[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-15081

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00070-CDL

WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, 

individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 

MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ-GALICIA, 

individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 

SHOAIB AHMED, 

individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

CORECIVIC, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

________________________

(February 28, 2020)

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 1 of 24 
2

Before HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN,

* District Judge.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

In this case, Appellees Wilhen Hill Barrientos, Margarito Velazquez-Galicia, 

and Shoaib Ahmed, current and former alien detainees, brought a class action

lawsuit against Appellant CoreCivic, Inc., a private contractor, which owns and 

operates the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia (“Stewart”). Stewart 

is a federal immigration detention facility where aliens are held during the 

pendency of removal proceedings or for other reasons related to enforcement of the 

nation’s immigration laws. At Stewart, CoreCivic, as a private contractor, is 

required to operate what is referred to as a “voluntary work program,” through 

which detainees may perform work for compensation. 

Appellees’ complaint alleged that, far from operating a “voluntary” work 

program, CoreCivic coerces alien detainees to perform labor at Stewart by, inter 

alia, the use or threatened use of serious harm, criminal prosecution, solitary 

confinement, and the withholding of basic necessities. Appellees’ complaint 

asserted that CoreCivic’s labor scheme violated, and continues to violate, the 

forced-labor prohibition in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”), 18 

U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594–95, and Georgia law. The TVPA subjects to criminal and 

*

Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein, United States District Judge for the Western District of 

Washington, sitting by designation.

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 2 of 24 
3

civil liability “[w]hoever” knowingly obtains the labor or services of a “person” by 

any one of the prohibited coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA. 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1589(a), 1595. 

CoreCivic moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the TVPA does 

not apply to a private government contractor or cover labor performed in work 

programs by alien detainees in lawful custody of the U.S. government. Although it 

denied the motion, the district court certified for immediate appeal the narrow, 

purely legal question of “[w]hether the TVPA applies to work programs in federal 

immigration detention facilities operated by private for-profit contractors.” See 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b). We granted CoreCivic’s petition for permission to immediately 

appeal the district court’s order. 

After review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that: 

(1) under the plain language of the statute, the TVPA covers the conduct of private 

contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities; (2) the TVPA does 

not bar private contractors from operating the sort of voluntary work programs 

generally authorized under federal law for aliens held in immigration detention 

facilities; but (3) private contractors that operate such work programs are not 

categorically excluded from the TVPA and may be liable if they knowingly obtain 

or procure the labor or services of a program participant through the illegal

coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA. Because our review is limited to the 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 3 of 24 
4

legal question of the TVPA’s applicability to private contractors operating federal 

immigration detention facilities, we do not at this time address whether the factual 

allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a TVPA claim.

I. BACKGROUND

The question certified by the district court concerns the TVPA and work 

programs in federal immigration detention facilities. We review the TVPA, the 

relevant work programs, and then the district court proceedings. 

A. The TVPA

The TVPA prohibits knowingly “obtain[ing] the labor or services of a 

person” by any one of, or combination of, the following means:

(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of 

physical restraint to that person or another person;

(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person 

or another person;

(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; 

or

(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the 

person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or 

services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or 

physical restraint.

18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (collectively, the “illegal coercive means”). Section 1589(a) 

applies to “[w]hoever” knowingly provides or obtains such forced labor or services

from a “person.” Id.

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 4 of 24 
5

In turn, § 1595(a) provides a private cause of action for any victim of a 

violation of § 1589. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Under § 1595(a), “[a]n individual who 

is a victim of a violation” of the TVPA “may bring a civil action against the 

perpetrator,” as well as against anyone who “knowingly benefits, financially or by 

receiving anything of value,” from any such violation. Id.

B. Work Programs in ICE Detention Facilities

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detains certain aliens 

during the pendency of removal proceedings or for other reasons related to 

enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws. ICE detains some of those aliens in 

facilities operated by private contractors. Appellant CoreCivic is a private

contractor that operates several detention centers throughout the country, including 

the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia, where Appellees were or are 

being held.

1

 

CoreCivic, as a private contractor operating an ICE detention facility, is 

subject to, and required to follow, the Performance-Based National Detention 

Standards (“PBNDS”), the operative version of which was promulgated in 2011 

and revised in 2016. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Performance-Based 

National Detention Standards 2011 (rev. 2016), available at

1

CoreCivic operates the Stewart Detention Center through a contract with Stewart 

County, Georgia. The County is a party to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement with ICE, 

pursuant to which it detains aliens on ICE’s behalf. 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 5 of 24 
6

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011r2016.pdf. The 

PBNDS are designed to ensure a safe and secure detention environment that meets 

detainees’ basic needs and is consistent with applicable legal requirements. 

The PBNDS state that detention centers may require all detainees to 

“maintain their immediate living areas in a neat and orderly manner” through 

certain “personal housekeeping” tasks such as “making their bunk beds daily,” 

“stacking loose papers,” and “keeping the floor free of debris.” Id. § 5.8(V)(C). 

Beyond these basic required tasks, detainees “shall not be required to work,” and 

all other “[w]ork assignments are voluntary.” Id. §§ 5.8(II)(2), 5.8(V)(C).

As to voluntary work, the PBNDS further state that “[d]etainees shall be 

provided the opportunity to participate in a voluntary work program” through 

which they may earn monetary compensation.2 Id. §§ 5.8(I), 5.8(V)(A) (emphasis 

added). The purpose of such voluntary work programs is to reduce “[t]he negative 

impact of confinement . . . through decreased idleness, improved morale and fewer 

disciplinary incidents.” Id. § 5.8(II)(4). However, the facility administrator must 

operate the voluntary work program in compliance with the PBNDS, which

regulate the selection of detainees, the hours of work (no more than 8 hours per 

day and 40 hours per week), the minimum compensation for completed work (at 

2

Since 1950, Congress has authorized ICE and its predecessor agencies to pay detained 

aliens “for work performed” “while held in custody under the immigration laws.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1555(d).

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 6 of 24 
7

least $1.00 per day), the number of work assignments a detainee can perform, and 

the conditions under which that work occurs. Id. §§ 5.8(V)(D)–(O). The PBNDS 

delegate the site-specific rules for each work program to the “facility 

administrator.” Id. § 5.8(V)(D). 

Detainees may be removed from the voluntary work program for causes 

such as “unsatisfactory performance” or “disruptive behavior,” or as a “sanction

imposed . . . for an infraction of a facility rule, regulation or policy.” Id.

§ 5.8(V)(L). Additionally, the PBNDS specify that participants in the voluntary 

work program are “expected to be ready to report for work at the required time,” 

“may not leave an assignment without permission,” and “may not evade attendance 

and performance standards in assigned activities nor encourage others to do so.” 

Id. § 5.8(V)(M). 

The PBNDS otherwise provide for disciplinary action against detainees 

outside the context of the voluntary work program. See generally id. § 3.1. The 

PBNDS identify four categories of offenses and prescribe appropriate sanctions for 

each category. Id. §§ 3.1(V)(C), 3.1 app. A. Those categories are “greatest,” 

“high,” “high moderate,” and “low moderate.”3 Id. According to the PBNDS, all 

3

For example, the PBNDS define “[r]efusing to clean assigned living area” as a “high 

moderate” offense, while “failing to keep self and living area in accordance with posted 

standards” is a “low moderate” offense. PBNDS § 3.1 app. A. While the PBNDS define 

“[e]ncouraging others to participate in a work stoppage or to refuse to work” as a “high” offense, 

there is no specific offense prescribed in the PBNDS for a detainee who, after signing up for the 

voluntary work program, refuses to complete his assigned tasks. See generally id.

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 7 of 24 
8

four categories of infractions are punishable by a “[l]oss of privileges”—including 

“commissary, vending machines, movies, recreation, etc.”—and a “[c]hange [in] 

housing,” among other sanctions. Id. § 3.1 app. A. Additionally, all but the 

lowest category of infractions are punishable by the initiation of criminal 

proceedings and “[d]isciplinary segregation” of varying length based on the 

severity of the infraction. Id.

II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

A. Complaint

In their complaint, Appellees alleged that the voluntary work program as 

implemented by CoreCivic was, in fact, anything but voluntary. Rather, the 

complaint alleged, aliens detained at Stewart work because they have no other 

meaningful choice. The complaint alleged CoreCivic was operating, and continues 

to operate, a “deprivation scheme” by which it forces detainees to participate in the 

work program through threats of “serious harm” in the form of deprivation of 

privacy and safety, threats of referral for criminal prosecution, and threats of 

solitary confinement; through withholding basic necessities like food, toothpaste, 

toilet paper, and soap; and through deprivation of outside contact with loved ones. 

Appellees’ complaint claimed that, by engaging in this alleged forced-labor

“scheme,” CoreCivic ran afoul of §§ 1589(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4) in that it 

was knowingly “obtain[ing] . . . labor” by means of: (1) “force, threats of force, 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 8 of 24 
9

physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint”; (2) “serious harm or threats of 

serious harm”; (3) “the abuse or threatened abuse of the law or legal process”; and 

(4) a “scheme . . . intended to cause [a] person to believe that, if that person did not 

perform . . . labor or services, that person . . . would suffer serious harm or physical 

restraint.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a)(1)–(4). Appellees’ complaint claimed that this 

forced-labor scheme—which remains ongoing—operates as follows.

The conditions at Stewart are alleged to be poor, particularly in the “open 

dormitories,” which detainees refer to as the “Chicken Coop” due to the unsanitary 

conditions and overcrowding. The showers in the Chicken Coop, for example, are 

said to be moldy and without temperature control. CoreCivic allegedly does not 

provide detainees with basic hygiene products, including toilet paper, soap, and 

toothpaste. Detainees must purchase these items from the commissary when they 

run out. They also must purchase expensive “phone cards” from the commissary if 

they wish to speak with loved ones who are unable to make the trip to the detention 

center. 

Detainees who participate in CoreCivic’s voluntary work program, however,

are spared some of Stewart’s more unfavorable conditions and—because they are 

paid between $1.00 and $4.00 per day—are able to purchase necessities from the 

commissary. For example, according to Appellees’ complaint, work program 

participants are not housed in the “Chicken Coop,” but are provided two-person 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 9 of 24 
10

cells, a shared common area, a bathroom shared with only one other cellmate, and 

a shower with temperature control. Appellees’ complaint alleged that, once 

detainees are in the work program, CoreCivic threatens to harm or actually harms 

those who refuse to work. 

In short, Appellees’ complaint alleged that CoreCivic subjects detainees to 

inhumane conditions by depriving them of basic necessities and livable 

accommodations, detainees join the so-called voluntary work program to alleviate 

these conditions, and CoreCivic then threatens any program participants who 

refuse to work. In this way, Appellees claim, CoreCivic effectively forces 

detainees to continually work and participate in the program. Appellees allege that 

this provides CoreCivic with a cheap supply of labor to operate the facility with, 

which enables CoreCivic to increase its profits.

The three named plaintiffs—Barrientos, Velazquez-Galicia, and Ahmed—all 

either are working or previously worked as kitchen workers as part of the voluntary 

work program at Stewart. However, they all claimed their participation in the 

work program was not voluntary in any meaningful sense, as they were subject to 

the above-described “deprivation scheme.” Additionally, all three alleged they 

were subject to or witnessed threats from CoreCivic employees once they began 

participating in the work program.

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 10 of 24 
11

Barrientos, a citizen of Guatemala seeking asylum in the United States, 

earned between $1.00 and $4.00 per day as part of the voluntary work program, 

though he makes up to $8.00 per day if CoreCivic requires him to work 12 hours or 

more in one day. He alleged CoreCivic threatened to transfer him to the Chicken 

Coop, revoke his access to the commissary, and put him in solitary confinement if 

he stopped working, called in sick, refused to change shifts, or encouraged others 

to stop working. 

Velazquez-Galicia is a citizen of Mexico who intends to seek relief from 

deportation and whose wife and two children are U.S. citizens. He too is employed 

as a kitchen worker and is paid between $1.00 and $4.00 per day or up to $8.00 per 

day if he is required to work more than 12 hours in one day. He alleged he 

witnessed CoreCivic employees threaten to transfer detainees who declined to 

work from the preferable two-person cells to the Chicken Coop. 

Ahmed is a citizen of Bangladesh who was detained at Stewart until 

February 2018, when he allegedly opted to give up his asylum case in part due to 

his desire to escape Stewart’s poor conditions. Ahmed was paid $4.00 per day as a 

kitchen worker. Like the other plaintiffs, he earned additional money if he worked 

12 hours or more. He alleged that CoreCivic employees threatened to place him in 

solitary confinement if he stopped working, and actually did place him in solitary 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 11 of 24 
12

confinement for ten days when he threatened a work stoppage after he was not 

paid. 

B. District Court’s Order

CoreCivic moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Appellees’ 

complaint failed to state a claim under the TVPA because Congress did not intend 

the statute to apply at all to alien detainees in the lawful custody of the U.S. 

Government or to private contractors operating immigration detention facilities. 

The district court disagreed, finding “the plain language of the statute” clearly 

encompassed claims brought by alien detainees held in privately run detention 

facilities. The district court “decline[d] to read an implied exclusion for lawfully 

confined victims into the statute.” 

The district court recognized, however, that “[w]hether the TVPA applies to 

work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private forprofit contractors is a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 

ground for difference of opinion.” We agreed, and granted CoreCivic’s petition 

for immediate appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Our Limited Review

As an initial matter, we clarify the scope of our review. Although the 

district court identified a discrete legal question in its order, “appellate jurisdiction 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 12 of 24 
13

[under § 1292(b)] applies to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is not 

tied to the particular question formulated by the district court.” Yamaha Motor 

Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205, 116 S. Ct. 619, 623 (1996). Thus, 

while we “may not reach beyond the certified order,” we “may address any issue 

fairly included within the certified order.” Id. That said, we think it appropriate to 

limit our review to the discrete and abstract legal issue the district court identified. 

See McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The 

legal question must be stated at a high enough level of abstraction to lift the 

question out of the details of the evidence or facts of a particular case and give it 

general relevance to other cases in the same area of law.”). 

Because we limit our review to the discrete and abstract legal issue of the 

TVPA’s applicability to a certain class of cases, we are not concerned with the 

specific factual allegations in the complaint, apart from the nature of the parties 

(legally detained immigrants seeking to assert claims against a private, for-profit, 

government contractor) and, to a lesser extent, the fact that the claims arise out of 

the operation of a work program required by the PBNDS. In other words, we do 

not address whether the complaint in this case sufficiently alleged a violation of the 

TVPA, assuming it applies to private contractors like CoreCivic. We also do not

offer any opinion on CoreCivic’s operation of work programs generally. Indeed, 

we decline to address the adequacy of the complaint—or any other fact-intensive 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 13 of 24 
14

inquiry—at this stage in the litigation. See Mamani v. Berzain, 825 F.3d 1304, 

1312–13 (11th Cir. 2016) (declining to address, in an interlocutory appeal, whether 

a complaint stated a claim for relief under the Torture Victim Protection Act

because the issue did not ask the court “to decide a pure or abstract question about 

the TVPA itself”).4

B. Analysis

As to the discrete legal question before us, CoreCivic has not asked us to 

adopt a construction of the statute that would exempt federal contractors from any

and all liability under the TVPA. Rather, CoreCivic asks us to hold that the TVPA 

(specifically § 1589) can never apply in the specific context of a “federally 

mandated voluntary work program in a detention setting,” even where the work 

performed through that program is obtained through, for example, force, physical 

restraint, or threats of serious harm. CoreCivic insists that its construction of the 

4

We deny Appellees’ request to set aside the motions panel’s order granting Appellant 

CoreCivic permission to appeal. We recognize that, like any decision made by a motions panel, 

a petition for interlocutory review under § 1292(b) may be improvidently granted. See 11th Cir. 

R. 27-1(g); McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1253. Appellees insist that CoreCivic essentially asks us to 

consider fact-driven issues not appropriate for review under § 1292(b) and that, contrary to the 

district court’s conclusion, the unambiguous language of the statute leaves no room for a 

substantial difference of opinion. 

However, we agree with the district court that its order involves a pure question of law 

that controls at least a substantial part of the case and about which there is substantial ground for 

a difference of opinion, and that its resolution may well substantially reduce the amount of 

litigation necessary on remand. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A ruling in favor of CoreCivic on this 

pure question of law would eliminate Appellees’ sole federal claim and leave behind only one 

state law claim. And our answer to the legal question presented does not depend on any facts or 

the factual record below. In short, this appeal satisfies § 1292(b)’s requirements.

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 14 of 24 
15

statute would be consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of the TVPA. In 

support of its argument, CoreCivic points to: (1) the text of § 1589, particularly the 

requirement that one “obtain[] the labor or services of a person”; (2) the fact that, 

when Congress enacted the TVPA, it had long authorized labor by alien detainees;

(3) the fact that courts have consistently held that alien detainees can be required to 

perform labor while in detention; (4) the express purpose of the TVPA, as well as 

the legislative history leading to its enactment; and (5) the rule of lenity, which 

CoreCivic argues favors judicial restraint in the construction of this criminal 

statute. 

The question of statutory interpretation is a legal issue we review de novo. 

Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 2015). “The 

interpretation of a statute begins with its language.” United States v. St. Amour, 

886 F.3d 1009, 1013 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 205 (2018); see also Artis

v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 594, 603 (2018) (“In 

determining the meaning of a statutory provision, we look first to its language, 

giving the words used their ordinary meaning.” (quotation marks omitted)). We 

first “determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous 

meaning,” and, “[i]f so, we need go no further.” St. Amour, 886 F.3d at 1013 

(quotation marks omitted).

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 15 of 24 
16

As laid out above, the TVPA creates a cause of action—both criminal and 

civil—against “[w]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a 

person” by various illegal coercive means. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a), 1595(a). We, 

like the district court, find this language to be “plain and unambiguous.” See St. 

Amour, 886 F.3d at 1013. The use of the general terms “[w]hoever” and “person”

evinces no intent on the part of Congress to restrict the application of the statute to 

particular actors or particular victims. Instead, the clear and unambiguous 

language of the statute limits liability only by reference to the actions taken by a 

would-be violator: it applies to anyone who knowingly “obtains the labor or 

services of a person” through one of the four illegal coercive means explicitly 

listed in the statute. No other limiting principle is evident from the plain text. 

Indeed, the Dictionary Act—which provides the definition of various terms 

for courts to use in “determining the meaning of any Act of Congress”—states that 

the word “whoever” when used in a statute “include[s] corporations, companies, 

associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 

individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. Congress’s express inclusion of corporations and 

companies in the general definition of “whoever” presumptively indicates that a 

private, for-profit government contractor—like CoreCivic—falls within the 

meaning of “[w]hoever” for purposes of the TVPA. 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 16 of 24 
17

Despite the statute’s use of general terms to describe its coverage, CoreCivic 

asks us to read into the statute a limiting principle: that Congress could not have 

intended alien detainees participating in voluntary work programs to sue and make 

use of this statute. But “the presumed point of using general words is to produce 

general coverage—not to leave room for courts to recognize ad hoc exceptions.” 

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 

Texts 101 (2012). The primary textual argument CoreCivic makes is that the 

words “obtains the labor or services of a person” do not naturally encompass 

federally mandated voluntary work programs for alien detainees of the type run by 

CoreCivic. This is because CoreCivic, like any contractor operating an 

immigration detention facility on ICE’s behalf, is required to provide a voluntary 

work program for detainees, and thus it cannot illegally “obtain[] the labor” of 

detainees through such a program. See PBNDS § 5.8(V)(A). 

But the fact that the PBNDS require CoreCivic to operate a work program

for detainees does not mean that such a program can never be operated in a 

manner—i.e., by forcing labor through illegal coercive means—that violates the 

TVPA. If CoreCivic, or any other private for-profit contractor, actually forces 

detainees to provide labor (whether through a work program or not) through any of 

the illegal coercive means explicitly proscribed by the TVPA, it has “obtain[ed] the 

labor or services of a person” in violation of the TVPA. Again, nothing in the text 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 17 of 24 
18

of the statute excludes federal contractors providing immigration detention services 

from liability under the TVPA, even when that liability might arise out of the 

operation of a federally mandated work program. And nothing in the PBNDS 

permits CoreCivic, or other private contractors operating immigration detention 

facilities, to force detainees to perform labor (beyond personal housekeeping 

tasks), and certainly not through the illegal coercive means explicitly listed in the 

TVPA.

CoreCivic warns us against the unintended consequences of this construction 

of the statute, implying that this decision could open up criminal liability in any 

number of custodial settings in which detainees or prisoners are incentivized or 

required to perform work. As CoreCivic notes, however, Congress itself has long 

authorized paid work by detained aliens, and federal courts (including this Court) 

have long held that such detainees or inmates can be required to perform labor 

while in detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1555(d); see, e.g., Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 

202, 207 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[N]o Court of Appeals has ever questioned the power 

of a correctional institution to compel inmates to perform services for the 

institution without paying the minimum wage.” (quotation marks omitted)). Our 

decision here does nothing to call this precedent into question. 

To be clear, our opinion should not be read to call into question the legality 

of voluntary work programs in federal immigration detention facilities, or to call 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 18 of 24 
19

into question longstanding requirements that detainees or inmates be required to 

perform basic housekeeping tasks.

5

 But the mere fact that CoreCivic—or any 

other private government contractor—is operating a work program at the behest of 

the federal government does not, in and of itself, shield CoreCivic from liability 

under the TVPA if it in fact obtains the forced labor of program participants

through the illegal coercive means explicitly proscribed by the TVPA. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1589(a) (listing specific illegal coercive means). All we hold today is that the 

plain language of the TVPA brings within its scope for-profit government 

contractors operating work programs in federal immigration detention facilities, 

and such entities are not categorically excluded or shielded from liability under the 

TVPA.

C. Purpose and Legislative History

Having concluded that the “language at issue has a plain and unambiguous 

meaning,” “we need go no further.” St. Amour, 886 F.3d at 1013 (quotation marks 

omitted); see also United States v. Noel, 893 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2018)

(“[I]f the statute’s language is clear, there is no need to go beyond the statute’s 

plain language into legislative history.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. 

5

As discussed above, in the interest of maintaining order in an immigration detention

facility, the PBNDS authorize punishments for detainees who, among other things, refuse to 

complete basic personal housekeeping tasks or organize work stoppages. See generally PBNDS

§ 3.1. Our decision should likewise not be read to imply that these basic disciplinary measures, 

on their own, give rise to TVPA liability. 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 19 of 24 
20

denied, 140 S. Ct. 157 (2019).

6

 We do acknowledge CoreCivic’s arguments 

concerning the purpose and legislative history of the TVPA, but where, as here, the 

statutory text is not ambiguous, “[o]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary 

intentions in the legislative history will justify a departure from [the statutory] 

language.” United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680, 105 S. Ct. 2897, 2902 

(1985) (quotation marks omitted); see also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 

75, 105 S. Ct. 479, 482 (1984) (“When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, 

judicial inquiry is complete, except in rare and exceptional circumstances.” 

(quotation marks omitted)). We do not find any such extraordinary showing of 

contrary intentions here. 

As CoreCivic correctly points out, Congress enacted the TVPA as part of the 

Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 “to combat trafficking 

in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are 

predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of 

traffickers, and to protect their victims.” Victims of Trafficking and Violence 

Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(a), 114 Stat. 1464, 1466

(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101). Congress supported that purpose with 24 

6

CoreCivic’s argument that the rule of lenity weighs in favor of its preferred construction 

of the statute is similarly foreclosed by our conclusion that the statutory text is unambiguous. 

See United States v. Maturin, 499 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Because [the statute] is 

clear, we need discuss neither legislative history nor the rule of lenity.” (citing Salinas v. United 

States, 522 U.S. 52, 66, 118 S. Ct. 469, 478 (1997))).

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 20 of 24 
21

legislative findings, all of which focus on human trafficking and involuntary 

servitude. Id. § 102(b), 114 Stat. at 1466–69. And the legislative history indicates 

that § 1589 in particular was “intended to address the increasingly subtle methods 

of traffickers who place their victims in modern-day slavery.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-

939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.). 

We do not find a private government contractor’s obtaining forced labor

through actual or threatened force, restraint, or serious harm to be so far removed 

from the purpose Congress identified as to cause us to look beyond the plain 

statutory language. Just because Congress may have had in mind a particular 

narrow objective—here, combatting human trafficking—does not on its own 

justify a departure from the principle that we should give general terms their 

general meaning. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 103–04 (“The argument most 

frequently made against giving general terms their general meaning is the one 

made (and rejected) in the Slaughter-House cases—that those who adopted the 

provision had in mind a particular narrow objective (equal protection for blacks) 

though they expressed a more general one (equal protection for ‘any person’).”). 

As the Supreme Court has remarked, “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the 

principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the 

provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 21 of 24 
22

which we are governed.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 

79, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).7

We also are not persuaded by CoreCivic’s resort to Supreme Court decisions 

it claims counsel against adopting a construction of a criminal statute, like the 

TVPA, that may lead to results disconnected from Congress’s purpose. See

Marinello v. United States, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018); Yates v. United 

States, 574 U.S. 528, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 

134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). Those cases all involved some disconnect between the 

purpose of the statute and the nature of the conduct alleged. Here, in contrast, 

Appellees have alleged that CoreCivic engaged in precisely the type of conduct 

prohibited by the TVPA: obtaining labor by the specific illegal coercive means 

explicitly set out in the statute. CoreCivic’s argument is not that it is incapable of 

carrying out the prohibited conduct; instead, it insists that, even if it—or any other 

private contractor operating an immigration detention facility—engaged in the 

proscribed conduct, it cannot be the “[w]hoever” envisioned by the statute. We see 

7

What’s more, as the government notes in its amicus brief, “Congress has repeatedly 

emphasized that it seeks to stamp out any use of forced labor by federal contractors.” See Brief 

for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 7. Pointing to this history, 

along with the text and purpose of the TVPA, the government has adopted the position that “the 

TVPA does not contain an implicit exception for private providers of immigration detention 

services” and that Appellees “are not categorically barred from bringing a TVPA suit based on 

the conduct of a contractor or subcontractor that provides immigration detention services to the 

United States.” Id. at 8. The government’s position reinforces our conclusion that the results 

here are not wholly disconnected from Congress’s purpose in enacting the TVPA.

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 22 of 24 
23

no reason to read this limiting principle into the statute. Congress wrote this 

statute plainly, and it is up to Congress, not us, to rewrite it.

We further note that, while none of our sister circuits has addressed the 

specific application of the TVPA now before us, they have found § 1589 

applicable outside the core human-trafficking context to which CoreCivic would 

apparently have us limit the statute’s reach. See, e.g., Adia v. Grandeur Mgmt., 

Inc., 933 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2019) (concluding that § 1589(a)’s prohibition 

against obtaining labor through threats of serious harm applied to “an immigrant 

lawfully in this country on a temporary guest worker visa alleging that his 

employers threatened to revoke their sponsorship, thereby subjecting him to 

deportation”); Bistline v. Parker, 918 F.3d 849, 871 (10th Cir. 2019) (concluding 

that plaintiffs, all former members of a church, had plausibly alleged violations of 

the TVPA against the church leader by alleging that they “were threatened with 

force, kidnapped, physically restrained, [and] threatened with other harms” if they 

failed to follow orders from church leaders); United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 

606, 617 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The statute’s express terms do not limit its application 

to immigrant victims or sex workers. Rather, § 1589(a)’s proscription against the 

exploitation of the labor or services of ‘a person’ by prohibited means 

encompasses any person, no matter her nationality or place of birth.”). To clarify, 

we are not hereby approving the specific holdings or analyses in these decisions, 

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 23 of 24 
24

but cite them to show that federal courts have concluded that § 1589 is not limited 

to cases of overt human trafficking. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s denial of 

CoreCivic’s motion to dismiss Appellees’ complaint, and hold that the TVPA 

applies to private for-profit contractors operating federal immigration detention 

facilities. We express no opinion on the question of whether the factual allegations

in Appellees’ complaint, taken as true, are sufficient to establish a violation of the 

TVPA.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 24 of 24