[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10342

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

HUGO VALENCIA MENDOZA, 

a.k.a. Uriel Valencia Mendoza,

a.k.a. Yiyo, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00278-LMM-JSA-1

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Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Hugo Valencia Mendoza appeals his sentence of imprisonment for 210 months following his guilty plea for conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846, and aiding and abetting the 

possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mendoza 

contends the district court erred by applying a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D.1.1(b)(5) for his offense involving the importation of methamphetamine. He argues that the word “involved” in § 2D.1.1(b)(5) is unconstitutionally vague. After careful 

review, we affirm. 

The district court committed no error.1 Mendoza’s argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles v. 

United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). In Beckles, the Supreme Court 

1 We review constitutional challenges to a district judge’s use of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th 

Cir. 2015).

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21-10342 Opinion of the Court 3

held that the advisory Sentencing Guidelines cannot be challenged

as unconstitutionally vague. 137 S. Ct. at 892. The Supreme Court 

explained that the “void for vagueness” doctrine has been applied 

to two kinds of criminal laws: “laws that define criminal offenses 

and laws that fix the permissible sentences for criminal offenses.” 

Id. Because the Guidelines do neither, but rather serve as a nonbinding guide to aid judges in their sentencing, the vagueness doctrine does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. Further, the 

Supreme Court reasoned that the Guidelines do not interfere with 

the two policies that the void for vagueness doctrine protects—provision of notice and the avoidance of arbitrary enforcement. Id. at 

894. 

Mendoza’s attempt to distinguish Beckles fails. He contends 

that because of the vagueness of the word “involved” under 

U.S.S.G. § 2D.1.1(b)(5),2 district court judges across the country 

could apply the enhancement to anyone no matter how far down 

the chain of distribution. But in this specific case, it makes no difference how the district court applied the enhancement provision 

because Mendoza challenges only the vagueness of § 2D.1.1(b)(5), 

and the Supreme Court held that the advisory guidelines—

2 We previously declined to interpret the word “involved” narrowly and determined the language used by the Sentencing Guidelines supports a broader 

reading of the word “involved.” See United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 

779, 784 (11th Cir. 2007). 

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including § 2D.1.1(b)(5)—cannot be unconstitutionally vague in 

any case as a matter of law. See Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 894–95.

AFFIRMED. 

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