United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 18-1424 

DANIEL GRAJALES; WANDA I. GONZÁLEZ; 

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GRAJALES-GONZÁLEZ, 

Plaintiffs, Appellants, 

v. 

PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY, 

Defendant, Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Thompson and Barron, Circuit Judges. 

Eugenio W.A. Géigel-Simounet, with whom Géigel-Simounet Law 

Offices C.S.P. was on brief for appellants. 

Luis E. Palou Balsa, with whom Jennifer Lopez-Negrón and 

Nolla, Palou & Casellas LLC were on brief for appellee. 

April 29, 2019 
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BARRON, Circuit Judge. This appeal is the latest to 

have reached us concerning a suit that Daniel Grajales, his wife, 

and their children bring under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Puerto Rico 

law against the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (the "PRPA") and 

several of its employees after the PRPA transferred him from one 

posting at the PRPA to another and then eventually terminated his 

employment. In this appeal, Grajales asks us to overturn the 

District Court's grant of summary judgment to the PRPA on res 

judicata grounds. We affirm. 

I. 

This appeal represents Grajales's third in this case. 

See Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2012) 

("Grajales I"); Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 831 F.3d 11 (1st 

Cir. 2016) ("Grajales II"). In brief, Grajales alleges that he 

was transferred to a new job location and subsequently terminated 

from his employment with the PRPA because of both his political 

affiliation and his reporting of alleged safety violations by PRPA 

employees to the Puerto Rico Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration. See Grajales II, 831 F.3d at 14. 

Grajales filed the operative complaint in the District 

of Puerto Rico on August 31, 2012. He alleged that the PRPA, by 

taking such actions against him, violated the First Amendment of 

the Federal Constitution and various provisions of Puerto Rico 

law. His wife and their minor children also brought claims against 
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the PRPA, in which they sought damages under a Puerto Rico tort 

statute that permits relatives of those unlawfully terminated from 

employment to bring derivative claims. 

On May 18, 2012, just before Grajales filed his complaint 

in federal court, the Secretary of Labor and Human Resources of 

Puerto Rico (the "Secretary of Labor"), "representing and for the 

benefit of" Grajales, filed a civil complaint against the PRPA in 

the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance. See Complaint, Sec'y of 

Labor & Human Res. v. P.R. Ports Auth., No. AC2012-0079 (P.R. Ct. 

of First Instance May 18, 2012). The Secretary of Labor alleged 

in that complaint that Grajales had observed and reported an 

incident that involved the safety of another employee, that the 

PRPA had terminated Grajales in retaliation for his reporting of 

the incident, and that an investigation by the Puerto Rico 

Department of Labor had found that the PRPA engaged in practices 

that endangered the authority's employees. The Secretary of Labor 

sought Grajales's reinstatement and back pay for him on the basis 

of Puerto Rico's Occupational Safety and Health Act, P.R. Laws 

Ann. tit. 29, § 361aa, and Puerto Rico's Retaliation in the Work 

Place Law, id. § 194a. 

On May 17, 2017, while Grajales's federal suit against 

the PRPA was still pending, the Court of First Instance entered 

judgment in favor of the PRPA. The Court of First Instance ruled 

that Grajales's termination was justified for a number of non-
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retaliatory reasons, including acts of insubordination, violation 

of various PRPA policies, and disrespectful behavior that created 

a hostile work environment for others. The Court of First Instance 

also rejected Grajales's contention that he was terminated in 

retaliation for his reporting activity. 

The PRPA then moved for summary judgment in the District 

of Puerto Rico case on res judicata grounds in light of the ruling 

by the Court of First Instance, and the District Court granted 

that motion. Grajales now appeals from that judgment. 

II. 

We are dealing here with the claimed res judicata effect 

of a judgment of a Commonwealth court and thus with a judgment 

that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, must be given "full faith and 

credit." Id.; see also R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d 

178, 182-83 (1st Cir. 2006). In keeping with this statute, we 

must give the same res judicata effect to that judgment as the 

jurisdiction that issued it would give it in its own courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 1738; see also R.G. Fin. Corp., 446 F.3d at 182-83. Thus, 

we apply Puerto Rico law to determine the preclusive effect of the 

judgment of the Court of First Instance. R.G. Fin. Corp., 446 

F.3d at 182-83. Our review of the District Court's res judicata 

determination is de novo. Id. at 182. 

Puerto Rico's Civil Code provides, in relevant part: 
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In order that the presumption of the res 

adjudicata may be valid in another suit, it is 

necessary that, between the case decided by 

the sentence and that in which the same is 

invoked, there be the most perfect identity 

between the things, causes, and persons of the 

litigants, and their capacity as such. 

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3343. Thus, to demonstrate that the 

judgment of the Court of First Instance has res judicata effect 

here, the PRPA "must establish three elements: (i) the existence 

of a prior judgment on the merits that is 'final and unappealable'; 

(ii) a perfect identity of thing or cause between both actions; 

and (iii) a perfect identity of the parties and the capacities in 

which they acted." R.G. Fin. Corp., 446 F.3d at 183 (quoting 

Boateng v. InterAm Univ., Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2000)) 

(applying Puerto Rico law). Even if the PRPA makes that showing, 

however, res judicata effect may not be given under Puerto Rico 

law to the judgment of the Court of First Instance if "doing so 

would defeat the 'ends of justice, especially if reasons of public 

policy are involved.'" Núñez-Colón v. Toledo-Dávila, 648 F.3d 15, 

19 (quoting Bonafont Solís v. Am. Eagle, Exec. Airline, Inc., 1997 

P.R. Eng. 423416, 1997 WL 423416 (P.R. 1997)). 

We start with the claims that Grajales brings in his own 

right, before then turning to the derivative claims of his wife 

and children. With respect to the claim that he brings on his 

own, Grajales first contends that the PRPA failed to establish 

that the "perfect identity of thing or cause" element had been 
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satisfied. Specifically, he contends that the claims that the 

Secretary of Labor brought on his behalf in the Court of First 

Instance "could not include a claim for damages or for [a] First 

Amendment violation" and was only for the "purpose of reinstating 

[him] to his previous position" and to recover lost wages. 

But, the "identity of thing or cause," we have explained, 

"refers to factual cause" and is satisfied where two actions "flow 

from the same principal ground or origin." R.G. Fin. Corp., 446 

F.3d at 183 (citing Lausell Marxuach v. Diaz de Yanez, 3 P.R. 

Offic. Trans. 742, 746 (1975)). Thus, "a mere difference in the 

legal theories on which two causes of action are grounded does not 

destroy the identity of thing or cause that otherwise exists 

between two suits arising out of a common nucleus of operative 

fact." Id. at 184 (citing Boateng, 210 F.3d at 62). Instead, 

there may still be an "identity of thing or cause" between 

Commonwealth and federal actions -- notwithstanding the different 

legal theories and remedies sought in each -- if they share "a 

common nucleus of operative fact." See id. 

We conclude that the District Court correctly determined 

that the two actions at issue here do share "a common nucleus of 

operative fact." Id. As the PRPA explains, in both actions 

Grajales "claims he was dismissed from his employment in 

retaliation for complaining about safety issues in the workplace 

and/or participating in an investigation performed by [Puerto Rico 
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safety agencies]." Accordingly, we reject Grajales's challenge on 

this score. 

Grajales also relies on Puerto Rico's "public policy 

exception," which prevents the application of res judicata in 

"special circumstances." García-Monagas v. De Arellano, 674 F.3d 

45, 56 (1st Cir. 2012). Specifically, Grajales contends that his 

case presents such "special circumstances" because the Secretary 

brought the prior suit in the Court of First Instance to remedy a 

"violation of . . . Puerto Rico Public Policy" and that the Puerto 

Rico court "frustrated the ends of justice" by deciding the matter 

"on documents only," i.e., at summary judgment. 

But, the first case that Grajales relies on to support 

this argument, Pagán-Hernández v. University of Puerto Rico, 7 

P.R. Offic. Trans. 795 (P.R. 1978), makes clear that even the 

"invocation of a constitutional right" is not sufficient, in and 

of itself, to warrant application of the public policy exception. 

Id. at 808. We thus fail to see how the nature of the claims that 

Grajales brings suffices to show that the public policy exception 

to res judicata applies in this case. Nor does Grajales identify 

any authority that requires the conclusion that res judicata effect 

may not be given to a judgment of a Commonwealth court just because 

that court dismissed claims of the sort that Grajales brings here 

via summary judgment rather than after a trial. 
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In his reply brief, Grajales cites Ramos-González v. 

Félix-Medina, 21 P.R. Offic. Trans. 304 (P.R. 1988), to support 

his argument that his circumstances should fall into the public 

policy exception. In that case, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court 

applied the exception to allow to go forward claims alleging 

serious misconduct by three marshals of the Puerto Rico General 

Court of Justice that had been dismissed based on the plaintiff's 

failure to prosecute the action in the Commonwealth court. Id. at 

309-11. 

The Ramos-González court identified "exceptional 

reasons" compelling it "to set aside the finality of a judgment." 

Id. at 333. The court explained that it would set a "bad precedent" 

to permit a "procedural technicality" -- namely, the dismissal of 

the claims based on the plaintiff's failure to prosecute -- "to 

defeat the claim of some citizens against three officers of this 

branch of government who allegedly tried to take advantage of their 

position as such." Id. at 334. The court concluded in that 

connection that "[t]here is a public interest at stake in the 

instant case: the purity of the judicial process and the trust in 

its institutions." Id. at 334. 

Here, we see no similarly "exceptional reasons" to 

compel us "to set aside the finality of a judgment," id. at 333, 

given both the differing nature of the claims that are at issue 

here and the fact that they were dismissed based on a grant of 
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summary judgment and not by reason of what Ramos-Gonzalez 

characterized as a "procedural technicality." Id. at 334. We 

thus reject this ground for not giving res judicata effect to the 

judgment of the Court of First instance. 

We turn, then, to the claims that are brought by 

Grajales' wife and children. The contention is that res judicata 

does not bar these claims because the PRPA has failed to show that 

there is a "perfect identity . . . of parties" between the two 

actions that are at issue, given that the Secretary of Labor 

brought the suit in the Court of First Instance only on Grajales's 

behalf. But, the District Court concluded that the claims of 

Grajales's wife and children are brought only "under Article 1802 

of the Puerto Rico Civil Code," and no contrary argument has been 

made on appeal. That feature of the case matters because, as the 

District Court explained, Article 1802 claims are "derivative of 

the principal plaintiff's claim in that [they are] premised on 

some harm to the principal plaintiff, and 'if the principal 

plaintiff's claim fails, so too does the relative's derivative 

claim.'" Pagán-Colón v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc., 697 F.3d 

1, 16 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting González-Figueroa v. J.C. Penney 

P.R., Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 320 (1st Cir. 2009)). Thus, because 

Grajales's own claims are barred by res judicata, the derivative 

claims of his wife and children necessarily fail. 
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III. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

District Court.