See Act of J une 2, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 198, art. 1, § 1.01(a) , 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws 611, 1 611 (cha ng ing na me from Te x as De partment of Prote ctive and Re g ulatory Service s). Appellant is r epre sented on appea l by counsel. At trial, appe llant r epre sented himself pr o s e 2 wi th s tand

by c ouns e l. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00298- CV

Ja m e s W e sle y Sc he xni de r , A ppe lla nt

v. Texas Depart m ent of Fam ily and P rote ctive Service s, Appellee 1

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF MILLS CO UNTY, 35TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 20-1 0-5 468, HO NORAB LE STEPH EN ELLIS, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Jame s We sle y

Sc he xnide r a

pp e a ls f ro m th e te rm inatio n o f h is p are nta l rig hts to h is child, B.W.S. Appellant’s rig hts were terminated ba sed on multiple gr ounds. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(D) , (E), ( Q) (West 2002). We af firm the orde r of ter

mination. 2
F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound Appellant has been incarce rate d for capital m urder since 1995; he is not elig ible for parole until 2027. (The particula r fac ts of the murder

will be discussed later

in the opinion.) AfterFour

children w ere the subject of this 1997 termination proc eeding in Matag orda County
. One, 3 B.F ., a g irl, was not appellant’ s child. The other three children w ere boy s. Eliz abeth Ashw orth, the ma te rn a l g re a t- a

un t, w a s n a me d th e mana g ing c on se rv a tor fo r B .F ., B .W. S., and

on e of his br oth e rs , J .M.S. Virg inia Eliz abeth Ashworth, second cousin to the children, was n am ed manag ing conser vator of the oldest boy , J .W.S . Appellant’s pa renta l rig hts were not terminated. The curr ent pr oc e e din g inv olv e s only B .W. S. Th e re c or d doe s not re fl e c t app e lla nt’ s sta tus wi th r e g ard

to h is rig hts to any

of the other

children. 2 appellant’ s incarc eration, B.W.S. l ived with his biologica l mother, appe llant’s wife. H er pa renta l rig hts w ere terminated pursuant to he r voluntary relinquishment of those rig hts. B.W.S. then lived with his materna l g reat a unt, E liz abeth Ashworth, his c ourt-appointed manag in g conser vator. 3 B .W. S. b e g an to de ve lop se ri ou s e mot ion a l and be havio ra l pr ob le ms. Al tho ug h B .W. S. wa s in counseling , the sug g estion was made that Child P rotec tive Service s (“CPS” or “the Depa rtment” ) could provide more services because it was be g inning to appe ar that B.W.S. mi g ht need twe nty -four

ho ur -a -d ay c are . Ac c or din g ly , a t As hw or th’ s ins tig a tio n, e me rg e nc y pr oc e e din g s w e re ini tiate d to have the Depa

rtment appointed a s temporar y manag ing conser

vator, with A shworth and Ashwor th’s mot h er, Opal Duhon, name d as possessory conser vators. (A shworth, Duhon, B .W.S ., B.F ., and J.M.S . li ve d to g e the r. ) A t th a t ti me , CPS did no t se e k to te rm inate a

pp e lla nt’ s p are nta l r ig hts
. During a series of permanenc y hear ings, B.W.S. was showing im proved be havior at his therape utic foster home . CPS ultimately moved to terminate a

ppellant’s rig hts beca

use a deter mination was made that B.W.S. mig ht be adoptable, based on his prog ress. The foster mother
wa s a me na

ble to a lon g -t e rm pla c e me nt a lth ou g h s he wa s n ot s ur e if sh e wo uld

be a ble fi na nc ia lly to adopt B.W.S. After a

bench tr ial at which he persona lly appea red, appellant’ s pare ntal rig hts were terminated. Appellant brings five issues on appea l, asking whether the trial cour

t had jurisdiction
over B.W.S. ( issue one); whether the evidenc e wa s leg ally or fa ctually

sufficie nt to support each of3

the thr e e g ro un ds of

te rm inatio n (i ssu e s tw o, thr e e , and fo ur ); and wh e the r t he e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly
or fa c tua lly suffi cie nt to s up po rt

the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ingthat te rm inatio n w a s in B .W. S.’ s b e st interest (issue f

ive).
Discussion Jurisd ic tio n Ov e r B. W. S. Ap pe lla nt c on te nd s that the Mil ls C ounty Di str ic t Co ur

t la c ke d ju

ri sd ic tio n b e c a

us e
a cour t of continui ng , exclusive jurisdiction exis ted i n Matag orda County and ther e wa s no evidenc e to show that B.W.S. ha d lived in Mills County for the ne cessa

ry six months to allow a transfe r of the
c a s e to M il ls Co unty
. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 155.201( b), 262.203(a )(2) (West 2002). B.W.S.’s mother’s par ental rig hts were terminated in Matag orda County and Ashworth appointed
mana g ing c on se rv a tor in the same pr oc e e din g . Ho we ve r, B .W. S. ha d liv e d wi th A sh wo rt h in Mil ls County fo r t hr e e y e ars be fo re the ini tiatio n o f t he e me rg e nc y

pr oc e e din g that ul tim a te ly re su lte d in termination. The r ecor d ref lects a tra nsfer to Mill s County
. Id . § 26 2.20 3(a) (2) . We ov e rr ule appellant’ s first issue.
Stan dard of Revie w for Term inati on

Texas courts have long r ecog nized that the natural rig ht e xisting betwee n a par ent and a child is one of c onstitut ional dimensions. Ex parte Gode ke , 355 S.W .2d 701, 702 n.1 (Tex. 1962). But the “rig hts of natura l pa rents are not a

bsolute; pr otection of the c hild is paramount . . . .” In re A.V. , 1 13 S .W. 3d

35 5, 36 1 ( Te x. 20 03 ). Te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts is a dr a sti c re me dy

a nd is of such weig ht a

nd g ravity that due proce ss r equire s the petitioner to justify termination by

clea r and4

c on vin c inge vid e nc e . T e x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 1 61 .2 06 (a) (W est Supp . 2 00 4- 05 ); In re J .F .C. , 96 S.W. 3d 25 6, 26 3 (T e x. 20 02 ). Th e c le ar and c on vin c ing sta nd ard c re a te s a

hig he r b ur de n to fu lf

ill be c a us e o f

t h e s e v e r i t y

an d p e r m an e n c y o f t e r m i n a t i n g t h e p ar e n t
- c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p . O na

p p e a l, the n , an a

p p e ll a te c o u rt mu s t a ls o h a v e a h ig h e r s ta n d ar d w h e n r e v ie w in g th e le g a l and fac tual sufficie ncy

of the e vidence
. Id . at 26 4- 65 ; In re C.H. , 89 S.W .3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). I nre v i ew i n g t h e l ega l s u ff i ci en cy o f t h e e v i d en ce t o s u

p p o rt a t er m i n at i o nfi n d i n g, this Court l ooks at all the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the f inding to dete rmine whe ther
a re asonable trier of

fac t co u l d h ave formed a firm belief

or convic tion that its finding was true
. J.F.C., 96 S.W .3d at 266. I n doing so, we pre sume that the fa ct-finde r settled disputed fa cts in favor
o f th e f in d in g if a r e a s o n a

b le f a c t- f in d er c ould do so. Id . A nd we dis re g ard

a ll e vid e nc e that a
rea sonable fa ct-finde r could have disbelieve d or found incr edible. Id
.

When review i n g t h e factual sufficie ncy of the e vidence supporting a termination finding , we inquire as to whethe r all the e vidence , both in support of and contra ry to the trial court’ s fi nd ing , is su c h that a

fa c t- fi nd e r c ou ld r e a so na bly fo rm a fi rm be lie f o r c on vic tio n a

bo ut t he tr uth of the a lleg ations. C.H. , 89 S.W .3d at 27-29. F urther, w e consider whethe r the disputed evide nce is s uc h th a t a

re a so na ble fa c t- fi nd e r c ou ld n ot h a ve re c on c ile d that dis pu te d e vid e nc e in f a vo r o f i ts finding
. J .F .C. , 96 S.W. 3d

a t 26 6. I f t

he dis pu te d e vid e nc e is s o s ig nif ic ant t hat a fa c t- fi nd e r c ou ld
no t r e a so na

bly have fo rm e d a

fi rm be lie f o r c on vic tio n, the n th e e vid e nc e is fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt. Id
. Section 1 6 1
. 0 0 1 of the Te x as F amily Code permits a c ourt to order termination of pare ntal rig hts if two eleme n t s ar e es t ab l ished. First, the pa rent must have e ng ag ed in any one of5

the ac ts or omissions itemiz ed in the first subsec tion of the statute. Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.001(1). Sec ond, termination of the relationship must be in the best interest of the child. Id
. § 1 61 .0 01 (2 ). We t

ur n n owto t

he g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatin g a pp e lla nt’ s p are nta l r ig hts
. Subs e c tio n Q On e ba sis on wh ic h the c ourt may or de r te rm inatio n is tha t the pa re nt h a s “ kn ow ing ly eng ag ed in cr iminal conduct that re sults in t he par ent’s imprisonment an d i n ability to car e for

the child for not less than two y ear s from the date of filing the pe t i t i o n . ” T ex . Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.001(1)( Q). I n his second issue, appe llant contends that he pr oduced e vidence of his mother’s de sir e and wi lli ng ne ss t o c are fo r B .W. S. A c c or din g ly , h e ur g e s, the De pa rtme nt f a ile d to pr ov e thi s g round by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. I ncar cer ation alone doe s not just i fy t er m ination. Texas De p’t of Human Serv

s. v. Boyd , 7 27 S.W. 2d

53 1, 53 3 ( Te x. 19 87 ); In re Cab all e ro , 5 3 S. W.3 d 3 91 , 3 95 (T e x. Ap p. —A mari llo 2001, pet. denied)
. Acc ording ly , the “ca re” contemplated by subsection Q enc ompasses ar rang ing for c are to be provided by another
. C

ab all e ro , 53 S.W .3d at 396. Once the Depa rtment has established the f

irst pr ong of subsection Q, the pare nt must produce some evidenc e as to how he or she would provide or

arr ang e to provide c are for the ch i l d d u ri n g the per iod of incar cer ation. Id
. at 396. When that burden of production i s met, the Department t hen has the burden of per suasion that the ar rang ement would fa il to satisfy the par ent’s duty

to the child. Id
. Ap pe lla nt’ s pr op os e d arr ang e me nt fo r B .W. S.’ s c are wa s to h a ve him liv e wi th R os a Hawe s, appellant’s mother . Appellant refer red to his mother as having only one fe lony

conviction. Th a t f e lony c on vic tio n w a s f

or a idi ngand

a be tti ng a pp e lla nt i n d isp os ingof

the bo dy of the vic timHawe s was unable to trave l to the trial beca use of rec ent surg ery an d an x i et y about the trip. 4 The re cord shows a

deposition on written questions in which Ha wes stated that she wante d to car e fo r B .W. S. I n response to a g ener al inquiry about other possible relative placements, Knutson not ed that 5 the only other potential relative place ment would involve B.W.S. living next door to a re g istered se x offe nder, his older

brother w ho had bee n convicted a s a juvenile of inde cenc y with a cousin. Knutson s a i d t h a ts u c h a

p l a c e m e n tw a s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y. 6 of the mur de r t

hat led to a pp e lla nt’ s in c arc e ra

tio n. Hi s mo the r a lso ha d r e c e ntl y marr ie d a n inma te that she m et while visiting a ppellant. She had medic al problems, amongthem rec ent foot surg ery and anxiety attacks when driving out side her own small town (Ora ng e, Tex as) that could interfer e
w i t h B
. W
. S
. r e c e i v i n g t h e r a p y i f a n e e d ar o s e f o r tr a v e l t o a

l ar g e r c i t y f o r t h a tt h e r a p y. 4 B e tti na Kn uts on , th e CPS su

pe rv iso r f or the c a se , tes tif

ie d tha t on e fe lony

wo uld ru le out placeme nt with th at famil y member. K eri F arr ell, B.W.S.’s CASA volunteer, also expressed
c on c e rn a bo ut p la c e me nt w itha

c on vic te d f

e lon and wi th H awe s’ s a

nxie ty a tta c ks a s a

po ssi ble i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t r an s p o rt a t i o nt o t h e r a p y. Ashworth testified that B .W.S .’s biologic al mother onc e took the childre n and stay ed with Hawe s and would not retur n the childre n. When Ashworth finally retrie ved the children, the y
we re hu ngry and dir

ty . H awe s th re a te ne d to kil l A sh wo rt h. Af te r t hat e pis od e , B .W. S. b e g a n to
manif e st m or e se ve re e mot ion a l and be havio ra l pr ob le ms. 5 After revie wing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the finding , we c onclude that a rea sonable trier of fac t c ould have f ormed a firm belief

or convic tion that appellant’s propose d
ar r an g e me n t to c ar e f

o r B
. W. S. w a s in a d e qu a te
. See J.F .C. , 96 S.W .3d at 266. Fur ther, a revie wThe appellate court’s opinion s h o u ld a d dr e s s e v e r y is s u e r a is e d an d n e cessa ry to the final 6 dispositi on of t he appeal while being “as brief as prac ticable.” Tex. R. App. P . 47.1. “I f the issues are se ttl e d, the c ourt

sh ou ld w ri te a br ie f me mor and um o pin ion

no lon g e r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry to a dv ise the parties of the court’s decision and the basic rea sons f or it.” Id . 47.4. Acc ording ly , we ne ed not rea ch appe llant’s third and four th issues c o n ce rn i n g alternative g rounds for te rmination as our sustaining one g round under section 16 1
. 0 0 1 i s all that is nece ssary to the first prongof the te rm inatio n a

na ly sis
. 7 of the e vidence in support of an d co n t rary to the trial court’ s finding le ads us to conclude that the fac t-finder could rea sonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the alleg ations. No disputed evidenc e wa s so significa nt that a fact-finde r could not rea sonably have f ormed a firm belief or convic tion as to the i nadequa cy of appellant’s arr ang ements for B.W.S. W e over rule a ppellant’s second issue. A cour

t may order termination if two eleme nts are e stablished: the pare nt has
e n g a g e d i nan y one of the acts or omissions itemiz ed in the first subsection of the statute, see T e x. Fam. Code
. Ann. § 161.001(1), and termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. § 161.001(2). Having upheld one of the g rounds for te rmination, we now turn to a n analy sis of the best intere st of the child. 6
B.W .S. ’s Be st I nte re st A strong presumption exis ts that the best interest of the child is serve d by maintaining the par ent-c hild relationship. In re G.M

. , 5 96 S.W. 2d

84 6, 84 7 ( Te x. 19 80 ). I n d e te rm ini ngthe be st interest of the child, a number of fa ctors may

be conside red, inc luding the f ollowing: (1) the desire s of the c hild; (2) the prese nt a nd future phy sical and emotional nee ds of the child; (3) the prese nt and future emotional and phy sical dange r t o the child; (4) the pare nting a biliti es of the pe rson see king8

custody ; (5) prog rams ava ilable to assist tho s e p er sons in promoting the be st interest of the c hild; (6 ) p lans fo r t

he c hil d b y

tho se ind ivi du a ls or by the a g e nc y se e kin g c us tod y ; ( 7) sta bil ity of the ho me or propose d place ment; (8) the pa rent’ s ac t s or omissions which may indicate that the e x isting pa re nt- c hil d r e la tio ns hip is n ot a pr op e r o ne ; and

(9 ) any e xcu se fo r the pa re nt’ s a c ts o r o mis sio ns . Holley v . Adams , 544 S.W .2d 367, 371-72 (Te x . 1976).

Th e a bs e nc e of e vid e nc e a

bo ut som e of the se c on sid e ra tio ns wi ll not pr e c lud e a

fa c tfi nd e r f ro m r e a so na

bly fo rm ing a str on g c on vic tio n or be lie f that te rm inatio n is in t he c hil d’ s b e st interest. C.H. , 89 S.W .3d at 27. B ut the exis tence of sca nt evidence as to ea ch Holley fa c tor wi ll not support such a finding
. Id . I n a ter mination suit , our sole focus is the best interest of the child, not the pare nt. D. O. v. T exas Dep ’t

of H um an Se rv

s. , 8 51 S.W. 2d

35 1, 35 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 1993, no writ). T h e r e c o r d r e f le c ts s o me e v id e n c e o n a ll of the Ho l ley fa ct o rs . T h e t ri al j u d ge inte rv ie we d B .W. S. i n c hambe rs . B .W. S. e xpre sse d a de sir e to h a ve his fa

the r’ s p are nta l r ig hts te rm inate d a

nd a pr e fe re nc e to s tay

in his fo ste r hom e . H e e xpre sse d a ng e r at hi s f

a the r f or the c ri me his father committed. Howeve r, he w as not ag ainst contac t by letter. There was e vidence conce rning B.W.S.’s prese nt and future phy sical and e motional needs. D r. Richar d Connell, Ph.D., a p sy cholog ist, diagnose d B.W.S. as suffe ring from attention defici t h y pera ctivity

disorder a

nd posttraumatic stress disorde r. He noted that B .W.S . neede d place ment i n a hig hly

structure d and close ly

supervised r esidential setting , such as a residential treatment fac ility

or thera peutic foster

home. He was on psy chotropic me dication and would ne ed ong oing c ounseling . J ames Calloway , a licensed profe ssional c ounselor, noted that in the last three9

or four sessions leading up to the trial, B.W.S.’s behavior had re g resse d somewhat; re ading a long letter from his f

ather to B .W.S
. upset him. B.W.S. w as ang ry at his f ather
. J ay Paul Roy , a license d profe ssional couns el o r, testified that B .W.S . suffe red f rom post-traumatic stre ss disorder. He expressed ang er at his father, not sadne ss at being separ ated f rom him. There was testimony that he was doing well in the thera peutic foster home. Ashley , Knutson, Fe rre l, and Calloway all testified
e xpre ssl y that th e y tho ug ht t e rm inatio n w a s in B .W. S.’ s b e st i nte re st. To evaluate the elements of pr esent a nd future e motional and phy sical dang er to the
c hil d, the pa

re nt’ s a c ts or omi ssi on s wh ic h ma y ind ic a te that th e e xistin g pa re nt- c hil d r e la tio ns hip is not a proper one, and any excuse for the pare nt’s acts or omissions , we must c onsider the evidenc e surrounding the murder

and appe llant’s acc ount of t hat event. I n short, the evidence discusse d below shows appellant c onsistently tried to minimi ze the offe nse and discounted a ny possible impact on B .W. S. Appellant chara ct er ized hims elf a s having a “c lean” criminal re cord e x cept f or the
one offe nse that led to his conviction. Howeve r, appe llant also descr ibed himself as having be en a “runne r” f or a ma jor drugcar

tel, which mos t people would reg ard as criminal beha vior. He te stified that he wa s approa ched by the FB Iand asked to be a witness ag ainst the car tel. He say s he did so, but c laimed that law enfor ceme nt the n ref used to put him in a witness protection prog ram, lea ving him vulnerable to re taliation. King, the p er s o n h e k illed, was a dr ug deale r who ofte n visited neig hbors ac ross the s tree t from appellant’s m obile home in Vidor. Appe llant would buy drug s from King at a dis co u n t an d then re sell them for a profit, but profe ssed that he wa s not a drugdeale r b e c a u s e h e o n l y s o l d

dr u g s o c c a s i o n a l l y w h e nh e n e e d e d m o n e y.Appellant wa s diag nosed as a para noid schizophrenic when he first enter ed prison. He said that 7 he had boug ht drug s from King on the day of the murde r. 10 On the nig ht of the murder, King asked appellant if he wanted to g o for a ride. Af ter
a while, appellant beca

me suspicious that K ing was taking him to meet some members of the c arte l who would kill him. Appellant pulled a g un on King and made him turn the car around to re turn 7 ho me . E ve ntu a lly , t hey arriv e d at th e mob ile ho me , s tr ug g le d, and

a pp e lla nt s ho t K ing . T he n, in an excess of caution to ensure that King was de ad, appe llant slit his throat. Appellant moved King ’s body under his mobile home, then f led. He returne d five day s later, dismembered the body with a
s aw , an d h e an d h i s m o t h e r

dr o v e t o L o u i s i an a

t o d i s p o s e o f

t h e b o dy. Ap pe lla nt c on sis te ntl y tr ie d to min imi ze the mur de r a s o ne inc ide nt t hat ha pp e ne d in the distant pa st. Howeve r, the murder occur red ag ainst a bac kg round of a ppellant’s admitted drug use and dr ug sales, which w ere occur ring in close prox imity to his family ’s residence. He lef t King’ s body under the mobile home wher e his wife a nd ch i l d ren lived; a place wher e it could have been discovere d by

family members. Testimony

about whethe r B .W.S . had see n any of these e vents was mix ed. B.W.S
. said he did not reme mber seeing any thing. Howeve r, i n Ashworth’s initial repor t t o CPS asking for he lp with B.W.S., she stated that she believe d that the childre n witnessed the murder a n d th a t B
. W. S. h a d f

o u n d b o dy p arts u n d e r th e tr a il e r . I n s p it e o f mu c h te s ti mo n y to the contra ry , appellant wa s fix ated on the idea that all of B .W.S .’s problems we re be cause his “daddy couldn’t hug him.” Appellant testified that B .W.S .’s behavioral problems we re not due to any thing appellant did but to their conta ct beinglimit ed.I t ma y well have been in a

ppellant’s bes t i n t er es t t o co n t i n u e t o h av e l i m ited acc ess to the 8 children but the e vidence is leg ally and fa ctually sufficie nt to support the trial court’s de cision that it w a s in the c hil dr e n’ s bes t inte re st to ter min a te a pp e lla nt’ s par e nta l rig hts in or de r to m a ke po ssi ble their future adoption.” Sp ur loc k v . Te x as De p’ t of Pr ote c tiv e & Re

gu lator ySe rv s. , 904 S.W .2d 152, 1 5 9 (T ex . Ap p . —

Au s t i n1 9 9 5 ) ( ci t i n g In re D.O

. , 851 S.W .2d 351, 358 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, no writ)), rev’d in part on other grounds , In re C.H. , 89 S.W .3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002) (standa rd of appellate revie w). 11

Appell an t said he did not object to CPS being named a s B.W.S.’s manag ing
c on se rv a tor , bu t of

fe re d no re a l r e a so n th a t le a vin g his pa re nta l r ig hts int a c t in

ur e d to the c hil d’ s b e st interest. Knutson, the CPS supervisor, testified that CPS did not allow prison vi sits. C alloway , one

8 of the the ra

pis ts, te sti fi e d that he did no t kn ow if it w ou ld b e ne fi t B .W. S. t o h a ve c on ta c t w ithhis fathe r; in f

a c t, h e tho ug ht i t mi g ht b e a c tiv e ly de tr ime nta l. I n r e sp on se to a

state me nt b y

a pp e lla nt, Ca llo wa y te sti fi e d th a t he ha d ne ve r sa id t hat B .W. S. w a s tr a

umatize d b y

se pa ra tio n f ro m H a we s. Al tho ug h o rd e re d n ot t o d o s o, a pp e lla nt m a de c on ta c t w ithB .W. S. d ur ingthe tr ia l pr oc e e din g s. Th e on ly “ e xcu se ” of

fe re d by a pp e lla nt fo r his c ri min a l be havio r wa s that he wa s in fe ar b e c a us e of his a lle g e d a c tiv iti e s a s an in fo rm ant a nd the law e nf

or c e me nt a

uth or iti e s’ fa ilure to pr ote c t hi m. A

pp e lla nt p ro du c e d n o c or

ro bo ratio n f

or his state me nts
. Th e tr ia l c ourt , a s th e fa c tfi nd e r, ha d th e ri g ht t o r e so lve c re dib ili ty iss ue s and

c on fl ic ts w it hi n th e e vid e nc e . I t ma y fr e e ly choose to be lieve all, par

t, or none of the testimony espoused by

any particula r witness. Ramo, Inc

. v . E ng lis h , 5 00 S.W. 2d

46 1, 46 7 ( Te x. 19 73 ); In re E.S.M

. , 5 5 0 S. W. 2 d 7 4 9 , 7 57 (T e x. App.—H o u s t o n [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref ’d n.r.e .) (judg e entitled to disbelieve te stimony of biologica l pare nt).

Ap pe lla nt c on sis te ntl y

tr ie d to min imi ze t

he i mpa c t of

his a c tio ns and

re fu se d to
ac kn o wl ed ge th at h i s b eh av i o r m i gh t b e a so u rc e of B. W
. S
. ’s p ro b l em s . He re fu s edt o ac kn o wl ed geTh e re wa s n o c la im that a pp e lla nt e ve r p hy sic a lly

a bu se d B .W. S. 9 12 that B .W. S. wa s ang ry a t him
. He se e me d to vie w c on ta c t w ithhim se lf a s a ll the the ra

py tha t B .W. S.
ne e de d. Al l of

the se fa c tor s ma de it l ike ly that he wo uld

have dif fi c ult y ma int a ini ngan a

pp ro pr ia te
re l at i o n s h i p t h at wo u l d

n o tca u s e e m o t i o n al d an ger t o t h e c h i l d
. By re fu s i n g t o ac kn o wl ed ge 9 B.W.S.’s ang er, a

ppellant risks ang eringB.W.S. even more
. He m i gh t discourag e B .W.S . from
c oo pe ratin g a c tiv e ly

in t he ra py by ins ist ing that c on ta c t wi th his fathe r i s a ll the the ra py that B .W. S. neede d. The above e vidence is also releva nt to appellant’s par enting abilities, any assistance
a va ila ble to h im, and

pla ns fo r t he c hil d. Ap pe lla

nt wil l be in jai l at lea st unt il 2 02 7. Ev e n w ith in the l imited contac t possible, he seeme d unable to follow instructions about how to intera ct with the child, even w hen those instructions came from the c ourt. I t rea lly was not possible for him to make futur e pla ns ; he wo uld

no t be e lig ibl e fo r r e le a se fr om p ri so n unti l a ft e r B .W. S. w a s a n a du lt. There was e vidence about CPS ’s future plans for the child. Given the de arth of alternatives, the plan to attempt to place B.W. S
. for adoption was rea sonable. Give n that the thera peutic foster

mother had a

son somewhat olde r t hen B .W.S . and an olde r foster son, she had
e xpe ri e nc e de a lin g wi th ma le a do le sc e nts and tr a ini ng to h e lp h e r d e a l w ithB .W. S.’ s sp e c ia l ne e ds
. B.W.S. was doing well and she was av ai l ab le for long -term plac ement; she ha d not ruled out adoption. Th e De pa

rtme nt h a s o ve rc ome the pr e su mpt ion that th e be st i nte re st of the c hil d is
serve d by maintaining the pare nt-child relationship. G.M. , 5 96 S.W. 2d a t 84 7. Th e fa c t- fi nd e r c ou ld13

re a so na bly have fo rm e d a

str on g c on vic tio n or be lie f that te rm inatio n is in t he c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st. See C.H. , 89 S.W .3d at 27. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule a ppellant’s fifth issue.
Co nc lusi on After concludingthat the trial cour t had jurisdiction, we have revie wed the e vidence and hold t h at the re cord c ontained leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence to support at least one g ro un d o f t e rm inatio n a

nd to s up po rt

the pr op os iti on that ter

min a tio n wa s in B. W.S. ’s be st i nte re st. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r t e rm inatin g a pp e lla nt’ s p are nta l r ig hts
.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: Apr il 7, 2005