J-A25004-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

EDDIE GERVIS AND BARTOLO J. 

MORENO,

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

Appellants :

:

v. :

:

BUCKS COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH 

CLINIC AND CHRISTINE TORRES 

MATRULLO,

:

:

:

:

Appellees : No. 880 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment entered March 3, 2014,

Court of Common Pleas, Bucks County,

Civil Division at No. 2008-02415-32-2

BEFORE: DONOHUE, WECHT and PLATT*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 21, 2014

Eddie Gervis (“Gervis”) and Bartolo Moreno (“Moreno”) (collectively, 

“Appellants”) appeal from the judgment entered in favor of Bucks County 

Mental Health Clinic (“the Clinic”) and Christine Torres Matrullo (“Matrullo”) 

(collectively “Appellees”). For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:

[Gervis] first met [Matrullo] at the 

Panamerican Mental Health Clinic in Philadelphia. 

Matrullo was the Clinical Director of the Panamerican 

Mental Health Clinic, and Gervis worked there as a 

psychotherapist. They worked together at the 

Philadelphia location for a year and a half. 

Sometime around early 2006, both Gervis and 

Matrullo were transferred to the Panamerican Mental 

Health Clinic in Bristol, Pennsylvania. Shortly after 

this transfer, Matrullo called and told Gervis about a 

new clinic she was starting. This clinic became 
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known as Bucks County Mental Health Clinic, a 

nonprofit corporation, and Gervis began working 

there on March 31, 2006. 

Soon after Gervis joined, Matrullo told Gervis 

that the nonprofit Bucks County Mental Health Clinic 

was experiencing financial difficulties, and that an 

investment was needed to help with these 

difficulties. Gervis testified that Matrullo told him if 

he invested in the nonprofit ... he would receive large 

profits in the long run. On December 18, 2006, 

Gervis signed a document titled ‘Second Level Letter 

of Intention, and Agreement to Allow For A Third 

Investor’ (hereinafter, ‘Investor’s Agreement’). This 

document stated that Gervis would provide $20,000 

[] to the nonprofit Bucks County Mental Health Clinic 

to ‘ease its cash flow needs,’ and that he would be 

placed on the Board of Directors. [Moreno] signed 

an identical Investor’s Agreement, and also invested 

$20,000 [] in the nonprofit Bucks County Mental 

Health Clinic. 

The nonprofit Bucks County Mental Health 

Clinic provided psychotherapist services for mental 

health patients, along with family therapy. In the 

Investor’s Agreement signed by Gervis and Moreno, 

there were plans of a ‘for profit Corporation 

anticipated to be formed.’ Gervis testified that 

Matrullo led he and Moreno to believe [that] they 

would make money back from their investments 

through the for-profit corporation. Gervis and 

Moreno signed an Operating Agreement in 2011, 

giving them part ownership of Matrullo’s for-profit 

entity known as Bucks County Mental Health 

Services, LLC. The Operating Agreement of the forprofit [entity] states, ‘The Company desires to 

engage in the business of brokering of [sic] 

managing and operating a Mental Health Facility and 

providing mental health services for residents of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of 

New Jersey, particularly, Hunterdon and Mercer 

Counties.’ Gervis and Moreno were listed as each 

having a 10% interest in the for-profit [entity], along 
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with one vote each. Neither was listed as having 

given an initial capital contribution. Gervis testified 

that no meetings were ever held for the for-profit 

[entity] and no business was even conducted. 

Further, Gervis and Moreno claim that Matrullo 

guaranteed them a return on their $20,000 [] 

investment in the nonprofit [entity], and that this 

return never materialized. None of the documents 

related to either the nonprofit [] or the for-profit [] 

mention a guarantee of a return on any kind of 

investment, nor do they mention a specific return on 

a $20,000 [] investment. 

Gervis was employed by the nonprofit [entity] 

from March 31, 2006 until January 29, 2008. Gervis 

signed a ‘Mental Health Services Contract for 

Psychotherapist’ (hereinafter, ‘Employment 

Agreement’) on April 28, 2006. The Employment 

Agreement read, ‘In exchange for the mutual 

services and promises delineated herein, the Clinical 

Provider agrees to abide by and honor the following 

terms: (a) It will pay Contractor at the rate of $35 

per hour for services actually provided during the 

first six months of this contract and $40 per hour 

thereafter.’ Despite the contract language reading 

‘per hour,’ Gervis repeatedly testified that he was 

paid ‘per session,’ and at one point referred to the 

payment measures a ‘session hour.’ Gervis testified 

that he never received an increase in his pay. 

Additionally, Gervis claims that he stopped being 

paid altogether for some sessions, and would only 

receive a portion of what he was owed. Gervis 

resigned from his position on January 29, 20[08]. 

On March 11, 2008, Gervis and Moreno filed a 

[c]omplaint against Matrullo and Bucks County 

Mental Health Clinic, alleging [i]ntentional 

[m]isrepresentation, [u]njust [e]nrichment, [b]reach 

of [c]ontract, and a [c]laim under the Unfair Trade 

Practices and Consumer Protection Law. 

On December 19, 2013, the [c]ourt held a 

one-day non-jury trial. 
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On February 7, 2014, the [c]ourt entered a 

verdict in favor of [Appellees] on all claims. 

On March 3, 2014, the [c]ourt denied 

[Appellants’] [post-trial] [m]otion and entered 

judgment in the matter. 

On March 20, 2014, [Appellants] field their 

[n]otice of [a]ppeal ... . 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/14, at 1-5 (footnotes omitted). 

Appellants present one issue for our review: “Was the verdict so 

against the weight of the evidence such that it constitutes a miscarriage of 

justice and leads to the conclusion that the [trial court] committed a clear 

abuse of its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial?” Appellants’ Brief at 

4. 

A new trial based on weight of the evidence issues 

will not be granted unless the verdict is so contrary 

to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice; a 

mere conflict in testimony will not suffice as grounds 

for a new trial. Upon review, the test is not whether 

this Court would have reached the same result on 

the evidence presented, but, rather, after due 

consideration of the evidence found credible by the 

fact-finder, and viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, whether the 

court could reasonably have reached its conclusion. 

Our standard of review in denying a motion for a 

new trial is to decide whether the trial court 

committed an error of law which controlled the 

outcome of the case or committed an abuse of 

discretion.

We stress that if there is any support in the record 

for the trial court’s decision to deny the appellant’s 

motion for a new trial based on weight of the 

evidence, then we must affirm.
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Joseph v. Scranton Times, L.P., 89 A.3d 251, 274 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted). 

Appellants argue that the verdicts are against the weight of the 

evidence as to each of the three claims they raised in their complaint, and 

they address each claim separately. They begin with their claim for 

intentional misrepresentation. 

The elements of fraud, or intentional 

misrepresentation, are (1) a representation; (2) 

which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) 

made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or 

recklessness as to whether it is true or false; (4) 

with intent of misleading another into relying on it; 

(5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and 

(6) the resulting injury was proximately caused by 

the reliance.

Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1072 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Appellants argue that both Gervis’s testimony and the content of the 

Investor’s Agreements establish all of the elements required to succeed on 

this claim, and therefore that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. Appellants’ Brief at 11. Appellants summarize their argument as 

follows:

Matrullo took $20,000 from each [Appellant]. She 

never placed [Appellants] on any board of directors, 

never gave them voting rights in any entity, never 

gave them an equity interest in a for-profit entity 

and never formed a for-profit entity which carried on 

any business. [Matrullo] has never offered any 

explanation and failed to appear for trial. 
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[Appellants] proved their intentional 

misrepresentation case ... by clear and convincing

evidence. The verdict on [this] claim ... was against 

the weight of that evidence, and the [trial court] 

abused its discretion when it failed to award 

[Appellants] a new trial. 

Id. at 12. 

In reaching its conclusion, the trial court found that Appellees followed 

through with any/all of their obligations as outlined in the Investor’s 

Agreements. In doing so, it expressly rejected Gervis’s testimony that 

Matrullo represented that he and Moreno would receive a return on their 

investment. Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/14, at 8-9. The record supports the 

trial court’s determination. The Investor’s Agreements provide that the 

$20,000 payments made by each Appellant to the Bucks County Mental 

Health Clinic were “to ease its cash flow needs” and that it “constitutes an 

equity investment in the for[-]profit corporation, whose value is 10% of the 

for profit corporation’s stock and ownership of any and all assets deemed 

owned by said corporation.” Exhibit P-1 at 2; Exhibit P-2 at 2. It also 

provides that Appellants would be on the Boards of Directors of both the 

Clinic and the to-be-formed for-profit entity. Id. at 4; Exhibit P-2 at 4. 

There is no provision in these Agreements regarding a return of any kind on 

the $20,000 investment. The for-profit was formed on January 1, 2010, and 

Appellants were named as members with voting rights and 10% ownership 

interests therein. Exhibit P-3 at 8, Annex A. 
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Appellants make much of the fact that the for-profit entity has not carried on 

any business and that they were never called upon to cast votes for the 

entity. Appellant’s Brief at 9-10. Appellants have established only that they 

have not discharged any duties in connection with these entities. The fact 

that they have not been called upon to do so does not negate the trial 

court’s finding that they received what the Investor’s Agreements provided 

they would receive: seats on the Boards of Directors of both entities with 

voting rights and 10% ownership interests in the for-profit entity. The trial 

court’s determination to deny Appellant’s request for a new trial finds 

support in the record and we conclude that there was neither an error of law 

nor an abuse of discretion. 

Appellants next present their unjust enrichment claim. To prove 

unjust enrichment, one must establish “the retention of a benefit conferred 

by another, without offering compensation, in circumstances where 

compensation is reasonably expected, and for which the beneficiary must 

make restitution.” Roethlein v. Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd., 81 A.3d 

816, 825 n.8 (Pa. 2013). 

Appellants assert that they “conferred a $40,000 benefit upon 

[Appellees] and it would be inequitable for [Appellees] to retain that money 

without payment of value.” Appellants’ Brief at 13. Appellants argue that 

they were entitled to some return on their investments and that it would be 

inequitable to conclude otherwise. Id. at 13-14. However, as discussed 
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above, the trial court found that, pursuant to the Investor’s Agreements, 

Appellants made the $40,000 cash infusion to the Clinic in order to ease its 

cash flow needs and that no return on this money was promised or 

expected. Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/14, at 10. It therefore concluded that 

Appellants’ unjust enrichment claim could not succeed. As set forth above, 

the record supports trial court’s determination that the funds given to the 

Clinic were for its cash flow needs and that the Agreements did not provide 

that Appellants would receive a return on these funds. As the trial court’s 

determination is supported by the record, we may not disturb it. Joseph, 

89 A.3d at 274. This finding, which we may not disturb, supports the trial 

court’s denial as to this claim. 

Appellants’ final argument involves the breach of contract claim, which 

was premised on Gervis’s employment contract with the Clinic. To succeed 

on a claim for breach of contract, “a party must establish[] (1) the existence 

of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed 

by the contract, and (3) resultant damages.” McCausland v. Wagner, 78 

A.3d 1093, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2013). Gervis alleged that the Clinic breached 

its contract with him because it failed to pay him in accordance with the 

terms of the contract. Specifically, he alleged that the Clinic did not increase 

his rate of pay in October 2006 as it was required to do and that it did not 

pay him for approximately three months in 2007. The trial court found that 

there was “no question” as to the existence of a contract between Gervis 
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and the Clinic, but that Gervis failed to establish a breach of that contract 

because he did not have evidence of the precise sessions or period of time 

for which he alleges he is owed compensation. Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/14, 

at 11, 14. In doing so, the trial court rejected Gervis’s testimony as to the 

period of time for which he had not been paid and that he never received an 

increase in pay rate, as well as his manner of calculating the alleged amount 

he is owed. Id. at 14. Gervis argues only that the trial court erred in 

rejecting this evidence as incredible. Appellants’ Brief at 14-15. As an 

appellate court, we are not permitting to disturb the trial court’s credibility 

determinations. Nationwide Ins. Enter. v. Moustakidis, 830 A.2d 1288, 

1292 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to pass on 

the credibility of witnesses or to act as the trier of fact, and an appellate 

court will not substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder.”). Beyond 

Gervis’s testimony, there was no other evidence to support Gervis’s claims. 

As set forth above, on review of a claim that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence, the test we apply is whether “after due consideration 

of the evidence found credible by the fact-finder, and viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, ... the court could 

reasonably have reached its conclusion.” Joseph, 89 A.3d at 274. As the 

trial court found Gervis’ testimony incredible, and there was no other 

evidence from which the trial court could have determined the period of time 
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for which Gervis had not been paid or the rate of his pay, we find that the 

trial court’s conclusion is reasonable.

Judgment affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/21/2014