In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-2720

MICHAEL AMUNDSEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT, ROB O’CONNOR, KATHY

DUNLAP, MARILYN MORALES, and PETER PODGORSKI,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 C 2831--Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

Argued April 19, 2000--Decided June 30, 2000

 Before POSNER, Chief Judge, COFFEY and EASTERBROOK,

Circuit Judges.

 COFFEY, Circuit Judge. On October 29, 1998,

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Amundsen ("Amundsen")

filed a three count amended complaint under 18

U.S.C. sec. 1983. In the complaint, Amundsen

alleged in Count one that the Chicago Park

District’s ("Park District") administrative

hearing violated due process, in Count two that

the Park District and the individually named

defendants (Rob O’Connor, Kathy Dunlap, Marilyn

Morales and Peter Podgorski) conspired to violate

his constitutional rights, and in Count three

that the Park District terminated his employment

in violation of the collective bargaining

agreement./1 On June 10, 1999, the court granted

summary judgment in favor of the Park District

and the named defendants on each of the counts

and concluded that the administrative hearing was

conducted in compliance with due process.

Furthermore, the judge found that the plaintiff

failed to allege facts constituting a conspiracy

to deny him his constitutional rights and failed

to timely seek judicial review of his discharge

under Illinois state law.

 On appeal, Amundsen argues that the district

court erred in granting summary judgment to the

defendants because his administrative hearing

violated due process. He also claims that he pled
facts sufficient to support his conspiracy claim

and that federal law, rather than Illinois law,

governs his claim that his discharge was in

violation of the collective bargaining agreement.

We AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

 Amundsen was employed by the Chicago Park

District as a physical fitness instructor and

assigned to teach athletic skills to park

patrons. As a member of the Public Service

Employees Union Local 46, AFL-CIO, his employment

was governed by a collective bargaining

agreement. On or about March 24, 1995, the Park

District’s Area Manager, Rob O’Connor

("O’Connor"), informed Amundsen that a couple had

accused him of striking a park patron (their

child) during a class. Five days later, on March

29, 1995, Amundsen was summoned to meet with

Marilyn Morales ("Morales"), the Park District

Human Resources Manager, and Peter Podgorski

("Podgorski"), the Park District Supervisor of

Recreation. At the meeting, Amundsen was

suspended as a result of the physical abuse

charge./2

 After his suspension, Amundsen phoned the

president of his local union and was advised that

because he did not receive written notice of his

suspension, "if [he] did not report for work he

could be terminated from his job based upon job

abandonment. . . . [and] he could return to work

based upon a provision of the collective

bargaining agreement."/3 When the plaintiff

reported to work on April 4, 1995, he was asked

to leave by Podgorski, Morales and Kathy Dunlap

("Dunlap"), the Park District’s Region Manager,

but he refused. The police were then called and

after he refused to obey the command of the

police to leave the premises, he was arrested for

criminal trespass./4 Based on the physical abuse

charge and this incident, the Park District

terminated Amundsen on May 1, 1995. Shortly

thereafter, Amundsen requested a formal discharge

hearing with the Park District’s Personnel Board

("Personnel Board"), which in turn appointed a

hearing officer. The hearing officer conducted

hearings over three days in 1997 and upheld

Amundsen’s termination on the ground that "[h]is

defiance and refusal to stay away from the Park

District while the Park District investigated the

charges of physical abuse was insubordination of

the highest degree," but found that the charges

relating to him physically striking a child did

not warrant termination. Because Amundsen failed

to file exceptions to the hearing officer’s

rulings within the proscribed time limit, the

Personnel Board adopted the hearing officer’s

findings and his termination became final on
December 29, 1997. For reasons unexplained,

Amundsen failed to file an appeal in state court

seeking judicial review of the Park District

Personnel Board’s final decision within the 35-

day statute of limitations, as proscribed under

Illinois state law, and neither Amundsen nor his

union sought arbitration as permitted under the

collective bargaining agreement.

 Thereafter, the plaintiff filed this sec. 1983

suit in federal court, claiming that his

discharge hearing violated due process, the

defendants conspired to violate his

constitutional rights and his employment was

terminated in violation of the collective

bargaining agreement. On June 10, 1999, the court

granted summary judgment in favor of all the

defendants, finding that: (1) the Park District’s

administrative hearing was in compliance with due

process; (2) Amundsen failed to allege facts

constituting a conspiracy to deny him his

constitutional rights; and (3) he failed to

timely seek judicial review of his termination

under Illinois state law. The plaintiff appeals.

II. ISSUES

 On appeal, Amundsen alleges that the court

erred in granting summary judgment to the

defendants because: (1) the administrative

discharge hearing did not comply with due

process; (2) the facts pled in his amended

complaint were sufficient to sustain his claim

that the defendants conspired to deprive him of

his constitutional rights; and (3) federal law

governs his claim that his termination was a

violation of the collective bargaining agreement.

III. DISCUSSION

 A. Count one: The Park District’s Administrative

Hearing Process Violated Due Process

 In support of his claim that the Park

District’s administrative hearing process

violated due process, Amundsen alleges that: (1)

the hearing officer was hired and paid by the

Park District and thus was biased in favor of his

employer; (2) he did not have the ability to

subpoena witnesses; and (3) the hearing was not

conducted in accordance with formal rules of

evidence. At the outset, we note that Amundsen

relies on both Illinois and federal law in part

to support his sec. 1983 suit. However, both

Illinois and federal courts have rejected

arguments similar to those raised here by

Amundsen./5

 1. Bias of the Hearing Officer
 Amundsen initially accuses the hearing officer

of being biased in favor of the Park District as

"it is apparent that a hearing officer who

consistently rules against the Park District will

not continue to enjoy his place on the Park

District payroll." Thus, he claims, "[a]s a paid

agent of the [Park District] deciding a dispute

over the propriety of the actions of the

Defendant, the hearing officer can hardly be

relied upon to be impartial in such a situation."

[But a contention of bias] must overcome a

presumption of honesty and integrity in those

serving as adjudicators; and it must convince

that, under a realistic appraisal of

psychological tendencies and human weakness, . .

. [there is] such a risk of actual bias or

prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden

if the guarantee of due process is to be

adequately implemented.

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); see

Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1982)

(citation omitted); Scott v. Department of

Commerce, 416 N.E.2d 1082, 1089 (Ill. 1981)

("Without a showing to the contrary, State

administrators ’are assumed to be men of

conscience and intellectual discipline, capable

of judging a particular controversy fairly on the

basis of its own circumstances.’") (citing United

States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)).

 "This presumption can be rebutted by a showing

of conflict of interest or some other specific

reason for disqualification." Schweiker, 456 U.S.

at 195-96; see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,

579 (1973). To establish bias that "is too high

to be constitutionally tolerable," the asserting

party would need to prove that the adjudicator

had "a pecuniary interest in the outcome . . .

[or had] been the target of personal abuse or

criticism from the party before him." Withrow,

421 U.S. at 47. "But the burden of establishing

a disqualifying interest rests on the party

making the assertion." Schweiker, 456 U.S. at

196.

 The plaintiff has failed to present any

evidence of actual bias on the part of the

hearing officer. Amundsen’s bald accusation is

based solely on the fact that the hearing officer

was employed by the Park District, which of

itself is insufficient to establish actual bias.

Cf. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410

(1971); Cannon v. Apfel, No. 99-1578, 2000 WL

684688, at *6 (7th Cir. May 24, 2000); Van Harken

v. Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1352-53 (7th Cir.

1997) (stating that even when "an administrative

or adjudicative body derives a financial benefit

from fines or penalties that it imposes is not in
general a violation of due process"). Thus, we

hold that Amundsen has failed to satisfy his

burden of overcoming the well-established

"presumption of honesty and integrity in those

serving as adjudicators." See Withrow, 421 U.S.

at 47; see also Kloman v. Illinois Municipal

Retirement Fund, 674 N.E.2d 38, 42 (Ill. App. Ct.

1996).

 2. Inability to Subpoena Witnesses

 Amundsen’s next claim is that he did not have

the ability to subpoena witnesses, which he

contends, also violated due process. Contrary to

his assertion, the record reflects that an

employee challenging his discharge may request

that the Personnel Board or one of its hearing

officers issue a subpoena for witnesses as

provided under Illinois law. See 70 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 1505/16a(c)(2). In spite of this fact,

Amundsen never requested a subpoena for a

witness. Nonetheless, this court has held that in

the administrative hearing context, the ability

to subpoena witnesses is not an absolute right.

See Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1058-59 (7th

Cir. 1999); see also DeLong v. Hampton, 422 F.2d

21, 24-25 (3d Cir. 1970); Henley v. United

States, 379 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (M.D. Pa. 1974).

In fact, the Supreme Court came to the same

conclusion in the Social Security context because

of the "additional and pragmatic factor" of the

sheer "cost of providing live . . . testimony" at

administrative hearings. Perales, 402 U.S. at

406. Indeed, "in administrative matters, due

process is satisfied when the party concerned is

provided an opportunity to be heard in an orderly

proceeding which is adapted to the nature and

circumstances of the dispute." Obasi v.

Department of Prof. Reg., 639 N.E.2d 1318, 1325

(Ill. App. Ct. 1994).

 It is worthy to note that the hearing officer

did in fact read him a statement of his hearing

rights at the outset of the hearing, including

the right to call witnesses, the right to present

evidence on his behalf and the right to crossexamine witnesses testifying against him.

Amundsen was represented by counsel at the

hearing, testified himself and called three

witnesses to testify on his behalf. The plaintiff

also submitted evidence into the record,

including numerous letters of support from other

parents. Based on the record, we are convinced

that the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to

be heard, see Obasi, 639 N.E.2d at 1325, and

thus, we reject Amundsen’s claim that the alleged

denial of his right to subpoena witnesses

violated due process.
 3. Admission of Hearsay

 Lastly, Amundsen contends that the hearing was

not conducted in accordance with formal rules of

evidence and that hearsay evidence was improperly

considered. Contrary to his contention that the

Illinois Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")

mandates that the rules of evidence and privilege

be followed, we hasten to point out that the APA

does not apply to Park District administrative

hearings. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court has

held that "[c]learly the [Park District

Personnel] Board is an administrative unit

created pursuant to statute, specifically, the

Chicago Park District Act (Park Act) . . . . ,

[and] the APA does not apply to it because it is

a unit of local government and is therefore

specifically exempted from its provisions."

Schmeier v. Chicago Park District, 703 N.E.2d

396, 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (emphasis added);

see also 70 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1505/16a. 

 Because Amundsen has failed to present nor have

we been able to discover any law that mandates

that Park District hearings are bound by formal

rules of evidence, we reject his claim that his

hearing did not comport with due process. Thus,

the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

the defendants on Count one of the amended

complaint was proper.

 B. Count two: The Defendants Conspired to Deprive

Amundsen of his Constitutional Rights

 In relation to the plaintiff’s claim that the

defendants conspired to deprive him of his

constitutional rights, he alleged in his amended

complaint that: (1) O’Connor orally reprimanded

him; (2) Morales suspended him at a meeting at

which Podgorski was also present; (3) Podgorski,

Morales and Dunlap caused him to be arrested for

criminal trespass to land; and (4) Podgorski and

O’Connor gave perjured testimony at his criminal

trial.

 In Kunik v. Racine County, Wisconsin, 946 F.2d

1574, 1580 (7th Cir. 1991), we held that in order

to sustain a claim that the defendants conspired

to deny the plaintiff his constitutional rights,

"[t]here must be allegations that the defendants

directed themselves toward an unconstitutional

action by virtue of a mutual understanding. Even

were such allegations to be made, they must

further be supported by some factual allegations

suggesting a ’meeting of the minds.’" Thus,

Amundsen must satisfy the following: (1) allege

the existence of an agreement; (2) if the

agreement is not overt, "the alleged acts must be
sufficient to raise the inference of mutual

understanding" (i.e., the acts performed by the

members of a conspiracy "are unlikely to have

been undertaken without an agreement"); and (3)

"a whiff of the alleged conspirators’ assent . .

. must be apparent in the complaint." Id. at

1580-81. Indeed, a conspiracy claim cannot

survive summary judgment if the allegations "are

vague, conclusionary and include no overt acts

reasonably related to the promotion of the

alleged conspiracy." Id. at 1580; see Spiegel v.

Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 726-27 (7th Cir. 2000).

 The district court found that "the only

[denial] Amundsen specifically identifies in his

complaint" was the denial of "his right to due

process, as protected by the Fourth, Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments." The court also found that

the plaintiff "failed to allege any action taken

by any of the individual defendants that

constituted a denial of his right to due

process," "made no factual allegations supporting

a reasonable inference that the individual

defendants agreed to any sort of conspiracy" and

"fail[ed] to make any factual allegations

supporting the existence of a conspiracy." We

agree and similarly hold that Amundsen has failed

to make any allegations that constitute a due

process violation, much less any constitutional

violation. It is clear that the allegations set

out in his complaint and reiterated in his briefs

and at oral argument fail to set forth any

cognizable claim that a conspiracy existed

because the allegations "are vague, conclusionary

and include no overt acts reasonably related to

the promotion of the alleged conspiracy." Kunik,

946 F.2d at 1580. Because the plaintiff’s

allegations are nothing more than bald assertions

without any evidentiary support, we hold that

they are insufficient to establish that the

defendants conspired to deprive him of his

constitutional rights. The district court

correctly granted summary judgment to the

defendants on Count two of the amended complaint.

 C. Count three: The Plaintiff’s Termination

Violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement

 Lastly, Amundsen contends that the court erred

when it dismissed his claim that he was

terminated in violation of the collective

bargaining agreement. He asserts that his claim

is governed by federal law and therefore was not

required to timely seek judicial review.

 We disagree because Illinois law governs the

plaintiff’s claim. Under 29 U.S.C. sec. 152, the

federal Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA")

does not cover Illinois employees working for a
local public entity created by the state. See 29

U.S.C. sec. 152(2) (excluding "any State or

political subdivision thereof" from its

definition of "employer")./6 Because the Park

District is a political subdivision of the state

of Illinois, state law applies and as such,

"[a]ll final administrative decisions by the

personnel board discharging . . . an employee

with career service status are subject to

judicial review under the Administrative Review

Law." 70 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1505/16a(c)(4)(J) (The

Park District Act). Thus, when the Personnel

Board’s decision to terminate Amundsen became

final on December 29, 1997, Amundsen had 35 days

to seek judicial review under Illinois state law.

735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-103 ("Every action to

review a final administrative decision shall be

commenced by the filing of a complaint and the

issuance of summons within 35 days from the date

that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed

was served upon the party affected by the

decision . . . .")./7

 The record reveals and Amundsen conceded that

he failed to file an appeal within 35 days of the

Personnel Board’s final decision to terminate

him./8 Thus, because he failed to meet the

statute of limitations for seeking judicial

review under Illinois law, the court correctly

granted summary judgment to the defendants on

Count three. See Lockett v. Chicago Police Board,

549 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (Ill. 1990) ("The

requirement that a complaint be filed within the

35-day limit is jurisdictional; if a complaint is

not timely filed, no jurisdiction is conferred on

the circuit court and judicial review of the

administrative decision is barred.")./9

 Because the plaintiff failed to establish actual

bias on the part of the hearing officer, failed

to demonstrate that he was unconstitutionally

denied the right to subpoena witnesses, and

ignored the fact that the hearing was not

required to comport with formal rules of

evidence, we agree with the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of the

defendants on Count one. We also conclude that

the court properly granted summary judgment to

the defendants on Counts two and three because

Amundsen failed to sufficiently allege facts in

support of his conspiracy claim and failed to

file a timely appeal under Illinois law,

respectively. The district court’s decision is

AFFIRMED.

/1 The plaintiff’s original complaint was filed on
May 8, 1998, and after the judge granted summary

judgment in favor of the defendants on virtually

all counts, the court granted Amundsen leave to

file an amended complaint.

/2 Amundsen contends that he merely "flicked [the

child] on the forehead" to get his attention.

Nonetheless, the parents of the allegedly

stricken child swore out a criminal complaint for

battery against Amundsen. He was charged but was

later acquitted.

/3 We note that the Park District hearing officer

found that

[t]he advice [Amundsen] received from his union

president . . . was only partially correct. While

it is true that usual procedures require written

notice of suspension, . . . such written notice

is not mandated. . . .

There is little evidence in

support of Mr. Amundsen’s contention that

this refusal to obey his superiors by leaving and

not returning to Park District premises was based

on a good-faith misunderstanding of the

provisions of the Code of Conduct and on advice

of his union president. Rather, it is reasonable

to conclude that he refused to leave because he

was obstinate, especially given his caustic

responses to his superiors when they ordered him

on numerous occasions to leave.

/4 Amundsen was later acquitted of the charge.

/5 Amundsen’s suit does not belong in federal court

in spite of the fact that his claims are

meritless because his allegation that he was

discharged in violation of the collective

bargaining agreement is governed by Illinois law.

/6 Amundsen also mistakenly contends that the

district court previously concluded that his

claim falls under the Federal Labor Management

Relations Act and thus, this court on appeal is

bound by the court’s decision. Upon review of the

record, we have been unable to discover any

language in the court’s decision to support his

assertion.

/7 We also note that Section 12.3 of Amundsen’s

collective bargaining agreement provides that

Illinois law governs:

Suspensions of any length and discharges may be

appealed to the Personnel Board of the District

in accordance with the applicable provisions of

the Illinois Compiled Statutes (1992) and the

Illinois Revised Statutes (1991) and the
procedures of the Personnel Board and existing

procedures and practices in effect on the

effective date of this Agreement or as modified

from time to time in accordance with Section 16.7

herein.

/8 The plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to

file an appeal of his discharge in the Illinois

state court system and furthermore failed to file

his federal suit until May 8, 1998, more than

three months after the expiration of the 35-day

statute of limitations.

/9 Because Illinois state law governs the

plaintiff’s claim that he was terminated in

violation of his collective bargaining agreement,

the district court had only pendent jurisdiction

over the claim. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1367. Although

"[t]he general rule is that when as here the

federal claim drops out before trial (here way

before trial), the federal district court should

relinquish jurisdiction over the supplemental

claim," Van Harken, 103 F.3d at 1354, the

district judge chose not to do so. We see no

reason to disturb the judge’s ruling because his

interpretation of state law was correct and he

correctly resolved the plaintiff’s suit rather

than burden the state courts with the case. See

id.