IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-20104

Summary Calendar 

ROSEMARY THOMPSON; TIMOTHY E. THOMPSON, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants 

v. 

WELLS FARGO BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; AMERICA’S 

SERVICING COMPANY; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 

SYSTEM; WMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION; STARTEX TITLE 

COMPANY; STARTEX TITLE COMPANY, L.L.C., 

Defendants-Appellees 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:15-CV-598

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Rosemary and Timothy E. Thompson filed a pro se complaint against 

various financial institutions and companies involved in recording a refinanced 

mortgage on their property located at 1039 Pennygent Lane in Channelview, 

Texas. Generally, they asserted that they were not advised of new holders of 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 7, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-20104 Document: 00513944457 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/07/2017
No. 16-20104

2 

the mortgage, that they were denied requested modifications of the mortgage 

agreement, and that ultimately a state court entered a judgment of foreclosure. 

The Thompsons raised numerous claims challenging the validity of the 

mortgage agreement and the state foreclosure proceedings and asserted that 

the defendants had violated federal and state criminal and civil laws, engaged 

in conspiracy, committed fraud, and breached a contract. The district court 

granted motions to dismiss filed by various defendants pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that the Thompsons’ challenges to 

the mortgage and order of foreclosure were barred by the Rooker-Feldman1

doctrine, that the federal and state criminal statutes did not give rise to a 

private cause of action, that the Thompsons had not alleged sufficient facts to 

establish fraud or a breach of contract, that the Thompsons had failed to allege 

sufficient facts to show a violation under the Telephone Consumer Protection 

Act (TCPA) or the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (TUFTA), and that 

any attempt to amend would be futile. The Thompsons now appeal this ruling.

 We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded 

facts as true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff[].” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough 

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 

1 See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 

263 U.S. 413 (1923).

 Case: 16-20104 Document: 00513944457 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/07/2017
No. 16-20104

3 

In their appellate brief, the Thompsons repeat their contentions that the 

2004 mortgage and the state court foreclosure proceedings were not valid. 

They do not, however, refute the district court’s conclusion that these

allegations were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Although this court 

applies “less stringent standards to parties proceeding pro se than to parties 

represented by counsel” and liberally construes the briefs of pro se litigants, 

pro se parties must still brief the issues and reasonably comply with the 

requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28. Grant v. Cuellar, 59 

F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 

(5th Cir. 1993) (stating that pro se appellants must brief arguments in order 

to preserve them). The Thompsons’ failure to make any argument against the 

district court’s Rooker-Feldman ruling results in the abandonment of that 

issue. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 

748 (5th Cir. 1987).

The Thompsons also maintain in their appellate brief that they have 

established causes of action for false statements, mail and wire fraud, breach 

of contract, and mortgage fraud. They do not challenge the district court’s 

bases for rejecting these claims, and such arguments are therefore abandoned. 

See id. Additionally, their conclusional assertions that they are entitled to 

relief on these bases “will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Taylor v. 

Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). The Thompsons have not briefed any challenge 

to the district court’s rejection of their claims under the TCPA or TUFTA, and 

they do not assert that the district court should have granted them an 

additional opportunity to amend before dismissal; those claims are therefore 

abandoned as well. See Brinkmann, 813 F.2d at 748.

 The judgment of the district court is thus AFFIRMED. 

 Case: 16-20104 Document: 00513944457 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/07/2017