COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Elder 

Argued by teleconference 

MARC A. PEDERSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2070-97-4 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 APRIL 28, 1998 

PAMELA L. PEDERSON 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Barnard F. Jennings, Judge Designate 

 Marc A. Pederson, pro se. 

 John R. Powell (Pamela L. Pederson, pro se, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Marc A. Pederson (the father) appeals the trial court's 

denial of his petition to modify child support. He contends that 

the trial court erred: (1) by failing to enforce the terms of 

the parties' parenting agreement; (2) in denying his motion 

because he did not submit a statement of his income and expenses; 

(3) in failing to impute income to Pamela L. Pederson (the 

mother); and (4) in denying his motion to reconsider. We affirm. 

 I. 

 The parties executed a parenting agreement, which provides, 

in part: 

 [The mother] and [the father] agree that 

[the mother] shall continue to work 

part-time. At their annual meeting in May, 

1998 they will discuss the feasibility of her 

resuming full-time employment. Whenever [the 

mother] actually resumes full-time 

employment, they agree to recalculate their 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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child support obligations according to the 

Guidelines. 

This agreement was incorporated into the parties' final decree of 

divorce which was entered on December 23, 1996. The decree 

awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of their 

three minor children, and calculated child support based upon the 

mother's income from part-time employment. 

 In February, 1997, the mother informed the father that she 

intended to resume working full-time and in March, 1997, she 

resumed a full-time schedule. On March 21, 1997, the father 

filed a motion seeking modification of child support based upon 

the mother's resumption of full-time employment. Despite 

attempts at mediation, the parties were unable to reach an 

agreement on the amount of support. On April 25, 1997, the 

father renewed his motion. 

 On June 12, 1997, the mother returned to part-time work. On 

June 20, 1997, the father moved the trial court to calculate 

child support using the mother's full-time income. 

 On July 31, 1997, the trial court conducted a hearing, ore

tenus, on the father's motion for modification of child support. 

 Based upon the mother's temporary return to full-time 

employment, the father requested a reduction of his child support 

obligation from $307.54 to $26 per month. 

 The mother testified that she had undertaken full-time 

employment for financial reasons, but reverted to part-time 

status due to the children's emotional problems and the pending 
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legal matters. She testified that her employer had asked that 

she revert to part-time employment because she was missing work. 

 The trial court asked whether the father had prepared a 

statement of his income and expenses. The father replied that he 

did not have this information. The trial court denied and 

dismissed the father's motion for modification of child support. 

 Thereafter, it denied his motion for reconsideration. 

 II. 

 The father contends that the mother's resumption of 

full-time employment required modification of the parties' child 

support obligation. The parenting agreement provided that the 

parties would recompute child support according to the guidelines 

in Code § 20-108.2(B) when the mother resumed full-time 

employment. That agreement was incorporated into the final 

decree of divorce, and is enforceable as a term of the decree. 

See Code § 20-109.1. 

 The trial court recognized that the mother's return to 

full-time employment required recalculation of child support. 

"The starting point for a trial court in determining the monthly 

child support obligation of a party is the amount as computed in 

the schedule found in Code § 20-108.2(B)." Richardson v. 

Richardson, 12 Va. App. 18, 21, 401 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1991). 

However, "[t]his amount is determined according to a schedule 

that varies according to the combined gross income of the parties 

and the number of children involved." Id.
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 The father presented no evidence of his income and expenses. 

 Because Code § 20-108.2(B) requires competent evidence of the 

parties' gross combined income, the trial court was unable to 

calculate the presumptive amount of child support. 

 As the party moving for modification of child support, the 

father bore the burden of providing the information that would 

enable the trial court to recalculate his support obligation. 

Cf. Antonelli v. Antonelli, 242 Va. 152, 154, 409 S.E.2d 117, 119 

(1991) (noting that movant seeking a payment reduction based upon 

his changed financial condition "must also make a full and clear 

disclosure about his ability to pay"). To hold otherwise would 

require a trial court to speculate as to the parties' gross 

incomes, or require a court to conduct subsequent proceedings at 

the expense of the litigants and judicial economy. 

 The trial court requested a statement of the father's income 

and expenses and provided him an opportunity to offer such 

evidence. Because the father failed to present the evidence 

necessary to apply the guidelines pursuant to the parties' 

agreement, we affirm the trial court's denial of his motion. 

 III. 

 The father contends that the trial court erred by failing to 

impute income to the mother. A finding that the mother was 

voluntarily underemployed might have justified a deviation from 

the amount prescribed by the guidelines. See Code 

§ 20-108.1(B)(3); Bennett v. Commonwealth ex rel. Bennett, 22 Va. 
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App. 684, 691, 472 S.E.2d 668, 672 (1996); Calvert v. Calvert, 18 

Va. App. 781, 784-85, 447 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (1994). 

 However, where a party seeks modification of a child support 

award, "the trial court must first calculate the presumptive 

amount of support under the guidelines in Code § 20-108.2 and 

then determine whether deviation from the presumptive amount is 

required." Orlandi v. Orlandi, 23 Va. App. 21, 28, 473 S.E.2d 

716, 720 (1996). Thus, the presumptive amount must be calculated 

before a deviation may be considered. See Code § 20-108.2(A). 

The father, the moving party, failed to present evidence enabling 

the trial court to determine the presumptive amount. Therefore, 

the trial court could not consider a deviation. 

 IV. 

 The father contends that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion to reconsider. Whether to grant this motion lay 

within the sound discretion of the trial court. The record 

demonstrates that both parties received a fair opportunity to 

present their evidence and argument. See Morris v. Morris, 3 Va. 

App. 303, 307, 349 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1986). We find no abuse of 

discretion in the denial of the motion to reconsider. 

 We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.