NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIAN BORCHARDT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CITY OF TUCSON, a municipal 

corporation of the State of Arizona; D. 

COX, in official capacity, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16970 

D.C. No. 4:14-cv-02039-JGZ 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 7, 2017**

San Francisco, California

Before: M. SMITH and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and MCAULIFFE,*** District 

Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Brian Borchardt appeals the district court’s grant of

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Steven J. McAuliffe, United States District Judge for 

the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.

FILED

DEC 13 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

summary judgment with regard to Borchardt’s second cause of action, and its 

dismissal of Borchardt’s first cause of action as unripe. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

As the facts and procedural history are familiar to the parties, we do not 

recite them here. 

1. A just-compensation claim brought under § 1983 is not ripe where a plaintiff 

has not sought compensation through available state procedures. Williamson Cty.

Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194

(1985). Borchardt has not shown that he made any attempt to seek compensation 

in Arizona prior to initiating his federal suit, or that he did not do so because 

Arizona’s procedures were unavailable or inadequate. See Del Monte Dunes at 

Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1506-07 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Therefore, Borchardt’s § 1983 claim was unripe, and the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to consider it. See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of L.A., 922 F.2d 498, 

502 (9th Cir. 1990).

2. Borchardt’s Fifth Amendment due process claim fails as a matter of law 

because Borchardt has not alleged any misconduct on the part of the federal 

government. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir. 2001).

3. Borchardt’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim also fails as a matter 

of law because the notice provided by the City of Tucson (the “City”) was 
3 

sufficient. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that notice be “reasonably 

calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 

pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The City’s 

attempts to serve Borchardt at a variety of different addresses, through a variety of 

means, and over the course of several years, more than met this standard. 

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

with regard to Borchardt’s second cause of action and dismissal of Borchardt’s 

first cause of action as unripe are AFFIRMED. 

AFFIRMED.