IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 19–0283 

Submitted September 15, 2021—Filed October 15, 2021 

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee, 

vs. 

ALAN JAMES KUUTTILA,

Appellant. 

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van Marel 

(motions and trial) and James B. Malloy (sentencing), Judges. 

Defendant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence. AFFIRMED ON CONDITION AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Appel, Oxley, 

and McDermott, JJ., joined. Waterman, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 

Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., joined. 

Martha J. Lucey, Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant. 
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Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee. 
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McDONALD, Justice.

Alan Kuuttila was convicted of three misdemeanor drug offenses. In this 

direct appeal, Kuuttila contends the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress evidence. Kuuttila argues a sheriff’s deputy violated his federal and 

state constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizures and searches 

when the deputy seized and searched his trash without first obtaining a warrant. 

Kuuttila also argues the district court erred in ordering Kuuttila to pay 

restitution for certain court costs and attorney fees. 

In August and September of 2017, Story County Deputy Sheriff Andy 

Boeckman received tips Kuuttila was dealing marijuana and methamphetamine. 

Boeckman decided to investigate the tips and conduct warrantless trash pulls at 

Kuuttila’s residence. Kuuttila lived in a four-plex apartment (a single family 

house modified into four separate apartments). Boeckman testified there were 

four separate trash cans in a fenced enclosure outside the apartments. The trash 

cans were metal and lidded. None of the cans or bags in the cans had identifying 

markers. Boeckman took all of the trash bags from the four cans to his office, 

opened them, and searched through them. He found nothing of evidentiary 

value. Approximately one week later, Boeckman again took all of the trash bags 

from the four cans to his office and searched through them. During this second 

search, Boeckman found one bag that contained mail addressed to Kuuttila 

along with “two small baggies, one with a crystal substance in it and one with a 

green leafy substance in it, as well as paraphernalia.” One of the baggies tested 

positive for marijuana and one for methamphetamine. 
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Based on this trash pull, Boeckman obtained a search warrant for 

Kuuttila’s residence. The subsequent search of Kuuttila’s residence yielded 

controlled substances, including methamphetamine and prescription pills, and 

drug paraphernalia. Kuuttila cooperated with the officials executing the warrant 

and admitted the controlled substances were his. 

Kuuttila was charged with three misdemeanor possession offenses, each 

in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2017): possession of a cannabidiol, 

first offense; possession of methamphetamine; and possession of marijuana. He 

was also charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Kuuttila moved to 

suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless trash pull, contending it 

violated his federal and state constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable 

seizures and searches as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the Federal 

Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Based on existing 

law, the district court denied the motion to suppress evidence. 

Following a trial on the minutes of testimony, the district court found 

Kuuttila guilty of the possession offenses. The district court sentenced Kuuttila 

to serve fifteen days in jail with credit for five days served. As restitution, the 

district court assessed $192 for the cost of Kuuttila’s court-appointed attorney 

as well as an unspecified amount for the costs of the action. At the time of 

sentencing, the State moved to dismiss the charge for possession of drug 

paraphernalia and agreed the State would pay the costs of that charge. At the 

sentencing hearing, the district court agreed the charge would be “dismissed 
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with costs assessed against the State.” However, the sentencing order stated the 

charge was dismissed with costs assessed to the defendant. 

Kuuttila timely appealed his conviction and sentence, and this court 

transferred the matter to the court of appeals. On appeal, Kuuttila argued the 

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, the portion of 

the sentencing order assessing costs for the dismissed charge was not in accord 

with the oral pronouncement of sentence, and the district court erred in ordering 

Kuuttila to pay restitution without first making a determination of his reasonable 

ability to pay. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the 

motion to suppress evidence. The court of appeals reasoned Kuuttila’s federal 

and state constitutional claims were resolved by the controlling cases of 

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), and State v. Henderson, 435 N.W.2d 

394 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). With respect to sentencing, the court of appeals 

vacated the portion of the sentencing order assessing costs for the dismissed 

charge and remanded the matter for entry of an order nunc pro tunc to have the 

judgment entry reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence. The court of appeals 

also vacated the restitution order and remanded the matter for further 

proceedings. 

We granted Kuuttila’s application for further review. “On further review, 

we have the discretion to review any issue raised on appeal.” Burton v. Hilltop 

Care Ctr., 813 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v. Marin, 788 N.W.2d 

833, 836 (Iowa 2010), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 

880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016)). With respect to the motion to suppress evidence, 
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we exercise our discretion to address only Kuuttila’s claim arising under the 

state constitution. With respect to sentencing and restitution, we exercise our 

discretion to address only Kuuttila’s challenge to restitution. The court of 

appeals decision is final as to all other claims and arguments. 

Last term, in State v. Wright, 961 N.W.2d 396, 418–19 (Iowa 2021), we 

overruled Henderson, 435 N.W.2d 394. In Wright, we held law enforcement 

officers conducted an unreasonable and thus unconstitutional seizure and 

search in violation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution when they seized 

and searched garbage bags left out for collection without first obtaining a 

warrant. Wright, 961 N.W.2d at 420. Our conclusion in that case was based on 

the plain meaning of the article I, section 8 as informed by common law concepts 

of trespass. Id. at 404–12. We explained that “[w]ithin the meaning of article I, 

section 8, an officer acts unreasonably when, without a warrant, the officer 

physically trespasses on protected property or uses means or methods of general 

criminal investigation that are unlawful, tortious, or otherwise prohibited.” Id. at 

416. We held that “[o]therwise prohibited conduct includes means and methods 

of general criminal investigation that violate a citizen’s reasonable expectation of 

privacy.” Id. 

We concluded a warrantless trash pull was trespassory in two respects. 

First, the officer engaged in means and methods of general criminal investigation 

that were unlawful and prohibited. Id. at 417. Specifically, the municipality 

prohibited any person, other than an authorized trash collector, from taking or 

collecting trash left out for collection. Id. Any violation of the ordinance was 
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punishable by a fine. Id. The officer was not a licensed collector and thus engaged 

in unlawful conduct. Id. Second, we explained the officer violated Wright’s 

reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash: 

When a citizen places garbage out for collection in a closed garbage 

bag, the contents of the bag are private, as a factual matter. The 

citizen understands, however, that the contents of the bag may be 

revealed to someone at some point in time. That a citizen may 

actually lose privacy in certain things or in certain information at 

some point in the future does not preclude the possibility that a 

peace officer nonetheless violated the citizen’s right to privacy in 

accessing the same things or information. “Privacy rights do not 

protect a reasonable expectation that privacy will be maintained, but 

rather a reasonable expectation that privacy will not be lost in 

certain ways.” 

Id. at 418–19 (quoting Jeffrey M. Skopek, Untangling Privacy: Losses Versus 

Violations, 105 Iowa L. Rev. 2169, 2174 (2020)). We reasoned that the officer’s 

warrantless seizure and search of Wright’s trash violated Wright’s expectation 

that his garbage bags would be accessed only by a licensed collector under 

contract with the city. See id. at 419. 

Both rationales are applicable in this case. Kuuttila resided in the City of 

Nevada. As in Wright, the Nevada municipal code prohibits any person from 

“[t]ak[ing] or collect[ing] any solid waste which has been placed out for collection 

on any premises, unless such person is an authorized solid waste collector.” 

Nevada, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 105.10(4) (2006). Violation of the city code 

is punishable by a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment for up to thirty days. Id.

§ 1.14. Boeckman was not an authorized solid waste collector, and he acted 

unlawfully and thus unreasonably in seizing and searching Kuuttila’s trash 

without a warrant. See Wright, 961 N.W.2d at 417. In addition, Nevada’s 
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ordinance, like similar municipal ordinances, is positive evidence of a societal 

expectation that trash left out shall remain private and not disturbed by anyone 

other than an authorized collector. Boeckman violated this expectation of privacy 

in seizing and searching Kuuttila’s trash without a warrant. See id. at 419. 

Wright was issued after the district court denied Kuuttila’s motion to 

suppress evidence but while his appeal was pending. “Generally, when we create 

a new standard, we remand the case to the district court to apply the standard.”

Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 799 (Iowa 2018). This applies to the case 

creating the standard as well as all cases pending at the time the decision is 

filed. State v. Hahn, 961 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 2021); State v. Johnson, 539 

N.W.2d 160, 165 (Iowa 1995). 

Accordingly, we conditionally affirm Kuuttila’s convictions and remand 

this matter for further proceedings consistent with our opinion in Wright. See

State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 340 (Iowa 2019) (conditionally affirming 

conviction and remanding for further proceedings in light of new rule); State v. 

Lilly, 930 N.W.2d 293, 309 (Iowa 2019) (same). On remand, the district court 

shall hold a hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence without 

consideration of the evidence and information obtained during the trash pull 

used to support the warrant application. See Hahn, 961 N.W.2d at 372. The 

district court shall conduct further proceedings as necessary contingent upon 

its ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. In the event the 

district court concludes the convictions and sentences should stand, the 

defendant must exhaust all statutory procedures to challenge the district court’s 
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assessment of attorney fees and court costs. See Iowa Code §§ 910.2A, .7 (2021); 

State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590, 606–07 (Iowa 2021). 

AFFIRMED ON CONDITION AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. 

Appel, Oxley, and McDermott, JJ., join this opinion. Waterman, J., files a 

dissenting opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., join. 
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#19–0283, State v. Kuuttila

WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court’s denial of Alan 

Kuuttila’s motion to suppress. Under a proper reading of the Iowa Constitution, 

no warrant was required to search the trash placed out for collection at his 

four-plex. See State v. Wright, 961 N.W.2d 396, 429–52 (Iowa 2021) (Christensen, 

C.J., dissenting); id. at 452–58 (Waterman, J., dissenting); id. at 458–65 

(Mansfield, J., dissenting). This case provides yet another example of the efficacy 

of trash rips as a law enforcement practice. Police had received multiple tips that 

Kuuttila was a drug dealer selling methamphetamine and marijuana. A search 

of his discarded trash revealed drug paraphernalia with methamphetamine 

residue, which in turn supported the issuance of a search warrant for his 

apartment where the narcotics were found resulting in his conviction for 

possession of methamphetamine and marijuana. 

We should overrule State v. Wright and rejoin the clear majority of courts 

holding that antiscavenger ordinances don’t trigger a search warrant 

requirement to peruse property abandoned for disposal. See, e.g., United States 

v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding garbage placed 

outside for collection did not have any Fourth Amendment protection despite an 

antiscavenging ordinance because the defendant did not show he “relied upon 

the ordinance to increase his expectation of privacy” and “[t]he purpose of the 

ordinance was, presumably, sanitation and cleanliness, not privacy”); United 

States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1971) (“The town ordinance simply 
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cannot change the fact that he ‘threw (these articles) away’ and thus there ‘can 

be nothing unlawful in the Government’s appropriation of such abandoned 

property.’ ” (quoting Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960))); Rikard v. 

State, 123 S.W.3d 114, 120–22 (Ark. 2003) (noting that to hold constitutional 

rights vary depending on local ordinances “would run directly contrary to a 

pronouncement by this court of a uniform societal understanding relating to 

privacy rights in garbage”); State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746, 752 n.17 (Conn. 

1993) (“Our conclusion that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of 

privacy in garbage placed at the curb for collection is not undermined by the fact 

that the legislature has authorized municipalities to prohibit the scavenging of 

solid waste.”); State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) 

(holding a person “who places his trash in the swale area in front of his home for 

collection in accordance with applicable city ordinances governing trash 

collection” does not maintain “a reasonable expectation of privacy in that trash”); 

Ashlock v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.3d 79, 81 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (explaining 

that a local ordinance limiting who can remove trash from receptacles “has no 

bearing on the validity of the search under the Fourth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution”); 

Commonwealth v. Pratt, 555 N.E.2d 559, 567 (Mass. 1990) (“The fact that [a local] 

ordinance allowed only licensed trash collectors to transport garbage does not 

make the defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy any more reasonable.”); 

State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 693–94 (Minn. 2015) (rejecting the dissent’s 

argument that county ordinances regulating garbage disposal strengthen an 
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expectation of privacy in garbage); State v. Brown, 484 N.E.2d 215, 218 (Ohio Ct. 

App. 1984) (per curiam) (“[I]t is unreasonable to suggest that the intent in 

passing the [antiscavenging] ordinance was to impede law enforcement 

authorities in the performance of otherwise lawful investigative activities.”); 

Commonwealth v. Minton, 432 A.2d 212, 217 (Pa. 1981) (explaining the 

defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because an 

antiscavenging township code was for sanitation, not privacy); State v. Stevens, 

734 N.W.2d 344, 347–48 (S.D. 2007) (holding an expectation of privacy in one’s 

trash would be unreasonable because “[w]hile city ordinances may, in some 

cases, be reflective of societal expectations of privacy, they do not manifest such 

an expectation simply because they dictate how persons are to place their trash 

for collection or how the trash is to be collected”). 

Notably, Kuuttila never claimed he relied on the antiscavenger ordinance 

or was even aware of it. The ordinance was enacted to promote sanitation and 

hygiene, not to protect garbage from prying eyes. Indeed, there is no need for an 

antiscavenger ordinance to deter investigators. If the property isn’t abandoned, 

then it is protected by laws prohibiting theft and trespass. If it is abandoned, as 

garbage placed out for collection surely is, then those prohibitions don’t apply. 

In any event, Iowa cities such as Nevada are free to amend their ordinances to 

clarify that police may investigate possible criminal activity by searching garbage 

placed out for collection. And the legislature is free to enact a statute disclaiming 

privacy rights in such trash. 
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This case is also distinguishable from Wright, which involved a garbage 

can used by the defendant alone at his single-family residence. Wright, 961 

N.W.2d at 400–01. By contrast, the trash bins used by Kuuttila were used by 

the occupants of all four apartments in his four-plex. Yet to today’s majority, it 

doesn’t matter whether Kuuttila’s garbage cans were used by him alone, several 

neighbors, or hundreds of others. In my view, we should follow the great weight 

of authority holding that any expectation of privacy is diminished or eliminated 

when the trash receptacles are shared by other people in different households. 

See, e.g., United States v. Maestas, 639 F.3d 1032, 1037–40 (10th Cir. 2011) 

(holding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a garbage storage area 

adjacent to the triplex residence); United States v. Dunkel, 900 F.2d 105, 107 

(7th Cir. 1990) (“Someone who tosses documents into a dumpster to which 

hundreds of people have ready access has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 

the dumpster or its contents.”), vacated on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 747 (1991) 

(Mem); United States v. Michaels, 726 F.2d 1307, 1313 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Other 

tenants, guests, and visitors, perhaps curious about the contents of the trash 

within, could easily have rummaged through the bin. The evidence permits no 

other conclusion than that [the defendant] had no legitimate expectation of 

privacy in the contents of the garbage bags placed in the [apartment complex’s 

communal] trash bin.”); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 798–99 (Alaska 1973) 

(holding there is no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a dumpster 

in a parking area that accommodated several apartments); People v. Harris, 920 

N.Y.S.2d 850, 852 (App. Div. 2011) (“Abandonment is a question of intent and 
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trash disposed of in a communal place where others can access it with the 

understanding that it will be removed by a third party is deemed to be 

abandoned.”); State v. Washington, 518 S.E.2d 14, 16–17 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) 

(holding there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in garbage placed “in a 

communal dumpster in the apartment complex where he resided”); State v. 

Briggs, 756 A.2d 731, 743–44 (R.I. 2000) (holding there is no reasonable 

expectation of privacy for trash deposited in a communal dumpster). Indeed, 

Kuuttila argued at one point that the State failed to show the incriminating 

garbage belonged to him. Accordingly, Wright is inapposite and not controlling 

in this case. 

Our court stands alone in holding discarded trash is an “effect” entitled to 

constitutional protection. I would overrule Wright and affirm the district court in 

this case. 

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 

Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., join this dissent.