[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 20

- 10577 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:18

- cv
- 24005

- DPG

MARK A. TURNER,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus HOMESTEAD POLICE DEPARTMENT, CHARTER SC HOOLS USA, INC., KEYS GATE CHARTER SCHOOL, CITY OF HOMESTEAD,

Defendants

- Appellees.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Souther n District of Florida

________________________ ( September 18, 2020 ) Case: 20-10577 Date Filed: 09/18/2020 Page: 1 of 112 Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: After h e was arrested for trespassing at his daughter’s school, Mark Turner
sued Keys Gate Charter School , Charter Schools USA, Inc. , the C ity of Homestead , and its police department for defamation, false arrest , false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment of a child, spoliation of evidence, breach of
contract, and a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983

. Turner appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Turner’s daughter was a n elementary student at Keys Gate Charter School in Homestead, Florida

. School policy required parents to use a drive

- thr ough area when picking up elementary students and prohibited “walk ups

. ” On September 6, 2016, Turner drove to school to get his daughter. He arrived fifteen minutes after
dismissal had started

. Turner approached a teacher and asked for his daughter

. The
teacher said Turner would have to wait fifteen more minutes. Turner instead walked
into the school

. A vice principal approached Turner , warned him that he was not
allowed inside , and call ed the police. An officer arrived and told Turner to bring the
issue to the principal ’s attention . Turner and his daughter left the school without
further incident.

Case: 20-10577 Date Filed: 09/18/2020 Page: 2 of 113 Over the next two weeks , Turner tried unsuccessfully to meet with the principal to discuss what happened on September 6

. On September 23, Turner
entered the school and requested a meeting with the principal. T he school’s director
of student service s brought Turner to a conference room. In the presence of O fficer
Ducksworth of the Homestead Police Department , the director handed Turner a written trespass notice barring him from the school because of what happened on September 6

. Turne r left the school with Officer Ducksworth

. He asked the officer to get his daughter , and Officer Ducksworth told Turner to wait outside

. F orty minutes
later , Turne r re entered the school to find the officer

. S eeing Turner inside the building , Officer Ducksworth arrested him. Turner was charged in state court with trespass on school grounds, but the charges were dropped before trial.
Turne r sued Keys Gate , Charter Schools USA, Inc., the C ity of Homestead , and the Homestead Police Department for defamation, false arrest , false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment of a child, spoliation of evidence, breach of contract , and a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for deprivation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

. The defendant s moved for summary judgment , which the district court grant ed

. The district court concluded that : (1) the police department and Charter Schools USA were not proper parties; ( 2 ) the city and Keys Gate were entitled to

Case: 20-10577 Date Filed: 09/18/2020 Page: 3 of 114 sovereign immunity on Turner’s state tort claims because he did not give them pre
suit notice; ( 3 ) t he city was not liable under section 19 83 because Turner admitted that the city did not have a policy or practice th at caused his arrest ; and ( 4 ) there was no dispute of fact that Keys Gate did not materially breach a contract it had with
Turner. Turner appeals the summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s summary judgment de novo, viewing the
evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party

. Essex Ins. Co. v. Barrett Moving & Storage, Inc. , 885 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2018)

. A district court should grant summary judgment only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
DISCUSSION
The Police Department a nd Charter Schools USA Were Not Proper Part ies
The district court concluded that (1) the police department was not a proper party because it could not be sued under Florida law , and (2) Charter Schools USA was not a proper party because it was a parent company, one of its subsidiaries was solely responsib le for managing Keys Gate , and there was no evidence to pierce the corporate veil in order to hold the parent company liable

. As to the police department, Turner argues that the district court erred because his complaint imputed

Case: 20-10577 Date Filed: 09/18/2020 Page: 4 of 115 liability to the city and therefore allowed him to sue its police department. As to Charter Schools USA, he argues that Keys Gate is a subsidiary of Charter Schools USA, which makes the parent company vicariously liable for the actions of the
school ’s employees. Turner is mistake n on both counts

. A s to the police department , its ability to sue or be sued is “ determined by the
law of the state in which the district court is held.” Dean v. Barber , 951 F.2d 1210,
1214 (11th Cir. 1992) ( quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3)). Florida law provides that police departments lack “the capacity to sue and be sued.” Fla. City Police Dep’t v.
Corcoran , 661 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. Because a police department is not an entity subject to suit, the district court did not err in granting the department ’s motion for summary judgment. As to Charter Schools USA, under Florida law a parent co mpany and its
subsidiaries “ are separate and distinct legal entities. ” See Am . Int ’l Grp

. v. Cornerstone Bus

. , 872 So. 2d 333, 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). A parent company is not liable for the wrongful actions of a subsidiary absent a showing that the corporate veil should be pierced. Peacock v. Gen

. Motors Acceptance Corp

. , 432
So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). A party seeking to pierce the cor porate veil must prove that “the subsidiary was a ‘mere instrumentality ’ of the parent” and that “the parent engaged in ‘improper conduct’ through its organization or use of the subsidiary.” Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc., v. FPL Grp

. , 162 F.3d 129 0, 1320

Case: 20-10577 Date Filed: 09/18/2020 Page: 5 of 116 (11th Cir. 1998) ( quoting Dania Jai

– Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes , 450 So. 2d 1114,
1117

– 21 (Fla. 1984)). Such improper conduct occurs only where the subsidiary is “a mere device or sham to accomplish some ulterior purpose” or “ where the purpose
is t o evade some statute or to accomplish some fraud or illegal purpose.” Id. (quoting
Dania , 450 So. 2d at 1117).
There was no dispute that Charter Schools USA did not supervise Keys Gate
or its staff. Rather , Charter Schools USA at Keys Gate, LLC was responsible for operating the school

. Keys Gate, LLC was exclusively responsible for hiring, employing, and managing the school employees at issue. T urner presented no summary judgment evidence that the subsidiary was a “mere instrumentality” of
Charter Schools USA

. And there was no evidence that Charter Schools USA used
its subsidiary for an improper or fraudulent purpose. Thus, there was no basis to hold Charter Schools USA liable for the actions of school staff that its subsidiary employed and supervised , s ee Dania , 450 So. 2d at 1117 , and the district court did not err in granting Charter Schools USA ’s motion for summary judgment

. 1 The City a nd Keys Gate Did Not Get Pre

- Suit Notice of Turner’s Tort Claims
The district court concluded that the city and Keys Gate were entitled to sovereign immunity on Turner’s state tort claims because he did not give them or

1 W e do not address the district court’s other reasons for granting summary judgment in favor of the police department and Charter Schools USA : (1) both defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity ; and (2) Turner’s claims against them fail ed on the merits as a matter of law.

Case: 20-10577 Date Filed: 09/18/2020 Page: 6 of 117 the Florida Department of Financial Services pre

- suit notice of his claims, and the
time to do so had elapsed

. Turner argues that the dist rict court erred because he gave
both defendants adequate pre
- suit notice

. A sovereign cannot be sued without its own permission , Am. Home Assur ance Co. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 908 So. 2d 459, 471 (Fla. 2005) , and Florida has
enacted a limited waiver of its sovereign immunity for tort liability , Fla. Stat

. § 768.28(1)

. T o invoke this waiver, a plaintiff must provide a state agency or
subdivision with written notice of a claim before filing suit: An action may not be instituted on a claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions unless the claimant presents the claim in writing to the appropriate agency, and also, except as to any claim against a municipality, county, or the Florida Space Authority, pre sents such claim in writing to the Department of Financial Services, within 3 years after such claim accrues and the Department of Financial Services or the appropriate agency denies the claim in writing . . . .
Fla. Stat

. § 768.28(6)(a)

. Florida courts strictly construe any waiver of sovereign immunity , s ee Manatee Cnty

. v. Town of Longboat Key , 365 So. 2d 143, 147 (Fla. 1978) , and

s ection 768.28 (6)(a) is no exception , s e e Levine v. Dade C n ty. Sch. Bd. , 442 So. 2d 210, 212

– 13 (Fla. 1983)

. A valid pre
- suit notice must reasonably put the agency or subdivision on notice of a claim, which includes “ a demand for compensation for an injury. ” Smart v. Monge , 667 So. 2d 957, 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. A letter describing an incident involving the agency or subdivision is not enough. Id.

Case: 20-10577 Date Filed: 09/18/2020 Page: 7 of 118 Turner did not provide the city with pre
- suit notice of his claim s
. Although
he sent multiple letters to its police department, they failed to satisfy section
768.28 (6)(a)

. On September 26, 2016 , Turner sent a complaint to the department , which discussed his pending criminal case , accused Officer Ducksworth of misconduct, and requested that the department obtain video evidence from Keys
Gate

. It did not threaten a civil suit or demand compensation. In early 2017, Turner

sent two more complaints to the department. The first focused on the actions of Keys Gate employees on September 6

. The second addressed Officer Ducksworth’s
behavior on September 23

. Once again, these complaint s did not threaten suit or
demand compensation. Because Turner did not comply with section 768.28(6)(a),
and the three

- year window to give notice has closed, the city was entitled to sovereign immunity on his state tort claims. See id. We reach the same result as to Keys Gate. “ All charter schools in Florida are public schools ” and “ part of the state ’ s program of public education .” Fla. Stat

. § 1002.33(1). “ [F] or purposes of tort liability, the charter school

. . . [is] governed by [section] 768.28. ” Id. § 1002.33(12)(h). Turner therefore had to provide valid
pre
- suit notice to Keys Gate , but h e failed to do so. In 2017 , Turner sent a notice
letter to Charter School s USA’s insurance company in Pennsylvania , enclosing a draft complaint. This letter was not sent to Key s Gate, nor was it sent to the Department of Financial Services in Tallahassee

. Turner therefore did not satisfy

Case: 20-10577 Date Filed: 09/18/2020 Page: 8 of 119 the strict requirements of section 768.2 8(6)(a) , and the time to do so has passed

. See
Menendez v. N

. Broward Hosp. Dist. , 537 So. 2d 89 , 90

– 91 (Fla. 1988 ) ( even directly noticing a state agency of a claim is insufficient pre

- suit notice if the department is not also noticed ). Keys Gate therefore did not waive its sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment as to Turner’s state tort claims against the city and Key s Gate

. 2 There Was No Evidence of Municipal Liability Under Sec tion 1983 Turner argues that Officer Ducksworth maliciously arrested him without probable cause while acting under color of state law , in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. He argues that this gave rise to a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against the city. The district court disagreed

. S o do we. A municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for a constitutional violation committed by its officer. Hoefling v. City of Miami , 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 ( 11th Cir. 2016) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 693

- 94 (1978)). To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that the

2 Because we agree with the district court’s ruling on sovereign immunity , we do not address its other reasons for granting summary judgment in the city ’s and Keys Gate’s favor : ( 1 ) Turner’s false imprisonment claim fail ed because there was no dispute that he voluntarily entered the school conference room; (2) he lacked standing to bring his false imprisonment of a minor claim, and submitted no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude th at his daughter’s alleged restrain t was unreasonable; (3) his false arrest and malicious prosecution claim s failed because the undisputed facts established that Officer Ducksworth had probable cause to arrest him; (4) there was no independent cause of acti on for first

- party spoliation of evidence under Florida law; and (5) Turner’s defamation claim failed because he offered no evidence that the school employees had acted with the primary purpose of harming his reputation.

Case: 20-10577 Date Filed: 09/18/2020 Page: 9 of 1110 officer’s action “alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy, statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the body’s officers.” Monell , 436 U.S. at 690

. Typically, “[p]roof of a single
incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under
Monell , unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle , 471 U.S. 808, 823

– 24 (1985).
Turner did not allege that Officer Ducksworth’s actions were the result of a municipal policy or custom

. He admitted in deposition that he was unaware of the poli ce department’s arrest policies and could not take issue with them

. And Turner
admitted that he was unaware of other incidents involvin g the department and similar
facts. Because Turner has not alleged or shown that a municipal policy or practice
resulted in his arrest, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on
this claim. Keys Gate Did Not Materially Breach a Contract
Turner ’s final claim was that he signed a “ parent contract ” with Key s Gate,

w hich required the school to follow the Florida Charter Educatio nal Foundation’s administrative policies

. He argues that these policies required the school’s principal
to hear his complaints

. Turner contends that Keys Gate ’s failure to conduct an administrative grievance hearing with the principal, the designated “parent

Case: 20-10577 Date Filed: 09/18/2020 Page: 10 of 1111 facilitato r, ” was a breach of the parent contract

. The district court granted summary judgment against Turner because he failed to establish a material breach of the

contract

. We agree. Under Florida law, a state agency is liable for the breach of a contract that is express, written, and statutorily authorized. Pan

- Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep’t of
Corrs

. , 471 So. 2d 4, 5

– 6 (Fla. 1984). As in any breach of contract claim , the plaintiff must establish “a material breach of that contract” and resulti ng damages. Vega v. T

- Mobile USA, Inc. , 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Friedman
v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. , 985 So. 2d 56, 58 ( Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).
Even if a contract existed between Turner and the school , he has failed to show that Keys Gate materially breached it. The school’s policy handbook and i ts website
both required a n aggrieved parent to meet with “school administration.” Although Keys Gate’s website identifie d the principal as the “parent facilitator,” none of its policies required the principal or parent facilitator to resolve a complaint. Thus, Keys Gate did not materially breach the contract when the school’s director of student
services met with Turner to discu ss the September 6 incident

. We therefore affirm
the district court ’s order granting summary judgment on Turner’s breach of contract
claim.
AFFIRMED.

Case: 20-10577 Date Filed: 09/18/2020 Page: 11 of 11