U.S. NAVY NWP 3-15

U.S. MARINE CORPS MCWP 3-3.1.2

MINE WARFARE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND

HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS

1 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

PCN 143 000008 00

0411LP0004120

3 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

August 1996

PUBLICATION NOTICE

1. NWP 3-15/MCWP 3-3.1.2 MINE WARFARE, is available in the Naval Warfare Publications

Library. It is effective upon receipt.

2. Summary: NWP 3-15/MCWP 3-3.1.2 contains information on Mine Warfare for the battle group

or squadron commander and staff. It is intended to bridge the gap between NDP 3, Naval Operations, and the NWP 3-15 (formerly NWP 27 series) Mine Warfare publications.

5 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

ROUTING

Naval Warfare Publications Custodian

Naval warfare publications must be made readily

available to all users and other interested personnel

within the U.S. Navy.

Note to Naval Warfare Publications Custodian

This notice should be duplicated for routing to cognizant personnel in accordance with NWP 1-01.

Mine Warfare

CONTENTS

Page

No.

CHAPTER 1 — GENERAL CONCEPTS

1.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

1.2 KEY DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

1.2.1 Mine Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

1.2.2 Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

1.2.3 Mine Countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

1.3 MINE WARFARE FORCE ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

1.3.1 Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

1.3.2 Mine Countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

1.3.3 Naval Reserve Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

1.4 NATO/ALLIED COALITION AND COOPERATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

1.4.1 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

1.4.2 Non-NATO Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

1.4.3 Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

1.4.4 Support Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

1.5 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF MIW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

1.5.1 Hague Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

1.5.2 Other Legal Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

1.6 MINE WARFARE/POLITICAL INTERFACE (Intelligence and Warnings). . . . . . . . . . 1-8

1.6.1 Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

1.6.2 Movement of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

1.6.3 Delay Arming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

1.7 MINE WARFARE INTERFACE WITH OTHER WARFARE SPECIALTIES . . . . . . . . 1-8

1.7.1 Mine Warfare Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

1.7.2 Strike Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

1.7.3 Special Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

1.7.4 Surface Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

1.7.5 Antisubmarine Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

1.7.6 Antiair Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

1.7.7 Amphibious Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

1.7.8 Maritime Interdiction Operations/Law Enforcement Operations................ 1-10

1.7.9 Salvage Forces ......................................... 1-10

1.7.10 Command and Control Warfare ................................ 1-10

1.7.11 Fleet Exercises ......................................... 1-10

1.8 MINE WARFARE/JOINT INTERFACE. ........................... 1-10

1.8.1 Army - Navy .......................................... 1-10

7 ORIGINAL
1.8.2 Air Force - Navy ........................................ 1-11

1.8.3 Marine Corps - Navy ...................................... 1-11

1.8.4 Coast Guard - Navy ....................................... 1-11

1.9 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.................................. 1-11

1.9.1 Reconnaissance ......................................... 1-12

1.9.2 NATO/Allied ROE Interface .................................. 1-12

1.9.3 ROE Interface with Warfare Specialties Supporting Mine Warfare Forces. .......... 1-12

CHAPTER 2 — MINING

2.1 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MINING OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

2.1.1 Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

2.1.2 Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

2.2 MINE CLASSIFICATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

2.2.1 Final Position in the Water. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

2.2.2 Method of Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

2.2.3 Method of Actuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

2.3 COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURE FEATURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

2.3.1 Ship Counter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

2.3.2 Probability Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

2.3.3 Delay Arm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

2.3.4 Delay Rise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

2.3.5 Interlook Dormant Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

2.3.6 Intercount Dormant Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

2.3.7 Live Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

2.3.8 Dummy Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

2.3.9 Obstructers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

2.3.10 Anechoic Coating/Camouflage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

2.3.11 Nonsympathetic Detonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.3.12 Antisweeper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.3.13 Antirecovery, Self-Destruct, and Antistripping Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.4 MINE DAMAGE TO SHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.4.1 Contact Mine Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.4.2 Noncontact Mine Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.5 U.S. NAVY/ALLIED MINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

2.5.1 U.S. Navy Service Mines and Mine Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

2.5.2 Exercise and Training Mines .................................. 2-11

2.5.3 Future Mine Potentials ..................................... 2-11

2.5.4 Mine Storage, Preparation, and Transportation......................... 2-11

2.5.5 Minefield Planning Process/Procedures ............................ 2-12

2.5.6 Computer Programs in Use ................................... 2-14

2.6 U.S./ALLIED MINELAYING ASSETS ............................ 2-15

2.6.1 Air Delivery........................................... 2-15

ORIGINAL 8

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No.
2.6.2 Submarine Delivery....................................... 2-16

2.6.3 Surface Delivery ........................................ 2-16

2.7 IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENT ON MINING......................... 2-17

2.7.1 Water Depth........................................... 2-17

2.7.2 Winds .............................................. 2-17

2.7.3 Seas and Swells ......................................... 2-17

2.7.4 Sea Ice.............................................. 2-17

2.7.5 Tides .............................................. 2-17

2.7.6 Currents ............................................. 2-17

2.7.7 Seawater Temperature ..................................... 2-17

2.7.8 Water Transparency....................................... 2-17

2.7.9 Marine Life ........................................... 2-17

2.7.10 Bottom Conditions ....................................... 2-18

2.7.11 Magnetic Environment ..................................... 2-18

CHAPTER 3 — MINE COUNTERMEASURES

3.1 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.2 OFFENSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.2.1 Offensive Mine Countermeasures by Strike Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.2.2 Mining as an Offensive MINE COUNTERMEASURES Tactic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

3.3 DEFENSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

3.4 PASSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

3.4.1 Locating the Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

3.4.2 Localizing the Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

3.4.3 Reducing the Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

3.5 ACTIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

3.5.1 Mine Hunting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

3.5.2 Mechanical Minesweeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

3.5.3 Influence Minesweeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

3.5.4 Mine Neutralization....................................... 3-14

3.5.5 Mine Exploitation ........................................ 3-15

3.5.6 Brute Force Mine Clearance .................................. 3-15

3.6 INTEGRATED MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS ............... 3-16

3.7 COMBINED MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS ................ 3-16

3.7.1 Primary NATO/Allied Mine Countermeasures Assets ..................... 3-17

3.7.2 Other Mine Countermeasures Forces.............................. 3-19

3.8 AMPHIBIOUS MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS ............... 3-21

3.9 SUBMARINE MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS ............... 3-22

3.10 RIVERINE MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS ................. 3-22

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No.
3.11 DEPLOYMENT OF MINE COUNTERMEASURES FORCES ............... 3-23

3.11.1 Surface Mine Countermeasures Forces............................. 3-23

3.11.2 Airborne Mine Countermeasures Forces ............................ 3-24

3.11.3 Underwater Mine Countermeasures Forces .......................... 3-25

3.11.4 Mine Countermeasures Staff .................................. 3-37

3.12 INTERFACE WITH THE ENVIRONMENT ......................... 3-28

3.12.1 General/Introduction ...................................... 3-28

3.12.2 Environmental Factors ..................................... 3-28

3.12.3 Environmental Effects on Mine Warfare Weapons, Systems, and Decisions ......... 3-28

3.12.4 Environmental Data Collection ................................. 3-32

3.13 MINE COUNTERMEASURES FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL .......... 3-34

3.13.1 Concept of Operations ..................................... 3-34

3.13.2 Mine Countermeasures Staff Organization ........................... 3-35

3.13.3 The Mine Countermeasures Command Center ......................... 3-35

3.13.4 Mine Warfare C4I Systems ................................... 3-36

3.13.5 Mine Countermeasures Planning ................................ 3-36

3.13.6 Mine Countermeasures Exercises................................ 3-37

3.13.7 Mine Countermeasures Exercise Analysis ........................... 3-37

CHAPTER 4 — MINE COUNTERMEASURES FOR NON-MINE COUNTERMEASURES SHIPS

4.1 CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

4.1.1 Detect and Avoid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

4.1.2 Use of the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

4.1.3 Organic Mine Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

4.1.4 In-Stride Mine Countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

4.2 SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

4.2.1 Battle Group Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

4.2.2 Moored or Drifting Mine Self-Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

4.2.3 Electromagnetic Self-Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

4.2.4 Acoustic Self-Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

4.2.5 Seismic Self-Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

4.2.6 Pressure Self-Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

4.3 TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

4.3.1 Ship’s Self-Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

4.3.2 Drifting/Contact Mine Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

4.3.3 Moored Mine Tactics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

4.3.4 Magnetic Mine Tactics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

4.3.5 Acoustic/Seismic Mine Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

4.3.6 Pressure Mine Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

4.3.7 Group’s Self-Protection Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

4.3.8 Preplanned Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

4.3.9 Mine Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

4.4 PASSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES FOR SUBMARINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

ORIGINAL 10

Page

No.
APPENDIX A — MINE WARFARE TERMINOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

APPENDIX B — MINE WARFARE PROGRAM AND SUPPORT ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . B-1

APPENDIX C — MINE WARFARE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

APPENDIX D — U.S. MINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1

APPENDIX E — MINE WARFARE REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1

INDEX .................................................... Index-1

11 ORIGINAL

Page

No.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

No.

CHAPTER 1 — GENERAL CONCEPTS

Figure 1-1 Mine Storage and Preparation Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

Figure 1-2 Mine Countermeasures Operational Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

CHAPTER 2 — MINING

Figure 2-1 Environmental Considerations in Mining ........................ 2-18

CHAPTER 3 — MINE COUNTERMEASURES

Figure 3-1 Mine Countermeasures Family Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Figure 3-2 Localization of Threat by Q-Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Figure 3-3 AN/SQQ-32 Minehunting Sonar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

Figure 3-4 MH-53E with AN/AQS-14 Sonar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

Figure 3-5 AN/SLQ-38 Mechanical Sweep ............................. 3-10

Figure 3-6 A/N37-U Controlled Depth Sweep/AN/SLQ-53 Single Ship

Deep Sweep ....................................... 3-11

Figure 3-7 AN/SLQ-37 Combination Influence Sweep ....................... 3-12

Figure 3-8 MH-53E with Mk-105 Magnetic Minesweeping System ................ 3-13

Figure 3-9 Other Mine Countermeasures Assets .......................... 3-20

Figure 3-10 Environmental Considerations in Mine Countermeasures................ 3-29

CHAPTER 4 — MINE COUNTERMEASURES FOR NON-MINE

COUNTERMEASURES SHIPS

Figure 4-1 U.S. Navy Magnetic Silencing Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

APPENDIX B — MINE WARFARE PROGRAM AND SUPPORT

ORGANIZATION

Figure B-1 Mine Warfare Program Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-2

ORIGINAL 12
RECORD OF CHANGES

Change No. and

Date of Change Date of Entry Page Count Verifiedby (Signature)

13 ORIGINAL
RECORD OF CHANGES

Change No. and

Date of Change Date of Entry Page Count Verifiedby (Signature)

ORIGINAL 14
List of Acronyms/Abbreviations

A

AAW. Antiair warfare

ACMPM. Analytic Countered Minefield Planning

Model

ADCON. Administrative control

AFV. Armored fighting vehicle

AG. Armament groups

AHP. Allied navigation publication

AIMD. Aircraft intermediate maintenance department

AMC. Air Mobility Command

AMCM. Airborne mine countermeasures

AMW. Amphibious Warfare

AOA. Amphibious operations area

ARG. Amphibious ready group

ASD. Area Search Detachment

ASUW. Antisurface warfare

ASW. Antisubmarine warfare

ASWC. Antisubmarine warfare commander

ATF. Amphibious task force

ATP. Allied tactical publication

B

BF. Battle force

BFTT. Battle force tactical training

BT. Bathythermograph

C

CAPTOR. EnCAPsulated TORpedo

CATF. Commander amphibious task force

CCM. Counter countermeasure

CD-ROM. Compact disc-read only memory

CIC. Combat information center

CINC. Commander in chief

CINCLANT FLT. Commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic

fleet

CINCPACFLT. Commander in chief U.S. Pacific fleet.

CINCUSNAVEUR. Commander in chief U.S. Naval

forces, Europe

CLF. Commander landing force

CMPM. Countered minefield planning model

COASTSYSTA. coastal systems stations

COMINEWARCOM. Commander, Mine Warfare

Command

COMOMAG. Commander Mobile Mine Assembly

Group

COMSUBDEVRON. Commander, Submarine Development Squadron

COMUSMARDEZLANT. Commander, U.S. Maritime

Defense Zone, Atlantic

COMUSMARDEZPAC. Commander, U.S. Maritime

Defense Zone, Pacific

CONUS. Continental United States

COOP. Craft of opportunity

CRRC. Combat rubber raiding craft

CTDA. Commander’s Tactical Decision Aid

CUDIX. Common user digital information exchange

CV. Aircraft carrier

15 ORIGINAL
CVBG. Aircraft carrier battle group

CWC. Composite warfare commander

C2W. Command and control warfare

C4I. Command, control, communications, computers,

and intelligence

D

DAMA. Demand assigned multiple access

DEA. Defense exchange agreement

DELTAC. Delivery tactic

DEU. Diver evaluation unit

DIA. Defense Intelligence Agency

DMS. Deep moored sweep

DST. Destructor

E

EMI. Electromagnetic interference

ENWGS. Enhanced naval wargaming system

EOD. Explosive ordnance disposal

EODMCM. Explosive ordnance disposal mine

countermeasures

EODMU. Explosive ordnance disposal mobile unit

ET. Exercise and training

F

FADL. Fly away diving locker

FAMP. Forward area minefield planner

FARC. Fly away recompression chamber

FASCAM. Family of scatterable mines

FLTCINC. Fleet commander in chief

FMWC. Fleet Mine Warfare Center

FPB. Fast patrol boat

FSMTP. Fleet service mine test program

FSU. Fleet support unit

G

GPS. Global positioning system

GRP. Glass reinforced plastic

H

HF. High frequency

I

ICDP. Intercount dormant period

IDMS. Improved deep moored sweep

IEG. Information exchange groups

ILDP. Interlook dormant period

IOC. Initial operational capability

ISIC. Immediate senior in command

IWDM. Intermediate water depth mine

J

JMCIS. Joint Maritime Command Information

System

L

LCAC. Landing craft air cushion

LOS. Line of sight

LP. Live period

LSM. Littoral sea mine

LSS. Life support skid

M

MARDEZ. Maritime defense zone

MCAC. Multipurpose craft air cushion

MCD. Mobile communications detachment

ORIGINAL 16
MCCDC. Marine Corps Combat Development

Command

MCM. Mine countermeasures

MCMTA. MCM tasking authority

MCMV. Mine countermeasures vehicle

MCS. Mine countermeasures command and support

ship

MDA. Mine danger area

MEDAL. Mine Warfare Environmental Decision

Aids Library

MEDEVAC. Medical evacuation

MFPF. Minefield planning folder

MHC. Mine hunter coastal

MICFAC. Mobile integrated command facility

MIO/LEO. Maritime interdiction operations/law

enforcement operations

MILC. Minelike contact

MILVAN. Military owned demountable container

MIUW. Mobile inshore underwater warfare

MIW. Mine warfare

MIWC. Mine warfare coordinator

MMF. Mobile maintenance facility

MMS. Marine mammal system

MNS. Mine neutralization system

MNV. Mine neutralization vehicle

MOE. Measure of effectiveness

MOGAS. Motor gasoline

MOMAG. Mobile mine assembly group

MOP. Magnetic orange pipe

MPA. Maritime patrol aircraft

MPO. Minefield performance objective

MPSRON. Maritime Pre-positioning Squadron

MRCI. Mine warfare readiness certification

inspection

MRN. Mine reference number

MSB. Minesweeper boat

MSC. Minesweeper coastal

MSF. Magnetic silencing facility

MSI. Min sweeper inshore

MSO. Minesweeper ocean

MSS. Mine search squadron

MSU. Mine search unit

MWES. Mine warfare environmental survey

MWWP. Mine warfare working party

N

NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVIPO. Navy International Programs Office

NAVOCEANO. Naval Oceanographic Office

NAVSPECWAR. Navy Special Warfare Command

NCA. National Command Authorities

NDC. Naval Doctrine Command

NMIC. National Maritime Intelligence Center

NOD. Night observation device

NOMBO. Nonminelike bottom object

NRF. Naval Reserve Force

NSAP. Navy Science Assistance Program

NSW. Navy special warfare

NTIC. Navy Tactical Information Compendium

NUWC. Naval Underwater Warfare Center

17 ORIGINAL
O

OCD. Ordnance clearance detachment

ONR. Office of Naval Research

OOD. Officer of the deck

OPAREA. Operations area

OPCON. Operational control

OPDEC. Operational deception

OPLAN. Operation plan

OPSEC. Operations security

OPTASK. Operational tasking message

OPTEVFOR. Operational Test and Evaluation Force

OTC. Officer in tactical command

OTCIXS. Officer in tactical command information

exchange system

P

PAC. Probability actuation circuit

PEO MINEWAR. Program Executive Officer, Mine

Warfare

PERSTEMPO. Personnel tempo of operations

PG. Project group

PINS. Precise Integrated Navigation System

PMO. Program management office

PMS. Planned maintenance system

PMT. Performance Monitoring Team

R

RDT&E. Research, development, test and evaluation

RECO. Remote control

RHIB. Rigid hull inflatable boat

ROE. Rules of engagement

RO/RO. Roll on/roll off

ROV. Remotely operated vehicle

RSP. Render safe procedure

S

SACLANT. Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

SAM. Self-propelled acoustic magnetic vehicle

SAR. Search and rescue

SATCOM. Satellite communications

SEAL. Sea air land (Navy Special Warfare force

nickname)

SIMA. Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity

SLMM. Submarine launched mobile mine

SLOC. Sea line of communication

SMCM. Surface mine countermeasures

SMCMV. Surface mine countermeasures vehicle

SOA. Speed of advance

STW. Strike warfare

STWC. Strike warfare commander

SUW. Surface warfare

SW. Shallow water

SWDG. Surface warfare development group

SWMCM. Shallow-water mine countermeasures

SZ. Surf zone

T

TACMEMO. Tactical memorandum

TARLOC. Target localization

TAMPS. Tactical aircraft mission planning system

TARPS. Tactical air reconnaissance pod system

TDD. Target detecting device

ORIGINAL 18
TGO. Tactical group ORESTES

TLAM. Tomahawk land attack missile

TPFDD. Time Phased Force Deployment Data

TPFDL. Time Phased Force Deployment List

U

UBA. Underwater breathing apparatus

UEP. Underwater electric potential

UHF. Ultra high frequency

UMCM. Underwater mine countermeasures

UMPM. Uncountered minefield planning model

V

VDS. Variable depth sonar

VEMS. Versatile exercise mine system

VHF. Very high frequency

VLCC. Very large crude carrier

VMFI. Visual mine firing indicator

VSW. Very shallow water

19 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

PREFACE

NWP 3-15/MCWP 3-3.1.2 Mine Warfare, has been

brought into existence to give a broad command overview of Mine Warfare and to provide a link to other

documents critical to the understanding and planning

processes.

Throughout this publication, references to other

publications imply the effective edition.

Report any page shortage by letter to Commander,

Navy Warfare Development Command.

ORDERING DATA

Order a new publication or change, as appropriate,

through the Navy Supply System.

Changes to the distribution and allowance lists (to add

or delete your command from the distribution list, or to

modify the number of copies of a publication that you receive) must be made in accordance with NTTP 1-01.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES

Recommended changes to this publication may be

submitted at any time using the accompanying format

for routine changes.

Atlantic and Pacific fleet units and stations and all

other units and CONUS shore activities submit recommendations to:

COMMANDER MINE WARFARE COMMAND

325 FIFTH STREET SE

CORPUS CHRISTI TX 78419-5032

U.S. Marine Corps Unit submit recommendations

to:

COMMANDING GENERAL (WF06)

MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT

COMMAND

QUANTICO VA 22134-5001

In addition, forward two copies of all recommendations to:

COMMANDER

NAVWARDEVCOM

686 CUSHING RD

NEWPORT RI 02841-1207

URGENT CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS

When items for changes are considered to be urgent

(as defined in NTTP 1-01, and including matters of

safety), this information shall be sent by message (see

accompanying sample message format) to PRA, with

information copies to Navy Warfare Development

Command, and all other commands concerned, clearly

explaining the proposed change. Information addressees should comment as appropriate. See NTTP 1-01.

CHANGE SYMBOLS

Revised text in changes is indicated by a black vertical line in either margin of the page, like the one printed

next to this paragraph. The change symbol shows

where there has been a change. The change might be

material added or information restated. A change symbol in the margin by the chapter number and title indicates a new or completely revised chapter.

21 ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 22

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RECOMMENDED

CHANGE TO: ______________________________________________________ DATE: _____________

(PUBLICATION NUMBER / REVISION / CHANGE)

LOCATION: _____________ ____________ ____________ ____________

(PAGE) (PARA) (LINE) (FIG. NO.)

TYPE OF CHANGE: ADD_____ DELETE_____ MODIFY_____ TEXT _____ FIGURE _____

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ROUGH SKETCH OR IDENTIFY SOURCE. IF FIGURE IS TO BE CHANGED, INCLUDE A MARKED UP COPY OF EXISTING FIGURE.

RATIONALE:

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FM ORIGINATOR

TO COMINEWARCOM CORPUS CHRISTI TX

INFO COMNAVWARDEVCOM NEWPORT RI//N5//

BT

CLASSIFICATION//N03510//

MSGID/GENADMIN/(As required)//

SUBJ/URGENT CHANGE RECOMMENDATION FOR NWP 3-15/MCWP 3-3.1.2 //

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MCWP 3-3.1.2

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3. PROPOSED NEW TEXT (Include classification)

4. JUSTIFICATION.//

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Message provided for subject matter; ensure that actual message conforms to MTF requirements.

CHAPTER 1

General Concepts

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This publication has been brought into existence to

give a broad command overview of Mine Warfare and

to provide a link to other documents critical to the understanding and planning processes. Its ultimate purpose, therefore, is to play a supporting role in keeping

the Mine Warfare lessons learned truly learned. It may

thereby aid in the avoidance of such unfortunate tactical situations as befell USS PRINCETON (CG 59),

USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10), and USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (FFG 58). In future naval engagements with an

enemy, especially in joint littoral warfare, mines are

certain to play an important role. It is imperative to

minimize the potential loss of human life and warships

and to enhance the smooth integration, coordination,

and effectiveness of the mine warfighting element to

support overall military force and political objectives.

Since the invention of the Bushnell Keg in 1776,

mine warfare has been an important element of naval

warfare. The use of mines and countermeasures to

mines has figured significantly in every major armed

conflict and nearly every regional conflict in which the

United States has been involved since the Revolutionary War. Mine warfare has been increasingly important

and effective since World War I. Mines presently on

the world arms markets are relatively inexpensive, easy

to procure, reliable and effective, and difficult for intelligence agencies to track. The mine, as a weapon system, has an extremely favorable investment return (cost

of mine to cost of damage ratio) for the miner.

Despite the logic and effectiveness of maintaining

the mine element of war at sea on an even footing with

the other naval warfighting specialties, throughout its

history, the U.S. Navy has devoted proportionally

fewer resources to mine warfare. As a result, despite the

emergence of the U.S. Navy as the world’s premier

maritime power whose individual warfighting capabilities generally are superior to those of other navies, its

mine countermeasure capabilities have lagged behind.

The old adage that those who will not learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them has persistently applied to the mine warfare aspect of the U.S.

Navy. North Arabian Gulf operations of the U.S. Navy

in Desert Storm contain some bitter experiences, including the mission-aborting mine strikes to two major

warships, as well as the controversy over the decision

not to land U.S. Marines in Kuwait. Despite the unfortunate nature of the initial Desert Storm experience and

the need to recapture expertise in MCM, the U.S. Navy

and Allied navies did have substantial success in countering the nearly 1,300 naval mines deployed by the

Iraqis and emerged victorious in the MCM element of

Desert Storm warfighting as in the other aspects of that

war.

This positive conclusion to the mine clearance campaign in the North Arabian Gulf was because of the unparalleled material and logistics support from the

Department of the Navy’s shore establishment and the

cooperation of many allied nations in the coalition effort. In addition to national support and multinational

cooperation, the enabling elements of this success were

the ability of the American Bluejacket to learn and

adapt quickly, combined with good tactical command

in the fields. Of special note is that as the course of the

mine clearance campaign progressed, the Naval Component Command leadership came to understand, appreciate, and support the complex warfighting nature of

mine clearance operations.

1.2 KEY DEFINITIONS

Mine warfare uses many terms that, although they

may appear in other warfare areas, carry different or

more specific definitions when applied to mine warfare. Additionally, there are terms used by Allied mine

warfare forces that seem similar to U.S. terms but that

differ to some extent. Allied or coalition force operations can be far more difficult when the forces and commanders are not able to communicate freely because of

the misunderstandings caused by different terminology.

Therefore, it is important for the commander to become

familiar with the various terms that may be employed

when discussing and planning mine warfare operations.

1-1 ORIGINAL
Appendix A contains terminology used in mine warfare

that is not defined in Joint Pub 1-02 or NWP 1-02.

1.2.1 Mine Warfare. MIW is defined as the strategic

and tactical use of sea mines and their countermeasures.

It includes all available offensive, defensive, and protective measures for both laying and countering sea mines.

As such, it encompasses the fields of designing, producing, and laying mines, as well as the parallel efforts of

designing, producing, and operating all forms of MCM

equipment to combat the enemy’s mining campaign.

1.2.2 Mining. Mining is one of the two distinct subdivisions of mine warfare. Mining operations are used

to support the broad task of establishing and maintaining control of essential sea areas, and they embrace all

methods whereby naval mines are used to inflict damage on enemy shipping and/or hinder, disrupt, and deny

enemy sea operations. Mines may be employed either

offensively or defensively to restrict the movement of

surface ships, submarines, and underwater systems and

personnel. Mines can be used alone to deny free access to

and from ports, harbors, and rivers, as well as movement

through SLOCs, and they can be used as a force multiplier

to augment other military assets to reduce the enemy surface and submarine threat. A mining campaign is intended

to inflict damage on enemy ships that challenge the minefield, thereby having an adverse effect on their defense,

offensive operations, and logistics support efforts, but it

can also force the enemy into conducting a heavy MCM

effort that may exceed the magnitude of the mining operation itself. Enemy ships kept at their base or deterred in

transit by mining may be rendered as ineffective for the

immediate war efforts as if they were otherwise sunk or

destroyed. Further, delays in shipping may be as costly to

the enemy as actual losses. The threat posed by a minefield may be real or it may only be perceived, but mining

does have a significant psychological impact on the enemy by forcing him to combat an unseen force.

1.2.3 Mine Countermeasures. MCM is the other

distinct subdivision of mine warfare, and it includes all

offensive and defensive measures for countering a

mine threat, including the prevention of enemy

minelaying. MCM is considered to be any action that is

taken to counter the effectiveness of and/or reduce the

probability of damage to surface ships or submarines

from underwater mines.

1.3 MINE WARFARE FORCE ORGANIZATION

This section describes the operating forces for mining

and MCM in the U.S. Navy. However, as the Service is

downsized, this organization will undergo a process of

consolidation and change that may result in variation

from the organization as described. Complementary to

the following description of operating forces, Appendix B provides a discussion of the program management organization responsible for establishment of

requirements, budget, and program plans associated

with staffing, training, and maintenance for MIW ships,

aircraft, and systems. Appendix B also describes the

training and technical support organization, which performs a critical role in enabling MIW forces to operate

successfully.

CINCLANTFLT is the administrative and operational commander for the MIW forces. When MCM

support is required by other fleet commanders,

CINCLANTFLT directs COMINEWARCOM to provide forces as necessary.

CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR each have operational control over mobile

mine assembly group units or detachments and the

mine stocks located in their areas of responsibility.

COMINEWARCOM is responsible to CINCLANTFLT for the training, tactics, interoperability, and readiness of MIW forces. These forces are required to be

prepared to deploy on short notice with sufficient force

levels and capabilities to support two major regional

contingency operations in any combatant commander’s

area of responsibility.

COMINEWARCOM is also assigned as technical

adviser to CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, and SACLANT and provides technical advice to NATO and Allied countries when directed.

1.3.1 Mining. The COMINEWARCOM Staff conducts minefield planning and prepares MFPF as requested by naval component commanders. MFPF may

contain numerous possible minefields that a commander may select according to the intended purpose of

the minelaying operation.

COMINEWARCOM also advises naval component

commanders on the requirements for prepositioned mine

stocks to execute approved MFPF and recommends redistribution of mine stocks as necessary when new plans

are developed or variations in the stockpile occur.

Tactical minefield planners are those personnel on

numbered fleet staffs, battle group staffs, and air wing

staffs who may tailor plans from a MFPF to fit the specific mission needs of a commander or may generate

new minefield plans where no appropriate plan is available in a MFPF. These personnel are not dedicated planners, but they have been trained by attending necessary

ORIGINAL 1-2
courses at the Fleet Mine Warfare Training Center and

they perform planning as a collateral duty.

COMOMAG is under the operational and administrative control of COMINEWARCOM but also reports

for additional duty to CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR. COMOMAG is responsible for maintaining the highest standards of mine

material readiness and, when directed by the appropriate war plan execution authority, assembling and completing final preparation of service mines.

In performance of this mission, COMOMAG maintains permanently staffed Mobile Mine Assembly

group units and detachments at mine storage sites

around the world (see Figure 1-1) who monitor readiness of mine stocks, prepare mines for shipment, and

conduct assembly and final preparation of mines. Mobile teams from these sites are capable of rapid deployment to afloat units or other mine sites when necessary

to support mining operations. CINCLANTFLT,

CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR have operational control of the MOMAG units and detachments in

their area of operations, whereas administrative control

belongs to COMOMAG.

There are no dedicated mining assets in the U.S.

Navy. (A limited capability for surface laying of mines

is described in Chapter 2.) A minelaying mission is assigned to several types of Navy aircraft and some submarines. Some Air Force B-52s are also capable of

mine laying. For a breakdown of aircraft and submarine

types and capabilities, refer to Chapter 2.

A limited mine recovery capability exists in

Charleston, SC, under the command of EOD Mobile

Unit Six. This capability is specifically intended to support recovery of exercise and training mines at the

Charleston OPAREA Mine Range. This range is one of

only two locations on the east coast where minelaying

training and certification can be performed. The other

location is in the Puerto Rico OPAREA, where recovery is supported by assets from the Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, augmented by EOD

detachments from EODGRU TWO. In the Pacific

Fleet, ET mine location, scoring, and recovery services

are provided at the Pacific Missile Test Center Range

by detachments assigned to EODMU THREE. Detachment Point Mugu has primary responsibility and is augmented by a Mk 5 MMS detachment. In addition to the

location and tethering for recovery of ET mines configured for MMS, the Mk 5 MMS detachment has the capability to conduct similar missions to a depth of 500

feet at remote sites throughout the Pacific. Configuration for the Mk 5 MMS involves designated attachment

points and installed 9-kHz and 37-kHz pingers. Surface

craft support and actual mine shape recovery are conducted by contracted services.

1.3.2 MCM. The COMINEWARCOM Staff conducts MCM force deployment planning, MCM operations planning and analysis, and exercise planning and

1-3 ORIGINAL

CINCUSNAVEUR

London, UK

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

ADMIN CONTROL

MOMAG UNIT 12

Misawa, Japan

MOMAG UNIT 11

Charleston, SC

MOMAG UNIT 3

Earle, NJ

COMOMAG

CHARLESTON, SC

MOMAG UNIT 14

Yorktown, VA

MOMAG UNIT 15

Kingsville, TX

MOMAG UNIT 5

Sigonella, Italy

CINCLANTFLT

Norfolk, VA

MOMAG UNIT 8

Guam

MOMAG UNIT 1

Seal Beach, CA

CINCPACFLT

Pearl Harbor, HI

MOMAG Det 7

Barbers Pt, HI

MOMAG UNIT 10

Kadena, Okinawa

Figure 1-1. Mine Storage and Preparation
analysis. Staff intelligence personnel monitor the collection and analysis of intelligence on MEW capabilities throughout the world. Staff requirements personnel

conduct liaison with type and operational commanders

and with supporting organizations to determine unfilled operational needs and prepare mission need statements for unfilled requirements.

Operations personnel, in addition to planning operations and exercises, review tactics and doctrine seeking

to maximize integration of MIW forces into fleet operations and maximize the effectiveness of MCM forces.

As shown in Figure 1-2, Commander, Regional Support Group Ingleside (additional duty of COMINEWARCOM) is assigned administrative control over

surface MCM forces, including SIMA Ingleside.

COMNAVSURFLANT is the type commander for surface MCM units, performing all type commander duties except for scheduling. The COMINEWARCOM

Staff Operations Officer maintains scheduling authority of MCM forces.

COMCMRON ONE is responsible for planning and

executing MCM exercises and operations as directed by

COMINEWARCOM. COMCMRON ONE focuses on

MCM planning for the Pacific theater, although operational assignment may be to any theater. COMCMRON

ONE is assigned operational control of MCM 1 Class

and MHC 51 Class ships as necessary for intermediate or

advanced training and for participation in exercises or

real world operations. COMCMRON ONE also has operational control over Helicopter MCM Squadron Fifteen (HM-15) and west coast EODMCM detachments

(see Figure 1-2). Administrative control of HM-15 is assigned to COMNAVAIRPAC. Administrative control

of west coast EODMCM detachments is assigned to the

parent EOD Mobile Unit under COMEODGRU ONE.

COMCMRON TWO has the same responsibilities

as COMCMRON ONE with a focus on the Atlantic and

Mediterranean theaters and is assigned operational

control of HM-14, east coast EODMCM detachments,

and MCM or MHC ships as necessary. Administrative

control of HM-14 is assigned to COMNAVAIRLANT,

and administrative control of EODMCM detachments

remains with their parent EOD Mobile Unit under

COMEODGRU TWO.

COMINEWARCOM, under COMNAVSURFLANT, has administrative control over all MHC and

MCM class ships and operational control over all

MCM and MHC class ships that have not been assigned

to one of the other squadrons.

MCM assets that have completed all basic phase

training requirements may be assigned to COMSECONDFLT or COMTHIRDFLT for participation in fleet

level exercises or support of the numbered fleet commander’s operational requirements. This assignment

will usually be made as an integrated task unit including an MCM squadron commander.

EOD is a critical aspect of modern MCM forces.

EODMCM detachments are specially trained and

equipped with nonmagnetic, low-acoustic signature

equipment that permits them to approach influence

mines safely and perform identification, destruction, or

render-safe and recovery operations.

In the Atlantic Fleet, six EOD detachments are

assigned to EODMU SIX, and two MCM detachments

are assigned to EODMU EIGHT. Additionally, there is

one EOD MMS detachment with a mine recovery mission (Mk 5) assigned to EODMU SIX. Administrative/operational control of the EODMCM detachments

at EODMU EIGHT remain with EODMU EIGHT, under COMEODGRU TWO (ADCON) and CINCUSNAVEUR (OPCON). Other Atlantic Fleet EODMCM

and EOD MMS detachments ADCON remain with

their parent mobile units, and OPCON is assigned to

COMINEWARCOM. In the Pacific Fleet, two EODMCM detachments each are assigned to EODMU

ELEVEN and EODMU FIVE, and three EODMCM

detachments are assigned to EODMU THREE. Additionally, there are two EOD MMS detachments (Mk 4 and

Mk 7) with MCM missions assigned to EODMU THREE.

Administrative/operational control of the EODMCM detachments at EODMU FIVE remain with EODMU FIVE,

under COMEODGRU ONE (ADCON) and CTF-76

(OPCON). Other Pacific Fleet EODMCM and EOD MMS

detachments ADCON remain with their parent mobile

units and OPCON is assigned to COMINEWARCOM.

NSW forces are responsible for conducting MCM in

the VSW/SZ) regions in support of amphibious operations. NSW forces are not routinely included within the

MCM force chain of command. When an ATF is assembled, the NSW forces assigned to the CATF will include

SEAL teams capable of conducting the VSW/SZ MCM

mission. SEAL teams maintain one platoon trained in

conducting VSW/SZ MCM and capable of integrating

with other team members to execute the MCM mission.

The Commanders, MARDEZ Atlantic and Pacific are

responsible for MIW planning within the MARDEZ.

MARDEZ sector and subsector commanders participate

in preparation of MIW plans and monitor MCM operations but do not have permanently assigned MIW assets.

In wartime, COMSECONDFLT or COMTHIRDFLT

ORIGINAL 1-4
1-5 ORIGINAL

REGSUPPGRU INGLESIDE

*COMINEWARCOM

COMNAVSURFLANT

MCM 1 (NRF)

MCM 2 (NRF)

MCM 3

MCM 4

MCM 5

MCM 6

MCM 7

MCM 8

MCM 9

MCM 10

MCM 11

MCM 12

MCM 13

MCM 14

MHC 51

MHC 52 (NRF)

MHC 53 (NRF)

MHC 54 (NRF)

MHC 55 (NRF)

MHC 56 (NRF)

MHC 57 (NRF)

MHC 58 (NRF)

MHC 59 (NRF)

MHC 60 (NRF)

MHC 61 (NRF)

MHC 62 (NRF)

SIMA

INGLESIDE

MCS 12

(NRF)

MINESEARCHRON 1 (NRF)

SAM

DET

CINCLANTFLT CINCPACFLT

(MCM SUPPORT

AS REQUIRED)

COMINEWARCOM

COMCMRON 1 COMCMRON 2

SHIPS

AS ASSIGNED

**HELMINERON 15

***EODMU 3

3 MCM DETS

2 MMS DET

***EODMU 11

3 MCM DETS

***EODMU 6

6 MCM DETS

**HELMINERON 14

*

**

***

COMINEWARCOM reports to CINCLANTFLT but also serves as

COMREGSUPPGRU Ingleside. SMCM scheduling authority is

COMINEWARCOM N3.

ADCON for HM-14 and HM-15 is COMNAVAIRLANT/PAC

ADCON for EOD Dets is COMEODGRU 1 or 2 via parent EODMU

SHIPS

AS ASSIGNED

OPERATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE

Figure 1-2. MCM Operational Forces
will delegate control of mining or MCM forces as necessary (and if available) to support the MARDEZ

commanders.

1.3.3 Naval Reserve Forces. NRFs have played

an important role in MIW for many years. From the

early 1970s until the end of the 1980s, the majority of

the SMCM force was assigned to the NRF. Due largely

to the role of mines in the Iran-Iraq War and Operation

Earnest Will, as the MCM 1 Class ships replaced

MSOs, they have remained in the active force. The

MHC 51 Class was designated to be commissioned in

the active force and transfer after 1 year to NRF status

to maintain an active-reserve mix. As of October 1994,

the planned active-reserve mix of ships is 10 active to 4

NRF MCM 1 Class ships and 1 active to 11 NRF MHC

51 Class ships. Additionally, the MCS 12 will be assigned to NRF status when conversion is complete.

The Naval Reserve also plays a role in the AMCM

and EODMCM force. HM-14 and HM-15 each have a

reserve component of pilots and maintenance personnel. Of the 12 aircraft assigned to each squadron, 6 belong to the active squadron and 6 belong to the NRF

organization. NRF EOD forces are composed of four

reserve units: EODMU TEN and EODMU TWELVE

under COMEODGRU TWO, and EODMU SEVEN

and EODMU SEVENTEEN under COMEODGRU

ONE. Each reserve unit trains and provides administrative support for three different types of detachment:

OCDs are fully qualified in diving and demolition procedures and are trained to locate, identify, and dispose

of sea mines. ASDs use side-scan sonar systems to locate minelike objects underwater. MCDs provide fully

mobile communications capability in support of fleet

operations and exercises.

Another Naval Reserve program that supports MIW

is the MSS and MSU. The MSS is an administrative

staff consisting of reservists on active duty (TARs) who

manage the staffing and training of MSUs. Along with

other missions, an MSU trains in the operation of

side-scan sonar systems for mine hunting along

Q-routes or in harbor approaches where small craft can

operate. The craft used by these units may be Navy assets or commercial assets contracted for the purpose.

This program replaced the COOP in 1994.

Naval Reserve units are also used to augment the

command and control structure for MIW. COMINEWARCOM has a reserve staff detachment available for

augmentation when needed, and NRF Mine Division

Staffs have supported Mine Squadron Staffs. As the

armed forces are reduced in size, the NRF staff structure is also expected to be reduced.

1.4 NATO/ALLIED COALITION AND

COOPERATION

In almost any foreseeable MIW operation of significance, U.S. Navy MIW forces can expect to be operating

side by side with NATO and/or other Allied forces. Such

coalition type operations could even include MCM

forces of the former Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact.

1.4.1 Operations. Each of the NATO/Allied MIW

services brings its own strengths into combined operations. Whenever multinational forces operate together,

many different types of MIW vessels with varying systems and degrees of readiness will be encountered.

These may include sweepers, surface drones, hunters,

divers, AMCM helicopters, remote underwater vehicles, hull-mounted and variable depth sonars, side-scan

sonars, underwater vehicles with ahead-looking sonars,

and utility helicopters. (For a brief description of

NATO/Allied MCM assets, see paragraph 3.7.1.) If the

operation is being conducted as a NATO operation,

NATO doctrine, procedures, command structure, and

communications techniques will be used. In situations

such as the 1987-88 Operation Earnest Will in the Persian

Gulf, several nations’ MCM forces (all of whom were

members of NATO) were operating in the same area with

a common mission, but not under a combined command

structure. The forces used NATO procedures and doctrine

and resolved potential conflicts by close communications

between all nations concerned. Future multinational

MCM operations may include Partnership for Peace navies or Allies from the Pacific theater who are not members of NATO. MCM doctrine is currently being

developed in NATO that takes into account operations

with almost any free world navy. As more exercises and

real world operations that include multinational forces occur, fewer interoperability problems can be expected.

1.4.2 Non-NATO Operations. COMINEWARCOM

has made recommendations to the Navy International

Programs Office (IPO-10) on how to sanitize the NWP

3-15 (formerly NWP 27) series of MIW publications for

release to foreign nations. The sanitization instructions

are written at three different levels: NATO plus Japan

and Australia, Allied nations, and Third World nations.

NAVIPO does not automatically provide these sanitized

publications to foreign navies. A foreign government

must ask for the publications and must pay for them.

Therefore, a battle group commander who wishes to utilize these sanitized NWP 3-15 series publications to conduct Mine Warfare operations with a foreign navy must

ensure that the foreign navy requests the publications

from NAVIPO (IPO 10) or that the Battle Group Commander makes the request. In many cases, the actual

sanitization has not been done by NAVIPO. In that

ORIGINAL 1-6
case, the battle group commander may receive instruction from NAVIPO on how to sanitize the specific publications.

1.4.3 Doctrine. NATO MIW doctrine is delineated

in ATP 6 and ATP 24. This is the doctrine that all NATO

navies, including the U.S. Navy, will follow during

NATO operations or exercises. Almost every NATO nation has a national annex to ATP 24 that may contain variations in the standard doctrine or specifics on national

systems not released to all nations. U.S. national doctrine

is very similar in many ways to the NATO doctrine. The

only variations in doctrine may stem from differences in

force capabilities (e.g., availability of AMCM forces) or

different geographically driven missions. The NWP 3-15

series is the primary doctrine for U.S. Navy MCM and

mining forces. The U.S. MCM Commander must be prepared to operate exclusively within NATO doctrine and

procedures and to explain to NATO counterparts when

U.S. Navy forces will deviate or operate apart from the

NATO doctrine because of national concerns. This same

procedure is currently followed by other NATO navies

when national concerns become paramount.

1.4.4 Support Organizations. Within the NATO

organization there are working groups, planning

groups, IEGs, PGs, and AGs. Written agreements

which foster cooperative development of MIW techniques, tactics, and systems focus the combined knowledge of the participants on the shortcomings of existing

Mine Warfare systems and capabilities.

The bilateral (Belgium/The Netherlands) Mine Warfare School (Eguermin) at Oostende, Belgium, functions as a center for NATO MIW training. Eguermin is

used by U.S. forces as well and is closely linked with

U.S. MIW training facilities.

The MWWP was established to initiate, develop,

and process proposals for military standardization, including tactics, tactical instructions, and procedures in

the field of MIW. The MWWP brings Mine Warfare

participants together annually to discuss issues of common concern in mining, MCM, training, equipment,

support, command, control, and communications. This

has been a key component of the successes achieved by

NATO MIW forces, although each may have been

working under specific national directives. Currently,

the MWWP is organized with three panels: operational/tactical, technical, and exercise evaluation.

DEAs generally are bilateral diplomatic tools

whereby agreement is made to exchange certain data for

mutual military purposes. Unlike general agreements,

the DEAs are negotiated between countries or groups of

countries for specific types of information. There are

few general DEAs in existence. Frequently, newly obtained data and information can be exchanged rapidly

when a DEA is in place.

1.5 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF

MINE WARFARE

1.5.1 Hague Convention. The Hague Convention

(VIII) of 1907 probably had more of a legal impact on

MIW than any other forum. The attendees at this convention placed international restrictions on the use of

drifting mines, established various guidelines that affected automatic contact mines, and set forth requirements for the incorporation of sterilization and/or

self-destruct features in mines. The following specific

provisions were laid down by this Hague Convention:

1. Armed, unanchored mines must have a maximum life of 1 hour.

2. Armed, anchored mines must become unarmed

if they break free from their moorings.

3. Mines must be designed to become harmless

should they miss their target.

4. It is illegal to mine solely against commercial

shipping.

5. Neutral nations are not to be interfered with, and

the safe transit of neutral shipping must be

ensured.

6. Mines must be removed by the planting force at

the conclusion of hostilities.

The specific international laws set forth during the

Hague Convention remain in effect today; however,

they have not been always been adhered to by all nations, and world events have seen major deviations

from these principles. Although the United States did

not ratify the Hague Convention, we have always

abided by its restrictions and principles.

1.5.2 Other Legal Aspects. Both offensive and

defensive mining operations are considered to be acts

of war. The intent of these mining operations is to inflict damage to or restrict the transit of enemy shipping.

Protective mining conducted within a nation’s own waters is not considered an act of war as long as the necessary notifications to shipping are made through the

appropriate channels.

The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1972 prohibited

the use of mass destruction weapons that are attached to

1-7 ORIGINAL
the ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone. This

treaty applies to the use of nuclear warheads in either

bottom or moored mines since they are designed to remain in place after they are armed. U.S. policy on the

employment of naval mines is addressed in chapter 9 of

NWP 1-14 (formerly NWP 9), and in chapter 1 of

NWP 3-15.5 (formerly NWP 27-4).

1.6 MINE WARFARE/POLITICAL INTERFACE

(INTELLIGENCE AND WARNINGS)

History is well endowed with peacetime, wartime,

and low-intensity conflict MIW incidents ranging from

threat alone to large-scale mining campaigns. Appendix C provides a synopsis of MIW history to illustrate

the place of MIW in overall military-political

perspective.

The intelligence data available plays a crucial role in

determining the effectiveness of mining and MCM

planning and operations. Without knowledge of potential mining events or the MCM capability of a potential

enemy, mining and MCM planners are likely to prepare

ineffective plans that may place delivery assets, MCM

assets, or transiting commercial and naval ships at risk.

Mining and MCM planning are based on a significant

number of assumptions even in the best of situations;

therefore every effort should be made to reduce these

assumptions and protect the expenditure of critical resources. All information and data requested by a planning staff should be made available to the maximum

extent possible and as quickly as possible.

1.6.1 Threat. To the miner, knowledge of the threat

means knowing what the minelayer must face in performing his mission and knowing what MCM forces may be

used to counter the minefield. To the MCM planner,

knowledge of the threat means knowing what types of

mines were available to or used by the layer, as well as the

available operating selections of those mines. U.S. MCM

forces have no defensive ability against other threats.

The MCM commander must be able to brief military

and political authorities on the MIW threat so that they

can balance the final risks and goals against the realization

of that threat. No threat can be discounted as insignificant

to the MCM force or the transiting assets. Even primitive

weapons can bring havoc and mission- abort situations to

modern forces. The threat is always the explosive capability of the weapon without regard for the packaging.

1.6.2 Movement of Forces. An essential element

of intelligence information in MIW is movement of

forces. Consider the miner: movement of certain of his

forces may indicate pending or imminent deployment of

mines. If mines and the laying forces are not collocated,

the miner must plan the logistic support and timing to

get the mines to the minelayer, and this time can be exploited by the opposition if movement is detected.

MCM forces are typically slow transiters who require significant support to remain at sea. They are not

commonly found with a battle group unless an MCM

action is planned. Therefore, the movement of MCM

forces may be an indicator of a planned amphibious

landing or SLOC choke point penetration.

Political will must be exercised on either side in

these cases. Forward deployment of MCM forces may

be sufficient to determine or complicate and thwart a

mining plan. Early movement by miners may be sufficient to permit national authorities to justify offensive

MCM against vessels at sea or shore facilities.

1.6.3 Delay Arming. Delay arming features allow

the miner to conduct operations and leave the area prior

to the arming of weapons. This can permit actions to be

conducted prior to the acknowledged beginning of hostilities or operations. The threat may exist long before it

is recognized by conventional forces because the miner

determines when the threat becomes valid. Additionally, arming delays can and will complicate operations for the MCM forces because environmental

factors and operational factors can then require a

recommitment of critical assets to an area otherwise believed to be safe. Delay arming cannot be discounted in

any operational scenario until proof exists that no such

features were used by the opposing force.

Recent history has emphasized that the threat may be

outside of international law or convention, hence the

saying “ a mine in the water has no loyalty.”

1.7 MINE WARFARE INTERFACE WITH

OTHER WARFARE SPECIALTIES

1.7.1 Mine Warfare Coordinator. To improve

the interface between MIW and other warfare specialties, a MIWC was added to the CWC’s organization.

Following are the roles of the MIWC:

1. To act as the single point of contact for MIW

2. To provide recommendations to the CWC and

other warfare commanders and coordinators

3. To provide guidance on how MIW operations fit

into theater operations of the fleet commander.

The MIWC shall also perform the following tasks:

ORIGINAL 1-8
1. Make recommendations to assist in establishing

force disposition in the presence of a mine threat

2. Coordinate requests for all nonorganic mining

and MCM support

3. Evaluate the implications of enemy mine warfare operations and recommend appropriate

MCM operations

4. Coordinate with the ASWC on all defensive

minefield planning matters

5. Coordinate the employment of tactical air assets

in mining with the STWC

6. Ensure that mining operations are conducted in

accordance with international law

7. Designate MDAs

8. Maintain the status of all force MIW capabilities

9. Coordinate obtaining oceanographic support for

mining operations.

The MIWC maintains an OPTASK MIW Supplement to communicate general procedures and instructions to other forces inside and outside the CWC

organization as necessary.

1.7.2 Strike Warfare. STW capable aircraft are a

key element in many mining plans. The MIWC provides recommendations to the CWC for employment of

strike assets to conduct mining that will support CWC

objectives. If approved, the minelaying planning and

execution are then carried out by the STWC and Strike

Operations Department on board the CV.

STW assets are also employed in conducting offensive

MCM. Reconnaissance conducted by tactical aircraft may

identify movement of mine assets or minelayers, indicating mining is imminent. The MIWC monitors intelligence

data and provides offensive MCM targeting recommendations to the STW and CWC early in the conflict.

1.7.3 Special Operations. Special operations

forces are involved in both offensive and defensive

MCM. In certain situations, special operations forces

may be chosen to conduct raids to cripple or destroy opposition force mine storage sites and mine stocks. Their

ability to conduct small-scale raids with accuracy and

limited collateral damage may be preferred in some

cases over tactical air strikes or TLAM strikes. In the

defensive MCM role, NSW forces conduct beach reconnaissance in advance of an amphibious landing to determine whether a mine threat is present. When mines

are encountered, the NSW force is responsible for mine

clearance in the very shallow water and surf zones.

NSW forces work together with EODMCM, AMCM,

and SMCM forces to develop coordinated tactics for

conducting MCM in support of amphibious operations.

1.7.4 Surface Warfare. MCM forces interface with

ASUW forces in several ways. In situations where no

large deck MCM command ship is available, a surface

combatant may serve as the flagship for the MCM commander and provide support to surface MCMVs. Larger

ships (e.g. CGs) are well equipped as command platforms and can accommodate the MCM Commander’s

staff. ASUW forces can provide protection from various

threats to MCM forces, as well as some logistic support.

They also may be tasked to provide ASUW helicopters

to transport EOD forces and conduct spotting for mines

cut by mechanical sweep operations or drifting mines.

MCM forces conduct reconnaissance of ASUW ship operating areas when mining is suspected and, if necessary,

clear operating areas for ASUW ships to conduct patrol

operations or fire support operations.

1.7.5 Antisubmarine Warfare. ASW forces may

employ protective minefields (laid by air assets) as barriers to assist in controlling the submarine threat. The CAPTOR mine can be used alone or in conjunction with other

mines in this role. ASW forces will support the MCM

force by maintaining reconnaissance in their area of operations for minelaying assets or the existence of minefields. Some ASW sonars can also be employed for mine

detection and avoidance. They permit the ASW ship to

operate with an increased degree of safety in waters where

the mine threat has not been determined, allowing the ship

to detect moored mines and avoid transiting through a

mined area. The ASW ship’s helicopter can support

MCM forces by providing transportation to EODMCM

forces and conducting aerial surveillance.

1.7.6 Antiair Warfare. The interface between MIW

forces and AAW forces is limited to the protection role

AAW ships and aircraft perform. MCM forces, both surface and air, are not equipped for self-defense. If any

hostile air threat exists, it is necessary for AAW forces to

be assigned to counter that threat and permit MCM

forces to operate. Considering the small size of the

MCM force, even the loss of one ship or helicopter can

be critical to completion of the MCM mission.

1.7.7 Amphibious Warfare. MCM forces have

historically operated in close support of amphibious operations when conducting an opposed landing. The mine

is one of the cheapest weapons that can be employed

1-9 ORIGINAL
against an invading sea force, and the presence of

mines without a sufficient capability to counter them

can result in significant losses to the AMW force or

cancellation of landing operations.

Early, detailed requirements should be provided by

the supported commander for amphibious operations

(e.g., CATF) to the MCM Commander to facilitate

planning. MCM considerations include the size of the

AOA in comparison to the available MCM assets, slow

MCM ship transit times to the AOA, the rate of MCM

operations required to meet established deadlines, and

requirements to protect MCM operations against hostile threats (including the use of OPSEC and OPDEC).

Enemy observation of friendly MCM operations may

compromise tactical surprise. In addition to conventional MCM forces, NSW forces are employed in amphibious operations to locate, destroy, and/or neutralize

enemy barriers, obstacles, or minefields placed in or on

the shallow water approaches to the landing beaches.

Large-deck, aviation-capable amphibious ships are

frequently assigned to embark and support MCM forces

of all types. Although Marine forces are displaced, the

LPH and LPD have both been used extensively as MCM

support ships, with the MCM commander, AMCM helicopters, and EODMCM detachments embarked and providing logistic support to surface MCM vessels.

During MCM operations in support of amphibious

operations the CLF will also supply assets to be used in

the shallow water/surf zone MCM effort, such as combat engineers, tank plows, bulldozers, etc.

1.7.8 Maritime Interdiction Operations/Law

Enforcement Operations. MIO/LEO forces are

likely targets for mining and should remain alert for indications of mine laying. The use of passive MCM explained in Chapter 4 should be reviewed and employed

where appropriate. When inspecting transiting merchants, it is important to note any cargo and handling or

packing equipment that might have been used in transporting or laying mines. If mining has occurred or is expected, MIO/LEO forces should be supported by MCM

forces to establish safe operating areas, anchorages,

and transit lanes.

1.7.9 Salvage Forces. Salvage forces not engaged

in salvage operations may be called on to support MCM

forces by providing an operating platform for

EODMCM divers. Any salvage vessels that have an installed recompression chamber will be considered for

support to EOD divers who may require emergency

recompression. If an MCS is present and has an installed

recompression chamber, it may also be used to support

salvage forces. MCM forces are frequently called on to

assist in initial location of aircraft, boats, or other assets

that have been lost so that salvage forces can conduct

recovery operations. The minehunting sonars on MCM

1 and MHC 51 Class ships and the side-scan sonar used

by AMCM are excellent for locating bottom objects,

and the AN/SLQ-48 MNS can be used to make positive

identification on objects much deeper than divers can

operate.

1.7.10 Command and Control Warfare. C2W

is essentially an employer of MIW forces. The threat of

mining or the ready availability of MCM forces can be

used to influence an enemy’s command and control.

Placing a CV into position has significant impact on the

enemy’s decision-making because of the STW capability resident within the CV, including mining. In the same

manner, deployment of MCM forces or prepositioning

of MCM forces in a theater reduces the potential impact

of opposition mining and may result in a decision not to

commit a hostile mining action. Additionally, C2W may

play a part in the defense of minelaying forces by providing both early warning against opposition forces and

cover by jamming air defenses. For the MCM mission,

the primary interface is via the information flow from

C2W sensors, which might indicate mining in progress.

This information is normally channeled through the intelligence community for analysis and then passed to the

theater or battle group commander as an indicator of the

need for MCM effort.

1.7.11 Fleet Exercises. MCM forces are integrated

with battle group training exercises whenever possible.

For inport training exercises, participation may be limited

to MCM squadron staff members, either on-scene or from

a remote location. During fleet exercises, MCM forces

may participate in the scenario by transiting to the exercise operation area or by establishing a scripted geographic area near the MCMV homeport of Ingleside, TX.

The MCM staff can conduct exercises in this area and

transmit information with coordinates converted to match

the geography of the fleet exercise area. Since MCM operations frequently occur out of sight of the battle group,

this type of participation saves fuel and transit time without sacrificing significant aspects of the interface between

the MCM and the battle group.

1.8 MINE WARFARE/JOINT INTERFACE

1.8.1 Army-Navy. The Army is responsible for

conducting most mine development, minefield planning,

and MCM on land, although the Marines share some responsibility. The Navy responsibility ends at the landward limit of the craft landing zone along sea shores, but

extends inland where waters are navigable from the sea.

Where navigation is no longer possible by seagoing

vessels, Navy responsibility ends. However, when a

ORIGINAL 1-10
mining situation exists, the Joint Force Commander

will be primarily concerned with capability, not responsibility. If Navy assets are capable of conducting MCM

in a waterway where Army craft need to navigate, it is

likely they will be directed to clear the mines. The

riverine MIW operations in Vietnam are a prime

example.

The Army has a tremendous amount of material that

has to be moved to support overseas operations such as

Operation Desert Storm. The majority of this material

must be moved by sealift ships belonging or under contract to MSC. To support the rapid buildup of forces

normally desired in an overseas conflict, the loading,

transit, and unloading of these ships must follow a tight

schedule. A mining threat either in CONUS, at

chokepoints along the SLOCs, or at the offload port can

delay or completely halt the movement of material.

U.S. Navy MCM forces (and MCM forces from NATO

or Allied nations if involved) will be tasked by the Joint

Force Commander to clear channels and anchorages

and to maintain them to permit the free flow of traffic.

EODMCM forces may also be tasked to clear and assist

in maintaining safe harbors for off-loading of shipping.

1.8.2 Air Force-Navy. The Air Force plays two important roles in supporting MIW forces (in addition to

potentially supporting offensive MCM). The first role

played by Air Force assets is the laying of mines by

B-52 aircraft. The B-52 can carry the largest mine load

of any U.S. aircraft and can deliver mines at long distances from CONUS or other bases. B-52s may play a

critical role in accomplishing mining plans directed for

execution by joint commands.

The second is the Air Mobility Command’s support

of deployment of AMCM and EODMCM forces and the

continuing delivery of critical repair parts via AMC aircraft. Even in a situation where all MCM forces deploy

by surface lift, rapid delivery of critical repair parts is

crucial to maintain MCM force readiness for operations.

1.8.3 Marine Corps-Navy. The interface of Marine

Corps assets and MCM forces is to some extent the same

as that described for its interface with the Army. Rapid

deployment of USMC forces other than those already

embarked on amphibious shipping is accomplished by

airlift of the personnel to a location where they can be

united with equipment stored on MPSRON ships. In the

same manner as MSC shipping carrying Army material,

the MPSRON ships must be provided clear channels,

safe anchorages, and harbors in which to unload their

material. In some situations the MPSRON ships will join

the amphibious ships and be supported by MCM forces

to establish a landing beach and move assets ashore.

1.8.4 Coast Guard-Navy. During peacetime, the

Coast Guard is part of the Department of Transportation and yet maintains a significant degree of interface

with the Navy through the MARDEZ organization. The

Commanders, MARDEZ Atlantic and Pacific are Coast

Guard Admirals, and there are Coast Guard officers on

many Navy staffs to maintain the MARDEZ structure

and interface with the Navy. These officers usually are

graduates of MIW training courses. As the MARDEZ

mission expands into deployable port control and

coastal shipping management and control, the interface

with Navy MCM commands will increase.

Coast Guard assets are frequently involved in exercises where mining and MCM are included. Liaison

with the local Coast Guard captain of the port is necessary for loading or unloading exercise mines at Coast

Guard bases or commercial docks. Establishment of exercise minefields in areas that are not regular Navy

OPAREAs requires coordination with the local Coast

Guard command.

In the past, when the mission to conduct route surveys in all U.S. ports was active, a Coast Guard officer

was assigned to the COMINEWARCOM staff to facilitate cooperation between Coast Guard assets and Navy

survey teams. Coast Guard buoy tenders have been and

may be used to conduct survey operations in a number

of scenarios using portable side-scan sonar equipment.

They could also be used again if the route survey mission were to be reactivated.

In wartime, when the Coast Guard operates under

the Department of the Navy, route survey and support

of MCM forces conducting operations in CONUS will

likely be supported to a major degree by Coast Guard

assets.

1.9 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

ROE are directive guidance that authorize and delineate the circumstances and limitations on the use of

force. ROE are generally mission-oriented and action

specific. ROE promulgated by the Theater Commander

are based on guidance provided by the NCA through

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This guidance

reflects political, legal, operational, and diplomatic factors that may restrict combat operations. ROE are required throughout the operational continuum to ensure

compliance with the laws of war and NCA guidance.

Combatant commander pre- and post-hostility ROE

and OPLAN ROE should address authority to place obstacles and mines, including the FASCAM. Following

NCA release of these elements for operations, ROE

should address their employment by U.S. forces and the

1-11 ORIGINAL
prevention, denial, or countering of their employment

by the enemy.

1.9.1 Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance operations

to identify potential mine storage sites, minelayer movements, and restriction of traffic within national waters

present circumstances that require special ROE. For

units conducting reconnaissance in international waters, ROE will define the permissible conduct of the

unit upon encountering forces of a hostile or neutral nation. The execution of MCM reconnaissance operations

may require the MCM force to operate in proximity to

or inside an adversary’s territorial waters. ROE will be

used to specify the permissible conduct of both the

MCM force and protective forces.

1.9.2 NATO/Allied Rules of Engagement Interface. When control of a U.S. mining or MCM force or

asset is assigned to a NATO commander, it must conform to ROE established by the NATO command structure. However, there may be occasions when U.S.

forces will operate with or in support of NATO or

Allied country forces, but control will not be passed to the

NATO command. In this situation, the U.S. forces must

conform to U.S. ROE until otherwise directed by the U.S.

command authority. Ideally, in a combined or coalition

force operation or exercise, all forces will operate under

the same ROE. When this is not the case, lines of communication must be established to permit the speedy

resolution of issues that arise concerning conflict between intended operations and ROE. The most important aspect of coalition operations is that the allies

understand U.S. ROE and that the U.S. commander

knows the ROE of other nations to employ all available

assets effectively.

1.9.3 Rules of Engagement Interface with Warfare Specialties Supporting Forces. As forces

from different branches of a command structure are assigned to work in supporting roles without a change in

controlling authority, conflicts in ROE may arise.

Mining or MCM forces may not be issued a relaxation

of ROE that is approved for protecting C2W, special

operations, or STW forces. Considerable confusion can

result when two units operating together have different

ROE and are not aware of the situational differences.

For this reason, it is important to keep supporting and

supported units advised of any changes in ROE. It may

be necessary to review and compare ROE when new

forces are assigned and when missions are changed.

ORIGINAL 1-12
CHAPTER 2

Mining

2.1 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

OF MINING OPERATIONS

2.1.1 Advantages. Mining operations are distinguished from other naval operations in that minefields can inflict major, long-term damage on enemy

shipping while allowing little or no chance for retaliatory action against the minelaying forces. Mines lie

in wait for their target. Mining permits enemy shipping to be attacked without the necessity for a direct

confrontation between the delivery vehicle and the

target ship. Since the delivery vehicle does not have

to directly engage or even locate the target ship, the

smallest minelayer may indirectly destroy the most

powerful capital ships, merchantmen, or enemy submarines. Minefields are also unique in that they provide the laying forces with the possibility of setting

up a preemptive defense in which the aggressor must

take full responsibility for any casualties that it

suffers.

The mine may also offer the advantage of covertness

and surprise, with the first indication of its presence being a detonation. Even if it is not covert, mining will offer the advantage of concealment because a properly

planted mine provides no visible warning of danger and

its exact location is undetermined. Moreover, an armed

mine operates 24 hours a day. From the time the mine is

armed until it is countered or its useful life expires and

it becomes sterilized, a mine will continuously threaten

enemy ships with no need to retire for logistics support

or any other purpose.

Mines, when used in conjunction with other forces,

can serve as a force multiplier. A well-laid minefield

can be used to perform a variety of functions that would

otherwise occupy patrol or other combat forces, thus

freeing those forces for use in other warfare operations.

For example, mines can be used to reduce the number

of vessels that are required to execute an effective naval

blockade.

Early offensive mining may disrupt an enemy’s war

plans more effectively than any other naval weapon.

Mining also offers numerous complementary actions,

such as the overloading and disruption of the enemy’s

transport and logistics systems caused by the minefield’s interruption of normal port activity. The funneling of supplies, or the storing of large concentrations of

supplies in a few ports, will cause those supplies to be

more susceptible to attack by other warfare forces.

One of the most widely recognized advantages of

mining, but perhaps the one most difficult to quantify,

is the psychological effect that a minefield has. The enemy’s perception of the danger that is posed by a minefield has a large psychological impact on the forces that

must transit through it. While this is a real factor and a

definite advantage that is unique to a mine, it must be

recognized that the psychological threat is the threat

perceived by the enemy, not by the minelayer, and that

this perception may vary from nation to nation and culture to culture.

The mine may also be the only weapon of naval

warfare that offers an apparent ability to alter geography. An area that has been mined or one that has been

declared to have been mined must be avoided by transiting

forces as if it were land.

Implicit in all these advantages is the fact that the

mine may be very effective if its use is only simulated

or threatened. That is, its actual detonation may not be a

significant factor in its effectiveness.

2.1.2 Disadvantages. The primary weakness of a

mine is that it is a passive weapon that must wait for a

target instead of seeking it out and attacking it, and once

laid, a mine recognizes no friends. Unless proper precautions are maintained, a mine can threaten friendly as well

as enemy ships. Also, a mine is stationary once it has

been planted, which provides the enemy with an opportunity to detect the minefield and then either avoid it or

counter it with MCM operations. Additionally, exposure to sea water for long periods of time can cause the

mine to become materially degraded through either biological fouling and/or corrosion, and the temperature of

the water can adversely affect the life of the mine’s batteries. Another environmentally related disadvantage

2-1 ORIGINAL
of mining is that there are water depth restrictions on

where mines can be laid.

2.2 MINE CLASSIFICATION

Naval Mines are typically classified in three ways:

1. By their final position in the water

2. By their method of delivery

3. By their method of actuation.

2.2.1 Final Position in the Water. When classified according to the position they assume in the water

after they have been laid, mines fall into three primary

categories.

1. Bottom/ground mines

2. Moored mines

3. Drifting mines.

2.2.1.1 Bottom/Ground Mines. Bottom mines are

nonbuoyant weapons. When planted, the mine case is in

contact with the sea bed and it is held in place by its own

weight. In areas with a soft bottom, these mines may be

completely or partially embedded in the sea bed, in

which case they would be referred to as buried mines. A

mine case that is resting on the bottom and not buried is

referred to as a proud mine. Bottom mines are also

called ground mines.

The nonbuoyant case of a bottom mine allows for the

use of a much larger explosive charge than that of a

buoyant mine case. This larger explosive charge provides the mine with a larger damage distance and enables a single mine to cover a larger volume of water.

However, bottom mines must be planted in water

depths where the target ships will be damaged by the

explosion. The depth at which a specific bottom mine

can be effective against a specific surface target is dependent upon the shock resistance of the target, as well

as the amount and type of explosive used in the mine. If

they are intended for use against a surface ship, bottom

mines are most effective in comparatively shallow waters (<200 feet). If planted in very deep waters, a surface vessel may pass over the mine without actuating its

firing mechanisms, or if the firing mechanism is actuated, the surface ship may pass by without suffering the

desired level of damage.

There are two special categories of bottom mines that

react differently from other bottom mines when they are

initially laid, but they become standard bottom mines

once they have reached their final plant position:

1. A moving bottom mine is a mine that is designed

to move itself along the bottom after it has been

planted but before it arms.

2. A self-propelled mine is a mine that is fitted with

propulsion equipment, such as a torpedo, that is

used to propel the mine case to its intended final

plant position. For example, a submarine could

fire a self-propelled mine from a standoff point

that is outside of the intended minefield location,

and the mine would then propel itself to the desired plant location.

2.2.1.2 Moored Mines. Moored mines have a

positive-buoyant mine case that is moored at a preset

depth beneath the water’s surface. The mine case is

held in place above the sea bottom by means of a cable

or chain that is attached to an anchor. Moored mines are

frequently, but not always, fitted with a self-destruct

device that will cause them to flood and sink if they are

separated from their anchor. A moored mine that has

been separated from its anchor and risen to the surface

is called a floater. Floaters may continue to float until

either they are struck and detonated or they deteriorate

from their exposure to the seawater.

Moored mines are designed to be laid in deep water,

and they are effective against both submarines and surface ships. The maximum water depth in which a

moored mine can be laid is limited by the length of its

mooring cable, the weight of the cable, and the mine

case crush depth. The explosive charge and firing

mechanism of a moored mine are housed in the positive-buoyant case. Because this mine case is buoyant,

the amount of the explosive charge used in moored

mines is less than that found in a typical bottom mine,

and the damage radius is also smaller.

A major disadvantage of moored mines is that the mooring cable can be cut with mechanical sweep gear. When

this occurs, the mine case floats to the surface and can be

avoided or detonated without accomplishing its mission.

Another disadvantage of moored mines is that they can be

affected by current and tidal variations that could cause the

mine case to dip below its intended depth and thereby reduce its effectiveness against a surface target.

Despite their susceptibility to mechanical sweeping,

moored mines play an important role in mining operations. They can be moored so close to the surface that

the smallest craft entering the minefield will be endangered. Additionally, mooring mines at different water

ORIGINAL 2-2
depths will add a vertical dimension to a minefield, rendering it hazardous to both surface ships and submerged submarines.

There are two special types of moored mines that

contain propulsion systems that enable the mine case to

quickly reach the intended target:

1. Homing/guided mines are propelled moored

mines that use guidance equipment to home onto

a target once the target has been detected.

2. A rising mine is a propelled or buoyant moored

mine that releases from its mooring and rises to

detonate on contact with, or in proximity to, a

target. A rising mine does not incorporate a

homing device to guide it to the target, but it

does contain logic circuitry that enables it to calculate where it expects the target to be.

2.2.1.3 Drifting Mines. Drifting mines have a

buoyant mine case, but they do not have an anchor or

any other device to maintain them in a fixed position.

They are free to move with the waves, currents, and

wind. Drifting mines may float at the water’s surface,

or they may be kept at a set depth beneath the surface by

a depth-controlling hydrostatic device. Drifting mines

are classified differently from a moored mine that becomes a floater, because a floater was designed to be

held in place by an anchor and a drifting mine was designed to float freely with the tides and currents.

A modified version of a drifting mine is a buoyant

mine case that has a weight attached to it that is heavy

enough to hold the mine case near the bottom, but not

heavy enough to hold it in place. These mines are

known as creeping mines, because they are free to creep

along the bottom when affected by tidal currents.

The principal advantage of drifting mines is that

their use is independent of the bottom depth. They can

be set to oscillate at or near a preset depth, which permits the mining of water that is too deep for bottom or

moored mines. The major drawback of drifting mines is

that they scatter and imperil friendly and neutral shipping. Consequently, drifters are usually, but not always, fitted with devices designed to sink them after a

relatively short life span. Because of their short life

span, the most useful application of drifting mines has

been in tactical situations in which they are laid in the

path of an enemy force to cause a delay or diversion

giving friendly forces a tactical advantage.

2.2.2 Method of Delivery. When mines are classified according to the method by which they are delivered, they again fall into three categories: aircraft-laid

mines; submarine-laid mines; and surface-laid mines.

2.2.2.1 Aircraft Delivery. Aircraft are the most

suitable vehicles for the majority of offensive

minelaying operations because they can penetrate areas

denied to surface ships and submarines. Air-delivered

mines are dropped from aircraft in the same manner as a

bomb, and in general, any aircraft that is equipped to

carry bombs can carry a similar load of mines of the

same weight class. These mines are specially configured for air delivery and they are designed so that they

will not crush or be damaged upon water entry.

There are a number of advantages associated with aerial mining operations. When compared to the other mine

delivery platforms, aircraft have a fast reaction time and

they can respond quickly to a mining mission. They are

also the only delivery platform that can replenish an existing minefield without being endangered from previously

laid mines. Airplanes can also be used to mine enemy-held inland waterways, and they can lay mines in

shallow bodies of water, including rivers and harbors, that

cannot be transited by submarines or surface minelayers.

There are two major disadvantages associated with

the use of aircraft as minelaying vehicles. First, the

weapon loads are relatively small unless large,

cargo-carrying aircraft are used for mine delivery. Second, the mine positioning accuracy is lower with aircraft than with surface ship deliveries.

2.2.2.2 Submarine Delivery. Submarine-delivered

mines are normally used in covert offensive operations.

These mines are specially configured so that they can be

launched from the torpedo tubes or mine belts of submarines. Submarines are effective minelayers because they

can penetrate areas that are too well protected by air

and/or surface craft for other minelayers. The availability

of mobile standoff mines enhances the submarine’s

minelaying capability.

Submarine mine delivery is a covert operation, and

when secrecy is paramount, the submarine is the preferred minelaying vehicle.

When required by OPORD or specified by Combatant Commander, capable SSNs can be available and

loaded with mines, but this requirement has to be anticipated in advance to be readily available. A disadvantage associated with submarine mine laying is that there

are limited numbers of submarines available, and they are

frequently already tasked for other missions when the

need for a mining mission is identified. Submarines have

a limited mine-carrying capacity and a relatively slow

2-3 ORIGINAL
reaction time. In order for a submarine to conduct a

mining mission, it must first be recalled to a port where

it can offload torpedoes and onload mines.

2.2.2.3 Surface Delivery. The Mk 60 CAPTOR

mine is the only U.S. mine that can be surface laid. It requires a surface ship with a crane or boom that can drop

the mine from a height of at least 30 feet above the water using a modified aircraft weapons rack. All other

U.S. mines would require extensive engineering modifications to be surface laid. Surface mine delivery requires control of the sea area, and it is therefore

considered to be a suitable delivery method for defensive minefields only.

Surface ships offer two major mine delivery advantages.

First, they are able to carry a much larger mine payload per

sortie than either aircraft or submarine minelayers, and,

second, they have the ability to deliver mines with much

greater accuracy than either aircraft or submarines.

Outweighing these advantages, however, is their

vulnerability to attack by the enemy. A surface minelayer can only be effectively used if the sea area being

mined and the surrounding air space are under friendly

control. In addition to this, their reaction time is slower

than aircraft because of their transit speed. Surface

minelayers must transit to a location where they can

onload the mines and then they have to transit to the desired minefield’s location.

2.2.3 Method of Actuation. Naval mines are actuated by three primary methods: contact, influence, and

command/control.

2.2.3.1 Contact Actuation Logic. Contact mines

are the oldest and perhaps the most commonly known

type of mine. Contact mines are mines that use a contact mechanism to initiate the firing sequence and actuate the mine’s explosive charge. To fire a contact

mine, the target ship must touch the mine case or a

contact-responsive mechanism that has been attached

to the mine case. Typical contact firing mechanisms include the following:

1. Inertial switch mechanisms consist of a freely suspended contact that is positioned between a number of stationary electrical contacts. When the

mine case is tilted or jarred by contact with a target, the suspended contact will engage one of the

stationary contacts and energize the firing circuit.

2. Chemical horn mechanisms contain a fragile vial

which is used to separate an electrolyte from the

battery electrodes. The vial ruptures when the

mine case is hit by a target ship, allowing the

electrolyte to flow between the electrodes. This

action energizes the battery and activates the firing circuit.

3. Switch horn mechanisms consist of a spike that

is connected to one terminal of a firing circuit.

When the target hits the mine case, the spike is

driven into the other terminal, which closes the

firing circuit and activates the mine.

4. Galvanic action mechanisms use seawatersea

water as the electrolyte. A copper antenna or

copper horn is attached to the mine case and connected to a firing mechanism. When the horn/antenna comes into contact with the steel hull of a

ship, a current is generated that actuates a relay

and the firing circuit.

2.2.3.2 Influence Actuation Logic. The firing

mechanism of an influence mine is actuated by a

change in the mine’s physical environment that is

caused by a target’s presence in the immediate vicinity.

A surface ship or submarine generates a variety of influence signatures, such as magnetic, acoustic, and

pressure, and an influence mine mechanism is designed

to sense these signatures. An influence mine utilizes

one or more detectors to sense one or more of the influence fields, and if the appropriate signal is detected, an

electrical signal is sent to the firing mechanism. The firing mechanism will then analyze the signal to determine whether it was generated by a valid target (i.e., an

enemy vessel of a given size) and, if it is determined

that a valid target is present, the firing mechanism triggers a mine actuation. The level of intensity and the duration of time that an influence field must be applied to

satisfy the firing circuits of a influence mine are options

available to the minefield planner.

1. A magnetic influence mechanism is a device that

is designed to sense a change in the earth’s ambient magnetic field that is caused by a target ship.

The two types of magnetic influence mechanisms

are magnetic dip-needle and magnetic inductance.

a. A magnetic-dip needle mechanism contains a

horizontally pivoted, delicately balanced magnetic needle that is designed to pivot far enough

on its axis to close a firing circuit. The horizontally pivoted magnetic needle aligns itself with

the surrounding earth’s magnetic field and waits

for this field to be disturbed by the presence of a

target. The needle pivots in response to the

change in the total vertical magnetic field at the

mine that results from the presence of a ship.

ORIGINAL 2-4
b. There are three types of magnetic inductance

mechanisms: search coil, total field magnetometer, and thin film magnetometer. Although their methods of detection differ, each

of these inductance mechanisms is capable of

generating an electrical impulse sufficient to

actuate a mine’s firing circuit. This electrical

impulse is generated in response to a designed

rate of change in the magnetic field intensity

surrounding the mechanism. This change in

the magnetic field intensity is caused by the

passing of a target ship.

2. Acoustic influence mechanisms consist basically

of passive microphones and associated circuitry

for detecting underwater noises and active transponders that transmit signals and receive echoes

from a previously acquired target. The passive

mechanisms consist of hydrophones that are responsive to the characteristic frequency, intensity,

and duration of detected noises generated by a

ship’s propeller, engine, machinery, or hull noises.

3. The seismic influence used in some mechanisms

is closely related to the acoustic influence. That

portion of the acoustic signature that is transmitted through the ocean bottom rather than

through the water is used to actuate a seismic

mechanism. These mines use a geophone to

sense the shaking or vibration through the mine

case that is caused by the sound.

4. Electric potential influence mechanisms make use

of the electric current flow that occurs when the dissimilar metals are used in the construction of a ship

are immersed in seawater. For example, an electric

current is formed because the hull of a ship and its

propeller are made out of different metals. This

electric current flows through the water around the

hull of the ship, and it can be measured and sensed

by properly designed mine mechanisms.

5. Pressure influence mechanisms detect the low

pressure zone created beneath a moving ship’s

hull. This system may be affected by surface

wave action, and, as a result, it is used primarily

in sheltered waters only in combination with another influence mechanism. The advantage of a

pressure influence system is that it is impossible

to simulate the pressure signature of a target ship

without actually towing a vessel. Therefore, this

type of mine is very difficult to sweep.

6. Combination influence mines consist of acoustic,

magnetic, and pressure-firing mechanisms assembled together, each of which is responsive to its

own type of influence. Each sensing mechanism

must receive the appropriate signal in a specified

period of time for the mine to detonate. Systems

involving a combination of influences are available in most mine firing devices. Combination

influence mechanisms are designed to use the

advantages of one system to compensate for the

disadvantages of another. The most common

combinations are: magnetic/acoustic; magnetic/

seismic; magnetic/acoustic/pressure; and magnetic/seismic/pressure. Mines with combination

influence sensors are much more difficult to

sweep than mines with a single influence.

2.2.3.3 Command/Control Detonated. The firing mechanisms of command/control mines are generally

directed by a control station on shore; however, it possible

to locate this control station in an afloat unit. The mines

receive their firing signals through hardwired control cables that run from the land-based control centers to the individual mines. Command/control mines are generally

fired by personnel located in the control station who track

the targets until they reach a position within the damage

radius of the mines. However, detection and localization

of potential targets may also be achieved by a monitoring

device that is located in a mine case. Command/control

mines are traditionally used as defensive weapons to protect

harbor approaches, but they can also be used offensively.

In some designs, the actuation control for the mine may be

switched to an automatic mode, in which case each

weapon becomes an influence mine. Examples of command/control mines are as follows:

1. Cable actuation

2. Remote control actuation

3. Independent actuation.

2.3 COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURE

FEATURES

To complicate the MCM problem, the minefield planner has a wide variety of CCM features available on modern mines that are used to give a planted mine resistance to

a wide variety of MCM techniques. These devices range

from simple antisweep devices that are designed to foul or

cut minesweeping equipment to highly sophisticated target discrimination circuitry and mine case construction

and coatings designed to inhibit detection by sonar. The

use of CCM devices, especially on influence mines, can

force an enemy to make repeated hazardous, costly, and

time-consuming passes over the same area to clear the

minefield.

2-5 ORIGINAL
The various types of CCM devices available include

the following:

1. Those that force the MCM equipment to simulate a ship exactly

2. Those that attack the sweeper or hunter

3. Those that make MCM physically more difficult

(e.g., obstructers, passthrough devices, and ship

counts)

4. Those that render the mine insensitive at predetermined times.

Some of the more important CCM accessories are

identified in the following paragraphs.

2.3.1 Ship Counter. A ship counter can be used on

mines with influence firing mechanisms to delay a

mine’s detonation until the firing mechanism has been

satisfied a predetermined number of times. A ship

counter is nothing more than a counting mechanism

that is included in the mine’s circuitry. When the mine

receives a signal that is of the correct type(s) and of sufficient strength and duration to satisfy the influence

mechanism(s), the counter is actuated and it clicks off a

ship count. When the counter has been actuated a preset

number of times that is, when the current ship count setting is one the firing circuit is closed and the mine becomes poised. A poised mine will fire on the next valid

target that it detects.

2.3.2 Probability Actuator. A PAC can be used

instead of a ship counter. A PAC allows the mine to be

active for only a specific number of seconds out of any

given time period. When the mine is not active, valid

ship and/or sweep signatures will not be registered and

the mine will not actuate.

2.3.3 Delay Arm. This accessory is a clock-delay

timing mechanism that keeps the mine circuits open for

a preset period of time after planting. While the mine

circuits are open, the mine is inactive and it will not

arm. The mine cannot be fired or swept until it has been

armed. The use of delay arming features will provide

for the apparent replenishment of a bottom influence

minefield by having the mine’s arm at varying time periods after planting. Thus, as enemy influence sweeping operations are conducted against active mines, the

delayed arming of other mines will periodically replenish the field. The available delay arming time periods

vary from one mine type to another, but they commonly

range from several minutes to as long as a year.

2.3.4 Delay Rise. A delayed rising feature can be

incorporated into moored mines that keeps the mine

case attached to the anchor until a preset amount of time

has passed. This feature can be used to reduce the effectiveness of mechanical mine sweeping. Delayed rising

devices are used in moored mines for the same purpose

as delayed arming in bottom influence mines. Through

the use of the delayed rising feature, the minefield can

be replenished on a continuing basis or the activation of

a minefield can be delayed until some preset time.

2.3.5 Interlook Dormant Period. The ILDP is a

specified period of time between influence looks during which time the weapon becomes inactive or dormant. Many influence mines require that the sensor

take more than one look to determine whether a valid

target is present, and each look may require the same or

different level of influence intensity.

2.3.6 Intercount Dormant Period. The ICDP is a

specified period of time between ship counts in which an influence mine becomes inactive or dormant. This feature is

incorporated into an influence mine so that a single pass of a

minesweeper is unable to satisfy more than one ship count.

2.3.7 Live Period. The LP is a time interval during

which a specified event, usually a second look, must

occur to satisfy the firing logic of the influence mine.

2.3.8 Dummy Mines. These are minelike objects

or sonar decoys that are placed in a minefield to complicate the minehunting operation. Any object that produces a minelike image on a sonar console could be

classified as a dummy mine. Each of these objects must

be classified, or marked and avoided, when they are

identified during minehunting operations.

2.3.9 Obstructers. These are mechanical or explosive devices that are designed to interfere with or hinder

mechanical minesweeping operations by severing the

sweep wires. A sprocket obstructer is a device that is

designed to allow a sweep wire to pass through the

mooring wire without severing the cable.

2.3.10 Anechoic Coating/Camouflage. This

would include anything that is done to a mine case to

make it more difficult to locate and identify through minehunting operations. Anechoic coating can be applied to

the exterior of a metallic mine case to reduce its acoustic

reflectivity. Nonmetallic mine cases that do not generate

an acoustic return when prosecuted by minehunting sonar

can also be used. Another form of camouflage would be

the use of irregularly shaped mine cases, which do not reflect the type of sonar image that is considered to be

minelike.

ORIGINAL 2-6
2.3.11 Nonsympathetic Detonation. Sensitivity

settings can be incorporated into influence mines to ensure that they are not affected by sympathetic detonation. That is, when one mine is actuated by a target ship

or a sweep, the minefield planner must ensure that other

mines in the minefield are not actuated. The minefield

planner should also specify what the minimum spacing

must be between any two mines in a specific minefield

to reduce the possibility of sympathetic detonation.

2.3.12 Antisweeper. Mines can be planted in a

minefield in such a way as to target surface minesweeping

vessels. These may be moored contact mines set just below the surface, or they may be bottom influence mines

that have extremely sensitive actuating mechanisms incorporated into them.

2.3.13 Antirecovery, Self-Destruct, and Antistripping Features. Mines may be equipped with

various features to prevent recovery by enemy forces or

to resist exploitation. These may include hydrostatic

switches that detonate the mine or erase the memory of a

programmable mine when raised above a certain depth

or internal switches that are tripped by any attempt to

disassemble the mine components. These features represent a significant threat to EODMCM personnel conducting render-safe or recovery operations.

2.4 MINE DAMAGE TO SHIPS

There are three types of ship damage that can be inflicted by a mine’s detonation. These types of damage

are as follows:

1. Hull rupture, which is caused by the pressure

wave created by the detonation.

2. Internal damage to equipment, which is caused

by vibration and flooding.

3. Structural damage, which is caused by the whipping motion of the bubble pulse that is created

by the detonation.

The type and amount of damage actually inflicted

depends upon two factors:

1. The magnitude of the explosive force

2. The shock resistance of a particular target.

The magnitude of the explosive force that the target is

exposed to is dependent upon the weight and composition

of the explosive charge, as well as the geometry of encounter (e.g., the athwartship distance and the mine/target

orientation).

The resistance of a particular target to an underwater

explosion is dependent upon the ship type and construction, the age and history of the vessel, and the machinery’s state of maintenance.

The amount of ship damage resulting from a mine’s

detonation also depends upon whether the mine was in

contact with the target ship when it detonated. Contact

mine detonations will result in an inefficient concentration of the shock wave energy, whereas noncontact

mine detonations will usually result in a full shock

wave and bubble pulse cycle.

2.4.1 Contact Mine Damage. When the mine explodes in contact with the ship’s hull, the primary shock

wave that hits the ship is moving much faster than the

speed of sound, and its overpressure is not greatly diminished from that of the detonating shock wave. In

any normal hull, the hull plating and structure yield for

several feet around the point of contact, resulting in a

large hole and severely bent or broken strength members. In the process, the ship will absorb quite a jolt that

may cause further damage.

If the hole opens into an air-filled space within the

ship, most of the gas will vent into the ship and expand

along the paths of least resistance until it is contained

by the ship structure or until it vents into the atmosphere. This may cause the rupturing of decks, hatches,

bulkheads, or doors. In a submerged submarine, the internal pressure will increase as explosive gasses enter

through the rupture. Seawater flooding through the hole

immediately follows.

2.4.2 Noncontact Mine Damage. The damage

caused by a mine that is not in contact with the ship’s

hull is a result of the shock wave and the gas bubble created by the explosion.

2.4.2.1 Initial Shock Wave. The most dangerous

element in underwater explosions is a high-pressure

pulse called the initial shock wave. Although other phenomena compound ship damage, the initial shock wave

produces the most violent results because 50 to 55 percent of a mine’s explosive energy is expended through

the shock wave.

The initial shock wave travels radially outward from

the explosion at supersonic (500 ft/s) speed. The spherical wave front will move through a ship, causing compression and acceleration of materials in every part of

the ship. The pressure pulse has a very short duration

(less than a millisecond) but contains enormous energy.

The most devastating results will be broken welds and

weakened structures. Some personnel injuries may be

2-7 ORIGINAL
caused by the initial shock wave, but most will result

from other effects of the explosion.

The broken welds and weakened structures will increase the ship’s vulnerability to these other effects of

the explosion, such as hull whipping.

2.4.2.2 Hull Whipping. After the initial shock

wave, the next destructive effect of an influence mine is

gas bubble expansion and consequent water displacement. This is what is called hull whipping. The speed at

which the gas bubble expands, pushing water before it,

can cause the keel to bend and the hull to buckle. Masts,

shafts, and other very long components of a ship will be

stressed and probably damaged. Hull plating may not

rupture, but the ship will likely suffer a mission kill due

to engineering and combat systems equipment damage.

2.4.2.3 Gas Bubble Behavior. The very hot gases

generated by an explosion expand rapidly, regardless of

hydrostatic pressure (hydrostatic pressure is about 45 psi

at 100-foot depth). Water is pushed outward, forming a

bubble that continues to expand until internal pressure

falls well below hydrostatic pressure.

If expansion were controlled and slow, the bubble

would grow only until internal pressure equaled hydrostatic pressure or until it reached the surface. But because

of the violent nature of the explosion, the bubble expansion is so rapid that it goes beyond the point of equilibrium. The radially displaced water continues to move

outward until hydrostatic pressure is reached. The farthest extent of expansion is called the first maximum.

Upon reaching maximum radius, the bubble collapses until internal pressure rises to about 10 times hydrostatic pressure. At this point, the gas bubble has

reached the first minimum and contraction abruptly

ceases, causing another shock wave. The elapsed time

for this depends on the depth and weight of the explosive, but for mine warfare considerations it is less than a

second. The internal pressure built during the collapse

causes another expansion to the second maximum. The

process continues up to 10 oscillations if the explosion

occurs in sufficient water depth.

Because the bubble is always lighter than the surrounding water, the size and depth of the explosion determines the time required for the bubble to reach the

surface. For example, 1,000 pounds of TNT in 40 feet

of water will cause an explosion that has only one expansion. The bubble gases will vent to the atmosphere

upon reaching the first maximum, with water rushing in

to fill the void. In another example, 300 pounds of TNT

in 300 feet of water will cause a gas bubble that expands

and collapses four or five times before venting to the

surface.

2.4.2.4 Energy Transmission. The initial shock

wave contains 50 to 55 percent of the energy from an

explosion. The gas bubble generated contains the remaining energy: the first expansion expends 5 to 10

percent (depending on depth), while the second shock

wave carries off about 20 percent. Successive contractions send off smaller shock waves, but by the end of

the second contraction, about 85 percent of the energy

has been expended. Depending on depth, the bubble

will expand and collapse until all explosive energy is

expended.

The energy from an explosion in deep water will primarily be converted to heat, raising the temperature of

the surrounding water. In shallower water and in the vicinity of boundaries like the bottom or a ship hull, a

more dramatic energy conversion takes place: the bubble expansion violently displaces water, which pushes

moveable objects before it; a reversal of water flow

when the bubble collapses then carries the movable objects back toward the center.

2.4.2.5 Secondary Shock Wave. Gas bubble

pressure at the first minimum is about 1,000 psi, depending on water depth and explosive weight. The reversal of water flow, when this high-pressure region

stops collapsing, creates another shock wave. The peak

pressure of the secondary shock wave is only about

one-twentieth of the initial shock wave, but the duration

of overpressure may last 10 times as long. Consequently, the impulse (pressure times duration) of the

secondary shock wave is of the same magnitude as the

initial shock wave even though the energy contained in

the wave is about one-tenth that of the initial wave. A

ship can receive additional damage from the secondary

shock wave if a mine detonation is close enough for the

initial shock wave to cause damage.

2.4.2.6 Bubble Migration. Because a gas bubble is

less dense than the surrounding water, it is moved upward

by buoyant forces. A bubble travels to the surface with increasing speed until it reaches terminal velocity or the surface. If a rising bubble oscillates at a frequency equal to or

a harmonic of the natural frequency of a ship’s hull (about

2 Hz), the bubble will emit shock waves that can amplify

damaging effects to the hull, keel, and equipment.

If mine detonation occurs near a boundary (sea bottom or ship hull), the bubble created tends to stick to the

boundary. Since bubble oscillations cause water to flow

outward from the point of the explosion, no flow will

occur on the boundary side. However, water on the side

ORIGINAL 2-8
away from the boundary will return to the vicinity of

the boundary on successive collapses, giving ship hull

plating an additional pounding.

2.4.2.7 Plume. A gas bubble generated in shallow

water will breach the surface and vent gases. A cylindrical sheet of water will be thrown high into the air

with enough velocity (hundreds of feet per second) that

ships or landing craft could sustain severe damage if in

the vicinity of the plume.

2.5 U.S. NAVY/ALLIED MINES

2.5.1 U.S. Navy Service Mines and Mine Characteristics. The U.S. mine inventory currently consists of air-and-submarine delivered, influence-actuated

mines. The smallest mine is in the 500-pound weight category and the largest is 2,000 pounds. There are no drifting

mines in the inventory, nor are there any contact or controlled mines in the U.S. inventory at this time. Appendix D provides a chart of U.S. mine characteristics. The

U.S. mining program is set up to support offensive mining

operations. If the United States desired to attain a strong

defensive minelaying capability, new mines would be required or extensive engineering modifications would be

required on current mines.

2.5.1.1 Destructor Mk 36 and Mk 40 (IOC 1968).

DST are aircraft-laid bottom mines which were developed to provide a rapid-response mining capability during the Vietnam Conflict. They were called DST

because the term “mine” was politically objectionable at

that time. The mine case and explosive charge for the

DST Mk 36 and Mk 40 are provided by the Mk 82

(500-pound) and Mk 83 (1,000-pound) General Purpose

Low-Drag Bombs, respectively. The explosive weight

of the DST Mk 36 is 196 pounds of H-6, and the DST

Mk 40 contains 453 pounds of H-6. Since these mines

are modified bomb bodies, they contain less explosives

by weight than they would if they had been developed

initially as mines. (Bombs have thick cases designed for

their shrapnel-producing capabilities and mine cases are

thin-walled and consequently lighter in comparison.)

The general purpose bombs are converted into mines

through the installation of a modification kit of modular

components. This kit contains an arming device, an explosive booster, an influence firing mechanism, a battery,

and all associated hardware. The Air Force can incorporate this kit into its 750-pound Mk 117 bomb, which then

becomes the DST Mk 59. In addition to the modification

kit, all DSTs are also equipped with a retardation device

(fin or parachute) for delivery.

When converting a bomb into a DST, the arming device and explosive booster are installed in the bomb’s

nose cavity, and the firing mechanism and battery are

installed in the bomb’s tail cavity. The DST’s firing

mechanism is capable of sensing and responding to two

different influence combinations, depending upon how

it is set. The DST can be used as solely a magnetic

mine, or it can be used as a combination magnetic and

seismic mine. There are also several sensitivity settings

available for use on DSTs as well as several delayed

arming settings. All DSTs are designed to self-destruct

at a preselected time after planting or when the battery’s charge falls to a specific point.

DSTs became the first sea mines that could be used on

both land and in water. When dropped on land, they bury

themselves in the ground on impact, ready to be actuated

by military equipment, motor vehicles, and personnel.

When dropped in rivers, canals, channels, and harbors,

they lie on the bottom, ready to be actuated by a variety

of vessels, including warships, freighters, coastal ships,

and small craft. DSTs were originally designed for use

against small junks, sampans, and other craft that have

small magnetic signatures, but they are also very effective against larger target types when they are properly set

and planted in the appropriate water depths.

2.5.1.2 Mine Mk 56 (IOC 1966). The Mine Mk 56

currently has the distinction of being the oldest service

mine in the U.S. inventory. The Mk 56 is a 2000-pound,

aircraft-delivered moored influence mine that consists

of an anchor, a buoyant mine case containing the explosive charge, which is 360 pounds of HBX-3, and flight

gear. It was designed as an antisubmarine mine that

was intended to be effective against high-speed, deepoperating submarines, but it can also be used effectively against some surface craft. The Mk 56 mine case

can be moored at various depths to create a vertical wall

against submarine intrusion.

The Mk 56 has a nonmagnetic, stainless steel case

and a cast steel anchor. It is also equipped with flight

gear since it is launched from an aircraft. The Mk 56

has a magnetic firing mechanism that uses a threedimensional total-field magnetometer as its influence

detector. This detector can be set to respond to various

levels of magnetic influence intensities, and it also has

various delay rise, case depth, and sterilization/selfdestruct settings available for use, depending upon the

intended purpose of the minefield.

When laid, the mine sinks to the bottom, where the

case and anchor remain together as an integral unit until

the preset delay rise time is reached. At that time the

case and anchor separate and the mine case rises toward

the surface. In the event that the mine becomes embedded

in bottom sediment before case and anchor separation

2-9 ORIGINAL
takes place, a slow-burning propellant in the anchor ignites. As this propellant burns, it creates bubbles

around the mine case, freeing it from any mud in which

it may be buried. As the case rises, a hydrostatic sensor

is used to ensure that the mine case is moored at the desired preselected depth. Should the mooring mechanism allow the mine case to rise to a depth that is too

shallow, the case will scuttle itself, which reduces the

possibility of compromise and eliminates it as a navigational hazard. This scuttling feature will also be used if

the mine cable breaks or if the mine is set to sterilize

rather than self-destruct when it reaches the end of its

preset armed life.

2.5.1.3 Quickstrike Mines Mk 62 and Mk 63

(IOC 1985). Quickstrike Mines Mk 62 and Mk 63 are

a new generation of aircraft-laid bottom mines that provide a fast response-to-readiness capability. Like the

DST family of mines, the Quickstrike Mk 62 and Mk

63 are conversions of General Purpose Bomb Bodies

Mk 82 (500-pound) and Mk 83 (1,000-pound), respectively. Also like the DST, the explosive weight of the

Mk 62 is 196 pounds of H-6 and the Mk 63 contains

453 pounds of H-6.

The conversion of a general purpose bomb into a

Quickstrike mine is very similar to that previously described for DST. In fact, the same arming device and

explosive booster used in the DST are also installed in

the nose cavity of the bombs to make these Quickstrike

mines. However, the parts inserted in the bomb’s tail

cavity are different, and include an improved battery

and a variable influence TDD Mk 57.

These mines were designed for use against both submarines and surface targets, and they are capable of

having various arming delay, sterilization, self-destruct,

and other operational settings placed into them. The

TDD Mk 57 uses magnetic and seismic influences for

target detection and validation, and like the DST’s firing

mechanism, it can be set to respond to various levels of

magnetic-only influences or it can be set to require a

combined magnetic and seismic influence of the proper

magnitude.

2.5.1.4 Quickstrike Mk 65 (IOC 1985). The

Quickstrike Mine Mk 65 is a 2,000-pound aircraft-laid

bottom mine. Unlike the other Quickstrike mines, this

mine is not a converted bomb. Instead, it is a weapon

that was designed specifically to be a mine, and it

consists of a distinctively different, new-concept,

thin-walled mine case. The Mk 65 also has a newly designed arming device and nose fairing, and it has a tail

section that is adaptable to a parachute option.

The Quickstrike Mine Mk 65 was designed for use

against both submarines and surface targets, and like

the other Quickstrike mines, it is also capable of having

various arming delay, sterilization, self-destruct, and

other operational settings placed into it. The Mk 65 can

have either a TDD Mk 57 or TDD Mk 58 firing mechanism, both of which can be set to operate at a variety of

sensitivity settings. The TDD Mk 57 uses magnetic and

seismic influences for target detection and validation,

and the TDD Mk 58 adds a pressure sensor capability to

those provided by the TDD Mk 57.

2.5.1.5 Mine Mk 60 (CAPTOR). The Mine Mk-60

is a 2,000-pound, deep-water moored mine. It is normally laid by submarine or aircraft, but it may be laid

by surface ships equipped with cranes or booms and a

special release device. It is more commonly referred to

as CAPTOR (an acronym for enCAPsulated TORpedo). The CAPTOR mine is a sophisticated antisubmarine weapon system that has an Mk 46 Mod 4

torpedo located inside of a mine case. This mine is designed so that it will detect and classify submarines and

then release a modified Mk 46 Mod 4 Torpedo to acquire and attack its target.

The CAPTOR mine incorporates an acoustic influence

target detection system. When employed, the weapon lies

dormant until a target is detected, at which time the torpedo swims out of its capsule to attack and destroy its target. There are various arming and sterilization delay

options that can be programmed into the Mine Mk 60, and

the mine will also sterilize if the case moors too shallow or

the battery voltage falls below a specific point.

2.5.1.6 Mine Mk 67 (SLM) (IOC 1987). The Mine

Mk 67, which is more commonly referred to as the

SLMM, is a 2,000-pound, submarine-laid bottom mine

that is designed to target both surface ships and submarines. The SLMM is designed to be covertly propelled to a

predetermined planting location and can be planted in areas that are not normally accessible for the planting of

other mines.

The Mk 67 mine consists of a modified Mk 37 torpedo with a mine section attached to it. The Mk 37 torpedo serves as the propulsion vehicle to deliver the

mine section to its intended location. The mine section

of the Mk 67 contains the main explosive charge as well

as the exploder, the arming device, the target detecting

device, and the associated battery.

The Mk 67 uses the same firing mechanism as the

DST. It can be set to respond to magnetic-only influences or to combination magnetic and seismic influences. There are multiple sensitivity settings available

ORIGINAL 2-10
for both the magnetic and the seismic sensors, and there

are also numerous delay arming, sterilization and

self-destruct settings available.

2.5.2 Exercise and Training Mines. ET mines

are reusable mine configurations used primarily for

training exercises. The ET mines use an inert loaded or

empty mine case that, in most cases, makes them look

like their service mine counterparts. Small explosive

devices and/or pyrotechnics are contained in some ET

mines to provide realism in mine delivery and firing

simulation and to aid in recovery operations. Specific

descriptions of some common exercise and training

mines follow.

2.5.2.1 Actuation Mines. Actuation mines can be

used to support total weapon employment training in

exercises and in war games at sea. The target response

characteristics of actuation mines are identical to those

of the service mines of the same Mk and Mod. Actuation mines may be configured for either aircraft or surface delivery.

Actuation mines consist of an inert-loaded mine case

that contains serviceable mine detection, firing, and

safety devices. The bottom mine has an externally attached float that contains a pyrotechnic smoke signal

and approximately 120 feet of nylon line used for recovery. When the mine actuates, it releases the smoke

signal. At a preset time, the float is released, which enables recovery teams to locate and recover the mine. The

moored mine also releases a smoke signal when actuated, and the case releases and rises to the surface for recovery at a preset time. Actuation mines use a sonar

transmitter (pinger), which aids in location and recovery.

To distinguish actuation mines from service mines, and

to enhance their visibility in expediting and facilitating recovery in the water, they are painted orange and white.

2.5.2.2 Versatile Exercise Mine System. VEMS

is an exercise and training mine that is manufactured by

British Aerospace. It can be used for a variety of purposes because it can be programmed to emulate any

various foreign or domestic mines. VEMS can be used

to assess the effectiveness of the magnetic/acoustic influence sweeps and tactics of the airborne, and surface,

and EODMCM forces, provide indication of platform

safety when sweeping against a particular mine, and

provide training in minesweeping and minehunting operations. It can also be used to check the ship’s magnetic signature.

2.5.2.3 Laying Mines. Laying mines are used by delivery vehicles during mine delivery practice. They consist of inert-loaded mine cases that contain weights in

place of internal mine components to provide a weight

and center of gravity equivalent to its service mine

components. Complete and operable mine flight gear is

used on mines planted from aircraft. Other components

that interface with arming wires are also provided (less

explosives). A sonar transmitter is installed to aid in location for recovery. The mine case is painted orange

with white stripes.

2.5.2.4 Diver Evaluation Unit. EOD Mobile Units

are equipped with a DEU, which although not a mine,

simulates the sensor package of a mine and provides the

diver a method of measuring the reaction of the mine to

his magnetic and acoustic signature. The EODMCM detachment uses the DEU for individual training and unit

exercises, and it can also be employed in larger scale exercises to provide effective training feedback to the EOD

force.

2.5.3 Future Mine Potentials. There are a number of mine improvement programs that are currently

being worked. One of these is intended to provide a

pressure influence capability for the SLMM, which will

make it much more effective when used in countered

minefields. There is also a program in place to develop

an LSM to replace the aging Mk 56 moored mine, our

only mine currently able to target surface ships in deep

water. Other mine program improvements being looked

at include a high-volume mining capability and a RECO

capability for mines. Future mines could have computer

chips in them for target detection devices, providing the

planner with very selective target selection abilities, or

mines which could cover a wider range of water depths

and give a wider selection of target types.

2.5.4 Mine Storage, Preparation, and Transportation. The U.S. Navy maintains Service mines at

pre-positioned locations in CONUS and overseas, as

well as on some aircraft carriers and ammunition ships.

Those mines located on afloat units can be made available for delivery within 24 hours, but their type and

number are limited. Those located at land-based storage facilities must first be built up and then transported

to the delivery platform. The time required to build

these mines varies by mine type, but most of them can

be prepared in less than 48 hours.

When land-based mines are needed for a mining

mission, they must be transported to the delivery vehicle. This may be accomplished by using one or more of

the following transport methods: truck, rail, cargo aircraft, or ammunition ship. The type of transport method

selected will depend on the number of mines that must

be transported, the availability of the transportation

2-11 ORIGINAL
methods, from what location they must be transported,

and to what location they must be transported.

2.5.5 Minefield Planning Process and Procedures. A minefield is the actual or implied use of underwater explosive devices to impose strategic or tactical constraints on the operational use of an area by

surface ships or submarines. The minefield is but one

weapon that the military strategist can employ to accomplish specific objectives, and it must be considered as

part of a total strategic network for a given campaign.

The United States maintains a set of preplanned strategic minefields that is contained in MFPFs. These

folders are planned by the COMINEWARCOM mine

planning staff, as directed by the FLTCINCs, and are

promulgated in accordance with a distribution list that

is provided in MFPF 00. The plans contained in approved MFPFs are developed according to situations

that may arise. MFPFs are reviewed and updated at

regular intervals to ensure that they support the

FLTCINCs’ General War Plans. However, when a

minefield is actually being considered for delivery, the

preplanned fields may not be sufficient to support the

desired objective, or there may not be a plan prepared

for the area to be mined. In that case, the current plan

may need to be updated, or a new plan may need to be

developed. This process can be accomplished by the

staff planners at COMINEWARCOM, if time permits,

or it can be accomplished by mine planners assigned to

the battle group or air wing.

MFPF 00 serves as an index to all MFPFs, providing

information about the Uniform Minefield Planning

System, how to use each MFPF distributed, types of

mines in the inventory, types of authorized delivery

platforms, and the number of mines each can carry.

Individual MFPFs contain the following:

1. Recommended minefields identified by latitude

and longitude

2. The recommended number and types of mines

that will be used in the field

3. A list of priority targets that the minefield is to

encounter

4. Recommended mine settings for the priority targets identified by the CINC

5. Options for different levels of threat

6. Recommended delivery platforms

7. An intelligence assessment of the country/area

to be mined.

During the minefield planning process, there are a

number of factors that must be determined and/or evaluated. For example, the number and type of mines that

will be planned for delivery to a specific minefield is

dependent upon a variety of variables, including the

type of minefield that is to be constructed, its purpose,

and whether it is expected to be countered. Target types

and environmental considerations also play a major

role in the minefield planning process. Some of the required planning factors must be provided to the minefield planner by the operational commander or other

higher authority, while others are standard items which

must be determined and/or evaluated by the planner.

2.5.5.1 Types of Mining Operations. The type

of mining operation will have an effect on the types of

mines that are used, as well as the settings that are employed on those mines. The location of the field and the

type of delivery vehicle used are also affected by the type

of the operation. Offensive mining operations are generally intended to destroy, or obtain mission abort damage,

to enemy naval or merchant shipping, and they may be

exposed to heavy enemy MCM efforts. Therefore, the

field will generally be planned using sophisticated weapons with counter-countermeasures features. On the other

hand, defensive and protective minefields are generally

not subjected to MCM procedures, but since they must

be planned to allow friendly passage, mine positioning

within the minefield is very important and must be considered when selecting the delivery vehicle.

2.5.5.2 Types of Minefields. There are many different types of minefields, each having an impact on

such things as field location, mine type(s) and settings,

field sustainability, etc. The following are a few of the

many types of fields:

1. A closure field is planned to prevent all enemy

movement and should present a degree of threat

severe enough to convince the enemy not to challenge the field. This type of minefield may be sustained or unsustained, countered or uncountered.

In this type of field, the planner wants to achieve

target damage whenever a mine actuates.

2. An attrition field would be planned to cause

enough damage to hinder enemy movements

through the field. These fields may be either sustained or unsustained fields.

3. A nuisance field would have an adverse effect on

enemy movements until it was determined that the

ORIGINAL 2-12
actual threat posed by the field was relatively

low. This type of minefield would be planned to

force the enemy into taking countermeasures

that would delay his efforts. In this type of field,

the planner is more concerned with obtaining

actuations than damage.

4. An antisubmarine field would be planned to specifically target submarines. It may be designed

to target other types of ships, or to be effective

only against submarines.

5. A dummy minefield contains no live mines and

presents only a psychological threat. This type of

field may be very effective against an enemy without an MCM capability, or it may sufficiently delay traffic while the enemy conducts MCM

operations to determine that the field is a dummy.

2.5.5.3 Countermeasures. Expected countermeasures also have an effect on the planning process.

1. A countered field is a minefield in which the enemy is expected to employ MCM procedures,

and the planner must determine what the expected level and type of MCM procedures would

most likely be. A countered field will usually require the use of mixed mines of varying ship

counts and delay arms, as well as other countercountermeasure features to ensure the field’s

effectiveness.

2. An uncountered field would be one in which the

enemy is not expected to employ any countermeasures techniques. These fields would generally require a smaller number of less sophisticated mines

that have little or no counter-countermeasure

features.

2.5.5.4 Intelligence. Available intelligence plays a

major role in the minefield planning process. Intelligence

information will be used to determine the primary and

secondary target types that the field is planned against,

and their expected transiting pattern. The number and

types of targets will affect the types of mines used in the

field, as well as the settings used on those mines. Available intelligence on enemy defenses will also have an impact on the planned type of delivery vehicle, which will

also affect the types of mines that can be used, as well as

where the field can be placed.

2.5.5.5 Measure of Effectiveness. A desired

MOE must be designated for the minefield so that the

planner has a quantifiable threat value to use in developing the minefield plan. The following five MOEs are

available for use.

1. Simple initial threat is the most widely used effectiveness measure because it is easy to understand and easy to plan. Simple initial threat is the

probability of hitting the very first target

transitor that challenges the field; however,

when this MOE is used, it does not provide any

threat information for subsequent transitors.

This MOE is very useful for fields where no

MCM or infrequent ship transits are expected

and is easy to calculate. Simple initial threat is

the only effectiveness measure that can be calculated without the use of a computerized planning

model.

2. A threat profile can be used to provide a threat

measurement for each transitor of a given type in

a sequence of transits. For example, if five

transitors are expected, it can be used to determine what the threat would be for each transitor

in the sequence. It represents an extension of

simple initial threat.

3. Sustained threat is commonly used for countered minefields, and it provides an effectiveness measure to expected transitors over a

period of time.

4. Expected casualties is an MOE that is useful to indicate the strength of a minefield. It is used to provide the average number of casualties that would

be expected to occur for a given number of transits.

5. Casualty distribution is the most useful effectiveness measure for minefields being planned

against multiple transitors. It specifies the probability of obtaining at least n casualties out of

k transits at a specified level of confidence.

Once minefield planners have been provided with the

above information, they commence the actual planning

process in which they will determine the field’s specific

location, the delivery vehicles to be used, and the types

and numbers of mines required, as well as the settings to

be used on these mines. During this process, the minefield planner must also know what types and numbers of

mines are available for use in the field being planned, as

well as the availability of the required delivery vehicles.

When developing the actual plan, planners must first

determine the actual geographic location of the minefield or minefield segments. This is accomplished by

surveying possible locations to determine which one is

best to achieve the objective within given constraints.

The environmental conditions in the desired location

will have an impact on mine quantities and types of

2-13 ORIGINAL
mines that can be used. The environmental considerations are extensive and are covered later in this chapter.

Using all available planning publications and/or

computerized aids, planners determine the actual mine

types and numbers required to achieve the desired result, as well as the specific sensitivity and operational settings that need be set into each mine. Some of the

operational settings that the planner must determine are

delay arming/rising, ship count, sterilization/selfdestruct times, ILDP, and ICDP.

Once planners have developed the best plan for the desired objective, they must ensure that it is logistically feasible. That is, the required types and numbers of mines

must be available within the time constraints required for

delivering the field, and the required types and numbers of

delivery vehicles must also be available. If these assets are

not available in the required numbers, it may be necessary

to lower the desired threat level or make other changes to

the plan so that it is deliverable within the required constraints. The threat level is determined through discussions with the operational commander, who has the

ultimate responsibility for the mine plan.

Delivery vehicle and weapon availabilities are important planning factors that may be uncertain until the

operation actually commences. If Navy carrier-based

aircraft are to be used, the field location might be chosen to minimize the number of mines (and the number

of required sorties), within the limits of some acceptable risk to the delivery aircraft. The availability and

storage location of the mines will also affect the minefield plan, and because of its availability, a less effective mine may be used in the field. Thus, during the

initial minefield and mission planning, a best estimate

of the situation is derived and included in the planning

factors. During the final mission planning, last-minute

alterations may have to be made to accommodate

changes in the situation and/or availability of assets.

2.5.6 Computer Programs in Use. There are a

number of computer programs available to the minefield planner. Some of these are available only to the

staff planners at COMINEWARCOM and others are

available to the mine planners on the battle group staff

and in the air wings.

2.5.6.1 Uncountered Minefield Planning Model.

The UMPM program is available to COMINEWARCOM staff planners. It allows the minefield planner

to develop sophisticated minefield plans for an uncountered scenario. The model can be used either to determine how many mines are required for a specific

scenario, or to evaluate a possible plan to determine

what a field’s measure of effectiveness would be. The

program accesses a database that contains damage and

actuation data for a wide variety of mines and settings

against various target types. The damage and actuation

data for a specific mine versus target can be entered if it

is not contained within the database.

2.5.6.1.1 Planning Mode. If the model is going to

be used to determine how many mines are required for a

specific minefield, the user must input a number of

items. These include mine type (Mk and Mod), mine

sensitivity setting, transitor type, number of transitors,

transitor speed, transitor’s navigational error, minefield

width, water depth, desired damage level, and desired

MOE. The planner usually desires to evaluate how different mines or different sensitivity settings will respond to a given situation. This can be done by

successive iterations of the program, entering different

variables for each iteration. The program is very simple

to use and an experienced planner can make multiple

runs very quickly. Each time the program is run, it calculates the number of mines of the given type and setting required to achieve the requested threat level. It

also calculates the resultant effectiveness measure for

all other types of effectiveness measures. For example,

if you used the model to determine how many mines

were required to achieve a 75-percent simple initial

threat for a given scenario, it would also tell you what

the resultant sustained threat, expected casualties,

threat profile, and casualty distribution are for the scenario using the calculated number of mines.

2.5.6.1.2 Evaluation Mode. The planning mode of

this model allows the planner to calculate only the number of mines required for one mine type at one sensitivity

setting. However, in most cases, multiple mine types

and/or multiple settings within a single minefield are

used. The evaluation mode of the program can determine

the effectiveness of a field with multiple mines and/or

multiple settings. The inputs are basically the same as

those required in the planning mode, except the number

of mines must be input for each mine/setting combination to be evaluated, and the desired effectiveness is not

entered. The resulting output will be the level of threat

that the minefield would be expected to provide.

2.5.6.2 Analytical Countered Minefield Planning Model. The ACMPM model provides a countered

minefield planning capability to COMINEWARCOM

planners. The program can be used in a planning or evaluation mode, similar to the UMPM, but requires additional, detailed information on anticipated MCM

equipment and MCM techniques that the enemy would

employ against the field. This program is very complex

ORIGINAL 2-14
and each iteration takes a great deal of time to set up and

run.

2.5.6.3 Forward Area Minefield Planner. The

FAMP computer model is available to the air wing planners.

It is a floppy-disk computer program that operates on a

WANG 2200 VP or MVP computer. FAMP provides fleet

planners with the on-board planning capability to support

their mining operations. It provides an uncountered planning capability similar to that available on UMPM, except that it has a smaller database. However, it is an

excellent planning tool for the tactical planner who

must develop a plan very quickly using on-board mine

assets. FAMP also has a limited CMPM, but the planner must input all of the operational characteristics for

the expected MCM assets, information that is usually

unavailable. FAMP will also generate a formatted

minefield plan message, prompting the user for the essential elements of information. The final module of the

FAMP model helps develop the minefield DELTAC

for TACAIR mine delivery. This segment of the program computes minelines and drop points for a uniform, random distribution minefield.

2.5.6.4 Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System. TAMPS is a computerized method for planning

and optimizing mission routes against hostile targets. It

consists of core application software and aircraft and

weapon-specific mission planning modules.

2.6 U.S./ALLIED MINELAYING ASSETS

Mines reach their maximum effectiveness only

when they are accurately positioned in their selected areas in time to be armed and ready for the transit of the

first target ship. This requirement for timely laying

places the burden on operational forces to employ delivery vehicles with acceptable capabilities. Mines may

be delivered to the minefield by aircraft, submarine, or

surface craft. The selection of the vehicle to be used for

carrying out a mining mission depends on the various

environmental and operational factors associated with

each situation. Factors to be considered when selecting

a delivery platform are as follows:

1. Whether the minefield is defensive or offensive

2. Number and type of mines to be delivered

3. Number of sorties required

4. Defensive capabilities of the area, the attrition

rate expected for delivery vehicles, and the need

for standoff delivery systems

5. Environmental characteristics, such as water

depth and bottom composition

6. The required accuracy of delivery

7. The logistics involved in coordinating stockpiled mines and delivery system.

Therefore, should a mining operation be ordered, the

choice of vehicle depends on its availability and its

compatibility for mine delivery.

2.6.1 Air Delivery. Aircraft are the most suitable

delivery vehicles for most offensive mining operations.

In general, any aircraft capable of carrying bombs can

carry a similar load of mines of the same weight class.

There are some constraints and limitations imposed by

the mismating of suspension lugs on some mines to certain bomb racks, the shape and dimensional changes of

some mines brought about by the addition of flight gear

or fins, and the high drag and buffeting characteristics

of mines carried on external stations. Several incompatibilities are correctable with existing adapters and modification kits, but the performance limitations imposed

on high-speed aircraft is also a factor. In planning a

minelaying mission, such factors as range, weather conditions, auxiliary equipment, and armament must be

considered because each can affect the maximum permissible load of the aircraft. The tactical manual of the

individual aircraft is the final authority on mine carriage.

2.6.1.1 Advantages. There are a number of advantages associated with air delivery.

1. Aircraft can penetrate those areas that are denied

to submarines by hydrographics or to surface

ships because of enemy defenses. Aircraft can

replenish existing minefields without endangering themselves from previously laid mines.

2. Aircraft have a faster reaction time than either

surface ships or submarines. When properly

alerted, aircraft can respond quickly and turn

around faster than other assets when multiple

strikes/sorties are required. Aircraft can also get

to the minefield location quicker than other

assets, especially if forward-deployed carrierbased aircraft are used.

3. Aircraft are generally more available than the

other assets. They can usually complete their

mining mission quickly and be made available

for other missions.

4. Aircraft can carry a wide variety of mine types.

2-15 ORIGINAL
5. Aircraft have a virtually unlimited approach

direction.

2.6.1.2 Disadvantages. There are a number of disadvantages associated with air delivery, but for offensive scenarios, many of these can be overcome through

proper planning.

1. The carrying capacity per sortie for most aircraft

is relatively small, except for large, cargo-carrying aircraft. However, this disadvantage can be

overcome by their ability to rapidly make multiple sorties.

2. The minelaying accuracy of aircraft is lower

than for a surface ship, but adequate for offensive mining scenarios.

3. Many aircraft types can be restricted by weather

conditions.

4. The range of aircraft is more restricted than that

available from either surface ships or submarines.

2.6.1.3 Helicopter Delivery. It is possible to deliver mines by helicopter, but the use of helicopters

would be inefficient because of their limited range and

carrying capacity. However, they may have a role in replenishing defensive and protective minefields or in

placing small barrier fields in rapid response situations.

2.6.2 Submarine Delivery. Submarines are most

effective in laying mines in areas that are too well protected for either surface or aircraft delivery. Normally,

they will be used in offensive minelaying, but may be

used to lay defensive fields as well. Submarine

minelaying operations can take place day or night, on

the surface or submerged. The availability of the submarine launched mobile mine enhances the submarine’s minelaying capability.

2.6.2.1 Advantages

1. The greatest advantage of submarine delivery is

that it is covert. The secrecy with which a submarine can deliver mines to an enemy port or operating area at great distances from friendly

bases provides an overwhelming tactical advantage. When secrecy is paramount, the submarine

is the preferred minelaying vehicle.

2. The mission radius of a submarine is also a major advantage.

2.6.2.2 Disadvantages.

1. Submarines cannot replenish a previously laid

minefield.

2. Submarines have a limited mine capacity, so

they are not conducive to carrying large payloads. To carry mines, a submarine must offload

one torpedo for every two mines.

3. Submarines have a slow reaction time. If not

preloaded with mines for a contingency operation, they must return to a port where torpedoes

can be offloaded and mines onloaded when

tasked with a mining mission. Their transit speed

is also slow when compared to aircraft delivery.

4. There are limited submarines available, and they

have other missions that would compete with

minelaying.

5. The variety of mine types available for submarine delivery is limited. Mines must be specially

configured to fit into a torpedo tube to be deliverable by submarine.

2.6.3 Surface Delivery. Surface delivery is the preferred method for protective and defensive minefields

where the transit distances are small and the area to be

mined is under friendly control. Any surface ship can be

rigged to lay mines by hoisting or rolling the mines over

the side or by using temporarily installed mine rails or

tracks. Although minelaying ships of various types appeared on the Navy list for about 60 years, there are no

active surface minelayers today. However, should an operational requirement develop, a surface minelaying capability could be provided through jury-rigged

appendages to whatever ships were available or, if time

permitted, by suitable conversion of ships with large

cargo capabilities. The allies do have a surface

minelaying capability.

2.6.3.1 Advantages

1. Surface ships are able to carry a larger number

of mines than either aircraft or submarine

minelayers.

2. Surface assets have the ability to position mines

more accurately than the other delivery assets.

2.6.3.2 Disadvantages

1. Surface ships have a slow reaction time and are

not suitable for minelaying when time is critical.

ORIGINAL 2-16
2. Surface ship minelaying is not very covert.

3. Surface ships are vulnerable to attack by the

enemy, so they are not effective offensive

minelayers.

4. Surface ships are unable to replenish existing

minefields.

2.7 IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENT ON MINING

The environment plays a significant role in mining.

The first consideration in planning a minefield is the possible geographic location. Locations (e.g., chokepoints,

harbors, and ports) where ship traffic is physically constrained may appear more suitable than others. Although

such points may seem to be the best choice from a geographic standpoint, other critical environmental factors

may override their use. These additional environmental

factors are water depth, prevailing sea state, sea ice,

tides, currents, seawater temperature, bottom conditions,

magnetic environment, acoustic environment, and pressure environment. Figure 2-1 provides a matrix of environmental considerations for mining.

2.7.1 Water Depth. The primary concern is to

choose waters where the mines selected will be effective

against their intended target. Water depth is a critical factor: a mine’s detection ability and damage effectiveness,

as well as its physical integrity, are affected by depth. If a

minefield is planned against a surface target and the water is too deep for the mine type used, surface units may

pass without actuating the mine, or if the mine is actuated, pass without suffering the desired level of damage.

Additionally, if a mine is laid in water too shallow for the

type used, much of the mine’s damaging ability may be

lost through surface venting.

2.7.2 Winds. Winds can have a direct impact on the

sea state and swells, and they can also affect the delivery accuracy of air-laid mines.

2.7.3 Seas and Swells. Dependent on wave height

and water depth, a pressure sensor can be affected by the

pressure signature of a wave along the bottom. Under the

right sea state conditions, an otherwise unsweepable

pressure mine may become sweepable because the prevailing pressure environment satisfies the pressure sensor. Therefore, the planner should, when possible, lay

pressure mines in sheltered areas where sea state will not

affect the sensor.

Seas and swells can also cause mine burial and mine

movement, and heavy swells can cause a sensitive magnetic sensor to actuate.

2.7.4 Sea Ice. A knowledge of the ice conditions

can allow the planner to evaluate a particular mine type

to determine its suitability for use. For example, ice

coverage is better for pressure mines: ice may increase

ambient background noise decreasing the effectiveness

of acoustic mines.

Large chunks of ice may activate certain mines in the

field, but it can also complicate the MCM effort. The

presence of ice is currently a major deterrent in placing

a minefield because of the uncertainties in the behavior

of mines under an ice cover and the difficulty of penetrating the ice cover.

2.7.5 Tides. Relatively shallow water areas where

moored mines might be used may be subject to very

large tidal variations. These variations can significantly

alter the depth at which a mine moors. Accordingly, the

selection of the mooring depth can be critical, depending upon the water depth, the range between high and

low tide, the lively tidal flow, other currents, and the

expected hour that the mines will moor. If all of these

factors are not carefully considered, that a large fraction

of the mines may scuttle or, for certain periods, mines

may be too deep to be effective.

2.7.6 Currents. Relatively high surface currents

may also affect the response of certain influence mines

by changing the magnitude of the acoustic and pressure

influence fields generated by passing ships. Currents

may also affect ground mines, especially on hard bottoms, by causing a rolling motion, resulting in spurious

actuations. Where bottom currents and hard bottom conditions are known to exist, minefield activation delays of

up to 3 days may be needed to allow the mines to settle.

Currents can also cause problems for moored mines,

causing the mine case to dip below its planned depth.

The amount of dip is determined by the current speed

and the amount of cable between the case and the anchor.

2.7.7 Seawater Temperature. High seawater temperature can reduce the life of a mine’s battery. However,

this is a concern only if the mine requires its maximum

possible life prior to sterilization.

2.7.8 Water Transparency. Water transparency

varies between operational areas and is dependent upon

the amount of light, absorption of light, and scattering

of light by particles suspended in the water. In very

clear water, the mines will become more visible to spot,

and can then be more easily countered or avoided.

2.7.9 Marine Life. Marine life fouling can degrade

the performance of acoustic sensors and marine life can

produce an increase in the ambient background noise.

2-17 ORIGINAL
Marine growth can also cause an increase in the amount

that a moored mine case dips.

2.7.10 Bottom Conditions

2.7.10.1 Topography. Slopes may allow a bottom

mine to roll out of position and may cause a moored

mine anchor to walk to the bottom of the slope. A rough

bottom or a cluttered bottom may increase sonar reverberation, decreasing the effectiveness of MCM minehunting operations. A rough bottom can also reduce

mine rolling.

2.7.10.2 Bottom Type. The nature of the bottom

affects the degree to which a bottom mine will bury itself. In general, a soft bottom, conducive to burial, is

desirable for several reasons. First, a fully or partially

buried mine is more difficult to locate by mine hunting

methods. Second, some degree of burial will lessen the

likelihood of movement (and resultant spurious actuation)

ORIGINAL 2-18

ENVIRONMENT EFFECTS ON MINEFIELD

FACTORS DEPEND ON GROUND MINE MECHANISMS MOORED

CONTACT OR

ACOUSTIC MAGNETIC PRESSURE INFLUENCE

BACKGROUND

NOISE

Marine life,

swell, waves,

tide, rain

Field effectiveness reduced.

Adjust sensitivity settings

Little/none Little/none Same as for

ground mine

MAGNETIC

FIELD

Magnetic

storms causing

short period

fluctuations

Little/none Comparatively

insignificant.

DSTs may

actuate

Little/none Same as for

ground mine

MINE BURIAL Bottom material, current,

mine mass, water depth, layer

Little effect Signal attenuation; shallow:

adjust sensitivity, deep: do

not use

Burial > 1 meter

may impede

operation of

delay rising

mechanism

BOTTOM

PRESSURE

Waves, swell Little/none Little/none Stresses sensor, reduces

sensitivity, aids

MCM

Little/none

CURRENTS

AND TIDES

Mine burial,

mine rolling

Mine burial,

mine rolling

Mine burial,

mine rolling

Dip depth of

mine below surface, mine

walking

FOULING Current,

temperature

Signal

attenuation

Little/none Unlikely to be

affected

Greater dip,

mooring

switches fouled,

bioluminescence

TRANSPARENCY

Water movement, bottom

sediment

Visual detection by diver, television, helicopter,

and/or surface

Detection enhanced in shallow clear water

Figure 2-1. Environmental Conditions in Mining
of the mine in the presence of strong bottom currents.

Burial has little or no effect on the sensitivity of a mine

firing actuated by magnetic influence. However, acoustic and pressure influences may be attenuated by burial.

Delayed rising moored mines may be adversely affected by soft bottoms, since separation of the case

from the anchor at the end of the delay period may be

inhibited. Knowledge of the bottom type allows the

planner to determine whether burial will occur.

There are three types of burial: impact, scouring, and

sand-ridge migration.

1. Impact burial occurs as the mine first strikes the

bottom. The amount of burial is dependent upon

impact angle, impact speed, bottom composition, and the weight of the weapon. The bottom

grain size will contribute to the amount of burial.

A decrease in the grain size of the bottom material will usually result in a higher degree of

burial.

2. Scouring occurs as a result of bottom sediment

being removed from around the bottom mine.

This is normally found in areas with sandy bottoms, and is caused by surface wave action. Sediment is eroded from either end of the mine,

creating a pit that continues to expand until the

mine settles into the pit. The sediments then

cover the mine.

3. Sand-ridge migration is another form of burial

that is induced by strong currents. The bottom

sand ridges migrate in the direction of the water

currents at a speed dependent upon the speed of

the current and the sand grain size.

2.7.11 Magnetic Environment. Magnetic influence mines are affected by changes in the earth’s magnetic fields, which may be caused by environmental

effects such as sunspots.

2-19 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

CHAPTER 3

Mine Countermeasures

3.1 GENERAL

MCM are classified as either offensive (proactive) or

defensive (enabling). Offensive MCM are preventive

in nature: because they are intended to prevent mines

from being laid, they eliminate the requirement for defensive MCM. The effective execution of offensive

countermeasures can eliminate or substantially reduce

the degree of risk from mines that must be borne by operating forces, warships and submarines, and merchant

shipping, as well as mine warfare ships, systems, and

personnel.

Defensive MCM are classified as either passive or

active. Passive MCM are dynamic measures that tend

to prevent interaction between the mine and target. Active MCM are reactive in nature and involve interfacing

directly with mines.

Figure 3-1 is illustrative of the relationships within

this warfare specialty.

3.2 OFFENSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES

The concept of offensive MCM is to render ineffective one or more of the critical links in the minelaying

process. This normally means destroying or disabling

mines before they can be laid, or destroying the enemy’s capability to lay mines and thereby preventing

the establishment of an operational minefield. Mining

can also be used as an offensive MCM tactic to trap surface minelayers in port. Offensive MCM should be an

integral part of any OPLAN and, to prevent mining,

must be considered by the battle group commander

very early in the planning stages.

3.2.1 Offensive Mine Countermeasures by

Strike Assets. Offensive operations against enemy

mine storing, handling, and laying capabilities need to

be included in the campaign plan. In addition, during a

period of impending hostilities, the MIWC should recommend that ROE allowing surveillance and interdiction of enemy mine laying be considered. Offensive

MCM is usually executed by strike or special operations

forces who have the capability to deliver an attack on

mine storage facilities, loading or transportation facilities, or minelaying assets. While MCM assets have several techniques for countering mines once they are laid,

no MCM asset has sufficient offensive weapons capability to conduct offensive MCM.

Intelligence is critical to successful offensive MCM.

Strike planners need to know location, types of mines,

fortification of the storage facility, and defense systems. Among the peacetime requirements for intelligence collection is the number, types, and location of

mine stocks throughout the world. Whenever there are

indications of potential hostility with a belligerent

country, monitoring of known mine storage facilities

should be high on the intelligence priority list. Early indications of mine movement can be detected and delivery countered if appropriate priority and planning are

given to the mine element of naval warfare. As part of

his planning, the MIWC must identify intelligence gaps

and prioritize collection requirements to increase his

knowledge of the enemy’s MIW plans. Overt surveillance of an enemy may act as a deterrent.

Once movement is detected, offensive MCM against

the transfer or loading operation is frequently a short

notice, time critical event. The determination that loading is in progress must be followed within a matter of

hours by the complete sequence of strike planning, approval, and execution if the offensive MCM operation

is to be successful. Delay may result in striking after the

mine movement is complete. Complicating the problem is the likelihood that if hostile intent exists, the

transfer of mines will be carried out surreptitiously in

darkness or using deceptive methods (as was the case

with the Iraqis in Operations Desert Shield and Desert

Storm).

The same is true for detection of minelaying operations. If the strike capability is not on-scene when mine

laying is detected, it is likely that mines will be deployed

before any offensive countermeasures can be made. In

international waters, the ROE may permit a response

without communication with higher authority, but in the

national/territorial waters of another nation, delay can

3-1 ORIGINAL
be expected in obtaining permission to strike even if the

capability is at hand.

To improve the chances of mounting a successful

strike on transfer or laying operations, the commander

might seek advance approval for strikes where mine

storage has been identified but the ROE will not permit

preemptive strike. With advance approval, the strike can

be planned and executed in a more timely manner. Attack air strike assets may still require a few hours, but a

TLAM attack can be executed very quickly.

3.2.2 Mining as an Offensive Mine Countermeasures Tactic. Where a direct assault on mine

stockpiles or minelaying assets is not feasible, offensive mining may be used to prevent the effective employment of minelaying assets.

ORIGINAL 3-2

MAGNETIC SIGNATURE

CONTROL

PRESSURE SIGNATURE

REDUCTION

DETECTION & AVOIDANCE HULL SHOCK RESISTANCE

PROTECTIVE MEASURES

PRECISE NAVIGATION

REDUCE THE RISK

NAV WARNINGS

CONVOYS

Q-ROUTE SYSTEM

LOCALIZE THE THREAT

ROUTE SURVEY ARCHIVE

RECONNAISSANCE

SURVEILLANCE

INTELLIGENCE

LOCATE THE THREAT

PASSIVE

DEFENSIVE

MINING MCM

ACTIVE

MINE HUNTING

OFFENSIVE

STRIKE MINE STOCKS

STRIKE MINE LAYERS

MINE THE MINE LAYERS

AHEAD LOOKING SONAR

MMS

MMS

DIVER/SWIMMER MINE NEUTRALIZATION

AERIAL SEARCH

SIDE SCAN SONAR

MNS DIVER/SWIMMER

EOD MINE RECOVERY

MINE

EXPLOITATION

MINESWEEPING

MECHANICAL MAGNETIC

ACOUSTIC COMBINATION

GUINEA PIG SWEEPING

BRUTE FORCE CLEARANCE

MINE WARFARE

JAMMING & SPOOFING

ACOUSTIC SIGNATURE

CONTROL

Figure 3-1. MCM Family Tree
Depending on the types of mines available to the enemy, aircraft, surface vessels, or submarines may be

used to lay mines. An offensive MCM effort against

minelaying air assets is a more difficult task requiring

the closing of all enemy airfields and support facilities

that support mining aircraft or helicopters. Strike assets

performing this mission face the same threat as if they

were conducting direct strikes on the laying aircraft.

Offensive mining against surface or submarine laying

assets is a simpler task. Mines laid in the loading ports or

approaches can target craft of any size, and the sinking of

one ship in the channel may be sufficient to stop all other

traffic, including surface minelayers. Mining on the

flanks of the operating area can help deny access to hostile surface and subsurface minelayers.

3.3 DEFENSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES

The objective of defensive MCM is to reduce the effectiveness of existing minefields. Defensive MCM is

divided into two categories: passive and active. Passive

defensive MCM includes all measures that reduce the

effectiveness of mines without physically removing the

mine. Active defensive MCM includes those measures

that reduce the effectiveness of minefields by removing

mines, destroying them in place, or neutralizing them.

3.4 PASSIVE MINE COUNTERMEAUSRES

This chapter will concentrate on passive MCM as

practiced by MCM vessels or an organized MCM planning staff. Chapter 4 describes passive MCM measures

for non-MCM vessels.

Passive MCM can be divided into three categories:

locating the threat, localizing the threat, and reducing

the risk.

3.4.1 Locating the Threat. Locating the mine threat

requires some of the same actions as were necessary to

support offensive MCM. First is a long-term intelligence

collection effort to determine who has mines, where they

have them, and where they intend to or are capable of laying them.

This must be followed by increased surveillance in

times of heightened tensions to determine when mine

laying is in progress and to chart as accurately as possible where the mines are being laid. Prior to the development of a long-range, stealthy minelaying capability

using submarines or aircraft, visual mine watching was

an effective surveillance method. A coast watcher spotting ships or aircraft dropping objects into the water

would plot the splash positions, which would help to

define the limits of an MDA. Although this technique is

still effective, modern technology has surpassed it.

Today’s surveillance methods involve satellite- and

aircraft-based long range electronic systems that, if

properly alerted, can track the minelayer from airfield

or port departure to arrival at the minefield. Long range

assets can then trigger tactical surveillance assets to

pinpoint the minelaying operation. The MCM commander’s involvement is to actively pursue intelligence

collection, dissemination, and analysis that will provide timely support to his primary mission.

The third step in locating the threat is reconnaissance

to determine whether mines are actually in place and, if

so, the types of mines and the extent of the minefield. If

the first two steps have been successful, reconnaissance

may be performed by MCM assets. When the first steps

fail, initial reconnaissance will most likely be performed by unprepared merchant or naval ships and the

mining incident will be documented by damage reports.

The critical link in successful location of the threat is

effective employment of intelligence assets. Where the

likelihood of conflict is increasing, mine detection must

have sufficient priority to keep mine stockpiles and

minelayers under frequent inspection.

Route survey operations are also used to locate the

threat. The primary goal of route survey is to compile an

archive of minelike contacts and other significant sonar

contacts before any mining has taken place. This permits

the ship, upon returning to the area, to conduct rapid exploratory operations along the route and sort out new contacts that might be mines. Contacts that correlate by

position as well as appearance to previously archived contacts can be bypassed. Critical to the success of route survey operations is the availability of a precise navigation

system of a common type for all MCM assets. Without a

common system, the minor variations in position between

different navigation systems will result in a loss of ability

to correlate sonar contacts to the data archive positions.

As part of route survey operations, channel conditioning may be performed. Channel conditioning is the

removal of objects that provide a minelike sonar target

from the channel area. Once conditioning is completed,

the channel should be clear of any objects causing

minelike echoes. Channel conditioning is not normally

practiced by U.S. Navy MCM forces.

3.4.2 Localizing the Threat. Localizing the mine

threat means reducing the area in which shipping may

be exposed to mines and thereby reducing the area that

MCM forces must cover to protect shipping. Efforts to

localize the threat do not depend on successful location

of a specific threat, but can be carried out in advance of

3-3 ORIGINAL
hostilities as well as during a conflict before mining has

been detected.

The most effective method of localizing the threat is

to establish a Q-route system for shipping to use when

transiting mineable waters. Q-routes are preplanned

shipping channels that transit over bottom areas best

suited for mine hunting. Each Q-route is 1,000 yards

wide (where not restricted by water depth or obstructions) and connects with other routes that permit shipping to transit from port to port or from port to deep

water and back.

The following is an example of the value of a

Q-route system (Figure 3-2):

Assume that two ports are 10 miles apart (or

that a port is 10 miles from deep water) and

the navigable body of water is 10 miles wide.

If ships are free to travel along any track, the

area that requires MCM effort is 100 square

miles. By establishing a Q-route one-half of

a mile wide, the area is reduced to 5 square

miles. Assuming that the Q-route is sufficient to accommodate all the traffic and

that the ships follow the route, mines laid

outside the route are not an immediate threat

and can be dealt with as time permits.

With or without a Q-route, if ships are directed to

travel in convoys, MCM forces can be scheduled to

prepare a channel and, if necessary, check it for

reseeding or delayed moored mines just before the convoy’s transit. Even when no MCM can be applied, the

threat to traffic is reduced if all ships follow the same

route because the traffic exposes itself to only a fraction

of the mines present. This technique is called

channelization.

For those ships not traveling in convoys and for Convoy Commanders, a navigation warning message system is used to provide information on suspected or confirmed minefields, cleared channels, or other important

ORIGINAL 3-4

Q-ROUTE

1⁄2 nm x 10 nm = 5nm area to be cleared 2

100 fathoms

Port

Potential Mined Area

10 nm x 10 nm = 100 nm area to be cleared 2

Figure 3-2. Localization of Threat by Q-Route
navigation information. The MCM commander assists

the OTC or area commander by maintaining a mine

sighting list, designating MDAs where necessary, and

reporting the status of channels that MCM forces have

been directed to clear.

3.4.3 Reducing the Risk. The primary passive

methods of reducing the risk for MCM forces are precise navigation and practicing influence signature control. Before the widespread use of satellite navigation,

risk reduction included altering navigation aids so that

the minelayer would be fooled into putting mines in the

wrong location. Since the minelayer may not depend on

navigation lights or local radio beacons, this tactic is no

longer as effective as before.

The availability of precise navigation for use by MCM

forces, as well as traffic ships, has resulted in a significant

reduction of risk for MCM forces. MCM units using GPS

P-code are able to pass contact locations from unit to unit

and successfully relocate those contacts without significant searching. The consistency of the GPS and the precise navigation and plotting systems now available to

SMCM and AMCM units allow a unit to hunt or sweep a

track and return to that same track later with confidence

that the track the unit is on is the same area that was previously covered, not 50 or 100 yards to either side in

uncleared waters. This risk reduction also extends to traffic ships using GPS. A GPS-equipped ship can transit

without a leadthrough vessel when provided the coordinates of the cleared channel.

An MCM ship is expected to maneuver in proximity

to all kinds of mines. Contact mines can be seen on sonar and avoided, but there are occasions when an MCM

ship will maneuver within the sensing range of influence mines. Consequently, the MCM ship must have a

magnetic and acoustic signature much smaller than the

signature most mines will be intended to target. The

greatest danger to an MCM ship is a shallow moored

mine or a sensitive-set influence mine.

The magnetic silencing requirements for MCM

ships are set by the ship Class Top Level Requirements

Document and the OPNAV 8950.2 series instruction. A

dedicated effort must be maintained to keep the ship’s

acoustic and magnetic signatures as low as possible and

to complete all degaussing, ranging, and adjustment requirements. MCM vessels are scheduled for degaussing ranging to update their certification as close as

possible to scheduled deployments, but there are only a

few certified ranges where quarterly updates can be accomplished. U.S. Navy ranges capable of measuring

MCM ships are located in Charleston, SC, and San Diego,

CA. (The Charleston range may be relocated to Ingleside,

TX.) Other ranges that could be used are located in

Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom. A portable degaussing check range was used by British forces during

Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf. Several portable ranges are being procured by PEO MINEWAR.

Acoustic silencing of MCM ships is much less defined.

The Class Top Level Requirements Document includes a

requirement for the ship’s acoustic signature, but there is

no periodic measuring requirement. Each ship is expected

to follow good maintenance practices and keep equipment

vibration isolation mounts in good working order.

Ships may be equipped with systems intended to protect the ship from influence mines by jamming and

spoofing mine sensors. If a mine sensor is designed to be

resistant to influence sweeping by signal processing, the

mine may be rendered temporarily ineffective by generating signals that cause the mine to shut down or make a

false target determination rather than properly detect the

ship. With the resulting protection from influence mine

sensors, an MCM ship may be able to successfully maneuver in a minefield for hunting or sweeping, or a traffic ship may transit a channel with less risk.

Systems that are designed for detection of mines with

the intention of avoiding the mine rather than prosecuting it are also classified as passive MCM. Detection and

avoidance of mines are less risky (whenever avoidance

is feasible) than active MCM. In the case of MCM

forces, avoidance is usually a temporary measure, but for

other combatants it is a valid tactic. Additional discussion of detection and avoidance is included in Chapter 4.

3.5 ACTIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES

The two main subsets of active MCM are mine hunting and minesweeping.

3.5.1 Mine Hunting. Mine hunting is determining

the location of individual mines so that countermeasures may be taken to avoid, remove, render harmless,

or destroy each mine. It is a one-on-one operation, unlike sweeping, during which process all mines in the

swept path are addressed at the same time.

Mine hunting performance is not affected by the

type of mine firing mechanism in the mine, the sensitivity settings of the mechanism, ship count settings, or

arming delays. Even delayed mooring mines can be detected by a bottom search.

Mine hunting operations are affected by the degree to

which mines are buried, mine casing construction and

3-5 ORIGINAL
material, clutter on the sea bottom, and many other environmental factors.

3.5.1.1 Mine Hunting Process. The mine hunting process includes the following:

1. Detection — Potential minelike contacts are

noted for further investigation.

2. Classification — The detected contact is further

investigated, usually with a higher resolution sonar, and classified as a MILC or NOMBO.

Equipment operators use all available features

of the mine hunting system to examine a contact,

possibly maneuvering to view a different aspect

of the object. If the contact cannot be classified

nonminelike with confidence, it will be called a

MILC until identification proves otherwise.

3. Localization — The contact position is refined

and plotted as precisely as possible (specifying

navigation sensor, datum, and position in latitude/ longitude to a thousandth of a minute) so

that further prosecution can be carried out either

immediately or at a later time. MCM forces use

the WGS-84 datum as measured by GPS P-code

as the standard reference system.

4. Identification — The contact is investigated either

by an EODMCM diver or ROV using video camera and sonar. Identification should be made using

an optical system so that a positive ID of the mine

can be made. This prevents expenditure of neutralization efforts and charges on nonthreatening objects. It also keeps the MCM forces from assuming

a minefield exists where there is none.

5. Neutralization — The mine is either rendered inoperative or removed from the area. Paragraph

3.5.4 provides details of neutralization methods.

Though not a step in the mine hunting process, the

prosecution of a contact should not be considered complete until details of the mine contact are reported to the

MCM Commander using standard MCM reporting

formats.

Since a neutralization charge does not provide positive evidence of success on the surface or on sonar, it is

important to confirm, by diver or ROV inspection, that

mines have indeed been neutralized. Verification may

be performed immediately after neutralization if the

operation is not on a critical time schedule. Otherwise,

it should be done as an administrative cleanup action

after the MCM objective has been attained.

3.5.1.2 Types of Mine Hunting. Acoustic mine

hunting is the use of active sonars (including marine

mammals) to find objects with minelike characteristics.

SMCM and AMCM mine hunting sonars use a video

display of the acoustic signal only and do not use audio,

as is common in ASW sonars. Acoustic mine hunting is

effective against mines with metallic cases or other

cases that provide sufficient echo. Mines partially buried in mud or sand can be detected up to a point in marginal environmental conditions. The Mk 7 Mod 1

Marine Mammal System can be used to locate buried

mines. Moored mines can be located by detection of the

case, by detection of the anchor, or by the echo from the

mine mooring cable.

Magnetic mine hunting is the use of magnetic detectors to find ferro-magnetic mines proud of the sea bed

or buried. The detection range of magnetic systems is

typically very short, making them unsuitable for

mounting in ships. Devices that are towed close to the

sea bottom have been tested. The difficulty with magnetic detectors is classifying contacts as minelike. With

a simple magnetic detector, the only indication is the

relative signature of the magnetic object. Currently no

magnetic mine hunting systems are operational for

shipboard or aircraft use. Developmental programs are

in progress that link magnetic detectors with sonar and

other sensors attempting to develop an effective combination. There are diver-carried magnetic locators, but

these have limite d use in MCM operations.

Optical mine hunting is the use of visual, optical, or

electro-optical systems to find mines on the surface, in

the volume, or on the sea bed. The primary limiting factor with optical systems is the poor light transmission

quality of seawater. The air bubbles, marine life, and

suspended matter in seawater scatter light rays very

quickly so that light wave frequencies visible to the human eye do not perform well. Even so, the best operational optical system is a visual search. Conducted from

a helicopter, a visual search can be effective against

mines on or near the surface. Ships’ lookouts are also

effective against mines on the surface if properly

trained, equipped, and stationed. Chapter 4 provides

additional detail on visual search methods and equipment. Developmental programs are underway for dedicated mine detection systems that use laser optics and

infrared frequencies, but none is fielded yet.

Detection of mines on the surface, particularly drifting mines, has also been attempted using aircraft radar

systems. Results have not indicated radar to be a dependable method for detection, although some success

has been observed.

ORIGINAL 3-6
3.5.1.3 U.S. Mine Hunting Systems. The AN/

SQQ-30 Mine Hunting Sonar is a trainable variable

depth sonar developed from the AN/SQQ-14 sonar used

for many years on MSOs. It is deployed by cable through

the ship’s hull and can be operated at various depths to

obtain the best contact detection configuration. It is a

dual-frequency sonar using one frequency for detection

and a higher frequency for classification. The

AN/SQQ-30 search and classify transducers are mechanically trained and are not individually trainable.

Consequently, when the classify operator has control of

the sonar, the detection operator can only search in the

sector where the contact is being classified. The

AN/SQQ-30 sonar is installed on MCM Class ships 2-9

and will be replaced in the future by the AN/SQQ-32.

The AN/SQQ-32 Mine Hunting Sonar (Figure 3-3)

is also a trainable VDS developed for deep-water minehunting. It also deploys by cable through the ship’s

hull, but has a longer cable and greater depth capability

(for system characteristics, refer to NWP 3-15.11 (formerly NWP 27-2), NWP 3-15.61 (formerly NWP

65-10), or NWP 3-15.62 (formerly NWP 65-32)). In

addition to separate detection and classification frequencies, the AN/SQQ-32 has a choice of three classification frequencies that permit better adjustment to the

environment. The sonar’s search transducer covers 360°

with electronic scanning while the classify transducer is

mechanically steered independently of the search transducer. The AN/SQQ-32 has computer-aided detection

capabilities that assist the operator when in a high clutter

environment. The AN/SQQ-32 is installed on MCM 1

and MCMs 10 to 14, as well as all MHC 51 Class ships.

The AN/AQS-14 Sonar Detecting Set (Figure 3-4) is a

cable-towed side-scan sonar operated by the MH-53E

AMCM helicopter at a tow speed of 7 to 20 knots. It has a

video waterfall display for the on-board operator, and the sonar data is recorded on magnetic tape for postmission analysis.

The AN/PQS-2A Sonar is a hand-held model used

by EOD divers for locating contacts. It provides an audio tone to the diver through earphones, which enables

him to localize a contact within the sonar beam.

The primary magnetic locating device used for

MCM is the Mk 25 Ordnance Locator. This is used by

EODMCM forces to locate ferrous objects. It has a relatively short range and is therefore more of a localization device than a minehunting system.

3.5.1.4 Mine Hunting Procedure. General MCM

procedure is to mine hunt when conditions permit and

mine sweep when mine hunting is not feasible. This is

based on the fact that mine hunting in a favorable environment is safer for the MCM assets than minesweeping.

When mine hunting, the ship is detecting the mine prior

to coming within range of the influence sensors. When

minesweeping, the ship must pass over the mine (or

nearby when using a diverted sweep) before the sweep

takes effect. Consequently, when the environment permits reasonable detection ranges and mine burial is not

significant, mine hunting is the optimal technique.

There are two approaches to the mine hunting process

that can be followed. One is to have the unit that makes

the detection carry out the neutralization prior to proceeding to the next detection. This is commonly referred to as

the “blow as you go” procedure and is usually followed by

the SMCM, since it has the option of employing the Mine

Neutralization Vehicle or EODMCM divers, if embarked.

The other approach is to have one unit conduct the

detection-to-localization process and a different unit carry

out the identification and neutralization. This procedure is

known as “bumper pool.” Since AMCM helicopters do

not have a neutralization capability, they must follow this

second procedure. SMCM ships may also use this procedure when separate vessels or helicopters are being used

to support EODMCM teams. This procedure can speed

up the detection process and permit the mine hunting assets to move on to other tasking or areas. Prior to the availability of GPS navigation, the relocation of contacts was

sometimes a lengthy process and not always successful.

However, since GPS is available to all MCM units, successful relocations have become routine.

3.5.2 Mechanical Minesweeping. Mechanical

minesweeping is an MCM technique in which the

sweep equipment physically contacts the mine or its appendages and removes the mine from the minefield.

The simplest form of mechanical sweep gear is a drag

chain with barbs, hooks, or other attachments that can

snag the control cables of control mines. Another relatively simple sweep is a catenary sweep, that is the use

of one or two ships towing a net or wire catenary to

scoop up mines and drag them to a designated dump

area. The net is effective against all moored mines, and

in smooth bottom conditions it can be used to clear bottom and closely tethered moored mines.

An oropesa sweep consists of one depressor wire

and two sweep wires towed astern at a preselected

scope and diverted to the sides. The depth at the forward end of the wire is determined by the scope of depressor wire streamed. The ends of the sweep wire are

spread by otters (also called kites or diverters), which

pull outboard under hydrodynamic load. The depth of

the end of the sweep wire (otter depth) is determined by

the length of a pendant that connects the otter to a surface

float. Various pendant lengths are carried or can be made

3-7 ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 3-8

Figure 3-3. AN/SQQ-32 Minehunting Sonar

ELECTRO-MECHANICAL

TOW CABLE

SONAR BODY

Figure 3-4. MH-53E with AN/AQS-14 Sonar
up on the ship. Mooring cables are cut either by abrasion by the sweep wire or mechanical or explosive cutters mounted on sweep wire, which can sever mooring

cables from 1/4-inch cable to 1 1/2-inch chain.

Against moored mines, oropesa mechanical sweeps

are designed to cut the mooring cable so that the mine

comes to the surface. Unless the mine has some

antidisturb function or antirecover hydrostatic actuator,

once the mooring is cut, the mine is converted to a drifting mine (usually still functional). These drifting mines

must be disposed of, preferably by EODMCM divers

operating from another ship or helicopter.

In mechanical sweeping by surface ships, the ship is

obliged to transit the mined area before the sweep, actuating any moored mines less than the ship’s draft.

AMCM helicopters can mechanically sweep without

being exposed to the mines. Consequently, modern tactics dictate a precursory sweep by AMCM assets for

sweeper safety or require sweeping the first track in

safe water with the sweep diverted into the mined area.

The AN/SLQ-38 Mechanical Minesweep System (in

Figure 3-5) is an oropesa sweep installed on the

MCM-1 Class. Sweep characteristics are provided in

NWP 3-15.11 (formerly NWP 27-2).

The DMS is a variation of the AN/SLQ-38 sweep in

which the wire is streamed on one side only and an extra depressor is used. The swept path is narrower, but

the depth can be increased. This sweep has also been referred to as the Single Ship Deep Sweep. The IDMS

variation of the AN/SLQ-38 sweep hooks the sweep

wire from two ships together to be towed like a catenary

sweep. Depths of 2,000 feet can be reached using this

sweep, but it is difficult to be sure of the swept path. If a

third ship is available, it may use sonar to track the

sweep and vector it towards mine contacts.

The Mk-103 Mechanical Sweep is a modified

oropesa-style sweep used by AMCM helicopters. The

depth of this sweep is determined entirely by selecting pendants that attach the sweep wire to surface floats at several

points. This sweep may also be towed by the MCAC.

A new sweep system developed to provide increased

depth capability for AMCM use is the A/N37-U Controlled Depth Sweep shown in Figure 3-6. It is similar in

design to oropesa gear, but depth is determined by control surfaces on the depressor and otters. One depressor

and each otter has a water-driven turbine generator that

powers control circuitry. Depth sensors are used to

vary the control surfaces and maintain the indicated

depth. Additional depressors, without adjustable surfaces, may be necessary as depth increases. No surface

floats are required.

The AN/SLQ-53 Single Ship Deep Sweep is a surface version of the A/N-37U packaged as a modular

mechanical sweep for the MHC 51 Class ships. A

palletized winch mounts on the ship’s fantail along

with storage containers for the sweep gear. The towed

gear is identical to the aircraft towed gear.

3.5.3 Influence Minesweeping. Influence mine

sweeping is intended to satisfy the mine sensor and

have it detonate at a safe distance from the sweeper. Influence mine sweeping includes magnetic influence,

acoustic influence, and combination influence sweeping. There is no minesweeping system for pressure mine

sensors. If pressure sensors are encountered, mine hunting is the technique that should be used. The alternative

is a guinea pig ship that can satisfy the pressure sensor

and detonate the mines. These ships are usually modified

cargo ships with additional flotation material to prevent

them from sinking and blocking a channel. The guinea

pig is intended to absorb the damage from several mine

detonations before being repaired or scrapped.

There are two tactical approaches to influence mine

sweeping. One is to take advantage of the weaknesses in

the target discrimination ability of mines by producing

an influence signature that will sweep all mines in the

field of a particular type or setting. This allows the use of

high-energy sources that have large sweep widths even

though the signatures are not exactly ship-like. To determine the required sweep characteristics, exploitation and

analysis must have been conducted on the mines. U.S.

Navy influence sweeps are designed for this tactic.

The other approach is to produce an influence signature that emulates the type of ship expected to transit

and sweep all mines that are a threat to that ship. The

emulation approach does not require knowledge of the

mines present, but it does require knowledge of the specific signature of transiting ships and may require a

more sophisticated sweep system.

3.5.3.1 Magnetic Minesweeping. In magnetic

mine sweeping, whether single-influence or combinationinfluence minesweeping (which includes a magnetic

component), the magnetic field of the surface minesweeper must be small enough to let it pass over the

mine without satisfying the mine sensor. Also, the magnetic field generated by the sweep must be far enough

astern of the sweeper so that a magnetic mine is not actuated until the ship is at a safe distance. When a mine

has a shipcount setting, the magnetic field of some

sweeps can be pulsed to simulate several ships passing.

3-9 ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 3-10

DEPRESSOR

SWEEP WIRE

INTERMEDIATE

CUTTERS

END CUTTER

MK 9

OTTER

SIZE 1 FLOAT

Figure 3-5. AN/SLQ-38 Mechanical Sweep
3-11 ORIGINAL

AN/SLQ-53 MODULAR

WINCH

FORWARD

ROLL

TAB

ROLL

TAB

ALTERNATOR

CONTROL

TAB

STARBOARD OTTER

STARBOARD OTTER

FAIRED SWEEP WIRE

BARE SWEEP WIRE

PORT OTTER

PORT OTTER

A/N-37-U

AUXILIARY

DEPRESSOR(S)

(1 TO 4)

DEPRESSOR

MK 17 MOD 1

CUTTER(S)

TOW LINE ASSEMBLY

SWEEP WIRE ASSEMBLY

Figure 3-6. A/N37-U Controlled Depth Sweep / AN/SLQ-53 Single Ship Deep Sweep
ORIGINAL 3-12

ACOUSTIC

POWER CABLE

K-4 ELECTRODE

QUAD CABLE

SWEEP WIRE

END CUTTER

MK 9

K-4 ELECTRODE

MAGNETIC

CABLE

OTTER

ACOUSTIC DEVICE

TB 27

SIZE 1 FLOAT

SIZE 1 FLOAT

Figure 3-7. AN/SLQ-37 Combination Influence Sweep
Otherwise the minesweeper must make multiple runs

on each track to account for all sweepable mines.

There are two types of magnetic sweeps used, those

that are natural magnets and those that generate a magnetic field by passing an electrical current through

some system of wire cables or coils.

The AN/SLQ-37(v)3 Influence Sweep System (Figure 3-7) is used on the MCM-1 Class and generates a

magnetic field around a cable (tail) streamed astern of

the MCM vessel. The major components are a

5,000-amp DC or AC gas turbine generator, an Influence Mine-sweeping Waveform Generator, and the

Magnetic Sweep Cable assembly. The waveform generator regulates the minesweep generator current flow

direction, rate of change, and duration. Waveforms created by the controller determine the characteristics of

the magnetic sweep field. The Magnetic Sweep Cable

(tail) consists of four rubber-insulated conductors

and two uninsulated electrode sections. The conductors are quadded from the connection on the ship to a

point astern where the first electrode is attached.

Quadding tends to cancel the magnetic field of each

wire so that the sweeper is not endangered. From the

point where the quadding ends, the cable assembly

forms a large loop through which current is passed.

The current flow causes a magnetic field to be

generated that simulates the field produced by a ship.

The following standard cable configurations are used:

1. The M-Mk 5(a) Open Loop Straight Tail is the

basic configuration. The tail is streamed behind

the ship with two uninsulated, nonbuoyant electrodes attached. Seawater is used to complete the

electric circuit. This configuration is effective

against vertical component mine sensors and,

depending on the environmental conditions,

some horizontal component sensors.

2. In the M-MK 6(a) Open Loop Diverted Sweep

configuration, the long leg of the sweep is diverted to one side using a diverter wire, float,

and otter. This improves the sweep effectiveness, making it effective against both horizontal

and vertical component mines, and shifts the

magnetic sweep signature to one side of the ship.

3. The M-MK 6(h) Closed Loop Diverted Sweep

configuration replaces the open electrodes with

an insulated connection link, providing a closed

circuit that does not rely on water as a conductive path. This configuration is used where the

water has low conductivity, such as fresh or

brackish waters.

3-13 ORIGINAL

TOW CABLE

(INCLUDES REFUELING HOSE AND

SWEEP CONTROL ELECTRICAL CABLE)

TURBINE GENERATOR

PLATFORM

450 FOOT

BUOYANT MAGNETIC

CABLE

150 FOOT

ELECTRODES

Figure 3-8. MH-53E with Mk-105 Magnetic Minesweeping System
The SAM is a Swedish-built, diesel-propelled,

remote-control catamaran craft. It has two pontoon

hulls built of foam-filled GRP with built- in solenoid

coils. The center platform, which supports the propulsion system and generator, also has a closed-loop

coil around the perimeter. The SAM is used in shallow

water or inshore operations but is limited by speed and

sea state for open-water operations.

The SPU-1/W MOP is a towed magnetic sweep that

was developed for AMCM use in shallow water, as well

as fresh and brackish water. The MOP is a ferrous metal

pipe that is 30 feet long, 10 3/4 inches in diameter, and

weighs 1,000 pounds. It is filled with polystyrene foam

to provide buoyancy and is capped at both ends with

padeyes to allow towing from either end. The MOP must

be remagnetized using a magnetic coil prior to each mission. It does not have a large magnetic field and is limited to use in water where other sweeps cannot be used.

Up to three MOPs may be towed together by the

MK-53E helicopter to increase the coverage provided.

The Mk-105 Magnetic Minesweeping System (Figure

3-8) is a hydrofoil sled towed by the MH-53E AMCM helicopter. Mounted on the sled is a 2,000-amp gas turbine

generator. The generator functions are controlled from the

helicopter, and constant current or pulsed modes are available. The in-water portion of the sweep is an open loop

electrode set. The device will sweep both vertical and horizontal component mines in water as shallow as 12 feet.

Components of the Mk-105 system are used when

outfitting an MCAC (LCAC converted for MCM operations) for magnetic sweeping.

3.5.3.2 Acoustic Mine weeping. Acoustic mine

sweeping is that portion of influence minesweeping involved in generating an acoustic signal to satisfy a passive acoustic mine sensor and may also include systems

to respond to active acoustic sensors.

Acoustic sweep systems may be simple mechanical

devices, combination electromechanical devices, or all

electronic devices.

U.S. Navy Acoustic Sweep Systems include the

following:

1. A-MK-2(g) Rattlebars are a mechanical sweep

consisting of closely fixed parallel pipes towed

through the water. Water flowing through the

pipes creates a venturi effect, which causes the

pipes to bang together and produce the acoustic

output. The acoustic frequency generated is uncontrolled medium- to high-frequency broadband

noise. The sweep is very effective but has a

small actuation width because of limited volume. Frequency and volume are dependent on

tow speed, but the device will self-destruct if

towed too fast. An A-MK-2(g) is used in shallow water to simulate hull noise and cavitation.

2. The AN/SLQ-37 Influence Sweep System (acoustic components) is an old technology electromechanical system installed on the MCM-1 Class

ships. It has an Acoustic Controller on the ship,

which provides power via the tow cable to operate

towed devices. Control options include steady

state operation, modulated operation (which is

continuous operation with alternating high and

low output levels), and pulsed operation (which is

cycles of high-level output followed by an off

period). There are two towed devices:

3. The TB 26, originally called A-MK-6(b), is a

low-frequency device that contains electrically

driven eccentric oscillating diaphragms to create

the acoustic signal. The eccentrics can be

changed to alter the frequency range.

4. The TB-27, originally called A-MK-4(v), is a

medium frequency device with an electric motordriven hammer striking a steel diaphragm to

cause broadband noise. It can be operated in

steady, pulsed, or modulated patterns.

5. Mk-104 Acoustic Minesweeping Gear is towed

by MH-53E AMCM helicopters. It consists of

an upper buoyant section and a lower soundproducing mechanism. The lower section contains

two rotating disks inside venturi tube assemblies.

Water flow causes the disks to rotate and cause a

cavitation effect in the venturi tube. This produces a

steady acoustic output. A drag brake system permits

the output frequency to be preset before the device

is streamed from the helicopter.

3.5.4 Mine Neutralization. Countermining or countercharging is mine disposal by using an explosive charge

to cause sympathetic high-order detonation of the mine.

The size of explosion should leave no doubt that

countermining was successful. The major advantage to

countermining is that it does not leave a minelike contact to

clutter the environment. A disadvantage is that it requires a

large explosive charge and/or closer placement to the mine,

which may involve higher risk to the diver or ROV.

Mine neutralization is rendering a mine inoperative

by using an explosive charge sized and placed to either

damage the mine mechanism or rupture and flood the

ORIGINAL 3-14
case by overpressure. Following detonation of the

neutralization charge, the mine case may continue to

look like a mine on sonar. If time permits, a postneutralization inspection should be made to verify that

the mine is neutralized. This may occur as part of an administrative cleanup after any time-sensitive objectives

have been attained. The major disadvantage to neutralization as compared to countermining is that it leaves a

mine case with explosives on the bottom, which may

contribute to bottom clutter.

Relocation of a mine to an area where it presents no

hazard is called removal. This method might be used for

mines located where detonation could cause damage to

pipelines, wellheads, docks, or other fixtures. It is also

used when trawl nets are employed for sweeping and

mines are swept but do not detonate. Since mines will be

a hazard wherever they are relocated, countermining or

neutralization is still necessary, but it could be done as

time permits where explosions represent no hazard to

other facilities or units.

Recovery of a mine is conducted when exploitation or

analysis is necessary. The purpose of exploitation is to

collect intelligence data on how the mine operates or to

use the mine for laboratory analysis to develop MCM tactics against that mine type. The purpose may also be to determine what types of mines are present and what settings

are in use so that sweeping can be done more effectively.

A RSP is performed to render a mine inoperative by

interruption of operating functions or separation of essential components prior to or during recovery.

EODMCM detachments are most effective when

permitted to work independent of other MCM forces to

conduct neutralization. The GPS permits the EOD team

to relocate contacts previously localized by SMCM or

AMCM. Using GPS, the EODMCM detachment arrives at the mine position by inflatable boat or other

support craft. The diver relocates the mine by a visual

search around the position or by using the PQS-2A

hand-held sonar, then places the explosive charge. This

technique is limited to the diver’s operating depth of

200 feet (300 feet with Type II emergency breathing

equipment). Divers cannot go to this depth continually

because they become saturated with nitrogen gas.

The main battery of the MCM/MHC class ships for

mine disposal is the AN/SLQ-48 Mine Neutralization

System. This is a remotely operated, tethered MNV,

which is powered down the cable. The MNV is equipped

with a short-range sonar for contact location and terminal guidance. It also has lights and a high-resolution television camera for contact identification. The MNV is

placed in the water from a specialized handling system

capable of operation up to sea state 3. The vehicle is

then piloted into the sonar beam and vectored to the vicinity of the contact by the sonar operator. The vehicle

pilot then approaches the contact based on his vehicle

sonar and TV monitor. Mission time is dependent on

weather, depth, current, and other factors, but it averages 30 to 45 minutes per contact.

The MNV can carry two explosive cable cutters for

moored mine cables or an explosive bomblet for bottom

mine neutralization. The cable cutters simply reclassify

the mine as a drifting mine that must be countercharged

by divers. A new mission package that is now under development will permit in-place countermining for

moored mines. The MNS is installed on all MCM-1 and

MHC-51 Class ships.

Chapter 4 discusses mine disposal procedures for

non-MCM forces.

3.5.5 Mine Exploitation. For an influence mine

sweeping operation to be successful, the sweep characteristics must to be matched to the mine settings. In

some cases, with mixed mine types or mixed settings,

multiple sweeping runs may be required. Unless other

intelligence sources have provided data on the mine

settings, the recovery and exploitation of several mines

to determine their settings should be one of the highest

priorities of the MCM Commander.

After field exploitation, the mine may be shipped to

the EOD Technology Division at Indian Head, MD,

and Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, FL, for

technical exploitation and analysis. If the mine is an unknown type or new modification, a full exploitation and

analysis to determine sweep tactics should be done. After sufficient exploitation has been conducted, mines of

a type that have previously been exploited and analyzed

may be disposed of by countercharging.

3.5.6 Brute Force Mine Clearance. Brute force

refers to the highly desirable but rarely practical requirement to clear or neutralize the mines in an area all at once.

It is theorized that by the use of a large enough force, sympathetic detonation or neutralization of all the mines in an

area could be accomplished in the same instant. While in

theory it is possible, in practice it has not yet proven to be

feasible. Attempts have been made using saturation bombing and naval gunfire, with little success. However, these explosives delivery methods do not provide a uniform

distribution of force over the area. Thus, while some mines

may be detonated and others damaged, the commander cannot, with confidence, consider the area to be cleared to a safe

level. Further development is ongoing with systems (such as

line charges and explosive nets) that can provide a more

3-15 ORIGINAL
even distribution of explosives which can be detonated all

at once. In the near future, it may be possible to clear the

surf zone or other shallow-water zones with brute force

techniques.

3.6 INTEGRATED MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS

MCM operations require a variety of assets equipped

with MCM capabilities to overcome the mixture of old

and new mines that are in use today. Integrated operations involve the coordinated planning and application

of these assets to achieve the objectives in the safest,

most expedient manner. There are four basic steps to an

integrated MCM operation:

1. Determine the tactical objective

2. Assess the threat

3. Assess MCM asset capabilities

4. Develop and implement a tactical plan.

The battle group or CATF (with advice from the

MCM commander) will determine the MCM objective

by considering general knowledge of the minefield location and enemy mission, the urgency of need to transit

the area, and the acceptable degree of risk for MCM assets and traffic vessels. Assessment of the threat is a continuing process that must include the threat from the

mines that might be encountered, the threat resulting

from or compounded by the environment in which the

operation must occur, and the threat from hostile forces.

In assessing MCM asset availability, capabilities, and

utilization, the MCM commander must evaluate the capability of each asset against each confirmed or suspected mine type and combination of types, evaluate the

logistic support requirements for each asset type, and

thereby determine the utilization factors of each asset.

Asset strengths that are exploited where possible include the following:

1. SMCM long operational endurance

2. SMCM influence sweep versatility

3. SMCM deep hunt, neutralize, and sweep ability

4. AMCM invulnerability to mines

5. AMCM speed at hunting and sweeping

6. AMCM shallow water sweep ability

7. EODMCM independent identify and neutralize

ability

8. MMS shallow water and buried mine capability.

Asset weaknesses to be worked around include the

following:

1. SMCM shallow water limits

2. SMCM vulnerability to mines

3. AMCM daylight only limits

4. AMCM inability to identify and neutralize

5. EOD/NSW environmental and bottom time

limitations

6. EODMCM diver endurance.

Having considered individual asset capabilities, the

MCM commander must now integrate those assets into

a tactical plan that will exploit strengths and minimize

weaknesses. Common aspects of an integrated plan

may include rapid reconnaissance by AMCM to help

refine planning for each area, precursor sweeping by

AMCM to protect the SMCMV against sensitive influence mines and shallow moored contact mines, or precursory hunting by AMCM to determine the presence

of moored mines. Once the tactical plan is prepared and

implemented, it must be continuously reevaluated using the most current threat information to determine

whether the plan needs to be modified and whether it is

accomplishing the objectives as intended.

The battle group and MCM commander may also request MPA or national assets. These assets can monitor

the area of operations to localize the mine threat and determine which forces pose a threat to MCM assets.

NSW may be requested to assist in VSW operations.

Air and surface platforms may be needed to provide defense for the MCM forces if operating in or near hostile

environments.

3.7 COMBINED MINE COUNTERMEASURES

OPERATIONS

Combined MCM operations are those conducted

with a combination of U.S. and Allied MCM forces

(NATO and/or other nations’ assets). These multinational operations may involve forces used to operating

under different doctrine, different tactical procedures,

and with limited connectivity in C4I systems. To determine the best tactical application of all available assets,

planning for combined operations can follow the same

ORIGINAL 3-16
procedure as for integrated operations. However, combined operations are sometimes affected by national

political limitations which prevent free employment of

some national forces. An example might be the prohibition of force employment in the territorial waters of the

aggressor nation or as an integrated force with some

other nation’s assets. Although these limitations will

complicate the planning problem, the same tactical approach (considering all asset capabilities and limitations) can be followed.

3.7.1 Primary NATO/Allied MCM Assets. MCM

has been a high priority for many European countries

during the Cold War years. Many NATO countries

have been mined before and continue to face mine

problems that are both left over from World Wars I and

II and a result of the former Soviet threat.

The U.S. MCM-1 Class was developed to counter

the ASW mining threat by the former U.S.S.R. (a deep

water threat). The threat most NATO countries planned

against was a shallow-water ASUW mining effort to

stop troop movement and commerce. This is reflected

in the capabilities and design of each country’s forces.

Forces and tactics are developed to suit the individual

needs of each country, not necessarily to fill particular

shortcomings in the NATO organization.

The following paragraphs highlight most of the significant NATO/Allied platforms. For additional detail and

current numbers, recommended references are as follows:

1. DST-1260H-061-yr, Naval Weapons Systems,

Less Missiles

2. DST-1260H-110-yr, Mine Warfare Capabilities: Selected Eastern European Countries

3. DST-1260H-120 yr, Naval Mines & MCM: Rest

of World less Eastern Europe

4. COMINEWARCOM MIW Assessment of

NATO/Allied Nations

5. Jane’s Fighting Ships.

3.7.1.1 Great Britain. Great Britain has an excellent MIW capability, which includes a career path for

officers and enlisted personnel who wish to remain in

the MCM community. Divers are an integral part of

each ship’s crew rather than a separate force. The FSU

is a mobile engineering support unit that deploys to

support British MCM forces as necessary, and an MCM

force will normally deploy with a support ship with an

MCMTA embarked.

There are 13 British HUNT Class ships. Their characteristics are as follows:

1. Conventional GRP frame structure with GRP

hull covering

2. Very low magnetic signature

3. Hydraulic auxiliary propulsion for mine hunting

4. Hull mounted 193M minehunting sonar

5. PAP-104 identification/neutralization ROV

6. Mechanical, magnetic, and acoustic sweep.

There are 12 British SANDOWN Class ships; they

are new and similar to the MHC-51 in capability.

1. GRP construction

2. Nonmagnetic diesel with Voith Schneiders and

bow thruster

3. Electric auxiliary propulsion for mine hunting

4. Marconi 2093 VDS minehunting sonar

5. PAP-104 identification/neutralization ROV

6. Nautis M tactical display/command and control

system.

3.7.1.2 France. France has a strong MCM force and

maintains a serious route survey program. It maintains

10 ERIDAN Class (TRIPARTITE) ships. TRIPARTITE was a joint French, Dutch, and Belgian project to

build mine hunters. Each built its own GRP hull but used

French electronics, Belgian electrical equipment, and

Dutch engines. Each have the following characteristics:

1. Two electrical active rudders for MH propulsion

2. DUBM 21A hull mounted sonar

3. PAP 104 identification/neutralization ROV

4. Mechanical sweep system.

3.7.1.3 Netherlands/Belgium. Eguermin, perhaps

the best MCM school in the world (a bilateral agreement between the Netherlands and Belgium), is located in Oostende, Belgium. In addition to a museum,

it has a complex simulator that can simulate any

MCM unit in the world against any mine threat in the

3-17 ORIGINAL
world, and is used to run full interactive planning problems. The new Mine Warfare Training Center in Texas

is patterned after Eguermin. The Netherlands has 15

TRIPARTITE minehunter/sweepers. Belgium has

seven TRIPARTITE mine hunter/sweepers and two

command and support ships.

3.7.1.4 Germany. Germany has a very strong mine

warfare program with very active and capable mining

and MCM programs. The following are Germany’s

MCM inventory and ship characteristics:

1. Six ELBE Class tenders for logistics support to

MCM and FPBs

2. Ten Type 332 MHC ships

a. Nonmagnetic steel hull

b. Electric minehunting propulsion motor

c. Hull-mounted minehunting sonar

d. Two Penguin mine identification/countermining ROVs

3. Ten Type 343 Class MSC ships

a. Sweeper version of Type 332 without electric

propulsion

b. Full sweep suite

c. Mine avoidance sonar

4. Ten Type 331 MHC ships

a. Constructed as sweeper then converted to

hunter

b. Hull-mounted minehunting sonars

c. PAP 105 mine identification/neutralization

ROV

d. Mechanical sweep system.

5. Six Type 351 TROIKA ships

a. Same as 331 but converted to Troika control

ship rather than hunter

b. Controls three acoustic/magnetic sweeping

drones by radar tracking and radio link

c. Retains mechanical sweep system.

3.7.1.5 Norway. Mining has priority in Norway

where 50 percent of coastal waters are unsuitable for

mine hunting, but they have recently built a new

SMCM ship. Norway’s MCM assets include four

OSKOY Class (MHC) ships and five ALTA Class

(MSO) ships. The following are their characteristics:

1. New class, first commissioned June 1994

2. GRP catamaran operating on surface effect between two hulls

3. Two diesel engines, two waterjet propulsion

units

4. MHC fitted with hull-mounted sonar and two

Pluto ROVs

5. MSO fitted with mine avoidance sonar and mechanical and influence sweep system.

3.7.1.6 Denmark. In Denmark, mining also has priority, and MCM assets are multipurpose ships. The

country has 14 FLYVEFISKEN Class mine hunter/

layer ships with six MCM suites. They have the following characteristics:

1. Stanflex 300 common hull and prop for MCM,

patrol, attack, and minelayer variants

2. GRP hull, combined diesel/gas turbine propulsion, hydraulic auxiliary propulsion

3. The six MCM equipment suites can be fitted to

any of the 14 ships

4. Suite includes side-scan sonar, ROV, and control over two SAV Class hunting drones (sidescan sonar).

3.7.1.7 Sweden. Sweden also places a heavy emphasis on mining. It has seven LANDSORT Class

MHC ships, which have the following characteristics:

1. GRP hull with four diesel engines and two Voith

Schneider props

2. Hull-mounted sonar and two ROVs

3. Mechanical and influence sweep systems

4. Control platform for SAM remote control influence sweeps (same as the two systems the U.S.

Navy purchased).

Sweden has numerous craft listed as minelayers with

dual roles as command/training/diver support, etc.

ORIGINAL 3-18
3.7.1.8 Italy. Italy has excellent MCM capabilities

and exports much MCM equipment. Among its assets

are the following:

1. Four LERICI Class MHC ships

a. GRP hull design was basis for U.S. Navy Osprey Class

b. Large diesel and prop for transit, three smaller

diesels, and three hydraulic props for mine

hunting

c. Italian-built SQQ-14 VDS minehunting sonar

d. MIN 77 mine identification ROV and Pluto

mine destruction ROV

e. Oropesa mechanical sweep

2. Eight GAETA Class (LERICI II) ships

a. Enlarged LERICI design, 8 feet longer, 170

tons heavier

b. Improved hydraulics, ROV, electrical generation, and reduced magnetic signature.

3.7.1.9 Japan. Japan takes MIW seriously and has a

large, capable SMCM force and a viable AMCM capability. Among its assets are the following:

1. Thirty HATSUSHIMA/UWAJIMA Class MHSC

ships

a. Hull-mounted sonar (two with 2093 VDS)

b. ROV neutralization system (two on some

ships)

c. Full sweeps system.

2. Three YAEYAMA MHSO ships

a. Very similar to U.S. Avenger Class

b. U.S. SQQ-32 VDS sonar, deep capable neutralization ROV

c. Deep capable mechanical sweep

d. Acoustic and magnetic sweep.

3. Several minelayer and minesweeper support

ships are maintained as flagships.

4. Twelve MH-53E AMCM Helicopters

a. U.S., Japan and Russia are only countries with

AMCM

b. Same aircraft as U.S. Navy AMCM

c. Mechanical, magnetic, and acoustic sweep

systems

3.7.1.10 Spain. Spain has good capabilities, considering its limited funding. Following are its assets:

1. Four GUADELETE Class ex-U.S. MSO ships

a. SQQ-14 VDS sonar and some ID-capable

ROVs

b. Mechanical and influence sweeps

2. Eight ex-U.S. Navy MSCs ships capable of performing mechanical and influence sweeps

3. Four CME Class ships being built using British

SANDOWN design.

3.7.1.11 Australia. Australia is serious about MCM

but has very limited ship assets. Its strength lies in the

quality of its Mine Clearance Diver community. Following are its assets:

1. Two MHCAT ships

a. 100-foot catamaran hull limits operability

b. Hull-mounted sonar with PAP ROVs

2. A trawler type COOP craft capable of towing

mechanical or influence sweep systems

3. Six new construction HUON Class MHC ships

using the Italian GAETA Class hull

a. British 2093 VDS sonar

b. Two Double Eagle neutralization-capable

ROVs

3.7.2 Other Mine Countermeasures Forces.

Figure 3-9 provides a listing of other countries with

MCM ship assets. The quality of ship maintenance and

training varies greatly between countries. Some vessels

are very old and have limited operational MCM

systems.

3-19 ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 3-20

COUNTRY ASSET ASSET ASSET ASSET

Argentina 4 MSC 2 MHC

Brazil 6 MSC

Bulgaria 8 MSC 11 MSI

China 8 MSC 27 MSO

Croatia 1 MHSO

Cuba 10 MSC

Egypt 10 MSO 3 MHC

Ethiopia 1 MSO 1 MSC

Finland 13 MSI

Greece 14 MSC

India 12 MSO 10 MSI

Indonesia 2 MHSO (Tripartite) 2 MSO 9 MSC

Iran 3 MSC 2 MSI

Iraq 5 MSI

Libya 8 MSO

Malaysia 4 MHC (Lerici)

Nigeria 2 MHC (Lerici)

North Korea 23 MSC

Pakistan 3 MHSO (Tripartite)

Poland 8 MSO 13 MSC 3 MHC

Romania 16 MSC

Russia 58 MSO 90 MSC 2 MHC 25 Haze B

Saudi Arabia 3 MHC (Sandown) 4 MHC

Singapore 4 MHC (Landsort)

South Africa 4 MSC 4 MHC

South Korea 8 MSC 8 MHC

Syria 10 MSC

Taiwan 7 MHC 4 MSO

Thailand 3 MSC 2 MHSC

Turkey 20 MSC

Uruguay 4 MSC

Vietnam 4 MSC 4 MSO 4 MHC 2 MHI

Yugoslavia 2 MSI 2 MHS

NOTE: This figure lists assets that have significant capability or are suitable for ocean-going MCM operations. Some ships

and craft that are only suited for harbor or river operations or whose MCM systems have been removed because of a

change in mission are omitted.

Figure 3-9. Other MCM Assets
3.8 AMPHIBIOUS MINE

COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS

Minefields and obstacles mixed with the minefield

form an integral part of the antilanding defenses that

must be overcome for a successful amphibious landing.

The mission of MCM forces is to prevent the delay or

disruption of amphibious operations due to enemy mining. MCM in support of amphibious operations is frequently referred to as SWMCM because of the relative

shallowness of the depth zones involved. The littoral

area is divided into three depth zones based on variations in environment, types of mines encountered, and

limitations of asset capability.

The SZ is that area between the high water mark or

zero feet out to 10 feet. In this area, any significant

wave action will make a swimmer unable to maintain

control and conduct a safe search for mines. The mines

that might be found here include ground contact mines,

ground influence mines, ground pressure plate mines,

ground tilt rod mines, moored contact, moored influence, and anti-invasion mines. Additionally, mixed

with the mines may be obstacles that can complicate the

mine clearance problem.

The VSW zone is between 10 and 40 feet deep.

Mines found in this zone may include ground or

moored contact mines, ground or moored single influence mines, ground multiple influence mines, and

ground tilt rod mines. Obstacles may also be found

here, though probably not as many as in the SZ.

The SW zone covers the 40- to 200-foot area.

Moored contact mines and ground or moored single

and multiple influence mines will be found here. Obstacles are still possible but less likely because they are

highly dependent on the severe tidal variations.

To avoid causing a delay in the amphibious landing,

MCM must be performed prior to the assault to clear

channels for landing craft and transport ships to approach the beach. During this time, MCM forces must

remain undetected if the element of surprise is to be

maintained. Problems which must be overcome include

the following:

1. AMCM and SMCM forces are not capable of

undetected operations where any radar system

or visual watch is maintained.

2. AMCM is limited to daylight operations.

3. SMCM can do exploratory mine hunting at night

but is detectable on radar and is defenseless.

4. MMS detachments could be used in exploratory/

marking operations at night but are also detectable and defenseless.

Current tactics used in support of amphibious operations are found in SWDG TACMEMO 6022-1-95/OH

1-17. Breach in stride, the breakthrough of an enemy

minefield during an amphibious assault, is one of the

methods and takes advantage of surprise and initiative

to get through the obstruction with minimal loss of momentum. It maintains the momentum of the attack by

denying the enemy time to mass forces to cover the obstacle or minefield. Subordinate units should be capable of independent breaching operations to accomplish

the mission against weak defense, light defense, simple

barriers, or unclear situations.

The NSW force conducts covert beach reconnaissance, which verifies that a mine threat is present. NSW

is responsible for clearance of mines from 21 feet to the

surf zone and may mark mines during reconnaissance

for later planting of neutralization charges or plant

charges during reconnaissance. To maintain covertness

as long as possible, detonation of neutralization charges

and charges on other obstacles will likely occur at the

beginning of the assault. If there is any significant wave

action, NSW swimmers are not able to safely and covertly operate in the surf zone, so even if total success

could be attained in other areas, some mines may still

be left where the concentrations of mines and obstacles

are the heaviest.

If surprise is sacrificed and overt MCM is commenced

prior to the assault using SMCM and AMCM forces in

daylight, ships, helicopters, and EOD boats are vulnerable

to any hostile fire from the beach. Heavy losses can be expected if all types of fire from the beach cannot be suppressed. If no preassault phase MCM is conducted other

than NSW reconnaissance, it is unlikely the MCM force

will be able to make a significant reduction in the threat

without delaying the assault. MCM is a time-consuming

process because of the slow pace at which sweeping and

hunting are conducted. Even a single-pass mechanical

sweep to cut moored mines is not quick because any cut

mines must be prosecuted individually.

The varying depth environment forces a division of

responsibility by depth capability. NSW is the only

force that can operate in the SZ. AMCM systems (the

fastest coverage rate of all systems) are not as effective

in the SZ, but depending upon equipment used, they

can operate as shallow as 8 feet. If any obstacles are encountered in this area, natural or manmade, gear losses

may be a critical factor. From 30 feet and deeper,

AMCM and SMCM can both be effective.

3-21 ORIGINAL
Mutual interference occurs when swimmers/divers

are working directly adjacent to AMCM or SMCM

conducting influence sweeping. Consequently these

operations must occur at different times or have a carefully orchestrated separation distance.

When mines are present, waiting until after the assault for MCM probably would result in unacceptable

losses. Continuing MCM after the assault will be necessary to expand cleared areas, increase clearance percentages, and counter any delay arm mines.

Coordination of MCM with other warfare areas during all phases is very important; however, the MCM

chain of command may vary according to the phase of

the operation. The MCM commander may be subordinate to the following:

1. The area commander, if MCM forces are in the

area before the ATF arrives. It is also likely

some forces will have to continue to support the

area commander.

2. The CATF, who has the overall responsibility

for MCM in the AOA. The CATF may delegate

the conduct of MCM to the MCM commander

and may assign the MCM force to the advance

force commander.

3. The advance force commander may have control of MCM forces, particularly for the

preassault phase. Careful liaison and coordination are required during planning to ensure the

MCM commander can fully support the ATF

commander during assault-phase MCM.

3.9 SUBMARINE MINE COUNTERMEASURES

OPERATIONS

In most roles, the submarine is an independent operator

counting on stealth to protect it from most threats. However, once in position, the mine is even more stealthy than

the submarine and can easily target any passing within its

detection envelope. Consequently, submariners have developed systems and tactics to detect and avoid mines.

Some submarine sonars originally designed to detect ice

have proven capable of detecting mines moored in the water column. Based on experience with these sonars, new

submarine sonar systems have been developed with the

necessary transducer arrays to permit searching for and

detecting mines. However, submarines are not MCM

platforms and should not be expected to transit mined waters on purpose. Nevertheless, they can be used to conduct reconnaissance ahead of a battle group to determine

whether a clear channel exists. They can also transit to

forward operating areas without requiring supporting

MCM forces to determine a clear channel.

Since submarines are capable of operating under the

ice in polar waters, they may also be faced with mines

either placed under the ice or laid in an area that has

since iced over. This cannot be addressed by surface or

airborne MCM forces and must therefore be dealt with

by the submarine on its own. A discussion of equipment and tactics for this situation can be found in the

NWP 3-21 (formerly NWP 70) series.

3.10 RIVERINE MINE COUNTERMEASURES

OPERATIONS

Riverine MCM operations include all MCM operations in rivers, canals, and lakes that are significant inland

traffic ways. The water may be saline, brackish, or freshwater and is assumed to have a considerably lower electrical conductivity than seawater. There may be a higher

concentration of debris on the bottom; mud or silt bottoms

are likely to be the norm. These environmental conditions

combined with the limited depths and maneuvering room

in many riverine scenarios make most current MCM platforms and systems poorly suited for these operations.

The last significant riverine MCM operation conducted

by U.S. Navy forces occurred in the Vietnam Conflict.

Although all of the specialized systems and platforms

used during that period have been retired, the designs and

procedures for employment are still available in archives

and could be recalled for use if necessary.

Of the SMCM platforms and systems in current use,

some would be employed in riverine MCM operations

despite limited suitability. The MCM 1 and MHC 51

Class ships are limited in utility because of size and limiting depths: the navigation drafts of 12.2 feet and 9.2

feet, respectively, prevent employment in the shallow

river environment except where deep channels exist or

have been created. Additionally, the MCM systems installed are all designed to operate in water greater than

30 feet deep, and the sonars require a minimum water

depth in the 50-foot range for deployment. The SAM

system would be far more suitable for riverine operations, but there are only two SAM craft in the inventory.

AMCM helicopters could be employed in riverine

operations, provided the surrounding geography provides room for maneuver. River banks shrouded with

tall or overhanging trees could cause severe limitations.

The AMCM shallow-water sweep systems (MOP and

Rattlebars) would be effective in riverine operations,

but the AN/AQS-14 Sonar, Mk-104, and Mk-105

Sweep Systems would probably not be usable.

ORIGINAL 3-22
EODMCM should be fully functional in riverine operations, although poor water clarity might hamper

diver operations. EOD MMS systems would be not be

employable since they require a seawater environment.

A description of the mine threat and MCM systems

employed in riverine operations can be found in the 1992

Mine Warfare Summary, published by the Mine Warfare

Branch of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3.11 DEPLOYMENT OF MINE

COUNTERMEASURES FORCES

MCM assets do not participate in normal rotational

deployment cycles like other combatant forces. The

force levels and ship characteristics necessary to maintain a continuous presence in overseas theaters do not

exist in the MCM force. The necessary endurance and

self-sufficiency for these cycles run contrary to the design requirement to minimize the influence signature of

MCM platforms. Therefore, when an OPLAN calls for

MCM forces, they must be transported to the area and

provided the basing/support that meets their somewhat

unique requirements. Transportation and support requirements vary by platform and unit type, but all must

be included in the OPLAN TPFDL, and sufficient priority must be assigned to ensure that lack of MCM

forces will not unduly hinder other force operations.

Prior to deploying an MCM force to an area where

no recent operations have been conducted, a site survey

should be conducted. The support requirements for

MCM forces are sufficiently different from other naval

forces to justify an advance party visit to the area from

which operations will be supported. The advance party

can conduct briefings of support personnel and survey

ship mooring facilities or aircraft landing, parking, and

maintenance areas to determine whether the existing

equipment is suitable to support the MCM force. If additional arrangements need to be made, they can be

started prior to arrival of the MCM force, and in some

cases, the advance party will be able to determine

whether additional equipment needs to be transported

from the home base or whether some equipment may be

left behind. Appendix B of NWP 3-15.1 (formerly NWP

27-1) contains a contingency plan survey list. More detailed lists are generally held by the MCM Squadron

staffs, AMCM Squadrons, and EOD Mobile Units.

3.11.1 Surface Mine Countermeasures Forces.

Surface MCM ships can be moved to the area of operations in three ways: self-transit, towing, or heavy lift

ship. The following characteristics may be advantages

or disadvantages, depending on the scenario and distance to be deployed:

1. Self-transit

a. Maximum average SOA is 8 knots.

b. Builds engine wear on nonmagnetic engines.

c. Ships require refueling every 3 to 4 days using

astern rig.

d. Must avoid heavy weather.

e. Maintenance period required on arrival for

PMS/voyage repairs.

f. The full crew rides the ship.

g. Escort desired for long transits and to provide

refueling services.

h. If escorted by MCS, the MCM Commander,

AMCM, and EODMCM can also be

embarked.

i. The escort may carry spare parts, engines, and

sweep gear.

2. Towing

a. Depends on availability of a tow ship.

b. The tow speed may be less than self-transit

speed.

c. Does not cause wear on engines.

d. Heavy weather may damage or delay tow.

e. May require maintenance period at end of tow

for PMS.

f. Crew can ride the ships, but training en route

is limited.

g. Tow ship may not be able to transport spare

parts, engines, and sweep gear.

3. Heavy Lift Ship

a. Depends on lift ship availability.

b. Only a few lift ships can carry three or four

MCM ships.

c. Some lift ships cannot transit the Panama

Canal.

3-23 ORIGINAL
d. Requires deep berth (60 feet) for onload and

offload with calm weather.

e. Onload requires about seven days, and

offload requires about three days.

f. Most lift ships are capable of a 12-knot SOA.

g. Results in no engine wear, but there are potential power train alignment problems from

docking.

h. Lift ship is not as susceptible to delay by

heavy weather.

i. Crew support may not be available on lift

ship.

j. Lift ship can usually carry containers of spare

parts, sweep equipment, C4I vans, and

EODMCM equipment, etc.

k. Requires significant additional funding.

If SMCM ships are deployed by towing or heavy

lift, any portion of the crews who do not ride the ships

can be given additional training and briefings to maintain or sharpen their skills for the anticipated operations. It may be feasible to assign another MCM or

MHC as training ship and conduct refresher training

underway, prior to the crews’ rejoining the ship.

The crews should arrive in theater just prior to the lift

or tow ship’s arrival at the destination if messing and

berthing can be provided. Otherwise it will be necessary to coordinate their arrival with the offload date so

that they will be able to embark the ship immediately.

Once in the area of operations, SMCM forces require

some unique support. The hulls of U.S. SMCM ships are

constructed of wood with a GRP sheath (MCM Class) or

solid GRP (MHC Class). Mooring facilities for the ships

need to be equipped with Yokohama-style fenders to protect the hull from direct contact with the pier structure.

Additionally, since these are relatively small ships, they

frequently require some additional effort to rig brows

when placed at commercial ship docking facilities.

Other than mooring support, the SMCM ships require frequent replenishment of supplies, often in

smaller quantities than most ship chandlers are used to

dealing with, and they have little crew support features.

These ships have no disbursing, ship’s store, barber, or

dental facilities, and these services need to be provided

by a shore base or other ship when not in company with

the MCS or other assigned support ship. Additional logistics support requirements are discussed in NWP

3-15.1 and NWP 3-15.11 (formerly NWP 27-1 and

NWP 27-2).

For long-term presence of MCM ships (forward deployment) or an operation longer than 6 months, MCM

and MHC ship crews may be rotated between CONUS

hulls and the deployed hulls to reduce the impact on

PERSTEMPO. Since the number of MCM and MHC

ships available and the time required for transiting to

and from a forward base make normal rotational deployments impractical, crew swapping may be used to

provide the personnel relief from the arduous lifestyle

when deployed on board a small ship

3.11.2 Airborne Mine Countermeasures

Forces. The AMCM mission includes a quick response readiness posture, being able to rapidly deploy

worldwide via air or surface lift, and an ability to conduct AMCM operations from fixed land bases, aircraft

carriers, and air-capable amphibious ships.

AMCM can transit by assisted self-lift, airlift, or surface lift. For short-range deployments, MH-53Es can fly

cross-country with some support personnel and MCM

equipment on board. Remaining support equipment and

personnel can be carried by ground transportation or

C-130/C-141 airlifters. Transportation of all support equipment and 90-day packup by ground requires 20 to 30 trailer

trucks, depending on the sweep systems to be carried.

For longer range deployments, AMCM can be transported by C-5A/C-141 airlifters. Approximately eight

C-5As and nine C-141s are required to deploy an

8-plane squadron. The squadron has a computerized

Loadout Support System program to prepare the load

plan which interfaces with the Air Force Computer

Aided Load Manifesting program.

Surface deployment of AMCM requires a large-deck

aviation-capable ship. CV, LHA, LHD, MCS, and LPD

types are all capable of transporting and supporting

AMCM operations. Operation from a CV/CVN displaces some of the air wing and requires significant

modification of the normal flight operations routine.

Operation from an LHD or LHA in conjunction with

some Marine air assets creates less impact than on a

CV, but still requires significant coordination. The LPH

has been the most frequently used and suitable platform,

but except for a few gunships and SAR/utility aircraft,

the Marine air combat element is displaced. Although

the LPH classes are being decommissioned, LPH 12 is

being converted and will remain in commission as MCS

12. An LPD can accommodate only three aircraft,

thereby limiting operations due to number of deck spots.

It also provides no maintenance support (such as AIMD

ORIGINAL 3-24
or hangar deck maintenance area) and cannot accommodate utility aircraft. LSDs are unsuitable due to deck

limits and lack of space. All platforms require 3 to 5

days on-load to properly stow equipment.

Whatever the method of deployment, the normal deployment package includes eight MH-53E helicopters,

Mk 103/104/105 Minesweeping Systems, AN/AQS-14

Sonars, AN/ALQ-141 Countermeasures Sets, ground

support and maintenance equipment, a 90-day packup

(205 cubic meters, 2,650 kilograms), Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats for equipment launch and recovery, and approximately 450 personnel.

Logistics support required for AMCM deployed operations is similar for shipboard or shore operations.

Requirements are summarized below, but more detailed requirements can be found in NWP 3-15.12 (formerly NWP 27-3).

1. Normal aviation support facilities aboard ship or

ashore (runways, parking apron, fuel trucks, etc.)

2. Accommodation for 90-day packup: spare aircraft parts for 90 days (which weigh 72,000

pounds and occupy 7,000 square feet), most of

which require covered storage

3. Space (4,120 square feet) for office and workcenter

4. Berthing and messing for 450 personnel

5. Fuel (22,000 gallons of JP-5 will be used per day

if each aircraft flies a single hop), as well as diesel fuel for RHIBs

6. Freshwater wash capabilities for aircraft and

sweep systems

7. MK-105 sled launch and recovery require crane

if ship is not well deck-equipped, or boat ramp

for shore site

8. RHIB boats for sled operations require crane/davit

for launch from trailers or pier berthing/parking

area for shore operations

9. AMCM packup, which includes four MMFs set

up to conduct equipment maintenance

10. Ground support equipment, including forklifts,

mobile power units, hydraulic test stands, tow

tractors, workstands, cranes, nitrogen carts, etc.

If on board ship, many of these items will be provided by the ship.

For extended operations, especially when 90-day

packup spares are expended, a dependable logistics

pipeline is needed. Movement of engines, transmissions, and rotor blades to and from CONUS refurbishment facilities must be accomplished.

3.11.3 Underwater Mine Countermeasures

Forces. The following paragraphs discuss briefly the

logistics of deploying UMCM forces. Additional detail

may be found in NWP 3-15.14 (formerly NWP 27-8).

3.11.3.1 Explosive Ordnance Disposed Mine

Countermeasures. EODMCM personnel can deploy for operations in conjunction with surface MCM

vessels, AMCM aircraft, or independently from both

shore-based and shipboard facilities. EODMCM detachments are designed for short notice deployments

and can operate for approximately 30 days without resupply (except for water, food, and fuel). A certified detachment can be deployed on very short notice.

For short range overland deployments, all EOD equipment is capable of being transported by three to four

trucks that can tow 8,000 pound trailers. For long transits

trailers may be loaded onto flatbed tractor trailer rigs. For

overseas surface lift, all equipment may be embarked on

board most large class ships. A detachment can embark

on an MCM ship but will be able to carry only a limited

operational equipment loadout. For long surface transits,

it is preferred to deploy the EOD detachment on a larger

ship and then transfer them to the MCM ship once in the

operating area. For airlift, the entire EODMCM detachment can be loaded on various airlifter combinations. Refer to TPFDD documents for specific data.

One EODMCM Detachment consists of eight personnel, and the equipment to be transported may include:

1. FADL — This is a 20’ x 8’ x 8’ trailer that stores

all dive equipment and provides an O2 clean area

for diving equipment maintenance.

2. FARC — This is a portable recompression

chamber with self-contained support systems

(Life Support Skid), portable power generator,

and three-man support crew.

3. RHIB — Each detachment has one 24-foot rigid

hull inflatable boat for diving support operations

and transport of divers to and from the dive area.

The boat is equipped with a trailer for storage.

4. Inflatable boat — Each detachment uses an inflatable

rubber boat (Mk-5 Zodiac) with engines suitable for

3-25 ORIGINAL
dive operations on mines. The boat can be

placed on a trailer or deflated for transportation..

Logistics support required for deployed operations (described in detail in NWP 3-15.14) is summarized below:

1. Land transportation — If stationed ashore, the

detachment will require trucks (which it may

bring itself) to tow boat and equipment trailers

and to transfer personnel.

2. Boat operations — If ashore, a small craft pier

space or a boat ramp is required to support operation of both craft. If afloat, a crane or davit to

launch and recover boats is required. Gasoline

for boat engines is needed.

3. Recompression chamber — Unless supported

by a local, certified recompression chamber, approximately 350 square feet is required to set up

the FARC. The FARC can be self-supporting for

30 days except for diesel fuel.

4. Diving locker — The FADL requires about 200

square feet of deck space, a freshwater supply,

and 3-phase, 60-Hz power.

5. Explosive storage — The detachment has a portable magazine for which 450 cubic feet of explosive storage is required.

6. Compressed gas storage — Aviation grade O2

and a helium oxygen mix are required.

7. Communications — The detachment requires

support to transmit and receive naval message

traffic and may require support for obtaining

keying material for secure voice radios.

8. Berthing and messing for eight to 12 persons.

9. Office/work space: Except for short-term operations, a covered, climate-controlled office and

work space is necessary.

3.11.3.2 Mine Mammal System. MMS can be

deployed to operate independently or as an integrated

force with SMCM and AMCM. Certain conditions

must exist in the area of operations for MMS.

MMS requires a safe base of operations on a friendly

shore or a support ship with sufficient space and weight

capacity to embark dolphin tanks, support systems, and

personnel. The minimum water depth at a shore staging

area must be 2.5 meters. Water temperature must remain

between 42 and 91 °F during the period the dolphins are

in the area. There must be no significant environmental

pollution, and water salinity must be at least 20 parts

per thousand. If these conditions do not exist, the area is

unsuitable for deployment of MMS.

Prior to deployment of MMS, a site survey is necessary to determine the suitability of the area and support

available. The survey takes from 1 to 3 days and includes water chemical sampling, facility inspection,

evaluation of the OPAREA for MMS, and logistics

support arrangements.

Short-distance deployments of EOD MMS MILVANs and SEABEE shelters can be accomplished by

truck. Boats require three to four trucks with an

800-pound towing capacity. The dolphins may be

moved on trucks; however, it is preferable to transport

them via cargo helicopters (internal load) to minimize

transport time. Long-distance deployments require

sealift or airlift. Maximum demonstrated sealift transit

time is currently 11 days. Long-term embarkation on the

lift ship without the opportunity for swimming in the

open sea may affect the health and training of the mammals. If a long-range surface lift is envisioned, airlift of

the mammals to the area of operations following surface

ship arrival is preferred to preserve their operability. For

airlift, the entire EOD MMS detachment can be transported on various aircraft combinations listed in the

TPFDD. Staggered arrival of transport aircraft permits

advance personnel to assemble support equipment prior

to arrival of the MMS. Regardless of deployment

method, once on scene, the mammals may require several days to acclimate to the new environment.

In addition to the limiting conditions mentioned before, deployed MMS requires the following:

1. A pier, causeway, quay wall, ship, or other stable platform to secure staging pens

2. 190 square meters of level ground for MILVAN

and support equipment

3. A crane capable of lifting and positioning

MILVAN and support equipment (15-ton

capacity)

4. A freshwater supply

5. 220/110-volt, 60-Hz AC, 100-amp electrical

service at the staging area

6. A suitable area for storage of Class A explosives

7. Messing and accommodations for up to 70 personnel (Mk 4 MMS has 24, Mk 7 MMS has 36, and

ORIGINAL 3-26
other personnel provide command element and

maintenance support)

8. Communications support for transmission and

reception of message traffic and periodic secure

voice radio encryption update.

An EOD MMS detachment deploys with sufficient assets to support 15 days of sustained operations, with the

exception of MOGAS. Mk 4 and Mk 7 MMS detachments conducting simultaneous operations may require

up to 500 gallons of MOGAS per day. A 15-day replenishment will require the following:

1. 100 kg (240 pounds) of frozen fish per day (if

full complement of both Mk 4 and Mk 7 are

deployed)

2. Food for personnel if operating from a remote site

3. Explosives and minefield markers

4. Dry cell batteries for radios, electronic search,

and navigation equipment

5. Spare parts as depleted by maintenance activities

6. 55 gallons of 2-cycle outboard motor oil.

Emergency support for MEDEVAC should be

planned due to the inherent dangers of diving and

MCM operations. Lon- term operations may require

additional maintenance support for equipment repairs.

3.11.3.3 Navy Special Warfare. NSW forces are

embarked with an ARG and, as directed by CATF, have

the capability to conduct MCM operations in relation to

an amphibious landing. They would not be likely to deploy for MCM independent of an ARG. Essentially all

support for NSW would be provided from within the

ARG, although the MCS 12 may be called on for some

support. Berthing, messing, and transportation of some

equipment is within the capability of the MCS. The NSW

combat rubber raiding craft can be launched and recovered from the MCS, and diving support facilities such as

bottled gases and a recompression chamber are available.

3.11.4 Mine Countermeasures Staff. One of the

first actions that should be taken when considering deployment of MCM forces (in addition to a site survey) is

the deployment of one or more Staff Liaison Officers

from the MCM squadron staffs. The primary purpose of

these officers is to maintain the communications flow

between a task group/force commander or theater commander and the MCM commander. They can be instrumental in making the initial decisions on which forces

are needed and laying the ground work for deployment

of other assets.

The MCM commander and staff can be deployed by

airlift independent of other forces or by sea embarked

on the MCM support ship. MCS 12 is specially configured to support the MCM commander and should be

used whenever possible. The staff consists of between

15 and 20 people (depending on the situation) with administrative support equipment and supplies packed in

cruise boxes. They can be deployed on very short notice, but should not deploy until some support facilities

are available in theater.

To effectively plan and control MCM operations, the

MCM commander requires a dedicated command center with C4I capabilities. The MCM and MHC class

ships are not equipped to support a staff; they have no

berthing, insufficient communications, and no spare

space in CIC to be used by a staff. If an afloat unit that is

outfitted as a flagship cannot be made available to the

MCM commander, it is possible for him to be set up in

an ashore command center. Minimum basic requirements are as follows:

1. Adequate secure space for six to eight personnel

(two to three maintaining a 24-hour watch)

2. Status boards and space for plotting on hydrographic charts (chart table or large flat table)

3. Communication suite to support sending and receiving message traffic, as well as maintaining

secure voice and data communications with

other command authorities and the MCM forces

4. 110-volt power source for operation of desk top

computers

5. Messing and berthing for the deployed personnel.

If no established command center exists ashore to

accommodate the MCM commander, an alternative is

to use the COMINEWARCOM deployable C4I van.

This new system is intended to be a self-contained command center that can be embarked on a ship or set up

ashore. It is equipped with all necessary communications and tactical data systems to support the MCM

commander. The characteristics of the C4i van were not

available for inclusion in this publication, but they can

be obtained by contacting COMINEWARCOM.

Although far less desirable, another option is to use

an MIUW command van, which can fulfill the minimum communications requirements.

3-27 ORIGINAL
3.12 INTERFACE WITH THE ENVIRONMENT

3.12.1 General/Introduction. Mine warfare is the

phase of littoral warfare most sensitive to environmental considerations. In strategic, tactical, and technical

planning for both mining and MCM, the environment

plays the dominant role. Minelaying missions will be

conducted only if environmental conditions are favorable for delivery and weapon effectiveness after the lay.

Mine weapon systems and components (mine cases,

mine sensors, and target signals, for example) are all affected in significant ways by myriad environmental

factors. Similarly, the fundamental decision in MCM (to

conduct exploratory and reconnaissance operations to

determine the presence or absence of mines, the extent of

any mine fields present, and which mine hunting, sweeping, avoidance, or combination of these tactics and techniques can be effectively employed) is environmental in

nature. A matrix summary of environmental factors affecting MCM is provided in Figure 3-10.

3.12.2 Environmental Factors. Many environmental factors affect mine, amphibious, and special warfare, and, because of the land/sea interface, they are more

complex in the coastal/littoral areas than the open ocean.

Environmental factors affecting littoral warfare will

be discussed in seven broad areas: oceanographic, meteorological, biological, acoustic, hydrographic and

geophysical, and anthropogenic (manmade).

3.12.2.1 Oceanographic. Considerations unique

to or magnified in the coastal oceanographic area are

tides, tidal currents, surf conditions, wave height and

direction, turbidity (and associated absorption of dissolved and particulate matter), and water visibility

(both vertical and horizontal). Salinity (conductivity),

water temperature, and temperature gradient as functions of depth should be considered in the evaluation of

sonar performance.

3.12.2.2 Meteorological. The atmospheric elements are magnified in the coastal environment. Wind

speed and direction, and therefore wave height, direction, and shape, are affected by diurnal effects (land and

sea breezes). Ambient light available is affected by particulate matter such as smoke and dust. Ship safety may

be affected by limited options for storm evasion.

Weather in general, unless ideal conditions are encountered, will figure most significantly in the time required

to conduct enabling mine warfare operations.

3.12.2.3 Biological. Marine life, from microscopic

organisms to large marine mammals, plants, fish, must

be considered in the planning and execution of littoral

warfare operations because of their special impact. Ambient noise, acoustic and optical scattering, false targets,

biofouling, and the effects of seaweed, kelp, coral reefs,

and coral heads are examples of marine life effects. Hazardous animals such as sea snakes, sharks, and jellyfish

(e.g., the Portuguese man-of-war), are certainly taken seriously and considered carefully by divers.

3.12.2.4 Acoustic. The decision to sweep is based

largely on the axiom, “mine hunt where and when you

can; mine sweep when and where you must.” While

there are some limited applications of nonacoustic

mine hunting, acoustics are the primary medium for the

detection and classification of minelike objects. The

sound velocity profile is extremely important in the littoral minehunting problem. Scattering, reverberations, layering, ambient noise, and signal energy transmission loss

determine in large measure minehunting effectiveness, efficiency, and safety. The minehunting measure of effectiveness will be used in the decision to hunt or sweep.

3.12.2.5 Hydrography, Bathymetry, and Geophysics. This combined category encompasses all the

properties related to the bottom, or sea bed, and includes

such factors as ambient magnetic background and anomalies, sediment (gases, gradient, conductivity, and stability), and pressure wave transmission. The hydrographic

concerns of beach slope, topography, and depth range will

be of primary importance to the amphibious planner, but

the enabling mine warfare commander will consider bottom conditions: type, roughness, strength and stability,

and clutter (which includes both magnetic and acoustic).

3.12.2.6 Anthropogenic. These effects in the littoral environment entail manmade influences on mine

and MCM systems. The human influence in the regions

includes different types of pollution, over-fishing, the

creation of artificial reefs and fishing havens, and military operations in which ordnance and debris are left

behind. Coastal merchant and fishing ships create noise

and can produce sediment upwelling. Shipwrecks,

trash, fishing traps, and well-heads are all manmade influences affecting littoral warfare operations.

The section that follows will discuss briefly some of

the effects of these influences on mine warfare weapons and systems.

3.12.3 Environmental Effects on Mine Warfare

Weapons, Systems, and Decisions. MIW planners and tacticians will know and take into consideration the problems facing the enemy miner, including

the environment. The impact of the environment on

mines as discussed in Chapter 2 is the starting point for

the MCM effort.

ORIGINAL 3-28
3-29 ORIGINAL

CATEGORY FACTORS MAJOR OPERATIONAL IMPACT

Coastal Topography

and Landmarks

Marginal topography, natural and manmade landmarks, aircraft flight path hazards, shoals, and other underwater

hazards to surface craft

Navigational control and accuracy flight restrictions and pattern controls

Atmospheric

Characteristics

Climatic conditions, duration of darkness

and light, visibility, air temperature, winds,

precipitation, storm frequency, and icing

conditions

All operational limitations and restrictions

common to adverse atmospheric conditions, platform and equipment selection,

force level requirements, logistical

concerns

Water Depth Bathymetry; water depth fluctuations because of tides, seasonal storms, river

runoff

Extent of operation area in relation to mine

type to be countered, choice of countermeasures, platforms, gear, and tactics,;

limits to diver employment

Sea and Surf Sea and swell conditions; surf characteristics Operational limits for surface craft, EOD

personnel, and MCM equipment; actuation probability for pressure mines; rate

and direction of sweep or hunt; mine detection capability

Currents Surface and subsurface current patterns,

including tidal, surf, and river originated

currents

Navigability and maneuverability of displacement craft and towed equipment;

navigational error; diver operation limitations; effect on mine burial

Ice Conditions Thickness and extent of sea ice Modify, restrict, or preclude operations depending on extent and thickness of ice

Water Column

Properties

Water temperature, salinity, and clarity Temperature effects on diver operations;

ability to visually or optically locate moored

or bottom mines; temperature/salinity affect on conductivity for magnetic sweep;

sonar depth and effectiveness

Sea Bed

Characteristics

Bottom roughness, material, strength, and

stability

Decision to employ minehunting techniques; limitations on mechanical sweep

gear; extent to which a mine will bury

Acoustic

Environment

Sound speed Acoustic propagation/attenuation

Magnetic

Environment

Electrical resistivity, number of magnetic

minelike contacts, ambient magnetic

background

Ability to employ open electrode sweeps;

extent and strength of magnetic field established by magnetic sweep gear; number of minelike targets limiting magnetic

hunt efficiency; effectiveness of magnetometer detectors

Pressure

Environment

Natural pressure fluctuations due to wave

action

Actuation probability for pressure mines

and hence, the selection of conventional

or guinea pig sweep techniques

Figure 3-10. Environmental Considerations in Mine Countermeasures
Environmental factors affecting the planning and execution of MCM operations will be discussed in two

categories: stable and transient characteristics.

1. Stable characteristics, such as bathymetry and topography (in short, valid data from prior surveys).

2. Transient characteristics, such as the thermal properties of the water column and meteorological conditions (in short, information obtained in situ).

3.12.3.1 Stable Environmental Characteristics

Affecting Minesweeping Operations.

3.12.3.1.1 Water Depth. The sweeping techniques

used are often determined by water depth. Ships rarely

operate in less than 10 meters of water, but they are well

suited for deep ocean sweeping. Helicopters and

non-displacement craft are better suited for shallow

water sweeping.

3.12.3.1.2 Bottom Topography. Variations of bottom gradient, as well as holes, ridges, and peaks, will

dictate special planning and handling of sweep gear.

Track orientation and depth segmenting must be considered to increase sweep efficiency and reduce risk

of damage to equipment. Further, a complex bottom

topography may require both sweeping and hunting to

reach the desired clearance level.

3.12.3.1.3 Bottom Composition. Mine burial will

be determined by various factors, including bottom

strength, composition, and stability. Burial will affect

both the miner and the countermeasures effort (sensitivities of acoustics and pressure mechanisms may be lessened by burial). The potential for mine burial figures

significantly in the decision whether to sweep or to hunt.

3.12.3.1.4 Underwater Obstacles. Wrecks and

other anthropogenic objects restrict the depth and perhaps even the use of sweeping equipment. In aggravated

situations, area avoidance may be the only viable option.

3.12.3.1.5 Geography. Prominent landmarks and

special coastal features are of use in both planning and

conducting MCM operations because these characteristics may affect navigation and maneuvers.

3.12.3.1.6 Magnetic Minesweeping Environment. While fairly complex in theory and planning,

there are two principal elements to consider in magnetic

mine sweeping: the electrical conductivity of water and

the depth of water. Electrical conductivity will dictate

the use of open- or closed-loop sweeps. Water depth is

the only factor affecting the performance of closed

sweeps against all magnetic mines and that of open

sweeps against the vertical component of magnetic

mines. Seawater conductivity affects the amount of

current that can be used in the open-loop sweeps.

3.12.3.1.7 Acoustic Minesweeping Environment. The most important factor in acoustic sweeps is

the sound pressure level loss in transmission of acoustic

signals. Transmission loss is a function of sweep-to-mine

distance, frequency, water and mine case depths, and bottom geology. The exact determination of transmission loss

is complex; for practical reasons average transmission

losses are tabulated as a function of depth and frequency.

3.12.3.2 Transient Environmental Characteristics Affecting Minesweeping Operations

3.12.3.2.1 Tides and Tidal Currents. Planning

and conducting MCM operations with respect to the

rise and fall of the tide is a straightforward navigation

problem. Tides will affect the case depth of some

moored mines if near the surface. The effect of tidal

streams and currents poses more complex problems, including mine dip. Currents can cause navigational, maneuvering, and sweep streaming problems and must be

dealt with carefully. Displacement minesweepers must

take current information into account when operating

where pressure mines may be present since current

must be figured in the ship’s speed over the ground.

3.12.3.2.2 Climate and Weather. Rain, fog, sea

state, and smoke all affect mine-sweeping operations.

The streaming of minesweeping equipment, both airborne and surface, is extremely hazardous, especially

as the sea state and/or turbulence increase.

3.12.3.2.3 Wind. Wind is one of the most significant environmental factors for all MCM operations because it drives sea state, affects current, induces

maneuvering (and therefore navigational) problems,

and limits helicopter operations. Wind combined with

low air temperature produces wind chill factors that

make exposed sweeper crews vulnerable to cold and fatigue, which in turn can limit crew on cycle time and

lengthen the time required for mine clearing operations.

3.12.3.2.4 Air Temperature and Pressure. In addition to the effects described above, air temperature and

pressure directly affect the performance of AMCM helicopters. Temperature and pressure combined will determine aircraft fuel limits (weight) and therefore mission time. Higher temperatures and lower pressures

lower helicopter efficiency.

3.12.3.2.5 Visibility. Reduced visibility hampers

sweeping operations, especially with regard to moored

ORIGINAL 3-30
minesweeping, in which the usual method of helicopterspotting of cut mines on the surface is degraded. While influence minesweeping by ship is relatively unaffected by

visibility, helicopter and diving operations (independent of

the parent ship) may be precluded altogether because of poor

visibility.

3.12.3.2.6 Sea Swells and Waves. Under the right

conditions, swells/waves may cause pressure variations

sufficient to actuate pressure mine firing mechanisms.

Therefore when surface wave and swell conditions

meet these requirements, combination magnetic/acoustic sweeps my be effective against pressure/magnetic/

acoustic combination influence mines. Large swell/wave

conditions may degrade the capability to perform more

operations.

3.12.3.2.7 Marine Life. Biological fouling of a

moored mine case will decrease the buoyancy of the

mine and, because of its greater drag and surface area,

increase its dip. Marine growth has little effect on magnetic and pressure mines, but acoustic mine sensitivity

can be significantly reduced by biological fouling. Additionally, heavy seaweed, especially kelp, can fire explosive cutters and foul mechanical cutters.

3.12.3.3 Stable Environmental Characteristics

Affecting Mine Hunting Operations

3.12.3.3.1 Water Depth. The types of mines used will

be determined in large measure by the water depth in the area

of interest. Water depth will affect the use of variabledepth mine hunting sonars and, in some instances, will

be the determining factor between sweeping and hunting.

3.12.3.3.2 Clutter. Bottom clutter is a general term

that may include both natural objects and anthropogenic

debris. Clutter ranges from rock outcroppings, coral

reefs and heads, and other bottom topography anomalies

to fishtraps, well-heads, oil drums, and other such manmade items discharged overboard. Generally, as the density of clutter increases, the more degraded mine hunting

operational performance becomes.

3.12.3.4 Transient Environmental Characteristics Affecting Mine Hunting Operations

3.12.3.4.1 Tides and Tidal Currents. These influences affect the maneuvering and navigation of the

mine hunter as described for the minesweeper. Maintaining station while prosecuting a minelike contact

presents a challenge to the mine hunter directly proportional to the adverse forces acting against the ship’s

control systems. Strong tidal currents in conjunction

with sandy bottoms may produce the problems of

burial by scouring or displacement of cylindrical mine

cases because of rolling. Currents, and especially tidal

streams from rivers and estuaries, can carry large

amounts of sediment, thereby adversely affecting water

visibility. Tidal currents can also affect the salinity profile, which can affect minehunting sonar performance.

3.12.3.4.2 Climate and Weather. Mine hunters

are subject to the same climate and weather factors as

minesweepers; however, prevailing weather during a

mine hunting campaign may have an even more pronounced effect. For example, sustained high winds and

associated sea states will limit mine hunting operations

more severely than minesweeping because of lowspeed maneuvering requirements for the hunter, the

quenching effect on hull-mounted sonar, and the loss of

operator efficiency where great concentration is required. Ambient noise levels will be higher with more

agitated sea states, with heavy rain and wind breaking

upon the surface. Wind and sea will also affect the

launching and recovery of remote underwater vehicles,

as well as boats and divers.

3.12.3.4.3 Underwater Visibility. The ability of

remotely operated vehicles to locate optically and identify

both moored and ground mines depends heavily on horizontal underwater visibility. Although a remotely operated

vehicle can localize a minelike contact for neutralization

using sonar only, mine destruction cannot be ascertained

without visual verification. Poor vertical visibility will adversely affect aerial mine hunting for ground mines, and

poor horizontal visibility affects the search for moored

mines by both visual and electro-optical means.

3.12.3.4.4 Sound Velocity Profile. Sound velocity varies because of changes in temperature, pressure,

salinity, and density. The resulting velocity gradients

cause bending of the sound paths. The mine hunting

acoustic problems are very similar to those of antisubmarine warfare sonar systems, with the major difference

being that of frequency and therefore range and resolution. All U.S. Navy mine hunting ships are equipped

with variable-depth sonars and are able to minimize the

adverse effects of sound velocity gradients.

3.12.3.4.5 Multipath Effects. Through forward

scattering, sound energy may reach targets of interest

through other than the direct path. The signal received

will be the sum of the returns from the various paths.

The net result of the multipath effect depends on the position and aspect of the mine itself to that of the sonar

transducer.

3.12.3.4.6 Absorption. Suspended matter and bubbles can cause absorption to be greater than that expected

3-31 ORIGINAL
in normal seawater. Absorption of sound energy will

degrade sonar performance because of transmission

loss and signal return loss. Higher than normal seawater

temperature will also increase attenuation loss at the

higher frequencies used in mine hunting sonars. This

temperature effect is negligible below about 4 °C, but

the effect is significant at temperatures of 27 °C and

higher, such as is found in tropical regions.

3.12.3.5 Stable Environmental Characteristics

Affecting EOD/Diving Operations

3.12.3.5.1 Water Depth. The depth of water and

whether the appropriate equipment for that depth of water is available determines the feasibility of diving operations. Physical effects on the diver are directly

determined more by water depth than by any other factor. Depth also affects the operational capabilities of the

diver, such as number of dives and length of dive. In

shallow water, the diver is generally not limited, but the

deeper the water, the more restricted the diving envelope. At maximum depth, the diver may be limited to

only one dive per day and to very short bottom stay time.

3.12.3.5.2 Bottom Conditions. Once in the water

and prosecuting a ground mine, the type and condition of

the bottom becomes a prime concern for the diver. A

rough sea bed will increase the degree of difficulty and

make the dive more dangerous. Accordingly, the time and

effort required will be much greater as bottom topography

and clutter become more difficult and dense, respectively.

Clutter and bottom objects, both natural and manmade,

can render bottom hand-held sonar and visual searches

more difficult.

3.12.3.5.3 Bottom Sediment. Underwater visual

searches are largely dependent on bottom composition.

Soft mud is easily stirred up by water movement, current,

or by the divers themselves resulting in loss of visibility.

Mines buried in mud, or sand may not be visible to divers

and thereby exposes them to significant danger from inadvertent mine actuation. Magnetic ordnance locators may

be required.

3.12.3.6 Transient Environmental Characteristics Affecting EOD/Diving Operations

3.12.3.6.1 Tides and Tidal Currents. Except in

very shallow water environments such as river mouths,

estuaries, and harbors, tides generally pose no special

problems for MCM diving operations. Current, on the

other hand, is of major concern for the planning and execution of diving operations. Surface currents will affect

small boat handling and navigation, but underwater currents have an even more significant impact. The greater

the underwater current, generally the greater the degree of

difficulty in managing underwater equipment such as

hand-held sonar and explosive packages, and the harder

it is to complete work on the bottom while fighting an

adverse current. Planning for working in strong currents or adverse conditions is required.

3.12.3.6.2 Water Temperature. The colder the

seawater temperature, the more adversely affected the

divers’ physical and mental functioning becomes. Efficiency and endurance are directly degraded by cold

temperatures.

3.12.3.6.3 Sea State. Small boat launching and recovery operations may be limited by sea state; however, airborne insertions of EOD personnel may be

made in worse conditions if necessary.

3.12.3.6.4 Water Density. Variations in water density can be caused by sharp temperature and salinity

gradients, which in turn can affect diver buoyancy.

These conditions may be most troublesome near large

river mouths but, while they may hinder diving operations to some extent, will not preclude such operations.

3.12.3.6.5 Climate and Weather. Except for the

disposal of drifting mines on the surface, once in the

water, the diver is relatively unaffected by the weather.

However, divers must be tended from the surface by

boat; therefore the sea state limitations outlined above

will govern whether the diver can attempt the mission.

3.12.3.6.6 Hazardous Marine Life. Biofouling

on mine cases may make identification hazardous and

difficult for mine investigation and exploitation missions. Also, marine growth on drifting mines designated for surface destruction by EOD personnel can

make handholds that are necessary for the attachment

of explosive charges slippery and dangerous. Sharks,

barracudas, and other predatory animals such as sea

snakes can make a diving mission significantly more dangerous, not only because of the immediate threat from

such creatures but because of the distractions they present

as well. Heavy seaweed (kelp, for instance), can present

major entanglement and visibility problems for divers.

3.12.4 Environmental Data Collection. One of

the most important keys to successful mine warfare

combat operations is the accurate collection, collation,

and dissemination of environmental information obtained during peacetime and immediately after the cessation of previous hostilities. The precision and quality of

environmental data directly affects the time required for

MCM forces to complete operations, the safety of MCM

forces, and risk to friendly shipping after MCM forces

have completed operations. The effort to provide accurate environmental data to the MCM force commander

ORIGINAL 3-32
should be the same priority as the effort to provide

high-quality mine intelligence information to mine

warfare forces.

Peacetime environmental data collection efforts are

not always welcomed in belligerent countries’ waters.

In the past, old data collected years earlier, best estimates, and educated guesses have been used when

more precise information was required for mining or

MCM operations. While accurate and timely environmental data is available from the Naval Oceanographic

Office, commercial and academic sources for environmental data frequently are available for most littoral nations of the world. Utilization of such sources in time of

hostilities should not be overlooked. Every effort

should be undertaken to ensure that the quality and precision of ephemeral and seasonal environmental data is the

best available without violating ROE or unnecessarily

arousing belligerent nation suspicions during peacetime.

While of great importance, the environmental data collected during peacetime is generally insufficiently specific for the precision required for safe and efficient mine

warfare operations. Real time in situ data is of paramount importance for MCM efficiency and safety.

Conflict creates a new and less hospitable feature to

mine warfare environmental data collection efforts. While

data precision and quality are in greater demand by mine

warfare forces, the ability to gather environmental data is

even more restricted than during peacetime. In the favor

of the MCM commander, however, is the more precise

geographic location of suspected minefields. Seasonal

and ephemeral data is more closely monitored and the

type of MCM operation to be undertaken can be better defined with the databases from peacetime collection coupled with the environmental data from seasonal anomalies

and predictions in the specific geographic area of interest.

In situ collection of environmental data from forces

on location for operations and actually engaged in operations is the best, most precise information available. The

data collected can directly influence risk to MCM forces,

efficiency of the MCM operation, risk to transiting

forces, and ultimately, the time required to complete

MCM operations. Data collected while on site in the

MCM operation is done in real time. Much data that

directly affects MCM combat system performance and

environmental prediction models can be collected by

MCM platforms. While bathymetry information can be

collected by expendable BTs, much data can be collected by the AN/SQQ-32 sonar and the AN/UQN-4

fathometer. With signal processing technology and operator training, characterization of the sea bottom sediment

and a prediction of conductivity of the sediment can

be produced from the fathometer, for instance, and reverberation noise and clutter can be refined by the sonar.

Added with visual and instrumentation systems on board

MCM platforms and a family of small off-the-shelf offboard systems under evaluation by the Navy Research

Laboratory, the environmental data collection capability

of MCM forces while actually conducting operations can

greatly affect efficiency, risk, and time in mine danger

areas.

3.12.4.1 Sources for Environmental Data.

NAVOCEANO has databases and archives of environmental information for U.S. Navy applications. In addition, NAVOCEANO publishes the Mine Warfare Pilot,

a compendium of environmental information that is

general in nature, but that encompasses specific geographic areas within each pilot. More precise data can

come from the environmental prediction models available at NAVOCEANO, and the prudent MIW commander will ask for these models and pilots well in

advance of an operation or exercise. In particular, mine

burial prediction models are the initial input to an

MCM commander in selecting whether MCM forces

will be engaged in minesweeping or mine hunting operations. Environmental information is available as well

from commercial sources and academia in specific areas of interest. The collection of environmental information by other U.S. Navy forces on site should be

made available to the MCM commander as rapidly as

possible. Data on water column depth, temperature, salinity, and local atmospheric conditions is of great importance to the MCM commander and may only be

available in real-time form from on-site U.S. Navy

forces exterior to MCM platforms.

3.12.4.2 Prediction Models. Prediction models generally fall into four categories: environmental prediction

models (mine burial, current circulation, or magnetic

surveys), acoustic prediction models (sound speed

profile), combat system performance prediction models

(sonar range prediction or magnetic sweeping safe current

prediction), and tactical decision aid models (which

integrate the first three model types). Model validity

should be tested and refined during peacetime exercises

for proper operation in time of conflict. Models require

full and accurate environmental information and the

collection of this information must be coregistered

(acoustic data collected in the same geographic area as

magnetic data, for instance) and in a usable format for

MCM operational use, such as the Mine Warfare Pilot

and the Mine Burial Prediction Model.

The Naval Oceanographic Office is the repository

for all environmental models and can access models

outside of DOD sources as well.

3-33 ORIGINAL
3.13 MINE COUNTERMEASURES FORCE

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3.13.1 Concept of Operations. The command and

control of MCM operations requires a high degree of expert planning and execution. The MCM commander and

his staff are specially trained and experienced in the

steps required to evaluate a mine threat, analyze possible

techniques and tactics to counter that threat, and, once

the most suitable option is determined, direct the execution of the operation.

As with any warfare command and control problem,

there are certain key elements that enable the commander to perform effectively. Some of these are a

supportive working environment, ready access to

information, and efficient communications. For MCM

command and control, this means a command center

with certain capabilities, knowledge of the mission to

be executed by the forces the MCM assets are supporting, access to the intelligence collected on enemy capabilities and movements, and two-way communication

with other warfare commanders for coordination.

Successful MCM planning requires the following:

1. A designated MIWC must be responsible for

mine warfare in the battle group, even when no

MCM force is present. His duties and responsibilities are described in paragraph 1.7.1.

2. The MCM commander must be included in

communications at the same level as other warfare commanders.

3. The number of levels of command between the

overall commander and the MCM commander

should be few. MCM forces should be in the

same chain of command as the forces they support to avoid excessive delay and message traffic.

4. The MCM support ship should be under the tactical control of the MCM commander. This

avoids a conflict in tasking and missions.

5. Protective forces for the MCM force should be

under the MCM commander’s tactical control.

Every operational staff, whether it is a naval component commander, numbered fleet commander, or amphibious squadron commander, should have a position with

the responsibility for MIW. In some cases this may be a

collateral duty of an officer who has had mine warfare

experience (typically an attack or maritime patrol aviator who has some mining training). Because few of

these officers have had sufficient experience or training in MCM to advise the commander effectively when a

real mine threat is encountered, it is essential that MIW

training for these officers be given a high priority.

When MCM assets are deployed to counter a threat,

the battle group commander should be augmented by

one of two tactical MCM squadrons. The MCM squadron commander will assume the duties of MCM commander, directing the battle force’s MCM efforts.

The MCM squadron commander has one or two officers on staff designated as liaison officers. The mission

of these officers is to be attached to a commander who

requires on-scene advice and assistance in coordinating

the support of an MCM force. Prior to the MCM squadron staff’s arrival in theater, the liaison officer may be

deployed as a quick response advance party and may be

instrumental in determining what MCM forces may be

required to counter a threat, as well as initiating planning against the threat while the rest of the MCM staff

oversees deployment of the MCM force.

In amphibious operations, the command structure

may take several forms and command relationships may

change during the course of the operation. MCM forces

may be assigned as part of an advance force conducting

operations prior to the arrival of the amphibious task

force, they may participate as part of a demonstration

force intended to mislead the enemy as to the actual location of the assault, or they may arrive as part of the ATF

to conduct operations just prior to and concurrent with

the landing. Command relationships will be determined

by the precise role of MCM as defined in the amphibious

operation initiating directive and by emerging requirements as the operation develops. The CATF exercises

operational control of all naval forces throughout the operation but may delegate control for some phases of the

operation. If an advance force precedes the ATF to the

AOA, MCM forces conduct operations as a task group

under OPCON of the Advance Force Commander. The

presence of a knowledgeable MIW officer on the advance force staff is critical to ensure close coordination

with other advance components, such as fire support, reconnaissance, air element, and close covering groups.

Upon completion of its mission and arrival of the ATF,

the advance force will be disestablished and OPCON

will revert to the CATF. As the operation progresses

through the assault and post-assault phases and until

conclusion of the operation, the closest coordination between the MCM Commander and other ATF and landing force elements possible is required to ensure

effective MCM effort. If MCM operations are to continue after the termination of the operations of the amphibious operation and disestablishment of the ATF,

OPCON may shift to the area commander.

ORIGINAL 3-34
3.13.2 Mine Countermeasures Staff Organization.

There are many aspects of a MCM operation that are

unique, with no comparison to other warfare areas. The

tactics and equipment often have no parallel and require

experienced MCM officers to plan and execute operations. This is the compelling reason why commanders

faced with a mine threat should request assistance from

COMINEWARCOM. COMINEWARCOM can send

an MCM squadron commander and staff to advise and

assist even before MCM assets are deployed.

The composition and number of staff deployed are

dependent upon the area and scope of the operation,

availability of staff support facilities, and other tasking

in progress or being planned. The typical MCM squadron staff that would deploy for a complex operation

would consist of the following:

1. MCM Commander (O-6)

2. Chief Staff Officer (O-5)

3. Tactical Cell

a. Operations Officer (O-4, 1110)

b. SMCM Tactics Officer (O-3, 1110)

c. AMCM Tactics Officer (O-3, 1310)

d. UMCM Tactics Officer (O-3, 1140)

e. Two MIW Liaison Officers (O-3/4)

f. Intelligence Officer

g. Four Operations Specialists (one E7, one E6,

and two E3-5)

h. Two Radiomen (E3-5)

4. Material Support Cell (TAD from other commands)

a. Engineering/Material Officer (O-3/4)

b. Supply Officer (O-3)

c. Medical Officer (O-3/4) (TAD Diving Medical Officer).

3.13.3 The Mine Countermeasures Command

Center. To perform his duties effectively, the MCM

commander requires facilities to set up an MCM command center and establish a watch. The function of the

command center is to manage MCM operations and

mining operations if the MCM commander is involved

in minefield planning. If minefield planning is assigned

to another commander, the MCM commander must still

plot mine positions and record mine settings in case he

is required to clear the minefield. The command center

should include status boards and tactical plots that display the status of each ongoing MCM task; the employment, readiness status, and material condition of MCM

forces; the status of all MDAs and channels; and a database of all mines or minelike objects located.

The command center watch must manage a complex

flow of information received in reports from MCM units

and prepare status reports for transmission to other commanders. They must also evaluate the progress of each

operation and prepare new tasking orders as necessary.

Computer-based tactical data aids and databases are critical to maintain the rapid flow of information that occurs

with a dynamic operation or exercise.

If USS INCHON (MCS 12) or other support ship is

not available, and no established command center exists ashore that can accommodate the MCM Commander, there are two options for establishing a

temporary center. One option is to use the MIW C4I

MICFAC being built for COMINEWARCOM, which

is designed to meet all of the MCM commander’s

needs. The other option is to use an AN/TSQ-108A

command and control van that belongs to the MIUW

commands and can fulfill the minimum communications requirements.

The MCM commander requires communications capabilities similar to that of other warfare commanders to

exchange data with the battle force commander and with

commanders supporting or supported by the MCM force.

OTCIXS and secure record and data communications

should be available by satellite and direct UHF means.

Communications with each of the MCM assets and

protective forces must also be available full time. This

will require the capability for plain and secure HF voice

and data, plain and secure UHF LOS voice and data, secure UHF SATCOM voice and data, and possibly VHF

voice circuits.

3.13.4 MIW C4I Systems. The purpose of the

MIW C4I system is to link MCM forces with the MCM

commander and integrate the MCM commander with

all other expeditionary warfare elements using Navy

standard C4I systems. To fulfill this mission need, a

C4I system is being developed to provide MCM forces

with the ability to communicate with each other and the

MCM commander by using computerized data links,

providing the MCM Commander and MCM forces

with the JMCIS common to other warfare forces.

3-35 ORIGINAL
Computer-based tactical data aids that are used by

MCM forces for planning and analysis are incorporated

into the MEDAL, which is in development as a segment of JMCIS (available to all MCM planners).

The MIW C4I system can be deployed to support the

MCM commander either as an integral part of the MCS

12 integrated C4I system, or in the COMINEWARCOM

MIW C4I MICFAC format. The portable system can be

set up to operate from a shore site or could be set up on

board a ship where sufficient deck space is available.

Included within the MIW C4I computer tactical data

aids are capabilities for the following:

1. Mine danger area and mine contact plotting and

management

2. MCM situation assessment and planning

3. MCM effectiveness evaluation

4. Mine area plotting and tactical data management

5. Mining situation assessment and planning

6. Mining effectiveness evaluation

7. Environmental database reference

8. Q-route and route survey data reference

9. Mine technical data reference

10. Mining and MCM asset data reference

11. Digital navigation chart reference

12. Message processing.

3.13.4.1 MCM Unit C4I (Comm Capability). The

MCM 1 Class ship was designed with satellite transmitand-receive capability but with insufficient depth. The

MCM can receive satellite record traffic (CUDIX) with

sufficient capability, but it has only a single-channel

transmit capability on satellite. This means that satellite

voice circuitry must be dropped to send record traffic.

Additionally, the satellite transmit antenna is an

omnidirectional design, which, due to location and performance limits, does not provide omnidirectional capability. When other forces are reducing HF transmissions,

the MCM is still depending on HF ship-shore to send

some message traffic.

On the other hand, the MHC 51 Class was designed

as a coastal operations platform with no satellite transmission capability. It is able to receive satellite broadcast record traffic, but it must transmit all outgoing

traffic on HF ship-shore or by UHF TGO circuits to

other surface units for retransmission. When conducting operations out of UHF LOS range from the MCM

Commander, the MHC must use HF voice to keep in

touch and make voice reports of progress.

Since HF transmissions create hazards to some ordnance systems, there are times when either ship class cannot communicate (while mine hunting or conducting

neutralization operations). If casualties occur or assistance

is required, the ship is unable to safely send a call for assistance on UHF satellite circuits as other platforms can do.

Programs to install new C4I capabilities into the

MCM 1 and MHC 51 classes are ongoing. These programs include improved SATCOM antennae, additional UHF SATCOM transceiver capability with

DAMA, an MIW tactical digital link, and JMCIS. Extension of tactical data exchange capability to AMCM

and EODMCM forces is also ongoing.

MH-53E AMCM helicopters also have communications requirements that must be addressed to effectively

use this asset. Coordination with AMCM must be done

on HF, VHF, or UHF LOS circuits. It must be noted

that the MH-53E does not have a data link capability;

all tactical data is passed over a voice circuit. AMCM

operations will require radio communication links for

both secure and nonsecure tactical voice and navigational requirements.

3.13.5 Mine Countermeasures Planning. To

plan MCM missions and provide tasking to MCM

units, the MCM commander must be provided some

specific information by higher authority. As the MCM

commander begins to assess the situation, he obtains

the following information:

1. Battle force mission priorities.

2. Risk estimates: how will mines affect the mission as planned?

3. Known or assumed intelligence (and which is

which) on the following:

a. Enemy mine inventory, location of stockpile

and laying doctrine

b. Enemy MIW order of battle and locations

c. Geography and political boundaries in the area

ORIGINAL 3-36
d. Minefield structure (density, spacing, laying

patterns, mine types, etc.)

e. Defendability of the minefield by non-naval

assets such as artillery, aircraft, infantry, or

armor.

4. Critical timing of events.

5. Protective forces to be assigned.

6. Supporting logistics arrangement.

7. Tactical organization (who supports whom).

In accordance with this information, the MCM commander will brief the battle force commander on possible courses of action to prevent, limit, or eliminate the

impact of enemy mining on the mission objective and

will recommend an MCM objective, MCM MOE, and

risk directive for the operation to be planned. The BF

commander must select the MCM objective, MOE, and

risk directive and issue an operational tasking directive

based on these recommendations. The MCM risk directive approved by higher authority has a major impact on

the approach to MCM operations and the techniques selected by the MCM commander. Each of these items

will then determine the information contained in an

MCM task order.

3.13.6 Mine Countermeasures Exercises. Exercises involving MCM forces are the primary opportunity to conduct integrated training of MCM forces and

to integrate with battle group forces. The objective of

all MIW exercises is to improve the fleet’s capability to

effectively use mines and MCM in the successful attainment of the overall mission

COMINEWARCOM coordinates the scheduling of

national exercise participation with numbered fleet

commanders. Participation in NATO or other allied

exercises is coordinated through CINCLANTFLT.

Whenever possible, an integrated MCM task group

with MCM squadron commander will participate in

major exercises. When participation by MCM forces in

the exercise area is not feasible, an MCM force may

participate in a separate operation area using scripted

geography to duplicate the scenario of the fleet exercise. Although the forces may be separated by thousands of miles, using procedures developed for

wargaming and the ENWGS, the MCM squadron commander can receive tasking from the battle group, carry

out planning, direct execution of the MCM effort, and

report results just as if the two forces were operating together. In the same fashion, if an insufficient number of

MCM platforms (or no platforms) can be assigned to

the exercise, the MCM squadron staff can employ the

MIW C4I system to simulate MCM effort accomplished and report to the battle group.

3.13.7 Mine Countermeasures Exercise Analysis. COMINEWARCOM conducts analysis of

MCM exercises as a tool to measure the effectiveness

of MCM forces and identify the shortcomings that need

additional attention. Analysis is performed on selected

exercises that involve new systems or tactics requiring

evaluation, and the results are used to support approval

of tactics or to direct the revision of tactics for future

evaluation.

3-37 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

CHAPTER 4

MCM for Non-MCM Ships

4.1 CONCEPTS

This chapter discusses concepts, systems, and tactics

to be employed by ships that do not have MCM as a primary mission. These may apply when no MCM forces

are in the area or when the ship is operating in the vicinity of a mine threat but outside the declared mine danger area where MCM forces are operating. Appendix E

lists MIW references that provide more detailed information and may be used to expand the commander’s

knowledge of MIW.

4.1.1 Detect and Avoid. The most effective action

to counter mining that can be taken by a ship that is not

designed for MCM is to detect and avoid minefields. It

is the task of the miner to make the minefields more difficult to detect and, if possible, to place them where

they cannot be avoided. It is the task of any commander

to take all precautions and actions that will enable the

ship or ships under his command to avoid being damaged by mines. Most ships are not equipped to detect

mines. Although some ASW sonars have been modified to improve their capability for mine detection, even

these do not have a high enough probability of detecting all mines or are not accurate enough to give the

commander confidence that the ship can safely transit a

minefield. Therefore, avoidance is the primary tactic,

and the purpose of detection is to enable avoidance.

4.1.2 Use of the Environment. The environment

is of tremendous importance in MIW. Determining environmental conditions is one of the first steps for both

the minefield planner and the MCM planner. If not

properly considered, the environment alone can invalidate a minefield or MCM effort. Use of the environment can also be one of the most effective tactics for

avoiding mines.

The environment determines where certain mines

can or cannot be used. By correlating any available information on the types of mines the miner can use with

a study of the environment, waters that are unsuitable

for mining and are therefore safe for shipping may be

revealed. The following are examples:

1. Ground (bottom) mines are not considered effective against surface ships/craft in anything

over 300 feet of water unless they are rising

mines. Even the largest bottom mine causes little

concern to most U.S. Navy surface ships at a

250-foot depth. Rising mines may be effective in

depths greater than 600 feet.

2. Moored mines will experience significant dip in

areas where current flow is strong, and dip increases with water depth, so deep areas with current flow are difficult to mine.

3. On a sloping bottom, mines may not remain in

place, but may collect at the lowest point.

When there is a choice of routes to follow, by evaluating the options that are available to the miner, it may

be possible to use a route that will avoid most of the

mineable water and at least know where mining is more

likely.

4.1.3 Organic Mine Countermeasures. Organic MCM are the capabilities inherent to a ship or

battle group that can be employed for detection and

avoidance of or countering mines. Since the resurgence

of MIW experience in the Persian Gulf, several projects

have been initiated to develop new systems or modify

existing systems to give individual ships greater capability for organic MCM. As with any effort to develop

new technology, some systems have proven ineffective

and development efforts have been discontinued,

whereas other projects that have shown promise are

continuing in development. Details of some systems

are given in paragrpah 4.3.

4.1.4 In-Stride Mine Countermeasures. In addition to developing organic MCM capabilities, a long

term goal has been set for development of an in-stride

MCM capability for use in amphibious operations. The

mine threat is a show stopper to an amphibious operation, and current MCM capabilities are insufficient to

counter the modern threat without causing significant

delay to the operation. The concept of in-stride MCM is

4-1 ORIGINAL
to equip the amphibious force with MCM assets that

will permit them to counter the mine threat without

breaking stride in the assault process.

4.2 SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

4.2.1 Battle Group Capabilities. Most battle

groups have some capabilities for self-protection within

their ranks. Ships with helicopters embarked can provide visual and/or radar searches along the intended

track of the battle group for drifting mines or signs of

other mines. Surface combatants with sonars and radars

can provide some degree of reconnaissance along the

track ahead of other ships not so equipped. However,

real battle group wide capabilities are not currently

available to protect against ground or moored mines.

Systems for this purpose are included in ongoing research and development projects.

4.2.2 Moored or Drifting Mine Self-Protection.

The majority of moored or drifting mines that might be

detected by ships without a mine-hunting sonar will be

contact actuated mines. Contact mines can be defeated

by any means that prevents the ship from coming into direct contact with the mine. If it is possible to reduce the

ship’s draft by offloading material or water ballast, that

will result in a direct reduction of the potential for interaction with a moored contact mine. During World War I,

when the majority of mines encountered were moored

contact mines, paravanes were employed by large ships

to fend off mines. They were not always successful and

frequently resulted in a drifting mine threat. As the threat

shifted to moored or ground influence mines, paravanes

lost their value. Modern self-protection systems focus

on detection and avoidance of contact mines.

4.2.2.1 Lookouts. Additional lookouts should be

employed by all ships when operating in mine threat

waters. Normal lookouts may not be well placed or

equipped to detect mines and may be distracted from

the mine search by other duties. A mine lookout whose

sole responsibility is to detect mines in the ship’s path

and who is specially equipped for mine spotting will be

more effective. A mine lookout should be positioned to

have the best available view forward of the ship and be

provided with the following equipment:

1. Polarized lens sunglasses to reduce the glare and

improve the ability to detect mines that may be

just below the surface.

2. Binoculars, preferably stabilized 10 by 40 mm.

3. A night observation device (NOD), preferably

the Mk 37 Mod 3 for night time watch.

4. Battle gear: helmet, flak jacket, gas mask, etc.,

as appropriate for a topside watchstation.

5. Sound-powered phone communications with the

bridge.

6. Appropriate clothing for the weather: in environments such as the Persian Gulf, a canopy for

protection from the sun may be appropriate.

7. Sun screen: the ship should provide protective sun

screen lotion, particularly if there is no canopy.

8. Water bottle or canteen: in hot, dry climates, dehydration will reduce the watchstander’s effectiveness, so a ready water source should be

maintained.

4.2.2.2 Helicopter Visual Search. A helicopter

can be very effective in conducting a visual search for

mines along the ship or battle group track. The most effective choice will be an aircraft that has several

crewmembers who can search for contacts while at least

one pilot concentrates on flying. In some helicopters, additional crew may be added to increase the number of eyes

conducting the search or to allow a rotation of searchers so

that eye strain does not prevent effective search. If the

conditions are favorable, it is possible to detect shallow

moored mines as well as drifting mines from a helicopter.

Optimum visual search conditions are clear water, a high

sun (between 40° and 70° altitude) in a clear sky, and a

calm sea. The apparent color of seawater is often an indicator of its clarity and consequently the depth to which

minelike contacts are visible. Normally, a deep blue color

indicates water of the greatest transparency. Green,

green-yellow, brown, red, and white are progressively

less transparent. From the air, mines in blue water appear

as light green objects. The shallower the mine, the

brighter its color. From the air, a group of mines is more

readily detected than individual mines. Lessons learned in

the Persian Gulf indicate that the best results in searching

for single mines have been achieved at altitudes of 500 to

600 feet. However, mine patterns can be spotted more

easily at altitudes of approximately 1,200 feet. Specific

search procedures include the following:

1. Search within 40° of the vertical.

2. Avoid looking directly into the sun’s azimuth.

3. The best solar altitude is approximately 65°.

When the sun is below 40° in altitude, not enough

sunlight penetrates the water to detect mines below the

surface. When the sun is above 70° in altitude, usually

ORIGINAL 4-2
not enough light appears on the sides of dark objects for

the objects to be visible, and there is a relatively greater

glitter interference from surface reflection.

An airspeed of 25 to 35 knots is recommended, but

adjustments may be necessary to cover the entire area of

a ship or battle group track in the mission time available.

If the search is concentrating on drifting mines only, a

lower sun angle and lower altitudes may be acceptable.

4.2.2.3 Radar Mine Detection. Tests have been

done to determine the effectiveness of various radars in

detecting mines on the surface. Although some surface

search and navigation radars have made detections, few

have proven to be dependable mine search tools. This

does not mean that radar contacts should be ignored;

however, a mine on the surface presents a small target

that may not be continuously detected and recognized

as a valid contact by operators. Aircraft radars such as

those used on the SH-60, S-3, and P-3 have given the

best performance. Conversion of a radar contact detected by the aircraft to a visual contact is difficult. The

contact is normally lost on radar before the aircrew are

able to gain visual contact, and the fixed wing aircraft’s

minimum speed makes it very difficult to get positive

contact identification.

4.2.2.4 Mast Mounted Sights. The mast mounted

sight system has proven to be a valuable tool in searching

for mines on the water surface. The mast mounted sight is

a combination infrared and television optical system that

can be used to search a 120° sector ahead of the ship. During hours of darkness, the infrared display can be used to

detect mines that have been heated by the sun during the

day. The mine case heats and cools at a different rate than

the surrounding water and provides a sufficient temperature differential that can be detected. However, when the

sea state builds and causes waves to wash over the case

regularly, the wave action will cool the case quickly and

eliminate the temperature differential.

4.2.2.5 Kingfisher. During Operation Earnest Will

(1987-88, Persian Gulf), there was an urgent need to

equip surface combatants for detection of moored contact mines. The Kingfisher Project included several

technical efforts to provide this capability, one of which

was a modification of the AN/SQS-53 and AN/SQS-56

sonars. The modification enabled the operator to detect

small contacts in the water column. Although most of

the Kingfisher Project efforts were found not operationally suitable, the AN/SQS-53 and 56 sonar modification was retained for further development. It has

come to be known as the Kingfisher System and has

been installed on a number of surface combatants.

Kingfisher consists of a modified waveform that

provides detection beams from 340° to 020° relative.

Detections in excess of 1,000 yards are normal, although the narrow beam coverage may not provide

continuous tracking on contacts from that range. A special display allows operators to evaluate target strength

and other characteristics.

Kingfisher has been accepted as a valuable system

for object avoidance by surface combatants, but it was

not designed as a minehunting sonar, and operators

should not attempt to use it as such. The limited bearing

coverage, as well as other characteristics of the platforms on which the sonar is installed, make it unsuitable for investigation of contacts. It should be used

strictly to detect contacts in the ship’s path and, when a

contact is detected, to determine a safe path to avoid

that contact.

4.2.3 Electromagnetic Self-Protection. All ships

are vulnerable to magnetic influence mines if the

proper sensitivity settings to target the ship’s influence

signature are used in the mine sensors. There are material and tactical measures that can be taken to limit the

ship’s vulnerability. The material measures include

some obvious actions, such as maintaining the ship’s

degaussing system. A ship’s magnetic signature consists of multiple components that come from several

sources. The static magnetic field exists because of the

permanent magnetism of the ship’s structure. Each of

the metallic components in the structure contributes to

the overall signature, and the degaussing system is designed specifically to counter this magnetic field. When

a steel-hulled ship is built, it is initially depressed to reduce the magnetic signature to a level that can be controlled by an installed degaussing system.

4.2.3.1 Degaussing. A degaussing system reduces

the ship’s magnetic field by creating a magnetic field

that is, as nearly as possible, equal and opposite to the

ship’s permanent and induced magnetism. This is accomplished by means of installed wire coils through

which a direct current is passed. An automatic degaussing control system determines the appropriate current

settings. Degaussing systems are installed on most naval ships except submarines.

4.2.3.2 Check Ranging. The degaussing system is

calibrated by transiting over a magnetic measurement

range and making adjustments as directed by the MSF

personnel. Over time, if the permanent magnetism increases to a level that can no longer be controlled by the

degaussing system, it must be reduced by another visit

to a deperming facility. U.S. Navy deperming facilities

and capabilities are shown in Figure 4-1.

4-3 ORIGINAL
4.2.3.3 Flash Deperming. Ships that do not have

an installed degaussing system can be flash depressed.

Current is passed through vertical and horizontal coils

wrapped around the outside of the hull to disrupt the acquired magnetic orientation. Submarines and landing

craft are flash depressed before deployment based on

the geographic area of operations. If a change in the

area of operations occurs, consideration must be given

to the difference in the magnetic environment.

4.2.3.4 Other Sources. A static electric field is created by the presence of two or more types of metals in salt

water. A small electric current is generated by the bimetallic corrosion process. Cathodic protection systems are

designed to reduce bimetallic corrosion by creating a substitute electric current. This current also results in a magnetic field that can be detected and exploited by a mine

sensor. UEP mines are designed specifically to target this

type of signature. Consequently, the cathodic protection

system should be turned off prior to transiting a minefield.

Moving machinery such as turbines, reduction gears,

propeller shafts, and rudders and steering gear can create an alternating magnetic field by their motion and by

generating alternating electric fields. Although these

fields may seem small in relation to the ship’s static

magnetic field, they each are contributors to the overall

magnetic signature. While it is not practical to eliminate the movement of machinery, it can be minimized

and stabilized when in a minefield. Since a mine sensor

measures the change in the magnetic field over time,

using the rudder minimally, making small speed

changes, making small course changes, and shutting

down noncritical machinery can all help to reduce the

ship’s vulnerability.

4.2.4 Acoustic Self-Protection. Mines target a

wide range of acoustic frequencies. Acoustic signature

sources include machinery noises, propeller cavitation,

hull flow noises, and others, but machinery and propeller noises are the most prevalent and easiest to control.

Material methods to reduce the ship’s acoustic signature for mine warfare purposes are the same as those employed for ASW. The installation and maintenance of

vibration dampening systems and the proper maintenance

of equipment are the primary actions that can reduce that

part of the signature generated by machinery. Ships that

have been subjected to a visit from the PMT will have

been provided information that will permit selection of

their quietest equipment for operation when a quiet ship

condition has been directed. Additionally, ships that have

been measured on an acoustic monitoring range will be

able to avoid operation of equipment at a speed or configuration that has proven to generate unusually high noise.

4.2.5 Seismic Self-Protection. A seismic mine

sensor responds to the vibrations that emanate from a

ship and can be sensed through the ocean bottom. These

vibrations are essentially low frequency sound waves

and are generated by the same sources as discussed for

acoustic sensors. There are no special methods to protect

ORIGINAL 4-4

Magnetic Silencing

Facility

Measurement Range Deperming Facility Minesweeper Test

Facility

Norfolk, VA YES YES

New London, CT YES

Charleston, SC YES YES

Mayport, FL YES

Kings Bay, GA1 YES YES

Ingleside, TX2 YES YES

San Diego, CA YES YES YES

Bangor, WA1 YES YES

Pearl Harbor, HI YES YES

Yokosuka, JA3 YES

Notes: 1. Bangor, WA, and Kings Bay, GA, are special facilities for submarines only.

2. Ingleside, TX, is a new facility with capability for ranging and special testing

minesweepers only. Estimated IOC is 1997.

3. MSF Yokosuka is shared with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.

Figure 4-1. U.S. Navy Magnetic Silencing Facilities
against seismic sensors other than those described for

acoustic self-protection.

4.2.6 Pressure Self-Protection. There is little that

can be done from a material standpoint to reduce the

ship’s signature against a mine sensor that uses pressure as one of the influences. The Bernoulli effect between the moving hull and sea bottom determines the

pressure signature, and the hull form cannot be modified. In some cases, reducing the ship’s draft may be

possible by reducing ballast, and this should reduce the

pressure signature. Except in unusual cases, however,

the change will be very slight and possibly insignificant. Reducing the ship’s speed to bare steerageway

can reduce a ship’s pressure signature and is by far the

most effective means available to reduce risks from

pressure activated mines.

4.3 TACTICS

4.3.1 Ship’s Self-Protection. Tactics for individual ships are separated into general, drifting/contact,

moored, magnetic, acoustic, and pressure categories. If the

type of mine threat has been verified, some tactics may be

ignored, but in most cases all tactics that do not prevent performance of the ship’s mission should be put into effect.

General precautions to be taken by ships when transiting an

MDA or any area suspected of mining (whether or not designated an MDA) include the following:

1. Set and maintain maximum watertight integrity.

Condition Zebra, or a modification of Zebra for

main deck and below, will minimize damage

should a mine be detonated.

2. Station a damage control party with full gear in a

topside area. Once a mine detonation occurs, it

may be difficult for key damage control personnel

to get to the repair locker and obtain equipment.

3. Have all personnel don protective gear, such as

battle helmets, life jackets, and flak jackets. Topside personnel should wear kapok or other naturally buoyant life jackets.

4. Muster all unnecessary personnel topside in an

area not subject to falling debris.

5. When the tactical situation permits, consider reducing the readiness state of some or all weapons

systems and stowing ordnance in the configuration that will best withstand shock.

6. Proceed over the same ground as other traffic. In the

case of contact mines, if other traffic has passed

safely, the track has been proven safe; if other mine

types are present, at least the track has been

proven clear of contact mines, and there is no increased risk by following another vessel.

4.3.2 Drifting/Contact Mine Tactics. The only other

action that can be certain to reduce the potential for

striking a contact mine is to find a ship with a larger

draft/beam and follow in its path. The following are

recommended precautions:

1. Post mine lookouts. See paragraph 4.2.2.1 for a

discussion of equipment for mine lookouts.

2. Watchstanders must be given special training

to be effective. They should report any contact,

and the OOD should take interest in every contact so that the watch understands the importance of his mission.

3. Use any available aircraft (helicopters are most

effective) to conduct a visual search for drifting

or floating mines along the intended track of the

ship. A search should be conducted in the morning, at midday, and in the afternoon along the

intended track adjusted for set and drift. See

paragraph 4.2.2.2 for a discussion of visual

search techniques.

4. Increase surveillance following rough seas or

storms that may have caused mine mooring cables to break, setting the mine adrift.

5. Plot drift patterns for the area. NAVOCEANO

has a prediction program for drift patterns that

can be used to estimate the danger area of mines

that break loose or are set adrift. If prevailing

currents and winds are not known for the area,

special buoys that are tracked by satellite to reveal the drift pattern can be dropped.

4.3.3 Moored Mine Tactics. Generic mine avoidance sonar procedures, where a mine avoidance sonar

has been installed and specific tactical procedures have

been developed, should be followed. The following description of procedures is intended to give the commander an appreciation for the tactics used with a mine

avoidance sonar installed in any unit other than an

MCM ship.

Mine avoidance sonars typically are effective for

mine detection at speeds of 8 knots or less. Above this

speed, the sonar picture is degraded, and the detection

range may be insufficient for safe avoidance. Detection

ranges can vary greatly, but few will be greater than

600 to 800 yards. Once a contact is detected, it must be

4-5 ORIGINAL
recognized as a possible mine, and the decision to maneuver must be made very rapidly.

The time for maneuvering to avoid a contact is determined by the ship’s speed, the dangerous distance for

the particular mine, and the range at which the decision

is made. The dangerous distance is the minimum range

at which a mine can be passed without endangering the

ship. For a contact mine, that might be 100 yards. If

there is reason to believe the mine may be an influence

type, the dangerous distance should be increased to at

least 300 yards.

To the maximum extent possible, prior to executing

the turn, the mine avoidance sonar should be used to investigate the new heading. This is particularly important

if the turn is ordered to avoid a sonar contact. Mines are

usually spaced just a few hundred yards apart, and if the

ship is approaching a mine line, the avoiding turn for one

mine may lead to collision with another mine.

4.3.4 Magnetic Mine Tactics. Tactical measures

for self-protection against magnetic mines are as follows:

1. Ensure each ship’s degaussing system is energized and operating properly. Do not energize or

deenergize a degaussing system when a ship is

in mined waters.

2. Secure the cathodic protection system several

hours prior to entering an area believed to have a

magnetic mine threat.

3. Secure all unnecessary electrical equipment that

has a significant power draw.

4. Travel in the deepest water possible and transit

shallow areas at high water. When possible, consider reducing water ballast to reduce draft. The

magnetic signature decreases with distance from

the hull, so the greater separation that can be

maintained between ground mines and the ship,

the better.

5. Slow the ship’s speed. Faster speeds generally

mean higher signatures from moving machinery

and a higher rate of change in magnetic signature compared to the earth’s magnetic field.

6. Avoid dropping or raising the ship’s anchor because these actions cause a change in the magnetic

signature, not only from the electric motor driven

winch, but also from the relocation of a large mass

of metal. The same is true for movement of large

weapons or aircraft and vehicle elevators.

7. Avoid starting and stopping electrical machinery that has high current because those actions

draw a momentary spike in the ship’s magnetic

signature. It may be better to start equipment

and leave it running if it must be used during a

minefield transit.

4.3.5 Acoustic/Seismic Mine Tactics. Tactical

measures for self-protection against acoustic/seismic

mines are as follows:

1. Implement the Quiet Ship Bill, which should result

in minimizing running equipment and selecting the

quietest equipment options. Avoid noisy operations,

such as operation of grinding or chipping tools or unnecessary use of weapons handling systems.

2. Operate Prairie/Masker systems, when installed

and, if appropriate, at the ship’s intended speed

to mask machinery and propeller noises.

3. Transit the deepest channel possible. As with the

magnetic signature, the acoustic signature decreases with distance between the ship and the

mine.

4. Transit during high water to increase the available depth.

5. Transit at the slowest speed consistent with the

tactical situation to reduce machinery, hull, and

propeller noises.

6. Minimize speed and rudder changes to reduce machinery noise and flow noise generated by propulsion system changes and rudder movement.

4.3.6 Pressure Mine Tactics. Tactical measures

to reduce the pressure signature are relatively limited.

They are as follows:

4.3.6.1 Maximize Water Depth. Remaining in the

deepest channel and transiting at high water will reduce

the pressure signature sensed by a ground mine.

4.3.6.2 Minimize Speed. Maintaining the minimum speed permissible in the tactical situation, while

still maintaining steerageway, will reduce the relative

water flow between hull and bottom and reduce the

pressure signature generated. If the ship could drift

through the minefield on natural current, there would

be no pressure signature generated.

4.3.6.3 Use Masking Techniques. A high sea state,

which increases the ambient pressure against which the

mine is trying to detect the ship, will tend to mask the

ORIGINAL 4-6
ship’s passage. (Unfortunately, the tactical situation

does not usually allow a delay until favorable weather

conditions exist.)

4.3.6.4 Defeat the Firing Sensor. Pressure sensors are not generally used independently, and the secondary sensor may be more easily defeated.

4.3.7 Group Self-Protection Tactics. Tactics

for single ships also apply to groups of ships. Conducting a helicopter search ahead of a dispersed battle

group requires a lot of helicopter time to cover the large

area. Therefore, if transiting in mined waters, a column

formation is the best for mine avoidance, although

other warfare considerations may not be satisfied.

If Kingfisher-equipped ships are available, they

should be placed in the front of the formation, and other

ships should attempt to follow in their path.

A Q-route system is a pattern of preplanned, dormant shipping lanes to be activated by the area commander in time of war. The routes are designed to

maximize the effectiveness of MCM by limiting the

amount of area MCM forces must cover and by allowing the ship to traverse the most favorable bottom environment that is practical for the area. A Q-route system

includes coastal routes, which follow the coastline for

transit from port to port; approach routes, which connect coastal routes to the port entrance; breakout routes,

which connect the coastal route to open water (beyond

mine threat); and link routes, which provide connections between coastal routes where useful.

Q-routes are listed in the AHP-7 series of publications, including a U.S. Supplement for routes of U.S.

Navy interest only. (A volume listing Atlantic and Gulf

Coast routes has not been published yet. These routes

are listed in an unofficial COMINEWARCOM supplement to AHP 7.)

Navigational warning messages, sent via the “Q”

message system, distribute classified information on

known or suspected minefields and channel status (up

to the NATO Secret level). The messages are originated

by an area commander, such as COMUSMARDEZLANT or COMUSMARDEZPAC, if activated. The

Q-message information is also sanitized and provided

to merchant ships or civilian convoy commanders.

Convoying of ships allows for the concentration of

defensive assets (i.e., MIW, AAW, ASW, and SUW) to

protect merchant shipping. This results in reduced efficiency for high speed merchant traffic that must wait

for the convoy departure and travel at the speed of the slowest convoy member. However, on the positive side, it

permits mutual support, allows the best navigation system to lead, and if escorts have mine detection and

avoidance capabilities, results in a significant reduction

in threat.

4.3.8 Preplanned Responses. Preplanned responses to certain situations should be promulgated

prior to encountering mines. The MIWC provides standardized procedures in the OPTASK MIW or

OPTASK MIW Supplement. These should include

quick reporting procedures, standard maneuvering instructions for different types of mine threats, and mine

contact identification and disposal policy.

A preplanned response should include steps to avoid

any contact that has been detected while still holding

contact and procedures for marking contacts with smoke

or dye markers dropped near but not on the contact.

4.3.9 Mine Disposal. Mines may be discovered by

non-MCM units when no MCM force is available. Specific procedures to be followed are found in the Navy

Wide Standing OPTASK MIW. If the mine is a tethered or bottom mine, an MDA will be designated and

an EODMCM detachment dispatched to conduct disposal. If the mine is drifting, an MDA may be designated because of the potential for other mines, but

immediate action is necessary. Drifting mines are difficult to track in darkness, so disposal before darkness is

desirable. After receiving a mine report, the MIWC will

determine whether an EODMCM team can be transported to the scene. EOD mobile detachments deployed

within the CVBG and ARG have limited MCM capability and are available within the battle group for immediate response. EOD swimmers can be delivered

directly to the mine by helicopter if they are available.

If no EOD swimmers are available, the MIWC may direct the ship to dispose of the mine by gunfire. Disposal

by gunfire is the method of last resort. On the average,

one in seven mines hit by gunfire detonates, resulting in

a shrapnel hazard to ships and helicopters. Before firing, the ship should be prepared for blast, with topside

personnel wearing flak jackets and helmets; shots

should be fired from the maximum practical range. A

50-caliber machine gun has sufficient range and power

to dispose of a mine, although, again, this is a last resort

option. Firing at a mine from a helicopter is not recommended. The 700-foot radial range and arc of shrapnel

from a mine exploding on the surface places any helicopter nearby in danger. Mines that do not detonate remain functional and, if they sink to the bottom, may

detonate if disturbed by fishing nets or anchors. Mines

may also flood partially and float somewhere in the water column as a serious threat to ships.

4-7 ORIGINAL
Any ship that is equipped with a helicopter or small

boat may at some time be tasked to provide transportation for EODMCM detachments and other EOD teams.

Helicopters are not threatened by mines as long as they

remain clear of explosive disposal procedures and do

not attempt to dispose of mines by gunfire. Small boats,

however, can be threatened not only by contact mines,

but they also may provide sufficient magnetic or acoustic signature to actuate influence mines. EODMCM detachments normally use a rubber boat with low

magnetic and acoustic signature. If other surface craft

are being used, they should restrict engine operations to

medium or low speed to reduce acoustic signature and

stay well clear of the mine contact.

4.4 PASSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES

FOR SUBMARINES

Submarines have many of the same concerns for reducing the threat from mines as do surface ships. A major difference, however, is that many of the actions

needed to reduce acoustic/seismic and magnetic signatures for a submarine are the same actions they carry

out to maintain the maximum effectiveness of their primary sensor and reduce all other threats to their existence. High quality maintenance to reduce noise and

EMI sources on the submarine also reduces the magnetic and acoustic source level for mines.

U.S. submarines do not have a degaussing system.

They have their signature read periodically and are

flash depressed when required. If a change in the area

of operations occurs, consideration must be given to the

difference in the magnetic environment, and extra precautions must be taken if the submarine cannot revisit

the deperming facility.

More specific information and tactics about submarine MCM exceed the classification of this publication.

Sources of additional information include NWP 3-15.53

and COMSUBDEVRON TACMEMO FZ-6060-1-90.

ORIGINAL 4-8
APPENDIX A

MIW TERMS

A.1 INTRODUCTION

MIW has its own language using many terms that,

although some may appear in other warfare areas, carry

different or more specific definitions when applied to

MIW. Additionally, there are terms used by allied MIW

forces that seem similar to U.S. terms, but have meanings that differ to some extent. Allied or coalition force

operations can be far more difficult when the forces and

commanders are not able to communicate freely because of the misunderstandings caused by different terminology or the different connotations of terms.

This appendix provides a compendium of terminology found in the primary Allied MIW reference, ATP

6, and the NWP 3-15 series (formerly the NWP 27 series) publications, as well as some new terminology

that has come into common use within MIW. In paragraphs A.1.2 and A.1.3 and their subparagraphs, key

definitions of mining and MCM are given with some

discussion. Paragraph A.2 provides an alphabetical listing of Allied terms from ATP 6, shown in normal style

type, and U.S.-unique terms/definitions, shown in italics. In some cases, italicized type is used to provide further interpretation of an Allied term as it applies to U.S.

MIW forces or systems. These are terms that are not

listed in Joint Pub 1-02 or whose meanings differ from

the version listed in that publication.

A.1.1 Mining. Mining is one of the two distinct

subdivisions of MIW. Mining operations are used to

support the broad task of establishing and maintaining control of essential sea areas and embrace all

methods whereby naval mines are used to inflict

damage on enemy shipping and/or hinder, disrupt,

and deny enemy sea operations. Mines may be employed either offensively or defensively to restrict

the movement of surface ships, submarines, and underwater systems and personnel. Mines can be used

alone to deny free access to and from ports, harbors,

and rivers, as well as movement through SLOC.

Mines can be used as a force multiplier to augment

other military assets to reduce the enemy surface

and submarine threat. A mining campaign is intended

to inflict damage on enemy ships that challenge

the minefield, thereby having an adverse affect on

their defense, offensive operations, and logistical

support efforts, but it can also force the enemy into

conducting a heavy mine countermeasures effort that

may exceed the magnitude of the mining operation

itself. Enemy ships kept at their base or deterred in

transit by mining may be rendered as ineffective for

the immediate war efforts as if they were otherwise

sunk or destroyed. Further, delays in shipping may be

as costly to the enemy as actual losses. The threat

posed by a minefield may be real or it may only be

perceived, but mining does have a significant psychological impact on the enemy by forcing him to

combat an unseen force.

A.1.1.1 Defensive Mining. Defensive mining operations are those conducted in undisputed international waters or straits with the declared intention of

controlling shipping in defense of sea communications.

Defensive mining is designed to provide protection by

denying enemy access to the friendly force’s SLOCs,

harbors, beaches, chokepoints, and surface and submarine operating areas. A key element to a defensive

mining campaign is that safe passage must be provided

for the merchant and combat shipping of friendly

forces, as well as those of neutral nations. Either a safe,

mine-free lane must be left in the minefield, or another

route must be available that will take the traffic around

the minefield. These safe areas would require monitoring from other forces to ensure that they are not also

used by the enemy, unless the intent of the mining operation is to force the enemy through a secondary route.

A.1.1.2 Offensive Mining. Offensive mining operations are those conducted in enemy territorial waters

or waters under the control of the enemy. The intent of

an offensive mining campaign is to deny, delay, or disrupt enemy ship movements. This is accomplished by

destroying or obtaining mission abort damage on the

naval and merchant ships that challenge the minefield

and/or by requiring the enemy to conduct a large MCM

effort to reduce the mine threat.

A.1.1.3 Protective Mining. Protective mining is

conducted in a nation’s own territorial waters or waters

A-1 ORIGINAL
under the control of an allied nation to protect ports,

harbors, anchorages, coasts, and/or coastal routes from

enemy maritime traffic. Safe passage for friendly and

allied combat forces must be provided through the

mined areas. If merchant shipping will be transiting

through the mined area, it also must be provided with

safe passage. Since protective mining operations are

conducted in restricted waters that the nation’s or

friendly maritime forces will be transiting, it is extremely important that the mines be accurately placed

so that they do not pose a threat to traffic transiting

through the safe channel.

A.1.2 Mine Countermeasures. MCM is the other

distinct subdivision of MIW, and it includes all offensive and defensive measures for countering a mine

threat, including the prevention of enemy minelaying.

MCM includes any actions taken to counter the effectiveness of and/or reduce the probability of damage to

surface ships and craft or submarines from underwater

mines. Further discussion of offensive and defensive

countermeasures terms and definitions can be found in

Chapter 3.

A.1.2.1 Offensive MCM. Offensive MCM includes

all actions taken to prevent the enemy from successfully laying mines. Offensive MCM includes any action resulting in the destruction of enemy minelayers

and mine stockpiles, as well as the laying of defensive

minefields in friendly waters to prevent mine delivery

by enemy surface or subsurface vessels.

A.1.2.2 Defensive MCM. Defensive MCM include

those operations intended to reduce the effect of enemy

minelaying once the mines have been placed in the water. In broad terms, defensive MCM is divided into two

classes of action or concepts: passive MCM and active

MCM.

A.1.2.3 Passive MCM. Passive MCM include all

measures employed to reduce the susceptibility of ships

and submarines to mine actuation and explosion. This

would include but not be limited to minefield location

and avoidance, as well as the reduction of the ship’s

magnetic signature (e.g., degaussing, deperming),

acoustic signature (e.g., quiet ship bill), and pressure

signature (e.g., slow transit through deep water).

A.1.2.4 Active MCM. Active MCM include the use

of ships, aircraft, systems, and personnel to locate and

neutralize mines. Active MCM can be divided into two

categories: mine hunting and mine sweeping.

A.1.2.5 Mine Hunting. Mine hunting involves the

location of individual mines so that actions may be

taken to avoid, remove, or destroy them. It is a

one-on-one operation, as opposed to minesweeping,

which seeks to clear an area of mines. Mine hunting includes mine detection, classification, localization,

identification, and neutralization.

A.1.2.6 Mine Sweeping. Minesweeping is the

MCM technique of sweeping a region of water either

by traversing it with mechanical or explosive sweep

gear designed to sever the moorings of moored mines

or by producing the influence fields necessary to actuate the firing mechanisms of influence mines using a

sweeping system or guinea pig ship. Minesweeping operations affect all mines located in the area that is

covered by the sweep being employed, instead of combating just one mine at a time.

A.1.2.7 Brute Force Mine Clearance. This is a

mine clearance technique that may take place independent of minehunting or minesweeping operations.

Brute force involves the use of high explosives in such

a manner to cause sympathetic detonation, neutralization, or physical displacement of a significant number

of the mines in an area. It is most frequently considered

in relation to amphibious operations where very shallow water and surf zone clearance is desired in a rapid

manner and where a relatively narrow path through a

minefield can permit landing craft to transit to the

beach and establish a foothold.

ORIGINAL A-2
A.2 ALPHABETICAL TERMINOLOG

COMPARISON

A

Acoustic Signature. The characteristic pattern of

the target’s acoustic influence as detected by the mine.

Active Acoustic Mine. A mine actuated by the reflection from a target of a signal emitted by the mine.

Actuation. The response of a mine-firing mechanism

to an influence (or series of influences) in such a way

that all requirements of the mechanism for firing or

for registering a ship count are met.

Actuation Level. The minimum influence signal level

needed to actuate a mine. The level of intensity and the

duration of time that the influence field must be applied

to satisfy the firing circuit requirements of the mine.

Actuation Mine. A mine used for training MCM

forces in mine sweeping. It has an inert loaded mine

case, operable components, and a flare and smoke

signal to indicate actuation. The mine may be delivered by either air or surface craft.

Actuation Mine Simulator (AMS). A device used

for MCM training and fleet exercises to simulate inservice mines. It contains the service mine intelligence

supplemented with components to control timing, detection functions, six flare and smoke signals, and an

actuation recorder to indicate actuations.

Actuation Probability. The average probability of

a mine of given type being actuated by one run of the

sweep within the actuation width.

Actuation Probability Area. A horizontal plane

within which the sweeper-sweep combination will

intercept an armed mine or its appendages, causing a

buoyant mine’s mooring to be cut, a contact mine to

be fired, or an influence mine to be actuated.

Actuation Width (W). The total area under an actuation curve. The path width over which mines can be

actuated. Also called “average firing width.”

Aggregate Actuation Width. This is numerically

equal to the area under the graph showing how mine

actuation probability varies with distance from the

sweep’s center of influence.

Aggregate Danger Width. For a given mine, this is

the integral of Pd(y), where y is the athwartship distance from the track of the MCMV and Pd is the probability of an actuation within the MCMV’s danger

area.

Aggregate Detection Width. This is numerically

equal to the area under the graph of mine detection

probability for detectable mines against distance

from the track of the detection gear.

Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM). MCM

operations conducted from an aircraft platform. Includes spotting, watching, hunting, sweeping, and

destroying.

Amphibious Breach. A type of deliberate breach

specifically designed to overcome antilanding defenses

to conduct an amphibious assault. It is characterized by

thorough reconnaissance, detailed planning, extensive

preparation and rehearsal, and a buildup of combat

power. One or more subordinate units are specifically

tasked to perform the role of support, breach, and assault forces. The amphibious breach is centrally

planned and executed. Units conduct an amphibious

breach when there are no other suitable landing areas.

AN/ALQ-141. An acoustic sweep device electrically

powered from the helicopter via a tow cable.

Analytic Countered Minefield Planning Model

(ACMPM). A model developed for planning countered

minefields. It uses a scenario in which an enemy

chooses a channel in a minefield and then employs

countermeasures to remove the mine threat.

AN/AQS-14. An AMCM side-scanning, minehunting

sonar towed by the MH-53E helicopter.

AN/PQS-2A. An active/passive, hand-held sonar

used by divers to locate submerged objects or to detect active acoustic pingers.

AN/SLQ-37. The magnetic/acoustic minesweeping

system aboard the MCM-1 Class ships.

AN/SLQ-38. The mechanical minesweeping system

aboard the MCM-1 Class ships.

AN/SLQ-48. A mine neutralization system (MNS) utilizing a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) carrying

cable cutters and a bomblet.

AN/SLQ-53. The single ship deep sweep (SSDS) mechanical minesweeping system developed for the

MHC-51 Class ships that utilizes converted lightweight mechanical AMCM sweep gear.

A-3 ORIGINAL
AN/SPU-1W. Magnetic orange pipe (MOP) AMCM

magnetic minesweeping gear.

AN/SQQ-30. A variable depth SMCM minehunting

sonar aboard some of the MCM-1 Class ships.

AN/SQQ-32. A variable depth SMCM minehunting

sonar aboard some of the MCM-1 Class and the

MHC-51 Class ships.

AN/SSN-2. The precise integrated navigation system

(PINS) aboard MCM-1 Class ships.

AN/SYQ-13. The navigation/command and control

system used on MHC-51 Class ships.

Antenna Sweep. A shallow wire sweep configuration that actuates the mine by contact with the

antenna.

Anti-Invasion Mine. A mine capable of use in very

shallow water against landing craft, fast patrol

boats, surface effect vehicles, and other amphibious

assault vehicles.

Anti-MCMV Mine. A mine that is laid or whose

mechanism is designed or adjusted with the specific

object of damaging MCM vehicles.

Anti-SMCM Mine. A mine that targets MCM ships.

Includes shallow water moored mines, snagline

mines, highly sensitive magnetic mines designed for

well-degaussed ships, and medium actuation level

acoustic mines. Also called an antisweeper mine.

Antisubmarine Minefield. A field laid specifically

against submarines. It may be unsafe for all vehicles,

orit may be deep and safe for surface vessels to cross.

Antisweep Device. Any device incorporated in the

mooring of a mine or obstructor or in the mine’s circuits to make the sweeping of the mine more

difficult.

Antiwatching Device. A device fitted in a moored

mine that causes it to sink should it watch (i.e., show

on the surface), so as to prevent the position of the

mine or minefield being disclosed.

AN/WQN-1. The special acoustic sweep used on

MCM-1 Class ships.

Approach Route. A sea route that joins a port to the

coastal or a transit route.

Arming Device. A safety mechanism that interrupts

the primary explosive firing train until a unique combination of environments is satisfied.

Assembly Configuration of Mines. This is a means

of referring to the assembly configuration of mines

by various numbered configurations.

Asymmetrical MCM Gear. Any MCM gear whose

center of actuation, influence, detection, or cutting is

displaced from the centerline of the MCM platform.

Attrition MCM Operations. The continuous application of MCM to keep the risk from mines to

all vehicles as low as possible. These operations

are appropriate against minefields that are being

replenished.

Attrition Objective. The objective of attrition is to

keep the threat of mines to ship traffic as low as possible when traffic must continue to transit the mined

waters for a comparatively long period of time and

when the mines cannot be cleared in a short time because of factors such as replenishment or the use of

mine mechanisms with delayed arming or high ship

count settings.

Audio Frequency (AF). See also “Acoustic Circuit.” Frequencies between 30 and 1500 Hz.

Avenger Class. MCM-1 Class Mine Countermeasures ships.

Average Actuation Area. The integral, over a

plane perpendicular of the centerline of the target

ship, of the probability, P(y,z), of actuation of a mine

under specified conditions.

Average Actuation Width. The integral, over

athwartship distance between the mine and the

keel of the target ship, of the probability, P(y), of

actuation of a mine at a given depth and under

specified conditions.

Avoidance. Actions taken to change a ship’s course

for the purpose of avoiding a mine. The deliberate act

of maneuvering around a mine or minefield once it

has been localized.

B

Bogie. A device mounted on the minelayer’s rails at

the foremost end of a mine train, around which passes

the hauling aft wire that will push the train aft when

the wire is hove in.

ORIGINAL A-4
Bomblet. Explosive charge for mine neutralization.

Bottom Sweep. A sweep, either wire or chain, used

either to sweep moored mines close to the bottom or

to remove mines from a channel by dragging them to

a nominated area. The sweep configuration may be

one or two ships dragging a wire or chain over the

bottom.

Breakthrough. A time-critical operation applied to

the mine countermeasures tactic of channelizing

through a minefield to gain passage for ships.

Buried Mine. A mine that is partially or fully covered

by bottom sediment.

C

CAPTOR. Acronym for “EnCAPsulated TORpedo.”

This weapon has the official designation of Mine Mk

60. This is a passive/active acoustic deep water ASW

mine that launches an Mk 46 torpedo at the target

when the detection and validation criteria have been

satisfied.

Case Depth. For moored mines, this is the water

depth at which the explosive charge is held by the

mooring line. For ground mines, the case depth is the

same as the water depth.

Casualty Distribution. The set of probabilities for

every possible number of casualties from zero to n out

of n transit attempts (e.g., 40 percent probability of 3

casualties in 10 transits).

Casualty Rate. The expected number of casualties

per time period in a sustained attrition mining

campaign.

Channel Conditioning. An operation that removes

minelike objects from channels, harbor approaches,

and Q-routes to reduce the number of minelike and

nonminelike bottom objects detectable by minehunting systems.

Channelization. The tactic of sending all transitors

through the same strip of a minefield.

Check MCM Operation. An MCM operation to

check that as far as possible no mines are left after a

previous MCM operation.

Classification Range. The range at which a contact

is classified. (This may be amplified by the prefixes

“actual expected” or “maximum.”)

Clearance Diver. Diver who is trained for air scuba

and mixed gas scuba diving and qualified to carry out

tasks in mine/ordnance search, investigation, recovery, and removal, both underwater and ashore.

Clearance Diving Team. Group of clearance divers

established to conduct clearance diving tasks. It may

be embarked in an MCM vessel or operate from an

ashore mobile support facility. The group includes a

leader and medical personnel. (Allied equivalent to

EOD plus salvage divers.)

Clearance MCM Operations. Operations whose

objective is to clear all mines from an area, channel,

or route.

Clearance Rate. The area that would be cleared per

unit of time, with a stated minimum percentage clearance, using specific MCM procedures.

Clearance Operations. The process of sweeping or

hunting in a mined area with the aim of clearing all or

a high percentage of mines from an area, channel, or

route. A specific percentage of clearance is usually

specified.

Clearing. The level of MCM effort required to sweep,

hunt, or otherwise neutralize a high percentage of the

mines in a field, whether of a certain type or total

possible/known types.

Clearing Objective. The objective of clearing is to

remove most mines from the assigned area. Since it is

generally impossible to guarantee that all mines are

cleared, a goal is assigned, such as removing or neutralizing 99.5 percent of the mines.

Closed-Loop Sweep. A magnetic sweep in which

the sweep current is carried entirely by insulated

electrical conductors and does not depend upon seawater to complete the electric circuit. The conductors

are diverted to one or both sides using components of

the oropesa mechanical sweep.

Clutter Density. The number of NOMBOs per

square inch in an operational segment.

Coastal Route. A sea route, normally following the

coastline, that joins adjacent approach routes.

Coincidence Method. The method whereby an explosive charge or a marker is guided until its position

coincides with that of the mine as shown on the sonar

display.

A-5 ORIGINAL
Contact Level. The minimum suction that will first

operate the pressure unit contact.

Continuous Traffic. Aflow of targets and/or sweepers

atasteadyaveragerateoverthetimeperiodofinterest.

Controlled Mine. A mine that, after laying, can be

controlled by the user to make the mine armed or safe

or to fire the mine.

Countered Field. A minefield in which some level of

mine countermeasures is undertaken by the enemy.

For planning purposes, the various levels of expected MCM are defined as follows:

a. NONE. Airspace not controlled by enemy,

no mine hunting, no mine watching, no guinea pig activity, no minehunting/sweeping assets nearby, primitive countermeasures only.

b. LOW. Minesweepers/hunters available or

nearby, low guinea pig activity and mine watching.

c. MEDIUM. Minesweeping/hunting available,

airspace controlled by enemy, moderate guinea pig activity, high value units targeted.

d. HEAVY. Minesweeping/hunting assets deployed in the area, line and depth charges available, airspace controlled by enemy, heavy guinea pig activity.

Counter-Countermeasures Setting (CCM). Options

on the weapons available to the minefield planner to

lessen the effectiveness of anticipated enemy mine

countermeasures efforts.

Craft of Opportunity (COOP). Nonmilitary craft

that, in an emergency, can be shifted from normal use

to military use with little or no cost and effort.

D

Damage Distance (Yd). Theathwartshiprangewithin

which a mine must detonate to cause a specified level of

damage to the target.

Damage Level. Measure of desired danger. Four

standard categories are Kill, Imminent Loss Likely,

Mission Abort, and Onboard Repairs Possible.

Damage Width (Wd). The integral of the probability,

P(y), of actuation of a mine under specified conditions,

integrated only over those values of athwartship distance y for which the explosion of the mine is likely

to do at least a specified amount of damage.

This is the area under an actuation probability curve

within the damage distances on each side of the ship.

Dangerous Front. The athwartship distance in which

there is a likelihood that an MCM platform could be

damaged by a mine that the MCM platform has swept.

Deep Moored Mines. Moored mines with strong,

small gauge cables that permit employment at great

depth.

Delay Arm. A feature on a mine causing it to remain

unarmed for a selected period of time after laying.

Delay Rise. A feature on a moored mine causing the

case to remain attached to the anchor for a selected

period of time after laying.

Delay Time. The time between the application of the

minimum pulse field and the registration of the look

under consideration.

Delayed Rising Mechanism. A device used with

moored mines that enables the release and rising of

the mine to be deployed.

Deperming. The use of high currents in coils temporarily arranged around a ship to reduce its magnetic

signature.

Depressor. A hydrodynamic planing device used to

obtain depth in a mechanical sweep.

Destruction Radius. The maximum distance from

an exploding charge of stated size and type at which a

mine will be destroyed by sympathetic detonation of

the main charge, with a stated probability of destruction, regardless of orientation.

Destructor Mine (DST). A mine developed for use

in Vietnam against junks and sampans. It uses a

modification kit to convert an Mk 80 series generalpurpose, low-drag bomb into a mine that can be

used either on land or in the water.

Detecting Mechanism. A mine subassembly, including sensors, relays, timing, and delay mechanisms, that

detects the presence of a targetlike influence and that

provides the necessary initiation signal to the minefiring mechanism to actuate the mine.

Detection Probability (Pd). The ratio of the number of mines detected on a single run to the number of

detectable mines within the characteristic detection

width.

ORIGINAL A-6
Detection Width. The width of path over which

mines can be detected on a single run at a given Pd.

DG Code Number. The peak vertical component of

the magnetic field in microtesla under a ship on the

worst heading and at a certain depth.

Directive. Ordered as A, B, or C. The directive ordered indicates the risk of MCM vessels acceptable

while carrying out an MCM operation.

Dispose. Elimination of mines by either countermining,

mine neutralization, or removal.

E

Electrical depth. In some cases, the electrical depth

is greater than the actual depth. This occurs when the

upper layer of the sea bed becomes saturated with

seawater such that the conductivity of this layer approximates the conductivity of the seawater.

Electrodes. Components of a magnetic sweep. The

cables from which electric current is passed from one

to the other via seawater return.

Enabling MCM. Enabling countermeasures are designed to counter mines once they have been laid.

Some enabling MCM operations are undertaken following the termination of conflict solely to eliminate

or reduce the threat to shipping posed by residual sea

mines. However, most enabling MCM operations are

undertaken during conflict to permit (enable) other

maritime operations, such as power projection, to be

conducted. Enabling MCM includes passive and active MCM.

EODMCM Detachment. Personnel with special

training and equipment to relocate, neutralize, countermine, or render safe and exploit sea mines.

Exercise and Training Mine. A mine suitable for

use in MIW exercises that is fitted with visible or audible indicating devices to show where and when it

would normally fire. Adevice to assist in mine recovery may also be fitted.

Expected Casualties. The average number of casualties in n transits of a minefield.

Exploratory MCM Operations. An MCM operation in which a sample of the route or area is subjected to MCM procedures to determine the presence

or absence of mines.

Exploratory/Reconnaissance Objective. The objective of exploratory/reconnaissance is to determine

wheteher mines are present and, if present, the limits of

the mined area. This is usually the first objective when

an enemy-laid minefield is suspected.

F

Fleet Service Mine Test Program (FSMTP). A

program with the primary purpose of determining

the operational reliability of stockpile service mines.

Fraction of Area Covered. Used in MCM operation to denote progress of the task; it is that fraction of

the assigned task area that has to date been covered

by the tasked MCMVs.

G

Gas Bubble. Gas produced by an explosion expands

rapidly, producing a bubble of extremely high pressure. When the pressure falls below the pressure in

the surrounding water, the bubble collapses. The

bubble and the shock wave it propagates are the damage effects of an underwater explosion.

Geophone. A sensor used in seismic mines.

Guillotines. A portable, explosive, cable-cutting device used to sever the tow wire in an emergency (helicopter installed).

Guinea Pig. A ship used to determine whether an

area can be considered safe from influence mines under certain conditions or, specifically, to actuate pressure mines.

H

Harassment Mines. Those mines specifically set to

target sweepers or to enhance the psychological

threat of a minefield.

Hold-On Time. The time during which the threshold

requirements of the mine must be satisfied.

Holiday. A gap in MCM coverage left unintentionally

during MCM operations due to errors in navigation,

station-keeping, buoy-laying, breakdowns or other

causes.

Homing Mine. A mine fitted with propulsion equipment that homes onto a target. The mine normally

rests on the sea bed or is secured to an anchor and is

set in motion by a ship’s influence.

A-7 ORIGINAL
Horizontal Component. That component of the total magnetic field in the horizontal plane.

Hunting. The act of searching for mines. This term also

covers the marking and/or neutralization of mines.

I

Identification. The determination of the exact nature

of an underwater object that has been detected and

classified.

Initial Threat. The probability that the first ship to attempt to transit a minefield will be damaged to at

least a specified level.

Intensity Mine Circuit. A circuit whose actuation is

dependent on the field strength’s reaching a level differing, by some preset minimum, from that experienced by the mine when no ships are in the vicinity.

Intercount Dormant Period (ICDP). The period

after the actuation of a ship counter before it is ready

to receive another actuation. This is an interval during which mechanism functions are reset and another

ship count cannot be registered. It is used as a countercountermeasures feature to prevent the runoff of multiple ship counts on a single sweeper pass.

Interlook Dormant Period (ILDP). The time interval after each look in a multilook mine during which

the firing mechanism will not register. During this period of time, the firing device either will not recognize

certain events or will respond in a unique manner.

Intermediate Water Depth Mine (IWDM). A weapon

system targeted against both high- and low-speed

surface and subsurface targets in the gaps between

shallow-bottom and deep-moored mines.

J

Jettisoned Mines. A mine that is laid as quickly as

possible to empty the minelayer of its mines without

regard to their condition or their position relative to

each other. Jettisoned mines are normally released in

a safe mode (without pulling arming wires). The wire

may, however, withdraw at water entry, arming the

mine. A mine that is discarded from the delivery vehicle and normal operation is not intended.

K

Kite. A device that, when towed, submerges and planes

at a predetermined depth without sideways displacement. This is a towed planing device that causes the

inboard end of the sweep to assume a determined

depth. Also known as a depressor in mechanical

sweeping.

L

Leadthrough Operations. Leadthrough operations are intended to assist traffic in the transit of

parts of a mined area that have previously been subject to an MCM effort.

Leadthrough Vessel (LTV). A vessel that provides

navigational accuracy so that accompanying ships

can transit the area of least threat. No MCM techniques are employed. The LTV is equipped with precise navigation equipment and has knowledge of the

threat present.

Link Route. A sea route, other than an approach,

coastal, or transit route, that links any two or more

routes.

Live Mine. A mine with an explosive filling and a

means of firing the explosive charge.

Live Period. In multilook mines, the maximum time

interval after the first look during which additional

looks will be accepted to satisfy all of the subsequent

looks and mine logic to cause an actuation.

Locate. To establish the precise position of an underwater object relative to a ship or to a specific navigational reference position.

Loop Sweep. A magnetic cable sweep in which the

current-carrying conductors are insulated from the

water throughout. In a single-ship sweep, the working portion of the sweep is spread by diverters to form

a loop in the water.Also called a closed-loop sweep.

M

Magnetic Orange Pipe (MOP) (AN/SPU-1W). AMCM

magnetic minesweeping gear. Primarily used for

very shallow water AMCM operations.

Magnetic Self-Protection. The protection of ships

and submarines by degaussing to reduce the magnetic signatures and to minimize the possibility of detection by magnetic mines.

Magnetic Signature. The characteristic pattern of

the target’s magnetic influence as detected by the

mine.

ORIGINAL A-8
Magnetic Silencing. The reduction of the magnetic

signature of a ship through construction materials

and techniques, degaussing, and the control of magnetic items aboard ship.

Marine Mammal System. An Explosive Ordnance

Disposal Detachment that employs marine mammals

to conduct mine countermeasures operations.

Marker Float. A mechanical sweep support device;

visual reference of sweep performance.

Master Reference Buoy (MRB). F Mk 6 Mod 0

minefield marker designed to have a small watch circle and good position-keeping ability. It can be configured as a single- or three-point moor.

Maximum Output Conditions. Sweeping carried

out under maximum output conditions when sweeps

are used at the full output of the generating source.

Maximum Towing Speed. The speed through the

water that may not be exceeded without causing

damage to the MCM gear or the towing vehicle.

MCM 1. USS AVENGER Class mine countermeasures

ship.

MCM Command and Support Ship (MCS). A ship

equipped to provide the command functions, support

services, and repair resources to an MCM force.

MCM Commander. The officer who exercises tactical control of all assigned MCM units.

MCM Commander’s Tactical Decision Aid

(MCM CTDA). A set of computer programs that provides the capability to analyze, evaluate, and reconstruct MCM operations.

MCM Efficiency Parameter (Y). A measure of the

effectiveness of a sweep/search technique. Used to

account for efficiencies in the navigation and control

of MCM systems.

MCM Level (M). The average number of times that a

representative mine is exposed to an MCM system.

MCM Objectives. Four specific types of MCM objectives have been identified that respond to the different needs/requirements of the MCM force:

exploratory/reconnaissance, breakthrough, attrition,

and clearing.

MCM Stage. The use of a specific MCM technique to

counter a particular type of mine.

MCM Task. A stage or combination of stages related

to a specific channel or area of execution, time of execution, and MCM forces for the execution.

MCM Technique. The use of a specific MCM vehicle

and its equipment in a particular way.

MCS 12. The Mine Countermeasures Command,

Control, and Support Ship, USS INCHON (formerly LPH 12).

Measures Of Effectiveness (MOE). The effectiveness of an MCM operation can be expressed in terms

of delay to the battle force while MCM is conducted,

the traffic casualties suffered after MCM is conducted,

and casualties suffered by the MCM force during

countermeasures operations.

Mechanical Sweeping. The minesweeping procedure by which mines are cut from their moorings, removed, or detonated through mechanical contact

between the gear and the mines or their attachments.

MH-53E. The Sea Dragon AMCM helicopter.

MHC 51. The USS OSPREY Class Coastal Minehunter.

Mine Actuation Level. The change in magnitude of

thefield,rateofchange,etc.,requiredtoactuateamine.

Mine Countermeasures Buoy Runner. A vehicle running along a line of MCM buoys whether the

vehicle is in fact conducting MCM operations or only

being used for reference by other MCMVs.

Mine Countermeasures Vehicle (MCMV) Track. The

prescribed line over the ground to be made good by the

MCMV to ensure the MCM gear follows the track.

Mine Danger Area (MDA). An area, varying in

size, drawn around the position of each discovered

mine for an initial estimate of the minefield.

Mine Danger Warning System. Provides up-to-date

shipping information on new mining or navigational

dangers.

Mine Density. The number of mines per square nautical mile.

Mine Evaluation. This technique uses EOD personnel to render safe, recover, and field-evaluate a mine.

The information gained by this intelligence gathering mission provides the MCM Commander with

data that will help him in planning the type of MCM

actions/efforts needed.

A-9 ORIGINAL
Minefield Activation. An occurrence wherein the

first mine of the field becomes armed.

Minefield Category. A classification of the minefield as offensive, defensive, or protective.

Minefield Clearance. An operation designed to remove all mines from an area.

Minefield Length. That dimension of a minefield

segment parallel to the anticipated target rack. The

transit distance through the minefield.

Minefield Performance Objective (MPO). A goal

stating what the minefield is intended to accomplish.

Minefield Threat. The probability of a vessel exploding at least one mine on each pass through the

minefield.

Minefield Width. That dimension of the minefield

segment that is perpendicular to the anticipated target track. The width is across the front of the

minefield.

Mine Marking. The marking of mines for avoidance

and/or later neutralization.

Mine Neutralization. An action using external

means to render a mine incapable of detonating on

the passage of a target, although it may remain dangerous to handle.

Mine Neutralization System (MNS). A tethered

vehicle with handling and control systems developed

for the combat system of the Avenger and Osprey

classes of ships.

Mine Recovery. The process of recovering a mine as

nearly intact as possible to enable further investigation for intelligence and/or evaluation purposes.

Mine Reference Number (MRN). Assigned to all

plotted minelike contacts. consists of a letter prefix

(C for minelike contact, M for a known mine, N for a

nonmine, or R for a minelike contact reclassified as a

nonmine), followed by a three-character code to

identify the unit that reported the contact, followed

by a three-digit number showing the sequence of that

contact as the one reported by that unit.

Mine Report (MINEREP). Report used to record

the location of a newly found mine or to update the

status of a mine previously reported. Refer to APP 4

for format.

Mine Sensitivity. A measure of the threshold level at

which a mine’s sensors and firing logic will respond

to target influence signals as determined by the variable settings available on the mine.

Mine Warfare Commander. The officer in tactical

command of a MIW operation.

Mine W arfare Coordinator (MIWC). A qualified

MIW officer assigned to the staff of a senior operational commander (battle force/group) responsible

for all mining and MCM operations.

Mine Warfare Environmental Survey

(MWES). A survey conducted to provide environmental data on specific MCM operation areas.

Mine Warfare Pilot. A comprehensive collection of

environmental and geographic data as well as mine

and MCM environmental characteristics of a specific area.

Minimum Mine Spacing. Minimum mine spacing

refers to the least distance that the weapons must be

separated to prevent failure or sympathetic detonation. In the case of the Mk 60, simultaneous detection

and subsequent mutual interference could result.

Minimum Towing Speed. The slowest possible

speed through the water at which it is possible to proceed

with MCM gear streamed and still counter the mines.

Mission Abort Damage. That level of damage necessary to prevent a target vessel from completing the

mission it was assigned. A mission abort would not

be reparable at sea, but it may not be so severe as to

cause immediate sinking or destruction. The degree

of damage required will vary with target hardness.

Mission Package. A deployable component of the

AN/SLQ-48 MNS. Used either for severing the cable

of a moored mine or neutralizing a ground mine.

Mixed Bag. A collection of mines of various types,

firing systems, sensitivities, arming delays, and ship

counters’ settings.

Mk 2 Mod 1. Flotation bladder used by EOD personnel to raise an object to the surface.

Mk 4. MMS used to detect moored mines, including

close-tethered, deep-moored mines.

Mk 7. MMS used to detect proud mines and buried

ground mines.

ORIGINAL A-10
Mk 25 Ordnance Locator. A magnetic anomaly detector used to locate hidden or buried ferrous objects.

Mk 16. An acoustically quiet, low magnetic signature,

mixed-gas underwater breathing apparatus (UBA).

Mk-103. AMCM mechanical minesweeping gear.

Mk-104. AMCM acoustic minesweeping gear.

Mk-105. AMCM magnetic minesweeping gear.

Mk-106. AMCM combined magnetic and acoustic

minesweeping gear (combination MK-104 and

MK-105 gear).

Modification Kit Mk 75 (DST Kit). A kit containing the necessary components (less battery) to convert standard general purpose bombs to Destructor

mines.

Modulation. Variation of the amplitude of the sound

output of an acoustic sweep.

Moving Mine. A collective description of mine

types, such as bouquet, creeping, drifting, homing,

oscillating, propelled, and rising.

Multilook Mechanism. An influence mine-firing

mechanism that requires more than one directional

look for actuation.

Multipurpose Air Cushion Craft (MCAC). A

variant of the LCAC designed to conduct mine countermeasures operations.

N

Navigational Error. The lateral distance between

the actual position of a ship and its intended track

over the ground at any given moment.

Navigational Margin. The navigational margin is

equal to twice the likely maximum navigational error.

Neutralization Radius. The greatest horizontal distance from an exploding charge of specified use at

which a mine will be neutralized.

Nonmagnetic. A term used in conjunction with any

gear, equipment, or material carried aboard a mine

craft that is constructed of a nonmagnetic substance

to minimize the vessel’s magnetic field.

Nonmine Minelike Bottom Object (NOMBO). An

object, such as an outcropping, coral reef, or manmade debris, that may give a minelike response on

minehunting sonars.

Nonmine Minelike Echo (NOME). An echo from

within the clutter. The source may not be a NOMBO.

Number of Tracks (N). The total number of parallel tracks in the area.

O

One-Look Mine Circuit. A mine circuit that requires actuation by a given influence once only.

Open-Loop Sweep. Aloop sweep in which the after

catenary (transverse portion of the cable) is omitted,

each side leg of the loop terminating in an electrode.

This magnetic sweep uses seawater to complete the

electric circuit. A loop sweep generates magnetic

fields in all directions on each portion of the bottom

under the sweep, making it effective against horizontal and vertical component mines in all orientations.

Open-loop sweeps can be used only when the salinity

of the water is suitable.

Operational Assembly. A mine of a given Mk and

Mod configured to the highest level of assembly to

meet a specific operational requirement by employing selected assembly-level items, such as tail sections, fairings, time-delay mechanisms, batteries,

and sterilizers, to satisfy the specific operational

requirement.

Operational Directive (OPDIR). Provides tasking

instructions from the MCM Commander. May be

promulgated in briefings or by regular naval

message.

Operational Speed. The highest speed at which

ships will be required to proceed during a particular

operation or during a stated period.

Optimum MCM Speed. The speed over the ground

for a given set of conditions that provides the greatest

sweeping/hunting rate.

Oropesa Sweep. A form of sweep in which a length

of sweep wire is towed by a single ship, lateral displacement being caused by an otter, and depth being

controlled at the ship end by a depressor and at the otter end by a float and float wire.

Oscillating Mine. A moving/drifting mine that maintains its depth by means of a hydrostatic depth control

mechanism, which causes it to oscillate about a set

depth.

A-11 ORIGINAL
Osprey Class. MHC-51 Class Coastal Minehunter

ships.

Otter. In naval Mine Warfare, a device that, when towed,

displaces itself sideways to a predetermined distance.

Overlap. The width of that part of the swept path of a

ship or formation which is also swept by an adjacent

sweeper or formation or is re-swept on the next adjacent track.

P

Paravane. A towed body with planes and a cutter

with a means of depth-keeping that displaces itself

sideways and can be used as a ship protection measure against certain moored mines.

Pass. See “Run.”

Pattern Minelaying. The laying of mines in a fixed

relationship to each other.

Penetration. The act of entering a minefield to either

transit or sweep that field area.

Percentage Clearance. The estimated percentage

of mines of specified characteristics that have been

cleared from an area or channel.

Pinger. An active acoustic transmitter used in exercise mines to aid in location for recovery.

Precise Integrated Navigation System (PINS).

A computer-based navigation system developed to

serve command and control functions of the Avenger

Class’s combat system.

Precursor MCM Operation. Operations in an area

or channel using relatively safe methods and techniques to reduce the risk to MCM vehicles.

Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECHREP).

Areport that forwards the results of the examination of

a mine or minelike object before it is disturbed.

Pressure Mine. A mine whose circuit responds to

the hydrodynamic pressure variation caused by a

passing ship.

Prevention of Stripping Equipment (PSE). A

booby trap included in a mine to fire the main or an

auxiliary charge when an attempt is made to open the

mechanism chamber or any other compartment. An

antitamper device.

Probability Actuation Circuit (PAC). A device

similar to an actuation counter or ship counter. It

controls an electronic mine-firing circuit by interrupting it for specific periods of time. It is used as a

counter-countermeasures device.

Probability Actuator. A counter-countermeasures

feature in the mine firing logic designed to allow only

a certain probability that a target or countermeasure

signal will actuate the mine.

Progressive Sequence. The normal sequence

chosen to most quickly create a channel safe for shipping with minimum risk to the sweeper.

Protective Minefield. Aminefield laid in waters under own or allied control to protect ports, harbors, anchorages, coasts, and/or coastal routes.

Proud Mine. A mine protruding from or lying on the

bottom. A mine that is not buried and is therefore susceptible to minehunting operations.

Psychological Threat. The unmeasurable effect a

minefield has on the enemy based upon his perception of its danger.

Pulse Cycle. (a) Standard Pulse Cycle (SPC). This

is a nationally established pulse program that is ordered for the respective sweep gear if no information

on the actuation levels of mines being countered is

available. (b) Recommended Pulse Cycle (RPC). This

is one of several alternative pulse programs that are ordered if minesweeping operations are not achieving a

satisfactory result using the Standard Pulse Cycle or if

information on actuation levels has been obtained.

Pulse Cycle Period. The time interval between the

beginning of one pulse and the beginning of the next

similar pulse in the same direction.

Q

Q-Route Survey. The process of searching and

mapping all significant contacts along a preplanned

dormant shipping lane (channel).

Q-System. Existing mine danger warning system

that provides up-to-date shipping information allowing for action to be taken to avoid new mining or navigational dangers.

Quickstrike Mine. An aircraft-delivered family of

bottom mines that is an improved follow-on to the

Destructor Mk 36 and Mk 40.

ORIGINAL A-12
R

Rattle Bars. Acoustic minesweeping gear (A-Mk-2(g))

made up of pipes.

Reconnaissance Operation. That phase of the

exploratory/reconnaissance objective designed

to make rapid assessment of the limits and density

of a minefield.

Recovering Sweeps. The process of retrieving all

the sweep gear aboard or into the towing vehicle on

completion of a minesweeping operation.

Reduced Current Operation. When sweeping sensitive magnetic mines, the output of the gear is reduced

to avoid danger to the sweep vehicle from the cable or

electrode field. Also referred to as safe current.

Release Delay. A device fitted to a moored mine or

its anchor to delay the rising of the mine case, either

for a preset interval or until the influence of a passing

target or sweep is received.

Removal. To take a mine out of an area where its detonation would be unacceptable.

Render Safe Procedure. An explosive ordnance

disposal procedure involving the application of special

explosive ordnance disposal methods and tools for the

interruption of function or separation of essential components of unexploded ordnance to prevent an unacceptable detonation. Action to make a mine inoperative

by direct interference with its firing system or explosive

train. May be done underwater or after recovery.

Replenishment. Replacement or addition of mines to

a minefield. Has the same meaning as “reseeding.”

Resonant Frequency. The resonant frequency of

an object is the frequency at which it will vibrate

when struck when free to do so.

Reverberation. The total of all nontarget sounds returned to the minehunting sonar.

Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB). Boat design

with rigid GRP hull and inflatable rubber collar

gunwale.

Rising Mine. A mine having positive buoyancy that

is released from an anchor by a target ship’s influence

or by a timing device. The mine may fire by contact,

hydrostatic pressure, or other means.

Route. The prescribed track over the ground to be followed from a specific point of origin to a specific destination. A sea route has no width, and shipping must

keep to the track over the ground.

Route Survey. An acoustic survey of designated

routes to detect any change in the acoustic profile

such as mines or minelike objects.

Run. The transit of an MCMV and MCM gear combination along a track. Arun produces a swept path and

may cause more than one actuation in a mine.

Runs Per Track (J). The number of successive passes

that will be made along one track through the minefield.

S

Scuttle. Intentional flooding of a buoyant mine case

by means of an internal device.

Segmentation. The division of the operational area

into segments with similar water depth.

Seismic Mine. A version of a passive acoustic mine

that uses geophonic elements to detect acoustic energy emanating from a ship. A mine that responds to

the acoustic energy transmitted through the ocean

bottom rather than through the water.

Self-Destruct Circuit. A timing circuit in a mine

that causes the mine to detonate after a set period.

Self-Destruction. Intentional detonation of a mine

by means of programmed actions taken by an internal device.

Self-Protection Measures. Measures taken by all

vehicles to reduce the risk from mines while in

mineable waters.

Self-Protection Output Conditions. When the output of the sweep is reduced sufficiently to give safety

to the sweeper from the mines being swept for.

Sensitive Mine. A mine whose detecting circuit requires a relatively small magnitude of influence (as

from a slow, small, quiet, and degaussed vessel) to

actuate it.

Sensitivity. A classification of a mine’s likelihood to

actuation by an influence field; the higher the sensitivity, the smaller the magnitude of the influence required.

It is a qualitative term, and if a measurement is to be included, the specific term (e.g., “actuation level”) should

be included.

A-13 ORIGINAL
Sensitivity Switch. A switch by which the sensitivity

of an influence mine may be adjusted.

Ship Count Setting. The number of times the mine

mechanism must be actuated to produce a fire.

Short-Term Operation. A short-term operation

consists of mine sweeping and/or mine hunting carried out when the time available before ships are

passed through a mined (or suspected mined) area is

insufficient to carry out clearance operations.

Short-Tethered Mine. A mine having a short mooring line or using only a portion of the line (usually

only a few feet) so that the buoyant case remains

close to the anchor. This reduces susceptibility to mechanical sweeping.

Signature. The characteristic pattern of the target’s

influence as detected by the mine.

Simple Initial Threat. The probability that the first

ship to transit a minefield will be damaged.

Single-Look Mechanism. A mine-firing mechanism requiring only one look for actuation.

Single Pulsing. The operation of magnetic gear on a

schedule consisting of forward or reverse pulses

only.

Skip-Track Sequence. A run sequence where distance between tracks swept is in multiples of normal

track spacing. One run is made on each track, then

the tracks are repeated in the same order until all required runs per track have been accomplished.

Sled. Mk-105 device.

Standard Deviation of Navigational Error (e). The

root mean square value of the navigation error. This is

a measure of the ability of an MCM system and its operating platform to adhere to the intended track

through a minefield.

Step-Look Circuit. A circuit in which the same influence must be detected twice before actuation occurs, the magnitude of the influence at the second

look bearing a predetermined ratio to that during the

first look.

Sterilization. Permanently rendering a mine incapable of firing by means of a device within the mine.

Self-destruction is considered a form of sterilization.

Stopped Penetration Distribution. The set of probabilities for every possible number of safe transits

prior to some postulated event that would cause the

enemy to stop his transit attempts.

Streaming. The process of deploying minesweeping

gear in preparation for a sweep operation.

Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM). A n

Mk 67, a ground mine launched from a submarine

and propelled to a predetermined point.

Survey Operations. Operations to collect data on

the MCM environment. They are conducted in peacetime to ascertain the suitability of conditions for the

MCM operations.

Sustained Threat. The ability of a minefield segment to present a continuous threat level for a specified period of time despite transitors or MCM efforts.

Sweeper. The vehicle that tows or carries minesweeping

equipment in a minesweeping operation.

Sweeping. The act of a sweeper towing and operating a sweep. This term also covers the destruction of

floating mines cut loose from their mooring cables.

Sweeping Speed. The speed that is the result of the

effect of the MCM gear streamed on the signaled speed.

Sweep Offset. The athwartship separation between

the track of the sweeper and the center of the characteristic actuation width for the sweep device.

Sweep Resistance. The counter-countermeasures

quality of a mine that inhibits its actuations as a result of enemy minesweeping efforts.

T

TARLOC. Target location computer program developed as an aid in determining the position of

AN/SQS-14 sonar contacts.

Task. A stage or combination of stages related to a

specific channel or area of execution, time of execution, and MCM means for the execution.

TB 26. An in-service U.S. acoustic device aboard

MCM 1 Class ships. (Formerly called A-Mk 6(b).)

TB 27. An in-service U.S. acoustic device aboard

MCM 1 Class ships. (Formerly called A-Mk 4(V).)

ORIGINAL A-14
Team Sweep. (a) Two or more sweepers linked together by a mechanical sweep. (b) In influence

sweeping, the interaction of sweep fields is an essential feature of the technique in use (e.g.,. synchronization of magnetic sweep fields).

Technical Report (TECHREP). A report that provides the results of mine exploitation efforts.

Technique. The operation of a specific MCM platform and equipment in a particular way.

Thermocline. A horizontal velocity layer produced

by temperature variations. It can cause a refraction

of the sonar signal, which can limit the sonar range.

Threat. The probability that a target ship passing once

through a minefield will explode at least one mine

and be damaged to a specified level.

Threat Profile. The expected threat to each of a sequence of transitors.

Track Course. The true course of the track.

Track Policy. The policy for carrying out runs on the

track, including the order in which tracks are to be

run and the number of runs to be completed on each

track before proceeding to the next track.

Track Spacing (D). The perpendicular distance between adjacent tracks.

Track Turn. The method of completing the end of a

run on one track and preparing to commence the next

run either on the same track or another track.

Traffic Ships. Normal kinds and numbers of ships

using the given area, usually considered major cargo

and military ships.

Transit. The passage of a ship through a minefield.

Transitor. A surface ship, submarine, or naval craft

that passes through or attempts to pass through a naval minefield.

Two-Frequency Acoustic Mine. Amine whose circuit must receive acoustic actuation on two frequencies

before the mine can fire. The relative volume of

sound at the two frequencies must bear comparison

with the sound spectrum of the target.

Two-Look Random Circuit. A mine circuit in

which the influence must be detected twice before

actuation occurs; the second look may follow consecutively or within certain time limits, and the polarity of the second look can be either the same as or

opposite to that of the first look. The mine may be

dormant during the interlook period.

Two-Look Reversal Circuit. A mine circuit in which

the influence must be detected twice before actuation

occurs; the second look may follow consecutively or

within certain time limits, and the polarity of the second look must be opposite to that of the first. The

mine may be dormant during the interlook period.

U

Uncountered Fields. Aminefield against which the

enemy takes no mine countermeasures actions.

Underwater Electric Potential (UEP). Alternating

and static electric fields caused by the electric current flowing through dissimilar metals in a ship’s underwater hull.

Unfitted Mine. A mine not containing a detonator or

some other essential part of the explosive train.

V

Versatile Exercise Mine System (VEMS). An exercise mine system that can be programmed to represent a variety of mines for sweep evaluation and

training purposes.

Vertical Component. That component part of the

total magnetic field in the vertical plane.

Vibrator. The acoustic device in certain acoustic mine

circuits. These are normally called seismic mines;

they depend on ships’sounds transmitted through the

ocean bottom rather than through the water.

A-15 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

APPENDIX B

MIW Program and Support Organizations

B.1 MINE WARFARE PROGRAM

ORGANIZATION

B.1.1 Director, Expeditionary Warfare. The Director, Expeditionary Warfare (CNO N85), within the

Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (N8), is

the resource and platform sponsor for MIW ships and

aircraft, equipment, and systems. N85 is responsible for

the establishment of military requirements and formulating budget and program plans associated with staffing,

training, and maintenance for all MIW ships, aircraft,

and systems. COMINEWARCOM serves N85 in an additional duty capacity as an advisor.

N85 is also the resource sponsor for amphibious warfare. With emphasis on littoral warfare and the associated

mine threat, sponsorship of both warfare areas by the

same division fosters close coordination and cooperation

between forces dependent on each other. Relationships of

N85 and other program offices are shown in Figure B-1.

B.1.2 Program Executive Officer for Mine Warfare. The PEO MIW is assigned the acquisition responsibility and management accountability for mines and

MCM programs, including airborne, surface, EOD,

NSW, and magnetic silencing systems. PEO MIW reports

directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, with appropriate

coordination with OPNAV and Headquarters Marine Corps

staffs. NAVAIR, NAVSEA, and MARCORSYSCOM

are designated as support systems commands for PEO

MIW and his program managers. NAVSEA, NAVAIR,

and SPAWARSYSCOM sponsored warfare centers (laboratories) provide support and are assigned work as appropriate by PEO MIW and the PMO offices. Systems

excluded from PEO MIW responsibility are ships, aircraft, submarine off-board sensor systems, submarine

mine avoidance sonars, submarine degaussing facilities,

and unmanned air vehicles.

B.1.2.1 Program Management Office for Surface Mine Warfare Systems. The PMO for Surface Mine Warfare Systems (PMO 407), under the PEO

MIW, is the program manager for all mine systems and

surface MCM systems. PMO 407 is responsible for acting on requirements established by the operating forces

once they have been approved and forwarded by CNO

N85. Oversight of new mine and surface MCM projects

and product improvement programs for existing mines

and surface MCM systems lie within the PMO 407

arena. The combat systems of the MCM and MHC

class ships are managed by this office. PMO 407 maintains liaison with NATO mine warfare organizations

through data exchange agreements and joint development programs.

B.1.2.2 Program Management Office for Airborne MCM Systems. The PMO for Airborne MCM

Systems (PMO 210) is the program manager for all

MCM systems associated with the AMCM helicopter

and other systems that are employed from aircraft to

conduct MCM related tasks.

B.1.2.3 Program Management Office for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. PMO EOD is an additional duty of personnel at the EOD Technical Center.

Responsibilities include all Navy and tri-Service EOD

systems associated with mine detection, localization,

classification, or neutralization.

B.1.2.4 Program Management Office for Naval

Special Warfare. The PMO for NSW USN MCM

(PMO SPECWAR) is an additional duty of personnel

in the NAVSEA 06Z office. Responsibilities include

systems employed by NSW units in conducting very

shallow water MCM and obstacle removal.

B.1.2.5 Program Management Office for Magnetic Silencing. The PMO MAGSIL is an additional duty of personnel in the NAVSEA 56Z office.

Responsibilities include current magnetic silencing

systems and new system development projects for

closed loop degaussing, portable degaussing ranges,

and advanced degaussing technology demonstrations.

B-1 ORIGINAL
B.1.3 MCM Ship Acquisition Program Office.

The NAVSEASYSCOM MCM Ship Acquisition Program Office (PMS 303) is responsible for the acquisition of ship assets for MCM. PMS 303 managed the

acquisition programs for the MCM 1 and MHC 51

Class ships and is also the life cycle manager for surface MCM ships responsible for planning and executing the Class Maintenance Plan, as well as for overall

management for modifications and improvements.

B.1.4 Program Executive Officer for Air Warfare. PEO A responsibilities in MIW include acquisition and life cycle management of the MH-53E

Minesweeping Helicopter through PMO 261. PMO 261

is responsible for the airframe and all equipment that is

considered part of the aircraft rather than part of the

MCM weapons systems. PMO 261 is also involved in

flight certification for MCM systems that interface with

the aircraft. Other NAVAIR codes, depending on aircraft type, are responsible for aircraft interface and

flight certification for mine delivery systems.

B.1.5 Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. The SPAWARSYSCOM supplies non-MCM

specific combat systems and C4I equipment to SMCM

ships and EODMCM detachments. These include

communications, radar, and navigation systems.

The GPS navigation system and all user equipment

are one example of the significant contribution of

SPAWARSYSCOM to the MIW mission.

ORIGINAL B-2

SYSCOMS

CNO N85 MCCDC

CMWC

NAVAL

LABORATORIES

PRIME

CONTRACTORS

PMO 210

AMCM

PMO*1

EODMCM

PMO 407

SMCM

PMO*2

NSW MCM

PMO*3

MAG SIL

OTHER

PEOs PEO

MINE WARFARE

DON

ASN (RD&A)

ADVISOR FUNDING

SUPPORT

ADDU OF:

*1 NAVSEA 06X

*2 NAVSEA 06Z

*3 NAVSEA 56Z

DOD

USD(A)

Figure B-1. Mine Warfare Program Organizaation
B.2 TRAINING/CERTIFICATION SUPPORT

ORGANIZATIONS

B.2.1 Fleet Mine Warfare Center. The FMWC at

Ingleside, TX (formerly Fleet and Mine Warfare

Training Center, Charleston, SC) is the primary site for

MIW specific training in the Navy. FMWC supports all

formal training for mine personnel and all MCM

schoolhouse training for MCM staffs and surface

MCM vessels. Courses currently include the following:

1. Mine Warfare Core Course

2. Mining Specialty Course

3. MCM Specialty Course

4. Staff Minefield Planner

5. Staff MCM Planning

6. MCM Ship Operations Course

7. MCM First Lieutenant Course

8. Surface MCM Vessel PCO Course

9. Mineman “A” and “C” schools

10. AN/SQQ-30 Sonar Operations & Maintenance

11. AN/SQQ-32 Sonar Operations & Maintenance

12. AN/WQN-1 Operations & Maintenance

13. AN/SLQ-48 MNS Operations, Maintenance &

Handling

14. AN/SSN-2 Precise Navigation System

15. AN/SYQ-13 Navigation/C2 System

16. MCM Electrician’s Mate Course

17. MCM Boatswain’s Mate Course.

The goal for the FMWC is to provide fully integrated

training for surface, air, and underwater MCM forces. The

installation of AN/SSQ-94 simulation equipment and C4I

systems will allow the integration of schoolhouse training

with fleet exercises [BFTT] and wargaming ENWGS.

B.2.2 AMCM Training Support. Training for active and reserve AMCM pilots and crewmembers is

conducted in three phases. Initial aircraft flight qualification on the MH-53E (or requalification when necessary) is conducted by Marine Helicopter Training

Squadron 302 (HMT-302). Following aircraft qualification, pilots and aircrew attend the AMCM Weapons

Systems Training School located at Norfolk, VA. This

school provides classroom and simulator training in operation and maintenance of all aircraft MCM systems.

Finally, live flight training and qualification for MCM

missions and equipment are conducted at the operational squadrons (HM-14 and HM-15).

B.2.3 EOD Training Support. Formal EOD

schooling is conducted at the Naval School EOD,

which is split between Eglin Air Force Base in Florida

and Naval Ordnance Station Indian Head, MD. Prior to

commencing EOD training, officers and enlisted must

be certified Navy divers. Upon completion of EOD

school, they are assigned to an EOD Mobile Unit.

When an MCM detachment is assigned a deployment,

EOD team training is conducted by an EODTEU located at Fort Story, VA, or Pearl Harbor, HI. These

units also conduct training for EODMCM detachments

prior to certification.

B.2.4 Mine Warfare Readiness Certification.

COMINEWARINSGRU i s responsible under

COMINEWARCOM for assessment of MIW readiness throughout the U.S. Navy. Teams from

COMINEWARINSGRU provide assistance visits to

commands preparing for the MRCI and assist the senior

inspector, who is normally the unit’s ISIC, in conducting the MRCI. MRCIs are required for commands responsible for mine storage, preparation, and delivery,

as well as MCM ships, air squadrons, and EODMCM

or MMS detachments. Inspections are also conducted

to certify the readiness of magnetic silencing ranges.

B.3 NAVY LAB AND SUPPORT

ORGANIZATIONS

B.3.1 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Coastal

Systems Station. The NAVSWC COASTSYSTA

at Panama City, FL, is the principal Navy activity responsible for conducting RDT&E in support of naval

missions and operations that occur primarily within

coastal or continental shelf regions. COASTSYSTA

maintains RDT&E capability for the following:

1. MCM, including mine hunting, mine neutralization, and minesweeping

2. Fire control systems and remotely piloted vehicles and launchers associated with MCM, including theory, tactics, and documentation.

B-3 ORIGINAL
3. Analysis of foreign mines for response to targets

or sweeps.

The COASTSYSTA laboratory combines MCM experience with simulation equipment, nonmagnetic facilities, a heliport for AMCM testing, and proximity to

bay, riverine, and open sea environments. As the only

warfare-oriented laboratory significantly devoted to

MCM, COASTSYSTA carries out a large share of the

Navy’s MCM research and development and continues

to assist in the preparation of MIW tactics.

B.3.2 Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity. NAVMINEWARENGACT at Yorktown, VA, provides engineering support for mines, surface deployed

MCM systems, and related equipment. NAVMINEWARENGACT provides engineering, logistics, inventory,

budgetary, procurement, test and evaluation, quality assurance, technical publication, and technical data management

support for all in-service mines and mine components, surface MCM sweep and neutralization systems, and associated test equipment. NAVMINEWARENGACT also

provides engineering, technical, and logistics support to

foreign nations for those mines and MCM systems acquired from the United States.

B.3.3 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division. The EODTECHDIV at Indian Head,

MD, is responsible for conducting RDT&E relating to

explosive ordnance disposal and RSP. EODTECHDIV

designs, develops, conducts technical evaluation of,

and performs in-service engineering for all tools and

equipment employed by EOD divers. EODTECHDIV

also establishes and validates EOD procedures for rendering safe or disposing of all types of domestic and

foreign ordnance. Once procedures are established,

EODTECHDIV maintains a database of procedures

and produces EOD publications for joint Service use.

B.3.4 Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren

Division, Detachment White Oak. NAVSWC

White Oak has an experienced staff of scientists and engineers. NAVSWC conducts research into all aspects

of MIW, including minefield theory; target detection,

tracking, localization, and classification; mine delivery; warheads and fusing; and energy sources. Based on

this research, mine systems are developed and evaluated

for use by the Navy. NAVSWC White Oak functions are

being relocated to Panama City, FL, where they will

share facilities with NAVSWC COASTSYSTA.

NAVSWC also maintains facilities at Fort Monroe,

VA, and Fort Lauderdale, FL. These facilities provide for

testing in-water Navy mine performance against various

targets and countermeasures, as well as specialized facilities for environmental, magnetic, pressure, and

laboratory acoustic testing of mines and related

components.

B.3.5 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division. NAVSWC Crane Division, at Crane, IN, is

the in-service engineering agent for minehunting

sonars and other electronic equipment.

B.3.6 Commander, Naval Oceanographic Office.

NAVOCEANO has the responsibility for collection

and dissemination of environmental data to support

MIW operations, development programs, and ordnance

and equipment performance predictions. Additionally,

this data supports force level requirement decisions.

NAVOCEANO compiles data and prepares environmental planning guides known as Mine Warfare Pilots

that are disseminated to all commands responsible for

planning mining or MCM evolutions.

B.3.7 Office of Naval Research. The ONR is an

independent organization that controls research funds

(6.1) and funds for exploratory development (6.2) of

new MIW concepts. ONR supports studies (such as the

investigation of low-frequency broadband acoustic

mine hunting) by evaluating the feasibility of proposed

solutions to specific MIW needs. ONR also administers

and funds the NSAP, which makes the capabilities of

Navy laboratories directly available to the operating

forces for the solution of operational problems. NSAP

advisors are assigned to major fleet staffs and submit

proposed projects via fleet and type commanders. MIW

related tasks are normally submitted through the

COMINEWARCOM NSAP advisor.

B.3.8 Naval Research Laboratory. The NRL,

Stennis Space Center, located at Bay St. Louis, MS, performs RDT&E in ocean science, ocean acoustics, atmospheric science, and related technologies. NRL develops

environmental sampling systems that support MIW.

B.3.9 Naval Research and Development Command. NRaD San Diego, CA (formerly Naval Undersea Warfare Center) is the principal Navy RDT&E

center for command, control, communications, ocean

surveillance, surface- and air-launched undersea weapon

systems, submarine arctic warfare, and supporting technologies. NRaD San Diego was the technical agent for

development of the AN/SSN-2(V) Precise Integrated

Navigation System (PINS) and the AN/SLQ-48(V)

Mine Neutralization System (MNS). It is also the technical agent for development of Marine Mammal Systems.

B.3.10 Naval Underwater Warfare Center. The

NUWC Division in Newport, RI, is the development

ORIGINAL B-4
center for surface and submarine sonar systems.

NUWC Division Newport is responsible for modifications and additions to the AN/SQS-56 and AN/SQS-53

surface ship sonars (known as Kingfisher), which have

increased their effectiveness as surface ship mine detection and avoidance systems.

B.3.11 Naval Doctrine Command. NAVDOCCOM

is responsible for developing naval concepts and integrated doctrine, including a coordinated Navy and Marine Corps voice in joint and multinational doctrine

development. In Mine Warfare this includes approval

of the addition or deletion of publications in the NWP

series and the coordination of review of existing NWPs.

NAVDOCCOM designates appropriate commands as

primary review authorities, coordinating review authorities, and technical review authorities for NWPs.

B.3.12 Surface Warfare Development Group.

The SURFWARDEVGRU is the coordinating command for tactics development in the surface community.

SURFWARDEVGRU is involved in development of

tactics for integration of mine warfare forces with amphibious forces in littoral warfare situations.

B.3.13 Marine Corps Combat Development Command. The MCCDC is responsible for development of

tactics for the Marine Corps and works closely with Navy

tactical development cells at COMINEWARCOM and

SURFWARDEVGRU to develop and refine tactics for

MIW in amphibious operations.

B.3.14 Operational Test and Evaluation Force.

The OPTEVFOR, located in Norfolk, VA, conducts

operational testing on new MCM ship classes or equipment and new mine systems. OPTEVFOR’s purpose is

to certify the ship’s or system’s suitability for operational use as specified in the applicable requirements

document.

B-5 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

APPENDIX C

Mine Warfare Historical Perspective

C.1 MINING HISTORY

Mine Warfare has played a critical role throughout

modern history, and the strategic, economic, and political effects of mines are evident from a review of naval

operations during the major hostilities of the last two

centuries.

The first known sea mine was developed in 1776 by

an American, David Bushnell, during the Revolutionary War. This first mine was a tar-covered wooden beer

keg filled with black powder and suspended a few feet

below the surface on a float. A flintlock firing mechanism was assembled inside the keg so that a light shock

would release the hammer and fire the powder charge.

The keg was then set adrift, relying on the tides and currents to bring it into contact with the enemy. In 1777,

under orders from General Washington, a number of

these kegs were set adrift in an attempt to destroy a fleet

of British warships anchored in the Delaware River off

Philadelphia. No keg mines struck a ship, but the British crews panicked and fired into the water at these

mines, in what has come to be known as “The Battle of

the Kegs.” This first use of sea mines was unsuccessful

in that no ships were sunk, but the field of mine warfare

had begun.

Mines were first put to use on a relatively large

scale during the American Civil War. The Confederate Navy was inferior to the Federal Navy and needed

a weapon that could be quickly and cheaply produced

to compensate for this disparity. They chose to use

mines, which were called torpedoes at that time, as

their equalizer because they were much cheaper and

easier to build than warships. The Confederate Army

Corps of Engineers designed and implemented sea

mines of many sizes and shapes, each of which contained encased explosives detonated either by contact

with a vessel’s hull or by remote control from a shore

station.

One of the most well-known uses of mines during the

Civil War was during the battle of Mobile Bay in 1864,

where a minefield of 80 mines had been laid in three

staggered minelines. Admiral Farragut received the order to attack Mobile with a squadron of his vessels. His

lead ship, the Tecumseh, led the way and struck a mine

long before it was within reach of the shoreline to effectively use its guns. The Tecumseh quickly sank and

most of the crewmembers were lost. Another ship in the

squadron saw mines in the water and began to alter its

course through the minefield. This action angered Admiral Farragut, who was heard to say, “Damn the torpedoes! Captain Drayton, go ahead!” A number of other

mines were struck by ships in the squadron, but none of

them exploded. (Many of these mines had been corroded by the water and made ineffective.)

Although this mining operation did not stop the attack by Admiral Farragut’s ships, other squadrons of

Union ships were not as lucky. The Confederates made

a very effective use of their mines, even though many

of them were of crude design, plagued with faulty fuses

and detonators or poor waterproofing techniques. Nevertheless, despite these problems, more than twice as

many ships were sunk by mines as were sunk by opposition naval gunfire. The number of ships lost to mines

would have been much higher except that many of the

Confederate mines were rendered inert due to immersion and wave action.

It is equally important to note Admiral Farragut’s

mine countermeasure efforts. His force had been

mine watching and mine hunting, although primitively, for a significant period before his advance.

The real lesson of this battle should be how seriously

Admiral Farragut took the Confederate mine threat

and his attention to preparation for and countering of

the mines.

In the years following the Civil War, the United

States paid little attention to mine warfare. However,

other countries, particularly Germany, Great Britain,

Russia, and Japan, were very active in the development

of underwater mines. Although defensive minefields

were laid during the Franco-Prussian and the Crimean

Wars, it was not until 1904, during the Russo-Japanese

War, that mines first received attention as offensive

weapons. The Russian and Japanese navies were both

well equipped with effective mines and minelaying

C-1 ORIGINAL
assets when this war began, and mines were used extensively during the early stages of the war by both sides.

The Russians planted 300 mines in a defensive field to

protect Port Arthur, and the Japanese offensively laid

mines just outside of Port Arthur. These Port Arthur minefields inflicted grave losses upon the Russian forces. In retaliation, the Russians wanted to mine Japanese shipping,

and to do this they laid mines in the open sea. This indiscriminate mining of open international waters threatened

the merchant shipping of nonbelligerent nations and

brought protests from the Western powers who were not

involved in the conflict. Additionally, many of the contact

mines that were laid in the harbors broke free from their

moorings and drifted into international shipping lanes,

also threatening nonbelligerent shipping. To deal with this

mine threat to nonbelligerent shipping, the Hague Convention (VIII) of 1907 was held to establish legal guidelines for the use of sea mines.

Mine warfare played a very significant role in World

War I; in fact the naval mine emerged as the Allies’ primary weapon against German submarines. During

World War I, American inventors developed a new

moored mine that featured a copper antenna attached to a

float. This antenna enabled the mine case to maintain a

predetermined distance beneath the surface, as opposed

to maintaining a set distance above the sea bed. This feature provided the Allies with the ability to plant mines

that would effectively target submerged submarines in

varying water depths while allowing surface ships to

pass over them unharmed. Between 1914 and 1918, the

Allies laid numerous minefields to bottle up German

submarines, as well as minefields designed to protect

harbors and ship channels from these same submarines.

From June to November 1918, American and British

minelayers planted nearly 73,000 mines during the largest mining campaign ever conducted. This minefield,

known as the North Sea Barrage, was a 250-mile barrier

that extended across the North Sea from Aberdeen, Scotland, to the coast of Norway. The objective of this barrier

was to prevent the transit of submerged German submarines out of the North Sea to Allied shipping lanes, and

the effectiveness of this minefield was augmented by patrol boats to deny passage to surfaced submarines.

Although this minefield was not laid until the final days

of the war, it was considered to have been highly effective. The barrage sank at least six submarines and damaged many more, and there were cases of mutiny among

German crews, who feared to transit the field. Moreover,

the submarines that did manage to transit the barrage and

reach the Atlantic had to employ the necessary evasive

tactics to avoid the mines, which wasted valuable time

and fuel. The mine played an important and significant

role in World War I naval strategy.

Improvements in underwater mine design and development added new dimensions to mine warfare at the

outbreak of World War II. A major improvement was

the development of the influence mine, which fired

when the mine sensed the proper ship-generated magnetic, acoustic, and/or pressure influence field. This improvement did not require the mine to come into

contact with the ship to actuate, and it enabled each

mine to cover a larger volume of water. The development of this influence technology, coupled with the introduction of submarines and airplanes as minelaying

vehicles, made the sea mine an important and effective

offensive weapon. The effectiveness of these sea mines

was also improved by the introduction of ship counters

and various timing devices.

German offensive mining during World War II was

extensive, and they used the full range of mine types

available to them at the time, including moored contact,

influence, and bottom influence mines. The Germans

were very aggressive in their use of mines, as is evidenced by

the 350 bottom magnetic and moored magnetic submarinelaid mines planted off of various Western hemisphere

ports from Trinidad to Nova Scotia. Eight of these offensive minefields were laid in U.S. waters. One minefield

was laid off New York and the Delaware Capes, four off

Norfolk, VA, and three off Charleston, SC. Several of the

ports were closed for up to 16 days by these mines, and 12

ships were sunk or severely damaged.

The U.S. Navy’s principal mining campaigns during

World War II were carried out in the Pacific against the

Japanese. There were a number of offensive campaigns

conducted using surface, subsurface, and aerial mine

delivery assets, but the largest single mining campaign

was Operation Starvation. This was a multiphased aerial mining operation that was conducted in 1945, during

the final stages of the war in the Pacific, against the Japanese mainland. During Operation Starvation, U.S. aircraft laid more than 12,000 influence mines in Japanese

shipping routes and harbor approaches. Japan was totally unprepared to cope with the influence mines that

saturated its home waters, and as a result, Japan’s seaborne transportation and heavy industry virtually collapsed. Six hundred fifty ships (75 percent of Japan’s

total military and merchant fleet) were sunk or seriously damaged by these mines. Those ships that were

not sunk by mines were either forced to stay in closed

ports or diverted to a few overcrowded ports where they

became prey to submarine and aircraft attack.

During the Korean war, Communist forces laid 3,000

to 4,000 moored contact and magnetic bottom mines to

block such major ports as Wonson, Hguam, Chongjin,

Chinnanpo, Po Hang-Do, Inchon, and Kunsan. This was

ORIGINAL C-2
one of the most successful mining operations ever conducted against U.N. forces and it caught the U.S. Navy

off guard. The United States was planning to land at

Wonson and support ground forces ashore so that they

could cut off Chinese and North Korean forces. The

minefield at Wonson delayed the initial landing eight

days, and 15 days were needed to clear a safe channel.

A new family of mines, called Destructors, was developed during the Vietnam Conflict and first came into

use in 1967. The Destructor consisted of a highly sophisticated firing mechanism that was inserted into the

fuse cavity of a general-purpose bomb. The name “Destructors” was used to circumvent an objectionable political implication that resulted from the term “mine.”

Early versions of the firing mechanism were entirely

magnetic, but by the end of the mining campaign, Destructors also incorporated a seismic influence capability.

Destructors employed the most advanced mechanisms in

mine design since the development of the bottom influence mine, and they gave mine planners an effective

weapon suitable for rapid deployment. Destructors were

designed to self-destruct at a preset time, rather than become sterilized (permanently disarmed) as all other U.S.

mines had done. That is, Destructors actually destroyed

themselves, disappearing both as an explosive threat and

as an obstruction to navigation.

The United States hesitated to use conventional mining to stop the influx of seaborne war supplies to North

Vietnamese ports and did so only when few offensive

options remained open. There were three separate mining campaigns. The first mining campaign occurred in

early 1967 and was a very limited conventional mining

effort carried out using conventional magnetic bottom

mines in selected river mouths and waterways in the

southern portion of North Vietnam. The second mining

campaign was conducted in June to July 1967, using Destructors made with 500-pound general-purpose bombs.

Carrier-based aircraft mined the ferry crossing of the

river Vinh, and an extensive mining effort was conducted that concentrated on depriving the North Vietnamese of inland waterway and roadway supply lines.

The third and by far the largest mining campaign began

in May l972 and continued until January 1973. This successful mining campaign closed North Vietnamese ports to

shipping and was conducted in response to the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam. U.S. forces laid a total

of 108 conventional bottom magnetic mines and more than

11,000 (500-pound) Destructors that incorporated magnetic and magnetic/seismic influence mechanisms.

The cornerstone of this mining campaign was the

planting of the 36 conventional ground mines in the

approaches to Haiphong Harbor. (The mines were set to

sterilize after a prescribed period of time, and the field was

replenished twice, each time with 36 mines.) This minefield trapped 27 merchant ships in Haiphong Harbor

before the United States cleared the mines. A DIA assessment of N.V.A. mining stated, “The mining of Haiphong

Harbor was a potent lever for U.S. negotiatiors both before and after the Peace Agreement was signed.” The Destructors were also used to mine other ports, coastal

shipping routes, and inland waterways.

During the Falklands/Malvinas Islands War, the Argentines laid mines to interfere with the British landing

at Port Stanley. Both Iran and Iraq laid moored contact

mines during their long war, which began in 1980.

Many of these mines broke free from their moorings

but did not become harmless in accordance with the

Hague Convention (VIII). As a result, these floaters

threatened tanker and other nonbelligerent merchant

shipping transiting the Persian Gulf. Most recently, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi forces

laid approximately 1,500 mines to threaten the multinational forces involved with Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm. These mines ranged from very simplistic, moored contact mines made around 1900 to

very modern, sophisticated bottom and moored influence mine types. Two U.S. warships, USS PRINCETON (CG 59) and USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10), were

severely damaged when they actuated Iraqi-laid mines.

C.2 MINE COUNTERMEASURES

The United States made use of its mine countermeasures capability as a diplomatic quid pro quo to obtain a

peace settlement in the Middle East during the mid-1970s

and as a member of the multinational force conducting

minehunting operations in the Gulf of Suez. Mine countermeasures also played an essential part in the U.S. actions to protect reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian

Gulf in 1987/1988 and during the 1990/1991 Desert

Shield/Desert Storm operations in the Persian Gulf.

Since mines were first used during the Revolutionary War, it is only natural that the first mine countermeasures efforts also took place during that war.

However, the MCM efforts used during the Revolutionary War, like the mines, were relatively unsophisticated by today’s measures. To counter the threat posed

by the keg mines, the British were limited to either exploding the kegs with musket fire or steering the vessel

away from the keg.

Moored mines were first employed in the Civil War,

and so were the techniques to counter them. Union forces

developed a number of MCM tactics in an attempt to

C-3 ORIGINAL
counter the Confederate mines, but none of them was

very successful. Devices called bow rakes, which were

similar to a snow plow on a truck, were developed and

placed on the bow of river craft to fend off any mines in

their path. Grapnel hooks and line drags were also

rigged between two ships to snag the cable of an anchored mine and pull it out of the ship’s path. Another

MCM effort was the development of a mine raft that

was pushed ahead of a ship to clear mines from the path

of transiting ships. Even though these techniques were

relatively effective, it was realized that measures were

needed to combat this new warfighting capability.

The first major MCM effort was conducted immediately following World War I, as the United States introduced the use of mine countermeasures ships into its

navy. After the armistice was signed, the mines laid in

the North Sea Barrage and other minefields had to be

cleared in accordance with the guidelines set forth by

the Hague Convention (VIII). U.S. and British forces

worked together to clear the North Sea Barrage. To accomplish this, the U.S. used several tugs and trawlers

that were converted into minesweepers, as well as a

number of specially designed 200-foot Bird Class steel

minesweepers that had been built. These ships used

oropesa mechanical sweeps (O gear) that had been developed by the British, to cut the mine mooring cables.

This allowed the buoyant mine case to rise to the surface, where it was destroyed by gunfire. This technique

worked, but problems were encountered. For example,

many of the mines would foul the sweep wires and explode before the ships could sink them by gunfire, and

these explosions frequently caused other mines to explode, often damaging the sweeping ships and their

sweep gear up to 1 mile away. Various sweeping techniques were experimented with to find the best one.

In addition to the North Sea Barrage, another major

minefield had to be cleared following World War I in the

Dardanelles. Both Turkish defensive minefields and

British offensive fields had been laid. It was difficult for

the minesweeping ships to determine where the boundaries of each minefield were, so the British sent up observation balloons to locate the different mine lines and

mark where they were. The minesweepers followed

these lines very closely while conducting their sweeping

operations to provide greater protection for the sweeping

ships. The British also used some air-dropped depth

charges in an attempt to counter the mines. These British

efforts were the first use of air MCM.

During the years between World War I and World

War II, a number of advances were made in mine countermeasures techniques and equipment accompanying

the similar advances with mines. The British developed

many of these significant advances, which included

shipboard degaussing systems, deperming/flashing

techniques, magnetic minesweeping systems, and

acoustic minesweeping systems. Mines and mine countermeasures were both becoming fairly sophisticated.

During World War II, the mining threat to U.S. and

Allied shipping and submarines became worldwide in

scope and required an active response. Minesweeping

equipment and ships were used to counter the new influence mine mechanisms, and passive response in the

form of self-protective measures were used to reduce

ships’ magnetic and acoustic signatures. The use of

mines with ship counters and arming delay devices

placed an immense burden upon the mine countermeasures forces of both the Allied and Axis powers.

The United States had minesweepers based in all of

its major ports, as well as at advance bases in Europe,

South America, and the Pacific. Minesweepers were

also used to accompany all invasion forces. The U.S.

minesweepers carried out daily exploratory sweeps and

could respond quickly when a minefield was discovered by other craft. U.S. Navy minesweepers encountered German mines off the beaches of Normandy,

throughout the Mediterranean, and on the east coast of

North and South America. Many of these mines were

located and removed by routine minesweeping missions, but others were discovered only when passing

ships struck mines and set them off.

In total, there were more than 1,200 U.S. minesweepers that participated in sweeping operations during and after World War II. U.S. MCM forces

continued to clear minefields throughout the Pacific

and European theaters until the opening of the Korean

war in 1950. (There was a gradual reduction in the size

and readiness of this MCM force.) A total of 45 U.S.

Navy minesweepers were lost to mines or other hostile

action during World War II and postwar sweeping.

The Communist mining of Wonson and other major

ports during the Korean war coincided with a U.S. postwar minesweeper force reduction program. The United

States had approximately 50 mine warfare ships in

commission at the outbreak of the Korean conflict, 15

of which were assigned to the Pacific Fleet. Only seven

of these were considered to be in a high state of readiness, since they had come directly from sweeping missions in Japanese waters. Initially, these ships were

ill-prepared to deal quickly with the 3,000 to 4,000

moored contact and bottom magnetic mines laid. The

planned landing at Wonson had to be delayed until a

channel could be cleared.

The Korean minesweeping operations proved costly to

U.S. forces. On 1 October 1950, one of these minesweepers, USS MAGPIE, struck a mine and sank. The

ORIGINAL C-4
sweeping of Wonson Harbor gained notoriety when

two 180-foot minesweepers, USS PLEDGE and USS

PIRATE, were also lost. Despite these casualties,

minesweeping operations continued until the end of

hostilities in July 1953. There was a total of four U.S.

minesweepers and one fleet tug sunk by mines and five

destroyers were severely damaged. South Korea also

had several small craft that were sunk or damaged.

During the Korean war, the United States recommissioned 63 minesweepers from the reserve fleet.

In addition to these ships, the United States contracted

with Japanese sweepers to assist with the sweeping of

minefields laid south of the 38th parallel. Navy minesweepers worked throughout the conflict to clear

moored contact mines and sensitive magnetic induction

mines from harbors, fire support areas, channels, and

amphibious landing areas. Once cleared, they continued sweeping operations to ensure that additional

mines were not laid. It was during this clearance operation that the helicopter was first used in an MCM role to

spot mines in the path of surface sweepers.

This Korean experience taught U.S. naval authorities a valuable lesson in mine countermeasures. Over

90 percent of the Communist-laid mines were of a

moored contact design dating to the early 1900s, and

only a few incorporated modern firing mechanisms,

arming delays, or ship counters. Nevertheless, these

mines delayed the landing at Wonson in 1950 and prevented troop and support ships from entering the port

for more than a week while all available minesweepers

worked to clear a channel into the harbor. Rear Admiral

Allan E. “Hoke” Smith, Commander, Amphibious

Task Force, used the following words to inform the

Chief of Naval Operations of the situation: “We have

lost control of the seas to a nation without a navy, using

pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.”

Following the Korean war, the U.S. Navy designed

and constructed a completely new and sophisticated

surface MCM force of more than 150 ships and boats,

including MSOs, MSCs, and MSBs. These ships and

boats were constructed entirely of wood and equipped

with nonmagnetic materials to reduce their magnetic

signatures. In addition, the MSOs and MSCs were outfitted with minehunting sonar systems, and all of the

new ships had elaborate degaussing systems installed

to further reduce their susceptibility to magnetically actuated mine mechanisms. In addition to these new surface vessels, various helicopters were examined for

their suitability in an MCM role, and helicopter-towed

moored, magnetic, and acoustic sweep equipment was

developed.

During the Vietnam Conflict, the U.S. conducted extensive MCM operations in the rivers, waterways, canals, and coastal areas of both North and South Vietnam.

The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces planted

primitive but effective homemade mines, as well as sophisticated Soviet influence mines, in the rivers and principal waterways of South Vietnam throughout the war.

This forced the United States and South Vietnam to develop special riverine and shallow water mine countermeasures. A new family of MCM technology emerged

as existing craft and equipment were converted and

adapted to the riverine environment.

The U.S. mining of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese

ports and the subsequent clearance operations played a major

role in peace negotiations. On 27 January 1973, an agreement

to restore peace in Vietnam wassigned by the United States

and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Article 2 of this

peace agreement stated that “the United States is to conduct mine clearance operations in the coastal areas of

North Vietnam to clear all United States laid mines from

those waters.” This mine clearance operation was the first

to rely on helicopter minesweeping methods. Titled Operation End Sweep, the clearance was carried out in 1973 by

Task Force 78, which consisted of 37 Navy and Marine

CH-53A helicopters and 6 MSOs supported by Amphibious Transport Docks and Amphibious Assault Ships.

During the many hours of sweeping, airborne units

cleared the inner channels while surface units cleared the

outer 3 miles of the main Haiphong Channel. Only one

mine, a conventional magnetic bottom mine, was actually

swept. Most of the mines had self-destructed or sterilized

by the time major clearance efforts had begun. To demonstrate the success of Operation End Sweep, the U.S. Navy

sent a Minesweeper Special (MSS 2) on an uneventful

check-sweep of the Haiphong Channel. This demonstration of U.S. adherence to the cease-fire agreement proved

useful in later treaty disputes.

Following the Vietnam Conflict there were various

Middle Eastern conflicts, such as the Six-Day and Yom

Kippur Wars, associated with the use or suspected use

of sea mines. In the aftermath of these wars, the United

States provided, at Egypt’s request, assistance in

sweeping the Suez Canal for suspected mines and other

ordnance that had closed the canal for almost 6 years. In

the spring of 1974, minesweeping operations known as

Operation Nimbus Star were conducted by Helicopter

Mine Countermeasures Squadron Twelve (HM-12) helicopters operating from the Amphibious Assault Ships

USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2) and USS INCHON (LPH 12),

as well as shore bases located in the canal area. These

AMCM forces conducted sweeping operations in a

120-square mile area that extended from Port Said to

Port Suez. There were no mines detonated during this

C-5 ORIGINAL
operation, which was deemed a massive success. While

these sweeping operations were being conducted, there

was a joint team of American, British, French, and Egyptian EOD personnel conducting clearance operations in

approaches to the canal. Over an eight-month period,

these forces cleared away 8,500 pieces of unexploded underwater ordnance, including bombs, shells, mines, etc.

In 1975, RH-53s from HM-12s operated from the USS

INCHON (LPH 12) to sweep five fields of Egyptian- laid,

Soviet-made magnetic/acoustic mines in the northern approaches to Alexandria, Damietta, and the Suez Canal.

Following these casualty-free sweeping operations and

those conducted in Haiphong Harbor, the Navy declared

helicopter minesweeping to be a great success. Admiral

Zumwalt claimed that “the ability of the helicopters to

sweep areas much faster than surface ships and with less

manpower demonstrated that this concept was a winner.”

In actuality, air MCM required the involvement of more

personnel than surface MCM, but that fact was lost on the

naval leaders at that time. The helicopter’s success during

the Haiphong and Gulf of Suez sweeping operations, coupled with Admiral Zumwalt’s policy decisions, unfortunately resulted in another decline of surface MCM forces.

In 1970 there were 64 MCM ships in active service, and

only 9 in 1974.

The next 10 years were relatively uneventful for mine

warfare forces, but in the summer of l984, MCM operations were once again required in the Red Sea and Gulf

of Suez. During July and August of that year, at least 16

minelike explosions were reported by merchant ships.

No ships received any significant damage, although one

or two had dents in the hull. The reported explosions

caused Egypt to ask for minesweeping assistance. The

Gulf of Suez was divided into sectors, and a different

sector was assigned to each participating MCM force.

MCM assets from Egypt, Britain, the United States,

France, Italy, and the Netherlands all participated in

mine clearance operations. The former U.S.S.R. also had

MCM vessels in the area. The United States sent AMCM

assets to participate in this campaign, which was called

Operation Intense Look. During this operation, which

terminated in September 1984, U.S. forces located a

number of minelike objects but did not locate or detonate

any mines in their assigned sector. Several old mines, believed to have been left from either the Six-Day or Yom

Kippur Wars, were found and detonated by allied navies.

Britain recovered and exploited one mine that had been

laid recently and was believed to be part of the mines that

caused the recent explosions.

The mine recovered by the British was determined to

be an export version of an advanced Soviet-made influence bottom mine. A Libyan RO/RO ship is suspected

of laying this and other mines during its transit of the

area, but this could not be proven. The mine was a very

sophisticated magnetic, seismic, and pressure capable

mine, and it is believed it was intended to target a ship

with a very small signature. The mine detonations that

did occur caused no significant damage because they

were detonated while the ship was still too far away to

receive critical damage.

Mines were laid by both sides during the long

Iran-Iraq War, which started in 1980. By 1983, moored

mines laid by both sides had broken loose from their

moorings and drifted into the Persian Gulf, causing a significant threat to oil tankers and other nonbelligerent

ship traffic. This threat was caused by drifting contact

mines that did not become harmless as required under

the Hague Convention (VIII). The problem was intensified in 1987 when Iran laid additional pre-World War I

vintage contact mines in the Persian Gulf. During May

and June of l987, four ships were damaged by mine explosions off Kuwait. A minefield off the entrance to Kuwait City was discovered. The mines in this field were

destroyed by U.S. and Kuwaiti EOD personnel. (The

Kuwaitis had been trained by the Egyptians.) To prevent

further damage, U.S. naval forces began to escort

re-flagged Kuwaiti tankers, as part of Operational Earnest Will, to protect them from surface and air attack.

During the first escort operation, the re-flagged VLCC

M/V BRIDGETON hit a moored mine off Farsi Island.

The mining attack resulted in the decision to deploy

MCM forces from the United States, Britain, France,

Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands to the Persian Gulf

and Gulf of Oman. A total of 25 MCM ships, four

MSBs, six AMCM helicopters, and numerous

EOD/clearance diving units were utilized. The MCM

operation was carried out from July 1987 to at least January l989. At least 26 mines were swept. A total of nine

ships were hit by mine explosions; two ships were

sunk, and USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (FFG 58) suffered extensive damage. Although it was able to take on

a partial load of oil and complete another transit out of

the Persian Gulf, the M/V BRIDGETON had to be

drydocked to repair a huge hull rupture.

A rare case of a successful offensive MCM mission

was conducted when the U.S. Navy captured and destroyed the Iranian ship IRAN AJR as it was laying a

minefield. The MCM effort covered the entire Persian

Gulf from Kuwait to the Strait of Hormuz, a distance of

more than 500 miles and into the Gulf of Oman. Of the

ships hit by mines, four were off Kuwait, two off Farsi

Island, one (USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS) off Sjah

Allum, and two ships in the Gulf of Oman off Khor

Fakhan.

ORIGINAL C-6
Mine countermeasures played a prominent role in the

operations that were conducted in 1990 and 1991 by

joint allied naval forces during Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm. Iraqi forces planted an estimated

1,300 sea mines in the Persian Gulf, ranging from simple

(but deadly) moored contact types designed in the early

1900s to some of the most modern types of magnetic and

acoustic influence mines obtained from the Soviet

Bloc and commercial sources in the free world. U.S.

MCM forces were part of the coalition MCM forces,

which included air, surface and underwater MCM

forces. These MCM forces conducted operations to locate, sweep, and neutralize Iraqi weapons during both

wartime and the postwar period. The heavy damage

sustained by two U.S. warships that struck Iraqi mines,

USS PRINCETON (CG 59) and USS TRIPOLI (LPH

10), generated considerable efforts to improve the U.S.

Navy’s MCM capabilities.

C-7 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

APPENDIX D

U.S. MINES

Note

(DST): Uses a special firing mechanism

with a General Purpose Bomb. QUICKSTRIKE (Q/S): Mk 62 and Mk 63 use

Target Detection Devices (TDDs) with

General Purpose Bombs. Mk 65 uses a TDD

with a case built as a mine body. CAPTOR:

EnCAPsulated TORpedo SEIS: Seismic

(geophone) Sensor SLMM: Submarine

Launched Mobile Mine NWP 3-15

D-1 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

DESIGNATION WEIGHT

IN

POUNDS

FINAL

POSITION

ACTUATION

METHOD

DELIVERY

METHOD

MK 36 DST 500 BOTTOM MAG/ SEIS AIR

MK 40 DST 1,000 BOTTOM MAG/ SEIS AIR

MK 56 2,000 MOORED MAGNETIC AIR

MK 59 750 BOTTOM MAG/ SEIS AIR (USAF)

MK 60 2,000 MOORED ACOUSTIC AIR/SUB

MK 62 500 BOTTOM MAG/ SEIS AIR

MK 63 1,000 BOTTOM MAG/ SEIS AIR

MK 65 2,000 BOTTOM MAG/ SEIS AIR

MK 67 2,000 BOTTOM MAG/ SEIS SU

APPENDIX E

MIW References

E.1 GENERAL

This appendix provides a list (and in some cases a

brief description) of publications that may be useful

for further reference. U.S. references are grouped

into mining interest only, MCM interest only, and

both interest categories. Allied references are listed

together because, in some cases, one volume is mining and the other is MCM (although many are of interest to both). Revision numbers have been omitted

throughout; the reader should ensure the current version of each publication is used. NWP 1-01 and the

NTIC CD-ROM are sources of current edition information. Additionally, most NWPs and some other

publications of interest can be found on the

CD-ROM.

E.2 NAVY PUBLICATIONS FOR MINING

1. NWP 3-15.5 (formerly NWP 27-4), Mining Operations: Sets forth broad principles of mining.

Describes planning factors, organization, execution of mining operations, and actions required

to marshal ordnance and delivery vehicles. Describes functional operation of U.S. mines.

2. NWP 3-15.51 (formerly NWP 27-5), Minefield

Planning: Describes technical information and

philosophy to be considered in planning naval

minefields. Documents Navy minefield planning doctrine.

3. NWP 3-15.52 (formerly NWP 27-6), Mine Mk

60 (CAPTOR) ASW Tactics: Provides detailed

description of procedures and tactics for Mk 60

CAPTOR mine employment.

4. MFPF 00, Minefield Planning Folder Double

Zero: Discusses the Uniform Mine Warfare

Planning System and provides detailed information on the content and availability of minefield

planning folders.

5. OP 2637 Vol. I, Systems Descriptions & Operational Characteristics of U.S. Naval Mines, Standard Naval Mines: This publication provides information on the various user selectable settings

available on current U.S. mines.

6. OP 2637 Vol. II, Mine Setting Guide & Actuation & Damage Data (4 parts in separate covers):

Data tables that the minefield planner uses to select the appropriate mine type for a given scenario, as well as the sensitivity settings that

should be used.

7. OP 2637 Vol III, Systems Descriptions & Operational Characteristics of U.S. Naval Mines:

Provides Secret data to supplement Unclassified/Confidential information in volume I.

8. OP 2637 Vol V, Systems Descriptions & Operational Characteristics of U.S. Naval Mines, Mk

60 Mods 0 and 1

9. DIA Naval Order of Battle (area), Air Order of

Battle (area), and Electronic Order of Battle (area):

Sources (3 separate pubs for each area) of intelligence used in minefield and mine delivery planning. Where available, theater produced Orders of

Battle may be more up to date and should be used.

10. NWP 3-15.53 (formerly NWP 79-0-2), Submarine Special Operations Manual, Mining: Procedures and tactics for mine-laying by submarine.

E.3 PUBLICATIONS FOR MCM PLANNERS

1. NWP 3-15.1 (formerly NWP 27-1), Mine Countermeasures Operations: Overview and discussion of MCM concepts, procedures, and

equipment.

2. NWP 3-15.11 (formerly NWP 27-2), Surface

Mine Countermeasures Operations: Detailed information about SMCM platforms, equipment,

operating procedures, and tactics.

3. NWP 3-15.12 (formerly NWP 27-3), Airborne Mine

Countermeasures Operations: Detailed information

E-1 ORIGINAL
about AMCM helicopters, equipment, operating

procedures, and tactics.

4. NWP 3-15.14 (formerly NWP 27-8), Underwater Mine Countermeasures Operations: Detailed

information about EOD and NSW units, equipment, operating procedures, tactics, and logistic

support.

5. NWP 3-15.13 (formerly NWP 55-8-H53), AMCM

Tactical Information Document (AMCM TACAID):

Quick reference tactical information for AMCM

helicopter operations.

6. NWP 3-15.21 (formerly NWP 27-1-1), MCM

Planning and Procedures (General Inst.): Detailed procedures for calculations necessary in

planning and evaluating an MCM operation.

7. NWP 3-15.22 (formerly NWP 27-1-2), MCM

Planning and Procedures (Data Appendices):

Data on systems needed for planning calculations described in NWP 27-1-1.

8. NWP 3-15.23 (formerly NWP 27-1-3), MCM

Planning and Procedures (Data Supplement):

Secret supplement to data on systems needed for

planning calculations described in NWP 27-1-1.

9. NWP 3-15.3 (formerly NWP 68-1), Passive

Mine Countermeasures Systems and Tactics:

Describes procedures for operation of special

passive systems. In future revision, additional

chapters will include description of passive

countermeasures tactics.

10. NWP 3-15.61 (formerly NWP 65-10), MCM-1

Class Tactical Manual: Tactical reference for

employment of MCM-1 Class ships. Contains

description of ship, equipment, staffing, operation of systems, and tactics. Valuable reference

for other ship types and staffs who operate with

or employ this class ship.

11. NWP 3-15.62 (formerly NWP 65-32), MHC-51

Class Tactical Manual: Tactical reference for

employment of MHC-51 Class ships. Contains

description of ship, equipment, staffing, operation of systems, and tactics. Valuable reference

for other ship types and staffs who operate with

or employ this class ship.

12. NWP 1-10.1 (formerly NWP 12-5-1), Tactical

Action Officer Handbook: Contains quick reference section for threat mines and tactics.

13. COMINEWARCOM MCM Experimental Tactics

Notebook: Part 1, TACNOTES; Part 2,

TACMEMOS; Part 3, Lessons Learned for MCM

operations.

14. OPNAVINST 8950.2, Magnetic Silencing: Establishes CNO requirements for magnetic silencing of ships.

E.4 PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST TO BOTH

MINING AND MCM PLANNERS

1. NAVOCEAN SP xxxx (publication numbers

supplied by port or location) — Mine Warfare

Pilot (MWPs): Environmental data for planning, and executing mining and mine countermeasures operations.

2. COMINEWARCOM MIW Assessment of

NATO/Allied Countries: Provides brief assessment of mining and MCM capabilities of countries friendly to U.S.

3. COMINEWARCOM OPORDER 2000-yr: Prescribes standard operating procedures for forces

operating under COMINEWARCOM control.

4. FXP 5, Amphibious Warfare (AMW) and Mine

Warfare (MIW) Exercises: Describes exercises

designed specifically for MIW forces.

5. Joint Pub 3-15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare: Describes mine warfare

for the joint staff officer, including interfaces with

U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Marines.

6. NWP 1-14 (formerly NWP 9), Commander’s

Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations

7. NWP 3-10 (formerly NWP 39), Naval Coastal

Warfare Doctrine: Describes operations in

coastal zones, including interface with Maritime

Defense Zone Commander

8. CNO Mine Warfare Summary, 1992: General information on mine warfare, including a brief history and summary of mines and countermeasures

systems previously used and in current use.

E.5 ALLIED PUBLICATIONS

1. ATP 6, Vol. I, Mine Warfare Principles

2. ATP 6, Vol. II, MCM Operations Planning and

Evaluation

ORIGINAL E-2
3. ATP 24, Vol. I, MCM Tactics and Execution

4. ATP 24, Vol. II, Mining and Minelaying Planning

and Evaluation Tactics and Execution

5. AAP 8, Naval Control of Shipping Information

on Ports, Authorities and NCS Publications

6. AEODP-1 series, Allied Explosive Ordnance

Disposal Publication, Navy

7. AHP 1, Allied Navigation Information in Time

of War “Q” System

8. AHP 1 NATO Supp 1, NATO Supplement to

Allied “Q” Message System

9. AHP 7 Vol 1, 2, 3, 4, & 6, Dormant “Q” Message Publication (“Z, B, J, C, K” Zone): Listing

of Allied force Q-routes, each volume for a different geographic area.

10. AHP 7 US Supp Vol 1, Dormant “Q” Message

Publication, Q-Routes of USN Interest (Eastern

Pacific): Listing of U.S. Q-Routes for west

coast and Hawaii. East coast volume has not

been published. Those routes were last listed in

an unofficial supplement published by

COMINEWARCOM and titled US Supp to

AHP 7 Vol 3.

11. AMP 3, Vol. 1, NATO MCM Vehicles and

Equipment

12. AMP 3, Vol. 2, NATO Mine Delivery Systems

13. AMP 4, Degaussing & Acoustic Ranging Information Concerning NATO Minesweepers and

Minehunters

14. AMP 7, Helicopter Mine Countermeasures

Manual

15. AMP 11, Vol. 3, Mine Warfare Pilot (Denmark);

Vol 5 Pt 2, Mine Warfare Pilot (Western Baltic);

Vol 8, Mine Warfare Pilot (Turkey); Vol 12 Pt

D, Mine Warfare Pilot (North & Eastern Coast

of Scotland & England); Vol 13 Pt 1, Mine Warfare Pilot (Norfolk, VA Approaches)

16. AMP 13, Vol. 1, Intro. & Definition of Terms

for NATO Sea Mines; Vol. 2, Characteristics of

NATO Sea Mines; Vol. 3, Characteristics of

NATO Exercise and Training Mines

17. AMP 14, Protection of Vessels from Electromagnetic Mines (or Electromagnetic Silencing)

18. APP 4, Vol. 1, Allied Maritime Structured Messages; Vol. 2, Allied Maritime Formatted Messages

19. ATP 1, Vol. I, Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures: Chapter on mine warfare

includes general protection procedures

20. ATP 1, Vol II., Allied Maritime Tactical Signal

and Maneuvering Book: Source for several messages required of MCM forces; see MW section.

21. ATP 2, Vol. 1, Allied Naval Control of Shipping

Manual; Vol. 2, Allied Naval Control of

Shipping, Guide to Masters; Supp 1, Allied Naval Control of Shipping Manual, Merchant Ship

Reporting and Control (MERCO) System

22. AXP 5 MW SUPP, Mine Warfare Supplement

to NATO Experimental Tactics & Amplifying

Tactical Instructions

E.6 COMMERCIAL PUBLICATIONS

1. “Damn the Torpedoes”: A Short History of

U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-

1991: Tamara Moser Melia, Naval Historical

Center. Excellent and current history of naval

mine warfare operations written by U.S. naval

historian with cooperation of MCM forces.

2. “Weapons That Wait”: Mine Warfare in the U.S.

Navy: Gregory K. Hartmann, Naval Institute

Press. (Older but still valuable history of mine

warfare.)

E.7 INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS

1. ONI TA #015-yr, MCM Systems Threat

Assessment

2. ONI TA #019-yr, Mine Systems Threat

Assessment

3. DST 1260H-061-yr, Naval Weapons Systems,

European Communist Countries

4. DST 1260S-110-yr, Mine Warfare Capabilities:

Selected Eastern European Countries

E-3 ORIGINAL
5. DST 1260S-120-yr, Naval Mines and MCM

(Selected Free World & Third World Countries)

6. DST 1260H-071-yr, Naval Mine Technical

Characteristics Handbook

7. ONI 2660H-002-yr, Naval Mine Recognition

Guide

8. COMINEWARCOM Shipboard Intelligence

Officer Handbook (CMWC ships/staff only)

9. COMINEWARCOM INST C3820.1 Predeployment Intelligence Support Collection

and Reporting

ORIGINAL E-4
INDEX

A

Actuation

logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

mines ..................... 2-11

Actuator probability ............... 2-11

Air delivery.................... 2-15

Allied/Navy mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

Allied publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-2

Alphabetical termilog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-3

Amphibious warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Antisweeper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

Arm delay ................... 1-8, 2-6

B

Bottom conditions ................ 2-18

Bubble migration ................. 2-28

C

Camouflage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Check ranging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Coating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Computer programs ............... 2-14

Concepts general. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

Countermeasure

planning .................... 3-36

staff ...................... 3-27

Countermeasures

amphibious mines ............... 3-21

combined mine ................ 3-16

command center................ 3-35

deployment .................. 3-23

operations ................... 3-16

riverine mines ................. 3-22

submarine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

submarine mines................ 3-22

underwater mines ............... 3-25

Currents...................... 2-17

D

Definitions key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

Degaussing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Delivery

aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

submarine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Diver evaluation unit ............... 2-11

Drifting mine ................. 2-3, 4-2

E

Energy transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

Environmental

impact ..................... 2-17

interface .................... 3-28

F

Firing sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Fleet exercises .................. 1-10

G

Gas bubble behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

H

Hague convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Helicopter visual search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

Hull whipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

I

Initial shock wave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

K

Kingfisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

L

Law enforcement operations ........... 1-10

M

Magnetic environment .............. 2-19

Marine life .................... 2-17

Masking techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

MCM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

Minelaying assets ................ 2-15

Mine

advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

brute force ................ A-2, 3-15

countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Index-1 ORIGINAL

Page

No.

Page

No.
exploration .................. 3-15

future potential ................ 2-11

operations ................... 2-12

preparation................... 2-11

storage ..................... 2-11

Mine hunting

procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

transportation ................. 2-11

Mine warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Minefield

planning .................... 2-12

types...................... 2-12

Minesweeping

magnetic.................... 3-15

mechanical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

Mining

history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

protective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-2

MIW

references. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1

warfare program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

Moored mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Movement forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

N

NATO doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

NATO/ROE ................... 1-12

Naval Doctrine Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . B-5

Naval research

lab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-4

office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-4

Naval reserve forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Non-NATO operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

O

Offensive mine countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . 3-1

P

Plume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

PMO magnetic silencing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

Preplanned responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Q

Quikestrike mines ................ 2-10

R

Radar mine detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Readiness certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3

Rules of engagement (ROE) ........... 1-11

S

Salvage forces .................. 1-10

Sea ice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17

Seawater temp .................. 2-17

Self protection

acoustic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

seismic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Ship aquisition program office . . . . . . . . . . B-2

Ship counter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

SPAWARSYSCOM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-2

Special operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Strike

assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Submarine delivery ................ 2-16

Support operation

EOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3

training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3

Support organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Surface delivery ................. 2-16

Swells and seas .................. 2-17

T

Threat location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

Tides ....................... 2-17

Training mines .................. 2-11

U

U.S. Mines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1

W

Warfare

center underwater. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-4

command and control ............. 1-10

organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

Water

position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

transparency .................. 2-17

ORIGINAL Index-2

Page

No.

Page

No.
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

LEP-1 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

Effective Pages Page Numbers

Original

Original

Original

Original

Original

Original

Original

Original

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Original

Original

Original

Original

Original

Original

1 (Reverse Blank)

3 (Reverse Blank)

5 (Reverse Blank)

7 thru 19 (Reverse Blank)

21 thru 23 (Reverse Blank)

1-1 thru 1-12

2-1 thru 2-19 (Reverse Blank)

3-1 thru 3-37 (Reverse Blank)

4-1 thru 4-8

A-1 thru A-15 (Reverse Blank)

B-1 thru B-5 (Reverse Blank)

C-1 thru C-7 (Reverse Blank)

D-1 (Reverse Blank)

E-1 thru E-4

Index-1, Index-2

LEP-1 (Reverse Blank)


NWP 3-15

MCWP 3-3.1.2