China’s Other Army: The People’s Armed Police in an 

Era of Reform

by Joel Wuthnow

CHINA STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 14

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Cover photo: Chinese paramilitary policemen take part in military training, 

Nanning, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, December 22, 2017

(Li Shijin/Imagechina via Associated Press)

The mission of the China Center is to serve as a national focal 

point and resource center for multidisciplinary research and analytic 

exchanges on the national goals and strategic posture of the People’s 

Republic of China and the ability of that nation to develop, field, and 

deploy an effective military instrument in support of its national strategic objectives. The Center keeps officials in the Department of 

Defense (DOD), other government agencies, and Congress apprised of 

the results of these efforts. The Center also engages the faculty and 

students of the National Defense University and other components of 

the DOD professional military education system in aspects of its work 

and thereby assists their respective programs of teaching, training, and 

research. The Center has an active outreach program designed to promote exchanges among American and international analysts of 

Chinese military affairs.

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs
China’s Other Army

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs

Institute for National Strategic Studies

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

Series Editor: Phillip C. Saunders

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

April 2019

by Joel Wuthnow

China’s Other Army:

The People’s Armed Police in an Era of Reform
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please visit inss.ndu.edu/Publications.aspx.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints 

or reviews.

First printing, April 2019
Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 1

Introduction........................................................................................................ 4

Background ......................................................................................................... 5

Key Organizational Changes............................................................................. 9

Drivers of Reform.............................................................................................16

Challenges and Indicators of Further Progress............................................24

Implications.......................................................................................................28

Conclusion ........................................................................................................31

Appendix: PAP Grade Structure.....................................................................32

Notes ..................................................................................................................33

About the Author .............................................................................................45

1

China’s Other Army

Executive Summary

China’s premier paramilitary force—the People’s Armed Police (PAP)—is undergoing its 

most profound restructuring since its establishment in 1982.

■ Previously under dual civilian and military command, the PAP has been placed firmly 

under China’s military. As chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping now 

has direct control over all of China’s primary instruments of coercive power. This represents the highest degree of centralized control over China’s paramilitary forces since the 

Cultural Revolution.

■ Local and provincial officials have lost the ability to unilaterally deploy PAP units in 

the event of civil unrest or natural disasters, but can still request support through a new 

coordination system.

■ The China Coast Guard, which previously reported to civilian agencies, has been placed 

within the PAP and is thus now part of the military command structure.

■ New PAP operational commands, known as “mobile contingents,” have been established with a diverse mix of capabilities. They will play a key role in protecting the capital 

and could be deployed in a Taiwan contingency, among other missions.

■ Geographic distribution of mobile PAP units remains skewed to western China, providing rapid reaction capabilities that could be used to repress dissent in Xinjiang and Tibet.

Politically, the reforms reaffirm Chinese Communist Party (and Xi Jinping’s) control over 

the PAP and may reduce the scope for local abuse of power.

■ Despite earlier reforms, the PAP’s chain of command was convoluted, confusing, and 

decentralized. These reforms sought to ensure central party control over an organization 

deemed vital for ensuring the party’s security and survival.

■ Centralizing command also attempts to bolster the party’s legitimacy by reducing the 

ability of local officials to misapply PAP assets through corruption or overuse of force to 

handle local grievances.
2 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

■ A consequence of tighter control, however, could be slower responses to incidents as local officials have to submit requests through PAP channels. In some cases, officials may be 

reluctant to request PAP support in order to avoid negative attention from senior leaders.

■ The reforms place Xi firmly in charge of the PAP, though he will have to exercise authority through trusted agents. The success of continued PAP reforms will depend on elite 

consensus that centralized management of PAP deployments is desirable.

Operationally, the reforms narrow the PAP’s responsibilities to three key areas: domestic 

stability, wartime support, and maritime rights protection.

■ Several law enforcement and economic functions previously under the PAP, such as 

border guards and gold mining, have been divested and placed within appropriate civilian 

ministries and localities.

■ PAP internal security forces remain focused on domestic security missions, including 

maintaining stability in western China, guarding government compounds, and disaster 

relief. PAP units would also be on the frontlines in responding to a major threat to the 

regime.

■ The PAP has also been encouraged to play a stronger role in supporting People’s Liberation Army (PLA) combat operations. Key roles could include guarding critical infrastructure and supply lines during wartime. Nevertheless, current PAP-PLA cooperation 

appears superficial and will remain so if the PAP is not better integrated into the PLA’s 

joint command system.

■ Incorporating the coast guard into the PAP could presage stronger integration with the 

navy in terms of operations, training, and equipment development, but this will require 

closer institutional cooperation than currently exists.

■ The PAP will continue to face capabilities gaps, especially in niche areas such as special 

operations forces and helicopters. Its ability to close those gaps will depend on its political 

effectiveness in future budget negotiations.
3

China’s Other Army

PAP activities beyond China’s borders are likely to increase and could have implications 

for the United States and other Indo-Pacific states.

■ The PAP has emerged as a partner of choice for foreign governments in areas such as 

counterterrorism and peacekeeping training, in addition to its longstanding role as contributors to United Nations peacekeeping missions.

■ PAP units are also likely to deploy overseas to support counterterrorism operations. In 

some cases, Beijing may also rely on PAP capabilities to protect Chinese citizens and assets abroad, such as projects under the Belt and Road Initiative.

■ Closer coast guard–navy cooperation, if it emerges, would increase risks to U.S. and 

allied maritime operations in the South and East China seas. U.S. officials will need to 

determine if new agreements are needed, and feasible, to cover coast guard encounters.

■ Over the long run, PAP forces may one day deploy to support Chinese combat operations; one example is a potential role in providing stability during a pacification campaign 

on Taiwan.
4 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

Introduction

Established in 1982, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) is the paramilitary wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with a primary responsibility for maintaining domestic stability 

and a secondary role in providing rear area support for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

during wartime. The PAP—with a strength of up to a million personnel—also fills a variety of 

other important roles and missions, such as responding to natural disasters, guarding government compounds, and participating in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations around 

the world. For most of its existence, the PAP was under the dual leadership of the Central 

Military Commission (CMC) and the State Council, with provincial and local officials granted 

significant latitude over PAP deployments in the event of emergencies. Some efforts to centralize authority were made during the 1990s and 2000s, but the basic character of the PAP went 

unchanged for three decades.

Under Xi Jinping’s tenure, China has embarked on a series of major reforms to the PAP. 

These followed, and in some ways complemented, earlier organizational reforms to the PLA.1

Indeed, while changes to the PLA came first, the breadth of reforms to the PAP—which were 

unveiled toward the end of 2017 and into 2018—is no less ambitious. Key changes included:

■ restructuring PAP headquarters

■ placing the PAP under the sole authority of the CMC and limiting the ability of local 

officials to deploy PAP units during a crisis

■ establishing new mobile contingents, which will provide national leaders with additional rapid response capabilities

■ divesting the PAP of certain law enforcement and economic responsibilities, such as 

border inspections and gold mining

■ merging the coast guard—previously under civilian authority—into the PAP, and thus 

into the military command structure.

These changes raise a number of questions: what goals motivated Xi and other officials 

to develop such an expansive reform agenda? What political, operational, and bureaucratic 

challenges will the PAP encounter as it implements the reforms? What implications could the 
5

China’s Other Army

reforms have for China’s domestic governance and elite politics, the Chinese armed forces, and 

for the United States and others in the region?

This paper explores the key dimensions, drivers, and implications of the PAP reorganization. The first section chronicles the PAP’s development between 1982 and 2017, highlighting 

the enduring problems that eluded previous reforms. The second section provides a detailed 

overview of the five major changes outlined in the bullets above. The third section argues that 

the reforms can be explained by a mix of political and operational factors. Politically, the reforms strengthened Xi’s (and the party’s) control over the paramilitary forces while enhancing 

the party’s legitimacy by diminishing problems such as misapplication of force and corruption. 

Operationally, the PAP will focus more squarely on three core missions: internal security, wartime support, and maritime law enforcement.

This is followed by a discussion of new and enduring challenges, including a near-term 

disruption of the PAP due to new responsibilities and personnel; ambiguities in the new system 

for deploying PAP units; weak institutional coordination between the PAP and PLA, including 

between the coast guard and navy; and gaps between existing and desired capabilities, which 

may be difficult to fill for budgetary reasons. The fifth section discusses the implications of the 

reforms, focusing on stronger unified party control, better management of resources, and an 

increasing ability to accomplish core domestic and international missions. The latter category 

includes a more prominent role in regional law enforcement activities; more cohesive maritime 

operations, strengthening Beijing’s ability to wage “hybrid warfare” in the South and East China 

seas;2

 and potential PAP involvement in future overseas contingencies.

The paper is based primarily on authoritative CCP, PLA, and PAP sources, including PAP 

Daily articles and selections from PAP journals. It is supported by Chinese media commentary, 

international news reporting, discussions with Chinese civilian and PLA analysts held in late 

2018, and foreign assessments. Chinese open sources remain limited in some areas, such as 

identifying the occupants of some key PAP billets, though the data are rich enough to allow for 

an initial examination of the reforms and their consequences.

Background

Since the 1930s, the CCP has fielded a paramilitary force to protect the party and, after the 

establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, ensure domestic stability. This force 

existed under different names, moved between different organizations, and involved a shifting 

degree of central versus local control.3

 The modern PAP, established on June 19, 1982, was the 

result of Deng Xiaoping’s desire to streamline the military’s responsibilities and organizational 
6 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

structure—the PAP’s predecessor had been under PLA authority for several years prior to Deng’s 

arrival—and reduce its bureaucratic clout while handing more authority over to local officials. 

The PAP remained an integral part of China’s armed forces, alongside the PLA and the militia, 

and was ultimately responsible to central party leaders, but actual lines of authority varied over 

time and across different operating forces within the PAP.

Prior to the recent reforms, the PAP was under the dual leadership of the CMC and State 

Council (see figure 1). According to the 2006 defense white paper, the CMC was responsible for 

“management of officers” (including selection and promotions), organizational structure, training, and political work, while the State Council—via “relevant functional departments,” referring 

principally to the Ministry of Public Security (MPS)—oversaw PAP operations, budgets, size, 

and composition.4

 Reporting to both the CMC and State Council was PAP headquarters, led by 

a military region grade [dajunqu ji, 大军区级] commander and a first political commissar who 

Figure 1. PAP Organizational Structure Prior to Reform

Key: Straight line: supervisory relationship; dotted line: coordinating relationship
7

China’s Other Army

served concurrently as MPS director.5 PAP headquarters was organized along the same lines as 

the PLA, with first-level staff, political, and logistics departments and a general office to manage 

paper flows. One difference was that, unlike the PLA, which established a General Armament 

Department in 1998, the PAP’s equipment bureau remained under the staff department.

PAP headquarters had only limited authority over 31 contingents [zongdui, 总队] based in 

the provinces, autonomous regions, and provincial-level cities. Each contingent was composed 

of detachments [zhidui, 支队], battalions [dadui, 大队], and companies [zhongdui, 中队] at the 

prefecture, county, and township levels, respectively.6

 Prior to 1995, command and management authority over these units was delegated to provincial- and lower level MPS departments, 

an arrangement cemented by double-hatting MPS chiefs as first political commissars in PAP 

units at the same level. Spurred by the lessons of the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, in which PAP 

forces proved ineffective at handling a national crisis, the State Council and CMC issued a directive in March 1995 that placed PAP personnel management under centralized CMC control. 

However, local MPS bureaus—and thus provincial leaders and others with oversight of those 

departments—retained the authority to deploy [tiaodong, 跳动] PAP units within their area of 

responsibility. In August 2009, the National People’s Congress (NPC) approved the PAP Law, 

which stated that deployments must strictly adhere to procedures prescribed by the CMC and 

State Council, but did not provide details on those processes.7

This autonomy allowed local officials opportunities to use PAP units at their disposal in 

illicit or egregious ways. Most notably, PAP forces were used to quell protests and other “mass 

incidents” [quntixing shijian, 群体性事件] on many occasions in the 1990s and 2000s. These 

incidents, which centered on local grievances ranging from labor disputes to environmental 

concerns, topped 58,000 in 2003, with about 700 of those involving direct clashes with police 

forces.8

 Some of these involved the use of force by PAP units. For instance, in December 2005, 

local officials summoned the PAP to quash an uprising in Shanwei, Guangdong, resulting in the 

death of at least 20 protesters, while in June 2008, local PAP forces clashed with protesters following a similar incident in Wenjian county, Guizhou Province.9

 Use of PAP forces to abet local 

corruption was also a problem, as discussed below.

In 1997, central leadership over the PAP was strengthened with the transfer of 14 mobile 

divisions [jidong shi, 机动师] from the PLA as part of a 500,000-person downsizing.10 These 

divisions, accounting for roughly 150,000 personnel, were at a second-tier [yi ji, 乙级] level of 

readiness and thus less able to execute modern combat operations than other units, but could 

perform basic stability maintenance functions and provide rear area support to PLA units during wartime.11 Once absorbed into the PAP, they were rebranded as “forces” [budui, 部队] and 
8 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

geographically dispersed throughout the country. The mobile divisions offered national leaders 

additional capabilities to address crises such as the 2009 Urumqi riots—and one mobile division 

was in fact based within Xinjiang—and support events such as the 2008 Olympics.

Along with the provincial contingents, the mobile divisions comprised the internal security forces [neiwei budui, 内卫部队], the largest of the PAP’s operational commands. The Military Balance estimated the overall size of the internal security forces at 400,000 during the 2000s 

(representing perhaps two-thirds of all PAP forces),12 though some estimates have run higher, 

putting the total number at up to 800,000.13 The internal security forces were also the largest 

recipient of PAP expenditures, which increased in the 2000s both in absolute terms and as a 

share of China’s domestic security spending.14 This funding came primarily from State Council 

coffers (with some contributions from local governments) and was thus not included in China’s 

military budget, although some foreign analysts regarded it as a type of defense spending.15

Growing budgets allowed the internal security forces to modernize significantly during 

the 1990s and 2000s. Provincial units were increasingly mobile and lethal, with many units possessing armored personnel carriers and military-grade equipment such as anti-tank weapons 

and Type-05/06 submachine guns.16 The PAP, like the PLA, also focused on building “newtype capabilities” [xinxing liliang, 新型力量] such as helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles 

(UAVs), which could be used in tandem with ground patrols to carry out a range of missions.17

Key developments included the introduction of Z-11WB light attack helicopters, which could 

provide support for counterterrorism, counternarcotics, battlefield reconnaissance, and other 

missions;18 establishment of helicopter units within five provinces as part of a June 2011 CMC 

and State Council decision; 19 and the proliferation of special operations forces (SOF) capabilities in all of the provinces, as well as the creation of elite commando teams such as the Falcons 

and Snow Leopards.20

Until the most recent reforms, the PAP also included seven other operating forces. However, in practice, none were directly supervised by PAP headquarters. Three were law enforcement 

services that reported to the MPS: the Public Security Border Defense Force [gong’an bianfang 

budui, 公安边防部队], which conducted surveillance and inspection activities along China’s 

land and sea borders; Public Security Firefighting Force [gong’an xiaofang budui, 公安消防部

队]; and Public Security Guards Force [gong’an jingwei budui, 公安警卫部队], which protected 

officials as well as visiting dignitaries. Li Zuobiao, a professor at the PAP Academy, assessed that 

placing Border Defense and other forces under their own command created a system of “horizontal internal relations” that was “not conducive to the long-term construction and sustainable 
9

China’s Other Army

development of the PAP” and advocated centralizing these units under PAP headquarters (a 

suggestion that was not adopted).21

Through the Border Defense Force, the MPS also oversaw the China Maritime Police 

[zhongguo gong’an bianfang haijing budui, 中国公安边防海警部队] (CMP), which was the 

largest and best equipped of China’s maritime law enforcement forces. Because of this affiliation, CMP personnel wore PAP uniforms, followed PAP ranks, and attended PAP academies. 

In July 2013, the CMP was merged into a new China Coast Guard [zhongguo haijingju, 中国

海警局] (CCG) under the dual leadership of the MPS and State Oceanic Administration, thus 

ending its direct affiliation with the PAP, though former CMP troops continued to follow PAP 

customs.22

The remaining four forces were specialized economic units that had been absorbed from 

the PLA in the mid-1980s. These included the Gold Force [huangjin budui, 黄金部队], responsible for securing gold and other mineral resources; Hydropower Force [shuidian budui, 水电部

队], which managed hydroelectric dams; Forestry Force [senlin budui, 森林部队], responsible 

for fighting forest fires; and the Transportation Force [jiaotong budui, 交通部队], which maintained China’s national highways. These forces also reported to their own commands, rather 

than PAP headquarters, and coordinated with relevant State Council departments. China’s defense white papers credited these units with a number of accomplishments such as the Three 

Gorges Dam and the Sichuan-Tibet highway, which aided China’s overall economic growth.23

In sum, the PAP developed into a proficient force capable of addressing a range of internal 

security, law enforcement, and economic challenges over its 35-year history. However, despite 

occasional reforms, such as the 1995 State Council/CMC directive and the 2009 PAP Law, PAP 

structure and lines of authority were not fundamentally altered.24 Several problems and weaknesses persisted, including a fragmented chain of command, excessive authority in the hands of 

local officials, and missions that extended well beyond ensuring regime security.25 The reasons 

for these failures are murky, but likely mirrored the impediments to overhauling the PLA during the same period, such as lack of effective political leadership from Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, bureaucratic intransigence, and threats that changes would pose to the interests of corrupt 

officers and local officials.26

Key Organizational Changes

After Xi Jinping became party general secretary and CMC chairman in November 2012, 

a number of signs indicated that reforms to the PAP were forthcoming. At the Third Plenum 

of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013, the Central Committee decided to “improve the 
10 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

structure and command and management system of the PAP.”27 This complemented similar 

proposed “above the neck” changes to the PLA, including updating the military’s command 

and leadership structure, and denoted that reforms to the PAP were an integral part of updating China’s armed forces. In December 2014, Xi appointed Wang Ning, a long-time colleague 

and former PLA ground force officer, as PAP commander, ensuring that a reliable ally would 

be in place to oversee the reforms.28 On January 1, 2016, the CMC published a detailed outline 

of a 5-year reform plan for the armed forces, which reiterated that the PAP’s “command and 

management system” would be updated.29 Xi also visited a number of PAP units throughout this 

period, seeking to personally drum up support for reform within the ranks.30

A series of major structural reforms were subsequently announced throughout the fall of 

2017 and spring of 2018, leading to a significantly altered organizational configuration and new 

lines of authority (see figure 2). First were reforms to the PAP headquarters that were completed 

by October 2017.31 The PAP’s Discipline Inspection Commission was elevated to a first-level 

Figure 2. PAP Organizational Structure after Reform

Key: Straight line: supervisory relationship; dotted line: coordinating relationship
11

China’s Other Army

department from its previous status as a subordinate unit of the PAP political department. This 

paralleled a similar change in which the PLA’s Discipline Inspection Commission was promoted to independent status as part of a restructuring of the CMC in January 2016. The effect was 

to give more autonomy to anti-graft inspectors, freeing them from potential manipulation by 

officials within the political department.32

The other key headquarters change was promoting the PAP equipment department to a 

first-level organization. This brought the PAP headquarters into alignment with the PLA’s standard departmental structure and underscored the importance of acquiring advanced weapons 

and equipment in transforming the PAP into a more effective force. Former PLA officer Song 

Zhongping explained that the PAP had previously depended on the PLA to meet many of its 

equipment needs, but this was no longer a useful arrangement given the specialized capabilities 

the PAP would require in the future. A stronger equipment department, in Song’s view, would 

be able to undertake this task more effectively.33

Second, the PAP was placed under the sole authority of the CMC, thus eliminating the 

dual leadership system that had prevailed since 1982. The legal basis for this change was laid at 

the National People’s Congress in November 2017, when delegates suspended provisions to the 

National Defense Law and the PAP Law, which established dual command.34 In late December, 

the CCP Central Committee formalized the decision, which took effect on January 1, 2018.35

In historical context, this decision returned the PAP to the status of its predecessor, which had 

been under full military control from 1966 to 1972 during the height of the Cultural Revolution.36 As a consequence, the State Council would no longer exercise authority over PAP budgets, size, and composition, and MPS directors would not be dual-hatted as PAP first political 

commissars.

With the PAP now fully part of the military chain of command, local officials would no 

longer be able to unilaterally deploy PAP units. The Central Committee’s December 2017 directive stated that, instead, relevant state and party organs at all levels would establish “mission 

needs and work coordination mechanisms” [renwu xuqiu he gongzuo xietiao jizhi, 任务需求

和工作协调机制].37 This mandate was repeated in provincial and local sources. For instance, a 

November 2018 Guangxi party committee opinion on emergency management work stated that 

working mechanisms should be established for party committees and governments at all levels 

to request military and PAP support in disaster response, and called for a clarification of work 

processes and responsibilities.38 Similarly, the deputy mayor of Changzhou, Jiangsu, stated that 

a coordination mechanism should be established for PLA and PAP roles in flood mitigation and 
12 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

response.39 Meanwhile, the PAP eliminated the organizational basis of local control by removing MPS leaders from their concurrent positions as PAP first political commissars.40

However, few details on the new coordination mechanism have emerged. One PLA interviewee speculated that local officials might retain some ability to mobilize local PAP forces in the 

event of a natural disaster, but would have to seek permission in the case of domestic unrest given 

the possibility of excessive use of force.41 Another PLA source suggested that all deployment 

decisions would have to be routed through the CMC.42 Speaking in a semi-authoritative media 

outlet, a local PAP staffer claimed that the PAP itself could approve deployment requests and that 

during emergencies, “frontline” forces could be called out with formal approvals from higher officials obtained after the fact.43 This confusion was either the result of unclear guidance or, as in 

the old system, secrecy requirements that limit access to information on deployment regulations.

Third, the PAP’s internal security forces were reorganized. The 14 mobile divisions were 

dismantled, with their subordinate units (roughly equivalent to PLA army regiments) renamed 

as mobile detachments [jidong zhidui, 机动支队].44 Some of these detachments were allocated 

to the provincial contingents, providing local authorities rapid reaction capabilities that could 

be utilized via the new coordination mechanism in the event of terrorism, natural disasters, or 

civil unrest.45 While most provinces now appear to have only one such unit, several western 

provinces and autonomous regions were afforded multiple mobile detachments (see table 1). 

This sustained, or in some cases possibly augmented, existing PAP mobile capabilities in these 

locations.46 This clearly reflected the judgment that mobile PAP units continue to be needed to 

maintain social order among ethnic minority populations in Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as in 

areas of surrounding provinces with large ethnic minority populations. In addition, PAP forces 

within the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps were elevated to the status of a full 

contingent—meaning that Xinjiang is now the only provincial-level region with two contingents.47 Among China’s provincial-level cities, Beijing and Shanghai were both allocated multiple mobile detachments, suggesting concerns about terrorism in the capital and in China’s 

most important financial hub.48

Other forces previously subordinate to the mobile divisions were assigned to two new 

“mobile contingents” [jidong zongdui, 机动总队].49 Unlike the provincial contingents, these 

commands do not have a fixed geographic area of responsibility, but appear to provide national 

and local leaders additional capabilities that can be deployed for crisis response purposes. The 

mobile contingents are composed of a mix of mobile detachments as well as specialized capabilities, including two or three SOF and transportation detachments apiece, and one engineering/chemical defense and helicopter detachment (see table 2 for an order of battle).50 Indicative 
13

China’s Other Army

of their relatively high bureaucratic status, these are corps leader grade [zhengjun ji, 正军级] 

commands within the PAP’s 15-level organizational hierarchy, one step higher than all of the 

provincial contingents other than Xinjiang and Beijing.51

The geographic distribution of units within the new mobile contingents provides clues 

about their operational priorities. The 1st Mobile Contingent is based in Shijiazhuang, a few hundred kilometers south of Beijing, with subordinate units located in Hebei and other provinces 

and cities in north-central China.52 This command would likely reinforce PAP units in Beijing in 

the event of a threat to the regime. Having such capabilities situated outside the capital is important given the lessons of the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, in which some Beijing-based units refused 

to follow orders to use deadly force against local citizens. The 2nd Mobile Contingent is based in 

Fuzhou, with units concentrated in Fujian and surrounding provinces along the southeast coast. 

A key role of this command is supporting the PLA in preparing for a conflict across the Taiwan 

Strait. As discussed below, these units, along with others based in the provinces, would provide 

rear area support such as maintaining roads and safeguarding supply routes.

Fourth, several ancillary forces were separated from the PAP (see table 3).53 Streamlining 

PAP functions was a consistent theme throughout the reform process. The May 2015 edition of 

China’s defense white paper stated that the PAP should focus on counterterrorism, contingency 

Contingent No. Mobile 

Detachments

Locations 

Xinjiang 7 Urumqi (1st, 2nd, 3rd), Yining (4th), Kashgar (5th, 6th), 

Hotan (7th)

Beijing 4 Beijing

Sichuan 4 Chengdu (1st, 4th), Garze Tibetan Autonomous 

Prefecture (2nd, 3rd)

Yunnan 3 Kunming (1st), Yulong Naxi Autonomous County (2nd), 

Honghe Meng Autonomous County (3rd)

Tibet 3 Lhasa (1st, 2nd), Chambdo (3rd)

Qinghai 2 Xining (1st), Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 

(2nd)

Shanghai 2 Shanghai

Sources: Huatu; various local government Web sites

Table 1. Provincial Contingents with Multiple Mobile Detachments
14 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

response, and stability maintenance, contrasting with previous white papers that lauded the 

PAP’s economic construction and law enforcement duties.54 The CMC reform plan adopted in 

November 2015 implemented a principle for the PAP that the “military is the military, the police are the police, and civilians are civilians” [jun shi jun, jing shi jing, min shi min, 军是军, 警是

警, 民是民], suggesting a reduced set of PAP responsibilities.55 Wang Qiang, a research fellow at 

the PLA National Defense University, explained that carrying out economic activities “distracts 

[the PAP] from the battlefield” and should be eliminated so that the PAP can “prepare to fight 

1st Mobile Contingent 2nd Mobile Contingent

Headquarters Shijiazhuang, Hebei Fuzhou, Fujian 

1st Mobile Detachment Panjin, Liaoning Wuyi, Jiangsu 

2nd Mobile Detachment Shenyang, Liaoning Wuyi, Jiangsu 

3rd Mobile Detachment Gutongliao, Inner Mongolia Wuyi, Jiangsu 

4th Mobile Detachment Tianjin Putian, Fujian 

5th Mobile Detachment Dingzhou, Hebei Putian, Fujian 

6th Mobile Detachment Baoding, Hebei Guangzhou

7th Mobile Detachment Puzhong, Shanxi Foshan, Guangdong 

8th Mobile Detachment Zhengzhou, Henan Mengzi, Yunnan 

9th Mobile Detachment Pingliang, Gansu Nanchong, Sichuan 

1st Special Operations 

Detachment

Beijing (Falcons) Guangzhou (Snow Leopards)

2nd Special Operations 

Detachment

Tianjin Huzhou, Zhejiang 

3rd Special Operations 

Detachment

Shijiazhuang, Hebei None

1st Transportation 

Detachment

Beijing Hefei, Anhui 

2nd Transportation 

Detachment

Xi’an, Shaanxi Mianyang, Sichuan 

3rd Transportation 

Detachment

None Linzhi, Tibet 

Engineering/Chemical 

Defense Detachment

Huludao, Liaoning Fuzhou, Fujian 

Helicopter Detachment Puzhong, Shanxi Chengdu, Sichuan 

Table 2. Mobile Contingents Order of Battle

Sources: The Paper, various (2018); Huatu
15

China’s Other Army

and win.”56 Military legal scholar Li Weihai similarly argued that any functions “not related to 

combat effectiveness should be discarded.”57

In March 2018, the CCP Central Committee published its plan for reorganizing party and 

state organs, which outlined the intended destination of six PAP law enforcement and economic 

services.58 The Border Defense Force and Guards Force were to be absorbed by the MPS, ending 

their status as active-duty PAP forces. Two others—the Firefighting Force and Forestry Force—

would be placed under a new State Council Emergency Management Department [yingji guanli 

bu, 应急管理部], which would take charge of internal disaster prevention and relief.59 The Gold 

Force and Hydropower Force were both designated as “non-active duty professional teams” [fei 

xianyi zhuanye duiwu, 非现役专业队伍] and reconstituted as state-owned enterprises under 

the supervision of the relevant State Council ministries. No announcement was made regarding the Transportation Force, but at least some of its subordinate units appear to have been 

merged into the new mobile contingents.60 Table 3 identifies the status of the PAP forces after 

the reforms.

Fifth, on July 1, 2018, the China Coast Guard was transferred from State Council to PAP 

command and its formal name revised to become the Maritime Police Contingent of the PAP 

[wuzhuang jingcha budui haijing zongdui, 武装警察部队海警总队]. An indication of the 

pending merger came at the Fourth Session of the 12th NPC in March 2016, when PAP political 

commissar Sun Sijing argued that laws should be adjusted to reflect the PAP’s expanding missions, including in the area of “maritime rights protection” [haishang weiquan, 海上维权].61

PAP Academy professor Li Zuobiao noted that while the PAP did not have any actual maritime 

responsibilities (having lost a maritime function when the coast guard was established in 2013), 

Sun’s suggestion would create a legal pretext for the CCG to be integrated into the PAP.62

The significance of the change was that the CCG would report through the military chain 

of command via PAP headquarters and no longer follow the directions of the State Oceanic 

Administration and MPS. This suggested a closer operational relationship with the navy, as 

discussed below, though precise details on how the two maritime services would coordinate 

are lacking. Nevertheless, there was also substantial continuity with the previous system. A 

PLA spokesman confirmed that despite the change in oversight, the CCG’s “basic duties” would 

not be altered.63 A June 2018 NPC Standing Committee decision stated that those functions 

will include combating maritime crimes, protecting maritime security, developing maritime 

resources, maritime ecological protection, and fisheries management.64 The decision also noted 

that the CCG would coordinate with public security organs and relevant departments.65
16 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

Overall, the PAP has unveiled successive changes designed to improve its “command and 

management system” as part of the CMC’s 5-year armed forces reform agenda. Speaking at 

the NPC in November 2017, PAP commander Wang Ning identified several other potential 

reforms, most of which parallel ongoing changes in the PLA. These include adjustments to the 

PAP rank system to reflect proposed (but not yet announced) changes in PLA ranks, adjusting the audit system, amending supervision of the PAP logistics and equipment systems, and 

developing new guidance on the transfer of PAP units.66 Taken together with the initial (completed) round of reforms, this agenda marks the most ambitious attempt to streamline the PAP’s 

structure, missions, and authorities since its establishment in 1982, and, as with China’s military 

reforms, reflects Xi’s ability to enact needed changes to a key system.

Drivers of Reform

Just as in the larger PLA reforms, the motives driving the PAP restructuring in 2017–2018 

fall generally into political and operational categories.67 The political imperative behind the two 

sets of reforms is identical in principle: solidifying the unified leadership of the party, and Xi 

in particular, as a corrective to the excessive delegation of authority to lower level officials. The 

Prior to Reforms After Reforms

Internal Security Force

—Provincial Contingents

—Mobile Divisions

—Remain

—Dismantled; some units transferred to 

provincial contingents, others to mobile 

contingents

Gold Force Ministry of Natural Resources and China 

National Gold Corporation

Forestry Force State Council Emergency Management 

Department

Hydropower Force China Aneng Construction Corporation, 

managed by State Council

Transportation Force Some units transferred to mobile contingents

Border Defense Force National Immigration Bureau, Ministry of 

Public Security/People’s Police

Firefighting Force State Council Emergency Management 

Department, localities

Guards Force Ministry of Public Security/People’s Police

Table 3. PAP Operating Forces before and after Reform
17

China’s Other Army

difference was that PLA reforms focused more on removing authority from corrupt senior military officers, while changes to the PAP emphasized the need to reduce civilian, and especially 

local, control over units. Both reforms were also driven by the impetus to create a more effective 

organizational structure to guide future operations. While PLA reforms focused on enabling future joint operations, changes to the PAP centered on improving effectiveness in three mission 

areas: internal stability, wartime support, and maritime law enforcement.

Political

Politically, the reforms can be attributed to three interrelated goals. First was strengthening 

Xi’s control over a key instrument of coercive power. One of the broader trends in Chinese civilmilitary relations under Xi was centralization of power around himself as CMC chairman.68

This was both a way to consolidate his authority within the party-state and to address mismanagement in the PLA, which had resulted in widespread corruption, opposition to reform, and 

poor coordination between the military and civilian authority. Xi used several tools to enhance 

his control over the PLA beginning in late 2012, including an anti-corruption campaign focused 

on key rivals (notably former CMC vice chairman Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong); dismantling 

the four general departments, where corruption had thrived; and compensating losers of reform, such as by finding new positions for officers whose commands were restructured.69 PLA 

political work also emphasized the “CMC chairman responsibility system” [junwei zhuxi zerenzhi, 军委主席责任制], signifying that ultimate decisions rested with Xi alone.70

These reforms, however, did not rectify Xi’s limited authority within the PAP. Under the 

dual leadership system, Xi wielded power only indirectly through personnel appointments—for 

example, placing Wang Ning as PAP commander and Sun Sijing as political commissar—and 

did not directly supervise PAP operations or budgets.71 Under the Jiang- and Hu-era compromises, those authorities were held by the State Council rather than augmenting the power of 

the CMC chairman. The ability of provincial leaders to deploy PAP assets was also a source 

of power for Xi’s political opponents. One case that exemplified the political dangers of dual 

command involved Bo Xilai, a Xi rival who had cultivated influence in provincial PAP forces as 

Chongqing party secretary. This control was on display in February 2012, when Bo dispatched 

mobile PAP units to apprehend his former police chief, Wang Lijun, who had fled to the U.S. 

consulate in Chengdu with damaging information about Bo. Xi likely hoped that by eliminating 

dual leadership, accumulation of power by others could be reduced.

As part of the end of dual leadership, PAP sources emphasized the need for loyalty to Xi as 

CMC chairman. At an NPC debate in March 2016, PAP political commissar Sun Sijing argued 
18 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

that the CMC chairman responsibility system needed to be written into the PAP Law “to ensure 

that the Party Central Committee, the CMC, and President Xi firmly grasp the highest command of the armed forces.”72 In a Study Times article, PAP commander Wang Ning argued that 

implementing the CMC chairman responsibility system was the “supreme political requirement” 

for all PAP personnel, who must promise to “safeguard the core” (referring to Xi).73 At an NPC 

meeting in November 2017, Wang similarly argued that suspending dual leadership was needed 

to “strengthen the unified leadership of the CCP Central Committee and the CMC over the 

PAP.”74 This language clearly implied that Xi’s authority over the paramilitary forces was absolute.

A second factor was strengthening party leadership within the PAP. One of the hallmarks 

of domestic governance under Xi has been increasing the CCP role, often at the expense of 

state agencies. Examples include empowering the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which has played a key anti-corruption role and moving authority over media outlets 

from the state to the CCP Propaganda Ministry.75 Enhancing party control was a major driver 

of the PLA reforms, as evidenced by greater attention to ideological work among PLA personnel. This reflected not only Xi’s argument that party control is necessary to ensure China’s economic success, but also the specific concern that some elements within the armed forces, albeit 

rarely identified by name, continue to support the “nationalization” [guojiahua, 国家化] and 

“de-party-ification” [feidanghua, 非党化] of the army. Those concerns have been periodically 

raised since the 1950s, but were piqued in 1989 when some PLA units sided with the people 

over the party.

Enhancing party control over the PAP was likely seen as a priority given the pivotal role 

of the paramilitary forces in protecting the regime. Over the past three decades, PLA modernization has focused on preparing for combat in China’s immediate periphery and, to a lesser 

extent, nontraditional security operations such as disaster relief. Responding to mass protests, 

formerly a PLA mission, has fallen to the PAP (though the PLA could be called on in an extreme 

case). The experience of Tiananmen provides a constant reminder that those responsible for 

such missions need to be unflinchingly loyal to the party and its top leaders. Dual leadership, 

in which the state and localities retained significant autonomy, was at odds with this imperative 

insofar as PAP units were responsible to multiple authorities. As one retired PLA senior colonel 

has argued, dual command weakened the principle that the “party commands the gun.”76 While 

Chinese sources do not suggest that a popular revolt is imminent, party officials still place high 

value on ensuring political reliability in the PAP given its sensitive responsibilities.

It is no surprise, then, that PAP sources frequently cited the need to strengthen CCP authority. A PAP Daily article published just prior to the transfer of the PAP to full CMC control 

cont. on 20
19

China’s Other Army

How Vulnerable Was Xi?

Several Hong Kong and overseas Chinese news 

reports have suggested that Xi Jinping’s political vulnerability was a key motive behind the 2017–2018 

People’s Armed Police reforms.1 These articles frequently cite the 2012 Bo Xilai episode and allude to 

lingering influence of Jiang Zemin and former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang 

within the PAP. One dubious version of events is that 

Zhou used his influence in the PAP to stage an aborted coup attempt against Hu Jintao in March 2012.2

While power consolidation was a likely motive, there are several reasons to discount these more 

sensationalist accounts. First is that the elite power 

struggles said to be animating Xi took place more 

than 5 years prior to the key PAP reforms. Xi had 

already taken steps to strengthen his authority over 

the People’s Liberation Army and the broader partystate (such as by installing himself as chairman of the 

new National Security Commission in late 2013). If 

Xi had been overly concerned about his status in the 

PAP, he could have undertaken those reforms earlier. 

Second, Xi’s political position going into the reforms 

was already strong: rivals such as Zhou and Bo had 

long been eliminated and Xi’s status as Central Military Commission chairman was unrivaled. By contrast, Jiang remained as CMC chairman for the first 

2 years of Hu’s tenure as party general-secretary. This 

likely gave Xi confidence that reforms to the PAP, 

though necessary, were not urgent. Third, provincial 

officials had some leeway over PAP deployments but 

did not exercise budgetary control: funding for the 

internal security forces came from State Council coffers.3

 Thus, despite the drama surrounding the 2012 

Bo incident, the political threat from provincial leaders was limited.

A related observation is that Xi did not attempt 

to unify all PAP responsibilities under his personal 

authority: several functions were, in fact, delegated to 

the State Council or localities. Sending units responsible for emergency management to the State Council, and placing Border Defense units under Ministry 

of Public Security command indicates that he saw no 

political value in trying to consolidate those functions under the CMC. Most interestingly, Xi accepted continued MPS supervision of the Guards Force, 

responsible for protecting some national officials 

(though not Xi personally or other members of the 

senior party elite and PLA high command) as well as 

provincial leaders.4

 Delegating this responsibility to 

the state sector illustrates Xi’s confidence in the current MPS leadership—which Xi hand-selected—including longtime confidante Zhao Kezhi, who serves 

concurrently as minister and party secretary. Had Xi 

felt more vulnerable, he likely would have tried to retain those units under his purview.

1 See June Mai and Minnie Chan, “Proposal to Expand Role 

of China’s Armed Police Force Would Strengthen Xi Jinping’s 

Power: Analysts,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 

March 9, 2016; “Beijing ‘Important Political Decision,’ Officially 

Carried Out on New Year’s Day 2018,” Aboluo News, January 2, 

2018; “Why Did the People’s Armed Police Increase Leadership 

Authority? Chinese Officials Respond,” Duowei News, December 

28, 2017.

 2 Jamil Anderlini, “Beijing on Edge amid Coup Rumors,” 

Financial Times, March 21, 2012.

 3 Adrian Zenz, “Coralling the People’s Armed Police: Centralizing Control to Reflect Centralized Budgets,” China Brief 18, 

no. 7 (April 24, 2018).

 4 Protection for top party and military leaders is a responsibility of the PLA’s Guards Bureau within the Central Military 

Commission General Office.
20 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

noted that the “biggest test” for PAP personnel is the “political test” and that only by “listening 

to the party can we ensure that the troops are absolutely loyal, absolutely pure, and absolutely 

reliable.”77 In a similar article, the director of the Zhejiang contingent’s political department stated that the top priority for building a “modern” PAP is for personnel to “resolutely listen to the 

party’s commands and always be the loyal guardian of the party and the people.”78 Another piece, 

written by the Heilongjiang contingent’s political commissar, described the reforms as a “major 

political decision to fully implement the party’s absolute leadership over the country’s armed 

force and to uphold and develop a socialist military system with Chinese characteristics.”79

Third was bolstering the party’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public and, to a lesser extent, 

the international community. As noted above, CCP leaders were concerned about the overuse 

of PAP capabilities to address local grievances. In the 2005 Shanwei case, for example, local officials ordered PAP troops to use live ammunition after tear gas had failed to disperse protesters; 

this decision was apparently made without higher approval.80 In 2011, PAP units blockaded the 

Guangdong village of Wukan after residents protested in response to an incident involving the 

local abuse of police power. Use of force was only averted after a deal was negotiated with residents.81 Isolated incidents can quickly attract national (and international) attention and damage 

the party’s legitimacy. One PAP Academy professor writes that the 2009 PAP Law permitted 

local authorities too much discretion in responding to incidents and notes that the PAP should 

be “particularly cautious about the mobilization of force” and “never use the armed police to 

solve mass incidents caused by the reasonable claims of the people.”82 Reducing local autonomy 

over PAP deployments does not mean that top leaders believe that force should never be used 

to resolve incidents—only that higher authorities should be consulted.

Another challenge to party legitimacy was corruption, both in terms of local misuse of 

PAP assets and within PAP ranks. Murray Scot Tanner notes that, in its early years, local officials used the PAP to appropriate grain, intervene in commercial disputes, enforce birth control 

policies, and establish “improper traffic management stations.”83 Earlier PAP reforms aimed 

to reduce these problems by centralizing control over personnel appointments and tightening 

rules governing PAP deployments.84 However, those reforms had limited success in reining in 

officials as evidenced by the 2012 Bo scandal. Corruption was also alleged at the highest levels 

of the PAP, with Wang Jianping, who served as PAP commander from 2009 to 2014, being investigated for bribery.85 Several senior PAP Transportation Force officers have also been accused 

of corruption in recent years.86 The reforms sought to combat these problems by raising the 

status of the Discipline Inspection Commission. Like its PLA counterpart, the PAP Discipline 

Inspection Commission likely has a direct, independent reporting chain to CMC chairman 
21

China’s Other Army

Xi Jinping through General Zhang Shengmin, the Director of the CMC Discipline Inspection 

Commission.

Operational

The key operational motive behind the reforms was refocusing the PAP on a handful of 

core missions. As noted, Chinese analysts argued that the previous PAP structure was too unwieldly and unfocused, leading to a diminished focus on essential tasks. The reforms addressed 

this problem in part by divesting the PAP of most law enforcement and economic functions. 

Applauding the new system, Li Weihai writes that reforms would make the “armed police management system smoother, the functions more clear, and law enforcement more efficient.”87 Xie 

Yongliang of the PLA Academy of Military Science likewise argues that the “previous system 

of being unable to clearly differentiate military, police, and civilian functions is now history.”88

Moreover, unlike previous PLA downsizings, the PAP did not absorb demobilized soldiers as 

part of Xi’s effort to reduce the army by 300,000 personnel (which was a main focus of the PLA 

reforms).This was helpful since PAP budgets would not need to accommodate these personnel, 

few of whom likely possessed the specialized skills needed to perform PAP missions.

In January 2018, the PLA spokesman noted that the remaining operational units—the 

internal security forces, mobile contingents, and the recently integrated CCG—would focus 

squarely on three problems: internal stability, wartime support, and maritime rights protection. This tripartite structure of organizations and missions was reflected in the three olive 

stripes on the PAP’s new flag (figure 3). The flag also contains the yellow star of the CCP and 

the characters for “81,” which symbolizes a closer relationship between the PAP and PLA, 

founded on August 1, 1927.89

The focus on internal stability reflects the PAP’s obligation to defend the party from domestic unrest and opposition. The primary driver of PAP developments in this arena appears 

to be the threat of turmoil in China’s western regions. The 2015 defense white paper noted that 

China faces a “formidable task” in safeguarding political stability, pointing specifically to the 

Tibetan independence movement and the “escalating violent terrorist activities” of “East Turkestan independence” forces in Xinjiang.90 The reforms addressed these problems by concentrating multiple PAP mobile detachments in areas with large ethnic Tibetan populations, including 

Tibet, Sichuan, and Yunnan, as well as in Xinjiang. Those rapidly deployable forces include SOF, 

aviation, and other specialized units, allowing commanders to develop force packages tailored 

to mission requirements. An example is the new “air-land” patrol mechanism in which helicopters are being used to support ground units in Xinjiang.91
22 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

Nevertheless, PAP reforms also ensured 

that all provinces, autonomous regions, and 

provincial-level cities retain mobile detachments as well as “duty detachments” [zhiqin 

zhidui, 执勤支队], which protect government compounds and perform other routine 

duties. This suggests that party leaders were 

not confident that local officials would be 

able to handle “mass incidents” through their 

own public security resources, even though 

local police are increasingly well-equipped—

including carrying firearms—and despite 

other forms of social control, such as CCTV surveillance and the advent of social credit scores.92

Retaining a formidable PAP presence across the country also suggests limits to the “Wukan model” of addressing protests through dialogue and economic compensation.93 However, it is likely 

that PAP rapid reaction units are meant as a backstop rather than a frontline force, as indicated 

in the new coordination system that makes it harder for local and provincial officials to summon 

PAP capabilities when needed.

Supporting wartime operations is another enduring mission for the PAP. According to 

the 2006 Science of Campaigns, the PAP would coordinate “defensive operations” [fangwei 

zuozhan, 防卫作战] with active and reserve PLA units and local governments in areas, such 

as anti-air assault, anti-psychological warfare, and counter-sabotage, and would help maintain 

transportation networks.94 These themes persisted in the 2017 Science of Strategy, which stated 

that the PAP must be able to conduct “defense operations” including guarding key sites, building “joint area defense forces” [quyu lianhe fangshou liliang, 区域联合防守力量], maintaining roads and bridges, providing specialized disaster relief services, and maintaining social 

stability.95

Providing support to combat forces was also a theme of the current reforms. Conferring a 

new flag on the PAP commander in January 2018, Xi himself called on the PAP to improve its 

“combat-ready training” and to “speed up its integration with the PLA’s joint operation system,” 

implying closer coordination during both peacetime and wartime.96

The reforms advanced this goal in three ways. First was establishing CMC authority over 

PAP operations, budgets, structure, and composition. Uniformed military officers, rather than 

State Council bureaucrats, will now be able to shape PAP expenditures and force structure, taking 

Figure 3. New PAP Flag
23

China’s Other Army

military requirements into account (though it remains to be seen how much authority the CMC 

will delegate to the PAP headquarters). Second was divesting local officials of unilateral deployment authority, which simplifies the operational chain of command and helps ensure that unified 

CMC control over the armed forces would be maintained during a conflict. Third was establishing 

the 1st and 2nd Mobile Contingents, which, as noted, will help maintain order in Beijing during a 

crisis and support defensive operations in a Taiwan conflict, respectively.

Maritime rights protection reflects China’s increasing emphasis on developing maritime 

economic interests and asserting territorial claims in the South and East China seas.97 It was 

a bureaucratic anomaly that the CCG, which performed paramilitary duties such as enforcing maritime territorial claims and possessed military-grade weapons such as 76mm cannons, 

was established outside the CMC.98 Ryan Martinson notes that the CCG’s militarized character 

was apparent in its officer accession program, wherein candidates would be commissioned in 

the PAP, and in recruitment materials that advertised the CCG as a “militarizing” [bei junshi 

hua fangxiang jianshe, 被军事化方向建设] force.99 Li Zuobiao of the PAP Academy likewise 

portrayed the PAP as a more sensible parent organization, since most key CCG personnel are 

already “active-duty armed police” [xianyi wujing, 现役武警], and stated that merging other 

CCG employees, such as civil servants and contractors, into the PAP could be done without 

difficulty.100 Another scholar observed that many foreign coast guards, including those of Russia and the United States, were closely aligned with their countries’ militaries, suggesting that 

China’s unique bureaucratic arrangement was out of step with international standards.101

Bringing the coast guard into the military command structure helps China extend its maritime influence by encouraging closer cooperation with the navy, which has been a long-term 

aspiration for Chinese planners.102 Indeed, the CCG and navy have had some success in coordinating activities, including intelligence-sharing and combined exercises, while some CCG personnel have received navy training.103 CCG and PLA navy ships have also coordinated activities 

in the South China Sea, with the former on the frontlines and the latter over the horizon in a 

deterrent or reserve capacity. One PLA commentator referred to this as a “cabbage strategy,” 

since contested territory would be wrapped in successive layers of maritime capabilities.104 Nevertheless, cooperation has been complicated because the two services did not share a common 

chain of command: CCG ships reported to the State Oceanic Administration, with operational 

guidance from the MPS, while the navy reported to the CMC.105

Chinese analysts cite several operational advantages of merging the CCG into the PAP. 

One is that, with a closer organizational relationship, the CCG and navy would be able to conduct more frequent exercises and patrols and cooperate more efficiently during a crisis, while 
24 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

still dividing their labor between combat and maritime law enforcement functions.106 Two experts from the China Maritime Police Academy write that closer coordination could be solidified through a “common command platform,” which would “ensure the synchronization and 

efficiency of decision-making during missions” (though the form that this has taken in the new 

structure remains unclear).107 Another benefit is that subordinating both services to the CMC 

would reduce duplicative development in maritime capabilities, which would be useful in an era 

of declining PLA budget growth.108 In sum, the reforms aimed to both strengthen unified party 

leadership over the PAP and improve its ability to accomplish key missions.

Challenges and Indicators of Further Progress

Despite ambitious organizational changes adopted under Xi, the PAP will continue to face 

a number of constraints as it develops into a more modern paramilitary force. First, reconfiguring the PAP’s organizational structure and chain of command will lead to at least some disruption in cohesion, morale, and readiness as mobile division headquarters are abolished, new 

mobile contingent commands established, commanders geographically rotated,109 and as PAP 

party committees lose MPS representation. A PAP Daily report published just after the reforms 

noted that officials were still struggling to understand their responsibilities under the new system.110 A related challenge was finding new occupations for the former mobile division leadership. Open source evidence suggests that, at least in a few cases, senior mobile division officials 

were placed in similar positions within the provincial contingents.111 Overall, this challenge is 

transitory and will abate as new routines are established.

Second are problems that may result from stronger party control over the PAP. One is a 

tension between ensuring CCP control and the drive to improve its professional competence. 

Achieving the former goal requires the PAP to strengthen ideological education (including for 

officers, who must be CCP members in good standing) and to retain Leninist features, such 

as party committees and dual command, whereby commanders and political commissars are 

jointly responsible for major decisions. These requirements, however, may come at the expense 

of performance: encumbered by ideological indoctrination, PAP personnel have less time for 

professional training, and collective decisionmaking may reduce the autonomy and flexibility of 

lower level commanders to act promptly in a crisis. Similar challenges face the PLA, which has 

constantly tried to navigate the balance between being “red” (loyal to the party) and “expert” 

(proficient in professional duties).112

Another consequence of tightening party control could be delayed crisis response. While 

the parameters of the new “coordination mechanism” through which local officials can request 
25

China’s Other Army

PAP support remain unclear, one possibility is that officials will hesitate to submit requests due 

to concern that this will attract negative attention of high-level party leaders and tarnish their 

reputations for being able to defuse incidents without the need to resort to force. This could paradoxically increase problems of social control as officials look after their own interests. A similar 

problem is that, depending on the level of approval needed, decisions on whether to authorize 

deployments may have to be adjudicated by senior officials, which could delay responses to 

crises (even if this reduces cases of indiscriminate force).113 To assess the extent of this problem, 

analysts should observe how the system is being put into practice, including the level at which 

deployment decisions are made. Key indicators will include specifics on how localities are actually responding to future mass incidents and details on how local emergency response plans are 

being updated to account for the new system.114

Third, the mobile contingents could play a role in supporting key missions, but uncertainties about their potential effectiveness remain. For instance, the wide dispersal of units raises 

questions about how cohesively the contingents will be able to plan and conduct operations. At 

face value, it is unlikely that SOF units based in Guangdong will be able to operate effectively 

with mobile detachments based in Fujian and Jiangsu and helicopters located in Sichuan, as 

is the case with the 2nd Mobile Contingent. Growing cohesion could be demonstrated by geographic consolidation of units, frequent cross-theater and cross-functional exercises, and realworld performance. In the absence of such evidence, it is unclear how the mobile contingents 

would have any advantages over the former mobile divisions.

Fourth, PAP support to the PLA could be reduced by conflicting responsibilities and weak 

coordination. Given finite resources, the provincial and mobile contingents will face a tradeoff 

between their two primary missions—domestic stability and wartime support. In the past, the 

PAP focused more on its domestic role, only occasionally taking part in PLA exercises focused 

on regional conflict.115 Restructuring the mobile divisions into mobile contingents does not 

clearly indicate that this balance will shift in favor of the latter mission; if anything, PAP mobile 

capabilities remain concentrated in western China rather than along the maritime periphery 

where most future wars will be waged. Some skills, such as guarding critical infrastructure, may 

be applicable to both missions, but it is unclear whether internal security units will increase 

their participation in PLA training.116

Questions also remain about the degree of PAP integration into the PLA joint operations 

system. A key component of recent PLA reforms has been to strengthen joint command through 

the creation of a new Joint Staff Department and the transformation of the military regions into 

five regional theater commands, each focused on a specific geographic area of responsibility.117
26 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

While most of the PLA’s services are well integrated into this system, there does not appear to 

be a strong link between PAP forces and the theater commands. Without such coordination, 

PAP units are less likely to be involved in joint planning and training, and less familiar with key 

PLA officials and procedures. Signs that this problem is being addressed would include more 

PAP participation in joint exercises, PAP officers being assigned to theater headquarters, and 

increasing enrollment of PAP students in PLA joint operations courses.118 Observers should 

also consult forthcoming PLA doctrinal regulations and teaching materials for signs of change 

in the PAP’s role in joint combat operations.119

Another sign of stronger links between the PAP and PLA would be transfer of PLA officers to the PAP. At the highest level, Xi has done this by appointing Wang Ning as commander. 

Wang was a career PLA officer who served in senior positions such as chief of staff of the Beijing 

Military Region and deputy chief of the general staff. Similar transfers have taken place at lower 

levels. An example is the inaugural commander of the 2nd Mobile Contingent, Chen Hong, who 

previously served as commander of the 1st Group Army and led the CMC Training and Administration Department’s Inspection Bureau, signifying confidence in his abilities among Xi and 

the PLA senior leadership.120 Other examples include the commander of the Xinjiang contingent, Zhou Jianguo, who previously served as deputy commander of the 21st Group Army, and 

PAP deputy commander Yang Guangyue, who formerly commanded the Yunnan military district.121 In addition to bringing personal connections with PLA officials, these transferees could 

provide insight into how the PAP may be used to augment PLA operations during wartime and 

promote more combat-realistic training.

A related challenge is tenuous linkages between the CCG and navy. While the coast guard 

now reports to the CMC, it is unclear how the two maritime forces (along with the maritime 

militia) will coordinate since there is no overlap in the chain of command below the CMC.122

Presumably both navy and CCG officers will continue to be represented in national- and theater-level border and coastal defense commissions, which also include civilian representatives, 

but this does not explain how practical, day-to-day coordination will be implemented.123 As 

with the ground forces, a key indicator of growing cooperation could be the seconding of naval 

personnel into CCG billets. An initial example was the posting of Rear Admiral Wang Zhongcai, who previously served as a deputy chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet, as CCG commander 

in December 2018.124 Another sign of progress would be CCG officers assigned as liaisons in 

theater joint operations command centers or in the three navy fleet headquarters (that is, North, 

East, and South Sea fleets), where they would work directly with their navy counterparts.125

Other evidence would include participation of CCG officers in the navy’s professional military 
27

China’s Other Army

education courses and more routine operations involving the coast guard and navy (as well as 

the maritime militia).

Fifth, the PAP may face continuing capabilities gaps. A PAP Daily article described, in 

general terms, two “bottlenecks” on PAP development: first, a gap between the “level of military 

construction” and the “requirements of modernization,” and, second, a gap between “mission 

capabilities” and the “fulfilment of mission requirements.”126 In May 2018, PAP commander 

Wang Ning stated that the PAP is “strong on land, but weak in the air and at sea,” “strong inside [China’s] borders, but weak outside,” and “strong with conventional forces but weak with 

information support,” indicating the need for greater maritime, aviation, SOF, and information 

technology capabilities.127 Two months later, Wang argued that in order to “adapt to the requirements of the times,” the PAP should focus on building mobile forces as a “sudden fist,” complemented by SOF “as a counterterrorism knife,” airpower “for efficient support,” maritime power 

“as the main force for rights enforcement,” and networked information support.128

Despite these goals, budgetary constraints could limit the acquisition and deployment of 

new capabilities. PAP budgets have grown in recent years, but often at a rate lower than increases in the military budget (see table 4). The year 2018 was notable in that military spending 

grew by 8.1 percent, while PAP expenses grew only 1 percent despite ongoing reforms.129 Beijing 

also clearly spends far more on PLA equipment, which may represent about one-third of official 

budgets, than on PAP equipment.130 Moreover, in the context of slowing economic growth, PAP 

officials may have to compete more intensely with other domestic security departments such as 

PLA* PAP

Expenses (RMB) Growth (%) Expenses (RMB) Growth (%)

2010 518.6 billion 7.5 66.3 billion –2.3

2011 582.9 billion 12.6 78.4 billion 12.1

2012 647.9 billion 11.1 87.6 billion 11

2013 717.7 billion 10.7 100.6 billion 10.2

2014 805.5 billion 12.2 107.4 billion 7.1

2015 886.9 billion 10.1 120 billion 3.4

2016 954.4 billion 7.6 126.5 billion 8.5

2017 1.023 trillion 7.1 139.8 billion 7.5

2018 1.107 trillion 8.1 141.4 billion 1

Table 4. PAP vs. PLA budgets, 2010–2018

* Includes active, reserve, and militia forces.

Source: Ministry of Finance
28 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

the MPS and PLA, most notably the growing navy and air force, for scarce resources. An indicator of PAP success in future budget negotiations will be overall expenditures, both in absolute 

and relative terms.131 In short, organizational changes carried out in 2017–2018 left a number 

of problems unaddressed. Observers will need to look for indications that these are being addressed in the next few years.

Implications

As with the preceding organizational reforms to the PLA, the implementation of the PAP 

reforms both reflected and deepened Xi’s ability to counter bureaucratic resistance and effect 

practical changes of the sort that eluded Jiang and Hu. The result is that Xi’s authority now 

encompasses all of China’s armed forces, though that change should not be exaggerated since 

he already had control over PAP personnel appointments, political work, and training as CMC 

chairman, in addition to his direct leadership of the PLA. Nevertheless, as CMC chairman, he 

is now able to leverage PAP budgets and force structure to solidify his influence within the PAP, 

has operational authority over the internal security forces and the two new mobile contingents, 

and oversees the CCG. Given his other responsibilities, Xi must obviously rely on trusted agents 

within the PAP to formulate and carry out policies in line with his wishes.

Aside from strengthening Xi’s position, the key political implication will be more effective 

management over PAP resources and operations. Incidences of corruption may decline as local 

governments are less able to misuse PAP assets and as the PAP’s Discipline Inspection Commission is more empowered to root out malfeasance within the ranks. Assuming that the new 

coordination system works as intended, embarrassing cases involving the use of force against 

civilians could decline (or at least shift to local police forces, where blame can be more easily attributed to local mismanagement) and thus aid the party’s domestic legitimacy. As Adrian Zenz 

notes, the reforms also brought PAP management into alignment with budgetary authorities: 

the internal security forces had been primarily funded by the central government and will now 

be under the tighter operational oversight of central leaders.132

The restructured internal security forces could be more effective in quelling unrest in Tibet 

and Xinjiang as well as in ethnic minority areas of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Qinghai. From the 

perspective of the CCP, this would contribute to stronger social and political control and either 

deter or enable better responses to mass incidents, especially as specialized capabilities such as 

helicopters and SOF are added. A more capable PAP presence in Xinjiang would complement, 

but not replace, other forms of social coercion that the CCP has been developing to manage 

discontent among ethnic Uighurs. These include augmenting local police forces, increasing 
29

China’s Other Army

use of facial recognition and other surveillance technology, and the opening of “re-education 

training centers” that international observers have compared to concentration camps. These 

developments have led to statements of concern by the United Nations as well as human rights 

advocates.133

An ancillary benefit of the reforms could be in the area of emergency management. Dispatching the Forestry and Firefighting forces to the State Council Emergency Management Department, for instance, could promote better integration of those functions with other civilian 

capabilities.134 PAP internal security forces will likely continue as first responders in large-scale 

disasters, although local autonomy over deployments will be curtailed. It is telling that one of 

the first reported exercises of the 2nd Mobile Contingent was a winter drill in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu, 

involving PAP transportation units working alongside provincial and municipal units to clear 

roads.135 It is also likely that some high-level coordination persists between the PAP and civilian 

agencies through the National Security Commission [zhongyang guojia anquan weiyuanhui, 中

央国家安全委员会], established in late 2013 to improve interagency cooperation.136

The provincial and mobile contingents may also provide stronger support for PLA combat 

operations, assuming that the PAP devotes more attention to its wartime support mission and 

coordination challenges between the PAP and PLA are resolved. Key PAP roles will include 

protecting critical infrastructure within China, guarding supply routes, and maintaining social 

stability (including responding to potential unrest in Beijing and other major cities). Despite 

the transfer of Border Defense Force units to the State Council, the PAP may also reinforce 

China’s borders during a conflict involving North Korea and handle an influx of refugees in the 

event of a North Korean collapse.137 In comparative context, this mirrors the role that the newly 

reconfigured Russian national guard is anticipated to play in the event that Russian territory is 

threatened during a regional conflict.138

While the PAP will remain focused on domestic missions, there are also several notable 

international implications of PAP reform. First is that the PAP is emerging as a valued training and operational partner in the nontraditional security arena. Some of these activities take 

place within China. As early as 2002, the PAP opened a training center for foreign police forces 

engaged in UN peacekeeping operations.139 In August 2016, the PAP Academy initiated another 

UN-related course for foreign police forces, with the first class drawn from several African 

countries.140 In 2016, the PAP also launched a biennial “Great Wall” counterterrorism forum in 

which it has brought representatives from many countries to China for discussions and to observe drills.141 PAP forces have also conducted joint counterterrorism exercises in China, such 
30 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

as a December 2017 event with Russian national guard forces that focused on “jointly cleaning 

up terrorist groups . . . [including scenarios] such as a bus hijacking.”142

The PAP is also poised to expand its overseas partnerships. One way is through participation in UN peacekeeping operations. The PAP first deployed civilian police to a UN mission in 

East Timor in 2000 and has participated in subsequent missions in countries such as Liberia, 

Haiti, and Afghanistan.143 These activities may continue or even increase as China looks to buttress its international reputation as a “responsible” country.144 Another avenue is through joint 

counterterrorism operations with individual countries. A legal basis was provided in the 2015 

Counter-Terrorism Law, which permitted PAP (and PLA) overseas deployments with CMC 

approval.145 Recent media reports suggest that PAP assets are pursuing this mandate through 

joint patrols in Afghanistan and have even opened a forward base in Tajikistan, from which PAP 

units are attempting to interdict terrorists flowing into Xinjiang.146 An advantage of using PAP 

assets is that Beijing can deny official “military” intervention in neighboring countries; those 

claims, however, will ring less true now that the PAP is fully under CMC control.147

Second is that the PAP may be called on to protect Chinese civilians and assets abroad. 

Overseas protection has become a key security challenge for Beijing in recent years, as illustrated in the evacuations of Chinese civilians from Libya in 2011 and Yemen in 2015.148 The challenge has increased under Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, which involves Chinese construction 

activities in unstable regions such as Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province.149 Beijing has a diverse set 

of capabilities at its disposal to address this challenge, including PLA-led noncombatant evacuations, host-country support, and services provided by private security companies, but the PAP 

also has a role to play. In a narrow sense, the PAP will continue its mission of guarding Chinese 

embassies and consulates (similar to the role played by U.S. Marine guards). PAP units might 

also be deployed in some cases, given their training and real-world experience in handling civilian unrest with minimal use of lethal force, which the PLA lacks.

Third is safeguarding Chinese maritime interests. Improved coordination between the 

CCG and PLA Navy will allow Beijing to improve enforcement of territorial claims, protect 

civilian assets (such as oil rigs and fishing fleets), and intimidate foreign naval and commercial vessels. A sign of increasingly intricate cooperation between the maritime services was the 

completion of initial joint navy-CCG law enforcement patrols in the Paracels and Senkakus in 

May and July 2018, respectively.150 Aside from their value in deterring rival territorial claimants, 

these patrols allowed naval and CCG personnel to improve interoperability, including practicing specialized terminology.151 The commander of the joint patrol in the Senkakus stated that 

“If we discover a foreign military vessel, our navy can immediately deal with it; if we discover 
31

China’s Other Army

foreign fishing vessels violating the law, our coast guard ships can enforce the law.”152 U.S. naval 

planners thus have good reasons to better understand China’s evolving maritime command 

system.

A practical issue for the United States in this context will be determining whether existing agreements on rules of behavior for naval forces should be expanded to cover activities of 

the China Coast Guard. A 2014 U.S.-China agreement provided guidelines for safe encounters 

between U.S. and Chinese naval vessels based on the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and other international standards.153 However, with the CCG now 

fully under the Chinese military, a case could be made that those standards should also apply 

to CCG vessels (as well as perhaps U.S. Coast Guard vessels when operating under U.S. military 

authority).154 This broader interpretation would mean that incidents could be raised in U.S.-

China military engagements such as Military Maritime Consultative Agreement talks.

Fourth, though less likely in the near future, is supporting overseas combat operations. For 

instance, the PAP could be called on to take part in the later stages of a PLA invasion of Taiwan. Unlike the PLA, which has had little combat experience since 1979, PAP personnel have 

been on the frontlines of armed clashes in Xinjiang and Tibet. Even though the geographic and 

operational circumstances would be quite different, such “battle-tested” PAP forces might be 

better suited to maintain order in Taiwan. Such a role, however, assumes that the PLA ground 

forces are unwilling or incapable of functioning as an occupation force and would likely require 

different PAP training and more effective PAP-PLA coordination than currently exists.155

Conclusion

The People’s Armed Police has taken an organizational leap forward as part of the larger 

reforms to China’s armed forces. The result is a smaller PAP that is under the firmer grasp of 

central party leaders and better positioned structurally to accomplish its core missions. How 

durable these reforms prove to be will depend on Xi’s continuing grasp on power as well as a 

consensus among CCP elites that a more centralized PAP is desirable. It is worth considering 

that the nature of authority over the PAP has fluctuated many times since the 1930s; the pendulum may ultimately swing back toward decentralized management. Local officials, and those 

wary about an overconcentration of power in the hands of one individual, might support a 

relaxation of control—or an interpretation of new guidelines that gives flexibility to the localities—but there is little evidence of any such momentum at present. In the absence of a catalytic 

event, such as a calamity attributed to Xi, the more muscular, centrally managed format of PAP 

authority appears destined to remain for many years.
32 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

Theater 

Command 

Grade

Deputy Theater 

Command Grade

Corps Leader 

Grade 

Deputy Corps 

Leader Grade 

Division 

Leader Grade 

PAP HQ • PAP HQ Staff 

Department

• PAP HQ Political 

Work Department 

(PWD)

• PAP HQ 

Discipline 

Inspection 

Commission 

• PAP HQ 

Logistics 

Department

• PAP HQ 

Equipment 

Department 

• Staff Dept. 

Training, 

Intelligence 

Bureau

• PWD 

Propaganda, 

Soldier and 

Civilian 

Personnel 

Bureau

• Two Mobile 

Contingents

• Beijing 

Contingent

• Xinjiang 

Contingent

Coast Guard (?)

Contingent:

Staff, Political 

Work Bureaus; 

Discipline 

Inspection; 

Detachments

Other Provincial 

Contingents

Contingent:

Logistics, 

Equipment 

Bureaus

Contingent:

Staff, Political 

Work; Discipline 

Inspection; 

Detachments

• PAP Academy

• PAP 

Engineering 

University

• PAP 

Command 

Academy 

• PAP Logistics 

Academy

• PAP Officers 

Academy

• PAP Special 

Police 

Academy

Appendix: PAP Grade Structure PAP HQ Organizations Operational Units Universities and Academies
33

China’s Other Army

Notes 1 For an overview of the reforms, see Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, “Introduction: 

Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, 

ed. Phillip C. Saunders et al. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2019); and Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. 

Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping, China Strategic Perspectives 10 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2017).

2 For a discussion of hybrid warfare, see Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” 

Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 34–39.

3 For a description of the People’s Armed Police (PAP)’s predecessor organizations, see Murray Scot Tanner, “The Institutional Lessons of Disaster: Reorganizing the People’s Armed Police After 

Tiananmen,” in The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. 

Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 589–600.

4 China’s National Defense in 2006 (Beijing: State Council Information Office, December 2006), 

available at <www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm>.

5 PAP units also had a political commissar who was a professional PAP political officer.

6 Depending on size, counties may also have a company-size PAP unit [zhongdui, 中队].

7 “People’s Republic of China People’s Armed Police Law” [中华人民共和国人民武装警察

法], Article 8, August 27, 2009, available at <www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-08/27/content_1403324.htm>.

8 Thomas Lum, Social Unrest in China, RL 33416 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, May 8, 2006), 1–2.

9 Xuezhi Guo, China’s Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 2012), 242–243; Jim Yardley, “Chinese Riot Over Handling of Girl’s Killing,” New York 

Times, June 30, 2008, available at <www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/world/asia/30riot.html>.

10 For a discussion of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) downsizings, see Daniel Gearin, “PLA 

Force Reductions: Impact on the Services,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA.

11 For the locations of PAP mobile division headquarters, see: Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese 

Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (New York: Routledge, 2012), 111.

12 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance (London: IISS, 

2009–2018). The 2006 defense white paper stated that the PAP’s strength was 660,000 personnel.

13 Adrian Zenz, “Coralling the People’s Armed Police: Centralizing Control to Reflect Centralized Budgets,” China Brief 18, no. 7 (April 24, 2018), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/

corralling-the-peoples-armed-police-centralizing-control-to-reflect-centralized-budgets/>. Moreover, 

Blasko notes that PAP end strength might have reached one million if the official figure did not include 

forces subordinate to the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 110.

14 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Rethinking China’s Coercive Capacity: An Examination of PRC 

Domestic Security Spending, 1992–2012,” China Quarterly 232 (December 2017), 1011–1012.

15 Ibid. On sources of PAP funding, see Zenz, “Coralling the People’s Armed Police”; Cortez 

A. Cooper III, “‘Controlling the Four Quarters:’ China Trains, Equips, and Deploys a Modern, Mobile 

People’s Armed Police Force,” in Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 145–146. For an 
34 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

earlier analysis, see Tanner, “The Institutional Lessons of Disaster,” 620–625.

16 Maxim Popenker, “Top 5 Submachine Guns Used by China’s Military and Police,” Tactical 

Life, January 12, 2015, available at <www.tactical-life.com/firearms/top-5-submachine-guns-china/>. 

See also Cooper, “Controlling the Four Quarters,” 140–142.

17 Xiao Tianliang, ed., Science of Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 

2017), 412–414.

18 “China’s Armed Police Looks to Buy New Z-11WB Light Attack Helicopters,” Defence blog, 

October 16, 2016, available at <https://defence-blog.com/news/chinas-armed-police-looks-to-buy-newz-11wb-light-attack-helicopters.html>.

19 “Shanxi People’s Armed Police Helicopter Complex Training Area Increases Counter-Terrorism Capabilities” [山西武警武装直升机复杂地域训练提升反恐能力], PAP Online [中国武警网], 

June 6, 2014, available at <www.chinanews.com/mil/2014/06-06/6250027.shtml>.

20 “In the People’s Armed Police Shanghai Zongdui Counter-Terrorism Exercises, Why Did 

the Experienced Special Operations Team Lose?” [武警上海总队反恐演练,经验丰富的特战队

为何吃了败仗], Liberation Daily [解放报], August 1, 2018, available at <www.jfdaily.com/news/

detail?id=98272>; Murray Scot Tanner, China’s Response to Terrorism, with James Bellacqua (Arlington, 

VA: CNA, 2016), 42; Guo, China’s Security State, 233.

21 Li Zuobiao, “Legal Thoughts on the People’s Armed Police Missions and Structure” [武警部

队职责与体制的法学思考], Journal of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Academy [武警学院学

报] 26, no. 7 (July 2010), 39.

22 Lyle J. Morris, “Organizing for the Gray Zone: Assessing the Rights Protection Capabilities 

of the New China Coast Guard,” in China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, ed. Ryan D. Martinson and 

Andrew S. Erickson (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018). See also Linda Jakobson, “The PLA 

and Maritime Security Actors,” in PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, ed. Phillip 

C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 300–323.

23 See especially the 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2012 China defense white papers.

24 On the implications of the PAP Law, see Murray Scot Tanner, “China’s People’s Armed Police 

Force Leadership, Command, and Organization in the Wake of the 2009 PAP Law,” in The PLA as Organization v2.0, ed. Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (Vienna, VA: DGI, 2015); and Yuning Wu, Ivan 

Y. Sun, and Aaron Fichtelberg, “Formalizing China’s Armed Police: The 2009 PAP Law,” Crime, Law, 

and Social Change 56, no. 3 (2011), 243–263.

25 As Tai Ming Cheung assessed in 1996, the PAP clung to a “fragmented command structure 

with widely varying standards of professionalism, competing institutional loyalties, and poor coordination and communication between the components.” See Tai Ming Cheung, “Guarding China’s Domestic 

Front Line: The People’s Armed Police and China’s Stability,” China Quarterly 146 (June 1996), 528.

26 See, for example, “Two Senior Chinese Officers Expelled from Communist Party,” Reuters, 

October 28, 2016, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-china-corruption-defence/two-senior-chinese-officers-expelled-from-communist-party-idUSKCN12S0B3>. On obstacles to PLA organizational 

reform, see Wuthnow and Saunders, Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping, 8–9.

27 “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues 

Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform,” China.org.cn, January 16, 2014, available at 
35

China’s Other Army

<www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm>.

28 Minnie Chan and Choi Chi-yuk, “Top Chinese General Linked to Disgraced Security Tsar 

Zhou Yongkang Arrested for Corruption,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), August 25, 2016, 

available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2009370/top-chinese-general-linkeddisgraced-security-tsar-zhou>.

29 “Central Military Commission Opinion on Deepening National Defense and Military 

Reform” [中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见], Xinhua, January 1, 2016, available at <www.

xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.

30 For instance, as early as January 29, 2013, Xi Jinping visited a PAP unit and enjoined troops 

to develop a “modern armed police force that listens to the party’s commands, can win battles, and has 

a good style,” echoing the slogans he recited to PLA personnel. See Yu Yu, Liu Fengqiao, and Xiao Yisha, 

“Striving to Promote the Construction of a Modernized People’s Armed Police” [奋力推进现代化武装

警察部队建设], PAP Daily [武警报], December 30, 2017, 1.

31 The date of these headquarters reforms is uncertain but was completed by October 4, 2017. 

See “People’s Armed Police Reform: Local Governments No Longer Have Power Over Command and 

Deployments” [武警改革:地方政府不再拥有对其指挥和调动权力], The Paper [澎湃], December 29, 

2017, available at <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2017-12-29/doc-ifyqchnr7089541.shtml>.

32 For a discussion of Xi’s political strategy in the PLA, see Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “Large and In Charge: Civil-Military Relations under Xi Jinping,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the 

PLA.

33 “People’s Armed Police Reform.”

34 Those were the National Defense Law and the PAP Law.

35 “Decision of the CCP Central Committee Adjusts the Leadership and Command System 

of the People’s Armed Police” [中共中央决定调整中国人民武装警察部队领导指挥体制], Xinhua, 

December 27, 2017, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/2017-12/27/c_1122175909.htm>.

36 In 1972, Mao Zedong gave local MPS bureaus operational and financial authority over local 

paramilitary forces. See Tai Ming Cheung, “Guarding China’s Domestic Front Line,” 526–527.

37 Ibid.

38 “Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Party Committee, Government Opinion on Advancing Reforms in Disaster Preventing, Reduction, and Relief ” [中共广西壮族自治区委员会广西壮族

自治区人民政府关于推进防灾减灾救灾体制机制改革的实施意见], Nanning City Civil Affairs 

Bureau, November 16, 2018, available at <www.nanning.gov.cn/xxgk/xxgkml/shgysyjslyxxgk/shjzhshfl/

t1415528.html>.

39 “Changzhou 2018 Military-Locality Joint Flood Control Rescue Drill Successfully Held” [常

州市2018军地联合防汛抢险演练成功举行], Changzhou Emergency Management Department, June 

8, 2018, available at <http://ajj.changzhou.gov.cn/html/ajj/2018/PPEAMIBP_0608/26236.html>.

40 Li Yan, “Three Days Later, Local Governments Will Have No Power to Mobilize People’s 

Armed Police Forces” [3天后, 地方政府将无权调动武警力量], Zhengzhijian [政知见], December 

28, 2017. Zhengzhijian is a public WeChat account operated by Beijing Youth Daily, which is run by the 

Communist Youth League.

41 Interview, Beijing, October 2018.
36 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

42 Ibid.

43 Li Yan, “Three Days Later, Local Governments Will Have No Power to Mobilize People’s 

Armed Police Forces.”

44 Like the mobile divisions, these were also known as forces [budui, 部队] and sometimes by 

their former appellations as regiments [tuan, 团].

45 The situation is somewhat muddled because provincial contingents already possessed some 

mobile capabilities, and some of these were also apparently rebranded as mobile detachments. See Guo, 

China’s Security State, 233.

46 Some of these units were drawn from the former mobile divisions. For instance, the Xinjiang 

4th Mobile Detachment likely was assembled from the former 8661 Force (Yining), while the Yunnan 3rd

Mobile Detachment likely came from the former 8751 Force (Honghe).

47 Yue Huairang, “PAP Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Command Adjusted 

to a Corps Contingent in October 2017” [武警新疆生产建设兵团指挥部于去年10月整编成立为

兵团总队], The Paper [澎湃], February 12, 2018, available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1996363>.

48 Beijing now has at least four mobile detachments, while Shanghai has two.

49 As early as January 2018, non-authoritative Chinese and foreign media reported on the 

creation of two new mobile contingents. The PLA’s spokesman eventually confirmed the existence of the 

mobile contingents during a press conference in June 2018, indicating that these would be distinct from 

the internal security forces (but not mentioning the status of the mobile divisions). See “Beijing ‘Important Political Decision,’ Officially Carried Out on New Year’s Day 2018” [北京“重大政治决定”

2018年首日正式执行], Aboluo News [阿波罗新闻], January 2, 2018, available at <www.aboluowang.

com/2018/0102/1049012.html>; “Beijing Observer: People’s Armed Police Reform Creates Mobile 

Contingents” [北京观察: 武警改革组建机动总队], Ta Kung Pao [大公网], February 14, 2018, available at <http://news.takungpao.com/mainland/focus/2018-02/3544027.html>; “The Cross-Military 

Reform of the People’s Armed Police Is Progressing in an Orderly Manner” [武警部队跨军地改革按计

划有序推进], People’s Daily [人民日报], June 29, 2018, available at <http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/

html/2018-06/29/nw.D110000renmrb_20180629_2-11.htm>.

50 While the mobile detachments appear to have been drawn from the former mobile divisions, some of the specialized units were likely drawn from the provincial contingents. For instance, 

non-authoritative reports suggest that the Snow Leopard commando team has been moved from the 

Beijing contingent to the 2nd Mobile Contingent and is now based in Guangzhou. See <www.xhclub.net/

thread-247634-5-1.html>.

51 Beijing and Xinjiang are also corps-level commands. The appendix provides more data on 

the PAP’s post-reform grade structure.

52 Wang Jun, “Two North and South PAP Mobile Contingents Come to Light: Respectively Located in Fujian, Hebei” (武警部队南北两支机动总队驻地亮相: 分别位于福建, 河北), The Paper

[澎湃], August 1, 2018, available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2310886>.

53 “Unprecedented Degree of People’s Armed Police Organizational Reform, Maritime Police 

Forces ‘Enter the Army’” [武警部队编制改革力度空前海警力量’当兵入伍’], People’s Daily Online [人

民网], March 22, 2018, available at <http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0322/c1011-29882805.html>.
37

China’s Other Army

54 “Advancement of People’s Armed Police Reforms, Eight Types of Police Are Fit and Slim” [

武警改革的出与进 八大警种瘦身健体], Beijing News [新京报], April 6, 2018, available at <www.

bjnews.com.cn/inside/2018/04/06/482152.html>.

55 Wang Ning revealed this formulation’s appearance in the November 2015 document during a 

National People’s Congress (NPC) speech 2 years later. See “Explanation of the Draft Decision on Temporary Adjustments to Relevant Laws and Regulations of the People’s Armed Police During the Reform 

Period” [关于“关于中国人民武装警察部队改革期间暂时调整适用相关法律规定的决定(草案)”

的说明], China National People’s Congress Online [中国人大网], November 8, 2017, available at <www.

npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2017-11/08/content_2032260.htm>.

56 “Wang Qiang: Deep Significance of the People’s Armed Police Adjustment and Reform” [王

强: 武警部队调整改革的深远意义], Global Times [环球时报], January 2, 2018, available at <http://

opinion.huanqiu.com/hqpl/2018-01/11488528.html>.

57 “Advancement of People’s Armed Police Reforms, Eight Types of Police Are Fit and Slim.”

58 “CCP Central Committee Publishes ‘Plan on Deepening the Reform of Party and State 

Organizations’” (中共中央印发“深化党和国家机构改革方案”), Xinhua, March 21, 2018, available at 

<www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-03/21/content_5276191.htm#1>.

59 “Advancement of People’s Armed Police Reforms, Eight Types of Police Are Fit and Slim.”

60 Wang Jun, “People’s Armed Police Second Mobile Contingent and Subsidiary Mobile Detachments and Transportation Detachments Come to Light” [武警第二机动总队及所属多个机动支

队和交通支队集中亮相], Pengpai News [澎湃新闻], July 18, 2018, available at <www.thepaper.cn/

newsDetail_forward_2273118>.

61 “Revising the PRC People’s Armed Police Law” [修订“中华人民共和国人民武装警察法”], 

PLA Daily [解放军报], March 8, 2016, available at <www.npc.gov.cn/npc/dbdhhy/12_4/2016-03/08/

content_1973601.htm>.

62 Li Zuobiao, “On the Work Relationship Between the State Oceanic Administration, the 

China Coast Guard, and the Ministry of Public Security” [试论国家海洋局中国海警局和公安部之

间的职务关系], Journal of the Armed Police Academy [武警学院学报] 32, no. 11 (November 2016), 8. 

The author is a professor in the Border Defense Department at the PAP Academy.

63 “Chinese Coast Guard to Be under the Command of Armed Police from July,” ChinaMil, 

June 28, 2018, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-06/28/content_8074409.htm>.

64 “NPC Standing Committee Decision on the Law Enforcement Authority of the China Coast 

Guard” [全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于中国海警局行使海上维权执法职权的决定], NPC, 

June 22, 2018, available at <www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-06/22/content_2056585.htm>.

65 Ibid.

66 “Explanation of the Draft Decision on Temporary Adjustments to Relevant Laws and Regulations of the People’s Armed Police During the Reform Period.”

67 For a discussion of the drivers of PLA reform, see David M. Finkelstein, “Breaking the Paradigm: Drivers Behind the PLA’s Current Period of Reform,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA.

68 Saunders and Wuthnow, “Large and In Charge.”

69 Wuthnow and Saunders, Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping, 32–35.

70 James Mulvenon, “The Cult of Xi and the Rise of the CMC Chairman Responsibility System,” 
38 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

China Leadership Monitor 55 (Winter 2018).

71 Viola Zhou, “Security Shake-up in Store as New Names Tapped to Run China’s Police and 

Intelligence Services,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), November 1, 2017, available at <www.

scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2117894/china-appoints-new-communist-party-chiefoversee-police>.

72 “Reforming the People’s Republic of China People’s Armed Police Law” [修订中华人民共

和国人民武装警察法], PLA Daily [解放军报], March 8, 2016, available at <www.npc.gov.cn/npc/

dbdhhy/12_4/2016-03/08/content_1973601.htm>. The CMC chairman responsibility system refers to 

language in the 1982 People’s Republic of China constitution, which states that the Central Military 

Commission chairman “assumes overall responsibility for the work of the CMC.” It has been emphasized in the Xi era to underscore that all major decisions ultimately rest with him. For a discussion, see 

James Mulvenon, “The Yuan Stops Here: Xi Jinping and the ‘CMC Chairman Responsibility System,’” 

China Leadership Monitor, July 14, 2015, available at <www.hoover.org/research/yuan-stops-here-xijinping-and-cmc-chairman-responsibility-system>.

73 Wang Ning, “Resolutely Defend and Implement the CMC Chairman Responsibility System, 

Ensure the Party’s Absolute Leadership Over the People’s Armed Police” [坚决维护和贯彻军委主席负

责制 确保党对武警部队绝对领导], Study Times [学习时报], October 11, 2017, available at <http://

theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1011/c40531-29580014.html>.

74 “Explanation of the Draft Decision on Temporary Adjustments to Relevant Laws and Regulations of the People’s Armed Police During the Reform Period.”

75 Timothy Heath, The Consolidation of Political Power in China under Xi Jinping, Testimony 

Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 7, 2019, 2.

76 “Why Did the People’s Armed Police Increase Leadership Authority? Chinese Officials Respond” [武警部队为何变更领导权? 中国官方回应], Duowei News [多维新闻], December 28, 2017, 

available at <http://news.dwnews.com/china/news/2017-12-28/60032514.html>.

77 Yu, Liu, and Xiao, “Striving to Promote the Construction of a Modernized People’s Armed 

Police,” 1.

78 Fu Yiyun, “Starting a New Journey for Building a Powerful and Modernized People’s Armed 

Police” [开启建设强大现代化武装警察部队新征程], PAP Daily [武警报], February 4, 2018, A3.

79 Zhao Shuyi, “Adapt a New System, Carry Out New Missions, Seek New Ways” [适应新体制 

履行新使命, 谋求新作为], PAP Daily [武警报], May 20, 2018, 3.

80 Edward Cody, “Chinese Police Bring Villagers to Heel After Latest Uprising,” Washington 

Post, December 21, 2005, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/

AR2005122001810.html>.

81 Jamil Anderlini, “Wukan Villagers Agree to Peace Deal,” Financial Times, December 21, 

2011, available at <www.ft.com/content/431ec782-2b9b-11e1-98bc-00144feabdc0>.

82 Zhang Liping, “Legal Considerations of the People’s Armed Police’s Management of Mass 

Incidents” [武警部队处置群体性事件的法律思考], Police Practical Combat Training [警察实战训练

研究], no. 2 (2013), 92–95.

83 Tanner, “The Institutional Lessons of Disaster,” 613.

84 See, for example, Jonathan Walton, “China Plans for Internal Unrest: People’s Armed Police 
39

China’s Other Army

and Public Security Approaches to ‘Mass Incidents,’” in The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency 

Planning in China, ed. Andrew Scobell et al. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2015), 55–84.

85 However, this investigation may also have been triggered by Wang’s ties to Zhou Yongkang. 

See Chan and Choi, “Top Chinese General Linked to Disgraced Security Tsar Zhou Yongkang Arrested 

for Corruption.”

86 “Two Senior Chinese Officers Expelled from Communist Party.” In addition, ChinaFile’s database of anti-corruption cases lists four PAP Transportation officers as having been investigated: Major 

General Liu Zhanqi (commander), Major General Wang Xin (political commissar), Major General Miu 

Guirong (chief engineer), and Major General Qu Mutian (commander). See <www.chinafile.com/infographics/visualizing-chinas-anti-corruption-campaign>.

87 “Advancement of People’s Armed Police Reforms, Eight Types of Police Are Fit and Slim.”

88 Xie Yongliang, “Why Is the Current People’s Armed Police Reform a Revolutionary Reform?” 

[为什么说这次武警部队改革是一次革命性变革], Beijing News [新京报], March 22, 2018, available 

at <http://news.ifeng.com/a/20180322/56947571_0.shtml>.

89 “Defense Ministry’s Interpretation on AFP Flag,” China Military Online, January 11, 2018, 

available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-01/11/content_7904961.htm>.

90 “Full Text: China’s Military Strategy,” Xinhua, May 26, 2015, available at <http://eng.mod.gov.

cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm>.

91 “Xinjiang Deploys over 10,000 Armed Police in Latest Show of Force after Terror Attacks,” 

South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), February 28, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/

diplomacy-defence/article/2074711/china-stages-another-huge-show-force-xinjiang-wake>.

92 See William Wan and Xu Jing, “Newly Armed Police in China Say They Fear Their Guns 

as Much as Public,” Washington Post, September 26, 2014, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/

news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/26/newly-armed-police-in-china-say-they-fear-their-guns-as-much-aspublic/?utm_term=.31e899ffb04e>. For an overview, see Anna Mitchell and Larry Diamond, “China’s 

Surveillance State Should Scare Everyone,” The Atlantic, February 2, 2018, available at <www.theatlantic.

com/international/archive/2018/02/china-surveillance/552203/>.

93 According to one analysis, government officials respond to 30 percent of mass incidents 

through economic compensation. See Yanqi Tong and Shaohua Lei, “Large-Scale Mass Incidents and 

Government Responses in China,” International Journal of China Studies 1, no. 2 (2010), 487–508. Notably, the “Wukan model” suffered a blow when residents of that village once again protested in 2016. See 

Austin Ramzy, “Protests Return to Wukan, Chinese Village That Once Expelled Its Officials,” New York 

Times, June 20, 2016, available at <www.nytimes.com/2016/06/21/world/asia/china-wukan-protest.

html>.

94 Zhang Yuliang, Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 

2006), 123.

95 Xiao, Science of Strategy, 420. Moreover, A 2013 Academy of Military Science volume on 

joint tactics similarly noted that the PAP should “maintain the security of important targets” and conduct urban defense, enemy reconnaissance, and other duties during a battle. See Chen Rongdi, Course 

of Instruction on Joint Battles [联合战斗教程] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2013), 80.

96 Zhao Lei, “Armed Police Must Obey Party,” China Daily, January 11, 2018, available at 
40 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

<www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/11/WS5a568f1ca3102e5b17374094.html>.

97 See Michael McDevitt, Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream (Arlington, 

VA: CNA, 2016).

98 Lyle Morris, “China Welcomes Its Newest Armed Force: The Coast Guard,” War on the Rocks, 

April 4, 2018, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/china-welcomes-its-newest-armedforce-the-coast-guard/>.

99 Ryan D. Martinson, The Arming of China’s Maritime Frontier (Newport, RI: China Maritime 

Studies Institute, 2017), 20.

100 Li Zuobiao, “On the Duty Relationship Between the State Oceanic Administration, China 

Coast Guard, and the Ministry of Public Security,” 8.

101 Su Yanshan, “Thoughts on China’s Maritime Law Enforcement System Construction” [我国

海上执法体制建设影响因素分析及其构想初探], Journal of the Armed Police Academy [武警学院学

报], 34, no. 3 (March 2018), 23–24.

102 For instance, Senior Captain Liang Fang of the PLA National Defense University wrote that 

the 2013 consolidation of China’s maritime law enforcement services would enable better coast guard–

navy cooperation, since the latter would only have to deal with a single entity. See “Experts: China’s 

Coast Guard Bureau Will Form a Ladder Defense System with the Navy” [专家: 中国海警局将与海

军形成梯次防卫体系], Southeast Online [东南网], March 19, 2013, available at <http://news.sohu.

com/20130319/n369408973.shtml>.

103 Ryan D. Martinson, Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute 

Strategy (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2018), 25–27.

104 Jeff Himmelman, “A Game of Shark and Minnow,” New York Times, October 27, 2013, available at <www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/index.html>.

105 “Advancement of People’s Armed Police Reforms, Eight Types of Police Are Fit and Slim.”

106 Xu Hailin, “China’s Military to Lead Coast Guard to Better Defend Sovereignty,” Global 

Times, June 24, 2018, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/1108223.shtml>.

107 Yang Yang and Li Peizhi, “Analysis of Problems of China Coast Guard–Navy Fusion-Type 

Development” [中国海警海军融合式发展问题探究], Journal of China Maritime Police Academy

[公安海警学院学报] 16, no. 1 (February 2017), 12. It is unclear whether this refers to the “Integrated 

Command Platform” that the PLA has developed to foster communication across services and regions; 

a sign of closer coast guard–navy cooperation would be use of this or a similar command system.

108 Ibid.

109 Although data on PAP personnel appointments are limited, there are at least a few examples 

of rotations between the provinces in the last few years. For instance, current commander of the Tibet 

contingent, Liu Guorong, previously served as commander of the Hunan contingent, while current 

political commissar of the Xinjiang contingent, Wang Aiguo, previously served in the same role in 

Shandong. Sources: 2016 and 2018 Directory of PRC Military Personalities.

110 Cai Xiang and Zhang Wei, “Rebirth in Remodeling and Reconstruction” [在重塑重构中重

生], PAP Daily [武警报], May 17, 2018, 3.

111 For instance, Wang Yadong, political department director of the former 8710 Force, became 

political commissar of the Guangdong contingent; Wang Qiang, chief of staff of the former 8620 Force, 
41

China’s Other Army

became commander of the Guangxi contingent; and Hua Ronglin, commander of the former 8730 

Force, became commander of the Guizhou contingent. Source: 2016 and 2018 Directory of PRC Military 

Personalities.

112 Wuthnow and Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping, 45–47.

113 Indeed, local effectiveness is a reason why officials had deployment authority in the first 

place. See Tanner, “The Institutional Lessons of Disaster,” 605–606.

114 For a discussion of local emergency response plans, see Catherine Welch, “Civilian Authorities and Contingency Planning in China,” in The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in 

China.

115 The PAP was able, however, to coordinate with the PLA in areas such as counterterrorism 

and border defense. See Cooper, “‘Controlling the Four Quarters,’” 142–143.

116 As a baseline, in 2013, the PAP reportedly carried out 40 combined exercises with the PLA 

in areas such as air-land combat, joint air defense, and long-range missile attacks. See “PLA and PAP 

Forces Will Carry Out a Series of Exercises to Boost Combat Capabilities” [解放军和武警部队将举

行系列军演提高打仗能力], PLA Daily [解放军报], February 26, 2013, available at <www.gov.cn/

jrzg/2013-02/26/content_2340538.htm>.

117 For an overview of the evolving joint command and control structure, see Joel Wuthnow, 

“A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, nos. 1–2 (2017), 

169-195. On the five theaters, see Edmund J. Burke and Arthur Chan, “Coming to a (New) Theater Near 

You: Command, Control, and Forces,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA.

118 A handful of PAP officers already participate annually in the PLA National Defense University’s senior-level (“Dragons”) command course.

119 Current PLA joint campaign doctrine dates from the early 2000s, but a new “6th generation” of doctrine is reportedly being written. See M. Taylor Fravel, “Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity,” 

International Security 42, no. 3 (Winter 2017/2018), 79–80; Elsa B. Kania, “When Will the PLA Finally 

Update Its Doctrine?” The Diplomat, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/when-will-the-plafinally-update-its-doctrine/>.

120 The inaugural commander of the 2nd Mobile Contingent, Major General Chen Hong, previously served as deputy commander of the 1st Group Army and led the CMC Training and Administration Department’s Inspection Bureau, signaling a high level of confidence in his abilities. See “Commanders of the PAP Second Mobile Contingent Come to Light: Chen Hong as Commander and Yang 

Zhenguo as Political Commissar” [武警第二机动总队军政主官亮相: 陈宏任司令员,杨振国任政

委], The Paper [澎湃], August 1, 2018, available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2310373>.

121 The 2016 and 2018 Directory of PRC Military Personalities. It is worth noting, however, that 

some of these PLA transferees may have joined the PAP as a result of ground force reductions rather 

than operational competence, per se.

122 The maritime militia continues to operate under a dual-leadership system, with command 

exercised both by local governments and the PLA via the military districts. There is also evidence that 

the coast guard coordinates its activities with the maritime militia. For a discussion, see Andrew S. 

Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, China’s Maritime Militia (Arlington, VA: CNA, March 7, 2016), 8–12.

123 Mark Stokes, “PLA Reform and Reorganization: Who Are the Masters of Cyber, Space, 
42 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

Nuclear, and Maritime Domains?” Paper presented at the 2016 CAPS-RAND-NDU Conference on the 

PLA, Arlington, VA, November 18–19, 2016, 11–17.

124 “Rear Admiral Ren Zhongcai Assumes Command of the China Coast Guard” [王仲才少

将任中国人民武装警察部队海警总队司令员], Sohu, December 8, 2018, available at <www.sohu.

com/a/280556724_726570>. For biographic details, see Ying Yu Lin, “Changes in China’s Coast Guard,” 

The Diplomat, January 30, 2019, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/changes-in-chinascoast-guard/>.

125 Cooperation between the three regional PLA Navy headquarters and three regional China 

Coast Guard (CCG) commands is also possible. This is perhaps likeliest in Qingdao, where both the 

North Sea Fleet and North Sea detachment are based. By contrast, the East Sea Fleet is based in Ningbo 

and the CCG East Sea detachment is based in Shanghai; the South Sea Fleet is based in Zhanjiang while 

the CCG South Sea detachment is based in Guangzhou.

126 Yu, Liu, and Xiao, “Striving to Promote the Construction of a Modernized People’s Armed 

Police,” 1.

127 Wang Jun, “People’s Armed Police Commander Wang Ning: Armed Police Force System 

Facing Clear Problem of Strong on Land, Weak in the Air and Sea” [武警部队司令员王宁: 武警力量

体系陆上强, 海空弱问题凸显], The Paper [澎湃], May 15, 2018, available at <http://news.sina.com.

cn/o/2018-05-15/doc-ihapkuvm2198908.shtml>.

128 “Wang Ning: Strive to Build a Strong and Modernized People’s Armed Police Force” [王宁: 

努力建设强大的现代化武装警察部队], People’s Daily [人民日报], July 20, 2018, available at <www.

forestry.gov.cn/main/74/20180720/091246768574107.html>.

129 “2018 Central Level Expenditure Budget” [2018年中央本级支出预算表], Ministry of 

Finance, March 2018, available at <http://yss.mof.gov.cn/2018zyys/201804/t20180403_2859400.html/>.

130 Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defense Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,” China Quarterly 216 (2013), 814–815.

131 In 2018, PAP expenses were still reported under “public security spending” [gonggong 

anquan zhichu, 公共安全支出] rather than incorporated into the official Chinese defense budget. A key 

reason is likely that adding PAP expenses would result in a major increase in China’s defense spending 

(of about 13 percent), potentially alarming China’s neighbors. For an analysis of China’s defense budget, 

see Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defense Spending: Less Mysterious in 

the Aggregate,” The China Quarterly 216 (December 2013), 805–830.

132 Zenz, “Coralling the People’s Armed Police.’

133 For a discussion, see “‘Eradicating Ideological Viruses’: China’s Campaign of Repression 

Against Xinjiang’s Muslims,” Human Rights Watch, September 9, 2018, available at <www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs#>. See 

also Greitens, “Domestic Security in China under Xi Jinping.”

134 Zhang Han, “PLA Downsizing Continues with Firefighters Transfer to Non-Military Department,” Global Times (Beijing), October 9, 2018, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/1122335.

shtml>. See also “Advancement of People’s Armed Police Reforms, Eight Types of Police Are Fit and 

Slim.” This new organization also integrated related functions such as the China Earthquake Administration and State Administration of Coal Mine Safety. See “China to Form Ministry of Emergency 
43

China’s Other Army

Management,” Xinhua, March 13, 2018, available at <http://english.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2018/03/13/content_281476076465182.htm/>.

135 “Military-Locality Exercise Comprehensive Emergency Support for Winter Road Traffic” [

军地联合演练冬季公路交通综合应急保障], Ministry of Transport, November 15, 2018, available at 

<www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-11/15/content_5340646.htm>.

136 For background, see Joel Wuthnow, “China’s New ‘Black Box’: Problems and Prospects for 

the National Security Commission,” China Quarterly 232 (2017), 886–903; and Andrew S. Erickson and 

Adam Liff, “Installing a Safety on the ‘Loaded Gun’: China’s Institutional Reforms, National Security 

Commission, and Sino-Japanese Crisis (in) Stability,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 98 (2016), 

197–215. Placing similar functions under a common organizational framework is significant given poor 

bureaucratic cooperation in responding to previous crises. For instance, after the May 2008 Sichuan 

earthquakes, disputes between premier Wen Jiabao and CMC vice chairman Guo Boxiong reportedly 

led to a breakdown in coordination between civilian and military assets. See Michael S. Chase et al., 

China’s Incomplete Military Transformation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 45–46.

137 Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Conflict and Chaos on the Korean Peninsula: Can China’s Military 

Help Secure North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons?” International Security 43, no. (2018), 106. However, it is 

unclear if this would have been a responsibility of the Border Defense Force, now under the MPS, or the 

internal security forces (or both, depending on the circumstances).

138 Zdzislaw Sliwa, The Russian National Guard: A Warning or a Message? (Riga: National Defence Academy of Latvia, 2018), 33.

139 “Langfang Homes to Asia’s Largest UN Police Training Center,” Xinhua, August 19, 2002, 

available at <http://china.org.cn/english/2002/Aug/39878.htm>.

140 Zhang Yi, “Training Begins in Beijing for UN Police Mission,” China Daily (Beijing), August 

9, 2016, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-08/09/content_26397779.htm>.

141 “Chinese Armed Police Host International Counter-Terrorism Forum,” ChinaMil, May 28, 

2018, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-05/28/content_8043868.htm>.

142 “China, Russia Conclude Joint Counter-Terror Exercises,” Xinhua, December 13, 2017, 

available at <www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-12/13/c_136823461.htm>.

143 On the East Timor deployment, see Marc Lanteigne, “A Change in Perspective: China’s Engagement in the East Timor UN Peacekeeping Operations,” in China’s Evolving Approach to Peacekeeping, ed. Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono (New York: Routledge, 2012). See also Guo, China’s Security 

State, 237.

144 For instance, Beijing routinely notes that China is the top United Nations (UN) permanent-5 contributor to UN peacekeeping missions as a way to demonstrate its status as a responsible 

country.

145 Peter Mattis, “New Law Reshapes Chinese Counterterrorism Policy and Operations,” China 

Brief 16, no. 2 (January 25, 2016), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/new-law-reshapes-chinese-counterterrorism-policy-and-operations/>.

146 Gerry Shih, “In Central Asia’s Forbidding Highlands, a Quiet Newcomer: Chinese Troops,” 

Washington Post, February 18, 2019, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/incentral-asias-forbidding-highlands-a-quiet-newcomer-chinese-troops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9
44 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 14

-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html>.

147 Charles Clover, “Mystery Deepens over Chinese Forces in Afghanistan,” Financial Times, 

February 26, 2017, available at <www.ft.com/content/0c8a5a2a-f9b7-11e6-9516-2d969e0d3b65>. 

Thanks to Andrew Small for bringing this article to my attention.

148 Shaio Zerba, “China’s Libya Evacuation Operation: A New Diplomatic Imperative—Overseas Citizen Protection,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 90 (November 2014), 1093–1112.

149 On security challenges along Belt and Road Initiative routes and potential options to address those threats, see Joel Wuthnow, Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2017), 13–21; and Timothy R. Heath, China’s Pursuit of Overseas Security (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), 21–32.

150 Xu Hailin, “Coast Guard, Newly under Military Command, Announces Diaoyu Patrol,” 

Global Times (Beijing), July 4, 2018, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/1109496.shtml>; Catherine Wong, “China’s Navy and Coast Guard Stage First Joint Patrols Near Disputed South China Sea 

Islands as ‘Warning to Vietnam,’” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 22, 2018, available at 

<www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2147154/chinas-navy-and-coastguard-stagefirst-joint-patrols>.

151 “Chinese Warships, Coast Guard Ships, and Law Enforcement Ships Carry Out First Joint 

Patrol in the Paracels” [中国军舰海警船及执法船首次联合巡逻南海岛礁], Military Reporter [军报

记者], May 20, 2018, available at <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2018-05-20/doc-ihaturft0588677.

shtml>.

152 Catherine Wong, “China’s Navy and Coast Guard Stage First Joint Patrols Near Disputed 

South China Sea Islands as ‘Warning to Vietnam,’” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 22, 

2018, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2147154/chinas-navy-andcoastguard-stage-first-joint-patrols>.

153 See “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Defense of the United 

States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China Regarding 

the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters,” November 9–10, 2014, available at 

<http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/141112_MemorandumOfUnderstandingRegardingRules.pdf>.

154 The Rules of Behavior apply to naval auxiliaries, defined as “a vessel, other than a warship, 

that is owned by or is under the exclusive control of the armed forces of the State and used for the time 

being on government non-commercial service.” Ibid., 1.

155 As Kevin McCauley notes, “Provisions for civilian control and reconstruction [of Taiwan], supported by the employment of People’s Armed Police national-level units, would need careful advanced planning.” See Kevin McCauley, “Amphibious Operations: Lessons of Past Campaigns 

for Today’s PLA,” Real Clear Defense, February 27, 2018, available at <ww.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/02/27/amphibious_operations_lessons_of_past_campaigns_for_todays_pla_113123.html>.
45

China’s Other Army

About the Author

Dr. Joel Wuthnow is a Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military 

Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. Prior to joining NDU, he was a China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, a post-doctoral fellow in 

the China and the World Program at Princeton University, and a pre-doctoral fellow at the 

Brookings Institution. His recent books and monographs include Chairman Xi Remakes the 

PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (NDU Press, 2019; co-editor); Raging Waters: China, 

India, Bangladesh, and Brahmaputra River Politics (Marine Corps University Press, 2018; with 

Nilanthi Samaranayake and Satu Limaye), Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative: 

Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives 12 (NDU Press, 2017); 

and Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications, Chinese Strategic Perspectives 10 (NDU Press, 2017). Dr. Wuthnow received an A.B. in Public and 

International Affairs from Princeton University, an M.Phil. in Modern Chinese Studies from 

Oxford University, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2018 CAPS-RAND-NDU conference 

on the People’s Liberation Army.

For helpful comments, the author thanks Dennis Blasko, Kristen Gunness, Lieutenant 

Colonel Kyle Marcrum, USA, and Phillip C. Saunders. Ian Burns McCaslin provided valuable 

research assistance.



For a complete list of INSS publications, researchers, and staff, visit http://inss.ndu.edu

No. 13 Chinese Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era

by John Costello and Joe McReynolds (10/18)

No. 12 Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications

by Joel Wuthnow (09/17)

No. 11 Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications

by Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen (07/17)

No. 10 Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications

by Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders (03/17)

No. 9 China Moves Out: Stepping Stones Toward a New Maritime Strategy

by Christopher H. Sharman (03/15)

No. 8 Red China’s ‘Capitalist Bomb’: Inside the Chinese Neutron Bomb Program

by Jonathan Ray (01/15)

No. 7 “Not an Idea We Need to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century

by Christopher Yung and Ross Rustici, with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin (10/14)

No. 6 China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for 

a Sino-American Military Confrontation

by Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice Miller (04/13)

No. 5 Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach

by Mark E. Redden and Phillip C. Saunders (09/12)

No. 4 Buy, Build, or Steal: China’s Quest for Advanced Military Aviation Technologies

by Phillip C. Saunders and Joshua Wiseman (12/11)

No. 3 China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles and Potential Solutions

by Christopher Yung and Ross Rustici, with Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman (12/10)

No. 2 Civil-Military Relations in China: Assessing the PLA’s Role in Elite Politics

by Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders (08/10)

No. 1 Assessing Chinese Military Transparency

by Phillip C. Saunders and Michael Kiselycznyk (06/10)

China Strategic Perspectives Series

Editor, Dr. Phillip C. Saunders