IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Natalie R. Laskey, Executrix of The : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Estate of Stephen Robert Laskey :

:

v. : No. 1224 C.D. 2019

:

North Union Township, a second :

class municipality of the :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Appellant :

Natalie R. Laskey, Executrix of :

The Estate of Stephen Robert :

Laskey, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1350 C.D. 2019

North Union Township, a second :

class municipality of the :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania : SUBMITTED: October 13, 2020

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: November 9, 2020

North Union Township (Township) appeals from the August 29, 2019 

Judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County (Trial Court) in 

the amount of $75,000 in favor of Natalie R. Laskey, Executrix of the Estate of 

Stephen Robert Laskey (Laskey).

1

 Laskey has also filed a cross-appeal from the 

Judgment, seeking an award of prejudgment interest.

1 Stephen Robert Laskey and his business, Steve’s Restaurant Appliance and Food 

Preparation Equipment, were the original plaintiffs when this matter initiated in the Trial Court in 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

This appeal stems from a jury trial in a breach of contract case. The original 

parties to the contract were the Township and Texas Eastern Transmission, L.P.

(Texas Eastern).2 However, Texas Eastern subsequently assigned its rights to 

Laskey as a result of a settlement agreement. The breach of contract case eventually 

proceeded to trial, and a jury entered a verdict in favor of Laskey and against the 

Township, awarding Laskey $75,000 in damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 

Both parties filed timely Post-Trial Motions, but the Trial Court never ruled 

on the Motions, despite previously scheduling a hearing to consider them. As 

discussed more fully below, because we conclude that the Judgment was entered 

prematurely, and because the parties’ Post-Trial Motions are still outstanding, we 

vacate the Judgment and remand this matter to the Trial Court for further 

proceedings.

Background

Laskey owns and operates an appliance repair business on a one-acre parcel 

located on Industrial Drive in Mount Braddock, Pennsylvania. Industrial Drive is 

adjacent to Ainsley Lane, a Township-owned road. The Township owns a five-acre 

parcel adjacent to Ainsley Lane, on which it operates a municipal park, a baseball 

field, and a parking area. Texas Eastern leases property on Connellsville Road, also 

adjacent to Ainsley Lane, on which it operates a pipe yard for the storage and 

distribution of gas transmission pipelines.

2011. Mr. Laskey died in November 2018. Thereafter, his wife, Natalie R. Laskey, became the 

Executrix of Mr. Laskey’s estate, and the Estate of Stephen Robert Laskey was substituted as the 

plaintiff in the proceedings below. For ease of reference, we refer to Mr. Laskey and his Estate 

interchangeably as “Laskey.”

2 Texas Eastern was one of the original defendants in the proceedings before the Trial 

Court. The Trial Court eventually removed Texas Eastern from the caption of the case and 

permitted its counsel to withdraw before trial due to a settlement agreement. However, Texas 

Eastern was never formally dismissed as a party. Trial Ct. Stmt. in Lieu of Op., 12/13/19, at 11.
3

In May 2011, the Township entered into an agreement with Texas Eastern, 

wherein Texas Eastern paid $50,000 to the Township as payment “in full for 

damages sustained from Texas Eastern’s use of Ainsley Lane, paving materials for 

Ainsley Lane[,] and installation of a storm drain in front of Stephen Laskey’s 

property to address drainage issue.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 64c. The 

Township and Texas Eastern also signed a document titled “Release” (2011 

Release), which stated that Texas Eastern’s $50,000 payment was for the costs of 

grading and repaving Ainsley Lane and installing a storm drain. The 2011 Release 

further provided:

[I]n consideration of the aforementioned and acknowledging the receipt 

of [$50,000,] the Township releases and discharges Texas Eastern from 

and against any and all claims, demands, causes of action, either direct 

or consequential, costs, expenses (including, but not limited to[,] 

attorneys’ fees), losses and compensation of any kind in law or in equity 

of the demands and conditions from any and all claims, demands and 

causes of action that the Township or any third party has or may have 

associated with Ainsley Lane, the repair of Ainsley Lane, or Texas 

Eastern’s use of Ainsley Lane. The release is for the benefit of Texas 

Eastern and its successors and assigns and shall bind the Township and 

its successors and assigns.

Id. at 63c (emphasis added). 

In May 2011, Laskey initiated this action by filing a writ of summons in the 

Trial Court. In November 2011, Laskey filed a Complaint against the Township and 

Texas Eastern, alleging damages caused by stormwater runoff and flooding on his

property. Laskey averred that both defendants were negligent in developing and 

maintaining their properties, which caused excessive stormwater to flow onto 

Laskey’s property since at least 2009. Laskey also averred that both defendants were 

negligent in maintaining Ainsley Lane, causing further damage to Laskey’s property. 
4

In April 2015, Texas Eastern filed a cross-claim for breach of contract against 

the Township. Texas Eastern alleged that the Township breached the terms of the 

2011 Release by failing to perform any of the work specified in the agreement. 

Texas Eastern averred that, as of that date, the Township had not regraded or repaved 

Ainsley Lane, nor had it installed a storm drain to alleviate the drainage and 

stormwater runoff problems on Laskey’s property.

In December 2017, Laskey settled its negligence claims against the Township 

with the Township’s liability insurer, Selective Insurance Company, in the amount 

of $127,500. See R.R. at 66c-67c.

Also in December 2017, Laskey settled its negligence claims against Texas 

Eastern for $38,000. See R.R. at 70c-73c. As part of the settlement agreement, 

Texas Eastern and Laskey signed a “Release” (2017 Release) and an “Assignment 

of Claim” (2017 Assignment). The 2017 Release provided that Laskey

[did] hereby release, remise, and forever discharge Texas Eastern . . . 

of and from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands, 

damages, costs, expenses, or any other recovery whatsoever . . . arising 

from alleged damage to [Laskey’s] real and personal property . . . 

allegedly caused by multiple surface water run-off incidents . . . against

[Texas Eastern], including but not limited to all claims that were, or 

could have been, asserted in the civil action filed by [Laskey] in the 

[Trial Court] . . . .

R.R. at 70c (emphasis added). The 2017 Assignment provided in pertinent part:

Texas Eastern . . . does hereby assign to Stephen Laskey . . . all [of 

Texas Eastern’s] right, title, and interest in and to the cause of action 

against [the] Township . . . for breach of contract arising out of the 

[2011 Release], as set forth more fully in the cross-claim filed by [Texas 

Eastern] in the [Trial Court] . . . with full right to maintain the action, 

and to settle and compromise the cause of action, and to give a release 

in [Texas Eastern’s] name in full discharge of the liability under the 

cause of action.
5

Id. at 68c (emphasis added).

In April 2019, Laskey and the Township proceeded to a jury trial on the only 

remaining cause of action: the breach of contract cross-claim that Texas Eastern had 

assigned to Laskey. At trial, both parties presented testimony and evidence 

regarding the 2011 Release between the Township and Texas Eastern, the 2017 

Release and the 2017 Assignment between Texas Eastern and Laskey, and the 

attorneys’ fees and costs Texas Eastern incurred in defending the Laskey negligence 

lawsuit. 

On April 17, 2019, following a three-day trial, a jury returned a unanimous 

verdict in the amount of $75,000 in favor of Laskey and against the Township. The 

jury specifically found that Laskey (as the assignee of Texas Eastern) proved the 

validity of the breach of contract claim between Texas Eastern and the Township by 

a preponderance of the evidence. The jury awarded Laskey: (1) $50,000 in 

monetary damages, which was the amount Texas Eastern had paid the Township 

under the 2011 Release; and (2) $25,000 for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by 

Texas Eastern in defending the negligence lawsuit.

On April 26, 2019, the Township filed a Post-Trial Motion seeking to set aside 

the jury’s verdict. The Township averred, inter alia, that “the jury failed to follow 

the instructions of the [Trial C]ourt and clearly did not understand the legal 

complexity associated with the documents that were admitted as evidence.” R.R. at 

14c-15c. On May 6, 2019, Laskey also filed a Post-Trial Motion, seeking an award 

of prejudgment interest (at a rate of 6% per annum) on the entire $75,000 verdict, 
6

totaling $17,940.15. R.R. at 17c. Both parties filed responses to each other’s PostTrial Motion.3

The Trial Court originally scheduled a hearing on Laskey’s Post-Trial Motion 

for May 29, 2019. However, the parties were unable to appear on that date, so the 

Trial Court canceled the hearing. The Trial Court did not schedule a new hearing at 

that time.

On June 24, 2019, Township filed a Motion for Hearing on the Issue of 

Prejudgment Interest. In its Motion, the Township averred “that there should be a 

hearing and oral argument on the issues raised as there are serious questions about 

whether or not prejudgment interest is justified.” R.R. at 26c. The Trial Court did 

not rule on that Motion.

In its Statement in Lieu of Opinion, the Trial Court explained what transpired 

with regard to the parties’ Post-Trial Motions as follows:

Counsel for [the] Township and Laskey indicated in emails to the [Trial 

Court’s] law clerk at the time that they were unavailable for argument 

on May 29, 2019, but the dates proposed by counsel in June [2019] 

were not open on the [Trial] Court’s schedule. There was never any 

formal motion to continue the argument filed by either of the attorneys, 

but there was a June 24, 2019 “Motion for Hearing on Issue of 

Prejudgment Interest[”] that this Court declined to grant because the 

Court believed it to be a legal issue[,] except for the documentary

evidence as to interest actually earned by the Township[.] . . . [The Trial 

Court] did not think ahead that all of the issues for argument could 

have been heard at such a hearing. Thereafter, summer vacations and 

the departure of the [Trial] Court’s previous law clerk caused this case 

to be overlooked.

. . . .

3

 Under Pa. R.C.P. No. 227.1(c)(1), a motion for post-trial relief must be filed within 10 

days after the jury’s verdict, and if a party has filed a timely post-trial motion, any other party to 

the action may file post-trial motions within 10 days after the filing of the first post-trial motion.
7

After the [Township’s N]otice of Appeal was filed, the [Trial Court] 

contacted counsel to indicate that the [Trial] Court believed the Post[-

]Trial Motions were still pending. In response[,] . . . counsel for [the] 

Township did file [a m]otion[] to schedule a hearing. This Court 

declined to do so at that point, on the belief that the pendency of the 

appeal deprived this [C]ourt of jurisdiction.

Trial Ct. Stmt. in Lieu of Op., 12/13/19, at 8-9 (emphasis added).

On August 29, 2019, upon Laskey’s filing of a Praecipe for Entry of Judgment 

on the Verdict, the Trial Court entered Judgment in the amount of $75,000 in 

Laskey’s favor. On September 5, 2019, the Township timely appealed to this Court 

(docketed at 1224 C.D. 2019). Laskey also filed a cross-appeal (docketed at 1350 

C.D. 2019), limited to the issue of prejudgment interest.

On September 16, 2019, the Township filed in the Trial Court a Motion to 

Strike Judgment Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 227.4. In its Motion to Strike, the 

Township asserted that Laskey’s Praecipe for Entry of Judgment was premature 

because 120 days had not passed since the filing of Laskey’s Post-Trial Motion and, 

thus, the August 29, 2019 Judgment should be stricken. The Trial Court did not rule 

on this Motion, due to the pendency of the appeals with this Court. See Trial Ct. 

Stmt. in Lieu of Op., 12/13/19, at 9.

Thereafter, both parties filed a Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of 

Errors Complained of on Appeal (Rule 1925(b) Statement) with the Trial Court.

On December 13, 2019, the Trial Court filed a Statement in Lieu of Opinion, 

in which it effectively reversed many of its prior rulings throughout the litigation. 

After summarizing the lengthy procedural history of the case, the Trial Court began 

its analysis by noting that the Township raised 15 issues in its Rule 1925(b) 

Statement and that Laskey raised only the issue of prejudgment interest. 
8

Turning to the evidence presented at trial, the Trial Court described the 2011 

Release between the Township and Texas Eastern as follows:

[Texas Eastern’s] cross-claim[, which was assigned to Laskey,] was 

contractual, and the document involved was captioned and written as a

“Release,” which was drafted by Texas Eastern. 

However, the “Release” was actually a poorly drafted “road 

maintenance agreement” under the provisions of the “Road Law” 

and/or the Second Class Township Code. A Township of the Second 

Class can agree to waive the weight limit on a Township Road for an 

overweight carrier--usually coal mining companies or timber 

producers--in exchange for a Road Bond that secures the cost of 

repairing any damage to the Township Road caused by the overweight 

truck traffic. Ainsley Lane had a 10,000 pound weight limit because it 

was originally little more than a low-traffic drive[]way providing 

access to only five properties (including the ballfield and the Laskey 

property on opposite corners at the beginning of [Ainsley] Lane, the 

Gallo property along [Ainsley] Lane, and the Texas Eastern property at 

the end of [Ainsley] Lane). The Texas Eastern pipe trucks, in contrast, 

weighed as much as 80,000 pounds, or even more. Both parties to the 

road maintenance agreement understood that such traffic had damaged 

and would continue to damage the road. In an effort to cooperate, the 

Township allowed Texas Eastern to use the road, and Texas Eastern 

used its own equipment to add additional “base” to the road, consisting 

of a layer or layers of stone. Notably, the Second Class Township Code 

and/or the Road Law permits a Township to allow an overweight 

trucking operation to let a road deteriorate while in use, provided that 

the user provides financial security to rebuild the road when the 

overweight use ceases. Since Texas Eastern is such a large and 

profitable company, instead of posting a surety bond, it chose to simply 

pay the estimated cost of repair in advance.

Trial Ct. Stmt. in Lieu of Op., 12/13/19, at 3-4. The Trial Court then opined that 

“[t]he Township’s mistake was in allowing Texas Eastern to draft the document 

captioned ‘Release’ . . . instead of captioning it and drafting it properly as a ‘Road 

Maintenance Agreement.’” Id. at 4.
9

With regard to the parties’ issues on appeal, the Trial Court stated:

This Court chooses not to address the individual issues [raised 

by the Township] piecemeal, as this Court is of the opinion that it was 

inappropriate for Texas Eastern to attempt to assign its claim against 

[the] Township arising from the 2011 “Release,” that it was 

inappropriate for Laskey to accept the assignment, and that all 

proceedings thereafter should be nullified. In other words, if this Court 

still had the power to do so, it would grant judgment to [the] Township 

notwithstanding the verdict of the jury.

That said, the [Trial Court] struggles to articulate exactly why 

the assignment was inappropriate and should be nullified. Certainty it 

completely changed “the gist of the action” from a negligence action to 

a contractual action.

Moreover, it is nonsensical for anyone to receive a refund of the 

money Texas Eastern paid to [the] Township for its destruction of and 

ongoing use of the Township [r]oad, “Ainsley Lane.” The taxpayers of 

[the] Township have no reason to subsidize the actions of Texas 

Eastern. The damage is real, and will ultimately be expensive to repair. 

Because the settlements left open only the claim for restitution for the 

road maintenance agreement[,] [the] Township wasn’t able to present 

the defense that Laskey prevented the installation of the “catch basin” 

by refusing the necessary easement. Whether that is or is not a proper 

defense has not been resolved. That is an obvious danger of mixing 

negligence and contract theories in a single action.

. . . .

Finally, champerty--sale of a lawsuit--used to be completely 

illegal, and this case is a good illustration of why it should still be 

prohibited. There was no logical relationship between any negligence 

damages suffered by Laskey and the contractual claim asserted by 

Texas Eastern. Not only was the undersigned groping on how to 

instruct the jury, the jury appeared to be completely bewildered by the 

nature of the proceedings.
10

That does leave open the question as to whether the attempted 

assignment of a non-assignable road maintenance agreement causes 

the settlement between Texas Eastern and Laskey to be nullified. That 

question was the reason this Court wanted to hear from Texas Eastern. 

Texas Eastern’s counsel was permitted to withdraw because his client 

was assertedly “effectively not a participant,” and the caption was 

amended pretrial to delete Texas Eastern to avoid confusing the jury, 

but Texas Eastern has never been dismissed as a party. This Court 

cannot conceive of any good reason for Texas Eastern to ignore the 

invitation to resume participating in the case.

Id. at 9-11 (emphasis added). 

The Trial Court then briefly addressed Laskey’s request for prejudgment 

interest, opining:

[E]ven if the $50,000 [damages] award is upheld, an award of 6% 

simple interest prior to judgment is excessive and confiscatory when 

there is no possibility that [the] Township did or could have earned 

anything like that rate of return on the money deposited as security for 

the repair of Ainsley Lane. This Court would have awarded only the 

amount actually earned by the Township as interest in the intervening 

period.

Id. at 11 (emphasis added). The Trial Court concluded with the following sentence: 

“A final decision and instructions from the Commonwealth Court will be most 

welcome.” Id. at 12.

On December 27, 2019, this Court consolidated the appeals at 1224 C.D. 2019 

and 1350 C.D. 2019 for disposition.

Analysis

On appeal, the Township raises numerous issues, many of which were raised 

in its Post-Trial Motion.4 Laskey also cross-appeals on the issue of prejudgment 

4 Although the Township purports to raise eight separate issues in its Statement of 

Questions Involved, the issues are misnumbered and some are duplicative. As Laskey correctly 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
11

interest that was raised in its Post-Trial Motion. However, apparently due to 

difficulties with summer scheduling and a staffing change, the Trial Court never 

ruled on either party’s Post-Trial Motion, despite previously scheduling a hearing to 

consider them. Laskey eventually filed a Praecipe for Entry of Judgment with the 

Trial Court, and Judgment was entered on August 29, 2019, even though the PostTrial Motions were still pending.

Generally, “judgment cannot be entered until after the trial court rules on 

post-trial motions, which necessarily means that post-trial motions must precede the 

entry of a judgment.” Mitchell v. Milburn, 199 A.3d 501, 505 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)

(emphasis added); see Oak Tree Condo. Ass’n v. Greene, 133 A.3d 113, 116 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2016) (“[W]here a trial has taken place and timely post-trial motions have 

been filed pursuant to [Pa. R.C.P. No.] 227.1, the appeal period does not begin to 

run until the trial court has issued a decision on the post-trial motions.”) (emphasis 

added).

It is true that, under Pa. R.C.P. No. 227.4(b), a party may praecipe for entry 

of judgment if the trial court does not rule on a post-trial motion within 120 days. 

Here, however, Laskey did not file its Praecipe for Entry of Judgment after the 

expiration of the 120-day period following the filing of its Post-Trial Motion as 

required by Rule 227.4(b). Rather, Laskey filed its Praecipe only 115 days after the 

filing of its Post-Trial Motion (although 120 days had passed since the Township 

filed its Post-Trial Motion). See Jahanshahi v. Centura Dev. Co., Inc., 816 A.2d 

observes in its brief, see Laskey Br. at 7 n.1, the Township’s issues on appeal can be condensed 

into four primary issues. The Township challenges: (1) the Trial Court’s rulings on counsels’ 

objections during the video depositions of Stephen Robert Laskey and Texas Eastern’s thencounsel, Donald Lewis, Esquire; (2) the Trial Court’s jury instructions regarding the computation 

of Texas Eastern’s attorneys’ fees; (3) the Trial Court’s jury instructions regarding the 

interpretation and application of the 2011 Release, the 2017 Release, and the 2017 Assignment; 

and (4) the Trial Court’s ruling on the Township’s Motion for Directed Verdict.
12

1179, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“[A]ny party may praecipe for entry of final judgment, 

notwithstanding the pendency of post-trial motions, if more than 120 days have 

passed and the trial court has failed to enter an appropriate order.”) (emphasis 

added).

Significantly, the Trial Court scheduled a hearing on Laskey’s Post-Trial 

Motion in May 2019, but canceled the hearing due to the parties’ unavailability on 

the scheduled date. Thereafter, on June 24, 2019, the Township filed a motion 

asking the Trial Court to reschedule the hearing, but the Trial Court did not rule on 

that request. In its Statement in Lieu of Opinion filed after the appeals, the Trial 

Court explained that it intended to hold a hearing on Laskey’s Post-Trial Motion, 

but the scheduling of that hearing was somehow overlooked. The Trial Court also 

stated that, in hindsight, it would have considered and heard arguments on both 

parties’ Post-Trial Motions had the hearing taken place.

Because both Post-Trial Motions stemmed from the same jury verdict, we 

conclude that the Trial Court erred in reducing the verdict to Judgment less than 120 

days after the filing of Laskey’s Post-Trial Motion, especially where the Trial Court 

clearly intended (and attempted) to hold a hearing on the parties’ Post-Trial Motions

and the Township requested such a hearing.

Conclusion

Given the unusual procedural posture of this case, as well as the Trial Court’s 

pronouncements in its Statement in Lieu of Opinion, we are compelled to vacate the 

August 29, 2019 Judgment and remand this matter to the Trial Court for: (1) a 

hearing on the issue of prejudgment interest;

5 and (2) rulings on the parties’ 

5 The Township only requested a hearing on the issue of prejudgment interest raised in 

Laskey’s Post-Trial Motion. However, in its Statement in Lieu of Opinion, the Trial Court 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
13

outstanding Post-Trial Motions. Should either party file an appeal to this Court 

following the Trial Court’s rulings on the Post-Trial Motions, we further direct the 

Trial Court to prepare a detailed Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion explaining its reasons 

for its rulings.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

indicated that it would have considered the issues raised in both parties’ Post-Trial Motions had it 

conducted a hearing. Thus, while we limit our directive to a remand hearing on prejudgment 

interest, the Trial Court may, in its discretion, consider other issues raised in the Post-Trial Motions 

at the remand hearing.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Natalie R. Laskey, Executrix of The : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Estate of Stephen Robert Laskey :

:

v. : No. 1224 C.D. 2019

:

North Union Township, a second :

class municipality of the :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Appellant :

Natalie R. Laskey, Executrix of :

The Estate of Stephen Robert :

Laskey, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1350 C.D. 2019

North Union Township, a second :

class municipality of the :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9

th day of November, 2020, the Judgment of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Fayette County (Trial Court), entered August 29, 2019, is hereby 

VACATED, and we hereby REMAND this matter to the Trial Court for further 

proceedings consistent with the foregoing Opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge