China’s Strategic Interests in the 

Arctic

by

Commander William G. Dwyer III

United States Coast Guard

Under publication review:

Joint Force Quarterly, NDU Press

3rd Place Paper, 2015 Secretary of Defense 

National Security Essay Competition

Strategy Research Project

United States Army War College

Class of 2015

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14. ABSTRACT

 China has been active in the Arctic for many years conducting climate research and expeditions. Over the 

last few years, China has made overtures for greater involvement in Arctic affairs and governance seeking 

full membership status in the Arctic Council and further collaboration with Arctic nations. China’s interest in 

the Arctic is driven by the need to fuel and feed the world’s largest population and most powerful economy. 

This study begins with a review of China’s historical activities in the Arctic then argues that its recently 

intensified interest there is driven by two factors: natural resources and new maritime trade routes. Next, it 

suggests venues for increased Chinese participation in the governance structures for the Arctic and 

concludes with recommendations of concrete steps that the United States, as the incumbent Chair of the 

Arctic Council in 2015, can take to promote U.S. national security interests and encourage China's 

responsible behavior in this dynamic international sphere of cooperation.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

 U.S. Arctic Strategy, Coast Guard, Icebreaker, Oil, Fisheries, Law of the Sea, Arctic Council

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

China’s Strategic Interests in the Arctic

by

Commander William G. Dwyer III

United States Coast Guard

Professor Brett Weigle

Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations

Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of 

Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission 

on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 

Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher 

Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of 

Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. 

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author 

and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department 

of Defense, or the United States Government.

U.S. Army War College

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

Title: China’s Strategic Interests in the Arctic

Report Date: 01 April 2015

Page Count: 33

Word Count: 4985

Key Terms: U.S. Arctic Strategy, Coast Guard, Icebreaker, Oil, Fisheries, Law 

of the Sea, Arctic Council

Classification: Unclassified

China has been active in the Arctic for many years conducting climate research and 

expeditions. Over the last few years, China has made overtures for greater involvement 

in Arctic affairs and governance seeking full membership status in the Arctic Council 

and further collaboration with Arctic nations. China’s interest in the Arctic is driven by 

the need to fuel and feed the world’s largest population and most powerful economy. 

This study begins with a review of China’s historical activities in the Arctic then argues 

that its recently intensified interest there is driven by two factors: natural resources and 

new maritime trade routes. Next, it suggests venues for increased Chinese participation 

in the governance structures for the Arctic and concludes with recommendations of 

concrete steps that the United States, as the incumbent Chair of the Arctic Council in 

2015, can take to promote U.S. national security interests and encourage China's 

responsible behavior in this dynamic international sphere of cooperation.

China’s Strategic Interests in the Arctic

The Arctic environment is in great flux as scientific studies show the Arctic ice 

cap has diminished by 40% over the past 35 years.1 Nations are conducting polar 

scientific research to better understand the changing Arctic ecosystem and the effects 

of the warming Arctic upon the world’s climate. The Arctic Ocean and coastal areas 

once barren and frozen under a dense sheet of ice are slowly coming to life with 

industry and commerce brought about by the receding ice conditions. 

These environmental changes bring new opportunities for the eight Arctic nations 

(Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States) 

that ring the North Pole (Figure 1). Arctic nations are competing for abundant resources 

such as oil, natural gas, minerals, and fish stocks that the newly accessible Arctic 

contains. The receding ice is also unlocking additional maritime trade routes that will

relieve the increasingly stressed global marine transportation system between Asian, 

European, and North American ports. This study will address these new trade routes 

known as the Northern Sea Route, the Transpolar Sea Route, and the once-legendary 

Northwest Passage. 

Although it has no Arctic littoral, China has been active in the Arctic for many 

years conducting climate research and scientific expeditions. Recently, China has 

signaled its intent to become more involved in Arctic affairs and governance by seeking 

full membership status in the multilateral Arctic Council and further collaboration with 

the Arctic nations. China's interest in the Arctic is driven by the need to fuel and feed the 

world's largest population and economy.

This study begins with a review of China’s historical activities in the Arctic and

argues that its recently intensified interest there is driven by two factors: 1) new sources 
2

of oil, natural gas, minerals and fish, and 2) additional maritime trade routes. This 

review also proposes avenues for increasing Chinese participation in the governance 

structures for the Arctic and concludes with recommendations of concrete steps that the 

United States, as the incumbent chair of the Arctic Council in 2015, can take to 

encourage China’s responsible behavior in this dynamic international sphere of 

cooperation.

Figure 1: The Arctic Nations2
3

China’s History in the Arctic

China’s interest in the polar regions dates back over thirty years. The Chinese 

Arctic and Antarctic Institute that directs the nation’s polar research program was 

established in 1981.3 China’s initial interest in the Arctic was related to scientific 

research to better understand the effects of changing Arctic conditions on the weather 

patterns in China.4It has since conducted numerous expeditions to both the North and 

South Poles.5In 2004, China built a permanent Arctic climate research facility in 

Norway.

6

Since 2007, Chinese publications have shifted from a purely scientific focus to 

more strategic, political, and legal issues concerning the Arctic region.7 China 

conducted four independent Arctic missions by 2010 aimed at scientific research, 

partnership building, and economic opportunities.

8 Looking ahead, China’s Twelfth Five 

Year Plan calls for increased polar research to understand potential effects of Arctic 

climate on its national economic policy.

9

Despite the aforementioned activity, China has no declared official Arctic policy. 

Rather, Chinese officials have issued statements espousing their interest in the 

environmental impacts of the changing Arctic climate.10 Unlike its position in the South 

China Sea, the Chinese government has stated the Arctic should be open to all nations 

– not simply those with territory in the region. This attitude indicates its intent to 

compete for the potentially immense natural resources the Arctic possesses and a 

subtle warning to any nation that looks to control the Arctic waterways. China’s State 

Oceanic Administration has called the Arctic the “inherited wealth of all 

humankind...and not the ‘private property’ of the Arctic nations...every country in the 

world has an equal right to exploit the Arctic Ocean.”11 The use of the word “exploit” 
4

signals a much greater intent than simply conducting scientific research. This language 

indicates that China sees the Arctic as an opportunity to meet its growing energy, 

mineral, and food supply needs. 

The region is rich in natural resources needed to sustain China’s large population 

and meet the demands from its rising middle class. In July 2014, China’s population 

was estimated at 1.4 billion people, the world’s largest.12 China’s government has used 

many different voices to express its intent to compete for Arctic access and resources. 

A leading Chinese academic stated, “Whoever has control of the Arctic route will control 

the new passage of world economics and international strategies.”13 A Chinese Navy 

official claimed that since 20% of the world’s population is located in China, it is entitled 

to 20% of the resources contained in the Arctic.14 Before discussing China’s goals in the 

Arctic, an explanation of the international legal framework that governs nations’ actions 

there is in order.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides

the legal framework for governance and cooperation. UNCLOS addresses many issues 

to include dispute resolution mechanisms for natural resource and maritime boundary 

line disputes through arbitration.15 Unlike the other seven Arctic nations, the United 

States has yet to join the current 156 signatories to UNCLOS because ratification by the 

Senate has stalled over concerns about political sovereignty. Yet, the U.S. government

has affirmed its commitment to the principles of the treaty and currently regards nearly 

all of UNCLOS as customary international law.

16 However, this approach does not allow 

authorize the United States to take advantage of the UNCLOS dispute resolution 

process. UNCLOS membership would aid U.S. sovereignty claims to the extended 
5

Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and allow for better multi-lateral cooperation in the 

Arctic.17

UNCLOS includes specific provisions for claims related to the OCS, which is 

defined as the seabed and subsoil areas that may reach beyond a nation’s exclusive 

economic zone (EEZ). The EEZ, by definition, extends past a nation’s twelve-nautical 

mile territorial sea out to 200 nautical miles from the baseline where the territorial sea 

originates (Figure 2).

18 UNCLOS awards coastal states the sovereign rights to the 

natural resources (such as oil and gas) both within their EEZ and in the Outer 

Continental Shelf.

19 States submit applications to the Commission on the Limits of the 

Continental Shelf based on scientific evidence proving where their OCS extends beyond 

the EEZ. Neither China (a non-Arctic nation) nor the United States (a non-party to 

UNCLOS) has legal standing to assert any extended OCS claims in the Arctic.

Figure 2: Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 20

The UNCLOS legal structure intended to resolve Arctic maritime boundary 

disputes is similarly unavailable to the United States, despite its unquestionable status 
6

as an Arctic nation. For example, the United States must negotiate resolution of two 

boundary disagreements on a bilateral level with Canada – outside the orderly process 

enjoyed by signatories to UNCLOS. With an understanding of how nations interact 

under this treaty regarding maritime natural resource issues, a look at China’s three 

interests in the Arctic is the next step.

China’s First Interest: Transpolar Trade Routes

As the world leader in global maritime commerce, almost 50% of China’s gross 

domestic product is reliant on ocean shipping and China’s ports continue to increase 

container throughput capacity.

21 Chinese shipping companies view the Arctic as a 

viable trade route during the ice-free months. Three Arctic Ocean routes (Figure 3) hold

great promise for China’s commerce: the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the Northwest 

Passage (NWP) and the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR).

Figure 3: Arctic Shipping Routes22
7

The Northern Sea Route, also known as the Northeast Passage, runs along the 

Arctic coasts of Russia and Norway. Vessels traveling the NSR can realize significant 

savings in sailing days (and fuel costs) between Northern Europe and Asia and avoid 

the risk of piracy associated with the Strait of Malacca near Malaysia. The traditional 

warm-water route through the Suez Canal averages 48 days and 11,300 nautical miles 

for oil tankers and large container vessels. That same voyage along the NSR is

shortened by 13 days and 4,000 nautical miles.

23 In 2014, the NSR was ice-free for

maritime traffic during six weeks from mid-August until October.

24

Russia defines the NSR as the leg transiting Russia’s “internal waters” (an 

UNCLOS term) from the Bering Strait to the western edge of the Kara Sea and 

consequently regulates vessel traffic along it.25 Specifically, vessels must apply for 

transit permits and are subject to inspection by Russian authorities. The NSR 

Information Office in Moscow received a record number of over 600 transit applications

in 2014. Currently, Russia and the other Arctic nations hold strong differences in 

interpretation of the UNCLOS terms regarding transits, leading to protests against

Russia’s “improper implementation of UNCLOS provisions” to support its sovereignty 

interests.26

Russia’s regulation of the NSR magnifies her global strategic importance to other 

maritime trading nations. China’s Polar Institute stated that if conditions permit, 5% to 

15% of China’s international trade could move via the NSR by 2020; its number of NSR 

transit permits today trails only Korea and Japan.

27 Some scholars believe China’s 

influence as a global leader in maritime shipping may force Russia to ease its control 
8

over this route as China advocates for freedom of navigation rights throughout the 

Arctic.28 

The Northwest Passage begins near Greenland, threads its way through the 

Canadian Arctic Archipelago to its western terminus south of the Bering Strait. The 

NWP is ice-free for about one month now and reduces distances between ports in Asia 

and Europe by nearly 2,700 nautical miles compared to the Suez Canal.

29 For example, 

the Nordic Orion, a bulk carrier, saved $200,000 and four days transiting from 

Vancouver to Finland via the NWP in September 2013.30 Experts predict traditional 

non-ice strengthened vessels will be able to make the voyage by the summer of 2050.31

Canada claims that since much of the NWP passes between its sovereign islands, it is 

considered Canadian territorial waters. However, the United States asserts the NWP is 

an “international strait” whereby “transit passage” applies instead.

32

As the Arctic Ocean ice cap shrinks to reveal ice-free routes in the summer 

months, the Transpolar Sea Route will become accessible. The TSR crosses the Arctic 

Ocean directly over the North Pole from the Bering Strait to Northern Europe. Only 

2,100 miles in length, this route may be the most perilous since it requires a mostly icefree Arctic Ocean for safe transit. Despite this restriction, the TSR may become the 

preferred route since it does not require innocent passage through the Russian or 

Canadian EEZs where those nations seek to enforce jurisdiction over vessels transiting

the NSR and NWP, respectively.

33 Current environmental conditions coupled with 

climate modeling predict ice-free summer months by 2030.34

The Chinese government has declared it shall “ensure the safety of marine 

transport channels and maintain our country’s marine rights and interests.”35 A senior 
9

Chinese officer stated, “[w]ith the expansion of the country’s economic interests, the 

navy wants to better protect the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our 

major sea lanes.”36 An increased Chinese naval presence in the Arctic creates another 

venue for potentially aggressive confrontations with vessels from other nations. China’s 

lack of compliance with the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing 

Collisions at Sea (which China signed in 1980) was highlighted as recently as 2013 in a 

near-collision with the USS Cowpens in the South China Sea.37

China has also expanded its civilian maritime capability to operate in the Arctic. 

Currently China has one operational polar icebreaker with another in production.

38 The

167-meter Xuelong (Snow Dragon) can break 1.2-meter thick ice and has deployed on 

five Arctic research expeditions since 1999.39 China’s new eight-thousand ton 

icebreaker will cost nearly $200 million, reflecting the level of China’s commitment to

future Arctic operations.

40 Both vessels are slated to deploy to the Arctic and Antarctic 

for over 200 days per year.41 

The United States, an Arctic nation, operates two polar icebreakers; however, 

unlike China, the U.S. Congress has committed no funding to fleet modernization. The 

U.S. Coast Guard cutters Polar Sea and Polar Star were built in the 1970s as “heavy 

icebreakers”— the most powerful non-nuclear icebreakers in the world.42 In 2000, the 

Coast Guard commissioned the Healy, an Arctic-only, medium icebreaker, funded by

the Department of Defense. In 2006, Polar Star was placed in indefinite caretaker status 

with no funding to replace her engines; her sister ship avoided the same fate only after

a nearly $60 million, ten-year service life extension. The Coast Guard is left to support 
10

U.S. maritime operations in the Arctic Ocean while resupplying American installations in 

Antarctica with only two icebreakers.

43

In support of its Arctic maritime vision, China is also investing in ice-strengthened 

vessels to carry both bulk cargo and containers. Its stated intent is for scientific polar 

research, but these vessels could escort Chinese merchant ships transiting the icechoked Arctic waters of the NSR. Their unstated mission will likely include increased

Arctic maritime domain awareness. 

China’s Interests: Petroleum and Minerals

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the Arctic region contains 

approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion 

barrels of natural gas liquids. Estimates place 84% of these resources in offshore areas 

of the Arctic Ocean.44 China, meanwhile, is a net importer of oil with projected demand 

to lead the world in this category by 2020. China currently gets half of its oil supply from 

the Middle East via tankers and is also a leading importer of that region’s natural gas. 

Middle East conflicts or interruptions in the sea-lane supply routes would adversely

impact the Chinese economy. 

As a result, China must seek more secure sources of oil and natural gas to fuel 

its expanding economy. Arctic hydrocarbons are available from an area more politically 

stable and closer to China than its current Middle East suppliers. Consequently, Russia 

and China are building partnerships for development of Arctic oil and liquefied natural 

gas fields in the Russian Arctic.

45

The Arctic can also potentially supply mineral resources China needs for its 

robust manufacturing sector. Greenland, which is a part of Denmark, holds large 

reserves of high-grade ores of copper, uranium, and other minerals that make it an area 
11

of keen interest for China’s industries and government. A Chinese corporation recently 

purchased an iron-ore deposit there along with a quartzite mine in Norway, and has 

planned oil exploration in the waters of neighboring Iceland.46 These investments, which 

often cost several billion U.S. dollars, provide economic boosts to the smaller Arctic 

nations who partner with Chinese state-run corporations. 

China’s Interests: Fisheries

According to a 2010 study on global fisheries conducted by the Pew Environment 

Group, China leads the world in catch by tonnage as well as in overall consumption of 

fish.47 The growing Chinese middle class places increasing demand on China’s 

commercial fishing industry to find new areas, such as the fish stocks of the bountiful 

Arctic Ocean.

China deploys a distant-water fishing fleet numbering more than 2000 vessels 

(ten times larger than the United States).

48 Currently, China has nearly 400 vessels 

operating near West Africa and 100 more fishing the waters off South America.49

Chinese fishing vessels are generally not compliant with international fishing standards

and regulatory practices; they have been cited or seized for illegal fishing from South 

Korea to Indonesia.

50 China’s disregard for fisheries management and refusal to control 

the actions of its fishing vessels could be disastrous for the health of fish stocks in the 

unpatrolled waters of the Arctic. 

In 2014, five Arctic nations (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United 

States) signed a ban on commercial fishing in the Arctic Ocean to protect the living 

marine resources of the thawing region.51 The United States had previously banned 

commercial fishing north of the Bering Strait in 2009. With the exception of the 

aboriginal native groups living in the Arctic who are allowed to harvest fish and sea 
12

mammals, there are no commercial Arctic fisheries. Fisheries stocks such as herring 

and cod are predicted to flourish as the climate warms.52

China may be positioning itself to exploit these marine resources of the unspoiled 

Arctic. Bans and active enforcement of national fisheries regulations may be seen by 

China as denying its right to the so-called “global commons.” This increasingly robust 

stance by China may be reflected in the deficit of international fisheries agreements 

concerning the Arctic. Surprisingly, despite its mandate to “promote cooperation...on 

issues of sustainable development,” the Arctic Council has not created a regional 

fisheries management organization as exists in other important fisheries around the 

globe.53 This could be a result of China’s lobbying efforts; this indirect approach against 

the only Arctic governance structure reflects China’s desire to gain influence in this 

realm – the second theme of this paper.

China’s Role in Arctic Governance

The Arctic Council was established in 1996 and is headquartered in Tromsø, 

Norway.54 It is a high-level intergovernmental forum, which addresses issues faced by 

the eight Arctic governments and the indigenous people of the Arctic.55 Although the 

Council’s original mandate was sustainable development and environmental 

awareness, it has expanded both in mission scope and membership.

The Arctic Council lacks regulatory authority on security issues, and its actions 

are non-binding, which undermines its potential effectiveness.56 The Council has 

demonstrated its worth as a forum for collaboration between members, who have 

crafted significant multi-lateral agreements. In 2011, Council members signed the 

Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue agreement (the body’s first binding 

agreement) followed by the 2013 Arctic oil spill response plan.

57

 
13

China’s Observer Status on the Arctic Council

The Arctic Council’s charter provides for non-Arctic states and organizations to 

be granted non-voting observer status. During its term as the secretariat of the Arctic 

Council in 2007-2013, Norway lobbied for inclusion of China as an observer.58 Perhaps 

due to its commercial interest in Greenland’s mines, China petitioned Denmark to 

support this initiative, too. Some Arctic states opposed the enlargement of the Council 

by observer states, assuming their interests were merely economic (read: China).

59

Russia, at first, resisted the admission of China, as it would potentially upset the 

balance of power in the Arctic. Its delegates believed that China, as a non-Arctic nation, 

would attract unwanted attention to the region.60

As a result, Canada proposed limitations to alleviate Russia’s concerns. Under 

the terms of admission to the Council, the observers must acknowledge the sovereign 

rights of Arctic nations and the application of UNCLOS. All observer states will come 

under review by the full members of the Arctic Council every four years and are not

allowed to vote on issues brought before the Council.

61 Ultimately, the Arctic Council 

admitted as observers China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, the 

Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, Spain and the United Kingdom, as well as nine 

intergovernmental and eleven non-governmental organizations.62 According to Espen 

Barth Aide, Norway’s foreign affairs minister, “We want people to join our club. That 

means they will not start another club.”63 Expanding the Arctic Council to non-Arctic 

states was important because issues such as marine transportation regulations would 

require support from non-Arctic states utilizing new trade routes. The aim of expanding 

the membership is not only to build the Council’s stature but also to maintain its status 

as the body of reference for all Arctic issues.
14

China is on a mission to convince the Arctic Council and the world that it has 

legitimate rights to the Arctic and its resources. In anticipation of the 2015 session, 

China wants to change the rules of the Arctic Council and is lobbying for full 

membership status. Calling itself a “near Arctic state,” China argues the Arctic is a 

global commons and that it should have access to the region’s natural resources and

scientific research potential.

64 According to Chinese Navy Admiral Yin Zhou, the “Arctic 

belongs to all the people around the world, as no nation has sovereignty over it...China 

must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as [it] has one-fifth of the world’s 

population.”65

As a result, many countries have questioned China’s role and interests in the 

Arctic. A Canadian official stated, “There exists in China a distinct group of academics 

and officials trying to influence their leaders to adopt a much more assertive stance in 

the Arctic than has traditionally been the case. This could ultimately bring China into 

disagreement with circumpolar states in a variety of issue areas and alter security and 

sovereignty relationships in the circumpolar region.”

66

U.S. Opportunities to Encourage China’s Responsible Actions in the Arctic

In 2015, the United States will assume the leadership chair of the Arctic Council 

for two years. President Obama appointed a well-qualified chairman, retired Admiral 

Robert Papp, former U.S. Coast Guard Commandant. As Commandant, he worked 

closely with his Chinese counterparts on the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum and 

strengthened the China-United States ship-rider program, where Chinese maritime 

enforcement officers deploy on U.S. Coast Guard cutters operating in the Western 

Pacific. The latter program is a sterling example of international cooperation to combat 

transnational maritime crime, specifically the prevention of illegal commercial fishing. 
15

The ship-rider program represents an ongoing opportunity for increased U.S.-China 

combined maritime operations and partnership in a common area of concern. Lastly, 

Papp established strong relationships with navy and coast guard leaders from other

Arctic nations to develop the Arctic search and rescue and oil spill response plans.

China and America share a common interest of freedom of navigation in the 

Arctic. However, while China views Canada and Russia as an Arctic power, it does not 

view the United States as an Arctic power. Perhaps China’s attitude stems from the lack 

of any serious U.S. Arctic strategy, its refusal to ratify UNCLOS, and diminished U.S. 

operations in comparison to other Arctic states.67

One option the new Arctic Council leadership should consider is offering China 

full member status in return for China submitting its controversial maritime claims in the 

South China Sea to UNCLOS arbitration. This alternative would take close coordination 

not only between Arctic member states but also littoral nations of the South China Sea. 

To date, China’s official messages concerning its interests in the Arctic have followed 

twin themes of scientific research and environmental monitoring, with undertones of 

natural resource allocation and the development of new trade routes. China has shown 

support of the Arctic Council, as evidenced in its pursuit of full membership status, and 

the underlying framework of UNCLOS as it applies in the Arctic.

At the same time, China has been unwilling to consider UNCLOS as a forum for

arbitration of maritime boundary disputes in the South China Sea. China’s signing of 

UNCLOS in 1996 was qualified by its rejection of certain provisions in dispute resolution 

clauses.68 Offering full member status on the Arctic Council in return for China’s 

submission to UNCLOS arbitration elsewhere on the planet may reveal China’s true 
16

ambitions. Both the South China Sea and the Arctic Ocean offer similar potential natural 

resources (hydrocarbons and fisheries). 

The United States may have an opportunity to collaborate with China on the 

Arctic Council while working to shape its expanding influence in the Arctic. China’s 

Twelfth Five Year Plan calls for increased coordination and cooperation to include 

forging bilateral and multilateral maritime cooperation agreements as well as active 

participation in international maritime forums.69 Acknowledging China’s great power 

status may encourage China to embrace a more cooperative tone and transparent 

efforts in the Arctic.

Even if not offered full member status, China will likely continue to expand 

economic partnerships with smaller Arctic countries such as Denmark and Iceland to 

meet China’s future natural resource demands. The Arctic Council, under U.S. 

leadership, needs to monitor these relationships and prevent China from becoming a 

quasi-Arctic state through its economic leverage over Council member states.

For example, China has forged a strong bilateral relationship with Iceland, as

evidenced by China’s construction of the largest embassy in Reykjavik. Iceland has 

permitted the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation to develop projects on its 

continental shelf.70 Additionally, China’s only free trade agreement in Europe exists with 

Iceland.71 Iceland has experienced significant problems with its economy since the 2008 

banking collapse, and the opportunity to collaborate with a rising China is seen as a 

financial lifeline.

72 The chair and the members of the Arctic Council must be alert to the 

character of votes cast by Iceland on Council issues. Do they truly reflect Icelandic 
17

positions and are they in the best interest of the Council? Or is China seeking to 

influence Council actions through its de facto Arctic proxy?

From 1951 through 2006, Iceland hosted U.S. forces at Keflavik Naval Air Station

until a U.S. military drawdown program closed the facility and withdrew 1,300 American 

personnel from Iceland.

73 With no organic military, the Icelandic government was upset 

since closing the base left the island nation with no defense presence.

74 Iceland likely 

still resents this abrupt move by fellow NATO member the United States. As their

bilateral relations with China strengthen, Iceland may offer China aircraft and naval 

basing rights to support their regional interests.

China’s burgeoning influence may potentially be a threat to this framework of 

Arctic cooperation and the broader security of the region. China, therefore, should not 

be allowed to create implicit proxy states through financial leverage or to exert undue 

diplomatic influence on smaller, politically and economically weaker Arctic states such 

as Iceland. The risk of an unchecked China in the Arctic may lead to regional instability 

and a lack of trust and cooperation among Arctic nations. It may cause a shift from the 

current state of liberalism fostered through the Arctic Council to a realist view.

China’s interest in the Arctic may also reinforce its broader narrative of a rising 

China as a global power. To this end, China has recently flexed its muscle on the United 

Nations Security Council through the increased use of its permanent member veto 

power (five times since 2007).75 Likewise, it has become a more assertive leader in 

Asian multinational forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and in 2014 

directly challenged the existing Bretton Woods monetary institutions with its 

establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

76
18

Conclusions

The Arctic will continue to be a strategically important region into the future as 

nations position themselves to take advantage of the untapped resources and 

expeditious maritime routes. Although China’s interests in the Arctic started with 

scientific research, they have evolved into a desire to exert influence over the control 

and distribution of the bountiful natural resources (oil, natural gas, minerals, and fish 

stocks) required to sustain China’s population and fuel the world’s largest economy. 

According to Stephen Blank, “China is clearly after more than simply investment and 

trade opportunities as it continues to display its obsession with securing energy and 

other supplies where the U.S. Navy cannot or will not go.”77 Additionally, China has 

signaled its intent to step up its use of the three Arctic maritime transit routes.

The Arctic Council is the internationally agreed model of governance and has 

established a strong reputation for cooperation and mutual respect among Arctic 

nations, as evidenced by the Arctic SAR and oil spill agreements. Some argue China 

will not be satisfied with its limited role of observer in Arctic affairs and will continue to 

lobby for full membership on the Council. However, the Arctic Council can capitalize on 

China’s leadership position in the global economy to boost the strategic importance of 

the group. The rise of China in the Arctic may also be seen as a balance to Russia, 

which is the most active and provocative state in this region. 

The self-labeling of the United States as an “Arctic nation” by national policy 

makers is not borne out by the intensity of American policy and activity in the region.78

Unlike Russia and Canada, the United States is perceived by China as neither an Arctic 

power nor a threat to China’s rising influence in the region. This perception offers the 
19

advantage of muting any aggressive notes in the tone of American calls for China to 

exhibit responsible behavior befitting a major international power.

The United States can take concrete actions in three arenas – unilateral, bilateral 

and multilateral – to reduce the risk to its national security interests in the Arctic. First, 

the U.S. Senate should ratify the UNCLOS and fund additional Coast Guard aircraft, 

icebreakers and other patrol vessels to give the United States both increased 

international legitimacy and Arctic maritime capability.

Second, the United States should capitalize on the success of the bilateral Coast 

Guard ship-rider program to build confidence with China in related maritime areas. A 

candidate venue could be the joint maritime patrols between littoral nations in the South 

China Sea proposed last month in Malaysia by the commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet. 

Scott Cheney-Peters of the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggests that 

the U.S. component of such patrols could be vessels from the Coast Guard (rather than 

the U.S. Navy) to reduce the appearance of a direct military challenge to China.79 The

law-enforcement character of the Coast Guard and its established capacity-building 

programs with its Chinese counterpart should result in a less provocative presence that 

could spawn additional areas of cooperation.

Third, the chair of the Arctic Council affords the United States a powerful 

legitimacy granted by a multilateral body that China desperately wants to join. The U.S. 

government must leverage this unique opportunity to build a solid coalition within the 

Council to induce China to assume the mantle of responsible global partner in several 

venues. The prize of full membership in the Arctic Council could be used to prod China 

into cooperation on maritime issues not only in the Arctic Ocean but further afield in the 
20

contentious theater of the South China Sea. The United States and the other Council 

members must be vigilant to Chinese attempts to subvert Council proceedings through 

economic coercion of vulnerable Arctic nations. The evolving Arctic offers great 

potential for multi-lateral cooperation rather than the pursuit of self-interest and 

competition. The United States and China have an opportunity to reinforce strong 

maritime governance in the Arctic for their mutual benefit. 

Endnotes

1 Scott Borgerson et al., The Emerging Arctic, Council on Foreign Relations, 2014.

http://www.cfr.org/arctic/emerging-arctic/p32620#!/ (accessed March 4, 2015).

2 Baker Vail Design, “Map of the Arctic.” http://www.bakervailmaps.com/mapillustration/world-maps/arctic-circle-map.html (accessed January 30, 2015).

3 Shilo Rainwater, “Race to the North,” Naval War College Review 66, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 

69.

4 Njord Wegge, “China in the Arctic: Interests, Actions and Challenges,” Nordlit 32 (2014): 

87. http://septentrio.uit.no/index.php/nordlit/article/view/3072/2964 (accessed December 4, 

2014). 

5 Linda Jakobson, “Beijing’s Arctic goals are not to be feared,” Financial Times, May 19, 

2013. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3dfd6f16-bef1-11e2-87ff-00144feab7de.html#axzz3PD95q0dA

(accessed January 20, 2015).

6 Oleg Vukmanovic and Balazs Koranyi, “Russia’s revival of Arctic Northern Sea Route at 

least 10 years away,” Reuters, January 25, 2013,

http://www.thestar.com/business/2013/01/25/russias_revival_of_arctic_northern_sea_route_at_l

east_10_years_away.html (accessed January 15, 2015); Rainwater, “Race to the North,” 69.

7 Olga Alexeeva and Frederic Lasserre, “China and the Arctic,” in Arctic Yearbook 2012,

edited by Lassi Heininen (Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum): 81.

http://www.arcticyearbook.com/images/Articles_2012/Alexeeva_and_Lassere.pdf (accessed 

March 10, 2015). 

8

Ibid., 81.

9 People’s National Congress, China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011-2015) (English 

translation), 17, http://cbi.typepad.com/files/full-translation-5-yr-plan-2011-2015.doc (accessed 

January 25, 2015).
21

10 Caitlin Campbell, “China and the Arctic: Objectives and Obstacles”, U.S.–China 

Economic and Security Review Commission (April 13, 2012): 3.

11 Ibid., 4.

12 Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, “China”, June 22, 2014. 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (accessed January 18, 

2015).

13 Humpert Malte and Andreas Raspotnik, “The Future of Arctic Shipping Along the 

Transpolar Sea Route,” in Arctic Yearbook 2012, edited by Lassi Heininen (Akureyri, Iceland: 

Northern Research Forum): 297.

http://www.arcticyearbook.com/images/Articles_2012/Humpert_and_Raspotnik.pdf (accessed 

March 3, 2015).

14 David C. Wright, “The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World: Arctic Policy Debate and 

Discussion in China,” China Maritime Studies 8 (August 2011): 7. 

15 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Annex II. Commission on 

the limits of the Continental Shelf. 1982. Article 76.

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/annex2.htm (accessed 

February 7, 2015).

16 Charles Ebinger and Evie Zambetkis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt,” International 

Affairs 85 (June 2009): 1226-1227.

17 Ibid., 1232.

18 UNCLOS, Annex II. section V, article 57.

19 Ibid., section VI, article 77.

20 Avin Kumar, “Different Zones of Sea Under UNCLOS,” Marine Engineering, February 26, 

2013. http://www.tunnel2funnel.com/2013_02_01_archive.html (accessed February 11, 2015).

21 Humpert and Raspotnik, “The Future of Arctic Shipping Along the Transpolar Sea Route,”

295. 

22 Malte Humpert and Andreas Raspotnik, “The Future of Arctic Shipping,” The Arctic 

Institute, October 11, 2012. http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/10/the-future-of-arcticshipping.html (accessed February 11, 2015).

23 Jeremy Bender, “Russia is militarizing the Arctic,” Business Insider, December 2, 2014.

24 Mike Schuler, “Northern Sea Route Transit Applications Hit Record High in 2014,” 

gCaptain, blog entry posted October 28, 2014, http://gcaptain.com/northern-sea-route-transitapplications-hit-record-high-2014/ (accessed February 17, 2015).

25 The Russian Federation, The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 

2020 (May 13, 2009), 42. http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020

(accessed March 3, 2015).
22

26 Oleg Vukmanovic and Balazs Koranyi, “Russia’s revival of Arctic Northern Sea Route at 

least 10 years away”, Reuters, January 25, 2013.

http://www.thestar.com/business/2013/01/25/russias_revival_of_arctic_northern_sea_route_at_l

east_10_years_away.html (accessed March 2, 2015).

27 Tom Røseth, “Russia’s China Policy in the Arctic,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (2014): 

851. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09700161.2014.952942 (accessed December 

4, 2014).

28 Ibid., 852; For more information on the applicable UNCLOS article concerning special 

regulations dealing with human activities in ice-covered waters, see UNCLOS. Section VII.

Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment. 1982. Article 234.

http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part12.htm (accessed March 

16, 2015). 

29 Paul Waldie, “A reality check on the Northwest Passage ‘boom’,” The Globe and Mail, 

January 7, 2014. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/breakthrough/will-colddark-northwest-passage-see-more-ships/article16231502/ (accessed February 27, 2015).

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid. 

32 Michael Byers, “Canada Can Help Russia with Northern Sea Route,” The Moscow Times, 

June 9, 2012. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/canada-can-help-russia-withnorthern-sea-route/460127.html (accessed March 16, 2015); UNCLOS, Part 3, Straits used for 

International Navigation. 1982. Section II. 

http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part3.htm (accessed March 

16, 2015).

33 UNCLOS, Article 19. “Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, 

good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this 

Convention and with other rules of international law.”

34 Humpert and Raspotnik, “The Future of Arctic Shipping Along the Transpolar Sea Route,”

285.

35 People’s National Congress, China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011-2015), 17.

36 Rainwater, “Race to the North,” 66.

37 David Alexander and Pete Sweeney, “U.S., Chinese warships narrowly avoid collision in 

South China Sea,” Reuters, December 13, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/14/ususa-china-ships-idUSBRE9BC0T520131214 (accessed April 12, 2015).

38 Wang Qian, “New icebreaker planned for 2016: officials,” China Daily, January 6, 2014. 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-01/06/content_17216579.htm (accessed January 18, 

2015).

39 Rainwater, “Race to the North,” 69. 
23

40 Ibid.

41 Alexeeva and Lasserre, “China and the Arctic,” 82.

42 National Research Council, Polar Icebreaker Roles and U.S. Future Needs: A Preliminary 

Assessment (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005). Heavy icebreakers are 

defined as vessels capable of breaking 6 feet of ice continuously at 3 knots, and can back and 

ram through at least 20 feet of ice; U.S. Coast Guard, “USCGC POLAR STAR (WAGB-10).”

https://www.uscg.mil/pacarea/cgcpolarstar/ (accessed February 5, 2015).

43 U.S. Coast Guard, Acquisition Directorate, Icebreaker. 

http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg9/icebreaker/ (accessed March 4, 2015).

44 Kenneth Bird et al., Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil 

and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, 2008, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008-3049.

http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/ (accessed December 16, 2014).

45 Atle Staalesen, “In Russia-China alliance, an Arctic dimension,” Barents Observer, 

November 14, 2014. http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2014/11/russia-china-alliance-arcticdimension-14-11 (accessed February 27, 2015).

46 Wegge, “China in the Arctic: interests, actions and challenges,” 83-98.

47 Pew Environment Group, “China tops world in catch and consumption of fish,” Science 

Daily, September 23, 2010. http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/09/100922121947.htm

(accessed January 18, 2015).

48 Katie Lebling, “Curbing China’s Massive – and Destructive – Distant Water Fishing Fleet,” 

The blog of the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program, blog entry 

posted November 11, 2013. http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2013/11/curbing-chinas-massivedestructive-distant-water-fishing-fleet/#.Uoubp41m6S4 (accessed March 4, 2015).

49 Daniel Pauly et al, “China's distant‐water fisheries in the 21st century,” Fish and Fisheries

15, no. 3 (2014): 474-488. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/faf.12032/full (accessed 

March 3, 2015).

50 Lebling, “Curbing China’s Massive – and Destructive – Distant Water Fishing Fleet”; Ben 

Otto, “China Makes Appeal for Chinese Fishermen Caught in Indonesia,” The Wall Street 

Journal, December 10, 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-makes-appeal-for-chinesefishermen-caught-in-indonesia-1418218872 (accessed March 4, 2015). 

51 Lauren Rosenthal, “Five Nations Tentatively Agree to Arctic Fishing Ban,” KUCBUnalaska, March 6, 2014. http://www.alaskapublic.org/2014/03/06/five-nations-tentativelyagree-to-arctic-fishing-ban/ (accessed December 16, 2014).

52 Heather Exner-Pirot, “New Direction for Governance of the Arctic Region,” Arctic 

Yearbook 2012, edited by Lassi Heininen (Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum): 238. 

http://www.arcticyearbook.com/images/Articles_2012/Exner_Pirot.pdf (accessed March 10, 

2015).
24

53 Erik J. Molenaar and Robert Corell, Arctic Fisheries (Brussels: Arctic TRANSFORM, 

February 9, 2009): 23. http://arctic-transform.org/download/FishBP.pdf (accessed February 9, 

2015); U.S. Department of State press statement, “Chairman’s Statement at Meeting on Future 

of Arctic Fisheries,” Washington, DC, May 1, 2013.

http://www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/pr/2013/209176.htm (accessed February 9, 2015).

54 Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of 

the Arctic Council (“Ottawa Declaration”), Ottawa, Canada, September 19, 1996. 

http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/5-

declarations?download=13:ottawa-declaration (accessed February 9, 2015).

55 Arctic Council Observers Page. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/aboutus/arctic-council/observers (accessed March 3, 2015).

56 Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interest in the Arctic: An Assessment of 

Current Challenges and New Opportunities for Cooperation, CSIS Europe Program at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2010, 13. 

http://csis.org/files/publication/100426_Conley_USStrategicInterests_Web.pdf (accessed March 

20, 2015). 

57 The Arctic Council, “First Live Arctic Search and Rescue Exercise - SAREX 2012,” 

September 25, 2012. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/environment-andpeople/oceans/search-and-rescue/620-first-arctic-search-and-rescue-exercise-sarex-2012

(accessed on March 3, 2015).

58 Morten Brugard, “Norway says yes to China in Arctic Council,” Barents Observer, 

January 22, 2013. http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2013/01/norway-says-yes-china-arcticcouncil-22-01 (accessed on January 18, 2015).

59 Røseth, “Russia’s China Policy in the Arctic,” 844.

60 Ibid. 

61 Ibid.

62 The Arctic Council. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arcticcouncil/observers (accessed February 27, 2015).

63 Brugard, “Norway says yes to China in Arctic Council.”

64 Arthur Guschin, “Understanding China’s Arctic Policies,” The Diplomat, November 14, 

2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/understanding-chinas-arctic-policies/ (accessed March 

16, 2015). 

65 Elizabeth Economy, “The Four Drivers of Beijing’s Emerging Arctic Play and What the 

World Needs to Do,” Forbes Asia, April 4, 2014.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabetheconomy/2014/04/04/the-four-drivers-of-beijingsemerging-arctic-play-and-what-the-world-needs-to-do/ (accessed February 11, 2015).

66 Wright, “The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World,” 6. 
25

67 Ibid., 3.

68 UNCLOS: Declarations made upon signature, ratification, accession or succession or 

anytime thereafter, China, June 7, 1996. 

http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention declarations.htm#China Upon 

ratification (accessed March 3, 2015). 

69 People’s National Congress, China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011-2015), 17.

70 Richard Milne, “CNOOC teams up with Icelandic group in its play for Arctic oil,” Financial 

Times, June 9, 2013. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7cd80ca8-d0fa-11e2-a3ea00144feab7de.html#axzz3TRrlxrvI (accessed March 3, 2015).

71 Wegge, “China in the Arctic: interests, actions and challenges,” 91.

72 Simon Bowers, “Iceland rises from the ashes of the banking collapse,” The Guardian, 

October 6, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/06/iceland-financial-recoverybanking-collapse (accessed March 3, 2015). 

73 Josh White, “U.S. to Remove Military Forces and Aircraft from Iceland Base,” The 

Washington Post, March 17, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/03/16/AR2006031601846.html (accessed April 10, 2015). 

74 Ibid.

75 Wegge, “China in the Arctic: interests, actions and challenges,” 86.

76 Ibid; The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Home page, http://aiibank.org/ (accessed 

April 12, 2015).

77 Stephen Blank, “China’s Arctic Strategy,” The Diplomat, June 20, 2013.

http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/chinas-arctic-strategy/ (accessed March 9, 2015).

78 Robert J. Papp, “America is an Arctic Nation,” The White House Blog (December 2, 

2014). http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/12/02/america-arctic-nation (accessed January 25, 

2015).

79 Scott Cheney-Peters, “Joint Patrols and U.S. Coast Guard Capacity,” Asia Maritime 

Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 1, 2015. 

http://amti.csis.org/joint-patrols-and-u-s-coast-guard-capacity/ (accessed April 12, 2015).