U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

33–386 2019

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–113] 

SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: 

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVES 

ON ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, 

AND TECHNOLOGY 

[Serial No. 115–66] 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 22, 2018 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

RO KHANNA, California 

SARAH MINEIRO, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MICHAEL GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

ANDY BIGGS, Arizona 

ROGER W. MARSHALL, Kansas 

NEAL P. DUNN, Florida 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina 

DEBBIE LESKO, Arizona 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania 

JERRY McNERNEY, California 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

MARK TAKANO, California 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CHARLIE CRIST, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

HON. BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

ANDY BIGGS, Arizona 

NEAL P. DUNN, Florida 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

AMI BERA, California, Ranking Member 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

CHARLIE CRIST, Florida 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services ......................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Bridenstine, Hon. James F., Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration ..................................................................................................... 2 

Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, United States Strategic Command .. 1 

Ross, Hon. Wilbur, Secretary of Commerce ........................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bridenstine, Hon. James F. ............................................................................. 69 

Babin, Hon. Brian, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology ................... 54 

Hyten, Gen John E. .......................................................................................... 59 

Ross, Hon. Wilbur ............................................................................................. 76 

Smith, Hon. Lamar, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Committee 

on Science, Space, and Technology .............................................................. 49 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 83 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 84 

Mr. Mitchell ...................................................................................................... 85 

(1) 

SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: 

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVES 

ON ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE, Washington, DC, Friday, June 22, 2018. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 9:01 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good morning. I want to thank Chairman Babin 

and Ranking Member Bera for their interest and cooperation in organizing this joint hearing to discuss space situational awareness 

in a whole of government context. 

I also appreciate the interest expressed by members of the House 

Armed Services Committee and the Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology more broadly, and, therefore, ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to participate in 

today’s hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there objection? 

Hearing none, so ordered. 

Non-subcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. 

Given that we have an excellent panel of witnesses and lots of 

member interest, I will ask unanimous consent to include into the 

record all member statements and extraneous material. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Today we will hear from an excellent panel of witnesses on SSA 

[space situational awareness], including the Honorable Wilbur 

Ross, Secretary of Commerce; the Honorable Jim Bridenstine, no 

stranger to this room or this subject matter, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and another person 

who is no stranger to this room, General John Hyten, Commander, 

United States Strategic Command. 

I will turn it over to you for your brief opening statements and 

then we will roll straight into questions. 

General Hyten, start with you. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, 

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General HYTEN. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Babin, Smith, the 

three chairmen, Ranking Members Cooper, Bera, Johnson, distin-
2 

guished committee members, all of you. It is an honor to be here 

today with Secretary Ross and Administrator Bridenstine. It is 

kind of difficult not to say Congressman Bridenstine, but he is on 

this side of the table, which is interesting. 

So it is always a privilege to be here, and it is a privilege to represent the 162,000 Americans that accomplish the missions of my 

command every day. So I would like to thank both committees for 

your enduring support to our Nation’s defense and in particular for 

your work on our national space policy. 

My command, U.S. Strategic Command, is a global warfighting 

command. We set the conditions across the globe as the ultimate 

guarantor of our national and allied security, and our missions are 

to deter strategic attack and employ nuclear, space, global strike, 

joint electronic warfare, and missile defense forces as directed. 

To do this, we rely on timely and accurate information about the 

operational environments we operate in. Space is one of those environments and it is no different than any other. Space situational 

awareness is how we bring together the multisource data needed 

for space control and to assess adversary intentions. 

Our national security mission demands that we make the space 

environment as safe as possible to operate in, and that has led to 

our current sharing arrangements. Today, we take our space situational awareness data and make it available for space safety, but 

it is not an inherent mission of Strategic Command or the Department of Defense. And I have never believed the Department of Defense should have to perform that space traffic management for the 

world. We do that because we need to do it. 

So for a while now I have advocated to move space traffic management to another agency while retaining the Department of Defense—in the Department of Defense the essential elements of 

space situational awareness needed for our national security. So I 

believe transition is a good idea, and I support the actions taken 

by the President on Monday to designate the Department of Commerce as that lead. It is the right move, and I commit to work with 

the administration, the Department of Congress and the Congress—the Department of Commerce and the Congress to meet the 

President’s space traffic management goals. 

So thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be 

here. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Hyten can be found in the 

Appendix on page 59.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, General. 

The Chair now recognizes Administrator Bridenstine. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. BRIDENSTINE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Chairman Cooper, Chairman Smith, Chairman 

Babin, Ranking Member—or I should say Ranking Member Cooper 

and—Chairman Rogers, I should say, Ranking Member Cooper and 

Ranking Member Bera, it is great to be back. Thank you so much 

for having me here. It is an honor to represent NASA here before 

the Strategic Forces Subcommittee and the Space Subcommittee 

here in the House of Representatives. 
3 

NASA has, of course, very important equities when it comes to 

space situational awareness and space traffic management. Of 

course, we have the Human Space Flight Program, and we have 

dozens of satellites that are delivering critically important science 

for our Nation and, in fact, for the entire world. So we have a big 

stake in making sure we get right space situational awareness and 

space traffic management. 

For objects that are big enough to track—of course, we don’t do 

the tracking ourselves and we don’t keep a catalog ourselves. We 

rely on the Strategic Command for that through the JSpOC [Joint 

Space Operations Center], but the data that we receive from the 

JSpOC we analyze very closely to make sure that our human space 

flight activities and our robotic space flight activities are protected 

and that they remain safe. So this is critical for us. 

Objects that are too small to track, NASA has a department, the 

Orbital Debris Program Office, that is responsible for characterizing that orbital debris, and we characterize it specifically so that 

we can model ultimately the risk from these very small pieces of 

debris that are not trackable. And I will be clear, the biggest risk 

is from objects that are not trackable. That is the biggest part of 

what we deal with every day when it comes to protecting our assets 

in space. 

And so we characterize, you know, where those debris fields are 

and ultimately how they could impact our missions and make assessments how much do we need to invest to shield our assets and/ 

or maybe operate in different orbital regimes. 

So this is important to NASA. I look forward to working with 

this committee. I look forward to following the—implementing I 

should say Space Policy Directive-2 and Space Policy Directive-3 

from the President that gives these new activities to the Department of Commerce. 

So, with that, I look forward to working with everybody here and 

thank you for having me. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bridenstine can be found in the 

Appendix on page 69.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Bridenstine. 

Secretary Ross, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILBUR ROSS, 

SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 

Secretary ROSS. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, 

Chairman Babin, Ranking Members Cooper and Bera, and both 

subcommittees, for allowing me to address you today. I would also 

like to thank Chairman Lamar Smith, Chairman Thornberry, and 

Ranking Members Johnson and Smith for your work on this important issue. Your continued support of this administration’s space 

policy vision is greatly appreciated. 

In addition, I thank my esteemed colleagues General Hyten and 

Administrator Bridenstine for joining me on this panel. It is a pleasure to work with all of you—decision makers, leaders, and 

enablers of U.S. space commercial and defense policy. Your work 

is imperative to the future achievement and well-being of the 

United States. 
4 

The Trump administration and the Department of Commerce are 

creating more opportunities for the space community to develop 

and thrive. In just 6 months, President Trump has signed three 

Presidential space directives. The first calls for human expansion 

across the solar system. It is about time. The second sets a schedule for streamlining regulations to unshackle commercial activity 

in space. 

Commerce is already advancing ambitious regulatory reform. 

Over the last year, we have worked with Department of Defense, 

State, Department of the Interior, and the Director of National Intelligence to reduce commercial remote sensing application timelines by about 50 percent from where they were before. We have 

cut what was 210 days down to an average of 91 days. 

The President’s third space policy directive, signed at this week’s 

Space Council meeting, establishes the country’s first comprehensive national space traffic management policy. The directive emphasizes safety, stability, and sustainability, foundational elements 

to successful space activities, and it names Commerce as the new 

U.S. Government interface for space traffic coordination. 

This new policy directs the Department to provide a basic level 

of space situational awareness data for public and nonpublic use, 

based on the space catalog compiled by the Department of Defense 

[DOD]. This change will better enable DOD to focus on its national 

security mission. 

Commerce is eager to provide that service to industry, to facilitate continued commercial development in outer space. As the 

friend-of-business agency and not a typical old-fashioned regulator, 

we are the perfect agency for the job. Unlike in past generations, 

activity in space is becoming largely commercial. Commerce already engages with private space companies on export control, 

spectrum issues, remote sensing licensing, and trade promotion. 

And we already manage, with NASA’s great support, the government’s largest operational civil satellite fleet, 14 NOAA [National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] satellites and 4 for the 

Air Force. We also have the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, which has a proven track record of working with industry to conduct research and to define scientific standards for 

business needs. 

We are looking forward to taking on this new role of space traffic 

coordination. The need for timely and accurate and actionable SSA 

data and STM [space traffic management] services has never been 

greater. DOD currently observes well over 20,000 objects circling 

the Earth, many of which are softball-size or larger pieces of manmade space debris. These objects fly around Earth at dangerous 

speeds of up to 17,500 miles per hour, about 10 times the speed of 

a small bullet. Even more concerning are the estimated 600,000 

smaller objects that could still cause significant harm if a collision 

occurred. 

Congestion in space will only increase. In the next few years, the 

number of American satellites in space will likely grow from 800 

to over 15,000. As more and more objects get launched, effective 

space traffic coordination and orbital debris mitigation standards 

will help promote our Earth’s orbits from further congestion. 
5 

With the growth of space commerce and DOD’s focus on national 

security, President Trump and the National Space Council determined that Commerce should become the new civil agency interface. With this role, Commerce can incentivize innovative space 

services, based on an open architecture data repository. This repository will establish a mechanism for SSA data sharing that will enable/enhance STM services that will empower greater industry-provided data and services. Involvement by industry, academia, and 

other stakeholders is paramount to the success of this endeavor, 

and it will take a whole of government approach to face this challenge. 

Working with NASA and DOD, Commerce is committed to facilitating these discussions and implementing their results so that the 

United States can provide global leadership for space traffic standards. America must continue to be the leader in space. Space traffic 

coordination is an important task, and Commerce has dedicated serious deliberation and planning in its execution. We have an excellent relationship with our partners and we will continue working 

with them to carry out the implementation plan approved by the 

National Space Council. 

The administration is setting clear milestones and will be transparent about achieving them. Commerce takes on this new responsibility with several goals in mind. We will be dedicated to creating 

economic growth and sustainable development in all industry sectors. 

Facilitating space traffic coordination will provide the space industry with more tools to be successful. Commerce will also work 

with industry to find ways to enhance space traffic coordination 

data and be more adaptive to industry concerns. 

Working with DOD, we will evolve the architecture that currently supports U.S. Strategic Command to be even more responsive to the space industry’s needs. And we look forward to working 

with Congress to protect a safe space environment for future commercial growth. 

With Commerce at the helm of commercial space traffic coordination, we will ensure that the growing space industry remains open 

for business, and America will continue to be the flag of choice for 

space commerce. 

I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Ross can be found in the 

Appendix on page 76.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I thank all the witnesses for being here and for those thoughtful 

opening statements and for what you do for our country. 

I recognize myself for the first set of questions. 

General Hyten, I fully support the President’s directive on space 

management policy, but I do want to make sure that I am clear on 

this, and I think you touched on it in your opening statement. 

Given that space is clearly now recognized as a warfighting domain, are you saying that you don’t believe that this unique DOD 

SSA requirements can only be met by the military, that you believe 

that they can be effectively met by nonmilitary efforts? 
6 

General HYTEN. So the—I really need to be specific on that, because we have to do the space situational awareness mission inside 

Strategic Command, inside the Department of Defense for the missions that we have to do for national security space. 

Mr. ROGERS. And that will continue? 

General HYTEN. That will not change. That will not change for 

as far as I can see into the future, because we have to know that 

information in order to defend ourselves against potential threats. 

That is why we started doing this business back in the Cold War 

days to begin with. 

So we are going to continue that, but we don’t have to be the 

public face to the world for—that is what the new decision is, to 

have the Department of Commerce be the public face to the world. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is what I wanted to make clear, and I appreciate that. 

Mr. Secretary, you are right about the activity up there. In addition to this roughly 620,000 pieces of debris that you and the administrator have talked about, we have a lot of activity going up 

and going to continue to be that way. You talked about 600 or so, 

600 to 800 satellites now and going toward 15,000. 

I know of Boeing and SpaceX in this country that are each talking about putting constellations up for broadband capability that 

can be as many as 2,000 or 3,000 satellites each, just small sats. 

And I know there is at least one Indian company that is doing the 

same thing, a couple thousand. That is just going to proliferate, 

and I have been very concerned about how we are going to manage 

that. 

Tell me exactly how you see this working as far as that traffic 

management and, more importantly, the debris mitigation that you 

made reference to. I would open that up for either one of the two 

of you. 

Secretary ROSS. Well, we already are dealing a lot with some of 

these issues through NOAA, because of its satellites. So we have 

people already somewhat familiar with this sector. We have 

planned to send initial delegations out to Vandenberg, out to 

Omaha to start learning more about the specifics that would be involved. And we are prepared to dedicate people to that and have 

people from those entities also working at Commerce so that we 

make a seamless integration. 

Hard to predict exactly what the timeline would be, but it is 

probably something more or less on the order of a year to make a 

seamless transition between the two. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you anticipate cooperation with countries like 

China and the companies therein and companies in India that are 

going to also be concerned about this activity? 

Secretary ROSS. Well, yes. We, as you know, have a very international map to both our activities and our physical presence. And 

parts of our activity, such as the ITA [International Trade Administration], the promotion entity that has created some $3 billion of 

space business already, NIST [National Institute of Standards and 

Technology] works with just about every country in the world in 

evolving standards. And standards and getting them agreed with 

other countries is clearly a very important part of this activity. 
7 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Bridenstine, how would debris mitigation work 

functionally? I just don’t know. I don’t have a clue. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So a couple of things. You mentioned earlier, 

Chairman Rogers, that there were going to be these constellations 

of potentially thousands of satellites in low Earth orbit for the purpose of communications. That is absolutely true. 

Where NASA is right now, we participate in what is called the 

Interagency Space Debris Coordination Committee. When this committee hears the word ‘‘interagency,’’ you think of within the U.S. 

Government. When we talk about the Interagency Space Debris Coordination Committee, we are talking about space agencies from 

around the world. 

And this interagency committee includes 13 different space agencies across the world. And what this organization has determined 

is that every 5 to 9 years, if launch cadences stay the same and 

the orbital debris fields stay the same, every 5 to 9 years we are 

going to have a collision in low Earth orbit similar to the IridiumCosmos collision that we saw back in 2009 that created thousands 

of pieces of orbital debris. Now, that is if launch cadences stay the 

same and constellations don’t grow. In fact, we are seeing just the 

opposite. Launch is going to be happening a whole lot more frequently, especially if I am successful doing my job as the NASA administrator. We are going to see a lot more launches. We are going 

to see a lot more activity in low Earth orbit. So these kind of collisions beget even more collisions. 

So we have to be very careful that we don’t let this eventually 

run away. And I am not saying that we are even close to that right 

now, but we need to be thinking the next 50 years, 100 years down 

the road, especially as we take more advantage of space. 

As far as how NASA deals with a lot of the—you mentioned the 

word ‘‘mitigation’’ challenges. NASA sets standards to prevent new 

orbital debris from occurring. So when a spacecraft gets launched 

and then it separates from its upper stage, sometimes that can result in debris. And so we set standards for ourselves as an agency 

to limit that kind of activity so that we prevent or we limit as 

much as possible the danger from space debris. 

Those standards then ultimately get promulgated throughout the 

rest of the interagency within the U.S. Government. So the Department of Defense follows those standards. NOAA follows those 

standards, other agencies that utilize space. And eventually, it got 

to the point where now those standards are, you know, required for 

commercial operations as well and, of course, promulgated throughout the international community. 

So NASA has led on this. I will be clear that not all the countries 

follow the same standards, so that is often a challenge, but I do believe it is important for us to lead and that those standards could 

eventually get to a point where there is enough international pressure that around the world countries will have to follow those 

standards. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you very much. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Cooper, for 

any questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
8 

I too would like to welcome the witnesses. I appreciate Mr. 

Bridenstine’s chart here. I think that is very helpful in helping us 

understand the debris problem. I am worried, though, that the 

chart underestimates the difficulty. As you point out in your testimony and Secretary Ross does as well, we have some 600,000 

pieces of very tiny debris to monitor, because each one of those 

pieces could be deadly. 

General HYTEN. That is right. 

Mr. COOPER. And as all the witnesses said, this problem is only 

increasing and it is probably increasing exponentially. So right now 

as we are offloading the priceless work the Air Force has been 

doing for space traffic management, right now we are reaching the 

acute phase, the urgent phase for the entire planet when, as Secretary Ross pointed out, a large percentage of today’s space debris 

is the result of just two collisions, just two, and how there are 

going to be thousands and perhaps tens of thousands of collision 

possibilities. And as the Secretary also pointed out in his testimony, each one of these could lead to a devastating chain reaction 

of creating yet further debris, which could tax the power of even 

the fastest supercomputer to monitor all these orbits and trajectories and speeds and things like that. 

So a simple question: Should we punish nations or companies 

that cause satellite debris? It is one thing to use carrots. Are we 

also going to consider sticks? To each of the witnesses. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Ranking Member Cooper, within the Outer 

Space Treaty, nations are responsible for what they do in space. 

There is a liability that nations have for these kind of activities. 

Unfortunately, if you look throughout history, some very nefarious 

activities have happened in space. 

On your subcommittee, we talk about the 2007 direct ascent antisatellite missile launched by China that hit one of their own weather satellites and created an orbital debris field of thousands of 

pieces that we are, in fact, still dealing with today in low Earth 

orbit. The challenge that we have is enforcement at the international level. It is a big challenge. 

So certainly we have seen activities change, based on international pressure, but we haven’t seen really any enforcement as 

far as liability, anybody paying the price for the damage that they 

have done to low Earth orbit. 

Mr. COOPER. Let’s make it a U.S.-only issue. Should we punish 

a U.S. company that causes needless space debris? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. That is a good question, sir. I would like to 

take that for the record, maybe get back to you on what a good approach on that might be. 

But certainly—and I think you are aware of this keenly—we 

want to maximize the utility of space. We want commercial companies to have access and availability. And if they are not, in fact, 

following the rules, we could deny access to space for everybody altogether, which would undermine our ability to maximize the utility of space. So there should be some kind of legal regime, yes, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. My time is limited with all the other members here, 

but there is the attribution problem. NASA currently has a statistical model to track these 600,000 pieces. How do you tell a satel-
9 

lite company or, worse, an astronaut that they died or were killed 

because of a statistic? People will want attribution. 

If you have enough data to form the model, then there must be 

some reasonable source for that data. So we have got to figure this 

out, because the 600,000 pieces you are tracking today could be 

tens of millions or billions shortly. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Yes, sir. Attribution is critical, and some of the 

new technologies that are being developed right now could help us 

to attribute, you know, a piece of orbital debris that caused somebody’s loss of life to a specific nation or company. That is a challenge going forward for sure. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Chairman 

Babin for any questions he may have. 

Mr. BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, witnesses, for being here too. 

Secretary Ross, I would like to start with you, if you don’t mind. 

I would like to start by stating my support for the President’s 

Space Policy Directive-3. And while I am at it, I support 1 and 2 

as well. In Congress, we have a responsibility to protect the taxpayer. Government spending and bureaucracy is a serious concern. 

However, not improving the Nation’s civil space situational awareness and space traffic management framework is unacceptable. 

What steps will be taken to protect against unnecessary spending 

and how much funding will be needed to carry this policy out? 

Secretary ROSS. Thank you for that question, sir. This activity 

will report to the regulatory reform officer at Commerce. And as 

you may be aware, we have already dismantled 65 regulations, 

which is more than any other Cabinet department. 

So we are keenly aware of the importance of reducing bureaucratic burden, both in terms of direct taxpayer expense and in 

terms of the burden unnecessarily placed on industry. So that will 

be one of the activities we have very, very much in mind. 

Mr. BABIN. Okay. Thank you. Then the next question for Administrator Bridenstine, NASA has substantial technical expertise relevant to improving space situational awareness and space traffic 

management. For example, Johnson Space Center is home to the 

world-renowned orbital debris scientists. Under SD–3, how will 

NASA leverage its expertise to further our national SSA and STM 

efforts? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. It is a wonderful question, Chairman. So 

under Space Policy Directive-3 and the implementation guidance, 

NASA is directed to lead a research and technology effort that 

takes advantages of the capabilities that we already have, but also 

make investments to improve on those capabilities and technologies. 

I think our biggest area of focus historically has been investing 

in characterizing the orbital debris population that cannot be 

tracked because it is too small, and then assessing risk based on 

that orbital debris population. And, of course, Space Policy Directive-3 is going to take it a step further and give us authorities to 

ultimately make investments to do space situational awareness or, 

you know, potentially, you know, creating an environment—kind of 

the way I see NASA being involved. 
10 

I will just start over here a little bit. Kind of like the way NASA 

does unmanned aerial systems traffic management, we don’t want 

to be involved in doing unmanned aerial systems traffic management for the United States of America and integrating UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] in into the airspace. That is not the job of 

NASA. But what we can do is we can do the technology demonstrations, we can do pilot programs, we can do the research, and then 

ultimately take all of what we learn and hand it over to the FAA 

[Federal Aviation Administration], which is the way NASA is dealing with UTM, unmanned aerial systems traffic management, right 

now. 

I think going forward, under Space Policy Directive-3, we are 

going to be charged with the same thing, maybe doing pilot programs, demonstrating technology, and then ultimately handing it 

over to Commerce, which will have the lead on space situational 

awareness and space traffic management in the future. 

It is also true that NASA will not be creating data. That is ultimately not what we do. Of course, the Air Force or I should say 

Strategic Command creates data through the JSpOC, and then 

that data could be provided to Commerce. It could also be provided 

to commercial partners. And then the data that Commerce has 

would be augmented probably also with commercial partners. 

And what NASA can do is ultimately test a lot of the technologies, test the data, and then ultimately implement a plan to help 

Commerce lead the effort. 

Mr. BABIN. Great. Okay, thank you. 

And then, General Hyten, the DOD and in particular the Air 

Force has proposed a significant increase in their space capabilities 

with the fiscal year 2019 budget. Would you talk a little bit about 

these capabilities that this increased investment will provide and 

how they will enhance your warfighting mission? 

General HYTEN. Mr. Chairman, I am a combatant commander, so 

the specific answer can come from the Air Force. But as a combatant commander, I do advocate for those capabilities. 

And I am very aware of what the Air Force has put in the budget, and I am pleased with the improvements the Air Force has 

made in the budget, because those improvements come in a number of different ways. For the purpose of this hearing, a lot of those 

improvements are in space situational awareness. 

The Air Force now has a joint program with the National Reconnaissance Office called Silent Barker where, instead of having two 

programs on two different sides of the national security space business, there will be one. That one program will improve our situational awareness of the geosynchronous orbit in a significant way. 

We are also producing the Space Fence. The Space Fence will 

come online in 2019. That capability will allow us to see hundreds 

of thousands of objects that we don’t see today. That data will be 

critical to our mission in the Department of Defense, but we can 

also provide that to the Department of Commerce and NASA to 

allow this broader piece to happen. 

And then, broadly speaking, what you see in the budget is an improvement of our ability to defend ourselves against threats in 

space. What you see is a change of our architecture from a large 

status quo structured approach to a more resilient survivable capa-
11 

bility that can defend ourselves in the future. And then you see in 

the classified world a lot of work being put to make sure we have 

the ability to defend ourselves if we are attacked. 

Mr. BABIN. And then right along those same lines, how will the 

establishment of a civil SSA program at the Department of Commerce benefit DOD and continue to protect national interests? 

General HYTEN. So we talked about the Iridium-Cosmos collision 

in 2009. I was the investigating officer of that collision. And one 

of the things we realized—and General Chilton was the commander 

of Strategic Command at the time. And when I briefed him, we 

kind of came to the realization that we are going to have to do this 

flight safety mission ourselves. And we had to take about a hundred airmen, a hundred military people off of other missions and 

put them on that in order to do that mission. 

Now, we have become a little more efficient as we have gone 

through the years, because we have been able to improve our automation and capabilities, but we still have dozens and dozens of airmen that do that all the time. When we move that now into the 

Department of Commerce, we still have to do the job for ourselves, 

but we will be able to free up those airmen to focus on the warfighting missions that we need to worry about. That is what we get 

out of this new approach. 

Mr. BABIN. Yes, sir. 

And then finally, Secretary Ross, Space Directive Number 3 

states that basic space situational awareness and space traffic 

management services should be provided free of direct user fees. 

And just to clear up some concern and questions, what services are 

considered basic and what are some examples of services that go 

beyond basic? 

Secretary ROSS. Well, thank you. We can use the same definition 

of basic services as has been used historically. We don’t see any 

reason to change that. But a major function will be an open architecture approach to it. Commerce is directed to build that under 

SPD–3 [Space Policy Directive-3] to incorporate DOD and NASA information with information from international partners and commercial operated data. So it will be a two-directional set of communications, and that will create an enhanced space situational 

awareness picture. 

Mr. BABIN. And then how about the basic—what is considered— 

what would be considered beyond basic? 

Secretary ROSS. Well, the idea of open architecture. Right now, 

there is not an open architecture. It is a one-way communication 

channel. We think there is merit to having inputs with information 

from international partners, as we do right now with the National 

Weather Service. We coordinate with lots and lots of other government entities in other parts of the world, and that is a very important part of our activity. 

Mr. BABIN. Okay. Thank you. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member Mr. Bera for any 

questions he may have. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
12 

And obviously, this is an incredibly timely hearing. Before I ask 

my questions, I also just want to be clear that we have not made 

a decision, this body, Congress, as to where space situational 

awareness should be housed. So that is not an administrative decision; that is a congressional decision. 

And Secretary Ross, with all due respect, I don’t want the Department of Commerce to start making those plans, because, as 

has already been raised in each of the testimonies, this is incredibly important as we go forward. 

Now, I think it is important, you know, under the leadership of 

both chairmen, of HASC [House Armed Services Committee] as 

well as Science, Space, and Technology, I know Chairman Smith, 

Chairman Babin, the Ranking Member Johnson, we have been 

talking about this quite a bit and we have got to get this right. It 

is better to get it right, because this is the 21st century. We have 

to make sure that DOD has everything that it needs to continue 

to do the important work of protecting our vital assets in space. 

And, you know, as Administrator Bridenstine has already pointed out, we don’t want to stifle the innovation in the commercial 

sector. We don’t want to stifle the interest in the international community. But we want to do this right and we do need that, for lack 

of a better way of describing it, air traffic control cop that is going 

to, you know, put everyone in the right lane and, you know, to the 

best of our abilities prevent accidents from happening in space. 

You know, it really does have the possibility of transforming 

what the 21st century looks like. So, you know, again, this Congress, as a deliberative body, has oversight over, you know, what 

situational awareness looks like in the 21st century. I appreciate 

the interest of the President and the Vice President, the Space 

Council, and your interest, Secretary Ross, but we have got to do 

our work and we are not abdicating that responsibility. 

So, Secretary Ross, if we are looking at housing situational 

awareness within Department of Commerce, there is a lot that has 

to go into this transition. What kind of resources are necessary? 

What kind of oversight? How do you share information that only 

the Department of Defense is probably going to be able to see? How 

do you make that publicly available? How do you make that internationally available? 

I would ask, are you prepared through your department to 

present an implementation and transition plan to Congress and to 

this body? 

Secretary ROSS. We certainly would if and when we are authorized to undertake the function. But we already, as I mentioned, we 

disseminate to the public about 40 percent of all the factual information emitted by the administration. So we are very used to packaging information, getting it to the right place, getting it in the 

right format for people to use. 

And one example is space weather is, as you know, a very major 

factor in this whole situation, because of the impact it has on 

things that are orbiting around. Well, we are already keenly involved with space weather through our space satellites that are 

part of the National Weather Service. So we are already into that 

aspect of it and in a very good position, for example, to integrate 

that with these other activities. 
13 

Mr. BERA. Well great. As my colleague from Colorado, who is 

helping us push a space weather bill through Congress, it might 

sound really geeky or wonky, but incredibly important since all of 

the technology that we rely on, GPS [Global Positioning System] 

technology, et cetera, not just our military but everyday consumers 

and individuals. 

General Hyten, we have put a lot of responsibility on the DOD 

and the Air Force, and the DOD has done a wonderful job kind of 

monitoring; and, you know, it is time that we relieve you of some 

of that burden for the international world and the commercial sector. 

From my perspective, as we go through this transition, there still 

are going to be unique capabilities that only the DOD has and only 

the DOD should have. We will have to think through how that information gets passed on to NASA or to Commerce or Department 

of Transportation. And as you are thinking through this, do you 

have any thoughts of what we should be thinking about as a deliberative body? 

General HYTEN. So a couple of thoughts. So I think from the 

largest perspective, we have to make sure that as we go forward 

in the future we always have the ability to make sure we understand what our adversaries are doing. That means we have to have 

exquisite situational awareness of exactly what is happening on a 

real-time basis. That is why you have authorized significant 

amounts of taxpayer dollars to be put against this problem. 

As we go into this different sharing arrangement, though, I think 

the first rule that comes to mind is the first rule of wing walking, 

and that is you don’t let go of the strut until you have good hold 

of the next strut, which means we can’t let loose of, you know, 

what we have now and what we are doing until we know what is 

on the other side. 

SPD–3 says for the future, the Department of Defense is responsible for providing the authoritative catalog for our country. That 

means the catalog will come out of the Department of Defense. 

Now we have to push that into Department of Commerce, into 

NASA, into other places. 

We are going to look with open eyes at how we do that, what the 

way is that we do that, are there better ways to do that. I think 

you will see things as we go through the coming year of different 

ways to do it. But, again, don’t let go of the one strut until you got 

hold of the next one. 

Mr. BERA. And I share that sentiment. Let’s hold onto that strut. 

Let’s think in a deliberative fashion what this looks like. Think 

through all the different scenarios and then come up with the right 

decision. Better to be deliberative about this and get it right as opposed to be hasty about this. 

Administrator Bridenstine—and, Jim, it is good to see you on 

that side of the podium—I know we share a mutual interest in, you 

know, allowing the commercial sector and recognizing the importance of space, but I think we also share a value, and I think all 

of us in this room share this value that the world is best served 

with American leadership, and, you know, that translates to space 

as well. 
14 

And, you know, I do think, you know, in how we look at the 

world, NASA is going to be critically important as we address this 

framework. Because it is not just a domestic issue; this is an international issue. And let’s get this framework right and then take it 

to the international community so it does set that framework. 

Do you have any thoughts of what we should be thinking about? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Absolutely, Ranking Member Bera. And it is 

good to be here. Thank you for that. And this goes really to the 

heart of what Chairman Babin was talking about was what is basic 

space situational awareness data? What is that? Because it is very 

clear in SPD–3 and the implementation guidance that that needs 

to be without fee, and the question is why. And as you mentioned, 

American leadership here matters. 

So we need to have, in my view, some basic SSA data available 

for free, because then when people all around the world are making 

investments, making determinations where they are going to invest 

their money to do space activities, they are going to make that determination in the United States of America, because we will have 

a regime that provides safety and security for their investments 

and at the same time is without fee. So that attracts capital to the 

United States. It keeps us in a preeminent position. 

Now, there will be debate about the fact that some people would 

like to see commercial companies—and this would be a good thing 

and I support it. Some people would like to see commercial companies providing the space situational awareness and space traffic 

management. We could have a regime where maybe Commerce 

were to license commercial companies to do that activity, and then 

before you launch you have to prove to Commerce that you have 

purchased or bought a subscription to one of those commercial companies providing SSA and STM. 

So that is a model where you would have a competitive market 

to provide more data and better data, with multiple [SSA]/STM 

providers all licensed by Commerce, but at the same time we get 

back to what is that basic [SSA]/STM that would be provided without fee. And this is going to be a balance, because ultimately we 

want people to make investments in the United States of America, 

and at the same time we want a commercial competitive marketplace where these providers of STA and—SSA and STM, they are 

competing to provide more data and better data at a lower cost, 

driving down insurance rates, all those kind of things. 

So this is not going to be an easy thing, as you have already 

identified, but here is what I think all of us believe. It has to be 

done, because what is at stake is so important right now. 

Mr. BERA. Great. And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Bera. 

The Chair now recognizes Chairman Lamar Smith for any questions he may have. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, let me say that it is gratifying to see the cooperation 

and collaboration between the two committees that has resulted in 

this hearing today. This may be a first. It is certainly the first in 

many years, and I hope it will be an example of further cooperation 

between our committees. 
15 

Second of all, it is nice to see a former member of the Science, 

Space, and Technology Committee as the new administrator of 

NASA. Jim Bridenstine is the right person at the right time in the 

right place, and that doesn’t happen that often, but it is nice that 

it happened here. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Jim, good to be with you. 

Secretary Ross, let me direct my first question to you, and I 

think this will help a number of members here. Would you go into 

some detail as to why you think the Department of Commerce is 

the best agency to oversee the space traffic management? 

Secretary ROSS. Yes, sir. First of all, as you know, we have elevated all of the space activities within Commerce into the Office of 

Space Commerce, which reports directly to me. So rather than 

being fragmented, rather than being buried in different parts of the 

Department, we are pulling it all together. That in and of itself will 

make it more functional, less bureaucratic than it had been. 

In terms of specific things that we can do, the ITA has the statutory duty, as does the Office of Space Commerce, to promote and 

assist this burgeoning space industry. The National Institute for 

Standards and Technology, which has a very proven record in developing standards and having them adopted throughout global 

economies, will be very, very involved. NTIA [National Telecommunications and Information Administration], which manages Federal 

spectrum use for space communications, will also play a very important role in it. And then NOAA, as you know, it already oversees the largest operational space force in the private civil sector. 

So those are some of the experiences that we already have. Notwithstanding, we continue to engage with our partners at the Department of Transportation on a variety of issues, and we will be 

working quite intensely with NASA on the one hand and with DOD 

on the other hand. 

So we already are planning within the next couple of weeks to 

send, as I mentioned, a delegation to Omaha and to Vandenberg. 

So we are trying very hard to figure out the proper way to integrate ourselves. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Secretary ROSS. The other thing that you should be aware, many 

companies that don’t need a license actually put a camera on their 

payload anyway to get the license for remote sensing from Commerce. And the reason they do that is it deals with their compliance with the Outer Space Treaty. 

So here you have companies volunteering to come under the regulatory regime of the Department of Commerce. And I think that 

speaks volumes about the degree to which the industry feels we 

and they can work in very good unison together. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Administrator Bridenstine, NASA has had a long and strong relationship with the Department of Defense that you have mentioned, and should the Department of Commerce take over the 

space traffic management, is your relationship with DOD going to 

change one way or the other? And also, what would be NASA’s role 

in dealing with the Department of Commerce on some of the issues 

that you have been dealing with the Department of Defense? 
16 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. That is a wonderful question. So even right 

now, NASA has folks at the JSpOC that are looking out for the interest of NASA, with all the great data and tools that are available 

inside the JSpOC. So that is happening right now. 

And if there is a NASA asset that could be at risk because of an 

object that is being tracked at the JSpOC, those orbital safety analysts ultimately take that data and they get in touch with one of 

two people. They go straight to Johnson, where they report it to the 

trajectory operations officer, we call it the TOPO, you know, at 

Johnson Space Center. 

And then they do further analysis to determine if that object 

could ultimately put the International Space Station at risk. That 

is what they are specifically looking for. And then if it does, what 

do we do about it? So that is on one hand. And on the other hand, 

some of the data goes to CARA [Conjunction Assessment Risk 

Analysis], which is over at Goddard, for the robotic capabilities. 

But I guess my point is to your question, the answer is yes, we 

have a great working relationship with the Department of Defense. 

We have our NASA personnel working side by side with their folks 

at the JSpOC feeding data to our centers to make sure that our 

assets are protected. And I anticipate that will continue. 

As General Hyten has said, if we win we move to a day where 

Commerce is at the helm of space situational awareness and traffic 

management, it is absolutely true that the Department of Defense 

will continue to keep the catalog, because they need to for their 

own purposes. 

So it is possible that NASA would continue to have our personnel 

maybe at the JSpOC. No decision has been made. Maybe we could 

take the data from the DOD and combine it with commercial data 

over at Commerce and international data over at Commerce and 

ultimately get a better integrated space picture at a different agency, not that that would necessarily happen, but it could. And if it 

did happen, then we would want our folks over at Commerce and 

we would probably keep them at DOD as well. But, again, this is 

way early and undetermined at this point. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Administrator Bridenstine. 

And, General Hyten, let me ask my last question to you. And it 

has just been mentioned both by the administrator and by Congressman Bera a few minutes ago in regard to the catalog of space 

objects that users take advantage of to avoid collisions in space. If 

the Department of Commerce takes over that responsibility and 

others that are now assumed by the Department of Defense, do you 

see any diminution in the quality of product, any diminution in the 

quality of service if the Department of Commerce takes over some 

of those responsibilities? 

General HYTEN. So, Mr. Chairman, I think that the line in the 

Space Policy Directive-3 that says the Department of Defense has 

to maintain the authority of the catalog, the reason that is there 

is because you can’t have arguing catalogs. You can’t have one in 

the Department of Commerce and one in the Department of Defense and then you end up arguing. 

We actually used to have that inside the Department of Defense, 

because we had one that was done by the Navy, one that was done 

by the Air Force. And it is not healthy to be arguing over which 
17 

one is better. You have to take the best data, build that catalog. 

And that is why I said the authoritative catalog will always be in 

the Department of Defense. Then we will feed that data into the 

Department of Commerce. 

And they can take other pieces to do the interface with other nations, with the commercial sector, possibly with NASA. I would envision what Congressman Bride—I did it—Administrator Bridenstine said. I would see it at the JSpOC at Vandenberg, soon to be 

the Coalition Space Operations Center. We will have international 

partners, NASA, Commerce there, and then we will feed information out of there into Commerce, into NASA. I think that is the 

healthy way. But, like Secretary Ross said, we are still in the early 

days of figuring this out. 

Mr. SMITH. Still, that clarification that you just mentioned I 

think is very reassuring to us, and it portends a wonderful relationship between DOD and the Department of Commerce. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member Johnson for any 

questions she may have. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good 

morning. Let me welcome our witnesses and thank you for your 

service. 

General, the Obama administration had considered agency roles 

and responsibilities for the civil SSA data and information services 

and had reached an interagency agreement that FAA assume that 

role. I understand that FAA, in coordination with DOD, was planning to do a pilot program at FAA on civil SSA data and information services. 

What would that pilot program have entailed, and what are your 

thoughts on a pilot program as part of the transition of SSA data 

sharing to the civil agency? 

General HYTEN. So thank you for the question, because it is important that we kind of go back in history a little bit to look at 

that. Because I have been working in this world for over two decades. In 1998 I transitioned a mission, a weather mission out of the 

Air Force into the Department of Commerce. 

For the last 10 years, really since the Iridium-Cosmos collision 

in 2009, I have been working very hard in the interagency to try 

to figure out where to put that mission, because it is not inherently 

a DOD mission. 

And so in the last administration, we were working with Commerce and Transportation. The FAA was going to do a pilot program. That pilot program was going to basically look at what it 

would take for us to ship the catalog into that organization and for 

them what kind of analysis tools, what kind of pieces would they 

have in order to do that information. 

As we have transitioned, this administration and the new SPD– 

3 that just came out says Commerce is going to take the lead on 

that, based on the burgeoning commercial sector. From the STRATCOM [Strategic Command] perspective, from the DOD perspective, 

bluntly, it doesn’t matter to me. We need a civil agency that is 

doing that role. Commerce makes sense. Transportation makes 

sense. That is a political decision. I think that Secretary Ross has 
18 

made a good argument today of why Commerce is properly the situation to do that. 

I will work with whatever element that our Nation decides is the 

right place to do it, and SPD–3 makes it clear that Commerce right 

now is the lead. So in the next few weeks, we will be working closely with Commerce. If that changes, I will work with whoever it 

takes. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Any other comments from other panel members? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Can you repeat the question one more time? 

Ms. JOHNSON. The question that I had posed is about the program, pilot program that had started with the FAA being the lead 

and if any information is transferable or—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So I think some of the arguments are that especially commercial industry would like a one-stop shop. And one 

of the challenges we have right now is that, from my perspective, 

it looks very difficult to find a one-stop shop, because you have got 

the FCC [Federal Communications Commission] that is responsible 

for spectrum. You have got NOAA that is responsible for remote 

sensing and imaging and that kind of regulation. You have got the 

FAA that is responsible for launch and reentry. And, of course, 

NASA is responsible for giving advice on, you know, protecting the 

space environment when it comes to orbital debris and even, you 

know, preventing harmful contamination of planets and things like 

that. 

So there are a whole host of different agencies involved in space 

at different levels. So the question then becomes how you do create 

a one-stop shop, and it looks increasingly more and more difficult 

all the time. 

So how do we minimize—this is the key I think, Ranking Member Johnson, that we all have to recognize. How do we create the 

maximum regulatory certainty with the minimal regulatory burden? And if we can consolidate these activities in one Federal agency or another, that minimizes the regulatory burden for the commercial operators especially. 

So Secretary of Commerce has I think very clearly articulated 

that they believe they have the capability. The President’s Space 

Policy Directive-3 says that they want Commerce to lead that activity. And I think that is a great idea. In fact, I voted on the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act and supported it in the 

subcommittee and the full committee when I was on the other side 

of the—other side of the aisle here. So I think the key is it needs 

to be done. I think Commerce is a good place to do it. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Did you have any comment, Mr. Ross? 

Secretary ROSS. Yes. Well, couple of things. Commerce already 

has many space industry-facing resources. By statute, we are 

obliged to foster growth in the space commerce industry through 

the Office of Space Commerce. 

Second, we license satellite remote sensing activities through the 

Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs Office. 

Third, we manage Federal spectrum through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration. 
19 

Fourth, we manage space weather data collection and distribution through NOAA. 

Fifth, we enforce the export administration regulations as they 

apply to space objects through the Bureau of Industry and Security. 

Sixth, we promote U.S.-based industry abroad through the International Trade Administration. 

And finally, once the payload is separated from the rocket, it is 

usually a different owner. The launch system is very different and 

it is usually a different entity from the one who has the payload. 

So there is no continuity between launch and what goes on once 

the payload is in outer space. That payload often is not, comes 

under our orbit in any event. 

I hope that explains why we think we are quite logical. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. What agencies now within Federal Government that currently carries out the research on SSA and the orbital debris, and to what extent are those activities coordinated? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Ranking Member Johnson, NASA, of course, 

does a lot of the research and technology. We really kind of set the 

standards that ultimately get followed by the other agencies. So 

NASA is very involved in it. We partner with universities and the 

commercial industry to come up with the best practices and the 

technology and research. And so, when it comes to the S&T 

[science and technology] piece of it, NASA really takes the lead. 

General HYTEN. And Representative Johnson, we have a lot of 

capability in the Department of Defense to look at that, but I would 

agree with Administrator Bridenstine, that NASA is the lead when 

it comes to the S&T into that. We take most of the algorithms and 

incorporate into what we do. We have to be able to characterize 

that, which is why we still do research in that area, but NASA is 

clearly the lead. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. Just one final question. 

How could this work be leveraged in a civil operational SSA system? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So ultimately, the idea behind SSA and STM, 

if we want to be as safe as possible, we need more data, and we 

need better data, more accurate data, and we need the ability to 

process that data. And so when it comes to science and technology, 

which is what NASA does, those are investments that we make. 

We want to be able to get more data, better data, and be able to 

process it in a way that ultimately gives us a much more safe environment, and then take that and hand it to the agencies that actually do SSA and STM. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all the 

chairmen for putting together this great hearing. And thank you 

for the panelists for what you are doing for our country. And I have 

got one question for each one of you. 

General Hyten, a lot of the data standards work for space situational awareness is done in Colorado Springs at Air Force Space 
20 

Command. So how will this policy affect that tremendously important work? 

General HYTEN. So the work that we need in order to characterize threats will continue. It will continue through STRATCOM, 

through my Joint Force Space Component commander, who is also 

the Air Force Space Command commander in Colorado. He has the 

people that do that work. That work will continue. It has to continue. But I think what will change as we look into the future, and 

this is just a natural progression as we look in the domain, is that 

we will have to partner closer with, not only NASA, and the Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation, but the 

commercial sector as well, because there is a number of significant 

commercial entities that actually do this mission. And they have 

capabilities that we need to be able to leverage as well. 

So it can’t be that one size fits all. We have to take the best debris from wherever it comes and integrate that to provide the best 

capabilities we can. 

The interesting thing that, you know, following on to what Administrator Bridenstine just said about the data, most of the data 

comes from the Air Force. Most of the data comes from the Department of Defense. We will ship that into multiple places, though, 

and people can use that data to produce better products. And I 

think that if we do it right, we will get benefit out of that and the 

Department of Defense because the folks that do that business will 

learn from others doing it as well and we will apply the best practices in the business that we have to do in the military. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. And oh, I see that the clock is 

working now. So I guess I better hurry. 

Administrator Bridenstine, and we have touched on this already 

with other questions previously, but do you believe that utilization 

of best of breed commercial SSA processing software for enhanced 

foundational SSA for NASA to avoid a potential catastrophic debris 

collision with the International Space Station is the best way to go? 

Or where should that software come from? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. That is a great question. The answer is to the 

extent—and, of course, this is in the future, we are not there yet— 

but to the extent we have a regime to do space situational awareness and space traffic management that is outside the Department 

of Defense, and instead in a civil entity, there are different ways 

it could be organized. 

And, of course, one of the ways it could be organized is that it 

could be done by commercial providers of space situational awareness that, in fact, some of which exist right now today. The Space 

Data Association, for example, the ComSpOC [Commercial Space 

Operations Center], and there are other companies providing data 

that feed the ComSpOC and the Space Data Association. So these 

are all technologies and capabilities that can be done commercially, 

can be done privately. 

The question is, going back to what General Hyten was talking 

about earlier, is who controls, who manages the data set, the catalog that is definitive. And ultimately, can it be enhanced with commercial, and those kind of things? 

One model, as I said earlier, is you could have multiple commercial companies and/or non-profits or universities competing to pro-
21 

vide SSA and STM to space operators. And the reason you want 

competition is because it drives down price, it increases innovation. 

Again, you get better data and more data. That is a model that 

works. And then ultimately, the people that pay for the data, that 

pay for the subscription would be the operators. 

It is also true that we have to balance this with the idea that 

we don’t want to drive people to other countries for their space situational awareness and space traffic management by having people 

in the United States pay for a subscription or pay for fees. So this 

is a balancing act. 

We want the United States of America to be preeminent when 

it comes to SSA/STM; and at the same time, we want to have commercial capabilities that give us more data, better data, and a competitive environment to drive down cost and increase innovation. 

So it is very early in the process. It is something that we really 

need to think through, and I am happy to be a part of it. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

And I was going to ask you, Secretary Ross, the same question. 

In just a few remaining seconds, do you want to address that? And 

then I will yield back the balance of my time. 

Secretary ROSS. Well, I agree very much with what the administrator has just said. There are alternate models that could be used, 

but at the end of the day, somebody in government needs either to 

do it, or to license the private sector to do it. So either model in 

concept could work, but you still need a government interface. I 

don’t think it is an activity that should just be left unbridled to the 

private sector. And I think everybody up here will agree with that. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I agree with that, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. 

Norcross, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you, Chairmans, for coming together to 

have this discussion. 

And it is good to see a member of HASC as the administrator 

of NASA, certainly. The questions that I want to follow up on are 

ones that we have all been working around. 

When we talk about the assets, the assets of collection, whether 

ground-based or space-based, who ultimately will be the decider of 

those assets? Who is going to purchase them? Who is going to look 

into them? And when that decision is made, I would assume most 

of these things are going to have to go through the Department of 

Defense first to say what is sensitive nature and who decides, who 

makes that decision, whether or not this information gets released 

to the commercial side. 

So, A, the assets, who is going to make the ultimate investments, 

and I have heard you talk about the commercial side, but ultimately—we don’t want duplication, but it all goes through the filter of the Department of Defense. So ultimately, who makes that 

decision on what information gets derived to the commercial side 

and who pays for the assets? If we could start with General Hyten. 

General HYTEN. I will start, Congressman. 

So I believe that if you look at it as a building block of capabilities, I think the baseline capabilities is in the Department of De-
22 

fense, and the Department of Defense will have to pay for that 

baseline. That baseline is what we need in order to understand 

what our adversaries are doing in space—— 

Mr. NORCROSS. That is the highest and number one priority. 

General HYTEN. That is the number one priority. So the bill for 

that comes to the Department of Defense. We have to pay for the 

sensors. We have to pay for the ground sensors, the space sensors, 

and the processing that allows us to do that. Now, that is the baseline. But it doesn’t talk about the interface with the commercial 

sector. It doesn’t talk about the interface with others. We have 

been making that up. I mean, literally making it up for 9 years 

now. We need to have a structured process. And that is where the 

commercial sector can come in. That is where the Department of 

Commerce can come in. And they can look at a different way of 

doing business. 

They can bring in other sources of information, other display 

tools, other capabilities that can do that. They may decide that 

there are other sources from the international community that they 

can bring in. I would hope that we have a partnership where if 

they bring other sources, they will feed that into our algorithm so 

we can take advantage of that too. We will have to work through 

those issues, but I see there is a baseline building block that the 

Department of Defense is responsible for, and then NASA, Commerce, the commercial sector, can build on top of that for other applications and other needs. 

Mr. NORCROSS. But would you ultimately have veto power if 

there is a piece of information that is coming from the Commerce 

side over to you that you see. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Norcross, is your microphone on? 

Mr. NORCROSS. Hello. 

Mr. ROGERS. There we go. 

Mr. NORCROSS. I usually can be heard. Do you ultimately have 

veto power on what information gets released? 

General HYTEN. So I think veto power is maybe too strong a 

statement. We are not going to have veto power. But this is the 

way it would work from a Department of Defense perspective, the 

algorithm that we use that processes all of this information that 

comes in, it is exquisite information, and we are going to take commercial, international, we are going to take all the information that 

we get. But believe it or not, some of it is better than others. Some 

data is better than other data. And the algorithms will be able to 

tell. And so if the data that we get from whatever source is deemed 

not as good and not providing the most accurate answer, we won’t 

use that data in our solution set. That is why it comes back to the 

authoritative catalog is the key. 

The authoritative catalog will take all the best data information. 

But at this point in time, from my perspective, all data is good, and 

then we will mathematically decide what is the best data. 

Mr. NORCROSS. And then on the commercial side is where you 

would make those decisions? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So there could be capabilities where somebody 

who has, maybe a commercial radar, or a commercial telescope that 

is creating their own data, that they could actually get data that 

the Commerce Department might not have. Or they could get data 
23 

that even the DOD might not have. And then they could share that 

data with either or both. 

So we don’t want to limit the idea that only the government can 

do it. We need to have partners that can share. One of the challenges sometimes, is that when you think about international data, 

they might not want to give it to Strategic Command. They might 

be willing to share data with Commerce. So that is a reason, another reason we need a civil authority doing this rather than simply the Department of Defense. 

It is a lot like NASA, as a matter of fact. A lot of countries 

around the world don’t want to partner with the United States Air 

Force, but they love to partner with NASA, because we are a separate space agency capable of doing science and technology apart 

from any kind of military capability, so—— 

Mr. NORCROSS. This is where you would allow the private sector 

who was doing this also in through those doors? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Absolutely. And a lot of that private sector 

might be more than happy to share the data with the Department 

of Defense or others, and, in fact, they already do, in many cases. 

General HYTEN. That is why I say I hope they would share, but 

I can’t guarantee that. 

Mr. NORCROSS. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And this is very gratifying. We have an administration that is clearly committed to focus 

on space and what we can utilize space for and what the dangers 

are and what the potential profit and benefit is. And especially 

when we have a Secretary of Commerce personally engaged, this 

has got to give a whole new energy to America’s space efforts. And 

I am very proud of each and every one of you and proud of our 

President for also stepping forward in this way. 

I believe that we have reached a tipping point in space beside 

what I just described. And that is, we have now reached a time in 

space where we have capabilities of doing so much more than what 

we are doing today. And the private sector has the possibility of 

doing so much more because of our technological capabilities. But 

at the same time, we have reaching a tipping point where space debris may get in the way of us achieving that goal. 

So this is the first step that I have seen that we are taking space 

debris seriously and that will open the door for some of these other 

great potentials that we have. 

We have whole constellations in the private sector being proposed for remote sensing and observation that could be very profitable businesses, but we know that unless we come to grips with 

this space debris challenge, they will not be going up. 

Let me ask you this: And I appreciate the fact that we are now 

talking mainly about cataloging and bringing in even the private 

sector for helping us catalog the problem. And make sure we know 

what the problem and defining what it is. But have we given any 

thought to actually having the private sector, once it is cataloged, 

doing something about it, meaning, actually having the private sector help us in extracting and taking some of this space debris, 

bringing it down? I would just like to ask that to the panel. 
24 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Congressman, the answer is absolutely yes. Of 

course, NASA is very involved in making investments right now to 

do robotic servicing of satellites in orbit, which would be an absolute game changer. And when you think about the constellations 

that are going into low Earth orbit for communications, we are 

talking about thousands and thousands of satellites, what we don’t 

want is each one of those satellites, when they become defunct, we 

don’t want them just becoming a piece of space junk, right? We 

need to be able to either, A, service them, or, B, de-orbit them. And 

I think there are good plans underway for that. 

But to the extent that NASA is making these investments in robotics, it is not just for servicing, it could ultimately be for, you 

know, the kind of activity you are talking about, which would be 

remediation, you know, getting objects out of space. But that has 

to become, as you mentioned, you want it done commercially. I 

think that would be beneficial to everybody. The way it becomes 

available commercially is ultimately to do robotics for servicing of 

satellites, have half a dozen, maybe even a dozen different companies, each with their own constellations of a dozen or more satellites doing robotic servicing. 

Once they are in orbit doing this activity commercially, because, 

again, they are doing it to serve customers that are providing, you 

know, DIRECTV, Dish Network, internet broadband from space, 

they are doing it for those purposes, well, then, while they are 

there, they can also do some remediation and the United States 

Government can actually pay for that service. 

So this is an architecture that needs to be developed. NASA is 

making investments, like I said, in the robotics. We are making investments in rendezvous and proximity operations autonomy, propulsion capabilities that can have a specific impulse that can keep 

us, our satellites active for a very long period of time. 

So navigation, of course, the sensing that is necessary to do ultimately the approaches and rendezvous and proximity. So we are 

absolutely right now making investments in that activity. When it 

is going to be sufficiently mature to move out on what I think you 

are hoping that we can do, I don’t have answer for that at this 

time, but certainly—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All of you are laying the foundation towards 

the next step. And without taking care of this challenge, we will 

impede all the other great things that humankind is capable of. 

So thank you all. And Secretary Ross, especially thank you. The 

general is out protecting our country in so many ways, and this is 

part of it. And Secretary Ross, you are the guy who is going to 

oversee commerce in the United States, and, you know, this industry, the aerospace industry is a tremendous asset to our country, 

and we are relying on you to, as you are showing today, take leadership and keeping that a major part of our economy. 

Secretary ROSS. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. God bless. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman yield back? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah. My time was up anyway. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Perlmutter for 5 minutes. 
25 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, 

thank you for your testimony today. 

I just want to sort of get back to some basics just so I understand 

the terminology here, because we are talking about space situational awareness, which seems kind of wonky, and traffic management. 

So General, from your testimony, I understand you, the Air 

Force, Department of Defense, would be, in effect, in charge of the 

space situational awareness with your monitoring capacity. Is that 

right? 

General HYTEN. Space situational awareness is a mission for the 

Department of Defense, and we will continue to do that mission. 

But it is interesting when you relate it to space traffic management, because the reason we started doing the space situational 

awareness mission, it was one of the—it was the foundation of the 

space control mission when I started this business 30-something 

years ago. We did it for space control. But when we started attaching space traffic management to it, we started thinking the catalog 

was actually to enable space traffic management. 

That is not why we do SSA. We do SSA to help defend ourselves 

against threats. And by having somebody else responsible for the 

space traffic management picture, the Department of Commerce in 

this case, will allow us to get back to using our SSA mission to 

focus on our space control mission, which is the essential piece, and 

somebody else will be doing the space traffic management. It is not 

that we don’t have a role to play. We do. But that is not our focus. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. But your main role is to just catalog and gather all of this information, which, then, you will share with NASA 

and with the Department of Commerce and other important agencies—— 

General HYTEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER [continuing]. Intelligence agencies, whatever 

they may be. 

General HYTEN. Exactly. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. So Mr. Secretary, let me turn my questioning 

to you. So under this approach that has come out of the Space 

Council and from the administration, Commerce is in charge of 

traffic management. And so, that is a concept that is not so hard 

for me to understand, because I just think about, okay, who is the 

law enforcement? You know, who gives the tickets? You know, who 

tows the abandoned vehicle? Who plows the road? You know, how 

do these kinds of things occur. And some of it is going to be commercial and some of it will be regulatory. I mean, is that how you 

look at this? 

Secretary ROSS. Yes, I do. And as you are probably aware, we already have very extensive collaboration and cooperation with Department of Defense in our export control activities, because those 

interface both with national defense and with our job as being the 

ones to find people who are violating sanctions on countries, who 

are planning to export militarily sensitive materials. 

So we have a pretty well-established vocabulary of how to deal, 

between the Department of Defense and ourselves, and this will 

just be another addition to that. 
26 

And I agree with what the general said. One size doesn’t fit all. 

There are going to have to be adjustments as we go along. And the 

technologies will evolve, new space ventures will evolve. You are 

going to get into lunar habitation, you may very well get into asteroid mining, all kinds of activities—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. So I am comfortable with—I mean, somebody 

in this hierarchy has got to take the lead on if there is a collision, 

you know, whose insurance pays for it. 

Secretary ROSS. Right. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. You know, that kind of thing. And Mr. Administrator, you and I have had this conversation several times. What 

are your thoughts, just the basics of this? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. A few things. As a pilot, if somebody says to 

you on the radio, ‘‘Call sign turn right 030 descend, maintain 

10,000 feet,’’ you do it. Why? Because if you don’t, it is illegal and 

you could possibly die. So that is why you do it. 

Right now in space, nobody has authority to compel you to maneuver. They can tell you, either the Department of Defense, the 

Strategic Command, can tell you it is a good idea, but they can’t 

tell you to do it. So that is the difference between space situational 

awareness, and, ultimately, space traffic management. 

One of the challenges with space traffic management is if you 

compel somebody to maneuver, you could be burning 4 months of 

their station-keeping fuel just to prevent them from having a collision. And the best we can do these days, in some cases—not all 

cases, but in some cases—the best we could do is, you know, there 

is 1 in 10,000 chances that your satellite will collide with another 

satellite. 

And are you going to burn 4 months’ worth of station-keeping 

fuel and give up 4 months’ worth of potential revenue as a company in order to avoid a 1-in-10,000 chance? Now, the answer is 

you are probably not, but when you think about the catastrophic 

consequences of not maneuvering, should that 1-in-10,000 chance 

occur, you can deny access to space or at least make it more problematic for, you know, generations to come. 

So this is a big deal. There has to be some agency that is capable 

of doing that. Again, I want to be clear, because this makes a lot 

of space operators nervous, we want an absolute minimal regulatory burden with maximum regulatory certainty and safety. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. But there has to be some kind of management. 

And I agree with that, and I yield back to the Chair. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

Mr. Brooks for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Forgive me for diverging 

from the primary focus of this hearing, but it occurs to me that 

each of you has significant persuasive influence on where the new 

Space Command will be headquartered, so I am going touch on 

that for just a moment. 

In that vein, I hope you will help make Redstone Arsenal a finalist in the Space Command headquarters debate. Redstone Arsenal 

has a lot to offer. We have, related to Space Command, either related a lot or related a little, the following Space Command activities: United States Army Aviation and Missile Command; Aviation 

and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center; PEO 
27 

[Program Executive Office] Missiles and Space; United States 

Army Space and Missile Command; Army Forces Strategic Command; United States Missile Defense Agency; Defense Intelligence 

Agency Missile and Space Intelligence Center; NASA’s Marshall 

Space Flight Center, which is the home and birthplace of America’s 

space program; a wealth of intellectual talent, engineers—we have 

the highest concentration of engineers in the United States of 

America—physicists, mathematicians, scientists. 

In conclusion, I hope you will concur that Redstone Arsenal and 

the Space Command seem like an excellent fit. 

Now, with that sales pitch behind me, let’s go more to the substance of this particular hearing. I do appreciate your indulgence, 

and I know you-all all have persuasive influence on the ultimate 

outcome of that Space Command location debate. 

I know that the Department of Defense has done some interim 

work with the Federal Aviation Administration on SSA. With respect to Jim Bridenstine’s Space Renaissance Act from last Congress, to put the one-stop shop for commercial space at the Department of Transportation, not the Department of Commerce, what 

would be your insight, your perspective on where we are looking 

at now? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. A great question. As you just recognized, I 

have, in the past, sponsored legislation, authored legislation to 

have the one-stop shop be at FAA AST [Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation], especially taking AST and moving it out of the 

FAA and making it a direct report to the Department of Transportation, specifically to the Secretary. 

So that was legislation that I ran a couple of years ago to really 

force the conversation about this kind of activity and how important it is. 

Now, I would also tell you as a member of the Science Committee, Space Subcommittee specifically, I have voted multiple 

times on the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, 

which puts this at Commerce. 

So my views on this, of course, have shifted, but I think more importantly than anything else, it has to be done. And to me, it 

doesn’t matter so much where, just the fact that we don’t have time 

to waste anymore. And if we get caught in whether it is a parochial 

issue or a jurisdictional issue among committees, and this thing 

gets held up for a year or two, we are at risk, especially when you 

consider the large constellations that are going to be put into low 

Earth orbit. 

I think Secretary Ross has made a compelling argument for why 

it should be Commerce. I fully support that, and I am ready to 

move out on it. 

Mr. BROOKS. General Hyten, question for you, but first a comment. 

It is always good to see someone with the success that you have 

enjoyed from my hometown, Huntsville, Alabama. So any time you 

get a chance to come back, we have got over 100 generals who have 

retired there. I am sure you would be welcome, too, when that time 

comes. 

General HYTEN. Are you trying to retire me, Congressman? 
28 

Mr. BROOKS. This question is for you. What is your assessment 

today of the Department of Commerce’s ability to manage these authorities, and do they have the proper resources and personnel 

needed to manage these authorities? And if not, what is your opinion on what is needed to get them there? 

General HYTEN. So, I guess if it is a yes-or-no question which you 

just asked, then the answer is no, they don’t have all the things 

they need to do. 

But Secretary Ross realizes that, and he has committed inside 

the National Space Council, he has committed to me at breakfast 

this morning, that he is going to identify the right people if he has 

to go down this path and put those people at this job. 

His folks have been unbelievably transparent and helpful in defining what this space traffic management piece would be in the 

Department of Commerce. They have been straightforward. 

So he does not have all the issues he will need to do that job in 

the future, but he has committed to making sure he identifies those 

and pursues those. I am sure he will be working with you on that 

issue in the future. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, with respect to Secretary Ross and General 

Hyten, and, of course, Jim Bridenstine, I happen to serve on the— 

I am vice chair of the Space Subcommittee of SST [Science, Space, 

and Technology Committee], and I am also on the Strategic Forces 

Committee of House Armed Services Committee. 

So if there is anything I can do to help ensure that the Department of Commerce has the resources it needs, please let me know 

in wearing one hat or the other. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lamb for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bridenstine, first question for you. 

You mentioned a couple times that you thought that if we took 

the lead on SSA in the United States and developed a better system through the Department of Commerce and worked with private enterprise, that that would actually give the United States a 

competitive advantage when it came to firms actually opening their 

businesses and putting their capital here in the future. 

Would you mind elaborating on exactly how that would work? 

Because I am just sort of picturing if what we are doing is really 

making data available, why would that actually give firms an incentive to locate in the United States? Or how could we make sure 

that it does, I guess? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Great question. So the idea is that we have 

companies that are international, investing, in many cases, billions 

of dollars into constellations that will be in low Earth orbit. And 

those companies are going to be looking for opportunities to protect 

their investments. How safe of a regime are they going to have, 

and certainly, they are going to want access to, you know, what the 

United States has to offer. 

Now, it is absolutely true that given the current regime that exists right now, the Department of Defense, through STRATCOM, 

ultimately provides space situational awareness and conjunction 
29 

analysis to the entire world, and they do it for free. And they do 

it for free because we have to protect the space domain. 

I mean, if you look historically, the Department of Defense got 

into this business because they were trying to protect American national security interest. Well, it is still in America’s national security interest to prevent collisions and more orbital debris in space. 

But I do believe that if the United States of America has a regime that could be commercial, and it could be led by a civilian 

agency, that a lot of companies all over the world are going to want 

to establish American companies to get the absolute best data for 

the protection of their $1 billion investments, or $100 million investments, big investments. 

And that, I think, is good for America. It grows the economy, it 

helps our balance of payments and our trade deficit, and I think 

that that is a big piece of what we ought to be doing. It also could 

lower insurance premiums if they have access to that data. 

Mr. LAMB. Does that place the onus on us, then, to make sure 

that any data-sharing from the civilian agency with private firms 

would be dependent on that private firm having an American presence, essentially? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So there is different levels. We talked about 

having basic SSA data that would be necessary for safety, in general. And then there is data that could be made available from 

commercial operators that would provide an enhanced level of protection, if you will. And so finding that right balance, I think, is 

important, because we want to have a competitive market where 

we are trying to get more data and better data. 

But as everybody here has agreed, it is inherently governmental, 

because ultimately, it is in everybody’s interest to protect space. So 

we have to have that civil agency that is responsible for it ultimately. 

Mr. LAMB. Thank you. General Hyten, I just wanted to follow up 

on a point in your testimony about our adversaries, other countries, 

even some of our allies making increasing investments in space at 

the same time. Can you talk about any of those to the extent you 

are able here that should concern us or that make the space more 

competitive than we might realize, investments being made by 

other countries? 

General HYTEN. So both China and Russia have invested enormous amounts of their national treasure to build capabilities for 

the sole purpose of countering the United States advantage in 

space. They built ground-based capabilities, space-based capabilities, a variety of different technologies that I can’t go into in this 

hearing. But enormous amounts of their treasure with the sole purpose, it is not for something going on in the Western Pacific, it is 

nothing for going on—the sole purpose is to counter the United 

States advantages in space. 

And as the commander responsible for defending the Nation in 

that domain, I have to look at those capabilities as real threats. 

And that means I have to develop counters to those threats, which 

is why the first thing I have to have, just like in any other domain, 

is exquisite situational awareness of what is happening in that domain so I can respond quickly enough. That is the same in air, 

land, sea. It is the same in space. 
30 

Mr. LAMB. Are they spending more than us in any of these domains, General, or just more than they have in the past? 

General HYTEN. I can’t go into specifics, but in certain areas they 

are investing more than we are. Our capabilities are so huge, enormous, powerful that the capabilities they have really can’t impact 

us today. But what we have to make sure is that 10 years from 

now, 20 years from now that is still the same. That is the challenge. 

Mr. LAMB. Thank you very much. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

At this point, we are going to pause for a minute. While we very 

much appreciate Secretary Ross and his participation in this hearing has been very helpful, he has been called to the White House. 

So we are going to excuse the Secretary and take any further questions for him for the record, and allow him 10 days to provide a 

written response to the member who has a question. And with that, 

thank you, Mr. Ross, and you are excused. 

Secretary ROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service to your country. Administrator Bridenstine, you display a tremendous amount of common 

sense, which makes it very clear why you are no longer in Congress. 

You gentlemen have provided excellent testimony in a very fascinating time in our history of mankind where space has clearly become a theater of engagement militarily, while at the same time 

is a new frontier for tremendous expansion of commercial activity. 

We have models like this, of course, throughout the history of 

man, there has never been a theater of engagement that did not 

include civilian commercial activity, be it by land, sea, or air. So 

the models of the past, as they help us to plan for the future, I believe we are on the right track here, because the DOD needs to 

handle defense and warfare capabilities in any theater of engagement. And to divest itself—and it is understandable why over the 

last, you know, several decades, DOD has become deeply involved, 

it is obvious that cataloging the activities in space, because of the 

responsibility of recognizing space as a theater of engagement, it 

is understandable why this has happened and got to this point, 

where DOD is doing a tremendous amount of activity that pulls it 

away from warfare capabilities. And it makes sense that at this 

juncture we would divest some of those responsibilities to the appropriate agency. 

So with respect to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, I believe what we endeavor to determine with absolute certainty is 

which civilian agency is appropriate to relieve that burden from 

DOD. So it has been suggested, and I am leaning yes to concur, 

that the Department of Commerce is that agency. 

So General, is this a good idea? Is this a win for America and 

for the defense of our Nation? 

General HYTEN. So, Congressman, this is actually a great day. 

Probably should have said that earlier on. Because this is a day 
31 

that we have been looking for for a long time. We have had interesting dynamics. The first time you see a collision between a piece 

of debris and a Chinese satellite, what are you supposed to do? 

Well, I remember that conversation, and the commander saying, 

tell them. You know, we don’t want a collision to happen. But how 

is that a Department of Defense mission? And so we started a long 

time ago trying to figure out how do we do this differently? That 

shouldn’t be the responsibility of the Department of Defense. We 

shouldn’t be forcing our airmen, soldiers, Marines, to make those 

kinds of decisions. That is clearly other elements of our government. 

So we have gone back and forth where it needs to be. The administration has decided Commerce is the place. Secretary Ross has 

jumped in and said, I am the guy, let’s go ahead and do that. I am 

all in with that. I am all in. I think that is the right decision. We 

just ought to go. 

Administrator Bridenstine said the same thing a while ago. We 

got to just go now. It is the time. We can’t waste any more time. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I concur. Administrator, would you comment on 

that question, please? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Here is what I would like to share. I think it 

is an important philosophical debate, but when you look at the expansion of humanity, whether humanity is crossing the Atlantic or 

crossing the continents from, you know, from east to west, or expanding into space, if you will, it is all driven by commerce. 

And philosophically, if we are going to go further, it is going to 

be driven by commerce. And the resources that are available in 

space are quite frankly, they are limitless. And so Commerce, I 

think should take the helm here for that basic philosophical reason. 

The other thing that is important to note is that space has transformed all of our lives, and we are now dependent on space in ways 

we never—a lot of Americans don’t recognize how dependent we 

are on space. The way we navigate, the way we communicate, the 

way we produce food, the way we produce energy, how we do disaster relief, predict weather, monitor the climate, the way we do 

national security and defense. All of it depends on space. 

In fact, the GPS signal is required for banking. If we lose the 

GPS signal, that changes. In fact, it could be catastrophic for our 

country. If you lose the GPS signal, you can’t do banking, next 

thing you know there is no milk in the grocery store. Civil unrest. 

That is a huge challenge. 

So here is the important thing, going back in time when you 

think about the history of naval power, for example, Alfred Thayer 

Mahan, he was a great theorist on naval power, commerce ultimately results in that commerce being threatened. 

And that is what is happening right now. Our entire way of life 

is dependent on space. And our, not enemies necessarily, but our 

competitors know that, and they are developing capabilities to 

thwart our way of life. 

And so if commerce is important for the power of nations as Alfred Thayer Mahan said back in the 1800s, then defending that 

commerce is also important as well, or protecting that commerce, 

which is, again, why I believe it is perfectly legitimate and good 
32 

that Commerce take the helm of providing space situational awareness and space traffic management. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Gentleman, you present a compelling argument. 

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Lucas, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And in response to your 

invitation, I have a question for Secretary Ross that I will submit 

basically noting my curiosity about as we transition to this new 

plan, since I don’t see anything in the fiscal year 2018 and 2019 

budgets to help the Department of Commerce finance that, how 

they plan on addressing it. But I will submit that in writing. 

If I could turn now to my fellow Oklahoman, the administrator, 

Mr. Bridenstine. First of all, I promised your constituents I will 

provide the most intense oversight—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Oh my goodness. 

Mr. LUCAS [continuing]. Of your life for the rest of your career 

in that role, which would be an awesome experience. Just taking 

care of my fellow Oklahomans’ concerns. 

Let’s talk for a moment, though, in general, if you would, since 

this summer is the 60th anniversary of the legislation that created 

your agency when the Eisenhower administration and our predecessors in Congress determined that we needed to have a civilian 

perspective on space exploration. 

As we talk today about what Commerce is going to do and the 

continued important mission of the Department of Defense, where 

do you envision NASA actually playing as these issues evolve over 

the coming decades? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So NASA is an agency, we do discovery and 

exploration. We do science. And, of course, we are not involved in 

national security space. We are not involved in defense. But certainly, we want to make sure that our assets are secure. And that 

is when you think about space situational awareness, space traffic 

management. And the fact that we have humans in orbit right 

now, we have to be very aware of the space environment and the 

risk that it poses to our astronauts. 

So I like how you framed it, Chairman Lucas, that in 1958, Eisenhower created NASA. He did it with an expressed intent that 

space exploration not be part of the Department of Defense. He 

wanted it intentionally separate. He wanted a peaceful agency that 

can partner with the rest of the world in making civilization-changing discoveries. That was his objective. 

And what I would say now is we don’t necessarily want space situational awareness and space traffic management to be a Department of Defense specific issue. Certainly, they are going to do that, 

but they don’t have to do the conjunction analysis and warning for 

the entire world for free, and not to mention all of the commercial 

operators as well. 

So I think it is important to have a civil agency capable of doing 

that, just like Eisenhower envisioned for NASA back in 1958. 

Mr. LUCAS. General, some 30-plus years ago, I had a conversation at a public event with a colonel who was an officer in, I believe, what is probably your organization now 30 years back. And 

as a nonpublic official, I spent a little bit of time asking him a vari-
33 

ety of questions, being inquisitive. And he was one of the most cautious, methodical, thorough officers I have seen. He said absolutely 

nothing. 

But I finally asked him a question, and I will ask you a question, 

the same question I asked him. How do you sleep at night? Thirtysome years ago he said, I sleep very well at night. How do you 

sleep at night with your responsibilities? 

General HYTEN. I sleep very well. 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you for the answer I wanted. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

General HYTEN. One comment on that. It is important. The reason I sleep well, as I mentioned in my opening statement, because 

I have 162,000 of the best and brightest that America has to offer 

that do the job every day. And they actually do the work. I don’t 

do any of the work. They do the work. 

And because they are out there deployed under the ground, 

under the sea, in the air, operating in space, that should allow you 

to sleep well, because it allows me to sleep well. 

Mr. LUCAS. And that is the exact point I wanted you to make, 

General, because the general public does not have an understanding or an appreciation for all of that. And for 30-plus years this important role has been fulfilled. 

Again, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will just say to the 

administrator, welcome back. We are honored that you are in the 

role you are in. We will miss you here, but you are the right person 

for this position at this time, and we are honored deeply that you 

are in that role. And welcome back here today. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you. 

Mr. HICE. General, let me begin with you. Just in light of all the 

conversation today, how do you prioritize the competing interests 

and needs between DOD, commercial, and SSA requirements? 

General HYTEN. So it goes back to the discussion of a building 

block. So the building block, the essential building block, from my 

perspective, is our national security. And so that is the first thing 

that I have to worry about. Do we have enough information, 

enough situational awareness to allow me to exercise the authorities and responsibilities that have been given to me for the mission 

of Strategic Command and defend our Nation in space. 

That is the first priority. That is the priority that the United 

States Department of Defense has to pay for, has to understand, 

et cetera. We have chosen over the last 9 years, since the IridiumCosmos collision, to pay for kind of the rest of the world, both with 

resources in manpower and money to provide that kind of collision 

warning, situational awareness for the world because we realized 

after the Iridium-Cosmos collision in 2009, if a collision occurs it 

is really bad for the security of America and for the security of the 

world. 

So nobody was doing it, so we said we can do it, so we did. But 

ever since that time, we have been looking for the structure that 

will allow us to just focus on our national security mission and 

have somebody else do that. Somebody else also pay the resources 
34 

for that additional function. Not above the baseline. We still have 

to continue to do the baseline, but all those other pieces from that. 

Now, the Space Policy Directive-3 designates the Department of 

Commerce is the person to step up and do that, and Secretary Ross 

has said he is the guy, he is going to step up and do that. And that 

is what we, in the Department of Defense, have been looking for, 

for a number of years. So we are happy with where we are right 

now. 

Mr. HICE. So are you saying the Department of Defense will be 

the top priority followed by SSA, then commercial? Is that kind 

of—— 

General HYTEN. Well, from an SSA perspective, not from a space 

traffic management perspective. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. 

General HYTEN. Space traffic management should be somebody 

else’s job, but we have to focus on what we need from space situational awareness in order to allow us to defend ourselves in space, 

and defend ourselves against any adversaries that might challenge 

us in space. That means exquisite situational awareness. It just so 

happens that that information is what is also needed for space traffic management. 

But we will give that data to somebody else to process, to do the 

analysis, to reach out, to reach out to nations, to reach out to companies. We have been doing that, and we have been making it up. 

And I am pretty proud of the folks that have been making that up, 

because it is a miracle to me that we haven’t had a collision, but 

that should be somebody else’s job. 

Mr. HICE. Then in light of that, how much currently, how much 

manpower and resources and so forth do you use when dedicating 

efforts to negotiate SSA agreements with commercial foreign states 

and so forth? 

General HYTEN. So for negotiating SSA agreements, it has been 

very small. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. 

General HYTEN. It is four or five people on my staff that do that 

work, and that is not their only job. They have other jobs that they 

do as well. But that is one of their additional duties, is to focus on 

that. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. 

General HYTEN. But the biggest impact, though, is the people 

that have to actually do the work, the processing. That number is 

in the dozens. That is what will be offloaded to significant numbers 

that will free them up to do what I believe is the real warfighting 

missions. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. So in freeing that up, you will be able to better 

utilize it for defense purposes? 

General HYTEN. Exactly. 

Mr. HICE. Mr. Administrator, I heard you bring up earlier, and 

let me just ask you this, how will the trend that is currently underway for small satellites affect SSA capabilities and beyond? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. That is another great question. So every orbital regime is different. Of course, we have a lot of assets in low 

Earth orbit. We have a lot of assets in geostationary orbit. Those 

are two orbits that are critically important and they will require 
35 

a space situational awareness and space traffic management regime that is very different than a medium Earth orbit or an orbit 

that is below low Earth orbit. 

You know, sometimes I have heard people make the argument 

that CubeSats ought to be below the International Space Station 

in order to not necessarily be regulated at all with STM or SSA. 

That if you are below the ISS, you are going to be de-orbiting just 

based on the trace atmosphere at that level within 5 to 10 years 

anyway, so we don’t really need a regime. 

So what I would say is it is not necessarily the size of the satellite that matters, but what matters is where that satellite is positioned and the different orbital regimes are going to have different 

kind of requirements for, you know, where they are located. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Again, thank you both, gentlemen, for all you 

do. We are honored. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Mitchell for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. First, Mr. Bridenstine, I 

want to congratulate you on becoming the administrator. And 

thank you, as your departing the committee gave me the opportunity to join the committee. So congratulations. And I am warming your chair, I guess. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. You are, indeed. Thank you for doing that. 

Mr. MITCHELL. It is an honor, sir. 

Question, if you could relay to also Mr. Ross, who will submit to 

the committee. 

You had advocated as well that this, this situational awareness 

or traffic management go to the FAA. And the FAA is currently involved in that they certify launches, aircraft that are launched, 

they provide certification for that in this process. 

Can you share with me how much involvement the FAA has been 

in this process as this transition is going on, and I will ask the 

same question of Secretary Ross as well. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Sure. So I will be honest. I have been in Congress until about 7 or 8 weeks ago, so I wasn’t part of all the negotiations that got to the point where we were ready to announce 

SPD–3, so I do know that FAA was involved. There were meetings 

in the National Space Council where this discussion was had. 

How robust it was and who said what and when, I am not 100 

percent sure. But I can tell you that everybody is in agreement 

that I have talked to that this has to be done in a civil agency. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Agreed. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And, you know, Commerce is a good place to 

do it. It is also important to note, as Secretary Ross noted, that 

Commerce is involved in space in a robust way already. A lot of 

people don’t realize the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, about 40 percent of their budget is space-related activities. And, of course, that is controlled by Commerce. And ultimately, they make purchases for those activities, and NASA is involved in buying a lot of their satellites, or at least doing a lot of 

the requirements generation and then the activities that are necessary to acquire those satellites. 
36 

So NASA is involved in that. But it is a Commerce function. It 

is also important to note that Commerce is involved in remote 

sensing licensing, and that kind of activity. So there is a lot of activities that are done both in Commerce and the FAA. 

A couple of years ago when I drafted that bill, you know, my 

thought was, we will put it at FAA and we will take everything 

and put it at FAA. It appears now that the right course of action 

given the consensus that has been come to is that it be at Commerce. And I fully support that. The key is, it needs to be done. 

That needs to happen. 

Mr. MITCHELL. I agree that does need to be done. 

One of the questions I have, as you well know, is space and commercial FAA-type traffic isn’t a clean division. There is clearly, and 

I have talked with several folks involved, SpaceX and others. There 

is an overlap of that. How do you reconcile and maybe, General, 

you have some feedback, how do you reconcile that or make it 

work? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I will take it real quick. There are a lot of 

seams here that are critically important. As you mentioned, if you 

are going to get to space, you are going to have to go through the 

National Airspace System, number one. Then when you get to 

space, eventually you are going to potentially de-orbit if you are in 

low Earth orbit. 

And so in each of these cases, you are going to be taking advantage of the National Airspace System. One of the challenges that 

we have right now is when a launch occurs, the National Airspace 

System for a geographic region gets shut down for a number of 

hours and commercial air traffic has to go around it. And it costs 

a lot of money and puts a big burden on industry. 

We want that to shrink. So whether it is launch or a whole host 

of other activities, Commerce is going to have to work with FAA 

and vice versa. And so these seams have to be really well thought 

out and we need to prepare for them, but that is going to happen 

regardless of where it is. Commerce and FAA are going to have to 

work together to make it happen. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Agreed. My concern was, I admit, I sit on TI 

[Transportation and Infrastructure Committee], and I am on the 

Aviation Subcommittee. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. There you go. 

Mr. MITCHELL. I didn’t see here, and I would encourage some description of how actually you engage with the FAA on this because 

I think there is, not just launch, but, in fact, failure of a launch, 

that area needs to be closed. All the risks and factors affect that 

civil aviation, that airspace now. 

General, do you have anything you wish to add to that, sir? 

General HYTEN. So I agree with the administrator. The key there 

is when it comes to space, every element of the government is involved. Some in big ways, some in small ways, which means there 

is always going to be seams. So the way you handle seams is with 

clear authorities and responsibilities. And the authority to the Secretary of Defense is to defend the Nation. The authority to the 

Commerce is to promote commerce. 

Now, you have to decide, for this space traffic management, 

where is the best place to put the authority? The administration 
37 

has decided the Department of Commerce is the best place to put 

that. But that doesn’t mean that—the FAA still has a role, the Department of Defense still has a role, NASA still has a role. We all 

are going to have roles as we go through this, but we all have to 

align under some—because if we don’t, we will just keep doing it. 

Mr. MITCHELL. I appreciate that. And I would suggest that 

maybe a little more clarity, and I will share with Secretary Ross 

as well, in terms of what those seams are and that role of the FAA 

so that we don’t end up losing something there. I think it would 

be critically important. 

I appreciate your answers. And I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognize Mr. Beyer for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, Administrator, 

thanks so much for being with us all morning. 

Administrator Bridenstine, I am very impressed with the many 

things NASA is doing in the space. The new Space Fence radar; the 

NASA Orbital Debris Engineering Model which predicts what is 

coming in the next 30 to 35 years; the LEO-to-GEO [low Earth 

orbit to geosynchronous Earth orbit] Environment Debris model, 

LEGEND, which looks at what the environment is going to be like 

in 100 to 200 years. 

Can you tell us what LEGEND tells us about this 100 to 200 

year? Is space going to become ever more crowded and ever more 

dangerous? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Absolutely. So just to be clear, Space Fence is 

not a NASA project; it is a DOD project. But we certainly will benefit from it. I am a little concerned that we are going to learn about 

so much space debris that our astronauts are going to be sheltering 

in place a lot more than they are right now. In fact, we haven’t 

sheltered in place since 2015. 

Once we have more situational awareness on all the debris that 

is out there, it could—you know, once you know what you need to 

be worried about, you get more worried about it. So there is a concern there on my end. 

Mr. BEYER. Administrator, let me ask you the most naive question of the morning. Is there anything we can do to collect the debris that is out there? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. There are certain technologies that are being 

developed. NASA, of course, is involved in robotic servicing of satellites. It is a project we have right now underway that is called 

Restore-L, and we are going to service a Landsat-7 satellite, which 

is a good project. 

But ultimately, if we want to do robotic servicing in a way that 

is beneficial to our country and game-changing, we need to develop 

robotic technologies that can then be licensed to a dozen companies, and each of those companies could have a dozen satellites in 

low Earth orbit doing robotic servicing of satellites. When we get 

to that position, it is absolutely possible that we could hire some 

of those commercial companies to remove orbital debris. 

So that is certainly within the realm of possibility and a futuristic kind of thought, a futuristic kind of thinking about how to deal 

with the orbital debris population. 
38 

Mr. BEYER. It would certainly, if you look at that 30 to 35 years 

or 100 to 200 years. I am working on the assumption that mankind 

is going to put ever more debris up there year after year. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. That is true. It is also true that the biggest 

risk to missions in low Earth orbit, the biggest risk is from objects 

that are too small to even track. So we can kind of create a statistical model as to what the environment looks like and create probabilities about how long a satellite can last in low Earth orbit, 

given the pelting that it is going to receive from debris, and how 

much shielding it might need to have. 

So we can create those statistical models. But ultimately, the biggest risk is from objects that we can’t even track right now. So it 

is going to be hard to remove them if we don’t know that they are 

there specifically. 

Mr. BEYER. Mr. Administrator, I know you have a hard science 

background with your triple major at Rice. Is there any value to 

the orbital degradation of the stuff or is it just too small to have 

the orbits degrade in our lifetimes? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Oh, they do degrade, especially in low Earth 

orbit. There is trace atmosphere. The gravity of the Earth is not 

uniform. And so we see a lot of these objects behaving in ways that 

sometimes are unanticipated. 

I know Dr. Moriba Jah was here just a few minutes ago from the 

University of Texas. He talks about the fact that a lot of these objects in space that are not even trackable or the objects that are 

trackable, we model them as if they are all perfect spheres, and 

they are not. We model them as if they don’t spin or maneuver, 

and they do. We model them as if the Earth’s gravity is perfectly 

uniform, and it’s not. 

So there is a lot we need to learn about orbital debris and how 

it behaves so that ultimately we can get better data to ultimately 

make predictions and characterizations that can protect our assets 

and property. 

But you are hitting some very key points, which are it is a dangerous environment, we need to do the best we can to characterize 

that environment, and ultimately we need to be able to detect objects that are smaller than 10 centimeters, which is what we can 

do right now. 

Mr. BEYER. Let me ask you a small but probably important budget question. In your testimony, you talked about the Conjunction 

Assessment Risk Analysis office—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Yes. 

Mr. BEYER [continuing]. At Goddard, which I am sure you are 

very proud of, and that they have the primary role of checking 65 

spacecraft, et cetera, et cetera. Its budget is $4 million a year, and 

yet we know the rest of the things you are putting up there are 

billions of dollars. Are we spending enough money on the CARA office? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I think we are. Certainly, more money is better, but given the risk that we are seeing to our missions and their 

ability to assess those risks and then make determinations for maneuvers as necessary, I believe we are in a good position right now 

with the investments that we have. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Administrator. 
39 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Dunn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator Bridenstine, Jim, it is great to see you here. I 

have a couple of questions about the services currently provided. So 

the Space Policy Directive reaffirmed the basic collision avoidance 

information services are and should continue to be provided free of 

user fees. Can you confirm that that is so going forward? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. That is a big objective, again, because it is important for the United States of America to be preeminent here in 

this capability, and we want companies to locate in the United 

States believing that they are going to have these kind of services 

available through a civil agency. So I believe basic SSA is important for the safety of the space environment in general. 

Mr. DUNN. As do my constituents. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay, good. 

Mr. DUNN. In that same vein, if the government contracts with 

a private company to provide space situational awareness functions, in that situation will the data and the analytics continue to 

be available and will the raw data be available in repository form 

so that civilian companies can perform their own analytics? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So that is a wonderful question and not an 

easy one, but eventually the way I think it is going to go is there 

is going to be a basic SSA kind of capability that is available to 

everybody, and it will be without fee, which I think is important. 

But there are also going to be private companies that are going 

to want to give advantages to other private companies operating in 

space. And in order to provide that advantage, they are going to 

license their data to a private company and the U.S. Government 

might not have access to that. 

So that presents an opportunity for commercial companies to 

augment data and get better resolution, higher resolution. And 

really in a free market, you know, the United States Government 

can’t confiscate that data. 

So I think there is going to be an architecture that is going to 

have a basic SSA capability, and then there are also going to be 

commercial companies that can come alongside and provide that to 

operators, maybe in their model. Other people might want to develop sensors and data and sell it directly to the government. That 

might be a model as well. 

Mr. DUNN. So specifically, can you address the raw data that the 

government currently gathers? Would that raw data be available to 

private companies? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. It would be available to the public. Any government data would be available to the public. And right now, that 

data generally comes from STRATCOM through the JSpOC. 

Mr. DUNN. Let me ask you. Maybe I should have asked the general, he is holding that. But let me ask, what was the rationale for 

assigning the Department of Commerce, not NASA, as the lead 

civil agency for space situational awareness? 
40 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So NASA is an agency that does science and 

technology. We do discovery. We do exploration. What we don’t do 

is regulate. That is historic—— 

Mr. DUNN. I think that is good. I just wanted to get you on 

record, because I actually agree with that decision. I just wanted 

to get it out. 

General Hyten, space is being designated as a warfighting domain as well as a commercial domain. Where do you see the trend 

in space control sort of evolving for DOD in space situational 

awareness? 

General HYTEN. It is interesting, because as the combatant commander with space as my joint operating area, I actually have two 

priorities and some people think they conflict. 

Priority number one is to defend this Nation against all threats. 

That means I have to be able to watch any threat, deal with any 

threat, defeat any threat. And I do that. 

But I also have an implied task that says I have to make sure 

that the space environment is safe for the future, because anything 

bad that happens in space, it is not like we were talking about 

cleaning up the environment a while ago. It is not like you can just 

go out right now and clean it up. You know, if you have a collision 

in space, the impacts are forever. So there is an implied task that 

I have to be able to operate safely in order to do that. 

That is why for the last 9 years we have stepped up to the job 

of providing that for the world. We will continue to do that until, 

hopefully, the Department of Commerce steps up in the near term 

to do that for us, because it is in our interest as a Nation to have 

a secure space environment. 

Mr. DUNN. I couldn’t agree with you more, and I think you have 

done a great job. I hope you continue to have a great presence 

there. 

A comment. I was looking when I saw that Space Policy Directive 

Number 3 came out, I said, what were 1 and 2? So I had a chance 

to go back and look at that. And, you know, the SPD–1 was let’s 

go to the moon and Mars. SPD–2 was let’s streamline the space 

regulatory environment. And now I am looking at SPD–3 and I am 

looking at all the things it addresses, and my staff summed that 

up well for me. They said, just make space great again. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Foster for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you to our witnesses, and congratulations to 

Administrator Bridenstine. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you. 

Mr. FOSTER. Nice to have you back. I would like, if you could, to 

speak a little bit about how you are viewing the international governance and enforcement of space commerce. You know, the United 

States is not alone. I think it’s, you know, the rest of the world has 

roughly a comparable number of orbiting devices and that ratio is 

going to change over time. 

And so do you anticipate a future where every country pretty 

much goes its own way and regulates its own commerce and we 

have to worry about a race to the bottom for the lowest level of regulation which will be the lowest cost for multinational corporations, 
41 

or do you anticipate that the U.S. regulator will serve underneath 

and be potentially overridden by an international body with regulation over all space activities? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. That is a great question, Congressman. Currently, in some orbital regimes, the International Telecommunications Union, the ITU, which is a part of the United Nations, does 

license orbital slots for the international community. And, of 

course, American companies are involved in getting their orbital 

slots from the ITU. The ITU is also involved in allocating spectrum 

for commercial operators. So there is already an international component there. 

Maybe where at this point it is insufficient is what is happening 

largely in low Earth orbit, where there is a whole lot more debris 

and a whole lot more risk, I should say. 

And the answer is, right now there isn’t that kind of international oversight in low Earth orbit the way there is in geostationary orbit. And what I would say is I think the direction we 

should go is we should set those standards, and NASA has a history of doing this. 

Mr. FOSTER. Right. But there is the enforcement problem when 

someone goes to a country that is not setting those standards, puts 

stuff up in space. Who says no and how is that enforced? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. It is done through the ITU, which is—— 

Mr. FOSTER. I mean, look at the South China Sea, right? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Right. No, that is right. 

Mr. FOSTER. You know, an international body clearly spoke and 

said that is not an acceptable activity, and a certain country that 

will remain nameless sort of is ignoring that. When that recurs in 

space, what is the scenario here that you are thinking of? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So as a pilot in the Navy, I used to operate in 

the Persian Gulf, and we would get challenged by various countries 

and they would say, you are operating in the wrong part of the 

world or whatever. 

And we would always go back and say, under ICAO procedures, 

the International Civil Aviation Organization, that we were a sovereign U.S. aircraft operating in international airspace, due regard. 

And that word ‘‘due regard’’ is ultimately what protects us from 

challenges from the international community. 

And I would argue that, you know, as it relates to us right now 

in space, we operate due regard. And I would say that as time goes 

on, American leadership might need to be a little stronger here so 

that ultimately we don’t have collisions that beget more collisions. 

Mr. FOSTER. Okay. But what happens when two countries start 

fighting over mining the same asteroid or things like that? You 

know, is there any alternative to an international governance organization? And if there is not, why are we not prioritizing that first, 

to get that structure in place and get the U.S. regulators plugged 

into it? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I think the model that we utilize right now— 

and, of course, this is established through the Outer Space Treaty, 

where—— 

Mr. FOSTER. Many countries are not signatories to the Outer 

Space Treaty, they have not ratified it, important countries, you 

know, like China, like others I could name. 
42 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Sure. So certainly that requires international 

pressure to get them to conform to the international standards. 

Mr. FOSTER. So is your concept here that U.S. regulation will be 

secondary to international regulation, or that we are just going to 

go make up our own rules? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I think we adhere to the treaties that are currently in place, specifically the Outer Space Treaty. And as long as, 

you know, we are operating under the obligations of our international treaty—— 

Mr. FOSTER. Right. Which are incomplete and there will have to 

be detailed regulations. For example, if you look at cybersecurity, 

you can’t have people put up swarms of satellites without enough 

cybersecurity that ensures they can’t be hacked and use their station-keeping ability to go and, you know, knock out the ISS, or any 

of these sort of scenarios. 

There will have to be international standards on, for example, 

cybersecurity for any satellite with station-keeping ability. Okay. 

And there will be different—countries will have different opinions 

on that. If some country thinks that the U.S. standards are not 

high enough and we say no, that is too expensive, how do you anticipate that that decision will be handled? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So as far as your earlier suggestion that if we 

mine an asteroid and maybe somebody else wants to mine the 

same asteroid and that could result in a dispute, I think the odds 

of that are exceptionally small, but I think also at the same time 

we can operate due regard. And whoever extracts the resource has 

the rights to the resource under the Outer Space Treaty, which we 

are signatories to. 

Mr. FOSTER. All right. Well, I guess my time is up here. But, you 

know, I really urge you to think more about the international—you 

know, the idea that America acting alone is a reasonable model to 

proceed is not going to work. You know, 50 years from now, the 

majority of objects in orbit are not going to be U.S. objects and we 

are not going to dominate space in the long term, and we should 

start planning for that and accept it rather than just pretending 

like the world is not changing. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I would argue that we are in compliance with 

our obligations under the Outer Space Treaty and other treaties, 

and that ultimately we will—— 

Mr. FOSTER. Yeah, but we have to get all the countries on Earth 

to do this or it is not going to be too meaningful. And that is the 

thing that worries me. And we have to start by strengthening those 

agreements and making them uniform, and I don’t see a lot of effort on this administration in plugging into a strong international 

regulatory regime. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. There isn’t a strong international regulatory 

regime. 

Mr. FOSTER. And that should be prioritized. 

I am over my time. I yield back. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And so we need to have American leadership. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman yields back. 

And that brings us to the conclusion of this hearing. I did want 

to point out that we had members having to come and go. So some 

members may have some questions they need to get to you all. So 
43 

we are going to leave the record open for 10 days, if you could respond to those in writing. 

And also make note of something else. This is a very important 

area of interest, and that is demonstrated by the fact that we had 

30 Members of Congress participate in this joint subcommittee 

hearing today, many of whom weren’t even on the two subcommittees. And combined with if you went outside, 2 hours before this 

hearing the line started forming to get in here. That usually only 

happens when the chiefs are here or the Secretary. People care 

about what you do. And we are very proud that we have got two 

competent individuals such as you serving in the roles that you 

have. 

So thank you for being here. It has been very helpful. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 22, 2018 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 22, 2018 

(49) 

Statement by Chairman Lamar Smith 

HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee and HSST Space 

Subcommittee Joint Hearing 

"Space Situational Awareness: Whole of Government 

Perspectives on Roles and Responsibilities" 

09:00a.m. on June 2018 

Mr. Chairman, let me start by thanking my 

Armed Services Committee colleagues, Chairman Mac 

Thornberry, Ranking Member Adam Smith, Chairman 

Mike Rogers, and Ranking Member Jim Cooper for 

collaborating on this joint hearing. 

Space situational awareness has dramatic civil, 

commercial, and national security implications. NASA, 

the Department of Commerce, the Department of 

Defense, and the private sector all play important. 

The House Science, Space, and Technology 

Committee has held a number of hearings on this topic, 

with testimony provided by civil, commercial, and 

national security experts. 
50 

But today is the first time our two Committees 

have jointly held a hearing on this crucial topic. And our 

timing couldn't be better. 

Earlier this week, President Trump presented and 

signed National Space Policy Directive 3 at a National 

Space Council ceremony at the White House. This 

Directive establishes new national policy for space 

situational awareness and space traffic management. 

The President's proposal for the Department of 

Commerce to take the lead in space situational awareness 

and space traffic management is good policy. The 

department's newly expanded space team and 

commercial space-related functions present the ideal 

environment for this responsibility. Unlike in past 

generations, activity in space is becoming largely 

commercial. Commerce is uniquely positioned to ensure 

that innovation, investment, and private sector leadership 

2 
51 

will have a prominent place in any future space traffic 

management framework. 

Granting the Department of Commerce this 

authority is consistent with the policy of the American 

Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, which passed the 

House by a voice vote this April. It also complements 

regulatory responsibilities assigned to the Commerce 

Department under National Space Policy Directive 2. 

I look forward to Secretary Ross's testimony this 

morning to learn more details about how the Department 

of Commerce will execute this responsibility. 

I recognize that transitioning the DoD 

responsibilities to Commerce will impact government and 

non-governmental customers of DoD's existing service. 

This is why it is critical that the Administration take all 

necessary actions to ensure that current levels of services 

are, at a minimum, maintained during the transition. 

3 
52 

No discussion of America's future in space is 

complete without including NASA. NASA has 

accumulated vast technical, engineering, and scientific 

expertise relevant to space situational awareness. 

NASA's expertise should be leveraged, on a reimbursable 

basis, to support the Department of Commerce. It will 

take a cooperative effort to meet the challenges and 

ensure American leadership in this field. Our former 

colleague and American Space Commerce bill co-author, 

now NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine, will make this 

happen I have no doubt. Welcome Jim. 

Finally, let me highlight the major developments 

occurring in the private sector. In the past, applied space 

situational science and technology development was solely 

the responsibility of the government and the national 

security industrial base. No longer. Today, the private 

sector is conducting independent research and developing 

4 
53 

new technologies to address civilian needs. We should 

foster such research and development and support the 

transition of private innovation to the marketplace. 

I thank our witnesses for appearing today and 

look forward to their testimony. 

### 

5 
54 

Statement by Subcommittee Chairman Brian Babin 

Science, Space, and Technology Space 

Joint Hearing HASC Strategic Forces and HSST Space 

Subcommittee Hearing 

"Space Situational Awareness: Whole of Government 

Perspectives on Roles and Responsibilities" 

09:00 a.m. on Friday, June 22, 2018 

Thank you Chairman Rogers. I appreciate the 

opportunity to collaborate on today's joint hearing 

and look forward to working together on this and 

other issues. 

Space situational awareness, and the related 

question of space traffic management, is an 

important and timely topic. One of the reasons is 

that American industry is investing in and operating 

more satellites and spacecraft in space than any 

other time in history. Indeed, America's future in 

space looks prosperous because our industry is 

leading a new era of private space activities. As 

more and more actors proliferate the Earth's orbital 

regimes, knowing where and when spacecraft will 
55 

be moving and being able to coordinate in order to 

avoid collisions, is critical to ensuring a sustainable 

operational environment for all. 

On Monday, I was at the National Space 

Council meeting as President Trump signed Space 

Policy Directive 3, a National Space Traffic 

Management Policy. SPD-3 is the first ever national 

policy to address space situational awareness 

(SSA) and space traffic management. Through this 

policy, America is leading the world in addressing 

this long-standing and rapidly growing issue .. I 

applaud President Trump for his leadership on this 

important topic. 

Last year, I co-sponsored, along with 

Chairman Lamar Smith and then Representative 

Jim Bridenstine, the American Space Commerce 

Free Enterprise Act. This Act directs the 

Department of Commerce to be responsible for 

2 
56 

authorizing and supervising in-space activities, in a 

minimally burdensome way. Part of this Act 

includes provisions on space debris mitigation and 

space traffic management consultations. In fact, the 

Free Enterprise Act laid the policy foundations for 

both National Space Policy Directive 2 and 3. 

Space Policy Directive 3 takes the policy 

principles of the Free Enterprise Act, including 

establishing the Department of Commerce as the 

lead agency, and builds upon them. I strongly 

support the Department of Commerce as the lead 

agency and I am glad the President agrees. 

As we look at the President's policy and reflect 

upon the need for legislationJ there are several 

important related policies that Congress should 

support. 

First, there is a need for federal science and 

technology investments to be coordinated and 

3 
57 

leveraged to support space situational awareness 

and space traffic management. 

Second, the Department of Commerce's space 

situational awareness program should be designed 

to be flexible, 

Third, as the Department of Commerce takes 

over public SSA services, we need to ensure there 

is a continuation of basic SSA services that DoD 

currently provides with no break in service or 

erosion in quality. 

Fourth, the Commerce Department should 

establish a SSA data test bed to allow for private 

and public-sector access to the underlying SSA 

data used to provide services. 

Lastly, the Department of Commerce must 

receive an appropriate level of funding from 

Congress to carry out its new mission. 

4 
58 

There has been a great need for leadership in 

these matters. I am proud that the United States has 

taken this opportunity to lead the world in the 

development of a civil space situational awareness 

and space traffic management framework. 

I understand that Secretary Ross went to great 

lengths to be available to testify this morning - I 

thank him and all of our witnesses for appearing 

and look forward to their testimony. 

### 

5 
59 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

HOUSE SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

STATEMENT OF 

JOHN E. HYTEN 

COMMANDER 

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

AND 

HOUSE SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SPACE SUBCOMMITTEE 

22 JUNE 20I8 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

HOUSE SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 
60 

INTRODUCTION 

USSTRA TCOM is a global warfighting command, setting the conditions across the globe 

as the ultimate guarantor of national and Allied security. Our forces and capabilities underpin and 

enable all Joint Force operations. 

USSTRATCOM forces are globally-dispersed from the depths of the ocean, on land, in the 

air, and into space, with a matching breadth of mission areas. Nearly 162,000 Soldiers, Sailors, 

Airmen, Marines, and Civilians are responsible for Strategic Deterrence, Nuclear Operations, 

Space Operations, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Global Strike, Missile Defense, 

and Analysis and Targeting. These critical mission areas are an integral part of our combat 

operations, which enables wartighters across all domains to preserve the peace and when called 

upon, dominate in conflict and win. 

USSTRATCOM conducts strategic planning, warfighting operations, aids the President's 

nuclear response decision-making process, provides global situational awareness to the National 

leadership and combatant commands, and, when necessary, is prepared to deliver a decisive 

response in all domains. 

The focus of USSTRATCOM remains to deter strategic attack on the United States and its 

Allies. We stand ready to respond to threats anywhere, anytime across the globe. We acknowledge 

that we cannot do this alone and must continually work towards enhancing our alliances and 

partnerships, in all areas. 

Today, deterrence is more than just our nuclear capabilities. Deterrence requires integrated 

planning for all capabilities, across all domains, including space. This enables synchronized 

operations and decisive responses to adversary aggression anytime, anywhere. We must make the 

concept of integration operational for all domain warfighting throughout the Department of 

Defense. 

In particular, we must normalize space as a warfighting domain. There is no war in space. 

There is only war, and war can extend into any domain. To tight wars in these domains we must 

develop the appropriate rules of engagement that allow for rapid response and delegate authority 

to the appropriate level to operate more quickly. 

GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 

Space was once an exclusive frontier accessible to few. Today, the barriers to entry into 

space are relatively low. Technology advancements and access to, through, and from space enable 

Page 2 of7 
61 

participation by almost any nation with the will. Although our ability to operate within the space 

domain is not an issue today, congestion and threatening activities are becoming increasing 

concerns. 

Not all are committed to the responsible and sustainable use of space. Russia and China 

continue to strengthen its military space capabilities and pursue counterspace capabilities to limit 

and prevent U.S. access to space systems, which are critical for modern military engagement. We 

anticipate that Russian and Chinese counterspace systems will be able to hold U.S. satellites in 

every orbital regime at risk within the foreseeable future. Iran and North Korea have and are 

pursuing countcrspace weapons, but not as aggressively and not as advanced (limited to GPS and 

SA TCOM jammers). 

These adversary trends present challenges to the safety, stability, and sustainability of U.S. 

space operations. Adversaries believe they can erode the U.S.'s economic and strategic advantage 

by disrupting and/or destroying U.S. (and our Allies and Partners) satellites providing space-based 

capabilities essential to our economic vitality and national security. The U.S., specifically 

USSTRA TCOM in coordination with the Intelligence Community, is responsible for detecting, 

assessing, and if necessary defending against threats to U.S. Government (USG) satellites. 

SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 

Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is the foundation upon which USSTRATCOM 

maintains spaceflight safety, provides warning, and assesses intentions of adversary actions 

towards U.S., Allies, and Partner satellites. There is a fundamental need to perform surveillance 

and reconnaissance to understand the space environment and support decision-making by manynot just the military. Space surveillance and reconnaissance, coupled with foundational and 

operational intelligence, fonns our SSA operating picture. SSA provides decision makers 

indications and waming of hazards and threats: natural and manmade; non-hostile or hostile. SSA 

also underpins efforts to preserve, protect, and defend assets in space to include manned 

spaceflight and activities supporting safe management of space tratftc fostering access to, and 

responsible use of, space for all. 

The Department tracks over 20,000 objects in space and that number is growing annually 

over 600 new satellites estimated in 2019, many difficult to track, including cube-sats and microsats. It is imperative the Department continues to maintain exquisite SSA given the defense 

implications for the nation. Currently, the Department publishes a catalog of these space objects 

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62 

and makes potential collision notifications for global users free of charge. We will see an increase 

in tracked objects as more nations pursue space capabilities and we improve our ability to detect 

and identify smaller objects. As the number of space objects increases, our current advisory 

activities and architecture will become inadequate. At the same time, the contested nature of 

operations in space is increasing the demand on Department resources for protecting and defending 

U.S. and Allied space assets. 

SSA MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 

Maintaining the benefits afforded to the U.S. by space is a cornerstone of our national 

security, however, an evolving strategic environment increasingly challenges U.S. space 

advantages. As part of the requirement to meet this challenge, USSTRA TCOM currently conducts 

SSA operations for: 

USG, U.S. commercial space capabilities, and services used lor national and homeland 

security purposes; 

U.S. civil space capabilities and operations, particularly human space flight activities; and 

Non-U.S. commercial and civil space entities as appropriate. 

In addition to safety of flight, we specifically conduct SSA operations to support: 

Awareness of adversary usc of space and their potential impacts to terrestrial or space 

services. 

Attribution necessary for deterrence, or dissuasion, of adversary threats or execution of 

harmful space actions. 

Denial or prevention of adversary capabilities which might impact space services or 

terrestrial operations when deterrence fails. 

Assured delivery of communication; position, navigation, and timing; intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (lSR); missile warning; and weather in support of 

diplomatic, informational, militmy, and economic national objectives. 

Implementation and verification of international treaties and agreements. 

These requirements dictate the need for systems that can provide surveillance and 

reconnaissance over a large volume of space; for an ever-increasing number of space objects 

(active satellites and inert debris); and, more important, a level of speed and precision necessmy 

to support wartighting operations. There is unprecedented growth in manned and unmanned 

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63 

spacet1ight. Our adversaries are making significant and rapid investments in military space 

programs. Meanwhile, our space warfighters are called on to preserve U.S. freedom of action in 

the space domain by detecting, identifying, tracking, characterizing, and predicting the motion of 

objects that are increasing in number and decreasing in size. The Department requires dedicated 

and supplemental systems that can provide persistent awareness of objects which pose a threat to 

high value capabilities (U.S. and Allied) and support actions to include executing protective 

measures against active threats, detecting and identifying launches, predicting re-entry, resolving 

anomalies, and attributing hostile actions. 

The Department provides SSA data and services to space-faring nations, to include 

military-to-military data sharing, through direct interactions with the Joint Space Operations 

Center (.JSpOC) at Vandenberg, AFB and a public website called 'Space-track.org.' The 'Spacetrack.org' website provides SSA data for a rudimentary understanding of where manmade objects 

are in space. The JSpOC interfaces directly with governments and commercial entities to warn 

and facilitate prevention of collisions in space. Next month, July 2018, we will begin transitioning 

the JSpOC to the Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) to integrate Allied and partner 

capabilities in specified mission areas to fill capability gaps. 

This commercial and government-to-government activity is not an inherently-military 

function. As of Monday, with President Trump's signing of Space Policy Directive-3, the 

Administration's position is to transfer a portion of this function to the Department of Commerce 

in order to free up USSTRA TCOM resources to conduct the inherently-military mission of 

protecting USG satellites and interests in space, while continuing to conduct SSA operations in 

support of national security objectives. I support this initiative. USSTRA TCOM will partner with 

the Department of Commerce to support its mission to interface with commercial and civil users, 

as well as the public in general, by providing its SSA generated from reliable data sources. Sources 

of data will not only come from long-standing U.S. military space surveillance assets, but may 

also come from allies and other partners- commercial and non-commercial alike. 

SSA SHARING AND SERVICES 

Title l 0 U.S.C § 2274 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide SSA services and 

information to non-USG entities free of charge. Under this statute, USSTRA TCOM has led the 

negotiation, coordination and signing of 16 government level agreements and 68 commercial SSA 

Page 5 of7 
64 

agreements. USSTRA TCOM provides three tiers of services to the public, allies, and other 

partners: 

Emergency services: The emergency service includes conjunction 1 data messages to 

virtually all satellite owners/operators; including Russia and China. This information 

helps satellite owner/operators avoid collisions in space. 

Basic services: The second level of service, basic services, requires a user account 

agreement to access information in the 'Space-track.org' website. These services include 

satellite catalog two-line element sets, reentry assessments, and recent cataloged and 

decayed objects. 

Advanced services: USSTRATCOM can provide seven advanced services upon request, 

in addition to basic services, to those nations and commercial partners with signed SSA 

sharing agreements- satellite anomaly resolution, collision avoidance support, 

conjunction assessment2, deorbit and reentry support, end-of-life and disposal support, 

launch support, and electromagnetic interference investigation. 

CAPABILITIES 

The cu!Tent Space Surveillance Network (SSN) is a worldwide "system of systems" of 

tracking and detection radars, imaging radars, and optical telescopes operated by military, 

intelligence, and civilian organizations. The ground-based SSN is augmented by imaging 

satellites to provide critical data on the space domain and environment. A large portion of the 

capabilities and locations are, for the most part, the result of non-space surveillance requirements 

(e.g. air and missile warning). In other words, for much of the '80s, '90s, and even early 2000s 

our SSA capability was primarily the result ofleveraging other missions' assets to perform space 

surveillance activities on a non-interfering basis. Though far from perfect, this resulted in an 

SSA capability that adequately met our flight safety needs in a benign space environment. Now 

that space is no longer a sanctuary, we are optimizing our SSA capability to meet the growing 

challenges of a warfighting domain. 

1 A conjunction is a close approach between space objects 2 Conjunction Assessment is the process of predicting and reporting the close approaches between space objects. 

Conjunction Assessment information may include, but is not limited to, time of closest approach, predicted 11miss 

distance" information, and position uncertainty information on the primary and secondary object. Conjunction 

Assessment excludes the process of determining and implementing courses of action to avoid on-orbit collisions. 

Page 6 of7 
65 

In light of the requirements outlined above, the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO) are developing capabilities (sensors and supporting ground analytic architectures) 

to deliver on advanced situational awareness capability vital to USSTRA TCOM's operations and 

the protection of our nation's critical on-orbit capability. As part of that advancement, we look 

f01ward to the near-term delivery of the first Space Fence, the future launch of the joint, Air Force 

and NRO, on-orbit indications and warning platform (Silent Barker), and continued investments 

in deep-space radars (Deep-space Advanced Radar Concept). We continue to refine and upgrade 

existing ground-based radars, telescopes stationed around the globe and employ the 

Geosynchronous SSA Program (GSSAP) satellites already on orbit in support of SSA. 

Additionally, we are increasing our interagency and international collaboration through the 

National Space Defense Center and the soon to be stood-up CSPoC. 

CONCLUSION 

USSTRA TCOM is committed to strengthening relationships with our USG, Allied, and 

Commercial partners to ensure the U.S. retains the superiority in space on which our Nation's 

economic and national security relies. We will continue to provide the critical national SSA 

capabilities essential to national security and support efforts to transition support functions to the 

Department of Commerce. l thank the Committees for their continued support as we work through 

the challenges of operationalizing space and preserving the availability for all of those who chose 

to use space responsibility and peacefully. 

Page 7 of7 
66 

General John E. Hyten 

Gen. John E. Hyten is Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRA TCOM), one of nine 

UniJied Commands under the Department of Defense. USSTRA TCOM is responsible for the 

global command and control of U.S. strategic forces to meet decisive national security 

objectives, providing a broad range of strategic capabilities and options for the President and 

Secretary of Defense. 

General Hyten attended Harvard University on an Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps 

scholarship, graduated in 1981 with a bachelor's degree in engineering and applied sciences and 

was commissioned a second lieutenant. General Hyten's career includes assignments in a variety 

of space acquisition and operations positions. He served in senior engineering positions on both 

Air Force and Army anti-satellite weapon system programs. 

The general's staff assignments include tours with the Air Force Secretariat, the Air Staft~ the 

Joint Staff and the Commander's Action Group at Headquarters Air Force Space Command as 

Director. He served as mission director in Cheyenne Mountain and was the last active-duty 

commander of the 6th Space Operations Squadron at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. In 2006, he 

deployed to Southwest Asia as Director of Space Forces for operations Enduring Freedom and 

Iraqi Freedom. General H:rten commanded the 595th Space Group and the 50th Space Wing at 

Schriever AFB, Colo. Prior to assuming command of Air Force Space Command, he served as 

the Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command. 

EDUCATION 

1981 Bachelor's degree in engineering and applied sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

1985 Master of Business Administration degree, Auburn University, Montgomery, Ala. 

1985 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1994 Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1999 National Defense Fellow, University oflllinois, Champaign 

2011 Senior Managers in Government Course, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass 

ASSIGNMENTS 

1. November 1981 - December 1985. Configuration Management Officer and Chief, Configuration 

Management Division, Automated Systems Program Office, Gunter AFB, Ala. 

2. December 1985 -July 1989, Chief, Software Development Branch; and Chief, Engineering and 

Acquisition Division, Space Defense Programs Office, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 

3. August 1989- July 1990, Special Adviser to the U.S. Army, Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite Program 

Office, U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command, Jluntsvi!le, Ala. 

4. J u1y 1990 -August 1991, Deputy for Engineering, Strategic Defense Initiatives Program Office, Los 

Angeles AFB, Calif. 

5. August 1991 -May 1992, Executive Speechwriter and Systems Analyst, Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force (Acquisition), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

6. May 1992 -July 1993, Program Element Monitor, Advanced Technology Prof,>rams, Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

7. July 1993 - June I 994, Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

8. July 1994- June 1996, Mission Director, Space Operations Officer, and Chief, Command Center 

Training, U.S. Space Command, Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, Colo. 

9. August 1996- August 1998, Commander, 6th Space Operations Squadron, Offutt AFB, Neb. 

10. August 1998- June 1999, National Defense Fellow, University of Illinois, Champaign 

11. June 1999- June 2001, Operations Officer, and Chief, Space Branch, Defense and Space Operations 

Division, Deputy Director for Operations (Current Readiness and Capabilities), J3, Joint Staff, the 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

12. June 2001 -June 2003, Chiet: Space Control Division, Directorate for Space Operations and 

Integration, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, 
67 

Washington, D.C. 

13. June 2003- July 2004, Director, Commander's Action Group, Headquarters Air Force Space 

Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

14. July 2004- April2005, Commander, 595th Space Group, Schriever AFB, Colo. 

15. April2005- May 2007, Commander, 50th Space Wing, Schriever AFB, Colo. (May 2006- October 

2006, Director of Space Forces, U.S. Central Command Air Forces, Southwest Asia) 

16. May 2007- September 2009, Director of Requirements, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, 

Peterson AFB, Colo. 

17. September 2009 -February 20 I 0, Director, Cyber and Space Operations, Directorate of Operations. 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, 

D.C. 

18. February 2010- August 2010, Director, Space Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air 

Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

19. September 2010- May 2012, Director, Space Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force for Acquisition, Washington, D.C. 

20. May 2012- Aug 2014, Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

21. Aug 2014- Oct 2016, Commander, Air Fo1·ce Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

22. Nov 2016- present, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Ncb. 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

1. July 1994- June 1996, Mission Director, Space Operations Officer, and Chief, Command Center 

Training, U.S. Space Command, Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, CO., as a major 

2. June 1999- June 2001, Operations Officer, and Chief, Space Branch, Defense and Space Operations 

Division, Deputy Director for Operations (Current Readiness and Capabilities), J3, Joint Staff, the 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant colonel 

BADGES 

Master Space Operations Badge 

Master Cyberspace Operator Badge 

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters 

Air Force Commendation Medal 

Army Commendation Medal 

Joint Service Achievement Medal 

Air Force Achievement Medal 

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS 

1991 Recipient of the William Jump Award for Excellence within the Federal Government 

1998 Recipient of a Laurels Award, Aviation Week and Space Technology Magazine 

2009 Gen. Jerome F. O'Malley Distinguished Space Leadership Award 

PUBLICATIONS 

"A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space," The Program in 

Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security Occasional Paper, University of Illinois, 2000 

"A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War," Air and Space Power Journal, Air University Press, 2002 

"Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare," with Dr. Robert Uy, Air and Space Power 

Journal, Air University Press, 2004 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant Aug. 23, 1981 

First Lieutenant Aug. 23, 1983 

Captain Aug. 23, 1985 
68 

Major May I, 1993 

Lieutenant Colonel Jan. I, 1997 

Colonel June I, 2002 

Brigadier General Oct. I, 2007 

MajorGeneral Nov.I0,2010 

Lieutenant General May 18, 2012 

General Aug. 15,2014 

(Current as of November 2016) 
69 

Statement of 

.James F. Bridenstine 

Administrator 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

before the 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

U. S. House of Representatives 

and 

Subcommittee on Space 

Committee on Science, Space and Technology 

U. S. House of Representatives 

HOLD FOR RELEASE 

UNTIL PRESENTED 

BY WITNESS 

June 22,2018 

Chairman Rogers, Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Bera, and Members of 

the Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Space Situational 

Awareness (SSA), particularly as it has to do with space object surveillance and tracking and orbital 

debris characterization. The space domain is becoming increasingly congested and contested, prompting 

the space community to recognize the need to establish a national space traffic management framework to 

enhance the safety, stability, and sustainability of operations in the space environment. 

To address some of these challenges, at the February 21,2018, meeting of the National Space Council, 

Vice President Pence directed the Executive Secretary of the Council to develop a whole-of-Government 

strategy for space traffic management. The President signed Space Policy Directive-3 on June \8,2018. 

This policy will guide critical and much-needed progress for space traffic management. SPD-3 builds on 

our continued progress implementing SPD-1, which is galvanizing American space leadership by 

returning to the Moon with commercial and international partners, and SPD-2, which will create 

regulatory certainty for entrepreneurs to raise capital to grow the American economy in space. As we 

continue to thrive in space, we also have more people launching to orbit, and an increasingly complex 

universe of satellites overhead. SPD-3 provides guidelines and initiatives to ensure that America is a 

leader in providing a safe and secure environment as space trat1ic increases. Common sense space 

situational awareness and traffic management will be good for our economy and will help provide a more 

stable environment for the burgeoning space economy. 

NASA's Current Space Situational Awareness Activities 

NASA maintains a strong, cooperative relationship with the DoD on SSA issues. NASA uses SSA 

information from DoD to avoid collisions between its assets and other tracked objects in Earth orbit. The 

Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) office at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and the 
70 

Human Space Flight Operations Directorate at the NASA Johnson Space Center comprise the NASA 

spaceflight safety functions. These NASA spaceflight safety functions currently maintain a direct 

interface with the U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) Joint Space Operations Center and the 

U.S. Air Force Space Command's 18th Space Control Squadron (18 SPCS), in order to ensure that the 

SSA needed for collision avoidance analysis is provided to NASA in a timely manner. 

NASA does not create or maintain a catalog for SSA- i.e., NASA does not track detailed debris orbits, 

report where an object will be in the coming days, or compute close approach predictions. This activity is 

conducted by the DoD through the United States Space Surveillance Network (SSN), which detects, 

identities, tracks, and catalogs human-made objects (e.g., active/inactive spacecraft, spent rocket bodies, 

or fragmentation debris) orbiting Earth as small as I 0 em in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and objects as small 

as I min Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO). The SSN is the responsibility of the USSTRATCOM 

Joint Force Space Component Commander. 

Collision Avoidance 

NASA depends upon DoD's SSA information to prevent its spacecraft from colliding with tracked 

objects in Earth orbit. NASA's spaceflight safety functions are mission-funded resources that perform 

risk assessment for their respective missions using software suites consisting of a combination of 

Commercial Oft~the-Shelf and custom applications to analyze the close approach data provided by the 18 

SPCS. These spaceflight safety functions maintain liaison with the 18 SPCS in order to ensure that the 

SSA needed for proper collision avoidance analysis is provided to NASA and that information regarding 

upcoming NASA spacecraft maneuvers is delivered to DoD in a timely manner. 

Collision avoidance is a three-step process. The first step is conjunction assessment screening, which 

involves computing the predicted close approaches between NASA spacecraft and the 18 SPCS catalog of 

space objects. This step is performed for NASA at the 18 SPCS by either the NASA Orbital Safety 

Analysts (OSAs) for robotic missions or by 18 SPCS Human Spaceflight (HSF) OSAs for crewed 

missions. The second step is a risk analysis, in which NASA analyzes results from the first step to 

detennine the level of risk posed by predicted close approaches and to further detennine whether the 

operational risk warrants additional investigation or mitigation. The third step, if required, is mitigation, 

in which the mission operator plans, and perhaps executes, a collision avoidance maneuver or other 

mitigating action, often in coordination with the owner of the other space object. Not all NASA 

spacecraft have propulsion systems and can take action in this third step. [n those cases, if the close 

approach is with an object that can maneuver, we will negotiate with the owners of that system to do so. 

If neither spacecraft can alter their trajectory, we monitor the conjunction until the danger has passed. 

CARA provides spaceflight safety support to all Agency robotic missions. It tunds a team of contract 

personnel, OSAs, who are embedded within the 18 SPCS. These NASA OSAs provide dedicated and 

focused support, ensure mission safety, and provide timely required SSA data streams back to CARA. 

They represent NASA's interests and protect NASA's robotic Earth-orbiting satellites. The OSAs have 

access to the 18 SPCS close-approach assessment systems, and they can produce specialized products for 

NASA missions. The OSAs are vested with the appropriate access and proticiencies to meet NASA 

mission needs and exigencies in a responsive manner. The current funding line for NASA CARA is 

approximately $4 million per year. This covers the full CARA service for about 65 spacecraft, including 

operators, offline analysts, software developers, OSA staff at the Vandenberg AFB 18 SPCS facility, the 

hardware, the software licenses, documentation, training, system administration and IT security, and 

management. 

For human spaceflight missions, the NASA teams in the Houston Mission Control Center perform both 

functions of risk assessment and operational response. Crewed spaceflight situation awareness services 

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are provided by Human Spaceflight (HSF) OSAs. These HSF OSAs are a team of 18 SPCS-provided 

civilian and military personnel providing around-the-clock conjunction assessment and other operational 

safety support to the Mission Control Center in Houston. These HSF OSAs also support other 18 SPCS 

functions such as catalog maintenance. Upon receiving alerts from the HSF OSAs at 18 SPCS, personnel 

in Mission Control assess the associated tracking and orbit predictions to determine the collision risk, and 

then coordinate an appropriate mitigation plan with the operations team, including international partners, 

as appropriate. 

Each NASA spaceflight safety function provides automated updates to their missions regarding the risk 

posed by close approaches each time SSA data is received from the 18 SPCS. They also perform manual 

analysis to determine the risk posed by each predicted close approach based on several factors, including 

the quality of the close approach prediction for the secondary (conjuncting) object, which depends upon 

the tracking data that was used to compute the trajectory and predict the close approach. NASA develops 

and maintains state of the art models for computing probability of collision for close approaches. This 

risk analysis assists the project managers in developing mitigations to avoid collisions. 

Orbital Debris Characterization 

While collision avoidance and catalog maintenance are important, they do not entirely address the 

problem of orbital debris collision risk. For every object that is currently tracked and can be avoided, 

there are orders-of-magnitude more orbiting objects too small to be tracked that could do serious damage 

to NASA spacecraft. The new Space Fence radar being constructed by DoD will help address this 

problem by lowering the minimum object size being tracked, but most risks from non-lrackable debris 

will remain. In fact, millimeter-sized orbital debris represents the highest penetration risk to most 

operational spacecraft in LEO. In addition, while collision avoidance is prudent for operational 

spacecraft, it is not a solution to the long-term degradation of the space environment due to future 

collisions. This is because the vast majority of potential collisions are between objects that cannot 

maneuver to avoid collisions, especially massive spent upper stages and retired spacecraft. 

The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) has the responsibility to define the environment for 

debris too small to be catalogued by 18 SPCS, but still large enough to threaten missions. These debris 

arc not tracked, but are measured using statistical techniques based on radar, telescope, and in situ 

measurement data to understand their size and orbit distribution, and to understand where they come 

from. The ODPO also creates and maintains modeling tools to understand the effects of debris on 

spacecraft risk and the long-term evolution of the debris environment. 

For understanding the present and near-term environment, the ODPO has created the Orbital Debris 

Engineering Model (ORDEM), an empirically-based model that predicts the orbital debris environment 

for the next 30-35 years and is intended to be used by spacecraft designers and mission planners to assess 

the impact risk from orbital debris to a spacecraft over its on-orbit lifetime. These analyses using 

ORDEM provide spacecraft designers/operators with quantitative results for evaluating the risk that 

orbital debris poses to the success of their missions as well as providing a basis for evaluating quantitative 

methods of the cost effectiveness of various debris shielding techniques as well as operational techniques 

for mitigating damage from the debris impacts. ORDEM can be used to compute the average rate at 

which debris of various sizes might be expected to hit a spacecraft over its mission lifetime, but is not 

designed to evaluate the risk a particular tracked object will hit a particular space asset at a particular 

time. 

The ORDEM model is also used in the Debris Assessment Software, a tool to assist spacecraft and 

mission designers to determine compliance with orbital debris mitigation requirements in NASA's 

Technical Standard, NASA-STD-8719.14A. The Debris Assessment Software, along with the Object 

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Reentry Survival Analysis Tool software, can be used to predict reentry survivability of an upper stage or 

spacecraft for human casualty risk assessments. 

Another important ODPO tool used to understand the debris environment is the LEO-to-GEO 

Environment Debris (LEGEND) model. LEGEND is NASA's long-term debris evolutionary model 

designed to predict the environment 100-200 years into the future based on user-specified scenarios, such 

as future launch rates and different mitigation and remediation measures. It is often used to lest the 

etlectiveness of mitigation and remediation strategies in use by the U.S. and other spacefaring nations. It 

can also be used to investigate potential negative long-term effects from special classes of missions, such 

as the proposed large constellations, to the environment to support the development of new guidelines and 

best practices to mitigate such effects. 

The inputs to these models are obtained by statistical measurements using ground-based radars and 

optical telescopes and by analysis of spacecraft surfaces that have been exposed to the space environment. 

None of these observations are primarily intended to provide real-time, actionable data like the collisionavoidance information from the 18 SPCS. Their goal is to monitor changes in the environment and to 

provide statistical data to update ODPO models, especially ORDEM, which is used to address the main 

orbital debris impact risks to space missions. 

For radar, ODPO uses the Haystack and Haystack Auxiliary radars operated by MIT Lincoln Labs and 

NASA's Deep-Space Network Goldstone radars. These radars can make statistical observations of the 

small particle environment (in some cases objects as small as 2-3 mm) in LEO (the region below 2000 km 

altitude), but they are incapable of tracking individual small debris. Optical telescopes are primarily used 

to characterize the environment at higher altitudes, such as the geosynchronous orbit region (36,000 km 

altitude). ODPO, in collaboration with the Air Force, has developed and installed the Meter Class 

Autonomous Telescope (MCAT) on Ascension Island. MCAT is in the process of undergoing readiness 

reviews and testing prior to proceeding to full operation, and should be able to help characterize and 

monitor debris in the geosynchronous and other regions in early 2019. Note that in the future, because of 

its unique capabilities and location, the MCAT is expected to have the capability to aid the 18 SPCS with 

its cataloging and tracking function on an as-needed basis. 

To improve our characterization and monitoring of the small particle (millimeter or smaller) environment, 

the ODPO has developed the Debris Resistive/ Acoustic Grid Orbital NASA-Navy Sensor 

(DRAGONS). DRAGONS is a cooperative project among NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office, 

Naval Research Lab, and the U.S. Naval Academy. It is an in situ experiment designed to fly on a 

spacecraft host and be directly exposed to the space environment and detect debris impacts on its surface. 

lt combines three sensor technologies, acoustic sensor, resistive grid, and dual-layer thin films to 

characterize the size, impact speed, impact direction, and the energy of the impacting particle. NASA has 

recently funded a technology demonstration mission of the sensor on the Intcmational Space Station to 

mature the DRAGONS technologies. 

Below is an orbital debris measurement coverage chart, from LEO to GEO. MCA T, which is used by 

NASA as a tool for debris characterization and modeling/analysis, will address the gap in GEO (for debris 

down to -15-20 em in size). In situ measurements are needed to fill the millimeter sized debris gap at 

600-1000 km altitude in LEO since debris in that size regime represent the highest mission-ending risk to 

spacecraft operating in that region. Data on such small debris could help improve the orbital debris 

impact risk assessments for the current missions and support the development and implementation of 

cost-effective debris impact protective measures for the safe operations of future missions. 

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10pm 100pm 1mm 1cm 10cm 1m 10m 

Particle Diameter (Boundaries are notional) 

To better understand the outcome of on-orbit collisions and to provide calibration data for radar and 

optical debris measurements, NASA and the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) have 

collaborated on a laboratory satellite impact test called DebriSat. A representative modern satellite was 

designed, fabricated, and then subjected to the impact of a -10 em projectile at close to 7 km/sec impact 

speed at the Air Force's Arnold Engineering Development Complex. The DebriSat fragment data will be 

used to improve the NASA and Air Force's satellite breakup models and be used to support other SSA 

applications, such as improving the debris size estimation model for radar observations and developing an 

optical debris size estimation model for telescope observations. 

Almost all ofODPO's measurements projects are collaborations with DoD and some also have university 

involvement. There is a MOU between DoD and NASA for measurements from the Haystack radars. 

The ODPO is also collaborating with the DoD on calibration of the new Space Fence. 

The ODPO is recognized worldwide as the leader in orbital debris measurements, modeling, and policy 

development. The NASA ODPO is located at Johnson Space Center and is funded by NASA Office of 

Safety and Mission Assurance at Headquarters. The current funding line for the ODPO is approximately 

$7 million/year. 

Conclusion 

NASA looks forward to continuing to collaborate with our interagency partners to ensure a safe and 

sustainable orbital environment. As a leading user of space situational awareness data, the world's 

leading organization for characterizing the orbital debris environment, and the world's leading space 

exploration agency, NASA is a major beneficiary of the Administration's continuing attention to these 

issues. 

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Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to respond to any questions you or the other Members of the 

Subcommittees may have. 

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NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine 

James Frederick "Jim" Bridenstine was nominated by President Donald Trump, confirmed by the 

U.S. Senate, and sworn in as NASA's 13th administrator on April23, 2018. 

Bridenstine was elected in 2012 to represent Oklahoma's First Congressional District in the U.S. 

House of Representatives, where he served on the A1med Services Committee and the Science, 

Space and Technology Committee. 

Bridenstine's career in federal service began in the U.S. Navy, flying the E-2C Hawkeye off the 

USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier. It was there that he flew combat missions in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and accrued most of his 1,900 flight hours and 333 carrier-arrested landings. He 

later moved to the F-18 Hornet and flew at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, the parent 

command to TOPGUN. 

After transitioning from active duty to the U.S. Navy Reserve, Bridenstine returned to Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, to be the Executive Director ofihe Tulsa Air and Space Museum & Planetarium. 

Bridenstine was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Commander in 2012 while l1ying missions in 

Central and South America in support of America's war on drugs. Most recently, he transitioned 

to the !37th Special Operations Wing of the Oklahoma Air National Guard. 

Bridenstine completed a triple major at Rice University, and earned his MBA at Cornell 

University. He has three children with his wife, Michelle. 
76 

Statement of 

Wilbur Ross 

Secretary 

Department of Commerce 

before the 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

U. S. Honse of Representatives 

and 

Subcommittee on Space 

Committee on Science, Space and Technology 

U. S. House of Representatives 

HOLD FOR RELEASE 

UNTIL PRESENTED 

BY WITNESS 

June 22, 2018 

Good morning, and thank you to Chairman Rogers, Chainnan Babin, Ranking Member Cooper, 

and Ranking Member Bera for providing an opportunity for me to address you today. I would 

also like to thank Chailman Smith, Chairman Thornberry, as well as Ranking Members Johnson 

and Smith, for their work on this important issue. Your continued support ofthis 

Administration's space policy vision and support of the Department of Commerce are greatly 

appreciated. In addition, thank you to my esteemed colleagues General Hyten and Administrator 

Bridenstine for joining me on this panel. It is a pleasure to be here with all of you- decision 

makers, leaders, and enablers of U.S. space commercial and defense policy. Your work is 

imperative to the future achievement and well-being of the United States. 

This has been an eventful week. The National Space Council met on Monday for the third time 

since President Trump reestablished it nearly a year ago to advise and assist him regarding 

national space policy and strategy. Under the leadership of Vice President Pence, the National 

Space Council has been very busy, providing recommendations to the President that have already 

resulted in three presidential space directives. Space Policy Directive-!, signed on December II, 

2017, calls for human expansion across the solar system starting with the return of manned 

landings on the moon as a first step to reaching Mars. Space Policy Directive-2, signed on May 

24, sets out an ambitious schedule for streamlining regulations for commercial use of space. As I 

discussed in my remarks at the National Space Council meeting this past Monday, the 

Department of Commerce is committed to achieving all the objectives laid out in Space Policy 

Directive-2 ahead of schedule. 
77 

President Trump continues to show his commitment to creating more opportunities for the space 

community to develop and thrive. He demonstrated that commitment at the National Space 

Council meeting Monday when he signed Space Policy Directive-3, debuting the country's tirst 

comprehensive National Space Traffic Management Policy. This new policy directs the 

Department of Commerce to provide a basic level of space situational awareness (SSA) data for 

public and non-public use, based on the space catalog compiled by the Department of Defense 

(DoD). Currently, the SSA catalog of all space objects orbiting Earth, some as small as I 0 em, is 

based on data from the DoD's Space Surveillance Network (SSN) and contributing sensors, and 

is maintained by the l8'h Space Control Squadron, a Joint Force Space Component Command 

unit under United States Strategic Command. 

Space Policy Directivc-3 and the implementation plan approved by the National Space Council 

name Commerce as the new U.S. Govemment interface for space traffic coordination. This 

change will better enable DoD to focus on its national security mission. There is an increasing 

demand for DoD to focus on protecting and defending U.S. space assets and interests, with a 

parallel increase in the need for a dedicated entity to provide basic SSA data and space traffic 

management (STM) services to a rapidly growing commercial space industry. Commerce is 

ready to provide those services to industry to facilitate continued commercial development in 

outer space. 

The need for timely and actionable SSA data and STM services has never been greater. As the 

U.S. commercial space industry makes plans to launch over 15,000 satellites during the next tive 

years, those expensive assets will face a potentially dangerous orbital environment. The DoD 

currently observes well over 20,000 objects circling the Earth, many of which are softball-sized 

or larger pieces of man-made space debris, some flying around the Earth at speeds of up to 

17,500 miles per hour. Even more conceming, there are an estimated 600,000 smaller objects 

that could still cause significant harm if a collision occurred. The impact of such a collision 

could cause a devastating chain reaction, and create even more dangerous debris in orbit. A 

large percentage of currently observed space debris resulted ti·om only two major collisions in 

space. Effective space tratlic coordination and orbital debris mitigation standards will help 

protect our Earth's orbits from fmiher congestion. 

For those reasons, President Trump and the National Space Council agree that the Department of 

Commerce should be the civil agency interface for the publicly releasable portion of the DoD 

catalog. With this role, Commerce can incentivize innovative space services based on an open 

architecture data repository. This repository will establish a mechanism for SSA data sharing 

that will enable enhanced STM services, to include industry-provided data and services. 

Involvement by industry and others, such as academia, is paramount to the success of this 

endeavor. Both mature and emerging space companies, as well as universities, have input and 

experience that can help shape the development of this data repository and accompanying space 

traffic coordination best practices. As the number of actors in space grows, the need to retine 

satellite safety design guidelines and establish best practices necessitates close collaboration. 

Updated guidelines and standards will enable more efficient and effective industry compliance, 

and could help establish standards that can be proposed for adoption intemationally. Commerce 

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is committed to facilitating these discussions and implementing their results so that the United 

States can provide global leadership for space trat1ic standards. 

Commerce will lead this new responsibility in its Space Policy Advancing Commercial 

Enterprise (SPACE) Administration, a new office being established in the Office of the 

Secretary. The office will also house the Office of Space Commerce and the Commercial 

Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs oftice, which already engage the space industry in 

promotional and regulatory roles respectively. The SPACE Administration will also coordinate 

the involvement of Commerce's other space equities throughout the Department, including the 

National Telecommunications and Information Administration, which manages federal spectrum 

use for space communications; the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which has a 

proven track record of working with industry to conduct research and define essential scientific 

standards; and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which already oversees 

the country's largest operational civil satellite fleet and engages in the space domain as the 

world's authoritative resource for timely and accurate space weather monitoring. 

Throughout its various space equities, Commerce is committed to streamlining processes and 

reducing regulatory burdens that could inhibit commercial sector growth and innovation. 

Consistent with its deadlines in Space Policy Directive-2, this week Commerce staff published 

an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. This notice provides an opportunity for space 

companies and partners to comment on cuJTent remote sensing regulations to facilitate the 

publication of a revised rule this fall. These reforms and our new space traffic coordination 

responsibility will be essential for opening up outer space for more commercial activity. 

This is an important task and we have dedicated serious deliberation and planning in its 

execution. We have an excellent working relationship with our partners in DoD and look 

forward to continuing to work with them to cmTy out the implementation plan approved by the 

National Space Council. We are setting clear milestones and want to be transparent about 

achieving them. Further, we want the Congress and stakeholders to recognize that we are taking 

the lessons of our interagency counterparts to heart, and that the Department of Commerce 

appreciates how important it is to get this right. 

Commerce is first and foremost dedicated to creating economic growth and sustainable 

development in all industry sectors. Facilitating space traftic coordination will provide the space 

industry with more tools to be successful. As such, with this new responsibility Commerce will 

work with industry to find ways to enhance space traffic coordination data and be adaptive to 

industry concerns. We want to evolve the architecture that currently supports U.S. Strategic 

Command to be even more responsive to the space industry's needs, and welcome your feedback 

and suggestions. 

With Commerce at the helm of commercial space traffic coordination, we will ensure that the 

growing space industry remains open for business. I would be happy to respond to any questions 

members of the Subcommittees may have. 

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79 

Wilbur Ross, Secretary of Commerce 

Wilbur L. Ross, Jr. was sworn in by Vice President Mike Pence as the 39th Secretary of 

Commerce on February 28,2017. Secretary Ross is the principal voice of business in the Trump 

Administration, ensuring that U.S. entrepreneurs and businesses have the tools they need to 

create jobs and economic opportunity. 

Secretary Ross is the former Chairman and Chief Strategy Otlicer of WL Ross & Co. LLC and 

has over 55 years of investment banking and private equity experience. He has restructured over 

$400 billion of assets in the airline, apparel, auto parts, banking, beverage, chemical, credit card, 

electric utility, food service, furniture, gypsum, homebuilding, insurance, marine transport, 

mortgage origination and servicing, oil and gas, railcar manufacturing and leasing, real estate, 

restaurant, shipyard, steel, textile and trucking industries. Secretary Ross has been chairman or 

lead director of more than 100 companies operating in more than 20 different countries. 

Named by Bloomberg Markets as one of the 50 most intluential people in global finance, 

Secretary Ross is the only person elected to both the Private Equity Hall of Fame and the 

Turnaround Management Hall of Fame. He previously served as privatization adviser to New 

York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani and was appointed by President Bill Clinton to the board of the 

U.S.-Russia Investment Fund. President Kim Dae-jung awarded Secretary Ross a medal for 

helping South Korea during its financial crisis and, in November 2014, the Emperor of Japan 

awarded him the Order of the Rising Sun, Gold and Silver Star. 

As a philanthropist, Secretary Ross has served as Chairman of the Japan Society, Trustee of the 

Brookings Institution and Chairman of its Economic Studies Council, International Counsel 

Member of the Musee des Arts Decoratifs in Paris, Trustee of the Blenheim Foundation, 

President of the American Friends of the Rene Magritte Museum in Brussels and Director of the 

Palm Beach Civic Association. He also was an Advisory Board Member of Yale University 

School of Management. 

Secretary Ross is a graduate of Yale University and Harvard Business School (with distinction). 

He and his wife Hilary Geary Ross have four children, Jessica Ross, Amanda Ross, Ted Geary 

and Jack Geary. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 22, 2018 

(83) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. Regarding the transition of civil oriented Space Situational Awareness (SSA) services from USSTRATCOM to the Department of Commerce (DOC), as 

suggested in the House Science Committee’s legislation a. How will the handoff 

occur and what is the estimated timeframe for such a transition? What criteria will 

be used to determine that the civil DOC SSA system is ready for operations? b. Will 

the current USSTRATCOM SSA system be available as a backup to the civil DOC 

SSA system, and vice versa? Will USSTRATCOM space object tracking sensors, including the Space Fence, be used by the civil DOC SSA system? If so, how will the 

military sensors be integrated with the DOC? c. How will all global satellite owner/ 

operators be incentivized to participate in the civil DOC SSA and Space Traffic Coordination (STC) programs? 

General HYTEN. Although a timeframe and detailed specifics of transitioning inherently non-military space traffic management functions to the DOC are still being 

finalized, USSTRATCOM has fully partnered with the DOC, to ensure a smooth, efficient and most importantly, safe hand-off. By year-end, both Departments will 

jointly provide a progress report to the National Space Council detailing requirements for a successful transition . . . to include a timeline for transition, a construct 

for managing the provision of basic SSA data; assessing the statutory and regulatory changes required; and maintaining the US space catalog while making portions releasable (via DOC) to the public. 

b. USSTRATCOM will continue to maintain the authoritative US space catalog 

and to provide military-unique SSA services upon DOC developing its indigenous 

STM capabilities. As part of this effort, we will investigate providing backup capabilities for DOC. The DOC will make publically available portions of the authoritative catalog which DOD will continue to maintain. We expect a variety of DOD, 

civil, Allied, and commercial sensors will contribute data which will be used to form 

DOC’s publically releasable catalog. 

c. We anticipate global satellite owner/operators wanting to leverage DOC capabilities out of their own best interest just as they use the USSTRATCOM capabilities today. This information will preserve their ability to utilize the space domain 

while minimizing the risk from orbital debris. 

Mr. COFFMAN. We have very important assets in my district that contribute to 

the Space Situational Awareness mission, and it is clear that DOD’s SSA requirements will be increasing in the future given our space control plans. How will the 

administration’s new Space Traffic Management Policy help you better prioritize 

DOD resources to meet DOD requirements? 

General HYTEN. While many details concerning the increased Department of Commerce role in SSA remain under development, by moving any inherently non-military activities to a civil agency I will be able to re-prioritize my resources to focus 

on meeting DOD requirements. These include: 

• Strengthen intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing to effectively assess potential adversary space, counterspace capabilities vulnerabilities and intentions 

• Acquire enhanced SSA capabilities and leverage commercial and allied/partner 

capabilities to provide Indications & Warning (I & W) of objects in space 

• Achieve full operational capability of the National Space Defense Center and 

continue development of infrastructure to allow command and control of space 

warfighting capabilities 

• Pivot SSA capabilities from routine catalog maintenance to more dynamic, 

search-based situational awareness with increased focus on potential hostile activity. This will enhance our ability to Protect and Defend the space domain and 

provide space effects for warfighters around the world 

• Deter, and–when necessary—defeat adversary space and counterspace threats. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Given that the DOD has already negotiated more than 60 different 

agreements with commercial and international entities, what is your plan to 

smoothly transfer those contracts to the Department of Commerce to minimize service disruption? Do you believe that you will need to maintain mil-to-mil agreements 

for SSA, how are you thinking about that framework of international military cooperation in the SSA realm for the future? a. What is your assessment today of the 

Department of Commerce’s ability to manage these authorities? Do they have the 

proper resources and personnel and what is your opinion on what is needed to get 

them there? b. What are the implications of an immediate move of these situational 

space awareness (SSA) authorities from DOD to the Department of Commerce? Are 

you concerned that hiccups in a transition may damage the United States position 

as the lead provider of global SSA? 
84 

General HYTEN. As of 21 Sep 18, USSTRATCOM has 88 agreements with governments, commercial satellite owner operations, and service providers. For militaryto-military agreements, USSTRATCOM will continue to have a significant role, however, many SSA sharing agreements are not inherently military. Consequently, 

USSTRATCOM is working closely with the Department of Commerce (DOC) to ensure an efficient and smooth transition of these non-military U.S. agreements with 

civil and commercial spacefarers. Though many details remain under development, 

a future where the DOC is responsible for negotiating, concluding, and executing 

SSA sharing agreements with commercial entities is indeed achievable. While DOC 

grows its capabilities, USSTRATCOM is fully committed to supporting our commercial, civil and international partners. We have no intention of transferring these responsibilities before DOC is prepared to take them on. I am not concerned about 

the transition because I have faith in the men and women executing this mission. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Are you concerned this new need for space funding will cannibalize 

from NASA budgets? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Space Policy Directive-3 (SPD–3), National Space Traffic Management Policy, recognizes that after more than 60 years of human space activities, 

orbital debris has become a serious problem to space operations. SPD–3 highlighted 

the need to advance space situational awareness and improve the fundamental 

knowledge of the space environment, such as the characterization of small debris. 

NASA will continue to prioritize requirements within available budget constraints, 

while striving to achieve SPD–3 objectives. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Regarding the transition of civil oriented Space Situational Awareness (SSA) services from USSTRATCOM to the Department of Commerce (DOC), as 

suggested in the House Science Committee’s legislation, a. How will the handoff 

occur and what is the estimated timeframe for such a transition? What criteria will 

be used to determine that the civil DOC SSA system is ready for operations? b. Will 

the current USSTRATCOM SSA system be available as a backup to the civil DOC 

SSA system, and vice versa? Will USSTRATCOM space object tracking sensors, including the Space Fence, be used by the civil DOC SSA system? If so, how will the 

military sensors be integrated with the DOC? c. How will all global satellite owner/ 

operators be incentivized to participate in the civil DOC SSA and Space Traffic Coordination (STC) programs? 

Secretary ROSS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Given that the DOD has already negotiated more than 60 different 

agreements with commercial and international entities, what is your plan to 

smoothly transfer those contracts to the Department of Commerce to minimize service disruption? Do you believe that you will need to maintain mil-to-mil agreements 

for SSA, how are you thinking about that framework of international military cooperation in the SSA realm for the future? a. What is your assessment today of the 

Department of Commerce’s ability to manage these authorities? Do they have the 

proper resources and personnel and what is your opinion on what is needed to get 

them there? b. What are the implications of an immediate move of these situational 

space awareness (SSA) authorities from DOD to the Department of Commerce? Are 

you concerned that hiccups in a transition may damage the United States position 

as the lead provider of global SSA? 

Secretary ROSS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. How much will this new program cost in year one, and how will 

these costs grow in the out-years? 

Secretary ROSS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. The 2013 National Space Transportation Policy calls for the use of 

U.S. rockets for U.S. government payloads, with some minor exceptions that perhaps should be revisited anyway. President Trump’s Space Policy Directive-2 directs 

the executive branch to ‘‘encourage American leadership in space’’ and ‘‘promote economic growth.’’ The U.S. currently has a competitive space launch industry, yet 

NASA payloads continue to fly on foreign launch vehicles, even those that are subsidized by foreign governments. Could NASA better promote the goals of the National Space Transportation Policy and Space Policy Directive 2 by using American 

rockets to launch American satellites? Should we have a ‘‘Buy American, Fly American’’ policy? 

General Hyten, as DOD looks to purchase more commercial data and services, do 

you agree that these should be purchased from entities that launch from American 

spaceports? 
85 

General HYTEN. The U.S. operates in a unique and contested space domain where 

all opportunities must be utilized. This includes leveraging our partner nations, if 

necessary, to increase responsiveness and capabilities. While I firmly believe the nation should maintain the ability to launch a vast majority of its payloads, such restrictions may limit the responsiveness and capabilities necessary to meet increasingly dynamic DOD requirements. The President’s National Strategy for Space addresses this issue. It stipulates the National Space Council develop a plan to remove 

barriers, streamline regulations, and reduce bureaucratic hurdles to commercial 

space companies, taking into account national security/public safety. Furthermore, 

the strategy directs Departments and Agencies to ‘‘promote conditions that result 

in a thriving and competitive domestic space industry’’ and ‘‘ensure the health of 

the industrial base to support required activities while protecting critical U.S. technologies and capabilities.’’ 

Mr. HUNTER. Administrator Bridenstine, the 2013 National Space Transportation 

Policy calls for the use of U.S. rockets for U.S. government payloads, with some 

minor exceptions that perhaps should be revisited anyway. President Trump’s Space 

Policy Directive-2 directs the executive branch to ‘‘encourage American leadership 

in space’’ and ‘‘promote economic growth.’’ The U.S. currently has a competitive 

space launch industry, yet NASA payloads continue to fly on foreign launch vehicles, even those that are subsidized by foreign governments. Could NASA better promote the goals of the National Space Transportation Policy and Space Policy Directive-2 by using American rockets to launch American satellites? Should we have a 

‘‘Buy American, Fly American’’ policy? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. NASA believes existing statute and policy supports a ‘‘Buy 

American Fly American’’ objective. NASA complies with 51 USC 50131, the 2013 

National Space Transportation Policy, and Space Policy Directive-2 for the launch 

services it procures and uses in support of Agency payload missions, with regard 

to both the launch vehicle and the provider of the launch service. 51 USC § 50131 

requires the U.S. Government to procure space transportation services from domestic commercial providers, with a few specific exceptions. The National Space Policy 

also requires the U.S. Government to use U.S. commercial space transportation 

services. NASA procures launch services in accordance with existing law and policy. 

In addition, NASA does not buy foreign launch vehicles for the launch of its satellites or science missions. United States Government payloads are to be launched 

on space launch vehicles manufactured in the United States, unless exempted by 

the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs through an interagency process. This policy, 

however, does not apply to use of foreign launch vehicles on a no-exchange-of-funds 

basis to support the following: flight of scientific instruments on foreign spacecraft, 

international scientific programs, or other cooperative government-to-government 

programs. A primary example of the application of this exception is the James Webb 

Space Telescope (JWST), for which the European Space Agency (ESA) has agreed 

to provide an Ariane 5 launcher and associated launch services to NASA as part 

of the European contribution to the mission. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MITCHELL 

Mr. MITCHELL. Administrator Bridenstine, you testified that the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) has already been involved in discussions about Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Traffic Management (STM). Can you detail how 

the National Aeronautical and Space Administration has worked with the Department of Transportation and the FAA previously—both during your tenure and before 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The FAA has held informal discussions with NASA, among 

other space operators, about the Agency’s internal methods for conjunction assessment risk analysis for both robotic and human spacecraft. However, these information exchanges were all informal; there is no formal agreement between NASA and 

the FAA focused on SSA or STM activities. 

Mr. MITCHELL. You testified that you support the Department of Commerce leading this mission as Space Policy Directive-3 calls for, but you also acknowledged 

that the FAA has special expertise in managing air traffic already. How does your 

agency intend to work with the FAA on SSA and STM moving forward? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Under the auspices of SPD–3, NASA is leading an interagency 

effort to update the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices 

so that that regulatory agencies—Departments of Transportation and Commerce or 

the Federal Communications Commission—have a sound scientific and technical 

basis for developing orbital debris mitigation policies and regulations for their re-
86 

spective commercial licensing regimes. NASA also has expertise in conjunction assessment risk analysis within our human and robotic space missions and will provide inputs relative to best practices to help inform DOT and DOC efforts. 

Mr. MITCHELL. General Hyten testified that when it comes to space, every element of the government is involved and that means there are going to be seams. 

He said that the seams are best addressed by establishing clear authorities and responsibilities. Can you provide more detail on how authorities and responsibilities 

are going to be handled among the partners identified in Space Policy Directive-3, 

especially the Department of Transportation? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. NASA would respectfully defer to the SPD–3, the first National 

Space Traffic Management Policy for a detailed and comprehensive outline of roles 

and responsibilities within the interagency, both currently and in future, as the Department of Defense transitions some roles to the Department of Commerce. The 

Department of Transportation will retain its current role of regulation of commercial 

launch, landing and spaceports. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Both space and traditional commercial airspace traffic have some 

interplay, how are you resolving that issue? How are you working with FAA to address that specific seam? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Launch and landing are where spaceflight interfaces with the 

U.S. National Airspace and its air traffic. NASA is a partner in a four-agency coordination group (Air Force Space Command, National Reconnaissance Office, FAA, 

NASA) that consider, among other launch and landing topics, how to address joint 

use between the launch ranges and the National Airspace as the number of commercial launch ranges and the frequency of commercial space launches is expected to 

increase. 

Mr. MITCHELL. How does NASA envision Space Situational Awareness and Space 

Traffic Management playing out in practice? Will this be handled by a government 

agency or is this an authority that could be given to another type of non-governmental entity? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The SPD–3 outlines a thoughtful and practical approach for implementing an improved future construct for Space Traffic Management, including 

Space Situational Awareness. SPD–3 does not limit involvement in STM and SSA 

activities and products to government agencies. As with any proposed approach, 

NASA and the rest of the interagency will make adjustments along the way as appropriate and as circumstances warrant. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Administrator Bridenstine testified that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has already been involved in discussions about Space Situational 

Awareness (SSA) and Space Traffic Management (STM). Can you detail how the Department of Commerce has worked with the Department of Transportation and the 

FAA—both during your tenure and before? 

Secretary ROSS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. MITCHELL. Space Policy Directive-3 makes the Department of Commerce the 

lead agency for Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management, but it 

also calls on them to cooperate with other agencies. The Federal Aviation Administration at the Department of Transportation already has unique expertise in commercial airspace management. How does the Department of Commerce plan to work 

with them on this issue moving forward? 

Secretary ROSS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. MITCHELL. General Hyten testified that when it comes to space, every element of the government is involved and that means there are going to be seams. 

He said that the seams are best addressed by establishing clear authorities and responsibilities. Can you provide more detail on how authorities and responsibilities 

are going to be handled among your partners identified in Space Policy Directive3, especially the Department of Transportation? 

Secretary ROSS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. MITCHELL. Both space and traditional commercial airspace traffic have some 

interplay, how are you resolving that issue? How are you working with FAA to address that specific seam? 

Secretary ROSS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. MITCHELL. How does the Department of Commerce envision Space Situational 

Awareness and Space Traffic Management playing out in practice? Will this be handled by a government agency or is this an authority that could be given to another 

type of non-governmental entity? 

Secretary ROSS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

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