DHS Should Seek a 

Unified Approach when 

Purchasing and Using 

Handheld Chemical 

Identification Devices 

February 28, 2020 

OIG-20-16 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
 

DHS Should Seek a Unified Approach when 

Purchasing and Using Handheld Chemical 

Identification Devices 

February 28, 2020 

Why We Did 

This Audit 

DHS implemented its “Unity 

of Effort” initiative to remove 

silos, centralize decision 

making, and enhance 

effectiveness and unity in 

operations. We conducted 

this audit to determine to 

what extent the Department 

ensures components are 

coordinating the procurement 

and use of small-scale drug 

interdiction technology 

(handheld chemical 

identification devices). 

What We 

Recommend 

We recommend DHS establish 

a process to coordinate 

common needs across 

components and maximize 

savings from strategic 

sourcing opportunities. These 

recommendations, when 

implemented, should help 

improve “Unity of Effort” in 

procuring and using handheld 

chemical identification 

devices. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 981-6000, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

The Department of Homeland Security does not 

have a unified approach to procuring and using 

handheld chemical identification devices across 

components. DHS components spent about 

$48.4 million on these devices to meet mission 

requirements and capability needs. However, each 

component purchased the equipment separately 

and did not coordinate common requirements to 

maximize cost-saving opportunities. 

This occurred because DHS components are not 

required to coordinate common requirements and 

capability needs for minor acquisitions and 

procurements, such as chemical identification 

devices. Further, DHS does not perform item-level 

spend analyses on its procurement data to identify 

common products and services for strategic 

sourcing opportunities. 

Solidifying a unified approach across DHS to 

enhance the security of the homeland remains a 

top challenge for the Department. Without a joint 

approach to coordinate the procurement and use 

of chemical identification devices, DHS 

components are not meeting objectives included in 

the Department’s “Unity of Effort” initiative. 

Additionally, DHS may limit potential savings from 

strategic sourcing opportunities and also risks 

greater costs resulting from inefficiency and 

duplication of effort. 

DHS Response 

DHS concurred with recommendation 1 but did 

not concur with recommendation 2. We consider 

both recommendations open and unresolved. 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-20-16 
February 28, 2020
	
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Sondra F. 

McCauley, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, or Don Bumgardner, Deputy 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-20-16 
 

 

                                                      

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

The Department of Homeland Security relies on a combination of people, 

assets, infrastructure, and technology across components to achieve its 

mission of ensuring our country is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism 

and other hazards. As the country continues to face a major opioid drug 

epidemic, DHS’ function of interdicting illicit narcotics has become increasingly 

critical. 

Use of Handheld Chemical Identification Devices 

One of the tools DHS uses to aid in preventing illegal narcotics from entering 

the country is handheld chemical identification devices. These devices contain 

two types of identification technology that allow DHS law enforcement officers 

to identify illegal drugs in a single test. 

 Raman Spectroscopy (Raman) technology uses a laser light to scan and 

identify substances. 

 Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR) technology requires that a 

sample be placed on the device to identify an unknown or suspected 

material. 

These devices also contain internal libraries of different chemical spectra1 or 

“fingerprints” that are used to 

compare and match substances for 

identification. 

DHS leads the Nation’s interdiction 

efforts through a multi-component 

approach, which includes support 

from U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) and the United 

States Coast Guard (Coast Guard). 

CBP safeguards the country’s 

borders from dangerous people and 

materials. This includes preventing 

illicit drugs and contraband from 

entering the country. CBP personnel 

Figure 1. Handheld chemical identification 

device with both Raman Technology and 

FTIR Technology (Device 1) 

Source: DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

photo

use three types of handheld chemical 

1 A spectra is a graphical representation of a substance’s chemical properties. Each chemical 

has a unique spectrum, much like a fingerprint. Spectra span thousands of substances, 

including explosives, toxic industrial chemicals, chemical warfare agents, narcotics, 

pharmaceuticals, precursors, and suspicious powders. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

identification devices to detect illicit drugs brought into the country at air, 

land, and sea ports of entry, or through international mail and express 

consignment courier facilities. One device contains both Raman and FTIR 

technology (see figure 1), the second device contains Raman technology (see 

Device 2 in figure 2), and the third device contains FTIR technology (see 

Device 3 in figure 2). 

Raman Technology (Device 2) FTIR Technology (Device 3) 

Figure 2. Handheld Chemical Identification Devices with Single 

Technology 

Source: OIG photos 

CBP is the primary user of handheld chemical identification devices for drug 

interdiction efforts. However, other DHS components, such as the Coast 

Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), also use the same types of 

devices in day-to-day mission operations, but employ the devices for different 

purposes. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) 2 has also 

identified a capability need for Device 1 and is seeking to acquire the device to 

augment its biological and chemical detection capabilities at high profile 

events. Table 1 lists the DHS components using chemical identification devices 

and their purposes. 

2 CWMD develops, acquires, and deploys detection technologies to enhance the Department’s 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detection capabilities. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 4 OIG-20-16 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table 1. Components’ Use of Handheld Chemical Identification Devices 

Component Application 

CBP Identify illicit narcotics and other 

hazardous substances 

Coast Guard Identify chemical agents and 

hazardous substances 

CWMD Identify hazardous substances 

FEMA Identify hazardous substances 

TSA Identify explosive materials 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of DHS data 

The Coast Guard’s mission is to ensure the Nation's maritime safety, security, 

and stewardship. As the lead Federal agency for drug interdiction on the high 

seas, the Coast Guard’s responsibilities include counterterrorism/counter 

weapons of mass destruction operations. Coast Guard personnel use two 

identification devices similar to those used by CBP to perform these essential 

operations. One device contains Raman technology (see Device 2 in figure 2) 

and the second device contains FTIR technology (see Device 3 in figure 2) to aid 

in identifying unknown chemical agents and hazardous substances. 

FEMA helps protect the country from hazards before, during, and after 

disasters through its emergency management program of mitigation, 

preparedness, response, and recovery. In support of this mission, FEMA 

personnel use the same Raman and FTIR devices CBP and the Coast Guard 

use to identify and classify chemical properties of hazardous materials. 

TSA protects the country’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of 

movement for people and commerce. This mission includes screening 

passengers and baggage to prevent dangerous or deadly objects from being 

smuggled onto aircraft. TSA personnel use chemical identification devices with 

Raman technology to identify explosive materials and substances at passenger 

screening checkpoints and baggage screening areas. 

Unity of Effort 

DHS continues to face challenges meshing divergent components, with 

different histories, cultures, and missions, into a single agency. Solidifying a 

unified approach across DHS to enhance the security of the homeland remains 

a top challenge for the Department. OIG has identified this challenge for the 

www.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIG-20-16 
 

 

                                                      

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

last 5 years in our annual report.3 In May 2005, the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) required Federal agencies to leverage their existing spending 

through strategic sourcing.4 Accordingly, the DHS Office of the Chief 

Procurement Officer established the Strategic Sourcing Program Office (SSPO) 

to oversee the development, coordination, and execution of sourcing strategies 

and collaborative activities on behalf of DHS components. New opportunities 

for strategic sourcing initiatives are identified through requests from a 

component’s chief executive officer, suggestions from other stakeholders, or 

based on a spend analysis. The spend analysis allows SSPO to view the 

Department’s expenditures by supplier and product or service classification 

using data from the Federal Procurement Data System Next Generation 

(FPDS-NG) — the central repository for Federal procurement award data. 

SSPO uses this information to gain an understanding of the Department’s 

spending trends and cost-saving opportunities and then documents its 

sourcing recommendations in a business case. 

In April 2014, then-DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson announced the “Unity of 

Effort” initiative to promote greater coordination among components, greater 

centralized decision making by leadership, a unified and strategic approach to 

the budget building process, and a department-wide approach to acquisition 

strategy.5 The initiative changed the Department’s analytical and 

decision-making processes for developing strategy, planning, and identifying 

joint requirements across components. The Department implemented these 

changes to enhance the effectiveness and unity of DHS operations and efforts 

to fulfill the Department’s mission responsibilities.6 In conjunction with this 

initiative, Secretary Johnson established the Joint Requirements Council (JRC) 

in June 2014 as a senior-level review board to identify crosscutting 

opportunities and common requirements among DHS components.7 The JRC 

identifies opportunities for joint capabilities enhancing operational outcomes 

and effectiveness, and creating department-wide efficiencies. The JRC also 

governs the Joint Requirements Integration and Management System (JRIMS), 

which DHS uses to review and validate component-guided analysis and identify 

requirements and associated gaps for major acquisitions. 

3 Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security
 

(DHS OIG-16-07), November 13, 2015; Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing 

the Department of Homeland Security (OIG-17-08), November 7, 2016; Major Management and 

Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security (OIG-18-11), 

November 3, 2017; Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of
 

Homeland Security (OIG-19-01), November 9, 2018; and Major Management and Performance 

Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security (OIG-20-02), November 13, 2019.
 4 OMB Memorandum, Implementing Strategic Sourcing, May 20, 2005.
 5 Memorandum, Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort, April 22, 2014.
 6 As recently as April 2019, DHS leadership supported a new crosscutting initiative to
 

consolidate DHS operational coordination functions in the spirit of “Unity of Effort.”
 7 Management Directive No. 071-02, The Joint Requirements Council, February 1, 2016. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIG-20-16 
 

 

                                                      

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In line with this unity of effort approach, we conducted this audit to determine 

to what extent the Department ensures components are coordinating the 

procurement and use of small-scale drug interdiction technology (handheld 

chemical identification devices). 

Results of Audit 

DHS May Limit Cost-Savings Opportunities for Handheld 

Chemical Identification Devices 

The Department does not have a unified approach for procuring and using 

handheld chemical identification devices across components. This occurred 

because DHS components are not required to coordinate common 

requirements and capability needs8 for minor acquisitions and procurements, 

such as handheld chemical identification devices. DHS also does not perform 

item-level spend analyses on the Department’s procurement data to identify 

and maximize strategic sourcing opportunities for common products. Without 

implementing a joint approach to coordinate the procurement and use of 

handheld chemical identification devices, DHS risks greater costs resulting 

from inefficiency and duplication of effort. Additionally, DHS may limit 

potential cost savings from strategic sourcing opportunities. 

DHS Lacks a Unified Approach for Procuring and Using Handheld 

Chemical Identification Devices 

The Department has not identified handheld chemical identification devices as 

a joint mission requirement, despite multiple components using the same type 

of devices in the performance of day-to-day operations. We reviewed 

equipment lists of handheld chemical identification devices for CBP, the Coast 

Guard, CWMD, FEMA, and TSA and identified more than $48.4 million in 

equipment commonly procured and used by these components. For example, 

TSA purchased 260 units of devices with the Raman technology (Device 2) and 

FEMA acquired 25 units of the same device model. TSA and FEMA together 

spent almost $12.9 million. Additionally, we determined the unit cost varied 

among the components. For example, FEMA purchased Device 2 for about 

$39,200 per unit, while TSA purchased it for about $45,800 per unit. 

Similarly, the Coast Guard purchased Device 3 for $46,667 per unit, while 

FEMA purchased it for $54,484 per unit. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the 

chemical identification devices by component and shows the different unit 

costs. 

8 A “capability need” is a capability required by DHS or a component to accomplish its mission. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIG-20-16 
 

 

                                                      

 

 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table 2: Examples of Handheld Chemical Identification Devices Procured 

by Components 

As of August 19, 2019a 

Component 

Device with Raman and 

FTIR Technologies 

(Device 1) 

Device with Raman 

Technology 

(Device 2) 

Device with FTIR 

Technology 

(Device 3) 

Units

Avg. 

Unit 

Costc 

Total 

Cost 

Units

Avg. 

Unit 

Costc 

Total 

Cost 

Units 

Avg. 

Unit 

Costc 

Total 

Cost 

CBP 315 $ 90,964 $28,653,660 14 $42,706 $ 597,884 8 $46,769 $ 374,152 

Coast Guardb 21 119,000 2,499,000 13 61,213 795,769 3 46,667 140,001 

CWMDb 13 119,000 1,547,000 

FEMA 25 39,242 981,050 17 54,484 926,228 

TSA 260 45,819 11,912,940 

TOTAL $32,699,660 $14,287,643 $1,440,381 

GRAND TOTAL $48,427,684 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of DHS data
 a This list is not all-inclusive of handheld chemical identification devices across the
 

Department. 

b The unit prices for these devices are based on CWMD’s estimated costs to acquire Device 1.
 c The average unit cost has been rounded to the nearest dollar.
 

No DHS Requirement for Components to Coordinate Common Mission 

Needs for Handheld Chemical Identification Devices 

Although DHS has implemented processes to improve its strategic planning 

and joint requirements coordination across the Department, it does not require 

components to coordinate common mission requirements and capability needs 

for handheld chemical identification devices. The JRC evaluates proposed 

capability needs and prioritizes requirements to inform DHS investment 

decisions for major acquisitions (Level 1 and Level 2), as well as for programs 

that are highly visible or politically sensitive.9 However, minor acquisitions 

(Level 3)10 and procurements, such as chemical identification devices, are not 

required to be evaluated through the JRIMS process. 

Components are responsible for ensuring the capability needs for minor 

acquisitions align with mission requirements as well as the overall mission of 

9 Level 1 major acquisition programs are those with life-cycle costs $1 billion or more, and 

Level 2 programs have life-cycle costs greater than or equal to $300 million and less than 

$1 billion. 

10 Level 3 acquisition programs have life-cycle costs less than $300 million. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 8 OIG-20-16 
 

 

                                                      

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

the Department. Nevertheless, components do not coordinate the common 

requirements for these devices. Although components may apply the 

technology in the devices differently, it is a common capability. This is 

inconsistent with the goals of DHS’ “Unity of Effort” initiative, which promotes 

coordination among components and a department-wide approach to 

acquisition strategy. 

Insufficient Spend Analyses on the Department’s Procurement Data to 

Identify Strategic Sourcing Opportunities 

According to OMB’s Implementing Strategic Sourcing memorandum, all Federal 

agencies are required to leverage spending whenever possible through strategic 

sourcing. OMB emphasized that the overall development and implementation 

of an agency’s strategic sourcing effort should begin with a spend analysis. 

However, DHS does not perform item-by-item spend analyses on the 

Department’s procurement data. Although the SSPO performs an annual 

spend analysis, it does not include an assessment of item-level expenditures, 

such as handheld chemical identification devices. Further, the FPDS-NG data 

SSPO uses to perform a spend analysis does not provide details on unit costs 

for products or services purchased even though the information is available 

and can be obtained from each component. Although it would take additional 

time to gather this information, it could provide SSPO with the data necessary 

to identify strategic sourcing opportunities for commonly used products or 

services. 

For example, in 2018, CWMD received requests from its Mobile Detection 

Deployment Program and the Coast Guard to purchase the same device CBP 

uses. As of May 2019, CWMD planned to purchase 34 units of Device 1, which 

combines both Raman and FTIR technologies, for more than $4 million 

(13 units for CWMD and 21 units for the Coast Guard). CWMD estimates a 

unit cost of $119,000 to acquire this device, whereas CBP has spent on average 

$90,964 or about $28,000 less to acquire the same device model. A CWMD 

Program Manager stated that CWMD attempted to consolidate this purchase 

request with additional CBP orders for Device 1, but was unsuccessful because 

CBP claimed an inability to transfer equipment to outside entities. 

Consequently, CWMD now intends to purchase similar devices independently 

under a separate contract for its Mobile Detection Deployment Program and the 

Coast Guard. 

A strategic sourcing strategy would allow CWMD to acquire Device 1 at a lower 

cost, potentially saving the Department about $1 million11 just from this single 

purchase. With the exception of this recent coordination between CWMD and 

11 The savings calculation is based on the difference in unit cost ($119,000 – $90,964) 

multiplied by 34 units CWMD plans to purchase ($28,036 x 34 = $953,224). 

www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIG-20-16 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Coast Guard, each component purchased the equipment separately, and did 

not coordinate common requirements. Evaluating individual components’ 

plans for purchasing handheld chemical identification devices, without a 

comparative analysis across the Department, may appear to be of 

inconsequential cost. However, with an aggregated approach, DHS could 

potentially realize significant cost savings. As a result, DHS did not leverage 

spending or maximize cost-saving opportunities as recommended by OMB’s 

Implementing Strategic Sourcing Memorandum. 

Conclusion 

Despite the widespread use of handheld chemical identification devices across 

multiple components, the Department does not have a unified approach for 

coordinating the procurement and use of these devices. Without implementing 

a joint approach to acquire common devices, DHS components are not 

achieving goals of DHS’ “Unity of Effort” initiative promoting coordinated 

decision making, strategic budget building, and acquisition strategy across the 

Department. Additionally, DHS risks greater costs resulting from inefficiency 

and duplication of effort and limits potential cost savings from strategic 

sourcing opportunities. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: We recommend the Deputy Under Secretary for 

Management establish a process to coordinate and perform systematic 

technical reviews across components for common mission requirements and 

capability needs, including handheld chemical identification devices. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend the Chief Procurement Officer: 

a.	 perform an annual item-by-item spend analysis of components’ 

procurement data including the vendor, actual product or service, number 

of units, unit cost, and total cost, in order to identify common products and 

services; and 

b. based on results of the annual analysis, initiate strategic sourcing strategies 

for products and services with cost-saving opportunities. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS concurred with recommendation 1 but did not concur with 

recommendation 2. Appendix A contains DHS management comments in their 

entirety. We also received technical comments on the draft report and revised 

the report as appropriate. A summary of DHS’ responses and our analysis 

follows. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 10	 OIG-20-16 
 

 

                                                      

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Deputy Under Secretary for Management Response to Recommendation 1: 

The Deputy Under Secretary for Management (DUSM) concurred with 

recommendation 1. According to DUSM, the Department has processes in 

place to coordinate and perform systematic technical reviews across 

components for common mission requirements and capability needs and it is 

unnecessary to establish any new processes. The Department will continue to 

address Level 3 acquisitions at the component level in conjunction with 

relevant commodity councils and working groups such as the Detection 

Equipment Commodity Council (DECC)12 or the Illicit Drugs Detection Working 

Group (IDDWG).13 Additionally, the Department is drafting guidance requiring 

component personnel to comply with the spirit and intent of its JRIMS directive 

and instruction manual for programs not routinely monitored by the JRC. The 

DUSM estimated a completion date of January 31, 2020. 

OIG Analysis of DUSM Comments: Although the Department has existing 

processes for coordinating common mission requirements and capability needs, 

gaps exist for acquisitions costing less than $300 million. The JRC evaluates 

proposed capability needs and prioritizes requirements for major acquisitions 

(Level 1 and Level 2) but components are not required to use the JRIMS 

process for minor acquisitions (Level 3), such as handheld chemical 

identification devices. Additionally, components are not required to participate 

in commodity councils and working groups like the DECC or the IDDWG. 

Each of the components we identified in this report bypassed the commodity 

groups during the acquisition of the devices. The existing processes do not 

ensure DHS or its components identify minor acquisitions with common 

requirements and coordinate with other potential components that could 

benefit. 

We also reviewed DHS’ proposed new guidance requiring components comply 

with the spirit and intent of its JRIMS policies. The proposed guidance did not 

include a process for the Department to coordinate and perform systematic 

technical reviews across components for Level 3 acquisitions with common 

mission requirements and capability needs. Without implementing a process 

to address this gap, the Department will continue to risk greater costs resulting 

from inefficiency and duplication of effort. We consider this recommendation 

open and unresolved until DHS proposes a process ensuring components 

coordinate on Level 3 acquisitions and an estimated date for implementing it. 

12 DHS formalized the DECC in November 2014. Its purpose is to develop and implement a 

DHS-wide strategy for the effective and efficient acquisition, coordination, and utilization of 

detection equipment. 

13 The IDDWG promotes the sharing of information between the relevant stakeholders from 

DHS component organizations and other Federal agencies and aims to provide direction in the 

development of department-wide requirements, standards, and technological solutions for the 

detection of illicit drugs. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 11 OIG-20-16 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of the Chief Procurement Officer Response to Recommendation 2: 

The Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) did not concur with 

recommendation 2. The OCPO disagreed an item-by-item spend analysis is an 

efficient method or a proactive strategy for identifying strategic sourcing across 

the Department. According to the OCPO, collecting procurement data from 

each component would be a time- and labor-intensive process and historical 

information is not indicative of future demand. Additionally, the OCPO pointed 

out DHS was recognized in 2012 as a leader for implementing strategic 

sourcing contract vehicles in the Federal Government. The OCPO requested 

the recommendation be closed upon issuance of the final report. 

OIG Analysis of OCPO Comments: OIG acknowledges DHS was recognized in 

2012 as a leader for implementing strategic sourcing contract vehicles in the 

Federal Government. However, process improvements are needed for the 

Department to continue as a leader. The Department’s processes do not 

ensure minor acquisitions that may be potential strategic sourcing 

opportunities are identified and coordinated with the SSPO. Consequently, a 

spend analysis is essential as the Department’s last line of defense for 

identifying cost-savings opportunities. We acknowledge that reviewing 

individual components’ approaches to purchasing handheld chemical 

identification devices may appear to be of inconsequential cost. However, with 

an aggregated approach DHS could potentially realize significant cost savings. 

The DHS annual spend analysis does not include an assessment of item-level 

expenditures, which is necessary to identify the Department’s commonly used 

products and services. Although we recognize this process may be laborintensive to start, the results could provide the Department with valuable 

information to identify strategic sourcing opportunities for commonly used 

products or services, such as the devices we discussed in the report. 

Additionally, performing this type of analysis could lead to significant cost 

efficiencies across the Department. We consider this recommendation 

unresolved. It will remain open until DHS provides documentation to support 

how its actions fully meet the intent of the recommendation. 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107−296) by an 

amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. 

We conducted this audit to determine to what extent the Department ensures 

components coordinate procurement and use of small-scale drug interdiction 

technology (handheld chemical identification devices). This is the second 

www.oig.dhs.gov 12 OIG-20-16 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

report generated from our review of DHS’ use of technology for illicit drug 

interdiction. Our first report, DHS OIG-19-67, Limitations of CBP OFO’s 

Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics, was issued on 

September 30, 2019. To achieve our audit objective, we interviewed officials 

from the following DHS headquarters offices to obtain an understanding of 

their roles, responsibilities, and processes for coordinating small-scale 

technology across the Department: 

 Border Security Technology Consortium 

 Detection Equipment Commodity Council 

 JRC 

 OCPO 

 Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans 

 Program Analysis and Evaluation 

 SSPO 

We also interviewed representatives from CBP, Coast Guard, CWMD, FEMA, 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Science and Technology 

Directorate, and TSA to obtain an understanding of their use of small-scale 

technology. 

To gain an understanding of how devices with chemical identification 

technology are used across these components, we requested and reviewed CBP, 

Coast Guard, FEMA, and TSA equipment lists for handheld chemical 

identification devices purchased between March 2008 and July 2019. We also 

reviewed corresponding purchase orders and contract files and CWMD’s 

purchasing requirements for Device 1. Because the component equipment lists 

did not match the contract award and procurement documentation in all 

instances, we did not rely on the provided equipment lists to support our 

findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Instead, using the contract and 

purchase order documentation, we totaled the number of units purchased and 

calculated the average unit price and total costs of each device by component. 

We believe this to be a sufficiently reliable approach to support our audit 

conclusions. 

To understand how SSPO prepares spend analyses and the data it uses, we 

reviewed SSPO’s fiscal year 2017 spend analysis of procurements and 

supporting data. We reviewed the JRC directive and the JRIMS manual to 

understand JRC’s responsibility and process for validating capability needs 

and operational requirements across DHS components. We reviewed policies, 

procedures, directives, memoranda, and other documents related to strategic 

sourcing, as well as the policies, procedures, directives, and memoranda 

relating to DHS’ “Unity of Effort” initiative. We also reviewed prior DHS OIG 

www.oig.dhs.gov 13 OIG-20-16 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

and Government Accountability Office audit reports as they related to our audit 

objective. 

We conducted this performance audit between November 2018 and August 

2019 pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and 

according to the generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. 

The Office of Audits major contributors to this report are Christine Haynes, 

Director; Loretta Atkinson, Audit Manager; Julian Brown, Auditor-in-Charge; 

Renee Foote, Auditor; Deborah Mouton-Miller, Communications Analyst; and 

Stephen Doran, Independent Referencer. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIG-20-16 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

DHS Comments to the Draft Report 

www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-20-16 
 

 

   

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

DHS Component Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

www.oig.dhs.gov 19 OIG-20-16 
Additional Information and Copies 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: 

www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General 

Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click 

on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at 

(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at: 

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Attention: Hotline 

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Washington, DC 20528-0305