alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 41 (Wednesday, March 3, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 9635]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-4036]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Highway Administration


Cancellation of Environmental Impact Statement; Harris and 
Brazoria Counties, TX

AGENCY: Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), TxDOT.

ACTION: Cancellation of SH 35 EIS.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In Vol. 68, No. 210/Thursday, October 30, 2003/Notices, FHWA 
issued a Notice of Intent to advise the public that an Environmental 
Impact Statement would be prepared for the proposed SH 35 roadway 
between Bellfort Road and FM 1462 in Harris and Brazoria Counties, 
Texas. The use of Federal funding for this project is no longer 
proposed and a State Environmental Impact Statement will be prepared.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Gregory S. Punske, Federal Highway 
Administration, Texas Division, 300 East 8th Street, Room 826, Austin, 
Texas 78701, Telephone (512) 536-5960.

    Issued on: February 19, 2010.
Gregory S. Punske,
District Engineer, FHWA Texas Division.
[FR Doc. 2010-4036 Filed 3-2-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-22-M
NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition 

is not citable as precedent. It is a public record.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2006-7064 

AGRIFINA C. BARO, 

 Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

R. JAMES NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

DECIDED: October 6, 2006 

 __________________________ 

Before LINN and PROST, Circuit Judges, and SARIS, District Judge.

∗

PER CURIAM. 

 Agrifina C. Baro appeals from a decision of the United States Court of Appeals 

for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirming the decision of the Board of Veterans’

Appeals (“Board”) which denied service connection for her husband’s death and denied 

entitlement to accrued benefits. Baro v. Nicholson, No. 04-1260 (Vet. App. Dec. 1, 

2005). We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

 ∗

 Honorable Patti B. Saris, District Judge, United States District Court for 

the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292, this court has limited jurisdiction over appeals from 

decisions of the Veterans Court. See Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002) (en banc). This court “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual 

determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a 

particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) (2000). 

Ms. Baro’s appeal to this court can be best construed as relying on two theories. 

The first is that the Veterans Court failed to find that her husband’s death was service 

connected. Because the determination of whether an injury is service connected is a 

factual determination, it is outside the jurisdiction of this court. Therefore, we decline to 

address Ms. Baro’s arguments with respect to that issue. 

Secondly, Ms. Baro’s appeal can be read to argue that the Veterans Court erred 

by failing to apply 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). This statute requires that 

[t]he Secretary shall consider all information and lay and medical evidence 

of record in a case before the Secretary with respect to benefits under 

laws administered by the Secretary. When there is an approximate 

balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to 

the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the 

doubt to the claimant. 

38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2000). Ms. Baro’s argument may either be that the Veterans 

Court did not consider all the evidence before it, or, having found that the evidence for 

and against her claim was relatively balanced, the court should have found in her favor. 

In either case, this argument constitutes a challenge to the application of law to the facts 

of this case. Such an issue is outside of this court’s jurisdiction. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) 

(2000). 

Accordingly Ms. Baro’s appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

 No costs. 

2006-7064 2
§ 522.960b Flumethasone acetate solution. ( a ) *Specifications.* Each milliliter of solution contains 2 milligrams (mg) of flumethasone acetate.
( b ) *Sponsor.* See No. 054771 in § 510.600(c) of this chapter.
( c ) *Conditions of use in dogs* — ( 1 ) *Amount.* Administer by intramuscular injection as follows: Dogs weighing up to 10 pounds (lbs): 2 mg; dogs weighing 10 to 25 lbs: 4 mg; dogs weighing over 25 lbs: 8 mg. Dosage should be adjusted according to the weight of the animal, the severity of the symptoms, and the response noted. Dosage by injection should not exceed 3 days of therapy. With chronic conditions intramuscular therapy may be followed by oral administration of flumethasone tablets at a daily dose of from 0.0625 to 0.25 mg per animal.
( 2 ) *Indications for use.* For use in certain acute and chronic canine dermatoses of varying etiology to help control the pruritus, irritation, and inflammation associated with these conditions.
( 3 ) *Limitations.* Federal law restricts this drug to use by or on the order of a licensed veterinarian.
[79 FR 16188, Mar. 25, 2014]
#### People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Lee Thomas, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 52,071. (Abstract of Decision.)

First District, Second Division.

May 27, 1969.

*377Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender of Cook County, of Chicago (James J. Doherty, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant;

Edward V. Hanrahan, State’s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and Thomas M. Walsh, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee.

Opinion by

PRESIDING JUSTICE LYONS.

Not to be published in full.
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.00
        

</TABLE>
38693.

#### NATIONAL DISTRIBUTING COMPANY v. OXFORD, Commissioner.

Frankum, Judge.

This suit was brought by the plaintiff against the State of Georgia, Dixon Oxford, State Revenue Commissioner, The Department of Revenue of the State of Georgia, and Georgia Industrial Realty Co., for damages resulting from water flowing from a broken tank of a commode, which *73fixture was located in a building leased from the Georgia Industrial Realty Co. by the State for the purpose of warehousing whisky as provided by Chapter 58-10' of the Code of Georgia. The plaintiff alleges numerous acts of negligence against the defendants, contending that said acts resulted in damage to its property. The trial court sustained the general demurrers of the State of Georgia, Dixon Oxford, State Revenue Commissioner, and the Department of Revenue, which ruling the plaintiff contends was erroneous. The trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrers. The State cannot be sued except by its express consent or by a constitutional provision. *Barwick v. Roberts,*192 Ga. 783 (16 S. E. 2d 867); *Holcombe v. Ga. Milk Producers' Confederation,*188 Ga. 358 (3 S. E. 2d 705); *Roberts v. Barwick,*187 Ga. 691 (1 S. E. 2d 713). There is no allegation in the petition to show the plaintiff has a right to sue the State. *Florida State Hospital v. Durham Iron Co.,*194 Ga. 350 (21 S. E. 2d 216). Furthermore, a suit cannot be maintained against a State official in his individual capacity as a means to sue the State. The allegations of the petition are insufficient to set forth a cause of action against Dixon Oxford as an individual. *Musgrove v. Ga. R. & Bkg. Co.,*204 Ga. 139 (49 S. E. 2d 26); *Fleisher v. Duncan,*195 Ga. 309 (24 S. E. 2d 15). A waiver of immunity to a suit by a state can only arise from a provision of its constitution *(Florida State Hospital v. Durham Iron Co.,*194 Ga. 350, 21 S. E. 2d 216), or from an act of its legislature *(Georgia Public Service Commission v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.,*205 Ga. 863, 55 S. E. 2d 618; *Musgrove v. Ga. R. & Bkg. Co.,*204 Ga. 139, 49 S. E. 2d 26; *Roberts v. Barwick,*187 Ga. 691, supra; *Thompson v. Continental Gin Co.,*73 Ga. App. 694, 37 S. E. 2d 819). As the petition has shown no right whereby the plaintiff may maintain an action against the State, and as we construe the petition as a tortious action against the State, the trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrers.

Decided January 19, 1961.

*Dudley Cook,*for plaintiff in error.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Townsend, P. J., Carlisle and Jordan, JJ., concur.*

*74*Eugene Cook, Attorney-General, Ben F. Johnson, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, Robert W. Goodman, Deputy Assistant Attorney-General,*contra.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 38 (Friday, February 26, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 9001]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-3976]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION


Proposal Review Panel for Materials Research; Notice of Meeting

    In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-
463 as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the 
following meeting:

    Name: Site visit review of the Materials Research Science and 
Engineering Center (MRSEC) at Colorado School of Mines by NSF 
Division of Materials Research (DMR) <greek-i>1203.
    Dates and Times: Thursday, April 22, 2010; 8:30 a.m.- 4 p.m.
    Place: Colorado School of Mines, Golden, CO.
    Type of Meeting: Part-open.
    Contact Person: Dr. Charles Ying, Program Director, Materials 
Research Science and Engineering Centers Program, Division of 
Materials Research, Room 1065, National Science Foundation, 4201 
Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230, Telephone (703) 292-8428.
    Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and recommendations 
concerning progress of the MRSEC at the Colorado School of Mines.
    Agenda: Thursday, April 22, 2010
8:30 a.m.-2 p.m. Open--Review of the Colorado School of Mines MRSEC.
2 p.m.-4 p.m. Closed--Executive Session.
    Reason for Closing: The work being reviewed may include 
information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including 
technical information; financial data, such as salaries and personal 
information concerning individuals associated with the proposals. 
These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c), (4) and (6) of the 
Government in the Sunshine Act.

    Dated: February 23, 2010.
Susanne Bolton,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 2010-3976 Filed 2-25-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555-01-P
# C_2014223EN.01000901.xml

| 14.7.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 223/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.7.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 223/9

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal d’instance de Dieppe (France) lodged on 8 May 2014 — Facet SA v Jean Henri

(Case C-225/14)

2014/C 223/13

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Referring court

Tribunal d’instance de Dieppe

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Facet SA

Applicant:

Defendant: Jean Henri

Defendant:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Does Article 22 of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers, (1) interpreted in the light of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (2) prohibit the existence and application of standard terms in credit agreements whereby the consumer acknowledges that the creditor’s obligations have been fulfilled? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Does Article 22 of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers, (1) interpreted in the light of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (2) prohibit the existence and application of standard terms in credit agreements whereby the consumer acknowledges that the creditor’s obligations have been fulfilled?

1

2

| 2. | Do the general principle of the effectiveness of Community law and Article 22 of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers, interpreted in the light of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, preclude the creditor’s being able to establish proof of fulfilment of its pre-contractual and contractual obligations solely by means of the standard terms in credit agreements whereby the consumer acknowledges that those obligations have been fulfilled, without producing before the court the documents issued by the creditor and supplied to the borrower? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Do the general principle of the effectiveness of Community law and Article 22 of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers, interpreted in the light of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, preclude the creditor’s being able to establish proof of fulfilment of its pre-contractual and contractual obligations solely by means of the standard terms in credit agreements whereby the consumer acknowledges that those obligations have been fulfilled, without producing before the court the documents issued by the creditor and supplied to the borrower?

---

(1)  Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66).

1

(2)  OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.

2

---
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                                    FORM 8-K

                CURRENT REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF
                     OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

                          Date of Report: March 27, 2001

                        Teltran International Group, Ltd.
             (Exact Name of registrant as specified in its Charter)

         Delaware                    0-25641                 11-3172507
(State of Incorporation)       Commission File No.          (IRS Employer
                                                         Identification No.)

One Penn Plaza, Suite 4429, New York NY                       10119
(Address of principal executive offices)                    (Zip Code)

                   Registrant's telephone number,(212)643-1600

Item 2.  Acquisition or Disposition of Assets

As of March  27,  2001 the  Company  completed  the  closing  of the sale to NCT
Network,  Inc. ("NCTN") of its wholly owned subsidiary  Teltran Web Factory Ltd.
(Web  Factory").  The Company  received  cash of $100,000 and shares of Series A
preferred  stock  having a stated  value of  approximately  (pound)4,900,000  or
$7,350,000  (which it intends to value at a lower amount).  The Company also may
receive  additional  cash in the amount of $250,000.  NCTN is also  obligated to
satisfy debt of (pound)1,500,000 or approximately  $2,150,000  guaranteed by the
Company in connection with the acquisition.

The Company  transferred a portion of the preferred  shares to  Relocate411.com,
Inc.("Relocate")  a corporation  affiliated with officers of the Company.  These
shares were used to satisfy amounts owed to Relocate for a advance which enabled
us to pay  installments  of the  Teltran Web Factory  purchase  price.  Relocate
received our Web Factory shares as security which Relocate  released so that the
shares  could  be sold to NCTN.  A  portion  of the  balance  of the  NCTN  were
delivered to certain funders and creditors of the company.  The remaining shares
of NCTN were delivered as security for advances and notes issued in satisfaction
of claims by existing securities holder.

NCTN has rights of offset and may  assert  claims  against  the  remaining  cash
installment payable by it and a portion of Series A Preferred Stock.

The date for  accounting  and other purposes may be dependent upon the date NCTN
assumed control over Web Factory.

SIGNATURES

Pursuant  to the  requirements  of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of  1934,  the
registrant  has duly  caused  this  report  to be  signed  on its  behalf by the
undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

                                 Teltran International Group, Ltd.
Date: April 6, 2001

                                     /s/ Byron Lerner
                                       By: Byron Lerner
                                     Title: President
[DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ No. 1 2- 11 71 2 Non -Arg um en t Ca le nd ar
__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ D.C. Dock etNo. 6 :1 1- cr-0 03 94 -GKS-KRS- 1 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, lll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us RUBEN PEREZ-RAM IREZ, a.k .a. Noe F lo res -Zav al a, ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

th e Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co urt forth e Mi dd le Dis tri ctof F lo rid a
__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ (Oct ob er 3 0, 2 01 2) Befo re TJ OFLAT, MARCUS an d P RYOR, Ci rcu itJu dg es . PER CURI AM:

Case: 12-11712 Date Filed: 10/30/2012 Page: 1 of 3On M arch 21 , 20 12 , app el lantRube n P erez -Ram ire z, havi ng pl edgu il ty to

reen try of a d ep orte d a li en , invi ol at io n o f 8 U.S.C . § 1 32 6( a), was sen te nc edby th e Dis tri ctCo urt t o apri so n t erm of 1 8 m on th s —an up wardva ria nc e fro m th e 1 Gui de li ne s s en te nc e ran ge of 0 to 6 m on th s b utwell be lo w th e st atut ory m ax im um pe na lty of 1 0 years’ im

pr is on m en t, 8 U.S.C. § 1 32 6( b) (1 ). He ap pe al s h is se nt en ce, arg ui ng th atth e Dis tri ctCo urt p ro cedur al ly erredinim po si ng hi s se nt en ce an d i n fa il in g t o p ro vi de a st at em en t o f rea so ns forth e v ari an ce. We fin d no erro r an d a cco rd in gl y

affi rm . W e fi ndno pro cedur al erro r in th is cas e. As requi redby Gal l v. Un it ed St at es , 55 2 U.S. 3 8, 4 1, 1 28 S.Ct . 58 6, 5 91 , 16 9 L.Ed .2d44 5 (2 00 7) , th e Dis tri ct Co urt p ro pe rly ado pt edth e Gui de li ne s s en te nc e ran ge setou t i n t he pre se nt en ce rep ort. Ap pe ll an t, wh o was rep res en te d b y co un se l, v oi cedno ob

jecti on to th at se nt en ce ra ng e o r th e rep ort’s re ci ta ti on of the fact s und erp in ni ng it . Nor d id ap pe ll an t o bjec t t o the sen te nc e h e rec ei ve d a fte r th e Dis tri ctCo urt i m po se d i t. As fo r st at in g the reas on s fo r th e se nt en ce, the Dis tri ctCo urt m ad e itcle ar Appellant wa s g iven cr edit for time ser ved betwe en his detention on Nove mber 9, 2011, 1 and the imposition of sentence . Appellant is a Mexican citizen. He ha d enter ed the United States illega lly

14 times. His first removal occ urre d in 2003, after he wa s convicted of

a misdemeanor. H e wa s arr ested for the instant offe nse on Nove mber 9, 2011, a fter the police stopped the ca

r in which heand 10 other s were riding . 2 Case: 12-11712 Date Filed: 10/30/2012 Page: 2 of 3th atitwas i m po si ng an18 m on th s’ per io d o f in carc erat io n b ecau se ap pe ll an t h ad en te redth e Uni te d S ta te s i ll eg al ly 14 t im es , anda se nt en ce ab ov e th e Gui de li ne s se nt en ce ra ng e was requi redto pro m ot e res pe ctforlaw an d t o d et er ap pe ll an t fr om il le ga ll y en te rin g thi s co un try agai n. Se e 18 U.S.C. § 3 55 3( a)(a )(2 )(A), (C) . AFFIRMED.

3 Case: 12-11712 Date Filed: 10/30/2012 Page: 3 of 3
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANICAL STATEMENTS OF SHERIDAN HEALTHCARE, INC. FOR THE YEAR ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENT.
</LEGEND>
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<S>                             <C>
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