IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-1534

Filed April 18, 2018

THERESA SEEBERGER,

Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

vs.

DAVENPORT CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION,

Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

and

MICHELLE SCHREURS,

Intervenor-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert, 

Judge.

The Davenport Civil Rights Commission and Michelle Schreurs appeal and 

Theresa Seeberger cross-appeals a district court ruling on Seeberger’s petition for 

judicial review. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED 

ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON CROSS-APPEAL. 

Latrice L. Lacey, Davenport, for appellant Davenport Civil Rights 

Commission.

Dorothy A. O’Brien of O’Brien and Marquard, P.L.C., Davenport, for 

appellant Michelle Schreurs. 

Randall D. Armentrout and Katie L. Graham of Nyemaster Goode, P.C., 

Des Moines, for appellee.

Heard by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.

The Davenport Civil Rights Commission (Commission) and Michelle 

Schreurs appeal a district court ruling on Theresa Seeberger’s petition for judicial 

review following an agency determination of Schreurs’s housing-discrimination 

complaint. The Commission contends the district court erred in concluding 

Schreurs’s complaint was not filed under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and 

the Davenport Municipal Code (2014) does not authorize an award of attorney fees 

in the context of discriminatory housing practices. Schreurs argues the district 

court erred in concluding the municipal code and FHA do not entitle her to an award 

of attorney fees incurred during administrative proceedings and abused its 

discretion in refusing to award her attorney fees in the judicial-review proceeding. 

Theresa Seeberger cross-appeals the same ruling. She asserts that 

holding her liable for her discriminatory statements violates the First Amendment 

to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Iowa Constitution 

because the statements she made amount to protected speech. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings 

Seeberger purchased a three-bedroom residential property in Davenport, 

Iowa in 2011. After living in the residence for approximately one year, Seeberger 

married in October 2012 and moved into her spouse’s home. Seeberger owned 

four cats at this time, but her spouse was allergic to them. Seeberger was not 

willing to give up her house or her cats, so she decided to retain ownership of the 

home and rent the rooms to tenants. After she began renting the property to 

tenants, she visited the property nearly every day to feed her cats. She also kept 

much of her clothing and many of her furnishings in the home. In or about August 
3

2013, Schreurs and her daughter moved into the property as tenants; the tenancy 

was not memorialized in a written agreement. At that time, there were also two 

other tenants residing in the home. Also around that time, Seeberger separated 

from her spouse and moved to a nearby apartment, where she lived until the end 

of August 2014. By mid-2014, Schreurs and her daughter were the only tenants 

in the home. Seeberger testified that, overall, Schreurs and her daughter were 

good tenants. 

On or about September 16, 2014, Seeberger visited the home and 

discovered a bottle of prenatal vitamins on the kitchen counter. Seeberger took a 

photograph of the bottle, text messaged it to Schreurs, and questioned, 

“Something I should know about?” The following day, Seeberger returned to the 

home and asked Schreurs if she had received the text message. When Schreurs 

responded in the negative, Seeberger showed her the photograph of the prenatal 

vitamins. Schreurs excitedly advised Seeberger her daughter, around fifteen years 

old at the time, was pregnant. Seeberger, after contemplating the situation for 

“thirty seconds to a minute,” angrily advised Schreurs, “You guys will have to be 

out in thirty days.” Seeberger then stated, “You don’t pay rent on time the way it 

is, now you’re bringing another person into the mix.” Seeberger also stated “she’s 

taking prenatal vitamins, . . . . obviously you’re going to keep the baby.” Seeberger 

testified she was disappointed with Schreurs for her irresponsibility in allowing her 

young daughter to become pregnant. Seeberger also asserted she terminated the 

tenancy because she wanted her house back to herself. Seeberger testified she 

began drafting a notice to terminate Schreurs’s tenancy on September 15, but she 

did not tender the notice to Schreurs until after her discovery of the prenatal 
4

vitamins. In her interview with the Commission, however, she stated she did not 

draft this notice until September 18. This notice advised Schreurs she needed to 

vacate the property by October 19. Seeberger subsequently advised Schreurs 

she would start staying at the home on September 26. 

On October 1, Seeberger, via text message, asked Schreurs whether one 

of her ex-boyfriends was the father of her grandchild-to-be. Schreurs came to the 

home with her boyfriend. At this time, Seeberger, who was at the home, confronted 

Schreurs, repeating her inquiry. This exchange upset Schreurs. Schreurs and her 

daughter were completely moved out of the home by October 5. After Schreurs 

and her daughter’s eviction, Seeberger allowed another tenant to live in the home. 

In November 2014, Schreurs filed a housing-discrimination complaint with 

the Commission alleging Seeberger discriminated against her on the basis of her 

familial status by making discriminatory statements. The complaint was amended 

in February 2015 and again in March. Her complaint and amended complaints 

noted they were filed pursuant to Davenport Municipal Code section 2.58.305(C) 

and Section 804(c) of the FHA.1 Following its investigation, the Commission 

issued a probable cause finding of discrimination. 

The matter proceeded to a public hearing before an administrative law judge 

(ALJ) in November. The ALJ concluded, with regard to Seeberger’s statements 

on September 16 and 17, that “[a]n ordinary listener listening to [her] statements 

would find her statements discriminatory on the basis of familial status” and 

“Seeberger engaged in a discriminatory housing practice by making the 

 

1 Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). 
5

statements.” The ALJ awarded Schreurs $35,000.00 in emotional-distress 

damages and imposed a civil penalty in the amount of $10,000.00. The ALJ 

subsequently awarded Schreurs $23,881.80 in costs and attorney fees pursuant 

to Davenport Municipal Code section 2.58.350(G).2 The Commission approved 

the ALJ’s decision in its entirety, with the exception of the award of damages, which 

it reduced to $17,500.00. 

In February 2016, Seeberger filed a petition for judicial review. In her 

subsequent brief in support of her petition, Seeberger argued, among other things, 

that the agency action was unconstitutional because it violated her freedom-ofspeech rights and the Davenport Municipal Code does not provide for an award of 

attorney fees prior to judicial review. In their briefings, Schreurs and the 

Commission argued Seeberger’s statements were not protected speech and 

Schreurs was entitled to attorney fees under municipal code section 

2.58.175(A)(8)3 or, in the alternative, the FHA. 

The district court entered a written ruling in July 2016. The court concluded 

(1) Seeberger’s discriminatory statements amounted to commercial speech, their 

utterance was illegal, and they were therefore not protected by the First 

Amendment and (2) Davenport Municipal Code section 2.58.175(A)(8) “does not 

clearly authorize an award of attorney fees in the context of a discriminatory 

housing practice.” The court therefore vacated the attorney fee award. 

 

2 This section, entitled “Fair Housing – Judicial Review,” provides: “The [ALJ] or the court 

may at its discretion allow the prevailing party, other than the commission, reasonable 

attorney fees and costs resulting from any administrative proceeding brought under this 

section, any court proceeding arising therefrom, or any civil action.” 

3 Schreurs and the Commission did not argue on judicial review that Schreurs was entitled 

to fees under the municipal code provision the ALJ actually awarded them, section

2.58.350(G). 
6

Schreurs moved for additional findings. In her motion, she requested the 

court to reconsider her entitlement to attorney fees under the municipal code and 

expand its ruling to consider her argument that she was also entitled to attorney 

fees under the FHA. The Commission also moved for additional findings and 

requested the court to consider Schreurs’s entitlement to attorney fees under 

Davenport Municipal Code section 2.58.350(G) and the FHA. Thereafter, pursuant 

to Davenport Municipal Code sections 2.58.175(A)(8) and 2.58.350(G) and the 

FHA, Schreurs requested an award of attorney fees incurred in the judicial-review 

proceeding. 

Following a hearing, the district court denied all pending motions. With 

regard to Schreurs’s entitlement to attorney fees under the FHA, the court ruled 

“the mere fact that the . . . complaint was cross-filed with the federal authorities 

does not expand the [Commission’s] authority to award attorney fees beyond what 

is allowed by the city ordinance” and fees under the FHA “were unavailable to 

[Schreurs] in her state court proceeding.” The court further concluded that the 

issue of Schreurs’s entitlement to fees under municipal code section 2.58.350(G) 

was waived because the parties “chose not to argue this statutory basis for any 

claim for fees, relying instead entirely on § 2.58.175[(A)](8).” The court declined 

to reconsider its determination as to Schreurs’s entitlement to fees under section 

2.58.175(A)(8). Finally, the court declined both Seeberger and Schreurs’s 

requests for attorney fees on judicial review. As noted, all parties appeal. 

II. Standards of Review

We review constitutional claims under the First Amendment de novo. See 

Mitchell Cty. v. Zimmerman, 810 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2012). The sole question on 
7

appellate review of a district court’s judicial review of an agency determination is 

whether the district court correctly applied the law. See Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil 

Rights Comm’n, 318 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Iowa 1982). “To the extent we are asked 

to engage in statutory interpretation, our review is for correction of errors at law.” 

DuTrac Cmty. Credit Union v. Hefel, 893 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Iowa 2017). Review 

of the district court’s decision to not award attorney fees in the district court 

proceeding is for an abuse of discretion. See Fennelly v. A-1 Mach. & Tool Co., 

728 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Iowa 2006). 

III. Freedom of Speech

Seeberger lodges an as-applied challenge to Davenport Municipal Code 

section 2.58.305(C), which provides it shall be unlawful to:

Make, print, or publish, or cause to be made printed or published any 

notice, statement or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental 

of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or 

discrimination based on . . . familial status . . . or an intention to 

make any such preference, limitation or discrimination. 

Seeberger argues her statements are not subject to the commercial-speech 

doctrine because they were inextricably intertwined with fully-protected speech or, 

in the alternative, if her statements amount to commercial speech, then the 

statements are still protected speech because they relate to a lawful activity. 

The United States Supreme Court has recognized a “distinction between 

speech [involving] a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally 

subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.” Cent. Hudson 

Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (quoting 

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)). These other 

varieties of speech generally include communications concerning “politics, 
8

nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.” See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. 

for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013) (quoting W.V. State Bd. of 

Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). “The Constitution . . . accords a 

lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed 

speech.” Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. However, where some commercial 

speech and some protected speech are “inextricably intertwined” as “component 

parts of a single speech,” courts “cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test 

to one phrase and another test to another phrase.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind 

of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988). Under such circumstances, the test for 

fully-protected speech is applicable. Id. 

Seeberger does not contest that her statements were discriminatory and 

related to a commercial transaction. Instead, she contends her discriminatory, 

commercial statements to Schreurs were inextricably intertwined with fullyprotected speech that she thought Schreurs was an irresponsible parent. 

Seeberger’s first statement—by text message, and later in person—was, 

“Something I should know about?” The obvious context of the question was based 

on Seeberger’s status as a landlord and Schreurs’s status as a tenant. The 

exchange between them that followed cements the conclusion that all of 

Seeberger’s remarks were in the context of their relationship as landlord and 

tenant. Although Seeberger also made reference to a history of Schreurs paying 

rent late, the context makes clear Schreurs’s changing familial status was the basis 

for the termination of the tenancy. While Seeberger may hold political, religious,

or other beliefs the expression of which might be protected in some contexts, the 
9

statements made to Schreurs were plainly directed at telling Schreurs her tenancy 

was being terminated because of her familial status. 

Seeberger testified she was disappointed with Schreurs for her 

irresponsibility in allowing her young daughter to become pregnant.4 Seeberger’s 

statements, on their face, do not indicate that her speech was non-commercial in 

nature or was otherwise based on a matter of religion, ideology, or philosophy, or 

on a position concerning responsible parenting. Rather, her September 17 

statements purely amounted to her pronouncement to Schreurs that her familial

status was the primary basis for terminating Schreurs’s tenancy. We conclude 

Seeberger’s statements were not inextricably intertwined with any form of fullyprotected speech. Seeberger’s concession that the statements terminating the 

tenancy were commercial in nature, together with our conclusion that such 

statements were not inextricably intertwined with protected speech, necessitate 

the application of the commercial-speech analysis laid out in Central Hudson. 

For commercial speech to be protected by the First Amendment, “it at least 

must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.” Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 

566.5 Our only concern in this case is whether the statement concerned a lawful 

activity. Seeberger concedes that her statements were in violation of Davenport 

Municipal Code section 2.58.305(C), which prohibits all landlords from making 

discriminatory statements in relation to the rental of a dwelling. She argues, 

 

4 Our analysis is based on the words spoken to Schreurs in the course of Seeberger’s 

termination of the tenancy, and not on Seeberger’s later testimonial characterizations.

5

“The four parts of the Central Hudson test are not entirely discrete. All are important 

and, to a certain extent, interrelated: Each raises a relevant question that may not be 

dispositive to the First Amendment inquiry, but the answer to which may inform a judgment 

concerning the other three.” Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 

527 U.S. 173, 183–84 (1999).
10

however, because she owned fewer than four single-family homes, the actual 

termination of Schreurs’s tenancy on the basis of her familial status was not illegal 

and, as such, the statement concerned a lawful activity. See Davenport, Iowa 

Mun. Code § 2.58.310(A)(1)(a) (“Nothing in subsection 2.58.305 of this Chapter 

other than subsection 2.58.305(C) shall apply to . . . [a]ny single-family house sold 

or rented by an owner provided that . . . [t]he private individual owner does not own 

more than three (3) such single-family houses at any one time.” (emphasis 

added)). For the purposes of Seeberger’s as-applied challenge, we will assume 

without deciding that her statements concerned a lawful activity. 

The next step in the Central Hudson test “asks whether the asserted 

governmental interest served by the speech restriction is substantial.” Greater 

New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc., 527 U.S. at 185. The Commission argues the 

interest in prohibiting discriminatory statements in housing is substantial. The Iowa 

Supreme Court has stated the government has a substantial interest in preventing 

discrimination in employment. Baker v. City of Iowa City, 867 N.W.2d 44, 54 (Iowa 

2015). We conclude the government’s interest in preventing discriminatory 

statements in housing is at least equally substantial to its interest in preventing 

discrimination in employment. 

Finally, we are required to determine if the ordinance advances the 

objective of preventing discriminatory statements in housing and, if so, whether it 

is more extensive than necessary. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The ordinance 

clearly advances the objective of preventing the making of discriminatory 

statements in housing. This is so even though the ordinance does not effectually 

prohibit discrete discrimination in all housing transactions. As applied in this case, 
11

the ordinance simply renders it unlawful to make any statement with respect to the 

“rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination 

based on” familial status “or an intention to make any such preference, limitation 

or discrimination.” Davenport, Iowa Mun. Code § 2.58.305(C). As Seeberger 

correctly points out, landlords owning no more than three single-family homes may 

legally discriminate in housing decisions on the basis of familial status, so long as 

they do not make a statement to that effect. Id. §§ 2.58.305(C), .310(A)(1)(a). The 

challenged ordinance merely prohibits landlords from subjecting prospective 

tenants to the stigmas associated with knowingly being discriminated against. For 

these reasons, we find the ordinance is not more extensive than necessary to 

serve the substantial interest of preventing discriminatory statements in housing 

transactions.

As such, we conclude the ordinance is not an unconstitutional infringement 

upon Seeberger’s freedom-of-speech rights. We therefore affirm the district 

court’s decision to uphold Seeberger’s liability under the ordinance. 

IV. Attorney Fees

A. Administrative Proceedings

Schreurs and the Commission contend Schreurs was entitled to attorney 

fees incurred in the administrative proceeding under Davenport Municipal Code 

sections 2.58.175(A)(8) and 2.58.350(G) or, in the alternative, the FHA. The 

district court considered the argument under section 2.58.350(G) waived and 

concluded fees under the FHA were unavailable. The court also concluded section 

2.58.175(A)(8) “does not clearly authorize an award of attorney fees in the context 

of a discriminatory housing practice.” The court reasoned section 2.58.175, 
12

entitled “Remedial Action,” only concerns unfair or discriminatory practices in areas 

other than housing. 

Chapter 258 of the municipal code is set out in three divisions: (1) general 

provisions, (2) unfair practices, and (3) fair housing. We first focus on division two, 

unfair practices, which is comprised of sections 2.58.100 through 2.58.190. 

Section 2.58.175 falls within division two. The first four sections concern unfair 

practices in employment, accommodations or services, credit, education, and 

aiding or abetting. See id. §§ 2.58.100, .110, .120, .125, .130. The next section 

relates to retaliation, and specifically includes housing matters, as does the 

following section, which concerns complaint procedures. Id. §§ 2.58.140, .150. 

The next two sections govern conciliation and public hearing; neither section 

excludes housing complaints, and our review of the record indicates both sections 

applied in this case. See id. §§ 2.58.160, .170. The public hearing provision 

provides that, if 

the hearing officer determines that the respondent has engaged in a 

discriminatory or unfair practice, the hearing officer shall . . . issue an 

order in writing requiring the respondent . . . to take the necessary 

remedial action as in the judgment the hearing officer will effectuate 

the purposes of this chapter.

Id. § 2.58.170(J) (emphasis added). Thereafter, the Commission reviews the 

decision and, if in agreement with the hearing officer, “shall issue an order requiring 

the respondent . . . to take necessary remedial action as in the judgment of the 

commission will carry out the purposes of this chapter.” Id. § 2.58.170(L) 

(emphasis added). 

Next is the remedial action provision, which provides, “The remedial action

ordered by the Commission may include . . . [p]ayment to the complainant of . . . 
13

reasonable attorney fees [and] payment of costs of hearing.” Id. § 2.58.175(A)(8)–

(9). Another provision in the remedial action section allows the Commission to 

order, obviously in relation to housing cases, the “[s]ale, exchange, lease, rental, 

assignment or sublease of real property to an individual.” Id. § 2.58.175(A)(4). 

The section also provides specific remedial actions in relation to employment, 

credit, education, and public accommodations. Id. § 2.58.175(A)(1), (2), (3), (5), 

(7). The final two sections of division two govern judicial review and court 

enforcement. See id. §§ 2.58.180, .190. Again, housing complaints are not 

specifically exempted from these provisions. 

On the other hand, division three of chapter 258, governing fair housing,

includes a provision that, “[i]f the administrative law judge finds that a respondent 

has engaged in or is about to engage in a discriminatory housing practice, such 

administrative law judge shall promptly issue an order for such relief as may be 

appropriate, which may include actual damages and injunctive or other equitable 

relief.” Id. § 2.58.340(F)(3) (emphasis added). 

Despite these dual and differing modes for relief, based on the plain 

language and statutory scheme of the ordinance, we conclude the remedial action 

provision in division two, section 2.58.175, encompasses all areas of 

discrimination, including housing. Because the section provides specific remedies 

for each of the differing areas, we conclude the overall remedies included in 

subsections 8 and 9 cover all of those differing areas. We therefore reverse the 

district court’s determination that Schreurs was not entitled to the attorney fees 

incurred in the administrative proceeding. Because the district court noted its 

“disposition render[ed] moot [Seeberger’s] alternative argument that the fee award 
14

was excessive,” we remand the case to the district court to determine whether the 

attorney-fee award was excessive. See De Stefano v. Apartments Downtown, 

Inc., 879 N.W.2d 155, 191 (Iowa 2016). This disposition makes it unnecessary for 

us to decide whether Schreurs was entitled to attorney fees under 2.58.350(G) or, 

in the alternative, the FHA. 

B. Judicial-Review Proceeding

Finally, Schreurs argues the district court abused its discretion in refusing 

to award her attorney fees in the judicial-review proceeding. Pursuant to 

Davenport Municipal Code section 2.58.350(G), “the court may at its discretion 

allow the prevailing party . . . reasonable attorney fees and costs resulting from” a 

judicial-review proceeding. (Emphasis added.) “[F]ee provisions using the word 

‘may’ place the decision about whether to award any attorney fees within the sound 

discretion of the district court.” Lee v. State, 874 N.W.2d 631, 644 (Iowa 2016). 

Similar to the FHA, an award of attorney fees in a judicial-review proceeding under 

the Davenport Municipal code is not mandatory. See id. at 644–45 (noting that 

when a “fee provision employs the word ‘shall’ instead of the word ‘may,’ it requires

the district court to award attorney fees”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3612(p). Because 

the ordinance renders any award of attorney fees discretionary, “[r]eversal is 

warranted only when the court rests its discretionary ruling on grounds that are 

clearly unreasonable or untenable.” GreatAmerica Leasing Corp. v. Cool Comfort 

Air Conditioning & Refrigeration, Inc., 691 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Iowa 2005) (quoting 

Gabelmann v. NFO, Inc., 606 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 2000)). 

In its ruling on attorney fees, the district court noted its prior affirmance of 

the determination concerning Seeberger’s liability, but also its reversal of the 
15

Commission’s award of damages and remand for reconsideration. With this 

dichotomy in mind, the district court determined neither party was the “prevailing 

party” in the judicial-review proceeding and therefore entitled to attorney fees. We 

do not find this ground for denying an award of attorney fees clearly unreasonable 

or untenable. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Schreurs’s request 

for attorney fees in the judicial-review proceeding. 

V. Conclusion

In sum, we conclude the challenged ordinance is not an unconstitutional 

infringement upon Seeberger’s freedom-of-speech rights and affirm the agency 

and district court’s findings of liability. We reverse the district court’s determination 

that Schreurs was not entitled to the attorney fees incurred in the administrative 

proceeding and remand the matter to the district court to consider whether the 

attorney-fee award was excessive. We affirm the district court’s denial of 

Schreurs’s request for attorney fees in the judicial-review proceeding. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED ON 

APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON CROSS APPEAL.