IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 12–0811

Filed November 30, 2012

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

ALLEN ROBERT ALLENSWORTH,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. 

Huppert, Judge. 

Defendant serving prison sentence appeals order denying earnedtime credit for period spent on supervised probation before his 

incarceration. AFFIRMED.

Joseph P. Vogel of The Law Office of Turner & Vogel, PLLC, 

Des Moines, for appellant. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee. 
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WATERMAN, Justice.

This appeal involves a dispute over the application of the probation 

credit recognized in Anderson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2011). The 

fighting issue is whether an offender accrues earned time under Iowa 

Code section 903A.2 (2011) while on supervised probation before his 

incarceration. Defendant, Allen Allensworth, initially received suspended 

sentences for drug offenses and two years of probation. He was 

incarcerated after his probation was revoked. Allensworth contends the 

Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) erroneously withheld his earnedtime credit for the probationary period, which would entitle him to 

release from prison on February 5, 2013. IDOC argues earned-time 

credits are only earned while the offender is incarcerated and calculates 

his tentative discharge date to be December 4, 2013.

The district court ruled IDOC correctly calculated his discharge 

date because earned-time credits are only earned while the offender is

incarcerated. We agree, based on the unambiguous language of the 

earned-time statute, which limits accrual of earned-time credit to 

inmates who are incarcerated. Id. Accordingly, we affirm the district 

court’s order denying earned-time credit for the time Allensworth spent 

on supervised probation. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

The facts are undisputed. In our prior opinion in this case, we set 

forth the circumstances of Allensworth’s arrest and search of his vehicle 

in April 2006 that yielded twenty-five grams of methamphetamine hidden 

in the steering column. State v. Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d 789, 790–91 

(Iowa 2008). He was charged with one count of possession of a 

controlled substance (more than five grams) with intent to deliver, in 

violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (2005), and a second 
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count of failure to possess a tax stamp, in violation of sections 453B.3

and 453B.12. He pled guilty to both charges after we reversed the 

district court order suppressing evidence of the methamphetamine. On 

October 31, 2008, the district court imposed suspended sentences of ten 

years (Count I) and five years (Count II) to run consecutively, and two 

years of supervised probation with the department of correctional 

services. 

His probation did not go well. On September 14, 2009, 

Allensworth stipulated to probation violations at a revocation hearing. 

On February 1, 2010, the district court conducted a dispositional 

hearing and extended his probation by three years and ordered him to 

complete an in-jail treatment program. On December 1, Allensworth 

stipulated to additional violations. The district court conducted a 

contested probation disposition hearing on December 22. The district 

court specifically found Allensworth had continued his drug usage and 

failed to comply with the terms of his drug treatment program. The next 

day, the court entered its order revoking his probation and imposing his 

original prison sentences totaling fifteen years. He currently is an inmate 

at the Clarinda Correctional Facility. 

On July 29, 2011, we filed our opinion in Anderson recognizing a 

probation credit under Iowa Code section 907.3(3) (2007). Anderson, 801

N.W.2d at 5. On October 31, Allensworth filed a “request for time,”

challenging the IDOC’s calculation of his tentative discharge date. The 

district court entered an order setting the matter for hearing and 

directing the IDOC to respond. The IDOC filed a response. The district 

court held an unreported hearing on March 22, 2012, and issued its 

ruling the next day. The ruling outlined the respective positions of the 

parties as follows:
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The parties agree on the raw numbers applicable to 

the calculations in question, as well as the defendant’s 

status to receive credit for his time on supervised probation, 

as required by Anderson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 

2011). Their only point of contention is the order in which 

the applicable credits are calculated; the defendant takes the 

position that earned time should be calculated before his 

probation credit under Anderson, while the Department of 

Corrections argues the order should be reversed. The 

significance of the argument is that if earned time is 

calculated before probation credit, the defendant’s sentence 

would be shortened by an additional 300 days, as compared 

to the Department’s calculations as contained in its written 

response. Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)(a) (2007) (earned time

accrues at the rate of 1.2 days for each day served). 

The district court ruled in favor of the IDOC, stating:

The court agrees with the Department’s calculations. 

The proper order of calculation would be to reduce the 

defendant’s sentence first by his probation credit, and then 

by his earned time (and jail credit). This is because earned 

time (as the name suggests) does not begin until the 

defendant is committed to the director of the Department of 

Corrections. Iowa Code § 903A.2(1) (2007). To allow him to 

take earned time off his sentence prior to any reduction for 

his probation credit under Anderson would be inconsistent 

with this directive. It would, in essence, give him credit (in 

terms of earned time) for time he never “earned;” i.e., never 

served while in a DOC facility. 

(Footnote omitted.)

Allensworth appealed. We retained the appeal to decide whether 

Allensworth’s time on supervised probation, credited against his prison 

sentence under Anderson, also accrued earned-time credit under section 

903A.2. 

II. Scope of Review. 

We review this question of statutory interpretation for correction of 

errors of law. Anderson, 801 N.W.2d at 3. 

III. Analysis. 

Allensworth is one of the inmates whose discharge dates were 

recalculated by the IDOC after our decision in Anderson. In that case, 
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we held Iowa Code section 907.3(3) (2007) required sentencing credit for 

time served on supervised probation after the defendant is committed to 

the judicial district department of correctional services. Id. at 5

(mandating credit against prison sentence for the offender’s time served 

living at home under electronic monitoring). We applied the following

language in section 907.3(3) as written: “ ‘A person so committed who 

has probation revoked shall be given credit for such time served.’ ” Id. at 

4 (quoting Iowa Code § 907.3(3) (2007)). 

The legislature amended section 907.3(3) in its next session

following the Anderson decision by adding the word “not” to that 

sentence, thus limiting the credit to time served in alternate jail or

correctional facilities. See 2012 Iowa Acts ch. 1138, § 91 (“A person so 

committed who has probation revoked shall not be given credit for such 

time served. However, a person committed to an alternate jail facility or a 

community correctional residential treatment facility who has probation 

revoked shall be given credit for time served in the facility.” (Emphasis 

added.)). This amendment became effective on the date of its enactment, 

May 25, 2012. Id. § 93. The State does not claim the 2012 amendment 

to section 907.3(3) applies to this appeal and agrees Allensworth is 

entitled to a section 907.3(3) credit reducing his prison sentence by each 

day he spent on supervised probation. 

Allensworth seeks to further reduce his remaining time 

incarcerated through the accrual of earned-time credit for his days spent

outside prison walls under supervised probation. The State argues he is 

not entitled to earned-time credit for this probationary period. This 

appeal provides the opportunity to clarify how probation credits should 

be calculated. The parties agree Allensworth’s fifteen-year sentence is 

reduced by three separate credits, but disagree as to the sequence in 
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which each credit is applied. The source for each sentencing credit is 

found in a different statutory provision: Iowa Code section 903A.2 

governs earned-time credits, section 903A.5(1) governs jail-time credit,

and section 907.3(3) governs the probation credit. 

Allensworth argues the earned-time credit under section 903A.2 

should be applied first to reduce the full sentence, then the credits for 

jail time under section 903A.5(1) and time spent on probation under 

section 907.3(3) are to be applied to offset the remaining sentence. As 

the district court recognized, this sequence accelerates his discharge 

date by accruing earned-time credit on days he spent on supervised 

probation. Conversely, the IDOC’s sequence avoids awarding 

Allensworth earned-time credit for the time he spent on probation by 

applying the section 907.3(3) (2007) probation credit against his sentence 

first. That way, the earned-time credit only accrues for days he actually 

is incarcerated. 

We must decide whether earned time can be earned while outside 

prison walls. We will examine the interrelated statutory provisions

together to determine the proper sequence for applying each credit. “ ‘If 

more than one statute relating to the subject matter at issue is relevant 

to the inquiry, we consider all the statutes together in an effort to 

harmonize them.’ ” Kolzow v. State, 813 N.W.2d 731, 736 (Iowa 2012) 

(quoting State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Iowa 2000)). 

A. Earned-Time Credit. Iowa Code section 903A.2 is titled

“Earned time” and allows inmates to reduce their sentences for good 

conduct. The purpose of earned-time credit “is to encourage prisoners to 

follow prison rules and participate in rehabilitative programs.” Kolzow, 

813 N.W.2d at 738. Section 903A.2 provides in part:
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1. Each inmate committed to the custody of the director 

of the department of corrections is eligible to earn a reduction 

of sentence in the manner provided in this section. For 

purposes of calculating the amount of time by which an 

inmate’s sentence may be reduced, inmates shall be grouped 

into the following two sentencing categories:

a. Category “A” sentences are those sentences which 

are not subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time 

of fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement under 

section 902.12. . . . An inmate of an institution under the 

control of the department of corrections who is serving a 

category “A” sentence is eligible for a reduction of sentence 

equal to one and two-tenths days for each day the inmate 

demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily participates in 

any program or placement status identified by the director to 

earn the reduction. . . . 

. . . . 

2. Earned time accrued pursuant to this section may 

be forfeited in the manner prescribed in section 903A.3. 

3. Time served in a jail or another facility prior to actual 

placement in an institution under the control of the department 

of corrections and credited against the sentence by the court 

shall accrue for the purpose of reduction of sentence under 

this section. Time which elapses during an escape shall not 

accrue for purposes of reduction of sentence under this 

section.

Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)–(3) (emphasis added).

Section 903A.2 by its terms limits eligibility for earned time to 

“inmate[s] committed to the custody of the director of the department of 

corrections.” Id. § 903A.2(1). Allensworth was not an “inmate” while he 

was on supervised probation, nor was he “committed to the custody” of 

IDOC until he began serving his prison sentence. We agree with the 

district court’s conclusion that “earned time (as the name suggests) does 

not begin until the defendant is committed to the director of the 

Department of Corrections,” and that permitting Allensworth to accrue 

earned time during his earlier probation “would be inconsistent with this 

directive.” 
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Allensworth is serving a category A sentence. The applicable 

earned-time credit is allowed for “an inmate of an institution under the 

control of the department of corrections who is serving a category ‘A’

sentence.” Id. § 903A.2(1)(a) (emphasis added). As noted, Allensworth 

was not an inmate of an IDOC-controlled institution while he was 

released on supervised probation. Accordingly, his probationary time is 

ineligible for earned-time credit under the plain language of the 

governing statute. 

Moreover, the statutory mechanism for forfeiting earned-time 

credit reinforces the conclusion that earned time only accrues while the 

offender is incarcerated. Section 903A.2 provides: “Earned time accrued 

pursuant to this section may be forfeited in the manner prescribed in 

section 903A.3.” Section 903A.3 in turn provides for loss or forfeiture of 

earned time for the inmate’s violation of “an institutional rule.” Specific 

procedures are required for forfeiture, including the inmate’s right of 

appeal to the warden or warden’s designee. No procedure is in place for 

forfeiture of earned time while on supervised probation. Nor is loss of 

earned time mentioned among the various penalties set forth in the 

separate statute governing probation violations. See id. § 908.11.

Significantly, the earned-time-credit statute expressly provides that 

earned time also accrues for “[t]ime served in a jail or another facility . . . 

credited against the sentence.” Id. § 903A.2(3). No provision applicable 

to Allensworth within section 903A.2 or elsewhere extends earned-time 

credit to supervised probation while the offender is not incarcerated. 

Accordingly, we see no textual basis for awarding earned-time credit for 

time on supervised probation. As the district court correctly concluded, 

earned time must be “earned” in an IDOC facility. If the legislature had 
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intended earned time to accrue while the offender is on probation, it 

would have said so. 

B. Jail-Time Credit. Section 903A.5 governs “jail time” credit.

This statute provides in part:

An inmate shall not be discharged from the custody of the 

director of the Iowa department of corrections until the 

inmate has served the full term for which the inmate was 

sentenced, less earned time and other credits earned and not 

forfeited, unless the inmate is pardoned or otherwise legally 

released. . . . An inmate shall be deemed to be serving the 

sentence from the day on which the inmate is received into 

the institution. If an inmate was confined to a county jail or 

other correctional or mental facility at any time prior to 

sentencing, or after sentencing but prior to the case having 

been decided on appeal, because of failure to furnish bail or 

because of being charged with a nonbailable offense, the 

inmate shall be given credit for the days already served upon 

the term of the sentence. 

Id. § 903A.5 (emphasis added).

Section 903A.5 by its plain language provides a credit against the 

prison sentence for time served in jail on the same charge. In calculating 

Allensworth’s tentative discharge date, IDOC has already reduced his 

prison sentence by his jail time with earned time credit accruing both for 

his time in jail and in prison. Earned-time credit accrues for time served 

“in a jail or another facility” when such jail time is credited against the 

sentence as expressly provided in section 903A.2(3). We held in 

Anderson that his “home is not a ‘jail or other correctional facility.’ 

Section 903A.5(1) does not entitle Anderson to sentencing credit for time 

spent under home supervision and electronic monitoring.” Anderson, 

801 N.W.2d at 4. Accordingly, because Allensworth’s street time falls 

outside of sections 903A.2(3) and 903A.5, there is no textual basis for 

extending the earned-time credit to his probationary period. 
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C. Section 907.3(3) Probation Credit. The statutory source for 

the probation credit is Iowa Code section 907.3(3). See Anderson, 801 

N.W.2d at 5. IDOC is allowing Allensworth day-for-day credit for his time 

spent on supervised street probation. But, nothing in section 907.3(3) 

allows earned-time credit to accrue while on probation outside the walls 

of a jail or other correctional facility. To the contrary, section 903A.2 

explicitly limits earned-time accruing before placement in prison to 

“[t]ime served in a jail or another facility.” Iowa Code § 903A.2(3). 

Allensworth was not serving time in an eligible facility during his days on 

supervised probation. 

“ ‘The general rule is that, absent a specific provision allowing for 

it, a court does not err by denying credit for time served on probation.’ ” 

State v. Canas, 571 N.W.2d 20, 25 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Trecker v. State, 

320 N.W.2d 594, 595 (Iowa 1982), superseded by statutory amendment, 

1996 Iowa Acts ch. 1193, § 19, as recognized in Anderson, 801 N.W.2d at 

4–5). The legislature amended section 907.3(3) in 1996 by adding the 

sentence requiring credit for time spent on supervised probation. See 

Anderson, 801 N.W.2d at 4–5 (“The 1996 amendment added the 

statutory authorization Trecker found lacking earlier.”). The amendment 

allowing a sentencing credit for probation, however, did not also

authorize accrual of earned-time credit for time spent on probation. We 

will not require the IDOC to recognize an earned-time credit the 

legislature did not expressly allow. See Canas, 571 N.W.2d at 25

(concluding that legislature’s failure to require a particular sentencing 

credit “indicates the legislature did not intend to grant such credit”). The 

probation credit found in section 907.3(3) does not entitle Allensworth to 

the earned-time credit allowed in section 903A.2. We will not rewrite the 
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statutes to provide a credit that is not there. As noted, the earned-time 

credit accrues only while he is incarcerated.

Because the operative statutory language in section 903A.2 

governing earned-time credit is unambiguous, the rule of lenity does not 

apply. See Kolzow, 813 N.W.2d at 739 (finding the rule of lenity did not 

apply to the unambiguous statute). Finally, we reject Allensworth’s 

constitutional argument because the IDOC applied the unambiguous 

language of Iowa Code section 903A.2 in calculating his tentative 

discharge date and, thus, did not arbitrarily restrain Allensworth’s 

liberty.

IV. Conclusion.

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude the district court 

correctly rejected Allensworth’s claim for earned-time credit to be 

accrued while he was on supervised probation. Earned-time credits are 

only earned while the offender is incarcerated. We therefore affirm the 

district court’s March 23 ruling. 

AFFIRMED.