects of the Russian and U.S. bilateral relationship.

 Review who the U.S. is partnering with in the Russian Government. 

 Consider the acquisition and operation of heavy tugs in the Bering Strait and broader U.S. Arctic 

regions.

 Increase USCG presence in the Bering Strait Region.

 Increase communications and automatic identification system (AIS) infrastructure in the Bering Strait 

Region.

 Increase funding for updating nautical charts.

 Ratify UNCLOS.
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

Improvements 68

We recommend starting with the following package of three steps:

1. Decouple the Arctic from other aspects of the U.S. and Russian bilateral relationship. As noted in the 

report, the U.S. and Russia have a long history of cooperation in the Arctic, even during periods of 

heightened political tension, as evidenced by the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears.

2. The U.S. and Russia should immediately plan to resume bilateral oil spill response and search and rescue 

(SAR) exercises in the Bering Strait Region. These exercises should alternate between functional and 

communications exercises on an annual basis. 

3. The U.S. and Russia should pursue the establishment of a joint maritime domain awareness center 

(MDAC) to maintain situational awareness. The MDAC should be used to implement dynamic areas to be 

avoided (ATBAs) and maritime speed restrictions, based on the real-time situation in the Bering Strait 

Region.

It is our desire that the findings and recommendations from this report will enhance bilateral cooperation in 

order to reduce risk in the region. The data provide a strong foundation for each of the recommendations, 

particularly the first steps towards the initial risk reduction package noted above.

Ultimately, bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Russia will mitigate the risks of increased maritime 

activity preserving the region for future generations.
The Bering Strait: Reducing Risk Through International Cooperation and Capability 

Improvements 69

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Appendix 1: Glossary

Arctic Adventure Tourism - See Ecotourism

Arctic - The Arctic is generally defined as all territory on the earth that is north of the Arctic Circle (66°33′). 

The Arctic Circle is the point that defines where there is continual daylight in the summer and continual 

darkness in the winter. The Arctic Council has expanded it focus beyond the Arctic Circle as has the United 

States, both of which include the Bering Strait in their Arctic areas despite it being south of the Arctic Circle.

Arctic 5 - The Arctic 5 refers to the five Arctic states that border the Arctic Ocean (Canada, Norway, Russia, 

Denmark (Greenland), and the United States). 

Arctic 8 - The eight member nations of the Arctic Council (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 

Sweden, Russia, and USA).

Arctic Coast Guard Forum - A council created in 2015 by the Arctic 8 to promote collective maritime 

safety, security and environmental efforts.

Arctic Council - The Arctic Council is an international body created by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996 and is 

comprised of the Arctic 8 along with multiple permanent participants and observer states. For more 

information please see http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/

AID - Accident Incident Database of the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment. A complete database of Arctic 

marine accidents and incidents from 1995-2004. For more information refer to Appendix 3.

AIS - The Automatic Identification System is a land and satellite based system to track ships worldwide. 

AMSA - The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment is a report completed by the Council's Protection of the 

Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) for the Arctic Council in 2009.

ATBA – Areas To Be Avoided is a procedural measure used to close certain areas to marine activities. The 

area can be permanently closed or it can be dynamic which means that the area is only closed when there is 

some reason that the area should not be used by vessels.

ATON - Aids To Navigation are physical and electronic measures used to help ships safely navigate.
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Bathymetry - The study of underwater topography in order to accurately represent the underwater 

environment on charts for mariners.

CGC - Coast Guard Cutter 

Container Shipping - Container shipping is the use of ships to move containers as a part of a global supply 

chain.

Contiguous Zone - Per NOAA (n.d. b), “The contiguous zone of the United States is a zone contiguous to the 

territorial sea. In this zone, the U.S. may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish infringement of 

its customs, fiscal, immigration, cultural heritage, or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or 

territorial sea. The U.S. contiguous zone is measured 24 nautical miles from the baseline.”

Destinational Shipping - Destinational shipping (industry term) is shipping that is point to point with the 

purpose of supporting “some activity in the Arctic,” like mining or resupply of towns (Carmel, 2013)

D17 - USCG District 17, the USCG District response for all Coast Guard activities in the State of Alaska.

E-ATON - Virtual aids to naviagation (see ATON)

Ecotourism - Tourism based on showcasing threatened environments including the Arctic. 

EEZ - Per NOAA (n.d. a), “the exclusive economic zone is the zone where the U.S. and other coastal nations 

have jurisdiction over natural resources. The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends no more than 200 

nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline and is adjacent to the 12 nautical mile territorial sea...”

Fetch - The distance traveled by wind or waves across open water.

General Coastline Distance - NOAA defines shoreline distance as the “mileage of outer coast, offshore 

islands, sounds, bays, rivers, and creeks is included to the head of tidewater or to a point where tidal waters 

narrow to a width of 100 feet” (NOAA Office of Coastal Management, n.d.).

ICC - “The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ІСС) is an international Indigenous Peoples' Organization representing 

approximately 160.000 Inuit living in the Arctic regions of Alaska, Canada, Greenland and Chukotka, Russia” 

(ICC, n.d.).

IMO - The International Maritime Organization is a United Nations Organization charged with the regulation 

of maritime safety and pollution.
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LNG - Liquefied Natural Gas

MDA - According to the National Maritime Domain Awareness plan, “Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 

is the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, 

safety, economy, or environment of the United States” (The White House, 2013, p. iv.)

MDAC - Maritime Domain Awareness Center 

MRO - Mass Rescue Operation

NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NSR - The Northern Sea Route or NSR is the Arctic sea route across the top of Russia that is defined by 

Russian legislation. For more information refer to http://www.arctic-lio.com.

NWP - The North West Passage or NWP is the Arctic sea route across the top of Canada.

PARS - The Port Access Route Study, or PARS, is an ongoing process by the USCG to establish vessel 

management procedures to reduce the risk of marine disasters and to increase efficiency in the Bering Strait 

Region. See Figure 8 on page 19 for a map of the current regulatory structure that is being reviewed by PARS.

Polar Code - The Polar Code is a new set of regulations enacted by the IMO to increase safety and 

environmental protection requirements for ships operating in Arctic waters that will come into force in 2017. 

For more information refer to http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx

SAR - Search and Rescue

Shoreline Distance - NOAA defines shoreline distance as the “mileage of outer coast, offshore islands, 

sounds, bays, rivers, and creeks is included to the head of tidewater or to a point where tidal waters narrow to a 

width of 100 feet” (NOAA Office for Coastal Management, n.d.).

Species of Concern - The term commonly refers to species that are declining or appear to be in need of 

concentrated conservation actions.

Territorial Sea - Per NOAA (n.d. b), “the territorial sea is a maritime zone over which the United States 

exercises sovereignty. Sovereignty extends to the airspace above and to the seabed below the territorial sea. 

The U.S. territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles from the baseline.”
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Transit Shipping - See Container Shipping

UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Ratified by all of the Arctic Council States 

except the United States who treats UNCLOS as customary international law.

USCG - The United States Coast Guard

WWF - World Wildlife Fund
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Appendix 2: Regional Maps

Figure 1: US and Russian EEZs in the Bering Sea46

 

46 Map is from https://arcticecon.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/us-russia-maritime-boundary-eez.jpg
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Figure 2: Political Map of the Bering Strait Region47

 

47Map from http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/beringcc.htm
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Appendix 3: An Analysis of Risk in the Bering Sea Using the Accident 

Incident Database48

Part of making the case for increased cooperation, infrastructure and regulation in the Bering Strait requires 

looking at what data already exists. One database that is of particular interest is the Arctic Council’s (2009a) 

Accident Incident Database (AID), which was created as a part of the Arctic Council’s (2009b) Arctic Marine 

Shipping Assessment or AMSA. The AID includes a “summary of the incidents and accidents occurring in the 

Arctic region between 1995-2004” (Arctic Council, 2009b, 86). The data was originally compiled from 

multiple sources, as no single source was available (Arctic Council, 2009a). The design of the dataset largely 

limits interpretation to descriptive statistics. The AMSA only included the following summary statistics from 

the database in its final report; vessel type, primary reason, month and year (Arctic Council, 2009b, p. 86). 

Accidents and incidents (hereafter accidents) were grouped into six broad categories:

 Grounding: where a vessel came in contact with the bottom and, therefore, required assistance or 

significant effort to be re-floated. In some cases, vessels could not be re-floated and were either 

abandoned or broken up for salvage.

 Collision: where two vessels make contact resulting in minor to serious damage to the vessel.

 Damage to Vessel: where damage to the vessel occurred, due to a variety of reasons ranging from 

contact with the pier, collision with ice, extreme weather or other factors.

 Fire/Explosion: where a fire or explosion occurred onboard a vessel, resulting in minor to very serious 

damage to the vessel and other consequences, such as fatalities.

 Sunk/Submerged: where a vessel was submerged in water for a period of time or sunk completely due 

to a range of causes.

 Machinery Damage/Failure: where a vessel sustained damage to machinery or complete machinery 

failure. (Arctic Council, 2009b, 87). 

Additionally, the dataset also includes the type of vessel, date of the incident, location, whether or not there 

were fatalities, whether or not fuel spilled, amount of fuel spilled in tons, whether the ship was an actual or 

constructive total loss and whether or not the ship sustained ice damage. The database includes 292 accidents 

but it may be missing events that may have involved human injury with no damage to a vessel (Arctic Council, 

2009b, 87).

When analyzing the database by geographical location, we made the decision to include the East and West 

Bering Sea as a single geographical location. We chose not to include the Chukchi Sea (See Appendix 2 for a 

map of the area) for ease of classification, and its inclusion would have only nominally changed the data, as 

there were only three accidents recorded in the Chukchi Sea (just over 1% of the total dataset) versus the 97 

recorded accidents recorded in the Bering Sea. The Bering Sea is a much broader area than the Bering Strait, 

but it is the closest geographical distinction to the Bering Strait using this dataset. The Bering Sea is also a 

 

48 This section is adapted from original research that Jeremy McKenzie did last semester for POLS 2580 with Professor Wendy 

Schiller. Comments from Professor Schiller are incorporated in this adaptation. 
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shared sea with the US, and Russia claims part of its waters a portion of its territorial sea and Exclusive 

Economic Zone.

Given the relatively limited geographical exploration of the data in the AMSA, it was important to see if the 

data showed something different happening in the Bering Sea versus the Arctic as a whole. 33.22% (97 of 

292) of the accidents in the Arctic occur in the Bering Sea (See Table 1). The next closest region in terms of 

number of accidents is the Norwegian Sea. This would demonstrate an increased risk in the region, and it is 

logical to assume that this risk would only increase as activity in the region continues to increase. It is 

important to note here that 90 of the 97 accidents in the Bering Sea occurred in the U.S. Exclusive Economic 

Zone (EEZ) while only seven occurred in the Russian EEZ, this is logical given the extent of the US EEZ 

versus the Russian EEZ in the Bering Sea Region (see Figure 1). Due to limitations in the dataset, we are 

unable to determine the flag of those vessels that had an accident. 

Table 1: The number of accidents in the Bering versus the rest of the Arctic

Frequency Percent Cumulative

ARCTIC ARCHIPELAGO 21 7.19 7.19

ARCTIC OCEAN 1 0.34 7.53

BAFFIN BAY/DAVIS STRAIT 16 5.48 13.01

BARENTS SEA 37 12.67 25.68

BEAUFORT SEA 1 0.34 26.02

BERING SEA 97 33.22 59.24

CHUKCHI SEA 3 1.03 60.27

EAST GREENLAND SHELF/SEA 2 0.68 60.95

FAROE PLATEAU 8 2.74 63.69

GULF OF ALASKA 3 1.03 64.72

HUDSON BAY 19 6.51 71.23

ICELAND SHELF/SEA 19 6.51 77.74

N/A 8 2.74 80.48

NEWFOUNDLAND-LABRADOR SHELF 5 1.71 82.19

NORWEGIAN SEA 49 16.78 98.97

WEST GREENLAND SHELF 3 1.03 100

TOTAL 292 100

The Bering sees a larger percentage of accidents than other Arctic areas did from 1995-2004, but we are 

unable to compare the number of ships in the Bering versus the Arctic due to limitations of this database. An 

additional area of interest when discussing the Bering Sea is whether ice is a factor (Table 2) in the accidents 

seen there. Ice was a factor in just one of the 97 incidents recorded in the Bering Sea (1.03%) whereas ice was 

a factor in 27 out of 195 incidents outside of the Bering (13.85%).
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Table 2: Is ice a factor in accidents in the Bering versus the rest of the Arctic?

Bering Sea Arctic Excluding Bering

Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Percent Cumulative

Yes 1 1.03 1.03 27 13.85 13.85

No 96 98.97 100 168 86.15 100

TOTAL 97 100 195 100

Analyzing accidents by the type of vessel involved also provides an interesting result that is substantively 

different from the rest of the Arctic. 63.92% of the accidents in the Bering are from fishing vessels versus only 

23.59% in the rest of the Arctic. This finding is of critical importance to the Bering region because many 

regulations apply only to ships of a certain tonnage and frequently fishing vessels are beneath that threshold. 

If future policy makers want to have the most impact then it is crucial for them to include fishing vessels in 

any measures implemented in the future. Table 3 shows the data regarding the type of vessels involved in 

accidents in the Bering versus the rest of the Arctic. 

Table 3: Accidents by Vessel Type in the Bering Versus the Rest of the Arctic

Bering Sea Arctic Excluding Bering

Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Percent Cumulative

BULK CARRIER 8 8.25 8.25 29 14.87 14.87

CONTAINER SHIP 1 1.03 9.28 7 3.59 18.46

FISHING VESSEL 62 63.92 73.2 46 23.59 42.05

GENERAL CARGO SHIP 17 17.53 90.72 55 28.21 70.26

GOVERNMENT VESSEL 0 0 90.72 10 5.13 75.38

OIL/GAS SERVICE & 

SUPPLY 0 0 90.72 1 0.51 75.9

PASSENGER SHIP 4 4.12 94.85 23 11.79 87.69

TANKER SHIP 1 1.03 95.88 11 5.64 93.33

TUG/BARGE 4 4.12 100 11 5.64 98.97

UNKNOWN 0 0 100 2 1.03 100

TOTAL 97 100 195 100

Interestingly it would appear that the only major difference between the Bering and the rest of the Arctic when 

it comes to accident reason is whether or not there was damage to the vessel (See Table 4). This would appear 

to be the result of the difference in the number of ships that receive ice damage in the Bering versus the rest of 

the Arctic (See Table 2). 47.3% or 25 of the 54 vessels in this dataset that listed damage to vessel as the 

primary reason for the accident had ice damage (only 1 of these was in the Bering Sea). 
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Table 4: A comparison of Arctic Marine Accidents by Reason and Location

Bering Sea Arctic Excluding Bering

Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Percent Cumulative

COLLISION 9 9.28 9.28 13 6.67 6.67

DAMAGE TO VESSEL 9 9.28 18.56 45 23.08 29.74

FIRE/EXPLOSION 11 11.34 29.9 14 7.18 36.92

GROUNDED 20 20.62 50.52 48 24.62 61.54

MACHINERY 

DAMAGE/FAILURE 24 24.74 75.26 47 24.1 85.64

MISCELLANEOUS 7 7.22 82.47 3 1.54 87.18

SUNK/SUBMERGED 17 17.53 100 25 12.82 100

TOTAL 97 100 195 100

The percentage of marine accidents that involved fuel spills only differs by approximately 5% but this fails to 

tell the whole story (Table 5A). More interesting is the fact that the Bering Sea saw 11 accidents that involved 

fuel spills in this period whereas the Arctic as a whole excluding the Bering Sea saw 13. This would again 

point to an elevated risk for environmental damage in the highly sensitive Bering Sea area. Additionally, it 

appears that accidents in the Bering Sea result in a statistically significant (greater than 95% confidence) larger 

amount of fuel spilled than in the rest Arctic (See Table 5B below).

Table 5A: A Comparison of the Number of Accidents Involving Fuel Spills

Bering Sea Arctic Excluding Bering

Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Percent Cumulative

No 

Spill 86 88.66 88.66 182 93.33 93.33

Fuel 

Spill 11 11.34 100 13 6.67 100

Total 97 100 195 100
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Table 5B: Results of t-test comparing Amount of Fuel Spilled in Tons by Accident Location

Group

Number of 

Observations Mean

Standard 

Error

Standard 

Deviation 95% Confidence Interval

Arctic 

Excluding 

Bering 185 0.1081081 0.075071 1.021076 -0.0400026 0.2562188

Bering 95 0.6105263 0.2170219 2.115267 0.1796243 1.041428

Combined 280 0.2785714 0.0896794 1.500623 0.1020373 0.4551055

Difference -0.5024182 0.2296392 -0.9572071 -0.0476293

Ha: diff !=0 PR(|T| > |t|) = 0.0307

The severity of accidents is also of concern. Does the Bering Sea have a higher number of accidents that result 

in a fatality? The answer is yes, 8% of accidents involve a fatality in the Bering versus only 3% in the rest of 

the Arctic (see Table 6). This data matches data about the sheer destruction involved in Bering accidents with 

a full 30% of accidents in the Bering resulting an actual or constructive total loss versus only 17% of accidents 

in the Arctic excluding the Bering resulting in an actual or constructive total loss (see Table 7).

Table 6: A comparison of accidents involving fatalities

Bering Sea Arctic Excluding Bering

Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Percent Cumulative

No 

Fatalities 89 91.75 91.75 189 96.92 96.92

Fatalities 8 8.25 100 6 3.08 100

Total 97 100 195 100

Table 7: A Comparison of the Results of Arctic Marine Accidents by Location

Bering Sea Arctic Excluding Bering

Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Percent Cumulative

ACTUAL TOTAL LOSS 28 28.87 28.87 33 16.92 16.92

CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL 

LOSS 1 1.03 29.9 1 0.51 17.44

NOT A LOSS 68 70.1 100 161 82.56 100

Total 97 100 195 100
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Thus far it would appear that the Bering Sea has a higher number of accidents than other locations and that 

these accidents largely involve fishing vessels. Additionally, the Bering Sea accidents involved almost 50% of 

the total number of fuel spills in the Arctic and those spills involved more fuel than others in the Arctic. 

Finally, the data also show that the accidents in the Bering were more severe than the Arctic as a whole with 

30% of the accidents resulting in an actual or constructive total loss of the ship versus only 17% in the Arctic 

as a whole excluding the Bering. A key question is how does the data look when compared across time?

When reviewing the number of Arctic marine accidents by month, the Bering Sea shows significantly more 

accidents than the rest of the Arctic from January through April (See Table 8 and Figure 8). This period 

coincides with the worst weather in the region and it is also King and Opelio Crab Season (Off-the-record 

interview, 2015). Even more interesting is the data shown in Table 9. The Bering Sea’s number of accidents 

actually exceeded the number of accidents in the rest of the Arctic in both 1995 and 1999. Additionally, the 

Bering saw a disproportionately high number of accidents in 1996. If one excludes 1995, 1996, and 1999 (the 

three years with the highest number of accidents in the Bering) from the analysis, would there be a significant 

difference between the percentages of accidents in the Bering versus the rest of the Arctic? Removing 1995, 

1996 and 1999 (see Table 10) from the dataset reduces the total number of accidents from 292 to 184. The 

number of accidents in the Bering is reduced from 97 to 45 and the percentage of accidents that occur in the 

Bering versus the rest of the Arctic is reduced from 33.22% to 24.46%. While this is a substantively 

significant reduction, it does not change the fact that the Bering Sea is an area that warrants both further 

research and policy attention given the disproportionate number of accidents that occurred there compared to 

other locations in the Arctic.

Table 8: A Comparison of Arctic Marine Accidents by Month and Location

Bering Sea Arctic Excluding Bering

Month Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Percent Cumulative

January 9 9.28 9.28 7 3.59 3.59

February 21 21.65 30.93 14 7.18 10.77

March 11 11.34 42.27 19 9.74 20.51

April 5 5.15 47.42 1 0.51 21.03

May 5 5.15 52.58 10 5.13 26.15

June 4 4.12 56.7 15 7.69 33.85

July 9 9.28 65.98 30 15.38 49.23

August 3 3.09 69.07 18 9.23 58.46

September 10 10.31 79.38 20 10.26 68.72

October 7 7.22 86.6 28 14.36 83.08

November 10 10.31 96.91 13 6.67 89.74

December 3 3.09 100 20 10.26 100

Total 97 100 195 100
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Table 9: A Comparison of Arctic Marine Accidents by Year and Location

Bering Arctic Excluding the Bering

Year Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Percent Cumulative

1995 18 18.56 18.56 17 8.72 8.72

1996 22 22.68 41.24 30 15.38 24.1

1997 6 6.19 47.42 17 8.72 32.82

1998 6 6.19 53.61 13 6.67 39.49

1999 12 12.37 65.98 9 4.62 44.1

2000 3 3.09 69.07 16 8.21 52.31

2001 8 8.25 77.32 23 11.79 64.1

2002 7 7.22 84.54 23 11.79 75.9

2003 9 9.28 93.81 19 9.74 85.64

2004 6 6.19 100 28 14.36 100

Total 97 100 195 100

Table 10: What would happen if you removed 1995, 1996 and 1999 from the Data?

Excluding 1995, 1996 and 

1999 All Years from 1995-2004

Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Percent Cumulative

Bering Sea 45 24.46 24.46 97 33.22 33.22

Arctic Excluding 

Bering 139 75.54 100 195 66.78 100

Total 184 100 292 100

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Bering Sea is a unique area with great economic, environmental and cultural significance 

and the literature largely agrees that the region is threatened by increased commercial shipping traffic. The 

AMSA data does highlight that the area already has one of the highest concentrations of traffic in the Arctic 

but the AID was only minimally explored in that report. Research since the AMSA has largely relied on the 

AMSA’s broad assessments but has failed to further evaluate shipping and accident trends in the region. 

Based on our research we believe that the Arctic Council should restart the AMSA’s data collection effort, as 

any future policy decisions need to be fully grounded in the data to ensure that they are effective. The data 

collection effort should focus on updating the AID to include the years 2005-2015, and it should also include 

an effort to collect data on the number of ships transiting Arctic waters for this entire period as well. These 

datasets will prove critical to predicting future trends as well as identifying the locations that need most 

investment in both regulation and infrastructure development. 

Finally, we believe the analysis of the AID recorded in this report clearly demonstrates that the Bering Sea is 
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unique in the Arctic with almost a third of the Arctic Marine Accidents occurring in the Bering Sea. These 

accidents are more likely to result in both fatalities as well as environmental damage from spilled fuel. The 

data also demonstrates that fuel spills in the Bering are larger than in the rest of the Arctic. As global warming 

continues to accelerate, thereby allowing for increased activity in the Bering, the risk of environmental damage 

or mass rescue operation in the Bering Strait or Sea will only continue to increase. The time to cooperate with 

the Russian Federation to enact a regulatory regime and develop infrastructure in the Bering Sea Region is 

now.
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Appendix 4: Meet the Authors

From Left to Right: Samuel Klarich, Catherine Ardrey, Kristopher Lagor and Jeremy McKenzie during their 

Alaskan Research Trip

Catherine Ardrey:

Catherine Ardrey is currently attending Brown University as a Master of Public Affairs candidate with an 

expected graduation in May of 2016. She is focused on Development with regards to non-profit organizations.

Prior to attending Brown University, Catherine attended Hofstra University from 2010 to 2014. She majored in 

History, Global Studies, Anthropology, and Civic Engagement. While attending Hofstra she also interned for 

the Kettering Foundation and Sustained Dialogue. Both organizations are bipartisan organizations that work to 
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make tough political conversations easier by holding political forums for all age groups. Catherine also played 

soccer while attending Hofstra University. She was a starting defender for three years and a captain for two 

years while at Hofstra. 

Catherine currently lives in Providence, Rhode Island, but she plans to pursue a job opportunity in Boston, 

Massachusetts after graduating from Brown University. 

Samuel Klarich: 

Samuel Klarich is a Master of Public Affairs candidate at Brown University, where he concentrates in 

communications and government relations. Samuel graduated in 2013 with a Bachelor’s of Science degree in 

Industrial and Labor Relations from Cornell University, where he concentrated in labor and employment law.

Prior to attending Brown University, Samuel worked as a labor relations consultant for the Mechanical 

Contractors Association of Eastern Missouri, where he advised union management on national health care 

reform and the establishment of worker classifications and compensation practices. He has expertise in the 

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, particularly as it relates to union employment and workplace 

requirements.

In 2015, Samuel worked as an Intern for the Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations System in Geneva, 

Switzerland. In this role, he worked as an independent researcher alongside and at the direction of UN 

Inspectors, who were specially appointed by the Secretary General to conduct formal and independent reviews 

of the 28 participating members of the United Nations System and Funds and Programmes.

Samuel is a native of St. Louis, Missouri and currently resides in Providence, Rhode Island. He hopes to 

pursue international opportunities in policy making in 2016.

Kristopher Lagor:

Kristopher Lagor is a Master of Public Affairs candidate at Brown University. Kristopher is also an eleven 

year veteran of the Rhode Island State Police. Additionally Kristopher is an active non-commissioned officer 

in the Rhode Island Army National Guard and is a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Prior to attending Brown University, Kristopher earned his bachelor’s degree in Criminal Justice from 

Westfield State University, in Massachusetts, and a Master’s Degree in Administration of Justice from Salve 

Regina University. 

Kristopher resides in Rhode Island with his wife Keri and their two daughters.
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Jeremy McKenzie:

Lieutenant Commander Jeremy McKenzie is currently assigned to Brown University as a Master of Public 

Policy candidate in advance of serving as a Public Policy Instructor at the United States Coast Guard 

Academy. As an MPP candidate he was recognized with the Director’s Award for leadership in the Master’s 

Program. He also interned for the City of Hartford Development Services Division as well as U.S. Senator 

Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut. 

Lieutenant Commander McKenzie previously served at both air stations Atlantic City and Savannah as an 

MH-65D Aircraft Commander and qualified in both the Search and Rescue (SAR) and Rotary Wing Air 

Intercept (RWAI) missions. Prior to serving in the Coast Guard he was an Army Medical Service Corps 

Officer and UH-60 Blackhawk medical evacuation pilot. In the Army he served multiple overseas tours to 

include Korea, a peacekeeping tour in Bosnia and two combat tours in Iraq. As an aircraft commander in both 

the Army and the Coast Guard, Lieutenant Commander McKenzie has more than 2,900 flight hours, including 

more than 300 hours of combat and imminent danger time. 

Lieutenant Commander McKenzie also completed a Master’s of Business Administration from the University 

of Maryland University College as well as a Master of Social Science from Syracuse University’s Maxwell 

School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Lieutenant Commander McKenzie's military decorations include the 

Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, two Air Medals, the Coast Guard Commendation Medal, 

the Army Commendation Medal (with two oak leaf clusters), the Army Achievement Medal (with one oak leaf 

cluster), two Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medals, Coast Guard Aviator Wings, the Expert Field 

Medical Badge, the Army Aviator Badge, and U.S. Army Jump Wings.

Lieutenant Commander McKenzie and his wife, Nicole, reside in Connecticut with their two daughters.
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