Interim Decision #3204 

MATTER OF H-M- et aL 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-28746032 

A-28746037 

A-28746038 

Decided by Board August 11, 1993 

(1) Comparing Acewicz v. United States INS, 984 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1993), with 

Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992), the Board concluded that it 

may take administrative notice of the change in conditions of a country in those cases 

arising within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit when an alien acknowledges this Board's authority to do so and discusses the 

changed circumstances on appeal. 

(2) Where an asylum applicant focuses his application on past persecution, the 

requirement to show that there is little likelihood of future persecution can be satisfied 

by taking administrative notice of the change in circumstances in the country at issue. 

(3) Where an asylum applicant violates currency laws which a government has a 

legitimate right to enforce, and he suffers harsh treatment as a result, the applicant 

must show that the government in question has punished him "on account or' his 

political opinion and not for the violation of the currency laws. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 

502 U.S. 478 (1992), followed. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Sec. 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)]—Entered without inspection 

(all respondents) 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: Thomas L Hiester, Esquire 

6767 Mission Street 

Daly City, California 94014 

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vacca, and Heilman, Board Members 

The respondents appeal the decision of the immigration judge, 

dated April 20, 1989, denying their applications for asylum under 

section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(a) (1988), and withholding of deportation under section 243(h) 

of the Act, S U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988). The immigration judge had 

found the respondents deportable as charged, but granted them the 

privilege of voluntary departure. The appeal will be dismissed. 

The respondents, three family members, are natives and citizens of 

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Interim Decision #3204 

Nicaragua who entered the United States without inspection on July 

12, 1986. As a result, on December 21, 1988, the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of 

Hearing (Form I-221) charging them with deportability for their entry 

without inspection. 

At their deportation hearing, the respondents admitted the truth of 

the allegations contained in the Order to Show Cause and conceded 

their deportability as charged. The immigration judge noted that the 

respondents' deportability had been established by clear, unequivocal, 

and convincing evidence, as required. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 

276 (1966); see also 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a) (1993). The respondents did 

not raise any issues regarding their deportability on appeal; therefore, 

it is not an issue before us. 

The immigration judge afforded the respondents an opportunity to 

apply for asylum, which was automatically considered as a request for 

withholding of deportation. The primary respondent filed a Request 

for Asylum in the United States (Form 1-589), upon which the 

remaining two respondents, his children, also base their asylum 

claims.' The respondent wrote in his application that he feared that if 

returned to Nicaragua he would be killed or imprisoned based upon 

his political opinion. In addition to his asylum application, the 

respondent included a statement and three translations of articles from 

a Nicaraguan newspaper. In his statement, the respondent wrote that 

he had been working as a peddler in his country when, in July 1980, he 

was arrested by the Sandinista government for selling foreign currency. 

The three articles specifically mention the respondent in an arrest that 

occurred on December 22, 1980, for selling and trading gold without 

authorization from the Sandinista government. The third article, dated 

January 20, 1981, indicates that for his role, the respondent was 

sentenced to 15 months' confinement and the confiscation of his 

vehicles. 

During the hearing concerning his asylum application, the respondent submitted his declaration and general background information. 

The general background information does not mention the respondent's name at all. In addition to his own testimony, the respondent 

offered the testimony of his son. The respondent bases his claim of 

asylum and withholding of deportation upon arrests or interrogations 

that occurred on July 12, 1980, and in November 1980, December 

1985, and June 1986. 

The record reflects that the respondent was first arrested in July 

The references to the "primary respondent" or "respondent" are interchangeable and 

as used in the singular incorporate the applications for asylum and withholding of 

deportation from all the respondents. 

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1980. He indicated that he was working as an independent stockbroker 

and as a speculator. The respondent testified and wrote in his 

declaration that he was arrested for a violation of Nicaraguan currency 

laws. He was questioned by the authorities about his activities and 

they wanted to know how he was able to obtain so many dollars. The 

respondent conceded that there were laws regulating the transfer of 

currency in Nicaragua. He testified that he was subjected to harsh 

treatment, beaten, and threatened after his arrest. The respondent was 

held in jail fof 12 days and then released. He admitted in his 

declaration that he was specifically informed that the buying and 

selling of foreign currency was against Nicaraguan law, and that if he 

violated it once more, he would go to jail again. One of the conditions 

of his release was to ask forgiveness for his crimes from the Nicaraguan 

people in a television broadcast. 

Contrary to the admonitions that he received from the Sandinista 

government, the respondent continued to work as a speculator, 

transferring gold and other currency without the permission of the 

government. The respondent was again arrested in November 1980 for 

his actions. The authorities questioned the respondent, desiring to find 

out where he was getting gold, United States currency, and other 

metals and international currencies. The respondent stated that his 

spouse was questioned for an 8-hour period during this time frame. 2 

 As indicated by the mews articles, the respondent was sentenced to 15 

months' confinement. The respondent indicated that while serving his 

sentence, he was maltreated and harassed. Through the efforts of his 

attorney, however, the respondent obtained an early release from 

prison on November 26, 1981. 

After his release, the respondent obtained employment with a 

construction company. He further refused to participate in any of the 

Sandinista Defense Committee ("CDS") activities. As a result of his 

refusal, the Sandinistas denied him a food ration card. The respondent 

indicated that he was forced to pay a higher price for food on the black 

market. In March 1982, the respondent turned to buying and selling 

merchandise on the black market. The respondent conceded in his 

declaration that he was buying and selling without a license or 

authority from the Ministry of Commerce. 

The respondent's next arrest occurred on December 5, 1985. The 

respondent was taken for interrogation regarding a suitcase which 

allegedly contained money and items stolen from the Department of 

2The respondent wrote in his declaration that his son was also "arrested" in 

December 1980. He was purportedly told that if he did not answer their questions, his 

son would be taken away.. The respondent indicated that although he refused to answer 

their questions, his son was released that same day. 

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Security. The authorities believed that someone had stolen the items 

and then transferred them to another individual, who in turn was 

suspected of giving them to the respondent. The respondent was 

apparently detained while the investigation continued. On December 

15, 1985, the respondent hired an attorney. On April 20, 1986, with 

the assistance of the attorney, the respondent was released based upon 

a lack of evidence implicating him in the alleged crime. After his 

release, the respondent was told that he would be watched, and if he 

committed an offense, he would be arrested. 

On June 7, 1986, the respondent was arrested and his home was 

searched. The respondent was questioned as to why he desired to go to 

Mexico and why was he taking his two children. The respondent was 

then confined for 8 days while the authorities conducted an investigation. At the completion of the investigation, the respondent was 

released without being criminally charged. Shortly thereafter, he fled 

with his two children to the United States. He wrote in his asylum 

application that he left Nicaragua so that he would not have any 

further problems with the government and his children could avoid 

military service. 

The immigration judge denied the respondents' applications for 

asylum and withholding of deportation which were based upon the 

primary respondent's claims of persecution. He concluded that the 

respondent had shown that he had been incarcerated on at least two 

occasions for the violation of Nicaraguan currency laws and regulations. He found that the respondent was ill-treated during his 

incarcerations, but that the record did not reflect that it was due to his 

political opinions. He determined that it was due instead to the general 

lack of due process and the prison conditions in Nicaragua. The 

immigration judge concluded that any past harm or fear of future 

harm was not based upon the respondent's political opinion or his 

religious beliefs? rather any fear was due to the respondent's criminal 

activities. He denied both asylum and withholding of deportation to 

all the respondents on this basis. The immigration judge then 

determined that they did not demonstrate that they would merit 

asylum in the exercise of discretion even if otherwise eligible. 

On appeal, the respondents first state in their Notice of Appeal 

(Form EOIR-26) that the immigration judge abused his discretion 

when he denied their applications for asylum and withholding of 

deportation. They claim that the immigration judge failed to consider 

3The respondent mentions in several places that he was and is a member of the 

Jehovah's Church. However, he does not claim anywhere that he has suffered or 

currently fears any persecution on account of his religion. Therefore, it is not an issue 

before us. 

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Interim Decision #3204 

that the loss of food and employment constituted persecution, citing 

Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969). In the appellate brief filed 

with this Board on May 11, 1990, the respondents state the following: 

In view of recent possible changes in Nicaragua, the argument here will be presented 

that in terms of Chen, which held as follows. Past persecution, as well as a wellfounded fear of future persecution, creates statutory eligibility for asylum. Past 

persecution also creates a rebuttable presumption of future persecution. The 

likelihood of future persecution is relevant to the issue of whether asylum should be 

granted in the exercise of discretion. In those situations where a persecutory 

government has been removed from power, the BIA may reopen the record or may 

take administrative notice of changed circumstances. 

The respondents therefore argue that given the changes that have 

occurred in Nicaragua, the primary respondent has suffered past 

persecution which warrants asylum for humanitarian reasons.4Furthermore, the respondents assert that they have demonstrated that 

they merit asylum in the exercise of discretion. Lastly, the respondents 

believe that they met the more stringent standard required for 

withholding of deportation. We disagree and will dismiss the appeal. 

Aliens who seek asylum and withholding of deportation bear the 

burden of establishing eligibility under sections 208(a) and 243(h) of 

the Act, respectively. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.5, 242.17(c) (1990); see also 

Matter of Dass, 20 I&N Dec. 120 (BIA 1989). To establish eligibility 

for withholding of deportation pursuant to section 243(h) of the Act, 

an alien's facts must show a clear probability of persecution in the 

country designated for deportation on account of race, religion, 

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 

opinion. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). This clear probability 

standard requires a showing that it is more likely than not that an alien 

would be subject to persecution if returned to the country from which 

he seeks withholding of deportation. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 

U.S. 421, 430 (1987); see also Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 

1991); Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. 16 (BIA 1989). 

Pursuant to section 208(a) of the Act, the Attorney General may, in 

the exercise of her discretion, grant asylum to an alien who qualifies as 

a "refugee" within the meaning of section 101(aX42)(A) of the Act R 

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (19 88). That section defines a "refugee" as 

any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a 

person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last 

habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 

unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 

4Without explicitly stating so, the respondents switched the emphasis of their 

arguments in their brief from the arguments raised in the Notice of Appeal. In the 

Notice of Appeal, the respondents Focused on the fear of future harm, whereas in their 

brief, based upon the changed conditions, they emphasize past persecution. 

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persecution or a welt-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 

Section 10l(a)(42)(A) of the Act. 

In INS v. Cardoza -Fonseca, supra, the Supreme Court held that the 

burden of proof required to establish eligibility for asylum is lower 

than that required for withholding of deportation. An applicant for 

asylum has established that his fear is "well-founded" if he shows that 

a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution. See 

Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). Further, asylum, 

unlike withholding of deportation, may be denied in the exercise of 

discretion to an alien who establishes statutory eligibility for that 

relief. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra; Matter of Mogharrabi, 

supra. 

In light of the Supreme Court's decision, this Board held that an 

applicant for asylum has established a well-founded fear of persecution 

if he shows that a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear 

persecution. Matter of Mogharrabi, supra. A reasonable person may 

well fear persecution even where its likelihood is significantly less than 

clearly probable. Id. However, there must be a reasonable possibility of 

actually suffering such persecution. The applicant must show that his 

fear of persecution is both subjectively genuine and objectively 

reasonable. Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1987); 

Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986). The objective 

component requires a showing by credible, direct, and specific 

evidence in the record of facts that would support a reasonable fear 

that the applicant faces persecution. Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 

1488 (9th Cir. 1986). In view of this standard of proof, there must be a 

showing that (1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a 

persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of punishment of 

some sort; (2) the persecutor is aware or could become aware that the 

alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the 

capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the 

inclination to punish the alien. Matter of Mogharrabi, supra. 

At the outset, exercising our authority to conduct an independent 

review of the record, we analyze whether the respondent has shown a 

well-founded fear of future persecution if returned to Nicaragua. 5We 

conduct the determination in light of the respondents' acknowledgement in their brief of this Board's ability to take administrative notice, 

and their explicit recognition that there has been a change in 

'The immigration judge determined that the respondent, if statutorily eligible, did not 

show that he would merit asylum in the exercise of discretion. Since we conclude that 

the respondent is not statutorily eligible for asylum, we do not reach the issue of 

discretion. 

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government in Nicaragua. We must address whether recognizing that 

conditions have changed in Nicaragua would be contrary to precedent 

in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the 

jurisdiction in which this case arises. See Gomez-Vigil v. INS, 990 F.2d 

1111 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Acewicz v. United States INS, 984 

F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1993); Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th 

Cir. 1992). We conclude that since the respondent specifically agreed 

that this Board could take administrative notice of changed circumstances in Nicaragua, the present case is more analogous to Acewicz v. 

United States INS, supra, than to Castillo-Villagra v. INS, supra. 

In Castillo-Villagra v. INS, supra, a case involving an asylum 

applicant from Nicaragua, the Ninth Circuit noted that the hearings 

were conducted in December 1987 and February 1988. It pointed out 

that the immigration judge's decision was rendered in February 1988, 

and briefing before this Board was completed in October 1989, all 

prior to the election in April 1990 which resulted in favor of Violeta 

Charnorro and her democratic coalition, UNO, and in defeat for the 

Sandinistas. Id. at 1021. According to Acewicz v. United States INS, 

supra, at 1060, central to the court's conclusion in Castillo-Villagra 

was the fact that "aliens were precluded therefore from presenting 

evidence to rebut the noticed facts and from disputing whether notice 

should be taken." The Ninth Circuit was concerned because "notice, 

and perhaps an opportunity to present contrary evidence and to 

dispute whether notice should be taken, was required as to whether the 

Sandinistas were truly without power and whether the applicants could 

have a well-founded fear of persecution despite the surprising election 

results." Id. 

The court concluded that the Board could take administrative 

notice in Acewicz, a case involving Polish asylum applicants, because 

the respondents had "ample opportunity" to introduce evidence "on 

the effect of the change of government." Id. at 1061. We do not believe 

that the Ninth Circuit fashioned a rule that we could take administrative notice for Polish asylum applicants and not Nicaraguan applicants. Rather, it requires that the record must reflect that the 

respondent was aware of the opportunity to respond to the change in 

circumstances. We must ensure that a respondent has had an 

opportunity, either before the immigration judge or us, to introduce 

evidence on the effect of a change in government. Id. Furthermore, we 

must demonstrate that the noticed facts are not "'blindly appl[iedj' to 

'automatically deny every asylum application submitted by'" an 

applicant. Id. (quoting Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 

1257 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

We conclude that the respondents' awareness in their brief of our 

specific ability to take administrative notice and their awareness of the 

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changed circumstances in Nicaragua presented them with the required 

opportunity to introduce and present evidence on the effect of a 

change in government. The present case is more aligned with the 

alien's case in Acewicz v. United States INS, supra, where the 

respondent did have an opportunity to respond to the change in 

government. The respondents in the present case were fully cognizant 

of the change in government and were aware of our ability to take 

administrative notice. The respondents, aware that circumstances in 

Nicaragua have changed, have shifted the focus of their asylum claims 

to emphasize that they have suffered past persecution such that a 

presumption arises which must be rebutted by a showing that there is 

little likelihood of future persecution. In so doing, however, the 

respondents do not present any reason to fear the new government. 

The rebuttable presumption that there is little likelihood of future 

persecution is also met by the noticed facts. Matter of Chen, supra, at 

4. 

As specifically mentioned by the respondents and as we have done 

in our precedent, we take administrative notice of the change in 

government in Nicaragua that occurred in 1990. See Matter ofR-R-, 20 

I&N Dec. 547 (BIA 1992). Effective April 25, 1990, a new coalition 

government, formed by parties in opposition to the Sandinistas, UNO, 

succeeded the former government of the Sandinista party following 

national elections and the inauguration of Violeta Chamorro as the 

new president. We take notice that the new presi dent of Nicaragua 

thereafter announced a general amnesty covering the hostilities 

between the former Contra resistance and the Nicaraguan Government, and an end to military conscription. See Matter ofR-R-, supra, 

at 5 51. Although the Sandinistas continue to operate the military and 

police with substantial autonomy (albeit in much smaller numbers), 

and there continues to be some civil strife and turmoil in Nicaragua, 

the elected government has continued in power for over 3 years. Id. 

Given that the Sandinista party no longer governs Nicaragua, under 

the present circumstances we do not find that the record before the 

immigration judge or that presently before us supports a finding that 

the primary respondent has a well-founded fear of persecution. The 

respondent has not shown that, given the change of government, he 

possesses a well-founded fear from the changed government. 

Independently and separately from our findings above, we conclude 

that the respondent has not shown that any fear of future harm or past 

persecution would be based upon a ground enumerated in the statute. 

The respondent's engaging in the speculation in foreign currency and 

sales on the black market which caused his arrests and incarceration in 

1980 do not constitute activity based on his political opinion. While 

the respondent writes in his brief that his activity was "quasi-legal," he 

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acknowledged during his testimony under oath that he had violated 

the currency laws of Nicaragua. The respondent's harsh treatment 

while incarcerated was not on account of his political opinion; rather, 

it was for his violation of the currency laws. The respondent did not 

show that he was treated more harshly for his crimes because of his 

political opinion than others who may have committed the same 

crime. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). The record 

reflects instead that the respondent simply committed a crime and 

became a victim of the harsh prison system in Nicaragua. 

Furthermore, the respondent's arrest in 1985 was based upon the 

government's belief that he was part of a conspiracy to possess illegal 

weapons. He was arrested and detained for 4 months. The respondent 

wrote in the addendum to his asylum application that he sought the 

assistance of an attorney and successfully obtained a release from 

prison. He pointed out that the others were actually convicted, 

sentenced, and punished for the crime that was committed. The 

respondent has not shown that the investigation was anything other 

than an investigation for illegal weapons, particularly when he was 

released and others were found guilty and punished. The respondent 

has failed to show that the arrest and detention were on account of his 

political opinion. We conclude that any claim of asylum based upon 

fear of future persecution, or past persecution fails. We also conclude 

that the past harm suffered by the respondent was not on account of a 

political opinion. Even if we were to assume for argument's sake that it 

was on account of a political opinion, it is not of the severe nature that 

we found in Matter of Chen, supra, to warrant asylum for humanitarian reasons. 

Lastly, the respondent raises a claim that he has suffered persecution for loss of his ration card and the deprivation of employment. Not 

only has the respondent failed to show that these actions were based 

upon his political opinion, they do not constitute persecution. See 

Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1985). Consequently, 

for all of the reasons stated above, we conclude that the respondents 

have failed to show their statutory eligibility for asylum based upon 

the primary respondent's application. 

Inasmuch as the respondents have failed to satisfy the lower burden 

of proof required for asylum, it follows that they have also failed to 

satisfy the clear probability standard of eligibility required for 

withholding of deportation. See Matter of Mogharrabi, supra. The 

evidence does not establish that it is more likely than not that the 

respondents would be subject to persecution on account of one of the 

five grounds specified in section 243(h) of the Act. See INS v. Stevic, 

supra. We therefore conclude that the respondents are statutorily 

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ineligible for asylum and for withholding of deportation. Accordingly, 

the appeal will be dismissed. 

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 

FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the immigration judge's 

order and in accordance with our decision in Matter of Chouliaris, 16 

I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1977), the respondents are permitted to depart 

from the United States voluntarily within 30 days from the date of this 

order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the 

district director, and in the event of failure so to depart, the 

respondents shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's 

order. 

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