U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

35–364PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT: 

OPTIONS FOR U.S. DIPLOMACY ON 

NORTH KOREA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND 

THE PACIFIC AND 

NONPROLIFERATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 26, 2019 

Serial No. 116–6 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Ranking 

Member 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

Jason Steinbaum, Democrat Staff Director 

Brendan Shieds, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND NONPROLIFERATION

BRAD SHERMAN, Chairman 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

GERALD CONNOLLY, Virgina 

AMI BERA, California 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

TED YOHO, Florida, Ranking Member 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

Don MACDonald, Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Richardson, Honorable Bill, Former Governor of New Mexico, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Secretary of Energy, and Member of Congress 10 

Cha, Dr. Victor, Senior Adviser and Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies ........................................................................................... 16 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 47 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 48 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 49 

(1) 

ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT: OPTIONS FOR 

U.S. DIPLOMACY ON NORTH KOREA 

Tuesday, February 26, 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND

NONPROLIFERATION

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Washington, DC 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in 

Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Sherman, 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Chairman SHERMAN. The consensus here seems to be that we 

can start. I know that Ranking Member Yoho will be watching this 

on video and on his—yes, on the way, and I am confident that my 

opening statement will take longer than it takes him to get here. 

I want to welcome all of our colleagues to this first subcommittee 

meeting of the congressional session for the Subcommittee on Asia, 

the Pacific, and Nonproliferation. 

We could not ask for a more timely hearing with the president 

in Vietnam and Kim Jong-Un having just arrived there by train. 

We could not ask for a more distinguished panel, including Governor Bill Richardson, who is famous for negotiating, and negotiating successfully, with North Korea, as well as Victor Cha, who 

has negotiated with the North as well. 

I and the ranking member will give opening statements for 5 

minutes and then whichever subcommittee members wish to make 

an opening statement will be allocated 2 minutes. 

Whether we are safer now than we were in June 2018 when the 

Singapore Summit was held and what can be done in Hanoi that 

will make us safer, these are the two questions that we ought to 

address. 

In the first year of his presidency, President Trump ratcheted up 

the rhetoric to an extreme level—‘‘little rocket man,’’ et cetera. This 

rhetoric was matched by the North Korean rhetoric and there were 

some that worried that it could lead to a kinetic war. 

Trump stopped the extreme rhetoric. Now things are calmer— 

that dialing things up and then dialing them back is hardly a great 

accomplishment. The facts are these. When Trump took over, 

North Korea had yet to demonstrate a hydrogen bomb. 

Now they have. During the Trump presidency, 20—the North has 

created enough fissile material for perhaps 20 additional bombs, 

perhaps eight additional bombs worth of fissile material created 

just since the Singapore Summit. 

I am not sure we are safer. Now, we have had a period without 

testing. But that is hardly unusual. The North conducted no nu-
2 

clear tests from 1994 to 2002 and from 2007 to 2013 they suspended their missile testing from 2009 to 2013. So a pause in testing of merely a year is not unusual. 

What is unusual is this. In the past, pauses in testing may have 

slowed down their program. Whereas now Kim Jong-Un said last 

April he does not need any additional tests. He has already developed his hydrogen weapon and his ICBM. 

Several hostages have been released by North Korea. But we 

have with us a witness who was able to secure the release of a like 

number of hostages without making concessions to the North Korean government and the remains of several service members have 

been turned over to the United States. 

But, once again, we have a witness here who did that without 

making any concessions. Perhaps you should write a book called 

‘‘The Art of the Deal.’’ 

But, more importantly, much larger numbers of the remains of 

our servicemen were turned over to us during the Clinton and 

Bush Administrations. 

We have made enormous concessions to North Korea. First, Kim 

has stood on the same level as the most powerful man in the world. 

Second, we have weakened our sanctions in two ways. First, the 

very act of the summit signals to businesses around the world that 

they can do business with North Korea. 

And second, we have not sanctioned major Chinese banks. Mr. 

Yoho and I, with him as chairman, both in 2017 and again in 2018, 

of this subcommittee sent letters to the administration demanding 

that the major Chinese banks be sanctioned, not just the tiny ones, 

and we have received no substantive response. 

There has been substantial leakage in our sanctions and the 

change in atmosphere caused by the summit is a major reason for 

that. We have weakened the U.S.-South Korea military defense capacity. During the Obama Administration, we had three to four 

major exercises per year. 

We have had zero major exercises with South Korea since Singapore and the one—there is one that is scheduled for the future that 

may or may not happen. In any case, it has been scaled down. 

As General Abrams, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea, stated, ‘‘this suspension has led to a denigration of the readiness of our 

force. So we have made massive concessions while getting nothing 

in return that makes us safer. Nothing.′′ 

I believe—and I see I have gone into overtime a bit here so I will 

be as quick as possible—I believe we need tougher sanctions, starting with those two big Chinese—the two letters that we sent focusing on several Chinese banks—large Chinese banks. That would 

send a signal that it is not business as usual or even business 

under the table with North Korea. 

Second, and I realize this is somewhat controversial, we ought to 

define down our definition of success. I do not think we are going 

to get CIVD—complete irrevocable verifiable disarmament—of all 

nuclear weapons. 

But we would be much safer if North Korea had a limited number of nuclear weapons that were highly monitored. If we were in 

that circumstance, North Korea would not be in a position to sell 

fissile material or nuclear weapons. 
3 

We would limit the amount of damage that they could do and we 

could move ourselves to a safer position that we have now. That 

is certainly much better than seeing new fissile material created 

every day, even while the summit is ongoing. 

With that, I yield to the ranking member. 

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate it and I thank you. 

Governor Richardson, good seeing you. Dr. Cha, good seeing you 

again. I had the good fortune of having breakfast with Dr. Chungin Moon this morning, who is the advisor of Moon Jae-in, and his 

take was a little different. 

He thought things were moving along very well and he was very 

impressed with President Trump and what he is doing. 

But let me go to my notes. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Sherman, for calling this hearing. Members on both sides of 

the aisle share similar national security concerns and oversights 

priorities in regard to the ongoing nuclear diplomacy discussions 

between the U.S. and North Korea. 

This important issue is fitting for our first subcommittee hearing 

of the 116th Congress. I look forward to continuing the strong bipartisanship and cooperation that this committee has displayed in 

the 115th Congress. 

As you said, we are on the letter together and we are going to 

continue to hold the administration accountable. This committee 

worked—this committee works respectfully together, even in some 

areas we may have disagreements. 

Over the next 2 days, President Trump will conduct a second 

summit with Kim Jong-Un, the totalitarian leader of North Korea. 

The word historic is often used to describe this summit. That much 

is true. 

U.S.-DPRK diplomacy has never before taken place at the heads 

of States at this level. We should not forget that when President 

Trump took office, President Obama warned him that the Korean 

Peninsula would present him his most urgent security challenge. 

However, over the course of President Trump’s first term, we 

have moved from the brink of war to a period of diplomacy. Again, 

the heads of two States, first time ever. 

As this administration moves forward, let us not forget who Kim 

Jong-Un is. He is No. 3 in a family lineage hierarchy that has held 

to deity stature. He has allowed his citizens to suffer while chasing 

his nuclear ambitions. 

He is a dictator who has executed over 140 members of the elite 

military that surrounded his father and grandfather, including his 

own uncle. 

He ordered the assassination of his brother in Malaysia using VX 

nerve gas. He also threatened the U.S. with nuclear annihilation 

and he sent medium-range ballistic missiles over Japan and proudly claimed that he would target our territory in the South Pacific— 

Guam—and the mainland, if so desired. 

So, yes, this is a historic second summit. But we must call—but 

we must call for extreme caution as we move forward. Keep in 

mind, three previous administrations have attempted to solve the 

North Korea dilemma and failed, allowing the Kim regimes to advance their nuclear programs and capabilities. 
4 

Unfortunately, one fact outside of the White House control remains unchanged. The Kim regime does not deal in good faith. Kim 

Jong-Un appears to be using the same play book as his two predecessors used before, which is to promise peace, denuclearization in 

exchange for sanction relief. Once this is granted, the DPRK continues their deceit and lying and continuation of a dangerous nuclear program. 

We need to note that nothing has occurred since the Singapore 

Summit in 2018 in terms of denuclearization. I am extremely concerned that any concessions presented by the DPRK’s diplomatic 

outreach are hiding equally significant risks. 

The president and his team have a giant task at hands. The facts 

show us that North Korea has not taken any meaningful action to 

dismantle its nuclear or missile programs. 

There has been no disclosure of the number of nuclear bombs, 

ICBMs, or even clear definition of what denuclearization means to 

all sides. Much work needs to be done during this second historic 

summit. 

Meanwhile, Kim Jong-Un’s international standing has never 

been higher, as you pointed out, Chairman Sherman. Kim’s diplomatic gambit has led South Korean President Moon to embrace 

him as a partner in the shared dream for peace and reunification 

that has given him the pretext of strategic coordination with China 

and a personal relationship with Xi Jinping. 

Kim will also visit Vladimir Putin in Russia later this year. 

Kim’s diplomacy has cost him nothing but has short-circuited the 

unanimous U.N. sanction campaign. Although Putin and Xi were 

never reliable partners in pressuring North Korea, Kim has shown 

he can leverage China-Russia relationships against U.N.-led sanctions and U.S. maximum sanction strategy, and our goal is to hold 

the administration accountable. 

The goal of this committee is to facilitate the summit to allow 

this administration to be successful where previous administrations 

came up short. 

I believe our combined intentions are to hold the administration 

accountable and make sure sanctions are not relieved until we get 

significant assurance and verification that the actions of Kim JongUn are sincere in bringing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 

We are privileged to be joined by the two witnesses who have 

personally sat across from North Korean counterparts at sensitive 

talks and I thank them both for being here with us today. 

Today’s hearing will be a valuable opportunity for this subcommittee and the members to develop an understanding of the 

specifics of this week’s summit and what expectations are reasonable and what we should realistically expect and how to measure 

success. 

And I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman SHERMAN. Who seeks to give an opening statement? 

The gentleman right here. I see the gentleman from Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair, and I want to welcome our 

panelists and especially my old friend, Governor Bill Richardson, 

who has a distinguished career but maybe the most important part 
5 

of his career was he served as a staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—a great place from which to launch a career. 

You know, Mr. Chairman, all of us, while our president is overseas at a summit negotiating with one of the most notorious dictators in the world, we wish him well. We want our president to 

succeed. 

Nothing would be better than to have success in denuclearizing 

the Korean Peninsula once and for all and setting the North Korean regime on a peaceful path for prosperity and coexistence with 

its neighbors, especially South Korea. 

However, it is important that we approach negotiations cleareyed, and I worry, as do many Americans, I think, that our president arrives in Hanoi in a very weakened position and because he 

does not do preparation, he does not read briefing papers, he does 

not like even briefings verbally, that he enters into these negotiations maybe with positive spirit but not with great preparation, 

and what could go wrong with that when you are up against Kim 

Jong-Un? 

And one trembles a little bit at the answer to that kind of rhetorical question. And so I think it is really important that we be very 

clear about what our goals are and that there be no fudging and 

that there be, frankly, no further concessions to the North until we 

see specific reciprocation on the table. 

And so I hope for success but I think we have to prepare for the 

worst. I yield back. 

Chairman SHERMAN. Mr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both you, Governor Richardson and Dr. Cha, for your service to our country 

along with the men and women that we have serving our country 

all around this world as we speak. 

I was at that same breakfast with the ranking member and we 

had—with Dr. Moon as well as our former Ambassador, Ambassador Stephens, who has a long history on the Korean Peninsula. 

The one takeaway that, you know, I think they left us with is, 

I think, as my colleague, Mr. Connolly—let us go into this open 

eyed, but let us also understand realistic expectations of what we 

might be able to get out of this and I think those realistic expectations are maybe that the parameters that allow you then to say, 

OK, here is what the steps are, moving forward, as opposed to coming out with any concrete deal, et cetera, and I think they both— 

Dr. Moon and Ambassador Stephens—said that would be a realistic 

successful goal if there were the framework and the parameters of 

how you now proceed and, you know, what those next steps are, 

again, not with any promises, et cetera, but the next steps in what 

a dialog would be. 

I will be very interested in both of your expertise on the Peninsula on what you think those parameters would be and what a successful outcome of this meeting over the next few weeks. 

And with that, I will yield back. 

Chairman SHERMAN. I recognize the gentlelady from Virginia. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you to the chair. Thank you, Governor 

Richardson. Thank you, Dr. Cha, for being here. 

The North Korean regime continues to pose a serious security 

threat to the United States, our interests at home and abroad, and 
6 

ahead of the week summit in Hanoi we must also recognize how 

North Korea’s belligerent and destabilizing behavior endangers our 

longstanding allies in the region and threatens our own country. 

I am always in favor of pursuing diplomatic negotiated solutions. 

However, Kim Jong-Un has repeatedly demonstrated that he cannot be trusted and we should always view his intentions with incredible skepticism. 

As the United States weighs its diplomatic, economic, and deterrence options to push back against North Korean aggression and 

promote peace on the Korean Peninsula, we need to pursue a smart 

tough strategy informed by U.S. intelligence that protects the lives 

of U.S. service members in South Korea and actually limits North 

Korea’s nuclear capabilities. 

Additionally, we need to avoid any concessions that could jeopardize the safety of our allies and we cannot ignore Pyongyang’s 

long record of atrocious crimes committed against its own people. 

As talks proceed, I will keep fighting to prevent American communities from living under the potential threat of North Korean 

missiles, nuclear weapons, and cyber aggression, and I will continue to voice my support for increased U.S. diplomatic engagement 

and improved coordination with our allies that protects U.S. interests and recognizes the true threat that is currently posed by the 

North Korean regime. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman SHERMAN. Seeing no other requests for time, I will introduce our first witness. Since 2010, Governor Richardson has operated the Richardson Center for Global Engagement, a foundation 

focusing on conflict resolution, prisoner release, and environment 

protection. 

In his long and distinguished career, he served as Governor of 

New Mexico, secretary of energy, a U.S. Ambassador to the United 

Nations, and as a member of this House for 15 years, overlapping 

my service in the House by exactly 1 month before he went on to 

serve as our Ambassador to the United Nations. 

As Gerry points out, Governor Richardson started working in the 

Senate and then came to the House, showing tremendous upward 

trajectory. 

He has regularly served as an official and unofficial interlocutor 

with North Korea for more than two decades. During this time he 

has visited North Korea eight times, once with Dr. Cha, securing 

the release of four Americans being held hostage in North Korea 

and helping to bring home the bodies of seven American service 

members who died in North Korea. 

We are honored to have you and very pleased to have you as the 

summit begins to open, Governor Richardson. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARDSON, FORMER GOVERNOR OF 

NEW MEXICO, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 

SECRETARY OF ENERGY, AND MEMBER OF CONGRESS 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I just want to 

state that some of my best years working were as a member of this 

House, although I was not privileged to serve on this committee. 
7 

It is good to see former friends, good friends—Congressman Connolly, Congresswoman Titus, and you, Mr. Chairman. I have not 

had the pleasure to speak to others here. 

But I will tell you I have been here long enough to say that I 

saw Mr. Levin come in and I was elected to Congress in 1982 with 

Mr. Levin’s father, which shows you how long I have been around. 

And it is great to be with Victor Cha. There is probably nobody 

in this country that knows the Peninsula better than Dr. Cha, and 

you are right, Mr. Chairman—we went together to North Korea 

and brought back the remains of seven of our service members. 

The first summit between the president and Chairman Kim in 

June 2018 produced a good moment for both leaders. They struck 

a personal relationship, an aspirational joint statement, a couple of 

outcomes such as the repatriation of remains of U.S. servicemen, 

and I think the president does deserve credit for taking the meeting with Kim Jong-Un. 

The region is—the region is less tense. There is more diplomacy. 

There is considerable, I would say, better atmospherics in the entire region. 

However, the last summit failed to produce what I think is a 

workable framework for negotiations and, like other summits, 

there was little or no staff work on substance prior to the meeting. 

As a result, following the summit, the two sides did not have a 

roadmap on how to proceed and what we saw was this organized 

efforts to get to a framework with both sides positioning but without any progress. 

I think Chairman Kim has made it very clear that his preferred 

negotiating partner is President Trump, not Secretary of State 

Pompeo, not the chief negotiator, Stephen Biegun, or working level 

teams. 

This is why once a second summit was announced, negotiations 

and communications between the two sides were revived. By the 

way, I think that the special envoy for North Korea, Stephen 

Biegun, is a very skilled negotiator who has worked with many 

Members of Congress and I would recommend the subcommittee 

calling him for briefings after the summit. 

So what we have is a situation where I think these latest talks, 

unfortunately, the whole issues of disarmament—arms control, 

which are key—have yielded a bit to what is called peace diplomacy, which is good. 

But the main focus, I believe, and accomplishments should have 

been the dismantling of nuclear weapons, WMDs, of missiles, and 

my sense is that the summit will fall short in that area. 

We should be clear about what our expectations of what is possible, what is not, and what would be the cost of an agreement 

with the North Koreans. 

Point No. 1—chances that the North Koreans will get rid of their 

existing stockpiles are very slim or nonexistent. They believe that 

these weapons are the reasons we are negotiating with them and 

the only reason we have not yet overpowered them militarily. 

Point No. 2—we can expect and demand the North Koreans cease 

all further development of nuclear weapons, WMDs, and ballistic 

missiles and have clear means for verification of dismantling such 

capability. 
8 

No. 3—we can expect and demand that North Koreans cease any 

further testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and have 

verification of the dismantling of launch and test sites. 

Point No. 4—we can expect and demand the North Koreans cease 

any proliferation of operations they have on nuclear technology, 

WMDs, and determine the means to verify this. 

In return—point No. 5—the North Koreans are going to demand 

the removal of sanctions, the end of the war, the normalization of 

relations, and the reduction of military presence on the Peninsula. 

So an agreement with these guidelines I believe might be possible, should be gradual, but broken into smaller reciprocal steps. 

Thus, a successful second summit between the two leaders should 

produce what the first summit failed to do: 

One, a detailed framework for negotiations including time lines, 

terms of reference, and routine schedule of summits. 

No. 2, set times for ongoing negotiations, both working level, 

high level, and perhaps additional Presidential summits. 

Considering Chairman Kim’s preference to negotiate directly 

with the president, Presidential summits should not be ruled out 

as long as good preparatory work is done and I am not sure, because of the president’s diplomatic style, that we are heading into 

this summit with the best preparations. 

Last, terms of reference for negotiations, general guiding principles for final agreement, definitions, and constraints, as well as 

time lines and benchmarks for the negotiation process. 

No. 2—and this is very important—an agreed pathway to recover 

and repatriate remains of U.S. servicemen. As the chairman pointed out, we got some but there are many, many more, and since this 

is a mutual interest of both sides, it is an easy and very powerful 

outcome for the summit. 

Many of you, I am sure, have relatives or have constituents that 

are affected directly with the remains of our soldiers and very compelling families that have come together to organize and ask that 

the U.S. administration, over the years, try to bring back the remains of several thousand of our men and women that have been 

in North Korea. 

No. 3, a mechanism and safeguards to mitigate risk of conflict if 

a crisis in negotiation occurs. This can happen by establishing a 

hotline between the leaders or mitigating contact group to include 

regional stakeholders. 

But there are other gestures the United States can offer that are 

short of policy concessions, which can be highly symbolic and motivating for the North Koreans, recommitment to the aspirational 

joint statement of the June summit. 

The summit would be a failure, in my judgment, if the following 

is not produced: 

One, failure to produce a practical and detailed framework for 

negotiations, failure to define benchmarks in terms of reference— 

without such framework, negotiations are going to fizzle once again 

until the next summit is announced; 

No. 2, failure to establish a roadmap for recovery and repatriation of remains; and three, ambiguity and no record of agreements 

and understandings reached between the two leaders during their 

one-on-one meeting. 
9 

So finally, Mr. Chairman, here is my concern. I stated the first 

one, that the disarmament talks yield and not produce concrete 

denuclearization agreements. 

The danger I see with North Korea is they do not want to 

denuclearize. We have different definition of denuclearization. My 

worry, too, is that somehow we will not get in this summit an inventory of all the nuclear weapons, fissile material that North 

Korea has. 

They are very concerned—the North Koreans, having talked to 

them for years—that if they disclose where these sites are that we 

are going to bomb the sites, quite frankly, and they do not want 

to disclose. But that is essential for any kind of verification or arms 

control agreement. 

So my concern is that on the issue of arms control and disarmament there is going to be a very low bar for success such as destroying the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, which I have been to 

that reactor. I think that has been promised several times. I am 

not sure how operational it is, and Dr. Cha probably has better information than I do. 

Also, there have been some sites that have been allegedly missile 

sites terminated. I am not sure if even verifying those sites or that 

one or two sites that that is significant disarmament initiative on 

the part of North Korea. 

Another concern I have is that the negotiating partners in the 

past that we have had—Victor, myself—have been the foreign ministry and, generally, the foreign ministry of the North Korean Republic—the DPRK—they are pragmatic. 

You can deal with them, on prisoners, on human rights, issues 

relating to remains, especially the Korean People Army—the military—which, in my judgment, is quite flexible. 

Our negotiating partners are the intelligence people now, the spy 

chief, and I am not sure that diplomacy wise they are necessarily 

the most flexible. That concerns me, too. 

So at the very end, in conclusion, here is my worry—that yes, 

some positive statements come out of the summit, some positive 

initiatives such as perhaps some joint searches for remains of our 

soldiers to sites that are being looked at for joint excavation of remains. 

Two, a liaison office. All right. That is good. That is good that 

we talk. That is good that we have operations in North Korea. But 

the North Koreans may not agree to it because they think that that 

is a way that we spy on them. 

Three, human rights issues relating to North and South, investments, economic development, development of joint economic facility between North and South, family reunification for North and 

South. That is good. 

But my concern is that the true goal of denuclearization, which 

is the issue of dismantling weapons of mass destruction—missiles, 

nuclear detonations, nuclear—will not happen. Maybe a freeze. All 

right. That is better than nothing. 

But those are my concerns, Mr. Chairman. I want the president 

to succeed. You know, this is probably our most dominant national 

security threat that we have. 

But I do not think the threat is diminished. 
10 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Richardson follows:] 

Statement of Governor Bill Richardson (WB Richardson LLC) 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and Nonproliferation 

"On the Eve of the Summit: Options for U.S. Diplomacy on North Korea" 

Tuesday, February 26, 2019// 10:15 AM 

The first summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim in June 2018 

produced a good moment for both leaders, striking a personal relationship; an 

aspirational joint statement; and a couple of positive developments, such as the 

repatriation of remains of U.S. servicemen. 

The summit, however, failed to produce a workable framework for 

negotiations. Unlike other summits, there was little to no staff work to develop 

substantive demands prior to the meeting. 

As a result, following the summit the two sides had no roadmap to proceed, 

and what we saw was a discombobulated effort to get to a framework, with both 

sides positioning but without any progress. 

Chairman Kim has made it very clear that his prefen·ed negotiating partner is 

President Trump, not Secretary of State Pompeo or the working-level teams. This 

is why it was only after the second summit was announced that negotiations and 

communications between the two sides were revived. 

President Trump puts significant weight on dangling the prospect of 

economic development and prosperity to North Korea, as he believes that will 

make them compromise on the nuclear items. 
11 

We should be clear about our expectations of what is possible, what is not, 

and what would be the cost of an agreement with the North Koreans: 

1. The chances that the North Koreans will get rid of their existing 

stockpiles are slim. They believe that these weapons are the reason we 

are negotiating with them, and the only reason we have not yet 

overpowered them militarily. 

2. We can expect and demand the North Koreans cease their development 

of nuclear weapons, WMDs and ballistic missiles; and that we have clear 

means for verifying the dismantling of such capabilities. 

3. We can expect and demand the North Koreans cease all testing of 

nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; and have verification of the 

dismantling of launch and test sites. 

4. We can expect and demand the North Koreans cease any proliferation 

operations of nuclear technology and WMDs; and determine the means 

to verify this. 

5. In return, the North Koreans will demand the removal of sanctions, end 

of war, normalization of relations and reduction of military presence on 

the Peninsula. 

An agreement with these guidelines should be gradual and broken into 

smaller reciprocal steps. 

Thus, a successful second summit between the two leaders should produce 

what the first summit failed to do: 

I. A detailed framework for negotiations, including time lines, terms of 

reference, and a schedule of future summits: 

2 
12 

Set times for ongoing negotiations, both working-level, high-level, 

and Presidential summits. Considering Chairman Kim's preference to 

negotiate directly with Trump, Presidential Summits might occur 

every 2 or 3 months. 

Terms of reference for negotiations. General guiding principles for a 

final agreement, definitions and constraints. 

Time lines and benchmarks for the negotiation process. 

2. An agreed pathway to recover and repatriate remains ofU.S. 

servicemen. Since this is a mutual interest of both sides, it is an easy and 

very powerful outcome for the summit. I have been personally involved 

in these efforts since 2007 and am still working with families of 

servicemembers to bring their relatives' remains home. 

3. A mechanism and safeguards to mitigate risk of conflict if a crisis in 

negotiations occur. This can be by establishing a hotline between the 

leaders, or a mitigating contact group to include regional stakeholders. 

4. There are other gestures the U.S. can offer that are short of policy 

concessions, which can be highly symbolic and motivating for the North 

Koreans. 

5. Recommitment to the aspirational joint statement of the June summit. 

The summit can be considered a failure if the following occurs: 

1. Failure to produce a practical and detailed framework for negotiations. 

Failure to define benchmarks and terms of reference. Without such 

framework, negotiations will fizzle again until the next summit is 

announced. 

2. Failure to establish a roadmap for recovery and repatriation of remains. 
13 

3. Ambiguity and no record of agreements and understandings reached 

between the two leaders during a one-on-one meeting. 

4 
14 

Chairman SHERMAN. Thank you, Governor. I think we all want 

the president to succeed. 

Dr. Victor Cha is a senior advisor and Korea chair at the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies here in Washington, DC. 

He is also a professor in government and international affairs at 

Georgetown University. 

Between 2004 and 2007 he served as director for Asian affairs 

at the National Security Council at the White House. He was responsible primarily for our relations with Japan, the Korean Peninsula, and the Pacific nations. 

Dr. Cha was also the deputy head of the delegation for the 

United States at the Six-Party Talks in Beijing. 

Dr. CHA. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CHA, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND KOREA 

CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES 

Mr. CHA. Thank you, Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member 

Yoho, members of the committee. It is a pleasure to be here with 

you today as well as with Governor Richardson. 

The last time I saw you I think we were in Pyongyang together 

a little while—a few years back. But it is really good to be here 

with the Governor. 

Let me first say that I think President Trump deserves credit for 

a couple of things. The first is that he stepped away from the fire 

and fury posture of 2017. 

Second is that he has invested in summit diplomacy based on the 

theory that there is only—the reality that there is only one person 

in North Korea that makes the decision. That is the leader of 

North Korea. So you have to talk to them. 

Three, he is really invested a lot of capital into try to building 

a personal relationship with the North Korean leader. And so I 

think, as everybody said here, we want him to succeed this week. 

But what I want to do is focus my comments on five numbers 

that I think we need to take into consideration with regard to what 

is going to happen this week, because there are a lot of opinions 

here and around town on North Korea and not a lot of data. So I 

am going to bring some data points to the discussion. 

The first is 1963, and 1963 is important because it is when North 

Korea started landscaping the ground for where they would build 

the Yongbyon nuclear complex. So this was not a program that 

started after the end of the cold war when they lost the support 

of the Soviet Union and China. 

They had been building this program for well over half a century. 

So I think as many of us clearly believe, I do not think they are 

fully going to denuclearize. 

The second number is 20. That refers to the number of undisclosed missile bases in North Korea—short-range, medium-range, 

and intermediate range ballistic missile bases. 

North Korea can close facilities without denuclearizing. They can 

close facilities that they no longer need, things from their past, and 

they can promise things about their future—the promise not to 

transfer, the transfer not to do more testing. 
15 

But what they will hold in their hands is the present and that 

are things like—those are things like these 20 missile bases, the 

nuclear weapons stockpile, things of these—things of this nature. 

That is a negotiating challenge. 

The third number is 108, and this is the number of times that 

the president has made reference to his—made reference to the 

question of whether we need to have U.S. forces in Korea. 

One of the key metrics for me of the success of this meeting will 

not be so much what North Korea gives, because I think that they 

will give very little, but that we do not cut into our alliance equities and offer those as negotiating chips to North Korea—things 

like our exercises and our readiness, our troop disposition on the 

Peninsula. These are not things that should be traded for temporary gains on North Korea. 

The fourth number is 2007. 2007 refers to the last agreement 

that we were a part of where North Korea agreed to a peace regime 

on the Korean Peninsula and the stipulation then was that at an 

appropriate time North Korea and the United States and other 

parties would engage in peace regime talks. 

The phrase ‘‘at an appropriate time’’ referred to North Korean 

denuclearization, return to the nonproliferation treaty, and full 

scope compliance with IAEA safeguards. So the idea of a peace regime was contingent on these steps forward. 

What we are doing now is we are potentially front loading the 

peace regime part to see if we can get steps toward 

denuclearization and compliance with IAEA NPT safeguards. 

And, finally, fifth—the fifth number is two, and that refers to 2 

years have gone by and the administration has still not appointed 

a senior envoy for human rights abuses in North Korea. The 

human rights issue is often framed as a distraction to the negotiations but it is not. For all of us to achieve our objectives, the 

human rights issue needs to be addressed. 

President Trump has made very clear that the core element of 

his negotiation is to offer North Korea a brighter economic future 

in return for giving up their weapons. 

That brighter economic future cannot come without some addressing of the human rights abuses because there is no international financial institution, there is no general counsel of any 

American corporation that is going to recommend putting money 

into North Korea if there are human rights abuses along the supply chain. 

So it is in the interests of both the United States, South Korea, 

and North Korea to bring human rights into the discussion. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cha follows:] 
16 

Statement Before the 

House Committee on Affairs 

Subcommittee on Asia, The Pacific, and No,nprollifcration 

A Testimony by: 

Victor Ph.D. 

Professor of Government, Georg;etc>wn Univ<~rsity, 

Senior Adviser and Korea Chair, 

Center for StrategiC and International Studies, and 

Fellow in Human Freedom, George W. Bush Institute 

February 26, 2019 

2172 House Office BuiidJing 
17 

Cha: Written Testimony, HFAC Asia, The Pacitic, and Nonproliferation Subcommittee 02/26/2019 

Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member Yoho, and distinguished members of the committee, it is a 

distinct honor to appear before this committee to discuss options for U.S. diplomacy on North 

Korea ahead of the second Tnunp-Kim summit in Hanoi this week. 

In less than 48 hours, the world will witness an unusual diplomatic event once again. a summit 

meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. president Donald Trump. The 

expectations for tangible progress towards North Korea's denuclearization are high for this 

meeting because there has been so little achieved since the Singapore summit this past summer. 

The most uncertain aspect of the Hanoi summit is not whether North Korea will hand over nuclear 

warheads, or provide a full inventory of its program, or agree to a timeline for complete 

dismantlement. Pyongyang will not take such major steps and instead will offer small, incremental 

concessions. The main concern is whether the president, besieged by domestic distractions, will 

give away too much, and take a bad deal that leaves the United States less secure, 

Giving the President Some Credit 

To be fair, the president should be commended for demonstrating the political will to address the 

North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear threat through summit diplomacy since there is only 

one person who can make a decision to denuclearize in the dictatorship. While Kim has written 

Trump private letters that have charmed him, the president has publicly defended the North Korean 

leader's intentions against skeptics, In the three-decade history of negotiations with North Korea, 

this is an extraordinary measure that speaks to Trump's desires to see success, This is far better 

than his fire and fury rhetoric in 2017 when it looked like war was possible. As evidence of his 

strategy's effectiveness, Trump likes to boast that he stopped Kim from WMD testing for the past 

15 months by his befl·iending the lonely dictator. But the empirical reality, according to a CSIS 

study that tracked the frequency ofNorth Korean provocations with U.S.-DPRK diplomacy, is that 

historically the North does not shoot missiles whenever it is sitting at the table with the U.S. 1 This 

was not just the case during the Trump administration, but was also generally the case during the 

Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, 

What ·rrump can take credit tor is the downturn in conventional military tensions across the border 

between the two Korcas. It was not too long ago that gunfire and artillery were being exchanged 

across the Demilitarized Zone over North Korean soldier defections and booby trap landmines 

maiming South Korean soldiers. 

North Korea's Negotiating Plan 

The pre-summit speculation is that Kim will hand over an old nuclear test site (Punggye-ri), a 

rocket test stand (Tongchang-ri), and maybe portions of the Yongbyon nuclear site for 

international inspection. This may look good to Trump but it's not a big win in the world of 

nuclear diplomacy, The North Koreans offered up a freeze of the Y ongbyon reactor in the last 

agreement that l worked on in 2007. And the two test sites, while technically new locations for 

U.S, inspectors to peruse, are no longer needed by the Nmth Koreans as their program has 

advanced from these facilities. Moreover, anything of value will have long been removed before 

1 Lisa Collins, "25 Years ofNegoliations m1d Provocations: Not1h Korea and the United States," CSIS Beyond 

Parallel. 
18 

Cha: Written Testimony, HfAC Asia, The Pacific, and Nonproliferation Subcommittee 02/26/2019 

any foreigner sets foot on the grounds. All the while, North Korea's stockpile of 20-60 nuclear 

weapons, uranium enrichment facilities, and its twenty operational missiles bases remain 

untouched by the negotiation.2 

If that is all that Kim has to offer, the president still is unlikely to walk away given the investment 

he has made in the diplomatic process and the public promises that his bromance with Kim Jongun is producing results. He will argue that closing the nuclear test site is an achievement that 

belongs to no other U.S. president (which would be factually accurate but materially irrelevant to 

fully verifiable and irreversible dismantlement given the scope of the program today). He will 

argue that verified decommissioning of the Sohae (Tongchang-ri) satellite facility could not be 

achieved by Obama who saw the North launch a rocket thm1 this very site that ended his "Leap 

Day" deal. 

If NOJih Korea gives even this much, it would be surprising. There are three key facts that the 

Chairman, ranking memher and distinguished members of this committee should internalize in 

advance of this summit. 

First. North Korea will not wholly give up its nuclear weapons programs. According to archived, 

declassified CIA satellite imagery obtained and analyzed by a recent CSIS study, North Korea 

started landscaping the site for the Yongbyon nuclear complex in 1963 - even before China 

detonated its first nuclear device.3 This program is a half-century effort that is deeply ingrained in 

the state-building and national narrative of this country. 

Second, their negotiating strategy is to offer up some of their past that is, old sites that they no 

longer need; or parts of their future in the form of promises not to test weapons or transfer them. 

But in the meantime, they will hold in tow their "present" - that is, their weapons stockpiles, 

operational missile bases, scientific expertise, and related facilities. We should not expect them to 

give more, but possibly even give less. Thae Yong flo, Norih Korea's former deputy ambassador 

to the United Kingdom and an escapee now living in South Korea, compared this strategy to that 

of a dishonest used-car salesman. "They're going to repaint their broken-down car, make it look 

new, and then sell it," he said recently.4 

Third, on missile negotiations, North Korea seeks to decouple the security of the United States 

from that of its allies. It may be willing to offer up a freeze of the developmental long-range ICBM 

program but get the United States to accede to the deployed and operational SRBM, MRBM, and 

IRBM programs and bases. Taking a deal like this will weaken our alliances in Asia, which is to 

the benefit of North Korea, China. and Russia. 

Bermudez, Victor Cha and Lisa Collins, '·Undeclared North Korea: The Sakkanmol Missile Operating 

,)/,) tf~yon·a f''atYi'l/el. November 12, 2018, https:f/bevondparallel.csis,orn/undeclared-north-koreaThe ITlli! Street Journal. 
19 

Cha: Written Testimony, HFAC Asia, The Pacific, and Nonproliferation Subcommittee 02126/2019 

Do Not Take a Bad Deal 

The operative question is whether Trump will give away too much in Hanoi for North Korean 

offerings. Kim will not immediately hand over his modest concessions but will try to milk the 

president for real chits including reduction of U.S. military readiness with ally South Korea, a 

peace declaration, political recognition, removal of sanctions, and even reductions in U.S. troop 

levels. 

Surely the president's advisors will tell him not to trade in our alliance assets for something as 

unreliable as North Korean promises, but as the president showed in Singapore when he 

unilaterally decided to give up U.S.-ROK military exercises to the North Koreans without telling 

his secretary of defense or the South Koreans, the president is unpredictable at best and dangerous 

at worst. This would be a bad deal that would not leave us more secure and would be tantamount 

to recognizing North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state. 

Very little will have been negotiated in advance of the summit. Nmih Koreans know that their 

American working-level counterpatis will drive a hard deal calling for a full inventory of all of 

their capabilities and a two-year timeline for inspection, dismantlement, and removal of all of the 

country's WMD programs. The North Koreans know that the last deal ten years ago fell apart 

when it came time for the regime to come clean on its weapons programs with a comprehensive 

declaration. They prefer to push the negotiations all the way to the top where the No11h Korean 

leadership has been diligently preparing, but our president, distracted by the Mueller investigation 

and immigration, prefers to .. wing it.'' The North Koreans and Chinese all see the best chances for 

an advantageous deal coming from the president not from his policy professionals. 

Negotiating North Korean denuclearization is literally rocket science. It is complicated and cannot 

simply be done through •·gut instincts,'' as the president once described his negotiating strategy 

with Kim. Unlike his lack of preparation before Singapore, the president needs to read his briefing 

book. push hard for a denuclearization list from DPRK, and jealously guard alliance assets from 

becoming bargaining chips. To do otherwise would benefit DPRK and China while making 

Americans no more secure. 

Raise Human Rights 

The president will never realize his dream of seeing North Korea trade its missile launch pads for 

bcachfront condominiums and casinos unless he addresses the regime's massive human-rights 

abuses. 

Trump's loudest pronouncements on the North's horrific human-rights record came in 2017 after 

the death of Otto Warm bier, a U.S. college student detained during a tourist visit to the country. 

The president even invited the Warmbier family to the State of the Union speech to highlight the 

issue. But since Trump met Kim in Singapore last summer, he's gone quiet on human rights. 

Over two years into his term, the administration still has not appointed an envoy for human-rights 

abuses in North Korea, a position mandated by Congress. The president seems to think that raising 

the issue in Hanoi with Kim would be impolite and distract from the question of denuclearization. 
20 

Cha: Written Testimony, HFAC Asia, The Pacific, and Nonproliferation Subcommittee 02/26/2019 

Washington's silence has had palpable consequences: five years after a United Nations 

Commission of Inquiry repott created a groundswell of support for charging the North Korean 

leadership with crimes against humanity, the UN Security Council last December voted against 

raising the issue at the behest of China and Russia.5 Even South Korea has cut almost all of its 

government funding for human rights NGOs. 

What this conventional policy thinking docs not account for is that human rights are critical to the 

president's negotiation strategy for five reasons as I have discussed in a recent George W. Bush 

Institute paper.6 

First, stopping North Korea's bomb-making activities means blocking the hard currency flows that 

finance them. Much of that money comes from the regime's slave-labor exports and other abusive 

business activities. Pressuring North Korea to stop these illicit practices not only advances the 

goals of nuclear nonproliferation and denuclearization, but it also ensures that fewer North Korean 

people are subject to such exploitation in the process of earning foreign currency for the regime. 

Second, in order to verify any nuclear deal, inspectors must be able to move around the country to 

different sites. That will require a much more open North Korean society than exists today, for 

which the U.S. should be pressing simultaneously with denuclearization. 

Third, raising human rights can strengthen U.S. leverage in the talks. Over the past three decades, 

North Korea has barely cracked a yawn when Washington has condemned its nuclear activities. 

But. when the international community began shining a spotlight on Pyongyang's human-rights 

abuses in 2014, the reclusive regime, feeling vulnerable, quickly dispatched diplomats abroad to 

lobby against punitive resolutions at the U.N. 

fourth, integrating human-rights demands into the negotiations would be smart politics at home, 

given how reluctant Congress will likely be to accept any deal that does not address those issues. 

Fifth, Trump's promise of economic betterment for Kim in return for his nukes simply will not be 

credible unless there is tangible progress on human rights. Current UN Security Council 

resolutions as well as U.S. laws make it difficult for private-sector companies or international 

financial institutions to engage economically with N01th Korea absent certification that the country 

is in compliance with international labor standards. Even at Trump's behest, no general counsel 

of any U.S. company would recommend investing in North Korea if human rights abuses in the 

supply chain might put them in violation of U.S. law. 

Raising human rights isn't just a necessity but an opportunity. Since the Commission of Inquiry 

report, Pyongyang has quietly become more engaged in humanitarian cffotts and informationgathering on human-rights standards. This may make the North Koreans more receptive to a 

dialogue about human rights and international monitoring standards for health and food assistance. 

5 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's 

Republic of Korea, 7 February 2014, NHRC/25163, available 

at:https:/lwww.ohchr.orglcn/hrbodieslhrc/coidprk/pages/reportofthecommissionofinquirydprk.aspx 

6 Victor Cha, ''Human Rights Must Be on the Table in Hanoi," George W. Bush Institute, February 22.2019, 

https:l lwww.bushcenter.org/publ ications/articles/20 1912/denuclearizing -north-korea.htm I 
21 

Cha: Written Testimony, HFAC Asia, The Pacific, and Nonproliferation Subcommittee 0212612019 

But. they aren't going to raise the issue if the U.S. doesn't. For the United States to continue to 

keep quiet in Hanoi would not just dim America's traditional role as a beacon of human freedom 

but make the task of denuclearizing North Korea even harder. 
22 

Chairman SHERMAN. I am going to hold off on my questions for 

a bit and recognize the gentlelady from Nevada. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you and the ranking member for bringing us such outstanding witnesses. They are so knowledgeable and I so much appreciate their 

being with us today. 

Both of you have mentioned how the president likes to negotiate 

directly with the chairman and he seems to prefer this mano a 

mano kind of diplomacy as opposed to anything multilateral. 

Some of us believe, however, you have to include your allies as 

you move forward in any kind of negotiation and I believe part of 

our success working with North Korea we will be able to work in 

collaboration with both Japan and South Korea. 

Would you two please address what you think are the consequences of our not bringing them into the circle or how is our 

leadership in terms of getting them to work together with us on 

this, even though their interests may not always align and their interests may not always align with ours? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. In my judgment, Congresswoman, we need to 

work with Japan better than we have. My sense is Japan has been 

left out of the negotiations with North Korea. You know, there is 

a rivalry with South Korea, who has been deeply engaged with us. 

So Japan is vulnerable to a missile attack and this is a horrific 

prospect that the Japanese people are concerned about. They also 

are concerned about getting some of their human rights issues addressed by North Korea. 

South Korea—I think President Moon has been very constructive. He was elected as a peace candidate dialog with North Korea. 

But sometimes I feel that he is getting ahead of us on wanting an 

agreement with North Korea at all costs, in my judgment. 

They are great allies, and Dr. Cha mentioned I think it was a 

mistake initially at the first summit for the United States to make 

a concession, which is to reduce or terminate the number of military exercises we had with South Korea. 

So the last peg here is China. I do believe China has made a 

positive effort at sanctions. You know, most of the commerce that 

goes through North Korea is through China and China, I believe, 

through the United Nations and other entities, there are coal sanctions, energy sanctions, people sanctions against North Korea. But 

they are not going to operate well unless they are enforced. 

I think China has done a better job in the past of enforcing sanctions. But there is a lot of cross-border contraband that they could 

do a better job of enforcing. 

And, quite frankly, I have been a little worried. I know we have 

some tense trade negotiations with China that somehow China has 

to say, well, you know, you want to slap some tariffs on us—maybe 

we will not help you as much on sanctions with North Korea, 

which is vital. 

Russia has not observed sanctions as much as they should—in 

fact, very little. That is another problem. 

So you are right, Congresswoman. You got to have regional support for what you are doing. I am pleased that they are having this 

summit in Vietnam. 
23 

I think Vietnam is an emerging positive country that is pro-private sector, that, you know, is concerned about Chinese expansionism and I am pleased that they are part of this regional situation. 

But the Six-Party Talks, which Victor was involved with—the 

other countries, which encircle the whole issue—I am not sure the 

Six-Party Talks can be revived again. I hope they would. But this 

is how I see the regional perspective that you mentioned. 

Ms. TITUS. Doctor? 

Mr. CHA. Yes. So on China, the key is to get China to continue 

to enforce sanctions. Without Chinese economic pressure, the North 

Koreans are not going to be willing to negotiate in earnest. 

Ninety percent of North Korea’s external trade today is with 

China. So if they do not put pressure on it does not work. 

With South Korea, it is really restraining them. They are so enthusiastic about moving forward that they too can do things that 

would undercut U.S. leverage at the table. And then with regard 

to Japan, as Governor Richardson said, they are—they are going to 

be important to any political and diplomatic deal that is reached 

with North Korea. 

Historically, they have been important in the past two deals and 

they will be important again. So it is important that we—it is critical that as we go into Hanoi that we have all of these pieces in 

the right place, and that takes work. That is—there is bilateral discussions with the North Koreans but there is also all this work you 

have to do on the side. 

Ms. TITUS. Do you feel like that is taking place? 

Mr. CHA. I think with the South Koreans I have a sense that it 

is. But it is difficult with the Chinese because of the trade disputes, 

and Korea and Japan, our two key allies, are just not talking to 

each other right now. 

And so it was important that Secretary Pompeo, in his last meeting with the South Korean foreign minister, expressly talked about 

the need for more trilateral coordination because usually we go into 

these meetings with North Korea having fully consulted with Seoul 

and with Tokyo. And right now, because of the difficulties between 

Seoul and Tokyo we are not able to do that. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SHERMAN. The ranking member is recognized. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your testimony. 

Again, I am going to just reiterate the historic nature of this. 

You know, in the past there has been three attempts—in the Clinton Administration, in the Bush, and the Obama Administration— 

to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula. 

Yet, during those negotiations they were traditional. They had 

traditional negotiators, people from the State Department, diplomacy and all of that, and they did not work. 

And so I think this is a great tactic. History will look back on 

this moment, whether it was a good one or a bad one, and let us 

hope for the—that it turns out the way we want it to. 
24 

But and you brought this up, Governor Richardson. An agreement should be gradual and broken into small reciprocal steps, and 

you both have experience in the Asian market. 

In order to do business, what we have heard, what is the first 

thing you have to establish to move forward in any negotiations 

over there? 

Dr. Cha. 

Mr. CHA. I mean, you have to establish a relationship. You have 

to establish a relationship with the other party. You just do not 

slap a legal document on the table. You have to establish a relationship. 

Mr. YOHO. That is what Americans are bad at. We have been 

told over and over again—you guys want to get here, get the bottom line, and you do not want to know anything about us. 

And so I commend, I will say, the foresight of President Trump 

reaching out to do this, and he has lavished praise and edification 

on Kim Jong-Un that he has probably never had, and I will hold 

off on whether he should deserve any of that at this point. 

But we need to look into the future of where we are going and 

we cannot move forward if we do not have that initial trust and 

that relationship. And then I had the opportunity to talk to Special 

Envoy Biegun about what denuclearization is. 

Do we have a firm commitment of what it is that all parties 

agree on? Do you guys have any speculation or any idea? Do we 

have a sound definition? 

Mr. CHA. I think that there is a definition, Congressman, you 

know, that has been agreed to by the North Koreans in the past 

in writing and that is denuclearization means they will give up all 

nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. That is language 

that they signed up to in 2007. 

I believe that—I believe that that is what the president believes 

and that is the definition I think we will try to push for in Hanoi. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. I believe that the North Koreans—we have a 

different perspective of what denuclearization is. I think that is the 

problem. In other words, we think, Congressman, that 

denuclearization is dismantling, destroying, ending whatever—the 

40 nuclear weapons, the WMD. 

The North Koreans do not believe in that definition. They want 

to keep their weapons. They want to keep some of their weapons. 

Now, so far, they have dismantled nothing. So there is a definition—what is the word I am looking for—a definition deficit 

here—— 

Mr. YOHO. Yes. 

Mr. RICHARDSON [continuing]. On what denuclearization is. Now, 

I do agree, you have to have trust—I think maybe that was the 

word you were looking for—in the relationship between the two 

leaders and I will maybe take a little issue with what you said. 

Under the Clinton Administration, the agreed framework, North 

Korea did not produce any weapons for 9 years and I think the 

Bush Administration negotiated well with North Korea. The problem was North Korea was intent on increasing their arsenal and 

they are still doing it right now while saying they are for 

denuclearization. 
25 

Mr. YOHO. Right. And I just—let me just add here, I am not putting criticism on anybody—— 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Right. OK. 

Mr. YOHO [continuing]. You know, because that is not going to 

do us any good. It is what can we learn from that that we can move 

forward. And, again, that breakfast I had this morning with Dr. 

Chung-in Moon, he has been there at all three negotiations—probably the only person that was there on the first three and he has 

been to every meeting up there with President Moon. 

He says he has seen a distinct difference in North Korea today 

from when it was before. Before when they went there it was all 

military that was present in the negotiations, in the streets, in the 

Pyongyang whereas today you do not see hardly any military presence. 

So the atmosphere in North Korea has changed. Let us just hope 

that we can have a definition that we all agree on that we can 

move forward based on that trust, and what he said that Kim 

Jong-Un has said that we have destroyed Yongbyon nuclear site. 

But it was a nonfunctional one, as we understood it. But, yet, he 

has not sent anybody in there to verify it from the outside world 

other than their word and those things have got to be built upon 

to move forward. 

And let us just hope that the skilled people we have, with Secretary Pompeo and Stephen Biegun, can move in that direction to 

help facilitate those documents to move forward and that once and 

for all we bring this Korean conflict to an end, peace to the Peninsula with reunification as they see fit to serve them between North 

and South, and that we look at trade because our top four trading—after World War II we were in a war with Germany, France. 

Since then it was Korea and Vietnam. None of those countries 

today have nuclear weapons and are—some of them are our best 

trading partners. 

So the idea that we want to implore to Mr. Kim is you do not 

need nuclear weapons. Let us just focus on trade and get rid of this 

and move forward on our economies and our countries. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman SHERMAN. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. Well, maybe on a more critical 

note—I think a case could be made for diplomatic malpractice in 

how we are approaching North Korea. Remember that this is the 

administration that ripped up the JCPOA with Iran, that by all accounts is working in every metric, because it was inadequate. 

And yet, they meet with the nuclear threat, Kim Jong-Un and 

North Korea, and he gets international legitimacy from meeting 

with the president of the United States, that audience with the 

president directly, the cancellation of military exercises with our 

South Korean allies, and in the joint statement they do not even 

mention that denuclearization needs to be irreversible and 

verifiable, which is one of our goals. 

Not even mentioned in the joint statement. Nor is there any 

mention of the North’s ballistic missile program—a criticism used 

to justify the evisceration of the JCPOA. 
26 

Why should we not look at that and call that what it is, diplomatic malpractice? We have nothing, and Kim Jong-Un has a lot. 

Now, maybe that is a strategic sort of move where we are being 

patient and waiting for the future and this summit may then prove 

that there are other steps. But it seems to me that thus far nothing 

has happened and we have not even furthered the goals ostensibly 

we say we are committed to. 

Dr. Cha. 

Mr. CHA. Thank you, Congressman. 

So I am a professor so I will give you another number, and that 

is seven. That is the number of pages that the agreement that we 

worked on in 2007 was. It was seven pages long—the Six-Party 

joint statement. 

The JCPOA, I think, was 150 pages. I do believe that if we are 

going to move forward with denuclearization with North Korea, we 

are going to need a document that is much more detailed, certainly, 

than what came out of Singapore and even what came out of the 

previous two agreements under President Bush and under President Clinton. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, let me just—a little footnote. Yes, but from 

your point of view after the first summit, did Kim Jong-Un commit 

to anything? 

Mr. CHA. No. I think the first summit laid out a statement of 

principles. In many ways, it was an agreement between the leaders 

about what the outcome of diplomacy should be, which is normalized relations, a peace treaty, and a fully denuclearized North 

Korea. 

But subsequent to that, there were really no steps that took us 

tangibly down any of those paths. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Governor Richardson. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. With what Dr. Cha—what you said, on the diplomacy side, I have been very involved with the remains issue. I 

think something positive has come out of that. We need to do a lot 

more. 

I do think there are some human rights family reunifications between North and South that are better. 

Third, you know, this is very vague but there is less tension in 

the Peninsula. However, Congressman, I agree with you in terms 

of what North Korea committed to in the first summit—complete 

denuclearization. 

They have done nothing there. In fact, they increased their enriched uranium capability. You know, they are not doing much. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. This is why I just hope the president, and Congressman Yoho mentioned Stephen Biegun and Pompeo—especially 

Biegun. He knows what he is doing. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr.—Governor Richardson, because I am going 

to run out of time but I thank you for that answer. 

Let me ask one other question. One of the concerns some people 

have is that North Korea is about to get us into a trap so that we 

sign an agreement ending the war, after 66 years. 

But in doing that, which is a laudable goal, we undermine the 

rationale for U.S. troop trip wire presence in South Korea. Is that 

a realistic concern, Dr. Cha, and also Governor Richardson? 
27 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CHA. Yes. I mean, I think there is some concern among experts that in trying to get bigger steps on denuclearization we 

might put bigger chips on the table. 

As I said in my testimony, I think there should be a bright red 

line between things that we do on sanctions versus things that we 

do with our alliances. Sanctions, liaison offices, some of the things 

that Governor Richardson mentioned—they may be part of the bargain. But we should not be trading away alliance equities. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If the chair would allow Governor Richardson 

also to answer, I thank the chair. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. Congressman, I agree. I would not trade 

an end to the war treaty or unless there is a denuclearization of 

sizable numbers of dismantling of weapons and WMD and missiles. 

I would not. 

Perhaps a vaguer statement that says tensions are less and the 

war is over, OK. Maybe. But not as a tradeoff unless there is substantial denuclearization. 

And I am concerned. There have been some reports that we are 

considering that. And it means exactly what you said—the vulnerability of us being or having to look at troop reductions in South 

Korea. We have 30,000 troops there—28,000. 

Chairman SHERMAN. I will recognize Mr. Bera after I recognize 

the gentleman from Utah. 

Mr. CURTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. 

This is an important hearing. Thank you to our witnesses for being 

here. 

I am hopeful that we see a productive summit. I, for one, view 

it as historic and important to be taking these steps. However, we 

know that the Kim regime does not negotiate in good faith and I 

think many of us are optimistic but worrisome. 

Regardless of the outcome of the summit, I for one will continue 

to urge the administration to use every possible economic and diplomatic solution to find answers and bring us forward. 

As I listened to your testimoneys and questions of my colleagues, 

I sometimes feel like we have a cultural thing here in America 

where we want to solve everything immediately and we hope that 

one summit or two summits has this magic ability to solve it. 

So I am curious, from both of your perspectives, not whether we 

are on the cusp of solving this but how do you see the trajectory? 

Are we improving and moving in a good trajectory? I guess that is 

my simple question. 

Governor first, and then Dr. Cha. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the trajectory is going to depend a lot on 

the results of this summit—this upcoming summit starting today 

or tomorrow. My hope, Congressman, is that there be substantial 

progress on the denuclearization issue. 

You talked about long range. I think it was unrealistic for anyone to expect North Korea to denuclearize completely. They always 

have—and if you look at that language, they have said it in the 

agreement with Clinton, with Bush, and they never do it. 

Now, is there a trajectory that is more positive? I think we have 

underestimated Kim Jong-Un. I think in the end—and I am not— 
28 

I am not praising him. I am saying he is—his vision is an exchange 

for the lesser—some dismantling of nuclear weapons. 

He wants American investment. He wants European investment. 

He wants infrastructure. He wants energy, a new grid, and so the 

trajectory is in that direction. His father, I think, was more of a— 

I will not call him—he was more of a negotiator. 

He used to say, OK, well, you want this prisoner back from the 

United States—send President Clinton to pick him. You know, 

things like that. 

Mr. CURTIS. Right. And I hate to push you but I am going to be 

short on time so let me—let me move on. 

Mr. CHA. So I think if we look, starting, Congressman, from 

2017, in 2017 there were 20 North Korean ballistic missile tests 

and a hydrogen bomb test and we were moving military assets to 

the region. 

I mean, it was a really scary time. I mean, since then we have 

gotten no diplomacy. We have gotten no more testing by the North 

Koreans. 

I just came back from South Korea about 10 days ago and there 

is a completely different view now in South Korea. Everybody says, 

the war is over—like, why do not we just admit the war is over. 

So I think there has been certainly a positive trajectory since 

2017. But, as the Governor said, the key piece is we really need 

to see tangible steps on denuclearization coming out of the summit 

because this has to be a road to somewhere, right, and so that is 

the key piece. 

Mr. CURTIS. Let me kind of followup on that. We almost exclusively talked about denuclearization and yet we have said in this 

hearing today that Japan could be hit by long-range ballistic missiles. 

Is it a mistake not to have a broader scope than just 

denuclearization? 

Mr. CHA. No. I agree that it must include ballistic missiles, not 

just the long-range but also the shorter and medium range ones. 

Mr. CURTIS. As well. What is there culturally that Americans 

need to understand that would help us better understand this process. The two cultures, right, are very, very different. 

I mentioned earlier ours is one of immediate expectations and 

things like that. What is there culturally that Americans could better understand that would help us get our arms around this process? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. From my experience—from my experience, they 

negotiate totally differently than we do. Their idea of a concession 

is they think they are always right. 

It is a deity that guides them—the father or the grandfather of 

Kim Jong-Un—and their idea of a concession is they will give you 

a little more time for you to get to their point of view. 

That is their idea of a concession. They always want you to go 

first. You make the concession and then we will—you know, we 

will see about whether we reciprocate or not. They are deeply suspicious of us, totally. 

I mean, they think if we—if they disclose where their 

weaponsites are we are going to bomb them. I mean, there is just— 

I have been there several times. It is just another—another world. 
29 

Mr. CURTIS. OK. I am out of time. Let me thank both of you and 

yield my time back. 

Chairman SHERMAN. I know I had said it would be the gentleman from California. However, the gentlelady from Pennsylvania has returned. She is vice chair of this subcommittee and she 

is recognized. 

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. I appreciate that, and thank you, 

gentlemen, for your testimony. 

The history of negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea is, 

obviously, long and tumultuous. But one thing is clear and I think 

a lot of people have been talking about it—the importance of all of 

our allies and our partners in the region and making sure that we 

are respectful to them. 

What is your assessment of how the administration is or is not 

implementing ARIA, or the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, which 

we recently signed in December? 

And, specifically, can you talk a little bit about the U.S.-Korea 

special measures agreement that was recently also agreed to and 

the impact that it might have on our bilateral relationships since 

it is a short timeframe instead of a longer timeframe? 

And then, finally, if you could talk about that impact on Japan, 

who is also up for that same kind of conversation as well and its 

impact on our relationship with that important ally. 

Mr. CHA. So, Congresswoman, I would say that the special measures, or SMA negotiations, have created a lot of ripple effects I 

think not just in Korea but in Asia and allies, more broadly. 

I mean, it is clearly a different template for negotiating, at least 

in the Korean case, the nonpersonnel cost of stationing U.S. forces 

in Korea. 

You know, someone said the president wants cost plus, which is 

very different from what has been negotiated in the past. A very 

tumultuous 12 months of negotiation led to this interim agreement. 

It is not followed as much here in the United States but it is followed very carefully in the region. 

And the SMA Korea negotiations were watched by Japan. They 

were watched by NATO because they are next on the block. These 

are not easy negotiations even in the best of times. But I think 

these particular negotiations are quite contentious and it is not 

clear to me what the ultimate effect will be in terms of how the 

allies perceive the United States as we continue to as for more and 

more of these allies. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Congresswoman, sometimes I feel that the 

U.S.-South Korea relationship is very important. But, if anything, 

I would say to this administration, for instance, they are obsessed 

with having South Korea pay more for the military relationship 

that we have. 

We do want to save money, but the U.S. military relationship 

with South Korea is in our interest, too, and sometimes, I will say, 

the president says, well, they should pay more. All right, and South 

Korea is paying a little more. 

But that is a very valuable military relationship for us, not just 

because of—not just because of North Korea but because of China 

and the region. 
30 

Second, with Japan, we should be more conscious of Japan’s 

needs in this security relationship with North Korea. Yes, the 

president and the prime minister of Japan have a very good personal relationship. 

But somehow the Japanese government—you can get a briefing 

on this—feels that they have been left out of this negotiation. 

Ms. HOULAHAN. Yes. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. China—again, it is a very complicated relationship we have with China and we absolutely need them to keep enforcing sanctions or the pressure on North Korea will deteriorate. 

Now, there are some very good, as I mentioned, family relationship, more investments between North and South. I think all of 

that is good—less tension. 

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. 

And my last question is, as a member of the Armed Services 

Committee as well as this one, I am very concerned about the suspension of exercises in other committee hearings that I have had. 

The military folks have been also similarly concerned about how 

long we can do this and still remain ready and effective. Do you 

all have any insight into that as well? 

Mr. CHA. So my understanding is that when we go for a full year 

without exercising then we are really starting to erode readiness. 

There are elements, as you know well, of these exercises that we 

can do in other places like Cobra Gold. But there are certain elements of the exercise that can only be done on the Peninsula. 

So this is something really that has to be considered, you know, 

if we are looking to suspend the spring exercises, which were to 

start actually this month. If we suspend those again, I think we 

really need to think about how we are going to maintain readiness 

because readiness is part of deterrence and that is what has made 

the Peninsula peaceful since 1953. 

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. 

And sir? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would just add, this was a concession in the 

first summit that we got nothing in return. So we should not concede that one again. Maybe you bring them back, those exercises, 

if North Korea is not conscious of doing something on 

denuclearization. 

They are valuable for South Korea, for the United States, for our 

troops. You know, you want them ready in case there is a misfire 

or some kind of small conflict that could light up the whole region. 

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. That is incredibly helpful, gentlemen. Thank you very much for your time. I yield back. 

Chairman SHERMAN. The gentleman from Utah is recognized. 

Oh, excuse me. No. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for your testimony. 

Dr. Cha, what was the United States posture vis-a-vis North 

Korea prior to this administration from a hostility/wartime footing? 

I mean, I am trying to—I am not trying to evoke—I am not trying 

to put words in your mouth but what would you—how would you 

characterize our posture vis-a-vis North Korea? 
31 

Mr. CHA. Prior to the state of this Administration it was, I think, 

popularly known as strategic patience, which was sort of a medium 

level sanctions plan with the effort of trying to bring North Korea 

to the table to negotiate. 

Mr. PERRY. And what was North Korea doing under that posture? 

Mr. CHA. They were actively building their nuclear weapons programs and ballistic missile programs and were on the verge of testing at the end of—at the end of 2016 and I believe that those tests 

would have happened in 2017 no matter who was president. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. So they were building, progressing, testing, 

and from the—from the United States standpoint, I think that we 

were at a posture of considering armed conflict with North Korea. 

But if I am the only one here that thinks that—I mean, do you 

get that sense that that is where we were? 

Mr. CHA. My sense is that the previous administration was really 

focused on sanctioning toward the last—sort of last 12 months in 

office, were really focused on ramping up the sanctions campaign, 

which then the Trump administration took to an even higher degree. 

Mr. PERRY. I agree with that. But having—I participated personally in the military exercises on the Peninsula as a service member 

and I was in this house at the time of the last administration and 

the conclusion of it and I attended briefings with uniformed service 

members who, I would just tell you, in my opinion, the posture of 

the United States military was planning for armed conflict if necessary in North Korea. And I just want to ask if you dispute that— 

if you can dispute that. Maybe that is the best way of putting it. 

Mr. CHA. I do not know, Congressman. I mean, I think what I— 

what I recognized the most was this effort at building sanctions on 

the regime and focusing on more robust exercises. 

Mr. PERRY. Sure. Sure. But the sanctions were not working, 

right? They were still constructing, they were testing, and they 

were posturing—the rhetoric, everything, was, in my opinion— 

maybe I am wrong so if I am wrong correct me. 

But everything we were seeing from North Korea was bellicose. 

Mr. CHA. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. Right? So let me ask you this. Is the fact that 

they are not launching missiles out into the ocean and over Japan 

and continue with nuclear tests for the last—essentially, the greater part of the last 2 years, is that—can that be viewed as a concession or not? 

Mr. CHA. It is certainly an important nonevent. Yes. Fifteen 

months of no testing of any sort is good for the diplomatic climate 

and also makes it harder for them to develop their programs. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. Right. So, look, I am not pie in the sky here 

and I am not looking, like, through rose-colored glasses. North 

Korea is a hostile actor and an enemy of the United States of 

America and Western civilization and democracies all around the 

world. That is a given, right? 

But I think we are at a—you know, I think it is hard to say objectively that we are not, at this very point, in a better place from 

a rhetorical and a wartime footing vis-a-vis North Korea than we 

were at the end of the last administration. 
32 

I think it is—and there has been a price to pay for that. Let us 

just—let us just admit there has been a price to pay for that. 

But I think that Americans right now are sleeping a little better 

not wondering if tomorrow their sons and daughters are going to 

be called up to go to war on the Korean Peninsula with potential 

horrific artillery barrage on Seoul or nuclear weapons being exchanged across the lines. I mean, is that reasonably safe to say? 

Mr. CHA. Yes. I mean, I think the—this administration’s decision 

to engage in the summit diplomacy with North Korea has certainly 

played a role in their not testing—— 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. CHA [continuing]. And that has made the situation a lot 

calmer. 

Mr. PERRY. So, because the tenor of the meeting seems to be that 

the president has failed. It is more dangerous. We are giving everything away. We are getting nothing for it. 

Look, I do not like dealing with dictators at all. But I understand 

they live in the world today and if we are going to—and if we are 

going to, you know, try and fix things we are going to have a discussion with them and I do not remember anybody on this committee on the other side of the aisle being too upset when the last 

administration negotiated with Cuba and opened up relations with 

them. 

One last question, though, for you, sir. With Asian diplomacy 

particular and specifically vis-a-vis other places in the world, is not 

the personal relationship key to success in that as opposed to the 

tenets of an agreement or the—or the facts of the matter. 

I mean, the relationship is what folks from that part of the world 

see as key and building a trusting relationship to moving forward. 

Is that true or not true, generally speaking? 

Mr. CHA. Yes. I mean, I think if we want a watershed agreement 

with North Korea there needs—you need to establish trust with the 

only person who makes a decision. 

Mr. PERRY. And how many meetings has this president has with 

that—with President Kim? 

Mr. CHA. This is now his second meeting. 

Mr. PERRY. This is now—so we have—we have one meeting. We 

have had one meeting and we are predicating all the rhetoric here 

in this committee on one meeting the start. Not the end of negotiations, like in the JCPOA, but the beginning. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield. 

Chairman SHERMAN. I recognize the gentleman from California. 

Mr. BERA. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to take a little bit of different perspective than my 

colleague from Pennsylvania. I do not view foreign policy and our 

strategic aims through a lens of partisanship or one administration 

or another administration and I would say, you know, I had my 

issues with the prior administration—President Obama and strategic patience, which I did think eroded some of our strength in 

that region. You know, I would point to the South China Sea and 

the complexity of not addressing that a bit more aggressively. 

I would also argue that, you know, having been on the same committee, having gone through those same briefings, I do not think 

the prior administration was putting us on a war footing. 
33 

I do think our troops on the Peninsula constantly are training, 

constantly are prepared. For those of us that have gone to the DMZ 

and talked to those troops, they are constantly ready for anything 

to happen. 

I do think 2 years ago this time and even a year and a half ago 

the tensions on the Peninsula, the potential of kinetic conflict, the 

potential of war was much higher. 

I will credit the Trump administration for being willing to negotiate and, you know, maybe there was a strategic goal there of increasing those tensions, increasing the possibility of war, increasing the sanctions, to bring them to the table. 

So, I am going to give credit to the Trump administration just 

starting a dialog. I have very real concerns that the outcome of the 

first summit was, you know, a halting of our troop preparation, our 

exercises in the region. 

I think we have to continue to maintain a strong posture there. 

I am very concerned, and both of you referenced it. We hear the 

rumblings of troop reductions, troop withdrawals. You know, regardless, even if we had a safe peninsula that was moving forward 

with denuclearization, the presence of our troops on the Peninsula 

served broader strategic importance—served strategic importance 

of stabilizing that region. 

We have an adversary in China. It serves a strategic importance 

in being a check on China’s aggressiveness in the region and I 

would caution the administration. I would point out that Congress 

does have an oversight role here. There are checks and balances. 

Our colleague from Arizona, Mr. Gallego, has in the prior Congress introduced legislation to—you know, if troop levels fall below 

a certain level you have got to come to Congress and justify that, 

and I think those are the right steps for us as a body. 

This is going to be a long process and, again, I am not criticizing 

the Trump administration. I would rather see dialog. I would rather see where we are today, where the atmosphere on the Peninsula 

is not one of imminent war or concern but is one of looking at how 

do you—how do you move forward. 

So both of you, in your opening testimony and, you know, my 

sense is let us not set expectations for this summit super high but 

let us actually be realistic. And if we can come out of the summit 

with that framework and that parameter of what does this look 

like, moving forward, in terms of meetings, who is going to be negotiating—future Chairman and President Trump negotiations. 

Governor Richardson, what would—if you were sitting at the negotiating table what would success look like to you? And then I will 

ask the same question to Dr. Cha. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, success for me would be a commitment 

by North Korea to dismantle some—some of their weapons, missiles. I will not get into a number because they vary. WMD—some 

tangible dismantling. What else are remaining? 

Mr. BERA. Do you think that is realistic out of this particular 

summit as opposed to, I guess, success—what a framework—next 

negotiating steps would be? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. A freeze would be a mild success of existing 

testing, weapons, new development. But, in a way, North Korea 

has already done that, you know, so you want to move forward. 
34 

Establishing a liaison office is good for both sides. Dialogue—it 

would allow, for instance, our inspectors to have a chance. Our inspectors’ verification time lines—that is also a definition of success. 

More joint excavations of our remains. I think Dr. Cha mentioned 

eventually a discussion on human rights, religious freedom there. 

But I think that is more—— 

Mr. BERA. And since I am going to run out of time let me just— 

you know, some of us also think part of the reason why Chairman 

Kim is willing to sit at the table now is they have acquired their 

nuclear capabilities. They have acquired their missile capabilities, 

et cetera. 

So now they are not negotiating from a place of weakness. They 

are negotiating from a place where they have acquired some of 

those capabilities and that is certainly—let us go into this with our 

eyes wide open. 

Mr. CHA. So I would say that in terms of what would be success, 

you know, the key word is verifiability. Whatever the North Koreans give us, whether it is a couple of sites or whether it is a promise not to produce more fissile material, it has to be verifiable, 

right. 

And so they decommissioned some sites after the Singapore Summit, as Congressman Yoho said, but they did not allow anybody to 

verify it. And so that is really the key piece to me is to see whatever they have put on the table—how small or how large—it has 

to be verifiable. 

Chairman SHERMAN. I recognize the gentlelady from Missouri. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank—thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing 

this hearing and thank you to our witnesses for their time. 

Following up on my friend and colleague, Mr. Bera’s, line of 

questioning, Dr. Cha, U.S. special representative for North Korea, 

Stephen Biegun, who Governor Richardson has spoken so highly of, 

has noted that even as United States pursues a direct leader-toleader format for the current talks with North Korea, it is 

supplementing summit-level meetings with intensive working-level 

negotiations. 

Do you think this strategy will better ensure the U.S. walks 

away from Hanoi with some sort of acceptable deal, agreement? 

Mr. CHA. Congresswoman, I think what—certainly what was better in process with regard to this summit was that there was a lead 

up of intense, as you said—— 

Mrs. WAGNER. Right. 

Mr. CHA [continuing]. Working-level negotiations that Steve 

Biegun led. The first summit in Singapore, as you remember, was 

just an announcement that they were going to meet and there was 

no working-level effort. 

So those working-level meetings are important to help the outcome of the summit be successful. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Not just happening at the summit. Let us be 

clear, Dr. Cha. It has been in the lead-up to the summit—— 

Mr. CHA. Yes. 

Mrs. WAGNER [continuing]. In a very intensified way, from what 

I understand. Is that your understanding? 

Mr. CHA. Yes. Yes. And that is—that is the way it should be 

done. Yes. 
35 

Mrs. WAGNER. Great. Wonderful. 

Governor Richardson, you have spent decades working through 

formal and informal channels in North Korea to secure the release 

of American citizens held unjustly by the Kim regime. 

Informal exchanges like the relationships you have built over the 

last several years can be highly effective in promoting mutual understanding. How do your efforts support and intersect with official 

talks? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think you asked a question about Special 

Envoy Biegun. I think he is very effective. You know, the administration consults with me. They do not listen, though. 

[Laughter.] 

Mrs. WAGNER. They do not listen to me either. 

Chairman SHERMAN. They do not even talk to me. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. RICHARDSON. They do, sometimes. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I know. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. My point here, Congresswoman, is I think you 

need, yes, Presidential—the president. That is good. Personal relationships. But you need the staff work in preparation for that. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Right. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. And sometimes I wonder, because of the president’s style, that that does not happen as much as it should. I hope 

he is listening. I mean, we are going to find out in 2 days whether 

this summit is a success or not. He listens to Envoy Biegun, the 

Secretary Pompeo, you know, who has had to negotiate with the 

North Korean’s spy chief ever since the first summit or before the 

first summit. 

My worry is—and before, I think, you came in I said it is better 

to negotiate with the foreign ministry types in North Korea rather 

than the intelligence people because they are more flexible. 

We will see what happens in this next summit. We are kind of 

hanging on to—for the result. 

Mrs. WAGNER. But you would agree that both formal and informal lines—— 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Absolutely. 

Mrs. WAGNER [continuing]. Of communication are important, correct? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Absolutely. Absolutely. You know, on prisoner 

exchanges. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Right. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. On rescuing American servicemen, on remains—yes. I mean—— 

Mrs. WAGNER. We thank you for your leadership in that—— 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Thank you. 

Mrs. WAGNER [continuing]. In that regard. Russia and China appear to be weakening on sanctions enforcement, although U.S. negotiators are working to solidify support in advance of the Hanoi 

Summit. 

Dr. Cha, how worried should we be about Chinese and Russian 

compliance and how can the U.S. convince the international community to kind of hold the line? 

Mr. CHA. So it is—I think it is a real problem, Congresswoman. 

Any agreement we make with North Korea has to be enforceable, 
36 

and enforceability means also sanctioning if they violate the agreement, and China holds a lot of cards when it comes to sanctioning. 

I mean, I think the only—the only way to really compel China 

to do this is to be willing to secondary sanction—I mean, to go after 

Chinese companies that are willfully and knowingly violating U.S. 

law. That is the only way to—— 

Mrs. WAGNER. Well, you found that secondary sanctions can be 

very effective in that regard? 

Mr. CHA. I think—I think they can. They certainly spread the 

net of who is responsible when it comes to this. I mean, China is 

a U.N. Security Council member so they should be complying with 

the 11 U.N. Security Council resolutions with regard to North 

Korea on—particularly on trade. But they really have not been for 

about 15 months now. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Well, thank you. I think my time is about to expire so I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SHERMAN. Thank you. I will recognize myself at this 

point. As to denuclearization, I am not sure that we disagree as to 

what it means. I think we disagree as to when. 

All the signatories of the nonproliferation treaty including Russia 

and the United States are on record saying we look forward to 

eventually having no nuclear weapons in the world and I am confident that Pyongyang will denuclearize as soon as the United 

States and Russia do so. 

As to the change in the level of tension, 2015 and 2016 was not 

a period of particularly high blood pressure. We had a policy of 

strategic patience. It was not a good policy but at least it was not 

a policy fraught with tension. 

The tension was in 2017. It has declined since then. As to a minimal level of success, I think I mostly agree with the Governor. But 

I would say that if we had a verifiable halt to the creation of more 

fissile material that would mean we were safer. 

If all we have is a halt to testing, well, Kim has said he has done 

all the testing he needs. So a new test might not make us less safe 

since it would give him the information he already has or claims 

to already have, whereas, clearly, a halt to the creation of new 

fissile material, if verifiable, would make us safer. 

Dr. Cha, you talk about the importance of human rights. We, obviously, need to be bringing this up. It is very important to the 

North Koreans. One place where they could make a concession easily is to allow more family reunification visits, particularly for the 

100,000 Korean Americans who have family north of the 38th Parallel. 

Is there any reason why Kim would not make that concession 

other than he knows we want it so he would not want to give it 

to us? Any disadvantage to him to allowing such family reunifications with Korean Americans? 

Mr. CHA. No. I mean, I think, as you said, that there are still 

many divided families as a result of the Korean War. This could 

be a very useful humanitarian gesture. 

I say useful because, from the perspective of incentives, there is 

every reason for him to do it if he wants to have, you know, a more 

positive view of the—of himself in the broader—in the broader 

press. 
37 

But there still needs to be—there needs to be a raising of the 

human rights abuses, not just humanitarian issues. 

Chairman SHERMAN. Gotcha. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Congressman, could I just add to that? 

Chairman SHERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. What North Korea needs more than anything 

in terms of investments, it is not necessarily the United States. It 

is South Korea. And there is an effort by South Korea to possibly 

invest in the railway in North Korea, the Kaesong joint facility 

that was shut down. 

So my point is that North Korea will want to make strong family 

reunification. It is in their interests if they want this South Korean 

investment. I mean, it is called politics. It is something that you 

are all the experts. 

Chairman SHERMAN. Now, the North Koreans have a conventional military double the size of South Korea and yet they are 

pressuring us to remove some of our 28,000 troops while, of course, 

North Korea has almost a million, or to make those troops less effective by canceling exercises. 

I have been told that the long-term North Korean dream is you 

get America to withdraw its forces. This makes international business less interested in investing in South Korea. That leads to the 

kind of economic decline in South Korea that makes unification on 

their terms possible. 

Is there any—how do the North Koreans argue for a diminution 

of American forces in South Korea when they have such a powerful 

conventional military? 

Governor or Doctor? 

Mr. CHA. Well, I think it goes along with, and this goes back to 

the gap and denuclearization definitions—it goes back to the way 

the North Koreans define denuclearization. 

They define it as being—their willingness to do this will be—will 

happen when the United States is off the Peninsula and no longer 

has a security commitment to South Korea. That is when they consider real—the real concept of denuclearization. 

Chairman SHERMAN. It’s good politics in the United States to announce an end to the Korean War and sign the peace treaty. All 

Americans like peace treaties. This would not cause pressure on 

the United States to move its forces from South Korea. 

We have a—World War II is over with peace treaties in Europe 

and Japan and we had troops in Germany—we have troops in 

Japan. So the question is would a peace treaty with North Korea— 

it, obviously, is important to them—but it—would it create pressure in South Korea to expel American troops? 

Doctor or Governor? 

Mr. CHA. Quickly, I will just say that—yes. Quickly, I will just 

say that I think it would start to create a discussion about the utility of U.S. forces in Korea once a peace declaration of some sort 

was made, certainly, among the progressive camp in South Korea. 

Maybe less so among the conservative camp, but certainly among 

the progressive camp. 

Chairman SHERMAN. OK. And then, finally, Governor, what are 

the phony concessions that North Korea can make? Are there facilities that are no longer useful to them? Yongbyon, I guess, may 
38 

have outlived its usefulness. The nuclear weapons testing facility 

they destroyed some or all of because it outlived its usefulness. 

What are the things they can give up that sound important that 

are not important? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. You mentioned the two that are, I think, most 

obvious—the Yongbyon facility, this test site where they blew up 

I think the sides and they did not allow inspections or the press 

there. 

Those are what I would expect they will try to get away with. 

I just happen to think that if they continue to say, we are not going 

to have any testing—nuclear testing, missile testing—they have already done that. I want them to do a lot more. 

While I am not diminishing that but, this is something that they 

have done the last—it is now almost a year. Let them do more. 

Again, I agree with Dr. Cha. Verification is essential of what they 

do, and I am concerned with one concession that I sense we may 

be giving up and that is list all of your sites, your facilities, and 

inventory so this can be inspected and verified, and I sense that 

we are kind of—may lose that at this summit. 

Chairman SHERMAN. All the press reports are that we have given 

up on that, and that—and with that, I will recognize the gentleman 

from Michigan. 

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to you and the 

ranking member for the terrific witnesses here. I thank both of you 

for coming. Good to see you, Governor Richardson. 

Dr. Cha, I want to start with a question for you about human 

rights. The logic behind choosing Vietnam for this summit’s setting 

seems to be that if Kim sees firsthand Vietnam’s economic success 

he will want to mirror that success in North Korea. Or, put another way, he may see an incentive to denuclearize. 

One issue that seems to be missing from this calculus, though, 

is human rights. Human Rights Watch reported earlier this month 

that, and I am quoting, ‘‘Vietnam’s one-party state severely restricts fundamental civil and political rights and has stepped up its 

harsh crackdown on activists and dissidents.’’ 

Reports indicate that these crackdowns range from arbitrary arrests of activists to a lack of press freedom to a grossly unfair legal 

system. Amnesty International has documented more than a hundred prisoners of conscience who remain in prison at the risk of 

being tortured or ill-treated. 

So my question to you is, is there a risk that Kim will get the 

message that North Korea can indeed achieve what Vietnam has 

and that just like Vietnam he does not need to respect human 

rights to do it? 

Mr. CHA. Thanks, Congressman. It is a great question. 

I certainly hope that is not the message that he will get. I mean, 

if anything, I think what would be very useful would be for the 

North Korean leader to get a briefing about all the laws that now 

exist passed by this body with regard to not just proliferation but 

human rights abuses that will make it impossible for U.S. companies to do any sort of business in North Korea. 
39 

That could probably be the most important thing that could be 

told to him that would be incentive for him to try to address the 

human rights abuses in the country. 

Mr. LEVIN. I really need to study up on that because I have noticed a lot of U.S. companies doing a lot of business in countries 

with gross human rights violations over the years. Maybe we have 

done a better job more recently before I came to Congress. I think 

of not—this is not just about Korea or Asia, you know—in Latin 

America and Central America and all over the world, in Africa and 

so forth. 

You mentioned earlier, that the Trump administration has failed 

to appoint a special envoy for human rights in North Korea, which 

is a requirement set forth in the North Korea Human Rights Act 

of 2004. What impact do you think this vacancy has on the coordination of our larger North Korea policy? 

Mr. CHA. So as you mentioned, it is mandated by Congress. 

President Bush appointed the first Special Envoy for Human 

Rights, Jay Lefkowitz, and then President Obama appointed Bob 

King. 

I think the most important job—position—role that this position 

plays is a leadership role not just here in Washington but at the 

United Nations and, indeed, around the world with regard to getting the international community to focus on the human rights 

abuses in North Korea. 

One very quick example—last December the U.N. Security Council did not vote for raising U.N.—North Korean human rights in 

the Security Council agenda, which I think was a big defeat because they had done it previously. 

And there is another opportunity this spring, perhaps after the 

summit, but it requires U.S. leadership and if we do not have an 

envoy and if we do not have a U.N. Ambassador it is harder to do 

that. 

Mr. LEVIN. And do you think that this lack of appointing someone sends a signal to the international community about our commitment to human rights, more broadly? 

Mr. CHA. Well, I think that there are a number of people around 

town who have drawn a relationship between the absence of a 

human rights envoy and things that are happening in China—more 

crackdowns in China—the Uyghur camps in China. 

So the United States always has been a beacon for human rights 

and human freedom, and we should continue to do so. 

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you very much. I hope we do continue to do 

so and I fear that we are not being that beacon right now. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Chairman SHERMAN. Thank you. 

I recognize the gentlelady from Virginia. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you, Mr.—— 

Chairman SHERMAN. Oh, and I will point out we will do a second 

round, but we will adjourn by 12:20 at the very latest. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So, Dr. Cha, you have written extensively and, Governor Richardson and Dr. Cha, we have talked extensively today about 

undeclared North Korean missile operating bases that may not be 

included in denuclearization discussions. 
40 

News reports earlier this month described a U.N.—a confidential 

U.N. report that North Korea was engaging in what the intelligence community calls denial and deception techniques—deliberate efforts to hide their nuclear and ballistic weapons to prevent 

U.S. and others from discovering them. 

Dr. Cha, you spoke a bit as well about the idea that any agreements have to be verifiable. So my question is, given the denial and 

deception, how can we ensure that inspectors, given whatever 

agreement is made, are gaining access to all of North Korea’s 

weapons and facilities and operating bases and how can the U.S. 

negotiate an agreement that North—with North Korea that would 

actually account for any undeclared weaponsites, development facilities, or operating bases and ensure that we can verify whatever 

agreements are made? 

Mr. CHA. Well, it requires the president to raise it. I mean, this 

is—I think there are things that North Korea will be willing to put 

on the table in the discussions over the next 48 hours. But the key 

condition, I think, for our side to say that this is useful or successful would be conditions and protocols for verification. 

I mean, once they agree to verification we know how to do it. The 

International Atomic Energy Agency knows how to do it. There are 

people there who have known these North Korean sites for years 

from working on them in the past. 

But it requires the president to raise it and for the North Koreans to agree to it. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. As a former intelligence officer myself—I am a 

former CIA officer—I am particularly concerned about what appears to be a growing disconnect between our political and intelligence leaders and, in particular, the undermining of objective 

nonpartisan intelligence assessment. 

So following up on that notion of what is verifiable, allowing 

third-party organizations to determine what is in fact happening on 

the ground in North Korea and also listening to our intelligence 

community assessments based—about what is happening in North 

Korea. 

Do you have any thoughts about what we, as Members of Congress, can do to ensure that the White House is, in the first place, 

receiving, considering, and then evaluating the intelligence information and other information that is available and created to help 

inform U.S. policy engagement with North Korea? 

Mr. CHA. It is a great question and, again, given your experience 

in this area, you know a lot more than I do about this. I will just 

say that when we were doing the negotiations 10 years ago, the intelligence briefing that we had every morning was about the most 

important information that we could work from and without it, personally, I felt like we were just flying blind. 

This is the hardest intelligence target in the world. I think Governor Richardson would agree it is the hardest intelligence target 

in the world. But I think our IC—the intelligence community—has 

done a remarkable job trying to gain information not just about 

their capabilities but their intentions. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would just add, Congresswoman, what is critical is that you and this committee get the best briefings from our 

intelligence people. That is No. 1. 
41 

And I believe that what the NSA and CIA and DIA the—and I 

am concerned about this gap between the White House and our intelligence people. And, you know, we spent billions on intelligence—human assets, technological assets, and we should listen 

to them. 

But I think you, in your role of oversight, should insist on those 

briefings. What else would I suggest? You know, verification inspections are key. The North Koreans will object if we are the inspectors, I believe—we, the United States. 

We should insist on that. Perhaps the International Atomic Energy Agency—the IAEA, that is involved with the Iran deal in the 

past—well, it still is—that that may be part of the inspections regime. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you very much to the witnesses. 

And to the chair, I yield back. 

Chairman SHERMAN. Without objection, we will recognize a member of the full committee who is not a member of this subcommittee 

but the former chair of the subcommittee, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

I apologize, first of all. I was in Judiciary and unable to—but I 

definitely wanted to stop by. It is a very important topic and I will 

go back and review the questions with my colleagues and the answers later on. 

You know, I have to be very honest about this whole negotiations 

and meetings with Kim Jong-Un. He is somebody—he, being Kim 

Jong-Un, is somebody—if he is anything like this father and grandfather and, I think in this case, the apple does not fall too far from 

the tree, we have to be extremely leery of anything he says and, 

obviously, the president and the people that he has surrounded 

himself with, the number-one—the number-one thing that we have 

to be focused on is what is in best interests of the United States 

and our security—security of the American people. 

Now, diplomacy certainly is better than military confrontation 

and I think we were getting closer and closer to that. I think it was 

a game changer when we believe that they had either reached or 

were very close to having the ability to land a nuclear device on 

American soil. 

I think previous administrations maybe had somewhat of a luxury in that we could continue to try to get North Koreans to back 

off their nuclear program and we could negotiate on occasion and 

we saw that when we had—when we would get together with them 

and, in general, we would provide food and energy resources and 

in return they would promise that they were going to back off their 

program or discontinue it or close down facilities and we would 

continue underground full speed ahead. 

Maybe not full speed ahead but they would continue the programs, maybe not quite as quickly as they would have if they had 

not agreed but they moved forward nonetheless. 

So I am concerned that that behavior will be repeated here. That 

being said, I hope and pray that the president is successful and 

that he really will be able to get some behavior changed in Kim 

Jong-Un. We cannot predict the future but I think we all are hoping that that is where we get. 
42 

So I guess my question then, after rambling on there for a couple 

of minutes, is should we be—should we be in a, like President 

Reagan said—he said, obviously, when negotiating with the Soviet 

Union, trust but verify? 

Is this a—should we be distrust but verify, but hopefully—I will, 

for example, as somewhat of a—well, not somewhat—quite skeptical, will I—am I likely to be surprised and there really is a possibility here that we will have peace on the Peninsula and they will 

denuclearize? 

So I would be happy to open it up to either Bill or the other gentleman here. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Congressman—Mr. Chairman—— 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you for your years of service here, too. We— 

a lot of us, especially those that have been around the block, it was 

an—it was an honor to call you a colleague and you have done 

great and done wonderful things for our country all over the globe. 

So thank you for that. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, my answer is I was going to commend 

you for your very hopeful and positive statement. I believe we need 

to continue these negotiations, even if this next summit does not 

appear to bear many results. I am concerned about that. 

But this is the most—this is the tensest region in the world right 

now, I believe, with nuclear weapons, with missiles, with our allies, 

with our troops—28,000 in South Korea, 30,000 in Japan. 

I think we need to keep talking and dialog, even if we do not get 

the results we want at this summit, needs to continue and regardless of what administration is in power. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Sir? 

Mr. CHA. I am—yes, I am uncertain, as you are, Congressman, 

of whether we can get to full denuclearization. But I do know that 

any steps we take along those paths cannot simply be promises 

that are made without verification because it makes no sense if 

nothing can be verified. 

And in the end, if we take steps along those lines then we are 

moving in a positive direction. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Thank you very much. I appreciate 

that, and I want to thank the chair and the ranking member for 

allowing me to participate. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman SHERMAN. Thank you. 

One thing about sanctions is that if you are dealing with a democracy you have a little bit of sanctions. You say depress income 

in the country by 10 percent—that is a big deal. 

It is not a big deal to Kim whether his people are 10 percent 

richer or 10 percent poorer, and so the problem with partially relaxing sanctions is that you certainly do not have regime-threatening sanctions if you go from what I think are the inadequate 

sanctions we have now to something even less. 

My first question is about the train. Kim flew to Switzerland 

when he was a student. He flew to Singapore last year. He is on 

a train through China. Why? 
43 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, first, the maintenance record of North 

Korean aircraft is not the best. That is why. Second, you know, this 

has been a tradition in his family—— 

Chairman SHERMAN. Yes. I mean, his father used to go to Beijing 

on an armored train. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. He would go to China, Russia, by train. I have 

seen that train. You should to go see it. It is in a museum in 

Pyongyang. Well, they move it in and out. 

But, last, I think it is mainly a security issue and, symbolically, 

I think Kim Jong-Un was trying to show that he went through and 

he needs China. So he was giving visibility to China, and I think 

going to Vietnam is a signal that North Korea wants to do business 

outside of China with Vietnam. 

Chairman SHERMAN. We have this image that Kim is in total 

power. Yet, I study dictators and none of them are in total power. 

If he was in total power he could do whatever he thought was in 

the long-term interests of his dynasty. 

What restraints are there? What red lines cannot he cross? What 

people in Pyongyang cannot he cross? What institutions? Or is he 

really that—the thing I have not been able to find in history and 

that is the total dictator? 

Mr. CHA. It is a great question, Congressman. It is a hard one 

to answer, I think. There was a view when he first started that because of his inexperience he needed to balance different factions in 

the party, the military, and, of course, the family. 

But he has since then gone on, as you know well, such a ruthless 

purging campaign that I think many experts saw his trip to—his 

first trip to China, first time out of the country, for as long as he 

was gone as a sign that he really had consolidated power. 

So I think there still is a degree of purging taking place but, you 

know, I think relative to when he started he seems to be in about 

as secure a position as we could have imagined, you know, 6 years 

ago and he does seem to be calling the shots. 

Chairman SHERMAN. If—and this would be my wildest fantasy— 

he just goes to Vietnam and gives up his nuclear program in return 

for getting the Apple headquarters and maybe Amazon as well 

move to Pyongyang—whatever it took—if he were to do that, and 

none of us expect it, what repercussions would he have at home or 

can he just go back and say, hey, it is time to be Silicon Valley? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. He has total control in North Korea. I think he 

is more secure than ever before. His main objective, Congressman—Mr. Chairman—is—his main objective is to stay in power, 

more so than detente with the United States or—stay in power and 

I think a source of that is keeping his nuclear weapons or some of 

his nuclear weapons. 

I think what you suggested may be a little wishful thinking that 

he will give it up. But he has said to his people, we have to improve our economy and, in a way, he said, you know, the only way 

we can do that perhaps is—they always want to deal with the 

United States. 

They would say to me, we should settle things. The U.S. and 

North Korea—not China, not Russia, not South Korea. We are the 

big guys around here. So I think that is why they are talking. 
44 

Chairman SHERMAN. I am going to make one more comment and 

that is the fact that Japan and Korea cannot cooperate is harmful 

to the United States’ national security and I recognize—I brought 

this home to both Korean and Japanese leaders recently—that they 

have a certain animosity from the first half of the 20th century. 

But Poland and Germany cooperate and that helps our national 

security, and if I had more time I would ask for—you could respond 

for the record as to if there is anything we can do to get these two 

countries to cooperate on that—on security matters. 

I am going to recognize the ranking member for a limited time 

and then I have to go, and I know the witness has to go as well. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you both, and I think the important thing is 

that we look forward where we are going. We cannot worry about 

what did not work in the past—I mean, we have to learn from 

that—but more forward looking. 

The thing that brought North Korea to the negotiating table— 

correct me if I am wrong—was the unanimous U.N. agreement resolution that I think 17 countries placed severe sanctions on North 

Korea. 

With people pretty much adhering to that—i.e., us, Russia, 

China, South Korea—that put enough pressure where they did 

come to the table. Since that point in time, we have seen Russia, 

China, even South Korea with a transfer of—it was either coal or 

petroleum that they said was a mistake—it did happen and they 

went after the people, you know, taking that on good faith. 

We have a report, and I do not have the U.N. report—it will be 

out later this year—that we have a report of over 148 ship-to-ship 

transfers from January to August. It was oil at sea. 

How detrimental is that to our negotiations and moving forward 

if they start normalizing and allow this to happen, and then, more 

importantly, what I would really like to hear from you your recommendations to us on this committee as a bipartisan group to 

where we can hold the administration or South Korea or China or 

Russia accountable so that we keep that maximum pressure on 

them until we get a clear blueprint of where we are going and then 

the verification. I wanted to ask you real quickly about that. But 

if you would answer those. 

Mr. CHA. So, first, to the chairman’s earlier point about trilateral 

coordination, for the record, it is absolutely necessary. We are 

stronger—the United States is stronger if we are lined up with our 

allies, Japan and Korea, for the record. 

Mr. YOHO. Sure. 

Mr. CHA. On the maximum pressure, diplomacy does not work 

without maximum pressure. The president’s efforts at diplomacy 

will not work without maximum pressure and that—and that 

speaks not just—as you said, not just to China but also to South 

Korea. 

And then the third point is there is a way—if we start to lift 

sanctions it will most likely be through South Korea—South Korea 

reopening Kaesong Industrial Complex with the North. 

I think where human rights matters there is we can require the 

South Koreans to ensure that they can pay the North Korean workers directly in Kaesong, which would address the human rights 

issue and address the desire for—— 
45 

Mr. YOHO. You know, that came up today in our meeting I had. 

How can you pay them directly? I mean, is Kim Jong-Un going to 

allow that to happen? I mean, that would have to go through him 

and he would have to OK that. 

Mr. CHA. Right. Right. Yes. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO. If that happens, that would be—I mean, that would 

be a huge concession on his part, I would think, to allow people to 

actually earn—keep what they earn and put in the labor. 

Mr. CHA. Right. And it would be—for our policy it would be a 

huge success if that could happen. 

Mr. YOHO. That would be a huge success. 

Governor, do you have any thoughts? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Congressman, my sense is that Russia is not 

observing sanctions. There is massive violations that—— 

Mr. YOHO. Oh, terrible. 

Mr. RICHARDSON [continuing]. The site of the border there, the 

port. Victor, what is the name of that port where the—China has— 

Russia has a short border. 

Mr. YOHO. Yes. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. So—— 

Mr. YOHO. I know where you are talking. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Russia needs to get tougher and they are not 

doing it. I think these U.N. sanctions were the strongest that we 

have ever had. A lot of it has been working and it is essential that 

China continue the sanctions. 

But the cross-border contraband, the verification—— 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. RICHARDSON [continuing]. There is key. I always found that 

the most effective sanctions, and I think this was in the Bush Administration on North Korea, were banking sanctions on their 

banks and how—I think there is some of that left. 

But the sanctions that have, I think, bitten—that bite the most 

have been the coal, the uranium, the oil sanctions that are imposed 

now by the U.N. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. But, yet, China and Russia are cheating and 

so what we wanted to do is go after the bigger banks, the bank of— 

the construction bank, their agriculture bank—the big ones. That 

would really hurt China. 

And so we are going to followup on our letter to the Treasury Department through this administration, and I guess we are at a 

point to demand why are these not taking place. Because if we put 

that pressure on China and Russia they will come to the table and 

I see China as just—they are insecure because they fear North 

Korea becoming more like South Korea. 

But, yet, if they look at the world overall, we are their largest 

trading partner and they are going to benefit hugely from this. But 

they are intimidated by success, I guess, of an open society. 

And then you brought up, and I agree with you, what would— 

the inspectors. I do not think they need to be U.S. inspectors. They 

just need to be verifiable inspectors that we have the faith in that 

they carry this out. And you are in agreement with that, right? 

I am out of time. He has got to get to a meeting. Thank you both. 

Chairman SHERMAN. I want to thank our witnesses and my colleagues, and I look forward to exploring this further. 
46 

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
47 

APPENDIX 

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation 

Brad Sherman (D-CA), Chairman 

February 26, 20'19 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation in 

Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website 

at www.foreignaffairs.house.gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday, February 26,2019 

10:15 a.m. 

On the Eve of the Summit: Options for U.S. Diplomacy on North Korea 

The Honorable Bill Richardson 

(Former Governor of New Mexico. US. Ambassador to the United 

Nations and Member of Congress) 

Dr. Victor Cha 

(Senior Adviser and Korea Chair, 

Centerfbr Strategic and International Studies) 

By Direction of the Chairman 
48 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMIITEE O~WI j!'\:\P f>Al..t:\=1<- t AN"Sl "-k>M<>Q-.1>\ I FFl!lATII>!.lHEARING 

Day Tuesday Date February 26, 2019 Room 2172 

Starling Time 10;15 AM Ending Time 12:18 PM 

Recesses __ L_to__) L_to __) L_to__) L_to __)L_to __) L_to _____) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Congressman Brad Sherman 

Check all oftilefollowillg tlrat apply: 

Open Session IZJ Executive W!Jsed) Session 0 Televised l..lJ 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Record!l!!.jtaped) IZJ 

Stenographic Record ILl 

011 the Eve of the Summit: Optio11sjor U.S. Diplomacy 011 North Korea 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

A«enda11ce form attached. 

NON-SUBCOMMIITEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with a11 • if they are not members of filii committee.) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [ZJ No 0 

(lf"no ",please list below 011d include till e. agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements sttbmilledfor the record.) 

See attached. 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE 10:15 AM 

or 

TIMEADJOURNED /2:18PM 
49 

Æ 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND NONPROLIFERATION COMMITTEE HEARING 

X Brad Sherman, CA 

X Gerald E. Connolly, VA 

X Ami Bera, CA 

X Dina Titus, NV 

X_ Andy Levin, Ml