C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS
D. R., Ap pe lla nt,
v . T E X A S D E P A R T M E N T O F F A M ILY AN D PR OT ECT I VE SER VI CES , Appellee
. § § § § § § No. 08-07-00355- CV

Appea l from the 65th J udicial District

Court of El Pa so County , T e xas (TC# 2006CM4085)

O P I N I O N This appea l arises fr om an orde r terminatingAppellant’s pa renta l rig hts to three childre n. Appellant D. R., ra ises two issues on appea l. In I ssue One, he challeng es the trial c ourt’s finding that the appe al is frivolous pursuant to T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 263.405(d)( 3). In I ssue Two, D. R. contends that Section 263.405 violates his constitutional right to due pr ocess. We re verse . D. R. is the biologica l father of minor childre n, D.J .R., E.N.R., and A.D.R. On S ep t em b er

2 4 , 2 0 0 7 , th e t ri al co urten t er edan “Int er l o cu t o ry Or d er o f T erm i n at i o n ” f

o l l o wi n g a jury trial. The or der state s that by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e ter mination of the fathe r’s pa re nta l r ig hts is i n th e be st i nte re sts of the c hil dr e n. Th e or de r f ur the r s tate s th at D . R. committed one or both of the f ollowing grounds for te rmination: (1) knowing ly place d or knowing ly

allowed the c hild to remain in conditions or surrounding s which enda ng er the phy sical or e motional well-beingof the c hild; or (2) eng ag ed in conduc t or knowing ly place d the
c hil d w ithpe rs on s who e ng a g e d in c on du c t w hic h e nd ang e rs the phy sic a l or e mot ion a l w e llbeingof the c hild. Accor ding to the or der, D . R. was incar cer ated at the time the judgme nt was-2-

enter ed. The Depa

rtment of F amily

and Protec tive Service s was appointed a s manag ing
conser vator for all three children. On Novembe r 14, 2007, the trial c ourt enter ed an “ Orde r of Te rmination” addr essing additional parties a

nd children involved in the c ase a nd another

fathe r is beingdelt with here
. Th e No ve mbe r 1 4 o rd e r s tate s: Not appea

ringwas [D. R.] , ag ainst whom an interlocutor y decr ee of termination was re ndere d by

this Court. That interlocutory decr ee of termination is a final judgme nt for appe llate purposes upon sig ning of this order. The cler

k is directed to send out the requir ed notice of final judg ment to the last known addre ss of [D
. R. ]. On Novembe r 27, 2007, D. R.’s appointed c ounsel filed a “ Statement of Points to be Presented on A

ppeal, with Objec tion, Moti on for Extension of Time, and Memora ndum of L aw” purs ua nt t o Se c tio n 2 63 .4 05 (b ) o f t he Te xas F amil y

Cod e . In th is d oc ume nt, D. R. o bje c te d to the c on sti tut ion a lity

of Se c tio n 2 63 .4 05 (b ), (d ), and (i ), a s a vio latio n o f h is r ig ht t o d ue pr oc e ss to the extent the provisions: (1) r eser ve the de termination that an a ppeal is fr ivolous to t he trial
c ourt , r athe r t

ha n th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls; (2 ) p ro hib it r e vie w o f t he re c or d o n a

pp e a l, o r i mpo se
unrea sonable de adlines to do so, prior to the submission of appellate points to the trial cour t; and (3) c onflict with the g ener al rules of appellate proce dure. D. R. also prese nted the followingnon-constitutional points he anticipated pre sentingon appea l: (1) denial of

a motion for continuanc e; (2) de nial of a motion to withdraw by trial counsel; (3) “[t] he trial c ourt’s admission into evidence [D. R.’s] video statement, or ‘ confe ssion’
a ft e r i t w a s o ri g ina lly

e xclu de d f

ro m e vid e nc e [as ] the state me nt w a s n ot f re e ly and vo luntari ly made a nd does not constitute competent or cre dible evidenc e;” ( 4) admission of unqualified a nd unreliable expert testimony by a medica l examiner, including the admission of unsubstantiatedD. R.’s first Notice of Appea l reg ardingthe termination wa s filed on August 29, 2007, 1 one we ek af

ter the jury

trial. The tria l court ente red its interlocutory order near ly a month later. -3- medical r ecor ds; (5) admission of hea rsay testimony ; (6) leg ally

insufficient e vidence to support the te rm inatio n gro un ds state d in the int e rl oc uto ry

or de r; and

(7 ) “ [a]s outli ne d a

bo ve , th e F amil y Code provisions that require a pre -appe al ‘ve tting’ of the appe llate issues in the trial cour t.” D. R. also filed an a

mended notice of appe al re g ardingthe termination on the same day he filed his a pp e llate po int s in

the tr ia l c ourt . 1 On De c e mbe r 1 0, 20 07 , th e pa rt ie s a pp e are d in

the tr ia l c ourt

purs ua nt t o T e xas F amil y Code sec. 263.405( d)(3) , for de termination whethe r D. R.’s appe al was f rivolous. At the hear ing’ s close, the tria l court ruled in the a ffirmative. D. R. filed a notice of appe al from the trial court’ s frivolousness rulingthree day s later. On D ece mber 19, 2007, the tria l court ente red a
wr i t t en o rd er

re fl ec t i n g i t s d ec i s i o natth e h ea ri n g. As a pre liminary

matter, the D epar

tment contends that we are prec luded from c onsidering
an y is s u e d r a is e d b y D
. R. b e c a

u s e h e d id

n o t t im e ly

f il e h is s tate me n t o f

p o ints o na

p p e a l. We
un de rs tand

the De pa rtme nt t o a

rgue , at le a st i n p art , th at th e a pp e a l is fr ivo lou s b e c a

us e D. R. d id not preser ve his issues for r eview by complying w ith Section 263.405(b) of the F amily Code. Th at se c tio n p ro vid e s: (b) Not later tha

n the 15th day

afte r the date a f

inal order is signed by

the trial jud g e , a pa rt y int e nd ingto a

pp e a l th e or de r m

us t f ile wi th t he tr ia l c ourt

a statement of the point or points on which the pa rty intends to appea l. The state me nt m ay

be c omb ine d w itha

mot ion fo r a ne w tri a l. Acts 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1090, § 9, 2001 T EX .G EN .LAWS 2395, 2397-98 (c urre nt versionThe L eg islature ame nded Section 263.405 in 2007. The ne w ver sion applied only to a 2 suit affe ctingthe par ent-c hild relationship filed on or af ter the e ffe ctive date of the Ac t, J une 15, 2007. The pe tition i n this case wa s filed J une 20, 2006. Ac cording ly , we will apply the 2005 version of Sec tion 263.405 to thi s appea l. All refe renc es to Section 263.405 ref er to this prior version of the statue unless noted other wise. -4- fo un d at T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 263.405(b)( Ver non Supp 2008)). 2 Under Section 263.405(i) and a ppellate c ourt may

not consider a

ny issue that was not sp e c if ic a lly pr e se nte d to the tr ia l c ourt in a tim e ly fi le d s tate me nt o f p oints i n whic h th e pa rt y intends to appea l or in a statement c ombined with a motion for new tr ial. Acts 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch. 176, § 1, 2005 T EX .G EN .L AWS 33 2 ( c ur re nt v e rs ion

fo un d at T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 263.405(i)(V ernon Supp. 2008))
. Citi ngSection 263.401(d) a nd In re T.L.S. , 143 S.W .3d 284, 287 (Tex.App.--Waco 2004, no pet.), the D epar

tment argues that the Interlocutory Orde r of Te rmination, entere d September 24, 2007, w as a f inal order with respec t to D. R., and theref ore, his stateme nt of po int s w a s d

ue to b e fi le d n o late r t

ha n O c tob e r 9 , 2 00 7. Th e De pa rtme nt c on c lud e s th at be c a us e D. R. did not file his statement of points until November 27, 2007, this Court cannot addre ss any of D. R.’ s is su e s. F amil y Cod e Se c tio n 1 09 .0 02 (b ) p ro vid e s th at “ [a]n a pp e a l ma y be take n b y

any pa rt y to a suit from a f

inal order rende red unde r this titl e.” T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 109.002(b)( Ver non 2002). An orde r is g ener ally considere d to be interlocutory if it does not dispose of all the par ties or cla ims in a case. See Lehm ann v. Har-Con Corp. , 3 9 S
. W
. 3 d 1 9 1 , 1 9 5 & n . 1 2 ( T e x . 2 0 0 1 )
. It is und isp ute d th at th e te rm inatio n o rd e r r e nd e re d o n Se pte mbe r 2 4, 20 07 did no t di sp os e of

a ll the par ties, and there fore , would be conside red a n interlocutory

order under the g ener al rule. The De pa rtme nt c onte nd s th at th e or de r t e rm inatin gD. R.’ s p are nta l r ig hts is a fi na l and a pp e a la bleThe L eg islature re peale d Section 263.401(d) in 2007. Ac ts 2007, 80th L eg ., R.S., ch. 3 866 § 5, 2007 T EX .G EN .L AWS 18 37 , 1 83 8. B e c a us e thi s su it w a s f

ile d p ri or to t he e ff e c tiv e date of the amendment, J une 20, 2006, the f ormer ve rsion of Section 263.401 applied to this appea l. Acts 2007, 80th L eg ., R.S., ch. 866, § 6, 2007 T EX .G EN .LAWS 1837, 1838. -5- order by virtue of Sec tion 263.401(d), and ther efor e, the a ppellate timetable be g an to run on September 25, 2007. Se c tio n 2 63 .4 01 pe rt a ins to t he dis mis sa l of

a su it a ff e c tin gthe pa

re nt- c hil d r e latio ns hip filed by the Depa rtment of F amily

and Regulatory

Service s. Subsection (a) r equire s the trial court to dismiss a suit filed by the depa rtment if the suit has bee n pendingfor one y ear and the court ha s not render ed a f inal order , or g rante d an extension under subsec tion (b). See T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 263.401(a) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). The f ormer ve rsion of Section 263.401(d) pr ovided: (d ) F or

purp os e s o f t

his se c tio n, a

fi na l or de r i s a

n o rd e r t hat: (1 ) re qu ir e s th at a

c hil d b e re tur

ne d to the c hil d’ s p are nt; (2) names a

relative of the c hild or another pe rson as the c hild’s manag ing c onservator; (3) without terminating the pare nt-child relationship, appoints t he depar tment as the mana g ing c onservator of the c hild; or (4) terminates the pa

rent-c hild relationship and appoints a re lative of the child, another

suitable person, or

the depa rtment as mana g ing conser vator of the child. Acts 1997, 75th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1022, § 90, 1997 T EX .G EN .LAWS 3733, 3768-69. 3 Under simil ar f acts, the Wac o Court of Appea ls util ized the definition of “fina l order” found in Section 263.401(d) a nd deter mined that an orde r which te rminated the pa renta l rig hts of one par ent and a

ppointed the Depa

rtment the child’s mana g ing c onservator was a final orde r for-6-

purp os e s o f c a lc ulatin gthe a pp e llate tim e ta

ble de sp ite the or de r’ s f

a ilure to a dju dic ate the ri g hts of all par ties to the proce eding , or all pendingclaims. In re T.L.S. , 143 S.W .3d at 287-89. The
c ourt of a pp e a ls d ism iss e d th e a

pp e a l be c a

us e the pa re nt h a d n ot f

ile d h e r n oti c e of

a pp e a l w ith in twenty day s after

the “f inal order ” wa s signe d. Id . at 290. We decline to f ollow this decision beca use the c ourt failed to c onsider that Section 263.401(d) beg ins with the phrase “ For purposes of this section . . . .” The plain meaningif this introductory phrase is to li mit the application of the def inition t o Section 263.401. I f the L eg islature had intende d for Sec tion 263.401(d)’s definition of “f

inal order ” to apply

elsewhe re, inc luding to Section 263.405, it would not have limit ed its application to Section 263.401. The trial c ourt enter ed the f inal termination order

in this case on Nove mber 14, 2007. D. R. filed his statement of points thirteen da y s later on Nove mber 27, 2007. The statement of p o i n t s w a s f

i l e d w i th i nth e f

i f t e e nd ay d e a d l i n e , an d

w a s th e r e f

o r e t i m e l y. We n owtur

n to D. R.’ s f

ir st i ssu e in whic h h e c ha lle ng e s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ingthat hi s appea l is frivolous. Section 263.405(d)(3) dir ects the tria l court to deter mine whether

the appe al is frivolous as provided by Section 13.003(b) of

the Civil P rac tice and Re medies Code. Unde r that section, in deter

mining whe ther a

n appea l is frivolous, a judge may consider w

hether the appellant ha s prese nted a substantial question for appellate revie w. T EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 13.003(b)( Ver

non 2002). An a

ppeal is fr ivolous when it lacks an a rguable ba sis in law or in fac t. In re M

.N.V. , 216 S.W .3d 833, 834 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2006, no pet.) , c iti ng DeLa Vega v . Taco Cabana, Inc. , 9 7 4 S. W. 2 d 1 5 2 , 1 5 4 ( T e x. Ap p . - - Sa

nA n to n io 1 9 9 8 , n o p e t. )
. We revie w a tria l court’s findingof fr ivolousness for an a buse of discr etion. In re M .N.V. , 216 S.W. 3d at 83 4; In re K.D. , 2 02 S.W. 3d 86 0, 86 6 ( Te x.Ap p. -- F or t Wor th 2 00 6, no pe t.) ; In reWe rec ognize that in denying the petition in I n r e D

. W. , the Texas Supreme Court 4 expressed no opinion on the constitutionality of Section 263.405(i). S e e I n r e D

. W. , 260 S.W .3d at 462. The issue of

Section 263.405’s constitutionality there fore rema ins unsettled. -7- H.D.H. , 127 S.W .3d 921, 923 (Tex.App.--B eaumont 2004, no pet.)
. In his statement of points, D. R. raises a c halleng e to the constitutionality of Section 263.405. Given that one c ourt of appe als has held that Sec tion 263.405(i) is unconstituti onal beca use it violates the Separ ation of Powers c lause of the Texas Consti tution, we conclude that D. R.’s constitutional challeng es have an ar guable ba sis in law. S e e I n r e D

. W. , 249 S.W .3d 625, 645 (Tex.App.--F ort Worth), pet. denied, 260 S.W .3d 462 (Tex. 2008). For this reason a lone, 4
we c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n b y

c on c lud ingthat D . R. ’s a pp e a l is frivolous. We believe A

ppellant’s other

constitutional arguments raise substantial que stions wh ic h s ho uld

be re vie we d o n th e me ri ts b y an a pp e llate c ourt . A ft e r r e vie wi ngbo th p art ie s’ briefs, D . R.’s statement of points on appea l, the cler k’s re cord, a

nd the re porter’ s rec ord fr om the Section 263.405(d) he aring , we f ind that the appea l is not frivolous. I ssue One is sustained. Gi ve n th e dis po sit ion

of I ssu e On e , th e re is n o n e e d to a dd re ss t he me ri ts o f I ssu e Tw o at th is time. We therefor e re verse the trial cour t’s order findingthe appe al frivolous, and or der that the
a pp e a l pr oc e e d o n th e me ri ts.

Dec ember

18, 2008 DAVI D WEL L I NGTONCHEW, C hief Just ice B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d C ar r , JJ. Carr, J., Not Participating