U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

75–059 DTP WASHINGTON : 2001

GETTING U.S. AID TO COLOMBIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

OCTOBER 12, 2000

Serial No. 106–276

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman

BOB BARR, Georgia

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

DOUG OSE, California

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

SHARON PINKERTON, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

CHARLEY DIAZ, Congressional Fellow

RYAN MCKEE, Clerk

SARAH DESPRES, Minority Counsel

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C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on October 12, 2000 .......................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana .................................................................................................................. 12

Ford, Jess T., Associate Director, International Relations and Trade

Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Government Accounting Office; Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of

International Narcotics, Department of State; Brigadier General Keith

Huber, Director of Operations, U.S. Southern Command; and Ana

Marie Salazar, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Drug Enforcement Policy and Support .............................................................................. 18

Gilman, Hon. Benjamin, a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York ................................................................................................... 15

Miller, Andrew, acting advocacy director for Latin America and the Caribbean for Amnesty International ............................................................... 77

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Beers, Rand, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics, Department of State, prepared statement of .................................................. 38

Ford, Jess T., Associate Director, International Relations and Trade

Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Government Accounting Office, prepared statement of ......................................... 21

Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Florida, prepared statement of .................................................................... 6

Miller, Andrew, acting advocacy director for Latin America and the Caribbean for Amnesty International, prepared statement of ........................ 80

Sheridan, Brian, Assistant Secretary of Defense, prepared statement of ... 46

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GETTING U.S. AID TO COLOMBIA

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,

AND HUMAN RESOURCES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Mica, Ose, Mink, Cummings, Kucinich,

Tierney, Turner, and Schakowsky.

Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, staff director and chief counsel;

Charley Diaz, congressional fellow; Ryan McKee, clerk; Sarah

Despres and David Rapallo, minority counsels; and Earley Green,

minority assistant clerk.

Mr. MICA. I would like to call the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources to order. Apologize for

those that have been waiting, particularly our first panel of witnesses. But we did have a vote that was scheduled for 1:30, and

then they added another vote, so we were delayed. I appreciate everyone’s forbearance.

The order of business for the hearing today will be that I’ll start

with an opening statement in order to get the hearing underway,

and we will be joined by our minority and majority members. And

then we’ll hear from our first panel. I think we have three panels.

I believe we have three panels today. Today’s hearing deals with

the subject of getting U.S. assistance to Colombia. And this afternoon the subcommittee will, once again, examine the U.S. response

to the growing crisis in Colombia.

In July, the Congress passed a $1.3 billion supplemental aid

package to support Plan Colombia. I voted for the package and the

aid because U.S. assistance is absolutely critical to combating drug

trafficking, and also to maintaining Colombia’s democratic way of

life. But I am very concerned that the Colombian people may not

see any real help for months, even years to come, particularly as

a result of the report that’s going to be released today.

My concerns stem from this administration’s poor track record of

delivering previously authorized counterdrug assistance, aid and

equipment to Colombia. At this subcommittee’s request, the General Accounting Office [GAO], examined the administration’s effort

to date, namely, those efforts of the Department of State and Department of Defense. What they found is not encouraging. As noted

in the title of their draft report, U.S. assistance to Colombia will

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take years to produce results, this is a report that I have here, the

prognosis for future aid delivery is dismal probably at best.

As we enter the 21st century, our hemisphere is facing one of the

greatest challenges to our national security as the situation in Colombia continues to deteriorate. Left unchecked, the narco-terrorist

threat in Colombia has continued to spiral out of control and now

threatens Latin America’s oldest democracy as well as stability in

the region. As the illegal drug trade continues to grow, it fuels

narco-terrorism and undermines legitimate government institution,

and also leads to increasing violence in this region. The impact of

further destabilization of the region will have a devastating impact

on our vital national security interests in that area.

After years of pleading and pressure by House members, the administration finally submitted a Colombian aid proposal to Congress in February of this year. It arrived 7 months after General

McCaffrey sounded the alarm, calling the situation an emergency.

That’s what’s printed here, my staff printed, as I recall. He called

it a flipping nightmare was his quote. And 4 months after the

Pastrana government submitted Plan Colombia, officially asking

the United States for assistance.

Because the U.S. response has been slow to materialize, Colombia now supplies some 80 percent of the world’s cocaine, the vast

majority of the heroin seized in the United States. Furthermore,

over the last several years, there has been an explosion of coca cultivation in Colombia of the recent explosion of opium poppy cultivation in Colombia is equally disturbing. Through DEA’s heroin signature analysis program, we know that Colombia, not the Far

East, and I know this through scientific testing, accounts for 70

percent of the heroin seized on the streets of the United States. All

of these facts point to Colombia as the center of gravity of the drug

supply and line to the United States.

But despite years of congressional pleas for counterdrug assistance to Colombia, countless hearings and intense congressional

pressure, resources approved by Congress have failed to be provided to Colombia in both a timely and also in an effective manner.

First, information sharing was denied in 1994, which, in fact,

turned the situation there into chaos, as my colleague from California Steve Horn so aptly described. As you recall, as of May 1994—

he said this in 1994—‘‘the Department of Defense decided unilaterally to stop sharing real time intelligence regarding aerial traffic in

drugs with Colombia and Peru. Now, as I understand it, that decision, which hasn’t been completely resolved, has thrown diplomatic

relations with the host countries into chaos.’’ That was a comment

by Congressman Steve Horn.

What we’ll have to do is recess the hearing. I’ve got votes. Apologize again. But we’ll continue. I’ll finish my opening statement and

we’ll hold the hearing in recess until we reconvene.

[Recess.]

Mr. MICA. If we could, I’d like to call the subcommittee back to

order. Apologize again for the delay. It appears the subcommittee

is having as much difficulty getting this hearing underway as the

administration is in getting anti narcotics resources to Colombia.

Let me continue, if I may, with my opening statement. I just

cited the chaos that was created by the administration in stopping

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real-time intelligence sharing. In 1996 and 1997, when this administration decertified Colombia without a national interest waiver, it

severely undermined the legitimate drug fighting efforts of General

Serrano and the Colombian National Police, cutting off international military educational money and also critical equipment.

Even worse, today the absence of U.S. intelligence sharing, due

in part to the reduced air coverage after the forced closure of Howard Air Force base in Panama, our counternarcotics efforts in the

region have been even further crippled. Without an adequate contingency plan, there now exists a gap in coverage as the new forward operating locations [FOL’s] come on line, the Commander-inChief for the U.S. southern command testified at one of our hearings earlier that the Department of Defense can only cover 15 percent of key trafficking routes 15 percent of the time. In fact, it may

be after the year 2002 before our anti-surveillance capability has

been fully restored.

The Congress passed a supplemental aid package in July to increase funding for counternarcotics work in Colombia. This wasn’t

the first time we pumped money into counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. Colombia received more than $300 million funding under

the fiscal year 1999 supplemental spending bill passed when Dennis Hastert, now our speaker, was chairman of the drug policy responsibility in a previous subcommittee.

Sadly, less than half of the equipment Congress funded in that

bill has been delivered, or in fact is operational. This administration’s poor track record was the subject of the GAO investigation

which I just cited, and we’ll hear more about it today. This report

concluded that ‘‘the United States has encountered long-standing

problems in providing counternarcotics assistance to Colombian

law enforcement and military agencies involved in counternarcotics

activities.’’ The report went on to say ‘‘these problems continue.’’

The report cites that the Department of State, ‘‘has not provided

enough financial or logistical support to the Colombian National

Police Helicopter Program.’’

This administration has also resisted the congressional efforts to

ensure that needed drug fighting equipment makes it to Colombia

in a timely manner. The administration has fought the Congress

for years on the Blackhawk utility helicopters for the Colombian

National Police, and has a pathetic track record of delivering this

type of assistance. And that type of assistance, incidentally, is the

main part of the package, that $1.3 billion package, at least the

anti-narcotics portion of it. In fact, even three helicopters, which

account for the bulk of aid dollars in fiscal year 1999, when finally

delivered to the Colombian National Police, sat idle for lack of

proper floor armoring and ammunition.

Despite this poor track record, this administration once again requested helicopters this time for the Colombian Armed Forces as

the bulk of aid proposed in their proposal before the Congress this

past February. Given the high cost of these assets, the poor delivery track record by the Department of State and the Office of International Narcotics Matters, I am deeply concerned about committing hundreds of millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars to a program

that has not worked well in the past.

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As chairman of this subcommittee, however, I want to pursue

programs that, in fact, have a proven track record of success.

Complicating the equation is the increased activity by Colombian

rebels, namely, more than 17,000 member narco- terrorist Army

known as the FARC, and the 5,000-plus member ELN. These armies of insurgents now control nearly 40 percent of the Colombian

countryside. The FARC Army has gone largely unchecked and is

now expanding beyond Colombia’s borders. I am deeply concerned

about reports of FARC intrusions into neighboring countries. The

rebels are heavily financed by the illegal drug trade and earned an

estimated $600 million per year from illicit drug activity.

And some of that also is outlined in this report that I think everyone needs to pay some attention to today. The basic tenet of this

administration’s aid package is to use the Colombian military and

Colombian National Police to push into southern Colombia. I know

it, you know it, and the rebels know it. We have been advertising

this fact for over a year now. As a result, the rebels have done two

things: they have fortified their defenses in the area in anticipation

of the Colombian troops, and they are also exploring other areas of

cultivation in and outside Colombia. When I asked about defensive

countermeasure capability to ensure the safety of Colombian security forces and protect our investment, the State Department said

they don’t have definite proof of a surface-to-air [SAM], missile

threat in southern Colombia. But I can tell you that any organization that can build, as we saw just a few weeks ago, a submarine,

pretty complex piece of equipment just a few miles from Bogota, capable of carrying an astonishing 200 tons of cocaine, can certainly

get their hands on surface to air missiles.

One of the points that needs to continually be reemphasized to

the American public is that Colombia matters. It matters both economically and it matters strategically. With 20 percent of the U.S.

daily supply of crude and refined oil imports coming from that area

and with the vitally important Panama Canal located just 150

miles to the north, the national security, and in fact, the economic

implications and in fact, energy implications, which I think we’re

going to see in the next few days with the disruption in the Middle

East, and now this disruption in this oil producing region, the implications to neighboring countries and to the United States are

enormous. For all these reasons, the United States can ill afford

further instability in this region also.

Effective delivery of promised U.S. aid will likely make the difference between success and failure of Plan Colombia. And that responsibility falls squarely on the shoulders of the executive branch,

the Department of State, DOD in particular. This subcommittee

will continue to play a key role in ensuring that the U.S.

counterdrug aid to Columbia is both sufficient, appropriate, and delivered in a timely manner.

Finally, as we face this serious and growing challenge in Colombia, our vital national interests are undeniably at stake. Drug-related deaths, as we have had reported to this subcommittee, drugrelated deaths now exceed homicides in the United States for the

first time in our history. The flow of deadly high purity heroin and

cocaine now flood our streets. The average beginning age of a heroin addict under the Clinton administration has dropped from age

5

25 to age 17. These are startling facts that I believe the fact that

the influx of illegal drugs to the United States is our greatest social

challenge, and most insidious national security threat. I know

many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle share this concern.

The situation in Colombia requires immediate attention, but the

execution of U.S. aid and assistance in Plan Colombia needs to be

carefully considered, especially in light of this administration’s past

track record. This hearing will shed light on their past record as

we look for ways to ensure more timely and effective delivery for

future aid. The lives of hundreds of brave Colombians and the lives

of countless Americans here at home are at stake. With those comments, I am pleased to recognize for the purpose of an opening

statement, the ranking member, the gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs.

Mink.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica follows:]

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Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased that we’re

having this hearing today to learn about the administration’s plans

to implement the massive aid package to Colombia that Congress

voted on earlier this year. It’s absolutely clear that there is a crisis

in Colombia. Colombia is now the world’s leader in coca cultivation,

and the source of 80 percent of the world’s cocaine. At the same

time, armed insurgence groups are increasingly involved in the

drug trade, and the government doesn’t have control over almost

half of the country.

All of this is against a backdrop of a country that has been fighting a civil war for decades. A war that has killed tens of thousands

of people and displaced over a million. Media accounts of human

rights abuses, kidnappings and internal refugees in Colombia have

become all too common. The United States has an interest in seeing this situation in Colombia reverse itself. The drugs that are

grown in Colombia end up on the streets of the United States.

The DEA estimates that 75 percent of the heroin seized in the

United States originates in Colombia. To this end, the U.S. Government has committed $1.3 billion to help the Colombian Government eradicate this drug trade. $1.3 billion is a lot of money. However, I am concerned that the aid we are providing in the form of

military equipment training and personnel will actually get the

United States more involved in the Colombian civil war than it will

deal with the drug problem in the United States. This concern that

I know many of the Members of Congress share must be taken seriously.

The Department of State Inspector General conducted an audit

of the aid programs in Colombia, administered by the State Department. One of the conclusions of that audit was that it was unclear

whether the eradication program today has decreased the supply of

drugs from Colombia and whether this program has had any impact on the U.S. drug market.

This audit also found in the drugs have moved from one region

in Colombia to another and that they now concentrated in southern

Colombia. The Colombian Government has not allowed full scale

access into this region. However the criticism has been made that

even if there were a full scale eradication effort in southern Colombia, the drugs will just move somewhere else, such as Ecuador,

Brazil or Peru. Sadly, this is now becoming a reality.

According to a Washington Post article of October 1, right wing

paramilitary groups as well as left wing insurgence groups from

Colombia have already become a presence in the Ecuadoran border

with Colombia. According to this article, the fighters from Colombia’s right wing militias have been arrested for running extortion

rings in Ecuador, and Colombia’s largest rebel group, the FARC,

easily cross the borders into Ecuador. It’s imperative that we seriously consider the real possibility of unintended consequences of

this aid package, specifically, that we move the drug problem from

one area to another or from one country to another, and that the

United States becomes increasingly involved in the civil war.

I am concerned that there is evidence that these possibilities are

in fact becoming realities. I thank the chairman for holding these

important hearings today. I would like to thank him for agreeing

to our request to invite Mr. Andrew Miller from Amnesty InterVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:24 Oct 10, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75059.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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national to testify this afternoon. I look forward to all the testimony and the witnesses. Thank you very much.

Mr. MICA. Thank the gentlelady. I am pleased now to recognize

the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate

your calling this hearing on getting U.S. aid to Colombia. From

1996 to 2000, Departments of State and the Federals and the U.S.

Agency for International Development have provided at least $761

million in counternarcotics assistance to Colombia. It is fitting,

since Colombia is the world’s leading producer of cocaine and has

become the major source of heroin that has devastated my community in Baltimore. Unfortunately not only are large amounts of heroin coming into my district, but the purity has increased.

According to the DEA’s domestic monitoring program, during the

timeframe of October to December 1999, the average purity of

south American heroin purchased through DNP buys in Baltimore

tested 13.3 percent higher than the national average for that same

timeframe.

The high purity of these drugs has led to overdoses and emergency room visits that have taken a real toll on the health care infrastructure of my community. I strongly believe that we must support efforts to stop drugs from coming into our country. However,

stopping drug abuse addiction and its related crime requires a

three-pronged approach. It must encompass clear balanced and

adequately funded education prevention, treatment, and interdiction strategies.

My constituents have voiced concern about the amount of funding that we are spending toward the interdiction efforts. I also believe that our investments in treatment have not been balanced.

Despite our grave concerns regarding the lack of funding for drug

treatment and allegations of human rights abuses and corruption

by Colombia’s military and police forces, I voted in favor of the supplemental appropriations bill that added to the overall U.S. contribution of $1.3 billion to assist Andreas Pastrana’s $7.5 billion

Plan Colombia.

We were led to believe that after the United States anted up

their portion, European nations and others would follow suit and

largely fund critical economic and social programs. Unfortunately,

that funding has not come forth.

Mr. Chairman, we are dealing with a complex situation.

Pastrana’s government is fighting two major insurgence groups and

a plethora of well-financed and technologically advanced drug trafficking organizations, a combination that has been deadly to both

our nations. Moreover, members in the military forces have been

accused of human rights abuses and corruption. The GAO report

we are going to discuss today has raised more concerns for me. Although they believe that U.S. assistance has helped, they have also

reported that there have been problems with planning, budgeting

and implementation of the $1.3 billion.

Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to the hearing today and to

the testimony so that I can get a better understanding of how we

can make our assistance to Colombia work as efficiently and effectively as possible. We must work to protect our children and famiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:24 Oct 10, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75059.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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lies from the scourge of drug addiction and abuse. Thank you very

much.

Mr. MICA. Thank the gentleman. I would like to recognize the

gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Schakowsky.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I voted against

Plan Colombia, and it’s not because I am against helping Colombia.

I would like to see us put more into strengthening the rule of law

which help Colombian citizens and help promote a peace process

there, and nor is it because I am against our taking aggressive and

bold action against drugs abuse, but I think that the most effective

and proven way to go is for us to spend more in the United States

on the demand side as opposed to the supply side. But the real reason that I opposed the funding for Plan Colombia is the repeated

evidence of human rights abuse and U.S. dollars going to oppress

the people of Colombia.

We have a GAO report that we’re going to be discussing today.

It confirms my initial concerns that, in essence, it says that Plan

Colombia, in my interpretation, is nothing more than a plan to put

all of our eggs in one flawed basket. The ONDCP warns us that

growers are now using higher yielding varieties of coca leaf and

have become more efficient in processing leaves into cocaine. In the

past, our attacks on the drug supply resulted in an adaptation that

left us with a more potent problem than we had before.

Another problem that this report reveals is that Plan Colombia

could simply result in American support for human rights abuses

abroad. The report noted concerns expressed by U.S. Embassy officials that the Colombian National Police does not always provide

documentation about its use of counternarcotics assistance. We’re

begging for trouble. There are many more problems with this effort

that the report revealed. Colombia is not ready to handle their

share of the management of the program. It may take years for Colombia to implement the systems and develop the staff necessary

to take control. Moreover, Colombia has not raised its share of the

funds necessary to successfully prosecute the plan.

I want to call your attention to an article that was in the L.A.

Times on October 11th that says that the massive U.S.-backed

antidrug offensive in Colombia is hitting major funding roadblocks

with European countries refusing to ante up more than $2 billion,

and the Colombians themselves aren’t sure that they have the

means to put up an additional $4 billion. The reluctance of international donors and the seeming inability of the Colombians to

fund the $7.5 billion aid effort, ‘‘leaves the American stepping up

to the plate and everybody else walking away from it,’’ said a senior Clinton administration official. If the Colombians and others

don’t come up with the money soon, the ambitious program could

be limited to the $1.3 billion and largely military assistance from

the United States, which administration officials say cannot put

more than a dent in the country’s powerful drug trade.

In Chicago, there was a hearing of what is called a tribunal of

opinion that was conducted by the Center for International Human

Rights at Northwestern School of Law on September 22nd and

23rd, with very prestigious members of our legal and human rights

community as hearers of testimony. And I’ll tell you I met with a

number of people who lived in a small village of Santo Domingo

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where 7 children and 10 adults were murdered. It was 19 civilians

killed and 25 others injured in Santo Domingo, Colombia on December 13, 1998. And there is credible evidence that U.S. Government funds, which were made available to the Colombian military,

were responsible.

Now, I want to tell you, I met with a mother who showed me pictures of her five children, three of whom are dead as a result of

this bombing. This woman is not a terrorist, she’s not a guerrilla,

she is a woman living with her children in a village that probably

was bombed as a result of U.S. aid to Colombia. I think we need

to step back from this, figure out if we’re really going to achieve

the results that we want. I think we will not. And see if we want

to be complicit in the kinds of atrocities that I think there is growing evidence is happening in Colombia using U.S. taxpayer dollars.

I certainly don’t want to be part of that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady. Additional opening statements? If there are no additional opening statements, Mrs. Mink

moves that the record be left open for a period of 2 weeks for further submissions of statements. Without objection, so ordered. I am

pleased now to recognize two individuals who really need no introduction but make up our first distinguished panel this afternoon.

First is the chairman of our House Government Reform Committee,

we’re a subcommittee of the full committee, and that’s the honorable Dan Burton from Indiana. And the second individual is the

chairman of the House International Relations Committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Gilman. Pleased to recognize the Chair

of our full committee first. I guess that would be the proper order.

You’re recognized and welcome, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Chairman Mica. My daughter right now is in surgery and I’ve got to catch a plane, so I will

submit my full statement for the record as well as exhibits that I

would like to have shown, but I do have to leave. I would just like

to make a couple of points that I think are extremely important.

Chairman Gilman and you and I, Speaker Hastert for the past 4

or 5 years, have been working on the Colombian problem. And I

think it’s important that all the members of the subcommittee and

anybody who’s paying attention really understand the full scope of

the problem. The human rights atrocities that have taken place

down there, Ms. Schakowsky, are wrong. Those have not come at

the hands of the Colombian National Police; it’s been the Colombian military.

One of the problems we have with Plan Colombia is that we’re

giving a disproportionate share of the money to the very people

who have been perpetrating these human rights violations. We

should be giving that money to the Colombian National Police.

Now this was a decision of the administration and the State Department. I don’t know why they’re doing it.

In addition to that, we’re sending helicopters down there finally,

and the people who know how to fly those helicopters are the Colombian National Police. The people who know how to maintain

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those helicopters are the Colombian National Police. Yet the overwhelming amount, a majority of the aid and equipment, is going

down to the people who are perpetuating these human rights atrocities. I don’t understand it.

General Serrano and his successors have pledged to make sure

that they fight this war in as humane a way as possible and protect the civilian population, but that’s not what Plan Colombia is

all about.

Bogota, Colombia, is closer to us right now than it is to Mr. Ose’s

district. That’s how close we’re talking about.

Mr. Cummings said a while ago that the problems in Baltimore

are out of control. Some of his colleagues in the legislative branch

of the city council say that one out of eight people are addicted to

heroin. It is a national tragedy. We’re losing 17,000 people a year

to drug addiction. They’re dying.

Now, we saw just recently an overwhelming outpouring of concern about Firestone tires, 100 people died. And it’s tragic, 100 people. 17,000 are dying a year from drug addiction and overdoses;

and this is a major, major problem. We have to deal with the problem in Colombia as well as here.

I’m for education, as you talked about, Mr. Cummings and Ms.

Schakowsky. I’m for treatment centers. I think that’s important,

too. But you’ve got to go to the source. Can you imagine dealing

with the people who had suffered from the Firestone tragedy by

saying, we’re going to help you folks out, but we’re not going to

deal with the production problem at Firestone. Of course, you have

to go to the source of the problem. We have to go to the source of

the problem in Colombia.

The FARC guerrillas have sanctuary down there right now. They

can go out and attack and kill people. They have taken the Colombian National Police and mayors down there, they have burned

their wives and children alive. They have cut their heads off—talk

about human rights violations—and they played soccer with them

in the town square. They put their heads up on pipes to scare everybody to death. That’s how bad the situation is.

Now, you know there’s a commercial in Indiana that I’ve seen

where a guy is working on a transmission. And—not a transmission but an auto engine. He’s got a Fram oil filter. He says, you

know you can change your oil filter and save your engine. You can

pay me now or pay me later. I really believe that if we don’t deal

with the Colombian tragedy and problem down there now, down

there, we’re going to rue the day we didn’t.

A couple of other things that ought to be thought about.

The largest supplier of oil to the United States that we know is

in an energy difficult situation right now is Venezuela. It’s right on

the border of Colombia. Just yesterday in—was it—where was it—

in Ecuador, we believe, FARC guerrillas flew in there in a helicopter and took five civilians out and made them hostages for ransom. So they’re now going beyond their borders. This whole area

is a tinderbox down there. The people who are running the FARC

guerrillas are Communists who have been working with Fidel Castro for training. This is not baloney. This is a fact. So we really

have to deal with that problem down there.

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The Panama Canal which we used to defend with our military

is defenseless now. The narcotic guerrillas know it is 150 miles

away. So we’ve got a problem with Venezuela as far as our oil supplies. The whole area down there is at risk. Mr. Pastrana, the

President down there, has given sanctuary to the FARC guerrillas

so they can go out and attack and go back in and be protected.

We either help now or we’re going to pay the price later. We’re

going to pay the price probably with more military expenses than

we can visualize today. We may even have American troops down

there, whether we want to or not. Certainly if we don’t deal with

it we’re not going to stem the tide of heroin and cocaine coming

into Baltimore, MD.

So, yes, we need to educate. Yes, we need to have programs to

rehabilitate people where we can. But we’ve got to go to the source

and fight those people and stop the drug production. Because, if we

don’t, it’s going to continue to come in here.

You and I know that the way to get carriers of drugs is at to take

an African American child in Baltimore or some place and they get

him hooked and they make that kid the person who’s going to carry

the drugs and get other people hooked. So as long as the profitability is there and as long as the production is there down in Colombia, they’re going to continue to do that. We’ve got to do something about it.

Now, Mr. Beers, who is here from the State Department, the

Plan Colombia sounded good. Not everything we wanted but it

sounded good at the beginning. Then Chairman Gilman and I at

the International Operations Committee about fell out of our chairs

when we found out they were cutting back the number of helicopters down there. They’re giving most of them to the military

who we know are prepared to use them and who we know is violating the human rights. They’re not giving to the CNP, and they’re

not going to get there until 2002.

Now, they’re going to tell you today they changed that. I’d like

to know—I hope Mr. Beers will tell you why they’re changing that

timetable. But even if they change the timetable, they have to have

competent pilots to fly those planes and mechanics to work on

them, and they don’t in the military. They do in the CNP. So the

State Department and the administration in my opinion needs to

rethink Plan Colombia, take into consideration human rights atrocities and violations and make sure we’re putting the money and the

equipment where it’s going to do good as well as protecting those

women and kids you’re talking about down there.

I’m sorry I didn’t have time to go into my whole statement, but

I think you got the gist of what I feel. Thank you very much.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Burton. Without objection his entire

statement will be made part of the record, and we’ll excuse you at

this time.

Pleased to recognize now the Chair of our International Relations

Committee and also member of our panel, the gentleman from New

York, Chairman Gilman.

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STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Chairman Mica, my colleagues. I want

to thank you for conducting this extremely important hearing on a

vital area, an area vital to our drug war and our Nation’s policy

on elimination of drug abuse. The Clinton administration has been given $1 billion in U.S. taxpayer dollars to help Colombia in our common struggle against illicit drugs, and yet there’s an obvious lack of clarity and direction

coming from the administration about our national policy at this

critical point of implementation of our military aid to Plan Colombia.

Uncertainty can spell serious trouble down the road for our vital

national interests in Colombia. What we need from our policymakers is clarity and strong leadership. A clear, definable and

achievable objective must be articulated regarding our U.S. policy

in Colombia. The policy must be articulated in a manner in which

the American people can readily understand it and, in turn, support it.

Colombia’s democratic survival from the onslaught of narco-terrorism and the destruction of its massive cocaine and heroin production network are important goals in this vital national interest.

We owe our young people and the democratic Colombia Government help in this common, two-prong fight which we cannot afford

to lose. Once the American people understand fully understand

these goals, we’re going to have to convince them that we can and

will achieve success in Colombia.

We recently met with General Gilbar of the Colombian National

Police, and he told us that he sees in sight the achievement of a

goal of a drug-free Colombia. We’ve already done so in part by

helping the Colombian National Police elite anti-drug unit do the

drug fighting job themselves, without expending any American

lives in this not-so-far-off land. Bear in mind Bogota is only 3 hours

away from us from Miami, and what happens there can affect all

of us here in our own Nation.

Colombia does not want, and has never asked for, American

blood to be shed on its battlefields as that beleaguered nation faces

a potential ‘‘narco state’’ status.

If, along with the rest of the world, especially Europe, we help

them with appropriate aid, they can win. So let us be perfectly

clear and let’s not be fooled by that old ‘‘it’s another Vietnam’’ canard some know is trying to sell to the American people.

On the military front, the Colombians have only asked for training and received some of the mechanical means—helicopters, for

example, they don’t want troops—to help them reach parts of their

rugged countryside which is controlled by the narco-guerrillas and

used in producing illicit drugs intended for use by Americans and

by the European continent.

Today, more than 80 percent of the cocaine that enters our Nation, 80 percent, along with 70 percent of the heroin sold or seized

on our streets and destroying our youngsters comes from that remote, inaccessible area of Colombia. We must help them destroy

those drugs so that in turn we know who is financing the self-sufficient insurgency that threatens their very own democracy.

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For years we’ve worked side by side with the elite anti-drug unit

of the Colombian National Police [CNP], to destroy the powerful

Cali and Medillin drug cartels.

Mr. Chairman I don’t know if you had an opportunity to see

the—there was a special documentary the other night. I thought it

was very forceful. I hope that my committee will have an opportunity to see a replay of that. It really showed explicitly the millions of dollars that the drug lords were earning each and every

day from this illicit trade.

These courageous police officers who are fighting the drug war

have suffered nearly 5,000 deaths in their war over a 10-year period—5,000 officers killed. General Serrano, who recently retired,

said he was sick of having to attend the funerals of his close associates.

Just recently, newer organizations controlling 80 percent of the

coca business from Colombia were taken out by the CNP, working

with our own outstanding DEA officers. Just like in our Nation,

drug fighting is a primary law enforcement function in Colombia.

It’s not a military function.

With a few of the new, well-armed, high performance utility helicopters which we recently provided, these courageous drug-fighting

police, the CNP, have destroyed record-shattering areas of coca for

cocaine, along with opium, essential for heroin production.

As a result of these relatively inexpensive police efforts, compared to the billions in annual societal loss here from these illicit

drugs coming from Colombia, we see record high prices for cocaine

with very low purity on our streets today. We’ll soon see the same

disruption with Colombian heroin. This in turn will mean fewer

American children will be able to buy and become addicted or overdose on these kind of deadly drugs.

The Colombian drug traffickers are screaming loudly about the

anti-drug police onslaught with their new drug-fighting equipment

used against their illicit crops which they pay the narco-guerrilla

insurgency so handsomely to protect. We’re making major progress.

The Peruvian Government confirms its progress in Colombian

opium reduction, reports that the Colombian traffickers know is

rapidly expanding opium production in several departments in that

neighboring nation where it was unknown before. We need a Peruvian plan of attack as well for this administration and a better regional game plan or we’ll be headed to failure as they move from

one area to another.

And we need, too, my colleagues, to combine this wise path of

supporting the Colombian police in the fight against drugs. Those

efforts will in turn help drain the swamp of the vast profits from

illicit drugs which in turn finance that civil insurgency that is

threatening Colombian democracy.

I remember when Congressman Rangel and I visited Colombia

many years ago. We visited the plaza in Bogota, and we saw the

Supreme Court which had been burned down by the drug traffickers as they attacked the whole court system and were virtually

holding hostage all of the judges, and they had to go in with tanks

to get them free. These drug traffickers know no bounds. They go

in every direction and attacking a government at its very vital organs is not beyond their means.

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We need to continue the wise path of supporting the Colombian

police in the fight against drugs. Those efforts can help to fight the

civil insurgency that threatens the very basis of Colombia.

Our continued drug-fighting effort will level the playing field. It

will also give the military in Colombia a chance to get its act together. Perhaps 1 day it will enable the military to fight the insurgency on an equal footing, consistent with respect for human rights

just as the CNP anti-drug unit do.

We were informed last week that, instead of the two new

Blackhawks for the CNP that were designated in an emergency

supplemental which we passed earlier this June with a strong vote

in the House, that the administration will fund only one of those

choppers. They tell us they will go back and properly reconfigure

the six operational Blackhawk police choppers down there already,

as they should have been originally, with the $96 million we provided in 1998.

I will not support any reprogramming request to cut the CNP’s

Blackhawk allotment, and I urge our colleagues not to do the same.

It runs counter to the emergency supplemental conference report

explicit language and good common sense. The Colombian drug police who are performing the job need more Blackhawks, not less.

The administration, after years of neglect and in its near panic

about a narco state emerging in Colombia as yet another looming

foreign policy failure, has finally moved to get support for Plan Colombia, which has the strong support of our Speaker and in committee.

Mr. Chairman, I applaud you for your support of all of these efforts. We need to learn from the mistakes made in providing aid

to our CNP allies and to get it right this time, and I look forward

to hearing today from the administration witnesses with regard to

that enormous challenge today.

With regard to the concerns about human rights violations, I

want to remind the committee that in more than 10 years of our

Nation’s assistance to the anti-drug police in Colombia there has

been no credible evidence of any human rights abuse by the

PLANTE, the CNP anti-drug unit.

So, Mr. Chairman, again I thank you for this hearing and for focusing attention on what should be done in Colombia at this very

important junction. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. I thank you, Chairman Gilman; and I applaud your

efforts. We also appreciate your testimony.

You’re also a member of this subcommittee and invite you to join

the panel if you would. I also applaud you for your efforts to seek

peace and resolution not only in this area under consideration

today, Colombia. You’ve done an incredible job and been persistent

for some 6 years now there and in the Mideast, and I know how

frustrated you must feel today with both areas in a state of chaos.

It concerns us all.

But, again, we thank you; and I’ll excuse you at this time.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Let me, if I may, call our second panel of witnesses

today.

They consist of Mr. Jess T. Ford, who’s Associate Director of

International Relations and Trade Issues with the General AcVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:24 Oct 10, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75059.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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counting Office; the Honorable Rand Beers, who is the Assistant

Secretary of the Bureau of International Narcotics under the State

Department; Brigadier General Keith Huber, who is the Director of

Operations for U.S. Southern Command.

And although we have printed Mr. Brian Sheridan, Assistant

Secretary of Defense, he has been called with the current crisis in

the Mideast I believe to the White House; and we have Anna Marie

Salazar, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Drug Enforcement Policy and Support at DOD.

If you all could come forward. This is, as you know, an investigations and oversight subcommittee of the House of Representatives.

In that regard, we do swear in our witnesses. If you would stand.

Raise your right hands, please.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. MICA. The witnesses answered in the affirmative.

We welcome the witnesses. We will be glad to hear your oral testimony.

We’re going to run the clock. Try to limit it to around 5 minutes

if we can. We do welcome any submissions to the subcommittee for

the record, and the entire statement will be made part of the

record upon request.

With that, let me recognize first Mr. Jess T. Ford, Director of the

International Affairs and Trade Issues Office of the General Accounting Office. Mr. Ford, you’re recognized.

STATEMENTS OF JESS T. FORD, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TRADE ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE; RAND BEERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; BRIGADIER GENERAL KEITH HUBER, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND; AND

ANA MARIE SALAZAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

DEFENSE DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT

Mr. FORD. Congressman Mica, Congresswoman Mink and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss

the work you requested on the counternarcotics efforts of the

United States and Colombia. Today I will highlight the preliminary

findings from our ongoing review on U.S. assistance to Colombia.

We plan to issue or report early next week.

I plan this morning this afternoon to discuss three broad issues:

first, how the drug threat has changed in recent years; second, the

problems the United States has had in providing its assistance to

Colombia in the past; and, third, the challenges that the United

States and Colombia face in reducing the illegal drug activities.

In October 1999, the Colombian Government announced a $7.5

billion plan known as Plan Colombia, which among other things

proposes the reduction of cultivation, processing and the distribution of narcotics by 50 percent over the next 6 years. Colombia has

pledged to provide about $4 billion to support the plan and called

on the international community, including the United States, to

provide the remaining $3.5 billion. To assist this effort, in July of

this year, the United States agreed to provide about $860 million

to Colombia for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 in addition to the reguVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:24 Oct 10, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75059.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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lar U.S. assistance program estimated at about $330 million for fiscal year 2000–2001. U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia

has doubled since 1999.

Mr. Chairman, I’m not going to review the threat issue because

it’s already been discussed several times. It’s commonly known that

there’s a major threat in Colombia. It is, in fact, a major producer

of cocaine entering the United States.

I think what I’ll try to focus on is the two main issues related

to our assistance effort. The United States has had longstanding

problems in providing counternarcotics assistance to Colombian

law enforcement and military agencies involved in counternarcotics

activities. Although U.S.-provided assistance such as aircraft, boats

and training has enhanced Colombian counternarcotics capabilities,

it has sometimes been of limited utility because the United States

did not provide spare parts or the funding necessary to operate and

maintain them to the extent possible for conducting counternarcotics operations.

Moreover, the U.S. Embassy has made little progress in implementing a plan to have the Colombian National Police assume

more responsibility for the aerial eradication program which currently requires the assistance of costly U.S. contractors. U.S. Embassy officials also expressed concern that the National Police have

not always provided documentation to show the use of some of the

assistance.

The United States and Colombian Governments face a number of

management and financial challenges in implementing Colombia’s

strategy to reduce cultivation over the next 6 years. Although both

governments are taking actions to address the challenges, at this

point the total cost and activities required to meet the plan’s goals

remain unknown, and significantly reducing drug activities may

take several years.

U.S. aid agencies, including the Department of State, Department of Defense and USAID, are still developing comprehensive

plans for eradication and interdiction activities and alternative development programs. However, negotiating for the manufacture

and delivery of major equipment, such as helicopters, is ongoing

and staffing new programs in Colombia will take time. As a result,

agencies do not expect to have many of the programs to support

Plan Colombia in place until late 2001.

Officials from State and DOD are now determining how the

Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters mandated by the Congress for

Colombia will be equipped and configured. They do not yet know

if the funding plan for fiscal year 2000 and 2001 to support Plan

Colombia will be sufficient. In addition, State officials have begun

planning for funding in fiscal year 2002 and beyond to continue the

plan. While estimates have not been completed, these officials have

stated that substantial funding may be needed.

Colombia is relying on international donors in addition to the

United States to fund Plan Colombia. But much of the support has

yet to materialize. To date, the Colombian Government has not

shown that it has the detailed plans and funding necessary to

achieve these goals.

Colombia faces continuing challenges associated with its political

and economic instability fostered by its longstanding insurgency

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and the need for the police and the military to comply with human

rights standards.

As evidenced by past U.S. counternarcotics assistance programs,

the United States has not always provided the necessary support

to operate and maintain the equipment to the extent possible to

help counter the illegal drug activities. If these problems continue,

the dramatic increase in U.S. support for Plan Colombia may not

be used in the most effective way. At a minimum, if the United

States and Colombia do not follow through with their commitments

under Plan Colombia and the international donor community does

not support appeals for additional assistance, Plan Colombia may

not be able to succeed as envisioned.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I’ll be happy to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Ford. We will withhold questions until

we have heard from all of the panelists.

I would like to recognize Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of the

Bureau of International Narcotics, Department of State. Welcome,

and you are recognized.

Mr. BEERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Mink

and other members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak today. I will offer a brief oral statement at this

point in time and focus on the implementation of our U.S. Government assistance to Plan Colombia, a broad-gauged, multifaceted effort by the Colombian Government to deal with counternarcotics

trafficking, economic development and government capacity.

Since the emergency supplemental for Colombia was passed and

signed into law in July, United States and Colombian planners

have worked together to develop a comprehensive plan for the implementation of our $1.3 billion. The result is a comprehensive

Interagency Action Plan that defines the implementation of our

support to Colombia’s counternarcotics effort and provides a mechanism to coordinate the various elements of our aid, particularly regarding eradication and alternative development.

With the Government of Colombia’s planning document in hand,

U.S. Government agencies are now refining their draft implementation plans. In an interagency action plan the Government of Colombia has laid out an organizational structure which will assist in

coordinating the counternarcotics programs with the other elements of Plan Colombia. Representatives of the Colombian police,

the military, PLANTE, the agency which administers alternative

development programs, and the social security agency will coordinate with mayors and Governors at the local and regional level.

They will work under the supervision of a national technical committee consisting of representative governmental ministries such as

PLANTE, Social Security and the security community. U.S. Embassy representatives will coordinate with this committee and at

the local levels with the Embassy’s Military Group, Narcotics Affairs Section, Drug Enforcement Administration personnel addressing counternarcotics matters. The Colombian technical committee

in turn will report to an interagency Colombian Government body

at the vice ministerial level, and finally to the heads of the ministries involved. Senior members of the Embassy country team will

handle bilateral issues at this level.

U.S. representatives will coordinate operational issues within the

Embassy and with lead responsibility for specific projects generally

falling to those agencies responsible for the project’s funding.

The initial 2-year phase of the Interagency Action Plan focuses

on southern Colombia. It will start with the rapid expansion of social programs and institutional strengthening. Interdiction efforts

will follow shortly thereafter, and eradication efforts will commence

by the end of the year. Alternative development and other programs to strengthen local communities will expand into neighboring regions where counternarcotics programs will continue regionally.

During the first phase, these regional efforts will be accompanied

at the national level by public outreach and programs meant to

prepare for the eventual expansion of the programs nationwide.

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Eradication in Putumayo will be conducted in two ways: In the

areas dominated by small-scale cultivation of 3 hectares or less per

farm, while voluntary eradication agreements, sometimes referred

to as community pacts, will be concluded with the Government of

Colombia and the individual communities, through this program

small farmers will be given the opportunity to eradicate their illegal crops voluntarily as part of their development projects. Aerial

eradication will continue to be important in the more remote areas

of Putumayo, where large agribusiness coca plantations dominate

the landscape and represent the largest area of cultivation in that

troubled province.

After the first 12 months of the eradication campaign in

Putumayo, those communities in the alternative development area

that have not opted to participate in the voluntary eradication program will be subject to possible aerial eradication. While eradication is getting under way, a Putumayo-focused interdiction effort

will also be launched to disrupt the supply of important precursor

chemicals into the region and the shipment of cocaine base and

processed cocaine out of the region.

Another principal activity will be the dismantling of processing

labs. These activities should decrease the revenue potential of coca

in the target area. When combined with the increased expense of

time and money caused by eradication, the resulting distortions in

the Putumayo coca market should encourage growers to abandon

the crop as a source of income.

An essential element of the interdiction efforts in southern Colombia will be the Colombian Army’s counternarcotics brigade.

While funding for its training and support was contained in the

supplemental appropriation, our greatest contribution to the brigade, both in terms of the dollar amount and operational need, is

helicopter lift.

We are complying with the legislative mandate to purchase UH–

60 Black Hawks through the DSCA, which provided us in the interagency community in September with the delivery estimates. These

original delivery estimates that, by the Army’s own admission,

were conservative indicated that the Brigade’s Black Hawks would

begin to arrive in Colombia in October 2002, with all of the scheduled aircraft to be in Colombia by May 2003. These dates were

based on worst-case assumptions that the contract would not be

signed until April, and that the first aircraft would be completed

18 months later.

I am pleased to report today, as we have indicated to committee

staffs earlier, that we have worked out a deal with Sikorsky, with

DSCA and with the Government of Colombia to establish a new

timetable that, depending upon having the contracts signed no

later than December 15th, will put all of the UH–60’s in Colombia

in 2001, with the first helicopters arriving in Colombia at the beginning of July 2001.

We currently expect the Brigade’s contingent of Huey II helicopters to be fully fielded within 2 years with the first aircraft arriving in mid-2001. These are current contractor estimates, and as

was the case with the UH–60’s, the delivery schedule may change

as details are finalized, but we expect, and we have spent a great

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deal of time on this, that these are accurate and will be the final

dates.

The exact delivery dates for all of the aircraft have not been as

precisely determined as the Black Hawks, but the aircraft will follow as quickly as possible. With respect to the Huey IIs, they will

follow those Huey IIs that are planned for the Colombian National

Police, and I am pleased to report that we have already signed the

contract with Bell and have taken delivery of the first Huey II kits

in order to ensure that the police have their helicopters as quickly

as possible. The Government of Colombia has committed itself to

making an effort to resolve that country’s problems. With our as- sistance package of $1.3 billion, the United States has pledged

much-needed support. While teams in both countries continue to

plan and adjust operational modalities, the implementation process

is now under way, and I am confident of the success of these programs and Plan Colombia, and I look forward to working closely

with this Congress, which has been supportive of this effort, as we

continue to address these critical issues.

This concludes my statement, and I am prepared to answer questions.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. We will withhold questions unless we have

heard from the other witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beers follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Next we have Anna Marie Salazar, Deputy Assistant

Secretary for Defense. Welcome, and you are recognized.

Ms. SALAZAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

committee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify on the

Department’s role on the support of U.S. assistance to Plan Colombia. Unfortunately Mr. Sheridan wanted me to pass on his regrets

for not being here this afternoon, and I ask that his written statement be submitted for the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, so ordered.

Ms. SALAZAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know it has

been a pretty rough day at the Department of Defense today, and

due to the tragic attack on the USS Cole, the Secretary of Defense

has asked Mr. Sheridan and required his presence at the Department of Defense. However, he did ask me to share briefly his

thoughts with you.

A couple of points in regards to the implementation of the supplemental in general. First, as Mr. Sheridan has testified previously on the Hill, I believe about five times in the last year, execution of Plan Colombia will be a challenge because of the extent

and the complexity of the package. There will be setbacks. However, many of our initial estimates on the program and implementation of the program, as we have provided in his written testimony, are by nature conservative, but this is a sound plan. It is

responsive to our Colombian counterparts, and it is worth doing,

and we will continue to work very closely with the interagency in

order to ensure fast implementation of the program.

With that said, the Department has moved quickly in the execution of the program where existing contracts supported such actions, and, as an example, the President signed the bill on July 13.

Mr. Sheridan signed the Department’s implementation of Plan Colombia on July 24th. Three days later on July 27, the U.S. Army

7th Special Forces Group commenced its training of the second Colombian counternarcotics battalion. Another example is we are in

discussions with the Colombians to see if they will have individuals

available so we can start training helicopter pilots beginning November 1.

So in the areas where we can move fast, where there is existing

contracts, and where there is Colombian availability and individuals to train, we will rapidly implement.

With respect to the GAO report, we agree with the general comments in the draft report, and we have provided formal responses

to the GAO. As I just stated, execution of supplemental programs,

including delivery of the associated support, will be a challenge.

This is not a surprise. We are continuing to look at the 506 drawdown process with a focus on improving the delivery of

counterdrugs support, and we are working closely with the State

Department.

That being said, equipment availability will continue to be problematic as the Department does not have large inventory of some

of the equipment being requested by our Colombian counterparts.

The supplemental has provided the State Department and Department of Defense with funding and authorities to contract out the

purchase of much of the equipment required by the Colombians,

and as a general rule contracting for new equipment will be much

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more efficient than using a 506 drawdown since we can go directly

to the source and not depend on existing military inventories for

equipment that may or may not exist or we may not have sufficient

quantity.

With that, I will conclude my remarks. I thank you for your attention, and I look forward to answering any questions.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheridan follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Did you have a statement, General Huber?

General HUBER. No, Mr. Chairman, I did not. I read Mr. Sheridan’s statement. He covered the DOD responsibilities. I would like

to make a few comments with your permission.

Mr. MICA. Please proceed.

General HUBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

committee, for this invitation and privilege to be present before you

in this very important meeting.

I would like to say that my lane of responsibility is fairly narrow,

as you recall, Mr. Chairman, from visiting Southern Command

headquarters in Miami. As the Director of Operations I supervise

the equipping and the training of the counternarcotics brigade. We

concluded with the first battalion last December. We are currently

in progress with the second battalion. We began at the end of last

month the training of the brigade staff, and we project the training

of the third battalion to begin in late January, and I am eager to

answer any questions that you might have that fall into my operational role as the Director of Operations at Southern Command.

Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

We will proceed now with questions.

First of all, Mr. Ford, let me just go over the report with you.

A couple of the points, on page 3, first of all, you gave examples

that the helicopters that the Department of State provided to the

Colombian National Police did not have sufficient spare parts or

the funding necessary to operate and maintain them; is that correct?

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir. We have identified several cases since 1998.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Beers, is that still the situation, or do you have

that corrected?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, there are two issues here to look at. I am not

in disagreement that there are some spare part shortages, but

there are input functions and output functions. With respect to the

output function, which is the operational readiness rate of the Colombian National Police, Colombian National Police helicopters

continue to operate at a 70 percent operational readiness rate,

which is not at all out of line with the normal operational readiness

rate of the U.S. military. So without denying that there are some

spare parts shortages, they are still flying those planes.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Ford, page 3, moreover the U.S. Embassy has

made little progress implementing a plan to have Colombian National Police assume more responsibility for the aerial eradication

program; is that the case? Through when? Through 1999?

Mr. FORD. Beginning late 1998, the narcotics affairs section at

the Embassy developed a plan to turn over the aerial eradication

program over to the National Police. It was meant to be a 3-year

effort. The current U.S. contractors down there, I believe, were supposed to help train the Colombians so that they could take over

that role. Basically I guess the issue has been overcome by events.

Given that Plan Colombia, it is a secondary priority there.

Mr. MICA. What is the situation, Mr. Beers? Is this correct as addressed?

Mr. BEERS. The facts are correct, sir. With respect to the nationalization effort, we began discussions with the Colombians in

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roughly that timeframe. We have had some modest transition in respect to the opium poppy effort where we have transferred six aircraft and essentially supported the Colombian National Police in

the opium poppy eradication effort; but with respect to the coca effort, that transition has not occurred.

We have an issue of the balance of using funds between a continuation of the current effort and a shift from the current effort

to a Colombian effort, and the funds were simply not available to

continue the eradication effort and also at the same time begin the

process of the transition to the Colombian National Police. I wish

that we had that funding. We did not, and so it has not happened.

Mr. MICA. Well, the GAO report also says State planning documents indicate it has not budgeted funds to train pilots and mechanics, provide logistical support and support the operations of

certain U.S.-provided helicopters. Mr. Ford, how current is that?

Mr. FORD. Well, the most current case is really a funding issue

having to do with the transfer of I believe it was 18 Huey–1N helicopters which were intended to support the counternarcotics battalion.

Mr. MICA. That was as of?

Mr. FORD. They were delivered between November and, I believe,

March 2000 with the intent that they would be used by the battalion by late April or early May. However, State basically ran out of

funds, and they basically had to put the program in abeyance.

Mr. MICA. Why didn’t we reprogram money to take care of this

situation, Mr. Beers?

Mr. BEERS. We did not reprogram money because we were waiting for the supplemental to be funded. We had reason to believe

from the early consultations in January and February when the

plan was proposed that the funding would be available. We had

programmed the 1N program on top of previously programmed

moneys, so it was an additive program. When the funding was not

available, we did not have the funding available within the overall

program.

Mr. MICA. So, General, you had your battalion trained, one battalion trained?

General HUBER. That is correct.

Mr. MICA. Were they deployed?

General HUBER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, although they had to use

ground mobility means. They did receive some support from the

National Police helicopters, but that first battalion located at Tres

Esquinas—— Mr. MICA. When was their training finished?

General HUBER. Last December.

Mr. MICA. When were they first deployed?

General HUBER. They were deployed in ground operations immediately at the conclusion of training. They have not simply stayed

put at Tres Esquinas.

Mr. MICA. Do you have the air capability to move them around

yet?

General HUBER. No, sir, we do not.

Mr. MICA. OK, thank you.

Let me ask this question, if I may. Someone told me that they

are going to start training pilots November 1, begin training heliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:24 Oct 10, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75059.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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copter pilots. Now, in the report that GAO supplied, they had

trained helicopter pilots, and then they laid them off; is that correct?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir, that is correct. We had trained the pilots.

They are a combination of contract and army, Colombian Army, pilots.

Mr. MICA. Do we have them—but then they were laid off. Now

we are training new pilots beginning November 1?

Mr. BEERS. No, they were rehired beginning late September.

They have basically been retrained now, and they will be deploying

to southern Colombia with the first eight of the 1Ns for training

activities in Larandia in the latter half of October.

Mr. MICA. So we have trained pilots?

Mr. BEERS. For the 1N, sir.

Mr. MICA. How long will it take to train them for the Black

Hawks?

Mr. BEERS. We have talked with the various training sources,

and they will be available no later than the first of July for all of

the Black Hawks, sir.

Mr. MICA. Trained?

Mr. BEERS. Trained pilots and mechanics.

Mr. MICA. We want to make sure that if we have Black Hawks

next July, that we have pilots.

Mr. BEERS. Absolutely.

Mr. MICA. I am very concerned about putting these—this equipment, particularly the helicopters, they are pretty expensive, and

not having adequate defense, whether it is armor, which some were

delivered without, and now I am concerned about the surface-to-air

missile threat. Is there such a threat, Ms. Salazar?

Ms. SALAZAR. We don’t have any confirmed information.

Mr. MICA. Do you think that it is possible? People who can build

a submarine a couple of miles from Bogota, would it be possible for

them to acquire surface-to-air missiles?

Ms. SALAZAR. As we have stated in the past, it would not surprise us.

Mr. MICA. General, do you feel that the equipment that is being

ordered for the new equipment, the Black Hawks in particular, is

sufficient to deter, say, a missile attack?

General HUBER. Sir, the State Department’s configuration of

those helicopters has indeed applied the proper measures to defeat

surface-to-air missiles.

Mr. MICA. That is not what I am told.

Mr. BEERS. Sir, that is current information. It may not have been

when you were told that, but the configuration which we described

has two features on it.

Mr. MICA. We won’t get into that in public, but I do want to sit

down and be briefed on that. I am very concerned that we have an

incident where this equipment which was sent down there to do

the job is not capable of defending itself from an attack.

Mr. BEERS. We will be happy to brief you in private, sir.

Mr. MICA. Let me defer at this point to the gentlewoman from

Hawaii.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The whole idea of this

particular method of addressing our drug problem in the United

62

States is very confusing and perplexing. I have every confidence

that the moneys having been provided to you for the specific purposes as outlined in the appropriation bill will be fully and competently expended for the purposes intended. So I have no intention to question when you are going to do it and how, and the fact

that it will be done as quickly as you humanly can get it in place

as intended.

I have no question with respect to the overall goals of Plan Colombia, which is to reduce the cultivation, processing and distribution of narcotics by 50 percent over 6 years—it is a laudable goal— and the request made by the Colombian Government to the United

States to participate in it, and to that extent the U.S. Congress has

appropriated $1.3 billion for that effort. My question really to the

entire panel is over the years of our concern about Colombia and

its importance with reference to our drug problem in the United

States, would you be able to say that the expenditures of the funds

thus far allocated to various segments of the U.S. Government

have been effective in curbing the market of these drugs within the

United States? And if not, why not?

Mr. BEERS. I will start, if I may. I think it is important in first

asking the question to talk about the coca problem not as a Colombian-only problem, but to talk about it as a regional problem. The

ability to supply the United States with coca is an Andean problem, it is not just a Colombian problem. It has become focused in

Colombia as a result of some successes in Peru and Bolivia, and I

think that those successes are noteworthy, and I think that those

successes overall still balance out in the affirmative with respect to

the overall success in the region as opposed to the dramatic increase of coca cultivation.

Mrs. MINK. In the successes of Peru and Bolivia, to what extent

was U.S. policy responsible for the successes that those two countries enjoyed?

Mr. BEERS. U.S. policy has been in support, but none of these

programs and policies and efforts work without the cooperation of

the host government concerned; and in both countries we had governments willing to deal with this problem and to go after it and

to do it successfully.

We have had some difficulty in Colombia in years past, despite

the efforts of the Colombian National Police, but I believe we have

now a Government in Colombia of like mind to the Governments

in Peru and in Bolivia.

With respect to the issue of the effect of the drug flow in the

United States, I cannot report to you that the overall success in the

Andean region has had the same direct effect within the United

States because the United States is also not the only drug market

in the world for cocaine use. And the ability of the traffickers to

produce drugs and supply markets around the world is a pretty effectively managed illegal industry, and while I think it is fair to

say that drugs have dropped within the United States over the last

certainly 20 years from the worst period in the late 1970’s, I am

not going to try to assert to you that there is a direct relationship

between the last 5 years of government assistance in Colombia or

even in the Andean region for the decreases in drug use within the

United States.

63

But I do believe that our effort on the supply reduction side together with our effort on the demand-reduction side are two parts

of a whole, both of which require the support of the U.S. Government, and only through both of which will we be successful.

Mrs. MINK. What is the real, honest expectation that we can convey to the American people that this particular involvement of the

United States in the Plan Colombia will yield the successes as we

want to see them in the United States, and that is to reduce the

supply?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, ma’am, I think this is the best opportunity that

the United States and the world will ever have to deal with the cocaine problem. We have for the first time—and I have been working in this area for 12 years through three administrations in the

State Department and at the White House, and I believe that

through the position of the three Andean coca-producing countries,

together with the United States, we have the best opportunity we

will ever have, and that the goal of reduction of coca in Colombia

by 50 percent over the next 5 years is a reasonable goal. It is exactly parallel to the already successful effort that has occurred in

Peru. It is slightly less heroic than the effort that has occurred in

Bolivia, which that same level of 50 percent has occurred in 21⁄2

years, but it is also a tougher environment in Colombia. I think

this is the best opportunity we will ever have. And that will show

an effect in the United States.

Mrs. MINK. The helicopters that are being built and transferred

to Colombia, exactly to whom are they being delivered? Under

whose management authority will these helicopters be flying and

for what purpose?

Mr. BEERS. There are two groups of helicopters in the general

sense. Some will go to the National Police, and some will go to the

Colombian Army. A few planes, not helicopters, will go to the Colombian Air Force. The title for those planes will all be retained by

the State Department, as is customary in these situations for counternarcotics purposes under the legislation under which you have

authorized us to proceed.

With respect to the Colombian Army, an organization which the

State Department has not supported in the past, we are moving together with the Department of Defense, together with U.S. Southern Command, to make available to the Colombian Army up to 16,

but it will probably be 13 or 14, Black Hawk helicopters, and up

to 30, but it may not be that many, Huey II helicopters and 33

UH–1N helicopters. The ability for the Colombian Army to be able

to have a fully air-mobile counternarcotics brigade and the first

ability to do that lift will be before the end of 2001.

With respect to the Colombian National Police, we will be providing one or two Black Hawk helicopters and 9 to 12 Huey IIs, in

addition to the already existing Colombian National Police aircraft

inventory, which includes Black Hawks and Huey IIs. They will be

to support the Colombian National Police operations on a national

basis.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady.

Let me yield now to Mr. Gilman, the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the

panelists for coming here today to give their expert opinions.

64

Let me first address a question or two to Mr. Beers.

Mr. Beers, the antidrug police in Colombian have the urgent

need, plus the pilots and the mechanics and infrastructure, to at

this time, at this very important moment, to support two Black

Hawks in the Plan Colombia emergency supplemental. The Army

does not have such capacity. We are hoping that you will work to

ensure that the first two, whatever total Black Hawks you agree

on for Colombia, will go to the police. It will make sense when

some of us are having trouble trying to decipher what the administration is doing with the Plan Colombia funds. So can I have your

assurance that you will work in that direction?

Mr. BEERS. I can’t give you my assurance that the first two Black

Hawks will go to the Colombian National Police. We will certainly

take your view into account. We have not decided yet on the final

configuration of the two Black Hawks for the police. We have decided on the final configuration for the Black Hawks for the Colombian Army. That does not mean that the first two cannot be delivered to the police. We will have to bring all of that into account.

We will have all of the Black Hawk helicopters delivered to Colombia, Army and police, before the end of calendar year 2001, in the

third quarter essentially.

Mr. GILMAN. Before 2001 in the third quarter?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. When will your first delivery take place?

Mr. BEERS. July 1, 2001. That is the earliest possible date that

Sikorsky can provide the helicopters. This is a delivery date that

is faster than the delivery date that the administration offered to

the Congress when we presented the original plan in February

2001, not having anything to do with the fact that it took another

6 months to pass the supplemental.

Mr. GILMAN. I think it is abominable to have to wait that long

when they are confronted with such a critical problem, and I hope

you will try to expedite that delivery and make certain that the delivery goes to the people who need them the most. They need these

Black Hawks. I hope that you will take a good hard look at that,

Mr. Secretary.

The State Department recently turned down a CNP for night vision goggle training on one of its Black Hawks by the Colombian

Army at no cost to our government. Why would we not want the

CNP to maximize the use of the Black Hawks at night as well by

giving them that kind of training?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, thank you for that question. That is a very good

question. The reason, the effort, the focus, of our effort is to do

what you want us to do, and one pilot in one plane does not make

a night-capable effort. Our effort is directed at training the Black

Hawk pilots, plural, for the Colombian National Police, and we are

engaged in a program to provide the Colombian National Police

with a Black Hawk pilot night vision capability.

I will give you a full report on that as soon as we and the Colombian National Police have agreed to how we are going to do that.

But it is the entire Black Hawk pilot fleet and not one pilot, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. We are not asking one pilot, we are asking that it

provide the training.

Mr. BEERS. That is what I am talking about, sir.

65

Mr. GILMAN. Pilots need that training to do their work.

Mr. BEERS. That is our objective.

Mr. GILMAN. The Colombian Army General Montoya, who is in

charge of the push into southern Colombia, recently told our committee staff that he couldn’t get any defensive weapons other than

an ineffective M–60 machine gun to protect his troops in our counternarcotics choppers. He cited the Leahy amendment as the reason. In addition, he told our staff, even these M–60’s, which at best

might scare the birds away, all burned up during the counternarcotics battalion training. Are we going to send the Army counternarcotics battalions who are trained into combat against the

FARC, who are waiting and know they are coming, without adequate defensive weapons like an MK–44 minigun to protect both

them and our choppers? Isn’t this a disaster waiting to happen?

General HUBER. Mr. Gilman, that is outside of my operational

lane. As to the configuration of the lethal aid—— Mr. GILMAN. Who is responsible for that? Is that Ms. Salazar?

Ms. Salazar, how do you respond to that?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes, thank you, Mr. Gilman.

As you know, the Department of Defense does not have authorities to allow us to purchase lethal aid. And in conversations with

our Colombian counterparts, we are providing the necessary equipment for the counterdrug battalions.

Mr. GILMAN. Doesn’t the statute provide for protection of the assistance that we provide?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes, but it very specifically states that we cannot

provide lethal aid. Our statutes prohibits us from doing that. In the

past you will find that you will not be able to provide lethal aid.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Beers, go ahead. What about proper protection?

You are sending this equipment down and—you don’t give them decent weapons.

Mr. BEERS. The authority rests with the Department of State.

We, together with U.S. Southern Command, not General Huber’s

portion of Southern Command, but the planning side of U.S. Southern Command, and the Colombian Army have had an ongoing configuration discussion with one another from May until August to

decide on what the armament ought to be for the aircraft.

Mr. GILMAN. What have you decided?

Mr. BEERS. It ought to be the M–60 machine gun and the MK– 44. Sir, this is agreed to by the Colombian Army and the best military experts in the U.S. military. This is not a State Department

decision.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Beers, is the M–60 an effective defensive weapon?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, this is the judgment of the military professionals

of two armies.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, that is not the opinions that we are receiving,

and I hope that you will take another look at it. They find that the

M–60’s are ineffective, and they burned out on use.

Ms. Salazar, who is in charge of U.S. military assistance in the

Colombian Army? Is it your office or Mr. Beers?

Ms. SALAZAR. We work closely with the U.S. Department of

State.

Mr. GILMAN. But who is in charge?

66

Ms. SALAZAR. We have the policy—the policy guidance over the

programs, but, as you know, much of the authorities and the funding comes from the Department of State.

Mr. GILMAN. But who makes the decisions with regard to the

kind of equipment, the military equipment?

Mr. BEERS. The military does, sir. The U.S. military does. We

provide the money. They provide the decision process.

Mr. GILMAN. Who in the U.S. military makes that decision?

Mr. BEERS. It is Assistant Secretary Sheridan in consultation

with the Chief of U.S. Southern Command.

Mr. GILMAN. General Huber, are you consulted with regard to

that?

General HUBER. Yes, sir. All of the general officers in Southern

Command have the ability to provide input as to the effectiveness

of equipment purchases.

Mr. GILMAN. General Huber, who decided to put the M–60’s on

the Hueys?

General HUBER. Sir, I cannot answer that question. I was not involved in that discussion.

Mr. GILMAN. Who would be?

General HUBER. My understanding of that discussion, specifically

as Mr. Beers stated, it was a combination of the people who are

going to use the platform, the Colombian military, as well as the

requirements strategy portion, Major General Soligan at Southern

Command.

Mr. GILMAN. Major General Soligan?

General HUBER. Yes, sir. He was involved in that discussion as

well.

Mr. GILMAN. In your opinion, is the M–60 a good defensive weapon?

General HUBER. Sir, I have had this discussion with Brigadier

General Montoya, and he and I differ on that opinion. The M–60,

when properly utilized and maintained, is an effective defensive

weapon.

Mr. GILMAN. Did General Montoya say it was ineffective?

General HUBER. I will ask him that question next week.

Mr. GILMAN. Would you please do that so we have good defensive

weapons for this expensive equipment?

Mr. Ford, in July the State IG reported that NAS in Colombia

didn’t consult with the CNP on the configuration of helicopters we

provided them. Has that changed today?

Mr. FORD. I can’t speak for the IG. I have seen the report. They

did, in fact, report that there were communication problems between the NAS and the police; and beyond that, I don’t have any

expertise in terms of where they got their information.

Mr. GILMAN. Is that a problem that can be straightened out?

Mr. FORD. I don’t see why not. It is a matter of communications.

They ought to be able to handle it.

Mr. GILMAN. Would you be able to handle it?

Mr. FORD. I will be happy to pass it on. I am not the State IG.

Mr. GILMAN. Is that Mr. Beers again?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.

67

Sir, I think that the report accurately stated that there were

some problems of consultation. I firmly believe that those problems

have been corrected.

I believe that the Black Hawk helicopters which you authorized

and appropriated for us to buy did involve full consultations. I can

assert absolutely that the Black Hawks that the Army and the police are currently discussing involve full consultations, as do all of

the other aircraft in Plan Colombia.

Mr. GILMAN. It is gratifying to hear that, and I hope with all of

this bureaucracy involved in trying to provide a proper offense

against narcotics traffickers, you will work together to make sure

that we have the most effective equipment and effective supplies

to go to the people who are there on the front line.

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Ms. Schakowsky.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Beers, I am wondering if you have any written response, or

the State Department does, to the GAO report, because after listening to Mr. Ford and then listening to you, it is as if you didn’t hear

him, or everything was going along hunky-dory, and I am wondering if the Department of Defense—Ms. Salazar, you said there are

written responses to the GAO report. Does the State Department

have a written response?

Mr. BEERS. We commented on some of the elements of the GAO

report. We welcome the opportunity for investigative organizations

such as the GAO and the State IG to help us do a better job. We

think that this was done in that spirit.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I am wondering if we can all get copies of your

responses that you do have.

Mr. BEERS. You certainly may.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I am concerned about three things that I want

to briefly ask about: the cost; the number of Americans involved;

and human rights abuses. It concerns me that neither the international donors or Colombia itself is coming up with their share,

it seems, of the $7.5 billion for Plan Colombia, but what I want to

know is if they don’t, do you foresee a request for yet more money

and a larger share of the burden being funded by our U.S. taxpayers?

Mr. BEERS. I think that it is fair to say that the Government of

Colombia has provided some—remember it is a 3-year program

when they estimated it was $7.5 billion, and we are only in the

first year of that program. So it is premature——

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. If they don’t come up with the money, do you

foresee us paying for more of it?

Mr. BEERS. We will be back to the Congress, and we never said

that we wouldn’t be back to the Congress independent of all of the

other assumptions in a 2002 request which will be for additional

money to support Plan Colombia. The money that is already in the

fiscal year 2001 budget in both the Department of Defense and

State Department budget is also supportive of Plan Colombia. So

there will be more requests for money to support Plan Colombia.

This is not even a 3-year program, it is a 5-year program.

68

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Will that amount that is requested be impacted by what the Europeans do or what—do or don’t do or what

the Colombians do or don’t do?

Mr. BEERS. It will be impacted by all of the factors that are relevant, and that is one of them.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I am concerned about the number of Americans involved. I want to quote you from an article that appeared

in the Chicago Tribune on September 24 of this year. It starts,

‘‘The hotshot pilot swoops down at 200 miles per hour in his Vietnam-era crop duster gliding 50 feet over the coca field valleys he

has been hired to destroy. For now he is part of a growing civilian

army hired by Uncle Sam to help fight Colombia’s war on drugs to be financed largely by the $1.3 billion in U.S. aid. While there are

limits to the number of U.S. military people who will be involved

in training Colombian troops, there are fewer restrictions on how

many U.S. civilians can be hired by military contractors. ‘Every pirate, bandit, everyone who wants to make money on the war, they

are in Colombia,’ said one Congressional aide in Washington. He

described efforts to snare contracts as a free-for-all. ‘This is what

we call outsourcing a war,’ he said, referring to the use of freelance

help.’’ Then it says, ‘‘It is difficult to predict how many Americans will

become part of the Colombian conflict, up to 100 special forces.

Navy SEALS already are teaching Colombia’s counternarcotics battalions. U.S. workers are operating ground radar stations. Civilian

coca-spraying crews provide aircraft maintenance at Colombian

bases. On any given day, 150 to 250 Americans are helping in Colombia’s drug war. That number will go to 500 U.S. military personnel and 300 civilians under new caps that can be increased by

the President.’’ I am wondering that we as Americans ought to be concerned

about this growing number and the extent to which this civilianpaid Army is a presence in Colombia; and what, if anything, we are

going to need to do, as Representative Gilman was asking, to protect them?

Mr. BEERS. The Department of Defense has programs of its own,

and I will only speak to the State Department and the Justice Department, since they are also part of this effort and are not here.

We have in Colombia, in support of efforts that preceded Plan

Colombia and that will continue into Plan Colombia, aircraft, a

number of aircraft, some of which are flown by American pilots, but

not all; some of which are maintained by American mechanics, but

not all. Those will continue until we have completed the training

process and turned this over to the Colombian National Police in

order to ensure that we have a continuous and strong effort to deal

with the eradication side.

That is one element of the overall U.S. contractor, and I am not

talking about Federal Government employees, I am only talking

about contractors that will be involved.

In addition to that, USAID, in support of programs which deal

with alternative development and support for social justice within

Colombia, will also have some U.S. contract personnel within Colombia.

In addition to that, the Justice Department, in addition——

69

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Is there a number?

Mr. BEERS. You will have to get that number from AID, or I will

get it for you. I don’t know it off the tip of my tongue.

In addition, the Justice Department will have some contract employees, but you are correct in saying that the limit currently is

300 contract U.S. employees within Colombia. That accounts for

the State Department portion of that. There are also some contracted employees in the Department of Defense as well as uniformed personnel.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. One more area that I wanted to get to.

I am concerned about the human rights abuses and our reliance

on the military, the same military that we are sending—and police,

by the way, Black Hawks and Huey IIs and whatever. On August

15, 2000, six children were killed when the army opened fire for

about 45 minutes. They claimed that guerillas were mixed up with

some children. There has been no evidence. There were no shells

near the children, no wounded or killed soldiers or guerillas.

In the last couple of days, two human rights defenders were abducted in Colombia. There had been death threats. We continue to

show our faith in the army and in the police where if—I have plenty of evidence here of cases where even the police who we say are

beyond approach are not so, and keep funding them. The President

certified that human rights criteria have been met. Why should we,

in the face of this kind of evidence, believe that is so?

Mr. BEERS. Ma’am, with respect to the two incidents that you

outlined, and particularly the tragic incident concerning the schoolchildren, we are as concerned as you are about those incidents, and

we have asked the Colombian Government for an accounting of

both of those incidents in order to understand what has happened

and what has gone wrong if it appears that the initial evidence,

with respect at least to the issue concerning the children, is, in

fact, accurate.

I am not in a position today to give you an answer to the Colombian response to us. I am not sure that we have received it yet. But

I will get you that information as quickly as I possibly can.

With respect to the efforts to support the police and the army

and the Colombian military more generally, you all have been generous in your support for focusing on and dealing with the human

rights situation in Colombia, and we take that funding support seriously; and we have both in the State Department and the Justice

Department and the Defense Department put together a number of

programs designed specifically to improve the overall human rights

situation in Colombia.

It will not happen overnight, and I am not here at this particular

point in time to say that there is a perfect record on the part of

the Government of Colombia. But I will say that I think we have

demonstrated from the State Department’s perspective that the situation has gotten better in Colombia, but there is still more work

to be done, and the Colombians would agree with my statement.

With respect to the President’s certification, with all due respect,

ma’am, he waived that certification. He did not certify. We were

not in a condition to certify because the conditions had not been

met by the Colombian Government. Those are a continuing subject

of dialog between ourselves and the Government of Colombia.

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Every meeting with senior-level officials of the Government of Colombia that I have participated in has involved that subject as a

major element of that discussion.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. What is the significance then of waiving? If

the aid packages are conditioned on the President’s certification,

does that mean that although we are not able to certify, we are

going to continue funding even in the face of continued human

rights abuses? What status is that?

Mr. BEERS. The provisions of law, as I understand them, are that

we are required in every fiscal year in which we expend money for

Plan Colombia to either certify or waive those requirements. So the

original waiver that the President signed was for fiscal year 2000.

Before we can obligate any money in fiscal year 2001, we will again

be required to certify or to waive those requirements.

Of those human rights requirements, three were factual: Has the

Government of Colombia done a specific act? The other three were,

having done that specific act, have they, in fact, implemented the

intent of that act over a period of time?

And the second three issues are written—currently written in

very absolute terms, fully implemented, completely done, and at

this particular point in time, I think if you asked us today to make

a determination, we would now be in a position to say that we believe that the Colombian Government has carried out the three

specific acts that you have asked them to carry out. But we are not

in a position today, and we will continue to work with the Government of Colombia to get them to be in a position to say that they

have, in fact, implemented the intent of those specific acts.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady, and I now recognize Mr. Ose

from California.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Beers, it is my recollection that the supplemental

we passed in July had a—had some specific reporting requirements

in terms of the actual strategy that was going to be used in Colombia. What I am trying to figure out—I know that there was a time

line on that. Was it 60 days that we were supposed to have that

back?

Mr. BEERS. I believe that is correct.

Mr. OSE. Has that been delivered?

Mr. BEERS. It has not, to the best of my knowledge, as of yesterday morning. I am not sure today. It is in final preparation in the

White House at this time, sir.

Mr. OSE. Who in the White House might we call?

Mr. BEERS. The Office of National Drug Control Policy is the office which has been assigned responsibility for drafting that strategy, sir.

Mr. OSE. The strategy is actually being reduced to black and

white?

Mr. BEERS. The strategy is drafted. It is in final clearance.

Mr. OSE. So we are going to get it shortly?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. We talked about the aid going to Colombia. How do we

measure its efficacy? Do we measure it by the price on the street?

Do we measure it by immigrant flows? How do we measure whether or not our aid is working?

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Mr. BEERS. Sir, I am a believer that the best measurement of

this kind of a program is what I talked about earlier, which is the

output function. The output function from Colombian drug traffickers is how much coca do they grow and process and export from

Colombia. And the principal benchmark which we use is the number of coca hectares under cultivation, and that is the measurement

against which the 50 percent reduction is designed to focus.

Mr. OSE. Do we track how much comes north?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. That is what DOD does?

Mr. BEERS. That is what the Intelligence Community does, sir.

Mr. OSE. How do they do that?

Mr. BEERS. It is a classified program, but in general terms,

through various forms of intelligence, they look at what information is available with respect to the movement of coca to the United

States.

Mr. OSE. So we have assets in the area that monitor the go-fast

boats?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir, planes, land transport, all of that.

Mr. OSE. Do we have locations in the area—we do have—we

have those forward-operating locations?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. We also have ships at sea.

Mr. OSE. Now, if I recall correctly, back in June, Ms. Salazar,

you were before us, and you were talking in particular—I think the

three forward-operating locations were Manta, Aruba and Curacao?

Ms. SALAZAR. And now El Salvador.

Mr. OSE. There were some problems with each of those. Having

pulled out of Howard, we had to make some improvements to the

runways and taxiways at Manta and also some aprons at Aruba

and Curacao. Did the Colombian supplemental contain funding for

those improvements?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes, under the MILCON authorities for those improvements. We will be coming back for fiscal year 2002 for the improvements for El Salvador.

Mr. OSE. I want to focus right now on the Manta improvements.

As I recall from your testimony in June, the Air Force was on the

verge of a contract for the runway and taxiway improvements like

the middle of July.

Ms. SALAZAR. Correct.

Mr. OSE. Were those contracts awarded?

Ms. SALAZAR. I believe we put a hold on it for a couple of weeks.

I believe they were about to be let, or they may have been let already, but we basically gave out the order for the contracts to be

let.

Yes, there were two series of contracting awards that were taking place. The first one, the construction contracts, were let.

Mr. OSE. OK. Now, obviously when we work on the runways and

taxiways at Manta, you can’t use the base while the construction

is under way. If I recall correctly, Southern Command was in the

process of arranging alternative—an alternative forward location to

Manta while the construction was under way. Have those arrangements been completed?

General HUBER. Yes, sir, they have. You are exactly correct. As

we looked at how long it would take basically to pour the concrete,

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we will use Aruba and Curacao as well as the international airfield

in El Salvador, where we have aircraft operating out of right now,

sir.

Mr. OSE. Are we—let’s see, July, August, September, are we on

schedule with the improvements to the runways and taxi ways at

Manta to be able to put AWACS into the region under the original

schedule which called for by summer of 2001?

General HUBER. In my opinion, yes, sir, we are.

Mr. OSE. Ms. Salazar, you were the one who brought this subject

up back in June.

Ms. SALAZAR. The way—I’m making calculus in my mind. As you

know, we didn’t get the supplemental until July 1st, so there was

some stalling in the first. So we may be off by some weeks.

Mr. OSE. So we are going to make it by the summer of 2001 on

AWACS at Manta.

Ms. SALAZAR. We hope so.

Mr. OSE. I guess that’s a commitment.

Now, the next question I have is that we had a long discussion

in that June hearing about P–3’s versus AWACS. And I know I

submitted some written questions for the record, Mr. Chairman, related to the efficacy of the P–3 versus the efficacy of the AWACS

relative to their cost and their range and what have you. Ms.

Salazar, if you can, is there a difference in the performance between a P–3 and an AWACS in this area?

Ms. SALAZAR. Sir, I would defer to General Huber since this is

an operational question.

Mr. OSE. General, is there a difference in the performance of a

P–3 versus an AWACS in this area?

General HUBER. Yes, sir, there is. Other than the obvious time

on station and duration, the AWACS, which is our primary goal,

as you know, to get that AWACS operating in Manta to give us

particularly the range into the southern portion of Peru which we

can get with the P–3’s here.

Mr. OSE. Is the—am I correct in recalling that—I’m trying to remember, it’s like if you have one AWACS that it requires 2.4 P–

3’s to do the same job?

General HUBER. I’m not familiar with that comparison, sir.

Mr. OSE. If a P–3 is not the equivalent of an AWACS on a oneto-one basis from an efficacy standpoint, is it half as effective? Is

it three-quarters as effective? Do you have any feel for that?

General HUBER. No, sir, I don’t. But I will get that answer from

the Air Force component. They’ve got the experience. I’m just a

simple infantry man.

Mr. OSE. We all dump on, don’t we. All right. I want to go back

one more question, Ms. Salazar, on these forward operating bases.

As it relates to Howard, if I recall correctly, your testimony for the

last fiscal year out of which or in which Howard operated as forward operating location was that there was a—cost of the flights

out of Howard was $75 million. The relative costs of operations out

of, say, Manta or Aruba or Curacao or El Salvador, how does that

compare to the $75 million?

Ms. SALAZAR. Sir, I want to come back to you with the exact

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bers were given at different times. If you allow me, I’ll come back

with the exact number.

Mr. OSE. I’m not sure I’m interested in doing that, Ms. Salazar,

because I did submit these questions for the record back in June

and I don’t yet have answers.

Ms. SALAZAR. I apologize, sir. Generally my staff and myself

are—we try to get those questions to you as soon as possible. If you

don’t have them, I will make sure that you have them this week.

Mr. OSE. Can you get a copy of this and take that to Ms. Salazar,

please?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And then bring me the original back.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. And also if we could have a

response for the record. We have it open for 2 weeks. We would appreciate you responding to the questions. If they weren’t answered

in June, they should certainly be answered after that hearing.

Let me yield now to the gentleman from Maryland, Mr.

Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I only have a few

questions. Mr. Beers, is the United States assisting Colombia in

identifying additional funding sources to support the plan?

Mr. BEERS. On a regular basis, sir. That is a constant topic of

discussions. We have weekly or nearly weekly television conferences with them and that’s one of the continuing every-time subjects that we talk about.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You said every time what?

Mr. BEERS. Every time we meet we talk about that subject and

what each of us are doing together and separately in order to generate additional external funding.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. And what kind of progress are we making?

Mr. BEERS. Well, since the conference that was in July we have generated, I believe the numbers, an additional $200 million in

pledges. We’re looking toward another conference coming up in October or early November to try as a date specific to generate additional funds. President Pastrana is going on a European tour, I believe at the end of October, and we will be sending people in parallel to talk to the European donors as well.

In addition to that, we have a longer term effort in association

with the U.N. Drug Control Program. There will be a major donors

conference meeting in December which I will attend. That will be

another opportunity to talk to donors about generating additional

funds.

Mr. CUMMINGS. According to the Los Angeles Times, I think they

say a third of the drugs coming out of Colombia go to Europe. Is

that accurate?

Mr. BEERS. Roughly, yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And other than these discussions, I mean do we

have ways of pressuring Europe to contribute more?

Mr. BEERS. Pressure, I wouldn’t put it quite that way, sir, but

we certainly make a strong effort at senior levels in the State Department to make that clear that this is a joint effort and that we

are all subject to the problems that come out of Colombia. We provide them with information both open source and for those countries with which we exchange classified information we provide

74

them with that same information or more information, I should

say, on the classified basis. We have made attempts to talk to

media in European media outlets in order to bring this effort to the

publics within Europe in order to try to generate that same kind

of support as has been done so effectively by many of you in this

country in terms of drawing the American people’s attention to the

problem of drugs.

Mr. CUMMINGS. There have been reports that the guerrillas have

said that anyone who accepts U.S. money will become a potential

military target. Have you heard that?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. In light of this information what’s the United

States doing to protect our humanitarian workers and their Colombian counterparts?

Mr. BEERS. The Ambassador in Colombia is responsible for all of

the protection of all of the official Americans in Colombia. And let

me focus first on that, because that’s not the only issue. With respect to that, she has regular meetings or her deputy chief of mission have regular meetings to talk about, one, the general threat

to official Americans in Colombia and, two, any specific information

about specific threats.

As a result of that, there is a changing posture which can change

within a few hours of receiving the information to say that an individual can go some place or cannot go some place, that individuals

are in some place have to come back to a safer location in order

to ensure their protection. In some cases that directly affects the

ability for periods of time to deliver the programs that we’ve been

talking about here, both on the humanitarian side and on the counternarcotics side. But we and she take very seriously the protection

of official Americans.

In addition to that, and through the same structure, she has the

ability to reach out to nonofficial Americans in Colombia. There is

a network in order to get information out to nonofficial Americans

in Colombia to tell them about changes in the threat environment,

to tell them where places are safe and where places are not safe.

And then, third, we have the general notification process which

says to the traveling American public what the dangers and risks

are if you choose to travel to Colombia, for example, as a tourist.

And Colombia is currently regarded as a place in which great caution should be exercised and most people should not consider going.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just one last question, Brigadier General Huber,

it’s my understanding that in response to the increased U.S. presence in Colombia, drug traffickers and even the guerrillas have

moved their operations to countries along the border. What is the

U.S.’s response to the violence and the drug trafficking spreading

in that region?

General HUBER. Sir, from U.S. Southern Command’s perspective

as I travel the region and talk to my military counterparts, they

support the statement that you just made, that the police and the

military of the neighboring countries have indeed repositioned and

reinforced their borders in an attempt in coordination with the

military of Colombia to contain the movement of the coca cultivation. As far as our response from my perspective, it is once again

the training of those military units much like in our country, where

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the military provides support to the law enforcement agencies in

the matters of communication, transportation, training, enhance

those capabilities.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Pleased to recognize the gentleman from

Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, members of the panel, for your testimony. Could I just ask—and it may

be something that I missed—but are we anticipating in the next

go-around there will be a waiver or certification on the human

rights issues?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, I’m not in a position to predict precisely what

would happen, but if you ask me where we are today we would

have to waive again.

Mr. TIERNEY. We would have to waive again. We talked a little

bit, Mr. Cummings asked about the progress of other participants

in this plan. What about the status of money that Colombia was

supposed to dedicate to this plan? According to the GAO report,

they’re a long way from identifying where they’re going to get the $4 billion that they’re putting up. What’s our progress in helping

them do this?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, it’s 3 years worth of money. And like this country, they appropriate on an annual basis. So to say that they

haven’t put all the money forward is to say that their process

hasn’t engaged in the second and third year yet.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you feel they’re fully committed at least to date?

Mr. BEERS. I feel that the President of Colombia and the Government of Colombia is fully committed to funding this. And we certainly will be in discussions with them about providing this. But

is the funding identified? No, it’s not.

Mr. TIERNEY. With respect to the Colombian National Police assuming control over the aerial eradication operations, what’s the

status on that? In the report they’re indicating that there was some

distance to go on that, that the plan had not been finally adopted

by the Colombians and that we were still looking at a situation

where we didn’t know exactly what direction we were heading in.

Mr. BEERS. There are two parts to that process, sir. With respect

to the discussions with the Government of Colombia the last draft

of the nationalization plan remains with the Colombian National

Police. And we have not received back from them their comments

or final position with respect to the draft which we printed them

some time ago.

Having said that, and in fairness to everybody concerned, we

have not identified the money that would be necessary to support

that process because what we are talking about is maintaining the

current eradication effort, and on top of that, transitioning that

eradication effort from on the coca side what is primarily an American contract-supported eradication effort to a fully Colombian

eradication effort.

They fly a number of the planes, but we plan most of the missions and we fly most of the eradication aircraft but not the support aircraft in those missions.

With respect to the opium poppy effort, it is now entirely a Colombian National Police effort. What we need to do now is work

76

both of those issues in order to both ensure that we don’t lose the

effort that we are currently undertaking and planning to expand

and at the same time increase the Colombian content to that effort.

That is our objective and that’s the direction we’re moving in.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Have we done anything about our oversight down there? The reports here indicate that some of the helicopters might be used for purposes other than counternarcotics and

some of the fuel, a substantial amount of the fuel provided for

counternarcotics may have been misused. Are we tightening up on

the oversight?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. We have done two things with respect to the

fuel. Let me comment on that first. We have set up—we asked for

this IG investigation. And we welcome the indication that we needed to be doing a better job because that’s—this is an important

issue. What we have done first is try to make sure that we have

an accurate and easily retrievable reporting system about each of

the transactions. They were not done as they should have been

done in the past. Part of that was the shortage of personnel, part

of that was it simply wasn’t attended to properly.

Second, we are hiring additional oversight personnel to make

sure that, once, the data is available, we can in fact go back and

interrogate that information and then go back to make sure that

the information as delivered is in fact information that is real. So

we take that as a serious charge to be dealt with and we have efforts under way to do that.

Mr. TIERNEY. I thank you. I will yield the balance of my time to

Mr. Turner because I know we will be called for a vote pretty soon.

I know he has some questions to ask, so I thank you.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Turner, please proceed.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I actually have a series of questions

that I would be happy just to submit to Secretary Beers for the

record and ask that they be answered and placed in as part of the

record. And in the event the questions are beyond the scope of the

State Department’s knowledge, perhaps also I would ask that General Huber join in answering these questions. But they all relate

to the procurement item, and I will be happy to submit them to

have them answered as part of the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, we’ll submit them and they will be

part of the record. I ask the witnesses to respond. Did you have

anything else Mr. Turner? Madam Ranking. Mr. Ose.

Well, I commented with Mrs. Mink that this has been a very

frustrating experience for me over the past year, three-quarters.

And she as ranking member, we’ve got an extremely difficult situation at hand and we seem to be taking one step forward and two

steps back. And I would please ask the witnesses if there are any

changes in timetables, anything that you’ve testified before today

that between now and the beginning of next year you keep the subcommittee posted. We want to know if there are any changes in delivery of this equipment, any further delays, anything we can assist

with.

Now the first money that was going down there, I think we

called everyone in every 2 weeks the end of last year to try to make

certain some of that moved forward. If we have to do that, we’ll do

that again. But we need to make certain that this is administered

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and accomplished in the way Congress intended and effectively. So

we’re counting on you and we ask you to respond to us.

There being no further questions of this panel, I thank you and

dismiss you at this time.

Let me call our third and final panel which consists of one individual. That individual is Mr. Andrew Miller, who is acting advocacy director for Latin America and the Caribbean for Amnesty

International. If we could have Mr. Miller come up. Mr. Miller, this

is an investigation and oversight subcommittee of the Government

Reform Committee of the House of Representatives. In that regard

we do swear in our witnesses. If you have a lengthy statement, and

I believe I’ve been provided with a rather lengthy statement and

some background information upon request of the Chair and the

committee, the entire statement and background will be made a

part of the record. So if you would, I request in that regard, if you

would please remain standing and let me swear you in. Raise your

right hand.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. MICA. The witness answered in the affirmative. Thank you.

Mr. Miller, you’re the only witness on this panel. Did you want

this lengthy statement to be made part of the record?

Mr. MILLER. I would like for the lengthy statement to be made

part of the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, so ordered and you are recognized.

We won’t run the clock on you but if you could summarize and provide your testimony to the panel, I know they would be grateful.

Thank you and please proceed.

STATEMENT OF ANDREW MILLER, ACTING ADVOCACY DIRECTOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN FOR AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

Mr. MILLER. I would ask the chairman further that Human

Rights Watch Amnesty International report that’s attached to that

to which I will be referring also.

Mr. MICA. That was also part of my request.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much. Chairman Mica, members of

the subcommittee, I am very pleased to be before you today. I am

especially pleased to not be a member of the Clinton administration, a high ranking member of the administration who is supposed

to be implementing Plan Colombia.

I would just summarize my comments and I know your time is

valuable and there are many things to do. I would like to address

the human rights component of Plan Colombia, Amnesty International’s concerns in Colombia.

Primarily, when we think about the Plan Colombia we’re concerned about what impact this is going to have on the human

rights situation and in particular what message this sends to the

Colombian military about their human rights performance.

Going back many years, various international bodies, the United

Nations and American Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty

International, have been making detailed recommendations about

what concrete steps need to be taken in order for human rights to

be improved in Colombia. And unfortunately to date very few, if

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lombian state. And from the perspective of Amnesty International

this highlights a lack of concrete political will to implement human

rights in that country.

Considering the U.S. military aid going to Colombia, we’re concerned that aid itself might be involved in the commission of

human rights violations or might be supporting military units who

operate in the same area as the paramilitary units that work hand

in hand. Amnesty International and many other organizations have

extensively and overwhelmingly documented the links, the historic

links and the current links between the Colombian military and

paramilitary organizations.

Along that line, we would like to mention considering the counternarcotics focus of the Plan Colombia that there are multiple

groups within Colombia implicated in drug production, drug trafficking, etc., and as indicated in the GAO report, the paramilitaries

are included in that group. So we’re very concerned in addition to

the human rights concerns that the plan itself focuses on one actor

in a multiplicity of actors. And if indeed the objective is to eradicate drugs, etc., focusing on armed opposition groups solely and not

on other actors that are seated with the state will not obtain that

objective.

Now this concern has been expressed by members of this committee for some time now. I believe the issue came about in committee,

a subcommittee hearing in August of last year. Representative

Mink submitted questions for the record. It again emerged in February of this year. And unfortunately, questions that have been put

forth to the Clinton administration about the role of paramilitary

groups and drug trafficking, drug production have not been answered to date.

Now, one part of our testimony, and I believe you all have copies

of a document which Amnesty International obtained through a

Freedom of Information Act request, which indicates that as far

back as 1993 the Defense Intelligence Agency Counternarcotics Division knew that main paramilitary leaders were heavily implicated in the drug trade and that in fact the Colombian state enthusiasm about going against them would be lessened by the fact that

these paramilitary groups had similar goals, similar

counterinsurgency goals fighting the Colombian guerrillas. We believe that this document has got to be simply the tip of the iceberg

in terms of information between the Defense Intelligence Agency,

between the DEA, the CIA and other intelligence gathering organisms of the U.S. Government. This has got to be the tip of the iceberg in terms of information that is known about the role of paramilitary groups in drug trafficking and human rights violations.

So we’re somewhat concerned by the fact that the administration

has not responded to those questions, and we would hope that this

subcommittee would continue pushing forward demanding answers

to those.

In closing, I’ll simply say that in terms of the certification process that was congressionally mandated Amnesty International participated in that. We put together a joint document that we’re submitting for the record and we outlined concrete steps that should

be taken immediately by the Colombian state that would have a

positive impact toward protection of human rights in Colombia. In

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particular, those steps are investigating people for whom there are

credible allegations both within the Colombian military, Colombian

military groups, armed opposition groups, carrying out civilian investigations into those individuals, suspending them if they’re military, not dismissing them, arresting them if they’re paramilitary

armed opposition, holding those trials in civilian courts and actually sending them to jail.

One indicator of Colombian state political will to address human

rights violations is whether or not there are high level Colombian

military officials in jail, because we know that some of them are

the intellectual authors of political violence in Colombia that goes

back decades. They’re well known paramilitary leaders who operate

openly. They appear on television. It’s known where they are. It’s

known where they live. The state doesn’t go after them. So once we

see these individuals, trials, credible trials against them, those individuals in jail, that will be an indication that Colombia indeed

has the will. Until that time Amnesty will continue to be very concerned about the human rights situation in Colombia and in fact

will continue to expose the military component of Plan Colombia.

At this time I would happy to take questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller, some of your testimony and some of the material you’ve submitted deals with some

past atrocities committed by the right wing paramilitary. Has there

been any improvement that Amnesty International has seen since

the advent of the Pastrana administration? I mean, admittedly in

the previous administration it was a pretty horrible situation. And

it didn’t seem that there were any overt attempts to clean up

human rights violations. Is there any glimmer of hope?

Mr. MILLER. Well, essentially what—unfortunately, the situation

continues to deteriorate on all sides. I was surprised to hear

Representative—— Mr. MICA. On all sides. Then the FARC and the ELN is also committing atrocities and human rights violations?

Mr. MILLER. Absolutely. You’ll notice in the testimony that I

refer to those and Amnesty International through the years has denounced those violations.

I’d like to comment on the Pastrana administration. Essentially

the tendency in Colombia has been that over time progressively the

Colombian military itself seems to be getting out of the dirty war

business. At the same time it’s worth mentioning that there’s a

commensurate rise in violations carried out by paramilitary groups

which often operate in heavily militarized zones. Amnesty International this year and in previous years has documented dozens

and dozens of cases. The El Salado massacre is a high profiled

case. It came out in the New York Times in July. There are numerous other massacres that have happened at the same time. In the

packet that I have given there’s a paper called Outsourcing Political Violence that lists a number of massacres in years past and in

recent years carried out by paramilitary groups in the presence of

military.

Mr. MICA. So if you had a choice between giving assistance to the

military or the National Police, I take it you would prefer the National Police?

Mr. MILLER. Well, it’s worth mentioning that at the same time

that there are the same kinds of allegations against the National

Police, a direct commission of human rights violations. The National Police themselves are also implicated in the same way in the

sense that they’re not going after the paramilitaries. In many areas

of Putumayo, in Caqueta, the National Police operate in areas

where the paramilitaries also operate and they do not go after the

paramilitaries either.

Mr. MICA. Would your solution be to just withdraw all assistance?

Mr. MILLER. My solution would be to demand that concrete improvements be made. I mean the obstacle to these improvements

is that the Colombian state actually has the desire to do them. And

unfortunately, we’re concerned that the assistance offers a green

light that all the past administration and the Colombian militaries

need to do is come up with a good public relations scheme and

they’re very good. The discourse is impeccable, but the concrete

steps have not been taken, and we’re concerned that they will not

be taken as long as they continue to obtain their objectives.

Mr. MICA. Let me just yield to Mr. Ose. Then I’ll yield to the

ranking member.

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Mr. OSE. Just for the record, back on June 23rd Chairman Gilman in his international report reported that the Colombia National Police had in fact gone into Catatumbo and basically attacked some of these right wing paramilitaries who were operating

drug labs and illicit coca crops. I just want to get that on the

record. I’ll come back to it in my questioning. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Let me yield now to the gentlelady from Hawaii our

ranking member, Mrs. Mink.

Mrs. MINK. I appreciate, Mr. Miller, your attendance here this

afternoon. I know you had very short notice in preparing your testimony. But I think the issues that you raise are very much in the

minds of many of the Members who are concerned about the relevance of the Colombia drug production to the problems here in the

United States. But we also have concerns about what the impacts

will be to the people who live in Colombia and to what extent this

huge infusion of military equipment, and so forth, will exacerbate

their lives and make the human rights conditions much more difficult.

When you say that the current administration has said all the

right words and given all the right intentions with respect to really

weighing in on this human rights question but that they have

failed to perform, exactly what steps do you have in mind that the

Pastrana administration must take in order to demonstrate to Amnesty International and others that they are prepared to do what

is necessary to bring an end to this travesty of human rights that

is occurring by both the military and the paramilitary groups?

Mr. MILLER. Well, as I mentioned, the international community

has been making recommendations for years now but what the

steps are in the joint document we outline exactly, using the congressional mandate.

Mrs. MINK. Can you outline that for the record?

Mr. MILLER. Absolutely. Essentially to suspend military officers

for whom there are credible allegations, which it’s important to emphasize suspends as opposed to dismiss, because last year a number of high ranking military officers were dismissed but nothing is

happening against them. They’re operating freely and that’s not a

positive outcome.

Mrs. MINK. What is the difference between a dismissal and a

suspension? I noticed that in your testimony.

Mr. MILLER. The difference is dismissal simply means that

they’re let go, they’re fired essentially but then they operate freely.

A suspension means that they’re held in administrative suspension,

they’re held by the military pending a trial. And it’s important we

mention that the trial be held in a civilian jurisdiction. The military justice system in Colombia essentially has proven itself as a

mechanism to ensure impunity for members of the Colombian

armed forces. So it’s important that these people are suspended,

they’re held pending a legitimate trial, that the trial be carried

forth, and that if indeed they are responsible for crimes under Colombian law, human rights crimes, that they be held accountable

for this.

Mrs. MINK. How many would you estimate are in this category

of having been dismissed without having been brought to trial?

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Mr. MILLER. Actually we name four or five of those in our report.

We explicitly say that those people need to be brought to trial given

the outstanding allegations against them. So I would say roughly

four or five, four that I can think of off the top of my head, were

suspended last year. There are a number of other generals who

simply left over the years for whom there are very strong, credible

allegations.

Mrs. MINK. Anything else?

Mr. MILLER. I simply would mention that one important component is something that I mention in my testimony, is how U.S. aid

is monitored and how the impacts of U.S. aid are monitored there.

I think Congress can and must play a very important role in demanding that the administration report back explicitly about what

the impacts have been in terms of human rights violations, in

terms of any people who have been killed or any allegations

against U.S.-supported units and including paramilitary activity in

those same areas.

Mrs. MINK. Earlier this afternoon Mr. Beers was asked a question with respect to the United States certifying that Colombia had

met all the requirements with respect to receiving foreign assistance from the United States. And he testified that based upon the

situation as it exists today that the United States could not certify

and that there would have to be a waiver.

Do you agree with that statement?

Mr. MILLER. I absolutely agree with that statement. We of course

prepare this document in the context of the first certification discussions. The new discussions will be happening later on this

month and we will be reviewing this document. Of course the joint

document is what we will take to the State Department and say

to them what concrete improvement has been made on these cases.

At the same time we will probably lump on the range of other cases

that have happened in the meantime or happened in the past.

There’s no lack of cases of human rights violations in Colombia.

Mrs. MINK. What are the specific grounds which allows the

President to waive the requirement of Congress that human rights

has to be certified before foreign aid can be given?

Mr. MILLER. As per the law they’re on national security grounds.

Mrs. MINK. What are the national security grounds that support

a waiver in this instance?

Mrs. MINK. I don’t believe that they are specifically—I don’t believe that the President has to specifically say and I don’t believe

in this recent—when he did waive, I don’t think he offered specific

reasons. I believe he simply said for national security reasons and

went on to state that he believed that improvements were being

made.

Mrs. MINK. But my question to you is do you see any national

security basis for a waiver?

Mr. MILLER. I believe that’s the President’s prerogative. But you

know Amnesty International believes that it’s very grave that these

have simply been set aside by the President and we believe it sends

a very negative message in terms of President Clinton’s commitment to human rights.

Mrs. MINK. Absent a finding of a national security basis, there

would be no basis for a waiver, isn’t that true?

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Mr. MILLER. That is true.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. The gentleman from California, Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Miller, when you talk

about the Colombian National Police, are we engaged with the entire police force? I mean is the U.S. Government working with the

entire Colombian National Police force?

Mr. MILLER. I don’t know the answer to that question.

Mr. OSE. The reason I bring it up is that I mean, I understand

your concern that we all share about the atrocities, but I also know

that in some instances elsewhere, at least historically, one group

might be committing atrocities while another might not. Now are

we working with the group, for instance, that is or isn’t or do you

know?

Mr. MILLER. I think that would be a good question for the State

Department. I can’t think of units of the National Police which are

not allowed to receive aid under Leahy provisions.

Mr. OSE. It’s my understanding that our aid is going to the counternarcotics police force section only. Are there any allegations of

atrocities against them?

Mr. MILLER. I cannot think of allegations of atrocities again the

counternarcotics section of the National Police. But I don’t believe

that—I haven’t seen allegations.

Mr. OSE. So as far as this aid goes, we’re doing a pretty good job

in terms of protecting human rights as affected by our partners in

this effort, I mean if I understand your response correctly.

Mr. MILLER. Yeah, my response is simply that I don’t believe

that there are specific units which under Leahy provisions are not

allowed to receive that aid. So that would indicate that at least by

State’s judgment there weren’t credible allegations against these

counternarcotics units and I don’t believe that Amnesty has specific

information right now of credible allegations against those units either.

Mr. OSE. You may have it about other sections of the Colombian

National Police, but not about the people that we’re working with.

Mr. MILLER. What comes to mind are police units in urban areas

which are involved in social cleansing operations. That’s what

comes to mind. But that I believe would be different than the units

to which you are referring.

Mr. OSE. OK. I just wanted to clarify that. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Did you have any additional questions? No

additional questions.

Well, Mr. Miller we want to thank you. We appreciate the work

that Amnesty International does in acting as the conscience for the

world in many difficult international situations and atrocities in

human rights that you call such eloquent attention to. We look forward to working with you. We appreciate your coming before our

subcommittee today.

There being no further business before the subcommittee, I’ll excuse you, Mr. Miller, and——

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much.

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Mr. MICA. We are leaving the record open for a period of 2 weeks

for additional comments. Appreciate participation of the Members

today and our witnesses. This meeting of the Subcommittee on

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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